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diff --git a/old/55368-0.txt b/old/55368-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 83b5d4c..0000000 --- a/old/55368-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53331 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Vol. I), by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - -Title: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Vol. I) - -Author: Various - -Release Date: August 16, 2017 [EBook #55368] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAZI CONSPIRACY *** - - - - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer, and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by TIA-US. - - - - - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - NAZI CONSPIRACY - AND AGGRESSION - - _VOLUME I_ - - - _Office of United States_ - _Chief of Counsel For Prosecution_ - _of Axis Criminality_ - - [Illustration] - - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - WASHINGTON • 1946 - - - - - For Sale by the - Superintendent of Documents - U. S. Government Printing Office - Washington 25, D. C. - - - - - - -A Collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by the -American and British Prosecuting Staffs for presentation before the -International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of - - THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED - KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF - SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS - - —against— - - HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP, - ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED - ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER - FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH, KARL - DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR von SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, - ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ von PAPEN, ARTUR - SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN von NEURATH, and HANS - FRITZSCHE, Individually and as Members of Any of the Following - Groups or Organizations to which They Respectively Belonged, - Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER - POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN - ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE - SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN - ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DIE - SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME - STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the - “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known - as the “SA”) and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the - GERMAN ARMED FORCES all as defined in Appendix B of the - Indictment, - - Defendants. - - - - - C O N T E N T S - - - Page - Preface v - Chapter - I. Agreement by the United States, France, Great Britain, and - the Soviet Union for the Prosecution and Punishment of the - Major War Criminals of the European Axis 1 - - II. Charter of the International Military Tribunal and Protocol - of 6 October 1945 4 - - III. International Military Tribunal, Indictment No. 1 and - Statement of Reservation Filed by U. S. Chief of Counsel 13 - - IV. Motions, Rulings, and Explanatory Material Relating to - Certain of the Defendants 83 - 1. Robert Ley 83 - 2. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach 84 - 3. Martin Bormann 94 - 4. Ernst Kaltenbrunner 95 - 5. Julius Streicher 96 - 6. Rudolf Hess 97 - - V. Opening Address for the United States 114 - - VI. Organization of the Nazi Party and State 175 - - VII. Means used by the Nazi Conspirators in Gaining Control of - the German State 184 - 1. Common Objectives, Methods, and Doctrines of the - Conspiracy 184 - 2. Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control 199 - 3. Consolidation of Totalitarian Political Control 218 - 4. Purge of Political Opponents and Terrorization 239 - 5. Destruction of the Free Trade Unions and Acquisition of - Control over the Productive Labor Capacity 252 - 6. Suppression of the Christian Churches 263 - 7. Adoption and Publication of the Program for Persecution - of Jews 296 - 8. Reshaping of Education and Training of Youth 312 - 9. Propaganda, Censorship, and Supervision of Cultural - Activities 328 - 10. Militarization of Nazi Organizations 341 - - VIII. Economic Aspects of the Conspiracy 349 - - IX. Launching of Wars of Aggression 370 - 1. The Plotting of Aggressive War 370 - 2. Preparation for Aggression: 1933-1936 410 - 3. Aggression Against Austria 450 - 4. The Execution of the Plan to Invade Czechoslovakia 515 - 5. Opening Address for the United Kingdom 593 - 6. Aggression as a Basic Nazi Idea: Mein Kampf 644 - 7. Treaty Violations 651 - 8. Aggression against Poland, Danzig, England and France 673 - 9. Aggression against Norway and Denmark 733 - 10. Aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands, and - Luxembourg 760 - 11. Aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia 775 - 12. Aggression against the USSR 794 - 13. Collaboration with Italy and Japan and Aggressive War - against the United States: November 1936 to December - 1941 840 - - X. The Slave Labor Program, the Illegal Use of Prisoners of - War, and the Special Responsibility of Sauckel and Speer - Therefor 875 - - XI. Concentration Camps 949 - - XII. The Persecution of the Jews 978 - - XIII. Germanization and Spoliation 1023 - - XIV. The Plunder of Art Treasures 1097 - - - - - PREFACE - - - I - -On the 2d day of May 1945, President Truman signed Executive Order 9547 -appointing Justice Robert H. Jackson as Representative of the United -States and as its Chief of Counsel in the preparation and prosecution of -the case against the major Axis war criminals. Since that date and up to -the present, the staff of the Office of Chief of Counsel, or OCC, has -been engaged continuously in the discovery, collection, examination, -translation, and marshalling of documentary evidence demonstrating the -criminality of the former leaders of the German Reich. Since the 20th -day of November 1945, a considerable part of this documentary arsenal -has been directed against the 22 major Nazi war criminals who are on -trial before the International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg. As of this -writing the American and British cases-in-chief, on Counts I and II of -the Indictment charging, respectively, conspiracy and the waging of wars -of aggression, have been completed. - -There is perhaps no need to recall in these pages that the Nurnberg -trial represents the first time in history that legal proceedings have -been instituted against leaders of an enemy nation. It is perhaps equal -supererogation to state here that there are no exact precedents for the -charges made by the American, British, French, and Russian prosecutors -that to plot or wage a war of aggression is a crime for which -individuals may be punished. Yet it was because of these very facts that -in its indictment the prosecution presented a challenge to itself quite -as great as to the defense. A heavy burden was laid on the accusing -nations to make sure that their proof measured up to the magnitude of -their accusations, and that the daring of their grand conception was -matched by the industry of their research, lest the hard-bought -opportunity to make International Law a guardian of peace should fail by -default. - -It is not surprising, therefore, that the American collecting and -processing of documentary evidence, under the general direction of Col. -Robert G. Storey, gradually developed into an operation of formidable -scope. Although some pieces of evidence were secured in Washington and -London, by far the greater part was obtained in the land of the enemy. -As the American Armies had swept into Germany, military investigating -teams had filled document centers with an increasing wealth of materials -which were freely made available by the Army to OCC field investigators. -Special assistance was given by the Document Section, G-2 Division, -SHAEF, and by the Document Sections of the Army Groups and Armies -operating in the European Theater. OCC investigators also made valuable -discoveries while prospecting on their own. They soon found themselves -embarrassed with riches. Perhaps foremost among the prize acquisitions -was the neatly crated collection of all the personal and official -correspondence of Alfred Rosenberg, together with a great quantity of -Nazi Party correspondence. This cache was discovered behind a false wall -in an old castle in Eastern Bavaria, where it had been sent for -safekeeping. Another outstanding collection consisted of thirty-nine -leather-bound volumes containing detailed inventories of the art -treasures of Europe which had been looted by the _Einsatzstab -Rosenberg_. These catalogues, together with much of the priceless -plunder itself, were found hidden deep in an Austrian salt mine. An -innocent-appearing castle near Marburg was found to contain some 485 -tons of crated papers, which inspection revealed to be the records of -the German Foreign Office from 1837 to 1944. Among other outstanding -bulk acquisitions were more than 300 crates of German High Command -files, 85 notebooks containing minutes of Hitler’s conferences, and the -complete files of the German Navy. - -The task was to screen thoroughly this abundance of material so as to -overlook no relevant item, and yet at the same time to obtain the proof -and to translate it in season, so as not to delay preparation of the -Indictment or commencement of the trial. The procedures followed in this -process are described in the affidavit of Maj. William H. Coogan -(_001-A-PS_), which is listed numerically among the documents. As a -result of those procedures, more than 100,000 documents were -individually examined in order to segregate those of importance. Of -these 100,000 documents, approximately 4,000 were found to be of clear -or potential value. This group of 4,000 was further reduced through -exacting standards of elimination to a total of some 2,000 documents -which it was proposed to offer in evidence, and which make up the bulk -of this publication. Thus, the documents presented in these volumes are -the fittest survivors of a rigorous sifting. Each of them has met -requirements designed to ensure the selection of only the most -significant in bearing on the American case. Documents primarily -concerned with the report of individual barbarities or perversions were -excluded, in conformity with the emphasis placed upon those tending to -prove elements in the Nazi Master Plan. - -These documents consist, in the main, of official papers found in -archives of the German Government and Nazi Party, diaries and letters of -prominent Germans, and captured reports and orders. There are included, -in addition, excerpts from governmental and Party decrees, from official -newspapers and from authoritative German publications. The authenticity -of all these materials is established by Maj. Coogan’s affidavit -(_001-A-PS_). Considered together, they reveal a fairly comprehensive -view of the inner workings and outward deeds of the German government -and of the Nazi Party, which were always concealed from the world, and -for which, the world will always hold the Hitler regime in horror and -contempt. - - II - -It is important that it be clearly understood what this collection of -documents is not. In the first place, it is neither an official record, -nor an unofficial transcript of the trial proceedings. It is not -designed to reproduce what has taken place in court. It is merely the -documentary evidence prepared by the American and British prosecuting -staffs, and is in no wise under the sponsorship of the Tribunal. It is -presented in the belief that this collection containing the full text of -the documents, classified under appropriate subjects, may be more useful -to students of the Nurnberg trial than the official record, when -prepared, may be. - -The reason for this goes back to the first few days of the trial, when -the Tribunal ruled that it would treat no written matter as in evidence -unless it was read in full, word by word, in court. The purpose of the -ruling was to enable the documentary material which the American and -British staffs had translated from German into English to be further -translated into Russian and French through the simultaneous interpreting -system in the courtroom. The consequence, however, was to enforce upon -the American and British prosecution the task of trimming their evidence -drastically unless the trial was to be protracted to an unconscionable -length. Counsel therefore had to content themselves in most instances -with introducing, by reading _verbatim_, only the most vital parts of -the documents relied upon. Only these evidentiary minima appear in the -daily transcript, and presumably, since no more is officially in -evidence under the Tribunal’s ruling, no more can properly be included -in the official record. It has frequently been the case, furthermore, -that different parts of certain documents were read in proof of -different allegations, and hence are scattered throughout the -transcript. American counsel, in several instances, read only sketchy -portions of some documents, leaving other portions, at the request of -the French and Soviet delegations, to be read later as a part of their -case. Still other portions of the same document will undoubtedly be read -later on by the defense. It is an unavoidable consequence that the -transcript itself will be a thing of shreds and patches, and that any -comprehensive and orderly notion of the documentary evidence must be -obtained elsewhere. The documentary excerpts, when accompanied by the -explanation of trial counsel, are of course sufficient for the trial and -for the judgment of the Tribunal. But the purposes of historians and -scholars will very likely lead them to wish to examine the documents in -their entirety. It is to those long-range interests that these volumes -are in the main addressed. - -Secondly, this collection of documents is not the American case. It is -at once more and less than that. It is less, because it of course cannot -include the captured motion picture and still photographic evidence -relied upon, and because it contains only a few of the organizational -charts and visual presentation exhibits utilized at the trial. It is -more, because although it does contain all the evidence introduced -either in part or in whole by the American staff in proof of Count I, it -also includes many documents not introduced into evidence at all. There -were various reasons for not offering this material to the Tribunal: the -documents were cumulative in nature, better documents were available on -the same point, or the contents did not justify the time required for -reading. (The document index at the end of Volume VIII is marked to -indicate which documents were introduced, either in whole or in part, in -evidence.) Of more than 800 American documents so far introduced in -evidence, a small number were received through judicial notice or oral -summarization, while some 500 were read, in part or in whole, in court. -Approximately 200 more went into evidence in the first few days of the -trial, under an earlier ruling of the Tribunal which admitted documents -without reading, and merely on filing with the court after proof of -authenticity. Of the documents not now in evidence and thus not before -the Tribunal for consideration in reaching its decision, many have been -turned over to the French and Soviet prosecuting staffs and, by the time -these volumes are published, will have been introduced in the course of -their cases. Others will have been put before the Tribunal by the -American case in rebuttal or utilized in cross-examining witnesses -called by the defense. - -This publication includes a series of affidavits prepared under the -direction of Col. John Harlan Amen, chief of the OCC Interrogation -Division. Those which were introduced into evidence are listed among the -documents in the _PS_ series. A number of affidavits which were not -offered to the Tribunal are printed in a separate section at the end of -the document series. Affidavits of the latter type were prepared in an -attempt to eliminate surprise by delineating clearly the testimony which -the affiant might be expected to give in court, should it be decided to -call him as a witness. In the case of the affiants who testified in -court, their affidavits represent a substantially accurate outline of -their testimony on direct examination. Others of the affiants may, by -the time of publication, have been called as rebuttal witnesses for the -prosecution. In addition, there are included selected statements of -certain defendants and prisoners written to the prosecutors from prison. -It should be mentioned in this connection that as a result of many -months of exhaustive questioning of the defendants, prisoners of war, -and other potential witnesses, the Interrogation Division has harvested -approximately 15,000 typewritten pages of valuable and previously -unavailable information on a variety of subjects. These extensive -transcripts represent approximately 950 individual interrogations and -are presently being edited and catalogued in Nurnberg so that the -significant materials may be published in a useful form and within a -manageable scope, as a supplement to these present volumes. - -This collection also includes approximately 200 documents obtained and -processed by the British prosecuting staff, known as the British War -Crimes Executive, and presented in substantiation of Count II of the -Indictment, which the British delegation assumed the responsibility of -proving. It seems altogether fitting that these documents should be -included in these volumes since, in proving illegal acts of aggression, -they naturally supplement the American documents proving the illegal -conspiracy to commit aggression. The American prosecuting staff is -grateful to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British Deputy Chief Prosecutor, -from whom and from the goodly company of whose associates there has ever -been the most generous cooperation, for consent to the publication of -the British documents by the United States Government. - -Under the division of the case agreed on by the Chief Prosecutors of the -four Allied nations, the French and Soviet delegates are responsible for -the presentation of evidence bearing on the proof of Count III (War -Crimes) and Count IV (Crimes against Humanity) of the Indictment. The -French case will concern itself with these crimes when committed in the -West, while the Russian evidence will concern the commission of these -crimes in the East. None of the documents obtained by these two -prosecuting nations are included in these volumes. The reason is that, -at this writing, the French case has just commenced and the Soviet case -will not be reached for several weeks. Since one of the objects of this -undertaking is to acquaint the American public at the earliest -opportunity with the character of the evidence produced by its -representatives, there seems no justification in delaying publication -until the close of the French and Russian cases, when all the -prosecution documents will be available. As is indicated by the title of -these present volumes, _Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression_, this collection -relates only to Counts I and II of the Indictment, or one-half of the -prosecution case. It is to be hoped, however, that supplementary volumes -containing the French and Soviet documents may be published at a later -time. - -Finally, this collection, by its nature limited to a part of the -prosecution case, does not of course purport to present the whole story -of the evidence adduced at Nurnberg. The evidence and arguments of -defense counsel will not be presented for some time, and the text of -these matters will, if possible, be included in any additional volumes, -which it may become possible to publish. - - III - -On the other hand, it may be useful to indicate what this collection is. -The publication is offered in accordance with the conviction which has -constantly animated the American prosecution, that only a part of its -duty would have been done if it succeeded in persuading the judges of -the International Military Tribunal. Its full task will be accomplished -only if the world is also convinced of the justness of the cause. There -were always some people who, perhaps under the spell of the exposure of -the “atrocity propaganda” used in the First World War, felt that the -deceptions and the outrages laid to the Nazis were quite possibly untrue -and in any event exaggerated. The mission of convincing these skeptics -is one that has not been and cannot be discharged by newspaper reports -of the Nurnberg proceedings, which by their nature are incomplete and -evanescent. But an inspection of the Nazis’ own official records should -suffice to banish all honest doubts, and to make it undeniably clear -that those things really happened because the Nazis planned it that way. -It is the hope of the American prosecution that these volumes may in -some measure expose, for the warning of future generations as well as a -reminder to the present, the anatomy of National Socialism in all its -ugly nakedness. Many of these documents disclose the repressive -governmental machinery and intricate Party bureaucracy by which the -Nazis stifled initiative and opposition. They reveal also the image of -horror which a gang of brigands created in the name of the German state, -in order to seize and maintain power for themselves at the expense of -the liberties of their own people and the lives of their neighbors. -Legal proof has perhaps seldom been so overwhelming, certainly never so -self-admitted, as is this proof of the deeds with which the Nazi -leadership befouled the earth. - -Yet, although these documents naturally are concerned primarily with the -guilt of the leaders of the German Reich, they also contain a wealth of -information, much of it hitherto unavailable elsewhere, on many other -matters of importance. Their pages illuminate many dark corners of -recent history. Hence, this collection has an additional purpose. It is -offered as a source book, of interest to historians, political -scientists, students, universities, libraries, government agencies, -private research groups, newspaper editors, and others, so that they may -see, from the official papers of the Nazi government and from the words -of its own leaders, the things that went on in Germany in the days of -that blasphemous regime. These papers, although they include a few legal -matters, are not addressed nor are they expected to appeal primarily to -lawyers. The satisfaction of these professional interests must perforce -be postponed until publication of the official record of the trial. - - IV - -It is apparent that such a vast collection of documents on a variety of -subjects would be useless to any one not thoroughly conversant with the -field, without some sort of guide through the maze. That is the reason -for the first two volumes, which consist of various explanatory -materials included in order to facilitate understanding. The average -reader who tries to cope with some of the more pompous of the Nazi -titles—such as _Beauftragter des Fuehrers fuer die ueberwachung des -Gesamten Geistigen und Weltausschaulichers Schulung und Erziehung der -NSDAP_, or Delegate of the Fuehrer for the Total Supervision of -Intellectual and Ideological Training and Education of the Party -(Rosenberg)—is plainly in need of assistance. A Glossary of common -German and Nazi titles, designations, and terms has therefore been -compiled. For those who are unfamiliar with the difference between a -_Hauptmann_ and a _Hauptsturmfuehrer_, a table of military ranks, with -their American equivalents, has been prepared. A brief biographical -gazeteer of the more prominent Nazis, together with a listing of the -major officials of the Government, Party, and Armed Forces, has also -been included for reference purposes. In addition, an index of the -Code-Words used by the Nazis to preserve the secrecy of the invasions -they plotted has been compiled. Moreover, in order to make clear -developments in the proceedings affecting the status of several of the -defendants, certain motions of counsel and rulings of the Tribunal, -together with factual accounts, are also presented. And finally the -international treaties relating to land warfare and prisoners of war are -printed in full (_3737-PS_; _3738-PS_). - -The principal content of Volumes I and II is composed of what might be -called essays, summarizing and connecting up most of the documents -relating to particular subjects in the order of their mention in Counts -I and II of the Indictment. As an additional aid, at the end of each -essay there appears a descriptive list of all documents referred to in -the essay, so that the reader may quickly discover which of the -published documents bear upon the subject in which he is interested. In -many cases these lists include documents not discussed in the essays for -the reason that they are cumulative in nature or were discovered -subsequent to the preparation of the essays. - -Some of these essays are adaptations of factual “trial briefs” prepared -by the staff of OCC. Some of these “trial briefs” were handed to the -Tribunal for its assistance, while others were used only for the -guidance of trial counsel. Others of the essays have been adapted from -the oral presentation and summary of counsel in court. Their difference -in origin explains their difference in form. It must be borne in mind -that each of these essays, which were originally prepared for the -purpose of convincing the Tribunal of the legal guilt of the defendants, -has been submitted to a process of editing and revision in order to -serve a quite different purpose—to give the general reader a general -and coherent conception of the subject matter. - -These essays bear the marks of haste and are not offered as in any sense -definitive or exhaustive. The task of translation from German into -English was a formidable one, and in many instances translations of -documents could be made available to the brief-writers only a few days -before the briefs were scheduled to be presented in court. In other -instances it was utterly impossible, with the constantly overburdened -translating staff available, to translate in full all the material known -to be of value if the prosecution was to be ready on the date set for -trial. The diary of Hans Frank, for example (_2233-PS_) consisted of 42 -volumes, of which only a few outstanding excerpts, chosen by -German-reading analysts, were translated. Similarly, large portions of -the 250 volumes of the Rosenberg correspondence remain still -untranslated and unused. Books, decrees, and lengthy reports were not -translated, in full, and only salient excerpts were utilized. -Approximately 1,500 documents in the possession of OCC have not yet been -translated and more are being received daily. It is expected that they -will be used for purposes of cross-examination and rebuttal, and may -later be published. - -It must also be remembered that these documents are, in the main, -translations from the original German. The magnitude of the task, -coupled with a sense of the hastening on of time, naturally resulted in -imperfections. However, an attempt has been made to preserve the format -of the original documents in the printed translations. Italics represent -underlining in the original documents and editorial additions have been -enclosed in brackets. The reader may notice occasional variations -between the English wording of documents quoted in the essays, and the -full text of the document itself. This divergence is explained by the -fact that translations of the same documents were sometimes made by two -different persons. Variations in the exact means of expression were of -course to be expected in such an event, yet both translations are of -equal authenticity. Certain passages of some documents may strike the -reader as confused or incomplete, and occasionally this is the result of -hasty work. More frequently, however the jumble of language accurately -reflects the chaos of the original German, for the language of National -Socialists was often merely a turgid and mystical aggregation of words -signifying nothing, to which the German language easily lends itself. -The accuracy of the translations is attested to in Maj. Coogan’s -affidavit (_001-A-PS_). - -If the case had not been set down for trial until 1948, a complete and -satisfactory preparation would have been possible. A perfect case could -not have been made in less time. But the Allied governments and public -opinion were understandably impatient of delay for whatever reason, and -they had to be respected. The nature of the difficulties caused by the -pressure for speed were stated in Justice Jackson’s address opening the -American case: - - “In justice to the nations and the men associated in this - prosecution, I must remind you of certain difficulties which may - leave their mark on this case. Never before in legal history has - an effort been made to bring within the scope of a single - litigation the developments of a decade, covering a whole - Continent, and involving a score of nations, countless - individuals, and innumerable events. Despite the magnitude of - the task, the world has demanded immediate action. This demand - has had to be met, though perhaps at the cost of finished - craftsmanship. In my country, established courts, following - familiar procedures, applying well thumbed precedents, and - dealing with the legal consequences of local and limited events, - seldom commence a trial within a year of the event in - litigation. Yet less than eight months ago today the courtroom - in which you sit was an enemy fortress in the hands of German SS - troops. Less than eight months ago nearly all our witnesses and - documents were in enemy hands. The law had not been codified, no - procedures had been established, no Tribunal was in existence, - no usable courthouse stood here, none of the hundreds of tons of - official German documents had been examined, no prosecuting - staff had been assembled, nearly all the present defendants were - at large, and the four prosecuting powers had not yet joined in - common cause to try them. I should be the last to deny that the - case may well suffer from incomplete researches and quite likely - will not be the example of professional work which any of the - prosecuting nations would normally wish to sponsor. It is, - however, a completely adequate case to the judgment we shall ask - you to render, and its full development we shall be obliged to - leave to historians.” - - V - -No work in a specialized field would be complete without its own occult -paraphernalia, and the curious reader may desire an explanation of the -strange wizardry behind the document classification symbols. The -documents in the American series are classified under the cryptic -categories of “_L_,” “_R_,” “_PS_,” “_EC_,” “_ECH_,” “_ECR_,” and “_C_.” -The letter “_L_” was used as an abbreviation for “London,” and -designates those documents either obtained from American and British -sources in London or processed in the London Office of the OCC, under -the direction of Col. Murray C. Bernays and Col. Leonard Wheeler, Jr. -The letter “_R_” stands for “Rothschild,” and indicates the documents -obtained through the screening activities of Lt. Walter Rothschild of -the London branch of OSS. The origins of the “_PS_” symbol are more -mysterious, but the letters are an abbreviation of the amalgam, -“Paris-Storey.” The “_PS_” symbol, accordingly, denotes those documents -which, although obtained in Germany, were processed by Col. Storey’s -division of the OCC in Paris, as well as those documents later processed -by the same division after headquarters were established in Nurnberg. -The “_EC_” symbol stands for “Economic Case” and designates those -documents which were obtained and processed by the Economic Section of -OCC under Mr. Francis M. Shea, with field headquarters at Frankfurt. The -“_ECH_” variant denotes those which were screened at Heidelberg. The -letter “_C_,” which is an abbreviation for “Crimes,” indicates a -collection of German Navy documents which were jointly processed by -British and American teams, with Lt. Comdr. John Bracken representing -the OCC. - -The British documents hence include some in the joint Anglo-American -“_C_” series. The remainder of the British documents are marked with the -symbols “_TC_,” “_UK_,” “_D_,” and “_M_.” The symbol “_TC_” is an -abbreviation of “Treaty Committee” and signifies the documents selected -by a Foreign Office Committee which assisted the British prosecution. -“_UK_” is the abbreviation for “United Kingdom” and indicates documents -collected from another source. No especial significance lurks in the -letters “_D_” and “_M_,” which were apparently the result of accident, -possibly caprice, rather than design. As a matter of record, however, -“_M_” stands for the first name of the British assistant prosecutor. -Finally, “_D_” is merely an humble filing reference, which may have had -some obscure connection with the word “document.” - -The reader will note that there are numerous and often lengthy gaps in -the numbering of documents within a given series, and the documents are -not numbered in any apparent order. This anomaly is accounted for by -several different factors. As the documents avalanched into the OCC -offices they were catalogued and numbered in the order received without -examination. Upon subsequent analysis it was frequently found that an -earlier document was superseded in quality by a later acquisition, and -the earlier one was accordingly omitted. Others were withdrawn because -of lack of proof of their authenticity. Occasionally it was discovered -that two copies of the same document had been received from different -sources, and one of them was accordingly stricken from the list. In -other cases blocks of numbers were assigned to field collecting teams, -which failed to exhaust all the numbers allotted. In all these cases no -change was made in the original numbers because of the delay and -confusion which would accompany renumbering. Nor has renumbering been -attempted in this publication, and the original gaps remain. This is -because the documents introduced into evidence carried their originally -assigned numbers, and students of the trial who use these volumes in -conjunction with the official record will therefore be able to refer -rapidly from citations in the record of the proceedings to the text of -the documents cited. - - VI - -It only remains to acknowledge the toil and devotion of the members of -the OCC staff who were responsible for the original preparation of the -materials contained in these volumes. Mention must first be made of Mr. -Gordon Dean, who was responsible in large part for the conception of -this undertaking, and of Lt. Comdr. Charles A. Horsky, USCGR (T) who set -in motion the governmental machinery necessary to publication. - -The material in Chapter VI on the Organization of the Nazi Party and -State was originally prepared by Mr. Ralph G. Albrecht. - -The essays in Chapter VII on the Means Used by the Nazi Conspirators in -Gaining Control of the German State were originally prepared by Col. -Leonard Wheeler, Jr., Lt. Col. Benjamin Kaplan, Maj. Frank B. Wallis, -Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, Maj. Seymour M. Peyser, Maj. J. Hartley Murray, Lt. -Paul Johnston, USNR, Lt. Comdr. Morton E. Rome, USNR, Capt. D. A. -Sprecher, Lt. Samuel E. Sharp, Lt. (jg) A. R. Martin, USNR, Lt. Henry V. -Atherton, and Lt. William E. Miller. - -The materials on the Economic Aspects of the Conspiracy, contained in -Chapter VIII, on Slave Labor, contained in Chapter X, and on -Germanization and Spoliation, contained in Chapter XIII, were prepared -by Mr. Francis M. Shea, Mr. Benedict Deinard, Lt. Col. Murray I. -Gurfein, Lt. Comdr. W. S. Emmet, USNR, Lt. Thomas L. Karsten, USNR, -Capt. Sam Harris, Capt. James H. Mathias, Capt. Melvin Siegel, Capt. -Edward H. Kenyon, Lt. (jg) Bernard Meltzer, USNR, Lt. (jg) Brady O. -Bryson, USNR, Lt. Raymond Ickes, USMCR, Mr. Jan Charmatz, Mr. Walter -Derenberg, Mr. Sidney Jacoby, Mr. Werner Peiser, Mr. Edgar Bodenheimer, -and Mr. Leon Frechtel. - -The materials contained in Chapter IX on Aggressive War, (except those -relating to Aggression as a Basic Nazi Idea, the Violation of Treaties, -and Aggression against Poland, Danzig, England and France, Norway and -Denmark, the Low Countries, and the Balkans) were prepared by Mr. Sidney -S. Alderman, Comdr. Sidney J. Kaplan, USCGR, Lt. Col. Herbert Krucker, -Maj. Lacey Hinely, Maj. Joseph Dainow, Lt. Comdr. Harold Leventhal, -USCGR, Lt. John M. Woolsey, Jr., USNR, Lt. James A. Gorrell, and Lt. Roy -H. Steyer, USNR. - -The materials contained in Chapter XII, on Persecution of the Jews, in -Chapter XI on Concentration Camps, and in Chapter XIV on Plunder of Art -Treasures, were prepared by Col. Hardy Hollers, Maj. William F. Walsh, -Mr. Thomas J. Dodd, Capt. Seymour Krieger, Lt. Frederick Felton, USNR, -Lt. (jg) Brady O. Bryson, USNR, Mr. Hans Nathan, Mr. Isaac Stone, Lt. -Daniel F. Margolies, Capt. Edgar Boedeker, Lt. (jg) Bernard Meltzer, -USNR, Lt. Nicholas Doman, and Mr. Walter W. Brudno. - -The materials contained in Chapter XVI on the responsibility of the -Individual Defendants were prepared by Col. Howard Brundage, Mr. Ralph -G. Albrecht, Dr. Robert M. W. Kempner, Lt. Col. William H. Baldwin, Maj. -Seymour M. Peyser, Maj. Joseph D. Bryan, Capt. D. A. Sprecher, Capt. -Norman Stoll, Capt. Robert Clagett, Capt. John Auchincloss, Capt. -Seymour Krieger, Lt. Whitney R. Harris, USNR, Lt. Frederick Felton, -USNR, Lt. Henry V. Atherton, Lt. Richard Heller, USNR, Mr. Henry -Kellerman, Mr. Frank Patton, Mr. Karl Lachmann, Mr. Bert Heilpern, Mr. -Walter Menke, Mr. Joseph Michel, Mr. Walter W. Brudno, Mrs. Katherine -Walch, Miss Harriet Zetterberg, Lt. (jg) Brady O. Bryson, USNR, and -Capt. Sam Harris. - -The materials contained in the first six sections of Chapter XV on the -Criminal Organizations were prepared by Lt. Col. George E. Seay, Maj. -Warren F. Farr, Lt. Comdr. Wm. S. Kaplan, USNR, Lt. Whitney R. Harris, -USNR, Miss Katherine Fite, Maj. Robert G. Stephens, Lt. Thomas F. -Lambert, Jr., USNR, and Mr. Charles S. Burdell. - -The materials contained in Section 7 of Chapter XV on the General Staff -and High Command were prepared on behalf of the American delegation by -Col. Telford Taylor, Maj. Loftus Becker, Maj. Paul Neuland, Capt. Walter -Rapp, Capt. Seymour Krieger, and Mr. Charles Kruszeawski; with the -assistance of a British staff made jointly available to both the -American and British delegations, consisting of W/Cdr. Peter -Calvocoressi, RAFVR, Maj. Oliver Berthoud, IC, Lt. Michael Reade, RNVR, -F/Lt. George Sayers, RAFVR, S/O Barbara Pinion, WAAF, W/O Mary Carter, -WAAF, and Miss Elizabeth Stewart. - -The charts reproduced are among those introduced by the prosecution, and -were designed and executed by presentation specialists assigned to OCC -by the Office of Strategic Services, and headed by David Zablodousky -under the direction of Comdr. James B. Donovan, USNR. - -Acknowledgment must also be made of the very effective labors of the -British delegation in preparing those materials in Chapter IX on -Aggressive War relating to Aggression as a Basic Nazi Idea, the -Violation of Treaties, and the Aggressions against Poland, Danzig, -England and France, Norway and Denmark, the Low Countries, and the -Balkans, as well as the materials in sections on Individual Defendants -relating to Streicher, Raeder, Doenitz, Neurath, and Ribbentrop. This -share of the common task was borne by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, K.C., -M.P., Mr. Geoffrey D. Roberts, K.C., Lt. Col. J. M. G. Griffith-Jones, -M.C., Col. Harry J. Phillimore, O.B.E., and Maj. Elwyn Jones, M.P. The -British opening address was delivered by the Attorney General and chief -of the British delegation, Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P. - -Recognition is also due to Maj. F. Jay Nimitz, Miss Alma Soller, and -Miss Mary Burns, for their loyal and capable assistance in all the -harassing details of compiling, editing and indexing these numerous -papers. - -One final word should be said in recognition of the financial burden -assumed by the State and War Departments, which have generously joined -in allocating from their budgets the very considerable funds required to -make this publication possible. - - Roger W. Barrett, Captain, JAGD - William E. Jackson, Lieutenant (jg), USNR - _Editors_ - -Approved: - - Robert H. Jackson - _Chief of Counsel_ -Nurnberg, 20 January 1946. - - - - - Chapter I - - - AGREEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE - PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE - UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT - OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS FOR THE PROSECUTION AND - PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN AXIS. - -WHEREAS the United Nations have from time to time made declarations of -their intention that War Criminals shall be brought to justice; - -AND WHEREAS the Moscow Declaration of the 30th October 1943 on German -atrocities in Occupied Europe stated that those German Officers and men -and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have -taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes will be sent back to -the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that -they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated -countries and of the free Governments that will be created therein; - -AND WHEREAS this Declaration was stated to be without prejudice to the -case of major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographic -location and who will be punished by the joint decision of the -Governments of the Allies; - -NOW THEREFORE the Government of the United States of America, the -Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the -United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government -of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter called “the -Signatories”) acting in the interests of all the United Nations and by -their representatives duly authorized thereto have concluded this -Agreement. - -_Article 1._ There shall be established after consultation with the -Control Council for Germany an International Military Tribunal for the -trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical -location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as -members of organizations or groups or in both capacities. - -_Article 2._ The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the -International Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter -annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of -this Agreement. - -_Article 3._ Each of the Signatories shall take the necessary steps to -make available for the investigation of the charges and trial the major -war criminals detained by them who are to be tried by the International -Military Tribunal. The Signatories shall also use their best endeavors -to make available for investigation of the charges against and the trial -before the International Military Tribunal such of the major war -criminals as are not in the territories of any of the Signatories. - -_Article 4._ Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the provisions -established by the Moscow Declaration concerning the return of war -criminals to the countries where they committed their crimes. - -_Article 5._ Any Government of the United Nations may adhere to this -Agreement by notice given through the diplomatic channel to the -Government of the United Kingdom, who shall inform the other signatory -and adhering Governments of each such adherence. - -_Article 6._ Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the jurisdiction -or the powers of any national or occupation court established or to be -established in any allied territory or in Germany for the trial of war -criminals. - -_Article 7._ This Agreement shall come into force on the day of -signature and shall remain in force for the period of one year and shall -continue thereafter, subject to the right of any Signatory to give, -through the diplomatic channel, one month’s notice of intention to -terminate it. Such termination shall not prejudice any proceedings -already taken or any findings already made in pursuance of this -Agreement. - -IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the present Agreement. - -DONE in quadruplicate in London this 8th day of August 1945 each in -English, French and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity. - - For the Government of the United States of America - [signed] ROBERT H. JACKSON - For the Provisional Government of the French Republic - [signed] ROBERT FALCO - For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain - and Northern Ireland - [signed] JOWITT C. - For the Government of the Union of Soviet - Socialist Republics - [signed] I. T. NIKITCHENKO - [signed] A. N. TRAININ - - - - - Chapter II - CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - - I. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -_Article 1._ In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of -August 1945 by the Government of the United States of America, the -Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the -United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government -of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall be established -an International Military Tribunal (hereinafter called “the Tribunal”) -for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals -of the European Axis. - -_Article 2._ The Tribunal shall consist of four members, each with an -alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed by each of -the Signatories. The alternates shall, so far as they are able, be -present at all sessions of the Tribunal. In case of illness of any -member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some other reason to -fulfill his functions, his alternate shall take his place. - -_Article 3._ Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can -be challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their Counsel. -Each Signatory may replace its member of the Tribunal or his alternate -for reasons of health or for other good reasons, except that no -replacement may take place during a Trial, other than by an alternate. - -_Article 4._ - - (_a_) The presence of all four members of the Tribunal or the -alternate for any absent member shall be necessary to constitute the -quorum. - - (_b_) The members of the Tribunal shall, before any trial begins, -agree among themselves upon the selection from their number of a -President, and the President shall hold office during that trial, or as -may otherwise be agreed by a vote of not less than three members. The -principle of rotation of presidency for successive trials is agreed. If, -however, a session of the Tribunal takes place on the territory of one -of the four Signatories, the representative of that Signatory on the -Tribunal shall preside. - - (_c_) Save as aforesaid the Tribunal shall take decisions by a -majority vote and in case the votes are evenly divided, the vote of the -President shall be decisive: provided always that convictions and -sentences shall only be imposed by affirmative votes of at least three -members of the Tribunal. - -_Article 5._ In case of need and depending on the number of the matters -to be tried, other Tribunals may be set up; and the establishment, -functions, and procedure of each Tribunal shall be identical, and shall -be governed by this Charter. - - II. JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES - -_Article 6._ The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in -Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals -of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish -persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, -whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of -the following crimes. - -The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the -jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual -responsibility: - - (_a_) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, -or waging of war of aggression, or a war in violation of international -treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or -conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; - - (_b_) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. -Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, -ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of -civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment -of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder -of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or -villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; - - (_c_) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, -enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any -civilian population, before or during the war; or persecution on -political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection -with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not -in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated. - -Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the -formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of -the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any -persons in execution of such plan. - -_Article 7._ The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of -State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be -considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment. - -_Article 8._ The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his -Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but -may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determine -that justice so requires. - -_Article 9._ At the trial of any individual member of any group or -organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of -which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of -which the individual was a member was a criminal organization. - -After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as -it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make -such declaration and any member of the organization will be entitled to -apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the -question of the criminal character of the organization. The Tribunal -shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application -is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall -be represented and heard. - -_Article 10._ In cases where a group or organization is declared -criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any -Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for -membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In -any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is -considered proved and shall not be questioned. - -_Article 11._ Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before -a national, military or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of -this Charter, with a crime other than of membership in a criminal group -or organization and such court may, after convicting him, impose upon -him punishment independent of and additional to the punishment imposed -by the Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such -group or organization. - -_Article 12._ The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings -against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this -Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for -any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct -the hearing in his absence. - -_Article 13._ The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure. These -rules shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter. - - III. COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND, - PROSECUTION OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - -_Article 14._ Each Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor for the -investigation of the charges against and the prosecution of major war -criminals. - -The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following -purposes: - - (_a_) to agree upon a plan of the individual work of each of the Chief -Prosecutors and his staff, - - (_b_) to settle the final designation of major war criminals to be -tried by the Tribunal, - - (_c_) to approve the Indictment and the documents to be submitted -therewith, - - (_d_) to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying documents with the -Tribunal, - - (_e_) to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its approval draft -rules of procedure, contemplated by Article 13 of this Charter. The -Tribunal shall have power to accept, with or without amendments, or to -reject, the rules so recommended. - -The Committee shall act in all the above matters by a majority vote and -shall appoint a Chairman as may be convenient and in accordance with the -principle of rotation: provided that if there is an equal division of -vote concerning the designation of a Defendant to be tried by the -Tribunal, or the crimes with which he shall be charged, that proposal -will be adopted which was made by the party which proposed that the -particular Defendant be tried, or the particular charges be preferred -against him. - -_Article 15._ The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting in -collaboration with one another, also undertake the following duties: - - (_a_) investigation, collection and production before or at the Trial -of all necessary evidence, - - (_b_) the preparation of the Indictment for approval by the Committee -in accordance with paragraph (_c_) of Article 14 hereof, - - (_c_) the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of -the Defendants, - - (_d_) to act as prosecutor at the Trial, - - (_e_) to appoint representatives to carry out such duties as may be -assigned to them, - - (_f_) to undertake such other matters as may appear necessary to them -for the purposes of the preparation for and conduct of the Trial. - -It is understood that no witness or Defendant detained by any Signatory -shall be taken out of the possession of that Signatory without its -assent. - - IV. FAIR TRIAL FOR DEFENDANTS - -_Article 16._ In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the -following procedure shall be followed: - - (_a_) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying in -detail the charges against the Defendants. A copy of the Indictment and -of all the documents lodged with the Indictment, translated into a -language which he understands, shall be furnished to the Defendant at a -reasonable time before the Trial. - - (_b_) During any preliminary examination or trial of a Defendant he -shall have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges -made against him. - - (_c_) A preliminary examination of a Defendant and his Trial shall be -conducted in or translated into, a language which the Defendant -understands. - - (_d_) A defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense -before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of Counsel. - - (_e_) A defendant shall have the right through himself or through his -Counsel to present evidence at the Trial in support of his defense, and -to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution. - - V. POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL AND - CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL - -_Article 17._ The Tribunal shall have the power - - (_a_) to summon witnesses to the Trial and to require their attendance -and testimony and to put questions to them, - - (_b_) to interrogate any Defendant, - - (_c_) to require the production of documents and other evidentiary -material, - - (_d_) to administer oaths to witnesses, - -(_e_) to appoint officers for the carrying out of any task designated by -the Tribunal including the power to have evidence taken on commission. - -_Article 18._ The Tribunal shall - - (_a_) confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the -issues raised by the charges, - - (_b_) take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause -unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements of any -kind whatsoever, - - (_c_) deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate -punishment, including exclusion of any Defendant or his Counsel from -some or all further proceedings, but without prejudice to the -determination of the charges. - -_Article 19._ The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of -evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent -expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence -which it deems to have probative value. - -_Article 20._ The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature of -any evidence before it is offered so that it may rule upon the relevance -thereof. - -_Article 21._ The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common -knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also take -judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of the -United Nations, including the acts and documents of the committees set -up in the various allied countries for the investigation of war crimes, -and the records and findings of military or other Tribunals of any of -the United Nations. - -_Article 22._ The permanent seat of the Tribunal shall be in Berlin. The -first meetings of the members of the Tribunal and of the Chief -Prosecutors shall be held at Berlin in a place to be designated by the -Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall be held at Nurnberg, -and any subsequent trials shall be held at such places as the Tribunal -may decide. - -_Article 23._ One or more of the Chief Prosecutors may take part in the -prosecution at each Trial. The function of any Chief Prosecutor may be -discharged by him personally, or by any person or persons authorized by -him. - -The function of Counsel for a Defendant may be discharged at the -Defendant’s request by any Counsel professionally qualified to conduct -cases before the Courts of his own country, or by any other person who -may be specially authorized thereto by the Tribunal. - -_Article 24._ The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following -course: - - (_a_) The Indictment shall be read in court. - - (_b_) The Tribunal shall ask each Defendant whether he pleads “guilty” -or “not guilty”. - - (_c_) The prosecution shall make an opening statement. - - (_d_) The Tribunal shall ask the prosecution and the defense what -evidence (if any) they wish to submit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal -shall rule upon the admissibility of any such evidence. - - (_e_) The witnesses for the Prosecution shall be examined and after -that the witnesses for the Defense. Thereafter such rebutting evidence -as may be held by the Tribunal to be admissible shall be called by -either the Prosecution or the Defense. - - (_f_) The Tribunal may put any question to any witness and to any -Defendant, at any time. - - (_g_) The Prosecution and the Defense shall interrogate and may -cross-examine any witnesses and any Defendant who gives testimony. - - (_h_) The Defense shall address the court. - - (_i_) The Prosecution shall address the court. - - (_j_) Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal. - - (_k_) The Tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce sentence. - -_Article 25._ All official documents shall be produced, and all court -proceedings conducted, in English, French, and Russian, and in the -language of the Defendant. So much of the record and of the proceedings -may also be translated into the language of any country in which the -Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers desirable in the -interests of justice and public opinion. - - VI. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE - -_Article 26._ The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the -innocence of any Defendant shall give the reasons on which it is based, -and shall be final and not subject to review. - -_Article 27._ The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a -Defendant on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be -determined by it to be just. - -_Article 28._ In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the Tribunal -shall have the right to deprive the convicted person of any stolen -property and order its delivery to the Control Council for Germany. - -_Article 29._ In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in -accordance with the orders of the Control Council for Germany, which may -at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but may not -increase the severity thereof. If the Control Council for Germany, after -any Defendant has been convicted and sentenced, discovers fresh evidence -which, in its opinion, would found a fresh charge against him, the -Council shall report accordingly to the Committee established under -Article 14 hereof, for such action as they may consider proper, having -regard to the interests of justice. - - VII. EXPENSES - -_Article 30._ The expenses of the Tribunal and of the Trials, shall be -charged by the Signatories against the funds allotted for maintenance of -the Control Council for Germany. - - * * * * * - - PROTOCOL - -Whereas an Agreement and Charter regarding the Prosecution of War -Criminals was signed in London on the 8th August 1945, in the English, -French and Russian languages. - -And whereas a discrepancy has been found to exist between the originals -of Article 6, paragraph (_c_), of the Charter in the Russian language, -on the one hand, and the originals in the English and French languages, -on the other, to wit, the semi-colon in Article 6, paragraph (_c_), of -the Charter between the words “war” and “or”, as carried in the English -and French texts, is a comma in the Russian text. - -And whereas it is desired to rectify this discrepancy: - -NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned, signatories of the said Agreement on -behalf of their respective Governments, duly authorized thereto, have -agreed that Article 6, paragraph (_c_), of the Charter in the Russian -text is correct, and that the meaning and intention of the Agreement and -Charter require that the said semi-colon in the English, text should be -changed to a comma, and that the French text should be amended to read -as follows: - - (_c_) LES CRIMES CONTRE L’HUMANITE: c’est à dire l’assassinat, -l’extermination, la reduction en esclavage, la deportation, et tout -autre acte inhumain commis contre toutes populations civiles, avant ou -pendant la guerre, ou bien les persecutions pour des motifs politiques, -raciaux, ou religieux, lorsque ces actes ou persecutions, qu’ils aient -constitue ou non une violation du droit interne du pays ou ils ont ete -perpetres, ont ete commis a la suite de tout crime rentrant dans la -competence du Tribunal, ou en liaison avec ce crime. - -IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the present Protocol. - -DONE in quadruplicate in Berlin this 6th day of October, 1945, each in -English, French, and Russian, and each text to have equal authenticity. - - For the Government of the United States of America - /s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON - For the Provisional Government of the French Republic - /s/ FRANCOIS de MENTHON - For the Government of the United Kingdom - of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - /s/ HARTLEY SHAWCROSS - For the Government of the Union - of Soviet Socialist Republics - /s/ R. RUDENKO - - - - - Chapter III - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, - INDICTMENT NUMBER I. - - -THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF - GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST - REPUBLICS - - —AGAINST— - -HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, ROBERT -LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, -WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV -KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR VON -SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN, -ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH, AND HANS -FRITZSCHE, =Individually and as Members of Any of the Following -Groups or Organisations to Which They Respectively Belonged, -Namely=: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER -POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI -(LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER -NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (=commonly known -as the= “SS”) AND INCLUDING DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST (COMMONLY KNOWN -AS THE “SD”); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, -=commonly known as the= “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER -N.S.D.A.P. (COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE “SA”) AND THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH -COMMAND OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES ALL AS DEFINED IN APPENDIX B. - - Defendants - - - INDICTMENT - - I. - -The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of -Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist -Republics by the undersigned, Robert H. Jackson, Francois de Menthon, -Hartley Shawcross and R. A. Rudenko, duly appointed to represent their -respective Governments in the investigation of the charges against and -the prosecution of the major war criminals, pursuant to the Agreement of -London dated 8th August, 1945, and the Charter of this Tribunal annexed -thereto, hereby accuse as guilty, in the respects hereinafter set forth, -of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, and of -a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes, all as defined in -the Charter of the Tribunal, and accordingly name as defendants in this -cause and as indicted on the counts hereinafter set out: HERMANN WILHELM -GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, WILHELM -KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM -FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP VON -BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR VON SCHIRACH, -FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN, ARTUR -SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH AND HANS FRITZSCHE, -individually and as members of any of the Groups or Organizations next -hereinafter named. - - II. - -The following are named as Groups or Organizations (since dissolved) -which should be declared criminal by reason of their aims and the means -used for the accomplishment thereof and in connection with the -conviction of such of the named defendants as were members thereof: DIE -REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER -NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF -THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN -DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the “SS”) and including DIE -SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME -STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); -DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the “SA”); and -the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES. The -identity and membership of the Groups or Organizations referred to in -the foregoing titles are hereinafter in Appendix B more particularly -defined. - - - COUNT ONE—THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY - - (Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (_a_)) - III. Statement of the Offense - -All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years -preceding 8th May, 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, -instigators or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common -plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, -Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, as -defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accordance with the -provisions of the Charter, are individually responsible for their own -acts and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such -plan or conspiracy. The common plan or conspiracy embraced the -commission of Crimes against Peace, in that the defendants planned, -prepared, initiated and waged wars of aggression, which were also wars -in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. In the -development and course of the common plan or conspiracy it came to -embrace the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the -defendants determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against -countries and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of war, -including as typical and systematic means by which the wars were -prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor and for -other purposes of civilian populations of occupied territories, murder -and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on the high seas, -the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of public and-private -property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and -devastation not justified by military necessity. The common plan or -conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as typical and systematic -means, and the defendants determined upon and committed, Crimes against -Humanity, both within Germany and within occupied territories, including -murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts -committed against civilian populations before and during the war, and -persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, in execution of -the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many -of such acts and persecutions being violations of the domestic laws of -the countries where perpetrated. - - IV. Particulars of the nature and development of the common plan or - conspiracy - - (_A_) NAZI PARTY AS THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY - -In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or Fuehrer of the -Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist -German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had been -founded in Germany in 1920. He continued as such throughout the period -covered by this Indictment. The Nazi Party, together with certain of its -subsidiary organizations, became the instrument of cohesion among the -defendants and their co-conspirators and an instrument for the carrying -out of the aims and purposes of their conspiracy. Each defendant became -a member of the Nazi Party and of the conspiracy, with knowledge of -their aims and purposes, or, with such knowledge, became an accessory to -their aims and purposes at some stage of the development of the -conspiracy. - - (_B_) COMMON OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF CONSPIRACY - -The aims and purposes of the Nazi Party and of the defendants and divers -other persons from time to time associated as leaders, members, -supporters or adherents of the Nazi Party (hereinafter called -collectively the “Nazi conspirators”) were, or came to be, to accomplish -the following by any means deemed opportune, including unlawful means, -and contemplating ultimate resort to threat of force, force and -aggressive war: (i) to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles -and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany; -(ii) to acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the -World War of 1914-1918 and other territories in Europe asserted by the -Nazi conspirators to be occupied principally by so-called “racial -Germans”; (iii) to acquire still further territories in continental -Europe and elsewhere claimed by the Nazi conspirators to be required by -the “racial Germans” as “Lebensraum,” or living space, all at the -expense of neighboring and other countries. The aims and purposes of the -Nazi conspirators were not fixed or static but evolved and expanded as -they acquired progressively greater power and became able to make more -effective application of threats of force and threats of aggressive war. -When their expanding aims and purposes became finally so great as to -provoke such strength of resistance as could be overthrown only by armed -force and aggressive war, and not simply by the opportunistic methods -theretofore used, such as fraud, deceit, threats, intimidation, fifth -column activities and propaganda, the Nazi conspirators deliberately -planned, determined upon and launched their aggressive wars and wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances by the -phases and steps hereinafter more particularly described. - - (_C_) DOCTRINAL TECHNIQUES OF THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY - -To incite others to join in the common plan or conspiracy, and as a -means of securing for the Nazi conspirators the highest degree of -control over the German community, they put forth, disseminated, and -exploited certain doctrines, among others, as follows: - -1. That persons of so-called “German blood” (as specified by the Nazi -conspirators) were a “master race” and were accordingly entitled to -subjugate, dominate or exterminate other “races” and peoples; - -2. That the German people should be ruled under the Fuehrerprinzip -(leadership principle) according to which power was to reside in a -Fuehrer from whom sub-leaders were to derive authority in a hierarchical -order, each sub-leader to owe unconditional obedience to his immediate -superior but to be absolute in his own sphere of jurisdiction; and the -power of the leadership was to be unlimited, extending to all phases of -public and private life; - -3. That war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans; - -4. That the leadership of the Nazi Party, as the sole bearer of the -foregoing and other doctrines of the Nazi Party, was entitled to shape -the structure, policies and practices of the German State and all -related institutions, to direct and supervise the activities of all -individuals within the State, and to destroy all opponents. - - (_D_) THE ACQUIRING OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL OF GERMANY: POLITICAL - -1. _First steps in acquisition of control of State machinery_ - -In order to accomplish their aims and purposes, the Nazi conspirators -prepared to seize totalitarian control over Germany to assure that no -effective resistance against them could arise within Germany itself. -After the failure of the Munich Putsch of 1923 aimed at the overthrow of -the Weimar Republic by direct action, the Nazi conspirators set out -through the Nazi Party to undermine and capture the German Government by -“legal” forms supported by terrorism. They created and utilized, as a -Party formation, Die Sturmabteilungen (SA), a semi-military, voluntary -organization of young men trained for and committed to the use of -violence, whose mission was to make the Party the master of the streets. - -2. _Control acquired_ - -On 30th January, 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. -After the Reichstag fire of 28th February, 1933, clauses of the Weimar -constitution guaranteeing personal liberty, freedom of speech, of the -press, of association and assembly were suspended. The Nazi conspirators -secured the passage by the Reichstag of a “Law for the Protection of the -People and the Reich” giving Hitler and the members of his then cabinet -plenary powers of legislation. The Nazi conspirators retained such -powers after having changed the members of the cabinet. The conspirators -caused all political parties except the Nazi Party to be prohibited. -They caused the Nazi Party to be established as a para-governmental -organization with extensive and extraordinary privileges. - -3. _Consolidation of control_ - -Thus possessed of the machinery of the German State, the Nazi -conspirators set about the consolidation of their position of power -within Germany, the extermination of potential internal resistance and -the placing of the German nation on a military footing. - - (_a_) The Nazi conspirators reduced the Reichstag to a body of their -own nominees and curtailed the freedom of popular elections throughout -the country. They transformed the several states, provinces and -municipalities, which had formerly exercised semi-autonomous powers, -into hardly more than administrative organs of the central government. -They united the offices of the President and the Chancellor in the -person of Hitler; instituted a widespread purge of civil servants; and -severely restricted the independence of the judiciary and rendered it -subservient to Nazi ends. The conspirators greatly enlarged existing -State and Party organizations; established a network of new State and -Party organizations; and “co-ordinated” State agencies with the Nazi -Party and its branches and affiliates, with the result that German life -was dominated by Nazi doctrine and practice and progressively mobilized -for the accomplishment of their aims. - - (_b_) In order to make their rule secure from attack and to instil -fear in the hearts of the German people, the Nazi conspirators -established and extended a system of terror against opponents and -supposed or suspected opponents of the regime. They imprisoned such -persons without judicial process, holding them in “protective custody” -and concentration camps, and subjected them to persecution, degradation, -despoilment enslavement, torture and murder. These concentration camps -were established early in 1933 under the direction of the defendant -GOERING and expanded as a fixed part of the terroristic policy and -method of the conspirators and used by them for the commission of the -Crimes against Humanity hereinafter alleged. Among the principal -agencies utilized in the perpetration of these crimes were the SS and -the GESTAPO, which, together with other favored branches or agencies of -the State and Party, were permitted to operate without restraint of law. - - (_c_) The Nazi conspirators conceived that, in addition to the -suppression of distinctively political opposition, it was necessary to -suppress or exterminate certain other movements or groups which they -regarded as obstacles to their retention of total control in Germany and -to the aggressive aims of the conspiracy abroad. Accordingly: - - (1) The Nazi conspirators destroyed the free trade unions in - Germany by confiscating their funds and properties, persecuting - their leaders, prohibiting their activities, and supplanting - them by an affiliated Party organization. The leadership - principle was introduced into industrial relations, the - entrepreneur becoming the leader and the workers becoming his - followers. Thus any potential resistance of the workers was - frustrated and the productive labor capacity of the German - nation was brought under the effective control of the - conspirators. - - (2) The Nazi conspirators, by promoting beliefs and practices - incompatible with Christian teaching, sought to subvert the - influence of the Churches over the people and in particular over - the youth of Germany. They avowed their aim to eliminate the - Christian Churches in Germany and sought to substitute therefor - Nazi institutions and Nazi beliefs and pursued a programme of - persecution of priests, clergy and members of monastic orders - whom they deemed opposed to their purposes and confiscated - church property. - - (3) The persecution by the Nazi conspirators of pacifist groups, - including religious movements dedicated to pacifism, was - particularly relentless and cruel. - - (_d_) Implementing their “master race” policy, the conspirators -joined in a program of relentless persecution of the Jews, designed to -exterminate them. Annihilation of the Jews became an official State -policy, carried out both by official action and by incitements to mob -and individual violence. The conspirators openly avowed their purpose. -For example, the defendant ROSENBERG stated: “Anti-Semitism is the -unifying element of the reconstruction of Germany.” On another occasion -he also stated: “Germany will regard, the Jewish question as solved only -after the very last Jew has left the greater German living space . . . -Europe will have its Jewish question solved only after the very last Jew -has left the Continent.” The defendant LEY declared: “We swear we are -not going to abandon the struggle until the last Jew in Europe has been -exterminated and is actually dead. It is not enough to isolate the -Jewish enemy of mankind—the Jew has got to be exterminated.” On another -occasion he also declared: “The second German secret weapon is -anti-Semitism because if it is consistently pursued by Germany, it will -become a universal problem which all nations will be forced to -consider.” The defendant STREICHER declared: “The sun will not shine on -the nations of the earth until the last Jew is dead.” These avowals and -incitements were typical of the declarations of the Nazi conspirators -throughout the course of their conspiracy. The program of action against -the Jews included disfranchisement, stigmatization, denial of civil -rights, subjecting their persons and property to violence, deportation, -enslavement, enforced labor, starvation, murder and mass extermination. -The extent to which the conspirators succeeded in their purpose can only -be estimated, but the annihilation was substantially complete in many -localities of Europe. Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in the parts of -Europe under Nazi domination, it is conservatively estimated that -5,700,000 have disappeared, most of them deliberately put to death by -the Nazi conspirators. Only remnants of the Jewish population of Europe -remain. - - (_e_) In order to make the German people amenable to their will, and -to prepare them psychologically for war, the Nazi conspirators reshaped -the educational system and particularly the education and training of -the German youth. The leadership principle was introduced into the -schools and the Party and affiliated organizations were given wide -supervisory powers over education. The Nazi conspirators imposed a -supervision of all cultural activities, controlled the dissemination of -information and the expression of opinion within Germany as well as the -movement of intelligence of all kinds from and into Germany, and created -vast propaganda machines. - - (_f_) The Nazi conspirators placed a considerable number of their -dominated organizations on a progressively militarized footing with a -view to the rapid transformation and use of such organizations whenever -necessary as instruments of war. - - (_E_) THE ACQUIRING OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL IN GERMANY: ECONOMIC; AND - THE ECONOMIC PLANNING AND MOBILIZATION FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR - -Having gained political power the conspirators organized Germany’s -economy to give effect to their political aims. - -1. In order to eliminate the possibility of resistance in the economic -sphere, they deprived labour of its rights of free industrial and -political association as particularized in paragraph (_D_) 3 (_c_) (1) -herein. - -2. They used organizations of German business as instruments of economic -mobilization for war. - -3. They directed Germany’s economy towards preparation and equipment of -the military machine. To this end they directed finance, capital -investment, and foreign trade. - -4. The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists among -them, embarked upon a huge rearmament programme and set out to produce -and develop huge quantities of materials of war and to create a powerful -military potential. - -5. With the object of carrying through the preparation for war the Nazi -conspirators, set up a series of administrative agencies and -authorities. For example, in 1936 they established for this purpose the -office of the Four Year Plan with the defendant GOERING as -Plenipotentiary, vesting it with overriding control over Germany’s -economy. Furthermore, on 28th August, 1939, immediately before launching -their aggression against Poland, they appointed the defendant FUNK -Plenipotentiary for Economics; and on 30th August, 1939, they set up the -Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich to act as a War -Cabinet. - - (_F_) UTILIZATION OF NAZI CONTROL FOR FOREIGN AGGRESSION - -1. _Status of the conspiracy by the middle of 1933 and projected plans._ - -By the middle of the year 1933 the Nazi conspirators, having acquired -governmental control over Germany, were in a position to enter upon -further and more detailed planning with particular relationship to -foreign policy. Their plan was to rearm and to re-occupy and fortify the -Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, -in order to acquire military strength and political bargaining power to -be used against other nations. - -2. The Nazi conspirators decided that for their purpose the Treaty of -Versailles must definitely be abrogated and specific plans were made by -them and put into operation by 7th March, 1936, all of which opened the -way for the major aggressive steps to follow, as hereinafter set forth. -In the execution of this phase of the conspiracy the Nazi conspirators -did the following acts: - - (_a_) They led Germany to enter upon a course of secret rearmament -from 1933 to March, 1935, including the training of military personnel -and the production of munitions of war, and the building of an air -force. - - (_b_) On 14th October, 1933, they led Germany to leave the -International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. - - (_c_) On 10th March, 1935, the defendant GOERING announced that -Germany was building a military air force. - - (_d_) On 16th March, 1935, the Nazi conspirators promulgated a law -for universal military service, in which they stated the peace-time -strength of the German Army would be fixed at 500,000 men. - - (_e_) On 21st May, 1935, they falsely announced to the world, with -intent to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they -would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles Treaty and -comply with the Locarno Pacts. - - (_f_) On 7th March, 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the -Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact -of Locarno of 16th October, 1925, and falsely announced to the world -that “we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.” - -3. _Aggressive action against Austria and Czechoslovakia_ - - (_a_) _The 1936-1938 phase of the plan: planning for the assault on -Austria and Czechoslovakia_ - - The Nazi conspirators next entered upon the specific planning - for the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, realizing it - would be necessary, for military reasons, first to seize Austria - before assaulting Czechoslovakia. On 21st May, 1935, in a speech - to the Reichstag, Hitler stated that: “Germany neither intends - nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to - annex Austria or to conclude an Anschluss.” On 1st May, 1936, - within two months after the reoccupation of the Rhineland, - Hitler stated: “The lie goes forth again that Germany tomorrow - or the day after will fall upon Austria or Czechoslovakia.” - Thereafter, the Nazi conspirators caused a treaty to be entered - into between Austria and Germany on 11th July, 1936, Article 1 - of which stated that “The German Government recognizes the full - sovereignty of the Federated State of Austria in the spirit of - the pronouncements of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor of 21st - May, 1935.” Meanwhile, plans for aggression in violation of that - treaty were being made. By the autumn of 1937, all noteworthy - opposition within the Reich had been crushed. Military - preparation for the Austrian action was virtually concluded. An - influential group of the Nazi conspirators met with Hitler on - 5th November, 1937, to review the situation. It was reaffirmed - that Nazi Germany must have “Lebensraum” in central Europe. It - was recognized that such conquest would probably meet resistance - which would have to be crushed by force and that their decision - might lead to a general war, but this prospect was discounted as - a risk worth taking. There emerged from this meeting three - possible plans for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. - Which of the three was to be used was to depend upon the - developments in the political and military situation in Europe. - It was contemplated that the conquest of Austria and - Czechoslovakia would, through compulsory emigration of 2,000,000 - persons from Czechoslovakia and 1,000,000 persons from Austria, - provide additional food to the Reich for 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 - people, strengthen it militarily by providing shorter and better - frontiers, and make possible the constituting of new armies up - to about twelve divisions. Thus, the aim of the plan against - Austria and Czechoslovakia was conceived of not as an end to - itself but as a preparatory measure toward the next aggressive - steps in the Nazi conspiracy. - - (_b_) _The execution of the plan to invade Austria: November, 1937, -to March, 1938_ - - Hitler on 8th February, 1938, called Chancellor Schuschnigg to a - conference at Berchtesgaden. At the meeting of 12th February, - 1938, under threat of invasion, Schuschnigg yielded a promise of - amnesty to imprisoned Nazis and appointment of Nazis to - ministerial posts. He agreed to remain silent until Hitler’s - 20th February speech in which Austria’s independence was to be - reaffirmed, but Hitler in his speech, instead of affirming - Austrian independence, declared himself protector of all - Germans. Meanwhile, subversive activities of Nazis in Austria - increased. Schuschnigg on 9th March, 1938, announced a - plebiscite for the following Sunday on the question of Austrian - independence. On 11th March Hitler sent an ultimatum, demanding - that the plebiscite be called off or that Germany would invade - Austria. Later the same day a second ultimatum threatened - invasion unless Schuschnigg should resign in three hours. - Schuschnigg resigned. The defendant SEYSS-INQUART, who was - appointed Chancellor, immediately invited Hitler to send German - troops into Austria to “preserve order.” The invasion began on - 12th March, 1938. On 13th March, Hitler by proclamation assumed - office as Chief of State of Austria and took command of its - armed forces. By a law of the same date Austria was annexed to - Germany. - - (_c_) _The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia: April, -1938, to March, 1939_ - - 1. Simultaneously with their annexation of Austria the Nazi - conspirators gave false assurances to the Czechoslovak - Government that they would not attack that country. But within a - month they met to plan specific ways and means of attacking - Czechoslovakia, and to revise, in the light of the acquisition - of Austria, the previous plans for aggression against - Czechoslovakia. - - 2. On 21st April, 1938, the Nazi conspirators met and prepared - to launch an attack on Czechoslovakia not later than 1st - October, 1938. They planned specifically to create an “incident” - to “justify” the attack. They decided to launch a military - attack only after a period of diplomatic squabbling which, - growing more serious, would lead to the excuse for war, or, in - the alternative, to unleash a lightning attack as a result of an - “incident” of their own creation. Consideration was given to - assassinating the German Ambassador at Prague to create the - requisite incident. From and after 21st April, 1938, the Nazi - conspirators caused to be prepared detailed and precise military - plans designed to carry out such an attack at any opportune - moment and calculated to overcome all Czechoslovak, resistance - within four days, thus presenting the world with a fait - accompli, and so forestalling outside resistance. Throughout the - months of May, June, July, August and September, these plans - were made more specific and detailed, and by 3rd September, - 1938, it was decided that all troops were to be ready for action - on 28th September, 1938. - - 3. Throughout this same period, the Nazi conspirators were - agitating the minorities question in Czechoslovakia, and - particularly in the Sudetenland, leading to a diplomatic crisis - in August and September, 1938. After the Nazi conspirators - threatened war, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact - with Germany and Italy at Munich on 29th September, 1938, - involving the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to - Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. On 1st - October, 1938, German troops occupied the Sudetenland. - - 4. On 15th March, 1939, contrary to the provisions of the Munich - Pact itself, the Nazi conspirators caused the completion of - their plan by seizing and occupying the major part of - Czechoslovakia not ceded to Germany by the Munich Pact. - -4. _Formulation of the plan to attack Poland_: _preparation and -initiation of aggressive war_: _March, 1939, to September, 1939_ - - (_a_) With these aggressions successfully consummated, the -conspirators had obtained much desired resources and bases and were -ready to undertake further aggressions by means of war. Following -assurances to the world of peaceful intentions, an influential group of -the conspirators met on 23rd May, 1939, to consider the further -implementation of their plan. The situation was reviewed and it was -observed that “the past six years have been put to good use and all -measures have been taken in correct sequence and in accordance with our -aims”; that the national-political unity of the Germans had been -substantially achieved; and that further successes could not be achieved -without war and bloodshed. It was decided nevertheless next to attack -Poland at the first suitable opportunity. It was admitted that the -questions concerning Danzig which they had agitated with Poland were not -true questions, but rather that the question was one of aggressive -expansion for food and “Lebensraum.” It was recognized that Poland would -fight if attacked and that a repetition of the Nazi success against -Czechoslovakia without war could not be expected. Accordingly, it was -determined that the problem was to isolate Poland and, if possible, -prevent a simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers. Nevertheless, -it was agreed that England was an enemy to their aspirations, and that -war with England and her ally France must eventually result, and -therefore that in that war every attempt must be made to overwhelm -England with a “Blitzkrieg.” It was thereupon determined immediately to -prepare detailed plans for an attack on Poland at the first suitable -opportunity and thereafter for an attack on England and France, together -with plans for the simultaneous occupation by armed force of air bases -in the Netherlands and Belgium. - - (_b_) Accordingly, after having denounced the German-Polish Pact of -1934 on false grounds, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to stir up the -Danzig issue to prepare frontier “incidents” to “justify” the attack, -and to make demands for the cession of Polish territory. Upon refusal by -Poland to yield, they caused German armed forces to invade Poland on 1st -September, 1939, thus precipitating war also with the United Kingdom and -France. - -5. _Expansion of the war into a general war of aggression: planning and -execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium, The Netherlands, -Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece: 1939 to April, 1941_ - -Thus the aggressive war prepared for by the Nazi conspirators through -their attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia was actively launched by -their attack on Poland, in violation of the terms of the Briand-Kellogg -Pact, 1928. After the total defeat of Poland, in order to facilitate the -carrying out of their military operations against France and the United -Kingdom, the Nazi conspirators made active preparations for an extension -of the war in Europe. In accordance with those plans, they caused the -German armed forces to invade Denmark and Norway on 9th April, 1940; -Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on 10th May, 1940; Yugoslavia -and Greece on 6th April, 1941. All these invasions had been specifically -planned in advance. - -6. _German invasion on June 22nd, 1941, of the U.S.S.R. territory in -violation of Non-Aggression Pact of 23rd August, 1939_ - -On June 22nd, 1941, the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced the -Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and without any -declaration of war invaded Soviet territory thereby beginning a War of -Aggression against the U.S.S.R. - -From the first day of launching their attack on Soviet territory the -Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their detailed plans, began to -carry out the destruction of cities, towns and villages, the demolition -of factories, collective farms, electric stations and railroads, the -robbery and barbaric devastation of the natural cultural institutions of -the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the devastation of museums, churches, -historic monuments. The mass deportation of the Soviet citizens for -slave labor to Germany, as well as the annihilation of old people, women -and children, especially Belo-Russians and Ukrainians. The extermination -of Jews committed throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. - -The above-mentioned criminal offenses were perpetrated by the German -troops in accordance with the orders of the Nazi Government and the -General Staff and High Command of the German armed forces. - -7. _Collaboration with Italy and Japan and aggressive war against the -United States: November, 1936, to December, 1941_ - -After the initiation of the Nazi wars of aggression the Nazi -conspirators brought about a German-Italian-Japanese ten-year -military-economic alliance signed at Berlin on 27th September, 1940. -This agreement, representing a strengthening of the bonds among those -three nations established by the earlier but more limited pact of 25th -November, 1936, stated: “The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, -considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all -nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to -stand by and co-operate with one another in regard of their efforts in -Greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their -prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated -to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.” -The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken -and handicap those nations with whom they were at war, and those with -whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted -Japan to seek “a new order of things.” Taking advantage of the wars of -aggression then being waged by the Nazi conspirators, Japan commenced an -attack on 7th December, 1941, against the United States of America at -Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, and against the British Commonwealth -of Nations, French Indo-China and the Netherlands in the southwest -Pacific. Germany declared war against the United States on 11th -December, 1941. - -(_G_) WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF - EXECUTING THE CONSPIRACY FOR WHICH THE CONSPIRATORS ARE RESPONSIBLE - -1. Beginning with the initiation of the aggressive war on 1st September, -1939, and throughout its extension into wars involving almost the entire -world, the Nazi conspirators carried out their common plan or conspiracy -to wage war in ruthless and complete disregard and violation of the laws -and customs of war. In the course of executing the common plan or -conspiracy there were committed the War Crimes detailed hereinafter in -Count Three of this Indictment. - -2. Beginning with the initiation of their plan to seize and retain total -control of the German State, and thereafter throughout their utilization -of that control for foreign aggression, the Nazi conspirators carried -out their common plan or conspiracy in ruthless and complete disregard -and violation of the laws of humanity. In the course of executing the -common plan or conspiracy there were committed the Crimes against -Humanity detailed hereinafter in Count Four of this Indictment. - -3. By reason of all the foregoing, the defendants with divers other -persons are guilty of a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment -of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy to commit Crimes against -Humanity in the course of preparation for war and in the course of -prosecution of war; and of a conspiracy to commit War Crimes not only -against the armed forces of their enemies but also against -non-belligerent civilian populations. - -(_H_) INDIVIDUAL, GROUP AND ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFENSE - STATED IN COUNT ONE - -Reference is hereby, made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility, of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count One of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count One of -the Indictment. - - - COUNT TWO—CRIMES AGAINST PEACE - - (Charter, Article 6 (_a_)) - V. Statement of the Offense - -All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period of years -preceding 8th May, 1945, participated in the planning, preparation, -initiation and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in -violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances. - - VI. Particulars of the wars planned, prepared, initiated and waged - -(_A_) The wars referred to in the Statement of Offense in this Count Two -of the Indictment and the dates of their initiation were the following: -against Poland, 1st September, 1939; against the United Kingdom and -France, 3rd September, 1939; against Denmark and Norway, 9th April, -1940; against Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 10th May, 1940; -against Yugoslavia and Greece, 6th April, 1941; against the U.S.S.R., -22nd June, 1941; and against the United States of America, 11th -December, 1941. - -(_B_) Reference is hereby made to Count One of the Indictment for the -allegations charging that these wars were wars of aggression on the part -of the defendants. - -(_C_) Reference is hereby made to Appendix C annexed to this Indictment -for a statement of particulars of the charges of violations of -international treaties, agreements and assurances caused by the -defendants in the course of planning, preparing and initiating these -wars. - - VII. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense - stated in Count Two - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count Two of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Two of -the Indictment. - - - COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES - - (Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (_b_)). - VIII. Statement of the Offense - -All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1st September, 1939, and -8th May, 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and territories -occupied by the German armed forces since 1st September, 1939, and in -Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the High Seas. - -All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and -executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit War Crimes as defined in -Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. This plan involved, among other things, -the practice of “total war” including methods of combat and of military -occupation in direct conflict with the laws and customs of war, and the -commission of crimes perpetrated on the field of battle during -encounters with enemy armies, and against prisoners of war, and in -occupied territories against the civilian population of such -territories. - -The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other -persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6 -of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War -Crimes performed their acts in execution of a common plan and conspiracy -to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which -plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, -organizers, instigators and accomplices. - -These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws and of the general principles of -criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations, -and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. - -(_A_) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS OF OR IN OCCUPIED - TERRITORY AND ON THE HIGH SEAS - -Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun by -their armed forces the defendants, for the purpose of systematically -terrorizing the inhabitants, murdered and tortured civilians, and -ill-treated them, and imprisoned them without legal process. - -The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means, -including shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross overcrowding, -systematic under-nutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond -the strength of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate provision of -surgical and medical services, kickings, beatings, brutality and torture -of all kinds, including the use of hot irons and pulling out of -fingernails and the performance of experiments by means of operations -and otherwise on living human subjects. In some occupied territories the -defendants interfered with religious services, persecuted members of the -clergy and monastic orders, and expropriated church property. They -conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of -racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain -occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of -people and national, racial or religious groups, particularly Jews, -Poles and Gypsies and others. - -Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, with -the object of obtaining information. - -Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically to -“protective arrests” whereby they were arrested and imprisoned without -any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law, and they were -imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane conditions. - -In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were classified -“Nacht und Nebel”. These were entirely cut off from the world and were -allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They disappeared without -trace and no announcement of their fate was ever made by the German -authorities. - -Such murders and ill-treatment were contrary to International -Conventions, in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, -the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as -derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal -penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to -Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - -The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later in -this count are set out herein by way of example only, are not exclusive -of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice to the right -of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases of murder and -ill-treatment of civilians. - -1. _In France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy and -the Channel Islands (hereinafter called the “Western Countries”) and in -that part of Germany which lies west of a line drawn due North and South -through the centre of Berlin (hereinafter called “Western Germany”)._ - -Such murder and ill-treatment took place in concentration camps and -similar establishments set up by the defendants and particularly in the -concentration camps set up at Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Breendonck, -Grini, Natzweiler, Ravensbruck, Vught and Amersfoort, and in numerous -cities, towns and villages, including Oradour sur Glane, Trondheim and -Oslo. - -Crimes committed in France or against French citizens took the following -forms:— - -Arbitrary arrests were carried out under political or racial pretexts; -they were both individual and collective; notably in Paris (round-up of -the 18th Arrondissement by the Field Gendarmerie, round-up of the Jewish -population of the 11th Arrondissement in August, 1941, round-up of -Jewish intellectuals in December, 1941, round-up in July, 1942); at -Clermont-Ferrand, (round-up of professors and students of the University -of Strasbourg, who were taken to Clermon-Ferrand[Clermont-Ferrand?] on -25th November, 1943); at Lyons; at Marseilles (round-up of 40,000 -persons in January, 1943); at Grenoble (round-up on 24th December, -1943); at Cluny (round-up on 24th December, 1944); at Figeac (round-up -in May, 1944); at Saint Pol de Leon (round-up in July, 1944); at Locminé -(round-up on 3rd July, 1944); at Eyzieux (round-up in May, 1944) and at -Moussey (round-up in September, 1944). These arrests were followed by -brutal treatment and tortures carried out by the most diverse methods, -such as immersion in icy water, asphyxiation, torture of the limbs, and -the use of instruments of torture, such as the iron helmet and electric -current, and practised in all the prisons of France, notably in Paris, -Lyons, Marseilles, Rennes, Metz, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse, Nice, -Grenoble, Annecy, Arras, Bethune, Lille, Loos, Valenciennes, Nancy, -Troyes and Caen, and in the torture chambers fitted up at the Gestapo -centres. - -In the concentration camps, the health regime, and the labour regime, -were such that the rate of mortality (alleged to be from natural causes) -attained enormous proportions, for instance:— - - 1. Out of a convoy of 230 French women deported from Compiegne to -Auschwitz in January, 1943, 180 died of exhaustion by the end of four -months. - - 2. 143 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 23rd March and 6th -May, 1943, in Block 8 at Dachau. - - 3. 1,797 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 21st November, 1943, -and 15th March, 1945, in the Block at Dora. - - 4. 465 Frenchmen died of general debility in November, 1944, at -Dora. - - 5. 22,761 deportees died of exhaustion at Buchenwald between 1st -January, 1943, and 15th April, 1945. - - 6. 11,560 detainees died of exhaustion at Dachau Camp (most of -them in Block 30 reserved for the sick and infirm) between 1st January -and 15th April, 1945. - - 7. 780 priests died of exhaustion at Mauthausen. - - 8. Out of 2,200 Frenchmen registered at Flossenburg Camp, 1,600 -died from supposedly natural causes. - -Methods used for the work of extermination in concentration camps -were:—bad treatment, pseudo-scientific experiments (sterilization of -women at Auschwitz and at Ravensbruck, study of the evolution of cancer -of the womb at Auschwitz, of typhus at Buchenwald, anatomical research -at Natzweiller, heart injections at Buchenwald, bone grafting and -muscular excisions at Ravensbruck, etc.), gas-chambers, gas-wagons and -crematory ovens. Of 228,000 French political and racial deportees in -concentration camps, only 28,000 survived. - -In France also systematic extermination was practised, notably at Asq on -1st April, 1944, at Colpo on 22nd July, 1944, at Buzet sur Tarn on 6th -July, 1944 and on 17th August, 1944, at Pluvignier on 8th July, 1944, at -Rennes on 8th June, 1944, at Grenoble on 8th July, 1944, at Saint Flour -on 10th June, 1944, at Ruisnes on 10th July, 1944, at Nimes, at Tulle, -and at Nice, where, in July, 1944, the victims of torture were exposed -to the population, and at Oradour sur Glane where the entire village -population was shot or burned alive in the church. - -The many charnel pits give proof of anonymous massacres. Most notable of -these are the charnel pits of Paris (Cascade du Bois de Boulogne), -Lyons, Saint Genies Laval, Besancon, Petit Saint Bernard, Aulnat, Caen, -Port Louis, Charleval, Fontainebleau, Bouconne, Gabaudet, L’hermitage, -Lorges, Morlaas, Bordelongue, Signe. - -In the course of a premeditated campaign of terrorism, initiated in -Denmark by the Germans in the latter part of 1943, 600 Danish subjects -were murdered and, in addition, throughout the German occupation of -Denmark, large numbers of Danish subjects were subjected to torture and -ill-treatment of all sorts. In addition, approximately 500 Danish -subjects were murdered, by torture and otherwise, in German prisons and -concentration camps. - -In Belgium between 1940 and 1944 tortures by various means, but -identical in each place, were carried out at Brussels, Liege, Mons, -Ghent, Namur, Antwerp, Tournai, Arlon, Charleroi and Dinant. - -At Vught, in Holland, when the camp was evacuated about 400 persons were -murdered by shooting. - -In Luxembourg, during the German occupation, 500 persons were murdered -and, in addition, another 521 were illegally executed, by order of such -special tribunals as the so-called “Sondergericht”. Many more persons in -Luxembourg were subjected to torture and mistreatment by the Gestapo. -Not less than 4,000 Luxembourg nationals were imprisoned during the -period of German occupation, and of these at least 400 were murdered. - -Between March, 1944, and April, 1945, in Italy, at least 7,500 men, -women and children, ranging in years from infancy to extreme old age -were murdered by the German soldiery at Civitella, in the Ardeatine -Caves in Rome, and at other places. - -2. _In the U.S.S.R., i.e., in the Bielorussian, Ukrainian, Esthonian, -Latvian, Lithuanian, Karelo-Finnish, and Moldavian Soviet Socialist -Republics, in 19 regions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist -Republic, and in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the -Balkans (hereinafter called “the Eastern Countries”) and in that part of -Germany which lies East of a line drawn North and South through the -centre of Berlin (hereinafter called “Eastern Germany”)._ - -From the 1st September, 1939, when the German armed forces invaded -Poland, and from the 22nd June, 1941, when they invaded the U.S.S.R., -the German Government and the German High Command adopted a systematic -policy of murder and ill-treatment of the civilian populations of and in -the Eastern Countries as they were successively occupied by the German -armed forces. These murders and ill-treatments were carried on -continuously until the German Armed Forces were driven out of the said -countries. - -Such murders and ill-treatments included:— - -(_a_) Murders and ill-treatments at concentration camps and similar -establishments set up by the Germans in the Eastern Countries and in -Eastern Germany including those set up at Maidanek and Auschwitz. - -The said murders and ill-treatments were carried out by divers means -including all those set out above, as follows: - -About 1,500,000 persons were exterminated in Maidanek and about -4,000,000 persons were exterminated in Auschwitz, among whom were -citizens of Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, Great -Britain, Czechoslovakia, France and other countries. - -In the Lwow region and in the city of Lwow the Germans exterminated -about 700,000 Soviet people, including 70 persons in the field of the -arts, science and technology, and also citizens of the U. S. A., Great -Britain, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Holland, brought to this region -from other concentration camps. - -In the Jewish ghetto from 7th September, 1941, to 6th July, 1943, over -133,000 persons were tortured and shot. - -Mass shooting of the population occurred in the suburbs of the city and -in the Livenitz forest. - -In the Ganov camp 200,000 peaceful citizens were exterminated. The most -refined methods of cruelty were employed in this extermination, such as -disembowelling and the freezing of human beings in tubs of water. Mass -shootings took place to the accompaniment of the music of an orchestra -recruited from the persons interned. - -Beginning with June, 1943, the Germans carried out measures to hide the -evidence of their crimes. They exhumed and burned corpses, and they -crushed the bones with machines and used them for fertilizer. - -At the beginning of 1944 in the Ozarichi region of the Bielorussian -S.S.R., before liberation by the Red Army, the Germans established three -concentration camps without shelters, to which they committed tens of -thousands of persons from the neighbouring territories. They brought -many people to these camps from typhus hospitals intentionally, for the -purpose of infecting the other persons interned and for spreading the -disease in territories from which the Germans were being driven by the -Red Army. In these camps there were many murders and crimes. - -In the Esthonian S.S.R. they shot tens of thousands of persons and in -one day alone, 19th September, 1944, in Camp Kloga, the Germans shot -2,000 peaceful citizens. They burned the bodies on bonfires. - -In the Lithuanian S.S.R. there were mass killings of Soviet citizens, -namely: in Panerai at least 100,000; in Kaunas more than 70,000; in -Alitus about 60,000; at Prenai more than 3,000; in Villiampol about -8,000; in Mariampol about 7,000; in Trakai and neighbouring towns -37,640. - -In the Latvian S.S.R. 577,000 persons were murdered. - -As a result of the whole system of internal order maintained in all -camps, the interned persons were doomed to die. - -In a secret instruction entitled “the internal regime in concentration -camps”, signed personally by Himmler in 1941 severe measures of -punishment were set forth for the internees. Masses of prisoners of war -were shot, or died from the cold and torture. - -(_b_) Murders and ill-treatments at places in the Eastern Countries and -in the Soviet Union, other than in the camps referred to in (_a_) above, -included, on various dates during the occupation by the German Armed -Forces: - -The destruction in the Smolenck region of over 135,000 Soviet citizens. - -Among these, near the village of Kholmetz of the Sychev region, when the -military authorities were required to remove the mines from an area, on -the order of the Commander of the 101st German Infantry Division, -Major-General Fisler, the German soldiers gathered the inhabitants of -the village of Kholmetz and forced them to remove mines from the road. -All of these people lost their lives as a result of exploding mines. - -In the Leningrad region there were shot and tortured over 172,000 -persons, including over 20,000 persons who were killed in the city of -Leningrad by the barbarous artillery barrage and the bombings. - -In the Stavropol region in an anti-tank trench close to the station of -Mineralny Vody, and in other cities, tens of thousands of persons were -exterminated. - -In Pyatigorsk many were subjected to torture and criminal treatment, -including suspension from the ceiling and other methods. Many of the -victims of these tortures were then shot. - -In Krasnodar some 6,700 civilians were murdered by poison gas in gas -vans, or were shot and tortured. - -In the Stalingrad region more than 40,000 persons were killed and -tortured. After the Germans were expelled from Stalingrad, more than a -thousand mutilated bodies of local inhabitants were found with marks of -torture. One hundred and thirty-nine women had their arms painfully bent -backward and held by wires. From some their breasts had been cut off and -their ears, fingers and toes had been amputated. The bodies bore the -marks of burns. On the bodies of the men the five pointed star was -burned with an iron or cut with a knife. Some were disembowelled. - -In Orel over 5,000 persons were murdered. - -In Novgorod and in the Novgorod region many thousands of Soviet citizens -were killed by shooting, starvation and torture. In Minsk tens of -thousands of citizens were similarly killed. - -In the Crimea peaceful citizens were gathered on barges, taken out to -sea and drowned, over 144,000 persons being exterminated in this manner. - -In the Soviet Ukraine there were monstrous criminal acts of the Nazi -conspirators. In Babi Yar, near Kiev, they shot over 100,000 men, women, -children and old people. In this city in January, 1941, after the -explosion in German Headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Street the Germans -arrested as hostages 1,250 persons—old men, minors, women with nursing -infants. In Kiev they killed over 195,000 persons. - -In Rovno and the Rovno region they killed and tortured over 100,000 -peaceful citizens. - -In Dnepropetrovsk, near the Transport Institute, they shot or threw -alive into a great ravine 11,000 women, old men and children. - -In Kamenetz-Podolsk Region 31,000 Jews were shot and exterminated, -including 13,000 persons brought there from Hungary. - -In the Odessa Region at least 200,000 Soviet citizens were killed. - -In Kharkov about 195,000 persons were either tortured to death, shot or -gassed in gas vans. - -In Gomel the Germans rounded up the population in prison, and tortured -and tormented them, and then took them to the centre of the city and -shot them in public. - -In the city of Lyda in the Grodenen region on 8th May, 1942, 5,670 -persons were completely undressed, driven into pens in groups of 100 and -then shot by machine guns. Many were thrown in the graves while they -were still alive. - -Along with adults the Nazi conspirators mercilessly destroyed even -children. They killed them with their parents, in groups and alone. They -killed them in children’s homes and hospitals, burying the living in the -graves, throwing them into flames, stabbing them with bayonets, -poisoning them, conducting experiments upon them, extracting their blood -for the use of the German Army, throwing them into prison and Gestapo -torture chambers and concentration camps, where the children died from -hunger, torture and epidemic diseases. - -From 6th September to 24th November, 1942, in the region of Brest, -Pinsk, Kobren, Dyvina, Malority and Berezy-Kartuzsky about 400 children -were shot by German punitive units. - -In the Yanov camp in the city of Lwow the Germans killed 8,000 children -in two months. - -In the resort of Tiberda the Germans annihilated 500 children suffering -from tuberculosis of the bone, who were in the sanatorium for the cure. - -On the territory of the Latvian S.S.R. the German usurpers killed -thousands of children, which they had brought there with their parents -from the Bielorussian S.S.R., and from the Kalinin, Kaluga and other -regions of the R.S.F.S.R. - -In Czechoslovakia as a result of torture, beating, hanging, and -shootings, there were annihilated in Gestapo prisons in Brno, Seim and -other places over 20,000 persons. Moreover many thousands of internees -were subjected to criminal treatment, beatings and torture. - -Both before the war, as well as during the war, thousands of Czech -patriots, in particular catholics and protestants, lawyers, doctors, -teachers, etc., were arrested as hostages and imprisoned. A large number -of these hostages were killed by the Germans. - -In Greece in October, 1941, the male populations between 16 and 60 years -of age of the Greek villages Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia Mesovunos, -Selli, Ano-Kerzilion and Kato-Kerzilion were shot—in all 416 persons. - -In Yugoslavia many thousands of civilians were murdered. Other examples -are given under paragraph (_D_), “Killing of Hostages”, below. - - (_B_) DEPORTATION FOR SLAVE LABOUR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES OF THE - CIVILIAN POPULATIONS OF AND IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES - -During the whole period of the occupation by Germany of both the Western -and the Eastern Countries it was the policy of the German Government and -of the German High Command to deport able bodied citizens from such -occupied countries to Germany and to other occupied countries for the -purpose of slave labour upon defence works, in factories and in other -tasks connected with the German War effort. - -In pursuance of such policy there were mass deportations from all the -Western and Eastern countries for such purposes during the whole period -of the occupation. - -Such deportations were contrary to international Conventions, in -particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed and to Article 6 (_b_) -of the Charter. - -Particulars of deportations, by way of example only and without -prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases are as follows: - -1. From the Western Countries: - -From France the following deportations of persons for political and -racial reasons took place—each of which consisted of from 1,500-2,500 -deportees: - - 1940 3 Transports - 1941 14 Transports - 1942 104 Transports - 1943 257 Transports - 1944 326 Transports - -Such deportees were subjected to the most barbarous conditions of -overcrowding; they were provided with wholly insufficient clothing and -were given little or no food for several days. - -The conditions of transport were such that many deportees died in the -course of the voyage, for example: - -In one of the wagons of the train which left Compiegne for Buchenwald, -on the 17th September, 1943, 80 men died out of 130; - -On 4th June, 1944, 484 bodies were taken out of the train at Sarrebourg; - -In a train which left Compiegne on the 2nd July, 1944, for Dachau, more -than 600 dead were found on arrival, i.e., one-third of the total -number; - -In a train which left Compiegne on the 16th January, 1944, for -Buchenwald more than 100 men were confined in each wagon, the dead and -the wounded being heaped in the last wagon during the voyage; - -In April, 1945, of 12,000 internees evacuated from Buchenwald, 4,000 -only were still alive when the marching column arrived near Regensburg. - -During the German occupation of Denmark, 5,200 Danish subjects were -deported to Germany and there imprisoned in concentration camps and -other places. - -In 1942 and thereafter 6,000 nationals of Luxembourg were departed from -their country under deplorable conditions as a result of which many of -them perished. - -From Belgium between 1940 and 1941 at least 190,000 civilians were -deported to Germany and used as slave labour. Such deportees were -subjected to ill-treatment and many of them were compelled to work in -armament factories. - -From Holland, between 1940 and 1944 nearly half a million civilians were -deported to Germany and to other occupied countries. - -2. From the Eastern Countries: - -The German occupying authorities deported from the Soviet Union to -slavery about 4,978,000 Soviet citizens. - -750,000 Czechoslovakian citizens were taken away for forced labor -outside the Czechoslovak frontiers in the interior of the German war -machine. - -On June 4, 1941, in the city of Zagreb (Yugoslavia) a meeting of German -representatives was called with the Councillor Von Troll presiding. The -purpose was to set up the means of deporting the Yugoslav population -from Slovenia. Tens of thousands of persons were deported in carrying -out this plan. - -(_C_) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND OF OTHER MEMBERS - OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES WITH WHOM GERMANY WAS AT WAR, AND - OF PERSONS ON THE HIGH SEAS - -The Defendants murdered and ill-treated prisoners of war by denying them -adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care and attention; by -forcing them to labor in inhumane conditions; by torturing them and -subjecting them to inhuman indignities and by killing them. The German -Government and the German High Command imprisoned prisoners of war in -various concentration camps, where they were killed and subjected to -inhuman treatment by the various methods set forth in paragraph VIII -(_A_). Members of the armed forces of the countries with whom Germany -was at war were frequently murdered while in the act of surrendering. -These murders and ill-treatment were contrary to International -Conventions, particularly Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, and to Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the Prisoners of War -Convention (Geneva 1929) the laws and customs of war, the general -principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all -civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which -such crimes were committed and to Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - -Particulars by way of examples and without prejudice to the production -of evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. In the Western Countries: - -French officers who escaped from Oflag X C were handed over to the -Gestapo and disappeared; others were murdered by their guards; others -sent to concentration camps and exterminated. Among others, the men of -Stalag VI C were sent to Buchenwald. - -Frequently prisoners captured on the Western Front were obliged to march -to the camps until they completely collapsed. Some of them walked more -than 600 kilometers with hardly any food; they marched on for 48 hours -running, without being fed; among them a certain number died of -exhaustion or of hunger; stragglers were systematically murdered. - -The same crimes have been committed in 1943, 1944 and 1945 when the -occupants of the camps were withdrawn before the Allied advance; -particularly during the withdrawal of the prisoners of Sagan on February -8th, 1945. - -Bodily punishments were inflicted upon non-commissioned officers and -cadets who refused to work. On December 24th, 1943, three French N.C.O’s -were murdered for that motive in Stalag IV A. Many ill-treatments were -inflicted without motive on other ranks: stabbing with bayonets, -striking with rifle-butts and whipping; in Stalag XX B the sick -themselves were beaten many times by sentries; in Stalag III B and -Stalag III C, worn-out prisoners were murdered or grievously wounded. In -military gaols in Graudenz for instance, in reprisal camps as in -Rava-Ruska, the food was so insufficient that the men lost more than 15 -kilograms in a few weeks. In May, 1942, 1 loaf of bread only was -distributed in Rava-Ruska to each group of 35 men. - -Orders were given to transfer French officers in chains to the camp of -Mauthausen after they had tried to escape. At their arrival in camp they -were murdered, either by shooting, or by gas and their bodies destroyed -in the crematorium. - -American prisoners, officers and men, were murdered in Normandy during -the summer of 1944 and in the Ardennes in December, 1944. American -prisoners were starved, beaten and otherwise mistreated in numerous -Stalag in Germany and in the occupied countries, particularly in 1943, -1944 and 1945. - -2. In the Eastern Countries: - -At Orel prisoners of war were exterminated by starvation, shooting, -exposure, and poisoning. - -Soviet prisoners of war were murdered en masse on orders from the High -Command and the Headquarters of the SIPO and SD. Tens of thousands of -Soviet prisoners of war were tortured and murdered at the “Gross -Lazaret” at Slavuta. - -In addition, many thousands of the persons referred to in paragraph VIII -(A) 2, above, were Soviet prisoners of war. - -Prisoners of war who escaped and were recaptured were handed over to -SIPO and SD for shooting. - -Frenchmen fighting with the Soviet Army who were captured were handed -over to the Vichy Government for “proceedings”. - -In March, 1944, 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III at -Sagan, when recaptured, were murdered. - -In September, 1941, 11,000 Polish officers, who were prisoners of war -were killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk. - -In Yugoslavia the German Command and the occupying authorities in the -person of the chief officials of the Police, the SS troops (Police -Lieutenant General Rosener) and the Divisional Group Command (General -Kuebler and others) in the period 1941-43 ordered the shooting of -prisoners of war. - - (_D_) KILLING OF HOSTAGES - -Throughout the territories occupied by the German armed forces in the -course of waging aggressive wars, the defendants adopted and put into -effect on a wide scale the practice of taking, and of killing, hostages -from the civilian population. These acts were contrary to International -Conventions, particularly Article 50 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the -laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as -derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal -penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed and to -Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - -Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of -evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. In the Western Countries: - -In France hostages were executed either individually or collectively; -these executions took place in all the big cities of France, among -others in Paris, Bordeaux and Nantes, as well as at Chateabriant. - -In Holland many hundreds of hostages were shot at the following among -other places—Rotterdam, Apeldoorn, Amsterdam, Benschop and Haarlem. - -In Belgium many hundreds of hostages were shot during the period 1940 to -1944. - -2. In the Eastern Countries: - -At Kragnevatz in Yugoslavia 2,300 hostages were shot in October, 1941. - -At Kralevo in Yugoslavia 5,000 hostages were shot. - - (_E_) PLUNDER OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY - -The defendants ruthlessly exploited the people and the material -resources of the countries they occupied, in order to strengthen the -Nazi war machine, to depopulate and impoverish the rest of Europe, to -enrich themselves and their adherents, and to promote German economic -supremacy over Europe. - -The Defendants engaged in the following acts and practices, among -others: - -1. They degraded the standard of life of the people of occupied -countries and caused starvation, by stripping occupied countries of -foodstuffs for removal to Germany. - -2. They seized raw materials and industrial machinery in all of the -occupied countries, removed them to Germany and used them in the -interest of the German war effort and the German economy. - -3. In all the occupied countries, in varying degrees, they confiscated -businesses, plants and other property. - -4. In an attempt to give color of legality to illegal acquisitions of -property, they forced owners of property to go through the forms of -“voluntary” and “legal” transfers. - -5. They established comprehensive controls over the economies of all of -the occupied countries and directed their resources, their production -and their labor in the interests of the German war economy, depriving -the local populations of the products of essential industries. - -6. By a variety of financial mechanisms, they despoiled all of the -occupied countries of essential commodities and accumulated wealth, -debased the local currency systems and disrupted the local economies. -They financed extensive purchases in occupied countries through clearing -arrangements by which they exacted loans from the occupied countries. -They imposed occupation levies, exacted financial contributions, and -issued occupation currency, far in excess of occupation costs. They used -these excess funds to finance the purchase of business properties and -supplies in the occupied countries. - -7. They abrogated the rights of the local populations in the occupied -portions of the USSR and in Poland and in other countries to develop or -manage agricultural and industrial properties, and reserved this area -for exclusive settlement, development, and ownership by Germans and -their so-called racial brethren. - -8. In further development of their plan of criminal exploitation, they -destroyed industrial cities, cultural monuments, scientific -institutions, and property of all types in the occupied territories to -eliminate the possibility of competition with Germany. - -9. From their program of terror, slavery, spoliation and organized -outrage, the Nazi conspirators created an instrument for the personal -profit and aggrandizement of themselves and their adherents. They -secured for themselves and their adherents - - (_a_) Positions in administration of business involving power, -influence and lucrative perquisites. - - (_b_) The use of cheap forced labor. - - (_c_) The acquisition on advantageous terms of foreign properties, -business interests, and raw materials. - - (_d_) The basis for the industrial supremacy of Germany. - -These acts were contrary to International Conventions, particularly -Articles 46 to 56 inclusive of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed and to Article 6 (_b_) -of the Charter. - -Particulars (by way of example and without prejudice to the production -of evidence of other cases) are as follows: - -1. Western Countries: - -There was plundered from the Western Countries from 1940 to 1944, works -of art, artistic objects, pictures, plastics, furniture, textiles, -antique pieces and similar articles of enormous value to the number of -21,903. - -In France statistics show the following: - - _Removal of Raw Materials_ - Coal 63,000,000 tons - Electric energy 20,976 Mkwh - Petrol and fuel 1,943,750 tons - Iron ore 74,848,000 tons - Siderurgical products 3,822,000 tons - Bauxite 1,211,800 tons - Cement 5,984,000 tons - Lime 1,888,000 tons - Quarry products 25,872,000 tons - -and various other products to a total value of 79,961,423,000 francs. - - _Removal of Industrial Equipment_ - -Total: 9,759,861,000 Francs, of which 2,626,479,000 Francs of Machine -Tools. - - _Removal of Agricultural Produce_ - -Total: 126,655,852,000 francs, i.e., for the principal - - Products: - Wheat 2,947,337 tons - Oats 2,354,080 tons - Milk 790,000 hectolitres - Milk (concentrated 460,000 hectolitres - and in powder) - Butter 76,000 tons - Cheese 49,000 tons - Potatoes 725,975 tons - Various vegetables 575,000 tons - Wine 7,647,000 hectolitres - Champagne 87,000,000 bottles - Beer 3,821,520 hectolitres - Various kinds of 1,830,000 hectolitres - alcohol - - _Removal of Manufactured Products_ - -to a total of 184,640,000 francs. - - _Plundering_ - -Francs: 257,020,024,000 from private enterprise. - -Francs: 55,000,100,000 from the State. - - _Financial Exploitation_ - -From June 1940 to September 1944 the French Treasury was compelled to -pay to Germany 631,866,000,000 francs. - - _Looting and Destruction of Works of Art_ - -The museums of Nantes, Nancy, Old-Marseilles were looted. - -Private collections of great value were stolen. In this way Raphaels, -Vermeers, Van Dycks and works of Rubens, Holbein, Rembrandt, Watteau, -Boucher disappeared. Germany compelled France to deliver up “The Mystic -Lamb” by Van Eyck, which Belgium had entrusted to her. - -In Norway and other occupied countries decrees were made by which the -property of many civilians, societies, etc., was confiscated. An immense -amount of property of every kind was plundered from France, Belgium, -Norway, Holland and Luxembourg. - -As a result of the economic plundering of Belgium between 1940 and 1944 -the damage suffered amounted to 175 billions of Belgian francs. - -2. Eastern Countries: - -During the occupation of the Eastern Countries the German Government and -the German High Command carried out, as a systematic policy, a -continuous course of plunder and destruction including:— - -On the territory of the Soviet Union the Nazi conspirators destroyed or -severely damaged 1,710 cities and more than 70,000 villages and hamlets, -more than 6,000,000 buildings and made homeless about 25,000,000 -persons. - -Among the cities which suffered most destruction are Stalingrad, -Sevastopol, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov, Orel, -Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don, Stalino and Leningrad. - -As is evident from an official memorandum of the German command, the -Nazi conspirators planned the complete annihilation of entire Soviet -cities. In completely secret order of the Chief of the Naval Staff -(Staff Ia No. 1601/41, dated 29, IX, 1941), addressed only to Staff -officers, it was said: - -“The Fuehrer has decided to erase from the face of the earth St. -Petersburgh. The existence of this large city will have no further -interest after Soviet Russia is destroyed. Finland has also said that -the existence of this city on her new border is not desirable from her -point of view. The original request of the Navy that docks, harbor, etc. -necessary for the fleet be preserved—is known to the Supreme Commander -of the Military Forces, but the basic principles of carrying out -operations against St. Petersburgh do not make it possible to satisfy -this request. - -It is proposed to approach near to the city and to destroy it with the -aid of an artillery barrage from weapons of different calibres and with -long air attacks. - -The problem of the life of the population and the provisioning of them -is a problem which cannot and must not be decided by us. - -In this war * * * we are not interested in preserving even a part of the -population of this large city.” - -The Germans destroyed 427 museums, among them the wealthy museums of -Leningrad, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Novgorod, Poltava and others. - -In Pyatigorsk the art objects brought there from the Rostov museum were -seized. - -The losses suffered by the coal mining industry alone in the Stalin -Region amount to 2,000,000,000 rubles. There was colossal destruction of -industrial establishments in Makerevka, Carlovka, Yenakievo, -Konstantinovka, Mariupol, from which most of the machinery and factories -were removed. - -Stealing of huge dimensions and the destruction of industrial, cultural -and other property was typified in Kiev. More than 4,000,000 books, -magazines and manuscripts (many of which were very valuable and even -unique) and a large number of artistic productions and valuables of -different kinds were stolen and carried away. - -Many valuable art productions were taken away from Riga. - -The extent of the plunder of cultural valuables is evidenced by the fact -that 100,000 valuable volumes and 70 cases of ancient periodicals and -precious monographs were carried away by Rosenberg’s staff alone. - -Among further examples of these crimes are: - -Wanton devastation of the city of Novgorod and of many historical and -artistic monuments there. Wanton devastation and plunder of the city of -Rovno and of its province. The destruction of the industrial, cultural -and other property in Odessa. The destruction of cities and villages in -Soviet Karelia. The destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial and -other buildings. - -The destruction of medical and prophylactic institutes, the destruction -of agriculture and industry in Lithuania, the destruction of cities in -Latvia. - -The Germans approached monuments of culture, dear to the Soviet people, -with special hatred. They broke up the estate of the poet Pushkin in -Mikhailovskoye, desecrating his grave, and destroying the neighboring -villages and the Svyatogor monastery. - -They destroyed the estate and museum of Lev Tolstoy, “Yasnaya Polyana” -and desecrated the grave of the great writer. They destroyed in Klin the -museum of Tsaikovsky and in Penaty, the museum of the painter Repin and -many others. - -The Nazi conspirators destroyed 1,670 Greek Orthodox Churches, 237 Roman -Catholic Churches, 67 Chapels, 532 Synagogues, etc. - -They broke up, desecrated and senselessly destroyed also the most -valuable monuments of the Christian Church, such as Kievo-Pecherskaya -Lavra, Novy Jerusalem in the Istrin region, and the most ancient -monasteries and churches. - -Destruction in Esthonia of cultural industrial and other premises: -burning down of many thousands of residential buildings: removal of -10,000 works of art: destruction of medical and prophylactic -institutions. Plunder and removal to Germany of immense quantities of -agricultural stock including horses, cows, pigs, poultry, beehives and -agricultural machines of all kinds. - -Destruction of agriculture, enslavement of peasants and looting of stock -and produce in Lithuania. - -In the Latvian Republic destruction of the agriculture by the looting of -all stock, machinery and produce. - -The result of this policy of plunder and destruction was to lay waste -the land and cause utter desolation. - -The overall value of the material loss which the U.S.S.R. has borne, is -computed to be 679,000,000,000 rubles, in state prices of 1941. - -Following the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 the -defendants seized and stole large stocks of raw materials, copper, tin, -iron, cotton, and food; caused to be taken to Germany large amounts of -railway rolling stock, and many engines, carriages, steam vessels and -trolley buses; plundered libraries, laboratories, and art museums of -books, pictures, objects of art, scientific apparatus and furniture; -stole all gold reserves and foreign exchange of Czechoslovakia, -including 23,000 kilograms of gold of a nominal value of £5,265,000; -fraudulently acquired control and thereafter looted the Czech banks and -many Czech industrial enterprises; and otherwise stole, looted and -misappropriated Czechoslovak public and private property. The total sum -of defendants’ economic spoliation of Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1945 -is estimated at 200,000,000,000 Czechoslovak crowns. - - (_F_) THE EXACTION OF COLLECTIVE PENALTIES - -The Germans pursued a systematic policy of inflicting, in all the -occupied countries, collective penalties, pecuniary and otherwise, upon -the population for acts of individuals for which it could not be -regarded as collectively responsible; this was done at many places, -including Oslo, Stavanger, Trondheim and Rogaland. - -Similar instances occurred in France, among others in Dijon, Nantes and -as regards the Jewish population in the occupied territories. The total -amount of fines imposed on French communities add up to 1,157,179,484 -francs made up as follows— - - A fine on the Jewish population 1,000,000,000 - Various fines 157,179,484 - -These acts violated Article 50, Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and -customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from -the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of -the countries in which such crimes were committed and Article 6 (_b_) of -the Charter. - - (_G_) WANTON DESTRUCTION OF CITIES, TOWNS AND VILLAGES AND DEVASTATION - NOT JUSTIFIED BY MILITARY NECESSITY - -The Defendants wantonly destroyed cities, towns and villages and -committed other acts of devastation without military justification or -necessity. These acts violated Articles 46 and 50 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized -nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes -were committed and Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - -Particulars by way of example only and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases are as follows: - -1. Western Countries: - -In March, 1941, part of Lofoten in Norway was destroyed. - -In April, 1942, the town of Telerag in Norway was destroyed. - -Entire villages were destroyed in France, among others -Oradour-sur-Glane, Saint-Nizier and, in the Vercors, La Mure, Vassieux, -La Chapelle en Vercors. The town of Saint Dié was burnt down and -destroyed. The Old Port District of Marseilles was dynamited in the -beginning of 1943 and resorts along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean -coasts, particularly the town of Sanary, were demolished. - -In Holland there was most widespread and extensive destruction, not -justified by military necessity, including the destruction of harbours, -locks, dykes and bridges: immense devastation was also caused by -inundations which equally were not justified by military necessity. - -2. Eastern Countries: - -In the Eastern Countries the Defendants pursued a policy of wanton -destruction and devastation: some particulars of this (without prejudice -to the production of evidence of other cases) are set out above under -the heading—“Plunder of Public and Private Property”. - -In Greece in 1941, the villages of Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia, -Messovunos, Selli, Ano-Kerzilion and Kato-Kerzilion were utterly -destroyed. - -In Yugoslavia on 15 August, 1941, the German military command officially -announced that the village of Skela was burned to the ground and the -inhabitants killed on the order of the command. - -On the order of the Field Commander Hoersterberg a punitive expedition -from the SS troops and the field police destroyed the villages of -Machkovats, and Kriva Reka in Serbia and all the inhabitants were -killed. - -General Fritz Neidhold (369 Infantry Division) on 11 September, 1944, -gave an order to destroy the villages of Zagniezde and Udora, hanging -all the men and driving away all the women and children. - -In Czechoslovakia the Nazi conspirators also practised the senseless -destruction of populated places. Lezaky and Lidice were burned to the -ground and the inhabitants killed. - - (_H_) CONSCRIPTION OF CIVILIAN LABOUR - -Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted and -forced the inhabitants to labour and requisitioned their services for -purposes other than meeting the needs of the armies of occupation and to -an extent far out of proportion to the resources of the countries -involved. All the civilians so conscripted were forced to work for the -German war effort. Civilians were required to register and many of those -who registered were forced to join the Todt Organization and the Speer -Legion, both of which were semi-military organizations involving some -military training. These acts violated Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague -Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles -of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized -nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes -were committed and Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - -Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to the -production of evidence of other cases, are as follows: - -1. Western Countries: - -In France, from 1942 to 1944, 963,813 persons were compelled to work in -Germany and 737,000 to work in France for the German Army. - -In Luxembourg in 1944 alone, 2,500 men and 500 girls were conscripted -for forced labor. - -2. Eastern Countries: - -Of the large number of citizens of the Soviet Union and of -Czechoslovakia referred to under Count Three VIII (_B_) 2 above many -were so conscripted for forced labor. - -(_I_) FORCING CIVILIANS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO A - HOSTILE POWER - -Civilians who joined the Speer Legion, as set forth in paragraph (_H_) -above, were required under threat of depriving them of food, money and -identity papers, to swear a solemn oath acknowledging unconditional -obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer of Germany, which was to them a -hostile power. - -In Lorraine, Civil Servants were obliged, in order to retain their -positions, to sign a declaration by which they acknowledged the “return -of their Country to the Reich”, pledged themselves to obey without -reservation the orders of their Chiefs and put themselves “at the active -service of the Fuehrer and the Great National Socialist Germany”. - -A similar pledge was imposed on Alsatian Civil Servants by threat of -deportation or internment. - -These acts violated Article 45 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws -and customs of war, the general principles of international law and -Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - - (_J_) GERMANIZATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES - -In certain occupied territories purportedly annexed to Germany the -defendants methodically and pursuant to plan endeavoured to assimilate -those territories politically, culturally, socially and economically -into the German Reich. The defendants endeavoured to obliterate the -former national character of these territories. In pursuance of these -plans and endeavours, the defendants forcibly deported inhabitants who -were predominantly non-German and introduced thousands of German -colonists. - -This plan included economic domination, physical conquest, installation -of puppet Governments, purported de jure annexation and enforced -conscription into the German Armed Forces. - -This was carried out in most of the Occupied Countries including: -Norway, France (particularly in the departments of Upper Rhine, Lower -Rhine, Moselle, Ardennes, Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Moselle), Luxembourg, -the Soviet Union, Denmark, Belgium, Holland. - -In France in the Departments of the Aisne, the Nord, the Meurthe and -Moselle, and especially in that of the Ardennes, rural properties were -seized by a German state organization which tried to have them exploited -under German direction; the landowners of these exploitations were -dispossessed and turned into agricultural labourers. - -In the Department of the Upper Rhine, the Lower Rhine and the Moselle, -the methods of Germanization were those of annexation followed by -conscription. - -1. From the month of August, 1940, officials who refused to take the -oath of allegiance to the Reich were expelled. On September 21st -expulsions and deportation of populations began and on November 22nd, -1940, more than 70,000 Lorrainers or Alsacians were driven into the -South zone of France. From July 31, 1941, onwards, more than 100,000 -persons were deported into the Eastern regions of the Reich or to -Poland. All the property of the deportees or expelled persons was -confiscated. At the same time, 80,000 Germans coming from the Saar or -from Westphalia, were installed in Lorraine and 2,000 farms belonging to -French people were transferred to Germans. - -2. From 2nd January, 1942, all the young people of the Departments of -the Upper Rhine and the Lower Rhine, aged from 10 to 18 years, were -incorporated in the Hitler Youth. The same thing was done in the Moselle -from 4th August, 1942. From 1940 all the French schools were closed, -their staffs expelled, and the German school system was introduced in -the three departments. - -3. On the 28th September, 1940, an order applicable to the Department of -the Moselle ordained the Germanization of all the surnames and christian -names which were French in form. The same thing was done from the 15th -January, 1943, in the Departments of the Upper Rhine and the Lower -Rhine. - -4. Two orders from the 23rd to 24th August, 1942, imposed by force -German nationality on French citizens. - -5. On the 8th May, 1941, for the Upper Rhine and the Lower Rhine, the -23rd April, 1941, for the Moselle, orders were promulgated enforcing -compulsory labour service on all French citizens of either sex aged from -17 to 25 years. From the 1st January, 1942, for young men and from the -26th January, 1942, for young girls, national labour service was -effectively organized in the Moselle. It was from the 27th August, 1942, -in the Upper-Rhine and in the Lower Rhine for young men only. The -classes 1940, 1941, 1942 were called up. - -6. These classes were retained in the Wehrmacht on the expiration of -their time and labour service. On the 19th August, 1942, an order -instituted compulsory military service in the Moselle. On the 25th -August, 1942, the classes 1940-44 were called up in three Departments. -Conscription was enforced by the German authorities in conformity with -the provisions of German legislation. The first revision boards took -place from the 3rd September, 1942. Later in the Upper Rhine and the -Lower Rhine new levies were effected everywhere on classes 1928 to 1939 -inclusive. The French people who refused to obey these laws were -considered as deserters and their families were deported, while their -property was confiscated. - -These acts violated Articles 43, 46, 55 and 56 of the Hague Regulations, -1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal -law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the -internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed -and Article 6 (_b_) of the Charter. - - IX. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense - stated in Count Three - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count Three of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups, and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Three -of the Indictment. - - - COUNT FOUR—CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY - - (Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (_c_).) - X. Statement of the Offense - -All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during a period of -years preceding 8th May, 1945 in Germany and in all those countries and -territories occupied by the German armed forces since 1st September, -1939 and in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in Italy and on the High -Seas. - -All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and -executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit Crimes against Humanity -as defined in Article 6(_c_) of the Charter. This plan involved, among -other things, the murder and persecution of all who were or who were -suspected of being hostile to the Nazi Party and all who were or who -were suspected of being opposed to the common plan alleged in Count One. - -The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the defendants and by -other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under -Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons, when committing the -said War Crimes, performed their acts in execution of a common plan and -conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and -execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated -as leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices. - -These methods and crimes constituted violations of international -conventions, of internal penal laws, of the general principles of -criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations -and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. The -said acts were contrary to Article 6 of the Charter. - -The prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count Three as -also constituting Crimes against Humanity. - -(_A_) MURDER, EXTERMINATION, ENSLAVEMENT, DEPORTATION AND OTHER INHUMANE - ACTS COMMITTED AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATIONS BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR - -For the purposes set out above, the defendants adopted a policy of -persecution, repression, and extermination of all civilians in Germany -who were, or who were believed to, or who were believed likely to -become, hostile to the Nazi Government and the common plan or conspiracy -described in Count One. They imprisoned such persons without judicial -process, holding them in “protective custody” and concentration camps, -and subjected them to persecution, degradation, despoilment, -enslavement, torture and murder. - -Special courts were established to carry out the will of the -conspirators; favoured branches or agencies of the State and Party were -permitted to operate outside the range even of nazified law and to crush -all tendencies and elements which were considered “undesirable”. The -various concentration camps included Buchenwald, which was established -in 1933 and Dachau, which was established in 1934. At these and other -camps the civilians were put to slave labour, and murdered and -ill-treated by divers means, including those set out in Count Three -above, and these acts and policies were continued and extended to the -occupied countries after the 1st September, 1939, and until 8th May, -1945. - - (_B_) PERSECUTION ON POLITICAL, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUNDS IN - EXECUTION OF AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMON PLAN MENTIONED IN COUNT - ONE - -As above stated, in execution of and in connection with the common plan -mentioned in Count One, opponents of the German Government were -exterminated and persecuted. These persecutions were directed against -Jews. They were also directed against persons whose political belief or -spiritual aspirations were deemed to be in conflict with the aims of the -Nazis. - -Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were deprived of -their liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered -and ill-treated. Their property was confiscated. Hundreds of thousands -of Jews were so treated before the 1st September, 1939. - -Since the 1st September, 1939, the persecution of the Jews was -redoubled: millions of Jews from Germany and from the occupied Western -Countries were sent to the Eastern Countries for extermination. - -Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of -evidence of other cases are as follows: - -The Nazis murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss, the Social -Democrat Breitscheid and the Communist Thaelmann. They imprisoned in -concentration camps numerous political and religious personages, for -example Chancellor Schuschnigg and Pastor Niemoeller. - -In November, 1938 by orders of the Chief of the Gestapo, anti-Jewish -demonstrations all over Germany took place. Jewish property was -destroyed, 30,000 Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camps and -their property confiscated. - -Under paragraph VIII (_A_), above, millions of the persons there -mentioned as having been murdered and ill-treated were Jews. - -Among other mass murders of Jews were the following: - -At Kislovdosk all Jews were made to give up their property: 2,000 were -shot in an anti-tank ditch at Mineraliye Vodi: 4,300 other Jews were -shot in the same ditch. - - 60,000 Jews were shot on an island on the Dvina - near Riga. - 20,000 Jews were shot at Lutsk. - 32,000 Jews were shot at Sarny. - 60,000 Jews were shot at Kiev and - Dniepropetrovsk. - -Thousands of Jews were gassed weekly by means of gas-wagons which broke -down from overwork. - -As the Germans retreated before the Soviet Army they exterminated Jews -rather than allow them to be liberated. Many concentration camps and -ghettos were set up in which Jews were incarcerated and tortured, -starved, subjected to merciless atrocities and finally exterminated. - -About 70,000 Jews were exterminated in Yugoslavia. - - XI. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense - stated in Count Four - -Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for a -statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for the -offense set forth in this Count Four of the Indictment. Reference is -hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the -responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as criminal -groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count Four of -the Indictment. - -Wherefore, this Indictment is lodged with the Tribunal in English, -French and Russian, each text having equal authenticity, and the charges -herein made against the above-named defendants are hereby presented to -the Tribunal. - - ROBERT H. JACKSON. - _Acting on Behalf of the United States of America._ - FRANCOIS DE MENTHON. - _Acting on Behalf of the French Republic._ - HARTLEY SHAWCROSS. - _Acting on Behalf of the United Kingdom of Great_ - _Britain and Northern Ireland._ - R. RUDENKO. - _Acting on Behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist_ - _Republics._ - -_Berlin, 6th October, 1945._ - - * * * * * - - APPENDIX A - -Statement of Individual Responsibility for Crimes Set Out in Counts One, - Two, Three and Four - -The statements hereinafter set forth following the name of each -individual defendant constitute matters upon which the prosecution will -rely _inter alia_ as establishing the individual responsibility of the -defendant: - -GOERING: - -The defendant GOERING between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, -Supreme Leader of the SA, General in the SS, a member and President of -the Reichstag, Minister of the Interior of Prussia, Chief of the -Prussian Police and Prussian Secret State Police, Chief of the Prussian -State Council, Trustee of the Four Year Plan, Reich Minister for Air, -Commander in Chief of the Air Force, President of the Council of -Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet -Council, head of the Hermann Goering Industrial Combine, and Successor -Designate to Hitler. The defendant GOERING used the foregoing positions, -his personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in -such a manner that: he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi -conspirators and the consolidation of their control over Germany set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the military and -economic preparation for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; -he participated in the planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators -for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, -Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the War -Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and the Crimes -against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including a -wide variety of crimes against persons and property. - -RIBBENTROP: - -The defendant RIBBENTROP between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi -Party, a member of the Nazi Reichstag, Advisor to the Fuehrer on matters -of foreign policy, representative of the Nazi Party for matters of -foreign policy, special German delegate for disarmament questions, -Ambassador extraordinary, Ambassador in London, organizer and director -of Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, member -of the Secret Cabinet Council, member of the Fuehrer’s political staff -at general headquarters, and General in the SS. The defendant RIBBENTROP -used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate -connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators as set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances as set -forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in accordance with the -Fuehrer Principle he executed and assumed responsibility for the -execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set forth -in Count One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including more particularly the crimes against persons -and property in occupied territories. - -HESS: - -The defendant HESS between 1921 and 1941 was a member of the Nazi Party, -Deputy to the Fuehrer, Reich Minister without Portfolio, member of the -Reichstag, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the -Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet Council, Successor Designate to the -Fuehrer after the defendant Goering, a General in the SS and a General -in the SA. The defendant Hess used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner -that: he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and -the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One -of the Indictment; he promoted the military, economic and psychological -preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the political planning and preparation for Wars of -Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements -and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment: he -participated in the preparation and planning of foreign policy plans of -the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -authorized, directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes -against persons and property. - -KALTENBRUNNER: - -The defendant KALTENBRUNNER between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi -Party, a General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, a General of the -Police, State Secretary for Security in Austria in charge of the -Austrian Police, Police Leader of Vienna, Lower and Upper Austria, Head -of the Reich Main Security Office and Chief of the Security Police and -Security Service. The defendant KALTENBRUNNER used the foregoing -positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: he promoted -the consolidation of control over Austria seized by the Nazi -conspirators as set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the Crimes -against Humanity involved in the system of concentration camps. - -ROSENBERG: - -The defendant ROSENBERG between 1920 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi -Party, Nazi member of the Reichstag, Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for -Ideology and Foreign Policy, the Editor of the Nazi newspaper -“Voelkischer Beobachter”, and of the “NS Monatshefte”, head of the -Foreign Political Office of the Nazi Party, Special Delegate for the -entire Spiritual and Ideological Training of the Nazi Party, Reich -Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories, organizer of the -“Einsatzstab Rosenberg”, a General in the SS and a General in the SA. -The defendant ROSENBERG used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner -that: he developed, disseminated and exploited the doctrinal techniques -of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the psychological preparations for war set -forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the political -planning and preparation for Wars of Aggression and Wars, in Violation -of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and -property. - -FRANK: - -The defendant FRANK between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, a -General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister without -Portfolio, Reich Commissar for the Coordination of Justice, President of -the International Chamber of Law and Academy of German Law, Chief of the -Civil Administration of Lodz, Supreme Administrative Chief of the -military district of West Prussia, Poznan, Odz and Krakow and Governor -General of the Occupied Polish territories. The defendant FRANK used the -foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection -with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the accession to -power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control -over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he authorized, -directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of -the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four -of the Indictment, including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes -against Humanity involved in the administration of occupied territories. - -BORMANN: - -The defendant BORMANN between 1925 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi -Party, member of the Reichstag, a member of the Staff of the Supreme -Command of the SA, founder and head of “Hilfskasse der NSDAP”, -Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff Office of the Fuehrer’s Deputy, head of the -Party Chancery, Secretary of the Fuehrer, member of the Council of -Ministers for the Defence of the Reich, organizer and head of the -Volkssturm, a General in the SS and a General in the SA. The defendant -BORMANN used the foregoing position, his personal influence and his -intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted -the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the War -Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against -Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide -variety of crimes against persons and property. - -FRICK: - -The defendant FRICK between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, -Reichsleiter, General in the SS, member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister -of the Interior, Prussian Minister of the Interior, Reich Director of -Elections, General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich, -head of the Central Office for the Reunification of Austria and the -German Reich, Director of the Central Office for the Incorporation of -Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, the eastern incorporated territories, Eupen, -Malmedy, and Moresnot, Director of the Central Office for the -Protectorate of Bohemia, Moravia, the Government General, Lower Styria, -Upper Carinthia, Norway, Alsace, Lorraine and all other occupied -territories and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The defendant -FRICK used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his -intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted -the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators -for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, -Agreements and Assurances set forth in Count One and Two of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the War -Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against -Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including more -particularly the crimes against persons and property in occupied -territories. - -LEY: - -The defendant LEY between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, -Reichsleiter, Nazi Party Organization Manager, member of the Reichstag, -leader of the German Labor Front, a General in the SA, and Joint -Organizer of the Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers. The -defendant LEY used the foregoing positions, his personal influence and -his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he -promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany as set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed and participated in the -War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and in the Crimes -against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including -particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity relating to the -abuse of human beings for labor in the conduct of the aggressive wars. - -SAUCKEL: - -The defendant SAUCKEL between 1921 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi -Party, Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia, a member of the -Reichstag, General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labour under -the Four Year Plan, Joint Organizer with the defendant Ley of the -Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers, a General in the SS -and a General in the SA. The defendant SAUCKEL used the foregoing -positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: he promoted -the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One -of the indictment; he participated in the economic preparations for Wars -of Aggression and Wars in Violation of Treaties, Agreements and -Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he -authorized, directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth, in -Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth -in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the War Crimes -and Crimes against Humanity involved in forcing the inhabitants of -occupied countries to work, as slave laborers in occupied countries and -in Germany. - -SPEER: - -The defendant SPEER between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, -Reichsleiter, member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister for Armament and -Munitions, Chief of the Organization Todt, General Plenipotentiary for -Armaments in the Office of the Four Year Plan, and Chairman of the -Armaments Council. The defendant SPEER used the foregoing positions and -his personal influence in such a manner that: he participated in the -military and economic planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators -for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, -Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the War -Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against -Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including more -particularly the abuse and exploitation of human beings for forced labor -in the conduct of aggressive war. - -FUNK: - -The defendant FUNK between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, -Economic Adviser of Hitler, National Socialist Deputy to the Reichstag, -Press Chief of the Reich Government, State Secretary of the Reich -Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Reich Minister of -Economics, Prussian Minister of Economics, President of the German -Reichsbank, Plenipotentiary for Economy and member of the Ministerial -Council for the Defense of the Reich. The defendant FUNK used the -foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close connection -with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the accession to -power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control -over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the -preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the military and economic planning and preparation of -the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including more particularly crimes against persons and -property in connection with the economic exploitation of occupied -territories. - -SCHACHT: - -The defendant SCHACHT between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, -a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister of Economics, Reich Minister -without Portfolio and President of the German Reichsbank. The defendant -SCHACHT used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his -connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; and he participated in the military and economic plans and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression, and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth -in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. - -PAPEN: - -The defendant PAPEN between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, a -member of the Reichstag, Reich Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor under Hitler, -special Plenipotentiary for the Saar, negotiator of the Concordat with -the Vatican, Ambassador in Vienna and Ambassador in Turkey. The -defendant PAPEN used the foregoing positions, his personal influence and -his close connection with the Fuehrer in such manner that: he promoted -the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and participated in the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; and he participated in the political planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth -in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. - -KRUPP: - -The defendant KRUPP was between 1932-1945: head of Friedrich KRUPP A.G., -a member of the General Economic Council, President of the Reich Union -of German Industry, and head of the Group for Mining and Production of -Iron and Metals under the Reich Ministry of Economics. The defendant -KRUPP used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his -connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of -their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count One of the -Indictment; he participated in the military and economic planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth -in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including more particularly the exploitation and abuse -of human beings for labor in the conduct of aggressive wars. - -NEURATH: - -The defendant NEURATH between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, -a General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister, Reich -Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of the Secret Cabinet Council, -and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The defendant NEURATH used -the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close -connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the -accession to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth -in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in accordance with the Fuehrer -Principle he executed, and assumed responsibility for the execution of -the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One -of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the -War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes -against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including -particularly the crimes against persons and property in the occupied -territories. - -SCHIRACH: - -The defendant SCHIRACH between 1924 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi -Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Youth Leader on the Staff of the -SA Supreme Command, Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for Youth Education, -Leader of Youth of the German Reich, head of the Hitler Jugend, Reich -Defence Commissioner and Reichstatthalter and Gauleiter of Vienna. The -defendant SCHIRACH used the foregoing positions, his personal influence -and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he -promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the psychological and educational -preparations for war and the militarization of Nazi-dominated -organizations set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he -authorized, directed and participated in the Crimes against Humanity set -forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including, particularly, -anti-Jewish measures. - -SEYSS-INQUART: - -The defendant SEYSS-INQUART between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi -Party, a General in the SS, State Councillor of Austria, Minister of the -Interior and Security of Austria, Chancellor of Austria, a member of the -Reichstag, a member of the Reich Cabinet, Reich Minister without -Portfolio, Chief of the Civil Administration in South Poland, Deputy -Governor-General of the Polish Occupied Territory, and Reich Commissar -for the Occupied Netherlands. The defendant SEYSS-INQUART used the -foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: he -prompted the seizure and the consolidation of control over Austria by -the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he -participated in the political planning and preparation of the Nazi -conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and -property. - -STREICHER: - -The defendant STREICHER between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi -Party, a member of the Reichstag, a General in the SA, Gauleiter of -Franconia, Editor in Chief of the anti-Semitic newspaper “Der Stuermer”. -The defendant STREICHER used the foregoing positions, his personal -influence, and his close connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner -that: he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and -the consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One -of the Indictment: he authorized, directed and participated in the -Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including particularly the incitement of the persecution of the Jews set -forth in Count One and Count Four of the Indictment. - -KEITEL: - -The defendant KEITEL between 1938 and 1945 was: Chief of the High -Command of the German Armed Forces, member of the Secret Cabinet -Council, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the -Reich, and Field Marshal. The defendant KEITEL used the foregoing -positions, his personal influence and his intimate connection with the -Fuehrer in such a manner that: he promoted the military preparations for -war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the -political planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of -Aggression and Wars in Violations of International Treaties, Agreements -and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he -executed and assumed responsibility for the execution of the plans of -the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of -International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts -One and Two of the Indictment; he authorized, directed and participated -in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the -Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, -including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity -involved in the ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of the civilian -population of occupied territories. - -JODL: - -The defendant JODL between 1932 and 1945 was: Lt. Colonel, Army -Operations Department of the Wehrmacht, Colonel, Chief of OKW Operations -Department, Major-General and Chief of Staff OKW and Colonel-General. -The defendant JODL used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, -and his close connection with the Fuehrer in such a manner that: he -promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the -consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of -the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the military planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth -in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons and -property: - -RAEDER: - -The defendant RAEDER between 1928 and 1945 was: Commander-in-Chief of -the German Navy, Generaladmiral, Grossadmiral, Admiralinspekteur of the -German Navy, and a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. The defendant -RAEDER used the foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a -manner that: he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One -of the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth -in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he executed, and assumed -responsibility for the execution of the plans of the Nazi conspirators -for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, -Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in the war -crimes, set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, including -particularly war crimes arising out of sea warfare. - -DOENITZ: - -The defendant DOENITZ between 1932 and 1945 was: Commanding Officer of -the Weddigen U-boat flotilla, Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat arm, -Vice-Admiral, Admiral, Grossadmiral and Commander-in-Chief of the German -Navy, Advisor to Hitler, and Successor to Hitler as head of the German -Government. The defendant DOENITZ used the foregoing positions, his -personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Fuehrer in such -a manner that: he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count -One of the Indictment; he participated in the military planning and -preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in -Violation of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth -in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and -participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment, including particularly the crimes against persons and -property on the high seas. - -FRITZSCHE: - -The defendant FRITZSCHE between 1933 and 1945 was: a member of the Nazi -Party, Editor-in-Chief of the official German news agency, “Deutsche -Nachrichten Bureo”, Head of the Wireless News Service and of the Home -Press Division of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, Ministerialdirektor -of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, head of the Radio Division of the -Propaganda Department of the Nazi Party, and Plenipotentiary for the -Political Organization of the Greater German Radio. The defendant -FRITZSCHE used the foregoing positions and his personal influence to -disseminate and exploit the principal doctrines of the Nazi conspirators -set forth in Count One of the Indictment, and to advocate, encourage and -incite the commission of the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the -Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of -the Indictment including, particularly, anti-Jewish measures and the -ruthless exploitation of occupied territories. - - * * * * * - - APPENDIX B - - Statement of Criminality of Groups and Organizations - -The statements hereinafter set forth, following the name of each Group -or Organization named in the Indictment as one which should be declared -criminal, constitute matters upon which the prosecution will rely inter -alia as establishing the criminality of the Group or Organization: - - DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET) - -“Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet)” referred to in the Indictment -consists of persons who were: - - (i) Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, the date -on which Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic. The term -“ordinary cabinet” as used herein means the Reich Ministers, i.e., heads -of departments of the central government; Reich Ministers without -portfolio; State ministers acting as Reich Ministers; and other -officials entitled to take part in meetings of this cabinet. - - (ii) Members of der Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung (Council -of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich). - - (iii) Members of der Geheimer Kabinettsrat (Secret Cabinet Council). - -Under the Fuehrer, these persons functioning in the foregoing capacities -and in association as a group, possessed and exercised legislative, -executive, administrative and political powers and functions of a very -high order in the system of German government. Accordingly, they are -charged with responsibility for the policies adopted and put into effect -by the government including those which comprehended and involved the -commission of the crimes referred to in Counts, One, Two, Three and Four -of the Indictment. - - DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN - ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY) - -“Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen -Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party)” referred to in the -Indictment consists of persons who were at any time, according to common -Nazi terminology, “Politischer Leiter” (Political Leaders) of any grade -or rank. - -The Politischen Leiter comprised the leaders of the various functional -offices of the Party (for example, the Reichsleitung, or Party Reich -Directorate, and the Gauleitung, or Party Gau Directorate), as well as -the territorial leaders of the Party (for example, the Gauleiter). - -The Politischen Leiter were a distinctive and elite group within the -Nazi Party proper and as such were vested with special prerogatives. -They were organized according to the leadership principle and were -charged with planning, developing and imposing upon their followers the -policies of the Nazi Party. Thus the territorial leaders among them were -called Hoheitstraeger, or bearers of sovereignty, and were entitled to -call upon and utilize the various Party formations when necessary for -the execution of Party policies. - -Reference is hereby made to the allegations in Count One of the -Indictment showing that the Nazi Party was the central core of the -common plan or conspiracy therein set forth. The Politischen Leiter, as -a major power within the Nazi Party proper, and functioning in the -capacities above-described and in association as a group, joined in the -common plan or conspiracy, and accordingly share responsibility for the -crimes set forth in Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the Indictment. - -The prosecution expressly reserves the right to request, at any time -before sentence is pronounced, that Politischer Leiter of subordinate -grades or ranks or of other types or classes, to be specified by the -prosecution, be excepted from further proceedings in this Case No. 1, -but without prejudice to other proceedings or actions against them. - -DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI - (COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE SS) INCLUDING DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST (COMMONLY - KNOWN AS THE SD) - -“Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei -(commonly known as the SS) including Die Sicherheitsdienst (commonly -known as the SD)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the entire -corps of the SS and all offices, departments, services, agencies, -branches, formations, organizations and groups of which it was at any -time comprised or which were at any time integrated in it, including but -not limited to, the Allgemeine SS, the Waffen SS, the SS Totenkopf -Verbaende, SS Polizei Regimente and the Sicherheitsdienst des -Reichsfuehrers-SS (commonly known as the SD). - -The SS, originally established by Hitler in 1925 as an élite section of -the SA to furnish a protective guard for the Fuehrer and Nazi Party -leaders, became an independent formation of the Nazi Party in 1934 under -the leadership of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, Heinrich Himmler. It was -composed of voluntary members, selected in accordance with Nazi -biological, racial and political theories, completely indoctrinated in -Nazi ideology and pledged to uncompromising obedience to the Fuehrer. -After the accession of the Nazi conspirators to power, it developed many -departments, agencies, formations and branches and extended its -influence and control over numerous fields of governmental and Party -activity. Through Heinrich Himmler, as Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the -German Police, agencies and units of the SS and of the Reich were joined -in operation to form a unified repressive police force. The -Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrers-SS (commonly known as the SD), a -department of the SS, was developed into a vast espionage and -counter-intelligence system which operated in conjunction with the -Gestapo and criminal police in detecting, suppressing and eliminating -tendencies, groups and individuals deemed hostile or potentially hostile -to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles and objectives, and -eventually was combined with the Gestapo and criminal police in a single -security police department, the Reich Main Security Office. - -Other branches of the SS developed into an armed force and served in the -wars of aggression referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. -Through other departments and branches the SS controlled the -administration of concentration camps and the execution of Nazi racial, -biological and resettlement policies. Through its numerous functions and -activities it served as the instrument for insuring the domination of -Nazi ideology and protecting and extending the Nazi regime over Germany -and occupied territories. It thus participated in and is responsible for -the crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the -Indictment. - - DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE - GESTAPO) - -“Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known as the -Gestapo)” referred to in the Indictment consists of the headquarters, -departments, offices, branches and all the forces and personnel of the -Geheime Staatspolizei organized or existing at any time after 30 January -1933, including the Geheime Staatspolizei of Prussia and equivalent -secret or political police forces of the Reich and the components -thereof. - -The Gestapo was created by the Nazi conspirators immediately after their -accession to power, first in Prussia by the defendant GOERING and -shortly thereafter in all other states in the Reich. These separate -secret and political police forces were developed into a centralized, -uniform organization operating through a central headquarters and -through a network of regional offices in Germany and in occupied -territories. Its officials and operatives were selected on the basis of -unconditional acceptance of Nazi ideology, were largely drawn from -members of the SS, and were trained in SS and SD schools. It acted to -suppress and eliminate tendencies, groups and individuals deemed hostile -or potentially hostile to the Nazi Party, its leaders, principles and -objectives, and to repress resistance and potential resistance to German -control in occupied territories. In performing these functions it -operated free from legal control, taking any measures it deemed -necessary for the accomplishment of its missions. - -Through its purposes, activities and the means it used, it participated -in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set forth in -Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the Indictment. - - DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN - ARBEITERPARTEI (COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE SA) - -“Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen -Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SA)” referred to in the Indictment -was a formation of the Nazi Party under the immediate jurisdiction of -the Fuehrer, organized on military lines, whose membership was composed -of volunteers serving as political soldiers of the Party. It was one of -the earliest formations of the Nazi Party and the original guardian of -the National Socialist movement. Founded in 1921 as a voluntary militant -formation, it was developed by the Nazi conspirators before their -accession to power into a vast private army and utilized for the purpose -of creating disorder, and terrorizing and eliminating political -opponents. It continued to serve as an instrument for the physical, -ideological and military training of Party members and as a reserve for -the German armed forces. After the launching of the wars of aggression, -referred to in Counts One and Two of the Indictment, the SA not only -operated as an organization for military training but provided auxiliary -police and security forces in occupied territories, guarded -prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps and supervised and -controlled persons forced to labour in Germany and occupied territories. - -Through its purposes and activities and the means it used, it -participated in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes set -forth in Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the Indictment. - - GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES - -The “General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces” referred -to in the Indictment consist of those individuals who between February -1938 and May 1945 were the highest commanders of the Wehrmacht, the -Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. The individuals comprising this -group are the persons who held the following appointments: - - Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander in Chief of the - Navy) - - Chef (and, formerly, Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung - (Chief of Naval War Staff) - - Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander in Chief of the Army) - - Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres (Chief of the General Staff of - the Army) - - Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander in Chief of the Air - Force) - - Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe (Chief of the General Staff - of the Air Force) - - Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command - of the Armed Forces) - - Chef des Fuehrungstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief - of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces) - - Stellvertretender Chef des Fuehrungstabes des Oberkommandos der - Wehrmacht (Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of the High - Command of the Armed Forces) - - Commanders-in-Chief in the field, with the status of - Oberbefehlshaber, of the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air Force. - -Functioning in such capacities and in association as a group at the -highest level in the German Armed Forces Organization, these persons had -a major responsibility for the planning, preparation, initiation and -waging of illegal wars as set forth in Counts One and Two of the -Indictment and for the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved -in the execution of the common plan or conspiracy set forth in Counts -Three and Four of the Indictment. - - * * * * * - - APPENDIX C - - Charges and Particulars of Violations of International Treaties, - Agreements and Assurances Caused by the Defendants in the Course of - Planning, Preparing and Initiating the Wars - - I - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of -International Disputes signed at The Hague, 29 July, 1899._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, by force and arms, on the dates -specified in Column 1, invade the territory of the sovereigns specified -in Column 2, respectively, without first having attempted to settle its -disputes with said sovereigns by pacific means. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Greece - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Yugoslavia - - II - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of -International Disputes signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, by force of arms invade the territory of the sovereigns -specified in Column 2, respectively, without having first attempted to -settle its dispute with said sovereigns by pacific means. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 1 September 1939 Republic of Poland - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - - III - -CHARGE: _Violation of Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of -Hostilities, signed 18 October 1907._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, commence hostilities against the countries specified in Column -2, respectively, without previous warning in the form of a reasoned -declaration of war or an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 1 September 1939 Republic of Poland - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 10 May 1940 Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - - IV - -CHARGE: _Violation of Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and -Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, signed 18 -October 1907._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, by force and arms of its military forces, cross into, invade, -and occupy the territories of the sovereigns specified in, Column 2, -respectively, then and thereby violating the neutrality of said -sovereigns. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - - V - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and -Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919, known -as the Versailles Treaty._ - -PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on and after 7 March 1936, -maintain and assemble armed forces and maintain and construct military -fortifications in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in violation -of the provisions of Articles 42 to 44 of the Treaty of Versailles. - -(2) In that Germany did, on or about 13 March 1938, annex Austria into -the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 80 of the -Treaty of Versailles. - -(3) In that Germany did, on or about 22 March 1939, incorporate the -district of Memel into the German Reich in violation of the provisions -of Article 99 of the Treaty of Versailles. - -(4) In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, incorporate the -Free City of Danzig into the German Reich in violation of the provisions -of Article 100 of the Treaty of Versailles. - -(5) In that Germany did, on or about 16 March 1939, incorporate the -provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, formerly part of Czechoslovakia, into -the German Reich in violation of the provisions of Article 81 of the -Treaty of Versailles. - -(6) In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and thereafter, -repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval and Air Clauses of -the Treaty of Versailles, by creating an air force, by use of compulsory -military service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty -limits, and by increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits, - - VI - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty between the United States and Germany -Restoring Friendly Relations, signed at Berlin, 25 August 1921._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and -thereafter, repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval and Air -Clauses of the Treaty Between the United States and Germany Restoring -Friendly Relations by creating an air force, by use of compulsory -military service, by increasing the size of the army beyond treaty -limits, and by increasing the size of the navy beyond treaty limits. - - VII - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, -Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October -1925._ - -PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, -unlawfully send armed forces into the Rhineland demilitarized zone of -Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. - -(2) In that Germany did, on or about March 1936, and thereafter, -unlawfully maintain armed forces in the Rhineland demilitarized zone of -Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. - -(3) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, and thereafter, -unlawfully construct and maintain fortifications in the Rhineland -demilitarized zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty -of Mutual Guarantee. - -(4) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and -invade Belgium, in violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of Mutual -Guarantee. - -(5) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully attack and -invade Belgium, without first having attempted to settle its dispute -with Belgium by peaceful means, in violation of Article 3 of the Treaty -of Mutual Guarantee. - - VIII - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and -Czechoslovakia, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 15 March 1939, unlawfully -by duress and threats of military might force Czechoslovakia to deliver -the destiny of Czechoslovakia and its inhabitants into the hands of the -Fuehrer and Reichschancellor of Germany without having attempted to -settle its dispute with Czechoslovakia by peaceful means. - - IX - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Arbitration Convention between Germany and -Belgium, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully -attack and invade Belgium without first having attempted to settle its -dispute with Belgium by peaceful means. - - X - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, -done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, -unlawfully attack and invade Poland without first having attempted to -settle its dispute with Poland by peaceful means. - - XI - -CHARGE: _Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered -into between Germany and the Netherlands on 20 May 1926._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning and notwithstanding its -solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature -whatever which might arise between it and the Netherlands which were not -capable of settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by -mutual agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did, -on or about 10 May 1940, with a Military force, attack, invade, and -occupy the Netherlands, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial -integrity and destroying its sovereign independence. - - XII - -CHARGE: _Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation entered -into between Germany and Denmark on 2 June 1926._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its -solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature -whatever which might arise between it and Denmark which were not capable -of settlement by diplomacy and which had not been referred by mutual -agreement to the Permanent Court of International Justice, did, on or -about 9 April, 1940, with a Military Force, attack, invade, and occupy -Denmark, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and -destroying its sovereign independence. - - XIII - -CHARGE: _Violation of Treaty between Germany and other Powers providing -for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at -Paris 27 August 1928, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates specified in -Column 1, with a military force, attack the sovereigns specified in -Column 2, respectively, and resort to war against such sovereigns, in -violation of its solemn declaration condemning recourse to war for the -solution of international controversies, its solemn renunciation of war -as an instrument of national policy in its relations with such -sovereigns, and its solemn covenant that settlement or solution of all -disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or origin arising between it -and such sovereigns should never be sought except by pacific means. - - _Column 1_ _Column 2_ - 1 September 1939 Republic of Poland - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway - 9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium - 10 May 1940 Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg - 10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Greece - 6 April 1941 Kingdom of Yugoslavia - 22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - 11 December 1941 United States of America - - XIV - -CHARGE: _Violation of Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation entered -into between Germany and Luxembourg on 11 September 1929._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and notwithstanding its -solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all disputes which might -arise between it and Luxembourg which were not capable of settlement by -diplomacy, did, on or about 10 May 1940, with a military force, attack, -invade, and occupy Luxembourg, thereby violating its neutrality and -territorial integrity and destroying its sovereign independence. - - XV - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Declaration of Non-Aggression entered into -between Germany and Poland on 26 January 1934._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany proceeding to the application of force for -the purpose of reaching a decision did, on or about 1 September 1939, at -various places along the German-Polish frontier employ military forces -to attack, invade and commit other acts of aggression against Poland. - - XVI - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurance given on 21 May 1935 that the -Inviolability and Integrity of the Federal State of Austria would be -Recognized._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 12 March 1938, at various -points and places along the German-Austrian frontier, with a military -force and in violation of its solemn declaration and assurance, invade -and annex to Germany the territory of the Federal State of Austria. - - XVII - -CHARGE: _Violation of Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany during the period from 12 February 1938 to -13 March 1938 did by duress and various aggressive acts, including the -use of military force, cause the Federal State of Austria to yield up -its sovereignty to the German State in violation of Germany’s agreement -to recognize the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria. - - XVIII - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurances given on 30 January 1937, 28 -April 1939, 26 August 1939 and 6 October 1939 to Respect the Neutrality -and Territorial Inviolability of the Netherlands._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to -peaceful means of settling any considered differences did, on or about -10 May 1940, with a military force and in violation of its solemn -assurances, invade, occupy, and attempt to subjugate the sovereign -territory of the Netherlands. - - XIX - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurances given on 30 January 1937, 13 -October 1937, 28 April 1939, 26 August 1939 and 6 October 1939 to -Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Integrity and Inviolability of -Belgium._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, did on or about 10 May -1940, with a military force and in violation of its solemn assurances -and declarations, attack, invade, and occupy the sovereign territory of -Belgium. - - XX - -CHARGE: _Violation of Assurances given on 11 March 1938 and 26 September -1938 to Czechoslovakia._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939 did, by -establishing a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, under duress and by -the threat of force, violate the assurance given on 11 March 1938 to -respect the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic and the -assurance given on 26 September 1938 that, if the so-called Sudeten -territories were ceded to Germany, no further German territorial claims -on Czechoslovakia would be made. - - XXI - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Munich Agreement and Annexes of 29 September -1938._ - -PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany on or about 15 March 1939, did by -duress and the threat of military intervention force the Republic of -Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of the Czech people and country -into the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich. - -(2) In that Germany refused and failed to join in an international -guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakia state as provided -for in Annex No. 1 to the Munich Agreement. - - XXII - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Solemn Assurance of Germany given on 3 -September 1939, 28 April 1939 and 6 October 1939 that they would not -violate the Independence or Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Norway._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning did, on or about 9 April -1940, with its military and naval forces attack, invade and commit other -acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Norway. - - XXIII - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurances given on 28 April 1939 and 26 -August 1939 to Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Inviolability of -Luxembourg._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and without recourse to -peaceful means of settling any considered differences, did, on or about -10 May 1940, with a military force and in violation of the solemn -assurances, invade, occupy, and absorb into Germany the sovereign -territory of Luxembourg. - - XXIV - -CHARGE: _Violation of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and -Denmark signed at Berlin 31 May 1939._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without prior warning did, on or about 9 -April 1940, with its military forces attack, invade and commit other -acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Denmark. - - XXV - -CHARGE: _Violation of Treaty of Non-Aggression entered into between -Germany and U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939._ - -PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ -military forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the -U.S.S.R. - -(2) In that Germany without warning or recourse to a friendly exchange -of views or arbitration did, on or about 22 June 1941, employ military -forces to attack and commit acts of aggression against the U.S.S.R. - - XXVI - -CHARGE: _Violation of German Assurance given on 6 October 1939 to -Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Integrity of Yugoslavia._ - -PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without prior warning did, on or about 6 -April 1941, with its military forces attack, invade and commit other -acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. - - * * * * * - - STATEMENT OF RESERVATION TO THE INDICTMENT - -Upon the signing of the Indictment in Berlin on 6 October 1945, Justice -Jackson, on behalf of the United States, filed the following statement -of reservation with the Tribunal and with the Chief Prosecutors of -France, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia: - - Berlin - 6 October 1945 - -M. Francois de Menthon, -Sir Hartley Shawcross, -General R. A. Rudenko. - -Dear Sirs: - -In the Indictment of German War Criminals signed today, reference is -made to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and certain other territories as -being within the area of the USSR. This language is proposed by Russia -and is accepted to avoid the delay which would be occasioned by -insistence on an alteration in the text. The Indictment is signed -subject to this reservation and understanding. - -I have no authority either to admit or to challenge, on behalf of the -United States of America, Soviet claims to sovereignty over such -territories. Nothing, therefore, in this Indictment is to be construed -as a recognition by the United States of such sovereignty or as -indicating any attitude, either on the part of the United States or on -the part of the undersigned, toward any claim to recognition of such -sovereignty. - - Respectfully submitted, - [signed] Robert H. Jackson - ROBERT H. JACKSON - Chief of Counsel for the United States - - * * * * * - -To the Clerk or Recording Officer, - International Military Tribunal: - -The representative of the United States has found it necessary to make -certain reservations as to the possible bearing of certain language in -the Indictment upon political questions which are considered to be -irrelevant to the proceedings before this Tribunal. However, it is -considered appropriate to disclose such reservations that they may not -be unknown to the Tribunal in the event they should at any time be -considered relevant. For that purpose, the foregoing copy is filed. - - - - - Chapter IV - MOTIONS, RULINGS, AND EXPLANATORY MATERIAL - RELATING TO CERTAIN OF THE DEFENDANTS - - -Although 24 individuals were named as defendants in the Indictment -signed in Berlin on 6 October 1945, only 22 remained as defendants when -the trial commenced on 20 November. The number had been reduced by the -suicide of Robert Ley and by the Tribunal’s severance of Gustav Krupp -von Bohlen und Halbach from the proceedings. Of the 22 surviving -defendants only 20 appeared in the prisoners’ dock at the opening of -court. Martin Bormann, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, -was presumed to be alive and at large. Ernst Kaltenbrunner had been -hospitalized by a cranial hemorrhage, and as a consequence was unable to -be present at the trial save for one period of a few days. - -Defense counsel for two of the twenty men in the prisoners’ dock, Hess -and Streicher, sought to have the proceedings against their clients -dismissed on the grounds of their mental incapacity to stand trial. -Expert medical examiners concluded that both defendants were fit to -defend themselves, and the proceedings against them were resumed. One of -them, Hess, who had claimed to be a victim of amnesia, created something -of a sensation by confessing in open court that he had only been -pretending to suffer from amnesia and that his memory was actually in -good repair. - -Fuller explanatory notes concerning the positions taken by the -prosecution and the defense and the actions of the Tribunal in the cases -of each of these six defendants, together with significant papers -bearing on these matters, are printed hereinafter. - - - 1. ROBERT LEY - -Pending the opening of the trial on 20 November 1945 the defendants were -held in the prison at the Palace of Justice in Nurnberg, under the -custody of the United States Army. In the evening of October 25 the -guard on watch before the cell of Robert Ley noticed that the prisoner -had maintained the same position for some time without moving. The guard -entered the cell to find that although the prison officials had taken -every known precaution, Ley had succeeded in committing suicide. Ley had -ripped the hemmed edge from a towel, twisted it, soaked it in water, and -fashioned it into a crude noose which he fastened to an overhead toilet -flush pipe. He had then stuffed his mouth with rags, apparently torn -from his own underwear. When he seated himself, strangulation was -produced, and Robert Ley had succeeded in accomplishing his exit from -the court of judgment, and from the world of living men. A farewell -message written by Ley, together with other statements made by him -during imprisonment, may be found at the end of the last volume -(_Statements_ XI-XIII). - - - 2. GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH - -The name of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach stood thirteenth on the -list of twenty-four defendants accused in the Indictment signed in -Berlin on 6 October 1945. On 4 November counsel for Krupp filed a motion -requesting that the Tribunal defer proceedings against the defendant -until his health permitted him to stand trial, and that he should not be -tried in his absence. The Tribunal on 5 November appointed a medical -commission consisting of representatives of the Soviet Union, France, -Great Britain, and the United States, to examine Krupp and determine -whether he was fit to stand trial. On 12 November the Chief of Counsel -for the United States filed an answer opposing the motion of defense -counsel and proposing that Gustav Krupp should not be dismissed from the -proceedings unless Alfried Krupp, the son and sole owner of the Krupp -Works, were substituted as a defendant. On 14 November, before the -opening of the trial itself, the Tribunal heard oral argument by the -prosecution and defense, in which substantially the same views were -presented as had been previously expressed in the written motions. - -The Tribunal on 15 November announced its ruling postponing the -proceedings against Gustav Krupp, but retaining the Indictment charges -against him on the docket for later trial if his physical and mental -condition should permit. The ruling stated that the question of adding -another name to the Indictment would be considered later. Thereupon, on -16 November, the American Chief of Counsel filed a memorandum with the -Tribunal stating as a matter of record that the United States was not -committed to participate in any subsequent four-power trial. On the same -day the Soviet and French Chief Prosecutors joined the United States -Chief of Counsel in a motion formally designating Alfried Krupp a -defendant. On the following day the Tribunal announced its ruling -rejecting the motion to add the name of Alfried Krupp as a defendant. - -The significant papers pertaining to these questions are set forth -below. - - A. _MOTION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST - GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH_ - - Nurnberg, 4 November 1945 - -THEODOR KLEFISCH -LAWYER -COLOGNE, 43, BLUMENTHALSTRASSE - -To: The International Military Tribunal Nurnberg. - -As defending counsel to the accused Dr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und -Halbach I beg to state that the proceedings against this accused be -deferred until he is again fit for trial. - -At any rate I request that the accused be not tried in his absence. - - _Reasons_ - -By Article 12 of the Statute of the International Military Tribunal this -court has the right to try an accused in his absence if he cannot be -found, or if the court deem this necessary for other reasons in the -interest of justice. - -The 75 year old accused Krupp von Bohlen has for a long time been -incapable of trial or examination owing to his severe physical and -mental infirmities. He is not in a position to be in contact with the -outside world nor to make or receive statements. The indictment was -served on him on the 19th October 1945 by a representative of the -International Military Tribunal by placing the document on his bed. The -accused had no knowledge of this event. Consequently he is not aware of -the existence of an indictment. Naturally therefore he is not capable of -communicating either with his defense counsel nor with other persons on -the subject of his defense. - -To prove the above, 2 medical certificates are enclosed viz. that of the -court medical expert Doctor Karl Gersdorf of Werfen Salzburg of 9th -September 1945 and that of the Professor Doctor Otto Gerke of Bedgnstein -of 13th September. - -Latterly Herr Krupp von Bohlen has been examined several times by -American military doctors. As far as it is possible I should like to -request for another complete medical examination. If the accused is -unable to appear before the court, then according to article 12 of the -statute he could only be tried if the court deemed it necessary in the -interests of justice. - -Whatever may be understood by the phrase “in the interests of justice” -it would hardly be objective justice to try a defendant accused of such -serious crimes, if he were not informed of the contents of the -accusations or if he were not given the chance to conduct his own -defense or instruct a defense counsel. Particularly is he in no -condition to comprehend the following rights of an accused set out in -the statute: - -1. By article 16 Section (a) of the statute a copy of the indictment in -a language which he understands will be served on the accused at a -suitably appointed time. In the first place this concerns the statement -which the accused has to render on inquiry as to whether he admits his -guilt or not, a statement which is of particular importance for the -course of the trial and for the decision of the tribunal. This is all -the more important as this statement regarding guilt or innocence can -only be made exclusively by the accused himself according to his own -judgment and after examining his conscience. So far as the procedure is -admissible at all, the defense counsel could not at the request of the -court express himself on the question of guilt as such a declaration -presupposes the possibility of communication and understanding with the -accused. - -Also the defendant could not exercise the right to the last word to -which he is entitled according to Article 24 Section f. - -The legislators who set up these guarantees for the defense, cannot wish -to deny them undeservedly to an accused who cannot make use of them -owing to illness. If by Article 12 of the statute the trial of an absent -defendant is allowed then this exception to the rule can only be applied -to a defendant who is unwilling to appear though able to do so. As is -the case with the criminal procedure rules of nearly all countries, it -is on this principle that the rules and regulations concerning the trial -of absent defendants are based. - - [signed] Klefisch - Lawyer -B. _ANSWER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO THE MOTION FILED IN BEHALF OF KRUPP - VON BOHLEN_ - -To the International Military Tribunal: - -The United States respectfully opposes the application on behalf of -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach that his trial be “deferred until he -is again fit for trial.” - -If the Tribunal should grant this application, the practical effect -would be to quash all proceedings, for all time, against Krupp von -Bohlen. - -It appears that Krupp should not be arrested and brought to the court -room for trial. But the plea is that the Tribunal also excuse him from -being tried _in absentia_. This form of trial admittedly is authorized -by Article 12 of the Charter of the Tribunal. Of course, trial _in -absentia_ in the circumstances of the case is an unsatisfactory -proceeding either for prosecution or for defense. But the request that -Krupp von Bohlen be neither brought to court nor tried in his absence is -based on the contention that “the interest of justice” requires that he -be thus excused from any form of trial. Public interests, which -transcend all private considerations, require that Krupp von Bohlen -shall not be dismissed unless some other representative of the Krupp -armament and munitions interests be substituted. These public interests -are as follows: - -Four generations of the Krupp family have owned and operated the great -armament and munitions plants which have been the chief source of -Germany’s war supplies. For over 130 years this family has been the -focus, the symbol, and the beneficiary of the most sinister forces -engaged in menacing the peace of Europe. During the period between the -two World Wars the management of these enterprises was chiefly in -defendant Krupp von Bohlen. It was at all times, however, a Krupp family -enterprise. Krupp von Bohlen was only a nominal owner himself; his wife, -Bertha Krupp, owned the bulk of the stock. About 1937 their son, Alfried -Krupp, became plant manager and was actively associated in policy-making -and executive management thereafter. In 1940, Krupp von Bohlen, getting -on in years, became Chairman of the Board of the concerns, thus making -way for Alfried, who became President. In 1943, Alfried became sole -owner of the Krupp enterprises by agreement between the family and the -Nazi government, for the purpose of perpetuating this business in Krupp -family control. It is evident that the future menace of this concern -lies in continuance of the tradition under Alfried, now reported to be -an internee of the British Army of the Rhine. - -To drop Krupp von Bohlen from this case without substitution of Alfried, -drops from the case the entire Krupp family, and defeats any effective -judgment against the German armament makers. Whether this would be “in -the interests of justice” will appear from the following recital of only -the most significant items of evidence now in possession of the United -States as to the activities of Krupp von Bohlen, in which his son -Alfried at all times aided, as did other associates in the vast armament -enterprises, all plotting to bring about the second World War, and to -aid in its ruthless and illegal conduct. - -After the first World War, the Krupp family and their associates failed -to comply with Germany’s disarmament agreements, but all secretly and -knowingly conspired to evade them. - -In the March 1, 1940 issue of the Krupp Magazine, the defendant Krupp -stated: - - “I wanted and had to maintain Krupp in spite of all opposition, - as an armament plant for the later future, even if in - camouflaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most - intimate circles, about the real reasons which made me undertake - the changeover of the plants for certain lines of production. * - * * Even the Allied snoop commissioners were duped. * * * After - the accession to power of Adolf Hitler, I had the satisfaction - of reporting to the Fuehrer that Krupp stood ready, after a - short warming-up period, to begin rearmament of the German - people without any gaps of experience * * *” - -Krupp von Bohlen (and Alfried Krupp as well) lent his name, prestige, -and financial support to bring the Nazi Party, with an avowed program of -renewing the war, into power over the German State. On April 25, 1931 -von Bohlen acted as chairman of the Association of German Industry to -bring it into line with Nazi policies. On May 30, 1933 he wrote to -Schacht that “it is proposed to initiate a collection in the most -far-reaching circles of German industry, including agriculture and the -banking world, which is to be put at the disposal of the Fuehrer of the -NSDAP in the name of ‘The Hitler Fund’ * * * I have accepted the -chairmanship of the management council.” Krupp contributed from the -treasury of the main Krupp company 4,738,446 Marks to the Nazi Party -fund. In June, 1935 he contributed 100,000 Marks to the Nazi Party out -of his personal account. - -The Nazi Party did not succeed in obtaining control of Germany until it -obtained support of the industrial interests, largely through the -influence of Krupp. Alfried first became a Nazi Party member and later -von Bohlen did also. The Krupp influence was powerful in promoting the -Nazi plan to incite aggressive warfare in Europe. - -Krupp von Bohlen strongly advocated and supported Germany’s withdrawal -from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. He -personally made repeated public speeches approving and inciting Hitler’s -program of aggression; on April 6th and 7th, 1938 two speeches approved -annexation of Austria; on October 13, 1938 he publicly approved Nazi -occupation of the Sudetenland; on September 4, 1939 he approved the -invasion of Poland; on May 6, 1941 he spoke commemorating the success of -Nazi arms in the West. Alfried Krupp also made speeches to the same -general effect. The Krupps were thus one of the most persistent and -influential forces that made this war. - -The Krupps also were the chief factor in getting ready for the war. In -January, 1944 in a speech at the University of Berlin, von Bohlen -boasted, “Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork -was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German Armed Forces -at the appointed hour without loss of time or experience.” In 1937, -before Germany went to war, the Krupps booked orders to equip satellite -governments on approval of the German High Command. Krupp contributed -20,000 Marks to the defendant Rosenberg for the purpose of spreading -Nazi propaganda abroad. In a memorandum of October 12, 1939, a Krupp -official wrote offering to mail propaganda pamphlets abroad at Krupp -expense. - -Once the war was on, Krupps, both von Bohlen and Alfried being directly -responsible therefor, led German industry in violating treaties and -International Law by employing enslaved laborers, impressed and imported -from nearly every country occupied by Germany, and by compelling -prisoners of war to make arms and munitions for use against their own -countries. There is ample evidence that in Krupp’s custody and service -they were underfed and overworked, misused and inhumanly treated. -Captured records show that in September, 1944, Krupp concerns were -working 54,990 foreign workers and 18,902 prisoners of war. - -Moreover, the Krupp companies profited greatly from destroying the peace -of the world through support of the Nazi program. The rearmament of -Germany gave Krupp huge orders and corresponding profits. Before this -Nazi menace to the peace began, the Krupps were operating at a -substantial loss. But the net profits after taxes, gifts and reserves -steadily rose with rise of Nazi rearmament, being as follows: - - _Marks_ - For year ending Sept. 30, 1935 57,216,392 - For year ending Sept. 30, 1938 97,071,632 - For year ending Sept. 30, 1941 111,555,216 - -The book value of the Krupp concerns mounted from 75,962,000 Marks on -October 1, 1933 to 237,316,093 Marks on October 1, 1943. Even this -included many going concerns in occupied countries carried at a book -value of only 1 Mark each. These figures are subject to the adjustments -and controversies usual with financial statements of each vast -enterprise but approximately reflect the facts about property and -operations. - -The services of Alfried Krupp and of von Bohlen and their family to the -war aims of the Nazi Party were so outstanding that the Krupp -enterprises were made a special exception to the policy of -nationalization of industries. Hitler said that he would be “prepared to -arrange for any possible safeguarding for the continued existence of the -works as a family enterprise; it would be simplest to issue ‘lex Krupp’ -to start with.” After short negotiations, this was done. A decree of -November 12, 1943 preserves the Krupp works as a family enterprise in -Alfried Krupp’s control and recites that it is done in recognition of -the fact that “for 132 years the firm of Fried. Krupp, as a family -enterprise has achieved outstanding and unique merits for the armed -strength of the German people.” - -It has at all times been the position of the United States that the -great industrialists of Germany were guilty of the crimes charged in -this Indictment quite as much as its politicians, diplomats, and -soldiers. Its Chief of Counsel on June 7, 1945, in a report to President -Truman, released by him and with his approval, stated that the -accusations of crimes include individuals in authority in the financial, -industrial, and economic life of Germany, as well as others. - -Pursuant thereto, the United States, with approval of the Secretary of -State, proposed to indict Alfried Krupp, son of Krupp von Bohlen, and -President and owner of the Krupp concern. The Prosecutors representing -the Soviet Union, the French Republic, and the United Kingdom -unanimously opposed inclusion of Alfried Krupp. This is not said in -criticism of them or their judgment. The necessity of limiting the -number of defendants was considered by representatives of the other -three nations to preclude the addition of Alfried Krupp. Learning the -serious condition of Krupp von Bohlen, immediately upon service of the -Indictment, the United States again called a meeting of Prosecutors and -proposed an amendment to include Alfried Krupp. Again the proposal of -the United States was defeated by a vote of three-to-one. If now the -Tribunal shall exercise its discretion to excuse from trial the one -indicted member of the Krupp family, one of the chief purposes of the -United States will be defeated, and it is submitted that such a result -is not “in the interests of justice.” - -The United States respectfully submits that no greater disservice to the -future peace of the world could be done than to excuse the entire Krupp -family and the armament enterprise from this trial in which aggressive -war-making is sought to be condemned. The “interests of justice” cannot -be determined without taking into account justice to the men of four -generations whose lives have been taken or menaced by Krupp munitions -and Krupp armament, and those of the future who can feel no safety if -such persons as this escape all condemnation in proceedings such as -this. - -While of course the United States can not, without the concurrence of -one other power, indict a new defendant, it can under the Charter alone -oppose this Motion. The United States respectfully urges that if the -favor now sought by Krupp von Bohlen is to be granted, it be upon the -condition that Alfried Krupp be substituted or added as a defendant so -that there may be a representative of the Krupp interests before the -Tribunal. - -It may be suggested that bringing in a new defendant would result in -delay. Admitting, however, that a delay which cannot exceed a few days -may be occasioned, it is respectfully suggested that the precise day -that this trial will start is a less important consideration than -whether it is to fail of one of its principal purposes. The American -Prosecution Staff has been by long odds the longest and farthest away -from home in this endeavor. On personal, as well as public interest -considerations, it deplores delay. But we think the future, as well as -the contemporary world, cannot fail to be shocked if, in a trial in -which it is sought to condemn aggressive war-making, the Krupp -industrial empire is completely saved from condemnation. - -The complete trial brief of the United States on Krupp von Bohlen, with -copies of the documents on which his culpability is asserted, will be -made available to the Tribunal if it is desired as evidence concerning -him and Alfried Krupp and the Krupp concerns. - -Respectfully submitted: - - [signed] Robert H. Jackson - ROBERT H. JACKSON, - Chief of Counsel for the United States of America. - 12 November 1945. - C. _RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL ON 15 NOVEMBER 1945_ - - IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF COUNSEL FOR KRUPP VON BOHLEN FOR - POSTPONEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THIS DEFENDANT - -Council for Gustav Krupp von Bohlen has applied to the Tribunal for -postponement of the proceedings against this defendant on the ground -that his physical and mental condition are such that he is incapable of -understanding the proceedings against him and of presenting any defence -that he may have. - -On November 5, the Tribunal appointed a medical commission composed of -the following physicians: R. E. Tunbridge, Brigadier, O.B.E., M.D., -M.Sc., F.R.C.P., Consulting Physician, British Army of the Rhine; Rene -Piedelievre, M.D., professor a la Faculte de Medicine de Paris; Expert -pres les Tribuneaux; Nicolas Kurshakov, M.D., Professor of Medicine, -Medical Institute of Moscow; Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public -Health, U.S.S.R.; Eugene Sepp, M.D., Emeritus Professor of Neurology, -Medical Institute of Moscow; Member, Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R.; -Eugene Krasnushkin, M.D.; Professor of Psychiatry, Medical Institute of -Moscow; Bertram Schaffner, Major, Medical Corps, Neuropsychiatrist, Army -of the United States. - -The Commission has reported to the Tribunal that it is unanimously of -the opinion that Krupp von Bohlen suffers from senile softening of the -brain; that his mental condition is such that he is incapable of -understanding court procedure and of understanding or cooperating in -interrogations; that his physical state is such that he cannot be moved -without endangering his life; and that his condition is unlikely to -improve but rather will deteriorate further. - -The Tribunal accepts the findings of the medical commission to which -exception is taken neither by the Prosecution nor by the Defense. - -Article 12 of the Charter authorizes the trial of a defendant _in -absentia_ if found by the Tribunal to be “necessary in the interests of -justice”. It is contended on behalf of the Chief Prosecutors that in the -interests of justice Krupp von Bohlen should be tried _in absentia_, -despite his physical and mental condition. - -It is the decision of the Tribunal that upon the facts presented the -interests of justice do not require that Krupp von Bohlen be tried _in -absentia_. The Charter of the Tribunal envisages a fair trial in which -the Chief Prosecutors may present the evidence in support of an -indictment and the defendants may present such defence as they may -believe themselves to have. Where nature rather than flight or contumacy -has rendered such a trial impossible, it is not in accordance with -justice that the case should proceed in the absence of a defendant. - -For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal _Orders that_: - -1. The application for postponement of the proceeding against Gustav -Krupp von Bohlen is granted. - -2. The charges in the indictment against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall -be retained upon the docket of the Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the -physical and mental condition of the Defendant should permit. - -Further questions raised by the Chief Prosecutors, including the -question of adding another name to the Indictment, will be considered -later. - - D. _MEMORANDUM FILED BY THE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL_ - -TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -The United States, by its Chief of Counsel, respectfully shows: - -The order of the Tribunal, that “The charges in the indictment against -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall be retained upon the docket of the -Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the physical and mental condition of -the Defendant should permit,” requires the United States to make clear -its attitude toward subsequent trials, which may have been -misapprehended by the Tribunal, in order that no inference be drawn from -its silence. - -The United States never has committed itself to participate in any Four -Power trial except the one now pending. The purpose of accusing -organizations and groups as criminal was to reach, through subsequent -and more expeditious trials before Military Government or military -courts, a large number of persons. According to estimates of the United -States Army, a finding that the organizations presently accused are -criminal organizations would result in the trial of approximately -130,000 persons now held in the custody of the United States Army; and I -am uninformed as to those held by others. It has been the great purpose -of the United States from the beginning to bring into this one trial all -that is necessary by way of defendants and evidence to reach the large -number of persons responsible for the crimes charged without going over -the entire evidence again. We, therefore, desire that it be a matter of -record that the United States has not been, and is not by this order, -committed to participate in any subsequent Four Power trial. It reserves -freedom to determine that question after the capacity to handle one -trial under difficult conditions has been tested. - -Respectfully submitted: - - [signed] Robert H. Jackson - ROBERT H. JACKSON, - Chief of Counsel for the United States - 16 November 1945 - E. _MOTION BY THE SOVIET, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN CHIEF PROSECUTORS TO - DESIGNATE ALFRIED KRUPP AS A DEFENDANT_ - -TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: - -Upon the Indictment, the motion of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach -and the answers thereto, and all proceedings had thereunder, the -Committee of Prosecutors created under the Charter hereby designates -Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach as a defendant and respectfully -moves that the Indictment be amended by adding the name of Alfried Krupp -von Bohlen und Halbach as a defendant, and by the addition of -appropriate allegations in reference to him in the Appendix A thereof. -It also moves that the time of Alfried Krupp be shortened from thirty -days to December 2, 1945. For this purpose, the Committee of Prosecutors -adopts and ratifies the Answer filed on behalf of the United States on -November 12, 1945 in response to the Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach -motion, and the motion made by Robert H. Jackson in open Court on behalf -of the United States of America, The Soviet Union, and The Provisional -Government of France. This motion is authorized by a resolution adopted -at a meeting of the Committee of Prosecutors held on November 16, 1945. - - [signed] Pokrovsky - For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - [signed] Francois de Menthon - For the Provisional Government of France - [signed] Robert H. Jackson - For the United States of America. - 16 November 1945. - F. _RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL REJECTING THE PROSECUTION’S MOTION TO NAME - ALFRIED KRUPP AS A DEFENDANT_ - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - Sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 17 November 1945, - In session 1500 hours - -THE PRESIDENT: The motion to amend the indictment by adding the name of -Alfried Krupp has been considered by the Tribunal in all its aspects and -the application is rejected. - -The Tribunal will now adjourn. - -(Whereupon at 1505 the Tribunal adjourned.) - - - 3. MARTIN BORMANN - -As the day of the trial approached, Martin Bormann, although named as a -defendant in the Indictment, had not yet been apprehended despite the -efforts of numerous special investigators. On 17 November 1945 the -Tribunal requested the views of the prosecution on the question of trial -_in absentia_. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Deputy Chief Prosecutor of Great -Britain, reviewed the information available and, on behalf of the United -States and France as well as Great Britain, stated that: “The -prosecution cannot say that the matter is beyond a probability that -Bormann is dead. There is still the clear possibility that he is alive.” -Notice had been publicly given, in the manner prescribed by the -Tribunal, that Bormann had been named a defendant, and it was therefore -suggested that the case fell within Article 12 of the Charter -authorizing trial _in absentia_. The Soviet representative expressed -concurrence; whereupon Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding, orally -announced the Tribunal’s ruling, on the same date: - - “The Tribunal has decided that, in pursuance of Article 12 of - the Charter, it will try the Defendant Bormann in his absence, - and it announces that counsel for the Defendant Bormann will be - appointed to defend him.” - -Thereafter, the counsel named to defend Bormann moved for postponement -of the proceedings against the defendant. The Tribunal announced on 22 -November through Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding, that: - - “* * * in view of the fact that the provisions of the Charter - and the Tribunal’s rule of procedure have been strictly carried - out in the notices which have been given, and the fact that - counsel for Bormann will have ample time before they are called - upon to present defense on his behalf, the motion is denied.” - - - 4. ERNST KALTENBRUNNER - -On 18 November 1945, two days before the opening of the trial, -Kaltenbrunner suffered a spontaneous subarachanoid hemorrhage and was -taken to the hospital for treatment. He remained there until 6 December, -when he was returned to the jail. He attended the 10 December session of -the Tribunal and was in court for several days thereafter, but his -condition deteriorated so that it was necessary to return him to the -hospital for further treatment. Medical opinion expects at this writing -(23 January), that he will be required to remain under hospital care for -a considerable period. - -On 2 January Kaltenbrunner’s counsel, Dr. Kauffmann, requested the -Tribunal to postpone the case against his client because of his illness. -The Tribunal ruled (1) that the prosecution should proceed with any -evidence which it proposed to direct against the criminality of -organizations with which Kaltenbrunner was connected, (2) that any -prosecution evidence directed against Kaltenbrunner as an individual -should be withheld until the prosecution reached that part of its case -in which it had planned to trace the responsibility of individual -defendants, and (3) that Kaltenbrunner’s case should properly be left -until the end of this section of the evidence. If at that time the -defendant should be still unable to be present in court, the Tribunal -ruled that “the evidence will have to be given in his absence.” - -A closed session followed at which the Tribunal heard both the -prosecution and defense counsel, as a result of which the Tribunal -modified its ruling. Since the prosecution’s evidence was so -inextricably mingled that it was impossible to divide it between that -which bore against Kaltenbrunner as an individual and that which bore -against the organizations which he headed, the Tribunal ruled that it -would hear the prosecution’s evidence in its entirety. Counsel for -Kaltenbrunner, however, was given the privilege of cross-examining at a -later date any witnesses which the prosecution might call against -Kaltenbrunner. The Tribunal pointed out that defense counsel would also, -of course, have an opportunity to deal with any documentary evidence -against Kaltenbrunner when the time came for the presentation of the -defense case. - - - 5. JULIUS STREICHER - -Counsel for Streicher orally requested the Tribunal, on 15 November -1945, to appoint a commission to make a psychiatric examination of the -defendant. This was requested for the Defense Counsel’s “own -protection”, although the defendant thought himself normal and did not -wish an examination. The Tribunal directed the Defense Counsel to make -his motion in writing. The Soviet prosecutor suggested to the Tribunal -the desirability of having such an examination, if it were necessary at -all, while medical experts from the Soviet Union remained in Nurnberg. -Subsequently a panel of three medical experts examined Streicher and -reported that he was fit to stand trial. The Tribunal thereupon ruled, -Lord Justice Lawrence making the announcement orally in court on 22 -November, that - - “* * * the Tribunal wishes me to announce the decision on the - application made on behalf of the Defendant Julius Streicher by - his counsel that his condition should be examined. It has been - examined by three medical experts on behalf of the Tribunal and - their report has been submitted to and considered by the - Tribunal; and it is as follows: - - “‘1. The Defendant Julius Streicher is sane. - - “‘2. The Defendant Julius Streicher is fit to appear before the - Tribunal, and to present his defense. - - “‘3. It being the unanimous conclusion of the examiners that - Julius Streicher is sane, he is for that reason capable of - understanding the nature and policy of his acts during the - period of time covered by the indictment.’ - - “The Tribunal accepts the report of the medical experts and the - trial against Julius Streicher will, therefore, proceed.” - - - 6. RUDOLF HESS - -Through his pre-trial confinement in the Nurnberg prison, Hess had -consistently maintained that he was suffering from amnesia and therefore -could not remember facts concerning his previous activities. In order to -determine Hess’ mental state the Tribunal appointed a commission of -psychiatric experts from the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and -France, to examine the defendant and furnish a report. After receiving -the medical report the Tribunal directed that oral argument by the -prosecution and defense counsel should be heard on 30 November 1945 -concerning the issues raised by the medical report. Prior to the oral -argument, both the prosecution and defense filed written motions which -outlined substantially the positions later taken in court. - -At the conclusion of the oral arguments, the Tribunal called upon Hess -for a statement. Hess thereupon announced that he had simulated loss of -memory for tactical reasons and that his memory was “again in order.” On -the following day the Tribunal ruled that Hess was capable of standing -trial and that his case would proceed. - -The papers pertaining to these matters are set out below. - -A. _RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL ORDERING ARGUMENT ON THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY - THE MEDICAL REPORTS_ - -1. Counsel for the defendant Hess has made application to the Tribunal -to appoint an expert designated by the medical faculty of the University -of Zurich or of Lausanne to examine the defendant Hess with reference to -his mental competence and capacity to stand trial. This application is -denied. - -2. The Tribunal has designated a commission composed of the following -members: - - Eugene Krasnuchkin, M.D., Professor Psychiatry, - Medical Institute of Moscow, assisted by - Eugene Sepp, M.D., Professor Neurology, - Medical Institute of Moscow - Member, Academy of Medical Sciences, USSR; and, - Nicolas Kuraskov, M.D., Professor of Medicine - Medical Institute of Moscow, - Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public Health, USSR. - Lord Moran, M.D., F.R.C.P. - President of the Royal College of Physicians, assisted by - Dr. T. Reece, M.D., F.R.C.P. - Chief Consultant Psychiatrist to the War Office, and - Dr. George Ruddock, M.D., F.R.C.P. - Director of Neurology to the London Hospital and - Chief Consultant Neurologist to the War Office - Dr. Nolan D. C. Lewis, assisted by - Dr. D. Ewen Cameron and - Col. Paul Schroeder, M.D. - Professor Jean Delay. - -The Tribunal has requested the commission to examine the defendant Hess -and furnish a report on the mental state of the defendant with -particular reference to the question whether he is able to take his part -in the trial, specifically: (1) Is the defendant able to plead to the -indictment? (2) Is the defendant sane or not, and on this last issue the -Tribunal wishes to be advised whether the defendant is of sufficient -intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings of the trial so as -to make a proper defense, to challenge a witness to whom he might wish -to object and to understand the details of the evidence. - -3. The examiners have presented their reports to the Tribunal in the -form which commends itself to them. It is directed that copies of the -reports be furnished to each of the Chief Prosecutors and to defense -counsel. The Tribunal will hear argument by the Prosecution and by -defense counsel on the issues presented by the reports on Friday, -November 30 at 4 P. M. - - INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - [signed] Geoffrey Lawrence - Geoffrey Lawrence - President - Dated Nurnberg, Germany this 24th day of November, 1945 - Copies of four (4) Medical Reports attached: - _(1) British Medical Report_ - -REPORT on Rudolf Hess, telephoned from London. - -“The undersigned, having seen and examined Rudolf Hess, have come to the -following conclusion: - -1. There are no relevant physical abnormalities. - -2. His mental state is of a mixed type. He is an unstable man, and what -is technically called a psychopathic personality. The evidence of his -illness in the past four years, as presented by one of us who has had -him under his care in England, indicates that he has had a delusion of -poisoning, and other similar paranoid ideas. - -Partly as a reaction to the failure of his mission, these abnormalities -got worse, and led to suicidal attempts. - -In addition, he has a marked hysterical tendency, which has led to the -development of various symptoms, notably a loss of memory, which lasted -from November 1943 to June 1944, and which resisted all efforts at -treatment. A second loss of memory began in February 1945 and lasted -till the present. This amnesic symptom will eventually clear, when -circumstances change. - -3. At the moment he is not insane in the strict sense. His loss of -memory will not entirely interfere with his comprehension of the -proceedings, but it will interfere with his ability to make his defense, -and to understand details of the past, which arise in evidence. - -4. We recommend that further evidence should be obtained by -narco-analysis and that if the Court decides to proceed with the Trial, -the question should afterwards be reviewed on psychiatric grounds.” - - [signed] Moran - J. Rees, MD, FRCP - George Riddoch - Dated 19th November, 1945 - _(2) Joint American and French Medical Report_ - 20 November 1945 - -MEMORANDUM TO: Brigadier General Wm. L. Mitchell, General Secretary for -the International Military Tribunal. - -In response to request of the Tribunal that the defendant Rudolf Hess be -examined, the undersigned psychiatrists examined Rudolf Hess on November -15th and 19th, 1945, in his cell in the Military Prison in Nurnberg. - -The following examinations were made: physical, neurological and -psychological. - -In addition, documents were studied bearing information concerning his -personal development and career. Reports concerning the period of his -stay in England were scrutinized. The results of all psychological, -special psychometric examinations and observations carried out by the -prison psychiatrist and his staff were studied. Information was also -derived from the official interrogation of the defendant on November -14th and November 16th, 1945. - -(1) We find, as a result of our examinations and investigations, that -Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in part by loss of -memory. The nature of this loss of memory is such that it will not -interfere with his comprehension of the proceedings, but it will -interfere with his response to questions relating to his past and will -interfere with his undertaking his defense. - -In addition there is a conscious exaggeration of his loss of memory and -a tendency to exploit it to protect himself against examination. - -(2) We consider that the existing hysterical behaviour which the -defendant reveals was initiated as a defense against the circumstances -in which he found himself while in England; that it has now become in -part habitual and that it will continue as long as he remains under the -threat of imminent punishment, even though it may interfere with his -undertaking a more normal form of defense. - -(3) It is the unanimous conclusion of the undersigned that Rudolf Hess -is not insane at the present time in the strict sense of the word. - - (s) D. Ewen Cameron - DR. D. EWEN CAMERON - Professor of Psychiatrie, McGill University - (s) Paul L. Schroeder - COL. PAUL L. SCHROEDER - A.U.S. Neuropsychiatric Consultant - (s) Jean Delay - DR. JEAN DELAY - Professor of Psychiatrie at the Faculty of Medicine in Paris - (s) Nolan D. C. Lewis - DR. NOLAN D. C. LEWIS - Professor Psychiatry, Columbia University - _(3) Soviet Medical Report_ - -TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL - -In pursuance of the assignment by the Tribunal, we, the medical experts -of the Soviet Delegation, together with the physicians of the English -Delegation and in the presence of one representative of the American -Medical Delegation, have examined Rudolf Hess and made a report on our -examination of Mr. Hess together with our conclusions and interpretation -of the behavior of Mr. Hess. - -The statement of the general conclusions has been signed only by the -physicians of the Soviet Delegation and by Professor Delay, the medical -expert of the French Delegation. - -Appendix: 1 Conclusions and 2 the Report on the examination of Mr. Hess. - - (signed) Professor Krasnushkin, - Doctor of Medicine - (signed) Professor Sepp, - Honorary Scientist, Regular Member of the - Academy of Medicine - (signed) Professor Kushakov, - Doctor of Medicine, Chief Therapeutist of the - Commissariat of Health of the U.S.S.R. - November 17, 1945 - (_a_) Conclusions - -After observation and an examination of Rudolf Hess the undersigned have -reached the following conclusions: - -1. No essential physical deviations from normality were observed. - -2. His mental conditions are of a mixed type. He is an unstable person, -which in technical terms is called a psychopathic personality. The data -concerning his illness during the period of the last four years -submitted by one of us who had him under observation in England, show -that he had a delusion of being poisoned and other similar paranoic -notions. - -Partly as a reaction to the failure of his mission there, the abnormal -manifestations increased and led to attempts at suicide. In addition to -the above-mentioned he has noticeable hysterical tendencies which caused -a development of various symptoms, primarily, of amnesia that lasted -from November 1943 to June of 1944 and resisted all attempts to be -cured. - -The amnesia symptom may disappear with changing circumstances. - -The second period of amnesia started in February of 1945 and has lasted -up through the present. - -3. At present he is not insane in the strict sense of the word. His -amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding what is going -on around him but it will interfere with his ability to conduct his -defense and to understand details of the past which would appear as -factual data. - -4. To clarify the situation we recommend that a narco-analysis be -performed on him and, if the Court decides to submit him to trial, the -problem should be subsequently reexamined again from a psychiatric point -of view. - -The conclusion reached on November 14 by the physicians of the British -Delegation, Lord Moran, Dr. T. Rees and Dr. G. Riddoch, and the -physicians of the Soviet Delegation, Professors Krasnushkin, Sepp, and -Kurshakov, was also arrived at on November 15 by the representative of -the French Delegation, Professor Jean Delay. - -After an examination of Mr. Hess which took place on November 15, 1945, -the undersigned Professors and experts of the Soviet Delegation, -Krasnushkin, Sepp and Kurshakov, and Professor Jean Delay, the expert -from the French Delegation, have agreed on the following statement: - -Mr. Hess categorically refused to be submitted to narco-analysis and -resisted all other procedures intended to effect a cure of his amnesia, -and stated that he would agree to undergo treatment only after the -trial. The behavior of Mr. Hess makes it impossible to apply the methods -suggested in Paragraph 4 of the report of November 14 and to follow the -suggestion of that Paragraph in present form. - - (signed) Professor Krasnushkin, - Doctor of Medicine - (signed) Professor Sepp, - Honorary Scientist, Regular Member of the - Academy of Medicine - (signed) Professor Kurshakov, - Doctor of Medicine, Chief Theraputist of the - Commissariat of Health of the U.S.S.R. - (signed) Professor Jean Delay - of the School of Medicine in Paris - November 16, 1945 - (_b_) Record of Examination of Rudolf Hess - -According to the information obtained on Nov. 16, 1945, during the -interrogation of Rosenberg who had seen Hess immediately before the -latter’s flight to England, Hess gave no evidence of any abnormality -either in appearance or conversation. He was, as usual, quiet and -composed. Nor was it apparent that he might have been nervous. Prior to -this, he was a calm person, habitually suffering pains in the region of -the stomach. - -As can be judged on the basis of the report of the English psychiatrist, -Doctor Rees, who had Hess under observation from the first days of his -flight to England, Hess, after the airplane crash, disclosed no evidence -of a brain injury, but, upon arrest and incarceration, he began to give -expression to ideas of persecution. He feared that he would be poisoned, -or killed and his death represented as a suicide, and that all this -would be done by the English under the hypnotic influence of the Jews. -Furthermore, these delusions of persecution were maintained up to the -news of the catastrophe suffered by the German Army at Stalingrad when -the manifestations were replaced by amnesia. According to Doctor Rees, -the delusions of persecution and the amnesia were observed not to take -place simultaneously. Furthermore, there were two attempts at suicide. A -knife wound, inflicted during the second attempt, in the skin near the -heart gave evidence of a clearly hysterico-demonstrative character. -After this there was again observed a change from amnesia to delusions -of persecution, and during this period he wrote that he was simulating -his amnesia, and, finally, again entered into a state of amnesia which -has been prolonged up to the present. - -According to the examination of Rudolf Hess on Nov. 14, 1945, the -following was disclosed. - -Hess complains of frequent cramping pains in the region of the stomach -which appear independent of the taking of food, and headaches in the -frontal lobes during mental strain, and, finally, of loss of memory. - -In general his condition is marked by a pallor of the skin and a -noticeable reduction in food intake. - -Regarding the internal organs of Hess, the pulse is 92, and a shakening -of the heart tone is noticeable. There has been no change in the -condition of the other internal organs. - -Concerning the neurological aspect, there are no symptoms of organic -impairment of the nervous system. - -Psychologically, Hess is in a state of clear consciousness; knows that -he is in prison at Nurnberg under indictment as a war criminal; has -read, and, according to his own words, is acquainted with the charges -against him. He answers questions rapidly and to the point. His speech -is coherent, his thoughts formed with precision and correctness and they -are accompanied by sufficient emotionally expressive movements. Also, -there is no kind of evidence of paralogism. It should also be noted -here, that the present psychological examination, which was conducted by -Lieut. Gilbert, M.D., bears out the testimony that the intelligence of -Hess is normal and in some instances above the average. His movements -are natural and not forced. - -He has expressed no delirious fancies nor does he give any delirious -explanation for the painful sensation in his stomach or the loss of -memory, as was previously attested to by Doctor Rees, namely, when Hess -ascribed them to poisoning. At the present time, to the question about -the reason for his painful sensations and the loss of memory, Hess -answers that this is for the doctors to know. According to his own -assertions, he can remember almost nothing of his former life. The gaps -in Hess’ memory are ascertained only on the basis of the subjective -changing of his testimony about his inability to remember this or that -person or event given at different times. What he knows at the present -time is, in his own words, what he allegedly learned only recently from -the information of those around him and the films which have been shown -him. - -On Nov. 14 Hess refused the injection of narcotics which were offered -for the purpose of making an analysis of his psychological condition. On -Nov. 15, in answer to Prof. Delay’s offer, he definitely and firmly -refused narcosis and explained to him that, in general, he would take -all measures to cure his amnesia only upon completion of the trial. - -All that has been exposed above, we are convinced, permits, of the -interpretation that the deviation from the norm in the behavior of Hess -takes the following forms: - -I. In the psychological personality of Hess there are no changes typical -of the progressive schizophrenic disease, and therefore the delusions, -from which he suffered periodically while in England, cannot be -considered as manifestations of a schizophrenic paranoia, and must be -recognized as the expression of a psychogenic paranoic reaction, that -is, the psychologically comprehensible reaction of an unstable -(psychologically) personality to the situation (the failure of his -mission, arrest and incarceration). Such an interpretation of the -delirious statements of Hess in England is bespoken by their -disappearance, appearance and repeated disappearance depending on -external circumstances which affected the mental state of Hess. - -II. The loss of memory of Hess is not the result of some kind of mental -disease but represents hysterical amnesia, the basis of which is a -subconscious inclination toward self-defense as well as a deliberate and -conscious tendency toward it. Such behavior often terminates when the -hysterical person is faced with an unavoidable necessity of conducting -himself correctly. Therefore, the amnesia of Hess may end upon his being -brought to trial. - -III. Rudolf Hess, prior to his flight to England, did not suffer from -any kind of insanity, nor is he now suffering from it. At the present -time he exhibits hysterical behavior with signs of a -conscious-intentional (simulated) character, which does not exonerate -him from his responsibility under the indictment. - - (signed) Professor Krasnushkin, - Doctor of Medicine - (signed) Professor Sepp, - Honorary Scientist, Regular Member of the - Academy of Medicine - (signed) Professor Kurshakov, - Doctor of Medicine, Chief Theraputist of the - Commissariat of Health of the U.S.S.R. - 17 November 1945 - B. _MOTION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST - HESS_ - -Attorney-at-law von Rohrscheidt -Defense Counsel for Rudolf Hess - - Nurnberg, 29 November 1945 - -To the General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, -Nurnberg: - -_Reference: Rudolf Hess—Session of 30 November 1945._ - -I. Reply to the request of the Tribunal of 28 November 1945. - -II. Preparatory statement for the trial. - - I - -I, as Counsel for the Defendant Hess, answer the request of the Tribunal -of 28 November 1945 as follows: - -1. No formal objection is being raised by Defense against presentation -and use of the expert opinions obtained by the Tribunal. - -2. The Defense does not think the defendant Hess to be -“verhandlungsfaehig” (in a state of health to be tried). - -3. Material objections are being raised by the Defense, inasmuch as the -expert opinion denies the competence of the defendant as a consequence -of a mental disorder. - - II - -For the proceedings, I, as Counsel for the Defendant Hess, wish to make -the following statement: - -1. _I move_: - -_a._ That a decision be made to adjourn the proceedings against the -defendant temporarily. - -_b._ That in case incapacity to be tried is asserted, proceedings in -absentia against the defendant should not be carried on. - -_c._ That in case my motion _ad a_ is rejected, a super expert opinion -be obtained from additional eminent psychiatrists. - -2. I _argue_ these motions as follows: - -_ad 1-a_: The adjournment of the proceedings is necessary because of the - unfitness of the defendant to follow them. - -In this respect the (medical) opinions state unanimously upon the -questions asked by the Tribunal, that “the ability of the Defendant Hess -is impaired to the extent that he cannot defend himself, nor oppose a -witness, nor understand the details of evidence.” Even if the amnesia -does not keep him from understanding what happens about him or to -understand the course of the trial, this amnesia nevertheless has a -disturbing effect on his defense. - -The impairment of the defendant in his defense, through his amnesia, -recognized by all opinions as a mental defect, has to be acknowledged as -such, in view of the statements in the opinions of the Soviet, English -and American Delegations of 14 November 1945, which designate the mental -condition as one of a mixed kind, but more as one of a sort of mental -abnormality. This will not make a pertinent defense possible for him -(Hess). - -In this respect, it does not have to be considered that the defendant is -not mentally ill “in the literal meaning of the word” and that he can -follow the proceedings. The question whether the defendant is at present -incapable, as a result of the diminution of his “mental powers,” to -understand all occurrences and to defend himself properly, has nothing -to do with his mental derangement when committing the crime. - -In the opinion of counsel, the defendant is in no case in a position to -make himself understood or to understand argument, because he is -impaired in his mental clarity through the loss of his memory and -because he has completely lost the knowledge of previous events and of -people of former acquaintance. - -Since the expert establishment of his mental disorder which impairs the -defendant in the full execution of his defense, makes proceedings -against him inadmissible, the statement of the defendant that he thinks -himself capable of being tried has no significance. - -According to expert opinion, the impairment of the defendant cannot be -removed within a measurable space of time. It is not sure whether -treatment through Narco-Analysis, as proposed by the medical experts, -will have the desired result. The defendant has refused to submit to -this treatment only because he thinks of himself as capable of being -tried and consequently not in need of such treatment. Furthermore, -because he is opposed to any forcible influence upon the body, and -finally, he is afraid of physical disturbances which would prevent him -from participating in the trial if such method of treatment is used at -this time. The proceedings would have to be dropped in case of an -illness of long duration which excludes his fitness to be tried. - -_ad 1-b_: According to Article 12 of the Statutes, the Tribunal has the - right to proceed against a defendant in absentia if - -he, the defendant, cannot be located or if the Tribunal thinks it -necessary, for other reasons, in the interests of justice. If the -Tribunal, on the basis of convincing expert opinions, establishes that -the defendant is not in a position to put up a pertinent defense and -consequently decides not to proceed against him, proceedings in -absentia, according to Article 12, could then only be carried on if this -is in the interest of justice. It would not be compatible with objective -justice, in case that actual proof of this fact is available, if the -defendant is impeded by an impairment based upon health reasons, in -personally standing up for his rights and in being present at the trial. - -In proceedings which accuse the defendant of such serious crimes and -possibly carry the death penalty, it would not be compatible with -objective justice if he were personally denied the opportunity to look -after his rights as stated in Article 16 of the Statutes. These rights -provide for his self-defense. The possibility to “personally present -evidence for one’s defense and to cross-examine each witness of the -prosecution” is of such importance that any exclusion of such rights has -to be considered an injustice toward the defendant. Proceedings in -absentia can, under no circumstances, be accepted as a “fair trial.” - -The same is true for the exclusion of the defendant from the rights -which are granted him during the proceedings according to Article 24. - -If the defendant is impaired in his ability to defend himself for the -reasons of the expert opinions, and to the extent explained therein, -then he is just as little in a position to give his Counsel the -necessary information and to enable him to take care of the defense in -his absence. - -Since the Statutes establish the rights for the defense in this precise -manner, it does not seem fair to withhold these from a defendant in a -case when he is prevented from personally taking care of his defense -during the proceedings. The rules in Article 12, regarding the -proceedings against an absent defendant, have to be considered as an -exception which should only be used against a defendant who tries to -dodge in spite of his being in a position to be tried. The Defendant -Hess has always been prepared to be tried in order to avoid proceedings -in absentia, which he considers an injustice of the highest measure. - -_ad 1-c_: In case the Court should not agree with the explanations and - should not consider the statements of the expert - -opinion in the sense of the defense, and therefore come to a denial of -the Application ad a, it seems necessary to obtain the super opinion -because the opinions testify to the fact that the defendant is a -psychopathic personality who suffers from hallucinations and still today -shows, in the loss of memory, clear signs of a serious hysteria. If the -Tribunal does not consider these sentiments alone as sufficient for the -establishment of incapability to be tried, a more intensive examination -would have to follow which would not be confined to an examination of -only one or two hours on several days, but require a clinical -observation. - -The opinions, themselves, provide for another examination of the mental -condition of the defendant, which seems to prove that the experts -possibly have a “disturbance of the mental capacity” in mind if the -condition of the defendant lasts and the Tribunal, against expectations, -declares the defendant unfit to be tried and therewith incompetent under -all circumstances. - - /Signed/ von Rohrscheidt - Attorney-at-Law - Translator: Dr. H. v. V. Veith - C. _ANSWER BY THE FOUR CHIEF PROSECUTORS_ - -TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: -MATTER OF RUDOLF HESS - -The undersigned representatives of their respective nations answer the -request of the Tribunal of 28 November, 1945 respectfully as follows: - -1. We do not challenge or question the report of the Committee. - -2. It is our position that the defendant Rudolf Hess is fit to stand -trial. - -3. Observations may be filed by any of the undersigned based on their -respective relationships to the subject matter. - - [signed] R. RUDENKO - For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - [signed] C. DUBOST - For the Provisional Government of France - [signed] DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE - For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - [signed] ROBERT H. JACKSON - For the United States of America - 29 November 1945 - _(1) Answer by the United States Chief of Counsel_ - -TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: - -The United States respectfully files the following observations on the -application of RUDOLF HESS: - -Hess’ condition was known to the undersigned representative of the -United States immediately after his delivery to the Nurnberg prison and -was the subject of a report by Major Douglas McG. Kelley of the Medical -Corps of the United States Army, which report is attached hereto. - -The report of Major Kelley and his recommendation for treatment were -submitted to me and on October 20, 1945, I advised that “any treatment -of this case involving the use of drugs which might cause injury to the -subject is disapproved.” This was not because I disapproved of the -treatment. I approve of the treatment and would insist on its being -employed if the victim were a member of my own family. But I was of the -opinion that the private administration of any kind of drug to Hess -would be dangerous because if he should thereafter die, even of natural -causes, it would become the subject of public controversy. This -completely agreed with the opinion of the Security Officer, Colonel B. -C. Andrus, whose report is attached. - -In view of the statements contained in the medical report of the -Commission and in view of the facts which I have recited, the United -States must regard Hess as a victim, at most, of a voluntary amnesia and -presenting no case for excuse from trial. - -Respectfully submitted - - [signed] Robert H. Jackson - Chief of Counsel for the United States. - 29 November 1945. - - * * * * * - - [Enclosure] - - HEADQUARTERS - INTERNAL SECURITY DETACHMENT - OFFICE US CHIEF OF COUNSEL - APO 403, US ARMY - - 16 October 1945 - -SUBJECT: Psychiatric Status of Internee. -TO: Commanding Officer, Internal Security Detachment. - -1. Internee Rudolf HESS has been carefully studied since his admission -to Nurnberg Prison. - -2. On entry HESS manifested a spotty amnesia. The British psychiatrist -accompanying him stated that from 4 October 43 to 4 February 45 HESS -presented symptoms of total amnesia. From 4 February 45 to 12 July 45 he -recovered, and is said to have made a statement that his previous -amnesia was simulated. On 12 July 45 he again developed amnesia which -has lasted to the present. Also while in England HESS claimed he was -being poisoned and sealed up numerous samples of food, chocolate, -medicine, etc. as “evidence” to be analyzed prior to his trials. Such -behavior could be either simulated or a true paranoid reaction. - -3. Present examination reveals a normal mental status with the exception -of the amnesia. Attitude and general behavior are normal, mood and -affect, while slightly depressed, are intact and normal. Sensorium is -intact and insight is good. Content reveals vague paranoid trends, but -there is no evidence of any actual psychosis. His reactions to his -suspicions are not fixed—and delusioned trends—are distinctly spotty -and disconnected. His reactions are those of an individual who has given -up a simulated behavior pattern rather than those of the psychotic. -Oddly enough his memory for this phase of behavior is excellent. - -4. Special examinations with Rorschach cards indicate some neurotic -patterns. They point to a highly schizoid personality with hysterical -and obsessive components. Such findings are confirmed in the patient’s -present reactions. He complains bitterly of “stomach cramps” which are -obviously neurotic manifestations. He is over-dramatic in his actions -presenting typical hysterical gestures, complaints and symptoms. His -amnesia is at present limited to personal events concerning his history -after joining the party. The amnesia however shifts in a highly -suspicious fashion. Such amnesias may be hysterical in nature but in -such cases do not change in depth from day to day and facts recently -learned are not lost as with Hess. - -5. In HESS’ case there is also the factor of his long amnesia in -England. It is quite possible that he has suggested an amnesia to -himself for so long that he partially believes in it. In a person of -hysterical make-up such auto suggestion could readily produce an amnesic -state. Also the “gain” or protection found in amnesia, fancied or real, -would be a bar to its easy clearance. Finally a large conscious element -may well be present. - -6. In this case I believe all those factors are present. Treatment will -have to be formulated along lines attacking the suggestive factors and -overcoming conscious restraints. Hypnosis would be a value but probably -chemical hypnosis will be required. Such narco-hypnosis and analysis -require the use of intra venous drugs of the barbitol series, either -sodium amytol or sodium pentothal. Such treatment is in general -innocuous if proper precautions are taken. It must be borne in mind, -however, that occasional accidents happen in any intravenous technique. -With the drugs mentioned above rare fatalities have been reported -although in more than 1000 such cases personally treated, I have never -seen one. - -7. Essentially the present situation is as follows: - -_a._ Internee HESS is sane and responsible. - -_b._ Internee HESS is a profound neurotic of the hysterical type. - -_c._ His amnesia is of mixed etiology, stemming from auto suggestions -and conscious malingering in a hysterical personality. - -_d._ Treatment will be required if it is felt desirable to remove this -amnesia. - -_e._ Such treatment, though it cannot eliminate the conscious element is -of great value in estimating its importance. With such techniques -accurate estimates of malingering can be made. If this is a true -amnesia, total recovery can be predicted. - -_f._ Such treatment is essentially harmless except in extremely rare -instances. In ordinary practice the value of the treatment far outweighs -any of its hazards. - -8. Clarification as to the desired degree of treatment in this case is -requested. - - [signed] DOUGLAS McG. KELLEY - Major, MC - - * * * * * - - 1st Ind - -HEADQUARTERS, INTERNAL SECURITY DETACHMENT, OFFICE US CHIEF OF -COUNSEL—APO 403, U. S. ARMY—17 OCTOBER 1945 - -TO: Mr. Justice Jackson’s Office US Chief of Counsel - APO 403, U. S. Army - (Attention: Colonel Gill) - -HESS believes or has pretended that the British attempted to poison him. -Treatment with drugs might call forth the same suspicion or allegation -against us by him. Undue alarm might be injurious to the patient. - - /s/ B. C. Andrus - /t/ B. C. ANDRUS - Colonel Cav - Commandant - - * * * * * - - 2nd Ind - -OFFICE US CHIEF OF COUNSEL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE, APO, 403, U. S. ARMY - - 20 October 1945 - -TO: Headquarters, Internal Security Detachment. - Office US Chief of Counsel - -Any treatment of this case involving the use of drugs which might cause -injury to the subject is disapproved. - - ROBT. J. GILL - Colonel, CMP - Executive - - D. _STATEMENT BY HESS TO THE TRIBUNAL CONCERNING HIS MEMORY_ - - 30 November 1945 - Afternoon Session - -“Mr. President: At the beginning of this afternoon’s proceedings, I -handed my defense counsel a note stating that I am of the opinion that -these proceedings could be shortened if I could speak briefly. What I -have to say is as follows: In order to prevent any possibility of my -being declared incapable of pleading—although I am willing to take part -in the rest of the proceedings with the rest of them, I would like to -make the following declaration to the Tribunal although I originally -intended not to make this declaration until a later time. My memory is -again in order. The reason why I simulated loss of memory was tactical. -In fact, it is only that my power for concentration is slightly reduced -but in conflict to that my capacity to follow the trial, my capacity to -defend myself, to put questions to witnesses or even to answer -questions—in these, my capacities are not influenced. I emphasize the -fact that I bear full responsibility for everything that I have done, -signed or have signed as co-signatory. My fundamental attitude that the -Tribunal is not legally competent, is not affected by the statement I -have just made. Hitherto, in my conversations with my official defense -counsel, I have maintained my loss of memory. He was, therefore, acting -in good faith when he asserted I had lost my memory.” - - E. _RULING OF THE TRIBUNAL_ - -The ruling of the International Military Tribunal was announced orally -by Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding, on 1 December 1945: - -“The Tribunal has given careful consideration to the motion of Counsel -for the Defendant Hess, and it has had the advantage of hearing full -argument upon it both from the Defense and from the Prosecution. The -Tribunal has also considered the very full medical reports, which have -been made on the condition of the Defendant Hess, and has come to the -conclusion that no grounds whatever exist for a further examination to -be ordered. - -“After hearing the statement of the Defendant Hess in court yesterday, -and in view of all the evidence, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the -Defendant Hess is capable of standing his trial at the present time, and -the motion of Counsel for the Defense is, therefore, denied, and the -trial will proceed.” - - - - - Chapter V - OPENING ADDRESS FOR THE UNITED STATES - - -_The following address, opening the American case under Count I of the -Indictment, was delivered by Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel -for the United States, before the Tribunal on 21 November 1945:_ - -May it please Your Honors, - -The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against -the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which -we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and -so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored -because it cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations, -flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance -and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law -is one of the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to -Reason. - -This tribunal, while it is novel and experimental, is not the product of -abstract speculations nor is it created to vindicate legalistic -theories. This inquest represents the practical effort of four of the -most mighty of nations, with the support of seventeen more, to utilize -International Law to meet the greatest menace of our times—aggressive -war. The common sense of mankind demands that law shall not stop with -the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must also reach men -who possess themselves of great power and make deliberate and concerted -use of it to set in motion evils which leave no home in the world -untouched. It is a cause of this magnitude that the United Nations will -lay before Your Honors. - -In the prisoners’ dock sit twenty-odd broken men. Reproached by the -humiliation of those they have led almost as bitterly as by the -desolation of those they have attacked, their personal capacity for evil -is forever past. It is hard now to perceive in these miserable men as -captives the power by which as Nazi leaders they once dominated much of -the world and terrified most of it. Merely as individuals, their fate is -of little consequence to the world. - -What makes this inquest significant is that those prisoners represent -sinister influence that will lurk in the world long after their bodies -have returned to dust. They are living symbols of racial hatreds, of -terrorism and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power. They -are symbols of fierce nationalisms and militarism, of intrigue and -war-making which have embroiled Europe generation after generation, -crushing its manhood, destroying its homes, and impoverishing its life. -They have so identified themselves with the philosophies they conceived -and with the forces they directed that any tenderness to them is a -victory and an encouragement to all the evils which are attached to -their names. Civilization can afford no compromise with the social -forces which would gain renewed strength if we deal ambiguously or -indecisively with the men in whom those forces now precariously survive. - -What these men stand for we will patiently and temperately disclose. We -will give you undeniable proofs of incredible events. The catalogue of -crimes will omit nothing that could be conceived by a pathological -pride, cruelty, and lust for power. These men created in Germany, under -the _Fuehrerprinzip_, a National Socialist despotism equalled only by -the dynasties of the ancient East. They took from the German people all -those dignities and freedoms that we hold natural and inalienable rights -in every human being. The people were compensated by inflaming and -gratifying hatreds toward those who were marked as “scape-goats.” -Against their opponents, including Jews, Catholics, and free labor the -Nazis directed such a campaign of arrogance, brutality, and annihilation -as the world has not witnessed since the pre-Christian ages. They -excited the German ambition to be a “master race,” which of course -implies serfdom for others. They led their people on a mad gamble for -domination. They diverted social energies and resources to the creation -of what they thought to be an invincible war machine. They overran their -neighbors. To sustain the “master race” in its war-making, they enslaved -millions of human beings and brought them into Germany, where these -hapless creatures now wander as “displaced persons”. At length -bestiality and bad faith reached such excess that they aroused the -sleeping strength of imperiled civilization. Its united efforts have -ground the German war machine to fragments. But the struggle has left -Europe a liberated yet prostrate land where a demoralized society -struggles to survive. These are the fruits of the sinister forces that -sit with these defendants in the prisoners’ dock. - -In justice to the nations and the men associated in this prosecution, I -must remind you of certain difficulties which may leave their mark on -this case. Never before in legal history has an effort been made to -bring within the scope of a single litigation the developments of a -decade, covering a whole Continent, and involving a score of nations, -countless individuals, and innumerable events. Despite the magnitude of -the task, the world has demanded immediate action. This demand has had -to be met, though perhaps at the cost of finished craftsmanship. In my -country, established courts, following familiar procedures, applying -well thumbed precedents, and dealing with the legal consequences of -local and limited events seldom commence a trial within a year of the -event in litigation. Yet less than eight months ago today the courtroom -in which you sit was an enemy fortress in the hands of German SS troops. -Less than eight months ago nearly all our witnesses and documents were -in enemy hands. The law had not been codified, no procedure had been -established, no Tribunal was in existence, no usable courthouse stood -here, none of the hundreds of tons of official German documents had been -examined, no prosecuting staff had been assembled, nearly all the -present defendants were at large, and the four prosecuting powers had -not yet joined in common cause to try them. I should be the last to deny -that the case may well suffer from incomplete researches and quite -likely will not be the example of professional work which any of the -prosecuting nations would normally wish to sponsor. It is, however, a -completely adequate case to the judgment we shall ask you to render, and -its full development we shall be obliged to leave to historians. - -Before I discuss particulars of evidence, some general considerations -which may affect the credit of this trial in the eyes of the world -should be candidly faced. There is a dramatic disparity between the -circumstances of the accusers and of the accused that might discredit -our work if we should falter, in even minor matters, in being fair and -temperate. - -Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution -and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes. The -worldwide scope of the aggressions carried out by these men has left but -few real neutrals. Either the victors must judge the vanquished or we -must leave the defeated to judge themselves. After the First World War, -we learned the futility of the latter course. The former high station of -these defendants, the notoriety of their acts, and the adaptability of -their conduct to provoke retaliation make it hard to distinguish between -the demand for a just and measured retribution, and the unthinking cry -for vengeance which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task, so -far as humanly possible, to draw the line between the two. We must never -forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the -record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants -a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon -such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this trial -will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to -do justice. - -At the very outset, let us dispose of the contention that to put these -men to trial is to do them an injustice entitling them to some special -consideration. These defendants may be hard pressed but they are not ill -used. Let us see what alternative they would have to being tried. - -More than a majority of these prisoners surrendered to or were tracked -down by forces of the United States. Could they expect us to make -American custody a shelter for our enemies against the just wrath of our -Allies? Did we spend American lives to capture them only to save them -from punishment? Under the principles of the Moscow Declaration, those -suspected war criminals who are not to be tried internationally must be -turned over to individual governments for trial at the scene of their -outrages. Many less responsible and less culpable American-held -prisoners have been and will be turned over to other United Nations for -local trial. If these defendants should succeed, for any reason, in -escaping the condemnation of this Tribunal, or if they obstruct or abort -this trial, those who are American-held prisoners will be delivered up -to our continental Allies. For these defendants, however, we have set up -an International Tribunal and have undertaken the burden of -participating in a complicated effort to give them fair and -dispassionate hearings. That is the best known protection to any man -with a defense worthy of being heard. - -If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated nation to be -prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first to be given a -chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. Realistically, -the Charter of this Tribunal, which gives them a hearing, is also the -source of their only hope. It may be that these men of troubled -conscience, whose only wish is that the world forget them, do not regard -a trial as a favor. But they do have a fair opportunity to defend -themselves—a favor which these men, when in power, rarely extended to -their fellow countrymen. Despite the fact that public opinion already -condemns their acts, we agree that here they must be given a presumption -of innocence, and we accept the burden of proving criminal acts and the -responsibility of these defendants for their commission. - -When I say that we do not ask for convictions unless we prove crime, I -do not mean mere technical or incidental transgression of international -conventions. We charge guilt on planned and intended conduct that -involves moral as well as legal wrong. And we do not mean conduct that -is a natural and human, even if illegal, cutting of corners, such as -many of us might well have committed had we been in the defendants’ -positions. It is not because they yielded to the normal frailties of -human beings that we accuse them. It is their abnormal and inhuman -conduct which brings them to this bar. - -We will not ask you to convict these men on the testimony of their foes. -There is no count of the Indictment that cannot be proved by books and -records. The Germans were always meticulous record keepers, and these -defendants had their share of the Teutonic passion for thoroughness in -putting things on paper. Nor were they without vanity. They arranged -frequently to be photographed in action. We will show you their own -films. You will see their own conduct and hear their own voices as these -defendants reenact for you, from the screen, some of the events in the -course of the conspiracy. - -We would also make clear that we have no purpose to incriminate the -whole German people. We know that the Nazi Party was not put in power by -a majority of the German vote. We know it came to power by an evil -alliance between the most extreme of the Nazi revolutionists, the most -unrestrained of the German reactionaries, and the most aggressive of the -German militarists. If the German populace had willingly accepted the -Nazi program, no Stormtroopers would have been needed in the early days -of the Party and there would have been no need for concentration camps -or the Gestapo, both of which institutions were inaugurated as soon as -the Nazis gained control of the German state. Only after these lawless -innovations proved successful at home were they taken abroad. - -The German people should know by now that the people of the United -States hold them in no fear, and in no hate. It is true that the Germans -have taught us the horrors of modern warfare, but the ruin that lies -from the Rhine to the Danube shows that we, like our Allies, have not -been dull pupils. If we are not awed by German fortitude and proficiency -in war, and if we are not persuaded of their political maturity, we do -respect their skill in the arts of peace, their technical competence, -and the sober, industrious and self-disciplined character of the masses -of the German people. In 1933, we saw the German people recovering -prestige in the commercial, industrial and artistic world after the -set-back of the last war. We beheld their progress neither with envy nor -malice. The Nazi regime interrupted this advance. The recoil of the Nazi -aggression has left Germany in ruins. The Nazi readiness to pledge the -German word without hesitation and to break it without shame has -fastened upon German diplomacy a reputation for duplicity that will -handicap it for years. Nazi arrogance has made the boast of the “master -race” a taunt that will be thrown at Germans the world over for -generations. The Nazi nightmare has given the German name a new and -sinister significance throughout the world which will retard Germany a -century. The German, no less than the non-German world, has accounts to -settle with these defendants. - -The fact of the war and the course of the war, which is the central -theme of our case, is history. From September 1st, 1939, when the German -armies crossed the Polish frontiers, until September, 1942, when they -met epic resistance at Stalingrad, German arms seemed invincible. -Denmark and Norway, The Netherlands and France, Belgium and Luxembourg, -the Balkans and Africa, Poland and the Baltic States, and parts of -Russia, all had been overrun and conquered by swift, powerful, -well-aimed blows. That attack upon the peace of the world is the crime -against international society which brings into international cognizance -crimes in its aid and preparation which otherwise might be only internal -concerns. It was aggressive war, which the nations of the world had -renounced. It was war in violation of treaties, by which the peace of -the world was sought to be safeguarded. - -This war did not just happen—it was planned and prepared for over a -long period of time and with no small skill and cunning. The world has -perhaps never seen such a concentration and stimulation of the energies -of any people as that which enabled Germany twenty years after it was -defeated, disarmed, and dismembered to come so near carrying out its -plan to dominate Europe. Whatever else we may say of those who were the -authors of this war, they did achieve a stupendous work in organization, -and our first task is to examine the means by which these defendants and -their fellow conspirators prepared and incited Germany to go to war. - -In general, our case will disclose these defendants all uniting at some -time with the Nazi Party in a plan which they well knew could be -accomplished only by an outbreak of war in Europe. Their seizure of the -German state, their subjugation of the German people, their terrorism -and extermination of dissident elements, their planning and waging of -war, their calculated and planned ruthlessness in the conduct of -warfare, their deliberate and planned criminality toward conquered -peoples, all these are ends for which they acted in concert; and all -these are phases of the conspiracy, a conspiracy which reached one goal -only to set out for another and more ambitious one. We shall also trace -for you the intricate web of organizations which these men formed and -utilized to accomplish these ends. We will show how the entire structure -of offices and officials was dedicated to the criminal purposes and -committed to use of the criminal methods planned by these defendants and -their co-conspirators, many of whom war and suicide have put beyond -reach. - -It is my purpose to open the case, particularly under Count One of the -Indictment, and to deal with the common plan or conspiracy to achieve -ends possible only by resort to crimes against peace, war crimes, and -crimes against humanity. My emphasis will not be on individual -barbarities and perversions which may have occurred independently of any -central plan. One of the dangers ever-present is that this trial may be -protracted by details of particular wrongs and that we will become lost -in a “wilderness of single instances.” Nor will I now dwell on the -activity of individual defendants except as it may contribute to -exposition of the common plan. - -The case as presented by the United States will be concerned with the -brains and authority back of all the crimes. These defendants were men -of a station and rank which does not soil its own hands with blood. They -were men who knew how to use lesser folk as tools. We want to reach the -planners and designers, the inciters and leaders without whose evil -architecture the world would not have been for so long scourged with the -violence and lawlessness, and wracked with the agonies and convulsions, -of this terrible war. - - THE LAWLESS ROAD TO POWER - -The chief instrumentality of cohesion in plan and action was the -National Socialist German Workers Party, known as the Nazi Party. Some -of the defendants were with it from the beginning. Others joined only -after success seemed to have validated its lawlessness or power had -invested it with immunity from the processes of the law. Adolf Hitler -became its supreme leader or _fuehrer_ in 1921. - -On the 24th of February, 1920, at Munich, it publicly had proclaimed its -program (_1708-PS_). Some of its purposes would commend themselves to -many good citizens, such as the demands for “profit-sharing in the great -industries,” “generous development of provision for old age,” “creation -and maintenance of a healthy middle class,” “a land reform suitable to -our national requirements,” and “raising the standard of health.” It -also made a strong appeal to that sort of nationalism which in ourselves -we call patriotism and in our rivals chauvinism. It demanded “equality -of rights for the German people in its dealing with other nations and -the evolution of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germaine.” It -demanded the “union of all Germans on the basis of the right of -self-determination of peoples to form a Great Germany.” It demanded -“land and territory (colonies) for the enrichment of our people and the -settlement of our surplus population.” All these, of course, were -legitimate objectives if they were to be attained without resort to -aggressive warfare. - -The Nazi Party from its inception, however, contemplated war. It -demanded “the abolition of mercenary troops and the formation of a -national army.” It proclaimed that “In view of the enormous sacrifice of -life and property demanded of a nation by every war, personal enrichment -through war must be regarded as a crime against the nation. We demand, -therefore, the ruthless confiscation of all war profits.” I do not -criticise this policy. Indeed, I wish it were universal. I merely point -out that in a time of peace, war was a preoccupation of the Party, and -it started the work of making war less offensive to the masses of the -people. With this it combined a program of physical training and sports -for youth that became, as we shall see, the cloak for a secret program -of military training. - -The Nazi Party declaration also committed its members to an anti-Semitic -program. It declared that no Jew or any person of non-German blood could -be a member of the nation. Such persons were to be disfranchised, -disqualified for office, subject to the alien laws, and entitled to -nourishment only after the German population had first been provided -for. All who had entered Germany after August 2, 1914 were to be -required forthwith to depart, and all non-German immigration was to be -prohibited. - -The Party also avowed, even in those early days, an authoritarian and -totalitarian program for Germany. It demanded creation of a strong -central power with unconditional authority, nationalization of all -businesses which had been “amalgamated,” and a “reconstruction” of the -national system of education which “must aim at teaching the pupil to -understand the idea of the State (state sociology).” Its hostility to -civil liberties and freedom of the press was distinctly announced in -these words: “It must be forbidden to publish newspapers which do not -conduce to the national welfare. We demand the legal prosecution of all -tendencies in art or literature of a kind likely to disintegrate our -life as a nation and the suppression of institutions which might -militate against the above requirements.” - -The forecast of religious persecution was clothed in the language of -religious liberty, for the Nazi program stated, “We demand liberty for -all religious denominations in the State.” But, it continues with the -limitation, “so far as they are not a danger to it and do not militate -against the morality and moral sense of the German race.” - -The Party program foreshadowed the campaign of terrorism. It announced, -“We demand ruthless war upon those whose activities are injurious to the -common interests”, and it demanded that such offenses be punished with -death. - -It is significant that the leaders of this Party interpreted this -program as a belligerent one certain to precipitate conflict. The Party -platform concluded, “The leaders of the Party swear to proceed -regardless of consequences—if necessary, at the sacrifice of their -lives—toward the fulfillment of the foregoing points.” It is this -Leadership Corps of the Party, not its entire membership, that stands -accused as a criminal organization. - -Let us now see how the leaders of the Party fulfilled their pledge to -proceed regardless of consequences. Obviously, their foreign objectives, -which were nothing less than to undo international treaties and to wrest -territory from foreign control, as well as most of their internal -program, could be accomplished only by possession of the machinery of -the German State. The first effort, accordingly, was to subvert the -Weimar Republic by violent revolution. An abortive putsch at Munich in -1923 landed many of them in jail. The period of meditation which -followed produced _Mein Kampf_, henceforth the source of law for the -Party workers and a source of considerable revenue to its supreme -leader. The Nazi plans for the violent overthrow of the feeble Republic -then turned to plans for its capture. - -No greater mistake could be made than to think of the Nazi Party in -terms of the loose organizations which we of the western world call -“political parties.” In discipline, structure, and method the Nazi Party -was not adapted to the democratic process of persuasion. It was an -instrument of conspiracy and of coercion. The Party was not organized to -take over power in the German State by winning support of a majority of -the German people. It was organized to seize power in defiance of the -will of the people. - -The Nazi Party, under the _Fuehrerprinzip_, was bound by an iron -discipline into a pyramid, with the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, at the top -and broadening into a numerous Leadership Corps, composed of overlords -of a very extensive Party membership at the base. By no means all of -those who may have supported the movement in one way or another were -actual Party members. The membership took the Party oath which in -effect, amounted to an abdication of personal intelligence and moral -responsibility. This was the oath: “I vow inviolable fidelity to Adolf -Hitler; I vow absolute obedience to him and to the leaders he designates -for me.” The membership in daily practice followed its leaders with an -idolatry and self-surrender more Oriental than Western. - -We will not be obliged to guess as to the motives or goal of the Nazi -Party. The immediate aim was to undermine the Weimar Republic. The order -to all Party members to work to that end was given in a letter from -Hitler of August 24, 1931 to Rosenberg, of which we will produce the -original. Hitler wrote, - - “I am just reading in the VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, edition - 235/236, page 1, an article entitled “Does Wirth intend to come - over?” The tendency of the article is to prevent on our part a - crumbling away from the present form of government. I myself am - travelling all over Germany to achieve exactly the opposite. May - I therefore ask that my own paper will not stab me in the back - with tactically unwise articles * * *” (_047-PS_). - -Captured film enables us to present the defendant, Alfred Rosenberg, who -from the screen will himself tell you the story. The SA practiced -violent interference with elections. We have the reports of the SD -describing in detail how its members later violated the secrecy of -elections in order to identify those who opposed them. One of the -reports makes this explanation: - - “The control was effected in the following way: some members of - the election-committee marked all the ballot papers with - numbers. During the ballot itself, a voters’ list was made up. - The ballot-papers were handed out in numerical order, therefore - it was possible afterwards with the aid of this list to find out - the persons who cast no-votes or invalid votes. One sample of - these marked ballot-papers is enclosed. The marking was done on - the back of the ballot-papers with skimmed milk * * *” - (_R-142_). - -The Party activity, in addition to all the familiar forms of political -contest, took on the aspect of a rehearsal for warfare. It utilized a -Party formation, _DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN_, commonly known as the SA. This -was a voluntary organization of youthful and fanatical Nazis trained for -the use of violence under semi-military discipline. Its members began by -acting as bodyguards for the Nazi leaders and rapidly expanded from -defensive to offensive tactics. They became disciplined ruffians for the -breaking up of opposition meetings and the terrorization of adversaries. -They boasted that their task was to make the Nazi Party “master of the -streets.” The SA was the parent organization of a number of others. Its -offspring include _DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN_, commonly known as the SS, formed -in 1925 and distinguished for the fanaticism and cruelty of its members; -_DER SICHERHEITSDIENST_, known as the SD; and _DIE GEHEIME -STAATSPOLIZEI_, the Secret State Police, the infamous Gestapo formed in -1934 after Nazi accession to power. - -A glance at a chart of the Party organization (_Chart No. 1_) is enough -to show how completely it differed from the political parties we know. -It had its own source of law in the fuehrer and sub-fuehrers. It had its -own courts and its own police. The conspirators set up a government -within the Party to exercise outside the law every sanction that any -legitimate state could exercise and many that it could not. Its chain of -command was military, and its formations were martial in name as well as -in function. They were composed of battalions set up to bear arms under -military discipline, motorized corps, flying corps, and the infamous -“Death Head Corps”, which was not misnamed. The Party had its own secret -police, its security units, its intelligence and espionage division, its -raiding forces, and its youth forces. It established elaborate -administrative mechanisms to identify and liquidate spies and informers, -to manage concentration camps, to operate death vans, and to finance the -whole movement. Through concentric circles of authority, the Nazi Party, -as its leadership later boasted, eventually organized and dominated -every phase of German life—but not until they had waged a bitter -internal struggle characterized by brutal criminality. In preparation -for this phase of their struggle, they created a party police system. -This became the pattern and the instrument of the police state, which -was the first goal in their plan. - -The Party formations, including the Leadership Corps of the Party, the -SD, the SS, the SA and the infamous Secret State Police, or Gestapo—all -these stand accused before you as criminal organizations; organizations -which, as we will prove from their own documents, were recruited only -from recklessly devoted Nazis, ready in conviction and temperament to do -the most violent of deeds to advance the common program. They terrorized -and silenced democratic opposition and were able at length to combine -with political opportunists, militarists, industrialists, monarchists, -and political reactionaries. - -On January 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German -Republic. An evil combination, represented in the prisoners’ dock, by -its most eminent survivors, had succeeded in possessing itself of the -machinery of the German Government, a facade behind which they -thenceforth would operate to make a reality of the war of conquest they -so long had plotted. The conspiracy had passed into its second phase. - - THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI POWER - -We shall now consider the steps, which embraced the most hideous of -crimes against humanity, to which the conspirators resorted in -perfecting control of the German State and in preparing Germany for the -aggressive war indispensable to their ends. - -The Germans of the 1920’s were a frustrated and baffled people as a -result of defeat and the disintegration of their traditional government. -The democratic elements, which were trying to govern Germany through the -new and feeble machinery of the Weimar Republic, got inadequate support -from the democratic forces of the rest of the world. It is not to be -denied that Germany, when worldwide depression was added to her other -problems, was faced with urgent and intricate pressure in her economic -and political life which necessitated bold measures. - -The internal measures by which a nation attempts to solve its problems -are ordinarily of no concern to other nations. But the Nazi program from -the first was recognized as a desperate program for a people still -suffering the effects of an unsuccessful war. The Nazi policy embraced -ends always recognized as attainable only by a renewal and a more -successful outcome of war. The conspirators’ answer to Germany’s -problems was nothing less than to plot the regaining of territories lost -in the First World War and the acquisition of other fertile lands of -Central Europe by dispossessing or exterminating those who inhabited -them. They also contemplated destroying or permanently weakening all -other neighboring peoples so as to win virtual domination of Europe and -probably of the world. The precise limits of their ambition we need not -define for it was and is as illegal to wage aggressive war for small -stakes as for large ones. - -We find at this period two governments in Germany—the real and the -ostensible. The forms of the German Republic were maintained for a time, -and it was the outward and visible government. But the real authority in -the State was outside of and above the law and rested in the Leadership -Corps of the Nazi Party. - -On February 27, 1933, less than a month after Hitler became Chancellor, -the Reichstag building was set on fire. The burning of this symbol of -free parliamentary government was so providential for the Nazis that it -was believed they staged the fire themselves. Certainly when we -contemplate their known crimes, we cannot believe they would shrink from -mere arson. It is not necessary, however, to resolve the controversy as -to who set the fire. The significant point is in the use that was made -of the fire and of the state of public mind it produced. The Nazis -immediately accused the Communist Party of instigating and committing -the crime, and turned every effort to portray this single act of arson -as the beginning of a Communist revolution. Then, taking advantage of -the hysteria, the Nazi met this phantom revolution with a real one. In -the following December, the German Supreme Court with commendable -courage and independence acquitted the accused Communists, but it was -too late to influence the tragic course of events which the Nazi -conspirators had set rushing forward. - -Hitler, on the morning after the fire, obtained from the aged and ailing -President von Hindenburg a Presidential decree suspending the extensive -guarantees of individual liberty contained in the Constitution of the -Weimar Republic. The decree provided that: - - “Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the - Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further - notice. Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of - free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on - the right of assembly and the right of association, and - violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic - communications, and warrants for house-searches, orders for - confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also - permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.” - (_1390-PS_). - -The extent of the restriction on personal liberty under the decree of -February 28, 1933 may be understood by reference to the rights under the -Weimar Constitution which were suspended: - - “_Article 114._ The freedom of the person is inviolable. - Curtailment or deprivation of personal freedom by a public - authority is only permissible on a legal basis. - - “Persons who have been deprived of their freedom must be - informed at the latest on the following day by whose authority - and for what reasons the deprivation of freedom was ordered; - opportunity shall be afforded them without delay of submitting - objections to their deprivation of freedom. - - “_Article 115._ Every German’s home is his sanctuary and - inviolable. Exceptions may only be made as provided by law. - - * * * * * * - - “_Article 117._ The secrecy of letters and all postal, - telegraphic and telephone communications is inviolable. - Exceptions are inadmissible except by Reich law. - - “_Article 118._ Every German has the right, within the limits of - the general laws, to express his opinions freely in speech, in - writing, in print, in picture form or in any other way. No - conditions of work or employment may detract from this right and - no disadvantage may accrue to him from any person for making use - of this right. * * * - - * * * * * * - - “_Article 123._ All Germans have the right to assemble - peacefully and unarmed without giving notice and without special - permission. - - “A Reich law may make previous notification obligatory for - assemblies in the open air, and may prohibit them in the case of - immediate danger to the public safety. - - “_Article 124._ All the Germans have the right to form - associations or societies for purposes not contrary to criminal - law. This right may not be curtailed by preventive measures. The - same provisions apply to religious associations and societies. - - “Every association may become incorporated (Erwerb der - Rechtsfaehigkeit) according to the provisions of the civil law. - The right may not be refused to any association on the grounds - that its aims are political, social-political or religious. - - * * * * * * - - “_Article 153._ Property is guaranteed by the Constitution. Its - content and limits are defined by the laws. - - “Expropriation can only take place for the public benefit and on - a legal basis. Adequate compensation shall be granted, unless a - Reich law orders otherwise. In the case of dispute concerning - the amount of compensation, it shall be possible to submit the - matter to the ordinary civil courts, unless Reich laws determine - otherwise. Compensation must be paid if the Reich expropriates - property belonging to the Lands, Communes, or public utility - associations. - - “Property carries obligations. Its use shall also serve the - common good.” (_2050-PS_). - -It must be said in fairness to von Hindenburg that the Constitution -itself authorized him temporarily to suspend these fundamental rights -“if the public safety and order in the German Reich are considerably -disturbed or endangered.” It must also be acknowledged that President -Ebert previously had invoked this power. - -But the National Socialist coup was made possible because the terms of -the Hitler-Hindenburg decree departed from all previous ones in which -the power of suspension had been invoked. Whenever Ebert had suspended -constitutional guarantees of individual rights, his decree had expressly -revived the Protective Custody Act adopted by the Reichstag in 1916 -during the previous war. This Act guaranteed a judicial hearing within -24 hours of arrest, gave a right to have counsel and to inspect all -relevant records, provided for appeal, and authorized compensation from -Treasury funds for erroneous arrests. - -The Hitler-Hindenburg decree of February 28, 1933 contained no such -safeguards. The omission may not have been noted by von Hindenburg. -Certainly he did not appreciate its effect. It left the Nazi police and -party formations, already existing and functioning under Hitler, -completely unrestrained and irresponsible. Secret arrest and indefinite -detention, without charges, without evidence, without hearing, without -counsel, became the method of inflicting inhuman punishment on any whom -the Nazi police suspected or disliked. No court could issue an -injunction, or writ of _habeas corpus_, or _certiorari_. The German -people were in the hands of the police, the police were in the hands of -the Nazi Party, and the Party was in the hands of a ring of evil men, of -whom the defendants here before you are surviving and representative -leaders. - -The Nazi conspiracy, as we shall show, always contemplated not merely -overcoming current opposition but exterminating elements which could not -be reconciled with its philosophy of the state. It not only sought to -establish the Nazi “new order” but to secure its sway, as Hitler -predicted, “for a thousand years.” Nazis were never in doubt or -disagreement as to what these dissident elements were. They were -concisely described by one of them, Col. General von Fritsch, on -December 11, 1938, in these words: - - “Shortly after the first war I came to the conclusion that we - should have to be victorious in three battles if Germany were to - become powerful again: 1. The battle against the working - class—Hitler has won this. 2. Against the Catholic Church, - perhaps better expressed against Ultramontanism. 3. Against the - Jews.” (_1947-PS_). - -The warfare against these elements was continuous. The battle in Germany -was but a practice skirmish for the worldwide drive against them. We -have in point of geography and of time two groups of crimes against -humanity—one within Germany before and during the war, the other in -occupied territory during the war. But the two are not separated in Nazi -planning. They are a continuous unfolding of the Nazi plan to -exterminate peoples and institutions which might serve as a focus or -instrument for overturning their “new world order” at any time. We -consider these Crimes against Humanity in this address as manifestations -of the one Nazi plan and discuss them according to General von Fritsch’s -classification. - - 1. The Battle Against the Working Class - -When Hitler came to power, there were in Germany three groups of trade -unions. The General German Trade Union Confederation (ADGB) with -twenty-eight affiliated unions, and the General Independent Employees -Confederation (AFA) with thirteen federated unions together numbered -more than 4,500,000 members. The Christian Trade Union had over -1,250,000 members. - -The working people of Germany, like the working people of other nations, -had little to gain personally by war. While labor is usually brought -around to the support of the nation at war, labor by and large is a -pacific, though by no means a pacifist force in the world. The working -people of Germany had not forgotten in 1933 how heavy the yoke of the -war lord can be. It was the workingmen who had joined the sailors and -soldiers in the revolt of 1918 to end the First World War. The Nazis had -neither forgiven nor forgotten. The Nazi program required that this part -of the German population not only be stripped of power to resist -diversion of its scanty comforts to armament, but also be wheedled or -whipped into new and unheard of sacrifices as part of the Nazi war -preparation. Labor must be cowed, and that meant its organizations and -means of cohesion and defense must be destroyed. - -The purpose to regiment labor for the Nazi Party was avowed by Ley in a -speech to workers on May 2, 1933, as follows: - - “You may say what else do you want, you have the absolute power. - True we have the power, but we do not have the whole people, we - do not have you workers 100%, and it is you whom we want; we - will not let you be until you stand with us in complete, genuine - acknowledgment.” (_614-PS_). - -The first Nazi attack was upon the two larger unions. On April 21, 1933 -an order not even in the name of the Government, but of the Nazi Party -was issued by the conspirator Robert Ley as “Chief of Staff of the -political organization of the NSDAP,” applicable to the Trade Union -Confederation and the Independent Employees Confederation. It directed -seizure of their properties and arrest of their principal leaders. The -party order directed party organs which we here denounce as criminal -associations, the SA and SS “to be employed for the occupation of the -trade union properties, and for the taking into custody of personalities -who come into question.” And it directed the taking into “protective -custody” of all chairmen and district secretaries of such unions and -branch directors of the labor bank (_392-PS_). - -These orders were carried out on May 2, 1933. All funds of the labor -unions, including pension and benefit funds, were seized. Union leaders -were sent to concentration camps. A few days later, on May 10, 1933, -Hitler appointed Ley leader of the German Labor Front (_DEUTSCHE -ARBEITSFRONT_), which succeeded to the confiscated union funds. The -German Labor Front, a Nazi controlled labor bureau, was set up under Ley -to teach the Nazi philosophy to German workers and to weed out from -industrial employment all who were backward in their lessons -(_1940-PS_). “Factory Troops” were organized as an “ideological shock -squad within the factory” (_1817-PS_). The Party order provided that -“outside of the German Labor Front, no other organization (whether of -workers or of employees) is to exist.” On June 24, 1933 the remaining -Christian Trade Unions were seized pursuant to an order of the Nazi -Party signed by Ley. - -On May 19, 1933, this time by government decree, it was provided that -“trustees” of labor, appointed by Hitler, should regulate the conditions -of all labor contracts, replacing the former process of collective -bargaining (_405-PS_). On January 20, 1934 a decree “regulating national -labor” introduced the fuehrer-principle into industrial relations. It -provided that the owners of enterprises should be the “fuehrers” and the -workers should be the followers. The enterpriser-fuehrers should “make -decisions for employees and laborers in all matters concerning the -enterprise” (_1861-PS_). It was by such bait that the great German -industrialists were induced to support the Nazi cause, to their own -ultimate ruin. - -Not only did the Nazis dominate and regiment German labor, but they -forced the youth into the ranks of the laboring people they had thus led -into chains. Under a compulsory labor service decree on 26 June, 1935, -young men and women between the ages of 18 and 25 were conscripted for -labor (see _1654-PS_). Thus was the purpose to subjugate German labor -accomplished. In the words of Ley, this accomplishment consisted “in -eliminating the association character of the trade union and employees’ -associations, and in its place we have substituted the conception -‘soldiers of work’.” The productive manpower of the German nation was in -Nazi control. By these steps the defendants won the battle to liquidate -labor unions as potential opposition and were enabled to impose upon the -working class the burdens of preparing for aggressive warfare. - -Robert Ley, the field marshal of the battle against labor, answered our -indictment with suicide. Apparently he knew no better answer. - - 2. The Battle Against the Churches - -The Nazi Party always was predominantly anti-Christian in its ideology. -But we who believe in freedom of conscience and of religion base no -charge of criminality on anybody’s ideology. It is not because the Nazi -themselves were irreligious or pagan, but because they persecuted others -of the Christian faith that they become guilty of crime, and it is -because the persecution was a step in the preparation for aggressive -warfare that the offense becomes one of international consequence. To -remove every moderating influence among the German people and to put its -population on a total war footing, the conspirators devised and carried -out a systematic and relentless repression of all Christian sects and -churches. - -We will ask you to convict the Nazis on their own evidence. Martin -Bormann in June, 1941, issued a secret decree on the relation of -Christianity and National Socialism. The decree provided: - - “For the first time in German history the Fuehrer consciously - and completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand. - With the party, its components and attached units the Fuehrer - has created for himself and thereby the German Reich leadership - an instrument which makes him independent of the church. All - influences which might impair or damage the leadership of the - people exercised by the Fuehrer with help of the NSDAP, must be - eliminated. More and more the people must be separated from the - churches and their organs, the pastors. Of course, the churches - must and will, seen from their viewpoint, defend themselves - against this loss of power. But never again must an influence on - leadership of the people be yielded to the churches. This - (influence) must be broken completely and finally. - - “Only the Reich government and by its direction the party, its - components and attached units have a right to leadership of the - people. Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers - and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the state, so - must the possibility of church influence also be totally - removed. Not until this has happened, does the state leadership - have influence on the individual citizens. Not until then are - people and Reich secure in their existence for all the future” - (_D-75_). - -And how the party had been securing the Reich from Christian influence, -will be proved by such items as this teletype from the Gestapo, Berlin, -to the Gestapo, Nurnberg, on July 24, 1938. Let us hear their own -account of events in Rottenburg. - - “The Party on 23 July 1939 from 2100 on carried out the third - demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants about - 2500-3000 were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The - Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the - demonstration. This town took rather a hostile attitude to the - demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the - Party Member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the - palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people - forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw - files out of the windows and rummaged through the beds in the - rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got to - the other objects of equipment in the rooms and the palace, the - flaming bed could be thrown from the window and the fire - extinguished. The Bishop was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg - and the ladies and gentlemen of his menage in the chapel at - prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed into this chapel and - molested those present. Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop - Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth. - Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not the - one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave the - building. After the evacuation of the palace by the - demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop Groeber, who - left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to turn to the - Fuehrer and Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick, anew. On - the course of the action, the damage done as well as the homage - of the Rottenburg populace beginning today for the Bishop I - shall immediately hand in a full report, after I am in the act - of suppressing counter mass meetings. * * * - - “In case the Fuehrer has instructions to give in this matter, I - request that these be transmitted most quickly * * *” - (_848-PS_). - -Later, defendant Rosenberg wrote to Bormann reviewing the proposal of -Kerrl as Church Minister to place the Protestant Church under State -tutelage and proclaim Hitler its Supreme head. Rosenberg was opposed, -hinting that Naziism was to suppress the Christian Church completely -after the war (see _098-PS_). - -The persecution of all pacifist and dissenting sects, such as Jehovah’s -Witnesses and the Pentecostal Association, was peculiarly relentless and -cruel. The policy toward the Evangelical Churches, however, was to use -their influence for the Nazis’ own purposes. In September, 1933, Mueller -was appointed the Fuehrer’s representative with power to deal with the -“affairs of the Evangelical Church” in its relations to the State. -Eventually, steps were taken to create a Reich Bishop vested with power -to control this Church. A long conflict followed, Pastor Niemoeller was -sent to concentration camp, and extended interference with the internal -discipline and administration of the Churches occurred. - -A most intense drive was directed against the Roman Catholic Church. -After a strategic concordat with the Holy See, signed in July, 1933 in -Rome, which never was observed by the Nazi Party, a long and persistent -persecution of the Catholic Church, its priesthood and its members, was -carried out. Church Schools and educational institutions were suppressed -or subjected to requirements of Nazi teaching inconsistent with the -Christian faith. The property of the Church was confiscated and inspired -vandalism directed against Church property was left unpunished. -Religious instruction was impeded and the exercise of religion made -difficult. Priests and bishops were laid upon, riots were stimulated to -harass them, and many were sent to concentration camps. - -After occupation of foreign soil, these persecutions went on with -greater vigor than ever. We will present to you from the files of the -Vatican the earnest protests made by the Vatican to Ribbentrop -summarizing the persecutions to which the priesthood and the Church had -been subjected in this Twentieth Century under the Nazi regime. -Ribbentrop never answered them. He could not deny. He dared not justify. - - 3. Crimes Against the Jews - -The most savage and numerous crimes planned and committed by the Nazis -were those against the Jews. These in Germany, in 1933, numbered about -500,000. In the aggregate, they had made for themselves positions which -excited envy, and had accumulated properties which excited the avarice -of the Nazis. They were few enough to be helpless and numerous enough to -be held up as a menace. - -Let there be no misunderstanding about the charge of persecuting Jews. -What we charge against these defendants is not those arrogances and -pretensions which frequently accompany the intermingling of different -peoples and which are likely despite the honest efforts of government, -to produce regrettable crimes and convulsions. It is my purpose to show -a plan and design, to which all Nazis were fanatically committed, to -annihilate all Jewish people. These crimes were organized and promoted -by the Party Leadership, executed and protected by the Nazi officials, -as we shall convince you by written orders of the Secret State Police -itself. - -The persecution of the Jews was a continuous and deliberate policy. It -was a policy directed against other nations as well as against the Jews -themselves. Anti-Semitism was promoted to divide and embitter the -democratic peoples and to soften their resistance to the Nazi -aggression. As Robert Ley declared in _Der Angriff_ on 14 May 1944, “The -second German secret weapon is Anti-Semitism because if it is constantly -pursued by Germany, it will become a universal problem which all nations -will be forced to consider.” - -Anti-Semitism also has been aptly credited with being a “spearhead of -terror.” The ghetto was the laboratory for testing repressive measures. -Jewish property was the first to be expropriated, but the custom grew -and included similar measures against Anti-Nazi Germans, Poles, Czechs, -Frenchmen, and Belgians. Extermination of the Jews enabled the Nazis to -bring a practiced hand to similar measures against Poles, Serbs, and -Greeks. The plight of the Jew was a constant threat to opposition or -discontent among other elements of Europe’s population—pacifists, -conservatives, communists, Catholics, Protestants, socialist. It was, in -fact, a threat to every dissenting opinion and to every non-Nazi’s life. - -The persecution policy against the Jews commenced with non-violent -measures, such as disfranchisement and discriminations against their -religion, and the placing of impediments in the way of success in -economic life. It moved rapidly to organized mass violence against them, -physical isolation in ghettos, deportation, forced labor, mass -starvation, and extermination. The Government, the Party formation -indicated before you as criminal organizations, the Secret State Police, -the Army, private and semi-public associations, and “spontaneous” mobs -that were carefully inspired from official sources, were all agencies -concerned in this persecution. Nor was it directed against individual -Jews for personal bad citizenship or unpopularity. The avowed purpose -was the destruction of the Jewish people as a whole, as an end in -itself, as a measure of preparation for war, and as a discipline of -conquered peoples. - -The conspiracy or common plan to exterminate the Jew was so methodically -and thoroughly pursued that despite the German defeat and Nazi -prostration, this Nazi aim largely has succeeded. Only remnants of the -European Jewish population remain in Germany, in the countries which -Germany occupied, and in those which were her satellites or -collaborators. Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in Nazi-dominated Europe, -60 percent are authoritatively estimated to have perished. 5,700,000 -Jews are missing from the countries in which they formerly lived, and -over 4,500,000 cannot be accounted for by the normal death rate nor by -immigration; nor are they included among displaced persons. History does -not record a crime ever perpetrated against so many victims or one ever -carried out with such calculated cruelty. - -You will have difficulty, as I have, to look into the faces of these -defendants and believe that in this Twentieth Century human beings could -inflict such sufferings as will be proved here on their own countrymen -as well as upon their so-called “inferior” enemies. Particular crimes, -and the responsibility of defendants for them, are to be dealt with by -the Soviet Government’s Counsel, when committed in the East, and by -Counsel for the Republic of France when committed in the West. I advert -to them only to show their magnitude as evidence of a purpose and a -knowledge common to all defendants, of an official plan rather than of a -capricious policy of some individual commander, and to show such a -continuity of Jewish persecution from the rise of the Nazi conspiracy to -its collapse as forbids us to believe that any person could be -identified with any part of Nazi action without approving this most -conspicuous item of its program. - -The Indictment itself recites many evidences of the anti-Semitic -persecutions. The defendant Streicher led the Nazis in anti-Semitic -bitterness and extremism. In an article appearing in _Der Stuermer_ on -19 March, 1942 he complained that Christian teachings have stood in the -way of “radical solution of the Jewish question in Europe,” and quoted -enthusiastically as the Twentieth Century solution the Fuehrer’s -proclamation of February 24, 1942 that “the Jew will be exterminated.” -And on November 4, 1943, Streicher declared in _Der Stuermer_ that the -Jews “have disappeared from Europe and that the Jewish ‘Reservoir of the -East’ from which the Jewish plague has for centuries beset the people of -Europe, has ceased to exist.” Streicher now has the effrontery to tell -us he is “only a Zionist”—he says he wants only to return the Jews to -Palestine. But on May 7, 1942 his newspaper, _Der Stuermer_, had this to -say: - - “It is also not only an European problem! _The Jewish question - is a world question!_ Not only is Germany not safe in the face - of the Jews as long as one Jew lives in Europe, but also the - Jewish question is hardly solved in Europe so long as Jews live - in the rest of the world.” - -And the defendant Hans Frank, a lawyer by profession I say with shame, -summarized in his Diary in 1944 the Nazi policy thus: “The Jews are a -race which has to be eliminated; whenever we catch one, it is his end.” -(Frank Diary, 4 March 1944, p. 26). And earlier, speaking of his -function as Governor-General of Poland, he confided to his diary this -sentiment: “Of course I cannot eliminate all lice and Jews in only a -year’s time.” (_2233-C-PS_) I could multiply endlessly this kind of Nazi -ranting but I will leave it to the evidence and turn to the fruit of -this perverted thinking. - -The most serious of the actions against Jews were outside of any law, -but the law itself was employed to some extent. There were the infamous -Nurnberg decrees of September 15, 1935 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1935, Part -I, p. 1146). The Jews were segregated into ghettos and put into forced -labor; they were expelled from their professions; their property was -expropriated; all cultural life, the press, the theatre, and schools -were prohibited them; and the SD was made responsible for them -(_212-PS_; _069-PS_). This was an ominous guardianship, as the following -order for “The Handling of the Jewish Question” shows: - - “The competency of the Chief of the Security Police and Security - Service, who is charged with the mission of solving the European - Jewish question, extends even to the occupied eastern provinces. - * * * - - “An eventual act by the civilian population against the Jews is - not to be prevented as long as this is compatible with the - maintenance of order and security in the rear of the fighting - troops * * * - - “The first main goal of the German measures must be strict - segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. In the - execution of this, first of all is the seizing of the Jewish - populace by the introduction of a registration order and similar - appropriate measures * * * - - “Then immediately, the wearing of the recognition sign - consisting of a yellow Jewish star is to be brought about and - all rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They are to - be placed in Ghettos and at the same time are to be separated - according to sexes. The presence of many more or less closed - Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Ukraine makes - this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen which - make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower in case labor - needs are present * * * - - “The entire Jewish property is to be seized and confiscated with - exception of that which is necessary for a bare existence. As - far as the economical situation permits, the power of disposal - of their property is to be taken from the Jews as soon as - possible through orders and other measures given by the - commissariate, so that the moving of property will quickly - cease. - - “Any cultural activity will be completely forbidden, to the Jew. - This includes the outlawing of the Jewish press, the Jewish - theatres and schools. - - “The slaughtering of animals according to Jewish rites is also - to be prohibited * * *” (_212-PS_). - -The anti-Jewish campaign became furious in Germany following the -assassination in Paris of the German Legation Councillor von Rath. -Heydrich, Gestapo head, sent a teletype to all Gestapo and SD offices -with directions for handling “spontaneous” uprising anticipated for the -nights of November 9 and 10, 1938, so as to aid in destruction of -Jewish-owned property and protect only that of Germans (_374-PS_; -_765-PS_). No more cynical document ever came into evidence. Then there -is a report by an SS Brigade Leader, Dr. Stahlecher, to Himmler, which -recites that: - - “Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start - pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, - though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following - our orders, the Security Police was determined to solve the - Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But - it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an - immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the - extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German - circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native - population itself took the first action by way of natural - reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades - and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the - preceding period.” - - * * * * * * - - “In view of the extension of the area of operations and the - great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security - Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the - cooperation of the reliable population for the fight against - vermin—that is mainly the Jews and Communists. Beyond our - directing of the first spontaneous actions of self-cleansing, - which will be reported elsewhere, care had to be taken that - reliable people should be put to the cleansing job and that they - were appointed auxiliary members of the Security Police.” - - * * * * * * - - “Kowno * * * To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in - motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. KLIMATIS, the leader of - the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this - purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis - of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in - Kowno, and in such a way that no German order or German - instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first - pogrom in the night from 25. to 26.6 the Lithuanian partisans - did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several - synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a - Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During - the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a - similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions - followed the example of Kowno, though smaller and extending to - the Communists who had been left behind. - - “These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army - authorities who had been informed showed understanding for this - procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that only the first - days after the occupation would offer the opportunity for - carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of the partisans the - self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily. - - “It proved much more difficult to set in motion similar - cleansing actions in Latvia.” - - * * * * * * - - “From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish - problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In - accordance with the basic orders received, however, the - cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a - complete annihilation of the Jews * * * - - “The sum total of the Jews liquidated in Lithuania amounts to - 71,105.” (_L-180_). - -Of course, it is self-evident that these “uprisings” were managed by the -government and the Nazi Party. If we were in doubt, we could resort to -Streicher’s memorandum of April 14, 1939, which says, “The anti-Jewish -action of November, 1938 did not arise spontaneously from the people. * -* * Part of the party formation have been charged with the execution of -the anti-Jewish action.” (_406-PS_). Jews as a whole were fined a -billion Reichsmarks. They were excluded from all businesses, and claims -against insurance companies for their burned properties were -confiscated, all by decree of the defendant Goering -(_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, Part I, Pp. 1579-1582). - -Synagogues were the objects of a special vengeance. On November 10, -1938, the following order was given: “By order of the Group Commander, -all Jewish Synagogues in the area of Brigade 50 have to be blown up or -set afire. * * * The operation will be carried out in civilian clothing. -* * * Execution of the order will be reported * * *.” (_1721-PS_). Some -40 teletype messages from various police headquarters will tell the fury -with which all Jews were pursued in Germany on those awful November -nights. The SS troops were turned loose and the Gestapo supervised. -Jewish-owned property was authorized to be destroyed. The Gestapo -ordered twenty to thirty thousand “well-to-do Jews” to be arrested. -Concentration camps were to receive them. Healthy Jews, fit for labor, -were to be taken (_3051-PS_). - -As the German frontiers were expanded by war, so the campaign against -the Jews expanded. The Nazi plan never was limited to extermination in -Germany; always it contemplated extinguishing the Jew in Europe and -often in the world. In the west, the Jews were killed and their property -taken over. But the campaign achieved its zenith of savagery in the -East. The Eastern Jew has suffered as no people ever suffered. Their -sufferings were carefully reported to the Nazi authorities to show -faithful adherence to the Nazi design. I shall refer only to enough of -the evidence of these to show the extent of the Nazi design for killing -Jews. - -If I should recite these horrors in words of my own, you would think me -intemperate and unreliable. Fortunately, we need not take the word of -any witness but the Germans themselves. I invite you now to look at a -few of the vast number of captured German orders and reports that will -be offered in evidence, to see what a Nazi invasion meant. We will -present such evidence as the report of _Einsatzgruppe_ (Action Group) A -of October 15, 1941, which boasts that in overrunning the Baltic States, -“Native Anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against the -Jews during the first hours after occupation * * *.” The report -continues: - - “From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish - problem in the East could not be solved by pogroms alone. In - accordance with the basic orders received, however, the - cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a - complete annihilation of the Jews. Special detachments - reinforced by selected units—in Lithuania partisan detachments, - in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police—therefore - performed extensive executions both in the towns and in rural - areas. The actions of the execution detachments were performed - smoothly. - - “The sum total of the Jews liquidated in Lithuania amounts to - 71,105. During the pogroms in Kowno 3,800 Jews were eliminated, - in the smaller towns about 1,200 Jews. - - “In Latvia, up to now a total of 30,000 Jews were executed. 500 - were eliminated by pogroms in Riga.” (_L-180_). - -This is a captured report from the Commissioner of Sluzk on October 30, -1941, which describes the scene in more detail. It says: - - “The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had - received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews - here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. Then I requested him - to postpone the action one day. However, he rejected this with - the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere and - in all towns and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. - Within these two days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of - Jews by all means. * * * All Jews without exception were taken - out of the factories and shops and deported in spite of our - agreement. It is true that part of the Jews was moved by way of - the ghetto where many of them were processed and still - segregated by me, but a large part was loaded directly on trucks - and liquidated without further delay outside of the town. * * * - For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must - point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already - on sadism. The town itself offered a picture of horror during - the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the - German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian - partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White - Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded - together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in - different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The - White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves - from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish - people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a - terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian - people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over - with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an - action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a - revolution. * * *” (_1104-PS_). - -There are reports which merely tabulate the numbers slaughtered. An -example is an account of the work of _Einsatzgruppen_ of Sipo and SD in -the East, which relates that— - - In Estonia, all Jews were arrested immediately upon the arrival - of the Wehrmacht. Jewish men and women above the age of 16 and - capable of work were drafted for forced labor. Jews were - subjected to all sorts of restrictions and all Jewish property - was confiscated. - - All Jewish males above the age of 16 were executed, with the - exception of doctors and elders. Only 500 of an original 4,500 - Jews remained. - - 37,180 persons have been liquidated by the Sipo and SD in White - Ruthenia during October. - - In one town, 337 Jewish women were executed for demonstrating a - “provocative attitude.” In another, 380 Jews were shot for - spreading vicious propaganda. - -And so the report continues, listing town after town, where hundreds -upon hundreds of Jews were murdered. - - In Witebsk 3,000 Jews were liquidated because of the danger of - epidemics. - - In Kiew, 33,771 Jews were executed on September 29 and 30 in - retaliation for some fires which were set off there. - - In Shitomir, 3,145 Jews “had to be shot” because, judging from - experience they had to be considered as the carriers of - Bolshevik propaganda. - - In Cherson, 410 Jews were executed in reprisal against acts of - sabotage. - - In the territory east of the Djnepr, the Jewish problem was - “solved” by the liquidation of 4,891 Jews and by putting the - remainder into labor battalions of up to 1,000 persons - (_R-102_). - -Other accounts tell not of the slaughter so much as of the depths of -degradation to which the tormentors stooped. For example, we will show -the reports made to defendant Rosenberg about the army and the SS in the -area under Rosenberg’s jurisdiction, which recited the following: - - “Details: In presence of SS man, a Jewish dentist has to break - all gold teeth and fillings out of mouth of German and Russian - Jews _before_ they are executed.” - - Men, women and children are locked into barns and burned alive. - - Peasants, women and children are shot on pretext that they are - suspected of belonging to bands (_R-135_). - -We of the Western World heard of Gas Wagons in which Jews and political -opponents were asphyxiated. We could not believe it. But here we have -the report of May 16, 1942 from the German SS officer, Becker, to his -supervisor in Berlin which tells this story: - - Gas vans in C. group can be driven to execution spot, which is - generally stationed 10 to 15 kms. from main road only in dry - weather. Since those to be executed become frantic if conducted - to this place, such vans become immobilized in wet weather. - - Gas vans in D. group camouflaged as cabin trailers, but vehicles - well known to authorities and civilian population which calls - them “Death Vans”. - - Writer of letter (Becker) ordered all men to keep as far away as - possible during gassing. Unloading van has “atrocious spiritual - and physical effect” on men and they should be ordered not to - participate in such work (_501-PS_). - -I shall not dwell on this subject longer than to quote one more -sickening document which evidences the planned and systematic character -of the Jewish persecutions. I hold a report written with Teutonic -devotion to detail, illustrated with photographs to authenticate its -almost incredible text, and beautifully bound in leather with the loving -care bestowed on a proud work. It is the original report of the SS -Brigadier General Stroop in charge of the destruction of the Warsaw -Ghetto, and its title page carries the inscription, “The Jewish Ghetto -in Warsaw no longer exists.” It is characteristic that one of the -captions explains that the photograph concerned shows the driving out of -Jewish “bandits”; those whom the photograph shows being driven out are -almost entirely women and little children. It contains a day-by-day -account of the killings mainly carried out by the SS organization, too -long to relate, but let me quote General Stroop’s summary: - - “The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could only be - suppressed by energetic actions of our troops day and night. - _The Reichsfuehrer SS ordered, therefore on 23 April 1943 the - cleaning out of the ghetto with utter ruthlessness and merciless - tenacity._ I, therefore, decided to destroy and burn down the - entire ghetto without regard to the armament factories. These - factories were systematically dismantled and then burned. Jews - usually left their hideouts, but frequently remained in the - burning buildings and jumped out of the windows only when the - heat became unbearable. They then tried to crawl with broken - bones across the street into buildings which were not afire. - Sometimes they changed their hideouts during the night into the - ruins of burned buildings. Life in the sewers was not pleasant - after the first week. Many times we could hear loud voices in - the sewers. SS men or policemen climbed bravely through the - manholes to capture these Jews. Sometimes they stumbled over - Jewish corpses; sometimes they were shot at. Tear gas bombs were - thrown into the manholes and the Jews driven out of the sewers - and captured. Countless numbers of Jews were liquidated in - sewers and bunkers through blasting. The longer the resistance - continued the tougher became the members of the Waffen SS police - and Wehrmacht who always discharged their duties in an exemplary - manner. Frequently Jews who tried to replenish their food - supplies during the night or to communicate with neighboring - groups were exterminated.” (_1061-PS_). - -This action eliminated, says the SS commander, “a proved total of -56,065. To that we have to add the number of those killed through -blasting, fire, etc., which cannot be counted.” - -We charge that all atrocities against Jews were the manifestation and -culmination of the Nazi plan to which every defendant here was a party. -I know very well that some of these men did take steps to spare some -particular Jew for some personal reason from the horrors that awaited -the unrescued Jew. Some protested that particular atrocities were -excessive, and discredited the general policy. While a few defendants -may show efforts to make specific exceptions to the policy of Jewish -extermination, I have found no instance in which any defendant opposed -the policy itself or sought to revoke or even modify it. - -Determination to destroy the Jews was a binding force which at all times -cemented the elements of this conspiracy. On many internal policies -there were differences among the defendants. But there is not one of -them who has not echoed the rallying cry of Naziism—_DEUTSCHLAND -ERWACHE JUDA VERRECKE!_ (GERMANY AWAKE, JEWRY PERISH!) - - TERRORISM AND PREPARATION FOR WAR - -How a Government treats its own inhabitants generally is thought to be -no concern of other Governments or of international society. Certainly -few oppressions or cruelties would warrant the intervention of foreign -powers. But the German mistreatment of Germans is now known to pass in -magnitude and savagery any limits of what is tolerable by modern -civilization. Other nations, by silence, would take a consenting part in -such crimes. These Nazi persecutions, moreover, take character as -international crimes because of the purpose for which they were -undertaken. - -The purpose, as we have seen, of getting rid of the influence of free -labor, the churches, and the Jews was to clear their obstruction to the -precipitation of aggressive war. If aggressive warfare in violation of -treaty obligation is a matter of international cognizance, the -preparations for it must also be of concern to the international -community. Terrorism was the chief instrument for securing the cohesion -of the German people in war purposes. Moreover, these cruelties in -Germany served as atrocity practice to discipline the membership of the -criminal organization to follow the pattern later in occupied countries. - -Through the police formations that before you are accused as criminal -organizations, the Nazi Party leaders, aided at some point in their -basic and notorious purpose by each of the individual defendants -instituted a reign of terror. These espionage and police organizations -were utilized to hunt down every form of opposition and to penalize -every nonconformity. These organizations early founded and administered -concentration camps—Buchenwald in 1933, Dachau in 1934. But these -notorious names were not alone. Concentration camps came to dot the -German map and to number scores. At first they met with resistance from -some Germans. We have a captured letter from Minister of Justice -Guertner to Hitler which is revealing. A Gestapo official had been -prosecuted for crimes committed in the camp at Hohnstein, and the Nazi -Governor of Saxony had promptly asked that the proceeding be quashed. -The Minister of Justice in June of 1935 protested because, as he said: - - “In this camp unusually grave mistreatments of prisoners have - occurred at least since Summer 1933. The prisoners not only were - beaten with whips without cause, similarly as in the - Concentration Camp Bredow near Stettin till they lost - consciousness, but they were also tortured in other manners, - e.g. with the help of a dripping apparatus constructed - exclusively for this purpose, under which prisoners had to stand - until they were suffering from serious purulent wounds of the - scalp * * *” (_787-PS_). - -I shall not take time to detail the ghastly proceedings in these -concentration camps. Beatings, starvings, tortures, and killings were -routine—so routine that the tormenters became blase and careless. We -have a report of discovery that in Ploetzens one night, 186 persons were -executed while there were orders for only 180. Another report describes -how the family of one victim received two urns of ashes by mistake. -Inmates were compelled to execute each other. In 1942, they were paid -five Reichsmarks per execution, but on June 27, 1942, SS General Gluecks -ordered commandants of all concentration camps to reduce this honorarium -to three cigarettes. In 1943, the Reichsleader of the SS and Chief of -German Police ordered the corporal punishments on Russian women to be -applied by Polish women and vice versa, but the price was not frozen. -“As reward, a few cigarettes” was authorized. Under the Nazis, human -life had been progressively devalued until it finally became worth less -than a handful of tobacco—ersatz tobacco. There were, however, some -traces of the milk of human kindness. On August 11, 1942, an order went -from Himmler to the commanders of fourteen concentration camps that -“only German prisoners are allowed to beat other German prisoners.” -(_2189-PS_). - -Mystery and suspense was added to cruelty in order to spread torture -from the inmate to his family and friends. Men and women disappeared -from their homes or business or from the streets, and no word came of -them. The omission of notice was not due to overworked staff; it was due -to policy. The Chief of the SD and Sipo reported that in accordance with -orders from the Fuehrer anxiety should be created in the minds of the -family of the arrested person (_668-PS_). Deportations and secret -arrests were labeled, with a Nazi wit which seems a little ghoulish, -_Nacht und Nebel_ (Night and Fog) (_L-90, 833-PS_). One of the many -orders for these actions gave this explanation: - - “The decree carries a basic innovation. The Fuehrer and - Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces commands that crimes of - the specified sort committed by civilians of the occupied - territories are to be punished by the pertinent courts-martial - in the occupied territories _only_ when - - _a._ the sentence calls for the death penalty, and - - _b._ the sentence is pronounced within 8 days after the arrest. - - “Only when both conditions are met does the Fuehrer and - Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces hope for the desired - deterrent effect from the conduct of punitive proceedings in the - occupied territories. - - “In other cases in the future the accused are to be secretly - brought to Germany and the further conduct of the trial carried - on here. The deterrent effect of those measures lies - - _a._ in allowing the disappearance of the accused without a - trace, - - _b._ therein, that no information whatsoever may be given about - their whereabouts and their fate.” (_833-PS_). - -To clumsy cruelty, scientific skill was added. “Undesirables” were -exterminated by injection of drugs into the bloodstream, by asphyxiation -in gas chambers. They were shot with poison bullets, to study the -effects (_L-103_). - -Then, to cruel experiments the Nazi added obscene ones. These were not -the work of underling degenerates but of master minds high in the Nazi -conspiracy. In May 20, 1942, General Field Marshal Milch authorized SS -General Wolff to go ahead at Dachau Camp with so-called “cold -experiments”; and four female gypsies were supplied for the purpose. -Himmler gave permission to carry on these “experiments” also in other -camps (_1617-PS_). At Dachau, the reports of the “doctor” in charge show -that victims were immersed in cold water until their body temperature -was reduced to 28 degrees centigrade (82.4 degrees Fahrenheit), when -they all died immediately (_1618-PS_). This was in August 1942. But the -“doctor’s” technique improved. By February, 1943, he was able to report -that thirty persons were chilled to 27 to 29 degrees, their hands and -feet frozen white, and their bodies “rewarmed” by a hot bath. But the -Nazi scientific triumph was “rewarming with animal heat.” The victim, -all but frozen to death, was surrounded with bodies of living women -until he revived and responded to his environment by having sexual -intercourse (_1616-PS_). Here Nazi degeneracy reached its nadir. - -I dislike to encumber the record with such morbid tales, but we are in -the grim business of trying men as criminals, and these are the things -their own agents say happened. We will show you these concentration -camps in motion pictures, just as the Allied armies found them when they -arrived, and the measures General Eisenhower had to take to clean them -up. Our proof will be disgusting and you will say I have robbed you of -your sleep. But these are the things which have turned the stomach of -the world and set every civilized hand against Nazi Germany. - -Germany became one vast torture chamber. Cries of its victims were heard -round the world and brought shudders to civilized people everywhere. I -am one who received during this war most atrocity tales with suspicion -and skepticism. But the proof here will be so overwhelming that I -venture to predict not one word I have spoken will be denied. These -defendants will only deny personal responsibility or knowledge. - -Under the clutch of the most intricate web of espionage and intrigue -that any modern state has endured, and persecution and torture of a kind -that has not been visited upon the world in many centuries, the elements -of the German population which were both decent and courageous were -annihilated. Those which were decent but weak were intimidated. Open -resistance, which had never been more than feeble and irresolute, -disappeared. But resistance, I am happy to say, always remained, -although it was manifest in only such events as the abortive effort to -assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944. With resistance driven underground, -the Nazi had the German State in his own hands. - -But the Nazis not only silenced discordant voices. They created positive -controls as effective as their negative ones. Propaganda organs, on a -scale never before known, stimulated the party and party formations with -a permanent enthusiasm and abandon such as we democratic people can work -up only for a few days before a general election. They inculcated and -practiced the _fuehrerprinzip_, which centralized control of the Party -and of the Party-controlled state over the lives and thought of the -German people, who are accustomed to look upon the German State by -whomever controlled with a mysticism that is incomprehensible to my -people. - -All these controls from their inception were exerted with unparalleled -energy and singlemindedness to put Germany on a war footing. We will -show from the Nazis’ own documents their secret training of military -personnel, their secret creation of a military air force. Finally, a -conscript army was brought into being. Financiers, economists, -industrialists, joined in the plan and promoted elaborate alterations in -industry and finance to support an unprecedented concentration of -resources and energies upon preparations for war. Germany’s rearmament -so outstripped the strength of her neighbors that in about a year she -was able to crush the whole military force of Continental Europe, -exclusive of that of Soviet Russia, and then to push the Russian armies -back to the Volga. These preparations were of a magnitude which -surpassed all need of defense and every defendant, and every intelligent -German, well understood them to be for aggressive purposes. - - EXPERIMENTS IN AGGRESSION - -Before resorting to open aggressive warfare, the Nazis undertook some -rather cautious experiments to test the spirit and resistance of those -who lay across their path. They advanced, but only as others yielded, -and kept in a position to draw back if they found a temper that made -persistence dangerous. - -On 7 March 1936, the Nazis reoccupied the Rhineland and then proceeded -to fortify it in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of -Locarno. They encountered no substantial resistance and were emboldened -to take the next step, which was the acquisition of Austria. Despite -repeated assurances that Germany had no designs on Austria, invasion was -perfected. Threat of attack forced Schuschnigg to resign as Chancellor -of Austria and put the Nazi defendant Seyss-Inquart in his place. The -latter immediately opened the frontier and invited Hitler to invade -Austria “to preserve order.” On March 12th the invasion began. The next -day, Hitler proclaimed himself Chief of the Austrian State, took command -of its armed forces, and a law was enacted annexing Austria to Germany. - -Threats of aggression had succeeded without arousing resistance. Fears -nevertheless had been stirred. They were lulled by an assurance to the -Czechoslovak Government that there would be no attack on that country. -We will show that the Nazi Government already had detailed plans for the -attack. We will lay before you the documents in which these conspirators -planned to create an incident to justify their attack. They even gave -consideration to assassinating their own Ambassador at Prague in order -to create a sufficiently dramatic incident. They did precipitate a -diplomatic crisis which endured through the summer. Hitler set September -30th as the day when troops should be ready for action. Under the threat -of immediate war, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact with -Germany and Italy at Munich on September 29, 1938 which required -Czechoslovakia to acquiesce in the cession of the Sudetenland to -Germany. It was consummated by German occupation on October 1, 1938. - -The Munich Pact pledged no further aggression against Czechoslovakia, -but the Nazi pledge was lightly given and quickly broken. On the 15th of -March, 1939, in defiance of the treaty of Munich itself, the Nazis -seized and occupied Bohemia and Moravia, which constituted the major -part of Czechoslovakia not already ceded to Germany. Once again the West -stood aghast, but it dreaded war, it saw no remedy except war, and it -hoped against hope that the Nazi fever for expansion had run its course. -But the Nazi world was intoxicated by these unresisted successes in open -alliance with Mussolini and covert alliance with Franco. Then, having -made a deceitful, delaying peace with Russia, the conspirators entered -upon the final phase of the plan to renew war. - - WAR OF AGGRESSION - -I will not prolong this address by detailing the steps leading to the -war of aggression which began with the invasion of Poland on September, -1, 1939. The further story will be unfolded to you from documents -including those of the German High Command itself. The plans had been -laid long in advance. As early as 1935 Hitler appointed the defendant -Schacht to the position of “General Deputy for the War Economy.” -(_2261-PS_). We have the diary of General Jodl (_1780-PS_); the “Plan -Otto,” Hitler’s own order for attack on Austria in case trickery failed -(_C-102_); the “Plan Green” which was the blueprint for attack on -Czechoslovakia (_388-PS_); plans for the War in the West (_376-PS_, -_375-PS_); Funk’s letter to Hitler dated August 25, 1939, detailing the -long course of economic preparation (_699-PS_); Keitel’s top secret -mobilization order for 1939-40 prescribing secret steps to be taken -during a “period of tension” during which no “‘state of war’ will be -publicly declared even if open war measures against the foreign enemy -will be taken.” This latter order (_1639-A-PS_) is in our possession -despite a secret order issued on March 16, 1945, when Allied troops were -advancing into the heart of Germany, to burn these plans. We have also -Hitler’s directive, dated December 18, 1940, for the “Barbarossa -Contingency” outlining the strategy of the attack upon Russia -(_446-PS_). That plan in the original bears the initials of the -defendants Keitel and Jodl. They were planning the attack and planning -it long in advance of the declaration of war. We have detailed -information concerning “Case White,” the plan for attack on Poland -(_C-120_). That attack began the war. The plan was issued by Keitel on -April 3rd, 1939. The attack did not come until September. Steps in -preparation for the attack were taken by subordinate commanders, one of -whom issued an order on June 14, providing that: - - “The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the working out - of a _plan of deployment against Poland_ which takes in account - the demands of the political leadership _for the opening of war - by surprise and for quick success_ * * * - - “I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the - divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as - possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to - limit the extent of the information, and ask that all suitable - measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting - information.” - - * * * * * * - - “The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish - mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with - forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed - on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial - superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that - can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly - bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the - marching up of the Polish Army. - - “If the development of the Political situation should show that - a surprise at the beginning of the war is out of question, - because of well advanced defense preparations on the part of the - Polish Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army will order the - opening of the hostilities only after the assembling of - sufficient additional forces. The basis of all preparations will - be to surprise the enemy.” (_2327-PS_). - -We have also the order for the invasion of England, signed by Hitler and -initialed by Keitel and Jodl. It is interesting that it commences with a -recognition that although the British military position is “hopeless,” -they show not the slightest sign of giving in (_442-PS_). - -Not the least incriminating are the minutes of Hitler’s meeting with his -high advisers. As early as November 5, 1937, Hitler told defendants -Goering, Raeder, and Neurath, among others, that German rearmament was -practically accomplished and that he had decided to secure by force, -starting with a lightning attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria, greater -living space for Germans in Europe no later than 1943-45 and perhaps as -early as 1938 (_386-PS_). On the 23rd of May, 1939, the Fuehrer advised -his staff that— - - “It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and - of securing our food supplies * * * over and above the natural - fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously - increase the surplus.” - - “There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are - left with the decision: _To attack Poland at the first suitable - opportunity_. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. - There will be war.” (_L-79_). - -On August 22nd, 1939 Hitler again addressed members of the High Command, -telling them when the start of military operations would be ordered. He -disclosed that for propaganda purposes, he would provocate a good -reason. “It will make no difference,” he announced, “whether this reason -will sound convincing or not. After all, the victor will not be asked -whether he talked the truth or not. We have to proceed brutally. The -stronger is always right.” (_1014-PS_). On 23 November 1939 after the -Germans had invaded Poland, Hitler made this explanation: - - “For the first time in history we have to fight on only one - front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know - how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time - whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. - Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to - strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or - later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was - decided that the east was to be attacked first * * *” - (_789-PS_). - -We know the bloody sequel. Frontier incidents were staged. Demands were -made for cession of territory. When Poland refused, the German forces -invaded on September 1st, 1939. Warsaw was destroyed; Poland fell. The -Nazis, in accordance with plan, moved swiftly to extend their aggression -throughout Europe and to gain the advantage of surprise over their -unprepared neighbors. Despite repeated and solemn assurances of peaceful -intentions, they invaded Denmark and Norway on 9th April, 1940; Belgium, -The Netherlands and Luxembourg on 10th May, 1940; Yugoslavia and Greece -on 6th April, 1941. - -As part of the Nazi preparation for aggression against Poland and her -allies, Germany, on 23rd August, 1939 had entered into a nonaggression -pact with Soviet-Russia. It was only a delaying treaty intended to be -kept no longer than necessary to prepare for its violation. On June 22, -1941, pursuant to long matured plans, the Nazis hurled troops into -Soviet territory without any declaration of war. The entire European -world was aflame. - - CONSPIRACY WITH JAPAN - -The Nazi plans of aggression called for use of Asiatic allies and they -found among the Japanese men of kindred mind and purpose. They were -brothers, under the skin. - -Himmler records a conversation he had on January 31, 1939 with General -Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. He wrote: - - “Furthermore, he (Oshima) had succeeded up to now to send 10 - Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These - Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional - Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the - frontier.” (_2195-PS_). - -On September 27th, 1940, the Nazis concluded a German-Italian-Japanese -ten-year military and economic alliance by which those powers agreed “to -stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in -Greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their -prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things * * *.” - -On March 5, 1941, a top secret directive was issued by defendant Keitel. -It stated that “The Fuehrer has ordered instigation of Japan’s active -participation in the war” and directed that “Japan’s military power has -to be strengthened by the disclosure of German war experiences and -support of a military, economic and technical nature has to be given.” -The aim was stated to be to crush England quickly, “thereby keeping the -United States out of the war.” (_C-75_). - -On March 29, 1941, Ribbentrop told Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign -Minister, that the German Army was ready to strike against Russia. -Matsuoka reassured Ribbentrop about the Far East. Japan, he reported, -was acting at the moment as though she had no interest whatever in -Singapore, but “intends to strike when the right moment comes.” -(_1877-PS_). On April 5, 1941, Ribbentrop urged Matsuoka that entry of -Japan into the war would “hasten the victory” and would be more in the -interest of Japan that of Germany since it would give Japan a unique -chance to fulfill her national aims and to play a leading part in -Eastern Asia (_1882-PS_). - -The proofs in this case will also show that the leaders of Germany were -planning war against the United States from its Atlantic as well as -instigating it from its Pacific approaches. A captured memorandum from -the Fuehrer’s headquarters, dated October 29, 1940, asks certain -information as to air bases and supply and reports further that - - “The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the - occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the - prosecution of war against America at a later date. - Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here.” - (_376-PS_). - -On December 7, 1941, a day which the late President Roosevelt declared -“will live in infamy,” victory for German aggression seemed certain. The -Wehrmacht was at the gates of Moscow. Taking advantage of the situation, -and while her plenipotentiaries were creating a diplomatic diversion in -Washington, Japan without declaration of war treacherously attacked the -United States at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Attacks followed -swiftly on the British Commonwealth and The Netherlands in the Southwest -Pacific. These aggressions were met in the only way they could be met, -with instant declarations of war and with armed resistance which mounted -slowly through many long months of reverse until finally the Axis was -crushed to earth and deliverance for its victims was won. - - CRIMES IN THE CONDUCT OF WAR - -Even the most warlike of peoples have recognized in the name of humanity -some limitations on the savagery of warfare. Rules to that end have been -embodied in international conventions to which Germany became a party. -This code had prescribed certain restraints as to the treatment of -belligerents. The enemy was entitled to surrender and to receive quarter -and good treatment as a prisoner of war. We will show by German -documents that these rights were denied, that prisoners of war were -given brutal treatment and often murdered. This was particularly true in -the case of captured airmen, often my countrymen. - -It was ordered that captured English and American airmen should no -longer be granted the status of prisoners of war. They were to be -treated as criminals and the Army was ordered to refrain from protecting -them against lynching by the populace (_R-118_). The Nazi Government, -through its police and propaganda agencies, took pains to incite the -civilian population to attack and kill airmen who crash-landed. The -order, given by the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, on 10 August 1943, -directed that, - - “It is not the task of the police to interfere in clashes - between German and English and American fliers who have bailed - out.” - -This order was transmitted on the same day by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer -Brand of Himmler’s Personal Staff to all Senior Executive SS and Police -officers, with these directions: - - “I am sending you the inclosed order with the request that the - Chief of the Regular Police and of the Security Police be - informed. They are to make this instruction known to their - subordinate officers verbally.” (_R-110_). - -Similarly, we will show Hitler’s top secret order, dated 18 October -1942, that commandos, regardless of condition, were “to be slaughtered -to the last man” after capture (_498-PS_). We will show the circulation -of secret orders, one of which was signed by Hess, to be passed orally -to civilians, that enemy fliers or parachutists were to be arrested or -liquidated (_062-PS_). By such means were murders incited and directed. - -This Nazi campaign of ruthless treatment of enemy forces assumed its -greatest proportions in the fight against Russia. Eventually all -prisoners of war were taken out of control of the Army and put in the -hands of Himmler and the SS (_058-PS_). In the East, the German fury -spent itself. Russian prisoners were ordered to be branded. They were -starved. I shall quote passages from a letter written February 28, 1942 -by defendant Rosenberg to defendant Keitel: - - “The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the - contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3.6 millions of - prisoners of war, only several hundred thousand are still able - to work fully. A large part of them has starved, or died, - because of the hazards of the weather. Thousands also died from - spotted fever. - - “The camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to - put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have rather - let them starve to death. - - “In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep up on - the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot - before the eyes of the horrified civilian population, and the - corpses were left. - - “In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war was - provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or - snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes or caves. - - “Finally, the shooting of prisoners of war must be mentioned. - For instance, in various camps, all the ‘Asiatics’ were shot.” - (_081-PS_). - -Civilized usage and conventions to which Germany was a party had -prescribed certain immunities for civilian populations unfortunate -enough to dwell in lands overrun by hostile armies. The German -occupation forces, controlled or commanded by men on trial before you, -committed a long series of outrages against the inhabitants of occupied -territory that would be incredible except for captured orders and the -captured reports showing the fidelity with which these orders were -executed. - -We deal here with a phase of common criminality designed by the -conspirators as part of the common plan. We can appreciate why these -crimes against their European enemies were not of a casual character but -were planned and disciplined crimes when we get at the reason for them. -Hitler told his officers on August 22, 1939 that “The main objective in -Poland is the destruction of the enemy and not the reaching of a certain -geographical line.” (_1014-PS_). The project of deporting promising -youth from occupied territories was approved by Rosenberg on the theory -that “a desired weakening of the biological force of the conquered -people is being achieved.” (_031-PS_). To Germanize or to destroy was -the program. Himmler announced, “Either we win over any good blood that -we can use for ourselves and give it a place in our people or, -gentlemen—you may call this cruel, but nature is cruel—we destroy this -blood.” As to “racially good types” Himmler further advised, “Therefore, -I think that it is our duty to take their children with us to remove -them from their environment if necessary by robbing or stealing them.” -(_L-70_). He urged deportation of Slavic children to deprive potential -enemies of future soldiers. - -The Nazi purpose was to leave Germany’s neighbors so weakened that even -if she should eventually lose the war, she would still be the most -powerful nation in Europe. Against this background, we must view the -plan for ruthless warfare, which means a plan for the commission of war -crimes and crimes against humanity. - -Hostages in large numbers were demanded and killed. Mass punishments -were inflicted, so savage that whole communities were extinguished. -Rosenberg was advised of the annihilation of three unidentified villages -in Slovakia. In May of 1943, another village of about 40 farms and 220 -inhabitants was ordered wiped out. The entire population was ordered -shot, the cattle and property impounded, and the order required that -“the village will be destroyed totally by fire.” A secret report from -Rosenberg’s Reich Ministry of Eastern territory reveals that: - - “Food rations allowed the Russian population are so low that - they fail to secure their existence and provide only for minimum - subsistence of limited duration. The population, does not know - if they will still live tomorrow. They are faced with death by - starvation. - - “The roads are clogged by hundreds of thousands of people, - sometime as many as one million according to the estimate of - experts, who wander around in search of nourishment. - - “Sauckel’s action has caused great unrest among the civilians. - Russian girls were deloused by men, nude photos in forced - positions were taken, women doctors were locked into freight - cars for the pleasure of the transport commanders, women in - night shirts were fettered and forced through the Russian towns - to the railroad station, etc. All this material has been sent to - the OKH.” - -Perhaps the deportation to slave labor was the most horrible and -extensive slaving operation in history. On few other subjects is our -evidence so abundant or so damaging. In a speech made on January 25, -1944, the defendant Frank, Governor-General of Poland, boasted, “I have -sent 1,300,000 Polish workers into the Reich.” The defendant Sauckel -reported that “out of the five million foreign workers who arrived in -Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” This fact was reported to -the Fuehrer and defendants Speer, Goering, and Keitel (_R-124_). -Children of 10 to 14 years were impressed into service by telegraphic -order of Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories: - - “The Command is further charged with the transferring of - worthwhile Russian youth between 10-14 years of age, to the - Reich. The authority is not affected by the changes connected - with the evacuation and transportation to the reception camps of - Pialystok, Krajewo, and Olitei. The Fuehrer wishes that this - activity be increased even more.” (_200-PS_). - -When enough labor was not forthcoming, prisoners of war were forced in -war work in flagrant violation of international conventions (_016-PS_). -Slave labor came from France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and the East. -Methods of recruitment were violent (_R-124, 018-PS, 204-PS_). The -treatment of these slave laborers was stated in general terms, not -difficult to translate into concrete deprivations, in a letter to the -defendant Rosenberg from the defendant Sauckel, which stated: - - “All _prisoners of war_, from the _territories_ of the West as - well of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely - incorporated into the German armament and munition industries. - Their production must be brought to the highest possible level. - - “The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the - use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men - and women, has become an undisputable necessity for the solution - of the mobilization of labor program in this war. - - “All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as - to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest - conceivable degrees of expenditure.” (_016-PS_). - -In pursuance of the Nazi plan permanently to reduce the living standards -of their neighbors and to weaken them physically and economically, a -long series of crimes were committed. There was extensive destruction, -serving no military purpose, of the property of civilians. Dikes were -thrown open in Holland almost at the close of the war not to achieve -military ends but to destroy the resources and retard the economy of the -thrifty Netherlanders. - -There was carefully planned economic syphoning off of the assets of -occupied countries. An example of the planning is shown by a report on -France dated December 7, 1942 made by the Economic Research Department -of the Reichsbank. The question arose whether French occupation costs -should be increased from 15 million Reichsmarks per day to 25 million -Reichsmarks per day. The Reichsbank analyzed French economy to determine -whether it could bear the burden. It pointed out that the armistice had -burdened France to that date to the extent of 18½ billion Reichsmarks, -equalling 370 billion Francs. It pointed out that the burden of these -payments within two and a half years equalled the aggregate French -national income in the year 1940, and that the amount of payments handed -over to Germany in the first six months of 1942 corresponded to the -estimate for the total French revenue for that whole year. The report -concluded, “In any case, the conclusion is inescapable that relatively -heavier tributes have been imposed on France since the armistice in -June, 1940 than upon Germany after the World War. In this connection, it -must be noted that the economic powers of France never equalled those of -the German Reich and that vanquished France could not draw on foreign -economic and financial resources in the same degree as Germany after the -last World War.” - -The defendant Funk was the Reichs Minister of Economics and President of -the Reichsbank; the defendant Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister; the -defendant Goering was Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, and all of -them participated in the exchange of views of which this captured -document is a part (_2149-PS_). Notwithstanding this analysis by the -Reichsbank, they proceeded to increase the imposition on France from 15 -million Reichsmarks daily to 25 million daily. - -It is small wonder that the bottom has been knocked out of French -economy. The plan and purpose of the thing appears in a letter from -General Stulpnagle, head of the German Armistice Commission, to the -defendant Jodl as early as 14th September, 1940 when he wrote, “The -slogan ‘Systematic weakening of France’ has already been surpassed by -far in reality.” - -Not only was there a purpose to debilitate and demoralize the economy of -Germany’s neighbors for the purpose of destroying their competitive -position, but there was looting and pilfering on an unprecedented scale. -We need not be hypocritical about this business of looting. I recognize -that no army moves through occupied territory without some pilfering as -it goes. Usually the amount of pilfering increases as discipline wanes. -If the evidence in this case showed no looting except of that sort, I -certainly would ask no conviction of these defendants for it. - -But we will show you that looting was not due to the lack of discipline -or to the ordinary weaknesses of human nature. The German organized -plundering, planned it, disciplined it, and made it official just as he -organized everything else, and then he compiled the most meticulous -records to show that he had done the best job of looting that was -possible under the circumstances. And we have those records. - -The defendant Rosenberg was put in charge of a systematic plundering of -the art objects of Europe by direct order of Hitler dated 29 January -1940 (_136-PS_). On the 16th of April, 1943 Rosenberg reported that up -to the 7th of April, 92 railway cars with 2,775 cases containing art -objects had been sent to Germany; and that 53 pieces of art had been -shipped to Hitler direct, and 594 to the defendant Goering. The report -mentioned something like 20,000 pieces of seized art and the main -locations where they were stored (_015-PS_). - -Moreover, this looting was glorified by Rosenberg. Here we have 39 -leather-bound tabulated volumes of his inventory, which in due time we -will offer in evidence. One cannot but admire the artistry of this -Rosenberg report. The Nazi taste was cosmopolitan. Of the 9,455 articles -inventoried, there were included 5,255 paintings, 297 sculptures, 1,372 -pieces of antique furniture, 307 textiles, and 2,224 small objects of -art. Rosenberg observed that there were approximately 10,000 more -objects still to be inventoried (_015-PS_). Rosenberg himself estimated -that the values involved would come close to a billion dollars -(_090-PS_). - -I shall not go into further details of the war crimes and crimes against -humanity committed by the Nazi gangster ring whose leaders are before -you. It is not the purpose in my part of this case to deal with the -individual crimes. I am dealing with the common plan or design for crime -and will not dwell upon individual offenses. My task is only to show the -scale on which these crimes occurred, and to show that these are the men -who were in the responsible positions and who conceived the plan and -design which renders them answerable, regardless of the fact that the -plan was actually executed by others. - -At length, this reckless and lawless course outraged the world. It -recovered from the demoralization of surprise attack, assembled its -forces, and stopped these men in their tracks. Once success deserted -their banners, one by one the Nazi satellites fell away. Sawdust Caesar -collapsed. Resistance forces in every occupied country arose to harry -the invader. Even at home, Germans saw that Germany was being led to -ruin by these mad men, and the attempt on July 20, 1944 to assassinate -Hitler, an attempt fostered by men of highest station, was a desperate -effort by internal forces to stop short of ruin. Quarrels broke out -among the failing conspirators, and the decline of the Nazi power was -more swift than its ascendancy. German armed forces surrendered, its -government disintegrated, its leaders committed suicide by the dozen, -and by the fortunes of war these defendants fell into our hands. -Although they are not by any means all the guilty ones, they are -survivors among the most responsible. Their names appear over and over -in the documents and their faces grace the photographic evidence. We -have here the surviving top politicians, militarists, financiers, -diplomats, administrators, and propagandists of the Nazi movement. Who -was responsible for these crimes if they were not? - - THE LAW OF THE CASE - -The end of the war and capture of these prisoners presented the -victorious Allies with the question whether there is any legal -responsibility on high-ranking men for acts which I have described. Must -such wrongs either be ignored or redressed in hot blood? Is there no -standard in the law for a deliberate and reasoned judgment on such -conduct? - -The Charter of this Tribunal evidences a faith that the law is not only -to govern the conduct of little men, but that even rulers are, as Lord -Chief Justice Coke put it to King James, “under God and the law.” The -United States believed that the law long has afforded standards by which -a juridical hearing could be conducted to make sure that we punish only -the right men and for the right reasons. Following the instructions of -the late President Roosevelt and the decision of the Yalta conference, -President Truman directed representatives of the United States to -formulate a proposed International Agreement, which was submitted during -the San Francisco Conference to Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, -the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of France. With many -modifications, that proposal has become the Charter of this Tribunal. - -But the Agreement which sets up the standards by which these prisoners -are to be judged does not express the views of the signatory nations -alone. Other nations with diverse but highly respected systems of -jurisprudence also have signified adherence to it. These are Belgium, -The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Poland, -Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Australia, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, New -Zealand, Venezuela, and India. You judge, therefore, under an organic -act which represents the wisdom, the sense of justice, and the will of -twenty-one governments, representing an overwhelming majority of all -civilized people. - -The Charter by which this Tribunal has its being embodies certain legal -concepts which are inseparable from its jurisdiction and which must -govern its decision. These, as I have said, also are conditions attached -to the grant of any hearing to defendants. The validity of the -provisions of the Charter is conclusive upon us all whether we have -accepted the duty of judging or of prosecuting under it, as well as upon -the defendants, who can point to no other law which gives them a right -to be heard at all. My able and experienced colleagues believe, as do I, -that it will contribute to the expedition and clarity of this trial if I -expound briefly the application of the legal philosophy of the Charter -to the facts I have recited. - -While this declaration of the law by the Charter is final, it may be -contended that the prisoners on trial are entitled to have it applied to -their conduct only most charitably if at all. It may be said that this -is new law, not authoritatively declared at the time they did the acts -it condemns, and that this declaration of the law has taken them by -surprise. - -I cannot, of course, deny that these men are surprised that this is the -law; they really are surprised that there is any such thing as law. -These defendants did not rely on any law at all. Their program ignored -and defied all law. That this is so will appear from many acts and -statements, of which I cite but a few. In the Fuehrer’s speech to all -military commanders on November 23, 1939, he reminded them that at the -moment Germany had a pact with Russia, but declared, “Agreements are to -be kept only as long as they serve a certain purpose.” Later on in the -same speech he announced, “A violation of the neutrality of Holland and -Belgium will be of no importance.” (_789-PS_). A Top Secret document, -entitled “Warfare as a Problem of Organization,” dispatched by the Chief -of the High Command to all Commanders on April 19, 1938, declared that -“the normal rules of war toward neutrals may be considered to apply on -the basis whether operation of rules will create greater advantages or -disadvantages for belligerents.” (_L-211_). And from the files of the -German Navy Staff, we have a “Memorandum on Intensified Naval War,” -dated October 15, 1939, which begins by stating a desire to comply with -International Law. “However,” it continues, “if decisive successes are -expected from any measure considered as a war necessity, it must be -carried through even if it is not in agreement with international law.” -(_UK-65_). International Law, natural law, German law, any law at all -was to these men simply a propaganda device to be invoked when it helped -and to be ignored when it would condemn what they wanted to do. That men -may be protected in relying upon the law at the time they act is the -reason we find laws of retrospective operation unjust. But these men -cannot bring themselves within the reason of the rule which in some -systems of jurisprudence prohibits _ex post facto_ laws. They cannot -show that they ever relied upon International Law in any state or paid -it the slightest regard. - -The Third Count of the Indictment is based on the definition of war -crimes contained in the Charter. I have outlined to you the systematic -course of conduct toward civilian populations and combat forces which -violates international conventions to which Germany was a party. Of the -criminal nature of these acts at least, the defendants had, as we shall -show, clear knowledge. Accordingly, they took pains to conceal their -violations. It will appear that the defendants Keitel and Jodl were -informed by official legal advisors that the orders to brand Russian -prisoners of war, to shackle British prisoners of war, and to execute -commando prisoners were clear violations of International Law. -Nevertheless, these orders were put into effect. The same is true of -orders issued for the assassination of General Giraud and General -Weygand, which failed to be executed only because of a ruse on the part -of Admiral Canaris, who was himself later executed for his part in the -plot to take Hitler’s life on July 20, 1944 (_Affidavit A_). - -The Fourth Count of the Indictment is based on crimes against humanity. -Chief among these are mass killings of countless human beings in cold -blood. Does it take these men by surprise that murder is treated as a -crime? - -The First and Second Counts of the Indictment add to these crimes the -crime of plotting and waging wars of aggression and wars in violation of -nine treaties to which Germany was a party. There was a time, in fact I -think the time of the first World War, when it could not have been said -that war-inciting or war-making was a crime in law, however -reprehensible in morals. - -Of course, it was under the law of all civilized peoples a crime for one -man with his bare knuckles to assault another. How did it come that -multiplying this crime by a million, and adding fire arms to bare -knuckles, made a legally innocent act? The doctrine was that one could -not be regarded as criminal for committing the usual violent acts in the -conduct of legitimate warfare. The age of imperialistic expansion during -the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries added the foul doctrine, -contrary to the teachings of early Christian and International Law -scholars such as Grotius, that all wars are to be regarded as legitimate -wars. The sum of these two doctrines was to give war-making a complete -immunity from accountability to law. - -This was intolerable for an age that called itself civilized. Plain -people, with their earthly common sense, revolted at such fictions and -legalisms so contrary to ethical principles and demanded checks on war -immunity. Statesmen and international lawyers at first cautiously -responded by adopting rules of warfare designed to make the conduct of -war more civilized. The effort was to set legal limits to the violence -that could be done to civilian populations and to combatants as well. - -The common sense of men after the First World War demanded, however, -that the law’s condemnation of war reach deeper, and that the law -condemn not merely uncivilized ways of waging war, but also the waging -in any way of uncivilized wars—wars of aggression. The world’s -statesmen again went only as far as they were forced to go. Their -efforts were timid and cautious and often less explicit than we might -have hoped. But the 1920’s did outlaw aggressive war. - -The reestablishment of the principle that there are unjust wars and that -unjust wars are illegal is traceable in many steps. One of the most -significant is the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, by which Germany, Italy, -and Japan, in common with practically all the nations of the world, -renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to -seek the settlement of disputes only by pacific means, and condemned -recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. This -pact altered the legal status of a war of aggression. As Mr. Stimson, -the United States Secretary of State put it in 1932, such a war “is no -longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the -principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of -nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. * * * By that very act, we have -made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession -the task of reexamining many of its codes and treaties.” - -The Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of International -Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments, -declared that “a war of aggression constitutes * * * an international -crime.” The Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on -unanimous resolution of the representatives of forty-eight member -nations, including Germany, declared that a war of aggression -constitutes an international crime. At the Sixth Pan-American Conference -of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a -resolution stating that “war of aggression constitutes an international -crime against the human species.” - -A failure of these Nazis to heed, or to understand the force and meaning -of this evolution in the legal thought of the world is not a defense or -a mitigation. If anything, it aggravates their offense and makes it the -more mandatory that the law they have flouted be vindicated by juridical -application to their lawless conduct. Indeed, by their own law—had they -heeded any law—these principles were binding on these defendants. -Article 4 of the Weimar Constitution provided that “The generally -accepted rules of international law are to be considered as binding -integral parts of the law of the German Reich.” (_2050-PS_). Can there -be any doubt that the outlawry of aggressive war was one of the -“generally accepted rules of international law” in 1939? - -Any resort to war—to any kind of a war—is a resort to means that are -inherently criminal. War inevitably is a course of killings, assaults, -deprivations of liberty, and destruction of property. An honestly -defensive war is, of course, legal and saves those lawfully conducting -it from criminality. But inherently criminal acts cannot be defended by -showing that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war -itself is illegal. The very minimum legal consequence of the treaties -making aggressive wars illegal is to strip those who incite or wage them -of every defense the law ever gave, and to leave warmakers subject to -judgment by the usually accepted principles of the law of crimes. - -But if it be thought that the Charter, whose declarations concededly -bind us all, does contain new law I still do not shrink from demanding -its strict application by this Tribunal. The rule of law in the world, -flouted by the lawlessness incited by these defendants, had to be -restored at the cost to my country of over a million casualties, not to -mention those of other nations. I cannot subscribe to the perverted -reasoning that society may advance and strengthen the rule of law by the -expenditure of morally innocent lives but that progress in the law may -never be made at the price of morally guilty lives. - -It is true, of course, that we have no judicial precedent for the -Charter. But International Law is more than a scholarly collection of -abstract and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties and -agreements between nations and of accepted customs. Yet every custom has -its origin in some single act, and every agreement has to be initiated -by the action of some state. Unless we are prepared to abandon every -principle of growth for International Law, we cannot deny that our own -day has the right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that -will themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened International -Law. International Law is not capable of development by the normal -processes of legislation for there is no continuing international -legislative authority. Innovations and revisions in International Law -are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet a change -in circumstances. It grows, as did the Common Law, through decisions -reached from time to time in adapting settled principles to new -situations. The fact is that when the law evolves by the case method, as -did the Common Law and as International Law must do if it is to advance -at all, it advances at the expense of those who wrongly guessed the law -and learned too late their error. The law, so far as International Law -can be decreed, had been clearly pronounced when these acts took place. -Hence, I am not disturbed by the lack of judicial precedent for the -inquiry we propose to conduct. - -The events I have earlier recited clearly fall within the standards of -crimes, set out in the Charter, whose perpetrators this Tribunal is -convened to judge and punish fittingly. The standards for war crimes and -crimes against humanity are too familiar to need comment. There are, -however, certain novel problems in applying other precepts of the -Charter which I should call to your attention. - - THE CRIME AGAINST PEACE - -A basic provision of the Charter is that to plan, prepare, initiate, or -wage a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international -treaties, agreements, and assurances, or to conspire or participate in a -common plan to do so is a crime. - -It is perhaps a weakness in this Charter that it fails itself to define -a war of aggression. Abstractly, the subject is full of difficulty and -all kinds of troublesome hypothetical cases can be conjured up. It is a -subject which, if the defense should be permitted to go afield beyond -the very narrow charge in the Indictment, would prolong the trial and -involve the Tribunal in insoluble political issues. But so far as the -question can properly be involved in this case, the issue is one of no -novelty and is one on which legal opinion has well crystalized. - -One of the most authoritative sources of International Law on this -subject is the Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed at -London on July 3, 1933 by Rumania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, The -Soviet Union, Persia, and Afghanistan. The subject has also been -considered by international committees and by commentators whose views -are entitled to the greatest respect. It had been little discussed prior -to the First World War but has received much attention as International -Law has evolved its outlawry of aggressive war. In the light of these -materials of International Law, and so far as relevant to the evidence -in this case, I suggest that an “aggressor” is generally held to be that -state which is the first to commit any of the following actions: - - (1) Declaration of war upon another State; - - (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration - war, of the territory of another State; - - (3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a - declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of - another State; - - (4) Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory - of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the - invaded State, to take in its own territory, all the measures in - its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or - protection. - -And I further suggest that it is the general view that no political, -military, economic or other considerations shall serve as an excuse or -justification for such actions; but exercise of the right of legitimate -self-defense, that is to say, resistance to an act of aggression, or -action to assist a State which has been subjected to aggression, shall -not constitute a war of aggression. - -It is upon such an understanding of the law that our evidence of a -conspiracy to provoke and wage an aggressive war is prepared and -presented. By this test each of the series of wars begun by these Nazi -leaders was unambiguously aggressive. - -It is important to the duration and scope of this trial that we bear in -mind the difference between our charge that this war was one of -aggression and a position that Germany had no grievances. We are not -inquiring into the conditions which contributed to causing this war. -They are for history to unravel. It is no part of our task to vindicate -the European _status quo_ as of 1933, or as of any other date. The -United States does not desire to enter into discussion of the -complicated pre-war currents of European politics, and it hopes this -trial will not be protracted by their consideration. The remote -causations avowed are too insincere and inconsistent, too complicated -and doctrinaire to be the subject of profitable inquiry in this trial. A -familiar example is to be found in the _Lebensraum_ slogan, which -summarized the contention that Germany needed more living space as a -justification for expansion. At the same time that the Nazis were -demanding more space for the German people, they were demanding more -German people to occupy space. Every known means to increase the birth -rate, legitimate and illegitimate, was utilized. _Lebensraum_ -represented a vicious circle of demand—from neighbors more space, and -from Germans more progeny. We do not need to investigate the verity of -doctrines which led to constantly expanding circles of aggression. It is -the plot and the act of aggression which we charge to be crimes. - -Our position is that whatever grievances a nation may have, however -objectionable it finds the _status quo_, aggressive warfare is an -illegal means for settling those grievances or for altering those -conditions. It may be that the Germany of the 1920’s and 1930’s faced -desperate problems, problems that would have warranted the boldest -measures short of war. All other methods—persuasion, propaganda, -economic competition, diplomacy—were open to an aggrieved country, but -aggressive warfare was outlawed. These defendants did make aggressive -war, a war in violation of treaties. They did attack and invade their -neighbors in order to effectuate a foreign policy which they knew could -not be accomplished by measures short of war. And that is as far as we -accuse or propose to inquire. - - THE LAW OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY - -The Charter also recognizes individual responsibility on the part of -those who commit acts defined as crimes, or who incite others to do so, -or who join a common plan with other persons, groups or organizations to -bring about their commission. The principle of individual responsibility -for piracy and brigandage, which have long been recognized as crimes -punishable under International Law, is old and well established. That is -what illegal warfare is. This principle of personal liability is a -necessary as well as logical one if International Law is to render real -help to the maintenance of peace. An International Law which operates -only on states can be enforced only by war because the most practicable -method of coercing a state is warfare. Those familiar with American -history know that one of the compelling reasons for adoption of our -Constitution was that the laws of the Confederation, which operated only -on constituent states, were found ineffective to maintain order among -them. The only answer to recalcitrance was impotence or war. Only -sanctions which reach individuals can peacefully and effectively be -enforced. Hence, the principle of the criminality of aggressive war is -implemented by the Charter with the principle of personal -responsibility. - -Of course, the idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits -crimes is a fiction. Crimes always are committed only by persons. While -it is quite proper to employ the fiction of responsibility of a state or -corporation for the purpose of imposing a collective liability, it is -quite intolerable to let such a legalism become the basis of personal -immunity. - -The Charter recognizes that one who has committed criminal acts may not -take refuge in superior orders nor in the doctrine that his crimes were -acts of states. These twin principles working together have heretofore -resulted in immunity for practically everyone concerned in the really -great crimes against peace and mankind. Those in lower ranks were -protected against liability by the orders of their superiors. The -superiors were protected because their orders were called acts of state. -Under the Charter, no defense based on either of these doctrines can be -entertained. Modern civilization puts unlimited weapons of destruction -in the hands of men. It cannot tolerate so vast an area of legal -irresponsibility. - -Even the German Military Code provides that: - - “If the execution of a military order in the course of duty - violates the criminal law, then the superior officer giving the - order will bear the sole responsibility therefor. However, the - obeying subordinate will share the punishment of the - participant: (1) if he has exceeded the order given to him, or - (2) if it was within his knowledge that the order of his - superior officer concerned an act by which it was intended to - commit a civil or military crime or transgression.” - (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1926, No. 37, p. 278, Art. 47). - -Of course, we do not argue that the circumstances under which one -commits an act should be disregarded in judging its legal effect. A -conscripted private on a firing squad cannot expect to hold an inquest -on the validity of the execution. The Charter implies common sense -limits to liability just as it places common sense limits upon immunity. -But none of these men before you acted in minor parts. Each of them was -entrusted with broad discretion and exercised great power. Their -responsibility is correspondingly great and may not be shifted to that -fictional being, “the State”, which can not be produced for trial, can -not testify, and can not be sentenced. - -The Charter also recognized a vicarious liability, which responsibility -is recognized by most modern systems of law, for acts committed by -others in carrying out a common plan or conspiracy to which a defendant -has become a party. I need not discuss the familiar principles of such -liability. Every day in the courts of countries associated in this, -prosecution, men are convicted for acts that they did not personally -commit but for which they were held responsible because of membership in -illegal combinations or plans or conspiracies. - - THE POLITICAL, POLICE, AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS - -Accused before this Tribunal as criminal organizations are certain -political and police organizations which the evidence will show to have -been instruments of cohesion in planning and executing the crimes I have -detailed. Perhaps the worst of the movement were the Leadership Corps of -the NSDAP, the Schutzstaffeln or “SS”, and the Sturmabteilungen or “SA”, -and the subsidiary formations which these include. These were the Nazi -Party leadership, espionage, and policing groups. They were the real -government, above and outside of any law. Also accused as organizations -are the Reich Cabinet and the Secret State Police or Gestapo, which were -fixtures of the Government but animated solely by the Nazi Party. - -Except for a late period when some compulsory recruiting was done in the -SS, membership in all these militarized formations was voluntary. The -police organizations were recruited from ardent partisans who enlisted -blindly to do the dirty work the leaders planned. The Reich Cabinet was -the governmental facade for Nazi Party Government and in its members -legal as well as actual responsibility was vested for the entire -program. Collectively they were responsible for the program in general, -individually they were especially responsible for segments of it. The -finding which we ask you to make, that these are criminal organizations, -will subject members to punishment to be hereafter determined by -appropriate tribunals, unless some personal defense—such as becoming a -member under threat to person, to family, or inducement by false -representation, or the like—be established. Every member will have a -chance to be heard in the subsequent forum on his personal relation to -the organization, but your finding in this trial will conclusively -establish the criminal character of the organization as a whole. - -We have also accused as criminal organizations the High Command and the -General Staff of the German Armed Forces. We recognize that to plan -warfare is the business of professional soldiers in every country. But -it is one thing to plan strategic moves in the event war comes, and it -is another thing to plot and intrigue to bring on that war. We will -prove the leaders of the German General Staff and of the High Command to -have been guilty of just that. Military men are not before you because -they served their country. They are here because they mastered it, along -with these others, and drove it to war. They are not here because they -lost the war but because they started it. Politicians may have thought -of them as soldiers, but soldiers know they were politicians. We ask -that the General Staff and the High Command, as defined in the -Indictment, be condemned as a criminal group whose existence and -tradition constitute a standing menace to the peace of the world. - -These individual defendants did not stand alone in crime and will not -stand alone in punishment. Your verdict of “guilty” against these -organizations will render _prima facie_ guilty, as nearly as we can -learn, thousands upon thousands of members now in custody of United -States forces and of other Armies. - - THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS TRIBUNAL - -To apply the sanctions of the law to those whose conduct is found -criminal by the standards I have outlined, is the responsibility -committed to this Tribunal. It is the first court ever to undertake the -difficult task of overcoming the confusion of many tongues and the -conflicting concepts of just procedure among divers systems of law, so -as to reach a common judgment. The tasks of all of us are such as to -make heavy demands on patience and good will. Although the need for -prompt action has admittedly resulted in imperfect work on the part of -the prosecution, four great nations bring you their hurriedly assembled -contributions of evidence. What remains undiscovered we can only guess. -We could, with witnesses’ testimony, prolong the recitals of crime for -years—but to what avail? We shall rest the case when we have offered -what seems convincing and adequate proof of the crimes charged without -unnecessary cumulation of evidence. We doubt very much whether it will -be seriously denied that the crimes I have outlined took place. The -effort will undoubtedly be to mitigate or escape personal -responsibility. - -Among the nations which unite in accusing these defendants the United -States is perhaps in a position to be the most dispassionate, for, -having sustained the least injury, it is perhaps the least animated by -vengeance. Our American cities have not been bombed by day and night, by -humans and by robots. It is not our temples that have been laid in -ruins. Our countrymen have not had their homes destroyed over their -heads. The menace of Nazi aggression, except to those in actual service, -has seemed less personal and immediate to us than to European peoples. -But while the United States is not first in rancor, it is not second in -determination that the forces of law and order be made equal to the task -of dealing with such international lawlessness as I have recited here. - -Twice in my lifetime, the United States has sent its young manhood -across the Atlantic, drained its resources, and burdened itself with -debt to help defeat Germany. But the real hope and faith that has -sustained the American people in these great efforts was that victory -for ourselves and our Allies would lay the basis for an ordered -international relationship in Europe and would end the centuries of -strife on this embattled continent. - -Twice we have held back in the early stages of European conflict in the -belief that it might be confined to a purely European affair. In the -United States, we have tried to build an economy without armament, a -system of government without militarism, and a society where men are not -regimented for war. This purpose, we know now, can never be realized if -the world periodically is to be embroiled in war. The United States -cannot, generation after generation, throw its youth or its resources -onto the battlefields of Europe to redress the lack of balance between -Germany’s strength and that of her enemies, and to keep the battles from -our shores. - -The American dream of a peace and plenty economy, as well as the hopes -of other nations, can never be fulfilled if those nations are involved -in a war every generation so vast and devastating as to crush the -generation that fights and burden the generation that follows. But -experience has shown that wars are no longer local. All modern wars -become world wars eventually. And none of the big nations at least can -stay out. If we cannot stay out of wars, our only hope is to prevent -wars. - -I am too well aware of the weaknesses of juridical action alone to -contend that in itself your decision under this Charter can prevent -future wars. Judicial action always comes after the event. Wars are -started only on the theory and in the confidence that they can be won. -Personal punishment, to be suffered only in the event the war is lost, -will probably not be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the -warmakers feel the chances of defeat to be negligible. - -But the ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in -a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible -to law. And let me make clear that while this law is first applied -against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a -useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations, -including those which sit here now in judgment. We are able to do away -with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power -against the rights of their own people only when we make all men -answerable to the law. This trial represents mankind’s desperate effort -to apply the discipline of the law to statesmen who have used their -powers of state to attack the foundations of the world’s peace and to -commit aggressions against the rights of their neighbors. - -The usefulness of this effort to do justice is not to be measured by -considering the law or your judgment in isolation. This trial is part of -the great effort to make the peace more secure. One step in this -direction is the United Nations organization, which may take joint -political action to prevent war if possible, and joint military action -to insure that any nation which starts a war will lose it. This Charter -and this trial, implementing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, constitute another -step in the same direction—juridical action of a kind to ensure that -those who start a war will pay for it personally. - -While the defendants and the prosecutors stand before you as -individuals, it is not the triumph of either group alone that is -committed to your judgment. Above all personalities there are anonymous -and impersonal forces whose conflict makes up much of human history. It -is yours to throw the strength of the law back of either the one or the -other of these forces for at least another generation. What are the real -forces that are contending before you? - -No charity can disguise the fact that the forces, which these defendants -represent, the forces that would advantage and delight in their -acquittal, are the darkest and most sinister forces in -society—dictatorship and oppression, malevolence and passion, -militarism and lawlessness. By their fruits we best know them. Their -acts have bathed the world in blood and set civilization back a century. -They have subjected their European neighbors to every outrage and -torture, every spoliation and deprivation that insolence, cruelty, and -greed could inflict. They have brought the German people to the lowest -pitch of wretchedness, from which they can entertain no hope of early -deliverance. They have stirred hatreds and incited domestic violence on -every continent. These are the things that stand in the dock shoulder to -shoulder with these prisoners. - -The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization. In all our -countries it is still a struggling and imperfect thing. It does not -plead that the United States, or any other country, has been blameless -of the conditions which made the German people easy victims to the -blandishments and intimidations of the Nazi conspirators. - -But it points to the dreadful sequence of aggressions and crimes I have -recited, it points to the weariness of flesh, the exhaustion of -resources, and the destruction of all that was beautiful or useful in so -much of the world, and to greater potentialities for destruction in the -days to come. It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and -beautiful city, with untold members of its civilian inhabitants still -buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition that to start or wage an -aggressive war has the moral qualities of the worst of crimes. The -refuge of the defendants can be only their hope that International Law -will lag so far behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is -crime in the moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law. - -Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to -deal with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of -importance. It does not expect that you can make war impossible. It does -expect that your juridical action will put the forces of International -Law, its precepts, its prohibitions and, most of all, its sanctions, on -the side of peace, so that men and women of good will in all countries -may have “leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath the law.” - - * * * * * - - [In most instances, documents referred to or quoted from have - been cited by number, even though some of them have not been - introduced in evidence as part of the American case. Where they - were not offered as evidence it was chiefly for the reason that - documents subsequently discovered covered the point more - adequately, and because the pressure of time required the - avoidance of cumulative evidence. - - In some instances, no citations are given of documents quoted - from or referred to. These are documents which for a variety of - reasons were not introduced in evidence during the American - case. The length of some of them was disproportionate to the - value of their contents, and hence instead of full translations - only summaries were prepared in English. In some cases a - translation of the document referred to was made only for use in - the address and was not included in the evidence which it was - proposed to offer in court. In other cases the document, - although translated, was turned over to the French or Russian - delegations for use in the proof of Counts III and IV, and hence - forms no part of the American case.] - - - - - Chapter VI - ORGANIZATION OF THE NAZI PARTY AND STATE - - - I. THE NAZI PARTY - -In the opinion of the prosecution, some preliminary references must be -made to the National Socialist German Labor Party, the NSDAP -(_Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei_) which is not itself -one of the defendant organizations in this proceeding, but which is -represented among the defendant organizations by its most important -formations, viz., the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party (_Das Korps der -Politischen Leiter der NSDAP_), the SS (_Die Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP_), -and the SA (_Die Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP_). - -The prosecution has prepared a chart (_Chart No. 1_) showing the -structure and organization of the NSDAP substantially as it existed at -the peak of its development in March 1945. This chart has been prepared -on the basis of information contained in important publications of the -National Socialist Party, with which the defendants must be presumed to -have been well acquainted. Particular reference is made to the -Organization Book of the Party (_Das Organisationsbuch der NSDAP_) and -to the National Socialist Year Book (_Nationalsozialistisches -Jahrbuch_), of both of which Robert Ley was publisher. Both books were -printed in many editions and appeared in hundreds of thousands of -copies, throughout the period when the National Socialist party was in -control of the German Reich and of the German people. This chart has -been certified on its face as correct by a high official of the Nazi -party, viz. Franz Xaver Schwarz, its Treasurer (_Reichsschatzmeister der -NSDAP_), and its official in charge of party administration, whose -affidavit is submitted with the chart. - -Certain explanatory remarks concerning the organization of the National -Socialist party may be useful. - -The _Leadership Corps of the NSDAP_, named as a defendant organization, -comprised the sum of the officials of the Nazi party. It was divided -into seven categories: - - 1. The Fuehrer - 2. Reichsleiter - { 3. Gauleiter - { 4. Kreisleiter - _Hoheitstraeger_ { 5. Ortsgruppenleiter - { 6. Zellenleiter - { 7. Blockleiter - -The _Fuehrer_ was the supreme and only leader who stood at the top of -the party hierarchy. His successor designate was first, Hermann Goering, -and second, Rudolf Hess. - -The _Reichsleiter_, of whom 16 are shown on the chart, made up the Party -Directorate (_Reichsleitung_). Through them, coordination of party and -state machinery was assured. A number of these _Reichsleiter_, each of -whom, at some time, was in charge of at least one office within the -Party Directorate, were also the heads of party formations and of -affiliated or supervised organizations of the party, or of agencies of -the state, or even held ministerial positions. The _Reichsleitung_ may -be said to have represented the horizontal organization of the party -according to functions, within which all threads controlling the varied -life of the German people met. Each office within the _Reichsleitung_ of -the NSDAP executed definite tasks assigned to it by the Fuehrer, or by -the leader of the Party Chancellory (_Chef der Parteikanzlei_), who in -1945 was Martin Bormann and before him, Rudolph Hess. - -It was the duty of the _Reichsleitung_ to make certain these tasks were -carried out so that the will of the Fuehrer was quickly communicated to -the lowliest _Zelle_ or _Block_. The individual offices of the -_Reichsleitung_ had the mission to remain in constant and closest -contact with the life of the people through the subdivisions of the -party organization, in the _Gaue_, _Kreisen_, and _Ortsgruppen_. These -leaders had been taught that the right to organize human beings accrued -through appreciation of the fact that a people must be educated -ideologically (_weltanschaulich_), that is to say, according to the -philosophy of National Socialism. Among the former _Reichsleiter_ on -trial in this cause are the following defendants: - - _Alfred Rosenberg_—The delegate to the Fuehrer for Ideological - Training and Education of the Party. (_Der Beauftragte des - Fuehrer’s fuer die Ueberwachung der gesammten geistigen und - weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP_). - - _Hans Frank_—At one time head of the Legal Office of the party - (_Reichsleiter des Reichsrechtsamtes_). - - _Baldur von Schirach_—Leader of Youth Education (_Leiter fuer - die Jugenderziehung_). - -and the late - - _Robert Ley_—Leader of the Party Organization - (_Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP_) and Leader of the German - Labor Front (_Leiter der Deutschen Arbeitsfront_). - -The next categories to be considered are the _Hoheitstraeger_, the -“bearers of sovereignty.” To them was assigned political sovereignty -over specially designated subdivisions of the state of which they were -the appointed leaders. The _Hoheitstraeger_ may be said to represent the -vertical organization of the party. These leaders included all: - - _a. Gauleiter_, of which there were 42 within the Reich in 1945. - A _Gauleiter_ was the political leader of the largest - subdivision of the State. He was charged by the Fuehrer with - political, cultural, and economic control over the life of the - people, which he was to coordinate with the National Socialist - ideology. A number of the defendants before the bar of the - Tribunal were former _Gauleiter_ of the NSDAP. Among them are - Julius Streicher (Franconia) whose seat was in Nurnberg, Baldur - von Schirach (Vienna), and Fritz Sauckel (Thuringia). - - _b. Kreisleiter_, the political leaders of the largest - subdivision of a _Gau_. - - _c. Ortsgruppenleiter_, the political leaders of the largest - subdivision of a _Kreis_ consisting of several towns or - villages, or of a part of a larger city, and including from 1500 - to 3000 households. - - _d. Zellenleiter_, the political leaders of a group of from 4 to - 8 city blocks or of a corresponding grouping of households in - the country. - - _e. Blockleiter_, the political leaders of from 40 to 60 - households. - -Each of these _Hoheitstraeger_, or “bearers of sovereignty,” was -directly responsible to the next highest leader in the Nazi hierarchy. -The _Gauleiter_ was directly subordinate to the _Fuehrer_ himself, the -_Kreisleiter_ was directly subordinate to the _Gauleiter_, the -_Ortsgruppenleiter_ to the _Kreisleiter_, and so on. The _Fuehrer_ -himself appointed all _Gauleiter_ and _Kreisleiter_, all _Reichsleiter_, -and all other political leaders within the Party Directorate -(_Reichsleitung_) down to the grade of _Gauamtsleiter_, the head of a -subdivision of the party organization within a _Gau_. - -The _Hoheitstraeger_ and _Reichsleitung_ together constituted the -all-powerful group of leaders by means of which the Nazi party reached -into the lives of the people, consolidated its control over them, and -compelled them to conform to the National Socialist pattern. For this -purpose, broad powers were given them, including the right to call upon -all party machinery to effectuate their plans. They could requisition -the services of the SA and of the SS, as well as of the HJ and the NSKK. - -The controlled party organizations (_Gliederungen der NSDAP_) actually -constituted the party itself, and substantially the entire party -membership was contained within these organizations, viz.: - - SA—NS Storm Troops (_Sturmabteilungen_). - - SS—NS Elite Corps (_Schutzstaffeln_). - - NSKK—NS Motor Corps (_Kraftfahrkorps_). - - HJ—Hitler Youth (_Hitlerjugend_). - - NS Women’s Organization (_Frauenschaft_). - - NS German Students’ Bund (_Deutscher Studentenbund_). - - NS University Teachers’ Bund (_Deutscher Dozentenbund_). - -There were additional affiliated organizations (_Angeschlossene -Verbaende der NSDAP_). Among these were included the following: - - DAF—German Labor Front (_Deutsche Arbeitsfront_). - - NS Public Welfare Organization (_Volkswohlfahrt_). - - NS War Victims’ Organization (_Kriegsopferversorgung_). - - NS Bund for German Technology (_Bund Deutscher Technik_). - - German Civil Service (_Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten_). - - NS Physicians’ Bund (_Deutscher Aerztebund_). - - NS Teachers’ Bund (_Lehrerbund_). - - NS League of Legal Officials (_Rechtswahrerbund_). - -A third group of organizations was officially known as supervised -organizations (_Betreute Organisationen der NSDAP_). These included the -following: - - German Women’s Work (_Deutsches Frauenwerk_). - - German Students’ Society (_Deutsche Studentenschaft_). - - NS Bund of Former German Students (_Altherrenbund der Deutschen - Studenten_). - - Reich League “German Family” (_Reichsbund Deutsche Familie_). - - German Communal Congress (_Deutscher Gemeindetag_). - - NS Bund for Physical Exercise (_Reichsbund fuer - Leibesuebungen_). - -According to the official party designations, there was a fourth -classification known as _Weitere Nationalsozialistische Organisationen_, -and in this category the following organizations appeared: - - RAD—Reich Labor Service (_Reichsarbeitsdienst_), at one time - subordinate to the Reich Labor leader (_Reichsarbeitsfuehrer_). - - NSFK—NS Flying Corps (_NS-Fliegerkorps_), which was subordinate - to the Reich Minister for Aviation. - - 2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE THIRD REICH - -The prosecution has prepared another chart (_Chart No. 18_) delineating -substantially the organizational structure of the government of the -Third Reich, as it existed in March 1945, and “the chief leadership -personnel of the Reich Government and the Reich Administration during -said years.” This chart has been prepared on the basis of information -contained in two well known official publications: The _Taschenbuch fuer -Verwaltungsbeamte_, and the _Nationalsozialistischer Jahrbuch_, -above-mentioned, of which Robert Ley was publisher. The chart has been -examined, corrected, and certified by Wilhelm Frick, whose affidavit is -submitted with it. It seems plain that Frick, a former Minister of -Interior of the Reich from January 1933 to August 1943, was well -qualified, by reason of his position and long service in public office -during the National Socialist regime, to certify to the substantial -accuracy of the facts disclosed in this chart. - -It may be useful to commence with consideration of the -_Reichsregierung_, a word which may not be translated literally as -“government of the Reich.” The word _Reichsregierung_ was a word of art -applied collectively to the ministers who composed the German cabinet. -The _Reichsregierung_, which has been named as a defendant group in this -proceeding, includes the following: - - _a._ Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, i.e. - Reich ministers with and without portfolio and all other - officials entitled to participate in the meetings of this - cabinet. - - _b._ Members of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the - Reich (_Ministerrat fuer die Reichsverteidigung_). - - _c._ Members of the Secret Cabinet Council (_Geheimer - Kabinettsrat_). - -Unlike the cabinets and ministerial councils in countries not within the -orbit of the former Axis, the _Reichsregierung_, after 30 January 1933 -when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of the German Republic, did not -remain merely the executive branch of the government. In short order it -also came to possess, and it exercised, legislative and other functions -in the governmental system developed under the domination of the -National Socialist party. - -It is proper to observe here that, unlike such NS party organizations as -the SS and the SA, the _Reichsregierung_ before 1933 was not a body -created exclusively or predominantly for the purpose of committing -illegal acts. The _Reichsregierung_ was an instrument of government -provided for by the Weimar Constitution. Under the Nazi regime, however, -the _Reichsregierung_ gradually became a primary agent of the party with -functions formulated in accordance with the objectives and methods of -the party. The party was intended to be a _Fuehrerorden_, an order of -_Fuehrers_, a pool of political leaders; and whole the party was—in the -words of a German law—“the bearer of the concept of the German State,” -it was not identical with the State. Hence, in order to realize its -ideological and political objectives and to reach the German people, the -party had to avail itself of official state channels. The -_Reichsregierung_, and the agencies and offices established by it, were -the chosen instruments by means of which party policies were converted -into legislative and administrative acts binding upon the German people -as a whole. - -In order to accomplish this result, the _Reichsregierung_ was thoroughly -remodelled so as to coordinate party and state machinery, in order to -impose the will of the _Fuehrer_ on the German people. On 30 January -1933 the _Reichsregierung_ contained but few National Socialists. But as -the power of the party in the Reich grew, the composition of the cabinet -came to include an ever-increasing number of Nazis until, by January -1937, no non-party member remained in the _Reichsregierung_. New cabinet -posts were created and Nazis appointed to fill them. Many of these -cabinet members were also in the _Reichsleitung_ of the party. - -To give a few examples: Rosenberg, the Delegate of the _Fuehrer_ for -Ideological Training and Education of the Party, was a member of the -_Reichsregierung_ as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories -(_Reichsminister f. d. b. Ostgebiete_). Frick, the leader of the -National Socialist faction in the Reichstag, was also Minister of the -Interior (_Reichsinnenminister_). Goebbels, the _Reichsleiter_ for -Propaganda, also sat in the cabinet as Minister for Public Enlightenment -and Propaganda (_Reichsminister fuer Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda_). - -After 25 July 1934, party participation in the work of the cabinet was -at all times attained through Rudolf Hess, the Deputy of the _Feuhrer_. -By a decree of the _Fuehrer_, Hess was invested with power to take part -in the editing of bills dealing with all departments of the Reich. Later -this power of the Fuehrer’s Deputy was expanded to include all executive -decisions and orders published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. After Hess’ -flight to England in 1941, Martin Bormann took over, as his successor, -the same function and, in addition, was given the authority of a Reich -minister and made a member of the cabinet. - -On 30 January 1937 Hitler accepted into the party those last few members -of the cabinet who were not then party members. Only one cabinet member -had the strength of character to reject membership in the party; he was -the Minister of Ports and of Transportation, von Eltz-Ruebenach, who -stated at the time that he was unable to reconcile membership in the -NSDAP with his beliefs in Christianity. But such was not the case with -Constantin von Neurath. He did not reject party membership. Nor did -Erich Raeder reject party membership. And if Hjalmar Schacht was not -already a party member at that time, then he too did not reject -membership on 30 January 1937. - -The chart shows many other instances where party members on the highest -as well as on subordinate levels occupied corresponding or other -positions in the organization of the state. - -_a._ Hitler himself, the _Fuehrer_ of the NSDAP, was also the Chancellor -of the Reich, with which office the office of President of the German -Republic was united after the death of President von Hindenburg in 1934. - -_b._ Goering, the successor designate of Hitler as Fuehrer of the NSDAP, -was a member of the cabinet as Minister for Air (_Luftfahrtminister_), -and he also held many other important positions, including that of -Commander in Chief of the _Luftwaffe_, the German air force, and -Delegate for the Four Year Plan (_Beauftragter f. d. Vierjahresplan_). - -_c._ Heinrich Himmler, the notorious head of the SS (_Reichsfuehrer -SS_), was also Chief of the German Police, reporting to Frick. He -himself later became Minister of the Interior after the attempted -assassination of Hitler on 20 June 1944, which event also catapulted him -into the position of Commander in Chief of the German Reserve Army. - -The _Reichstag_, which was the German parliament, presents an anomaly in -this picture. Under the Republic it had been the supreme law-making body -of the Reich, subject only to a limited check by the _Reichsrat_ -(Council of the Reich), the President, and the German people themselves, -by way of initiative and referendum. Putting their opposition to all -forms of parliamentarism at once into effect, the Nazis proceeded to -curtail these legislative powers of the _Reichstag_, the _Reichsrat_, -and the _Reichspraesident_. - -By the Act of 24 March 1933 the cabinet was given unlimited legislative -powers, including the right to deviate from the constitution. -Subsequently the _Reichsrat_ was abolished; and later, upon the death of -President von Hindenburg in 1934, the posts of Chancellor and President -were merged. - -The development of the _Reichstag_ into an emasculated legislative body -was an intermediate step on the road to rule by Fuehrer decree, the -ultimate goal of the National Socialist party—and one which it -achieved. - -The Nazis then proceeded to delegate some of the functions of the -_Reichsregierung_ to various newly-created agencies. Cabinet functions -were delegated: - -1. To the _Reichsverteidigungsrat_, the Reich Defense Council, possibly -as early as 4 April 1933 but certainly not later than May 1935. This was -a large war-planning group of which Hitler was chairman and Goering -alternate. The group included many cabinet members, and a working -committee, presided over by Fieldmarshal Wilhelm Keitel, was also -composed of cabinet members and Reich defense officials, the majority of -whom were appointed by cabinet members and subordinate to them. - -2. To the Plenipotentiary for War Economy (_Generalbevollmaechtigter f. -d. Kriegswirtschaft_), Hjalmar Schacht (and later Walter Funk), who by -the Secret Reich Defense Law of May 1935 was authorized to “begin his -work already in peacetime.” - -3. To the Plenipotentiary for Administration (_Generalbevollmaechtigter -f. d. Reichsverwaltung_), Wilhelm Frick, whose deputy, Himmler, later -succeeded him, and who was appointed by a Secret Reich Defense Law. -Subordinate to Frick as Plenipotentiary were the ministries of the -Interior, Justice, Education, Church Affairs and _Raumordnung_ (Spatial -Planning). - -4. To the Delegate for the Four Year Plan (_Beauftragter f. d. -Vierjahresplan_), Goering. - -5. To the _Dreierkollegium_, the College of Three, consisting of the two -Plenipotentiaries for War Economy and Administration, and Fieldmarshal -Keitel as chief of the OKW. The duties of this _Dreierkollegium_ appear -to have included the drafting of decrees in preparation of and for use -during the war. - -6. To the _Geheime Kabinettsrat_, the Secret Cabinet Council, created by -Fuehrer decree in February 1938, of which von Neurath was president; and - -7. To the _Ministerrat f. d. Reichsverteidigung_, the Council of -Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, established by _Fuehrer_ decree -on 30 August 1939 and responsible to him alone. Its membership was taken -from the Reich Defense Council. It had broad powers to issue decrees -with force of law insofar as the _Reichsregierung_ itself had not -legislated on the subject. - -It should be stressed that this delegation of cabinet functions and -authority to various secret and semi-secret groups composed largely of -its own members, helped to conceal some of the most important policies -of the _Reichsregierung_, particularly those relating to preparation for -war. - -Thus, step by step, the National Socialist party succeeded in putting -its policies into effect through the machinery of the state, the -_Reichsregierung_, in its revised form. - - - - - Chapter VII - MEANS USED BY THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS IN GAINING - CONTROL OF THE GERMAN STATE - - - I. COMMON OBJECTIVES, METHODS, AND DOCTRINES OF - THE CONSPIRACY - -In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or _Fuehrer_ of the -_Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei_ (National Socialist -German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had been -founded in Germany in 1920. He continued as such throughout the period -covered by the Indictment. As will be shown, the Nazi Party, together -with certain of its subsidiary organizations, became the instrument of -cohesion among the defendants and their co-conspirators and an -instrument for the carrying out of the aims and purposes of the -conspiracy. And as will also be shown, each defendant became a member of -the Nazi Party and of the conspiracy, with knowledge of their aims, and -purposes, or, with such knowledge, became an accessory to their aims and -purposes at some stage of the development of the conspiracy. - -A. _Aims, and Purposes._ The aims and purposes of the Nazi conspirators -were: - -(1) _To abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its -restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany._ The -first major public meeting of the NSDAP took place in Munich on 24 -February 1920. At that meeting Hitler publicly announced the Program of -the Party. That program, consisting of 25 points (annually reprinted in -the National Socialist Yearbook), was referred to as “The political -foundation of the NSDAP and therewith the fundamental political law of -the state,” and “has remained unaltered” since the date of its -promulgation. Section 2 of the Program provided as follows: - - “We demand equality of rights for the German people with respect - to other nations, and abolition of the Peace Treaties of - Versailles and St. Germain.” (_1708-PS_) - -In a speech at Munich on 13 April 1923, Hitler said: - - “It was no Peace Treaty which they have signed, but a betrayal - of Peace. So long as this Treaty stands there can be no - resurrection of the German people: no social reform of any kind - is possible. The Treaty was made in order to bring 20 million - Germans to their deaths and to ruin the German nation. But those - who made the Treaty cannot set it aside. At its foundation our - movement formulated three demands: - - 1. Setting aside of the Peace Treaty - - 2. Unification of all Germans - - 3. Land and soil (_Grund und Boden_) to feed our - nation.” (_2405-PS_) - -On August 1, 1923 Hitler declared: - - “The day must come when a German government shall summon up the - courage to declare to the foreign powers: ‘The Treaty of - Versailles is founded on a monstrous lie.’ We fulfill nothing - more. Do what you will! If you want battle, look for it! Then we - shall see whether you can turn 70 million Germans into serfs and - slaves!” (_2405-PS_; see also additional statements of Hitler - contained in _2405-PS_ castigating those Germans who shared - responsibility for the Treaty of Versailles, viz; the “November - criminals.”) - -In his speech of 30 January 1941 Hitler alluded to the consistency of -his record concerning the aims of National Socialist foreign policy: - - “My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was to abolish - the Treaty of Versailles. It is futile nonsense for the rest of - the world to pretend today that I did not reveal this program - until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of listening to the foolish - chatter of emigrés, these gentlemen would have been wiser to - read what I have written thousands of times. - - “No human being has declared or recorded what he wanted more - than I. Again and again I wrote these words: ‘The abolition of - the Treaty of Versailles’. * * *” (_2541-PS_) - -Similar views were expressed by other Nazi conspirators. Rosenberg -stated that the lie of Germany’s war guilt was the basis of the Treaties -of Versailles and St. Germain. He rejected the idea of a “revision” of -those Treaties and demanded outright cancellation. (_2433-PS_) - -Hess, in advocating rearmament in violation of treaty restrictions, -stated in 1986 that “guns instead of butter” were necessary lest “one -day our last butter be taken from us.” (_2426-PS_) - -(2) _To acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the -World War of 1914-1918, and other territories in Europe asserted to be -occupied by so-called “racial Germans.”_ Section I of the Nazi Party -Platform gave advance notice of the intentions of the Nazi conspirators -to claim territories occupied by so-called racial Germans. It provided: - - “We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany - on the basis of the right of self-determination of people.” - (_1708-PS_) - -While Rosenberg pointed out in 1922 that it was not possible at that -time to designate “such European and non European territories which -would be taken into consideration for colonization” he nevertheless -stated that the following could be laid down as a basic objective, -namely that - - “* * * German Foreign Policy must make its most important - primary goal the consolidation of all Germans living closely - together in Europe in one state and to secure the territory of - what today is the Polish-Czech East.” (_2433-PS_) - -In his Reichstag speech of 20 February 1928 Hitler said: - - “The claim, therefore, for German colonial possession will be - voiced from year to year with increasing vigor, possessions - which Germany did not take away from other countries, and which - today are virtually of no value to these powers, but appear - indispensable for our own people.” (_2772-PS_) - -Again, in his Reichstag speech of 30 January 1939 Hitler declared: - - “The theft of the German colonies was morally unjustified. - Economically, it was utter insanity. The political motives - advanced were so mean that one is tempted to call them silly. In - 1918, after the end of the war, the victorious Powers really - would have had the authority to bring about a reasonable - settlement of international problems. * * * - - “The great German colonial possessions, which the Reich once - acquired peacefully by treaties and by paying for them, have - been stolen—contrary indeed to the solemn assurance given by - President Wilson, which was the basic condition on which Germany - laid down her arms. The objection that these colonial - possessions are of no importance in any case should only lead to - their being returned to us with an easy mind.” (_2773-PS_) - -(3) _To acquire further territories in colonial Europe and elsewhere -claimed to be required by “racial Germans” as “Lebensraum” or living -space, at the expense of neighboring and other countries._ Hitler made -it clear that the two objectives of the Nazi conspirators set forth -above were only preliminary steps in a more ambitious plan of -territorial aggrandizement. Thus he stated: - - “One must take the point of view, coolly and soberly, that it - certainly cannot be the intention of Heaven to give one people - fifty times as much space (_Grund und Boden_) on this earth as - to another. One should not permit himself to be diverted in this - case by political boundaries from the boundaries of eternal - justice. - - * * * * * * - - “The boundaries of 1914 do not mean anything for the future of - the German nation. They did not represent either a defense of - the past nor would they represent a power in the future. The - German people will not obtain either its inner compactness by - them, nor will its nutrition be secured by them, nor do these - boundaries appear from a military standpoint as appropriate or - even satisfactory. * * *” (_2760-A-PS_) - -While the precise limits of German expansion were only vaguely defined -by the Nazi conspirators, they clearly indicated that the _lebensraum_ -to which they felt they were entitled would be acquired primarily in the -East. Rosenberg was particularly insistent in his declarations that -Russia would have to “move over” to make way for German living space. He -underlined this demand as follows: - - “The understanding that the German nation, if it is not to - perish in the truest sense of the word, needs ground and soil - for itself and its future generations, and the second sober - perception that this soil can no more be conquered in Africa, - but in Europe and first of all in the East—these organically - determine the German foreign policy for centuries. (_2777-PS_) - - “The Russians * * * will have to confine themselves so as to - remove their center of gravity to Asia.” (_2426-PS_) - -A similar view was expressed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_: - - “If one wanted territory in Europe, this could be done on the - whole at the expense of Russia, and the new Reich would have to - set out to march over the road of the former Knights, in order - to give soil to the German plow by means of the German sword, - and to give daily bread to the nation.” (_2760-A-PS_) - -In _Mein Kampf_ Hitler threatened war as a means of attaining additional -space: - - “If this earth really has space (_Raum_) for all to live in, - then we should be given the territory necessary. Of course, one - will not do that gladly. Then, however, the right of - self-preservation comes into force; that which is denied to - kindness, the fist will have to take. If our forefathers had - made their decisions dependent on the same pacifistic nonsense - as the present, then we would possess only a third of our - present territory. - - * * * * * * - - “In contrast, we, National Socialists, have to hold on steadily - to our foreign political goals, namely, _to secure on this earth - the territory due to the German people_. And this action is the - only one which will make bloody sacrifice before God and our - German posterity appear justified.” (_2760-A-PS_) - -B. _Methods. The Nazi conspirators advocated the accomplishment of the -foregoing aims and purposes by any means deemed opportune, including -illegal means and resort to threat of force, force, and aggressive war._ -The use of force was distinctly sanctioned, in fact guaranteed, by -official statements and directives of the conspirators which made -activism and aggressiveness a political quality obligatory for Party -members. - -Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_: - - “* * * The lack of a great creative idea means at all times an - impairment of the fighting spirit. The conviction that it is - right to use even the most brutal weapons is always connected - with the existence of a fanatical belief that it is necessary - that a revolutionary new order of this earth should become - victorious. A movement which does not fight for these highest - aims and ideals will therefore never resort to the ultimate - weapon.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * It is not possible to undertake a task half-heartedly or - hesitatingly if its execution seems to be feasible only by - expending the very last ounce of energy . . . One had to become - clear in one’s mind that this goal [i.e. acquisition of new - territory in Europe] could be achieved by fight alone and then - had to face this armed conflict with calmness and composure.” - (_2760-A-PS_) - -In 1934 Hitler set out the duties of Party members in the following -terms: - - “Only a part of the people will be really active fighters. But - they were the fighters of the National Socialist struggle. They - were the fighters for the National Socialist revolution, and - they are the millions of the rest of the population. For them it - is not sufficient to confess: ‘I believe,’ but to swear: ‘_I - fight_’.” (_2775-PS_) - -This same theme is expressed in the Party Organization Book: - - “The Party includes _only fighters_ who are ready to accept and - sacrifice everything in order to carry through the National - Socialist ideology.” (_2774-PS_) - -At the trial of _Reichswehr_ officers at Leipzig in September 1930 -Hitler testified: - - “Germany is being strangled by Peace Treaties. * * * The - National Socialists do not regard the Treaty as a law, but as - something forced upon us. We do not want future generations, who - are completely innocent, to be burdened by this. When we fight - this with all means at our disposal, then we are on the way to a - revolution.” - -President of the Court: ‘Even by illegal means?’ - - Hitler: “I will declare here and now, that when we have become - powerful (_gesiegt haben_), then we shall fight against the - Treaty with all the means at our disposal, even from the point - of view of the world, with illegal means.” (_2512-PS_) - -Moreover, Hitler stated the true reason for rearmament as follows: - - “It is impossible to build up an army and give it a sense of - worth if the object of its existence is not the preparation for - war. Armies for the preservation of peace do not exist; they - exist only for the triumphant exertion of war.” (_2541-PS_) - -C. _Doctrines. The Nazi conspirators adopted and published the following -doctrines:_ - -(1) _That persons of so-called “German blood” were a master race and -were accordingly entitled to subjugate, dominate, or exterminate other -“races” and “peoples.”_ The Nazi doctrine of racial supremacy was -incorporated as Point 4 in the Party Program of 24 February 1920, which -provided as follows: - - “Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the - race can only be one who is of German blood, without - consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of - the race.” (_1708-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators’ dogma of the racial supremacy of the Germanic -peoples was fully elucidated in the writings of Rosenberg: - - “The meaning of world history has radiated out from the north - over the whole world, borne by a blue-eyed blond race which in - several great waves determined the spiritual face of the world * - * * - - “We stand today before a definitive decision. Either through a - new experience and cultivation of the old blood, coupled with an - enhanced fighting will, we will rise to a purificatory action, - or the last Germanic-western values of morality and - state-culture shall sink away in the filthy human masses of the - big cities, become stunted on the sterile burning asphalt of a - bestialized inhumanity, or trickle away as a morbific agent in - the form of emigrants bastardizing themselves in South America, - China, Dutch East India, Africa. - - “A new faith is arising today: the myth of the blood, the faith, - to defend with the blood the divine essence of man. The faith, - embodied in clearest knowledge that the Nordic blood represents - that mysterium which has replaced and overcome the old - sacraments.” (_2771-PS_) - -Thus, the Nazi conspirators acclaimed the “master race” doctrine as a -new religion—the faith of the blood—superseding in individual -allegiance all other religions and institutions. According to Rosenberg: - - “The new thought puts folk and race higher than the state and - its forms. It declares protection of the folk more important - than protection of a religious denomination, a class, the - monarchy, or the republic; it sees in treason against the folk a - greater crime than treason against the state.” (_2771-PS_; see - also further excerpts from Rosenberg’s writings contained in - _2405-PS_.) - -Illustrative of the Nazi conspirators’ continued espousal and -exploitation of racial dogmas following their accession to power was the -discriminatory legislation which they caused to be enacted. These laws, -with particular reference to Jews, are set forth in Section 7 of this -Chapter on the Program for Persecution of Jews. - -The logical consequence of the “master race” dogma, in its bearing on -the right of Germany to dominate other “inferior” peoples and to acquire -such of their territory as was considered necessary for German living -space, was disclosed by the Nazi conspirators. In a speech concluding -the _Reichsparteitag_ at Nurnberg on 3 September 1933 Hitler said: - - “But long ago man has proceeded in the same way with his - fellowman. The higher race—at first ‘higher’ in the sense of - possessing a greater gift for organization—subjects to itself a - lower race and thus constitutes a relationship which now - embraces races of unequal value. Thus there results the - subjection of a number of people under the will often of only a - few persons, a subjection based simply on the right of the - stronger, a right which, as we see it in Nature, can be regarded - as the sole conceivable right because founded on reason. The - wild mustang does not take upon itself the yoke imposed by man - either voluntarily or joyfully; neither does one people welcome - the violence of another.” (_2584-PS_) - -(2) _The Fuehrerprinzip (Fuehrer Principle)._ - -(_a_) _Essential elements._ - - _1. Complete and total authority is vested in the Fuehrer._ - - “The Fuehrer Principle requires a pyramidal organization - structure in its details as well as in its entirety. - - “The Fuehrer is at the top. - - “He nominates the necessary leaders for the various - spheres of work of the Reich’s direction, the Party - apparatus and the State administration.” (_1814-PS_) - - “He shapes the collective will of the people within - himself and he enjoys the political unity and entirety - of the people in opposition to individual interests. - - “The Fuehrer unites in himself all the sovereign - authority of the Reich; all public authority in the - state as well as in the movement is derived from the - authority of the Fuehrer. We must speak not of the - state’s authority but of the Fuehrer’s authority if we - wish to designate the character of the political - authority within the Reich correctly. The state does not - hold political authority as an impersonal unit but - receives it from the Fuehrer as the executor of the - national will. The authority of the Fuehrer is complete - and all-embracing; it unites in itself all the means of - political direction; it extends into all fields of - national life; it embraces the entire people, which is - bound to the Fuehrer in loyalty and obedience. The - authority of the Fuehrer is not limited by checks and - controls, by special autonomous bodies or individual - rights, but it is free and independent, all-inclusive - and unlimited. - - “The Fuehrer-Reich of the (German) people is founded on - the recognition that the true will of the people cannot - be disclosed through parliamentary votes and plebiscites - but that the will of the people in its pure and - uncorrupted form can only be expressed through the - Fuehrer.” (_2771-PS_) - - “Thus at the head of the Reich, stands a single Fuehrer, - who in his personality embodies the idea which sustains - all and whose spirit and will therefore animate the - entire community.” (_2780-PS_) - -As stated in the Organization Book of the Nazi Party: - - “The will of the Fuehrer is the Party’s law.” - (_1814-PS_) - - The first commandment for the Party members declares: - - “The Fuehrer is always right.” (_1814-PS_) - - “He (the Fuehrer) is responsible only to his conscience - and the German people.” (_1814-PS_) - - Hess, in a speech broadcast at Cologne on 25 June 1934, - characterized the position of the Fuehrer as follows: - - “It is with pride that we see that one man is kept above - all criticism—that is the Fuehrer. - - “The reason is that everyone feels and knows: he was - always right and will always be right. The National - Socialism of us all is anchored in the uncritical - loyalty, in the devotion to the Fuehrer that does not - ask for the wherefore in the individual case, in the - tacit performance of his commands. We believe that the - Fuehrer is fulfilling a divine mission to German - destiny! This belief is beyond challenge.” (_2426-PS_; - see also additional statements of the Nazi conspirators - designed to condition the German people to blind - acceptance of the decisions of the Fuehrer and his - co-conspirators, as translated in _2373-PS_.) - - _2. The Fuehrer’s power descends to sub-leaders in a hierarchial - order._ In the words of the Organization Book of the NSDAP: - - “The Party is the order of fuehrers. - - “All political directors (_Politische Leiter_) stand as - appointed by the Fuehrer and are responsible to him. - They possess full authority towards the lower echelons. - (_1893-PS_) - - “He (The Fuehrer) nominates the necessary leaders for - the various spheres of work of the Reichs’ direction, - the Party apparatus, and the State administration.” - (_1814-PS_) - - The effect of this was aptly expressed by Hitler in 1933: - - “When our opponents said, ‘It is easy for you: you are a - dictator’—We answer them, ‘No, gentlemen, you are - wrong; there is no single dictator, but ten thousand, - each in his own place.’ And even the highest authority - in the hierarchy has itself only one wish, never to - transgress against the supreme authority to which it, - too, is responsible.” (_2771-PS_) - - _3. Each subleader is bound to unconditional obedience to his - immediate superior and to the Fuehrer._ As Hitler said, - - “We have in our movement developed this loyalty in - following the leader, this blind obedience of which all - the others know nothing and which gave to us the power - to surmount everything.” (_2771-PS_) - - The duty of obedience is so fundamental that it is incorporated - as the second of the NSDAP commandments for party members: - - “Never go against discipline!” (_2771-PS_) - - As Ley said: - - “Our conscience is clearly and exactly defined. Only - what Adolf Hitler, our Fuehrer, commands, allows, or - does not allow is our conscience.” (_2771-PS_) - - The obedience required was not the loyalty of a soldier to the - Fatherland, as was the case prior to the Nazi regime. On the - contrary, the obedience exacted was unconditional and absolute, - regardless of the legality or illegality of the order. The oath - taken by political leaders (_Politische Leiter_) yearly was as - follows: - - “I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge - unconditional obedience to him and the Fuehrers - appointed by him.” (_1893-PS_) - - _4. Each subleader is absolute in his own sphere of - jurisdiction._ The Nazi Party Organization Book lays down the - same principle with respect to the successive tiers of its - leaders: - - “The Fuehrer Principle represented by the Party imposes - complete responsibility on all party leaders for their - respective spheres of activity * * * The responsibility - for all tasks within a major sphere of jurisdiction - rests with the respective leader of the NSDAP: i.e., - with the Fuehrer for the territory of the Reich, the - Gauleiter for the territory of the Gau, the district - leader for the territory of the district, the local - leader for the territory of the local group, etc. - - “The Party leader has responsibility for the entire - territory under his jurisdiction on the one hand, and on - the other hand, his own political fields of activity - appertaining thereto. - - “This responsibility for the complete or partial - performance of task entails a relationship of - subordination of the leaders among themselves, - corresponding to the fuehrer principle.” (_2771-PS_) - -(3) _Glorification of War as a noble and necessary activity of Germans._ -The Nazi conspirators disseminated dogmas designed to engender in the -masses a deep reverence for the vocation of the warrior and to induce -acceptance of the postulate that the waging of war was good and -desirable _per se_. The motive underlying the concerted program of the -Nazis to glorify war was disclosed by Hitler in _Mein Kampf_: - - “Thus the question of how to regain German power is not: How - shall we manufacture arms?, but: How do we create the spirit - which enables a nation to bear arms? If this spirit governs a - people, the will finds thousands of ways, each of which ends - with a weapon!” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * Oppressed countries are led back into the lap of a common - Reich by a mighty sword and not by flaming protests. It is the - task of the inner political leaders of a people to forge this - sword; to safeguard the work of the smith and to seek comrades - in arms in the task of the foreign policy.” (_2760-A-PS_) - -Hitler’s writings and public utterances are full of declarations -rationalizing the use of force and glorifying war. The following are -typical: - - “Always before God and the world, the stronger has the right to - carry through his will. History proves it: He who has no might, - has no use for might. (_2405-PS_) - - “The political testament of the German People for its foreign - policy should and must always follow this line of thought: Never - tolerate the rise of two continental powers in Europe. See in - every attempt to organize a second military power, * * * an - attack against Germany and take therefrom not only the right but - the duty to prevent by all means, including the use of arms, the - rise of such a state, respectively to destroy such a state if it - has already arisen. Take care that the strength of our people - should have its foundation not in colonies but in the soil of - the home country in Europe. Never consider the Reich as secured - as long as it cannot give to every descendant of our people his - own bit of soil for centuries to come; never forget that the - most sacred right on this earth is the right to own the soil - which one wants to cultivate and the most sacred sacrifice, the - blood which is shed for this soil.” (_2760-A-PS_) - -(4) _The leadership of the Nazi Party._ - -(_a_) _The Nazi Party leadership was the sole bearer of the doctrines of -the Nazi Party._ The Party Organization Book declares: - - “The Party as an instrument of ideological education, must grow - to be the Leader Corps (_Fuehrer Korps_) of the German Nation. - - “This Leader Corps is responsible for the complete penetration - of the German Nation with the National Socialist spirit * * *” - (_1893-PS_) - - “The Party is the order of fuehrers. It is furthermore - responsible for the spiritual ideological National Socialist - direction of the German people.” (_1814-PS_) - -Referring to the mission of the _Ortsgruppenleiter_ (local chapter -leader) of the NSDAP, the Party Organization Book states: - - “As Hoeheitstraeger (bearer of sovereignty) all expressions of - the party will emanate from him; he is responsible for the - political and ideological leadership and organization within his - zone of sovereignty.” (_1893-PS_) - -Similar statements are made with regard to the _Kreisleiter_ (county -leader) and the _Gauleiter_ (Gau leader) and the Reich Directorate -(1893-PS). - -(_b_) _The Nazi Party leadership was entitled to control and dominate -the German state and all related institutions and all individuals -therein._ Hitler said at the 1935 Nurnberg Party Congress: - - “It is not the State which gives orders to us, it is we who give - orders to the State.” (_2775-PS_) - -Frick declared in a similar vein: - - “In National Socialist Germany, leadership is in the hands of an - organized community, the National Socialist Party; and as the - latter represents the will of the nation, the policy adopted by - it in harmony with the vital interests of the nation is at the - same time the policy adopted by the country. * * *” (_2771-PS_) - -Goebbels declared: - - “The Party must always continue to represent the hierarchy of - National Socialist leadership. This minority must always insist - upon its prerogative to control the state. * * * It is - responsible for the leadership of the state and it solemnly - relieves the people of this responsibility.” (_2771-PS_) - -Hess remarked that the Party was a “necessity” in the German state and -constituted the cohesive mechanism with which to “organize and direct -offensively and defensively the spiritual and political strength of the -people.” (_2426-PS_) - -Nazi interpreters of constitutional law expressed the same idea: - - “The NSDAP is not a structure which stands under direct state - control, to which single tasks of public administration are - entrusted by the state, but it holds and maintains its claim to - totality as the ‘bearer of the German state-idea’ in all fields - relating to the community—regardless of how various single - functions are divided between the organization of the Party and - the organization of the State.” (_2771-PS_) - -This doctrine was incorporated into laws which established the NSDAP as -“the only political party in Germany” and declared the NSDAP “The bearer -of the German state-idea” and “indissolubly linked to the state.” -(_1388-A-PS_; _1395-PS_) - -(_c_) _The Nazi Party leadership was entitled to destroy all opponents._ -Reference is made generally to Sections2 and 3 on the Acquisition and -Consolidation of Political Control of Germany for proof of this -allegation. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COMMON OBJECTIVES, - METHODS, AND DOCTRINES OF THE CONSPIRACY - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (B, │ │ - │ C). │ I │ 16, 17 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - 1388-A-PS │Law against the establishment of │ │ - │ Parties, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962 - │ │ │ -*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │ - │ State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │ - │ (GB 252) │ III │ 978 - │ │ │ -*1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │ - │ Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. │ │ - │ (USA 255; USA 324). │ IV │ 208 - │ │ │ -*1814-PS │The Organization of the NSDAP and its │ │ - │ affiliated associations, from │ │ - │ Organization book of the NSDAP, │ │ - │ editions of 1936, 1938, 1940 and 1943,│ │ - │ pp. 86-88. (USA 328) │ IV │ 411 - │ │ │ -*1893-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of the │ │ - │ NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323) │ IV │ 529 - │ │ │ - 2373-PS │Extracts from German Publications. │ IV │ 1106 - │ │ │ - 2405-PS │Extracts from German Publications. │ V │ 79 - │ │ │ -*2426-PS │Extracts from Speeches, by Hess. (GB │ │ - │ 253) │ V │ 90 - │ │ │ -*2433-PS │Extracts from “Nature, Foundation and │ │ - │ Aims of NSDAP” by Rosenberg, 1934. │ │ - │ (USA 596) │ V │ 93 - │ │ │ - 2512-PS │Hitler’s Testimony Before the Court for │ │ - │ High Treason, published in Frankfurter│ │ - │ Zeitung, 26 September 1931. │ V │ 246 - │ │ │ - 2541-PS │Extracts from German Publications. │ V │ 285 - │ │ │ - 2584-PS │Hitler’s speech concluding the │ │ - │ Reichsparteitag, 3 September 1933. The│ │ - │ First Reichstag of the United German │ │ - │ Nation, 1933. │ V │ 311 - │ │ │ - 2760-A-PS │Extract from Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler,│ │ - │ 41st edition, 1933. │ V │ 407 - │ │ │ - 2771-PS │U. S. State Department, National │ │ - │ Socialism, published by U. S. │ │ - │ Government Printing Office, 1943. │ V │ 417 - │ │ │ - 2772-PS │Speech of Hitler, published in Documents│ │ - │ of German Politics, Vol. IV, Part I, │ │ - │ p. 37. │ V │ 417 - │ │ │ - 2773-PS │Speech of Hitler, published in Documents│ │ - │ of German Politics, Vol. VII, 1939, │ │ - │ pp. 466-7. │ V │ 417 - │ │ │ - 2774-PS │Extract from Organization Book of the │ │ - │ NSDAP, 1937, 4th Edition, p. 86. │ V │ 418 - │ │ │ -*2775-PS │Hitler’s speech, published in Nurnberg │ │ - │ Party Congress, 1934. (USA 330) │ V │ 418 - │ │ │ -*2777-PS │Article: Space Policy by Rosenberg, │ │ - │ published in National Socialist │ │ - │ Monthly, May 1932, p. 199. (USA 594). │ V │ 418 - │ │ │ - 2780-PS │Extract from Constitution and │ │ - │ Administration in the Third Reich, by │ │ - │ Paul Schmidt, Berlin, 1937. │ V │ 419 - │ │ │ -*3863-PS │Extracts from Operations in the Third │ │ - │ Reich by Lammers. (GB 320) │ VI │ 786 - - - 2. ACQUISITION OF TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROL - -A. _First Steps in Acquiring Control of State Machinery._ - -(1) _The Nazi conspirators first sought control of State machinery by -force. The Munich Putsch of 1923, aimed at the overthrow of the Weimar -Republic by direct action, failed._ On 8 November 1923 the so-called -Munich Putsch occurred. During the evening, von Kahr, State Commissioner -General of Bavaria, was speaking at the _Buergerbraeukeller_ in Munich. -Hitler and other Nazi leaders appeared, supported by the -_Sturmabteilungen_ (Storm Troops) and other fighting groups. Hitler -fired a shot and announced that a Nationalist Revolution setting up a -dictatorship had taken place. There followed a conference after which -von Kahr, von Lossow, and Colonel of Police von Seisser, announced they -would cooperate with Hitler and that a “Provisional National Government” -was established, as follows: - - Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler - Leader of the National Army Gen. von Ludendorff - Reich Minister of War von Lossow - Reich Minister of Police von Seisser - Reich Finance Minister Feder - -It was also announced that Kahr would be State Administrator for -Bavaria, Poehner would be Bavarian Prime Minister, and Frick would be -Munich Police President. Kahr, Lossow and Seisser then departed. During -the night the latter group alerted the police, brought troops to Munich, -and announced that their consent to the Putsch had been obtained by -force. On the afternoon of the next day, Hitler, Ludendorff, and their -supporters attempted to march into the center of Munich. At the -_Feldherrnhalle_ the procession met a patrol of police, shots were -exchanged, and men on both sides were killed. Hermann Goering was -wounded, the Putsch was broken up, the Party and its organization were -declared illegal, and its leaders, including Hitler, Frick, and -Streicher were arrested. Rosenberg, together with Amann and Drexler, -tried to keep the Party together after it had been forbidden. Hitler and -others later were tried for high treason. At the trial Hitler admitted -his participation in the foregoing attempt to seize control of the State -by force. He was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. (_2532-PS_; -_2404-PS_) - -(2) _The Nazi Conspirators then set out through the Nazi Party to -undermine and capture the German Government by “legal” forms supported -by terrorism._ - -(_a_) _In 1925, the conspirators reorganized the Nazi Party and began a -campaign to secure support from Germany voters throughout the nation._ -On 26 February 1925, the _Voelkischer Beobachter_, the official -newspaper of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) -appeared for the first time after the Munich Putsch, and on the -following day Hitler made his first speech after his release from -prison. He then began to rebuild the Party organization. The -conspirators, through the Nazi Party, participated in election campaigns -and other political activity throughout Germany and secured the election -of members of the Reichstag. (_2532-PS_) - -As a reflection of this activity the Nazi Party in May 1928, received -2.6% of the total vote and obtained 12 out of 491 seats in the -Reichstag. In September 1930, the Nazi Party polled 18.3% of the total -vote and won 107 out of 577 seats in the Reichstag. In July 1932, it -received 37.3% of the total vote east and won 230 out of 608 seats. In -November 1932, it polled 33.1% of the vote and won 196 out of 584 seats -in the Reichstag. (_2514-PS_) - -(_b_) _The Nazi conspirators asserted they sought power only by legal -forms._ In November 1934, Hitler, speaking of the Munich Putsch of 1923 -said: - - “It gave me the opportunity to lay down the new tactics of the - Party and to pledge it to legality”. (_2741-PS_) - -In September 1931, three officers of the _Reichswehr_ were tried at -Leipzig for high treason. At the request of Hans Frank, Hitler was -invited to testify at this trial that the NSDAP was striving to attain -its goal by purely legal means. He was asked: “How do you imagine the -setting up of a Third Reich?” His reply was, “This term only describes -the basis of the struggle but not the objective. We will enter the legal -organizations and will make our Party a decisive factor in this way. But -when we do possess constitutional rights then we will form the State in -the manner which we consider to be the right one.” The President then -asked: “This too by constitutional means?” Hitler replied: “Yes.” -(_2512-PS_) - -(_c_) _The purpose of the Nazi conspirators in participating in -elections and in the Reichstag was to undermine the parliamentary system -of the Republic and to replace it with a dictatorship of their own._ -This the Nazi conspirators themselves made clear. Frick wrote in 1927: - - “There is no National Socialist and no racialist who expects any - kind of manly German deed from that gossip club on the - Koenigsplatz and who is not convinced of the necessity for - direct action by the unbroken will of the German people to bring - about their spiritual and physical liberation. But there is a - long road ahead. After the failure of November, 1923, there was - no choice but to begin all over again and to strive to bring - about a change in the spirit and determination of the most - valuable of our racial comrades, as the indispensable - prerequisite for the success of the coming fight for freedom. - Our activities in parliament must be evaluated as merely part of - this propaganda work. - - “Our participation in the parliament does not indicate a - support, but rather an undermining of the parliamentarian - system. It does not indicate that we renounce our - anti-parliamentarian attitude, but that we are fighting the - enemy with his own weapons and that we are fighting for our - National Socialist goal from the parliamentary platform.” - (_2742-PS_) - -On 30 April 1928, Goebbels wrote in his paper “_Der Angriff_”; - - “We enter parliament in order to supply ourselves, in the - arsenal of democracy, with its own weapons. We become members of - the Reichstag in order to paralyze the Weimar sentiment with its - own assistance. If democracy is so stupid as to give us free - tickets and _per diem_ for the this “blockade” (_Barendienst_), - that is its own affair.” - -Later in the same article he continued: - - “We do not come as friends, nor even as neutrals. We come as - enemies: As the wolf bursts into the flock, so we come.” - (_2500-PS_) - -In a pamphlet published in 1935, Goebbels said: - - “When democracy granted democratic methods for us in the times - of opposition, this was bound to happen in a democratic system. - However, we National Socialists never asserted that we - represented a democratic point of view, but we have declared - openly that we used democratic methods only in order to gain the - power and that, after assuming the power, we would deny to our - adversaries without any consideration the means which were - granted to us in the times of opposition. (_2412-PS_) - -A leading Nazi writer on Constitutional Law, Ernst Rudolf Huber, later -wrote of this period: - - “The parliamentary battle of the NSDAP had the single purpose of - destroying the parliamentary system from within through its own - methods. It was necessary above all to make formal use of the - possibilities of the party-state system but to refuse real - cooperation and thereby to render the parliamentary system, - which is by nature dependent upon the responsible cooperation of - the opposition, incapable of action.” (_2633-PS_) - -The Nazi members of the Reichstag conducted themselves as a storm troop -unit. Whenever representatives of the government or the democratic -parties spoke, the Nazi members marched out in a body in studied -contempt of the speaker, or entered in a body to interrupt the speaker, -thus making it physically impossible for the Reichstag President to -maintain order. In the case of speakers of opposition parties, the Nazi -members constantly interrupted, often resorting to lengthy and spurious -parliamentary maneuvers, with the result that the schedule of the -session was thrown out of order. The tactics finally culminated in -physical attacks by the Nazis upon members of the house as well as upon -visitors. (_L-83_) - -In a letter of 24 August 1931 to Rosenberg, Hitler deplored an article -in “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” the effect of which was to prevent -undermining of support for the then existing form of government, and -said: “I myself am travelling all over Germany to achieve exactly the -opposite. (_047-PS_) - -(_d_) _The Nazi conspirators supported their “legal” activities by -terrorism._ - - _1. The Nazi conspirators created and utilized as a Party - formation the Sturmabteilungen (SA) a semi-military voluntary - organization of young men trained for and committed to the use - of violence, whose mission was to make the Party the master of - the streets._ The SA was organized in 1921. As indicated by its - name, it was a voluntary organization of young men trained for - and committed to the use of violence. To quote from a pamphlet - compiled on order of the Supreme SA Headquarters: - - “The SA was not founded as one forms just any sort of - club. It was born in midst of strife and received from - the Fuehrer himself the name “Storm Troops” after that - memorable hall battle in Hofbraeuhaus at Munich on the - 4th of November 1921. * * * Blood and sacrifice were the - most faithful companions of the young SA on its hard - path to power. The Storm Troops were and still are today - the fist and propaganda arm of the movement”. - (_2168-PS_) - - It was organized along semi-military lines from the beginning. - To quote again from the same official pamphlet: - - “It is one of the greatest historical services of the SA - that at the time when the German People’s Army had to - undergo a dissolution, it held high those virtues which - marked the German soldier: personal courage, idealism, - willingness to sacrifice, consciousness of - responsibility, power to decide, and leadership. Thus, - the SA became among the people the messenger and bearer - of German armed strength and German armed spirit. - - “The 4th of November 1921 was not only the birth hour of - the SA by itself, but was the day from which the young - fighting troop of the Movement took its stand at the - focal point of political events. With the clear - recognition that now the unity (_Geschlossenheit_) of a - troop led to victory, the SA was systematically - reorganized and so-called “Centuries” - (_Hundertschaften_) were established * * *” (_2168-PS_) - - In March 1928, Goering took command of the entire SA. In - November 1923, SA units were used in the Munich Putsch. When the - Party was reorganized in 1925, the SA continued to be the - fighting organization of the Party. Again to quote the official - pamphlet on the SA: - - “And now a fight for Germany began of such a sort as was - never before fought. What are names, what are words or - figures which are not indeed able to express the - magnitude of belief and of idealism on one side and the - magnitude of hate on the other side. 1925: the Party - lives again, and its iron spearhead is the SA. With it - the power and meaning of the National Socialist movement - grows. Around the central events of the whole Movement, - the Reich Party Days, dates, decisions, fights and - victory roll themselves into a long list of German men - of undenying willingness to sacrifice.” (_2168-PS_) - - Mastery of the streets was at all times the mission of the SA. - While discussing his ideas as to the part which this - organization should play in the political activity of his Party, - Hitler stated: - - “What we needed and still need were and are not a - hundred or two hundred reckless conspirators, but a - hundred thousand and a second hundred thousand fighters - for our philosophy of life. We should not work in secret - conventicles, but in mighty mass demonstrations, and it - is not by dagger and poison or pistol that the road can - be cleared for the movement but by the conquest of the - streets. We must teach the Marxists that the future - master of the streets is National Socialism, just as it - will some day be the master of the state.” (_404-PS_) - - To quote again from the official SA pamphlet: - - “Possession of the streets is the key to power in the - state—for this reason the SA marched and fought. The - public would have never received knowledge from the - agitative speeches of the little Reichstag faction and - its propaganda or from the desires and aims of the - Party, if the martial tread and battle song of the SA - companies had not beat the measure for the truth of a - relentless criticism of the state of affairs in the - governmental system. * * * - - “The SA conquered for itself a place in public opinion - and the leadership of the National Socialist Movement - dictated to its opponents the law for quarrels. The SA - was already a state within a state; a part of the future - in a sad present.” (_2168-PS_; for further material - concerning the SA, see Section 4 of Chapter XV.) - - _2. The Nazi conspirators constantly used physical violence and - terror to break up meetings of political opponents, and to - suppress opposition in their own meetings._ The following facts - are indicative of the methods constantly used by the Nazi - conspirators during this period: On numerous occasions meetings - of the _Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft_ (Peace Society) were - broken up and terrorized by shock troops and SA units. Groups of - National Socialists invaded meetings of the society, interrupted - the speaker, attempted to attack him, and endeavored to make - sufficient disturbance so that the meetings would have to be - cancelled. (_L-83_) - - To quote once again from the official SA pamphlet: - - “* * * As an example of a seemingly impossible deed, the - 11th of February 1927 should be firmly preserved. It is - the day on which the SA broke the Red Terror, with heavy - sacrifice, in the hall battle at the Pharoah’s Hall - (_Pharussaelen_) in Berlin, the stronghold of the - Communists, and thereby established itself decisively in - the capitol city of the Reich. In considering the badly - wounded SA men, Dr. Goebbels coined the phrase “unknown - SA Man”, who silently fights and bleeds, obeying only - his duty.” (_2168-PS_) - - In Berlin, under the leadership of Goebbels, so-called - _Rollkommandos_, were organized for the purpose of disrupting - political meetings of all non-Nazi groups. These _Rollkommandos_ - were charged with interrupting, making noise, and unnerving the - speaker. Finally the Nazis broke up meetings by _Rollkommando_ - raids. In many cases, fights resulted, during which furniture - was destroyed and a number of persons hurt. The Nazis armed - themselves with blackjacks, brass knuckles, rubber truncheons, - walking sticks, and beer bottles. After the Reichstag election - of 1930, Nazi terrorism became more overt, and from then on - scarcely a day went by when the Chief of the Security Police in - Berlin did not receive a minimum of five to ten reports, and - often more, of riots instigated by Nazis. (_2955-PS_) - - During the campaign for the Reichstag election of 14 September - 1930, Nazi conspirators made it a practice to send speakers - accompanied by many Storm Troopers to meetings of other - political parties, often physically taking over the meetings. On - one such occasion a large detachment of Storm Troopers, some of - whom were armed with pistols and clubs, attended a meeting - called by the Social Democratic Party, succeeded in forcibly - excluding everybody not in sympathy with their views, and - concluded the meeting as their own. Such violent tactics, - repeated many times, were an integral part of the political - creed of the Nazi. (_L-83_) - - Ultimately, in Berlin, just before the Nazis seized power, it - was necessary to devote the entire Police Force to the job of - fighting the Nazis, thus leaving little time for other Police - duties. (_2955-PS_) - - _3. The Nazi conspirators constantly threatened their opponents - with organized reprisals and terror._ During the course of the - trial of three officers of the _Reichswehr_ for high treason in - Leipzig in September 1931, Hitler said: - - “But I may assure you that if the Nazi movement’s - struggle is successful, then there will be a Nazi Court - of Law too, the November 1918 revolution will be atoned, - and there’ll be some heads chopped off.” (_2512-PS_) - - Frick wrote in the National Socialist Yearbook for 1930: - - “No wonder that as the situation of the entire German - people, as well as that of the individual racial - comrade, grows rapidly worse, increased numbers are - realizing the incompetence of the parliamentarian - system, and no wonder that even some who are responsible - for the present system desperately cry for a - dictatorship. This however, will not save them from - their fate of one day being called to account before a - German State Tribunal.” (_2743-PS_) - - On 7 October 1929, the National Socialist District leader - Terboven said in a meeting in Essen: - - “This weakness is especially known to Severing, who - symbolizes the present State, and he intends to render a - service to the State, which is breathing its last; but - this too will no longer save the present corrupt - parliamentarian system. * * * But I give such a - dictatorship only four weeks. Then the people will - awaken, then the National Socialists will come to power, - and then there will not be enough lamp posts in Germany. - - “The National Socialists will march into the new - Reichstag with thirty members; then there will be black - eyes every day in this Reichstag; thus this corrupt - parliamentarian system will be further discredited; - disorder and chaos will set in, and then the National - Socialists will judge the moment to have arrived in - which they are to seize the political power.” - (_2513-PS_) - - On 18 October 1929, Frick, while discussing the Young Plan in a - meeting in Pyritz said: - - “This fateful struggle will first be taken up with the - ballot, but this cannot continue indefinitely, for - history has taught us that in a battle, blood must be - shed, and iron broken. The ballot is the beginning of - this fateful struggle. We are determined to promulgate - by force that which we preach. Just as Mussolini - exterminated the Marxists in Italy, so must we also - succeed in accomplishing the same through dictatorship - and terror.” (_2513-PS_) - - In December 1932, Frick, at that time Chairman of the Foreign - Affairs Committee of the Reichstag, stated to a fellow member of - that committee: - - “Don’t worry, when we are in power we shall put all of - you guys into concentration camps.” (_L-83_) - - _4. The Nazi conspirators openly approved acts of terrorist - committed by their subordinates._ On 22 August 1932, five - National Socialists were condemned to death for a murder in the - town of Potempa. Hitler wired to the condemned men: - - “My Comrades! Faced with this terrible blood sentence, I - feel myself bound to you in unlimited faithfulness. Your - liberty is from this moment a question of our honor. To - fight against a Government under which such a thing - could happen is our duty.” (_2532-PS_; _2511-PS_) - - Goering, two days later sent the following telegram to the - condemned men: - - “In nameless embitterment and rage against the terror - sentence which has struck you, I promise you, My - Comrades, that our whole fight from now on will be for - your freedom. You are no murderers. You have defended - the life and the honor of your Comrades. I send to your - families today 1,000 Marks which I have received from - your friends. Be courageous. More than 14,000,000 of the - best Germans have made your interest their own.” - (_2634-PS_) - - On 2 September 1932, the death sentences were commuted to - imprisonment for life. In 1933, after the Nazis came into power, - the five were set free. (_2532-PS_) - - Soon after coming to power the Nazi conspirators took steps to - grant a general amnesty for all unlawful acts, including acts of - violence, committed by their adherents in the course of their - struggle for power. On 21 March 1933 a decree was promulgated, - signed by von Hindenburg, Hitler, Frick, and von Papen granting - amnesty “For penal acts committed in the national revolution of - the German People, in its preparation or in the fight for the - German soil”. (_2059-PS_) - -B. _Control Acquired_ - -(1) _On 30 January 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of the German -Republic._ - -(2) _After the Reichstag fire of 28 February 1933, clauses of the Weimar -Constitution guaranteeing personal liberty and freedom of speech, of the -press, of association and assembly, were suspended._ The Weimar -Constitution contained certain guarantees as to personal freedom -(Article 114), as to inviolability of the home (Article 115), and as to -the secrecy of letters and other communications (Article 117). It also -had provisions safeguarding freedom of speech and of the press (Article -118), and of assembly (Article 123), and of association (Article 124). -The Reich President was authorized, “if public safety and order in the -German Reich are considerably disturbed or endangered,” to take steps to -suspend “the Fundamental Rights” established in Articles 114, 115, 117, -118, 123, 124, and 153. (Article 48 (2)). (_2050-PS_) - -On 28 February 1933, the Nazi conspirators, taking as their excuse a -fire which had just destroyed the Reichstag building, caused to be -promulgated a Decree of the Reich President suspending the -constitutional guarantees of freedom. This decree, which purported to be -an exercise of the powers of the Reich President under Article 48 (2) of -the Constitution, and which was signed by the Reich President, -Hindenburg, the Reich Chancellor, Hitler, the Reich Minister of the -Interior, Frick, and the Reich Minister of Justice, Guertner, provided -in part: - - “Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the - Constitution of the German Reich are suspended until further - notice. Thus, restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of - free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, on - the right of assembly and the right of association, and - violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic - communications, and warrants for house-searchers, orders for - confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also - permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.” - (_1390-PS_) - -(3) _The Nazi conspirators secured the passage by the Reichstag of a -“Law for the Protection of the People and the Reich”, giving Hitler and -the members of his then Cabinet plenary powers of legislation._ At the -first meeting of Hitler’s Cabinet on 30 January 1933, passage of an -Enabling Law (_Ermaechtigungsgesetz_) was discussed, and suppression of -the Communist Party was considered as a means for securing the majority -requisite for this and other purposes. (_351-PS_) Since such a law -involved a change in the Constitution it was governed by Article 76 of -the Weimar Constitution which provided: “The Constitution may be amended -by law. The acts of the Reichstag amending the Constitution can only -take effect if two-thirds of the regular number of members are present -and at least two-thirds of those present consent.” (_2050-PS_) At the -first meeting of the Hitler Cabinet on 30 January 1933, both Hitler and -Goering favored early dissolution of the Reichstag and new elections in -an effort to achieve a majority for the new Cabinet. (_351-PS_) This -course was followed and new elections for the Reichstag were held on 5 -March 1933, at which 288 Nazi were elected out of 647 members -(_2514-PS_). - -Taking advantage of the Presidential decree of 28 February 1933 -suspending constitutional guarantees of freedom, Goering and other Nazi -conspirators immediately caused a large number of Communists, including -party officials and Reichstag deputies, and a smaller number of Social -Democratic officials and deputies to be placed in “protective custody”. -(_2324-PS_; _2573-PS_; _L-83_) Thus all Communist deputies and a number -of Social Democratic deputies were prevented from attending the new -session of the Reichstag. On 9 March 1933, Frick announced that the -Communists would be prevented from participating in the first session of -the Reichstag on March 21st, because of their being more usefully -occupied. (_2403-PS_) As Frick cynically stated: - - “When the Reichstag meets the 21st of March, the Communists will - be prevented by urgent labor elsewhere from participating in the - session. In concentration camps they will be re-educated for - productive work. We will know how to render harmless permanently - sub-humans who do not want to be re-educated.” (_2651-PS_) - -At a meeting of the Reich Cabinet on 15 March 1933, the problem of -securing the necessary two-thirds majority in favor of an Enabling Act -was again considered. Frick stated his belief that the Act would have to -be broadly-conceived, in a manner to allow for any deviation from the -clauses of the Constitution of the Reich. Goering thought the two-thirds -majority would be forthcoming and that if necessary some of the Social -Democrats could be excluded from the room during the voting. (_2962-PS_) - -At a meeting of the Cabinet on 20 March 1933, there was further -discussion of means for securing the majority and quorum necessary to -secure passage of the Act (_2963-PS_). On 23 March, Hitler spoke in -favor of an Enabling Law proposed by the Nazi conspirators and in the -course of the debate said: - - “The Government insists on the passage of this law. It expects a - clear decision in any case. It offers to all the Parties in the - Reichstag the possibility of a peaceful development and a - possible conciliation in the future. But it is also determined - to consider a disapproval of this law as a declaration of - resistance. It is up to you, gentlemen, to make the decision - now. It will be either peace or war.” (_2652-PS_) - -Thus subject to the full weight of Nazi pressure and terror, the -Reichstag passed the proposed law, 441 deputies voting in its favor, and -94 Social Democrats being opposed (_2579-PS_). The following day, the -law was promulgated. It provided: - - “The Reichstag has resolved the following law, which is, with - the approval of the Reichsrat, herewith promulgated, after it - has been established that the requirements have been satisfied - for legislation altering the Constitution. - - “SECTION 1. Reich laws can be enacted by the Reich Cabinet as - well as in accordance with the Procedure established in the - Constitution. This applies also to the laws referred to in - article 85, paragraph 2, and in article 87 of the Constitution. - - “SECTION 2. The national laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet may - deviate from the Constitution so far as they do not affect the - position of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat. The powers of the - President remain undisturbed. - - “SECTION 3. The national laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet are - prepared by the Chancellor and published in the - Reichsgesetzblatt. They come into effect, unless otherwise - specified, upon the day following their publication. Articles 68 - to 77 of the Constitution do not apply to the laws enacted by - the Reich Cabinet. - - “SECTION 4. Treaties of the Reich with foreign states which - concern matters of national legislation do not require the - consent of the bodies participating in legislation. The Reich - Cabinet is empowered to issue the necessary provisions for the - execution of these treaties. - - “SECTION 5. This law becomes effective on the day of its - publication. It becomes invalid on April 1, 1937; it further - becomes invalid when the present Reich Cabinet is replaced by - another.” (_2001-PS_) - -The time limit stated in the law was twice extended by action of the -Reichstag and once by decree of Hitler. (_2047-PS_; _2048-PS_; -_2103-PS_) - -On 29 June 1933, Dr. Hugenberg resigned as Reich Minister of Economy and -as Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture (_351-PS_). Thereafter, other -members of the Cabinet resigned from time to time, and new members were -added. The Reich Cabinet continued to exercise, on numerous occasions -the plenary powers conferred on it by the law of 24 March 1933. (See -Section 3 of Chapter XV for further material on the Reich Cabinet.) - -(4) _The Nazi conspirators caused all political parties, except the Nazi -Party, to be prohibited._ After the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933, -the organization of the Communist Party was destroyed. On 9 March 1933, -the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, announced that the Communists -would be prevented from taking part in the opening of the Reichstag on -21 March 1933, because of their seditious activity. On 26 May 1933, a -law was promulgated, signed by Hitler and Frick, providing for the -confiscation of Communist property. (_2403-PS_; _1396-PS_) - -After suspension of the Constitutional guarantees of freedom on 28 -February 1933, numerous restraints were imposed on the Social Democratic -Party, including the arrest of a number of its leaders and Reichstag -deputies. The backbone of this Party was broken by the occupation of the -trade union buildings and the smashing of free trade unions in May 1933. -On 22 June 1933, the Social Democratic Party was suppressed in Prussia -(_2403-PS_). On 7 July 1933 a Reich decree eliminated Social Democrats -from the Reichstag and from the governing bodies of Provinces and -Municipalities. (_2058-PS_) - -On 14 July 1933, provisions of the Law of 26 May 1933 confiscating -Communist property were made applicable to assets and interests of the -Social Democratic Party and its affiliated organizations, “and also to -assets and interests which are used or destined to promote Marxist or -other activities found by the Reich Minister of the Interior to be -subversive to people and state.” (_1388-PS_) Faced with similar -pressure, the other German Parties either dissolved or combined with the -Nazis (_2403-PS_). - -The Nazi conspirators then promulgated a law declaring the Nazi Party to -be the only political party in Germany and making it criminal to -maintain any other political party or to form a new political party. -This law, which was signed by Hitler, Frick, and Guertner, provided in -part: - - “Art. 1 - - The National Socialist German Worker’s Party - (_National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei_) constitutes - the only political party in Germany. - - “Art. 2 - - Whoever undertakes to maintain the organizational structure of - another political party or to form a new political party will be - punished with penal servitude up to three years or with - imprisonment of from six months to three years, if the deed is - not subject to a greater penalty according to other - regulations.” (_1388-PS_) - -In a speech on 6 July 1933 Hitler stated: - - “The political parties have finally been abolished. This is a - historical occurrence, the meaning and implication of which one - cannot yet be fully conscious of. Now, we must set aside the - last vestige of democracy, particularly the methods of voting - and making majority decisions which today are used in local - governments, in economic organizations and in labor boards; in - its place we must validate the responsibility of the individual. - The achievement of external power must be followed by the - inner-education of the people * * *” - -Later in the same speech, Hitler said: - - “The Party has become the State. All power lies with the Reich - Authorities.” (_2632-PS_) - -(5) _The Nazi conspirators caused the Nazi Party to be established as a -para-governmental organization with extensive and extraordinary -privileges._ On 1 December 1933 the Reich Cabinet promulgated a law -designed for “Securing the Unity of Party and State”. It was signed by -Hitler and Frick, and provided: - - “Art. 1 - - 1. After the victory of the National Socialistic Revolution, the - National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the - concept of the German State and is inseparably the state. - - 2. It will be a part of the public law. Its organization will be - determined by the Fuehrer. - - “Art. 2 - - The deputy of the Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of the SA will - become members of the Reichs government in order to insure close - cooperation of the offices of the party and SA with the public - authorities. - - “Art. 3 - - 1. The members of the National Socialistic German Labor Party - and the SA (including their subordinate organizations) as the - leading and driving force of the National Socialist State will - bear greater responsibility toward Fuehrer, people and state. - - 2. In case they violate these duties, they will be subject to - special jurisdiction by party and state. - - 3. The Fuehrer may extend these regulations in order to include - members of other organizations. - - “Art. 4 - - Every action or neglect on the part of members of the SA - (including their subordinate organizations) attacking or - endangering the existence, organization, activity or reputation - of the National Socialistic German Labor Party, in particular - any infraction against discipline and order, will be regarded as - a violation of duty. - - “Art. 5 - - Custody and arrest may be inflicted in addition to the usual - penalties. - - “Art. 6 - - The public authorities have to grant legal and administrative - assistance to the offices of the Party and the SA which are - entrusted with the execution of the jurisdiction of the Party - and SA. - - “Art. 7 - - The law regarding the authority to inflict penalties on members - of the SA and SS, of the 28 April 1933 (RGBl, p. 230), will be - invalidated. - - “Art. 8 - - The Reichs Chancellor, as Fuehrer of the National Socialistic - German Labor Party and as the supreme commander of SA will issue - the regulation necessary for the execution and augmentation of - this law, particularly with respect to the organization and - procedure of the Jurisdiction of the Party and SA. He will - determine the time at which the regulations concerning this - jurisdiction will be effective.” (_1395-PS_) - -Thus the Nazi Party became a para-governmental organization in Germany. - -The Nazi conspirators granted the Nazi Party and its components -extensive and extraordinary privileges. On 19 May 1933, they passed a -law to protect and insure respect for Party symbols (_2759-PS_). On 20 -December 1934 the Nazi conspirators caused a law to be promulgated, -signed by Hitler, Guertner, Hess, and Frick, making it a crime to make -false or grievous statements to injure the prestige of the Government of -the Reich, the NSDAP, or its agencies. This law also declared it to be a -crime to wear the uniform or the insignia of the NSDAP without authority -to do so, and controlled the manufacture and sale of Party uniforms, -flags, and insignia (_1393-PS_). A decree of 29 March 1935, defining the -legal status of the NSDAP and of its components and affiliated -organizations, is a further indication of the extraordinary privileges -enjoyed by the Nazi Party. (_1725-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ACQUISITION OF - TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROL - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (D) │ │ - │ 1, 2. │ I │ 17, 18 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *047-PS │Letter to Rosenberg signed by Hitler, 24│ │ - │ August 1931. (USA 725) │ III │ 82 - │ │ │ - *351-PS │Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of │ │ - │ Hitler, 30 January 1933. (USA 389) │ III │ 270 - │ │ │ - *404-PS │Excerpts from Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. │ │ - │ 456, 475. (USA 256) │ III │ 385 - │ │ │ - 1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of Property │ │ - │ subversive to People and State, 14 │ │ - │ July 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │ Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962 - │ │ │ - 1388-A-PS │Law against the establishment of │ │ - │ Parties, 14 July 1933. 1933 │ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 479. │ III │ 962 - │ │ │ - 1390-PS │Decree of the Reich President for the │ │ - │ Protection of the People and State, 28│ │ - │ February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │ - │ Part I, p. 83. │ III │ 968 - │ │ │ - 1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against State│ │ - │ and Party, and for the Protection of │ │ - │ Party Uniforms, 20 December 1934. 1934│ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973 - │ │ │ -*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │ - │ State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. │ │ - │ (GB 252) │ III │ 978 - │ │ │ - 1396-PS │Law concerning the confiscation of │ │ - │ Communist property, 26 May 1933. 1933 │ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 293. │ III │ 979 - │ │ │ - 1725-PS │Decree enforcing law for securing the │ │ - │ unity of Party and State, 29 March │ │ - │ 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ - │ p. 502. │ IV │ 224 - │ │ │ - 2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People and│ │ - │ State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638 - │ │ │ - 2047-PS │Law for the extension of the law │ │ - │ concerning the removal of the distress│ │ - │ of People and Reich, 30 January 1937. │ │ - │ 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. │ │ - │ 105. │ IV │ 660 - │ │ │ - 2048-PS │Law for the extension of the law │ │ - │ concerning the removal of the distress│ │ - │ of the People and Reich, 30 January │ │ - │ 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ - │ p. 95. │ IV │ 660 - │ │ │ - 2050-PS │The Constitution of the German Reich, 11│ │ - │ August 1919. 1919 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │ Part I, p. 1383. │ IV │ 662 - │ │ │ - 2058-PS │Decree for the securing of the State │ │ - │ Leadership, 7 July 1933. 1933 │ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 462. │ IV │ 699 - │ │ │ - 2059-PS │Decree of the Reich President relating │ │ - │ to the granting of Amnesty, 21 March │ │ - │ 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ - │ p. 134. │ IV │ 701 - │ │ │ - 2103-PS │Decree of Fuehrer on Cabinet │ │ - │ Legislation, 10 May 1943. 1943 │ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 295. │ IV │ 729 - │ │ │ -*2168-PS │Book by SA Sturmfuehrer Dr. Ernst Bayer,│ │ - │ entitled “The SA”, depicting the │ │ - │ history, work, aim and organization of│ │ - │ the SA. (USA 411) │ IV │ 772 - │ │ │ -*2324-PS │Extracts from Reconstruction of a │ │ - │ Nation, by Hermann Goering, 1934. (USA│ │ - │ 233) │ IV │ 1033 - │ │ │ - 2403-PS │The End of the Party State, from │ │ - │ Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │ - │ pp. 55-56. │ V │ 71 - │ │ │ - 2404-PS │Report of Hitler’s speech in his own │ │ - │ defense, published in The Hitler Trial│ │ - │ (1934). │ V │ 73 - │ │ │ - 2405-PS │Extracts from German Publications. │ V │ 79 - │ │ │ - 2412-PS │Extracts from Nature and Form of │ │ - │ National Socialism pamphlet by Dr. │ │ - │ Joseph Goebbels, Berlin, 1935. │ V │ 88 - │ │ │ - 2500-PS │“What do we want in the Reichstag?” one │ │ - │ of Goebbels newspaper articles. │ V │ 237 - │ │ │ - 2511-PS │Statement by Hitler from Voelkischer │ │ - │ Beobachter, 24 August 1932. │ V │ 246 - │ │ │ - 2512-PS │Hitler’s Testimony Before the Court for │ │ - │ High Treason, published in Frankfurter│ │ - │ Zeitung, 26 September 1931. │ V │ 246 - │ │ │ -*2513-PS │Extract from The National Socialist │ │ - │ Workers’ Party as an Association │ │ - │ Hostile to State and to Republican │ │ - │ Form of Government and Guilty of │ │ - │ Treasonable Activity. (USA 235) │ V │ 252 - │ │ │ - 2514-PS │Extract from Statistical Yearbook of the│ │ - │ German Reich 1933, concerning │ │ - │ elections in the Reichstag. │ V │ 253 - │ │ │ - 2532-PS │Extract from The Third Reich, by Gerd │ │ - │ Ruehle. │ V │ 268 - │ │ │ - 2573-PS │Announcement of Official Prussian Press │ │ - │ Office, in Frankfurter Zeitung, 1 │ │ - │ March 1933. │ V │ 303 - │ │ │ - 2579-PS │Extracts from the Frankfurter Zeitung, │ │ - │ 24 March 1933, concerning happenings │ │ - │ 23 March. │ V │ 303 - │ │ │ - 2632-PS │Extracts from The National Socialist │ │ - │ Revolution 1933, published in Berlin │ │ - │ 1935. │ V │ 343 - │ │ │ - 2633-PS │Extracts from Constitutional Law of the │ │ - │ Greater German Reich, 1939. │ V │ 344 - │ │ │ - 2634-PS │Goering to the Condemned, published in │ │ - │ Voelkischer Beobachter, 26 August │ │ - │ 1932. │ V │ 344 - │ │ │ - 2651-PS │Statement by Frick from Voelkischer │ │ - │ Beobachter, 14 March 1933. │ V │ 359 - │ │ │ - 2652-PS │Speech of Hitler to Reichstag, 23 March │ │ - │ 1933, from Voelkischer Beobachter, 24 │ │ - │ March 1933. │ V │ 359 - │ │ │ - 2741-PS │Speech by Hitler on 9 November 1934, │ │ - │ published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │ - │ 10 November 1934. │ V │ 382 - │ │ │ - 2742-PS │Passage written by Frick in National │ │ - │ Socialist Yearbook, 1927, p. 124. │ V │ 383 - │ │ │ - 2743-PS │Passage written by Frick in National │ │ - │ Socialist Yearbook, 1930, p. 178. │ V │ 383 - │ │ │ - 2759-PS │Law for the protection of Nationalist │ │ - │ Symbols, 19 May 1933. 1933 │ │ - │ Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 285. │ V │ 394 - │ │ │ -*2955-PS │Affidavit of Magnus Heimannsberg, 14 │ │ - │ November 1945, referring to SA and │ │ - │ other Nazi groups posted at polling │ │ - │ places. (USA 755) │ V │ 659 - │ │ │ -*2962-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, 15 │ │ - │ March 1933. (USA 578) │ V │ 669 - │ │ │ -*2963-PS │Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, 20 │ │ - │ March 1933. (USA 656) │ V │ 670 - │ │ │ -*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │ picture composed of captured German │ │ - │ film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ -*3740-PS │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 6 March 1946.│ │ - │ (USA 779) │ VI │ 635 - │ │ │ -*L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July │ │ - │ 1945. (USA 234). │ VII │ 859 - - - 3. CONSOLIDATION OF TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROL - -_Between the Accession to Power (early 1933) and the Outbreak of the War -(late 1939) the Nazi Conspirators Consolidated Their Control of Germany -by Utilizing and Molding Its Political Machinery to Their Own Ends._ - -A. _The Nazi conspirators reduced the Reichstag to an impotent body of -their own appointees._ Under the Weimar Constitution of the German -Reich, adopted by the German people on 11 August 1919, the Reichstag was -a representative parliamentary body with broad legislative powers. -Article 20 provided that the Reichstag should be “composed of the -delegates of the German people.” Article 68 of the Chapter on -Legislation provided that: - - “Bills are introduced by the government of the Reich or by - members of the Reichstag. Reich laws shall be enacted by the - Reichstag.” (_2050-PS_) - -In _Mein Kampf_ Hitler stated the conspirators’ purpose to undermine the -Reichstag: - - “Our young movement in essence and structure is - anti-parliamentarian, i.e., it rejects majority voting as a - matter of principle as well as in its own organization * * * Its - participation in the activities of a parliament has only the - purpose to contribute to its destruction, to the elimination of - an institution which we consider as one of the gravest symptoms - of decay of mankind * * *” (_2883-PS_). - -With the passage of the Law for the Protection of the People and the -Reich (also known as the Enabling Act) the Nazi succeeded, in effect, in -depriving the Reichstag of its legislative functions. The legislative as -well as the executive powers of the government were concentrated in -Hitler and the Cabinet (_2001-PS_; the legislative activities of the -Cabinet (_Reichsregierung_) and its power to contravene constitutional -limitations are treated in Section 3 of Chapter XV). - -During the period from March 1933 until the beginning of 1937, the -Reichstag enacted only four laws: The Reconstruction Law of 30 January -1934 and the three Nurnberg laws of 15 September 1935. The Reichstag was -retained chiefly as a sounding board for Hitler’s speeches. All other -legislation was enacted by the Cabinet, by the Cabinet ministers, or by -decree of the Fuehrer (_2481-PS_). Hess has admitted the lack of -importance of the Reichstag in the legislative process after 1933. -(_2426-PS_) - -Hitler indicated in a 1939 decree that the Reichstag would be permitted -to enact only such laws as he, in his own judgment, might deem -appropriate for Reichstag legislation. (_2018-PS_) - -Immediately after the Nazis acquired the control of the central -government they proceeded systematically to eliminate their opponents. -First they forced all other political parties to dissolve, and on 14 -July 1933 issued a decree making illegal the existence of any political -party except the Nazi Party. (_1388-PS_) - -In early 1935 there were 661 delegates in the Reichstag. Of this number -641 were officially registered as Nazi party members and the remaining -20 were classified as “guests” (_Gaeste_). (_2384-PS_; _2380-PS_) - -B. _The Nazi conspirators curtailed the freedom of popular elections -throughout Germany._ Under the Weimar Republic there existed -constitutional and legislative guarantees of free popular elections. The -Weimar Constitution guaranteed the universal, equal and secret ballot -and proportional representation. (_2050-PS_) These general principles -were implemented by the provisions of the Reich Election Law of 1924, -particularly with respect to the multiple party system and the -functioning of proportional representation. (_2382-PS_) - -In _Mein Kampf_ Hitler stated the conspirators’ purpose to subvert the -system of popular election: - - “Majority can never replace men. * * * The political - understanding of the masses is not sufficiently developed to - produce independently specific political convictions and to - select persons to represent them.” (_2883-PS_) - -The occasional national elections after 1933 were formalities devoid of -freedom of choice. Bona fide elections could not take place under the -Nazi system. The basic ideological doctrine of the _Fuehrerprinzip_ -(Leadership Principle) dictated that all subordinates must be appointed -by their superiors in the governmental hierarchy. In order to insure the -practical application of this principle the Nazis immediately liquidated -all other political parties and provided criminal sanctions against the -formation of new parties. (For further discussion see Section 2 on the -Acquisition of Totalitarian Political Control.) - -Although the Reichstag, unlike all other elective assemblies in Germany, -was allowed to continue in existence, elections no longer involved a -free choice between lists or candidates. At these elections there were -usually large bands of uniformed Nazis surrounding the polls and -intimidating the voters. (_2955-PS_) - -The surreptitious marking of ballots (e.g. with skimmed milk) was also -customary, to ascertain the identity of the persons who cast “No” or -invalid votes. (_R-142_) - -Although it had already become practically impossible to have more than -one list of candidates, it was specifically provided by law in 1938 that -only one list was to be submitted to the electorate. (_2355-PS_) - -By the end of this period, little of substance remained in the election -law. In an official volume published during the war there are reprinted -the still effective provisions of the law of 1924. The majority of the -substantive provisions have been marked “obsolete” (_gegenstandslos_) -(_2381-PS_). - -The comprehensive Nazi program for the centralization of German -government included in its scope the whole system of regional and local -elections, which soon ceased to exist. Article 17 of the Weimar -Constitution had required a representative form of government and -universal, secret elections in all Laender and municipalities -(_2050-PS_). Yet in early 1934, the sovereign powers (_Hoheitsrechte_) -of the Laender were transferred by law to the Reich and the Land -governments were placed under the Reich control: - - “The popular assemblies (_Volksvertretungen_) of the Laender - shall be abolished.” (_2006-PS_) - -Pursuant to the German Communal Ordinance of 30 January 1935, the mayors -and executive officers of all municipalities received their appointments -“through the confidence of Party and State” (Article 6 (2)). -Appointments were made by Reich authorities from lists prepared by the -Party delegates (Article 41). City councillors were selected by the -Party delegates in agreement with the mayors (Article 51 (1)). -(_2008-PS_) - -C. _The Nazi conspirators transformed the states, provinces, and -municipalities into what were, in effect, mere administrative organs of -the central government._ Under the Weimar Constitution of the pre-Nazi -regime, the states, provinces, and municipalities enjoyed considerable -autonomy in the exercise of governmental functions—legislative, -executive and judicial. (_2050-PS_) - -Hitler, in _Mein Kampf_, stated the conspirators’ purpose to establish -totalitarian control of local government: - - “National Socialism, as a matter of principle, must claim the - right to enforce its doctrines, without regard to present - federal boundaries, upon the entire German nation and to educate - it in its ideas and its thinking. * * * The National Socialist - doctrine is not the servant of political interests of individual - federal states but shall become the ruler of the German nation.” - (_2883-PS_) - -These views were echoed by Rosenberg: - - “In the midst of the great power constellations of the globe - there must be, for foreign as well as for internal political - reasons, only one strong central national authority, if one - wants Germany to regain a position which makes it fit for - alliance with other countries.” (_2882-PS_) - -By a series of laws and decrees, the Nazi conspirators reduced the -powers of the regional and local governments and substantially -transformed them into territorial subdivisions of the Reich government. -The program of centralization began almost immediately after the Nazis -acquired the chief executive posts of the government. On 31 March 1933, -they promulgated the Provisional Law integrating the Laender with the -Reich (_2004-PS_). This law called for the dissolution of all state and -local self governing bodies and for their reconstitution according to -the number of votes cast for each party in the Reichstag election of 5 -March 1933. The Communists and their affiliates were expressly denied -representation. - -A week later there followed the Second Law Integrating the Laender with -the Reich (_2005-PS_). This Act established the position of Reich -Governor. He was to be appointed by the President upon the proposal of -the Chancellor, and was given power to appoint the members of the Land -governments and the higher Land officials and judges, the authority to -reconstruct the Land legislature according to the law of 31 March 1933 -(_2004-PS_, _supra_), and the power of pardon. - -On 31 January 1934, most of the remaining vestiges of Land independence -were destroyed by the Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich: - - “The popular referendum and the Reichstag election of November - 12, 1933, have proved that the German people have attained an - indestructible internal unity (_unloesliche innere Einheit_) - superior to all internal subdivisions of political character. - Consequently, the Reichstag has enacted the following law which - is hereby promulgated with the unanimous vote of the Reichstag - after ascertaining that the requirements of the Reich - Constitution have been met: - - Article I. Popular assemblies of the Laender shall be abolished. - - Article II. (1) The sovereign powers (_Hoheitsrechte_) of the - Laender are transferred to the Reich. - - (2) The Laender governments are placed under the Reich - government. - - Article III. The Reich governors are placed under the - administrative supervision of the Reich Minister of Interior. - - Article IV. The Reich Government may issue new constitutional - laws.” - -This law was implemented by a regulation, issued by Frick, providing -that all Land laws must have the assent of the competent Minister of the -Reich, that the highest echelons of the Land Government were to obey the -orders of the competent Reich Minister, and that the employees of the -Laender might be transferred into the Reich Civil Service. (_1653-PS_) - -The _Reichsrat_ (Reich Council) was abolished by law on 14 February -1934, and all official representation on the part of the Laender in the -administration of the central government was at an end (_2647-PS_). The -legislative pattern was complete with the enactment of the Reich -Governor Law on 30 January 1935, which solidified the system of -centralized control. The Reich Governor was declared to be the official -representative of the Reich government, who was to receive orders -directly from Hitler (_Reichstatthaltergesetz_ (Reich Governor Law), 30 -January 1935, 1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, p. 65). The same -development was apparent in the provinces, the territorial subdivisions -of Prussia. All local powers were concentrated in the Provincial -Presidents, who acted solely as representatives of the national -administration (_2049-PS_). Similarly, in the case of the municipalities -local self-government was quickly reduced to a minimum and communal -affairs were placed under central Reich control. The Nazi Party Delegate -was given special functions: - - “* * * in order to insure harmony between the communal - administration and the Party.” (Art. 6 (2)). - -The Reich was given supervision over the municipalities: - - “* * * in order to insure that their activities conform with the - laws and the aims of national leadership.” (_2008-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators frequently boasted of their comprehensive program -of government centralization. Frick, Minister of the Interior throughout -this period, wrote: - - “The reconstruction law abolished the sovereign rights and the - executive powers of the Laender and made the Reich the sole - bearer of the rights of sovereignty. The supreme powers of the - Laender do not exist any longer. The natural result of this was - the subordination of the Land governments to the Reich - government and the Land Ministers to the corresponding Reich - Ministers. On 30 January 1934, the German Reich became one - state. (_2481-PS_) - -In another article Frick indicated even more clearly the purposes which -underlay this program of centralization: - - “In the National Socialist revolution of 1933, it was stipulated - for the first time in the history of the German nation that the - erection of a unified state (_Einheitsstaat_) would be - accomplished. From the early days of his political activity, - Adolf Hitler never left a doubt in the mind of anyone that he - considered it the first duty of National Socialism to create a - German Reich in which the will of the people would be led in a - single direction and that the whole strength of the nation, _at - home and abroad_, would be placed on the balance scale.” - (_2380-PS_; _2378-PS_.) - -D. _The Nazi conspirators united the offices of President and Chancellor -in the person of Hitler._ The merger of the two offices was accomplished -by the law of 1 August 1934, signed by the entire cabinet (_2003-PS_). -The official Nazi statement concerning the effect of this statute -contains this observation: - - “Through this law, the conduct of Party and State has been - combined in one hand. * * * He is responsible only to his own - conscience and to the German nation.” (_1893-PS_) - -One of the significant consequences of this law was to give to Hitler -the supreme command of the German armed forces, always a prerequisite of -the Presidency (_2050-PS_). Accordingly, every soldier was immediately -required to take an oath of loyalty and obedience to Hitler. (_2061-PS_) - -E. _The Nazi conspirators removed great numbers of civil servants on -racial and political grounds and replaced them with party members and -supporters._ - -Hitler publicly announced the conspirators’ purpose: - - “We know that two things alone will save us: the end of internal - corruption and the cleaning out of all those who owe their - existence simply to the protection of members of the same - political parties. Through the most brutal ruthlessness towards - all officials installed by those political parties we must - restore our finances. * * * The body of German officials must - once more become what it was.” (_2881-PS_) - -The Nazi legislative machine turned to the task of purging the civil -service soon after the accession to power. On 7 April 1933, the Law for -the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service was promulgated -(_1397-PS_). Article 3 of this law applies the Nazi blood theories: - - “(1) Officials who are not of Aryan descent are to be retired - (See Section 8); where honorary officials are concerned, they - are to be discharged from office. - - (2) (1) Does not apply to officials who have been in service - since August 1, 1914, or who fought in the World War at the - front for the German Reich or for its allies or whose fathers or - sons were killed in the World War. The Reich Minister of the - Interior after consultation with the competent Minister or with - the highest state authorities may permit further exceptions in - the case of officials who are in foreign countries.” - -Article 8 provides that retirement does not carry a pension unless the -official has served at least ten years. The political purge provision of -this law is contained in Article 4: - - “Officials who because of their previous political activity do - not offer security that they will exert themselves for the - national state without reservations, may be discharged. For - three months after dismissal, they will be paid their former - salary. From this time on they receive three-quarters of their - pensions (see 8) and corresponding annuities for their heirs.” - -The provisions of the Act apply to all Reich, Land, and Communal -officials (Art. 1 (2)). Civil Servants may be placed on the retired list -without any reason, “for the purpose of simplifying the administration” -(Art. 6). Discharges and transfers, once decided on by the appropriate -administrative chief, are final and are not subject to appeal (Art. 7 -(1)). - -This basic enactment was followed by a series of decrees, regulations, -and amendments. For example, on 11 April 1933, the term “non-Aryan” was -defined to include persons with only one non-Aryan grandparent -(_2012-PS_). An amendatory law of 30 June ruled out all civil servants -married to non-Aryans. (_1400-PS_) - -The political standards of the “Purge Law” were made more explicit by -the supplementary law of 20 July 1933. Officials who belonged to any -party or organization which, in the opinion of the Nazis, furthered the -aims of Communism, Marxism, or Social Democracy were summarily to be -discharged (_1398-PS_). In the later years, these earlier provisions -were enlarged and codified, no longer solely for the purposes of -affecting the existing civil service, but rather to set out the -qualifications for the appointment of new applicants and for their -promotion. Proof of devotion to National Socialism and documentary proof -of acceptable “blood” were prescribed as conditions to promotion. -(_2326-PS_) - -The comprehensive German Civil Service Law of 26 January 1937 included -the discriminatory provisions of the earlier legislation, and prevented -the appointment of any applicants opposed or suspected of being opposed -to the Nazi program and policy (_2340-PS_). The legislation dealing with -the training and education of civil servants provided that no person can -be accepted for an official position unless he is a member of the Nazi -Party or one of its formations (_Gliederungen_). (_2341-PS_) - -The total subjugation of the German civil servant was ultimately -accomplished by the following resolution passed by the Reichstag at the -request of the Fuehrer. - - “* * * without being bound by existing legal provisions, the - Fuehrer must therefore in his capacity as Fuehrer of the nation, - as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, as Head of the - Government and as the highest bearer of all power, as highest - Law Lord and as Fuehrer of the Party, always be in a position to - require every German—whether a simple soldier or officer, - subordinate or higher official, or judge, supervisory or - operating functionary of the Party, laborer or employer—to - carry out his duties with all the means available to him and to - discharge these duties according to a conscientious examination - without reference to so-called vested rights, especially without - the preambles of pre-existing procedure, by removal of any man - from his office, rank or position.” (_2755-PS_) - -F. _The Nazi conspirators restricted the independence of the judiciary -and rendered it subservient to their ends._ - -The independence of judges, before the Nazi regime, was guaranteed by -the Weimar Constitution. The fundamental principle was stated briefly in -Article 102: - - “Judges are independent and subject only to the law.” - (_2050-PS_) - -Article 104 contained a safeguard against the arbitrary removal or -suspension of judges, while Article 105 prohibited “exceptional courts”. -The fundamental rights of the individual are set out in Article 109 and -include equality before the law. (_2050-PS_) - -Like all other public officials, German judges who failed to meet Nazi -racial and political requirements became the subject of a wide-spread -purge. Non-Aryans, political opponents of the Nazis, and all persons -suspected of antagonism to the aims of the Party were summarily removed -(_2967-PS_). The provisions of the Law for the Restoration of -Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933 applied to all judges. This -was declared expressly in the third regulation for the administration of -the law. (_2867-PS_) - -To make certain that cases with political ramifications would be dealt -with acceptably and in conformity with Party principles, the Nazis -granted designated areas of criminal jurisdiction to the so-called -Special Courts (_Sondergerichte_). These constituted a new system of -special criminal courts, independent of the regular judiciary and -directly subservient to the Party (_2076-PS_). A later decree -considerably broadened the jurisdiction of these courts. (_2056-PS_) - -In 1934, the People’s Court was set up as a trial court “in cases of -high treason and treason” (_2014-PS_). This action was a direct, result -of the dissatisfaction of the Nazi rulers with the decision of the -Supreme Court (_Reichsgericht_) in the Reichstag fire trial. Three of -the four defendants were acquitted although the Nazi conspirators had -expected convictions in all cases (_2967-PS_). The law which created -this new tribunal contained a wide definition of treason which would -include most of what were regarded by the Nazis as “political” crimes -(Art. 3 (1)). The express denial of any appeal from the decisions of the -People’s Court (Art. 5 (2)) was a further indication of the intention of -the Nazis to set up a criminal law system totally outside of accepted -judicial pattern. The substantive organization of the People’s Court was -later established by law in 1936. (_2342-PS_) - -These new tribunals were staffed almost exclusively with Nazis and were -used to tighten the Party’s grip on Germany. This control became -progressively stronger, due first, to the power of the prosecutor to -pick the appropriate court; second, to the restriction of defense -counsel in these courts to specially admitted attorneys; and finally, to -the absence of appeal from the decisions of these judges. Moreover, -there developed along side of the entire judicial system the -increasingly powerful police administration, under which persons opposed -to the regime were regularly imprisoned in concentration camps without -any type of hearing, even after acquittal by the courts. (_2967-PS_) - -Still another group of courts was established within the Party itself. -These Party Courts heard cases involving internal party discipline and -infractions of the rules of conduct prescribed for members of formations -and affiliated organizations. The published rules for the Party judges -emphasized the complete dependence of these judges upon the directions -and supervision of their Party superiors. (_2402-PS_) - -The Nazi legal theorists freely admitted that there was no place in -their scheme of things for the truly independent judge. They controlled -all judges through special directives and orders from the central -government. Frank underscored the role of the judge as a political -functionary and as an administrator in the National Socialist state -(_2378-PS_). Two case histories of this period serve to illustrate the -manner in which criminal proceedings were directly suppressed or -otherwise affected by order of the Reich government. - -In 1935, the Reich Governor of Saxony, Mutschmann, attempted to quash -criminal proceedings which, in this exceptional instance, had been -brought against officials of the Hohnstein concentration camp for a -series of extremely brutal attacks upon inmates. The trial was held and -the defendants convicted, but during the trial the governor inquired of -the presiding judge whether he did not think the penalty proposed by the -prosecutor too severe and whether an acquittal was not indicated. After -the conviction, two jurymen were ousted from the NSDAP and the -prosecutor was advised by his superior to withdraw from the SA. Although -Guertner, the then Minister of Justice, strongly recommended against -taking any action to alter the decision, Hitler pardoned all the -accused. (_783-PS_; _784-PS_; _785-PS_; _786-PS_) - -In another similar case, Guertner wrote directly to Hitler narrating the -horrible details of maltreatment and advising that the case be regularly -prosecuted. Nevertheless, Hitler ordered complete suppression of the -proceedings. (_787-PS_; _788-PS_) - -Under the Nazi regime, it was part of the official duty of many Party -functionaries to supervise the administration of justice. The official -papers of Hess contain detailed statements concerning his own functions -and those of the Gauleiter in deciding criminal cases. (_2639-PS_) - -Another type of governmental interference in judicial matters is -evidenced by the confidential letter which the Ministry of Justice sent -in early 1938 to the Chief Justices of the Regional Supreme Courts -(_Oberlandesgerichtspraesidenten_). The judges were instructed to submit -lists of lawyers who would be sufficiently able and trustworthy to -represent in court persons who had been taken into “protective custody”. -The main requirement was absolute political reliability. Simple Party -membership was not enough; to be selected, the lawyer had to enjoy the -confidence of the “Gestapo”. (_651-PS_) - -After the war began, Thierack, Minister of Justice, revealed the low -state to which the judiciary had fallen under Nazi rule. He argued that -the judge was not the “supervisor” but the “assistant” of the -government. He said that the word “independent”, as applied to the -judge, was to be eliminated from the vocabulary and that although the -judge should retain a certain freedom of decision in particular cases, -the government “can and must” give him the “general line” to follow. For -this purpose, Thierack decided in 1942 to send confidential Judge’s -Letters (_Richterbriefe_) to all German judges and prosecutors, setting -forth the political principles and directives with which all judicial -personnel were obligated to comply (_2482-PS_). The first of these -Judge’s Letters clearly expresses the complete subordination of the -judges to the Fuehrer and his government. (_D-229_) - -G. _The Nazi conspirators greatly enlarged existing State and Party -organizations and established an elaborate network of new formations and -agencies._ - -The totalitarian character of the Nazi regime led to the establishment -of a great number of new official and semi-official agencies and -organizations in the various fields of life which were permeated by Nazi -doctrine and practice, including culture, trade, industry, and -agriculture. - -New agencies had to be created to handle the large number of additional -administrative tasks taken over from the Laender and the municipalities. -Moreover, the mobilization of the political, economic, and military -resources of Germany required the formation of such coordinating -“super-agencies” as the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary for -Economics, the Plenipotentiary for Administration, and the Ministerial -Council for the Defense of the Reich. At the time of the launching of -war, the central Reich government was an extremely complicated structure -held together under strict Nazi dictatorship. (See _Chart Number 18_; -also _2261-PS_; _2194-PS_; _2018-PS_.) - -Simultaneously, in the Party, the growth of agencies and organizations -proceeded rapidly. The Party spread, octopus-like, throughout all -Germany and into many foreign lands. (See _Chart Number 1_; also -_1725-PS_.) - -This process of growth was summed up late in 1937 in an official -statement of the Party Chancellery: - -“In order to control the whole German nation in all spheres of life, the -NSDAP, after assuming power, set up under its leadership the new Party -formations and affiliated organizations.” (_2383-PS_) - -H. _The Nazi conspirators created a dual system of government controls, -set up Party agencies to correspond with State agencies, and coordinated -their activities, often by uniting corresponding State and Party offices -in a single person._ - -In _Mein Kampf_, Hitler announced the conspirators’ purpose: - - “Such a revolution can and will only be achieved by a movement - which itself is already organized in the spirit of such ideas - and thus in itself already bears the coming state. Therefore, - the National Socialist movement may today become imbued with - these ideas and put them into practice in its own organization - so that it not only may direct the state according to the same - principles, but also may be in a position to put at the state’s - disposal the finished organizational structure of its own - state.” (_2883-PS_) - -The Nazis attempted to achieve a certain degree of identity between the -Party and the State and, at the same time, to maintain two separate -organizational structures. After the rise to power, the fundamental -principle of unity was translated into “law”: - - “Article 1. After the victory of the National Socialistic - Revolution, the National Socialistic German Labor Party is the - bearer of the concept of the German State and is inseparably the - state.” (_1395-PS_) - -The manner in which the Nazis retained a duality of organization despite -the theory of unity is graphically portrayed in the charts of the Party -and the State (_Charts Number 1 and 18_). These visual exhibits -demonstrate the comprehensive character of the Party organization, which -was established on parallel lines with the corresponding government -structure. The Party structure remained at all times technically -separate and could be used for non-governmental purposes whenever such -use best served the needs of the conspirators. In innumerable instances, -the corresponding Party and State offices were, in fact, held by the -same person. For example, the Gauleiter of the Party in most instances -also held the post of Reich Governor (or, in Prussia, that of Provincial -President). (_2880-PS_) - -The coordination of the Party and State functions started at the top. -The Chief of the Party Chancellery was designated a Reich Minister and -endowed with plenary powers in the preparation and approval of -legislation. He acted as liaison officer at the highest level between -Party officials and cabinet ministers. He was given also the duty of -passing on the appointment of all the more important civil servants. -(_2787-PS_) - -Many of the same powers were bestowed upon the other _Reichsleiter_ -(Leaders composing the Party Directorate). The official Nazi exposition -of their position is as follows: - - “It is in the Reich Directorate where the strings of the - organization of the German people and the State meet. By - endowment of the Chief of the Party Chancellery with the powers - of a Reich Minister, and by special administrative directives, - the penetration of the State apparatus with the political will - of the Party is guaranteed. It is the task of the separate - organs of the Reich Directorate to maintain as close a contact - as possible with the life of the nation through their - sub-offices in the Gaus. Observations at the front are to be - collected and exploited by the offices of the Reich - Directorate.” (_1893-PS_) - -On the regional and local levels, the _Gauleiter_, _Kreisleiter_, etc., -were also empowered to control the purely governmental authorities on -political matters. Hess issued the following order shortly after the war -began: - - “I, therefore order that the bearer of sovereignty - (_Hoheitstraeger_) of the NSDAP (_Gauleiter_, _Kreisleiter_, - _Ortsgruppenleiter_) in the scope of his authority is - responsible for the political leadership and the frame of mind - (_Stimmung_) of the population. It is his right and his duty to - take or to cause to be taken any measures necessary for the - expeditious fulfillment of his political duties and for the - elimination of wrong within the Party. He is exclusively - responsible to his superior bearers of sovereignty - (_Hoheitstraeger_).” (_2383-PS_) - -In the later years, the functional coordination of Party and State -offices became much more common. The appointment of Himmler as -Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police is a typical example of -the way in which State and Party functions became inextricably merged so -as to render any clean lines of demarcation impossible. (_2073-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CONSOLIDATION OF - TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL CONTROL - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │ │ - │ (a). │ I │ 18 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *651-PS │Confidential circular signed by │ │ - │Schlegeberger, 31 January 1938, │ │ - │concerning representation by Counsel of │ │ - │Inmates of concentration camps. (USA │ │ - │730). │ III │ 466 - │ │ │ - *783-PS │Letter from Guertner to Mutschmann, 18 │ │ - │January 1935, concerning charges against│ │ - │members of camp personnel of protective │ │ - │custody Camp Hohnstein. (USA 731). │ III │ 558 - │ │ │ - *784-PS │Letters from Minister of Justice to Hess│ │ - │and SA Chief of Staff, 5 June 1935, │ │ - │concerning penal proceedings against │ │ - │merchant and SA leader and 22 companions│ │ - │because of inflicting bodily injury on │ (USA │ - │duty. │ 732) │ III - │ │ │ - *785-PS │Memorandum of Guertner concerning legal │ │ - │proceedings against the camp personnel │ │ - │of concentration camp Hohnstein. (USA │ │ - │733) │ III │ 564 - │ │ │ - *786-PS │Minister of Justice memorandum, 29 │ │ - │November 1935, concerning pardon of │ │ - │those sentenced in connection with │ │ - │mistreatment in Hohnstein concentration │ │ - │camp. (USA 734) │ III │ 568 - │ │ │ - *787-PS │Memorandum to Hitler from Public │ │ - │Prosecutor of Dresden, 18 June 1935, │ │ - │concerning criminal procedure against │ │ - │Vogel on account of bodily injury while │ │ - │in office. (USA 421) │ III │ 568 - │ │ │ - *788-PS │Letters from Secretary of State to the │ │ - │Minister of Justice, 25 June 1935 and 9 │ │ - │September 1935, concerning criminal │ │ - │procedure against Vogel. (USA 735) │ III │ 571 - │ │ │ - 1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of Property │ │ - │subversive to People and State, 14 July │ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │479. │ III │ 962 - │ │ │ -*1395-PS │Law to insure the unity of Party and │ │ - │State, 1 December 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. (GB │ │ - │252) │ III │ 978 - │ │ │ - 1397-PS │Law for the reestablishment of the │ │ - │Professional Civil Service, 7 April │ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │175. │ III │ 981 - │ │ │ - 1398-PS │Law to supplement the Law for the │ │ - │restoration of the Professional Civil │ │ - │Service, 20 July 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 518. │ III │ 986 - │ │ │ - 1400-PS │Law changing the regulations in regard │ │ - │to public officer, 30 June 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 433. │ III │ 987 - │ │ │ - 1653-PS │First regulation concerning the │ │ - │reconstruction of the Reich, 2 February │ │ - │1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │81. │ IV │ 162 - │ │ │ - 1725-PS │Decree enforcing law for securing the │ │ - │unity of Party and State, 29 March 1935.│ │ - │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 502. │ IV │ 224 - │ │ │ -*1893-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of the │ │ - │NSDAP, 1943 edition. (USA 323) │ IV │ 529 - │ │ │ - 2001-PS │Law to Remove the Distress of People and│ │ - │State, 24 March 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. │ IV │ 638 - │ │ │ - 2003-PS │Law concerning the Sovereign Head of the│ │ - │German Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 747. │ IV │ 639 - │ │ │ - 2004-PS │Preliminary law for the coordination of │ │ - │Federal States under the Reich, 31 March│ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │153. │ IV │ 640 - │ │ │ - 2005-PS │Second law integrating the “Laender” │ │ - │with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173. │ IV │ 641 - │ │ │ - 2006-PS │Law for the reconstruction of the Reich,│ │ - │30 January 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │ - │Part I, p. 75. │ IV │ 642 - │ │ │ - 2008-PS │German Communal Ordinance, 30 January │ │ - │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │49. │ IV │ 643 - │ │ │ - 2012-PS │First regulation for administration of │ │ - │the law for the restoration of │ │ - │professional Civil Service, 11 April │ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │195. │ IV │ 647 - │ │ │ - 2014-PS │Law amending regulations of criminal law│ │ - │and criminal procedure, 24 April 1934. │ │ - │1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 341. │ IV │ 648 - │ │ │ -*2018-PS │Fuehrer’s decree establishing a │ │ - │Ministerial Council for Reich Defense, │ │ - │30 August 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ (GB │ - │Part I, p. 1539. │ 250) │ IV - │ │ │ - 2049-PS │Second Decree concerning the │ │ - │reconstruction of the Reich, 27 November│ │ - │1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │1189. │ IV │ 661 - │ │ │ - 2050-PS │The Constitution of the German Reich, 11│ │ - │August 1919. 1919 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 1383. │ IV │ 662 - │ │ │ - 2056-PS │Decree concerning the extension of the │ │ - │Jurisdiction of Special Courts, 20 │ │ - │November 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 1632. │ IV │ 698 - │ │ │ - 2061-PS │Oath of Reich Officials and of German │ │ - │Soldiers, 20 August 1934. 1934 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 785. │ IV │ 702 - │ │ │ - 2073-PS │Decree concerning the appointment of a │ │ - │Chief of German Police in the Ministry │ │ - │of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487. │ IV │ 703 - │ │ │ - 2076-PS │Decree of the Government concerning │ │ - │formation of Special Courts, 21 March │ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ - │pp. 136-137. │ IV │ 705 - │ │ │ -*2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │ - │Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │ - │Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │ - │enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │ - │Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843 - │ │ │ -*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ - │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│ │ - │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of │ │ - │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and │ │ - │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │ │ - │May 1935 on the Council for defense of │ │ - │the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 - │ │ │ - 2326-PS │Reich Principles Regarding recruiting │ │ - │appointment and promotion of Reich and │ │ - │Provincial Officials, 14 October 1936. │ │ - │1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 893. │ IV │ 1034 - │ │ │ - 2340-PS │German public officials law of 27 │ │ - │January 1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 41. │ IV │ 1058 - │ │ │ - 2341-PS │Decree on Education and Training of │ │ - │German officials, 28 February 1939. 1939│ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 371. │ IV │ 1062 - │ │ │ - 2342-PS │Law on People’s Court and on 25th │ │ - │Amendment, to Salary Law of 18 April │ │ - │1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │369. │ IV │ 1062 - │ │ │ - 2355-PS │Second Law relating to right to vote for│ │ - │Reichstag, 18 March 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 258. │ IV │ 1098 - │ │ │ - 2378-PS │Extracts from Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Vol. 4, pp. 207, 337. │ V │ 4 - │ │ │ -*2380-PS │Articles from National Socialist │ │ - │Yearbook, 1935. (USA 396) │ V │ 6 - │ │ │ -*2381-PS │Extracts from The Greater German Diet, │ │ - │1943. (USA 476) │ V │ 7 - │ │ │ - 2382-PS │Law relating to the Reich Election, 8 │ │ - │March 1924. 1924 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │ - │I, pp. 159-162. │ V │ 8 - │ │ │ -*2383-PS │Ordinance for execution of decree of │ │ - │Fuehrer concerning position of the Head │ │ - │of Party Chancellery of 16 January 1942,│ │ - │published in Decrees, Regulations, │ │ - │Announcements. (USA 410) │ V │ 9 - │ │ │ - 2384-PS │The Delegates of the German People, │ │ - │published in Movement, State and People │ │ - │in their Organizations, 1935, p. 161. │ V │ 23 - │ │ │ - 2402-PS │Guide for Party Courts, 17 February │ │ - │1934. │ V │ 70 - │ │ │ -*2426-PS │Extracts from Speeches, by Hess. (GB │ │ - │253) │ V │ 90 - │ │ │ - 2481-PS │Extracts from Four Years of the Third │ │ - │Reich, by Frick, published in Magazine │ │ - │of the Academy for German Law, 1937. │ V │ 231 - │ │ │ - 2482-PS │Extract from German Justice, a legal │ │ - │periodical, 10th Year, Edition A, No. │ │ - │42, 16 October 1942. │ V │ 233 - │ │ │ - 2639-PS │Ordinances of the Deputy of the Fuehrer,│ │ - │published in Munich 1937. │ V │ 345 - │ │ │ - 2647-PS │Law relating to the abolition of the │ │ - │Reichsrat, 14 February 1934. 1934 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 89. │ V │ 358 - │ │ │ - 2755-PS │Resolution of the Greater German │ │ - │Reichstag, 26 April 1942. 1942 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 247. │ V │ 393 - │ │ │ - 2787-PS │Excerpt from Order of the Deputy of the │ │ - │Fuehrer. │ V │ 420 - │ │ │ - 2867-PS │Third Decree relating to Implementation │ │ - │of Law for restoration of Professional │ │ - │Civil Service, 6 May 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 245. │ V │ 527 - │ │ │ - 2880-PS │Extracts from Handbook for │ │ - │Administrative Officials, 1942. │ V │ 547 - │ │ │ - 2881-PS │Hitler’s speech of 12 April 1922, quoted│ │ - │in Adolf Hitler’s Speeches, published by│ │ - │Dr. Ernst Boepple, Munich, 1934, pp. │ │ - │20-21, 72. │ V │ 548 - │ │ │ - 2882-PS │The Party Program of 1922, by Rosenberg,│ │ - │25th edition, 1942, p. 60. │ V │ 548 - │ │ │ - 2883-PS │Extracts from Mein Kampf by Adolf │ │ - │Hitler, 41st edition, 1933. │ V │ 549 - │ │ │ -*2955-PS │Affidavit of Magnus Heimannsberg, 14 │ │ - │November 1945, referring to SA and other│ │ - │Nazi groups posted at polling places. │ │ - │(USA 755) │ V │ 659 - │ │ │ - 2957-PS │Extract from German Civil Servants │ │ - │Calendar, 1940, p. 111. │ V │ 663 - │ │ │ -*2967-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Hans Anschuetz, 17 │ │ - │November 1945. (USA 756) │ V │ 673 - │ │ │ -*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ - D-229 │Extract from pamphlet “Judges Letters” │ │ - │concerning judgment of Lower Court, 24 │ │ - │April 1942, on concealment of Jewish │ │ - │identification. │ VI │ 1091 - │ │ │ -*R-142 │Memoranda to Koblenz District │ │ - │Headquarters, 22 April 1938 and 7 May │ │ - │1938, relating to the plebiscite of 10 │ │ - │April 1938. (USA 481) │ VIII │ 243 - │ │ │ -Statement X │The Relationship of Party and State, As │ │ - │It Existed in Reality, by Wilhelm │ │ - │Stuckhart, Nurnberg, 1 December 1945. │ VIII │ 736 - │ │ │ -*Chart No. 1 │National Socialist German Workers’ │ │ - │Party. (2903-PS; USA 2) │ VIII │ 770 - │ │ │ -*Chart No. 18 │Organization of the Reich Government. │ End of Volume - │(2905-PS; USA 3) │ VIII - - - 4. PURGE OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS AND TERRORIZATION - -A. _The Nazi conspirators ruthlessly purged their political opponents._ -Soon after the Nazi conspirators had acquired political control, the -defendant Goering, 3 March 1933, stated: - - “Fellow Germans, my measures will not be crippled by any - judicial thinking. My measures will not be crippled by any - bureaucracy. Here, I don’t have to give justice, my mission is - only to destroy and exterminate, nothing more! This struggle, - fellow Germans, will be a struggle against chaos and such a - struggle, I shall not conduct with the power of any police. A - bourgeoise state might have done that. Certainly, I shall use - the power of the State and the police to the utmost, my dear - Communists! So you won’t draw any false conclusions; but the - struggle to the death, in which my fist will grasp your necks, I - shall lead with those down there—those are the Brown Shirts.” - (_1856-PS_) - -In 1934 Heinrich Himmler, the Deputy Leader of the Prussian Secret State -Police, stated: - - “We are confronted with a very pressing duty—both the open and - secret enemies of the Fuehrer and of the National Socialist - movement and of our National Revolution must be discovered, - combatted and exterminated. In this duty we are agreed to spare - neither our own blood nor the blood of anyone else when it is - required by our country.” (_2543-PS_) - -Raymond H. Geist, former American Counsel and First Secretary of the -Embassy in Berlin, Germany 1929-1939, has stated: - - “Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps were established - and put under charge of the Gestapo. Only ‘political’ prisoners - were held in concentration camps * * *. - - “The first wave of terroristic acts began in March 6-13, 1933, - accompanied by unusual mob violence. When the Nazi Party won the - elections in March 1933—on the morning of the 6th—the - accumulated passion blew off in wholesale attacks on the - Communists, Jews, and others suspected of being either. Mobs of - SA men roamed the streets, beating up, looting, and even killing - persons * * *. - - “For Germans taken into custody by the Gestapo * * * there was a - regular pattern of brutality and terror. Victims numbered in the - hundreds of thousands all over Germany.” (_1759-PS_) - -The Sturmabteilung (SA) had plans for the murder of former Prime -Minister Bruening, but his life was spared through the negotiations and -activities of the defendant Hess and Dr. Haushofer, President of the -Geopolitic Institute of Munich, because they feared his death might -result in serious repercussions abroad. (_1669-PS_) - -From March until October 1933 the Nazi conspirators arrested, mistreated -and killed numerous politicians, Reichstag members, authors, physicians, -and lawyers. Among the persons killed were the Social Democrat Stolling; -Ernst Heilman, Social Democrat and member of the Prussian Parliament; -Otto Eggerstadt, the former Police President of Altona; and various -other persons. The people killed by the Nazis belonged to various -political parties and religious faiths, such as Democrats, Catholics, -Communists, Jews, and pacifists. The killings were usually camouflaged -by such utterances as “killed in attempting to escape” or “resisting -arrest.” It is estimated that during this first wave of terror conducted -by the Nazi conspirators, between 500 and 700 persons died. (_2544-PS_; -see also _2460-PS_ and _2472-PS_.) - -On 30 June, and 1, 2 July 1934, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to -destroy opposition within their own ranks by wholesale murder -(_2545-PS_). In making a formal report of these murders to the Reichstag -on 13 July 1934, Hitler stated: - - “The punishment for these crimes was hard and severe. There were - shot 19 higher SA leaders, 31 SA leaders and SA members and also - 3 SS leaders as participants in the plot. Also 13 SA leaders and - civilians who tried to resist arrest and were killed in the - attempt. 3 others committed suicide. 5 members of the Party who - were not members of the SA were shot because of their - participation. Finally, 3 SS members were at the same time - exterminated because they had maltreated concentration camp - inmates.” (_2572-PS_) - -In this same speech, Hitler proudly boasted that he gave the order to -shoot the principal traitors and that he had prosecuted thousands of his -former enemies on account of their corruption. He justified this action -by saying, - - “In this hour I was responsible for the fate of the German - people.” (_Voelkischer Beobachter (People’s Observer), Berlin - ed., issue 195, 14 July 1934, Beiblatt, p. 2._) - -The conspirators took advantage of this occasion to eliminate many -opponents indiscriminately. - -In discussing the Roehm purge, the defendant Frick stated: - - “On account of this order, many, many people were arrested * * * - something like a hundred, even more, were even killed who were - accused of high treason. All of this was done without resort to - legal proceedings. They were just killed on the spot. Many - people were killed—I don’t know how many—who actually did not - have anything to do with the putsch. People who just weren’t - liked very well, as, for instance, SCHLEICHER, the former Reich - Chancellor, were killed. SCHLEICHER’s wife was also killed as - was GREGOR STRASSER, who had been the Reich organization leader - and second man in the Party after Hitler. STRASSER, at the time - he was murdered, was not active in political affairs anymore. - However, he had separated himself from the Fuehrer in November - or December of 1932.” (_2950-PS_) - -Such a large scale of extermination could not be carried out without -errors. Shortly after the event, the Nazi conspirators arranged for a -Government pension to be paid to one of its citizens, because “by -mistake” the political police had murdered her husband, Willi Schmidt, -who had never engaged in any kind of political activity. It was believed -at the time that the man intended was Willi Schmidt, an SA leader in -Munich, who was later shot on the same day. (_L-135_) - -The Nazi conspirators formally endorsed their murderous purge within -their own ranks by causing the Reichstag to pass a law declaring that -all measures taken in carrying out the purge on 30 June and 1-2 July -1934 were legal as a measure of State necessity (_2057-PS_). Referring -to this act of approval on the part of the Nazi-controlled Reichstag, -Goering stated: - - “The action of the Government in the days of the Roehm revolt - was the highest realization of the legal consciousness of the - people. Later the action which itself was justified, now has - been made legal by the passage of a law.” (_2496-PS_) - -Furthermore, the leader of the Nazi conspiracy on 25 July 1934 issued a -decree which stated that because of the meritorious service of the SS, -especially in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, the -organization was elevated to the standing of an independent organization -within the NSDAP. (_1857-PS_) - -B. _The Nazi conspirators used the legislative and judicial powers of -the German Reich to terrorize all political opponents._ - -(1) _They created a great number of new political crimes._ The decree of -28 February 1933 punished the inciting of disobedience to orders given -out by State or Reich Government authorities or the provocation of acts -“contrary to public welfare.” (_1390-PS_) A month later, in order to -give themselves legal justification for murdering by judicial process -their political enemies, the Nazi conspirators passed a law making the -provisions of the above decree applicable retroactively to acts -committed during the period from 31 January to 28 February 1933. -(_2554-PS_) - -Referring to these laws, the defendant Goering stated: - - “Whoever in the future raises a hand against a representative of - the National Socialist movement or of the State, must know that - he will lose his life in a very short while. Furthermore, it - will be entirely sufficient, if he is proven to have intended - the act, or, if the act results not in a death, but only in an - injury.” (_2494-PS_) - -On 21 March 1933 a decree was issued which provided for penitentiary -imprisonment up to two years for possessing a uniform of an organization -supporting the government of the Nationalist movement without being -entitled thereto, or circulating a statement which was untrue or greatly -exaggerated, or which was apt to seriously harm the welfare of the Reich -or the reputation of the Government, or of the Party or organizations -supporting the Government. (_1652-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators caused a law to be enacted punishing whoever -undertook to maintain or form a political party other than the NSDAP. -(_1388-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators enacted a law which made it a crime deliberately -to make false or grave statements calculated to injure the welfare or -the prestige of the Reich, or to circulate a statement manifesting a -malicious or low-minded attitude toward leading personalities of the -State or the Party. The law also applied to statements of this kind -which were not made in public, provided the offender counted on his -statements being eventually circulated in public. (_1393-PS_) - -In commenting on the above law, one of the leading Nazi conspirators, -Martin Bormann, stated: - - “Although it must absolutely be prevented that martyrs are - created, one must take merciless action against such people, in - whose attacks a bad character or attitude, decisively inimical - to the State, can be recognized. For this purpose, I request the - Gauleiters to report here briefly all crimes, which must - absolutely be punished, and which have become known to the - districts, regardless of the report to be made to the district - attorney’s office * * *. - - “The district and local leaderships are to be notified - accordingly. However, if it should be decided from wherein this - or that punishable case, that the miscreant is to be given a - simple or strong reprimand by the court, I shall give the - directive for the future, that the Districts are informed of the - names of the persons. - - “I therefore request, to see to it, that these compatriots be - especially watched by the Ortsgruppen, and that it be attempted, - to influence them in the National Socialist sense. Otherwise, it - will be necessary to place the activities of such persons, who - do not want to be taught, under exact control. In these cases, - it will eventually be necessary, to notify the Secret State - Police.” (_2639-PS_) - -On 24 April 1934 the Nazi conspirators passed a law imposing the death -penalty for “any treasonable act.” Included in the law was a declaration -to the effect that the creating or organizing of a political party, or -continuing of an existing one was a treasonable act. (_2548-PS_) - -(2) _By their interpretation and changes of the penal law, the Nazi -conspirators enlarged their terroristic methods._ After the enactment of -these new political crimes, the Nazi conspirators introduced into the -penal law the theory of punishment by analogy. This enabled them legally -to punish any act injurious to their political interests even if no -existing statute forbade it. The culpability of the act and the -punishment was determined by the law most closely relating to or -covering the act which was in force at the time. (_1962-PS_) - -In interpreting this law, Dr. Guertner, Reich Minister of Justice, -stated: - - “National Socialism substitutes for the idea of formal wrong, - the idea of factual wrong. * * * Even without the threat of - punishment, every violation of the goals toward which the - community is striving is a wrong per se. As a result, the law - ceases to be an exclusive source for the determination of right - or wrong.” (_2549-PS_) - -Referring to the penal code of Nazi Germany, the defendant Frank stated -in 1935: - - “The National Socialist State is a totalitarian State, it makes - no concessions to criminals, it does not negotiate with them; it - stamps them out.” (_2552-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators also revised the criminal law so that the State -could, within one year after a decree in a criminal case had become -final, apply for a new trial, and the application would be decided by -members of a Special Penal Chamber appointed by Hitler personally. Thus, -if a defendant should be acquitted in a lower court, the Nazi -conspirators could rectify the situation by another trial. (_2550-PS_) - -In direct contrast to the severity of the criminal law as it affected -the general population of Germany, the Nazi conspirators adopted and -endorsed a large body of unwritten laws exempting the police from -criminal liability for illegal acts done under higher authority. This -principle was described by Dr. Werner Best, outstanding Nazi lawyer, in -the following terms: - - “The police never act in a lawless or illegal manner as long as - they act according to the rules laid down by their superiors up - to the highest governing body. According to its nature, the - police must only deal with what the Government wants to know is - being dealt with. What the Government wants to know is being - dealt with by the police is the essence of the police law and is - that which guides and restricts the actions of the police. As - long as the police carry out the will of the Government, it is - acting legally.” (_1852-PS_) - -C. _The Nazi conspirators created a vast system of espionage into the -daily lives of all parts of the population._ - -(1) _They destroyed the privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic -communications._ They enacted a law in February of 1933 providing that -violations of privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic -communications were permissible beyond legal limitations. (_1390-PS_) - -Dr. Hans Anschuetz, the present District Court Director -(_Landgerichtsdirektor_) at Heidelberg, Germany, recently stated: - - “Subsequently, the system of spying upon and supervising the - political opinions of each citizen which permeated the entire - people and private life of Germany, was, of course, also - extended to judges.” (_2967-PS_) - -(2) _They used the Secret State Police (Gestapo) and the Security -Service (SD) for the purpose of maintaining close surveillance over the -daily activities of all people in Germany._ The Gestapo had as its -primary preventive activity the thorough observation of all enemies of -the State, in the territory of the Reich. (_1956-PS_) - -The SD was an intelligence organization which operated out of various -regional offices. It consisted of many hundreds of professional SD -members who were assisted by thousands of honorary members and -informers. These people were placed in all fields of business, -education, State and Party administration, and frequently performed -their duties secretly in their own organization. This information -service reported on the activities of the people. (_2614-PS_) - -D. _Without judicial process, the Nazi conspirators imprisoned, held in -protective custody and sent to concentration camps opponents and -suspected opponents._ - -_They authorized the Gestapo to arrest and detain without recourse to -any legal proceeding._ Officially, this power was described as follows: - - “The Secret State Police takes the necessary police preventive - measures against the enemies of the State on the basis of the - results of the observation. The most effective preventive - measure is without doubt the withdrawal of freedom which is - covered in the form of protective custody. * * * While - protective arrests of short duration are carried out in police - and court prisons, the concentration camps under the Secret - State Police admit those taken into protective custody who have - to be withdrawn from public life for a longer time.” (_1956-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators issued their own orders for the taking of people -into protective custody and these orders set forth no further details -concerning the reasons therefor, except a statement such as “Suspicion -of activities inimical toward the State.” (_2499-PS_) - -The defendant Frank stated: - - “To the world we are blamed again and again because of the - concentration camps. We are asked, ‘Why do you arrest without a - warrant of arrest?’ I say, put yourselves into the position of - our nation. Don’t forget that the very great and still untouched - world of Bolshevism cannot forget that we have made final - victory for them impossible in Europe, right here on German - soil.” (_2533-PS_) - -The defendant Goering said in 1934: - - “Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly. - It cannot be forgotten that at the moment of our rise to power, - according to the official election figures of March 1933, six - million people still confess their sympathy for Communism and - eight million for Marxism. * * * _Therefore, the concentration - camps have been created, where we have first confined thousands - of Communists and Social Democrat functionaries._ * * *” - (_2344-PS_) - -U. S. Ambassador George S. Messersmith, former Counsel General in -Berlin, Germany, 1930-34, and Raymond H. Geist, former American Counsel -and First Secretary of the Embassy in Berlin, Germany, 1929-1939, have -recently stated: - - “Independent of individual criminal acts committed by high - functionaries of the German government or the Nazi Party, such - as the murders ordered by Hitler, Himmler and Goering, all high - functionaries of the German government and of the Nazi Party * * - * are guilty in the highest degree of complicity in and - furtherance of the cardinal crimes of oppression against the - German people, persecution and destruction of the Jews and all - of their political opponents.” (_2386-PS_) - -Commenting further on the Nazi conspirators’ use of concentration camps -to destroy political opposition, Raymond H. Geist stated: - - “The German people were well acquainted with the goings on in - concentration camps and it was well known that the fate of - anyone too actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was - liable to be one of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler - regime was many months old, almost every family in Germany had - had first-hand accounts of the brutalities inflicted in the - concentration camps from someone either in the relationship or - in the circle of friends who had served a sentence there; - consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake - on any possible opposition.” (_1759-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators confined, under the guise of “protective custody” -Reichstag members, Social Democrats, Communists, and other opponents or -suspected opponents. (_2544-PS_; _L-73_; _L-83_; _1430-PS_.) - -E. _The Nazi conspirators created and utilized special agencies for -carrying out their system of terror._ - -(See Chapter XV, Sections 5 and 6, on the Gestapo, SS, and SD) - -F. _The Nazi conspirators permitted organizations and individuals to -carry out this system of terror without restraint of law._ - -(1) _Acts of the Gestapo were not subject to review by the courts._ In -1935 the Prussian Supreme Court of Administration held that the orders -of the Gestapo were not subject to judicial review; and that the accused -person could appeal only to the next higher authority within the State -Police itself. (_2347-PS_) - -In 1936 a law was passed concerning The Gestapo in Prussia which -provided that orders in matters of the Gestapo were not subject to -review of the Administrative Courts. (_2107-PS_) - -On the same subject, the following article appeared in the official -German Lawyer’s Journal, 1935. - - “Once again the court had to decide on the question of whether - political measures could be subjected to the review of the - ordinary courts. * * * The case in question concerned the - official performance of his duty by an official of the NSDAP. * - * * The principle of the importance and the mission of the Party - and its ‘Sovereign Functionaires’ cannot be overlooked. - Therefore, the plaintiff should have been denied the right to be - in court.” (_2491-PS_) - -(2) _Where no definite law protected terroristic acts of Nazi -conspirators and their accomplices, proceedings against them were in the -first instance suppressed or thereafter their acts were pardoned._ In -1935, proceedings against an employee of the Gestapo accused of -torturing, beating, and killing of inmates of a concentration camp were -suppressed (_787-PS_; _788-PS_). In June 1935 twenty-three SA members -and policemen convicted of the beating and murder of inmates of the -Hohnstein concentration camp were pardoned (_786-PS_). The prosecutor -was forced to resign from the SA. (_784-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PURGE OF POLITICAL - OPPONENTS AND TERRORIZATION - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │ │ - │ (b). │ I │ 19 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document as referred to during the trial│ │ - │but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *784-PS │Letters from Minister of Justice to Hess│ │ - │and SA Chief of Staff, 5 June 1935, │ │ - │concerning penal proceedings against │ │ - │merchant and SA leader and 22 companions│ │ - │because of inflicting bodily injury on │ │ - │duty. (USA 732) │ III │ 559 - │ │ │ - *786-PS │Minister of Justice memorandum, 29 │ │ - │November 1935, concerning pardon of │ │ - │those sentenced in connection with │ │ - │mistreatment in Hohnstein concentration │ │ - │camp. (USA 734) │ III │ 568 - │ │ │ - *787-PS │Memorandum to Hitler from Public │ │ - │Prosecutor of Dresden, 18 June 1935, │ │ - │concerning criminal procedure against │ │ - │Vogel on account of bodily injury while │ │ - │in office. (USA 421) │ III │ 568 - │ │ │ - *788-PS │Letters from Secretary of State to the │ │ - │Minister of Justice, 25 June 1935 and 9 │ │ - │September 1935, concerning criminal │ │ - │procedure against Vogel. (USA 735) │ III │ 571 - │ │ │ - 1388-PS │Law concerning confiscation of Property │ │ - │subversive to People and State, 14 July │ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │479. │ III │ 962 - │ │ │ - 1390-PS │Decree of the Reich President for the │ │ - │Protection of the People and State, 28 │ │ - │February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 83. │ III │ 968 - │ │ │ - 1393-PS │Law on treacherous attacks against State│ │ - │and Party, and for the Protection of │ │ - │Party Uniforms, 20 December 1934. 1934 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1269. │ III │ 973 - │ │ │ - 1430-PS │Compilation of Leading Men of the System│ │ - │Era, June 1939. │ IV │ 15 - │ │ │ - 1652-PS │Decree of the Reich President for │ │ - │protection against treacherous attacks │ │ - │on the government of the Nationalist │ │ - │movement, 21 March 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 135. │ IV │ 160 - │ │ │ -*1669-PS │Correspondence between Dr. Haushofer and│ │ - │Hess, 24 and 28 August 1933. (USA 741) │ IV │ 184 - │ │ │ -*1759-PS │Affidavit of Raymond H. Geist. (USA 420)│ IV │ 288 - │ │ │ -*1852-PS │“Law” from The German Police, 1941, by │ │ - │Dr. Werner Best. (USA 449). (See Chart │ │ - │No. 16) │ IV │ 490 - │ │ │ -*1856-PS │Extract from book entitled “Hermann │ │ - │Goering—Speeches and Essays”, 3rd │ │ - │edition 1939, p. 27. (USA 437) │ IV │ 496 - │ │ │ -*1857-PS │Announcement of creation of SS as │ │ - │independent formation of NSDAP. │ │ - │Voelkischer Beobachter, 26 July 1934, p.│ │ - │1. (USA 412) │ IV │ 496 - │ │ │ - 1956-PS │Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State │ │ - │Police, published in The Archives, │ │ - │January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1342. │ IV │ 598 - │ │ │ - 1962-PS │Law to change the Penal Code of 28 June │ │ - │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │839. │ IV │ 600 - │ │ │ - 2057-PS │Law relating to National Emergency │ │ - │Defense Measures of 3 July 1934. 1934 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529. │ IV │ 699 - │ │ │ - 2107-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 10 │ │ - │February 1936. 1936 Preussiche │ │ - │Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22. │ IV │ 732 - │ │ │ - 2344-PS │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering, │ │ - │1934, p. 89. │ IV │ 1065 - │ │ │ - 2347-PS │Court decisions from 1935 │ │ - │Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp. │ │ - │577-578, 20 July 1935. │ IV │ 1066 - │ │ │ -*2386-PS │Joint affidavit of George S. Messersmith│ │ - │and Raymond H. Geist, 29 August 1945. │ │ - │(USA 750) │ V │ 39 - │ │ │ -*2460-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels. (USA 751) │ V │ 205 - │ │ │ -*2472-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels, 31 October │ │ - │1945. (USA 752) │ V │ 224 - │ │ │ - 2491-PS │Extract from Legal Review, published │ │ - │Lawyers’ Journal, 1935. │ V │ 235 - │ │ │ - 2494-PS │Prime Minister Goering’s Press │ │ - │Conference, published in Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Berlin edition, 23-24 July │ │ - │1933, p. 1. │ V │ 236 - │ │ │ - 2496-PS │Extract from Goering’s address to Public│ │ - │Prosecutors of Prussia on 12 July 1934 │ │ - │from the Archive, 1934, Vols. IV-VI, p. │ │ - │495. │ V │ 236 - │ │ │ -*2499-PS │Original Protective Custody Order served│ │ - │on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March 1935. (USA │ │ - │232) │ V │ 236 - │ │ │ - 2533-PS │Extract from article “Legislation and │ │ - │Judiciary in the Third Reich”, from │ │ - │Journal of the Academy for German Law, │ │ - │1936, pp. 141-142. │ V │ 277 - │ │ │ - 2543-PS │Extract from The Mission of the SS, │ │ - │published in The National Socialist │ │ - │Magazine, Issue 46, January 1934. │ V │ 288 - │ │ │ -*2544-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Diels, former │ │ - │Superior Government Counsellor of the │ │ - │Police Division of the Prussian Ministry│ │ - │of the Interior. (USA 753) │ V │ 288 - │ │ │ - 2545-PS │Extract from Hitler’s cleaning up act in│ │ - │Reich, published in Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Berlin edition, No. 182-183,│ │ - │1-2 July 1934, p. 1. │ V │ 290 - │ │ │ - 2548-PS │Law about changing rules of Criminal Law│ │ - │and Criminal Procedure of 24 April 1934.│ │ - │1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 34. │ V │ 291 - │ │ │ - 2549-PS │Extract from “Germany’s Road to Freedom”│ │ - │as published in Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Vol. 3. │ V │ 292 - │ │ │ - 2550-PS │Law on modification of rules of general │ │ - │criminal procedure, 16 September 1939. │ │ - │1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1841.│ V │ 293 - │ │ │ - 2552-PS │Excerpt concerning criminals, published │ │ - │in Journal of the Academy for German │ │ - │Law. No. 3. March 1935. │ V │ 293 - │ │ │ - 2554-PS │Law concerning adjudication and │ │ - │execution of the death penalties of 29 │ │ - │March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │ - │I, p. 151. │ V │ 294 - │ │ │ - 2572-PS │Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on 13 │ │ - │July 1934, printed in The Third Reich, │ │ - │Vol. II, p. 247. │ V │ 302 - │ │ │ -*2614-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │ - │November 1945. (USA 918) │ V │ 337 - │ │ │ - 2639-PS │Ordinances of the Deputy of the Fuehrer,│ │ - │published in Munich 1937. │ V │ 345 - │ │ │ -*2950-PS │Affidavit of Frick, 19 November 1945. │ │ - │(USA 448) │ V │ 654 - │ │ │ -*2967-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Hans Anschuetz, 17 │ │ - │November 1945. (USA 756) │ V │ 673 - │ │ │ -*L-73 │Affidavit of Bruno Bettelheim, 10 July │ │ - │1945. (USA 746) │ VII │ 818 - │ │ │ -*L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July │ │ - │1945. (USA 234) │ VII │ 859 - │ │ │ -*L-135 │Affidavit of Kate Eva Hoerlin, 9 July │ │ - │1945. (USA 747) │ VII │ 883 - - - 5. DESTRUCTION OF THE FREE TRADE UNIONS AND - ACQUISITION OF CONTROL OVER THE - PRODUCTIVE LABOR CAPACITY - -A. _They destroyed the independent organization of German labor._ - -(1) _Before the Nazis took control, organized labor held a well -established and influential position in Germany._ Most of the trade -unions of Germany were joined together in two large congresses or -federations, the Free Trade Unions (_Freie Gewerkschaften_) and -Christian Trade Unions (_Christlichen Gewerkschaften_). Unions outside -these two large groupings contained only 15 per cent of the total union -membership. The Free Trade Unions were a congress of two federations of -affiliated unions: (1) the General German Trade Union Federation -(_Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund_, or the “ADGB”) with 28 -affiliated unions of industrial workers; (2) the General Independent -Employees Federation (_Allgemeinen Freien Angestelltenbund_, or the -“AFA”) with 13 affiliated unions of white collar workers. (_392-PS_) - -The membership of the Free Trade Unions, the affiliated organizations of -the Christian Trade Unions, and all other unions at the end of 1931 (the -last year for which the official government yearbook gives statistics) -was as follows (_2411-PS_): - - Union Group │ Number of │ Percentage of - │ members │ total - │ │ - Free Trade Unions │ 4,569,876│ 65.9 - Christian Trade Unions │ 1,283,272│ 18.5 - Others Unions │ 1,081,371│ 15.6 - │ ————│ —— - Total │ 6,934,519│ 100.0 - -Under the Weimar Constitution, workers were “called upon to take part on -equal terms” with employers in regulating conditions of employment. “It -was provided that organizations on both sides and agreements between -them shall be recognized.” Factory Representative Councils (otherwise -known as Workmens or Factory Works Councils) had the right, in -conjunction with employers’ representatives, to take an official part in -the initiation and administration of social and economic legislation. -(_2050-PS_) - -(2) _The Nazi conspirators conceived that the free trade unions were -incompatible with their objectives._ - -Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_: - - “It (the trade union) created the economic weapon which the - international world Jew uses for the ruination of the economic - basis of free, independent states, for the annihilation of their - national industry and of their national commerce, and thereby - for the enslavement of free people in the service of the - above-the-state-standing, world finance Jewry (_ueberstaatlichen - Weltfinanz-Judentums_).” (_404-PS_) - -In announcing to Germany the seizure of the Free Trade Unions, Dr. -Robert Ley, speaking as chairman of the Nazi Committee for the -Protection of German Labor, stated: - - “You may say, what else do you want, you have the absolute - power, but we do not have the whole people, we do not have you - workers 100 percent, and it is you whom we want; we will not let - you be until you stand with us in complete, genuine - acknowledgement.” (_614-PS_; see also _2224-PS_ and _2283-PS_.) - -(3) _Soon after coming to power the Nazi conspirators took drastic -action to convert the Factory Representative Councils into -Nazi-controlled organizations._ The Nazi conspirators eliminated the -independence of the Factory Representative Councils by giving the -Governors of the Laender authority to cancel the membership of labor -representatives in the councils; by abrogating the right of the councils -to oppose the dismissal of a worker when he was “suspected of an -unfriendly attitude toward the state” (_1770-PS_); and finally by -limiting membership in all Factory Representative Councils to Nazis -(_2336-PS_). (After 7 April 1933, the Governors of the Laender were -appointed by the Reich President “upon the proposal of the Reich -Chancellor,” Hitler, _2005-PS_). - -(4) _Soon after coming to power the Nazi conspirators proceeded to -destroy the independent unions._ In mid-April 1933, Hitler directed Dr. -Robert Ley, then staff director of the PO (Political Organization) of -the NSDAP, to take over the trade unions. (_2283-PS_) - -Ley issued an NSDAP circular directive on 21 April 1933 detailing a -“coordination action” (_Gleichschaltunsaktion_) to be taken on 2 May -1933 against the General German Trade Union Federation (ADGB) and the -General Independent Employees Federation (AFA), the so-called “Free -Trade Unions” (_392-PS_). This directive created a special “Action -Committee” to direct the entire action and declared that the supporters -of the action were to be drawn from the National Socialist Factory Cells -Organization or NSBO (_Nationalsozialistiche -Betriebszellen-Organisation_), the NSDAP political leaders (_Politische -Leiter_) in the factories; it named NSDAP commissars for the -administration of the larger ADGB unions to be seized in the action; it -made the Gauleaders (_Gauleiter_) of the NSDAP responsible for the -disciplined execution of the action in their respective areas and -authorized them to nominate additional commissars to administer the -unions subjected to the action. The directive ordered that SA and SS -were to be used in occupying union offices and the Bank of Workers, -Employees and Officials, Inc., and for taking into protective custody -the higher union leaders. - -The order of seizure was carried out as planned and ordered. On 2 May -the official NSDAP press service reported that the NSBO had “eliminated -the old leadership” of Free Trade Unions and taken over their -leadership. (_2224-PS_) - -On 3 May 1933 the NSDAP press service announced that the Central League -of Christian Trade Unions (_Gesamtverband der Christlichen -Gewerkschaften_) and several smaller unions “have unconditionally -subordinated themselves to the leadership of Adolf Hitler” (_2225-PS_). -The next day the NSDAP press stated that the German Nationalist Clerks -League (DHV) had also “recognized the leadership of the NSDAP in German -trade union affairs * * * after a detailed conversation” between Dr. Ley -and the leader of the DHV (_2226-PS_). In late June 1933, as a final -measure against the Christian Trade Unions, Ley directed that all their -offices were to be occupied by National Socialists. (_392-PS_) - -The duress practiced by the Nazi conspirators in their assumption of -absolute control over the unions is shown by a proclamation of Muchow, -leader of the organizational office of the German Labor Front, in late -June 1933. By this Party proclamation, all associations of workers not -yet “concentrated” in the German Labor Front had to report within eight -days. Thereafter they were to be notified of the branch of the German -Labor Front which “they will have to join”. (_2228-PS_) - -(5) _The Nazi Conspirators eliminated the right of collective bargaining -generally._ During the same months in which the unions were abolished, a -decree eliminated collective bargaining on conditions of employment and -substituted regulation by “trustees of labor” (_Treuhaender der Arbeit_) -appointed by Hitler. (_405-PS_) - -(6) _The Nazi conspirators confiscated all union funds and property._ -The NSDAP circular ordering the seizure of the Free Trade Unions on 2 -May 1933 directed that the SA and SS were to be used to occupy the -branches and paying offices of the Bank for Workers, Employees and -Officials and appointed a Nazi commissar, Mueller, for the bank’s -subsequent direction. The stock of this bank was held entirely by the -General German Trade Union Association and its affiliated member unions. -The NSDAP circular also directed that all union funds were to be blocked -until re-opened under the authority and control of NSDAP-appointed -commissars (_392-PS_; _2895-PS_). The Fuehrer’s basic order on the -German Labor Front of the NSDAP in October 1934 declared that all the -property of the trade unions and their dependent organizations -constituted (_bildet_) property of the German Labor Front (_2271-PS_). -Referring to the seizure of the property of the unions in a speech at -the 1937 Party Congress, Ley mockingly declared that he would have to be -convicted if the former trade union leaders were ever to demand the -return of their property. (_1678-PS_) - -(7) _The Nazi conspirators persecuted union leaders._ The NSDAP order on -the seizure of the “Free Trade Unions” directed that the chairmen of the -unions were to be taken into “protective custody”. Lesser leaders could -be arrested with the permission of the appropriate Gau leader of the -NSDAP (_392-PS_). In late June 1933 the German Labor Front published a -“List of Outlaws” who were to be denied employment in the factories. The -List named union leaders who had been active in combatting National -Socialism and who allegedly continued to carry on their resistance -secretly. (_2336-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators subjected union leaders to maltreatment ranging -from assaults to murder. Among the offenses committed against union -leaders are the following: assault and battery; degrading work and work -beyond their physical capacity; incarceration in concentration camps; -solitary confinement; denial of adequate food; surveillance; arrest and -maltreatment of members of their families; murder. (_2330-PS_; -_2331-PS_; _2335-PS_; _2334-PS_; _2928-PS_; _2277-PS_; _2332-PS_; and -_2333-PS_) - -B. _The Nazi conspirators introduced the Leadership Principle into -industrial relations._ In January 1934, a decree introduced the -Leadership Principle (_Fuehrerprinzip_) into industrial relations, the -entrepreneur becoming the leader and the workers becoming his followers. -(_1861-PS_) - -C. _The Nazi conspirators supplanted independent unions by an affiliated -Party organization, the German Labor Front (DAF)._ - -(1) _They created the German Labor Front._ On the day the Nazis seized -the Free Trade Unions, 2 May 1933, they publicly announced that a -“united front of German workers” with Hitler as honorary patron would be -formed at a Workers’ Congress on 10 May 1933. (_2224-PS_) - -Ley was appointed “leader of the German Labor Front” (_Deutsche -Arbeitsfront_, or “DAF”) on 10 May 1933 (_1940-PS_). The German Labor -Front succeeded to the confiscated property of the suppressed trade -union. It was an affiliated organization of the NSDAP, subject to the -Leadership Principle; Ley was concurrently Reich Organization Leader -(_Reichsorganisationsleiter_) and leader of the German Labor Front -(_1814-PS_). The National Socialist Factory Cells Organization or NSBO -contained the political leaders (_Politische Leiter_) of the NSDAP in -the German Labor Front and those political leaders were given first -preference in the filling of jobs in the DAF (_2271-PS_). The German -Labor Front became the largest of the Party’s organizations. At the -outbreak of the war it had 23 million individual members and about 10 -million corporative members who were members of organizations affiliated -with it. (_2275-PS_) - -(2) _They utilized the German Labor Front as an instrument to impose -their ideology on the masses, to frustrate potential resistance, and to -insure effective control of the productive labor capacity of Germany._ -The DAF was charged with the ideological orientation of the broad masses -of Germans working in the factories. Its leaders were charged with -weeding out potential opponents to National Socialism from the ranks of -the DAF and from employment in industry. In its surveillance functions, -the German Labor Front relied on Gestapo reports and on its own -intelligence service (_2336-PS_). The German Labor Front took over the -leadership of the German Cooperatives with the view to their subsequent -liquidation (_2270-PS_). The Nazi conspirators established Factory -Troops (_Werkscharen_) within the Strength Through Joy branch of the -German Labor Front as an “ideological shock squad (_Weltanschaulicher -Stosstrupp_) within the factory” (_1817-PS_). These shock squads were -formed only of voluntary members ready “to fight” for Nazi conceptions. -Among their objects were the speeding up of labor effort and the forging -of a “single-willed community” (_1818-PS_). The SA was charged with the -promotion and building up of Factory Troops by all means. When a factory -worker joined the Factory Troops, he automatically became an SA -candidate. Factory Troops were given a special uniform and their -physical training took place within SA cadre units. (_2230-PS_) - -During the war, the German Labor Front was made responsible for the care -of foreign labor employed within the Reich (_1913-PS_). Barely two years -after the suppression of the independent unions and the creation of the -German Labor Front, the Nazi conspirators decreed compulsory labor -service (_Reichsarbeitsdienst_) under which young men and women between -18 and 25 years of age were conscripted for labor service under the -administration of the Reich Minister of Interior, Frick. (_1389-PS_) - -After war had been declared, the Nazi conspirators openly admitted the -objectives of the Nazis’ control over labor. A publication of the -Scientific Institute of the German Labor Front declared that it had been -difficult to make the German people understand continuous renunciations -in social conditions because all the nation’s strength had been -channeled into armaments (_Wehrhaftigkeit_) for “the anticipated clash -with an envious surrounding world” (_2276-PS_). Addressing workers five -days after the launching of war on Poland, Ley admitted that the Nazis -had mobilized all the resources and energies of Germany for seven years -“so as to be equipped for the supreme effort of battle” and that the -First World War had not been lost because of cowardice of German -soldiers, “but because dissension and discord tore the people asunder” -(_1939-PS_). Ley’s confidence in the Nazis’ effective control over the -productive labor capacity of Germany in peace or war was declared as -early as 1936 to the Nurnberg Party Congress: - - “The idea of the Factory Troops is making good progress in the - plants, and I am able to report to you, my Fuehrer, that - security and peace in the factories has been guaranteed, not - only in normal times, but also in times of the most serious - crisis. Disturbances such as the munitions strikes of the - traitors Ebert and confederates, are out of the question. - _National Socialism has conquered the factories. Factory Troops - are the National Socialist shock troops within the factory, and - their motto is: THE FUEHRER IS ALWAYS RIGHT._” (_2283-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO DESTRUCTION OF THE - FREE TRADE UNIONS AND ACQUISITION OF CONTROL OVER THE PRODUCTIVE LABOR - CAPACITY - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │ │ - │ (c) (1). │ I │ 19 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *392-PS │Official NSDAP circular entitled “The │ │ - │Social Life of New Germany with Special │ │ - │Consideration of the German Labor │ │ - │Front”, by Prof. Willy Mueller (Berlin, │ │ - │1938). (USA 326) │ III │ 380 - │ │ │ - *404-PS │Excerpts from Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. │ │ - │456, 475. (USA 256) │ III │ 385 - │ │ │ - 405-PS │Law Concerning Trustees of Labor, 19 May│ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │285. │ III │ 387 - │ │ │ - 614-PS │Proclamation of the Action Committee for│ │ - │the Protection of German Labor, 2 May │ │ - │1933. Documents of German Politics, Vol.│ │ - │I, p. 151-3. │ III │ 447 - │ │ │ - 1389-PS │Law creating Reich Labor Service, 26 │ │ - │June 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part │ │ - │I, p. 769. │ III │ 963 - │ │ │ -*1678-PS │Speech of Dr. Robert Ley. Documents of │ │ - │German Politics, Vol. V, pp. 373, 376. │ │ - │(USA 365) │ IV │ 190 - │ │ │ - 1770-PS │Law concerning factory representative │ │ - │councils and economic organizations, 4 │ │ - │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │ - │I, p. 161. │ IV │ 343 - │ │ │ -*1814-PS │The Organization of the NSDAP and its │ │ - │affiliated associations, from │ │ - │Organization book of the NSDAP, editions│ │ - │of 1936, 1938, 1940 and 1943, pp. 86-88.│ │ - │(USA 328) │ IV │ 411 - │ │ │ - 1817-PS │Bureau for factory troops, from │ │ - │Organization Book of the NSDAP, 1936 │ │ - │edition, p. 211. │ IV │ 457 - │ │ │ - 1818-PS │Bureau for Factory troops and training, │ │ - │from Organization Book of the NSDAP, │ │ - │1940 edition, pp. 195-196b. │ IV │ 457 - │ │ │ - 1861-PS │Law on the regulation of National labor,│ │ - │20 January 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,│ │ - │Part I, p. 45. │ IV │ 497 - │ │ │ -*1913-PS │Agreement between Plenipotentiary │ │ - │General for Arbeitseinsatz and German │ │ - │Labor Front concerning care of │ │ - │non-German workers. 1943 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 588. (USA │ │ - │227) │ IV │ 547 - │ │ │ - 1939-PS │Speech by Ley published in Forge of the │ │ - │Sword, with an introduction by Marshal │ │ - │Goering, pp. 14-17. │ IV │ 581 - │ │ │ - 1940-PS │Fuehrer edict appointing Ley leader of │ │ - │German Labor Front. Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Munich (Southern German) │ │ - │edition, p. 1. │ IV │ 584 - │ │ │ - 1947-PS │Letter from von Fritsch, 11 December │ │ - │1938, concerning need of Germany to be │ │ - │victorious over working class, Catholic │ │ - │Church and Jews. │ IV │ 585 - │ │ │ - 2005-PS │Second law integrating the “Laender” │ │ - │with the Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173. │ IV │ 641 - │ │ │ - 2050-PS │The Constitution of the German Reich, 11│ │ - │August 1919. 1919 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 1383. │ IV │ 662 - │ │ │ -*2224-PS │The End of the Marxist Class Struggle, │ │ - │published in National Socialist Party │ │ - │Press Agency, 2 May 1933, pp. 1-2. (USA │ │ - │364) │ IV │ 864 - │ │ │ - 2225-PS │The Front of German Workers has been │ │ - │Erected, published in National Socialist│ │ - │Party Press Agency, 3 May 1933, p. 1. │ IV │ 868 - │ │ │ - 2226-PS │The Labor Front Stands, published in │ │ - │National Socialist Party Press Agency, 4│ │ - │May 1933, p. 2. │ IV │ 869 - │ │ │ - 2228-PS │Order issued by German Labor Front, │ │ - │published in National Socialist Party │ │ - │Press Agency, 26 June 1933, p. 5. │ IV │ 869 - │ │ │ - 2230-PS │Agreement between Ley and Lutze, chief │ │ - │of staff of SA, published in │ │ - │Organization Book of NSDAP, 1938, pp. │ │ - │484-485b, 486c. │ IV │ 871 - │ │ │ - 2270-PS │Coordination of Cooperatives, published │ │ - │in National Socialist Party Press Agency│ │ - │release of 16 May 1933. │ IV │ 938 - │ │ │ - 2271-PS │The National Socialist Factory Cells │ │ - │Organization, published in Organization │ │ - │Book of NSDAP, pp. 185-187. │ IV │ 940 - │ │ │ - 2275-PS │The German Labor Front, published in │ │ - │Nature-Aim-Means. Footnote on p. 11. │ IV │ 949 - │ │ │ - 2276-PS │The German Labor Front, published in │ │ - │Nature-Aim-Means. p. 55. │ IV │ 950 - │ │ │ -*2277-PS │Affidavit, 17 October 1945, of Gustav │ │ - │Schiefer, Chairman of General German │ │ - │Trade Union Association, Local │ │ - │Committee, Munich, in 1933. (USA 748) │ IV │ 951 - │ │ │ -*2283-PS │The Fifth Day of the Party Congress, │ │ - │from Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich │ │ - │(Southern German) Edition, Issue 258, 14│ │ - │September 1936. (USA 337) │ IV │ 971 - │ │ │ -*2330-PS │Order of Protective Custody, Police │ │ - │Directorate of Nurnberg-Fuerth of Josef │ │ - │Simon, Chairman of German Shoemaker’s │ │ - │Union, 29 August 1935. (USA 237) │ IV │ 1038 - │ │ │ -*2331-PS │Declaration required of union leader │ │ - │Josef Simon upon his release from │ │ - │Protective Custody by Bavarian Political│ │ - │Police, 20 December 1935. (USA 743) │ IV │ 1039 - │ │ │ - 2332-PS │Death certificate, Flossenburg │ │ - │Concentration Camp, concerning union │ │ - │leader Staimer and official letter to │ │ - │his wife, 22 December 1941. │ IV │ 1040 - │ │ │ -*2333-PS │Death certificate, Flossenburg │ │ - │Concentration Camp, concerning union │ │ - │leader Herrmann, and official letter to │ │ - │his wife, 29 December 1941. (USA 744) │ IV │ 1040 - │ │ │ -*2334-PS │Affidavits of Lorenz Hagen, Chairman of │ │ - │Local Committee, German Trade Unions, │ │ - │Nurnberg. (USA 238) │ IV │ 1041 - │ │ │ -*2335-PS │Affidavits of Josef Simon, Chairman of │ │ - │German Shoemakers’ Union in 1933. (USA │ │ - │749) │ IV │ 1046 - │ │ │ - 2336-PS │Special Circular on Securing of │ │ - │association of German Labor Front │ │ - │against hidden Marxist sabotage, 27 June│ │ - │1933. │ IV │ 1052 - │ │ │ - 2411-PS │Chart of unions of workers and │ │ - │employees, from Statistical Yearbook for│ │ - │German Reich, 1932, p. 555. │ V │ 87 - │ │ │ -*2895-PS │Joint affidavit of union leaders Simon, │ │ - │Hagen, and Lex, 13 November 1945. (USA │ │ - │754) │ V │ 563 - │ │ │ -*2928-PS │Affidavit of Mathias Lex, deputy │ │ - │president of the German Shoemakers │ │ - │Union. (USA 239) │ V │ 594 - │ │ │ -Statement XII │Political Testament of Robert Ley, │ │ - │written in Nurnberg prison, October │ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 742 - │ │ │ -Statement XIII │Outline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley, │ │ - │written in Nurnberg prison, 24 October │ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 749 - - - 6. SUPPRESSION OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES - -A. _The Nazi conspirators sought to subvert the influence of the -churches over the people of Germany._ - -(1) _They sought to eliminate the Christian Churches in Germany._ - -(_a_) _Statements of this aim._ Martin Bormann stated in a secret decree -of the Party Chancellery signed by him and distributed to all Gauleiters -7 June 1941: - - “Our National Socialist ideology is far loftier than the - concepts of Christianity, which in their essential points have - been taken over from Jewry * * *. A differentiation between the - various Christian confessions is not to be made here * * * the - Evangelical Church is just as inimical to us as the Catholic - Church. * * * All influences which might impair or damage the - leadership of the people exercised by the Fuehrer with the help - of the NSDAP must be eliminated. More and more the people must - be separated from the churches and their organs the pastors. * * - * Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers and - other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so must - the possibility of church influence also be totally removed. * * - * Not until this has happened, does the state leadership have - influence on the individual citizens. Not until then are the - people and Reich secure in their existence for all time.” - (_D-75_) - -Hans Kerrl, Reich Minister for Church Affairs, in a letter dated 6 -September 1939 to a Herr Stapel, which indicated that it would be -brought to the attention of the Confidential Council and of the -defendant Hess, made the following statements: - - “The Fuehrer considers his efforts to bring the Evangelical - Church to reason, unsuccessful and the Evangelical Church with - respect to its condition rightfully a useless pile of sects. As - you emphasize the Party has previously carried on not only a - fight against the political element of the Christianity of the - Church, but also a fight against membership of Party Members in - a Christian confession. * * * - - “The Catholic Church will and must, according to the law under - which it is set up, remain a thorn in the flesh of a Racial - State * * *.” (_129-PS_) - -Gauleiter Florian, in a letter dated 23 September 1940 to the defendant -Hess, stated: - - “The churches with their Christianity are the danger against - which to fight is absolutely necessary.” (_064-PS_) - -Regierungsrat Roth, in a lecture 22 September 1941, to a group of -Security Police, in the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) concluded his -address on Security Police (_Sipo_) measures for combatting church -politics and sects with the following remarks: - - “The immediate aim: the church must not regain one inch of the - ground it has lost. The ultimate aim: Destruction of the - Confessional Churches to be brought about by the collection of - all material obtained through the intelligence service - (_Nachrichtendienst_) activities which will at a given time be - produced as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities - during the German fight for existence.” (_1815-PS_) - -The Party Organization Book states: - - “Bravery is valued by the SS man as the highest virtue of men in - a struggle for his ideology. - - “He openly and unrelentingly fights the most dangerous enemies - of the State; Jews, Free Masons, Jesuits, and political - clergymen. - - “However, he recruits and convinces the weak and inconstant by - his example, who have not been able to bring themselves to the - National Socialistic ideology.” (_1855-PS_) - -(_b_) _The Nazi conspirators promoted beliefs and practices incompatible -with Christian teachings._ The 24th point of the Program of the NSDAP, -unchanged since its adoption in 1920, is as follows: - - “We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations - within the state so long as they do not endanger its existence - or oppose the moral senses of the germanic race. The Party as - such advocates the standpoint of a positive Christianity without - binding itself confessionally to any one denomination. It - combats the Jewish materialistic spirit within and around us, - and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our nation can only - succeed from within on the framework: common utility precedes - individual utility.” (_1708-PS_) - -In official correspondence with the defendant Rosenberg in 1940, Bormann -stated: - - “Christian religion and National Socialist doctrines are not - compatible. * * * The churches cannot be subjugated through - compromise, only through a new philosophy as prophesied in - Rosenberg’s works.” - -He then proposed creation of a National Socialist Catechism to provide a -“moral foundation” for a National Socialist religion which is gradually -to supplant the Christian churches. He stated the matter was so -important it should be discussed with members of the Reich Cabinet as -soon as possible and requested Rosenberg’s opinion before the meeting. -(_098-PS_) - -In a secret decree of the Party Chancellery, signed by Bormann and -distributed to all _Gauleiters_ on 7 June 1941, the following statements -appeared: - - “When we National Socialists speak of a belief in God, we do not - understand by God, like naive Christians and their spiritual - opportunists, a human-type being, who sits around somewhere in - the sphere * * *. The force of natural law, with which all these - innumerable planets move in the universe, we call the Almighty, - or God. The claim that this world force * * * can be influenced - by so-called prayers or other astonishing things is based upon a - proper dose of naiveté or on a business shamelessness. - - “As opposed to that we National Socialists impose on ourselves - the demand to live naturally as much as possible, i.e., - biologically. The more accurately we recognize and observe the - laws of nature and of life, the more we adhere to them, so much - the more do we conform to the will of the Almighty. The more - insight we have into the will of the Almighty, the greater will - be our successes.” (_D-75_) - -Rosenberg in his book “The Myth of the 20th Century” advocated a new -National Socialist faith or religion to replace the Christian -confessions in Germany. He stated that the Catholic and Protestant -churches represent “negative Christianity” and do not correspond to the -soul of the “Nordic racially determined peoples”; that a German -religious movement would have to declare that the idea of neighborly -love is unconditionally subordinated to national honor; that national -honor is the highest human value and does not admit of any equal valued -force such as Christian love. He predicted: - - “A German religion will, bit by bit, present in the churches - transferred to it, in place of the crucifixion the spirit of - fire—the heroic—in the highest sense.” (_2349-PS_) - -The Reich Labor Service (_Reichsarbeitsdienst_), a National Socialist -youth organization, was prohibited from participating in religious -celebrations of any kind, and its members were instructed to attend only -the parts of such ceremonies as weddings and funerals which took place -before or after the church celebration. (_107-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators considered religious literature undesirable for -the Wehrmacht. National Socialist publications were prepared for the -Wehrmacht for the expressed purpose of replacing and counteracting the -influence of religious literature dissimulated to the troops. (_101-PS_; -_100-PS_; _064-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators through Rosenberg’s Office for Supervision of the -Ideological Training and Education of the NSDAP and the Office of the -Deputy of the Fuehrer “induced” the substitution of National Socialist -mottoes and services for religious prayers and services in the schools -of Germany. (_070-PS_) - -On 14 July 1939, Bormann, as Deputy of the Fuehrer, issued a Party -regulation excluding clergymen, persons closely connected with the -church, and Theology students from membership in the Party. It was -further decreed that in the future Party Members who entered the clergy -or turned to the study of Theology must leave the Party. (_840-PS_) - -(_c_) _The Nazi conspirators persecuted priests, clergy and members of -monastic orders._ The priests and clergy of Germany were subjected by -the police to systematic espionage into their daily lives. The Nazi -conspirators through the Chief of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) -maintained a special branch of the Security Police and Security Service -(Sipo/SD) whose duties were to investigate the churches and maintain -constant surveillance upon the public and private lives of the clergy. -(_1815-PS_) - -At a conference of these police “church specialists” called by Heydrich, -who was then SS Gruppenfuehrer and Chief of the Reich Main Security -Office (RSHA), in Berlin, 23 September 1941, SS Sturmbannfuehrer Hartl, -acting for Heydrich, stated that the greatest importance was to be -attached to church political activity. The intelligence network in this -field, he continued, was to be fostered with the greatest of care and -enlarged with the recruitment of informants, particular value being -attached to contacts with church circles. He closed his lecture with the -following words: - - “Each of you must go to work with your whole heart and a true - fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made in the execution of - this work, this should in no way discourage you, since mistakes - are made everywhere. The main thing is that the enemy should be - constantly tackled with determination, will, and effective - initiative.” (_1815-PS_) - -In a letter of 22 October 1941, Heydrich, as Chief of the Reich Main -Security Office (RSHA) issued detailed instructions to all State Police -Offices outlining the organization of the Catholic Church and directing -close surveillance of the activities, writings, and reports of the -Catholic clergy in Germany. In this connection he directed: - - “Reports are also to be submitted on those Theological students - destined for Papal Institutes, and Priests returning from such - institutes to Germany. Should the opportunity arise of placing - someone for intelligence (_Nachrichtendienst_) purposes in one - of these Institutes, in the guise of a Theological student, we - should receive immediate notification.” (_1815-PS_) - -Priests and other members of the clergy were arrested, fined, -imprisoned, and otherwise punished by executive measures of the police -without judicial process. In his lecture before a conference at the -Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) in Berlin, for “church specialists,” -of the Security Police, 22 November 1941, _Regierungsrat_ Roth stated -(_1815-PS_): - - “It has been demonstrated that it is impracticable to deal with - political offenses (malicious) under normal legal procedure. - Owing to the lack of political perception which still prevails - among the legal authorities, suspension of this procedure must - be reckoned with. The so-called “Agitator-Priests” must - therefore be dealt with in future by Stapo measures, and, if the - occasion arises, be removed to a Concentration Camp, if agreed - upon by the RSHA. - - “The necessary executive measures are to be decided upon - according to local conditions, the status of the person accused, - and the seriousness of the case—as follows: - - 1. Warning - - 2. Fine - - 3. Forbidden to preach - - 4. Forbidden to remain in parish - - 5. Forbidden all activity as a priest - - 6. Short-term arrest - - 7. Protective custody.” - -Members of monastic orders were forced by the seizure and confiscation -of their properties to give up their established place of abode and seek -homes elsewhere (_R-101-A_; _R-101-D_). A secret order of the SS -Economic Administration Office to all Concentration Camp Commanders, -dated 21 April 1942, concerning labor mobilization of clergy, reveals -that clergymen were at that time, and had previously been, incarcerated -in Concentration Camps. (_1164-PS_) - -On the death of von Hindenburg, the Reich Government ordered the ringing -of all church bells on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th August 1934. In Bavaria, -there were many instances of failure to comply with this order. The -Bavarian police submitted a report outlining the above situation and -stating that in three cases the taking into protective custody of -recalcitrant clergy could not be avoided. - - “The Parish priest, Father Johann Quinger of Altenkunstadt BA - Lichtenfels. He was taken into protective custody on 3 August on - the express order of the State Ministry of the Interior, because - he assaulted SA leaders and SA men who were ringing the bells - against his wishes. He was released from custody on 10 August - 1934. - - “The Parish priest, Father Ludwig Obholzer of Kiefersfelden, BA - Rosenheim. For his personal safety he was in police custody from - 2400 hours on the 2 August 1934, till 1000 hours on 3 August - 1934. On 5 August 1934, he said sarcastically in his sermon, - referring to the SA men who had carried out the ringing of the - funeral knell on their own account, ‘Lord forgive them, for they - know not what they do’! “The Parish priest, Father Johann - Nepomuk Kleber of Wiefelsdorf, BA Burglengenfeld, refused to - ring the church bells on the 2nd and 3rd. He is badly tainted - politically and had to be taken into protective custody from the - 5th to the 8th of August 34 in the interests of his own safety.” - (_1521-PS_) - -After Hitler’s rise to power, Bishop Sproll of Rottenburg delivered a -series of sermons regarded by the Nazis as damaging, and on 10 April -1938 he refrained from voting in the plebiscite. For this, the Reich -Governor of Wuertemberg declared he would no longer regard Bishop Sproll -as head of the Diocese of Rottenburg; made an official request that he -leave the Gau; and declared he would see to it that all personal and -official intercourse between the Bishop and the State and Party offices -as well as the Armed Forces would be denied (_849-PS_). For his alleged -failure to vote in the plebiscite, of 10 April 1938, the Party caused -three demonstrations to be staged against the Bishop and his household -in Rottenburg. The third demonstration was described as follows in a -teletype message from Gestapo Office Stuttgart to Gestapo Office Berlin: - - “The Party on 23 July 1938 from 2100 on carried out the third - demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants about - 2,500-3,000 were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The - Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the - demonstration. The town took rather a hostile attitude to the - demonstrations. The action got completely out of hand of the - Party Member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the - palace, beat in the gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people - forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw - files out of the windows and rummaged through the beds in the - rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got to - the other objects of equipment in the rooms and the palace, the - flaming bed could be thrown from the window and the fire - extinguished. The Bishop was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg - and the ladies and gentlemen of his menage in the chapel at - prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed into this chapel and - molested those present. Bishop Groeber was taken for Bishop - Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth. - Finally the intruders realized that Bishop Groeber is not the - one they are seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave the - building. After the evacuation of the palace by the - demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop Groeber, who - left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to turn to the - Fuehrer and Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick anew. On - the course of the action, the damage done as well as the homage - of the Rottenburg populace beginning today for the Bishop I - shall immediately hand in a full report, after I am in the act - of suppressing counter mass meetings.” (_848-PS_) - -Reich Minister for Church Affairs Kerrl and other Party officials -alleged that these demonstrations were spontaneously staged by indignant -citizens of Rottenburg and caused representations to be made to the Holy -See in an effort to effect the Bishop’s removal from office. (_849-PS_) - -On or about 3 December 1941, a copy of a secret decree of the Party -Chancellery on the subject of Relationship of National Socialism to -Christianity was found by the Security Police in the possession of -Protestant Priest Eichholz at Aix-la-Chapelle. For this he was arrested -and held for questioning for an unknown period of time. (_D-75_) - -(_d_) _The Nazi conspirators confiscated church property._ On 20 January -1938, the Gestapo District Office at Munich issued a decree dissolving -the Guild of the Virgin Mary of the Bavarian Diocese, together with its -branches and associations. The decree also stated: - - “The property belonging to the dissolved Guild is to be - confiscated by the police. Not only is property in cash to be - confiscated, but also any stock on hand and other objects of - value. All further activity is forbidden the dissolved Guilds, - particularly the foundation of any organization intended as a - successor or as a cover. Incorporation as a body into other - women’s societies is also to be looked on as a forbidden - continuation of activity. Infringements against the above - prohibition will be punished according to par. 4 of the order of - 28.2.1933.” - -The reasons for the dissolution and confiscation were that the Guild of -the Virgin Mary had occupied itself for years “to a most far-reaching -degree” with arrangements of a “worldly and popular sporting character” -such as community games and “social evenings”; and further that the -president of the society supplied the members with “seditious materials” -which served for “seditious discussions”; and that the members of the -Guild were trained and mobilized for “political and seditious tasks.” -(_1481-PS_) - -In a lecture delivered to a conference of police investigators of Church -Affairs assembled in the lecture hall of the Reich Main Security Office -(RSHA) in Berlin, 22 September 1941, _Regierungsrat_ Roth stated that -about 100 monasteries in the Reich had been dissolved and pointed out -that the proper procedure called for seizure of the churches at the same -time the monasteries were dissolved. (_1815-PS_) - -In February 1940, SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich suggested to Himmler the -seizure of monasteries for the accommodation of Racial Germans. He -proposed that the authorities of the monastic orders be instructed to -make the monasteries concerned available and move their own members to -less populous monasteries. He pointed out that the final expropriation -of properties thus placed at their disposal could be carried out step by -step in the course of time. Himmler agreed to this proposal and ordered -the measure to be carried out by the Security Police and Security -Service (_Sipo_ and SD) in collaboration with the Reich Commissioner for -Consolidation of German Folkdom. (_R-101-A_) - -These orders for confiscation were carried out, as revealed in a letter -dated 30 March 1942 from the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) Chief of -Staff to Himmler mentioning claims for compensation pending in a number -of confiscation cases. In this letter he stated that all rental payments -to those monasteries and ecclesiastical institutions whose premises had -been put to use as camps for resettlers had been stopped on receipt of -Himmler’s order. Concerning current developments, he stated: - - “After further preparations in which the Party Chancellery - participated prominently, the Reich Minister of the Interior - found a way which makes it possible to seize ecclesiastical - premises practically without compensation and yet avoids the - impression of being a measure directed against the Church. * * - *” (_R-101-D_) - -In a letter of 19 April 1941, Bormann advised Rosenberg that libraries -and art objects of the monasteries confiscated in the Reich were to -remain for the time being in these monasteries and that the Fuehrer had -repeatedly rejected the suggestion that centralization of all such -libraries be undertaken. (_072-PS_) - -(_e_) _The Nazi conspirators suppressed religious publications._ On 6 -November 1934, Frick, as Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, -issued an order forbidding until further notice publication of all -announcements in the daily press, in pamphlets and other publications, -which dealt with the Evangelical Church; with the exception of official -announcements of the Church Government of the Reich. (_1498-PS_) - -By order of the State Police for the District of Duesseldorf, the Police -Regulation which is quoted in part below was promulgated 28 May 1934: - - “The distribution and sale of published items of any sort in - connection with worship or religious instructions in public - streets or squares near churches is forbidden. In the same sense - the distribution and sale of published items on the occasions of - processions, pilgrimages and similar church institutions in the - streets or squares they pass through or in their vicinity is - prohibited.” (_R-145_) - -In January 1940, Bormann informed Rosenberg that he had sought to -restrict production of religious publications by means of having their -rations of printing paper cut down through the control exercised by -Reichsleiter Amann, but that the result of these efforts remained -unsatisfactory. (_101-PS_) - -In March 1940, Bormann instructed Reichsleiter Amann, Director of the -NSDAP Publications Office, that in any future redistribution of paper, -confessional writings should receive still sharper restrictions in favor -of literature politically and ideologically more valuable. He went on to -point out: - - “* * * according to a report I have received, only 10% of the - over 3000 Protestant periodicals appearing in Germany, such as - Sunday papers, etc. have ceased publication for reasons of paper - saving.” (_089-PS_) - -In April 1940, Bormann informed the High Command of the Navy that use of -the term “Divine Service” to refer exclusively to the services arranged -by Christian Confessions was no longer to be used, even in National -Socialist daily papers. In the alternative he suggested: - - “In the opinion of the Party the term ‘Church Service’ cannot be - objected to. I consider it fitting since it properly implies - meetings arranged and organized by the _Churches_.” (_068-PS_) - -(_f_) _The Nazi conspirators suppressed religious organizations._ On 28 -May 1934, the State Police Office for the District of Duesseldorf issued -an order concerning denominational youth and professional organizations -which stated in part as follows: - - “Denominational youth and professional organizations as well as - those created for special occasions only are prohibited from - every public activity outside the church and religious sphere. - - “Especially forbidden is: Any public appearance in groups, all - sorts of political activity. Any public sport function including - public hikes and establishment of holiday or outdoor camps. The - public display or showing of flags, banners, pennants or the - open wearing of uniforms or insignia.” (_R-145_) - -On 20 July 1935, Frick, as Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, -issued secret instructions to the provincial governments and to the -Prussian Gestapo that Confessional youth organizations were to be -forbidden to wear uniforms, or uniform-like clothing, to assemble -publicly with pennants and flags, to wear insignia as a substitute for -uniforms, or to engage in any outdoor sport activity. (_1482-PS_) - -On 20 January 1938 the Gestapo District Office at Munich, issued a -decree which stated in part as follows: - - “The Guild of the Virgin Mary (_die Marianisch - Jungfrauenkongregation_) of the Bavarian dioceses, including the - diocese of Speyere, together with its branches and associations - and the Societies of Our Lady (_Jungfrauenvereinen_) attached to - it, is by police order to be dissolved and forbidden with - immediate effect.” - -Among the reasons cited for this action were the following: - - “The whole behavior of the Guild of the Virgin Mary had - therefore to be objected to from various points of view. It - could be repeatedly observed that the Guild engaged in purely - worldly affairs, such as community games, and then in the - holding of ‘Social Evenings’. - - “This proves incontestably that the Guild of the Virgin Mary was - active to a very great degree in a manner unecclesiastical and - therefore worldly. By so doing it has left the sphere of its - proper religious task and entered a sphere of activity to which - it has no statutory right. The organization has therefore to be - dissolved and forbidden.” (_1481-PS_) - -According to the report of a Security Police “church specialist” -attached to the State Police Office at Aachen, the following points were -made by a lecturer at a conference of Security Police and Security -Service church intelligence investigators in Berlin, on 22 September -1941: - - “Retreats, recreational organizations, etc., may now be - forbidden on ground of industrial war-needs, whereas formerly - only a worldly activity could be given as a basis. - - “Youth camps, recreational camps are to be forbidden on - principle, church organizations in the evening may be prevented - on grounds of the blackout regulations. - - “Processions, pilgrimages abroad are to be forbidden by reason - of the over-burdened transport conditions. For local events too - technical traffic troubles and the danger of air-attack may - serve as grounds for their prohibition. (One Referent forbade a - procession, on the grounds of it wearing out shoe leather).” - (_1815-PS_) - -(_g_) _The Nazi conspirators suppressed religious education._ In a -speech on 7 March 1937, Rosenberg stated: - - “The education of youth can only be carried out by those who - have rescued Germany from disaster. It is therefore impossible - to demand one Fuehrer, one Reich and one firmly united people as - long as education is carried out by forces which are mutually - exclusive to each other.” (_2351-PS_) - -In a speech at Fulda, 27 November 1937 Reich Minister for Church Affairs -Hans Kerrl stated: - - “We cannot recognize that the Church has a right to insure that - the individual should be educated in all respects in the way in - which it holds to be right; but we must leave it to the National - Socialist State to educate the child in the way it regards as - right.” (_2352-PS_) - -In January 1939, Bormann, acting as Deputy of the Fuehrer, informed the -Minister of Education, that the Party was taking the position that -theological inquiry was not as valuable as the general fields of -knowledge in the universities and that suppression of Theological -Faculties in the universities was to be undertaken at once. He pointed -out that the Concordat with the Vatican placed certain limitations on -such a program, but that in the light of the general change of -circumstances, particularly the compulsory military service and the -execution of the four-year plan, the question of manpower made certain -reorganizations, economies and simplification necessary. Therefore, -Theological Faculties were to be restricted insofar as they could not be -wholly suppressed. He instructed that the churches were not to be -informed of this development and no public announcement was to be made. -Any complaints, if they were to be replied to at all, should be answered -with a statement that these measures are being executed in a general -plan of reorganization and that similar things are happening to other -faculties. He concludes with the statement that the professorial chairs -vacated by the above program are to be turned over to the newly-created -fields of inquiry, such as Racial Research. (_116-PS_) - -A plan for the reduction of Theological Faculties was submitted by the -Reich Minister for Science, Education and Training in April 1939 to -Bormann, who forwarded it to Rosenberg for consideration and action. The -plan called for shifting, combining and eliminating Theological -Faculties in various schools and universities throughout the Reich, with -the following results: - - “To recapitulate this plan would include the complete closing of - Theological Faculties at Innsbruck, Salzburg and Munich, the - transfer of the faculty of Graz to Vienna and the vanishing of - four Catholic faculties. - - “_a._ Closing of three Catholic Theological Faculties or Higher - Schools and of four Evangelic Faculties in the winter semester - 1939/40. - - “_b._ Closing of one further Catholic and of three further - Evangelic Faculties in the near future.” (_122-PS_) - -In a secret decree of the Party Chancellery, signed by Bormann, and -distributed to all Gauleiters on 7 June 1941, the following statement -concerning religious education was made: - - “No human being would know anything of Christianity if it had - not been drilled into him in his childhood by pastors. The - so-called dear God in no wise gives knowledge of his existence - to young people in advance, but in an astonishing manner in - spite of his omnipotence leaves this to the efforts of the - pastors. If therefore in the future our youth learns nothing - more of this Christianity, whose doctrines are far below ours, - Christianity will disappear by itself.” (_D-75_) - -(2) _Supplementary evidence of acts of suppression within Germany._ In -laying the groundwork for their attempted subversion of the Church, the -Nazi conspirators resorted to assurances of peaceful intentions. Thus -Hitler, in his address to the Reichstag on 23 March 1933 declared: - - “While the government is determined to carry through the - political and moral purging of our public life, it is creating - and insuring prerequisites for a truly religious life. The - government sees in both Christian confessions the factors most - important for the maintenance of our Folkdom. It will respect - agreements concluded between them and the states. However, it - expects that its work will meet with a similar appreciation. The - government will treat all other denominations with equal - objective justice. However, it can never condone that belonging - to a certain denomination or to a certain race might be regarded - as a license to commit or tolerate crimes. The Government will - devote its care to the sincere living together of Church and - State.” (_3387-PS_) - -(_a_) _Against the Evangelical Churches._ The Nazi conspirators, upon -their accession to power, passed a number of laws, under -innocent-sounding titles, designed to reduce the Evangelical Churches to -the status of an obedient instrument of Nazi policy. The following are -illustrative: - - Document │ Date │Reichsge│ Title and Gist of Law │Signed by - Number │ │setzblat│ │ - │ │ t—Page │ │ - │ │ │ │ - _3433-PS_ │ 14.7.33│I.471 │_Gesetz ueber die Verfassung │Hitler - │ │ │ der Deutschen Evangelischen │Frick - │ │ │ Kirche_ (Law concerning the │ - │ │ │ Constitution of the German │ - │ │ │ Evangelical Church), │ - │ │ │ establishing among other │ - │ │ │ things the new post of Reich│ - │ │ │ Bishop. │ - │ │ │ │ - _3434-PS_ │ 26.6.35│I.774 │_Gesetz ueber das │Hitler - │ │ │ Beschlussverfahren in │Frick - │ │ │ Rechtsangelegenheiten der │ - │ │ │ Evangelisschen Kirche_ (Law │ - │ │ │ concerning procedure for │ - │ │ │ decisions in legal affairs │ - │ │ │ of the Evangelical Church), │ - │ │ │ giving the Reich Ministry of│ - │ │ │ the Interior sole authority │ - │ │ │ to determine the validity of│ - │ │ │ measures taken in the │ - │ │ │ Churches since 1 May 1933, │ - │ │ │ when raised in a civil │ - │ │ │ lawsuit. │ - │ │ │ │ - _3435-PS_ │ 3.7.35│I.851 │_Erste Verordnung zur │Frick - │ │ │ Durchfuehrung des Gesetzes │ - │ │ │ ueber das Beschlussverfahren│ - │ │ │ in Rechtsangelegenheiten der│ - │ │ │ Evangelischen Kirche_ (First│ - │ │ │ Ordinance for Execution of │ - │ │ │ the Law concerning procedure│ - │ │ │ for decisions in legal │ - │ │ │ affairs of the Evangelical │ - │ │ │ Church), setting up detailed│ - │ │ │ organization and procedures │ - │ │ │ under the law of 26 June │ - │ │ │ 1935. │ - │ │ │ │ - _3466-PS_ │ 16.7.35│I.1029 │_Erlass ueber die │Hitler - │ │ │ Zusammenfassung der │Rust - │ │ │ Zustaendigkeiten des Reichs │Koerner - │ │ │ und Preussens in │ - │ │ │ Kirchenangelegenheiten_ │ - │ │ │ (Decree to unite the │ - │ │ │ competences of Reich and │ - │ │ │ Prussia in Church affairs) │ - │ │ │ transferring to Kerrl, │ - │ │ │ Minister without Portfolio, │ - │ │ │ the church affairs │ - │ │ │ previously handled by Reich │ - │ │ │ and Prussian Ministers of │ - │ │ │ the Interior and of Science,│ - │ │ │ Education, and Training. │ - │ │ │ │ - _3436-PS_ │ 24.9.35│I.1178 │_Gesetz zur Sicherung der │Hitler - │ │ │ Deutschen Evangelischen │Kerrl - │ │ │ Kirche_ (Law for the │ - │ │ │ Safe-guarding of the German │ - │ │ │ Evangelical Church) │ - │ │ │ empowering the Reich │ - │ │ │ Minister of Church Affairs │ - │ │ │ (Kerrl) to issue Ordinances │ - │ │ │ with binding legal force. │ - │ │ │ │ - _3437-PS_ │ 2.12.85│I.1370 │_Fuenfte Verordnung Zur │Kerrl - │ │ │ Durchfuehrung des Gesetzes │ - │ │ │ zur Sicherung der Deutschen │ - │ │ │ Evangelischen Kirche_ (Fifth│ - │ │ │ decree for execution of the │ - │ │ │ law for the Safe-guarding of│ - │ │ │ the German Evangelical │ - │ │ │ Church) prohibiting the │ - │ │ │ churches from filling their │ - │ │ │ pastorates, ordaining │ - │ │ │ ministers, visitation, │ - │ │ │ publishing of banns, and │ - │ │ │ collecting dues and │ - │ │ │ assessments. │ - │ │ │ │ - _3439-PS_ │ 25.6.37│I.697 │_Fuenfzehnte Verordnung zur │Kerrl - │ │ │ Durchfuehrung des Gesetzes │ - │ │ │ zur Sicherung der Deutschen │ - │ │ │ Evangelischen Kirche_ │ - │ │ │ (Fifteenth decree for the │ - │ │ │ Execution of the Law for │ - │ │ │ Security of the German │ - │ │ │ Evangelical Church) │ - │ │ │ establishing in the Reich │ - │ │ │ Ministry for Church Affairs │ - │ │ │ a Finance Department, to │ - │ │ │ supervise administration of │ - │ │ │ the church property budget, │ - │ │ │ tax assessment, and use of │ - │ │ │ budget funds. │ - -With the help of their Reich Bishop, Bishop Mueller, they manoeuvered -the Evangelical Youth Association into the Hitler Jugend under Von -Schirach in December 1933. (_1458-PS_) - -They arrested prominent Protestant leaders such as Pastor Niemoeller. By -1937, the result of all these measures was complete administrative -control by the Nazi conspirators over the Evangelical churches. - -(_b_) _Against the Catholic Church._ Just as in their program against -the Evangelical Churches, so in their attack on the Catholic Church, the -Nazi conspirators concealed their real intentions under a cloak of -apparent respect for its rights and protection of its activities. On 20 -July 1933, a Concordat was concluded between the Holy See and the German -Reich, signed for the Reich by Von Papen (_3280-A-PS_). It was the Nazi -Government, not the Church, which initiated the negotiations. - - “The German Government asked the Holy See to conclude a - Concordat with the Reich.” (_3268-PS_) - -By Article I of the Concordat, - - “The German Reich guarantees freedom of profession and public - practice of the Catholic religion. - - “It acknowledges the right of the Catholic Church, within the - limit of those laws which are applicable to all, to manage and - regulate her own affairs independently, and, within the - framework of her own competence, to publish laws and ordinances - binding on her members.” (_3280-A-PS_) - -Other articles formulated agreements on basic principles such as free -communication between Rome and the local ecclesiastical authorities, -freedom of the Catholic press, of Catholic education and of Catholic -action in charitable, professional, and youth organizations. In return, -the Vatican pledged loyalty by the clergy to the Reich Government and -emphasis in religious instruction on the patriotic duties of the -Christian citizen. (_3280-A-PS_) - -In reliance upon assurances by the Nazi conspirators, the Catholic -hierarchy had already revoked their previous prohibition against -Catholics becoming members of the Nazi Party (_3389-PS_). The Catholic -Center Party, under a combination of Nazi pressure and assurances, -published on 29 December 1933, an announcement of its dissolution -(_2403-PS_). Thus the Catholics went a long way to disarm themselves and -cooperate with the Nazis. Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators continued -to develop their policy of slow strangulation of religion, first in -covert, and then in open, violation of their assurances and agreements. - -In the Encyclical “_Mit Brennender Sorge_”, on 14 March 1937, Pope Pius -XI described the program: - - “It discloses intrigues which from the beginning had no other - aim than a war of extermination. In the furrows in which we had - labored to sow the seeds of true peace, others—like the enemy - in Holy Scripture (Matt. xiii, 25)—sowed the tares of - suspicion, discord, hatred, calumny of secret and open - fundamental hostility to Christ and His Church, fed from a - thousand different sources and making use of every available - means. On them and on them alone and on their silent and vocal - protectors rests the responsibility that now on the horizon of - Germany there is to be seen not the rainbow of peace but the - threatening storm clouds of destructive religious wars. * * * - Anyone who has any sense of truth left in his mind and even a - shadow of the feeling of justice left in his heart will have to - admit that, in the difficult and eventful years which followed - the Concordat, every word and every action of Ours was ruled by - loyalty to the terms of the agreement; but also he will have to - recognize with surprise and deep disgust that the unwritten law - of the other party has been arbitrary misinterpretation of - agreements, evasion of agreements, evacuation of the meaning of - agreements, and finally more or less open violation of - agreements.” (_3280-PS_) - -The Nazis suppressed the Catholic Youth League, beginning ten days after -the concordat was signed. (See Section 8, infra.) - -On 18 January 1942, in declining to accede to a demand made by the -German Government that no further appointment of Archbishops, Bishops, -and other high administrative dignitaries be made in the new territories -of the Reich, or of certain of them within the old Reich, without -previous consultation with the German Government (_3261-PS_), the -Secretary of State of Pope Pius XII pointed to measures taken by the -German Government, - - “Contrary not only to the existing Concordats and to the - principles of international law ratified by the Second Hague - conference, but often—and this is much more grave—to the very - fundamental principles of divine law, both natural and - positive.” - -The Papal Secretary of State continued: - - “Let it suffice to recall in this connection, among other - things, the changing of the Catholic State elementary schools - into undenominational schools; the permanent or temporary - closing of many minor seminaries, of not a few major seminaries - and of some theological faculties; the suppression of almost all - the private schools and of numerous Catholic boarding schools - and colleges; the repudiation, decided unilaterally, of - financial obligations which the State, Municipalities, etc. had - towards the Church; the increasing difficulties put in the way - of the activity of the religious Orders and Congregations in the - spiritual, cultural and social field and above all the - suppression of Abbeys, monasteries, convents and religious - houses in such great numbers that one is led to infer a - deliberate intention of rendering impossible the very existence - of the Orders and Congregations in Germany. - - “Similar and even graver acts must be deplored in the annexed - and occupied territories, especially in the Polish territories - and particularly in the _Reichsgau Wartheland_, for which the - Reich Superintendent has issued, under date of September 13th - last, a ‘Decree concerning Religious Associations and Religious - Societies’ (_Verordnung ueber Religioese Vereinigungen und - Religion-gesellschaften_) in clear opposition to the fundamental - principles of the divine constitution of the Church.” - (_3261-PS_) - -Illustrative of the numerous other cases and specific incidents which -might be adduced as the program of suppression was carried into action -within Germany proper, are the measures adopted beginning in 1936 to -eliminate the priest Rupert Mayer of Munich. Because of his sermons, he -was confined in various prisons, arrested and rearrested, interned in -Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen concentration camp, and the Ettal Monastery, -from which he was released by Allied troops in May 1945, and later died. -(_3272-PS_) - -(_c_) _Against other religious groups._ - -Members of the sect known as “_Bibelforscher_”—meaning “Members of a -Biblical Society” or “Bible-Researchers”—were as early as 1937 sent as -a routine matter to concentration camps by the Gestapo, even after -serving of a sentence imposed by a court or after the cancellation of an -arrest order (_D-84_). At one camp alone—Dachau—there were over 150 -“_Bibelforscher_” in protective custody in 1937. (_2928-PS_) - -B. _Acts of suppression of the Christian Churches in Annexed and -Occupied Territories._ - -(1) _In Austria._ The methods of suppression of churches followed in -Austria by the occupying power began with measures to exclude the Church -from public activities, such as processions, printing of newspapers and -Reviews which could spread Christian doctrines; from forming Youth -organizations, such as Boy Scouts; from directing educational or -charitable activities; and even from extending help in the form of food -to foreigners. Unable in conscience to obey the public prescription, -ministers of religions were arrested and sent to concentration camps, -and some were executed. Churches were closed, convents and monastries -suppressed, and educational property confiscated. The total number of -confiscations, suppressions, or alienations of religious institutions -exceeded 100 cases in one diocese alone. (_3278-PS_) - -The Lutheran Church in Austria, though comprising a small minority of -the population, was subjected to organized oppression. Its educational -efforts were obstructed or banned. Believers were encouraged, and -sometimes intimidated, to repudiate their faith. Lutheran pastors were -given to understand that a government position would be awarded to each -one who would renounce his ministry and if possible withdraw from the -Lutheran Church. (_3273-PS_) - -In summation of the period of Nazi domination and in review of the -attempted suppression of the Christian Church, the Archbishops and -Bishops of Austria in their first joint Pastoral after liberation -declared: - - “At an end also is an intellectual battle, the goal of which was - the destruction of Christianity and the Church among our people; - a campaign of lies and treachery against truth and love, against - divine and human rights and against international law.” - (_3274-PS_) - -(2) _In Czechoslovakia._ The Czechoslovak Official Report for the -prosecution and trial of the German Major War Criminals by the -International Military Tribunal established according to the Agreement -of the Four Great Powers of 8 August, 1945 describes in summary form the -measures taken by the Nazi conspirators to suppress religious liberties -and persecute the churches. The following excerpts are quoted from this -report (_998-PS_): - - “(_a_) _Catholic Church._ - - “* * * At the outbreak of war, 487 Catholic priests were among - the thousands of Czech patriots arrested and sent to - concentration camps as hostages. Venerable high ecclesiastical - dignitaries were dragged to concentration camps in Germany. * * - * Religious orders were dissolved and liquidated, their - charitable institutions closed down and their members expelled - or else forced to compulsory labor in Germany. All religious - instruction in Czech schools was suppressed. Most of the - weeklies and monthlies which the Catholics had published in - Czechoslovakia, had been suppressed from the very beginning of - the occupation. The Catholic gymnastic organization “Orel” with - 800,000 members was dissolved and its property was confiscated. - To a great extent Catholic church property was seized for the - benefit of the Reich. - - “(_b_) _Czechoslovak National Church._ - - “* * * The Czechoslovak Church in Slovakia was entirely - prohibited and its property confiscated under German compulsion - in 1940. It has been allowed to exist in Bohemia and Moravia but - in a crippled form under the name of the Czecho-Moravian Church. - - “(_c_) _Protestant Churches._ - - “The Protestant Churches were deprived of the freedom to preach - the gospel. German secret state police watched closely whether - the clergy observed the restrictions imposed on it. * * * Some - passages from the Bible were not allowed to be read in public at - all. * * * - - “* * * Church leaders were especially persecuted, scores of - ministers were imprisoned in concentration camps, among them the - General Secretary of the Students’ Christian Movement in - Czechoslovakia. One of the Vice-Presidents was executed. - - “Protestant Institutions such as the YMCA and YWCA were - suppressed throughout the country. - - “The leading Theological School for all Evangelical - denominations, HUS Faculty in Prague and all other Protestant - training schools for the ministry were closed down in November - 1939, with the other Czech universities and colleges. - - “(_d_) _Czech Orthodox Church._ - - “The hardest blow was directed against the Czech Orthodox - Church. The Orthodox churches in Czechoslovakia were ordered by - the Berlin Ministry of Church Affairs to leave the Pontificat of - Belgrade and Constantinople respectively and to become - subordinate to the Berlin Bishop. The Czech Bishop Gorazd was - executed together with two other priests of the Orthodox Church. - By a special order of the Protector Daluege, issued in September - 1942, the Orthodox Church of Serbian Constantinople jurisdiction - was completely dissolved in the Czech lands, its religious - activity forbidden and its property confiscated. - - “All Evangelical education was handed over to the civil - authorities and many Evangelical teachers lost their employment; - moreover the State grant to salaries of many Evangelical priests - was taken away.” (_998-PS_) - -(3) _In Poland._ The repressive measures levelled against the Christian -Church in Poland where Hans Frank was Governor-General from 1939 to -1945, were even more drastic and sweeping. In protest against the -systematic strangulation of religion, the Vatican, on 8 October 1942, -addressed a memorandum to the German Embassy accredited to the Holy See -in which the Secretariat of State emphasized the fact that despite -previous protests to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, von -Ribbentrop, the religious condition of the Catholics in the _Warthegau_ -“has become even sadder and more tragic.” This memorandum states: - - “For quite a long time the religious situation in the - _Warthegau_ gives cause for very grave and ever-increasing - anxiety. There, in fact, the Episcopate has been little by - little almost completely eliminated; the secular and regular - clergy have been reduced to proportions that are absolutely - inadequate, because they have been in large part deported and - exiled; the education of clerics has been forbidden; the - Catholic education of youth is meeting with the greatest - opposition; the nuns have been dispersed; insurmountable - obstacles have been put in the way of affording people the helps - of religions; very many churches have been closed; Catholic - intellectual and charitable institutions have been destroyed; - ecclesiastical property has been seized.” (_3263-PS_) - -On 18 November 1942 the Papal Secretary of State requested the -Archbishop of Breslau, Cardinal Bertram, to use every effort to assist -Polish Catholic workers transferred to Germany, who were being deprived -of the consolations of religion. In addition, he again appealed for help -for the Polish priests detained in various concentration camps, whose -death rate was “still on the increase.” (_3265-PS_). On 7 December 1942 -the Cardinal Archbishop of Breslau replied that all possible efforts -were being put forward by the German Bishops without success on behalf -of the victims of concentration camps and labor battalions, and deplored -“the intolerable decrees” against religious ministration to Poles. -(_3266-PS_) - -On 2 March 1943, the Cardinal Secretary of State addressed a note to von -Ribbentrop, Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, in which the violations -of religious rights and conscience among the civilian population of -Poland were set out in detail, and the time, locality, and character of -the persecutions were specified. Priests and Ecclesiastics were still -being arrested, thrust into concentration camps, and treated with scorn -and derision, while many had been summarily executed. Religious -instruction was hampered; Catholic schools were closed; the use of the -Polish language in sacred functions and even in the Sacrament of Penance -was forbidden. Even the natural right of marriage was denied to men of -Polish nationality under 28 years of age to women under 25. In the -territory called “General Government” similar conditions existed and -against these the Holy See vigorously protested. To save the harassed -and persecuted leaders of the Catholic Church, the Vatican had -petitioned that they be allowed to emigrate to neutral countries of -Europe or America. The only concession made was that they would all be -collected in one concentration camp—Dachau. (_3264-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators adopted a dilatory and obstructionist policy -toward complaints as to religious affairs in the overrun territories, -and a decision was “taken by those competent to do so. * * * that no -further consideration will be taken of proposals or requests concerning -the territories which do not belong to the Old Reich.” (_3262-PS_) - -“Those competent” to make decisions on complaints as to religious -affairs in the overrun territories—especially the Party Chancery, -headed by Bormann—the methods they used, and the reasons for their -attitude are outlined by the Cardinal Archbishop of Breslau, a German -living in Germany, in a letter to the Papal Secretary of State on 7 -December 1942 as follows: - - “Your Eminence knows very well the greatest difficulty in the - way of opening negotiations comes from the overruling authority - which the “National Socialist Party Chancery” (_Kanzlei der - National-Sozialistischen Partei_, known as the _Partei-Kanzlei_) - exercises in relation to the Chancery of the Reich - (_Reichskanzlei_) and to the single Reich Ministries. This - ‘_Parteikanzlei_’ directs the course to be followed by the - State, whereas the Ministries and the Chancery of the Reich are - obliged and compelled to adjust their decrees to these - directions. Besides, there is the fact that the “Supreme Office - for the Security of the Reich” called the - ‘_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_’ enjoys an authority which - precludes all legal action and all appeals. Under it are the - ‘Secret Offices for Public Security’ called ‘_Geheime - Staatspolizei_’ (a title shortened usually to _Gestapo_) of - which there is one for each Province. Against the decrees of - this Central Office (_Reichssicherheitshauptamt_) and of the - Secret Offices (_Geheime Staatspolizei_) there is no appeal - through the Courts, and no complaint made to the Ministries has - any effect. Not infrequently the Councillors of the Ministries - suggest that they have not been able to do as they would wish - to, because of the opposition of these Party offices. As far as - the executive power is concerned, the organization called the - SS, that is _Schutzstaffeln der Partei_, is in practice supreme. - - “This hastily sketched interrelation of authorities is the - reason why many of the petitions and protests made by the - Bishops to the Ministries have been foiled. Even if we present - our complaints to the so-called Supreme Security Office, there - is rarely any reply; and when there is, it is negative. - - “On a number of very grave and fundamental issues we have also - presented our complaints to the Supreme Leader of the Reich - (_Fuehrer_). Either no answer is given, or it is apparently - edited by the above-mentioned Party Chancery, which does not - consider itself bound by the Concordat made with the Holy See.” - (_3266-PS_) - -The interchange of correspondence following the transmission of the -above-described note of 2 March 1943 on the religious situation in the -overrun Polish Provinces illustrates the same evasive tactics. -(_3269-PS_) - -In his Allocution to the Sacred College, on 2 June 1945, His Holiness -Pope Pius XII recalled, by way of example, “some details from the -abundant accounts which have reached us from priests and laymen who were -interned in the concentration camp at Dachau”: - - “In the forefront, for the number and harshness of the treatment - meted out to them, are the Polish priests. From 1940 to 1945, - 2,800 Polish ecclesiastics and religious were imprisoned in that - camp; among them was the Auxiliary bishop of Wloclawek, who died - there of typhus. In April last there were left only 816, all the - others being dead except for two or three transferred to another - camp. In the summer of 1942, 480 German-speaking ministers of - religion were known to be gathered there; of these, 45 were - Protestants, all the others Catholic priests. In spite of the - continuous inflow of new internees, especially from some - dioceses of Bavaria, Rhenania and Westphalia, their number, as a - result of the high rate of mortality, at the beginning of this - year, did not surpass 350. Nor should we pass over in silence - those belonging to occupied territories, Holland, Belgium, - France (among whom the Bishop of Clermont), Luxembourg, - Slovenia, Italy. Many Of those priests and laymen endured - indescribable sufferings for their faith and for their vocation. - In one case the hatred of the impious against Christ reached the - point of parodying on the person of an interned priest, with - barbed wire, the scourging and the crowning with thorns of our - Redeemer.” (_3268-PS_) - -Further revealing figures on the persecution of Polish priests are -contained in the following extract from Charge No. 17 against Hans -Frank, Governor-General of Poland, submitted by the Polish Government, -entitled “Maltreatment and Persecution of the Catholic Clergy in the -Western Provinces”: - - “IV. _GENERAL CONDITIONS AND RESULTS OF THE PERSECUTION_ - - 11. The general situation of the clergy in the - Archdiocese of Poznan in the beginning of April 1940 is - summarized in the following words of Cardinal Hlond’s - second report: - - ‘5 priests shot - - 27 priests confined in harsh concentration camps - at Stutthof and in other camps - - 190 priests in prison or in concentration camps - at Bruczkow, Chludowo, Goruszki, Kazimierz, - Biskupi, Lad, Lubin and Puszczykowo, - - 35 priests expelled into the Government General, - - 11 priests seriously ill in consequence of - ill-treatment, - - 122 parishes entirely left without priests.’ - - 12. In the diocese of Chelmno, where about 650 priests - were installed before the war only 3% were allowed to - stay, the 97% of them were imprisoned, executed or put - into concentration camps. - - 13. By January 1941 about 7000 priests were killed, 3000 - were in prison or concentration camps.” (_3279-PS_) - -The Allocution of Pope Pius XII on 2 June 1945 described National -Socialism as “the arrogant apostasy from Jesus Christ, the denial of His -doctrine and of His work of redemption, the cult of violence, the -idolatry of race and blood, the overthrow of human liberty and dignity.” -It summarized the attacks of “National Socialism” on the Catholic Church -in these terms: - - “The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become even more - bitter: there was the dissolution of Catholic organizations; the - gradual suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools, both - public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from family - and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the conscience of - citizens, and especially of civil servants; the systematic - defamation, by means of a clever, closely-organized propaganda, - of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, the Church’s - institutions, teaching and history; the closing, dissolution, - confiscation of religious houses and other ecclesiastical - institutions; the complete suppression of the Catholic press and - publishing houses.” (_3268-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO SUPPRESSION OF THE - CHRISTIAN CHURCHES - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a, │ │ - │ c). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (D) 3│ │ - │ (_c_) (2, 3); X (B). │ I │ 20, 55 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *064-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 27 │ │ - │September 1940, enclosing letter from │ │ - │Gauleiter Florian criticizing Churches │ │ - │and publications for soldiers. (USA 359)│ III │ 109 - │ │ │ - *068-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 5 │ │ - │April 1940, enclosing copy of Bormann’s │ │ - │letter to the High Command of Navy, and │ │ - │copy of Navy High Command letter to │ │ - │Bormann of 9 February 1940. (USA 726) │ III │ 114 - │ │ │ - *070-PS │Letter of Deputy Fuehrer to Rosenberg, │ │ - │25 April 1941, on substitution of │ │ - │National Socialist mottos for morning │ │ - │prayers in schools. (USA 349) │ III │ 118 - │ │ │ - *072-PS │Bormann letter to Rosenberg, 19 April │ │ - │1941, concerning confiscation of │ │ - │property, especially of art treasures in│ │ - │the East. (USA 357) │ III │ 122 - │ │ │ - *089-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 8 │ │ - │March 1940, instructing Amann not to │ │ - │issue further newsprint to confessional │ │ - │newspapers. (USA 360) │ III │ 147 - │ │ │ - *098-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 22 │ │ - │February 1940, urging creation of │ │ - │National Socialist Catechism, etc. to │ │ - │provide moral foundation for NS │ │ - │religion. (USA 350) │ III │ 152 - │ │ │ - *100-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 18 │ │ - │January 1940, urging preparation of │ │ - │National Socialist reading material to │ │ - │replace Christian literature for │ │ - │soldiers. (USA 691) │ III │ 160 - │ │ │ - *101-PS │Letter from Hess’ office signed Bormann │ │ - │to Rosenberg, 17 January 1940, │ │ - │concerning undesirability of religious │ │ - │literature for members of the Wehrmacht.│ │ - │(USA 361) │ III │ 160 - *107-PS │Circular letter signed Bormann, 17 June │ │ - │1938, enclosing directions prohibiting │ │ - │participation of Reichsarbeitsdienst in │ │ - │religious celebrations. (USA 351) │ III │ 162 - │ │ │ - *116-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, enclosing│ │ - │copy of letter, 24 January 1939, to │ │ - │Minister of Education requesting │ │ - │restriction or elimination of │ │ - │theological faculties. (USA 685) │ III │ 165 - │ │ │ - *122-PS │Bormann’s letter to Rosenberg, 17 April │ │ - │1939, enclosing copy of Minister of │ │ - │Education letter, 6 April 1939, on │ │ - │elimination of theological faculties in │ │ - │various universities. (USA 362) │ III │ 173 - │ │ │ - *129-PS │Letter from Kerrl to Herr Stapol, 6 │ │ - │September 1939, found in Rosenberg │ │ - │files. (USA 727) │ III │ 179 - │ │ │ - *840-PS │Party Directive, 14 July 1939, making │ │ - │clergy and theology students ineligible │ │ - │for Party membership. (USA 355) │ III │ 606 - │ │ │ - *848-PS │Gestapo telegram from Berlin to │ │ - │Nurnberg, 24 July 1938, dealing with │ │ - │demonstrations against Bishop Sproll in │ │ - │Rottenburg. (USA 353) │ III │ 613 - │ │ │ - *849-PS │Letter from Kerrl to Minister of State, │ │ - │23 July 1938, with enclosures dealing │ │ - │with persecution of Bishop Sproll. (USA │ │ - │354) │ III │ 614 - │ │ │ - *998-PS │“German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia”. │ │ - │Excerpts from Czechoslovak Official │ │ - │Report for the prosecution and trial of │ │ - │the German Major War Criminals by the │ │ - │International Military Tribunal │ │ - │established according to Agreement of │ │ - │four Great Powers of 8 August 1945. (USA│ │ - │91) │ III │ 656 - │ │ │ -*1164-PS │Secret letter, 21 April 1942, from SS to│ │ - │all concentration camp commanders │ │ - │concerning treatment of priests. (USA │ │ - │736) │ III │ 820 - │ │ │ -*1458-PS │The Hitler Youth by Baldur von Schirach,│ │ - │Leipzig, 1934. (USA 667) │ IV │ 22 - │ │ │ -*1481-PS │Gestapo order, 20 January 1938, │ │ - │dissolving and confiscating property of │ │ - │Catholic Youth Women’s Organization in │ │ - │Bavaria. (USA 737) │ IV │ 50 - │ │ │ -*1482-PS │Secret letter, 20 July 1933 to │ │ - │provincial governments and the Prussian │ │ - │Gestapo from Frick, concerning │ │ - │Confessional Youth Organizations. (USA │ │ - │738) │ IV │ 51 - │ │ │ -*1498-PS │Order of Frick, 6 November 1934, │ │ - │addressed inter alios to Prussian │ │ - │Gestapo prohibiting publication of │ │ - │Protestant Church announcements. (USA │ │ - │739) │ IV │ 52 - │ │ │ -*1521-PS │Report from the Bavarian Political │ │ - │Police to the Gestapo, Berlin, 24 August│ │ - │1934, concerning National mourning on │ │ - │occasion of death of von Hindenburg. │ │ - │(USA 740) │ IV │ 75 - │ │ │ -*1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │ - │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. (USA│ │ - │255; USA 324) │ IV │ 208 - │ │ │ -*1815-PS │Documents on RSHA meeting concerning the│ │ - │study and treatment of church politics. │ │ - │(USA 510) │ IV │ 415 - │ │ │ - 1855-PS │Extract from Organization Book of the │ │ - │NSDAP, 1937, p. 418. │ IV │ 495 - │ │ │ -*1997-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941, │ │ - │concerning administration of Newly │ │ - │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA 319) │ IV │ 634 - │ │ │ -*2349-PS │Extracts from “The Myth of 20th Century”│ │ - │by Alfred Rosenberg, 1941. (USA 352) │ IV │ 1069 - │ │ │ - 2351-PS │Speech of Rosenberg, 7 March 1937, from │ │ - │The Archive, Vol. 34-36, p. 1716, │ │ - │published in Berlin, March 1937. │ IV │ 1070 - │ │ │ - 2352-PS │Speech of Kerrl, 27 November 1937, from │ │ - │The Archive, Vol. 43-45, p. 1029, │ │ - │published in Berlin, November 1937. │ IV │ 1071 - │ │ │ - 2403-PS │The End of the Party State, from │ │ - │Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, │ │ - │pp. 55-56. │ V │ 71 - │ │ │ - 2456-PS │Youth and the Church, from Complete │ │ - │Handbook of Youth Laws. │ V │ 198 - │ │ │ -*2851-PS │Statement by Rosenberg of positions │ │ - │held, 9 November 1945. (USA 6) │ V │ 512 - │ │ │ -*2910-PS │Certificate of defendant Seyss-Inquart, │ │ - │10 November 1945. (USA 17) │ V │ 579 - │ │ │ -*2928-PS │Affidavit of Mathias Lex, deputy │ │ - │president of the German Shoemakers │ │ - │Union. (USA 239) │ V │ 594 - │ │ │ -*2972-PS │List of appointments held by von │ │ - │Neurath, 17 November 1945. (USA 19) │ V │ 679 - │ │ │ -*2973-PS │Statement by von Schirach concerning │ │ - │positions held. (USA 14) │ V │ 679 - │ │ │ -*2978-PS │Frick’s statement of offices and │ │ - │positions, 14 November 1945. (USA 8) │ V │ 683 - │ │ │ -*2979-PS │Affidavit by Hans Frank, 15 November │ │ - │1945, concerning positions held. (USA 7)│ V │ 684 - │ │ │ -*3261-PS │Verbal note of the Secretariate of State│ │ - │of His Holiness, to the German Embassy, │ │ - │18 January 1942. (USA 568) │ V │ 1009 - │ │ │ - 3262-PS │Report of His Excellency, the Most │ │ - │Reverend Cesare Orsenigo, Papal Nuncio │ │ - │in Germany to His Eminence the Cardinal │ │ - │Secretary of State to His Holiness, 27 │ │ - │June 1942. │ V │ 1015 - │ │ │ -*3263-PS │Memorandum of Secretariate of State to │ │ - │German Embassy regarding the situation │ │ - │in the Warthegau, 8 October 1942. (USA │ │ - │571) │ V │ 1017 - │ │ │ -*3264-PS │Note of His Eminence the Cardinal │ │ - │Secretary of State to Foreign Minister │ │ - │of Reich about religious situation in │ │ - │Warthegau and in other Polish provinces │ │ - │subject to Germany, 2 March 1943. (USA │ │ - │572) │ V │ 1018 - │ │ │ - 3265-PS │Letter to His Eminence the Cardinal │ │ - │Secretary of State to the Cardinal │ │ - │Archbishop of Breslau, 18 November 1942.│ V │ 1029 - │ │ │ -*3266-PS │Letter of Cardinal Bertram, Archbishop │ │ - │of Breslau to the Papal Secretary of │ │ - │State, 7 December 1942. (USA 573) │ V │ 1031 - │ │ │ - 3267-PS │Verbal note of German Embassy to Holy │ │ - │See to the Secretariate of State of His │ │ - │Holiness, 29 August 1941. │ V │ 1037 - │ │ │ -*3268-PS │Allocution of His Holiness Pope Pius │ │ - │XII, to the Sacred College, 2 June 1945.│ │ - │(USA 356) │ V │ 1038 - │ │ │ - 3269-PS │Correspondence between the Holy See, the│ │ - │Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin, and the │ │ - │defendant von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister│ │ - │of Foreign Affairs. │ V │ 1041 - │ │ │ - 3272-PS │Statement of Rupert Mayer, 13 October │ │ - │1945. │ V │ 1061 - │ │ │ - 3273-PS │Statement of Lutheran Pastor, Friedrich │ │ - │Kaufmann, Salzburg, 23 October 1945. │ V │ 1064 - │ │ │ -*3274-PS │Pastoral letter of Austrian Bishops read│ │ - │in all churches, 14 October 1945. (USA │ │ - │570) │ V │ 1067 - │ │ │ -*3278-PS │Report on fighting of National Socialism│ │ - │in Apostolic Administration of │ │ - │Innsbruck-Feldkirch of Tyrol and │ │ - │Vorarlberg by Bishop Paulus Rusch, 27 │ │ - │June 1945 and attached list of church │ │ - │institutions there which were closed, │ │ - │confiscated or suppressed. (USA 569) │ V │ 1070 - │ │ │ -*3279-PS │Extract from Charge No. 17 against Hans │ │ - │Frank submitted by Polish Government to │ │ - │International Military Tribunal. (USA │ │ - │574) │ V │ 1078 - │ │ │ -*3280-PS │Extract from Papal Encyclical “Mit │ │ - │Brennender Sorge”, set forth in Appendix│ │ - │II, p. 524, of “The Persecution of the │ │ - │Catholic Church in the Third Reich”. │ │ - │(USA 567) │ V │ 1079 - │ │ │ - 3280-A-PS │Concordat between the Holy See and the │ │ - │German Reich. Reichsgesetzblatt, Part │ │ - │II, p. 679. │ V │ 1080 - │ │ │ -*3387-PS │Hitler Reichstag speech, 23 March 1933, │ │ - │asking for adoption of Enabling Act, │ │ - │from Voelkischer Beobachter, 24 March │ │ - │1933, p. 1. (USA 566) │ VI │ 104 - │ │ │ -*3389-PS │Fulda Declaration of 28 March 1933, from│ │ - │Voelkischer Beobachter, 29 March 1933, │ │ - │p. 2. (USA 566) │ VI │ 105 - │ │ │ - 3433-PS │Law concerning the Constitution of the │ │ - │German Protestant Church, 14 July 1933. │ │ - │1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 471. │ VI │ 136 - │ │ │ - 3434-PS │Law concerning procedure for decisions │ │ - │in legal affairs of the Protestant │ │ - │Church, 26 June 1935. 1935 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 774. │ VI │ 143 - │ │ │ - 3435-PS │First Ordinance for Execution of Law │ │ - │concerning procedure for decisions in │ │ - │legal affairs of the Protestant Church, │ │ - │3 July 1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 851. │ VI │ 144 - │ │ │ - 3436-PS │Law for Safeguarding of German │ │ - │Protestant Church, 24 September 1935. │ │ - │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1178.│ VI │ 145 - │ │ │ - 3437-PS │Fifth Decree for execution of law for │ │ - │safeguarding of the German Protestant │ │ - │Church, 2 December 1935. 1935 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1370. │ VI │ 146 - │ │ │ - 3439-PS │Fifteenth decree for the Execution of │ │ - │law for Security of German Protestant │ │ - │Church, 25 June 1937. 1937 │ │ - │Reiehsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 697. │ VI │ 147 - │ │ │ - 3466-PS │Decree to unite the competences of Reich│ │ - │and Prussia in Church Affairs, 16 July │ │ - │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │1029. │ VI │ 168 - │ │ │ - 3560-PS │Decree concerning organization and │ │ - │administration of Eastern Territories, 8│ │ - │October 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 2042. │ VI │ 244 - │ │ │ - 3561-PS │Decree concerning the Administration of │ │ - │Occupied Polish Territories, 12 October │ │ - │1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │2077. │ VI │ 246 - │ │ │ - 3701-PS │Proposal for Reichsleiter Bormann │ │ - │concerning speech of Bishop of Muenster │ │ - │on 3 August 1941. │ VI │ 405 - │ │ │ -*3751-PS │Diary of the German Minister of Justice,│ │ - │1935 concerning prosecution of church │ │ - │officials and punishment in │ │ - │concentration camps. (USA 828; USA 858) │ VI │ 636 - │ │ │ -*D-75 │SD Inspector Bierkamp’s letter, 12 │ │ - │December 1941, to RSHA enclosing copy of│ │ - │secret decree signed by Bormann, │ │ - │entitled Relationship of National │ │ - │Socialism and Christianity. (USA 348) │ VI │ 1035 - │ │ │ -*D-84 │Gestapo instructions to State Police │ │ - │Departments, 5 August 1937, regarding │ │ - │protective custody for Bible students. │ │ - │(USA 236) │ VI │ 1040 - │ │ │ -*EC-68 │Confidential letter from Minister of │ │ - │Finance and Economy, Baden, containing │ │ - │directives on treatment of Polish │ │ - │Farmworkers, 6 March 1941. (USA 205) │ VII │ 260 - │ │ │ -*R-101-A │Letter from Chief of the Security Police│ │ - │and Security Service to the Reich │ │ - │Commissioner for the Consolidation of │ │ - │German Folkdom, 5 April 1940, with │ │ - │enclosures concerning confiscation of │ │ - │church property. (USA 358) │ VIII │ 87 - │ │ │ - R-101-B │Letter from Himmler to Dr. Winkler, 31 │ │ - │October 1940, concerning treatment of │ │ - │church property in incorporated Eastern │ │ - │countries. │ VIII │ 89 - │ │ │ -*R-101-C │Letter to Reich Leader SS, 30 July 1941,│ │ - │concerning treatment of church property │ │ - │in incorporated Eastern areas. (USA 358)│ VIII │ 91 - │ │ │ -*R-101-D │Letter from Chief of Staff of the Reich │ │ - │Main Security Office (RSHA) to Reich │ │ - │Leader SS, 30 March 1942, concerning │ │ - │confiscation of church property. (USA │ │ - │358) │ VIII │ 92 - │ │ │ -*R-103 │Letter from Polish Main Committee to │ │ - │General Government of Poland on │ │ - │situation of Polish workers in the │ │ - │Reich, 17 May 1944. (USA 204) │ VIII │ 104 - │ │ │ -*R-145 │State Police Order, 28 May 1934, at │ │ - │Duesseldorf, signed Schmid, concerning │ │ - │sanction of denominational youth and │ │ - │professional associations and │ │ - │distribution of publications in │ │ - │churches. (USA 745) │ VIII │ 248 - - - 7. ADOPTION AND PUBLICATION OF THE PROGRAM FOR - PERSECUTION OF JEWS - -A. _The official program of the NSDAP, proclaimed 24 February 1920 by -Adolf Hitler at a public gathering in Munich._ - - Point 4: “None but members of the nation (_Volksgenosse_) may be - citizens. None but those of German blood, whatever their creed, - may be members of the nation. No Jew, therefore, may be a member - of the nation.” - - Point 5: “Anyone who is not a citizen may live in Germany only - as a guest and must be regarded as being subject to legislation - for foreigners.” - - Point 6: “The right to determine matters concerning government - and legislation is to be enjoyed by the citizen alone. We demand - therefore that all appointments to public office, of whatever - kind, whether in the Reich, Land, or municipality, be filled - only by citizens. * * *” - - Point 7: “We demand that the state make it its first duty to - promote the industry and livelihood of citizens. If it is not - possible to nourish the entire population of the State, the - members of foreign nations (non-citizens) are to be expelled - from the Reich.” - - Point 8: “Any further immigration of non-Germans is to be - prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who entered Germany - subsequent to 2 August 1914, shall be forced immediately to - leave the Reich.” - - Point 23: “We demand legal warfare against conscious political - lies and their dissemination through the press. In order to make - possible the creation of a German press we demand: - - (_a_) that all editors and collaborators of newspapers published - in the German language be members of the nation. - - (_b_) non-German newspapers be requested to have express - permission of the State to be published. They may not be printed - in the German language. - - (_c_) non-Germans be prohibited by law from financial - participation in or influence on German newspapers, and that as - penalty for contravention of the law such newspapers be - suppressed and all non-Germans participating in it expelled from - the Reich. * * *” (_1708-PS_) - -B. _Development of ideological basis for anti-Semitic measures._ - -Among the innumerable statements made by the leaders of the NSDAP are -the following: - -Rosenberg advocated in 1920 the adoption of the following program -concerning the Jews: - - “(1) The Jews are to be recognized as a (separate) nation living - in Germany, irrespective of the religion they belong to. - - (2) A Jew is he whose parents on either side are nationally - Jews. Anyone who has a Jewish husband or wife is henceforth a - Jew. - - (3) Jews have no right to speak and write on or be active in - German politics. - - (4) Jews have no right to hold public offices, or to serve in - the Army either as soldiers or as officers. However, their - contribution of work may be considered. - - (5) Jews have no right to be leaders of cultural institutions of - the state and community (theaters, galleries, etc.) or to be - professors and teachers in German schools and universities. - - (6) Jews have no right to be active in state or municipal - commissions for examinations, control, censorship, etc. Jews - have no right to represent the German Reich in economic - treaties; they have no right to be represented in the - directorate of state banks or communal credit establishments. - - (7) Foreign Jews have no right to settle in Germany permanently. - Their admission into the German political community is to be - forbidden under all circumstances. - - (8) Zionism should be energetically supported in order to - promote the departure of German Jews—in numbers to be - determined annually—to Palestine or generally across the - border.” (_2842-PS_) - -Rosenberg’s “Zionism” was neither sincere nor consistent, for in 1921 he -advocated breaking up Zionism, “which is involved in English-Jewish -politics.” (_2432-PS_). He advocated in 1921 the adoption by “all -Germans” of the following slogans: “Get the Jews out of all parties. -Institute measures for the repudiation of all citizenship rights of all -Jews and half-Jews: banish all the Eastern Jews; exercise strictest -vigilance over the native ones. * * *” (_2432-PS_) - -Frick and other Nazis introduced a motion in the Reichstag on 27 May -1924, “to place all members of the Jewish race under special laws.” -(_2840-PS_). Frick also asked in the Reichstag, on 25 August 1924, for -the realization of the Nazi program by “exclusion of all Jews from -public office.” (_2893-PS_) - -C. _Anti-Semitism was seized upon by the Nazi conspirators as a -convenient instrument to unite groups and classes of divergent views and -interests under one banner._ - -Adolf Hitler described racial anti-Semitism as “a new creed for the -masses” and its spreading among the German people as “the most -formidable task to be accomplished by our movement.” (_2881-PS_). -Rosenberg called for the “_Zusammenraffen aller Deutschen zu einer -stahlharten, voelkischen Einheitsfront_” (gathering of all Germans into -a steel-hard racial united front) on the basis of anti-Semitic slogans -(_2432-PS_). Gotfried Feder, official commentator of the Nazi Party -program, stated: “Anti-Semitism is in a way the emotional foundation of -our movement.” (_2844-PS_) - -There are innumerable admissions on the part of the Nazi leaders as to -the part which their anti-Semitic propaganda played in their acquisition -of control. The following statement concerning the purpose of racial -propaganda was made by Dr. Walter Gross, director of the Office of -Racial Policy of the Nazi Party: - - “In the years of fight, the aim was to employ all means of - propaganda which promised success in order to gather people who - were ready to overthrow, together with the Party, the harmful - post-war regime and put the power into the hand of the Fuehrer - and his collaborators. * * * In these years of fight the aim was - purely political: I meant the overthrow of the regime and - acquisition of power. * * * Within this great general task the - education in racial thinking necessarily played a decisive part, - because herein lies basically the deepest revolutionary nature - of the new spirit.” (_2845-PS_) - -In another official Nazi publication, recommended for circulation in all -Party units and establishments, it is stated: - - “The whole treatment of the Jewish problem in the years prior to - our seizure of power is to be regarded essentially from the - point of view of the political education of the German people.” - (To disregard this angle of the use made of anti-Semitism means) - “to disregard the success and aim of the work toward racial - education.” (_2427-PS_) - -D. _After the acquisition of power the Nazi conspirators initiated a -state policy of persecution of the Jews._ - -(1) _The first organized act was the boycott of Jewish enterprises on 1 -April 1933._ The boycott action was approved by all the defendants who -were members of the _Reichsregierung_ (Reich Cabinet), and Streicher was -charged with its execution. Presented as an alleged act of “self -defense”, the boycott action was intended to frighten Jewish public -opinion abroad and force it, by the threat of collective responsibility -to all Jews in Germany, to desist from warning against the Nazi danger. -(_2409-PS_; _2410-PS_) - -The boycott was devised as a demonstration of the extent to which the -Nazi Party controlled its members and the German masses; consequently, -spontaneous action and physical violence were discouraged. Goebbels -stated: - - “The national socialist leadership had declared: ‘The boycott is - legal’, and the government demands that the people permit that - the boycott be carried out legally. We expect iron discipline. - This must be for the whole world a wonderful show of unity and - manly training. To those abroad who believe that we could not - manage it, we want to show that we have the people in our hand.” - (_2431-PS_) - -(2) _Laws eliminating Jews from various offices and functions._ The Nazi -conspirators legislative program was gradual and, in the beginning, -relatively “moderate.” In the first period, which dates from 7 April -1933 until September 1935, the laws eliminated Jews from public office -and limited their participation in schools, certain professions, and -cultural establishments. The following are the major laws issued in this -period: - - Document │ Date │Reichsge│ Title and gist of law │Signed by - No. │ │setzblat│ │ - │ │ t page │ │ - │ │ │ │ - _1397-PS_ │ 7.4.33│I.175 │_Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung │Hitler - │ │ │ des Berufsbeamtentums_ (Law │Frick - │ │ │ for the reestablishment of │Schwerin - │ │ │ the professional civil │V. Krosigk - │ │ │ service), removing Jews from│ - │ │ │ Civil Service. │ - │ │ │ │ - │ 7.4.33│I.188 │_Gesetz uber die Zulassung zur│Guertner - │ │ │ Rechtsanwaltschaft_ (Law │ - │ │ │ relating to admission to the│ - │ │ │ Bar) removing Jews from the │ - │ │ │ Bar. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2868-PS_ │ 22.4.33│I.217 │_Gesetz betreffend die │Hitler - │ │ │ Zulassung zur │Guertner - │ │ │ Patentanwaltschaft_ (Law │ - │ │ │ relating to the admission to│ - │ │ │ the profession of patent │ - │ │ │ agent and lawyer) excluding │ - │ │ │ Jews from acting as patent │ - │ │ │ attorneys. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2869-PS_ │ 6.5.33│I.257 │_Gesetz uber die Zulassung von│Hitler - │ │ │ Steuerberatern_ (Law │Schwerin - │ │ │ relating to the admission of│V. Krosigk - │ │ │ Tax Advisors) eliminating │ - │ │ │ “non-Aryans” from the │ - │ │ │ profession of tax │ - │ │ │ consultants. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2084-PS_ │ 22.4.33│I.215 │_Gesetz uber die uberfullung │Hitler - │ │ │ deutscher Schullen_ (Law │Frick - │ │ │ against the overcrowding of │ - │ │ │ German schools and higher │ - │ │ │ institutions) limiting │ - │ │ │ drastically the number of │ - │ │ │ Jewish students. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2870-PS_ │ 26.7.33│I.538 │_Verordnung zur Durchfuehrung │Pfundtner - │ │ │ des Gesetzes uber den │(Asst. to - │ │ │ Widerruf von │Frick) - │ │ │ Einbuergerungen_ (Executing │ - │ │ │ decree for the law about the│ - │ │ │ Repeal of Naturalizations │ - │ │ │ and the adjudication of │ - │ │ │ German citizenship) defining│ - │ │ │ Jews from Eastern Europe as │ - │ │ │ “undesirable” and subject to│ - │ │ │ denationalization. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2083-PS_ │ 4.10.33│I.713 │_Schriftleitergesetz_ │Hitler - │ │ │ (Editorial Law) barring │Goebbels - │ │ │ “non-Aryans” and persons │ - │ │ │ married to“"non-Aryans” from│ - │ │ │ the newspaper profession. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2984-PS_ │ 21.5.35│I.608 │_Wehrgesetz_ (Law concerning │V. - │ │ │ Armed Forces) barring │Blomberg - │ │ │ “non-Aryans” from military │ - │ │ │ service. │ - -On 10 September 1935, Minister of Education Rust issued a circular -ordering the complete elimination of Jewish pupils from “Aryan” schools -(_2894-PS_). This legislative activity, in addition to being the first -step towards the elimination of the Jews, served an “educational” -purpose and was a further test of the extent of control exerted by the -Nazi Party and regime over the German masses. - -Dr. Achim Gercke, racial expert of the Ministry of the Interior, stated: - - “The laws are mainly educational and give direction. The aspect - of the laws should not be underestimated. The entire nation is - enlightened on the Jewish problem; it learns to understand that - the national community is a blood community; it understands for - the first time the racial idea, and is diverted from a too - theoretical treatment of the Jewish problem and faced with the - actual solution.” (_2904-PS_) - -It was clear, however, that the Nazi conspirators had a far more -ambitious program in the Jewish problem and put off its realization for -reasons of expediency. In the words of Dr. Gercke: - - “Nevertheless the laws published thus far cannot bring a final - solution of the Jewish problem, because the time has not yet - come for it, although the decrees give the general direction and - leave open the possibility of further developments. - - “It would be in every respect premature now to work out and - publicly discuss plans to achieve more than can be achieved for - the time being. However, one must point out a few basic - principles so that the ideas which one desires and must have - ripened will contain no mistakes. * * * - - “All suggestions aiming at a permanent situation, at a - stabilization of, the status of the Jews in Germany do not solve - the Jewish problem, because they do not detach the Jews from - Germany. * * * - - “_Plans and programs must contain an aim pointing to the future - and not merely consisting of the regulation of a momentarily - uncomfortable situation._” (_2904-PS_) - -(3) _Deprivation of Jews of their rights as citizens._ After a -propaganda barrage, in which the speeches and writings of Streicher were -most prominent, the Nazi conspirators initiated the second period of -anti-Jewish legislation (15 September 1935 to September 1938). In this -period the Jews were deprived of their full rights as citizens (First -Nurnberg Law) and forbidden to marry “Aryans” (Second Nurnberg Law). -Further steps were taken to eliminate Jews from certain professions, and -the groundwork was laid for the subsequent expropriation of Jewish -property. These laws were hailed as the fulfillment of the Nazi Party -program. - -The major laws issued in this period are listed below: - - Document │ Date │Reichsge│ Title and gist of law │Signed by - No. │ │setzblat│ │ - │ │ t page │ │ - │ │ │ │ - _1416-PS_ │ 15.9.35│I 1145 │_Reichsbuergergesetz_ (Reich │Hitler - │ │ │ Citizenship Law), first │Frick - │ │ │ Nurnberg Law, reserving │ - │ │ │ citizenship for subjects of │ - │ │ │ German blood. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2000-PS_ │ 15.9.35│I 1146 │_Gesetz zum Schutze des │Hitler - │ │ │ deutschen Blutes_, (Law for │Frick - │ │ │ _protection of German_ blood│Guertner - │ │ │ and German honor), │Hess - │ │ │ forbidding marriages and │ - │ │ │ extra-marital relations │ - │ │ │ between Jews and “Aryans”. │ - │ │ │ │ - _1417-PS_ │ 14.11.35│I 1333 │_Erste Verordnung zum │Hitler - │ │ │ Reichsbuergergesetz_ (First │Frick Hess - │ │ │ regulation to Reich │ - │ │ │ citizenship law), defining │ - │ │ │ the terms “Jew” and │ - │ │ │ “part-Jew”. Jewish officials│ - │ │ │ to be dismissed. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2871-PS_ │ 7.3.36│I 133 │_Gesetz ueber das │Hitler - │ │ │ Reichstagwahlrecht_ (Law │Frick - │ │ │ governing elections to the │ - │ │ │ Reichstag) barring Jews from│ - │ │ │ Reichstag vote. │ - │ │ │ │ - _1406-PS_ │ 26.4.38│I 414 │_Verordnung ueber die │Goering - │ │ │ Ammeldung des Vermogens von │Frick - │ │ │ Juden_ (Decree for reporting│ - │ │ │ Jewish-owned property), │ - │ │ │ basis for subsequent │ - │ │ │ expropriation. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2872-PS_ │ 25.7.38│I 969 │_Vierte Verordnung zum │Frick - │ │ │ Reichsbuergergesetz._ Fourth│ - │ │ │ decree on the Citizenship │ - │ │ │ Law, revoking licenses of │ - │ │ │ Jewish physicians. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2873-PS_ │ 17.8.38│I 1044 │_Zweite Verordnung zur │Frick - │ │ │ Durchfuhrung des Gesetzes │ - │ │ │ ueber die Aenderung von │ - │ │ │ Familiennamen und Vornamen_ │ - │ │ │ (Second decree on law │ - │ │ │ concerning change of first │ - │ │ │ and last names), forcing │ - │ │ │ Jews to adopt the names │ - │ │ │ “Israel” and “Sara”. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2874-PS_ │ 27.9.38│I 1403 │_Fuenfte Verordnung zum │ - │ │ │ Reichsbuergergesetz._ (Fifth│ - │ │ │ decree to law relating to │ - │ │ │ the Reich citizenship), │ - │ │ │ revoking admission of Jewish│ - │ │ │ lawyers. │ - -(4) _Program of 9 November 1938 and elimination of Jews from economic -life._ - -In the autumn of 1938, within the framework of economic preparation for -aggressive war and as an act of defiance to world opinion, the Nazi -conspirators began to put into effect a program of complete elimination -of the Jews. The measures taken were partly presented as retaliation -against “world Jewry” in connection with the killing of a German embassy -official in Paris. Unlike the boycott action in April, 1933, when care -was taken to avoid violence, an allegedly “spontaneous” pogrom was -staged and carried out all over Germany on orders of Heydrich. - -The organized character of the pogrom is also obvious from the admission -of Heydrich and others at a meeting presided over by Goering at the Air -Ministry in Berlin. (_1816-PS_) - -The legislative measures which followed were discussed and approved in -their final form at a meeting on 12 November 1938 under the chairmanship -of Goering, with the participation of Frick, Funk and others. The -meeting was called following Hitler’s orders “requesting that the Jewish -questions be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or -another.” The participants agreed on measures to be taken “for the -elimination of the Jew from German economy.” Other possibilities, such -as the establishment of ghettos, stigmatization through special -insignia, and “the main problem, namely to kick the Jew out of Germany”, -were also discussed. All these measures were later enacted as soon as -conditions permitted. (_1816-PS_) - -The laws issued in this period were signed mostly by Goering, in his -capacity as Deputy for the Four Year Plan, and were thus connected with -the consolidation of control over German economy in preparation for -aggressive war. - -The major laws issued in this period are listed below: - - Document │ Date │Reichsge│ Title and gist of law │Signed by - No. │ │setzblat│ │ - │ │ t page │ │ - │ │ │ │ - _1412-PS_ │ 12.11.38│I 1579 │_Verordnung ueber eine │Goering - │ │ │ Suhneleistung der Juden_ │ - │ │ │ (Order concerning expiation │ - │ │ │ contribution of Jews of │ - │ │ │ German nationality), │ - │ │ │ obligating all German Jews │ - │ │ │ to pay a collective fine of │ - │ │ │ 1.000.000.000 Reichsmark. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2875-PS_ │ 12.11.38│I 1580 │_Verordnung zur Ausschaltung │Goering - │ │ │ der Juden aus dem deutschen │ - │ │ │ Wirtschaftsleben_ (Decree on│ - │ │ │ elimination of Jews from │ - │ │ │ German economic life), │ - │ │ │ barring Jews from trade and │ - │ │ │ crafts. │ - │ │ │ │ - _1415-PS_ │ 28.11.38│I 1676 │_Polizeiverordnung ueber das │Heydrich - │ │ │ Auftreten der Juden in der │(assistant - │ │ │ Queffentlichkeit_ (Police │to Frick) - │ │ │ regulation of the appearance│ - │ │ │ of Jews in public), limiting│ - │ │ │ movement of Jews to certain │ - │ │ │ localities and hours. │ - │ │ │ │ - _1409-PS_ │ 3.12.38│I 1709 │_Verordnung ueber den Einsatz │Funk Frick - │ │ │ des Juedischen Vermoegens_ │ - │ │ │ (Order concerning the │ - │ │ │ Utilization of Jewish │ - │ │ │ property), setting time │ - │ │ │ limit for the sale or │ - │ │ │ liquidation of Jewish │ - │ │ │ enterprises; forcing Jews to│ - │ │ │ deposit shares and │ - │ │ │ securities held by them; │ - │ │ │ forbidding sale or │ - │ │ │ acquisition of gold and │ - │ │ │ precious stones by Jews. │ - │ │ │ │ - _1419-PS_ │ 30.4.39│I 864 │_Gesetz ueber │Hitler - │ │ │ Mietverhaeltnisse mit Juden_│Guertner - │ │ │ (Law concerning Jewish │Krohn - │ │ │ tenants) granting to │Frick Hess - │ │ │ landlords the right to give │ - │ │ │ notice to Jewish tenants │ - │ │ │ before legal expiration of │ - │ │ │ lease. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2876-PS_ │ 4.7.39│I 1097 │_Zehnte Verordnung zum │Frick Rust - │ │ │ Reichsbuergergesetz_ (Tenth │Kerrl Hess - │ │ │ decree relating to the Reich│ - │ │ │ Citizenship Law), forcible │ - │ │ │ congregation of Jews in the │ - │ │ │ “Reichsvereinigung der Juden│ - │ │ │ in Deutschland”. │ - │ │ │ │ - _2877-PS_ │ 1.9.41│I 547 │_Polizeiverordnung ueber die │Heydrich - │ │ │ Konnzeichnung der Juden_ │ - │ │ │ (Police order concerning │ - │ │ │ identification of Jews) │ - │ │ │ forcing all Jews over 6 │ - │ │ │ years of age to wear the │ - │ │ │ Star of David. │ - -(5) _Extermination of German Jews._ Early in 1939 Hitler and the other -Nazi conspirators decided to arrive at a “final solution of the Jewish -problem.” In connection with preparations for aggressive war, further -consolidation of controls and removal of elements not belonging to the -_Volksgemeinschaft_ (racial community) were deemed necessary. The -conspirators also anticipated the conquest of territories in Eastern -Europe inhabitated by large numbers of Jews and the impossibility of -forcing large-scale emigration in wartime. Hence, other and more drastic -measures became necessary. The emphasis in this period shifted from -legislative acts to police measures. - -On 24 January 1939 Heydrich was charged with the mission of “arriving at -a solution of the Jewish problem.” (_710-PS_) - -On 15 January 1939 Rosenberg stated in a speech at Detmold: - - “For Germany the Jewish problem will be solved only when the - last Jew has left Germany.” - -On 7 February 1939, Rosenberg appealed to foreign nations to forget -“ideological differences” and unite against the “real enemy,” the Jew. -He advocated the creation of a “reservation” where the Jews of all -countries should be concentrated (_2843-PS_). In his Reichstag speech on -30 January 1939, Hitler made the following prophecy: - - “The result [of war] will be * * * the annihilation of the - Jewish race in Europe.” (_2663-PS_) - -Thus the direction was given for a policy which was carried out as soon -as the conquest of foreign territories created the material conditions. -(For the carrying out and results of the program of the Nazi -conspirators against Jewry, see Chapter XII.) - -In the final period of the anti-Jewish crusade very few legislative -measures were passed. The Jews were delivered to the SS and various -extermination staffs. The last law dealing with the Jews in Germany, -signed by Frick, Bormann, Schwerin V. Krosigk, and Thierach, put them -entirely outside the law and ordered the confiscation by the State of -the property of dead Jews (_1422-PS_). This law was a weak reflection of -a factual situation already in existence. Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, -assistant to Frick, stated at that time: - - “The aim of the racial legislation may be regarded as already - achieved and consequently the racial legislation as essentially - closed. It led to the temporary solution of the Jewish problem - and at the same time prepared the final solution. Many - regulations will lose their practical importance as Germany - approaches the achievement of the final goal in the Jewish - problem.” (_Stuckart and Schiedermair: Rassen und Erbpflege in - der Gesetzgebung des Reiches_ (The care for Race and Heredity in - the Legislation of the Reich), Leipzig, 1943, p. 14.) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ADOPTION AND - PUBLICATION OF THE PROGRAM FOR PERSECUTION OF JEWS - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │ │ - │ (d). │ I │ 20 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *710-PS │Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31 July│ │ - │1941, concerning solution of Jewish │ │ - │question. (USA 509) │ III │ 525 - │ │ │ - 1397-PS │Law for the reestablishment of the │ │ - │Professional Civil Service, 7 April │ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │175. │ III │ 981 - │ │ │ - 1401-PS │Law regarding admission to the Bar, 7 │ │ - │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │ - │I, p. 188. │ III │ 989 - │ │ │ - 1406-PS │Decree for reporting of Jewish-owned │ │ - │property, 26 April 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 414. │ III │ 1001 - │ │ │ - 1409-PS │Order concerning utilization of Jewish │ │ - │property, 3 December 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1709. │ IV │ 1 - │ │ │ - 1412-PS │Decree relating to payment of fine by │ │ - │Jews of German nationality, 12 November │ │ - │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │1579. │ IV │ 6 - │ │ │ - 1415-PS │Police regulation concerning appearance │ │ - │of Jews in public, 28 November 1938. │ │ - │1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1676.│ IV │ 6 - │ │ │ - 1416-PS │Reich Citizen Law of 15 September 1935. │ │ - │1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1146.│ IV │ 7 - │ │ │ - *1417-PS │First regulation to the Reichs │ │ - │Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935. 1935 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1333. (GB │ │ - │258) │ IV │ 8 - │ │ │ - 1419-PS │Law concerning Jewish tenants, 30 April │ │ - │1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │864. │ IV │ 10 - │ │ │ - 1422-PS │Thirteenth regulation under Reich │ │ - │Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943. 1943 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 372. │ IV │ 14 - │ │ │ - *1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │ - │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. (USA│ │ - │255; USA 324) │ IV │ 208 - │ │ │ - *1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │ - │The Jewish Question, under the │ │ - │Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, 12│ │ - │November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425 - │ │ │ - 2000-PS │Law for protection of German blood and │ │ - │German honor, 15 September 1935. 1935 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 100, p. │ │ - │1146. │ IV │ 636 - │ │ │ - 2022-PS │Law against overcrowding of German │ │ - │schools and Higher Institutions, 25 │ │ - │April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │ - │I, p. 225. │ IV │ 651 - │ │ │ - 2083-PS │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933. │ │ - │1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 713. │ IV │ 709 - │ │ │ - 2084-PS │Law on formation of the Student │ │ - │Organization at Scientific Univesities, │ │ - │22 April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 215. │ IV │ 718 - │ │ │ - *2409-PS │Extracts from The Imperial House to the │ │ - │Reich Chancellery by Dr. Joseph │ │ - │Goebbels. (USA 262) │ V │ 83 - │ │ │ - 2410-PS │Article by Julius Streicher on the │ │ - │“coming popular action” under banner │ │ - │headline “Beat the World Enemy”, from │ │ - │Voelkischer Beobachter, South German │ │ - │Edition, 31 March 1933. │ V │ 85 - │ │ │ - 2427-PS │The Racial Awakening of German Nation by│ │ - │Dr. Rudolf Frercks, in National │ │ - │Political Enlightenment Pamphlets. │ V │ 92 - │ │ │ - 2431-PS │The Revolution of the Germans; 14 years │ │ - │of National Socialism, by Dr. Joseph │ │ - │Goebbels. │ V │ 92 - │ │ │ - 2432-PS │Extracts from Rosenberg’s, Writings From│ │ - │The Years, 1921-1923. │ V │ 93 - │ │ │ - *2663-PS │Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag, 30 │ │ - │January 1939, quoted from Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Munich edition, 1 February │ │ - │1939. (USA 268) │ V │ 367 - │ │ │ - 2840-PS │Dr. Wilhelm Frick and his Ministry, │ │ - │1937, p. 180-181. │ V │ 503 - │ │ │ - 2841-PS │Extract from the Care for Race and │ │ - │Heredity in the Legislation of the │ │ - │Reich, Leipzig, 1943, p. 14. │ V │ 504 - │ │ │ - 2842-PS │Extract from Writings of the years, │ │ - │1917-21, by Alfred Rosenberg, published │ │ - │in Munich 1943, pp. 320-321. │ V │ 504 - │ │ │ - 2843-PS │Race Politics from Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Vol. VII, pp. 728-729. │ V │ 505 - │ │ │ - 2844-PS │The Program of the Nazi Party, by │ │ - │Gottfried Feder, August 1927, Munich, p.│ │ - │17. │ V │ 506 - │ │ │ - 2845-PS │One Year of Racial Political Education │ │ - │by Dr. Gross in National Socialist │ │ - │Monthly No. 54, September 1934, pp. │ │ - │833-834. │ V │ 506 - │ │ │ - 2868-PS │Law relating to admission of profession │ │ - │of Patent-Agent and Lawyer, 22 April │ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, │ │ - │No. 41, pp. 217-8. │ V │ 529 - │ │ │ - 2869-PS │Law relating to admission of Tax │ │ - │Advisors, 6 May 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 49, p. │ │ - │257. │ V │ 530 - │ │ │ - 2870-PS │Executory decree for law about repeal of│ │ - │Naturalization and Adjudication of │ │ - │German Citizenship, 26 July 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 538. │ V │ 530 - │ │ │ - 2871-PS │Law governing elections to Reichstag, 7 │ │ - │March 1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, No. │ │ - │19, p. 133. │ V │ 532 - │ │ │ - 2872-PS │Fourth decree relative to Reich Citizen │ │ - │Law of 25 July 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 969. │ V │ 533 - │ │ │ - 2873-PS │Second decree allotting to │ │ - │Implementation of Law on change of first│ │ - │and family names, 17 August 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1044. │ V │ 534 - │ │ │ - 2874-PS │Fifth decree to law relating to Reich │ │ - │Citizenship, 27 September 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 165, p. │ │ - │1403. │ V │ 535 - │ │ │ - 2875-PS │Decree on exclusion of Jews from German │ │ - │economic life, 12 November 1938. │ V │ 536 - │ │ │ - 2876-PS │Tenth decree relating to Reich │ │ - │Citizenship Law, 4 July 1939. 1939 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1097. │ V │ 537 - │ │ │ - 2877-PS │Police decree concerning “marking” of │ │ - │Jews, 1 September 1941. 1941 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 100, p. │ │ - │547. │ V │ 539 - │ │ │ - 2881-PS │Hitler’s speech of 12 April 1922, quoted│ │ - │in Adolf Hitler’s Speeches, published by│ │ - │Dr. Ernst Boepple, Munich, 1934, pp. │ │ - │20-21, 72. │ V │ 548 - │ │ │ - 2893-PS │Article: “Dr. Frick and the Unity of the│ │ - │Reich” by Walter Koerber, published in │ │ - │Our Reich Cabinet, Berlin, 1936, p. 87. │ V │ 562 - │ │ │ - 2894-PS │General Decree of September 10, 1935 on │ │ - │establishment of separate Jewish │ │ - │schools, published in Documents of │ │ - │German Politics, 1937, p. 152. │ V │ 562 - │ │ │ - 2904-PS │The Racial Problem and the New Reich, │ │ - │published in The National Socialist │ │ - │Monthly, No. 38, May 1933, pp.196-7. │ V │ 570 - │ │ │ - 2984-PS │Law concerning armed forces, 21 May │ │ - │1935. 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I. │ V │ 686 - │ │ │ - *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - - - 8. RESHAPING OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF YOUTH - -A. _The Nazi conspirators reshaped the educational system._ - -(1) _The Nazi conspirators publicly announced the purposes of their -educational and training program._ Hitler stated at Elbing, Germany: - - “When an opponent declares, ‘I will not come over to your side, - and you will not get me on your side,’ I calmly say, ‘Your child - belongs to me already. A people lives forever. What are you? You - will pass on. Your descendants however now stand in the new - camp. _In a short time they will know nothing else but this new - community.’_” (_2455-PS_) - -Hitler said on 1 May 1937: - - “The youth of today is ever the people of tomorrow. For this - reason we have set before ourselves the task of inoculating our - youth with the spirit of this community of the people at a very - early age, at an age when human beings are still unperverted and - therefore unspoiled. * * * This Reich stands, and it is building - itself up for the future, upon its youth. And this new Reich - will give its youth to no one, _but will itself take youth and - give to youth its own education and its own upbringing_.” - (_2454-PS_) - -The first sentence in the official instructors manual for high schools -reads: - - “The German school is a part of the National Socialist - Educational order. It is its obligation to form the national - socialistic personality in cooperation with the other - educational powers of the nation, but by its distinctive - educational means.” (_2453-PS_) - -Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_: - - “On this basis the whole education by the National State must - aim primarily not at the stuffing with mere knowledge, but at - the building up of bodies which are physically healthy to the - core. The development of intellectual faculties comes only after - this.” (_2392-PS_) - -(2) _They transferred responsibility for education from the states to -the Reich._ The Reich Ministry of Education was established, and control -of all schools, public and private, including universities and adult -educational activities, was transferred to this Reichsministry -(_2078-PS_; _2088-PS_). The control of education by the local -authorities was replaced by the absolute authority of the Reich in all -educational matters. (_2393-PS_) - -(3) _They changed the curricula and textbooks._ - -_Kindergarten_: Children from two to six years were trained in more than -15,000 Kindergartens operated by the Party and State. The teachers in -charge were trained in special schools that emphasized the ideological -views of the Nazi Party. The children were given a systematic training -in Nazi ideology. (_2443-PS_; _2441-PS_) - -_Elementary schools_: Primary emphasis was placed on physical training. -History, German race culture and mathematics were the other subjects -emphasized. These subjects were taught in such a way as to emphasize the -cultural superiority of the German people, the importance of race, the -Fuehrer principle, glorification of German war heroes, the subversive -elements that caused the defeat of Germany in World War I, the shame of -the Versailles Treaty, and the rebirth of Germany under the Nazis. -(_2392-PS_; _2397-PS_; _2441-PS_; _2394-PS_) - -In addition to education in the schools all children from six to ten -years were registered in the _Kindergruppen_ (Children’s Groups) -conducted by the National Socialist _Frauenschaft_ (National Socialist -Women’s Organization). All children were required to obtain an -efficiency record card and uniform and were instructed in Nazi ideology -by the members of the Women’s Organization. (_2441-PS_; _2452-PS_) - -_High Schools_ (Hoeheren Schule): The curricula and organization of the -_Hoeheren_ School was modified by a series of decrees of the Minister of -Education in order to make these schools effective instruments for the -teaching of the Nazi doctrines. A new curricula emphasizing physical -training, German war history, and race culture was introduced. -(_2453-PS_) - -_Universities_: The schools of politics and physical education became -the largest colleges at the universities. Beginning in 1933 the Nazis -introduced courses in heredity and race culture, ancient and modern -German history, biology and geopolitics. (_2443-PS_; _2441-PS_) - -Textbooks in the schools were changed to accord with the expressed -objectives of the Nazi conspirators. (_2446-PS_; _2442-PS_; _2444-PS_; -_2445-PS_) - -(4) _The Nazi conspirators acquired domination and control over all -teachers._ The law for the reestablishing of the professional civil -service made it possible for the Nazi conspirators thoroughly to -reexamine all German teachers and to remove all “harmful and -untrustworthy” elements (_1397-PS_; _2392-PS_). Many teachers and -professors (mostly Jewish) were dismissed and were replaced with “State -spirited” teachers (_2392-PS_). All teachers were required to take an -oath of loyalty and obedience to Hitler. (_2061-PS_). All teachers were -required to belong to the National Socialist _Lehrerbund_ (National -Socialist Teachers League), which organization was charged with the -training of all teachers in the theories and doctrines of the NSDAP. -(_2452-PS_) - -In 1934 the National Socialist Teachers League was declared to be the -official organ of German education. (_2393-PS_) - -The Civil Service Act of 1937 required the teachers to be “the executors -of the will of the party-supported State.” It required them to be ready -at “any time to defend without reservation the National Socialist -State.” The law required the teachers to participate strenuously in -elections, have thorough knowledge of Party principles and literature, -render the Hitler Salute, send their children to the Hitler Youth, and -educate them in the Nazi spirit (_2340-PS_). Before taking their second -examination (required for permanent appointment), teachers in Prussia -were required to show service in the SA and in the _Arbeitsdienst_ -(Labor Service) (_2392-PS_). Candidates for teaching and other public -positions were required to have “proved themselves” in the Hitler Jugend -(_2451-PS_; _2900-PS_). Teachers’ academies were judged by the Minister -of Education on their ability to turn out men and women with new ideas -“based on blood and soil”. (_2394-PS_) - -The leadership principle replaced the democratic school principle. A -decree of the Reich Minister of Education made the head of any school -fully responsible for the conduct of the institution in line with the -official party ideology. Teachers committees and Student Committees were -abolished (_2393-PS_; _2392-PS_). A “confidential instructor,” the -school youth warden of the Hitler Jugend, appointed by the Hitler Youth -authorities, was assigned to each school (_2396-PS_). The “Parents -Advisory Committees” in the public schools were dissolved, and replaced -by the “School Communities,” (_Schulgemeinde_). The headmaster was the -leader. He appointed, after consultation with the local party leader, -two to five teachers or parents, known as “_Jugendwalter_,” (Youth -Advisors) and one Hitler Youth leader, who was appointed after -consultation with the Hitler Youth officials in the district -(_2399-PS_). The duties of the “School Community” were to bring to the -attention of the public the educational objectives of the Nazi Party, -including race questions, heredity indoctrination, physical training, -and the Youth League activities. The function of advising the school -authorities, formerly performed by the “Parents Advisory Committees,” -was eliminated by the decree. (_2399-PS_) - -_Universities_: The Leadership Principle was introduced into the -universities. The _Rektor_ (head of the university) was appointed by the -Reich Minister of Education for an unspecified period of time and was -responsible only to the Reichs Minister. The University was divided into -the _Dozentenschaft_ (Lecturers Corps) and the _Studentenschaft_ -(Student Corps). The leaders of these two bodies were also appointed by -the Reichsminister of Education (_2394-PS_). The teaching staff of the -university was subject to the control of the National Socialist -_Dozentenbund_ (NSDoB) (Nazi Association of University Lecturers). The -purposes of the NSDoB were: - -(_a_) to take a decisive part in the selection of lecturers and to -produce candidates for the teaching staff who were wholly Nazi in their -outlook. - -(_b_) to train all university lecturers in Nazi ideology, - -(_c_) to see that the entire university life was run in accordance with -the philosophy of the Party. (_2452-PS_; _318-PS_) - -All German students at the universities were required to belong to the -_Studentenschaft_ (Student Corps) (_2084-PS_). The Student Corps was -responsible for making the students conscious of their duties to the -Nazis, and was obliged to promote enrollment in the SA and labor -service. Physical training of students was the responsibility of the SA. -Political education was the responsibility of the -_National-Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund_ (NSDStB), (National -Socialist German Student Bund) (_2458-PS_). The National Socialist -Student Bund (NSDStB) was the Nazi “elite” of the student body and was -responsible for the leadership of the university students, and all -leaders of the Student Corps were appointed from its membership. The -Nazi Student Bund was solely responsible for the entire ideological and -political education of the students. (_2395-PS_; _2399-PS_; _2441-PS_; -_2392-PS_; _2393-PS_) - -B. _The Nazi conspirators supplemented the school system by training the -youth through the Hitler Jugend._ - -(1) _The Nazi conspirators from their early days expressed their belief -in the fundamental importance of controlling the education and training -of youth._ Hitler stated in _Mein Kampf_: - - “It is precisely our German people, that today broken down, lies - defenseless against the kicks of the rest of the world who need - that suggestive force that lies in self-confidence. But this - _self-confidence has to be instilled_ into the young - fellow-citizen from childhood on. His entire education and - development has to be directed at giving him _the conviction_ - _of being absolutely superior to others_. With this physical - force and skill he has again to win the belief in the - invincibility of his entire nationality. For what once led the - German army to victory was the sum of the confidence which the - individual and all in common had in their leaders. The - confidence in _the possibility of regaining its freedom_ is what - will restore the German people. But this conviction must be the - final product of the same feeling of millions of individuals.” - (_404-PS_; see also _2901-PS_) - -Again in _Mein Kampf_ Hitler said: - - “The racial State will have to see to it that there will be a - generation which by a suitable education will be ready for the - final and ultimate decision on this globe. The nation which - enters first on this course will be the victorious one.” - (_404-PS_) - -The law of the Hitler Youth provides in part as follows: - - “The future of the German nation depends on its youth, and the - German youth shall have to be prepared for its future duties. * - * * - - “The German youth besides being reared within the family and - school, shall be educated physically, intellectually and morally - in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people and - community, through the Hitler Youth.” (_1392-PS_) - -On May 1, 1938 Hitler said in a speech to the youth: - - “Since the victory of the Movement, under whose banner you - stand, there has been completed within our people the - unification of heart (innere Einigung) of the Germans. And as - wages for this work of ours Providence has given us Greater - Germany (Grossdeutschland). _This unification is no gift of - chance, it is the result of a systematic education of our people - by the National Socialist Movement._ . . . . And this education - begins with the individual at an age when he is not already - burdened with preconceived ideas. The youth is the stone which - is to go to the building of our new Reich! You are Greater - Germany! In you is being formed the community of the German - people. Before the single leader there stands a Reich, before - the single Reich stands a people, and before the single people - stands German youth! When I see you my faith in the future of - Germany has no bounds, nothing can shake it. For I know that you - will fulfill all that we hope of you. So I greet you today on - this 1st of May in our new great Germany: for you are our - spring. In you will and shall be completed that for which - generations and centuries have striven, Germany!” (_2454-PS_) - -(2) _The Nazi conspirators destroyed or took over all other youth -organizations._ The first Nazi youth League (_Nationalsocialistischen -Jugendbund_) was organized in 1922. In 1925 the Hitler Youth was -officially recognized by the Nazi Party and became a Junior Branch of -the SA. In 1931 Baldur von Schirach was appointed Reichs Youth Leader of -the NSDAP with the rank of SA _Gruppenfuehrer_. (_1458-PS_) - -When the Nazi conspirators came to power the Hitler Jugend was a minor -organization among many youth associations in Germany. At the end of -1932 it had only 107,956 members—less than 5 percent of the total youth -population of Germany (_2435-PS_). Schirach was appointed -“_Jugendfuehrer des Deutschen Reichs_” (Youth Leader of the German -Reich), in June 1933. In this position he was directly responsible to -Hitler for the education and training of the German youth outside of the -home and school in accordance with the ideology of the Nazi Party. -(_1458-PS_) - -In June of 1933 on orders of Schirach, an armed band of Hitler youths -occupied by force the headquarters of the Reich Committee of The German -Youth Associations and took over all files and personnel records of the -youth leagues represented by the Committee. By the same method the -offices and property (including all youth hostels in Germany) of the -Reich Association for German Youth Hostels was seized, and a Nazi -representative of Schirach put in charge (_1458-PS_). By decree dated 22 -June 1933 Schirach dissolved the Grossdeutsches Bund and all of its -affiliated organizations and took over their property; he dissolved The -Reich Committee of The German Youth Associations, and required all other -youth organizations to make a complete report of all organizational -information, including names of all officers and members and inventory -of all funds and property (_2229-PS_). The Youth Associations of all -political parties and of all labor organizations were dissolved by -decree of Schirach. By virtue of these decrees all youth organizations -except those sponsored by the Catholic and Protestant Churches were -abolished or incorporated in the Hitler Jugend (_1458-PS_; _2260-PS_). -The Nazi-appointed Reichsbishop Mueller entered into an agreement with -Schirach which transferred all members of the Evangelical Youth to the -Hitler Jugend and provided that the Hitler Jugend alone would provide -the state political and physical education of the Protestant youth. By -the end of 1933 only the Catholic Youth organization remained untouched. -(_1458-PS_) - -The Concordat entered into with the Holy See on July 20, 1933 provided -for the continuance of the Catholic Youth Association (_2655-PS_). -Contrary to the provisions of the Concordat, the Nazi conspirators -immediately set out to smash the Catholic Youth organization and to -force all young people into the Hitler Youth. Ten days after the signing -of the Concordat, Schirach issued an order forbidding simultaneous -membership in the Hitler Jugend and the Catholic Youth League -(_2456-PS_). In 1934 Schirach wrote, “The denominational youth league -(Catholic Youth Association) has no right to exist in our time.” -(_1458-PS_). A year later Catholic youth associations were forbidden to -wear uniforms, to assemble publicly, to wear insignia, or to engage in -outdoor sport activity (_1482-PS_). Additional pressure was exerted on -the Catholic Youth by the requirement of membership in the Hitler Youth -as a prerequisite of public employment (_2451-PS_; _2900-PS_). Finally, -in 1937, Schirach announced: - - “_The struggle for the unification of the German Youth is - finished._ I considered it as my duty to conduct it in a hard - and uncompromising manner. Many might not have realized why we - went through so much trouble for the sake of the youth. And yet - the National Socialist German Workers Party, whose trustee I - felt I always was and always will be, this party considered _the - struggle for the youth as the decisive element_ for the future - of the German nation.” (_2306-PS_) - -(3) _The Nazi conspirators made membership in the Hitler Jugend -compulsory._ The Hitler Youth Law of 1936 provided that “All of the -German Youth in the Reich is organized within the Hitler Youth.” -(_1392-PS_). Executive decrees later implemented this law by the -establishment of severe penalties against anyone who deterred a youth -from service in the Hitler Jugend, and confirmed the policy of excluding -Jews from membership. - -The Hitler Jugend had been from its inception a formation of the Nazi -Party. By virtue of the 1936 Youth Law it became an agency of the Reich -Government while still retaining its position as a formation of the Nazi -Party. (_1392-PS_). - -The membership statistics of the Hitler Jugend to 1940 were: - - End 1932 107,956 - End 1933 2,292,041 - End 1934 3,577,565 - End 1935 3,943,303 - End 1936 5,437,601 - End 1937 5,879,955 - End 1938 7,031,226 - End 1939 7,728,259 - -And BDM (League of German Girls)—440,789. (_2435-PS_) - -(4) _Through the Hitler Jugend the Nazi conspirators imbued the youth -with Nazi ideology and prepared them for membership in the Party and its -formations._ Schirach said: - - “I am responsible to the Reich that the entire youth of Germany - will be educated physically, morally and spiritually in the - spirit of the National Socialist Idea of the State.” (_2306-PS_) - -_Mein Kampf_ was regarded as the “Bible” of the Hitler Jugend -(_1458-PS_). On entering the _Jungvolk_ at the age of 10, children took -the following oath: - - “In the presence of this blood-banner which represents our - Fuehrer I swear to devote all my energies, and my strength to - the Savior of our Country, Adolf Hitler. I am willing and ready - to give up my life for him, so help me God. One People, one - Reich, one Fuehrer.” (_2441-PS_) - -The Hitler Jugend organization operated solely on the Leadership -Principle. The leader was always appointed from above and the leader’s -will was absolute. (_1458-PS_; _2306-PS_; _2436-PS_; _2438-PS_) - -The Master Race doctrine and anti-semitism, including physical attacks -on the Jews, was taught systematically in the Hitler Jugend training -program. (_2436-PS_; _L-360-H_; _2441-PS_) - -The Hitler Jugend indoctrinated the youth with the idea that war is a -noble activity. (_1458-PS_; _2436-PS_) - -The Hitler Jugend, in accordance with the policy of the Nazi Party, -emphasized the importance and demanded the return of the colonies which -had been taken from Germany by the “Versailles Shame Dictate.” -(_1458-PS_; _2436-PS_; _2440-PS_; _2441-PS_) - -The Hitler Jugend taught that the guiding principle of German policy was -the utilization of the space to the East (_1458-PS_; _2439-PS_). All -activities carried on in support of the demands for modification of the -Versailles Treaty, the restoration of colonies, and the acquisition of -additional living space were closely coordinated with the (VDA) _Verein -fuer das Deutschtum in Ausland_ (Office of Germans in foreign -countries). (_L-360-H_) - -In order to carry out the program of indoctrination of the youth, more -than 765,000 were actively engaged as Hitler Youth leaders by May 1939. -Youth leaders were thoroughly trained, many of them in special “Youth -Leaders” schools (_2435-PS_). More than 200,000 political indoctrination -meetings (_Heimabend_) were held weekly. Each community was required by -law to provide a suitable meeting house for the Hitler Jugend. Training -and propaganda films were produced on an elaborate scale. In the winter -of 1937-38 more than three million youths attended showings of these -films. The Hitler Jugend press and propaganda office published at least -thirteen magazines and large numbers of other publications and yearbooks -appealing to all age groups and to the various interest groups of the -youth. (_2435-PS_) - -One of the most important functions of the Hitler Jugend was to prepare -the youth for membership in the Party and its formations. Hitler said at -the Reichsparteitag, 1935: - - “He alone, who owns the youth, gains the Future! Practical - consequences of this doctrine: The boy will enter the _Jungvolk_ - (boy 10-14) and the _Pimpf_ (members of the _Jungvolk_) will - come to the Hitler Youth, and the boy of the Hitler Youth will - join the SA, the SS and the other formations, and the SA man and - the SS man will one day join the Labor Service, and from there - he will go to the Armed Forces, and the soldiers of the people - will return again to the organization of Movement, the Party, - the SA, the SS, and never again will our people be so depraved - as they were at one time.” (_2656-PS_; _2401-PS_) - -The _Streifendienst_, a special formation of the Hitler Jugend, was -organized by virtue of an agreement between Himmler and Schirach for the -purpose of securing and training recruits for the SS, with special -emphasis on securing recruits for the Deaths Head Troops of the SS -(concentration camp guards). (_2396-PS_) - -The farm service section of the Hitler Jugend also became a cadet corps -of the SS by reason of the agreement entered into between Himmler and -Schirach in 1938. This formation was to train for SS membership youths -especially suited to become _Wehrbauer_ (militant peasants), who were to -be settled in places where the Nazis needed especially trained farmers. -(_2567-PS_) - -In 1937 the Adolf Hitler Schools were established in order to -indoctrinate boys selected by the Party to be the future leaders of the -Nazi state. The schools were operated by the Hitler Jugend for the -Party. Boys entered at the age of 12 and remained in the school until 18 -years of age. (_2653-PS_) - -(5) _The Nazi conspirators used the Hitler Jugend for extensive -pre-military training of youth._ In 1933 the Hitler Youth, in -cooperation with the SA and the Wehrmacht, entered into a secret program -of extensive pre-military training of the youth (_1850-PS_). Extensive -pre-military training was carried on in all age groups of the Hitler -Youth in close cooperation with the Wehrmacht. (_2438-PS_; _2441-PS_; -_1992-PS_) - -In addition to general military training, specialized training was given -in special formations. These included: - - Hitler Jugend Flying Units - - Hitler Jugend Naval Units - - Hitler Jugend Motorized Units - - Hitler Jugend Signal Units - - Hitler Jugend Medical Units - - Hitler Jugend Musical Units. (_2654-PS_). - -The extent of the military training in 1937 was set out by Hitler in a -speech at Berlin. - - “The Naval Hitler Youth comprises 45,000 boys, the Motor Hitler - Youth 60,000 boys. As part of the campaign for the encouragement - of aviation 55,000 members of the Jungvolk were trained in - gliding for group activities; 74,000 boys of the Hitler Youth - are organized in its flying units; 15,000 boys passed their - gliding test in the year 1937 alone. - - “Today 1,200,000 boys of the Hitler Youth receive regular - instructions in small-bore rifle shooting from 7,000 - instructors.” (_2454-PS_; see also _2441-PS_.) - -A formal agreement between the Wehrmacht and the Hitler Jugend was -published 11 August 1939. It recites that whereas 30,000 Hitler Jugend -leaders had been trained annually in shooting and field exercises, the -number would be doubled; that 60,000,000 shots had been fired in Hitler -Youth training courses in 1938 and that a considerable increase in the -figure was expected. The agreement recognized the close cooperation that -existed between the Hitler Jugend and the Wehrmacht in the military -training of youth and provided for a far more extensive program. -(_2398-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO RESHAPING OF - EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF YOUTH - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │ │ - │ (e). │ I │ 21 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - 200-PS │Confidential telegram from Berger to │ │ - │Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern │ │ - │Territories, 8 July 1944 concerning │ │ - │forced labor of children. │ III │ 214 - │ │ │ - *318-PS │Agreement between Rosenberg and Leader │ │ - │of the National Socialist University │ │ - │Professors League (NSDoB), 2 December │ │ - │1941. (USA 728) │ III │ 255 - │ │ │ - *404-PS │Excerpts from Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. │ │ - │456, 475. (USA 256) │ III │ 385 - │ │ │ - 1392-PS │Law on the Hitler Youth, 1 December │ │ - │1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │993. │ III │ 972 - │ │ │ - 1397-PS │Law for the reestablishment of the │ │ - │Professional Civil Service, 7 April │ │ - │1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │175. │ III │ 981 - │ │ │ -*1458-PS │The Hitler Youth by Baldur von Schirach,│ │ - │Leipzig, 1934. (USA 667) │ IV │ 22 - │ │ │ - 1462-PS │First Execution Order to the Law of the │ │ - │Hitler Youth, 25 March 1939. 1939 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 709. │ IV │ 44 - │ │ │ -*1482-PS │Secret letter, 20 July 1933 to │ │ - │provincial governments and the Prussian │ │ - │Gestapo from Frick, concerning │ │ - │Confessional Youth Organizations. (USA │ │ - │738) │ IV │ 51 - │ │ │ -*1850-PS │Conferences, 1933, calling for financing│ │ - │of military training of SA from Ministry│ │ - │of Interior Funds. (USA 742) │ IV │ 478 - │ │ │ -*1992-A-PS │Organization and Obligations of the SS │ │ - │and the Police from “National Political │ │ - │Education of the Army, January 1937”. │ │ - │(USA 439). │ IV │ 616 - │ │ │ - 2061-PS │Oath of Reich Officials and of German │ │ - │Soldiers, 20 August 1934. 1934 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 785. │ IV │ 702 - │ │ │ - 2078-PS │Decree concerning establishment of │ │ - │Ministry for Science, Education and │ │ - │Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365. │ IV │ 706 - │ │ │ - 2084-PS │Law on formation of the Student │ │ - │Organization at Scientific Universities,│ │ - │22 April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 215. │ IV │ 718 - │ │ │ - 2088-PS │Decree relating to tasks of Reichs │ │ - │Ministry for Education, 11 May 1934. │ │ - │1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 375. │ IV │ 718 - │ │ │ - 2115-PS │Second Executive Order to the Law for │ │ - │the Hitler Youth, 25 March 1939. 1939 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 710. │ IV │ 745 - │ │ │ -*2229-PS │The Reich Youth Leader at Work, │ │ - │published in National Socialist Party │ │ - │Press Service Release, 22 June 1933, pp.│ │ - │2-3. (USA 668) │ IV │ 870 - │ │ │ - 2260-PS │Settlement of Relationship between NSDAP│ │ - │and Stahlhelm (Steel Helmets) published │ │ - │in National Socialist Party Press │ │ - │Service release, 21 June 1933. │ IV │ 933 - │ │ │ -*2306-PS │Revolution of Education, by Baldur von │ │ - │Schirach, 1938, pp. 51-52, 63. (USA 860)│ IV │ 997 - │ │ │ - 2340-PS │German public officials law of 27 │ │ - │January 1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 41. │ IV │ 1058 - │ │ │ - 2392-PS │Extracts from The Third Reich, 1933, │ │ - │Vol. I, pp. 144-154. │ V │ 54 - │ │ │ - 2393-PS │Extracts from The Third Reich, 1934, │ │ - │[Vol. II], pp. 218-224. │ V │ 58 - │ │ │ - 2394-PS │Extracts from The Third Reich, 1935, │ │ - │Vol. III, pp. 208-212. │ V │ 60 - │ │ │ - 2395-PS │Extracts from The Third Reich, 1936, │ │ - │Vol. IV, pp. 360-362. │ V │ 62 - │ │ │ -*2396-PS │Handbook of Collected Youth Laws, Vol. │ │ - │I, Group 1, pp. 19a, 19b, 20. (USA 673) │ V │ 63 - │ │ │ - 2397-PS │National Socialist Handbook for Law and │ │ - │Legislation by Dr. Hans Frank, p. 566. │ V │ 65 - │ │ │ -*2398-PS │Cooperation of Hitler Jugend with │ │ - │Wehrmacht, 11 August 1939, published in │ │ - │The Archive, No. 65, August 1939, pp. │ │ - │601-602. (USA 677) │ V │ 66 - │ │ │ - 2399-PS │Articles “School Community to replace │ │ - │parents’ advisory committee” and “NSDAP │ │ - │takes over education of university │ │ - │students”, published in The Archive, │ │ - │1934, pp. 1039, 1147-1148. │ V │ 67 - │ │ │ -*2401-PS │The Hitler Youth as recruits for future │ │ - │leaders, from Organization Book of │ │ - │NSDAP, 1938, pp. 80-81. (USA 430) │ V │ 69 - │ │ │ - 2435-PS │Extracts from The Coming Germany, The │ │ - │Education of the Youth in the Reich of │ │ - │Adolf Hitler, by Kaufmann. │ V │ 113 - │ │ │ -*2436-PS │Extracts from Enjoyment, Discipline, │ │ - │Belief, Official handbook for cultural │ │ - │work in camp. (USA 859) │ V │ 119 - │ │ │ - 2438-PS │Extracts from Boys in Service, handbook │ │ - │for boys 10 to 14 years of age. │ V │ 132 - │ │ │ - 2439-PS │Extracts from Girl in Vacation Camp, │ │ - │official publication of Reichs Youth │ │ - │Headquarters. │ V │ 136 - │ │ │ - 2440-PS │Extracts from Boys, Your World, the │ │ - │yearbook of the Hitler Youth. │ V │ 139 - │ │ │ -*2441-PS │Affidavit of Gregor Ziemer, 4 October │ │ - │1945, from his book “Education for │ │ - │Death”. (USA 679) │ V │ 141 - │ │ │ - 2442-PS │Guide of racial science and science of │ │ - │heredity of fostering congenitally sound│ │ - │progeny of family science. │ V │ 176 - │ │ │ - 2443-PS │Extracts from Education in the Greater │ │ - │German Reich. │ V │ 178 - │ │ │ - 2444-PS │Extracts from German Reading Book for │ │ - │Elementary Schools, second volume. │ V │ 181 - │ │ │ - 2445-PS │Extracts from German Reading Book for │ │ - │Elementary Schools, fourth volume. │ V │ 183 - │ │ │ - 2446-PS │Extracts from History Book for the │ │ - │German Youth. │ V │ 184 - │ │ │ - 2451-PS │Decree of Reichsminister of Education │ │ - │Candidates for Teacher’s Positions to │ │ - │Prove themselves in Hitler Youth, │ │ - │published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │ - │Berlin edition, 22 October 1935. │ V │ 187 - │ │ │ - 2452-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of │ │ - │NSDAP, 1943. │ V │ 187 - │ │ │ - 2453-PS │Education and Instruction in the │ │ - │Upper Schools, official publication of │ │ - │the Reich and Prussian Minister of │ │ - │Education, 1938. │ V │ 189 - │ │ │ -*2454-PS │Quotations from speeches of Hitler, │ │ - │published in Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │ - │Munich edition. (USA 676) │ V │ 196 - │ │ │ - 2455-PS │Statement by Hitler at Elbing, Germany, │ │ - │quoted in Voelkischer Beobachter, Berlin│ │ - │edition, 6 November 1933. │ V │ 198 - │ │ │ - 2456-PS │Youth and the Church, from Complete │ │ - │Handbook of Youth Laws. │ V │ 198 - │ │ │ - 2458-PS │Constitution of the German Student │ │ - │Corps, 1934 Reichs Ministerialblatt, pp.│ │ - │76-79. │ V │ 199 - │ │ │ -*2567-PS │Decree signed by Himmler and von │ │ - │Schirach, concerning cooperation of HJ │ │ - │and SS, printed in The Young Germany, │ │ - │Berlin, February 1939. (USA 674) │ V │ 301 - │ │ │ -*2653-PS │The Way of German Youth, from The Third │ │ - │Reich, 5th Year, 1937, pp. 117-118. (USA│ │ - │669) │ V │ 359 - │ │ │ -*2654-PS │Organization and Insignia of the Hitler │ │ - │Youth, edited by Reich Youth │ │ - │Headquarters of NSDAP. (USA 675) │ V │ 361 - │ │ │ - 2655-PS │Concordat between the Holy See and the │ │ - │German Reich, Article 31. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, p. 679, │ │ - │687-8. │ V │ 364 - │ │ │ - 2656-PS │The Bearer of Sovereignty, from speech │ │ - │of the Fuehrer at the Reichsparteitag, │ │ - │1935. │ V │ 365 - │ │ │ - 2900-PS │Speech by Frick at Anniversary meeting │ │ - │of Hitler Youth, published in The │ │ - │Archive, January 1936, p. 1339. │ V │ 567 - │ │ │ - 2901-PS │Extract from The Book of the NSDAP, p. │ │ - │95. │ V │ 568 - │ │ │ -*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ -*3751-PS │Diary of the German Minister of Justice,│ │ - │1935 concerning prosecution of church │ │ - │officials and punishment in │ │ - │concentration camps. (USA 828; USA 858) │ VI │ 636 - │ │ │ -*L-360-H │Agreement between the League for │ │ - │Germandom in Foreign Countries and the │ │ - │Hitler Youth, 6 May 1933. (USA 671) │ VII │ 1108 - │ │ │ -*Chart No. 2 │Totalitarian Control of Propaganda and │ │ - │Education. (USA 21) │ VIII │ 771 - - - 9. PROPAGANDA, CENSORSHIP AND SUPERVISION - OF CULTURAL ACTIVITIES - -A. _The party organization._ - -(1) _The Reichspropagandaleitung_ (Party Propaganda Department) (RPL). -This office was founded in 1932, as the central propaganda control -office headed by Goebbels. Its functions were: - -(_a_) To direct, supervise and synchronize propaganda within the Nazi -movement. - - “Propaganda of the NSDAP, its formations and affiliated - associations is the responsibility of the - _Reichspropagandaleiter_. - - “He determines all manifestations of the Movement, including its - formations and affiliated associations, with regard to - propaganda. - - “He issues the directives for the Party, including its - formations and affiliated associations, for the realization of - the cultural wishes of the Fuehrer.” (_2319-PS_) - -These functions were organized vertically through a close network of -_Gauleiters_, _Kreisleiters_, and _Ortsgruppenleiters_ which reached -even the smallest communities. In addition, synchronization of -propaganda within the Movement was guaranteed through the _Reichsring -fuer National-Sozialistische Propaganda und Volksaufklaerung_, (National -Socialist Organization for Propaganda and People’s Enlightenment), an -office within the _Reichspropagandaleitung_. The _Reichsring_ -constituted the center of control responsible for the complete -coordination of Party and Movement in the field of propaganda. - - “The _Reichsring_ * * * had the task to ensure the uniform - direction of propaganda of all formations and affiliated - associations through the Party.” (_2319-PS_) - -(_b_) To imbue the Nazi Movement and the people with Nazi ideology. - - “(The _Reichspropagandaleiter_) upon his initiative, is - concerned with the permeation of German people with the National - Socialist ideology. - - “He enlightens the people about the achievements of Party and - State. - - “He controls the entire German wireless system with regard to - its internal organizational, cultural and economic - possibilities; - - “Press, radio and film are in the service of propaganda.” - (_2319-PS_) - -(c) To coordinate Party propaganda with that of the Reich Government. - - “The liaison officer has the task of centralizing all contacts - with the Reich Ministries, public authorities, and corporations - and to establish all such contacts with same * * *”. (_2319-PS_) - -(_d_) To investigate the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda. This function -was assigned to the lower grades of the Party leadership, and to -regional and local officials, who assembled and analyzed information on -public reaction to the current content of propaganda. - -(_e_) Other activities of the _Reichspropagandaleitung_ were discharged -by numerous functional departments which included, _inter alia_, -“_Hauptstellen_” (Main Bureaus) or offices for the following: - -_1._ _Press_—preparation of all propaganda material issued by - _Reichspropagandaleitung_ for dissemination to newspapers. -_2._ _Exhibits and fairs_—supervision of propaganda aspects of exhibits - and fairs in which the Party participated. -_3._ _Mass or “Aktive” propaganda_—organization of propaganda campaigns - within the movement; training and supplying speakers with - propaganda materials. -_4._ _Films_—Popularization of Nazi-inspired films; photographing official - rallies. -_5._ _Radio_—radio propaganda. -_6._ _Culture_—making all forms of art conform to Nazi standards. - -Other Bureaus included Architecture, Style and Design, Works of Art, -Formulation of Programs, and Training of Speakers. (_2319-PS_) - -The _Reichspropagandaleitung_ was regionally organized into _Gau-_, -_Kreis-_, and _Ortsgruppenpropagandaaemter_ (_Gau_, district, and local -propaganda offices). The _Gaupropagandaleiter_ (leader of the _Gau_ -propaganda office) was at the same time the _Gau_ representative of the -Chamber of Culture (_Landeskulturwalter_) and in most cases also -represented the regional office of the Propaganda Ministry, so that on -the lower levels, Party and State propaganda were completely unified. -(_2315-PS_) - -(2) _The office of Reichspressechef_ (Reich Press Chief). - -The office of Reich Press Chief of the NSDAP was created in 1934 by -decree of the Fuehrer (_2319-PS_). The functions of this office were -exclusive: - - “The Reich Press Office of the NSDAP is the central office for - the entire political publishing activity of the Party. It - represents the press interests of the Reich leadership of the - NSDAP _vis a vis_ both the German and the foreign press. It - alone has the authority to issue directives to the press of - Reich policies concerning the treatment of Party affairs. It - alone has the authority to issue press directives to all offices - of Reich leadership. It is responsible for the political and - editorial preparations, execution and utilization of all - important Party activities in the Reich. It supplies the - domestic and foreign press with information, news and - commentaries about the Party. It keeps a record of press - reaction to the Party work in publications of the domestic and - foreign press.” (_2319-PS_) - -The Reich Press Chief exercised control over all press offices, -including the chief editors of the National Socialist newspapers, as -well as the _Gau_ press wardens of the Party. He also served as liaison -officer between the Party press and the “Independent” press, and between -Party and Government. (_2319-PS_) - -The executive functions of the Reich Press Chief were carried out by two -offices: - -(_a_) _The Pressepolitisches Amt_ (Press Political Office). - -(_b_) _The Pressepersonalamt_ (Press Personnel Office), which was in -charge of training journalists and keeping files on German and foreign -journalists. - -The vertical organization of press controls, corresponding to that of -the _Reichspropagandaleitung_, included _Gau-_, _Kreis-_ and -_Ortsgruppen_ departments. Each was headed by an _Amtsleiter_, or press -warden, who was responsible for the entire Party press within his sphere -of jurisdiction. He supervised the editorial policy of the Party press, -issued information bulletins about the activities of the Movement, and -served as liaison officer between the Party and non-Party press. He also -transmitted local information to headquarters for distribution and made -recommendations concerning the appointments of local party editors. The -_Gau-_ and _Kreis-_ press wardens, at the same time, served as regional -and local representatives of the Home Press Division of the Propaganda -Ministry and of the Reich Press Chamber. (_2319-PS_; _2315-PS_) - -(3) _The Reichsleiter fuer die Presse_ (Reich Press Leader). - -The Reich Press Leader, Max Amann, was charged with supervising all -matters concerning the German publishing business. The -_Organisationsbuch der NSDAP_ (1937) described his function as follows: - - “He is charged with the creation of a press for the German - people, which is responsible and answerable to him, and which - reflects the life and experiences of the German people’s - community. In addition, the Reichsleiter for Press has the - function of issuing regulations necessary to carry out the - demands concerning publication policies established in Article - 23 of the Party Program and to supervise their execution.” - (_2319-PS_) - -Article 23 of the Party Platform referred to above, provided, _inter -alia_, that (a) all editors and newspaper personnel must be “members of -the nation”; (b) non-Germans are prohibited from financial participation -in, or influence of, newspapers; (c) the publication of papers “which do -not conduce to the national welfare” is prohibited; (d) tendencies in -art or literature “of a kind likely to disintegrate our life as a -nation” will be prosecuted; and (e) “institutions which militate against -the requirements mentioned above” will be suppressed. (_1708-PS_) - -Thus the Reich Press Leader was not only empowered to control all -publishing houses of the Party, but was assigned the task of bringing -the entire German press into line with National Socialist ideology. To -this end he was given wide and specific powers. - -His sphere of jurisdiction included specifically: - -(_a_) The administration, publishing, and financing of the Party press; - -(_b_) The establishment of newspapers by Party members or affiliated -associations; - -(_c_) The incorporation of newspapers into the Party press combine; - -(_d_) The appointment of publishers and of their deputies; - -(_e_) The termination or alteration of contracts with newspapers; - -(_f_) The appointment of Commissars to supervise publishing houses. -(_2319-PS_) - -In addition to controlling the administration and finance of the -National Socialist publishing houses in the _Gau_, the Press Leader -headed the _Zentralverlag_, which was the central publishing house and -holding company of the entire Party publishing machine and all its -official organs, such as _Der Voelkischer Beobachter_, _Der Angriff_, -_Der SA Mann_, _Das Schwarze Korps_, _Die HJ_, etc. (_3016-PS_) - -It was one of the Reich Press Leader’s duties to turn all publishing by -Party officials into a lucrative undertaking, and to set up an absolute -monopoly in the publication of all political literature. To effectuate -that objective, a decree was passed which made it mandatory for all -“manuscripts which have National Socialist problems and subject matter -as themes” to be offered first to _Eher Verlag_ publication. (_2383-PS_) - -The _Reichsleiter fuer die Press_, who was also president of the Reich -Press Chamber, exercised economic controls over the entire German press. -He made use of his position to expand the Party publishing machine at -the expense of non-party newspapers. As president of the Reich Press -Chamber, he was authorized to issue directives with the force of law. In -that capacity he issued certain regulations which had the effect of -prohibiting the ownership of newspapers by corporations of any kind, -except the NSDAP or such groups as were approved by the Party. -(_2315-PS_) - -These decrees enabled Amann to close down one or more papers in a -particular locality “to safeguard reasonable standards of competition.” -They thus provided, along with racial and other discriminatory -legislation, the “legal” basis for the pressure which was brought to -bear on such publishing firms as Ullstein and other opposition -publications, in order to force them to sell out to the Party. These -sales were in no sense voluntary; the alternative in each case was total -suppression. The authorizing decree provided: - - “The President of the Reich Chamber of the Press will therefore - endeavor at first in every individual case to effect agreements - which will relieve him of the necessity of issuing orders for - the closing of establishments.” (_2315-PS_) - -Max Amann has admitted in an affidavit that he discharged his duties as -Reich Press Leader consistently with the statement of his functions -contained in the Party Organization Book and with Article 23 of the -Party Program. He has further stated that racial and other -discriminatory legislation made it expedient for firms “owned or -controlled by Jewish interests, or by political or religious interests -hostile to the NSDAP * * * to sell their newspapers or assets to the -Eher concern”; and that there was “no free market for the sale of such -properties and the Franz Eher Verlag was generally the only bidder.” His -affidavit concludes as follows: - - “It is a true statement to say that the basic purpose of the - Nazi press program was to eliminate all press in opposition to - the Party.” (_3016-PS_) - -(4) _Parteiamliche Prufungskommission zum Schutz des NS-Christums_ -(Office of Party Examining Commission for the Protection of National -Socialist Publications) (PPK). - -The PPK was charged with the censorship and supervision of all -literature with cultural or political implications. According to the -Party Manual: - - “The functional scope of the official Party Examining Commission - is not confined to any one group of publications but includes - the entire publishing field. Thus the work of the Official Party - Examining Commission is sub-divided into departments for books, - magazines and newspapers. Out of these main departments a group - of important special fields have emerged as more or less - independent fields. They are specifically the editing of - speeches, scientific books, textbooks, scientific periodicals - and the calendar as a special type of magazine.” (_2319-PS_) - -The Examining Commission’s function was to protect National Socialist -literature from attempts to destroy its propagandistic effect or to -pervert its political and social content. The Party Manual stated: - - “It is the function of the Examining Commission to protect the - National Socialist literature from abuse, corruption, and - attempts at dissolution. Thus it forestalls the infiltration of - elements within the National Socialist literature which are - irreconcilable with it.” (_2319-PS_) - -In addition, the PPK concerned itself with the actual suppression of -literature incompatible with Party tenets, and with the approval of -those works which it deemed beneficial to the extension of the National -Socialist ideology. The Party Manual specified as follows: - - “Particularly it is the function of the official Party Examining - Commission to determine whether or not a work can be considered - National Socialist literature.” (_2319-PS_) - -This office worked in close collaboration with the Delegate of the -Fuehrer for the Total Supervision of the Intellectual and Ideological -Training and Education of the People (Rosenberg). (_2319-PS_; _2383-PS_) - -(5) _The Beauftragte des Fuehrers fuer die Ueberwachung der gesamten -geistigen und weltansschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP_ -(Delegate of the Fuehrer for the Total Supervision of the Intellectual -and Ideological Training and Education of the Party) (BdF). - -The delegate of the Fuehrer was _Reichsleiter_ Alfred Rosenberg. The -Office of the BdF was placed in charge of the Party’s intellectual and -ideological training and education. Its declared objective was the -uniform ideological orientation of the Party, Party formations, and -affiliated associations. Its main functions, in furtherance of this -objective, were the preparation of suitable training materials and the -issuance of directives thereon; the preparation, editing, and -establishment of curricula; the training of qualified teaching staffs; -the counseling of Party agencies, formations, and affiliates on content -and methods of indoctrination; and the elimination of such reading and -teaching materials as were deemed inappropriate from a National -Socialist point of view. To perform these tasks, Rosenberg had the -assistance of a large organization with numerous functional divisions -(_2319-PS_). The BdF took a major part in the work of Party -organizations, affiliated associations, and schools and training -institutes which were instrumental in the indoctrination of the German -people and youth. (_2383-PS_) - -B. _The Reich government organization._ - -The state organ of control was the _Reichsministerium fuer -Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda_ (Reich Ministry for Popular -Enlightenment and Propaganda). The Minister was Josef Goebbels. The -Ministry was founded by decree dated 13 March 1933, which defined its -duties as the “enlightenment of, and propaganda among, the people on the -subject of the policy of the Reich government and on the national -reconstruction of the homeland.” (_2029-PS_). By decree dated 30 June -1933 the functions of the Minister were extended to include -“jurisdiction over the whole field of spiritual indoctrination of the -nation, of propagandizing the State, of cultural and economic -propaganda, of enlightenment of the public at home and abroad; -furthermore he is in charge of all institutions serving these purposes.” -(_2030-PS_). In the words of Mueller, an authority on the Propaganda -Ministry, these decrees formed the basis for the creation of a central -agency for propaganda “the like of which heretofore existed nowhere in -the world.” (_2434-PS_). The influence which this agency exerted on the -everyday life and activities of the German citizen was illustrated by -the multitude of civic and cultural affairs, including public -entertainment, which fell under the sweep of its direction and control. -(_2434-PS_) - -A few of the more important departments of the Propaganda Ministry, -together with a brief description of their respective functions, -follows: - -(1) _Personnel._ This department issued directives for unified personnel -policy, and exercised general supervision over the personnel of public -art instituted within the entire Reich. - -(2) _Law._ “The nuclear task of the law department is the publication -and execution of national socialist cultural laws. The professions and -institutions of literature and art had to be transformed from carriers -of a liberal individualistic intellectual movement to the carriers of -the tasks of public propaganda and leadership. To reach this goal -required the enactment of governmental decrees for creating new -organizations or the making of new laws.” - -(3) _Propaganda._ This department coordinated propaganda policies and -issued over-all directives to the various functional departments (press, -radio, etc.) which then carried out the directives. A special function -was “enlightenment of the people as to Jewish question” and as to -“racial policies.” - -(4) _Foreign._ This department was the Ministry’s listening post for -political and economic developments abroad “to counteract the worldwide -publicity activities of the enemy against our philosophy and our -political objectives by exposing and rectifying the lies of the press” -and to exploit the information in German propaganda. It also cooperated -closely with the _Auslandsorganization der NSDAP_. - -(5) _Radio._ Hans Fritzsche headed this department. It supervised the -political content of German broadcasting, issued directives as to the -arrangement of programs and treatment of material, and cooperated with -the Party in the technical organization of German radio. - -(6) The _Film Department_ was in charge of directing and guiding the -German film industry, censoring of films, and developing the German -weekly newsreel. - -(7) _Literature._ This agency, in close collaboration with BdF and PPK, -controlled all German literary activities, censored new books, provided -for the publication of German books abroad, and arranged for the -translation and censorship of foreign books. - -(8) _Abteilung Deutsche Presse_ (German or Home Press Department). This -department was headed by Fritzsche until he was relieved in 1942 to take -charge of the Radio Division. It was responsible for political control -over the entire German press; it controlled the editorial policy of the -press and its personnel (through the Reich Press Chamber), and -supervised the dissemination of news through the official German News -Agency (DNB). The Home Press Division outlined the editorial policy of -all newspapers and the comment of editors and journalists in its daily -directives. (_Tendenz berichte_). These dealt with the daily contents of -the paper, the methods of treatment of news material, the writing of -headlines, the preference for or omission of certain items, and the -modification or cessation of current campaigns. The directives were -issued to the representatives of the press in person or sent through the -facilities of the DNB to the local papers. (_2434-PS_; _2529-PS_) - -The Home Press Department of the Propaganda Ministry had an important -participation in administering the provisions of the Editorial Control -Law, which made the profession of editor “a public task, which is -regulated as to its professional duties and rights by the state.” That -law also included requirements for admission to the profession and other -elaborate controls. (_2083-PS_) - -(9) _Periodical Literature._ This department supervised German -periodical literature in the same manner as the _Abteilung Deutsche -Presse_ controlled the daily press. - -Other divisions exercised supervision over the Theatre (selection and -supervision of the entire dramatic production and influencing the -programs of all German Theatres); the Arts; Music (“the entire cultural -and political leadership of German musical life”); Special Cultural -Tasks (“This department serves mainly to eliminate all Jews from German -Cultural life”); and Foreign Tourists. (_2434-PS_) - -A large organization of faithful Party followers was recruited to -discharge the manifold functions of the Propaganda Ministry. The staff -numbered 1000 persons in 1939-1940. In the words of Mueller: - - “It is no accident; therefore, that the great majority of the - official workers and other personnel of the Ministry consist of - reliable National Socialists of which almost 100 are bearers of - the Gold Party Pin.” (_2434-PS_) - -C. _The semi-autonomous professional organizations Reichskulturkammer_ -(Reich Chamber of Culture). - -The Reich Chamber of Culture was set up in September 1933 to control -(under the supervision of the Propaganda Ministry and within the -framework of general policy directives issued by that activity) -personnel engaged in all fields of propaganda (_2082-PS_). Its tasks as -described in the First Executive Decree of the above law, dated 1 -November 1933, were: - - “To promote German culture as responsible to the people and the - Reich, to regulate the social and economic relations of the - different groups in the cultural professions and to coordinate - their aims.” (_2415-PS_) - -The _Reichskulturkammer_ was a so-called “_Nachgeordnete Dienststelle_” -(Subordinate office) of the Propaganda Ministry. Together with its -subordinate Chambers it was charged with supervising all personnel -active in any field under the jurisdiction of the Propaganda Ministry. -All persons employed in the cultural professions were obligated to -register with one of the subordinate Chambers. The Chambers were also -responsible for investigating the activities and political reliability -of their members. Moreover, power was given to Chambers to prosecute -members offending against Nazi standards or persons pursuing their -occupation without being duly registered. The punitive powers included, -expulsion from membership, which was tantamount to the loss of -livelihood. The Chambers were also given power to issue directives, -which had the validity of law, regulating the cultural activities under -their control (_2529-PS_). The President of the Chamber of Culture was -the Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, who nominated the -Vice-Presidents. In 1937, the latter consisted of Walter Funk, Max Amann -(Reich Leader of the Press) and Leopold Gutterer (Secretary of State in -the Propaganda Ministry). - -The Chamber of Culture was divided into seven functional chambers: - -(1) _Reichspressekammer_ (Reich Press Chamber). Max Amann was president -of this chamber, which was, to a greater extent than the other chambers, -a loose association of technical bodies and organizations, such as the -Reich Association of German Newspaper Publishers. It integrated the -activities of these groups and, through the composition of its governing -body, ensured close coordination with Party and State propaganda -machinery. (_2529-PS_; _3016-PS_) - -(2) _Reichskammer der bildenden Kunste_ (Reich Chamber of Fine Arts). -This chamber supervised the activities of all architects, interior -decorators, landscape gardeners, sculptors, painters, draftsmen, art -publishers, etc. By 1937, all other art groups and associations had been -dissolved, and all their members “obligated by profession” to join this -chamber. (_2529-PS_) - -(3) _Reichsmusikkammer_ (Reich Music Chamber). This Chamber was -organized to “oversee the practice and activity of musicians in their -cultural, economic, and legal relationships with the world. * * * in -order that music will still remain a prized possession of the German -people.” (_2529-PS_) - -(4) _Reichstheaterkammer_ (Reich Theater Chamber). The Theater Chamber -was the professional organization for the entire field of the -professional theater. Its purpose was to supervise and promote the -“cultural, social and economic conditions of the professions which it -includes”. Actual censorship of stage production was the responsibility -of the _Reichsdramaturg_. (_2529-PS_) - -(5) _Reichsfilmkammer_ (Reich Film Chamber). The primary function of -this Chamber was to lift the film industry “out of the sphere of liberal -economic thoughts” by giving it a sound economic foundation and thus -enable it to “receive those tasks which it has to fulfill in the -National Socialist State”. (_2529-PS_) - -(6) _Reichsschrifttumskammer_ (Reich Chamber of Literature). The Chamber -of Literature had jurisdiction over all persons concerned with the -“basic production” (writing and publishing) of literature. Its task was -to protect writers “from undesirable elements” and to keep out of the -book market everything “unGerman.” It had the further function of -bringing literature to the people and making the writer more “aware of -his duty to the nation.” Primary responsibility for critical evaluation -and censorship of literature however, was left to the Propaganda -Ministry. (_2529-PS_) - -(7) _Reichsrundfunkkammer_ (Reich Radio Chamber). The official gazette -of the Reich Culture Chamber stated that the radio was the most -immediate propaganda instrument of the National Socialist leadership; -that the ideal and cultural life of the nation could be shown “totally” -in and through the radio; and that since the radio constituted the most -important technical means of influencing the masses it was necessary to -establish a close tie between the radio and the Party. - -Functions of the Radio Chamber included: mobilizing of all technical -possibilities of broadcasting, bringing the people closer to radio, -planning the manufacture of cheap receiving sets, and propaganda in -connection with the drive for new listeners. (_2529-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PROPAGANDA, - CENSORSHIP, AND SUPERVISION OF CULTURAL ACTIVITIES - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │ │ - │ (e). │ I │ 21 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ -*1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │ - │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. (USA│ │ - │255; USA 324) │ IV │ 208 - │ │ │ - 2029-PS │Decree establishing the Reich Ministry │ │ - │of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, │ │ - │13 March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 104. │ IV │ 652 - │ │ │ - 2030-PS │Decree concerning the Duties of the │ │ - │Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment │ │ - │and Propaganda, 30 June 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 449. │ IV │ 653 - │ │ │ - 2082-PS │Law relating to the Reich Chamber of │ │ - │Culture of 22 September 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 661. │ IV │ 708 - │ │ │ - 2083-PS │Editorial control law, 4 October 1933. │ │ - │1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 713. │ IV │ 709 - │ │ │ - 2315-PS │Order concerning the Supervision of │ │ - │District Leaders of Work of Reich │ │ - │Chamber of Culture, published in The Law│ │ - │of the Reich Chamber of Culture, Vol. 2,│ │ - │1 January to 30 June 1935. │ IV │ 1007 - │ │ │ -*2319-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of │ │ - │NSDAP, 4th edition, 1937. (USA 602) │ IV │ 1009 - │ │ │ -*2383-PS │Ordinance for execution of decree of │ │ - │Fuehrer concerning position of the Head │ │ - │of Party Chancellery of 16 January 1942,│ │ - │published in Decrees, Regulations, │ │ - │Announcements. (USA 410) │ V │ 9 - │ │ │ - 2415-PS │First decree for the implementation of │ │ - │law relating to The Reich Chamber of │ │ - │Culture, 1 November 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I. │ V │ 89 - │ │ │ -*2434-PS │The Reich Ministry for Enlightenment of │ │ - │the People and for Propaganda, Berlin │ │ - │1940, by Georg Mueller. (USA 722) │ V │ 102 - │ │ │ - 2529-PS │Extracts from Handbook of Reich Chamber │ │ - │of Culture for 1937. │ V │ 262 - │ │ │ -*3016-PS │Affidavit of Max Amann, 19 November │ │ - │1945. (USA 757) │ V │ 735 - │ │ │ -*3469-PS │Affidavit of Hans Fritzsche, 7 January │ │ - │1946. (USA 721) │ VI │ 174 - │ │ │ -*Chart No. 2 │Totalitarian Control of Propaganda and │ │ - │Education. (USA 21) │ VIII │ 771 - - - 10. MILITARIZATION OF NAZI ORGANIZATIONS. - -A. _The Nazi conspirators placed many of their organizations on a -progressively militarized footing with a view to the rapid -transformation and use of such organizations as instruments of war._ - -(1) _The Schutzstaffeln (SS)._ The SS was militarized beginning in March -1933, when special, volunteer, armed units were created consisting of -full-time garrisoned troops. These units, which rapidly grew in -strength, were a part neither of the Wehrmacht, nor of the police, but -were exclusively at the disposal of the Fuehrer. This militarization of -the SS was in accordance with Nazi policy. (For documentation and -further discussion see Chapter XV, Section 5.) - -(2) _The Sturmabteilung (SA)._ The SA was founded in 1921 as a -para-military organization to fight political enemies of the Nazis. -After the accession of the Nazis to power, the SA was used to provide -pre-military training at a time when the Reichswehr was legally limited -to a strength of 100,000 men. Thus the SA, from its inception, had a -military purpose, which was carried out and gradually increased in -scope. (For documentation and further discussion see Chapter XV, Section -4.) - -(3) _The Hitler Jugend (HJ)._ One of the chief purposes of the Hitler -Jugend was to provide for military training of German youth at a very -early age. As early as 1933, the HJ entered into a secret program of -extensive pre-military training for German youth in conjunction with the -SA and the Wehrmacht. In addition to general military training, members -of the HJ were given specialized training in various types of military -units, such as flying units, naval units, motorized units, signal units, -etc. (For documentation and further discussion, see Section 8, _supra_.) - -(4) _The National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK)._ The original NSKK was -founded under the name of NSAK (National Socialist Automobile Corps) on -1 April 1930 by Hitler, who joined as its first member. By the end of -1931 it had a membership of approximately 10,000, as compared to 300 at -the beginning of that year (_2804-PS_). In 1934 the motorized Hitler -Jugend and the motorized SA were placed under the NSKK. Hitler, on 23 -August of that year, decreed that: - - “the NSAK and the motorized SA are from now on welded together - into a unit called NSKK. The NSKK is directly subordinate to - me”. (_2804-PS_) - -Thus the NSKK was elevated to the position of an independent affiliated -unit of the NSDAP, similar to the SA and the SS. The membership of the -enlarged NSKK grew rapidly. - -The military purpose of the NSKK is evident from the following statement -from The _Organizationbuch der NSDAP_ (1940): - - “The young driver who has received his training in the six-week - courses of the NSKK will be well prepared in body and spirit - when the time comes for his military service, and will wear with - pride the dress of the Armed Forces of the Nation.” - (_2320-B-PS_) - -The program of militarization proceeded rapidly: - - “More than one-third of all leaders and men of the NSKK, which - had in the meantime grown to a membership of 350,000, were - already active in the fight for power * * * Thus, the NSKK had - in its ranks, in addition to the proud tradition of the period - of our fight, also that of the World War. This front spirit and - experience of a generation matured to manhood in the barrages, - in the battles of attrition, in the battles of the Freikorps, - and in the heroic fight of National Socialism for Germany’s - rebirth, is passed on to our youth as a sacred heritage.” - (_2804-PS_) - -The training given to NSKK members was intended to furnish seasoned -recruits for the Nazi military forces. - - “Military motorized training of our youth is the cardinal task - of the educational work of the NSKK. Here it collaborates most - closely with the bearer of the arms of the Reich, the Wehrmacht, - and it has done so already throughout the years before the - seizure of power. The demands and needs of the Army, which - continuously grew in scope after the awakening of our Nation and - after our regained military freedom also caused the tasks and - the work of the NSKK in the field of military motorized training - to grow correspondingly * * * By order of the Fuehrer and - Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, the NSKK has been given - charge of the pre-military training of the entire young reserve - of the motorized troop units of our Army in addition to - post-military training.” (_2804-PS_) - -NSKK-trained men were intended to be assimilated into Reich Panzer -units. - - “Well prepared physically and spiritually, the young German man - who has now become a motorized soldier, can serve with a - motorized or partially-motorized unit of the Army. To become a - tank soldier is his only ambition.” (_2804-PS_) - -The NSKK was actually used for military purposes. - - “The men of the NSKK have considerably contributed to the - liberation of the Sudetenland by the Fuehrer and have thus - gained undying merit, not only for the Germans in the - Sudetenland, but for the entire German people as a whole.” - (_2804-PS_) - -Further evidence of actual military use of the NSKK is given in the -following passage from “_Deutschland im Kampf_” written by -_Ministerialdirigent_ A. J. Berndt of the Reich Propaganda Ministry and -Lt. Col. von Wedel of the German Army High Command, in the issue of June -1940: - - “The NSKK is playing a decisive part in the carrying out of - considerable war-important tasks on the Inner Front, one of - which is traffic. * * * Among the tasks of the NSKK are - pre-military training, education, and schooling and motorized - transport. Thus, for instance, the conducting of the entire - transport system of the TODT Organization on the West Wall and - the traffic in the Western War Theater are in the hands of the - NSKK.” (_2810-PS_) - -(5) _The National Socialist Aviation Corps (NSFK)._ The NSFK was another -organization affiliated with the NSDAP used by the Nazi conspirators for -military purposes. It was the great training school for the Luftwaffe. - - “In the endeavor to assure for the German Luftwaffe a - numerically strong and well prepared reserve, and to strengthen - in the German people the conviction that Germany must retain its - head-start in all spheres of aviation, the NSFK was founded by - the Fuehrer on 17 April 1937 * * *. - - “The NSFK at the time of its creation, was given the following - tasks by the Reichsmarshal: - - “1. Pre-military aviation training of the new blood for the - Luftwaffe. - - “2. The keeping in training of the reservists of the aviation - troops. - - “3. The combining and directing of all German air sports. - - “4. Promotion and extension of the aviation idea among the - German people. - - “These tasks are so great that the cooperation of tens of - thousands of active members is necessary to make carrying them - out possible, so that the Luftwaffe may be able at any time to - count on their fulfillment according to plan.” (_2811-PS_) - -The paramount military purpose of the NSFK is clearly indicated in the -following admission by _Generalleutnant_ Friedrich Christiansen, -_Korpsfuehrer_ of the NSFK: - - “Schooled in character, trained physically as a flier, and as a - soldier, the member-to-be of the Luftwaffe leaves the NSFK.” - (_2813-PS_) - -(6) _The Reichsarbeitdienst (RAD)_ (The Reich Labor Service). The Reich -Labor Service was also subverted to military purposes by the Nazi -conspirators. - -Membership in the RAD was made compulsory for both young men and women -on 26 June 1935. - - “All young Germans of either sex between 18-25 years of age are - obligated to serve their people in the Reich Labor Service. As - the schooling of the Nation, it has as its object this education - of the German Youth to National Socialist Ideology. - - “The Reich Labor Service for men is, thanks to its military - nature, closely-knit units, and its particular education and - training an ever-ready, powerful tool of the National Socialist - Reich.” (_2805-PS_) - -The tens of thousands of members of the RAD were militarily trained and -ready for action when Germany launched her campaigns of aggression. -Actual military use of the men of the RAD is clearly shown in the 1 June -1943 edition of “_Fuehren und Erziehen_” (Leadership and Education), the -official magazine of the Reich Labor Service. A photograph depicts a -Labor Service man repairing a bridge at the front, across which four -infantrymen are proceeding, and is titled as follows: - - “The young crews who have gone through the educational - institutions of the Reich Labor Service today represent the most - active nucleus of our Army. * * * Our photograph shows labor men - who in the East are preparing the way for infantry shock troops - by repairing a bridge. Thus also the men of the Reich Labor - Service are today one of the examples of eternal German - soldierdom.” (_2806-PS_) - -The military uses of the RAD are further described in the following -letter written by Goering to Reich Labor Service Leader Konstantin -Hierl: - - “After the victorious termination of the campaign in Poland, I - cannot but convey to you my sincere thanks for and unreserved - recognition of the help rendered by the Reich Labor Service in - the carrying out of the operations of the Luftwaffe. In guarding - Army airfields, in clearing and quickly repairing former enemy - airports, in road construction and in bringing up supplies, - everywhere your men have done a real job and have thus - contributed considerably to the successes of the German - Luftwaffe.” (_2807-PS_) - -(7) _The TODT Organization (OT)._ The TODT Organization, or OT, was -another NSDAP affiliate used to further the militaristic aims of the -Nazi conspirators. The OT, originally an offshoot of the RAD, was -created as a separate entity in June 1938 when Dr. Fritz Todt was -charged with the construction of the Siegfried Line or West Wall. The -military employment of the OT is clearly shown in the following passage -from “_Maenner der OT_”, which was published by the Photographic Office -of the Reich Propaganda Office: - - “No sooner had the greatest and most modern fortifications of - the world, the West Wall, been completed by the workers of the - OT, when these very same workers were called upon by the Fuehrer - to prove their worth also in direct front service * * * and they - thus helped * * * to achieve the greatest victory in history. - When the great offensive in the west began, the brown workers’ - columns of the TODT organization followed immediately behind - them. After the armistice with France had been signed, an - entirely new situation developed for the TODT organization. Its - columns had pushed deep into enemy country. Not seldom did they - have direct contact with the enemy—their losses in dead and - wounded and the Iron Cross awards are heroic proof of that. - While, as the foremost construction workers of the German Reich, - they had already proved their worth when building the West Wall, - they were now able to perfect what they had learned in the fight - against the British world enemy. From the Channel coast to the - Atlantic Ocean, the front technicians and front workers of the - OT now proceeded to create the prerequisites for a successful - fight against England.” (_2808-PS_) - -Though the OT was in its origin technically a civilian organization, it -subsequently became a para-military body which, before and during the -war, cooperated fully with the German Army. On 2 July 1940, a directive -was issued from the German High Command appointing a liaison officer. - - “* * * to establish the closest liaison and cooperation of the - respective military offices with the main construction work of - the TODT Organization.” (_2812-PS_) - -This militarization of the OT is further shown in the following passage -from “_Nationalsozialistische Monatschefte_” for 1942: - - “From the Autobahn workers was developed the ‘Organization TODT’ - a body of hundreds of thousands of workers who help the - Wehrmacht everywhere in eliminating obstacles, building bridges - and erecting fortifications and shelters. The front soldier and - the front worker stand side by side. Together they have shed - their blood in this war and together they have won victories. - Long-range guns on the Channel coast, U-boat bases on the - Atlantic, and now the East will render the ‘OT’ immortal for all - times to come.” (_2809-PS_) - -A letter from Fritz Sauckel to Hitler, dated 17 May 1943, states that -the OT had supplied 248,200 workers by March 1943 for the completion of -the Atlantic Wall, and praises the OT for its excellent work in this -regard. (_407-VIII-PS_) - -By 1938, all phases of German life _had been_ mobilized for the -accomplishment of militant aims. - -Hitler declared to the Reichstag on 20 February 1938: - - “Only now we have succeeded in setting before us the great tasks - and in possessing the material things which are the - prerequisites for the realization of great creative plans in all - fields of our national existence. Thus, National Socialism has - made up within a few years for what centuries before it had - omitted. * * * - - “National Socialism has given the German people that leadership - which as party not only mobilizes the nation but also organizes - it, so that on the basis of the natural principle of selection, - the continuance of a stable political leadership is safeguarded - forever * * * National Socialism * * * possesses Germany - entirely and completely since the day when, five years ago, I - left the house in Wilhelmplatz as Reich Chancellor. There is no - institution in this state which is not National Socialist. Above - all, however, the National Socialist Party in these five years - not only has made the nation National Socialist, but also has - given itself that perfect organizational structure which - guarantees its permanence for all future. _The greatest - guarantee of the National Socialist revolution lies in the - complete domination of the Reich and all its institutions and - organizations, internally and externally, by the National - Socialist Party. Its protection against the world abroad, - however, lies in its new National Socialist armed forces._ * * * - - “In this Reich, anybody who has a responsible position is a - National Socialist. * * * Every institution of this Reich is - under the orders of the supreme political leadership. * * * The - party leads the Reich politically, the armed forces defend it - militarily. * * * There is nobody in any responsible position in - this state who doubts that I am the authorized leader of this - Reich.” (_2715-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO MILITARIZATION OF - NAZI ORGANIZATIONS - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (D) 3 │ │ - │ (f). │ I │ 21 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *407-VIII-PS │Telegram from Sauckel to Hitler, 17 May │ │ - │1943, concerning foreign labor. (USA │ │ - │210) │ III │ 394 - │ │ │ - 2320-B-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of │ │ - │NSDAP, 1940, p. 394. │ IV │ 1026 - │ │ │ -*2715-PS │Speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on 20 │ │ - │February 1938, published in The Archive,│ │ - │February 1938, Vol. 47, pp. 1441-1442. │ │ - │(USA 331). │ V │ 376 - │ │ │ - 2804-PS │Extracts from “Das NSKK” by Hans Helmut │ │ - │Krenzlein, NSKK Gruppenfuehrer, with │ │ - │foreword by Leader of NSKK, Korpsfuehrer│ │ - │A. Huehnlein. │ V │ 446 - │ │ │ - 2805-PS │Extract from Organization Book of NSDAP,│ │ - │1943, p. 465. │ V │ 447 - │ │ │ - 2806-PS │Extract from Leadership and Education, │ │ - │official magazine of Dutch Labor │ │ - │Service, 1 June 1943, p. 19. │ V │ 448 - │ │ │ - 2807-PS │Letter by Goering to Reich Labor Service│ │ - │Leader Konstantin Hierl, published by │ │ - │National Socialist Monthly, 1940, Vol. │ │ - │I, p. 155. │ V │ 448 - │ │ │ - 2808-PS │Men of the OT, published by Photographic│ │ - │Office of Reich Propaganda Office. │ V │ 448 - │ │ │ - 2809-PS │Extract from National Socialist Monthly,│ │ - │February-March, 1942, p. 167. │ V │ 449 - │ │ │ - 2810-PS │Extract from Germany in Battle, by │ │ - │Berndt of Reich Propaganda Ministry and │ │ - │von Wedel of German Army High Command, │ │ - │1940, p. 107. │ V │ 449 - │ │ │ - 2811-PS │Extracts from Organization Book of the │ │ - │NSDAP, 1938, pp. 470, 470(c). │ V │ 450 - │ │ │ - 2812-PS │Directive from German Army High Command,│ │ - │published in General Army Bulletin, │ │ - │1940, Vol. VII, p. 96. │ V │ 450 - │ │ │ - 2813-PS │Extract from The National Socialist Air │ │ - │Corps, p. 14. │ V │ 451 - │ │ │ -*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - - - - - Chapter VIII - ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY - - -It is well known that the Nazi conspirators rearmed Germany on a vast -scale. The purpose of that rearmament is revealed in the secret records -of the plans and deliberations of the inner councils of the Nazis. These -records show that the reorganization of the German government, the -financial wizardry of Hjalmar Schacht, and the total mobilization of the -German economy largely under Hjalmar Schacht, Hermann Goering, and -Walter Funk, were directed at a single goal: aggressive war. - - I. ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION FOR WAR - -The significance of the economic measures adopted and applied by the -conspirators can be properly appraised only if they are placed in the -larger social and political context of Nazi Germany. These economic -measures were adopted while the conspirators were directing their vast -propaganda apparatus to the glorification of war. They were adopted -while the conspirators were perverting physical training into training -for war. They were adopted while these conspirators were threatening to -use force and were planning to use force to achieve their material and -political objects. In short, these measures constitute in the field of -economics and government administration the same preparation for -aggressive war which dominated every aspect of the Nazi state. - -In 1939 and 1940, after the Nazi aggression upon Poland, Holland, -Belgium, and France, it became clear to the world that the Nazi -conspirators had created probably the greatest instrument of aggression -in history. That machine was built up almost in its entirety in a period -of less than one decade. In May of 1939 Major General George Thomas, -former Chief of the Military-Economic Staff in the Reich War Ministry, -reported that the German Army had grown from seven Infantry divisions in -1933 to thirty-nine Infantry divisions, among them four fully motorized -and three mountain divisions; eighteen Corps Headquarters; five Panzer -divisions; twenty-two machine gun battalions. Moreover, General Thomas -stated that the German Navy had greatly expanded by the launching, among -other vessels, of two battleships of thirty-five thousand tons, four -heavy cruisers of ten thousand tons, and other warships; further, that -the Luftwaffe had grown to a point where it had a strength of two -hundred sixty thousand men, twenty-one squadrons, consisting of two -hundred forty echelons, and thirty-three Anti-Aircraft Batteries. -(_EC-28_) General Thomas further reported, in a lecture delivered on 24 -May 1939 in the Nazi Foreign Office, that out of the few factories -permitted by the Versailles Treaty there had arisen * * * - - “The mightiest armament industry now existing in the world. It - has attained the performances which in part equal the German - wartime performances and in part even surpasses them. Germany’s - crude steel production is today the largest in the world after - the Americans. The aluminum production exceeds that of America - and of the other countries of the world very considerably. The - output of our rifle, machine gun, and artillery factories is at - present larger than that of any other state.” (_EC-28_) - -These results—about which General Thomas spoke in his book entitled -_Basic Facts for a History of German War and Armaments Economy_—were -achieved only by making preparation for war the dominating objective of -German economy. As General Thomas stated on page 479 of his book: - - “History will know only a few examples of cases where a country - has directed, even in peace time, all its economic forces - deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war, - as Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two - World Wars.” (_2353-PS_) - -The task of mobilizing the German economy for aggressive war began -promptly after the Nazi conspirators’ seizure of power. It was entrusted -principally to Schacht, Goering, and Funk. - -Schacht was appointed President of the Reichsbank in March 1933, and -Minister of Economics in August 1934. The world did not know, however, -that the responsibility for the execution of this program was entrusted -to the office of the Four Year Plan under Goering (_EC-408_). Nor did -the world know that Schacht was designated Plenipotentiary for the War -Economy on 21 May 1935, with complete control over the German civilian -economy for war production in the Reich Defense Council, established by -a top secret Hitler decree. - -A letter dated 24 June 1935, at Berlin, and signed by von Blomberg, -reads in part: - - “* * * The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the - President of the directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, to - be Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy. * * * - - “* * * I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more - * * *.” (_2261-PS_) - -Through Schacht’s financial genius monetary measures were devised to -restore German industry to full production; and through the control of -imports and exports, which he devised under his new plan of 1934, German -production was channeled in accordance with the requirements of the -German war machine. - -In 1936, with an eye to the experience in the First World War, the Nazi -conspirators embarked on an ambitious plan to make Germany completely -self-sufficient in strategic war materials such as rubber, gasoline, and -steel, in a period of four years, so that Germany would be fully -prepared for aggressive war. The responsibility for the execution of -this program was entrusted to the office of the Four Year Plan under -Goering. A “memorandum on the Four Year Plan and Preparation of the War -Economy,” dated 30 December 1936, and marked “Secret Command Matter”, -sets out that the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has conferred powers in -regard to mobilization preparations in the economic field that need -further definition. The third paragraph refers specifically to -Minister-President, Generaloberst Goering as Commissioner of the Four -Year Plan, by authority of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor granted 18 -October 1936. The existence of this program involved the reorganization -and control of the whole German economy for war. (_EC-408_) - -The military objectives of the German economy were clearly stated by -General Thomas in a lecture on 28 February 1939, delivered at the Staff -Instructor’s course. He stated: - - “The National Socialist State, soon after taking over the power, - has reorganized the German economy in all sections and directed - it towards a military viewpoint, which had been requested by the - Army for years. Due to the reorganization, agriculture, commerce - and professions became those powerful instruments the Fuehrer - needs for his extensive plans, and we can say today that - Hitler’s mobile politics, as well as the powerful efforts of the - Army and economy, would not have been possible without the - necessary reorganization by the National Socialist Government. - We can now say that the economic organization as a whole - corresponds with the needs, although slight adjustments will - have to be made yet. Those reorganizations made a new system of - economics possible which was necessary in view of our internal - and foreign political situation as well as our financial - problems. The directed economy, as we have it today, concerning - agriculture, commerce and industry, is not only the expression - of the present State principles, but at the same time also the - economy of the country’s defense.” (_EC-27_) - -This program was not undertaken in a vacuum; it was deliberately -designed and executed to provide the necessary instrument of the Nazi -conspirators’ plans for aggressive war. In September 1934 Schacht -admitted to the American Ambassador in Berlin that the Hitler Party was -absolutely committed to war, and that the people too were ready and -willing. (_EC-461_) At the same time Schacht promulgated his new plan -for the control of imports and exports in the interest of rearmament. A -year later he was appointed Plenipotentiary for War Economy by top -secret decree. (_2261-PS_) - -On 4 September 1936 Goering announced, at a Cabinet meeting attended by -von Blomberg, Schacht, and others, that Hitler had issued instructions -to the Reich War Minister on the basis that “the show-down with Russia -is inevitable,” and added that “all measures have to be taken just as if -we were actually in the stage of imminent danger of war.” (_EC-416_) - -In the same month the office of the Four Year Plan was created with the -mission of making Germany self-sufficient for war in four years. Goering -regarded it as his task, within four years, to put the entire economy in -a state of readiness for war. (_EC-408_) - - 2. COLLABORATION OF THE INDUSTRIALISTS IN REARMAMENT - -Although the Nazi government officials provided the leadership in -preparing Germany for war, they received also the enthusiastic and -invaluable cooperation of the German industrialists. - -On the invitation of Goering, approximately 25 of the leading -industrialists of Germany, together with Schacht, attended a meeting in -Berlin on 20 February 1933. This was shortly before the German election -of 5 March 1933. At this meeting Hitler announced the conspirators’ aim -to seize totalitarian control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary -system, to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of -the _Wehrmacht_. Among those present at that meeting were Gustav Krupp, -head of the munitions firm, Alfried Krupp, A.G.; four leading officials -of the I. G. Farben Works, one of the world’s largest chemical concerns; -Albert Vogler, head of United Steel Works of Germany; and other leading -industrialists. This meeting is described in the following affidavit of -George von Schnitzler: - - “I, George von Schnitzler, a member of the Vorstand of I. G. - Farben, make the following deposition under oath: - - “At the end of February 1933, four members of the Vorstand of I. - G. Farben, including Dr. Bosch, the head of the Vorstand, and - myself were asked by the office of the President of the - Reichstag to attend a meeting in his house, the purpose of which - was not given. I do not remember the two other colleagues of - mine who were also invited. I believe the invitation reached me - during one of my business trips to Berlin. I went to the meeting - which was attended by about 20 persons, who I believe were - mostly leading industrialists from the Ruhr. - - “Among those present I remember: - - “Dr. Schacht, who at that time was not yet head of the - _Reichsbank_ again and not yet Minister of Economics. - - “Krupp von Bohlen, who in the beginning of 1933 presided over - the _Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie_, which later on was - changed into the semi-official organization ‘_Reichsgruppe - Industrie_.’ - - “Dr. Albert Vogler, the leading man of the _Vereinigte - Stahlwerke_. - - “Von Lowenfeld from an industrial work in Essen. - - “Dr. Stein, head of the _Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria_, a mine - which belongs to the I. G. Dr. Stein was an active member of the - _Deutsche Volkspartei_. - - “I remember that Dr. Schacht acted as a kind of host. - - “While I had expected the appearance of Goering, Hitler entered - the room, shook hands with everybody and took a seat at the top - of the table. In a long speech, he talked mainly about the - danger of communism over which he pretended that he just had won - a decisive victory. - - “He then talked about the _Bundnis_—alliance—into which his - party and the _Deutsch Nationale Volkspartei_ had entered. This - latter party, in the meantime, had been reorganized by Herr von - Papen. At the end he came to the point which seemed to me the - purpose of the meeting. Hitler stressed the importance that the - two aforementioned parties should gain the majority in the - coming Reichstag election. Krupp von Bohlen thanked Hitler for - his speech. After Hitler had left the room, Dr. Schacht proposed - to the meeting the raising of an election fund of, as far as I - remember, RM 3,000,000. The fund should be distributed between - the two ‘allies’ according to their relative strength at the - time being. Dr. Stein suggested that the _Deutsche Volkspartei_ - should be included * * *.” (_EC-439_) - -In a speech delivered to the industrialists in Berlin on 20 February -1933, Hitler stated: - - “Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of - democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound - idea of authority and personality. * * * I recognized even while - in the hospital that one had to search for new ideas conducive - to reconstruction. I found them in Nationalism, in the value of - strength and power of individual personality. * * * If one - rejects pacifism, one must put a new idea in its place - immediately. Everything must be pushed aside, must be replaced - by something better. * * * We must not forget that all the - benefits of culture must be introduced more or less with an iron - fist just as once upon a time the farmers were forced to plant - potatoes. - - * * * * * * - - “With the very same courage with which we go to work to make up - for what had been sinned during the last 14 years, we have - withstood all attempts to move us off the right way.” - - “* * * We must first gain complete power if we want to crush the - other side completely. While still gaining power, one should not - start the struggle against the opponent. Only when one knows - that one has reached the pinnacle of power, that there is no - further possible development, shall one strike. * * * - - “* * * Now we stand before the last election. Regardless of the - outcome there will be no retreat, even if the coming election - does not bring about a decision. * * * - - “The question of restoration of the _Wehrmacht_ will not be - decided at Geneva but in Germany, when we have gained internal - strength through internal peace.” (_D-203_) - -In reply to these statements Goering, who was present at that same -meeting, declared: - - “That the sacrifice asked for surely would be much easier for - industry to bear if it realized that the election of March 5th - will surely be the last one for the next ten years, probably - even for the next hundred years.” (_D-203_) - -In a memorandum dated 22 February 1933, found in the personal files of -Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Krupp briefly described this same -meeting, and recalled that he had expressed to Hitler the gratitude of -the 25 industrialists present. (_D-204_) - -In April 1933, after Hitler had entrenched himself in power, Gustav -Krupp, as Chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry, which -was the largest association of German industrialists, submitted to -Hitler the plan of that association for the reorganization of German -industry. In connection therewith Krupp undertook to bring the -association into line with the aims of the conspirators, and to make it -an effective instrument for the execution of their policies. In a letter -of transmittal (_D-157_), Krupp stated that the plan of reorganization -which he submitted on behalf of the association of industrialists, was -characterized by the desire to coordinate economic measures and -political necessity, adopting the Fuehrer conception of the new German -state. In the plan of reorganization itself, Krupp stated: - - “The turn of political events is in line with the wishes which I - myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long - time. In reorganizing the Reich Association of German Industry, - I shall be guided by the idea of bringing the new organization - into agreement with the political aims of the Reich Government.” - (_D-157_) - -The ideas of Krupp were subsequently adopted. - -Under the decree introducing the leadership principle into industry, -each group of industry was required to have a leader who was to serve -without compensation. The leaders were to be appointed and could be -removed at the discretion of the Minister of Economics. The charter of -each group was to be created by the leader, who was obligated to lead -his group in accordance with the principles of the National Socialist -State (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Part I, 1194, Sec. 11, 12, 16). The -introduction of the leadership principle into the organizations of -business centralized authority and guaranteed the efficient execution of -orders, which the government issued to business, in the effort to -promote a war economy. - -The overwhelming support given by the German industrialists to the Nazi -war program is described in a speech prepared by Gustav Krupp in January -1944, for delivery at the University of Berlin: - - “War material is life-saving for one’s own people, and whoever - works and performs in those spheres can be proud of it. Here, - enterprise as a whole, finds its highest justification of - existence. This justification, I may inject this here, - crystallized especially during the time of interregnum between - 1919 and 1933, when Germany was lying down disarmed. * * * - - * * * * * * - - “It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that - it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its - activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons. - Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork - was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German armed - forces at the appointed hour without loss of time or experience. - - * * * * * * - - “Only through the secret activity of German enterprise, together - with the experience gained meanwhile through production of - peacetime goods, was it possible, after 1933, to fall into step - with the new tasks arrived at, restoring Germany’s military - power. Only through all that could the entirely new and various - problems, brought up by the Fuehrer’s Four-Year Plan for German - enterprise, be mastered. It was necessary to supply the new raw - materials, to explore and experiment, to invest capital in order - to make German economy independent and strong—in short, to make - it war-worthy. - - * * * * * * - - “I think I may state here that the German enterprises followed - the new ways enthusiastically, that they made the great - intentions of the Fuehrer their own by fair competition and - conscious gratitude, and became his faithful followers. How else - could the tasks between 1933 and 1939, and especially those - after 1939, have been overcome?” (_D-317_) - - 3. THE USE OF ECONOMIC MEASURES TO FACILITATE REARMAMENT - -It must be emphasized that the secret rearmament program was launched -immediately upon the seizure of power by the Nazi conspirators. On 4 -April 1933 the Reich Cabinet passed a resolution establishing a Reich -Defense Council. The function of this council was secretly to mobilize -for war. At the second meeting of the working committee of the -Councillors for Reich Defense, the predecessor of the Reich Defense -Council, which was held on 22 May 1933, the chairman was Keitel. Keitel -stated that the Reich Defense Council would immediately undertake to -prepare for war emergency. He stressed the urgency of the task of -organizing a war economy, and announced that the council stood ready to -brush aside all obstacles. Fully aware of the fact that their action was -in flagrant violation of the Treaty of Versailles, Keitel emphasized the -extreme importance of absolute secrecy: - - “No document ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into - the hands of the enemies’ intelligence service. Orally - transmitted, matters are not provable; they can be denied by us - in Geneva.” (_EC-177_) - -The singleness of purpose with which the Nazi conspirators geared the -German economy to the forging of a war machine is further shown by the -secret minutes of the second meeting of the working committee of the -Reich Defense Council, held on 7 February 1934. At this meeting at which -Capt. Schmundt, Col. Guerian, Maj. Gen. von Reichenau, Maj. Warlimont, -and Jodl—then a Lt. Col.—were present, Lieutenant-General Beck pointed -out that: - - “The actual state of preparation is the purpose of this - session.” (_EC-404_) - -Detailed measures of financing a future war were discussed and it was -pointed out that the financial aspects of the war economy would be -regulated by the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank, which was -headed by Schacht. (_EC-404_) - -Under his secret appointment as Plenipotentiary-General of the War -Economy, Schacht had the express function of placing all economic forces -of the nation in the services of the Nazi war machine. The secret -defense law of 21 May 1935 in effect gave Schacht charge of the entire -war economy. In case of war he was to be virtual economic dictator of -Germany. His task was to place all economic forces into service for the -conduct of war and to secure economically the life of the German people. -The Ministers of Economics, Food, Agriculture, Labor, and Forestry, as -well as all Reich agencies directly under the Fuehrer, were subordinated -to him. He was to be responsible for the financing as well as for the -conduct of the war; and he was further authorized to issue ordinances -within his sphere of responsibility, even if these deviated from -existing laws. (_2261-PS_) - -The rearmament of Germany proceeded at a rapid pace. By summer of 1935 -the Nazi conspirators were emboldened to make plans for the reoccupation -of the Rhineland, and at the tenth meeting of the working committee of -the council the question of measures to be taken in connection with the -proposed reoccupation of the Rhineland was discussed. - -At that meeting, on 26 June 1935, it was said that the Rhineland -required special treatment because of the assurances given by Hitler to -the French that no military action was being undertaken in the -demilitarized zone. Among the matters requiring special treatment was -the preparation of economic mobilization, a task specifically entrusted -to Schacht as secret Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. In this -connection it was stated: - - “* * * Since political entanglements abroad must be avoided at - present under all circumstances, only these preparatory measures - that are urgently necessary may be carried out. The existence of - such preparations, or the intention of them must be kept in - strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as in the rest of - the Reich.” (_EC-405_) - -Preparations of various types were thereupon discussed. - -The rapid success of German rearmament is attributable to the work of -Schacht. In the fall of 1934, the Nazi conspirators announced the “New -Plan”, which aimed at the control of imports and exports in order to -obtain the raw materials needed for armaments and the foreign currency -required to sustain the armament program. The “New Plan” was the -creation of Schacht. Under the plan, Schacht controlled imports by -extending the system of supervisory boards for import control, which was -previously limited to the main groups of raw materials, to all goods -imported into Germany. The requirement of licenses for imports enabled -the Nazi conspirators to restrict imports to those commodities which -served their war aims. - -Subsequently, in February 1935, the _Devisen_ Law was passed -(_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1935, I, 105). Under it, all transactions involving -foreign exchange were subject to the approval of _Devisenstellen_ -(Foreign Exchange Control Offices). By thus controlling the disposition -of foreign exchange, the conspirators were able to manipulate foreign -trade so as to serve their ends. - -Every aspect of the German economy was geared to war under the guidance -of the Nazi conspirators, particularly Schacht. In a study of the -economic mobilization for war as of 30 September 1934, it was stated -that steps had already been taken to build up stock piles, to construct -new facilities for the production of scarce goods, to redeploy industry -to secure areas, and to control fiscal and trade policies. The task of -stock piling, it was announced, had been hampered by the requirement of -secrecy and camouflage. Reserves of automobile fuels and stocks of coal -were accumulated, and the production of synthetic oil was accelerated. -Civilian supply was purposely organized so that most plants would be -working for the German Armed Forces. Studies were made of the -possibility of barter trade with supposedly neutral countries in case of -war. (_EC-128_) - -Financing of the armament program presented a difficult problem for the -conspirators. In 1934 and 1935, the German economy could by no -possibility have raised funds for the Nazis’ extensive rearmament -program through taxes and public loans. From the outset, the armament -program involved “the engagement of the last reserves.” Moreover, apart -from the problem of raising the huge sums required to sustain this -program, the Nazi conspirators were exceedingly anxious, in the early -stages, to conceal the extent of their armament activities. - -After considering various techniques of financing the armament program, -Schacht proposed the use of “mefo” bills. One of the primary advantages -of this method was the fact that through its use figures indicating the -extent of rearmament, which would have become public through the use of -other methods, could be kept secret. “Mefo” bills were used exclusively -for armament financing. Transactions in “mefo” bills worked as follows: -“Mefo” bills were drawn by armament contractors and accepted by a -limited liability company. The spelling of the word “mefo” is taken from -the name of this company, _Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft, -m.b.h._ (_MEFO_). This company had a nominal capital of one million -Reichsmarks and was merely a dummy organization. The bills were received -by all German banks for possible rediscounting with the Reichsbank. The -bills were guaranteed by the Reich. Their secrecy was assured by the -fact that they appeared neither in the published statements of the -Reichsbank nor in the budget figures. - -The “mefo” bill system continued to be used until 1 April 1938. Up to -that date 12 billion Reichsmarks of “mefo” bills for the financing of -rearmament had been issued. Since it was no longer deemed necessary to -conceal the vast progress of German rearmament, “mefo” financing was -discontinued at that time. (_EC-436_) - -Further sources of funds upon which Schacht drew to finance the secret -armament program were the funds of political opponents of the Nazi -regime, and Marks of foreigners on deposit in the Reichsbank. As Schacht -boasted in a memorandum to Hitler dated 3 May 1935: - - “Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our - political opponents.” (_1168-PS_) - -The outstanding “mefo” bills represented at all times a threat to the -stability of the currency because they could be tendered to the -Reichsbank for discount, in which case the currency circulation would -automatically have to be increased. Thus, there was an ever-present -threat of inflation. Schacht nevertheless continued on his course, -because he stood with unswerving loyalty to the Fuehrer, because he -fully recognized the basic idea of National Socialism, and because he -felt that at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task, -could be considered irrelevant. - -High-ranking military officers paid tribute to Schacht’s contrivances on -behalf of the Nazi war machine. An article written for the “Military -Weekly Gazette” in January 1937 stated: - - “The German Defense Force commemorates Dr. Schacht today as one - of the men who have done imperishable things for it and its - development in accordance with directions from the Fuehrer and - Reich Chancellor. The defense force owes it to Schacht’s skill - and great ability that, in defiance of all currency difficulties - it, according to plan, has been able to grow up to its present - strength from an army of 100,000 men.” - -After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Nazi conspirators redoubled -their efforts to prepare Germany for a major war. The Four Year Plan was -proclaimed by Hitler in his address at the Nurnberg Party Convention on -9 September 1936. It was given a statutory foundation by the decree -concerning the execution of the Four Year Plan dated 18 October 1936 -(_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1936, I, 887). By this decree Goering was put in -charge of the plan. He was authorized to enact any legal and -administrative measures deemed necessary by him for the accomplishment -of his task, and to issue orders and instructions to all government -agencies, including the highest Reich authorities. The purpose of the -plan was to enable Nazi Germany to attain complete self-sufficiency in -essential raw materials, notably motor fuel, rubber, textile fiber, and -non-ferrous metals, and to intensify preparations for war. The -development of synthetic products was greatly accelerated despite their -high costs. - -Apart from the self-sufficiency program, however, the Nazi conspirators -required foreign exchange to finance propaganda and espionage activities -abroad. Thus, in a speech on 1 November 1937 before the -_Wehrmachtakademie_, General Thomas stated: - - “If you consider that one will need during the war considerable - means in order to organize the necessary propaganda, in order to - pay for the espionage service, and for similar purposes, then - one should be clear that our internal Mark would be of no use - therefore, and that Foreign Exchange will be needed.” (_EC-14_) - -This need for foreign exchange was reduced in part by virtue of the -espionage and propaganda services rendered free of charge to the Nazi -state by leading German industrial concerns. A memorandum dated at Essen -on 12 October 1935, which was found in the files of the Krupp company, -contains the subheading: “Concerns:—distribution official propaganda -literature abroad with help of our foreign connections.” It goes on to -say that on the morning of 11 October the district representative of the -Ribbentrop Private Foreign Office, _Dienststelle Ribbentrop_, made an -appointment by telephone with Mr. Lachman to arrive at an appointed -time. The memorandum continues: - - “In answer to my question, with whom I was dealing and which - official bureau he represented, he informed me that he was not - himself the district representative of Ribbentrop’s Private - Foreign Office, but that a Mr. Landrat Bollman was such and that - he himself had come at Mr. Bollman’s order.” (_D-206_) - -After discussing the confusion in the field of foreign propaganda, the -memorandum states that Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office is creating a private -organization for foreign propaganda, and that for this purpose the -support of the Krupp firm and especially an index of addresses are -needed. This request received the following response: - - “I informed Mr. Lachman that our firm has put itself years ago - at the disposal of official bureaus for purposes of foreign - propaganda, and that we had supported all requests addressed to - us to the utmost.” (_D-206_) - -These activities are demonstrated by another document found in the files -of the Krupp company. A memorandum prefaced by Herr Sonnenberg, on 14 -October 1937, reports a meeting at Essen on 12 October 1937. The -government’s request for assistance in foreign intelligence activities -met this response: - - “On our part we undertook to supply information to the Combined - Services Ministry (R.K.M.) as required.” (_D-167_) - -Meanwhile the conspirators’ program of self-sufficiency was proceeding -with great speed. The production of steel, for example, as shown in -official German publication, rose as follows: - - _Tons_ - 1933 74,000 - 1934 105,000 - 1935 145,000 - 1936 186,000 - 1937 217,000 - 1938 477,000 - -The production of gasoline increased at an even greater tempo: from -387,000 tons in 1934 to 1,494,000 tons in 1938 (_Statistical Yearbook of -the German Reich, 1939-1942_). - -The Nazi conspirators pressed the completion of the armament program -with a sense of urgency betraying their awareness of the imminence of -war. At a meeting on 4 September 1936 Goering pointed out that “all -measures have to be taken just as if we were actually in the state of -imminent danger of war.” He pointed out that: - - “* * * if war should break out tomorrow we would be forced to - take measures from which we might possibly still shy away at the - present moment. They are therefore to be taken.” (_EC-416_) - -The extreme urgency was manifested by Goering’s remark that - - “* * * existent reserves will have to be touched for the purpose - of carrying us over this difficulty until the goal ordered by - the Fuehrer has been reached; in case of war they are not a - reliable backing in any case.” (_EC-416_) - -Schacht was advised by a top secret letter dated 31 August 1936 that -Hitler ordered all formations of the air force to be ready by 1 April -1937. (_1301-PS_) - -After their successes in Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi -conspirators redoubled their efforts to equip themselves for the war of -aggression which they planned to launch. In a conference on 14 October -1938, shortly before the Nazis made their first demands on Poland, -Goering stated: - - “* * * Everybody knows from the press what the world situation - looks like, and therefore the Fuehrer has issued an order to him - to carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous - achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the - way which he will overcome with the utmost energy and - ruthlessness.” (_1301-PS_) - -The supply of foreign currency had sunken because of preparations for -the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Replenishment was considered necessary. -At the same conference, on 14 October 1938, Goering declared: - - “These gains made through the export are to be used for an - increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by - export activities.” (_1301-PS_) - -Goering had received the order from the Fuehrer to increase armaments to -an abnormal extent, the air force having first priority, and interpreted -it as follows: - - “Within the shortest time, the air force should be increased - five fold; also the navy should create war weapons more rapidly, - and the army should produce large amounts of war weapons at a - faster rate, particularly heavy artillery and heavy tanks. Along - with this a larger production of armaments must go, especially - fuel, rubber, powders and explosives must be moved to the - foreground. This should be coupled with an accelerated expansion - of highways, canals, and particularly of the railroads.” - (_1301-PS_) - -In the course of these preparations for war, a clash of wills ensued -between Goering and Schacht, as a result of which Schacht resigned his -position as head of the Ministry of Economics and Plenipotentiary for -the War Economy in November 1937. He was removed from the presidency of -the Reichsbank in January 1939. Regardless of the details of this -controversy, Schacht’s departure in no way implied any disagreement with -the major war aims of the Nazis. Schacht took particular pride in his -vast attainments in the financial and economic fields in aid of the Nazi -war machine. In a letter to General Thomas Schacht wrote: - - “I think back with much satisfaction to the work in the Ministry - of Economics which afforded me the opportunity to assist in the - rearmament of the German people in the most critical period, not - only in the financial but also in the economic sphere. I have - always considered a rearmament of the German people as condition - _sine qua non_ of the establishment of a new German nation.” - (_EC-257_) - -In a letter written to General Von Blomberg, on 8 July 1937, Schacht -wrote: - - “The direction of the war economy by the plenipotentiary would - in that event never take place entirely independent from the - rest of the war mechanism but would be aimed at accomplishment - of the political war purpose with the assistance of all economic - forces. I am entirely willing, therefore, to participate in this - way in the preparation of the forthcoming order giving effect to - the Defense Act.” (_EC-252_) - -In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated with representatives of the -three branches of the armed forces in “war games in war economy” at -Godesberg. A report of these exercises, entitled “War economy tasks in -Godesberg undertaken by General Staff between the 25th of May and the -2nd of June,” records the speech welcoming Dr. Schacht: - - “Before I start with the discussion of the war game in war - economy, I have to express how grateful we all are that you, - President Dr. Schacht, have gone to the trouble personally to - participate in our final discussion today despite all your other - activities. This proves to us your deep interest in war economy - tasks shown at all times and your presence is renewed proof that - you are willing to facilitate for us soldiers the difficult - war-economic preparations and to strengthen the harmonious - cooperation with your offices.” - - * * * * * * - - “I want to point out, however, that all matters and all - information received has to be kept in strictest secrecy * * *.” - (_EC-174_) - -The annexation of Austria was apparently a goal which Schacht had long -sought, for in a speech to the employees of the former Austrian National -Bank he declared: - - “* * * Austria has certainly a great mission, namely, to be the - bearer of German culture, to insure respect and regard for the - German name, especially in the direction of the southeast. Such - a mission can only be performed within the Great German Reich - and based on the power of a nation of 75 millions, which, - regardless of the wish of the opponents, forms the heart and the - soul of Europe.” - - * * * * * * - - “We have read a lot in the foreign press during the last few - days that this aim, the union of both countries, is to a certain - degree justified, but that the methods of effecting this union - was terrible. This method which certainly did not suit one or - the other power was nothing but the consequence of countless - perfidies and brutal acts and violence which foreign countries - have practiced against us * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * I am known for sometimes expressing thoughts which give - offense and there I would not like to depart from this - consideration. I know that there are even in this country a few - people—I believe they are not too numerous—who find fault with - the events of the last few days, but nobody, I believe, doubts - the goal, and it should be said to all grumblers that you can’t - satisfy everybody. One person says he would have done it maybe - one way, but the remarkable thing is that they did not do it, - and that it was only done by our Adolf Hitler; and if there is - still something left to be improved, then those grumblers should - try to bring about these improvements from the German Reich, and - within the German community, but not to disturb us from - without.” (_EC-297-A_) - -A memorandum of 7 January 1939, written by Schacht and other directors -of the Reichsbank to Hitler, urged a balancing of the budget in view of -the threatening danger of inflation. The memorandum continued: - - “* * * From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the - fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by - the reconstruction of the German armed forces. It [the - Reichsbank] therefore assumed to a very great extent the - responsibility to finance the rearmament in spite of the - inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was - the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the - background, to carry through the armament at once, out of - nothing, and furthermore under camouflage, which made a - respect-commanding foreign policy possible.” (_EC-369_) - -The Reichsbank directors, as experts on money, believed that a point had -been reached where greater production of armaments was no longer -possible. That was merely a judgment on the situation and not a moral -stand, for there was no opposition to Hitler’s policy of aggression. -Doubts were merely entertained as to whether that policy could be -financed. Hitler’s letter to Schacht on the occasion of Schacht’s -departure from the Reichsbank paid high tribute to Schacht’s great -efforts in furthering the program of the Nazi conspirators. The armed -forces by now had enabled Hitler to take Austria and the Sudetenland. -Hitler, in his letter to Schacht declared: - - “Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first - epoch of national rearmament.” (_EC-397_) - -Even though dismissed from the presidency of the Reichsbank, Schacht was -retained as a minister without portfolio and special confidential -adviser to Hitler. Funk stepped into Schacht’s position as president of -the Reichsbank (_Voelkisher Beobachter_ of 21 January 1939). Funk was -uninhibited by fears of inflation, and like Goering, under whom he had -served in the Four Year Plan, he recognized no obstacles to the plan to -attack Poland. In a letter written on 25 August 1939, only a few days -before the attack on Poland, Funk reported to Hitler that the Reichsbank -was prepared to withstand any disturbances of the international currency -and credit system occasioned by a large-scale war. He said that he had -secretly transferred all available funds of the Reichsbank abroad into -gold, and that Germany stood ready to meet the financial and economic -tasks which lay ahead. (_699-PS_) - -It seems clear that the Nazi conspirators directed the whole of the -German economy toward preparation for aggressive war. To paraphrase the -words of Goering, the conspirators gave the German people “guns instead -of butter.” They also gave history its most striking example of a nation -gearing itself in time of peace to the single purpose of aggressive war. -Their economic preparations, formulated and applied with the energy of -Goering, the financial wizardry of Schacht, and the willing complicity -of Funk, among others, were the indispensable prerequisites for their -subsequent campaign of aggression. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF - THE CONSPIRACY - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (a).│ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (E). │ I │ 21 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *699-PS │Letter from Funk to Hitler, 25 August │ │ - │1939, reporting on economic affairs. (GB│ │ - │49) │ III │ 509 - │ │ │ -*1168-PS │Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler, 3│ │ - │May 1935, concerning the financing of │ │ - │the armament program. (USA 37) │ III │ 827 - │ │ │ -*1301-PS │File relating to financing of armament │ │ - │including minutes of conference with │ │ - │Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October │ │ - │1938, concerning acceleration of │ │ - │rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868 - │ │ │ -*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ - │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│ │ - │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of │ │ - │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and │ │ - │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │ │ - │May 1935 on the Council for defense of │ │ - │the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 - │ │ │ -*2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │ - │Facts for History of German War and │ │ - │Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071 - │ │ │ -*3787-PS │Report of the Second Meeting of the │ │ - │Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939. │ │ - │(USA 782) │ VI │ 718 - │ │ │ -*3901-PS │Letter written November 1932 by Schacht,│ │ - │Krupp and others to the Reich President.│ │ - │(USA 851) │ VI │ 796 - │ │ │ -*D-157 │Letter from Krupp to Hitler, 25 April │ │ - │1933, with enclosure. (USA 765) │ VI │ 1063 - │ │ │ -*D-167 │Memoranda by Sonnenberg and Dr. Conn │ │ - │concerning exchange of intelligence │ │ - │involving Krupp works. (USA 766) │ VI │ 1069 - │ │ │ -*D-203 │Speech of Hitler to leading members of │ │ - │industry before the election of March │ │ - │1933. (USA 767) │ VI │ 1080 - │ │ │ -*D-204 │Statement of Krupp concerning political │ │ - │organization of state and economy, 22 │ │ - │February 1933 (USA 768) │ VI │ 1085 - │ │ │ -*D-206 │Memorandum, 12 October 1939, on │ │ - │distribution of propaganda abroad │ │ - │through foreign connections of Krupp │ │ - │firm. (USA 769) │ VI │ 1085 - │ │ │ -*D-317 │Krupp speech, “Thoughts about the │ │ - │Industrial Enterpriser”, January 1944. │ │ - │(USA 770) │ VII │ 21 - │ │ │ -*EC-14 │Speech before the Wehrmacht War College,│ │ - │1 November 1937, by Major-General │ │ - │Thomas. (USA 758) │ VII │ 246 - │ │ │ -*EC-27 │Address of Major-General Thomas before │ │ - │the Staff Instructors’ Course, on 28 │ │ - │February 1939 in Saarow-Pieskow. (USA │ │ - │759) │ VII │ 250 - │ │ │ -*EC-28 │Lecture of Major-General Thomas │ │ - │delivered, 24 May 1939, at the Foreign │ │ - │Office. (USA 760) │ VII │ 250 - │ │ │ -*EC-128 │Report on state of preparations for │ │ - │war-economic mobilization as of 30 │ │ - │September 1934. (USA 623) │ VII │ 306 - │ │ │ -*EC-174 │Summary “war economy” trip to Godesberg │ │ - │undertaken by General Staff between 25 │ │ - │May and 2 June 1937. (USA 761) │ VII │ 326 - │ │ │ -*EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │ - │Committee of the Reich Defense held on │ │ - │26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328 - │ │ │ -*EC-252 │Letter from Schacht to Blomberg, 8 July │ │ - │1937. (USA 762) │ VII │ 346 - │ │ │ -*EC-257 │Personal letter from Schacht to Thomas, │ │ - │29 December 1937. (USA 763) │ VII │ 347 - │ │ │ -*EC-286 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │ - │Goering, March-April 1937, concerning │ │ - │price control. (USA 833) │ VII │ 380 - │ │ │ -*EC-293 │Letter from Schacht to Reich and │ │ - │Prussian Economics Minister, 24 December│ │ - │1935, concerning army demands for raw │ │ - │material. (USA 834) │ VII │ 391 - │ │ │ -*EC-297-A │Address in Vienna of the Reichsbank │ │ - │President, Dr. Schacht, 21 March 1938. │ │ - │(USA 632) │ VII │ 394 - │ │ │ -*EC-369 │Correspondence between Schacht and │ │ - │Hitler, January 1939. (USA 631) │ VII │ 426 - │ │ │ -*EC-383 │Letter 16 January 1937 with │ │ - │enclosure—article about Schacht │ │ - │appearing in the Military weekly │ │ - │Gazette. (USA 640) │ VII │ 436 - │ │ │ -*EC-397 │Letter from Hitler to Schacht, 19 │ │ - │January 1939. (USA 650) │ VII │ 438 - │ │ │ -*EC-404 │Minutes of conference of Sixth Session │ │ - │of Working Committee of Reichs Defense │ │ - │Council, held on 23 and 24 January 1934.│ │ - │(USA 764) │ VII │ 443 - │ │ │ -*EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │ - │Committee of Reichs Defense Council, 26 │ │ - │June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450 - │ │ │ -*EC-408 │Memorandum report about the Four Year │ │ - │Plan and preparation of the war economy,│ │ - │30 December 1936. (USA 579) │ VII │ 465 - │ │ │ -*EC-416 │Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, September │ │ - │1936. (USA 635) │ VII │ 471 - │ │ │ -*EC-436 │Affidavit of Puhl, 2 November 4 1945. │ │ - │(USA 620) │ VII │ 494 - │ │ │ -*EC-439 │Affidavit of Schnitzler, 10 November │ │ - │1945. (USA 618) │ VII │ 501 - │ │ │ -*EC-461 │Extracts from Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, │ │ - │1933-38. (USA 58) │ VII │ 515 - │ │ │ - Affidavit J │Affidavit of Erhard Milch, 23 January │ │ - │1946. │ VIII │ 653 - │ │ │ - Chart No. 9 │The Organization of German Business. │ VIII │ 778 - - - - - Chapter IX - LAUNCHING OF WARS OF AGGRESSION - - - I. THE PLOTTING OF AGGRESSIVE WAR - -The aggressive war phase of the case against the Nazi conspirators is, -in the view of the American prosecution, the heart of the case. -Everything else in this case, however dramatic, however sordid, however -shocking and revolting to the common instinct of civilized peoples, is -incidental or subordinate to, the fact of aggressive war. - -All the dramatic story of what went on in Germany in the early phases of -the conspiracy—the ideologies used, the techniques of terror used, the -suppressions of human freedom employed in the seizure of power, and even -the concentration camps and the crimes against humanity, the -persecutions, tortures and murders committed—all these things would -have had little international juridical significance except for the fact -that they were the preparation for the commission of aggressions against -peaceful neighboring peoples. Even the aspects of the case involving -“war crimes” in the strict sense are merely the inevitable, proximate -result of the wars of aggression launched and waged by these -conspirators, and of the kind of warfare they waged. It was total war, -the natural result of the totalitarian party-dominated state that waged -it; it was atrocious war, the natural result of the doctrines, designs -and purposes of the Nazi conspirators. - -The substantive rule of law which is controlling on this part of the -case is stated in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military -Tribunal, which, so far as is pertinent here, reads as follows: - - “_Article 6._ The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred - to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major - war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the - power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of - the European Axis countries, either as individuals or as members - of organizations, committed any of the following crimes. - - “The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within - the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be - individual responsibility: - - “(a) _Crimes against peace_: namely, planning, preparation, - initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in - violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, - or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the - accomplishment of any of the foregoing * * *” - - “Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating - in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy - to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all - acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.” - -Five important principles are contained in these portions of the -Charter: - -(1) The Charter imposes “individual responsibility” for acts -constituting “crimes against peace”; - -(2) The term “Crimes against peace” embraces planning, preparation, -initiation, or waging of illegal war; - -(3) The term “Crimes against peace” also embraces participation in a -common plan or conspiracy to commit illegal war; - -(4) An illegal war consists of either a war of aggression, or a war in -violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances; (these -two kinds of illegal war might not necessarily be the same; it will be -sufficient for the prosecution to show either that the war was -aggressive irrespective of breach of international treaties, agreements -or assurances, or that the war was in violation of international -treaties, agreements or assurances irrespective of whether or not it was -a war of aggression; but the American prosecution will undertake to -establish that the wars planned, prepared, initiated, and waged by the -Nazi conspirators were illegal for both reasons); - -(5) Individual criminal responsibility of a defendant is imposed by the -Charter not merely by reasons of direct, immediate participation in the -crime. It is sufficient to show that a defendant was a leader, an -organizer, instigator, or accomplice who participated either in the -formulation or in the execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit -crimes against peace. In this connection, the Charter declares that the -responsibility of conspirators extends not only to their own acts but -also to all acts performed by any persons in execution of the -conspiracy. - -It is familiar law in the United States that if two or more persons set -out to rob a bank in accordance with a criminal scheme to that end, and -in the course of carrying out their scheme one of the conspirators -commits the crime of murder, all the participants in the planning and -execution of the bank robbery are guilty of murder, whether or not they -had any other personal participation in the killing. This is a simple -rule of law declared in the Charter. All the parties to a common plan or -conspiracy are the agents of each other and each is responsible as -principal for the acts of all the others as his agents. - -The documentary evidence assembled on this aggressive war aspect of the -case will show the following: (1) the conspiratorial nature of the -planning and preparation which underlay the Nazi aggressions already -known to history; (2) the deliberate premeditation which preceded those -acts of aggression; (3) the evil motives which led to the attacks; (4) -the individual participation of named persons in the Nazi conspiracy for -aggression; (5) the deliberate falsification of the pretexts claimed by -the Nazi aggressors as they arose for their criminal activities. - -The critical period between the Nazi seizure of power and the initiation -of the first war of aggression was very short. This critical period of -illegal preparation and scheming, which ultimately set the whole world -aflame, covered 6 years, from 1933 to 1939. Crowded into these 6 short -years is the making of tragedy for mankind. - -A full understanding of these 6 years, and the 6 years of war that -followed, requires that this period be divided into phases that reflect -the development and execution of the Nazi master plan. These phases may -be said to be six. The first was primarily preparatory, although it did -involve overt acts. That phase covers roughly the period from 1933 to -1936. In that period the Nazi conspirators, having acquired government -control of Germany by the middle of 1933, turned their attention toward -utilization of that control for foreign aggression. Their plan at this -stage was to acquire military strength and political bargaining power to -be used against other nations. In this they succeeded. - -The second phase of their aggression was shorter. As the conspiracy -gained strength it gained speed. During each phase the conspirators -succeeded in accomplishing more and more in less and less time until -toward the end of the period, the rate of acceleration of their -conspiratorial movement was enormous. The second phase of their -utilization of control for foreign aggression involved the actual -seizure and absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that order. By -March 1939 they had succeeded in this phase. - -The third phase may be measured in months rather than years, from March -to September 1939. The previous aggression being successful and having -been consummated without the necessity of resorting to actual war, the -conspirators had obtained much desired resources and bases and were -ready to undertake further aggressions by means of war, if necessary. By -September 1939 war was upon the world. - -The fourth phase of the aggression consisted of expanding the war into a -general European war of aggression. By April 1941 the war which had -theretofore involved Poland, the United Kingdom, and France, had been -expanded by invasions into Scandinavia and into the Low Countries and -into the Balkans. - -In the next phase the Nazi conspirators carried the war eastward by -invasion of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. -The sixth phase consisted of collaboration with and instigation of their -Pacific ally, Japan, and precipitated the attack on the United States at -Pearl Harbor. - -The essential elements of the crime of aggressive war can be made out by -a mere handful of captured German documents. These documents will leave -no reasonable doubt concerning the aggressive character of the Nazi war -or concerning the conspiratorial premeditation of that war. After the -corpus of the crime has been demonstrated in this way, the documentary -evidence will be discussed in subsequent sections, in a more or less -chronological and detailed presentation of the relevant activities of -the conspirators from 1933 to 1941. - -Each of the ten documents which will be discussed in this section has -been selected to establish the basic facts concerning a particular phase -of the development of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression. Each document -has met three standards of selection: each is conspiratorial in nature; -each is believed to have been hitherto unknown to history; and each is -self-contained and tells its own story. - -A. _1933 to 1936._ - -The period of 1933 to 1936 was characterized by an orderly, planned -sequence of preparation for war. The essential objective of this period -was the formulation and execution of the plan to rearm and re-occupy and -fortify the Rhineland, in violation of the treaty of Versailles and -other treaties, in order to acquire military strength and political -bargaining powers to be used against other nations. - -A secret speech of Hitler’s delivered to all supreme commanders on 23 -November 1939, at 1200 hours, is sufficient to characterize this phase -of the Nazi conspiracy (_789-PS_). The report of the speech was found in -the OKW files captured at Flensberg. Hitler spoke as follows: - - “November 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to - which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the - following speech: - - “The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the - world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of - future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of - our armed forces was only possible in connection with the - ideological [_weltanschaulich_] education of the German people - by the Party. - - “When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in - final success was based on a thorough observation of the events - of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. - Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of setbacks which - were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has - had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had - a clear recognition of the probable course of historical events, - and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision - was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a - politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was - the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief - that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new - system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would - take over the leadership. After 15 years I arrived at my goal, - after strenuous struggles and many setbacks. When I came to - power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay - behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had - to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people - and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of - the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist - ideas, education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I - undertook the second task: to release Germany from its - international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be - pointed out: secession from the League of Nations and - denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard - decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would - lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of - believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which - stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After - that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous - prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In - 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that - militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be - impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in - me was very small. Then beginning of the fortification of the - whole country especially in the west. - - “One year later, Austria came. This step also was considered - doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the - Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step - also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of - all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not - possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me - from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the - Sudeten-German territory. That was only partial solution. The - decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the - erection of the Protectorate, and with that basis for the action - against Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite clear at that time - whether I should start first against the east and then in the - west, or vice-versa”. (_789-PS_) - -There are some curious antitheses of thought in that, speech, as in most -of Adolf Hitler’s speeches. In one sentence he combines guidance by -providence with the making of “brutal decisions.” He constantly speaks -of how very few people were with him, and yet the mass of the German -people were with him. But he does give a brief summary of this early -period: the organization of the mass of the people, the extension of -organization to the armed forces, and the various “brutal decisions” -that were made. - -A top secret letter dated 24 June 1935, from General von Blomberg to the -Supreme Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces demonstrates the -preparations for war in which the Nazi conspirators were engaged during -this period. Attached to that letter is a copy of a Secret Reich Defense -law of 21 May 1935, and a copy of a decision of the Reichcabinet of 21 -May 1935 on the Council for the Defense of the Reich (_2261-PS_). These -documents were captured in the OKW files at Fechenheim. Von Blomberg’s -letter reads as follows: - - “In the appendix I transmit one copy each of the law for the - defense of the Reich of the 21 May 1935, and of a decision of - the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich’s Defense - Council. The publication of the Reich’s defense law is - temporarily suspended by order of the Fuehrer and Reich - Chancellor. - - “The Fuehrer and the Reichschancellor has nominated the - President of the directorate of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht to - be ‘Plenipotentiary-General for War economy’. - - “I request that the copies of the Reich’s defense law needed - within the units of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July - 1935 at armed forces office (L) where it is to be established - with the request that the law should only be distributed down to - Corps Headquarters outside of the Reichministry of war. - - “I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.” - (_2261-PS_) - -Underneath von Blomberg’s signature is an indorsement, “Berlin, 3 -September 1935; No. 1820/35 L Top Secret II a. To Defense-Economic Group -G-3, copy transmitted (signed) Jodl.” (_2261-PS_) - -Attached to this letter is the statute referred to as the Reich’s -Defense Law of 21 May 1935, enacted by the Reichscabinet. The law covers -in detail preparations for a state of defense, mobilization, and -appointment of the Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy (Schacht) -with plenipotentiary authority for the economic preparation of the war. -Part III provides for penalties. The law is signed, “The Fuehrer and -Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler; the Reichsminister of War, von Blomberg; -the Reichsminister of the Interior, Frick.” At the bottom of it there is -this note: - - “Note on the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 May 1935. - - “The publication of the law for the defense of the Reich of 21 - May 1935 will be suspended. The law became effective 21 May - 1935. - - “The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, Adolf Hitler.” (_2261-PS_) - -Thus, although the publication itself stated the law was made public, -and although the law became effective immediately, publication was -suspended by Adolf Hitler. - -There was also further attached to von Blomberg’s letter a copy of the -decision of the Reichscabinet of 21 May 1935 on the Council for the -Defense of the Realm. This decree deals largely with organization for -economic preparation for the war. This law of May 1935 was the -cornerstone of war preparations of the Nazi conspirators, and makes -clear the relationship of Schacht to this preparation. (_2261-PS_) - -B. _Formulation and Execution of Plans to Invade Austria and -Czechoslovakia._ - -The next phase of aggression was the formulation and execution of plans -to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, in that order. - -One of the most striking and revealing of all the captured documents -which have come to hand is one which has come to be known as the -Hossbach notes of a conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 5 November -1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours (_386-PS_). In the course of that meeting -Hitler outlined to those present the possibilities and necessities of -expanding their foreign policy, and requested, “That his statements be -looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.” -The recorder of the minutes of this meeting, Colonel Hossbach, was the -Fuehrer’s adjutant. Present at this conspiratorial meeting, among -others, were Erich Raeder, Constantin von Neurath, and Hermann Wilhelm -Goering. The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystalization towards the -end of 1937 in the policy of the Nazi regime (_386-PS_). Austria and -Czechoslovakia were to be acquired by force. They would provide -“_lebensraum_” (living space) and improve Germany’s military position -for further operations. While it is true that actual events unfolded -themselves in a somewhat different manner than that outlined at this -meeting, in essence the purposes stated at the meeting were carried out. -These notes, which destroy any possible doubt concerning the Nazi’s -premeditation of their crimes against peace, read as follows: - - “Berlin, 10 November 1937. Notes on the conference in the - Reichskanzlei on 5 November 1937 from 1615 to 2030 hours. - - “Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor; - - “The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. Blomberg; - - “The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr v. Fritsch; - - “The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. Raeder; - - “The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst Goering; - - “The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr v. Neurath; - - “Oberst Hossbach [the adjutant who took the minutes]. - - “The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s - conference was of such high importance, that its detailed - discussion would certainly in other states take place before the - Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided - not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich - Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements - were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences - of his four and a half years in government; he desired to - explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the - possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy - and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that - his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his - last will and testament. - - “The Fuehrer then stated: The aim of German policy is the - security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. - This is consequently a problem of space. The German nation - comprises eighty-five million people, which, because of the - number of individuals and the compactness of habitation form a - homogeneous European racial body, the like of which can not be - found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the - demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. - If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands - of this racial body for living space then that is the result of - historical development spread over several centuries and should - this political condition continue to exist, it will represent - the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation at - its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the - German element in Austria and in Czechoslovakia is just as - little possible as the preservation of the present state in - Germany itself. - - “Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a - consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a - number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are - of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce - the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence - of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent - exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a - solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, - about one to three generations. - - “Before touching upon the question of solving the need for - living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the - German position with a good future can be attained, either by - way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal - commerce and industry. - - “Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict - National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming - this can be achieved the results are as follows: - - “A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but not total - autarchy can be attained: - - “1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw - materials autarchy is feasible. - - “2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. - Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by - ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can not. - - “3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as - sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not - possible. - - “4. Edible fats—possible. - - “B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be - answered with a definite NO. - - “The general increase of living standards, compared with thirty - to forty years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the - demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the - producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the - production increase in agriculture have been used for covering - the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute - increase in production. A further increase in production by - making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it - already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of - artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even - with the greatest possible increase in production, participation - in the world market could not be avoided. - - “The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food - by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases - catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The - possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the - increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births - would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the - child is a greater bread eater than the adult. - - “Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by - lowering the standard of living and by rationing is impossible - in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent - standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem - has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some - small corrections in our agricultural home production will be - possible, but not a wholesale alteration of the standard of food - consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, - specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as - generally. - - “Participation in world economy. There are limits to this which - we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an - obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; - international commercial agreements do not offer any guarantee - for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that - since the World War (1914-18), as industrialization has taken - place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a - period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies - again approaches the condition which originally motivated - colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis - of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive - Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have - special difficulties in expanding economically. - - “The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, - due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis - for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by - the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a - pronounced military weakness in those states who base their - existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out - over those sea lanes which are dominated by Britain, it is more - a question of security of transport than one of foreign - currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food - situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear - imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor - which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states - and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency - finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied states. Should the - security of our food situation be our foremost thought, then the - space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we - will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on - exploiting colonies. It is not a case of conquering people, but - of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more - to the purpose to seek raw material-producing territory in - Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this - solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two - generations. What would be required at a later date over and - above this must be left to subsequent, generations. The - development of great worldwide national bodies is naturally a - slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root - [Volksstamm] has for this purpose the most favorable foundations - in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all - times—Roman Empire, British Empire—has proved that every space - expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking - risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today - has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes - up against the proprietor.” (_386-PS_) - -After this somewhat jumbled discussion of geopolitical economic theory -and of the need for expansion and “_Lebensraum_”, Adolf Hitler, in these -Hossbach notes, posed a question and proceeded to answer it: - - “The question for Germany is where the greatest possible - conquest could be made at lowest cost. - - “German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, - England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the - center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would - oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and - overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of - all parties. Both countries would view the building of German - military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas - communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and - retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in - Europe. - - “England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial - possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences - in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has - suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian - ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. - Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the - readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies - which at the present moment are not in British hands, for - example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same - nature. - - “A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us - could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of - emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The - Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is - unshakeable. - - “Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered - territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and - the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard - to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a - serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which - originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into - all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to - subjugate Ancient Rome. - - “Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist - which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able - to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states - and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example, - defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern - interests against an attack by Japan? - - “The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire - unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot - be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are - significant pointers in this respect: - - “(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence. - - “(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her - half measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to - utilize the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a - weapon against Britain. - - “(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by - Japan. - - “(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by - virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a - genius—expands its power position and must consequently - infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome - of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which - Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in - the Mohammedan World. - - “It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be - held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in - spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the - populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland, - is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we - expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population - to become too low. - - “France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The - French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of - its colonial possessions represents a potential military - increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal - politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of - the nations have parliamentary governments, whereas 90 per cent - of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, we have to - take the following into our political consideration as power - factors: - - “Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller states. - - “The German question can be solved only by way of force, and - this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great - for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had - been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 - had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place - the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the - following expositions, then we are left to reply to the - questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide - upon three different cases. - - “Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change - for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy and the Air - Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are - practically concluded. - - “Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further - delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In - particular the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be - safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the - current recruiting age groups and an addition from older - untrained groups would be no longer available. - - “In comparison with the rearmament, which will have been carried - out at the time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative - power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the - absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, - for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary - foreign currency. This must be considered as a ‘point of - weakness in the regime.’ Over and above that, the world will - anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. - Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on - the offensive. - - “What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one - knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer. - - “On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for - securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its - leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the - standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no - other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it - will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space - problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before - 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3. - - “Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an - internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the - French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war - against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia - has come. - - “Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against - Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against - another State that it cannot ‘proceed’ against Germany. - - “For the improvement of our military political position it must - be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to - conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to - remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance - Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly - be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on - the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to - participate in the war will increase proportionally to the - degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation - could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards - the North or the West. - - “Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier, - Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland - in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. - Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as - Germany’s strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have any - setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps - also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account. - - “Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a - planned attack on our part in the years 1943 to ’45, then the - behaviour of France, England, Poland and Russia would probably - have to be judged in the following manner. - - “The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all probability - England and perhaps also France, have already silently written - off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that - this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The - difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being - entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive - factors in the nonparticipation of England in a war against - Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain without - influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France, without - British support, is hardly probable assuming that its offensive - would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without - England’s support, it would also not be necessary to take into - consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and - this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a - conflict with France, as in every case it would have as a - consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally we should in - every case, have to bar our frontier during the operation of our - attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken - into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s defence measures - will increase in strength from year to year, and that a - consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army will - also be effected in the course of years. Although the population - of Czechoslovakia, in the first place is not a thin one, the - embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless - constitute the conquest of food for five to six million people, - on the basis that a compulsory emigration of two million from - Czechoslovakia, and of one million from Austria could be carried - out. The annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily and - politically, would constitute a considerable relief, owing to - shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel - for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new - armies up to a strength of about twelve Divisions, representing - a new Division per one million population. - - “No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on - the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would - be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend - largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not. - - “The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s - attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war - against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear. - - “Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed - of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be - taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude. - - “Should Case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a Civil - War—then the situation should be utilized _at any time_ for - operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous - enemy would be eliminated. - - “The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming near; it could develop from the - existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, he - has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as - early as 1938. - - “Following recent experiences in the course of events of the war - in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an early end to hostilities - there. Taking into consideration the time required for past - offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is - within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the - German point of view, a one hundred per cent victory by Franco - is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of - the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. - Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula, it - would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of - Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed - towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our - future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the - Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions - on the Balearic Isles can not be tolerated either by France or - by England and could lead to a war by France and England against - Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white [Franco’s] - hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s enemies. A - subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. - Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. - The Fuehrer believes that Italy’s military strategy would be to - remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier - and carry out operations against France from Libya, against the - North African French colonial possessions. - - “As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can - be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper - Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate - before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of - communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent - paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa - to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, - France will have, at its disposal, solely the metropolitan - fighting forces. - - “If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the - Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must - be assumed that England—being at war with Italy—would not - decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British - support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be - anticipated. - - “The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be - made independent of the course of the Italian-French-English war - and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military - operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not - thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete - independence and by exploiting this unique favorable - opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against - Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take - place with the speed of lightning [_blitzartig schnell_]. - - “Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in - giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out - that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they - stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French Army to - such an extent that it would not be in a position to commence - operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. - Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which - would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against - Italy to be in the region of twenty divisions, so that a strong - French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. - The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to - advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which - France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very - small value of our then existing fortifications—which was - pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von - Blomberg—the four motorized divisions which had been laid down - for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With - regard to our offensive in a Southeasterly direction, - Fieldmarshal von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength - of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which - had, assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which would - present extreme difficulties to our attack. - - “Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of - a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the - possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia - with special consideration of the conquest of the - Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also - stated that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have to - relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 - November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer, who - gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to - be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by - Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch - regarding England and France’s attitude, the Fuehrer repeated - his previous statements and said that he was convinced of - Britain’s nonparticipation and that consequently he did not - believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the - Mediterranean conflict already mentioned, lead to a general - mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence - operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the - powers who are not participating in the war should declare their - disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have - to side with this attitude. - - “In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst - Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or - abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer - agreed to this, insofar as he believed this decision should be - postponed for a suitable date. - - “The second part of the discussion concerned material armament - questions. - - “(Signed) Hossbach”. (_386-PS_) - -The record of what happened thereafter is well-known to history. The -Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred -in March 1938. Pressure on Czechoslovakia resulted in the Munich Pact of -September 1938. That Pact was violated, and Czechoslovakia invaded by -Germany on 15 March 1939. - -Another captured document, a file kept by Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s -adjutant, reveals the truth concerning the deliberateness of the -aggressions against Czechoslovakia (_388-PS_). The file was found in a -cellar of the Platterhof at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. It -consists of a work-file of originals and duplicates, incidental to the -preparations for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. The German title is -“_Grundlagen zur Studie Gruen_”, (Basic Principles for “Case Green”), -“Green” being a codeword for the aggression against Czechoslovakia. Item -No. 2 in this file is dated 22 April 1938. It is a summary, prepared by -Schmundt, the adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler -and Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, relates -to “Case Green”. This meeting occurred within approximately one month -following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of -the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the “Plan Green”, to take -into account changed conditions, as a result of the bloodless success -against Austria. Item 2 reads: - - “Berlin, 22 April 1938. - - “Bases of the Dissertation on _Gruen_. - - “Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 - April: - - “A. Political Aspect. - - “1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any - cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As - result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a - critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the - elimination of the _last_ opponent on the mainland. - - “2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually - come to a crisis and lead to war. - - “3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for - example, assassination of German ambassador in connection with - an anti-German demonstration.) - - “Military Conclusions. - - “1. The preparations are to be made for the political - possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since - “_Gruen_” will have taken security measures. - - “2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the - divisions by rail—which is unavailable, but should be cut down - as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at - the time of the action. - - “3. ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediately with a - view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous - points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts - are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, - composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). - Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force. - - “The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example - divebombers; sealing off installations at penetration points, - hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal - communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.) - - “4. Politically, the first four days of military action are the - decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a - European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must - prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw - Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize - ‘_Gruen_.’ - - “Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and - employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and - ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.) - - “5. If possible, separation of transport movement ‘_Rot_’ from - ‘_Gruen_’. [‘_Rot_’ was the code name for their then plan - against the West.] A simultaneous strategic concentration - ‘_Rot_’ can lead ‘_Rot_’ to undesired measures. On the other - hand, it must be possible to put ‘_Case Rot_’ into operation at - any time. - - “C. Propaganda. - - “1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia - (_Gruenland_.) - - “2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs - (_Gruenen_). - - [Initialled by Schmundt]” (_388-PS_) - -Particular attention should be drawn to paragraph 3 of this document, -under the heading “Political Aspect”, which reads as follows: - - “Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (example: - Assassination of German ambassador as an upshot of an - anti-German demonstration).” (_388-PS_) - -The document as a whole establishes that the conspirators were planning -the creation of an incident to justify to the world their own aggression -against Czechoslovakia. It establishes that consideration was being -given to assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the -requisite incident. - -C. _Formulation and Execution of the Plan to Invade Poland._ - -The next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of -the plan to attack Poland, resulting in the initiation of aggressive war -in September 1939. Here again the careful and meticulous record keeping -of Hitler’s adjutant, Schmundt, has provided a document in his own -handwriting which throws down the mask (_L-79_). The document consists -of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the -conference was the Fuehrer’s Study in the New Reich Chancellery. -Goering, Raeder and Keitel were present. The subject of the meeting was, -“Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.” - -The authenticity and accuracy of Schmundt’s record of the meeting of 23 -May 1939 has been admitted by Keitel in a pretrial interrogation. The -minutes read as follows: - - “Top Secret - - “To be transmitted by officer only - - “Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39” - - “Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery. - - “Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt. - - “Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral - Raeder, Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. - Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. - Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, - Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Commd. - Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army). - - “Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future - aims. - - “The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference: - - “1. Analysis of the situation. - - “2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from - the situation. - - “3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks. - - “4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting - from these consequences. - - “Secrecy is the first essential for success. - - “The Fuehrer’s observations are given in systematized form - below. - - “Our present situation must be considered from two points of - view: - - “1. The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939; - - “2. The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany - lies. - - “In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. - - Our military situation improved enormously. - - “Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained - the same. - - “Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The - balance of power had been effected without the participation of - Germany. - - “This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the - necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges - as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘Encroachments’. - The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere - than of the simple threat of force. - - “A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological - problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No - German can evade the creation of the necessary economic - conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands - courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem - by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. - Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible - without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign - property. - - “Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is - the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the - problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The - choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’ - time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German - statesman can evade the question longer than that. - - “We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is - shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan. - - “The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good - use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in - harmony with our aims. - - “After 6 years, the situation is today as follows: - - “The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, - apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be - attained without the shedding of blood. - - “The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance. - - “The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on - the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, - Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every - opportunity to do us harm. - - “Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a - question of expanding our living space in the East and of - securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic - problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly - populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, - thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the - surplus. - - “There is no other possibility for Europe. - - “Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not - solve the food problem. Remember—blockade. - - “If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession - of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record - harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than - in peace. - - “The population of non-German areas will perform no military - service, and will be available as a source of labour. - - “The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West. - - “Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is - doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against - Russia. - - “It is questionable whether military success in the West can be - achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude - of Poland. - - “The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. - Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will - attempt to rob us of the victory. - - “There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are - left with the decision: - - “_To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity._ [This - sentence is underscored in the original German text.] - - “We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will - be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the - isolation will be decisive. - - “Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final - order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the - Western Powers [France and England]. - - “If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not - lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily - against England and France. - - “Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland—beginning with - an attack on Poland—will only be successful if the Western - Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be - better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same - time. - - “The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics. - - “Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various - reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool - and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to - take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time. - - “Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political - relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press - comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to - be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia - take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become - closer. - - “If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against - Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack - England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer - doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We - must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our - development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken - England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with - England will be a life-and-death struggle. - - “_What will this struggle be like?_ [This sentence is - underscored in the German original.] - - “England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few - powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should - be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood - will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin - will determine the duration of our resistance. - - “The Dutch and Belgium air bases will be occupied by armed - forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England - and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to - a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their - neutrality and make them build fortifications in order finally - to force them into cooperation. - - “Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to - pressure. - - “Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, - we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at - securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee. - - “The war with England and France will be a life-and-death - struggle. - - “The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no - such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a - question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 - million human beings. - - “_Question: Short or long war?_ - - “Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short - war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of - 10-15 years’ duration. - - “History has always shown that the people have believed that - wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that - it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea - still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state - will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers - some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar - weaknesses. - - “England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world - power. - - “_England_ is the driving force against Germany. - - “Her strength lies in the following: - - “1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, - firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to - exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure - and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. - The German average is higher. - - “2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. - Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely - something concrete, but must also be considered as a - psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this - immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit. - - “3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a - courageous air force. - - “_England’s weakness_: - - “If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two - cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the - morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England - brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war. - It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet. Landings had - to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her - own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible. - - “The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced - to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the - fleet’s protection. - - “If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will - not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is - destroyed immediate capitulation will be the result. - - “There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick - decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to - rely entirely on the element of surprise. - - “Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by— - - “1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles - concerned. - - “2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole - enterprise. - - “3. Human failings. - - “4. Weather conditions. - - “The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. - Beyond that time, the tension cannot be endured for long. It - must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any - surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible. - - “This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action. - - “1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or - the final decisive blow right at the start. Consideration of - right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. This - will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with - England on account of Poland. - - “2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparation for a long - war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for - England are eliminated. - - “The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and - Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and - held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions - for a successful war against England will have been secured. - - “England can then be blockaded from Western France at close - quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines - extend the range of the blockade. - - “_Consequences_: - - “England will not be able to fight on the Continent: - - “Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her - life-lines: - - “Germany will not bleed to death on land. - - “Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and - subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for - the following strategic considerations which are imperative— - - “1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a - wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end - would have been different. - - “2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is - impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the - lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense - counter-measures. - - “3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential. - - “4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, - has taken the most important positions, industrial production - will cease in flow in to the bottomless pit of the Army’s - battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy. - - “The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions. - Systematic preparation must be made for the attack. - - “Study to this end is of the utmost importance. - - “The aim will always be to force England to her knees. - - “A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning - battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it. - - “This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be - true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet - had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case - in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be - effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures. - - “Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be - decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise - and by masterly handling. * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “Purpose: - - “1. Study of the entire problem. - - “2. Study of the events. - - “3. Study of the means needed. - - “4. Study of the necessary training. - - “Men with great powers of imagination and high technical - training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with - sober sceptic powers of understanding. - - “Working principles: - - “1. No one is to take part in this who does not have to know of - it. - - “2. No one can find out more than he must know. - - “3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest? - No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it. - - “On Goering’s question, the Fuehrer decided that: - - “_a._ The armed forces determine what shall be built. - - “_b._ In the shipbuilding program, nothing is to be changed. - - “_c._ The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 - or 1944. - - [Schmundt certified this text.]” (_L-79_) - -These minutes demonstrate that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in -accordance with a plan. They demonstrate the cold-blooded premeditation -of the assault on Poland. They demonstrate that the questions concerning -Danzig, which the Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, -were not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated to -conceal their motive of aggressive, expansion for food, and -_Lebensraum_. - -Just one week prior to the launching of the attack on Poland, Hitler -made an address to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg, on 22 -August 1939. [Three reports of this meeting are available: (_L-3_; -_798-PS_; and _1014-PS_). The first of the three documents (_L-3_) was -obtained through an American newspaperman, and purported to be original -minutes of the Obersalzberg meeting, transmitted to the newspaperman by -some other person. There was no proof of actual delivery to the -intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document (_L-3_) -therefore, merely served as an incentive to search for something better. -The result was that two other documents (_798-PS_) and (_1014-PS_) were -discovered in the OKW files at Flensberg. These two documents indicate -that Hitler on that day made two speeches, one apparently in the morning -and one in the afternoon. Comparison of those two documents with the -first document (_L-3_) led to the conclusion that the first document was -a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches, and therefore was not -relied upon.] - -On this day of 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed the supreme commanders -of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the commanding -generals, (_Oberbefehlshabers_) as follows: - - “I have called you together to give you a picture of the - political situation, in order that you may have insight into the - individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in - order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss - military details. - - “It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come - sooner or later. I had already made this decision in Spring. - [Apparently this referred to (_L-79_).] But I thought I would - first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards - against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot - close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted - to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland, in order to - fight first against the West, but this plan which was agreeable - to me could not be executed, since essential points have - changed. - - “It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a - conflict in the West. - - “Poland wants access to the sea. - - “The further development became obvious after the occupation of - the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the - circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an - unopportune moment. - - “I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two - personal constitutions, my own personality, and that of - Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because - of my political activity. - - “Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have - the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will - probably never again be a man in the future with more authority. - My existence is, therefore, a factor of great value. But I can - be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot. - - “The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also - decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the - alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the - Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in - the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with - the strongest nerves in Italy. - - “The third factor, favorable for us is Franco. We can only ask - benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s - personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness - of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the - fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our - internal unity. - - “On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive - personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality - in England or France. - - “For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to lose: - we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our - restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. - Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must act. - Our opponents risk much and gain only little. England’s stake in - a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below - average. No personalities, no masters, no men of action. - - “Besides the personal factor, the political situation is - favorable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, - France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the - alarming of the Mohammedan world. - - “The English empire did not emerge from the last war - strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was - achieved: Conflict between England and Ireland, the south - African Union became more independent, concessions had to be - made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries. - A British statesman can look into the future only with concern. - - “France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the - Mediterranean. - - “Further favorable factors for us are these: - - “Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. - Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal - situation. - - “Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and - vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since - Kemal’s death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady - weak men. - - “All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in two - to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore - conflict better now. - - “The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement - politically but militarily it was questionable, since it was - achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is - necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by - general settlement, but by solving individual tasks. - - “The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy - hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My - propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by - England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The - initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. This moment is - more favorable than in two to three years. An attempt on my life - or Mussolini’s could only change the situation to our - disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another - with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded - that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They - talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was - danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great - that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with - reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as - a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to - be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.” - - * * * * * * - - “Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.” - - * * * * * * - - “We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us - with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which - demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute - some _Schweinhund_ will make a proposal for mediation.” - - * * * * * * - - “Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance - that the armed forces will do their duty.” (_798-PS_) - -In his second speech on 22 August 1939 the Fuehrer had this to say: - - “It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. - One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a - trade-barrier, not on blockade, and with severance of relations. - Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. - Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were - determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers. - Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as - she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, - greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by - getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would - not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect - everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each - other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental - factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In - 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisites were - not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only - through his mental power. - - “Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination - of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war - should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be - the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season. - - “I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never - mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be - asked, later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting - and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory. - - “Have no pity. Brutal attitude. 80,000,000 people shall get what - is their right. Their existence has to be secured. The strongest - has the Right. Greatest severity. - - “Quick decision necessary. Unshakable faith in the German - soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders - give way. - - “First aim: advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical - superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every - newly-created Polish force shall again be broken at once. - Constant war of attrition. - - “New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a - protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be - influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland - is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until - complete elimination. - - “Conviction that the German _Wehrmacht_ is up to the - requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday - morning.” (_1014-PS_) - -D. _Expansion into General War of Aggression: Scandinavia, The Low -Countries, The Balkans._ - -The aggressive war having been initiated in September 1939, and Poland -having been defeated shortly after the initial assaults, the Nazi -aggressors converted the war into a general war of aggression extending -into Scandinavia, into the Low Countries, and into the Balkans. (Under -the division of the case agreed by the four Chief Prosecutors, this -phase of aggression was left for development to the British prosecuting -staff, and is discussed in Sections 9, 10 and 11 of this Chapter, -_infra_.) - -E. _Aggression Against the U. S. S. R._ - -The attack upon Russia was preceded with premeditation and deliberation. -Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had -a code name for the secret operation, “Case Green”, so in the case of -aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name, “Case -Barbarossa”. A secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Fuehrer’s -Headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to “Case Barbarossa,” was -captured among the OKW files at Flensberg (_446-PS_). This directive was -issued more than six months in advance of the attack. (Other evidence -shows that the planning occurred even earlier.) This order, signed by -Hitler and initialled by Jodl and Keitel, was issued in nine copies, of -which we have the fourth. The directive reads: - - “The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia - in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England. - (Case Barbarossa.) - - “For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available - units with the reservation that the occupied territories will - have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks. - - “For the Eastern campaign the Air force will have to free such - strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick - completion of the ground operations may be expected and that - damage of the Eastern German territories will be avoided as much - as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East - is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle - and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently - protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on - England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted - to break down. - - “Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains - unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign. - - “If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for - action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended - beginning of operations. - - “Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not - yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 - May 1941. - - “Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an - attack will not be recognized. - - “The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the - following basis: - - “I. _General Purpose_: - - “The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be - destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges - with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into - the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented. - - “In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the - Russian Air force will no longer be able to attack German Reich - territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from - Asiatic Russian from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case - of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to - Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe. - - In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet - will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to - fight. - - “Effective intervention by the Russian Air force is to be - prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the - operations.” (_446-PS_) - -Another secret document captured from the OKW files establishes the -motive for the attack on the Soviet Union (_2718-PS_). It also -establishes the full awareness of the Nazi conspirators of the Crimes -against Humanity which would result from their attack. The document is a -memorandum of 2 May 1941 concerning the results of a discussion on that -day with the State Secretaries concerning “Case Barbarossa.” The -memorandum reads in part: - - “Matter for Chief; 2 copies; first copy to files Ia. Second copy - to General Schubert. May 2nd, 1941. Memorandum. About the result - of today’s discussion with the State Secretaries about - Barbarossa. - - “1. The war can only be continued if all armed forces are fed by - Russia in the third year of war. - - “2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people - will be starved to death if we take out of the country the - things necessary for us.” (_2718-PS_) - -F. _Collaboration with Japan: Precipitation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack._ - -With the unleashing of the German aggressive war against the Soviet -Union in June 1941, the Nazi conspirators and, in particular Ribbentrop, -called upon the Eastern co-architect of the New Order, Japan, to attack -in the rear. The Nazi’s incited and kept in motion a force reasonably -calculated to result in an attack on the United States. For a time, they -preferred that the United States not be involved in the conflict, due to -military considerations. However, their incitement resulted in the -attack on Pearl Harbor, and long prior to that attack, they had assured -the Japanese that they would declare War on the United States should a -United States-Japanese conflict occur. It was in reliance on these -assurances that the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor. - -These matters are disclosed in a document, captured from the files of -the German Foreign Office, which consists of notes dated 4 April 1941, -signed by Schmidt, regarding discussions between the Fuehrer and the -Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of Ribbentrop -(_1881-PS_). Pertinent parts of this document read as follows: - - “Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer - should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as - broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military - Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly - concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making - available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as - the latest technical improvements and inventions. * * * - - “Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United - States. In case that the country should decide to attack - Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for - a fight with the United States, because in that case America - would probably side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally - believed, that the United States could be restrained by - diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great - Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worse - situation, that is war against America. They were of the opinion - that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would - take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be - fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German - experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to - Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted - and how all the technical improvements of submarine, in all - details such as periscopes and such like, could best be - exploited by Japan. “To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the - Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities - would place at the disposal of the Japanese these developments - and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by - the Japanese. - - “The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too - considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but - that it had already made allowance for such a contingency. In - Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contribution - depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this - again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war - against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely - against England, but also against America. Germany has made her - preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would - conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats - and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which - would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would - be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the - German soldier naturally ranks high above the American. - - “In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed - out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the - consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United - States. It did not matter with whom the United States would - first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would - always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an - understanding with the other country subsequently. Therefore - Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in - case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the - strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, - their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten - individually. - - “Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might - give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German - authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the - latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to - them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a - conflict with the United States. - - “As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained - further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner - or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if - Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion - this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His - argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not - decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon - herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps - avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained - predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan - many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka - was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous - thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan continued to walk - along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway - and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances - than at present. - - “The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation - of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the - clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed - Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit - favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow - unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and - full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by - events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment - instantly to reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, - be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let - dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them. - - “Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling - politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuver - towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan - on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave - free passage to the consignment of rubber and tin to America to - their place of destination. However, America would war against - Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the - intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. * * * - - “The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America - did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, - that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they - could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, - whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would - be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan. - - “The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans - precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the - powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other - hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a - joint action of Japan and Germany. - - “Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give - to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude - inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him - regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as - Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan - itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the - Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This - would cause him serious damage in political and financial - circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he - became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close - friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter - had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of - rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose - energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under - those circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he - could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier - or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully - in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his - decision at a favorable moment, to make a clean breast of his - proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the - decision would have to be made within a few days, because the - plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk. - - “Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that - would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of - conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he - succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He - himself felt confident that he would succeed. - - “On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the - Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the - Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, - state that it was only on a hypothetical basis. - - “Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in - the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by - cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a - courier. - - “The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest - entirely assured of German reticence. - - “Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but - unfortunately could not say the same of Japan. - - “The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some - personal parting words. - - “Berlin, the 4th of April 1941. - - “(signed) SCHMIDT” (_1881-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PLOTTING OF - AGGRESSIVE WAR - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Section IV (F); │ │ - │ V. │ I │ 22, 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │ - │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │ - │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ - │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │ - │(USA 25) │ III │ 295 - │ │ │ - *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan │ │ - │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │ │ - │by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ - │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 - │ │ │ - 442-PS │General Order No. 16 on the preparation │ │ - │of a landing operation against England, │ │ - │16 July 1940, initialled by Jodl and │ │ - │Keitel. │ III │ 399 - │ │ │ - *446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed │ │ - │by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │ - │Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, │ │ - │concerning the Invasion of Russia (case │ │ - │Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407 - │ │ │ - *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │ - │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │ - │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 - │ │ │ - *798-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ - │at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA │ │ - │29) │ III │ 581 - │ │ │ -*1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ - │22 August 1939. (USA 30) │ III │ 665 - │ │ │ -*1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and │ │ - │Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop in │ │ - │Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522 - │ │ │ -*2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ - │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│ │ - │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of │ │ - │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and │ │ - │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │ │ - │May 1935 on the Council for defense of │ │ - │the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 - │ │ │ -*2718-PS │Memorandum “About the result of today’s │ │ - │discussion with State Secretaries about │ │ - │Barbarossa”, 2 May 1941. (USA 32) │ V │ 378 - │ │ │ - *D-660 │Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated │ │ - │edition of Mein Kampf. (GB 128) │ VII │ 164 - │ │ │ -**L-3 │Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme │ │ - │Commander and Commanding Generals, │ │ - │Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28) │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence) │ VII │ 752 - │ │ │ - *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ - │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ - │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 - - - 2. PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION: 1933-1936 - -By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial -proportions. At that time its plans called for the acquisition of -political control of Germany. This was indispensable for consolidation, -within the country, of all the internal resources and potentialities. - -As soon as there was sufficient progress along this line of internal -consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the -external disadvantages of existing international limitations and -obligations. - -The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development -of strength in all the fields necessary if Germany were to make war. -Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and -violation from the very time that the Versailles Treaty came into -effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain -proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty -of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the -extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. It -was as a part of the same plan and for the same reason that Germany -withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. -It was impossible for the Nazis to carry out their plan on the basis of -existing international obligations or on the basis of the orthodox kind -of future commitments. - -Every military and diplomatic operation undertaken by the Nazis was -preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all -participating forces. At the same time each event was part of a long -prepared plan of aggression. Each represented a necessary step in the -preparation of the schedule of aggressions which was subsequently -carried out. - -Three of the steps in preparation for aggression were first, the -withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations; -second, the institution of compulsory military service; and, third, the -reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these -steps was progressively more serious in the matter of international -relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the possibility of -sanctions being applied by other countries, and, particularly, a strong -military action from France with the possible assistance of England. -However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a -preventive war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly that -no one or combination of big powers would undertake the responsibility -for such a war. The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from -the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not violate any -international obligation. The League Covenant provided the procedure for -withdrawal. These actions, however, cannot be disassociated from the -general conspiracy and the plan for aggression. The announcement of the -institution of universal military service was a more daring action. It -was a violation of the Versailles Treaty, but the Nazis got away with -it. Then came outright military defiance, with the occupation of the -demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. - -A. _Planning to Overthrow the Versailles Treaty._ - -The determination and the plans of the Nazi conspirators to remove the -restrictions of Versailles, started very early. This fact is confirmed -by their own statements, their boasts of long planning and careful -execution. Hitler, in his speech to all Supreme Commanders on 23 -November 1939, stated that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles -(_789-PS_). And Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, -delivered an address after four years of war, on 7 November 1943, in -which he traced the development of German strength (_L-172_). The -seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, -including conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, -with special emphasis on modern armor and air forces. In his speech, -entitled “The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of -War,” General Jodl gave a retrospective summary of the war for the -benefit of the Reich and Gau leaders. He stated: - - “Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you - a review today of the strategic position in the beginning of the - 5th Year of War. - - “I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I - undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it - justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say - openly what is. No one—the Fuehrer has ordered—may know more - or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I - have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a - great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in - your Gaus, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the - enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours - concentrate, that try to find themselves a plan among our - people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. - All the cowards are seeking a way out, or—as they call it—a - political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is - still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of - to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war - there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of - the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy - propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to - know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am - justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncolored account - of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of - secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the - morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by - the force of arms but by the will of the whole people. Germany - was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered - not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down - internally. The result has been not the peace she expected - but—through the cowardice of these criminal traitors—a fate - thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side - would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, - Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data - concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as - your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without - restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the - people. - - “The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and - everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of - Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the - danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western - powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the - direction of the Mediterranean, and in that of Russia—these - also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war - so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious - set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to - become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask - itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could - do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this - questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for - use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points - of my present lecture; I shall divide it into three parts: - - “I. A review of the most important development up to the - present. - - “II. Consideration of the present situation. - - “III. The foundation of our morale and our confidence in - victory. - - “In view of my position as military advisor to the Fuehrer, I - shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own - personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time - that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this - way be giving expression only to one side of events. - - “I. _Review_ - - “1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its - struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the - outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is - not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like - however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful - regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played - by the National Socialist movement in reawakening the will to - fight [_Wehrwillen_] in nurturing fighting strength - [_Wehrkraft_] and in rearming the German people. In spite of all - the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small _Reichswehr_ - would never have been able to cope with this task, if only - because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the - Fuehrer aimed at—and has so happily been successful in bringing - about—was the fusion of these two forces. - - “2. The seizure of power in its turn has meant in the first - place restoration of fighting sovereignty - [_Wehrhoheit_—conscription, occupation of the Rhineland] and - rearmament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a - modern armoured and air arm. - - “3. The Austrian ‘_Anschlluss_’ in its turn, brought with it not - only the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the - effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of - materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till - then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most - menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction - of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), - Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. - - “Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that - she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with - rigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to - arrive. - - “This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by - the construction of the West Wall, which, in contra-distinction - to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and - resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active - policy in the East. - - “4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn - of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia - rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that - it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the - basis of more or less favourable strategic premises. - - “This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and - the question which next arises is whether the moment for the - struggle with Poland—in itself unavoidable—was favorably - selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in - doubt since the opponent—after all, not inconsiderable in - himself—collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers - who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form - a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the - possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our - hands. Concerning the course of the Polish campaign, nothing - further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which - made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up - till then had not been certain by any means; that is, the high - state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Great Germany.” - (_L-172_) - -In this speech General Jodl identifies himself fully with the Nazi -movement. His own words show that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as -he is concerned, his speech identifies the military with the political, -it also shows the deliberation with which the Treaty of Versailles was -abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was -militarized and fortified. - -In one of Adolf Hitler’s reviews of the six-year period between his -ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only -admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range -planning. The minutes of conference of the Fuehrer kept by Schmundt, his -adjutant, contain the following passage: - - “In the period 1933-1939 progress was made in all fields. Our - military system improved enormously.” - - * * * * * * - - “The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to good - use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in - harmony with our aims.” (_L-79_) - -B. _Economic and Financial Preparations for Aggressive War._ - -One of the most significant preparations for aggressive war is found in -the Secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 (_2261-PS_). The law went -into effect upon its passage. It stated at its outset that it was to be -made public instanter, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the -decree ordering that it be kept secret. General Thomas, who was in -charge of War Armament Economy and for some time a high-ranking member -of the German High Command, refers, to this law as the cornerstone of -war preparations. He points out that, although the law was not made -public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as -a program for preparations. These statements are made at page 25 of -General Thomas’ work, “A History of the German War and Armament Economy, -1923-1944.” (_2353-PS_) - -This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1939, at which time -it was replaced by another secret defense law (_2194-PS_) revising the -system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations -for the approaching status of “mobilization,” which was clearly an -euphemism for war. - -The covering letter, under which this second Reich Defense Law, was sent -to the Ministry for Economy and Labor for Saxony in Dresden, on 6 -December 1939, was classified Top Secret and read as follows: - - “Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief - Counsellor Hirches, or representative in the office of the Reich - Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, received Prague, 5 September - 1939, No. 274. - - “Inclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 - September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich - Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL 10.2212/38, - top secret, and of 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, top secret. - For your information and observance, by order, signed - Kretzchmar. 3 inclosures completed to Dresden, 4 September 1939, - signed Schneider 3 inclosures. Receipt for the letter of 4 - September 1939, with 3 inclosures, signed 5 September, 1939, and - returned to construction Counsellor Kretzchmar.” (_2194-PS_) - -Thus the second secret Reich Defense Law was transmitted under top -secret cover. - -The general plan for the breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the -ensuing aggressions was carried out in four ways: (1) secret rearmament -from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of military personnel (that -includes secret or camouflage training); (3) production of munitions of -war; (4) the building of an air force. - -The facts of rearmament and of secrecy are self-evident from the events -that followed. The significant phase of this activity lies in the fact -that it was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Treaty of -Versailles and of the Locarno Pact, and to make ready for aggressive -wars which were to follow. - -Those activities by their nature and extent, could only have been for -aggressive purposes. The highest importance which the German government -attached to the secrecy of the program is emphasized by the disguised -methods of financing utilized both before and after the announcement of -conscription, and the rebuilding of the army, on 16 March 1935. - -The point is illustrated by an unsigned memorandum by Schacht dated 3 -May 1935, entitled, “The Financing of the Armament program, -“_Finanzierung der Ruestung_.” (1168-PS) It is not signed by Schacht, -but in an interrogation on 16 October 1945, he identified it as being -his memorandum. The memorandum reads as follows: - - “Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler [identified by Schacht as - Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, page 40] May 3, 1935. - - “Financing of Armament. The following explanations are based - upon the thought, that the accomplishment of the armament - program with speed and in quantity is _the_ problem of German - politics, that everything else therefore should be subordinated - to this purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by - neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935, the - difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open - propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of - armament without endangering our position internationally - (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly - impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby - exceptionally difficult. - - “Another supposition must be also emphasized. The printing press - can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree, - as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation - increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the - domestic prices, is therefore like a snail biting its own tail. - The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged - completely till March 16, 1935, and even since this date the - camouflage had to be continued to a larger extent, making it - necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at - the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have - been natural, to start it (the printing press) at the final - point of financing. In the porte-feuille of the Reichsbank are - segregated notes for this purpose, that is, armament, of 3,775 - millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of - which the armament notes amount to Reichsmarks 2,374 millions, - that is, of April 30, 1935. The Reichsbank has invested the - amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to - foreigners in blank notes of armament. Our armaments are also - financed partly with the credits of our political opponents. - Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmarks were used for financing of - armament, which originated out of [_Reichsanleihe_], the federal - loans, placed with savings banks. In the regular budget, the - following amounts were provided. For the budget period 1933-34, - Reichsmarks 750 millions; for the budget period 1934-35, - Reichsmarks 1,100 millions; and for the budget period 1935-36, - Reichsmarks 2,500 millions. - - “The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after - the budget 1935-36 to 5 to 6 millions Reichsmarks. This total - deficit is already financed at the present time by short term - credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the - possibilities of utilization of the public market for the - armament. The Minister of Finance [_Reichsfinanzminister_], - correctly points out at the defense of the budget: As a - permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we cannot - figure with security with increased tax revenues in amount - balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the - other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the - impending great task of military policy. For all these reasons - we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget - policy which solves the problem of armament financing by organic - and planned reduction of other expenditures not only from the - point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, that - is, by saving. - - “How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the following, - that a large amount of task has been started by the state and - party and which is now in process, all of which are not covered - by the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to - be raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes. - - “The existing of various budgets side by side, which serve more - or less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a - clear view over the possibilities of financing the armaments. A - whole number of ministries and various branches of the party - have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities - of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of - finance of the state, but not subject to the control of the - Minister of Finance and therefore also not subject to the - control of the cabinet. Just as in the sphere of politics the - much too far-reaching delegation of legislative powers to - individuals brought about various states within the states, - exactly in the same way the condition of various branches of - state and party, working side by side and against each other, - has a devastating effect on the possibility of financing. If on - this territory concentration and unified control is not - introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible - task of armament financing is endangered. - - “We have the following tasks: - - “(1) A deputy is entrusted with finding all sources and - revenues, which have its origin in contributions to the federal - government, to the state and party and in profits of public and - party enterprises. - - “(2) Furthermore experts, entrusted by the Fuehrer, have to - examine how these amounts were used and which of these amounts - can in the future be withdrawn from their previous purpose. - - “(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all - public and party organizations, to which extent this property - can be used for the purpose of armament financing. - - “(4) The federal Ministry of Finance is to be entrusted to - examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new - taxes or increasing of existing taxes. - - “The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank under - existing political conditions was a necessity and the political - success proved the correctness of this action. The other - possibilities of armament financing have to be started now under - any circumstances. For this purpose all absolutely non-essential - expenditures for other purposes must not take place and the - total financial strength of Germany, limited as it is, has to be - concentrated for the one purpose of armament financing. Whether - the problem of financing, as outlined in this program, succeeds, - remains to be seen, but without such concentration, it will fail - with absolute certainty.” (_1168-PS_) - -C. _Renunciation of Armament Provisions of Versailles Treaty._ - -21 May 1935 was a very important date in the Nazi calendar. It was on -that date that the Nazis passed the secret Reich Defense Law -(_2261-PS_). The secrecy of their armament operations had already -reached the point beyond which they could no longer maintain successful -camouflage. Since their program called for still further expansion, they -unilaterally renounced the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty -on the same date, 21 May 1935. Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on that -day (_2288-PS_) was published in “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” under the -heading “The Fuehrer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace.” -Hitler declared: - - “1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva - Resolution of 17 May. - - “The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany - unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the dictate of - Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated, by those - powers who could not make up their minds to follow the - disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as - agreed upon by Treaty. - - “2. Because the other powers did not live up to their - obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the - German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles, - which are nothing but a discrimination against the German nation - for an unlimited period of time, since, through them, Germany is - being nailed down in a unilateral manner contrary to the spirit - of the agreement.” (_2288-PS_) - -In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for -aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect -training of a military nature. They included not only the training of -military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other -military organizations, such as the Police Force, which could be and -were absorbed by the Army. The extent of this program for military -training is indicated by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of ninety -billion Reichsmarks during the period 1933 to 1939, in the building up -of the armed forces. - -In a speech by Adolf Hitler delivered on 1 September, 1939, (_2322-PS_), -which was published in the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” under the heading -“The Fuehrer announces the Battle for the Justice and Security of the -Reich”, the following passage occurred: - - “For more than six years now, I have been engaged in building up - the German Armed Forces. During this period more than ninety - billion Reichsmarks were spent building up the _Wehrmacht_. - Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and - they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can - never be shaken.” (_2322-PS_) - -The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early -development is illustrated by a report to Hess, in 1932, concerning the -secret training of flying personnel, as well as the early plans to build -a military air force (_1143-PS_). This report was sent in a letter from -Schickedantz to Rosenberg, for delivery to Hess. Apparently Schickedantz -was very anxious that no one but Hess should get this letter, and -therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal delivery to Hess. The letter -points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized as to enable -their transfer into the military air force organization. The letter -dated 20 October 1932, reads: - - “Dear Alfred [Rosenberg]: I am sending you enclosed a - communication from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential - man (_Vertrauensmann_) which indeed is very interesting. I - believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will - not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not - known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our - tall friend.” [Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, - identified this “tall friend” as being Von Albensleben.] “I am - enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit - the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to write a - letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere. _Mit - bestem Gruss_, Yours Amo.” (_1143-PS_) - -Enclosed in the report is: - - “Air Force Organization” - - “Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to - provide for the case of the armament of the air force. - - “Entire management as a civilian organization will be - transferred to Col. Von Willberg, at present commander of - Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichwehr, is going - on leave of absence. - - “(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air lines in such a way - as to enable their transfer to the air force organization. - - “(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to - be done within the organization for military flying of the - Stahlhelm [steel helmet] which is being turned over to Col. - Hanel, retired. - - “All existing organizations for sport flying are to be used for - military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military - flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The - Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per - hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he - himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case - of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization, - proprietor and crew in the proportion of 10:20:20. Military - flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We - therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or - flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization. - It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the - RWM, also the NSDAP organization.” (_1143-PS_) - -D. _Secret Rearmament_ - -The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and -breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy -documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German navy -in this rearmament program which was secret at first. When it was deemed -safe to say so, the Navy openly acknowledged that it had always been its -objective to break the Versailles Treaty. - -In 1937 the Navy High Command (OKM) published a secret book entitled, -“The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935”, written by Sea -Captain Schussler (_C-156_). The preface refers to the fight of the navy -against the unbearable regulations of the peace treaty of Versailles. -The table of contents includes a variety of navy activities, such as -saving of coastal guns from destruction as required by Versailles; -independent armament measures behind the back of the government and -behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection of the U-boat -arm; economic rearmament; and camouflaged rearmament from 1933 to the -freedom from the restrictions in 1935. (_C-156_) - -This book points out the significant effect of seizure of power by the -Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature of the -rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching independence in -the building and development of the navy, which was only hampered -insofar as concealment of rearmament had to considered in compliance -with the Versailles Treaty (_C-156_). With the restoration of what was -called the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935—the reoccupation -of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland—the external camouflage of -rearmament was eliminated. - -This book of the German navy bears the symbol of the Nazi Party, the -Swastika, in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed -“secret”, underscored (_C-156_). Raeder has identified this book in an -interrogation and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of -the Versailles Treaty and at the same time to make progress in naval -development. The following are pertinent extracts from the book: - - “The object and aim of this memorandum under the heading - ‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on - documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in - the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the - peace treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich navy after - the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow - did not rest, but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable - enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man - navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so - create by work of soldiers and technicians the primary condition - for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more clearly - the services of these men, who, without being known in wide - circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal in - responsibility in the service of the fight against the peace - treaty; thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they - risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, - themselves and their position unrestrainedly in the partially - self-ordained task. This compilation makes it clearer, however, - that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to - a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the - whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the - soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even - more important condition for an effective rearmament in the - coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the - political, financial and spiritual power, could the work of the - soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this peace - treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed - under the driving power of this united will, [signed] The - Compiler”. (_C-156_) - -The summary of the contents indicated in the chapter titles is -significant: - - “I. First, defensive action against the execution of the Treaty - of Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the - Ruhr, 1923). - - “1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction to removal of - artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine weapons. * - * * - - “3. Limitation of destruction in Heligoland. - - “II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich - Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lomann - case in 1927). - - “1. An attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich - Navy. - - “2. Contributing to the strengthening of patriotism among the - people. - - “3. Activities of Captain Lohmann. - - “4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm. - - “5. Building up of the air force. - - “6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm (_Die Mine_). - - “7. Economic rearmament. - - “8. Miscellaneous measures. - - “a. The Aerogeodetic, and; - - “b. Secret evidence. - - “III. Planned armament work countenance by the Reich government - but behind the back of the legislative body from 1927 to the - seizure of power, 1933. - - “IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in - camouflage (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, 1935).” - (_C-156_) - -The following is a passage from Chapter IV: - - “The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the - taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of the decisive - influence on the size and shape of further rearmament. - - “While the second chamber, _Reichsrat_, approached its - dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the _Reichstag_ - assumed a composition which could only take a one-sided attitude - toward the rearmament of the armed forces. The government took - over the management of the rearmament program upon this - foundation. - - “Development of the Armed Forces.” - - “This taking over of the management by the Reich Government - developed for the armed forces in such a manner that the War - Minister, General von Blomberg, and through him the three - branches of the armed forces, received far-reaching powers from - the Reich Cabinet for the development of the armed forces. The - whole organization of the Reich was included in this way. In - view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting - body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then - on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duty of - the accounting office of the German Reich. - - “Independence of the Commander in Chief of the Navy” - - “The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary - doctor, had received the help of a far-reaching independence in - the building and development of the navy. This was only hampered - insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be - continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the - public budget there remained the previous special budget, which - was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit for the - provision of labor, which was made available by the Reich. Wide - powers in the handling of these credits were given to the - Director of the Budget Department of the navy, up to 1934 - Commodore Schussler, afterwards Commodore Foerster. These took - into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of - the Budget. - - “Declaration of Military Freedom” - - “When the Fuehrer, relying upon the strength of the armed forces - executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the - military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned - limitation on rearmament works namely, the external camouflage, - was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered - our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in - the air for one and a half decades, and carried by the - newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the armed - forces, and as part of it, the navy, can lead with full strength - towards its completion the rearmament already under way with the - goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the - world.” (_C-156_) - -An interrogation of Raeder concerning this book went as follows: - - “Q. I have here a document, _C-156_, which is a photostatic copy - of the work prepared by the High Command of the Navy, and covers - the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 - to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the - work? - - “A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited. - - “Q. Was that an official publication of the Germany navy? - - “A. This Captain Schuessler, indicated there, was Commander in - the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, which was an idea of these - officers to put all these things together. - - “Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the - authorization to prepare such a work was given to him? - - “A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he - told us here in the foreword. - - “Q. In the preparation of this work he had access to the - official naval files, and based his work on the items contained - therein? - - “A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, - and he would have had the files, which were necessary. - - “Q. Do you know whether before the work was published, a draft - of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for - comment? - - “A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it - only when it was published. - - “Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication? - - “A. It was a secret object. I think the upper commands in the - Navy had knowledge of it. - - “Q. It was not circulated outside of the naval circles? - - “A. No. - - “Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained - in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of the - Versailles Treaty? - - “A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only - remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word - of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages. - But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into - the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of - Versailles was filled. They didn’t belong to the Navy, as long - as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were - developed but not in Germany, and not in the Navy, but in - Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an - Industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built much later - when we began to act with the English government about the - Treaty of thirty-five to one-hundred, because we could see that - then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a - treaty with England, and so in order to keep the word of - Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but - tried to have advantages. - - “Q. Would the fair statement be that the Navy High Command was - interested in avoiding the limited provisions of the Treaty of - Versailles regarding the personnel and limits of armaments, but - would it attempt to fulfill the letter of the treaty, although - actually avoiding it? - - “A. That was their endeavor”. - -Raeder had his explanations: - - “Q. Why was such a policy adopted? - - “A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war - by danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia and so we - tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this - way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a - little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us; - it was nonsense to them of attacking the Poles in this state, - and for the Navy a second aim was to have some defense against - the entering of French forces into the Ostsee, or East Sea, - because we knew the French had intentions to sustain the Poles - from ships that came into the Ostsee Goettinger, and so the Navy - was a defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the - entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. Quite defensive - aims. - - “Q. When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in - official circles in Germany would you say? - - “A. When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we - thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know - exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of - the German government ministers, of the Army and Navy Ministers, - Groner and Noske. - - “Q. Then those views in your opinion were generally held - existing perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the - First World War? - - “A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and - about those years in the beginning, I can not give you a very - exact thing, because I was then two years in the Navy archives - to write a book about the war, and how the cruisers fought in - the first war. Two years, so I was not with these things.” - -The same kind of aims and purposes are reflected in the table of -contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in -captured official files of the German Navy (_C-17_). Although a copy of -the book itself has not been found, the project was written by Oberst -Scherff, Hitler’s special military historian. The table of contents -however, is available. It refers by numbers to groups of documents and -notes in the documents, which evidently were intended as working -material for the basis of the chapters to be written in accordance with -the table of contents. The title of this table of contents fairly -establishes the navy planning and preparations that were to get the -Versailles Treaty out of the way, and to rebuild the navy strength -necessary for war. Some of the headings in the table of contents read: - - “_Part A (1919—The year of Transition.)_ - - “Chapter VII. - - First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit - its effects. - - “Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of naval - offices in civil ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater - sections of the German maritime observation station and the - sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade-Canal, - etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934; - - “Noskos’ proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval - Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin; - - “Formation of the “Naval Arsenal Kiel”. - - “(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and - guns. - - “1. North Sea. Strengthening of fortifications with new - batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking - effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control - Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result - of efforts.” - - * * * * * * - - “2. Baltic. Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and - Swinemunde; - - “Salvage for the Army of one-hundred and eighty-five movable - guns and mortars there. - - “3. The beginnings of coastal air defense. - - “_Part B (1920-1924. The Organizational New Order)_ - - Chapter V. - - “_The Navy_ - “_Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty_ - “_Foreign Countries_ - - “(a) _The inter-allied Control Commissions._ - - “(b) _Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles - Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich - Government and the legislative bodies._ - - “1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and - automatic weapons. - - “2. Limitation of demolition work in Heligoland. - - “3. Attempt to strengthen personnel of the navy, from 1923. - - “4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous - associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of - “sports” unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in - naval recruitment). - - “5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since - 1920. (Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, - Argentine and Finland. Torpedo testing.) - - “6. Participation in the preparation for building of the - Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction, - teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air raid - defense, training of pilots). - - “7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch. - - _Part C (1925-1932. Replacement of Tonnage)_ Chapter IV. - “_The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, Foreign Countries._ - - “(a) _The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissions (up - to 31.1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace - Commission)_ - - “_Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich - Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case._ - - “1. The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation), their - significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work - from 1935. - - “2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat - arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection - with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, - relationship to Spain, Argentine, Turkey: the first post war - U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927; 250 - ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly; - electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain - and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an - anti-U-boat school. - - “3. Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of - the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for a Naval Air Arm, - Finance Aircraft Company Sevra, later Luftdienst CMRH; Naval - Flying School Warnemunde; Air Station List, training of sea - cadet candidates, Military tactical questions “Air Defense - Journeys”, technical development, experimental station planning, - trials, flying boat development DOX etc., catapult aircraft, - arming, engines ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the - Deutschland Flight 1925 and the Seaplane Race 1926. - - “4. Economic rearmament (“the Tebeg”—Technical Advice and Supply - Company as a disguised Naval Office abroad for investigating the - position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other War - economic questions.) - - “5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret - investigations.) - - “(c) _Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich - government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies_ - (1928 to the taking over of power.) - - “1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; - winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and - carrying on of other work. - - “2. Finance question. (“Black Funds” and the Special Budget). - - “3. The Labor Committee and its objectives. - - “(d) _The Question of Marine Attaches_ (The continuation under - disguise; open re-appointment 1932-1933). - - “(e) _The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad and in - Germany_ (The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London - Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931. - The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932). - - “_Part D (1933-1939. The Germany Navy during the Military - Freedom Period)_ - - “I. National Socialism and the question of the Fleet and of - prestige at sea. - - “II. Incorporation of the navy in the National Socialist State.” - - “III. The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the - Reich Government in a Disguised Way.” (_C-17_) - -The policy development of the navy is also reflected from the financial -side. The planned organization of the navy budget for armament measures -was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political -objectives. Military-political development was accelerated after the -withdrawal from the League of Nations. (_C-17_) - -A captured document, entitled “_Chef der Marineleitung_, Berlin, 12 May -1934,” and marked “Secret Commando Matter,” discusses the “Armament Plan -(A.P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase.” (_C-153_). This document, which -bears the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end, speaks of war tasks, -war and operational plans, armament target, etc., and shows that it was -distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. Dated 12 May 1934, -it shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any -alert period. The following are pertinent extracts: - - * * * “The planned organization of armament measures is - necessary for the realization of the target; this again requires - a coordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This - organization of financial measures over a number of years - according to the military viewpoint is found in the armament - program and provides - - “_a._ for the _military leaders_ a sound basis for their - operational considerations and - - “_b._ for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be - achieved with the military means available at a given time.” - - * * * * * * - - “All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up - with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert - period.” (C-153) - -The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long -before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. -Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-Boat -construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain -ships. Work on U-Boats had been going on, as already indicated, in -Holland and Spain. The Nazi theory was ingenious in that respect. The -Versailles Treaty forbade re-arming by the Germans in Germany, but the -Nazis said it did not forbid them to rearm in Holland, Spain, and -Finland. - -Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval -negotiations with England. The subject was discussed in a conversation -between Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. The record of that -conversation (_C-189_) is not signed by Raeder, but in an interrogation -on 8 November 1945, Raeder admitted that (_C-189_) was a record of this -conversation, and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign -his name at the end. The report is headed, “Conversation with the -Fuehrer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the -Commanding Officer of the _Karlsruhe_.” It reads: - - “1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning displacement of D. and - E. (defensive weapons). - - “Fuehrer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a - displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton - (ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may be stated. - - “2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the Fleet - must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from - 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns - (Like the King George Class). - - “3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats - completely secret. Plebiscite also in consideration of the - Saar.” (_C-189_) - -In order to continue the increase in navy strength, as planned, more -funds were needed than the navy had available. Hitler therefore proposed -to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the navy. This -appears from another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder -with Hitler, on 2 November 1934 (_C-190_). This report, again, is not -signed, but it was found in Raeder’s personal file and seems clearly his -memorandum. It is headed: “Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2.11.34 at -the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the “Emden”. -It reads: - - “1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available - for the armed forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a - fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible - that the navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he - did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He - considered it necessary that the navy be speedily increased by - 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get - Dr. Ley to put 120-150 million from the Labor Front at the - disposal of the navy, as the money would still benefit the - workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and - myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the - navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if - the navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from - Scandinavia. - - “2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have - six U-Boats assembled at the time of the critical situation in - the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this - point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the - assembling should commence.” (_C-190_) - -Then there is an asterisk and a note at the bottom: - - “The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in - the middle of June 35 according to plan.” (_C-190_) - -The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets -was a program encouraged by the navy, so that this industry would be -able to supply the requirements of the navy in case of need. A directive -of Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, and classified “Secret Commando -Matter,” requires German industry to support the armament of the navy -(_C-29_). It provides: - - “_TOP SECRET_ - _General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German - Armament Industry_ - - “The effects of the present economic depression have led here - and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an - active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad, - even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no - profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. - Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing - “self-sufficiency” would in any case make such participation - superfluous. - - “However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the - situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the - following contradictory corrective points: - - “_a._ The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce - be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war - politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the - assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to - a certain extent, - - “_b._ The consequent estimation of the duties of the German - Armament Industry lies mainly in the _Military-political_ - sphere. It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, - militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by - limiting the deliveries to our own armed forces. Its capacity - must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to - foreign countries over and above our own requirements. - - “_c._ Almost every country is working to the same end today, - even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by - restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and - especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets - for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic - representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern - ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the - guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits are not - merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their - armament industries, but first and foremost to expand their - output from the point of view of military policy. - - “_d._ It is just when the efforts to do away with the - restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy - has an ever-increasing and really vital interest in furthering - the German Armament Industry and preparing the way for it in - every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of - the world. - - “_e._ If, however the German Armament Industry is to be able to - compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the _confidence_ - of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for - our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to - be kept secret under all circumstances in the interest of the - defence of the country is comparatively small. I would like to - issue a warning against the assumption that, at the present - stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a - problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have - solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, - which may become known, if divulged to a third person by - naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already - superseded by new and better solutions on our part, even at that - time or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of - greater importance that we should be technically well to the - fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important - points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively. - - “_f._ To conclude: I attach particular importance to - guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by - the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. - If the purchasers are not made confident that something special - is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up - to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to - supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need.” - (C-29) - -This surreptitious rearmament, in violation of treaty obligations, -starting even before the Nazi came into power, is illustrated by a 1932 -order of Raeder, chief of the naval command, addressed to the main naval -command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo tubes in -E-Boats (_C-141_). He ordered that torpedo tubes be removed and stored -in the naval arsenal but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using -only the number permitted under the Treaty, at a given time, and by -storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of -operationally effective E-Boats was constantly increased. - -This German order for the concealed armament of E-Boats, issued by -Raeder on 10 February 1932, provides: - - “In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament - Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st - E-Boat-Half-Flotilla, which in a few months will consist of - exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as - a formation of torpedo-carrying boats as it is not intended to - count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats - allowed us. - - “I therefore order: - - “1. S2-S5, will be commissioned in the shipyard Luerssen, - Vegesack without armament, and will be fitted with easily - removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for - torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I. [Inspectorate - of Torpedoes and Mining] in agreement with the naval arsenal, - for the Boat ‘S1’ which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on - completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another - boat. - - “2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the naval - arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the - torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a - short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only - one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public - consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of - temporary trials by the T.V.A. [Technical Research - Establishment]. - - “It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed boats of - the Half-Flotilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The - duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the - torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible. - - “3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon - as the situation of the political control allows it.” (_C-141_) - -Along similar lines the navy was also carrying on the concealed -preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of -Transport Ships O. The preparations under this order were to be -completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these -ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion. This -was the result of a Top Secret order from the command office of the -navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. This order -bears the seal of the _Reichministerium, Marineleitung_, over the draft -signature. It provides: - - “Subject: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers. - - “It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 - (_AG-Aufstellungsgliederung_) a certain number of auxiliary - cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the high - seas. - - “In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the - ships will be referred to as “Transport Ships O”. It is - requested that in future this designation only will be used. - - “The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be - completed by 1.4.35.” (_C-166_) - -In the official navy files, notes were kept year by year, from 1927 to -1940, on the reconstruction of the German Navy. One of these notes -discloses that the displacement of the battleship -“_Scharnhorst-Gneisenau_” was actually greater than the tonnage which -had been notified to the British under the treaty obligations: - - “The true displacement of the battleship - ‘_Scharnhorst-Gneisenau_’ _and_ ‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent in - both cases the displacement reported to the British.” (_C-23_) - -There is annexed to this document a table with reference to different -ships, and two columns, headed “Displacement by Type”; one column reads -“Actual Displacement,” and the other, “Notified Displacement.” The -actual displacement of the “_Scharnhorst_”, is thus shown to be 31,300 -tons, although the notified displacement was only 26,000 tons. On the -“F/G” actual was 41,700, while notified was 35,000. On the “HI”, actual -was 56,200 tons, while notified was 46,850. And so on down the list. -(_C-23_) - -In these notes there also occurs the statement: - - “In a clear cut program for the construction, the Fuehrer and - Reich Chancellor has set the navy the task of carrying out the - aims of his foreign policy.” (_C-23_) - -The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament -limitation, and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared -superficial pretexts to explain away these violations. Following a -conference with the chief of “A” section [the military department of the -Navy], an elaborate survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a -careful list of the quantity and type of German naval armament and -ammunition on hand under manufacture or construction (_C-32_). A -statement of the justification or defense that might be used was -included in those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or -its allotment has been exceeded. The list contained 30 items under -“Material Measures” and 14 items under “Measures of Organization.” The -variety of details covered necessarily involved several sources within -the navy, which must have realized their significance. - -This Top Secret document, which is headed “A Survey Report of German -Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of “A” Section, dated 9 -September 1933,” contains three columns, one headed “Measure,” one -headed “Material Measures, Details,” and the third headed “Remarks.” The -“Remarks” contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the -violations of the treaty. The following are examples: - -“1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines.” Then figures are given. -“Remarks: Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered.” -(_C-32_) - -“Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic -artillery batteries.” The remarks column reads, “Justification: -Necessity for over-hauling. Cheaper repairs.” (_C-32_) - -“Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.” Remarks: “The offense -over and above that in serial number 3 lies in the fact that all -fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will -make it less severe; pure defense measures.” (_C-32_) - -“Number 7. Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries.” -Remarks: “Possible justification is that, though the calibre is larger, -the number of guns is less.” (_C-32_) - -“Number 8. Arming of mine-sweepers.” Remarks: “The guns are taken from -the fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for -training purposes. All nations arm their mine-sweeping forces (equality -of rights).” (_C-32_) - -“Number 13. Exceeding the number of machine guns, et cetera, permitted.” -Remarks: “Can be made light of.” (_C-32_) - -“Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts.” Remarks: “Difficult to -detect. If necessary can be denied.” (_C-32_) - -“Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels.” Remarks: “For warning shots. -Make little of it.” And so on throughout the list (_C-32_). This -document must have been used as a guide for negotiators who were -attending the Disarmament Conference, as to the position that they might -take. - -E. _Withdrawal From the Disarmament Conference and the League of -Nations: Building of the Air Force._ - -At this point, on 14th October 1933, Germany withdrew from the -International Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. The -Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the international -negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an issue which would -not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other countries. At the -same time, Germany attached so much importance to this action that it -considered the possibility of the application of sanctions by other -countries. In anticipation of the probable nature of such sanctions and -the countries which might apply them, plans were made for armed -resistance on land, at sea, and in the air. Military preparations were -ordered in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense (von -Blomberg) to the head of the Army High Command (Fritsch), the head of -the Navy High Command, (Raeder), and the Reichsminister for Air, -(Goering) (_C-140_). This directive, dated 25 October 1933, 11 days -after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of -Nations, provides: - - “1. The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparation of - the armed forces in the case of sanctions being applied against - Germany. - - “2. I request the chiefs of the Army and Navy High Command and - the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the preparations in - accordance with the following points: - - “(_a_) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no - facts become known to the outside world from which preparation - for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is - incompatible with Germany’s existing obligations in the sphere - of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized zone. If - necessary, the preparations must take second place to this - necessity.” (_C-140_) - -One of the immediate consequences of this action was that following the -withdrawal from the League of Nations, Germany’s armament program was -still further increased. As it was ordered on 12 May, 1934: - - “5. Owing to the speed of military political development since - Germany quitted Geneva and based on the progress of the army, - the new A-Plan will only be drawn up for a period of two years. - The third A phase lasts accordingly from 1.4.34 to 31.3.36.” - (_C-153_) - -On 10 March 1935, Goering announced that Germany was building a military -air force. At page 1830 of _Das Archiv_ it is stated: - - “The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen, - Goering, in his talk with the special correspondent of the Daily - Mail, Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German - Air Force. - - “General Goering said: - - “In the extension of our national defense [_Sicherheit_], it was - necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of - defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I restricted - myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line - of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which - would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a - military aviation which would be strong enough to repel, at any - time, attacks on Germany.” - - * * * * * * - - “In conclusion, the correspondent asked whether the German Air - Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany. General - Goering replied to that exactly as follows: - - “The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with the - will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is convinced, on - the other hand, that it will never be employed to threaten the - peace of other nations.” (_2292-PS_) - -Since they had gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret -training of personnel, the next step necessary to the conspirators’ -program for aggressive war was a large-scale increase in military -strength. This could no longer be done under disguise and camouflage, -and would have to be known to the world. Accordingly, on 16 March 1935, -there was promulgated a law for universal military service, in violation -of Article 173 of the Versailles Treaty. That law appeared in the -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Title I, Vol. I, 1935, page 369. The text of the -law itself provides: - - “In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the - following law: - - “Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935. - - “The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is - herewith promulgated: - - “Section 1. - - “Service in the Armed Forces is based upon compulsory military - duty. - - “Section 2. - - “In peace time, the German Army, including the police troops - transferred to it, is organized into: 12 Corps and 36 Divisions. - - “Section 3. - - “The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of - submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on - compulsory military duty.” (_1654-PS_) - -The law is signed first by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Adolf -Hitler, and then by many other officials, including von Neurath, Frick, -Schacht, Goering, Hess, and Frank. (_1654-PS_) - -F. _Assurances._ - -As a part of their program to weaken resistance in other states, the -Nazis followed a policy of making false assurances, thereby tending to -create confusion and a false sense of security. Thus, on 21 May 1935, -the same date on which Germany renounced the armament provisions of the -Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the intent of the German Government -to respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles and Locarno -Treaties. In his speech in the Reichstag on that date Hitler stated: - - “Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely - respect all other articles pertaining to the cooperation - [_zusammenleben_] of the various nations including territorial - agreements; revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by - it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only. - - “The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to - sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill. - However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even - if it was composed before this government took over. Therefore, - it will in particular adhere to all the allegations under the - Locarno Pact as long as the other partners of the pact also - adhere to it.” (_2288-PS_) - -For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and -Versailles Treaties, include the following: - -Article 1 of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, 16 October 1925, provides: - - “The High Contracting parties, collectively and severally, - guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the - maintenance of the territorial status quo, resulting from the - frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and - France and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed by, - or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles, on - June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulation of - Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty, concerning the - demilitarized zone.” - -That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the -Rhineland. - -Article 42 of the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, provides: - - “Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any - fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the - right bank, to the west of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the - east of the Rhine.” - -Article 43 provides: - - “In the area defined above, the maintenance and the assembly of - armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and military - maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent - works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.” - -G. _Reoccupation of the Rhineland._ - -The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was a sore spot with the Nazis -ever since its establishment after World War I. Not only was this a blow -to their increasing pride, but it was a bar to any effective strong -position which Germany might want to take on any vital issues. In the -event of any sanctions against Germany, in the form of military action, -the French and other powers would get well into Germany east of the -Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore, any -German plans to threaten or breach international obligations, or for any -kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and -refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations -for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started very early. - -A document apparently signed in the handwriting of von Blomberg, deals -with what is called “Operation _Schulung_”, meaning schooling or -training (_C-139_). It is dated 2 May 1935 and refers to prior staff -discussions on the subject. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army -Command, who at that time was Fritsch; the Chief of the Navy High -Command (Raeder); and the Reich Minister for Air (Goering). The document -does not use the name “Rhineland” and does not, in terms, refer to it. -It seems clear, however, that it was a plan for the military -reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles -and the Rhine Pact of Locarno. The first part, headed “Secret Document,” -provides: - - “For the operation, suggested in the last staff talks of the - Armed Forces, I lay down the _Code name Schulung_ [training]. - - “The supreme direction of the operation ‘_Schulung_’ rests with - the Reich Minister of Defense as this is a joint undertaking of - the three services. - - “Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according - to the following directives: - - “1. General. - - “1. The operation must, on issue of the code word ‘Carry out - _Schulung_,’ be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed. - _Strictest_ secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only - the very smallest number of officers should be informed and - employed in the drafting of reports, drawings, etc., and these - officers only in person. - - “2. There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking part. - These will be employed in their peace-time strength and with - their peace-time equipment. - - “3. The preparation for the operation will be made without - regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every - improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a - greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better - prospects of success.” (_C-139_) - -The rest of the order deals with military details. There are certain -points in this order which are inconsistent with any theory that it was -merely a training order, or that it might have been defensive in nature. -The operation was to be carried out as a surprise blow at lightning -speed. The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There was -to be reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, since -this order is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the -promulgation of the Conscription Law of 16 March 1935, it could hardly -have been planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions -which might have been applied by reason of the passage of the -Conscription Law. - -The actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place until 7 -March, 1936, and this early plan (_C-139_) necessarily underwent -revision to suit changed conditions and specific objectives. That the -details of this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were -carried out in reoccupying the Rhineland does not detract from the fact -that as early as 2 May 1935, the Germans had already planned that -operation, not merely as a staff plan but as a definite operation. It -was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon, -if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so if necessary. - -It is significant to note the date of this order is the same as the date -of the signing of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the Nazis later -asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation. - -The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was -actually carried into execution on 7 March 1936, were issued on 2 March -1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, von -Blomberg. They were addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army -(Fritsch), the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Raeder), and the Air -Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force (Goering) (_C-159_). That order, -classified “Top Secret”, in the original bears Raeder’s initial in green -pencil, with a red pencil note, “To be submitted to the C-in-C of the -Navy”. - -The first part of the Order reads: - - “Supreme Command of the Navy: - - “1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has made the following - decision: - - “By reason of the Franco-Russian alliance, the obligations - accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as they apply - to Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, which - referred to the demilitarized zone, are to be regarded as - obsolete. - - “2. Sections of the army and air force will therefore be - transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of - the demilitarized zone. In this connection, I issue the - following orders: * * *” (_C-159_) - -There follow detailed orders for the military operation. - -The order for Naval cooperation was issued on 6 March 1936, in the form -of an order on behalf of the Reich Minister for War, von Blomberg, -signed by Keitel, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy -(Raeder) (_C-194_). The order set out detailed instructions for the -Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the admirals commanding the Baltic -and North Sea. The short covering letter is as follows: - - “To: C-in-C Navy: - - “The Minister has decided the following after the meeting: - - “1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, not - over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day onward, has - been approved. C-in-C air force will instruct the air command VI - from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance - aircraft to be at the disposal of the C-in-C fleet. - - “2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-Boat - reconnaissance on line, until the evening of 7 March. The - immediate transfer of U-Boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven has - been approved. - - “3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed - Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as - the first counter-measures to be taken against military - preparations of neighboring states. It is far more essential to - examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A, - to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous - measures could not be omitted.” (_C-194_) - -The reoccupation and fortification of the Rhineland was carried out on 7 -March 1936. For the historical emphasis of this occasion, Hitler made a -momentous speech on the same day, in which he declared: - - “Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated - friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by - infringing the Reich pact through a military alliance with the - Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this - manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner - meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany - regards herself, for her part, as no longer bound by this - dissolved treaty. The German government are now constrained to - face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation - which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet - treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between - Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In - accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its - frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defense, the German - government have today restored the full and unrestricted - sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the - Rhineland.” (_2289-PS_) - -The German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland -caused extensive international repercussions. As a result of the -protests lodged with the League of Nations, the Council of the League -made an investigation and announced the following finding, which is -published in the League of Nations monthly summary, March, 1936, Volume -16, Page 78. [It is also quoted in the _American Journal of -International Law_, page 487 (1936)]: - - “That the German government has committed a breach of Article 43 - of the Treaty of Versailles, by causing on March 7, 1936, - military forces to enter and establish themselves in the - demilitarized zone, referred to in Article 42 and the following - articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno. At the - same time, on March 7, 1936, the Germans reoccupied the - Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Versailles and Locarno - Treaties. They again tried to allay the fears of other European - powers and lead them into a false sense of security by - announcing to the world ‘we have no territorial demands to make - in Europe.’” - -The last phrase occurred in Hitler’s speech on 7 March 1936: - - “We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above - all that all the tensions resulting either from false - territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers - of inhabitants to their living space cannot, in Europe, be - solved by war.” (_2289-PS_) - -The existence of prior plans and preparations for the reoccupation and -fortification of the Rhineland is indisputable. The method and sequence -of these plans and their accomplishments are clearly indicative of the -increasingly aggressive character of the Nazi objectives, international -obligations and considerations of humanity notwithstanding. - -The Nazi conspirators were determined, as these documents have shown, to -use whatever means were necessary to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty -of Versailles and its restrictions upon the military armament and -activity of Germany. In this process, they conspired and engaged in -secret armament and training, the secret production of munitions of war, -and they built up an air force. They withdrew from the International -Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on 14 October 1933. -They instituted universal military service on 16 March 1935. On 21 May -1935 they falsely announced that they would respect the territorial -limitations of Versailles and Locarno. On March 7 1936 they reoccupied -and fortified the Rhineland and at the same time, falsely announced that -they had no territorial demands in Europe. - -The accomplishment of all these objectives, particularly the repudiation -of the Versailles Treaty restrictions, opened the gates for the numerous -aggressions which were to follow. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PREPARATION FOR - AGGRESSION: 1933-1936 - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ - │ 1, 2; V. │ I │ 22, 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │ - │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │ - │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 - │ │ │ - *1143-PS │Letter from Schickendanz to Rosenberg, │ │ - │20 October 1932, for personal │ │ - │transmission to Hess concerning │ │ - │organization of Air Force. (USA 40) │ III │ 806 - │ │ │ - *1168-PS │Unsigned Schacht memorandum to Hitler, 3│ │ - │May 1935, concerning the financing of │ │ - │the armament program. (USA 37) │ III │ 827 - │ │ │ - *1639-A-PS │Mobilization book for the Civil │ │ - │Administration, 1939 Edition, issued │ │ - │over signature of Keitel. (USA 777) │ IV │ 143 - │ │ │ -**1654-PS │Law of 16 March 1935 reintroducing │ │ - │universal military conscription. 1935 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 369. │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence) │ IV │ 163 - │ │ │ - *2194-PS │Top secret letter from Ministry for │ │ - │Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich │ │ - │Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, │ │ - │enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense │ │ - │Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36) │ IV │ 843 - │ │ │ - *2261-PS │Directive from Blomberg to Supreme │ │ - │Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces,│ │ - │24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of │ │ - │Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and │ │ - │copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 │ │ - │May 1935 on the Council for defense of │ │ - │the Reich. (USA 24) │ IV │ 934 - │ │ │ - *2288-PS │Adolf Hitler’s speech before the │ │ - │Reichstag, published in Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Southern Germany Special │ │ - │Edition, No. 142a, 22 May 1935. (USA 38)│ IV │ 993 - │ │ │ - *2289-PS │Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag, 7 │ │ - │March 1936, published in Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Berlin Edition, No. 68, 8 │ │ - │March 1936. (USA 56) │ IV │ 994 - │ │ │ - *2292-PS │Interview of Goering by representative │ │ - │of London Daily Mail, concerning the │ │ - │German Air Force, from German report in │ │ - │The Archive, March 1935, p. 1830. (USA │ │ - │52) │ IV │ 995 - │ │ │ - *2322-PS │Hitler’s speech before the Reichstag, 1 │ │ - │September 1939. (USA 39) │ IV │ 1026 - │ │ │ - *2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │ - │Facts for History of German War and │ │ - │Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071 - │ │ │ - 2907-PS │Notes of conferences of Reich Ministers │ │ - │on 12 September 1933, 13 October 1933, │ │ - │and 14 October 1933. │ V │ 572 - │ │ │ - *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ - *3308-PS │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt, │ │ - │28 November 1945. (GB 288) │ V │ 1100 - │ │ │ - *3474-PS │Manuscript notes by Bodenschatz on │ │ - │conference of German Air Forces leaders,│ │ - │2 December 1936. (USA 580) │ VI │ 199 - │ │ │ - *3575-PS │Memorandum, 19 November 1938, concerning│ │ - │meeting of Reich Defense Council. (USA │ │ - │781) │ VI │ 267 - │ │ │ - 3581-PS │Letter from Minister of Interior to │ │ - │Minister of Propaganda Goebbels, 20 July│ │ - │1934, concerning unauthorized press │ │ - │releases about military affairs. │ VI │ 278 - │ │ │ - 3585-PS │Letter from Chief of Staff of Army (von │ │ - │Fritsch) to Minister of War, 8 October │ │ - │1934, enclosing memorandum signed by │ │ - │Brauchitsch 29 September 1934, on │ │ - │military situation in East Prussia. │ VI │ 279 - │ │ │ - 3586-PS │Directive to Counter-Intelligence units,│ │ - │16 October 1934, directing that new │ │ - │troop units which may be activated │ │ - │should be listed in telephone books only│ │ - │under camouflage designations. │ VI │ 281 - │ │ │ - 3587-PS │Memorandum from Beck, 14 November 1934, │ │ - │forbidding public use of designation │ │ - │“General Staff”. │ VI │ 282 - │ │ │ - *C-17 │Extracts from History of the German Navy│ │ - │1919-1939. (USA 42) │ VI │ 819 - │ │ │ - *C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │ - │Navy files containing notes year by year│ │ - │from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of │ │ - │the German Navy, and dated 18 February │ │ - │1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA│ │ - │49) │ VI │ 827 - │ │ │ - *C-29 │Directive of 31 January 1933 by Raeder │ │ - │for German Navy to support the armament │ │ - │industry. (USA 46) │ VI │ 830 - │ │ │ - *C-32 │Survey report of German Naval Armament │ │ - │after conference with Chief of “A” │ │ - │Section, 9 September 1933. (USA 50) │ VI │ 833 - │ │ │ - *C-135 │Extract from history of war organization│ │ - │and of the scheme for mobilization. (GB │ │ - │213) │ VI │ 946 - │ │ │ - *C-139 │Directive for operation “Schulung” │ │ - │signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA 53)│ VI │ 951 - │ │ │ - *C-140 │Directive for preparations in event of │ │ - │sanctions, 25 October 1935, signed by │ │ - │Blomberg. (USA 51) │ VI │ 952 - │ │ │ - *C-141 │Order for concealed armament of E-boats,│ │ - │10 February 1932, signed by Raeder. (USA│ │ - │47) │ VI │ 955 - │ │ │ - *C-153 │Naval Armament Plan for the 3rd Armament│ │ - │Phase, signed by Raeder, 12 May 1934. │ │ - │(USA 43) │ VI │ 967 - │ │ │ - *C-156 │Concealed Rearmament under Leadership of│ │ - │Government of Reich, from “Fight of the │ │ - │Navy against Versailles 1919-1935”. (USA│ │ - │41) │ VI │ 970 - │ │ │ - *C-159 │Order for Rhineland occupation signed by│ │ - │Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54) │ VI │ 974 - │ │ │ - *C-166 │Order from Command Office of Navy, 12 │ │ - │March 1934, signed in draft by Groos, │ │ - │concerning preparation of auxiliary │ │ - │cruisers. (USA 48) │ VI │ 977 - │ │ │ - *C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │ - │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │ - │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │ - │69) │ VI │ 1006 - │ │ │ - *C-189 │Conversation with the Fuehrer in June │ │ - │1934 on occasion of resignation of │ │ - │Commanding Officer of “Karlsruhe”. (USA │ │ - │44) │ VI │ 1017 - │ │ │ - *C-190 │Memorandum of conversation with Hitler │ │ - │on financing Naval rearmament and │ │ - │assembling six submarines, 2 November │ │ - │1934. (USA 45) │ VI │ 1018 - │ │ │ - *C-194 │Orders by Keitel and Commander-in-Chief │ │ - │of Navy, 6 March 1936, for Navy │ │ - │cooperation in Rhineland occupation. │ │ - │(USA 55) │ VI │ 1019 - │ │ │ - *EC-177 │Minutes of second session of Working │ │ - │Committee of the Reich Defense held on │ │ - │26 April 1933. (USA 390) │ VII │ 328 - │ │ │ - *EC-404 │Minutes of conference of Sixth Session │ │ - │of Working Committee of Reichs Defense │ │ - │Council, held on 23 and 24 January 1934.│ │ - │(USA 764) │ VII │ 443 - │ │ │ - *EC-405 │Minutes of Tenth Meeting of Working │ │ - │Committee of Reichs Defense Council, 26 │ │ - │June 1935. (GB 160) │ VII │ 450 - │ │ │ - *EC-406 │Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs │ │ - │Defense Council, 6 December 1935. (USA │ │ - │772) │ VII │ 455 - │ │ │ - *EC-407 │Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs │ │ - │Defense Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247) │ VII │ 462 - │ │ │ - *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ - │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ - │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 - │ │ │ - *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │ - │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │ - │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │ - │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920 - │ │ │ - *TC-44 │Notice by German government of existence│ │ - │of German Air Force, 9 March 1935. (GB │ │ - │11) VIII │ 386 │ - │ │ │ - TC-45 │Proclamation to German People of 16 │ │ - │March 1935. │ VIII │ 388 - │ │ │ - TC-46 │German memorandum to Signatories of │ │ - │Locarno Pact reasserting full German │ │ - │sovereignty over Rhineland, 7 March │ │ - │1936. │ VIII │ 394 - │ │ │ -Statement VII │The Development of German Naval │ │ - │Policy—1933-1939 by Erich Raeder, │ │ - │Moscow, fall 1945. │ VIII │ 684 - │ │ │ -Statement XIV │Hungarian Relations with Germany Before │ │ - │and During the War by Nicholas Horthy, │ │ - │Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946. │ VIII │ 756 - - - 3. AGGRESSION AGAINST AUSTRIA - -A. _The Events Leading up to the Autumn of 1937 and the Strategic -Position of the National Socialists in Austria._ - -(1) _The National Socialist Aim of Absorption of Austria._ In order to -understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators proceeded after the -meeting in the Reichschancellery on 5 November 1937, at which Hitler -laid plans for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia (_386-PS_), it -is advisable to review the steps which had already been taken in Austria -by the National Socialists of both Germany and Austria. The position -which the Nazis had reached by the Fall of 1937 made it possible for -them to complete their absorption of Austria much sooner and with less -cost than was contemplated in this meeting. - -The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of the German -National Socialists. On the first page of _Mein Kampf_, Hitler had -written, “German-Austria must return to the great German mother-land.” -He continued by stating that this purpose, of having common blood in a -common Reich, could not be satisfied by a mere economic union. This aim -was regarded as a serious program which the Nazis were determined to -carry out. - -This fact is borne out by an affidavit executed in Mexico City on 28 -August 1945 by George S. Messersmith, United States Ambassador in Mexico -City (_1760-PS_). Mr. Messersmith was Consul General of the United -States of America in Berlin from 1930 to the late Spring of 1934. He was -then made American Minister in Vienna, where he stayed until 1937. In -this affidavit he states that the nature of his work brought him into -frequent contact with German Government officials, many of whom were, on -most occasions, amazingly frank in their conversations, and made no -concealment of their aims. - -In particular, Mr. Messersmith states that he had contact with the -following twenty governmental officials, among others: Hermann Goering, -General Milch, Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Count -Schwerin von Krosigk, Josef Goebbels, Richard Walter Darré, Robert Ley, -Hans Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner, Franz von Papen, Walter Funk, -General Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Erich von Raeder, Admiral Karl Doenitz, -Dr. Behle, Dr. Stuckart, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, and Dr. Davidson. Mr. -Messersmith further states that in addition to this contact with -officials of the Government he maintained contact with individuals in -all parties in Germany in order to keep himself and the Government -informed of political developments in Germany. - -With regard to the Austrian matter, he states that from the very -beginning of the Nazi Party he was told by both high and secondary -government officials in Germany that incorporation of Austria into -Germany was both a political and economic necessity and that this -incorporation was going to be accomplished “by whatever means were -necessary.” He further states: - - “I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in - Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that - Hitler, and the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to - this end and the only doubt which ever existed in conversations - or statements to me was ‘how’ and ‘when.’” (_1760-PS_). - -As Mr. Messersmith relates, at the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1933 -Germany was too weak to make open threats of force against any country. -It developed a policy of securing its aims in Austria in the same manner -as in Germany—by obtaining a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in -the Ministry of Interior which controls the police, and quickly -eliminating the opposition elements. Mr. Messersmith states that -throughout his stay in Austria he was told on any number of occasions by -high officials of the Austrian Government, including Chancellor -Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, and President Miklas, that the German -Government kept up constant pressure upon the Austrian Government to -appoint ministers with Nazi orientation. - -(2) _Pressure Used, Including Terror and Intimidation, Culminating in -the Unsuccessful Putsch of 25 July 1934._ To achieve their end the Nazis -used various pressures. They used economic pressure. The law of 24 March -1933 imposed a prohibitive 1,000 reichsmark penalty on trips to Austria, -thus bringing hardship to Austria, which relied heavily on its tourist -trade (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1933, I, 311). The Nazis used propaganda. And -they used terroristic acts, primarily bombings. - -Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit (_1760-PS_) goes into some detail with -respect to these means. Although they were committed by National -Socialists in Austria, high Nazi officials in Germany admitted to Mr. -Messersmith that they were instigating and directing these waves of -terror in Austria. They made no effort to conceal their use of terror, -which they justified on the ground that terror was a necessary -instrument to impose the will of the party not only in Germany but in -other countries. Mr. Messersmith recalls specifically that General Milch -of the Air Force stated that the terrorism in Austria was being directed -by the Nazi Party in Berlin. - -Mr. Messersmith points out that all these outrages were a common -occurrence. They had peaks and distinct periods, one in mid-1933 and -another in early 1934. He points out that the wave of outrages in May -and June 1934 diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting of -Hitler and Mussolini in Venice, in mid-June 1934. (At that time -Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and interested -in its independence.) Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit quotes extensively -from dispatches sent from the American Legation in Vienna to the State -Department during this period. These dispatches indicate that the terror -was often directed at Catholic Churches and institutions, and at -railways and tourist centers. - -Mr. Messersmith also recalls that in addition, the Nazis maintained a -threat of violent action against Austria through the “Austrian Legion.” -This was a para-military force of several thousand men, armed by the -Nazis in Germany, and stationed in Germany near the Austrian border. It -included Austrian Nazis who fled from Austria after committing crimes. - -These terroristic activities of the Nazis in Austria continued until -July 25, 1934. On that day members of the NSDAP attempted a -revolutionary putsch and killed Chancellor Dollfuss. A message from Mr. -Hadow, of the British Legation in Vienna, to Sir John Simon contains -details of the putsch (_2985-PS_). The official version of events given -verbally by the Austrian Government to the diplomatic Corps, as set -forth in this document, stated that approximately a hundred men -attempting the putsch seized the Federal Chancellery. Chancellor -Dollfuss was wounded in trying to escape, being shot twice at close -quarters. The Radio Building in the center of the town was overwhelmed, -and the announcer was compelled to broadcast the news that Dollfuss had -resigned and Doctor Rintelen had taken his place as Chancellor. - -Although the putsch failed, the insurgents kept control of the -Chancellery Building and agreed to give it up only after they had a -safe-conduct to the German border. The insurgents contacted the German -Minister, Dr. Rieth, by telephone, and subsequently had private -negotiations with him in the building. At about 7:00 p. m. they yielded -the building, but Chancellor Dollfuss died about 6:00 p. m., not having -had the services of a doctor. - -The German Government denied all complicity in the putsch and -assassination. Hitler removed Dr. Rieth as Minister on the ground that -he had offered a safe-conduct to the rebels without making inquiry of -the German Government, and had thus without any reason dragged the -German Reich into an internal Austrian affair. This statement appears in -the letter which Hitler sent to Franz von Papen on the 26th day of July -1934. (_2799-PS_) - -Although the German Government denied any knowledge or complicity in -this putsch, there is ample basis for the conclusion that the German -Nazis bear responsibility for the events. Light is shed on this matter -in the extensive record of the trial of the Austrian Nazi, Planetta, and -others who were convicted for the murder, and in the Austrian Brown Book -issued after July 25. Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit offers further -evidence: - - “The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known - for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only - that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and - organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their - organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian - Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully - familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being - planned. The German Legation was located directly across the - street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police - kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation. - The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the time - and they also kept a discreet surveillance over people entering - the German Legation. I was told by both British and Austrian - officials that a number of the men who were later found guilty - by the Austrian Courts of having been implicated in the Putsch - had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I personally - followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth and I never - doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr. Rieth was in - close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in Austria; - these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could not - have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in - connection therewith. I recall too very definitely from my - conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian - Government after the Putsch, their informing me that Dr. Rieth - had been in touch with von Rintelen, who it had been planned by - the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss had the Putsch been - successful. - - “It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic - with the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he - was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his - assent thereto and connived therein. - - “As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to - overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of - the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time - for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the - Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German - Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that - almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told Signor Cerruti, - the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi - Government in Vienna in a month.” (_1760-PS_) - -Mr. William Dodd, Ambassador of the United States to Germany, published -in 1941 his Diary, covering the years 1933-1938 (_2832-PS_). The diary -contains an entry for July 26, 1934, which makes the following -observations. First, Ambassador Dodd noted that in February, 1934, Ernst -Hanfstaengl had advised him that he had brought what was virtually an -order from Mussolini to Hitler to leave Austria alone and to dismiss and -silence Theodor Habicht, the German agent in Munich who had been -agitating for annexation of Austria. On 18 June, in Venice, Hitler was -reported to have promised Mussolini to leave Austria alone. - -Mr. Dodd further states: - - “On Monday, July 23, after repeated bombings in Austria by - Nazis, a boat loaded with explosives was seized on Lake - Constance by the Swiss police. It was a shipment of German bombs - and shells to Austria from some arms plant. That looked ominous - to me, but events of the kind had been so common that I did not - report it to Washington. - - “Today evidence came to my desk that last night, as late as - eleven o’clock, the government issued formal statements to the - newspapers rejoicing at the fall of Dollfuss and proclaiming the - Greater Germany that must follow. The German Minister in Vienna - had actually helped to form the new Cabinet. He had, as we now - know, exacted a promise that the gang of Austrian Nazi murderers - should be allowed to go into Germany undisturbed. But it was - realized about 12 o’clock that, although Dollfuss was dead, the - loyal Austrians had surrounded the government palace and - prevented the organization of a new Nazi regime. They held the - murderers prisoners. The German Propaganda Ministry therefore - forbade publication of the news sent out an hour before and - tried to collect all the releases that had been distributed. A - copy was brought to me today by a friend. - - “All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel murder - and declared that it was simply an attack of discontented - Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria shows that thousands of - Austrian Nazis living for a year in Bavaria on German support - had been active for ten days before, some getting across the - border contrary to law, all drilling and making ready to return - to Austria. The German propagandist Habicht was still making - radio speeches about the necessity of annexing the ancient realm - of the Hapsburgs to the Third Reich, in spite of all the - promises of Hitler to silence him. But now that the drive has - failed and the assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German - Government denounces all who say there was any support from - Berlin. - - “I think it will be clear one day that millions of dollars and - many arms have been pouring into Austria since the spring of - 1933. Once more the whole world is condemning the Hitler regime. - No people in all modern history has been quite so unpopular as - Nazi Germany. This stroke completes the picture. I expect to - read a series of bitter denunciations in the American papers - when they arrive about ten days from now.” (_2832-PS_) - -In connection with the German Government’s denial of any connection with -the putsch and the murder of Dollfuss, the letter of appointment which -Hitler wrote to Vice-Chancellor von Papen on 26 July 1934 is -significant. This letter appears in a standard German reference work, -_Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, II, Page 83_ (_2799-PS_). (In -considering the letter the report wide-spread at the time should be -recalled, that von Papen narrowly missed being purged on 30 June, 1944, -along with Ernst Roehm and others.) The letter reads as follows: - - “26 July 1934 - - “Dear Mr. von Papen - - “As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to suggest - to the Reichs President the removal of the German Minister to - Vienna, Dr. Rieth, from his post, because he, at the suggestion - of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels - respectively consented to an agreement made by both these - parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to - Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government. - Thus the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal - Austrian affair without any reason. - - “The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was - strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has - made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without - any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if - possible an easing of the general situation, and especially to - direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have - been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly - channels. - - “For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to take - over this important task, just because you have possessed and - continue to possess my most complete and unlimited confidence - ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet— - - “Therefore, I have suggested to the Reichs President that you, - upon leaving the Reich-Cabinet and upon release from the office - of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on special mission to - the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period - of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to - me. - - “Thanking you once more for all that you have at one time done - for the coordination of the Government of the National - Revolution and since then together with us for Germany, I - remain, - - Yours, very sincerely, - Adolf Hitler.” - (_2799-PS_) - -Four years later, on July 25, 1938, after the Anschluss with Austria, -German officials no longer expressed regrets over the death of Dollfuss. -They were eager and willing to reveal what the world already knew—that -they were identified with and sponsors of the murder of the former -Chancellor. A dispatch from the American Consul General in Vienna to the -Secretary of State, dated July 26, 1938, relates to the Nazis’ -celebration of the murder of Dollfuss, held on July 24 and July 25, -1938, four years after the event. It states: - - “The two high points of the celebration were the memorial - assembly on the 24th at Klagenfurt, capital of the province of - Carinthia, where in 1934 the Vienna Nazi revolt found its widest - response, and the march on the 25th to the former Federal - Chancellery in Vienna by the surviving members of the S.S. - Standarte 89, which made the attack on the Chancellery in - 1934—a reconstruction of the crime, so to say. - - “The assembled thousands at Klagenfurt were addressed by the - Fuehrer’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, in the presence of the families - of the 13 National Socialists who were hanged for their part in - the July putsch. The Klagenfurt memorial celebration was also - made the occasion for the solemn swearing in of the seven - recently appointed Gauleiters of the Ostmark. - - “From the point of view of the outside world, the speech of - Reichs Minister Hess was chiefly remarkable for the fact that - after devoting the first half of his speech to the expected - praise of the sacrifices of the men, women and youths of Austria - in the struggle for a greater Germany, he then launched into a - defense of the occupation of Austria and an attack on the ‘lying - foreign press’ and on those who spread the idea of a new war. - The world was fortunate, declared Hess, that Germany’s leader - was a man who would not allow himself to be provoked. ‘The - Fuehrer does what is necessary for his people in sovereign calm. - * * * and labors for the peace of Europe’ even though - provocators, ‘completely ignoring the deliberate threat to peace - of certain small states,’ deceitfully claim that he is a menace - to the peace of Europe. - - “The march on the former Federal Chancellery, now the - Reichsstatthalterei, followed the exact route and time schedule - of the original attack. The marchers were met at the Chancellery - by the Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart, who addressed them and - unveiled a memorial tablet. From the Reichsstatthalterei the - Standarte marched to the old RAVAG broadcasting center from - which false news of the resignation of Dollfuss had been - broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet. - Steinhausl, the present Police President of Vienna, is a member - of the S. S. Standarte 89”. (_L-273_) - -The original plaque is now rubble. But a photograph of it was found in -The National Library in Vienna. [The photograph was offered in evidence -at the trial. See _2968-PS_.] The plaque reads: “154 German men of 89 SS -Standarte stood up here for Germany on July 26, 1934. Seven found death -at the hands of the hangman”. The words chosen for this marble tablet, -and it may be presumed that they were words chosen carefully, reveal -clearly that the men involved were not mere malcontent Austrian -revolutionaries, but were regarded as German men, were members of a -para-military organization, who stood up here “for Germany.” In 1934 -Hitler repudiated Dr. Rieth because he “dragged the German Reich into an -internal Austrian affair without any reason”. In 1938 Nazi Germany -proudly identified itself with this murder, took credit for it, and took -responsibility for it. - -(3) _The Program Culminating in the Pact of July 11, 1936._ In -considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators in Austria between -25 July 1934 and November 1937, there is a distinct intermediate point, -the Pact of 11 July 1936. Accordingly, developments in the two-year -period, July 1934 to July 1936, will first be reviewed. - -(_a_) _Continued Aim of Eliminating Austria’s Independence—Conversation -and Activities of von Papen._ The Nazi conspirators pretended to respect -the independence and sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the aim of -Anschluss stated in _Mein Kampf_. But in truth and in fact they were -working from the very beginning to destroy the Austrian State. - -A dramatic recital of the position of von Papen in this regard is -provided in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit. It states: - - “When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted - me with ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the - conversation.’ In the baldest and most cynical manner he then - proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the - borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he - had been charged with the mission of facilitating German - economic and political control over all this region for Germany. - He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was - to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in - Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from - Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the - other states to the South and Southeast. He said that he - intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain - influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, - towards that end. He said that he was telling me this because - the German Government was bound on this objective of getting - this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which - could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and - England was not realistic. - - “The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the - German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and - of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I - already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless - shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I - got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited - representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit - that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and - destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely - smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and - that he would of course, not be talking to others so clearly - about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard - to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute - frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of - their objectives.” - - * * * * * * - - “On the surface, however, German activities consisted - principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and - influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, - including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and - its facilities and personnel. Von Papen as German Minister - entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached - almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as - several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to - prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning - side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence - under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave - solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian - independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid - of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor, - Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, - and replace them by a few ‘nationally-minded’ Austrians, which - of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was - to bring about Anschluss. - - “In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, - informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, - the latter had remarked ‘Yes, you have your French and English - friends now and you can have your independence a little longer’. - The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German - but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign - Minister told me that he had replied to von Papen ‘I am glad to - have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what - your Chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken - such pains to deny.’ - - “Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly - with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored - the ‘Grossdeutschum’ idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly - disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience - or scruple, von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his - wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of - these Austrians in this respect.” (_1760-PS_) - -(_b_) _Continued Existence of Nazi Organizations with a Program of Armed -Preparedness._ The wiles of von Papen represented only one part of the -total program of the Nazi conspiracy. At the same time Nazi activities -in Austria, forced underground during this period, were carried on. - -Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit discloses the following: The Nazi -organization, weakened in the events following the putsch, began -reorganization work. An informant furnished the Austrian Government with -a memorandum of a meeting of Austrian Nazi chiefs held in Bavaria, -September, 1934. The memorandum shows that they agreed to prepare for -new terroristic acts, to proceed brutally against persons cooperating -with the Schuschnigg Government when the next action against the -Government took place, and to appear disposed to negotiate but to arm -for the struggle. A copy of this memorandum was furnished to Mr. -Messersmith. At the same time the Austrian Legion was kept in readiness -in Germany. This large, organized hostile group constituted a continuing -menace for Austria. (_1760-PS_) - -The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi party in Austria is -corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis, Rainer -(_812-PS_). (_812-PS_ contains three parts. First there is a letter -dated 22 August 1939 from Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to -Seyss-Inquart, then Reich Minister. That letter encloses a letter dated -6 July 1939, written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef -Buerckel. In that letter, in turn, Rainer inclosed a report on the -events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March 1938, the day -before the invasion of Austria.) - -The letter from Rainer to Buerckel indicates that he was asked to -prepare a short history of the role of the party. He states that after -the Anschluss Hitler and the general public gave Seyss-Inquart alone -credit for effecting the Anschluss. It is Rainer’s belief that credit -belongs to the entire Party, the leaders of which had to remain -underground. And so Rainer writes his report to show that the Party as a -whole is entitled to “the glory which was excessively ascribed to one -person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart”. - -Apparently Seyss-Inquart heard from Buerckel what Rainer said, and wrote -to Rainer asking for an explanation. To avoid misunderstanding, Rainer -prepared for Seyss-Inquart a copy of his letter to Buerckel and his -report. - -The Rainer report tells of the disorganization of the Nazi party in -Austria and of its reconstitution. The second and third paragraphs of -the report state: - - “Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the - July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, - the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete - destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of - fighters through imprisonment or flight into the ‘Alt-Reich’; - and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to - Austria, a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the - Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to - PAPEN, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships - between the two states, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first - stage of the battle; and a new method of political penetration - was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landesleitung Munich - was dissolved, and the party in Austria was left to its own - resources. - - “There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in - Austria. New leaderships were forming in the nine Gaus. The - process was again and again interrupted by the interference of - the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and - frequently there were two, three or more rival leaderships. The - first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaus in - Autumn 1934 was engineer REINTHALLER (already appointed - Landesbauernfeuhrer (leader of the country’s farmers) by Hess). - He endeavored to bring about a political appeasement by - negotiations with the government, with the purpose of giving the - NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting its political - activities. Simultaneously Reinthaller started the - reconstruction of the illegal political organization, at the - head of which he had placed engineer NEUBACHER.” (_812-PS_) - -(_c_) _Secret Contacts Between German Officials, Including Papen, and -the Austrian Nazis: the Use by the Austrian Nazis of “Front” -Personalities._ Two cardinal factors about the Nazi organization in -Austria should be borne in mind. First, although the Fuehrer had on the -surface cast the Austrian Nazis adrift, in fact German officials, -including Papen, maintained secret contact with the Austrian Nazis, in -line with Hitler’s desires. German officials consulted and gave advice -and support to the organization of the Austrian Nazis. In the second -place, the Austrian Nazis remained an illegal organization, organizing -for the eventual use of force in an “emergency.” But in the meanwhile -they deemed it expedient to act behind “front” personalities, such as -Seyss-Inquart, who had no apparent taint of illegality. - -Mr. Messersmith relates in his affidavit that he obtained a copy of a -document outlining this Nazi program. - - “For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the - Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic - acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in - 1935 and most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with - directives from Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which - came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January, the - Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a - document which I considered accurate in all respects and which - stated: - - ‘The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of - his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by - Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he - also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von - Neurath. In these conversations the following - instructions were given to him: - - ‘During the next two years nothing can be undertaken - which will give Germany external political difficulties. - On this ground, everything must be avoided which could - awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the - internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, - therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to - intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in - the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is - convinced that order could be brought into the Party at - once through a word from him. This word, however, he - will, for foreign political reasons, give all the less, - as he is convinced that the, for him, desirable ends may - be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor - Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does - not indicate any disinterestedness in the idea of - Austria’s independence. Also, before everything, Germany - cannot for the present withdraw Party members in - Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real - exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help - to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in - Austria. As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht - finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000 - marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support - of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the - supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to - Engineer Reinthaller, who, through the fact that he - alone had control over the money, would have a definite - influence on the Party followers. In this way it would - be possible to end most quickly and most easily the - prevailing difficulties and division in the Austrian - National Socialist Party. - - ‘The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the - recently authorized foundation of German “Ortsgruppen” - of the National Socialist Party in Austria (made up of - German citizens in Austria) would be so arranged as not - to give the appearance that Germany is planning to - interfere in Austrian internal affairs.’” (_1760-PS_) - -The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Buerckel in July 1939, -outlines the further history of the party and the leadership squabbles -following the retirement of Reinthaller. In referring to the situation -in 1935, he mentions some of the contacts with the Reich Government in -the following terms: - - “In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which - were, apart from the Gauleaders, also Globocnik and Rainer. - SCHATTENFROH then claimed, because of an instruction received - from the imprisoned LEOPOLD, to have been made deputy country - leader. A group led by engineer RAFFELSBERGER had at this time - also established connections with departments of the Alt-Reich - (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an - attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program - for the fighting movement of Austria.” (_812-PS_) - -The Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in 1936: - - “The principles of the construction of the organization were: - The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the - trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple - manner, and without compromise, according to the principle of - organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party - council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political - opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal - chances should be used without revealing any ties with the - illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal - party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at - the top of the party leadership. All connections with the party - in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the - Fuehrer. These said that the German state should officially be - omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP; and that - auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc. - should be established in the foreign countries bordering - Austria. - - “Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who - had connections with Dr. Wachter which originated from - Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July uprising. On the other side - Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and - especially well-established relations with Christian-Social - politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the - ‘Styrian Heimatschutz’ and became a party member when the entire - ‘Styrian Heimatschutz’ was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another - personality who had a good position in the legal field was Col. - Glaise-Horstenau who had contacts with both sides. The agreement - of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of - these two persons. Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the - Fuehrer as being a trusted person.” (_812-PS_) - -The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis -during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were -maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using -“front” personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The -Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their -activities and could be referred to as “Nationalists”. They presented, -supported, and obtained consideration of demands which could not be -negotiated by out-and-out Nazis like Captain Leopold. Seyss-Inquart did -not hold any public office until January 1937, when he was made -Councillor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a trustworthy member -of the Party through the ranks of the Styrian Heimatschutz, points him -out as one who strongly influenced the agreement of 11 July 1936. - -That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust -Seyss-Inquart, is indicated by a letter, dated 14 July 1939, addressed -to Field Marshal Goering (_2219-PS_). The letter ends with the “Heil -Hitler” close and is not signed, but it was undoubtedly written by -Seyss-Inquart. It was found among Seyss-Inquart’s personal files. On the -first page of the letter there appears a note in ink, not indicated in -the partial English translation, reading: “Air Mail. 15 July, 1515 -hours, Berlin, brought to Goering’s office.” - -The main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession in -behalf of one Muehlmann, who unfortunately got in Buerckel’s bad graces. -An extract from the letter, which shows Seyss-Inquart as one whose -loyalty to Hitler and the aims of the Nazi conspiracy led him to fight -for the Anschluss with all the means at his disposal, reads: - - At Present In Vienna, 14 July 1939 - - “To the General Field Marshal - - Sir: - - * * * * * * - - “If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I - know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final - decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced activism - (_Aktivismus_) this will certainly be regarded as a fault in my - personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity - to the goal in which I believe. That is Greater Germany - (_Grossdeutschland_) and the FUEHRER. And if some people are - already tired out from the struggle and some have been killed in - the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into - action. This, after all, was also the development until the year - 1938. Until July 1934 I conducted myself as a regular member of - the party. And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my - membership dues the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in - December 1931. I probably would have been an undisputed, - comparatively old fighter and party member of Austria, but I - would not have done any more for the union. I told myself in - July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on its own - ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever - method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a - mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination - because I and my friends had to fight against the whole - political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, against - everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we might - have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political - annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of the means - and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for - Austria, as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have - been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path - which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my - party comrades. I followed it calmly and would without - hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that at one - point I could serve the FUEHRER as a tool in his work, even - though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy - and honorable party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have - never paid attention to such things because I am satisfied with - the opinion which the FUEHRER and the men close to him have of - me.” (_2210-PS_) - -A letter from Papen to Hitler dated 27 July 1935 shows how Papen thought -the doctrines of National Socialism could be used to effect the aim of -Anschluss. It consists of a report entitled “Review and Outlook, One -Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss.” After reviewing the -success that the Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as -a martyr and his principles as the patriotic principles of Austria, -Papen stated: - - “National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian - ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is - only a centralized Reich German party and therefore unable to - transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups - of people of a different political make-up, the answer must - rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not - have been brought about in a different way. But when the - creation of the people’s community in the Reich will be - completed, National socialism could, in a much wider sense than - this is possible through the present party organization—at - least apparently—, certainly become the rallying point for all - racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in - regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized - tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated - clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become - possible to effect a breakthrough into the front of the New - Austria. A Nurnberg Party Day designated as ‘The German Day’ as - in old times and the proclamation of a national socialistic - peoples’ front, would be a stirring event for all beyond the - borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the - particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the - legitimistic Count Dubsky wrote in his pamphlet about the - ‘Anschluss’: The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will - not be at all. National Socialism must win it or it will perish, - if it is unable to solve this task * * *.” (_2248-PS_) - -Other reports from Papen to Hitler, hereinafter mentioned, show that he -maintained covert contact with the National Socialist groups in Austria. -From the very start of his mission Papen was thinking of ways and means -of using the principle of National Socialism for “National Germans” -outside the borders of Germany. Papen was working for Anschluss, and -although he preferred to use the principles of National Socialism rather -than rely on the party organization, he was prepared to defend the party -organization as a necessary means of establishing those principles in -the German Reich. - -(_d_) _Assurances and Reassurances._ The German Government did more than -keep up a pretense of noninterference with Austrian groups. It employed -the psychological inducement of providing assurances that it had no -designs on Austria’s independence. If Austria could but hope for the -execution of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the -granting of concessions, and obtain relief from the economic and -internal pressures. - -A letter from Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated 17 May 1935, -indicated that a forthright, credible statement by Germany reassuring -Austria would be most useful for German diplomatic purposes and the -improvement of relationships between Austria and German groups in -Austria (_2247-PS_). Papen had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his -Social-Christian forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of -Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. He hoped to persuade Schuschnigg -to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over -Starhemberg. Papen indicated that he obtained this idea from Captain -Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists. His letter states in -part: - - “* * * I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The - fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his - Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a home front - dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting - the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should - be afforded to him, in such way that he would submit the offer - to the government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of - interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of - the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian principle - of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a - combination of that part of the Christian-elements which favors - the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes - the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom - to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a - compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the - beginning by a coalition of these forces. A further consequence - of this step would be the possibility of the participation of - Germany in the Danube pact, which would take the sting out of - its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany - and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial - influence on the European situation and especially on our - relationship with England. One may object, that Mr. Schuschnigg - will hardly be determined to follow such a pattern, that he will - rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to - our opponents. Of course, one should first of all explore the - possibility of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through - the use of ‘Go betweens’. The possibility exists. If Mr. - Schuschnigg finally says ‘No’ and makes our offer known in Rome, - then the situation would not be any worse but, on the contrary, - the efforts of the Reich government to make peace with Austria - would be revealed—without prejudice to other interests. - Therefore even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be - an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the - far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian - course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal - government (_Bundesregierung_), Mr. Schuschnigg will grasp this - last straw—always under the supposition that the offer could - not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears - all the mark of an actually honest compromise with Austria. - Assuming success of this step, we would again establish our - active intervention in Central European politics, which, as - opposed to the French-Czech and Russian political maneuvers, - would be a tremendous success, both morally and practically. - Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the - way of explorations and Conferences, an immediate decision is - necessary. The Reich Army Minister (_Reichswehrminister_) shares - the opinion presented above and the Reich Foreign Minister - (_Reichsaussenminister_) wanted to discuss it with you my - Fuehrer. - - (Signed) Papen”. (_2247-PS_) - -In other words, Papen wanted a strong assurance and credible assurance, -of Austria’s independence. As he put it, Germany had nothing to lose -with what it could always call a mere effort at peace. And she might be -able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition -government with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen -her position in Europe. Finally, Papen urged haste. - -Exactly four days later (21 May 1935) in a Reichstag address Hitler -responded to Papen’s suggestion, asserting: - - “Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal - affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an - Anschluss”. (_TC-26_) - -Despite this assurance, Papen suggested and Hitler announced, for a -complexity of reasons, a policy completely at variance with their -intentions, which had been and continued to be to interfere in Austria’s -internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss. - -(_e_) _Temporary Continuance of a Quiet Pressure Policy._ On 1 May 1936 -Hitler branded as a lie any statement that tomorrow or the day after -Germany would fall upon Austria. His words were published in the -_Voelkische-Beobachter_, SD, 2-3 May 1936, p. 2. (_2367-PS_) - -If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal and -misleading sense that he would not fall upon Austria “tomorrow or the -day after”. For the conspirators well knew that the successful execution -of their purpose required for a while longer the quiet policy they had -been pursuing in Austria. - -A memorandum of a conversation which occurred when William Bullitt, -American Ambassador to France, called upon von Neurath, German Minister -for Foreign Affairs, on 18 May 1936, recounts von Neurath’s explanation -why Germany was trying to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by -the Nazis in Austria (_L-150_). The Nazis were growing stronger in -Austria, anyway, in view of their appeal to the young people. And the -German Government was doing nothing active in foreign affairs until the -Rhineland, reoccupied two months before, had been “digested”, and until -fortifications were constructed on the French frontier. Finally, Italy -still had a conflicting interest in Austria, and Germany wished to avoid -any involvement with Italy. - -(_f_) _The agreement of 11 July 1936._ But if Germany was not yet ready -for open conflict in Austria, its diplomatic position was vastly -improved over 1934, a fact which influenced Austria’s willingness to -make concessions to Germany and come to terms. As Mr. Messersmith points -out, Italy, formerly a protector of Austria, had embarked on her -Abyssinian adventure, and this, together with the refortification of the -Rhineland, strengthened Germany’s position (_1760-PS_). This weakening -of Austria helped pave the way for the Pact of 11 July 1936. (_TC-22_) - -The formal part of the agreement of July 11, 1936, between the German -Government and the Government of the Federal State of Austria, looks -like a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to -the effect that Austria, in its policy, especially with regard to -Germany, will regard herself as a German state. But the other two -provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of -Austria, and that it regards the inner political order of Austria -(including the question of Austrian National Socialism) as an internal -concern of Austria upon which it will exercise neither direct nor -indirect influence. - -But there was much more substance to the day’s events. Mr. Messersmith’s -summary, as set forth in his affidavit, is more revealing: - - “Even more important than the terms of the agreement published - in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal - understanding, the most important provisions of which were, that - Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals enjoying the - Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to Germany to positions in - the Cabinet; (2) would devise means to give the ‘national - opposition’ a role in the political life of Austria and within - the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all - Nazis save those convicted of the most serious offenses. This - amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and - thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of - the _Deutsche Nationaler_ into the Austrian Government was - accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as - Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund - Glaise-Horstenau as Minister Without Portfolio”. (_1760-PS_) - -These and other provisions of the secret part of the Agreement of July -11 are set forth briefly and in general terms in an affidavit by Kurt -Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, dated November 19, 1945 -(_2994-PS_). By two of those provisions Austria agreed to permit Nazi -organizations on Austrian soil, and also use of the swastika and singing -of the Horst Wessel song—all for German subjects. On its credit side, -Austria was to get repeal of the 1,000 mark barrier on tourist trade, -and in general tourist trade between the two countries was to resume. - -In view of the strategy and tactics of the Nazis, these were substantial -concessions made by Austria to obtain Germany’s diplomatic, formal -assurance of Austrian independence and non-intervention in Austrian -internal affairs. The release of imprisoned Nazis to the community -presented potential police problems. And as Mr. Messersmith pointed out -in a 1934 dispatch, quoted in his affidavit, any prospect that the -National Socialists might come to power would make it more difficult to -obtain effective police and judicial action against the Nazis for fear -of reprisals by the future Nazi Government against those taking action -against Nazis even in the line of duty (_1760-PS_). The preservation of -internal peace in Austria was thus dependent upon Germany’s living up to -its obligations under the Accord. - -(4) _Germany’s Continuing Program of Weakening the Austrian Government._ - -(_a_) _Germany’s Instructions to the Austrian National Socialists -Concerning Future Plans._ In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not -to influence directly or indirectly the internal affairs of Austria, -including the matter of Austrian National Socialism. On 16 July 1936, -just five days later, Hitler violated that provision. The report of -Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel states: - - “* * * At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the - party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what - Austrian National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner - was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of - the Austrian party. On 16 July 1936, Dr. Rainer and Globocnik - visited the Fuehrer at the ‘Obersalzburg’ where they received a - clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the - Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif - near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer - on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions - for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the - Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik - and Hiedler.” - - * * * * * * - - “Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lt. Gen. - (Gruppenfuehrer) Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which - was appointed, in accordance with the state treaty of 11 July - 1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At - the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Fuehrer - for the party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his - efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Dr. - Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaller as leader of the peasants, - Kaltenbrunner as leader of the SS, and Dr. Jury as deputy-leader - of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and - Seyss-Inquart.” (_812-PS_) - -A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith -describes it briefly in his affidavit: - - “The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have - been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded - happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under - the leadership; of a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known - definitely was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program - was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could - carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in - Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations - which had a legal basis but which were simply a device by which - the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion as - a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was - the _Ostmarkischer Verein_, the sponsor of which was the - Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence - of Glaise-Horstenau and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this - organization was declared legal by the Courts. I made specific - mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which - the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the - underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany.” - (_1760-PS_) - -A report from Papen to Hitler dated 1 September 1936 indicates Papen’s -strategy after 11 July 1936 for destroying Austria’s independence. Papen -had taken a substantial step forward with the agreement of July 11. -Incidentally, after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to -Ambassador. Now his tactics were developed in the following terms, as -explained in the last three paragraphs of his letter of September 1: - - “* * * The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the - present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the - Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti-National - Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of - utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected - prior to the conference on the abolishing of the Control of - Finances (Finanzkontrolle) at Geneva. The Chancellor of the - League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of his - intention, to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the - Interior. As a guiding principle (Marschroute) I recommend on - the tactical side, continued, patient psychological treatment, - with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the - regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking - place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the - realization of some of our projects. In discussion with - government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal - party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the - agreement of July 11. I am trying to direct the next - developments in such a manner to aim at corporative - representation of the movement in the fatherland front - (Vaterlaendischen Front) but nevertheless refraining from - putting National Socialists in important positions for the time - being. However such positions are to be occupied only by - personalities, having the support and the confidence of the - movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in - Minister Glaise-Horstenau. - - (Signature) Papen” - (_2246-PS_) - -To recapitulate, this report of von Papen, discloses the following -plans: - - 1. obtaining a change in personnel in Ministry of Security in - due course; - - 2. obtaining cooperative representation of the Nazi movement in - the Fatherland Front; - - 3. not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions - yet, but using “nationalist” personalities; - - 4. using economic pressure, and “patient psychological - treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing - the regime.” - -(_b_) _Nazi Demands and Demonstrations._ The Nazi demanded even more -open recognition. In January 1937 Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum -of demands. They are listed in Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit (_1760-PS_). -They were not formally received by the Austrian Cabinet, but they were -known to and considered by the Cabinet. They included the following -demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations suffered for -National Socialist or National activity or sympathy; (2) equal treatment -for National Socialists, including freedom of political activity and -cultural activity; (3) abolition of laws and sanctions used by the -Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum advocated cooperation -on the basis of political principles including: A broadening of the -Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance with the Reich; -common racial stock as a political aim; the application of anti-Semitic -measures; and an early plebiscite on Anschluss. - -Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit also states that these demands, and -Leopold’s petition for a nationalistic party, were supported by frequent -demonstrations and much propaganda work. As early as 29 July 1936, when -the Olympic Torch was carried through Vienna, there were violent Nazi -disorders. From that time on there were frequent arrests for -distributing illegal literature or staging illegal demonstrations. -(_1760-PS_) - -(_c_) _Schuschnigg’s Concessions._ Gauleiter Rainer’s historical review -points out that due to the activities of the Reich officials and the -Austrians who acted as the Nazi “fronts”, it was possible to obtain the -appointment of Seyss-Inquart as _Staatsrat_ (Councillor of State) in -July, 1937. (_812-PS_) - -Schuschnigg’s affidavit mentions the Olympic Torch incident, and in -addition the demonstration of the illegal Nazis at the time of the visit -of von Neurath to Vienna in February 1937. Schuschnigg also points out -other examples of the pressure increasingly exerted by Germany on -Austria. One of his main reasons for entering into the July 11 agreement -was to eliminate Germany’s 1,000 mark penalty on tourists to Austria. -The penalty was removed, but Germany made it illegal for a tourist to -bring more than 5 marks out of the country. And German buyers of cattle -and wood purchased only from Austrian Nazis. (_2994-PS_) - -Schuschnigg further reports that the incidents and pressure culminated -in the so-called Tavs Plan, discovered by the Austrian police in -November, 1937, containing instructions for unrest to break out among -the Nazis at a prearranged time. The German Government would submit an -ultimatum that National Socialists must be brought into the Government -or the German Army would invade. (_2994-PS_) - -It may be recalled that during this period Schuschnigg made concessions. -He appointed Seyss-Inquart as Councillor of State in July, 1937. He had -previously appointed a “Committee of Seven” to discuss with him the -desires of the national opposition. He played a delaying game, -presumably in the hope that a change in the foreign situation would -provide him with external support. - -B. _Germany’s Diplomatic Preparations for Conquest._ - -The program of the Nazi conspiracy aimed at weakening Austria externally -and internally, by removing its support from without as well as by -penetrating within. This program was of the utmost significance, since -the events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were overshadowed by the fact -that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and poised -them there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor. - -Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria, and steady increase -in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required -removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to -Austria’s aid. But the program of the conspiracy for the weakening and -isolation of Austria was integrated with its foreign policy program in -Europe generally. - -The Nazi conspirators’ diplomatic preparation for war is described in a -second affidavit of George S. Messersmith (_2385-PS_), which may be -summarized as follows: In 1933 the Nazis openly acknowledged the -ambition to expand the territorial borders of the Reich to include -Austria and Czechoslovakia. As for the other countries of Southeast -Europe, the professed objective was stated at that time not in terms of -territorial acquisition but rather in terms of political and economic -control. And the stated objectives were not limited to Southeast Europe, -for important Nazis even in 1933 were stating their desire for the -Ukraine as the granary of Germany. - -When they came to power, the Nazis had two principal objectives. They -wanted to establish their power in Germany. And they wanted to rearm and -establish Germany’s armed power. They wanted peace until they were -ready. But they wanted to acquire the ability to carry out their program -in Europe by force if necessary, although preferably by a threat of -force. They accordingly embarked upon their vast rearmament program. It -proceeded very rapidly. Goering and General Milch often said to -Messersmith or in his presence that the Nazis were concentrating on air -power in their rearmament, as the weapon of terror most likely to give -Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed most -rapidly. - -In addition to material preparation for war, there was preparation for -war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany youth of all ages -could be observed in military exercises and field maneuvers. - -Moreover, as Mr. Messersmith also observes, - - “Military preparation and psychological preparation were coupled - with _diplomatic_ preparation designed to so disunite and - isolate their intended victims as to render them defenseless - against German aggression.” (_2385-PS_) - -In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic -field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the -continent. She had woven a system of mutual assistance in the West and -in the East. The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the -Franco-Belgian alliance, guaranteed the territorial status quo in the -West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania were allied in the Little -Entente and each in turn was united with France by mutual assistance -pacts. Since 1922, France and Poland had likewise been allied against -external aggression. Italy had made plain her special interest in -Austrian independence. - -Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the -existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the -members of the Little Entente and the other Eastern European powers. - -Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises of -economic gain for cooperating with Germans. To some of these countries -she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards. -She offered Carinthia, in Austria, to Yugoslavia. She offered part of -Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part of Poland. She offered Yugoslav -territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering land in -Hungary to Yugoslavia. - -As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit: - - “Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program - of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors - of these countries with promises of a share in the loot. To - Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the - Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time: - - ‘* * * The major factor in the internal situation in the - last week has been the increase in tension with respect - to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia. * * * There - is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his - trip to various capitals in Southeastern Europe about - six months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a - part of Carinthia, when a National Socialist Government - came into power in Austria. * * * The Nazi seed sown in - Yugoslavia has been sufficient to cause trouble and - there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look - with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees - who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25.’ - - “Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and - to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their - acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As - I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, von Papen and - von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935, were spreading - the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division - Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland - the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they - knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all. - - “The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make - inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objectives. I - recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or - 1935, that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav - territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions - of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later - gave me the same information. - - “I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made - these promises were not only the died-in-the-wool Nazis but more - conservative Germans who already had begun to willingly lend - themselves to the Nazi program. In an official despatch to the - Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote - as follows: - - ‘* * * Europe will not get away from the myth that - Neurath, Papen and Mackensen are not dangerous people - and that they are “diplomats of the old school.” They - are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just - because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, - they are able to work more effectively. They are able to - sow discord just because they propagate the myth that - they are not in sympathy with the regime.’” (_2385-PS_) - -In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and -increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making -these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative -diplomats. It is true that Nazis openly scoffed at any notion of -international obligations. It is true that the real trump in Germany’s -hand was its rearmament and more than that its willingness to go to war. -And yet the attitude of the various countries was not influenced by -those considerations alone. Schuschnigg laid great stress upon, and was -willing to go to some lengths to obtain, an assurance of independence. -All these countries found it possible to believe apparently substantial -personages, like von Neurath, for example. They were led to rely on the -assurances given, which seemed more impressive since the diplomats -making them were represented as men who were not Nazis and would not -stoop to go along with the base designs of the Nazis. - -Germany’s approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of -limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a naval limitations -treaty with England and discussed a Locarno Air Pact. In the case of -both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and -harped on fears of Communism and war. - -In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of -the sanctity of international obligations. High-ranking Nazis, including -Goering, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany -would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited -Germany’s interests to do so. As Mr. Messersmith states in his -affidavit: - - “High-ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official - contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, - Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to - the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that - Germany would observe her international undertakings only so - long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so. Although these - statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made - to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any - secret for on many occasions they expressed the same ideas - publicly.” (_2385-PS_) - -France and Italy worked actively in Southeastern Europe to counter -Germany’s moves. France made attempts to promote an East Locarno Pact -and to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian -powers. Italy’s effort was to organize an economic bloc of Austria, -Hungary, and Italy. - -But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling its promises of loot, by -continuing its armament, and by another significant stratagem. The Nazis -stirred up internal dissensions to disunite and weaken their intended -victims. They supported the Austrian Nazis and the Henlein Party in -Czechoslovakia. They probed what Goebbels called the “sore spots.” In -Yugoslavia they played on the differences between the Croats and the -Serbs, and in particular played on the fear of the restoration of the -Hapsburgs in Austria, a fear which was very real in Yugoslavia. In -Hungary, Poland, and Rumania they stirred up other fears and hatreds. -These measures had considerable effect in preventing these countries -from joining any which were opposed to German designs. - -The Nazis consolidated their power in Germany very quickly. The German -people became increasingly imbued with the Nazi military spirit. Within -Germany, resistance to the Nazis disappeared. Army officers, including -many who originally aided the Nazis with the limited objective of -restoring the German Army, increasingly became imbued with aggressive -designs as they saw how remarkably their power was growing. - -The power of Nazi Germany outside the borders of the Reich increased -correspondingly. Other countries feared its military might. Important -political leaders in Yugoslavia, in Hungary, and in Poland became -convinced that the Nazi regime would gain its ends and that the best -course was to play along with Germany. These countries became apathetic -toward the development of Anschluss with Austria and cooperative toward -the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Messersmith’s despatches from -Europe to the State Department, setting out the developments in these -countries, are included in his second affidavit. (_2385-PS_) - -As for Italy, Germany’s initial objective was to sow discord between -Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory, -particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching agreement -with them and to block an East Locarno Pact. As Mr. Messersmith states: - - “While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in - 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the - opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England, - and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany’s program in - exchange for German support of Italy’s plans in Abyssinia.” - (_2385-PS_) - -That paved the way for the Austro-German declaration of 11 July 1936. -And in the Fall of 1936, Germany extended the hand of friendship and -common purpose to Italy in an alliance—the Rome-Berlin Axis. This, -together with Germany’s alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on -England and increased the relative strength of Germany. - -And so, by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, among -others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves so -that they could seriously consider plans for war and outline a -timetable. That timetable was developed in the conference with Hitler in -the Reichschancellery on 5 November 1937. (_386-PS_) - -C. _Crystallization of the Plan to Wage Aggressive War in Europe and to -Seize Austria and Czechoslovakia._ - -At the meeting of the conspirators in the Reichschancellery on 5 -November 1937, the Fuehrer insisted that Germany should have more space -in Europe (_386-PS_). It was concluded that the space required must be -taken by force, three different cases were outlined as possibilities, -and it was decided that the problem would have to be solved before the -period 1943 to 1945. The nature of a war in the near future was -envisaged, specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said -that for the improvement of Germany’s military political position the -first aim of the Nazis in every case of entanglement by war must be to -conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove -any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. -Hitler then calculated that the conquest of Czechoslovakia and Austria -would constitute the conquest of food for from five to six million -people, assuming that the comprehensive emigration of one million from -Austria could be carried out. He further pointed out that the annexation -of the two states to Germany would constitute a considerable relief, -both militarily and politically, since they would provide shorter and -better frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other purposes, and -would make possible the reconstitution of new armies. (_386-PS_) - -The minutes of this meeting reveal a crystallization in the policy of -the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to acquire Austria. -At the outset a revolutionary Putsch was attempted, using the personnel -of the Austrian Nazis, but that failed. The next period was one of -surface recognition of the independence of Austria and the use of -devious means to strengthen the position of the Nazis internally in -Austria. Now, however, it became clear that the need for Austria, in the -light of the larger aggressive purposes of the Nazi conspirators, was -sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in order to obtain -Austria with the desired speed. The Nazis were, in fact, able to secure -Austria, after having weakened it internally and removed from it the -support of other nations, merely by setting the German military machine -in motion and making a threat of force. The German armies were able to -cross the border and secure the country without the necessity of firing -a shot. Careful planning for war and the readiness to use war as an -instrument of political action made it possible in the end for the Nazis -to master Austria without having to fight for it. - -The German High Command had previously considered preparations against -Austria. On 24 June 1937 the Reich Minister for War and Commander in -Chief of the Armed Forces, General von Blomberg, issued a Top Secret -Directive (_C-175_). The importance of this directive, establishing a -unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war, is indicated by the -fact that the carbon copy received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy -was one of only four copies. This directive from General von Blomberg -stated that the general political situation indicated that Germany need -not consider an attack from any side, and also that Germany did not -intend to unleash a European war. It then stated, in point 1: - - “Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does - not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous - preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces. - - “_a._ to counter attacks at any time - - “_b._ to enable the military exploitation of politically - favorable opportunities should they occur.” (_C-175_) - -The directive then indicated that there would be certain preparations of -a general nature for war. - - “2. The preparations of a general nature include: - - “_a._ The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the - German Armed Forces, even before the completion of - rearmament and full preparedness for war. - - “_b._ The further working on ‘Mobilization without - public announcement’ in order to put the Armed Forces in - a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both - as regards strength and time.” (_C-175_) - -The directive finally indicated, in Part 3, that there might be special -preparation for war in Austria: - - “Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the - Monarchy. - - “The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed - force to give up a restoration. - - “Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian - people, the march in will be made in the general direction of - Vienna and will break any resistance.” (_C-175_) - -This plan is indicated in the document as having been superseded by new -and more detailed plans following the meeting of November 5, 1937. - -The plans of the conspirators were further revealed in two conversations -held by William Bullitt, United States Ambassador to France with Schacht -and with Goering in November, 1937. Both Schacht and Goering told -Bullitt that Germany was determined to annex Austria. Goering further -added that there could be no final solution of the Sudeten-German -question other than inclusion in the Reich. (_L-151_) - -D. _Pressure and Threats Resulting in Further Concessions: -Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938._ - -Chancellor Schuschnigg states in an affidavit (_2995-PS_) that in 1938 -von Papen suggested to him that he should meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden. -After several discussions Schuschnigg agreed to go, provided three -conditions were met: - - (1) He must be invited by Hitler. - - (2) He must be previously informed of the precise agenda and assured -that the agreement of 11 July 1936 would be maintained. - - (3) There was to be an agreement in advance that the communique to -be published at the end of the meeting would affirm the 11 July 1936 -agreement. - -Von Papen brought back word from Hitler inviting Schuschnigg and -agreeing with these conditions, particularly the maintenance of the July -1936 treaty. (_2995-PS_) - -The official German communique of this conference between Hitler and -Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938 was calm (_2461-PS_). -The communique stated that the unofficial meeting was caused by the -mutual desire to clarify by personal conversations the questions -relating to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria. The -communique listed, as among those present, Schuschnigg and his Foreign -Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and von -Papen. The communique concluded: “Both statesmen are convinced that the -measures taken by them constitute at the same time an effective -contribution toward the peaceful development of the European situation.” -(_2461-PS_). A similar communique was issued by the Austrian Government. - -In fact, as a result of the conference great concessions were obtained -by the German Government from Austria. The principal concessions are -contained in the official Austrian communique dated 16 February 1938 -(_2464-PS_). The communique announced a reorganization of the Austrian -Cabinet, including the appointment of Seyss-Inquart to the position of -Minister of Security and Interior. In addition, announcement was made of -a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes. (_2464-PS_) - -Two days later, on 18 February 1938, another concession was divulged in -the official German and Austrian communique concerning the equal rights -of Austrian National Socialists in Austria (_2469-PS_). The communique -announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference, the Austrian -National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the single -legal political party of Austria. - -Schuschnigg’s affidavit on his Berchtesgaden visit on February 12, 1938 -(_2995-PS_) points out that considerable pressure was brought to bear on -him at the Berghof. Several Generals—Keitel, Sperrle, and Reichenau, -names which were omitted from the formal communique later issued—were -present on his arrival. The conference started with a two-hour -conference between Schuschnigg and Hitler alone. Hitler made no precise -demands but attacked Schuschnigg violently. In the words of the -affidavit: - - “I furthermore state and affirm that, immediately after arriving - at the Berghof, I commenced a conference with Hitler. Hitler and - I were alone for two hours. Hitler attacked in a violent manner - the politics of Austria, both of the past and present. He - furthermore informed me that he, Hitler, had ‘decided to bring - the Austrian question to a solution so-or-so, even if he had to - immediately use military force.’ At no time during the first two - hours of our conversation did Hitler ever make any precise - demands or requests of me, but spent the whole of the two hours - accusing me and menacing me as a traitor to Austrian politics. - Especially he informed me that, according to his knowledge, - Austria could no longer reckon with any assistance from other - European Powers, and that Austria now stood alone in the world. - He furthermore added—‘Schuschnigg, you now have the chance to - put your name alongside the names of other famous German - leaders, such as Goering, Hess, Frick, Epp, Goebbels, and - others.’ * * * “. (_2995-PS_) - -After Hitler’s violent threats, Schuschnigg had discussions of a calmer -nature with von Ribbentrop and von Papen. They talked soothingly and -comfortingly to Schuschnigg but reached the same conclusion, that he -should yield to German demands, which in practical effect meant Nazi -control of the Government of Austria. - - “I furthermore state and affirm that I was next called before - Joachim von Ribbentrop with my Secretary for Foreign Affairs, - Guido Schmidt, and, in the presence of Franz von Papen, - Ribbentrop exhibited to me a typewritten draft containing the - conditions and demands made by Hitler upon me and Austria. He - furthermore added that Hitler has informed me, Ribbentrop, ‘that - these demands that I now offer to you are the final demands of - the Fuehrer and that he, Hitler, is not prepared to further - discuss them’. He further stated that, ‘you must accept the - whole of these demands herein contained’. Ribbentrop then - advised me to accept the demands at once. I protested, and - referred him to my previous agreements with von Papen, made - prior to coming to Berchtesgaden, and made it clear to - Ribbentrop that I was not prepared to be confronted with such - unreasonable demands as he had then and there placed before me. - Von Papen, still present, apologized and informed me that he, - von Papen, was entirely surprised and not at all informed about - the aims of the Fuehrer, as here laid down. He further stated, - and informed me, that he, von Papen, could only offer his advice - and that he should now accede to, and sign, these demands. He - furthermore informed me that I could be assured that Hitler - would take care that, if I signed these demands and acceded to - them, that from that time on Germany would remain loyal to this - Agreement and that there would be no further difficulties for - Austria.” (_2995-PS_) - -Finally, after obtaining some minor concessions from Ribbentrop, -Schuschnigg met with Hitler again. This time Hitler not only put -pressure upon Schuschnigg, but also, upon learning that the approval of -President Miklas of Austria was necessary, indicated clearly to -Schuschnigg that military action would follow if Miklas did not approve -the agreement. In the words of Schuschnigg’s affidavit: - - “I further state and say, that I then went before Hitler again. - Hitler was very excited and informed me that he would make a - final test with Austria, and stated further: ‘that you must - fulfill the conditions of the demands made by me on you within - three days, or else I will order the march into Austria.’ I - replied: ‘I am not able to take over the obligation to fulfill - your demands, for I am only the Chancellor of Austria, and that - obligation you attempt to place upon me is the duty only of the - Federal President, Miklas; I am only able to sign the draft and, - when I arrive in Vienna, to present it to the Federal - President’. Hitler then flung open the door and yelled ‘Keitel’. - At the same time, Hitler asked me to wait outside. Keitel then - came in to Hitler. After twenty minutes or more I was again - called before Hitler and, when before him, he, Hitler, informed - me as follows: ‘For the first time in my life, I have changed my - mind. You must sign the demands that I have made upon you, then - report them to the Federal President, Miklas, and within three - days from now Austria must fulfill the Agreement, otherwise - things will take their natural course’. I then agreed to sign - the demands and, while waiting in Hitler’s private room, he, - Hitler, in an entirely changed mood, said to Franz von Papen, - who was also present, ‘Herr von Papen, through your assistance I - was appointed Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was saved - from the abyss of communism. I will never forget that’. Papen - replied: ‘_Jawohl, Mein Fuehrer_’. - - “I furthermore say and affirm that I, in the presence of - Ribbentrop, Guido Schmidt, von Papen, and Hitler, signed the - demands, and retained a copy for the Austrian Government. “I - further state and affirm that, on the way back to Vienna from - Berchtesgaden, Franz von Papen accompanied me and my party. - Between the Berghof and Berchtesgaden, von Papen informed me as - follows: ‘Now, you have your own impression of how excited the - Fuehrer can get, but that happens very seldom, and I am - convinced that the next time you meet him, you will have an - amicable conversation with him.’” (_2995-PS_) - -The pressure put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden is also disclosed in -von Papen’s notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on 26 February -1938, the last two paragraphs of which read: - - “I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion - that he had acted under ‘brutal pressure’ in Berchtesgaden. I - myself had been present and been able to state that he had - always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The - Chancellor replied he had actually been under considerable moral - pressure, he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk - which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he - had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked - him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to - make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: - ‘To be honest, no!’ It appears to me of importance to record - this statement.” (_1544-PS_) - -For diplomatic purposes von Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept -up the pretense that there had been no pressure. But General Jodl, -writing the account of current events for his diary, was more candid. -This hand-written diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden -but also the fact that for some days thereafter, General Keitel and -Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure, in -order to coerce President Miklas into ratifying the agreement. And so -the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure, with threats of -invasion, for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference, in order to -produce the desired effect on Miklas. (_1780-PS_) - -The following entries, for Feb. 11-Feb. 14 were made in Jodl’s diary: - - “_11 February_: - - “In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. - Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together - with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and - military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol. - - “_13 February_: - - “In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come - to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the - effect that military pressure by shamming military action should - be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive - maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone - for approval. - - “_14 February_: - - “At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris - went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and - initiates the different measures. - - “The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is - created that Germany is undertaking serious military - preparations.” (_1780-PS_) - - The proposals for deceptive maneuvers mentioned by Jodl were - signed by Keitel. Underneath his signature appeared a pencilled - note that the Fuehrer approved the proposals. Among the rumors - which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria were the - following: - - “1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or - Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments. - - “2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the - conclusion of military preparations against Austria. - - “_a._ through V-men (V-Maenner) in Austria, - - “_b._ through our customs personnel (staff) at the - frontier, - - “_c._ through travelling agents. - - “3. Such news could be: - - “_a._ Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the - Sector of the VII A.K. - - “_b._ (Rolling Stock) is being assembled in Munich, - Augsburg, and Regensburg. - - “_c._ Major General Muff, the Military Attache in Vienna - has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter - of fact, this is the case). - - “_d._ The Police Stations located at the frontier of - Austria, have called up reinforcements. - - “_e._ Custom officials report about the imminent - maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade (_Gebirgsbrigade_) in - the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and - Berchtesgaden.” (_1775-PS_) - -The pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due course, -as is shown in the communiques already referred to, President Miklas -ratified the Berchtesgaden agreement, which foreshadowed a National -Socialist Austria. - -E. _Events Culminating in the German Invasion on 12 March 1938._ - -(1) _The Plebiscite._ The day after his appointment as Minister of the -Interior, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. -(_2484-PS_) - -On 9 March 1938, three weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge -of the police, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite -throughout Austria on the following Sunday, 13 March 1938. The question -was: “Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German and -united Austria?” A “yes” answer to this question was clearly compatible -with the agreement made by the German Government on 11 July 1936, and -carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Moreover, for a -long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of -Anschluss. But the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a -strong “yes” vote on the question put by Schuschnigg, and they could not -tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg -Government. They took this occasion to overturn the Austrian Government. - -Although the Plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March, -the Nazi Organization received word about it earlier in the day. It was -determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the -situation, and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the -Plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg, and that pending Hitler’s -approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg -about details of the plebiscite. - -In the words of Gauleiter Rainer’s report to Reichscommissioner -Buerckel: - - “The _Landesleitung_ received word about the planned plebiscite - through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a. - m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, - Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a - few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had - given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the - talks he made us understand that the illegal information we - received was based on truth, and that in view of the new - situation, he had been cooperating with the _Landesleitung_ from - the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik and - Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at - 10 a. m. There it was decided that first, the Fuehrer had to be - informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer - to intervene must be given to him by way of an official - declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and - thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until - clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. - Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to - Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer - by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.” - (_812-PS_) - -(2) _Germany’s Preparation for the Use of Force._ When news of the -Plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity. -Hitler was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he -called his military advisers and ordered preparation for the march into -Austria. He made diplomatic preparations by explaining in a letter to -Mussolini the reasons why he was going to march into Austria. In the -absence of von Ribbentrop, who was temporarily detained in London, von -Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again. - -The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a -vivid account of the activity in Berlin. The entry for the 10th of March -1938 reads: - - “By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg - ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13, March, which should bring - strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or - preparation. - - “Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March - 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called - back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is - ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is - with the District leader (_Gauleiter_) Buerckel in the - Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He - drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, - according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old - draft. - - “Prepare case Otto. - - “1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) - Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath - takes over the Foreign Office. - - “Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A - personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are - developed which force the Fuehrer to take action. - - “1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the - 8th Army (Corps Area 3) 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve - Army.” (_1780-PS_) - -In a directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 11 -March 1938 and initialed by Jodl and Keitel, Hitler stated his mixed -political and military intentions: - - “1. If these measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade - Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions - and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German - population. - - * * * * * * - - “4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this - operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on - the 12th of March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. - - “I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying - over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion. - - “5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we - do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in - our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out - without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry - welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be - avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken - ruthlessly by force of arms.” (_C-102_) - -An implementing directive of 11 March 1938 issued by Jodl provided -further: - - “If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in - Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile. - - “The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially - as Mussolini has declared himself uninterested in the solution - of the Austrian Question”. (_C-103_) - -The military preparations for invasion were complete. - -(3) _The Events of 11 March in Austria._ The events of 11 March 1938 in -Austria are available in three separate accounts. Although these -accounts differ in some minor details, they afford each other almost -complete corroboration with regard to the way in which the German -Government deprived Austria of its sovereignty. - -The first account is contained in a third affidavit executed by -Schuschnigg (_2996-PS_). Schuschnigg first states that he had been -discussing the plebiscite with Seyss-Inquart, and that Seyss-Inquart had -made some procedural objections but in general indicated his general -willingness to support the plebiscite. Schuschnigg went to bed on March -10 thinking the plebiscite would be a success. But on the morning of -March 11 he was told that traffic from Germany had stopped, and that -German Army forces were moving to the border. After 10 a. m. -Seyss-Inquart came to Schuschnigg’s office with Glaise-Horstenau. -Glaise-Horstenau had just come from Berlin and reported that Hitler was -in a rage. (_2996-PS_) - -Schuschnigg’s affidavit then relates the three ultimatums presented by -the German Government: - - “Seyss-Inquart was then and there called to the telephone and, - upon his return, read to me from a scrap of paper which he held - in his hand, the contents of a telephone call which he alleged - was just then received by him from Goering in Berlin. The - contents as he read it to me was as follows: ‘The Chancellor - must revoke the proposed plebiscite within the time of one hour, - and after three or four weeks, Austria must oblige herself to - carry out a plebiscite concerning the Anschluss according to the - SAAR status, otherwise the German Army is ordered to pass the - Austrian frontier’. - - “I further state and say that after informing the Federal - President of this demand made on Austria by Germany, we decided - to recall the Plebiscite, and thereupon I informed Seyss-Inquart - and Glaise-Horstenau of our intentions. - - “Seyss-Inquart said that he would go to the telephone and inform - Goering in Berlin concerning the decision of the Austrian - Government, at that time made. In a few minutes, he, - Seyss-Inquart, returned to my office, and informed me further, - as follows: - - ‘I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and - Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor - Schuschnigg, as follows: - - ‘“The situation can only be saved for Austria when - Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria within - two hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new - Chief of the Austrian Government; if Seyss-Inquart does - not inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering, - will suppose that you are hindered from doing so”’. - - “I then reported to the Federal President the new developments, - and, after some conversation with him and other members of the - Government, I decided to resign. The Federal President - reluctantly accepted my resignation at 3:30 p. m. on the - afternoon of the 11th of March 1938. He expressed himself - unwilling to appoint Seyss-Inquart as the Federal Chancellor—he - therefore asked me to continue my duties as caretaker Chancellor - until he had decided who would succeed me as Federal Chancellor. - I accepted and remained as ‘caretaker Chancellor’ from 3:30 p. - m., 11 March 1938 until about 11:30 p. m. the same night, when - Seyss-Inquart was appointed to the position of Federal - Chancellor. - - “I further state and say that at about 3:30 p. m. on the - afternoon of 11 March 1938, the Foreign Office of the Austrian - Government contacted the Embassy of Germany in Vienna, to - ascertain if the demands that had been then and there made by - Goering on Austria were the official demands of the German - Government. The Military Attache of Germany in Vienna, one - Lieutenant General Muff, came before the Austrian Federal - President, and repeated the contents of the German ultimatums - that had previously been delivered to us by Seyss-Inquart. - - “I furthermore state and say, that the Federal President, at - about 7:30 or 8:00 o’clock p. m. on the night of 11 March 1938 - ordered me, as caretaker Chancellor, to broadcast the events of - the day and to protest against the demands made on Austria - during that day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world - that Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of - Germany through superior force * * *.” (_2996-PS_) - -The report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichscommissioner Buerckel also -discusses the events of March 11. In general, Rainer’s report -corroborates Schuschnigg’s affidavit. (_812-PS_) - -Another document recalls vividly the events of 11 March 1938. This -document, which was found in a building of the courtyard of the German -Air Ministry, is a binder containing typed transcripts of some 27 -telephone conversations, held in Goering’s office in the Air Ministry on -11 March 1938 and up to 14 March 1938. Most of the conversations were -conducted by Goering, although at least one was held by Hitler -(_2949-PS_). (For purposes of convenience these telephone calls are -marked with an identifying letter, running from A through Z and then -beginning again with AA). - -The first group of conversations took place between Field Marshal -Goering, who was identified as F., and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified -as S. The transcript is in part, in the language of these two persons -and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. At 2:45 p. m. the -following conversation occurred: - - “F: How do you do, doctor. My brother-in-law, is he with you? - - “S: No. - - “Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following - turn: - - “F: How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have - any news? - - “S. The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and - therefore he has put S. and the other gentlemen in a difficult - situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive - precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at - 8 p. m. - - “F: Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor - Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment - he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear - stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a - postponement only, not a change of the present situation which - had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor - Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement. - - “Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the Fuehrer. - Afterwards F. phoned again S. This conversation was held at - 15:05. - - “F: Told S. that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the - decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy - any more the confidence of our government because he had broken - the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in - his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National - Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately - hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the - Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one - hour no report had come through the assumption would be made - that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would - mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was - then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As - a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal - President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow - Schuschnigg’s resignation.” (_2949-PS, Part A_) - -Thus Goering told Seyss-Inquart that it was not enough for Schuschnigg -to cancel the election. And twenty minutes later he telephoned -Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. When informed at -about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned, he pointed out that -in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the -Cabinet. - -An hour later Goering phoned Dombrowski at the German Embassy in Vienna. -He was concerned that the Nazi Party and all its formations should be -legalized promptly: - - “Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been legalized? - - “Dombrowski: But that is * * * it isn’t necessary to even - discuss that. - - “Goering: With all of its organizations. - - “Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country. - - “Goering: In uniform? - - “Dombrowski: In uniform. - - “Goering: Good. - - “Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have - already been on duty for one-half hour which means everything is - all right.” (_2949-PS, Part C_) - -In addition Goering stated that the Cabinet must be formed by 7:30 p. -m., and he transmitted instructions, to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart, -as to who should be appointed to the cabinet: - - “Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer - and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One - thing I have forgotten, Fishbeck must have the Department of - Economy and Commerce. - - “Dombrowski: That’s understood. - - “Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security - and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be - taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the - Justice Department. - - “Dombrowski: Yes, yes. - - “Goering: Give me the name. - - “Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law. Isn’t that right? - - “Goering: Yes? - - “Dombrowski: Yes. - - “Goering: That’s right and then also Fishbeck.” (_2949-PS, Part - C_) - -About twenty minutes later, at 5:26 p. m., Goering received the news -that Miklas was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. He -issued instructions for an ultimatum to be delivered to Miklas. The -telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart went as -follows: - - “G: Now remember the following: You go immediately together with - Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the - conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, - the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the - frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria - will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and - demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do - inform us immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him, there is - no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we - received before action was delayed, but now the situation is - that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of - Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be - held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas - has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (There - follows a sentence which is broken up) M. does not matter - whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party - with all its organizations (again interruption) and then call - out all the National Socialists all over the country. They - should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given - till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. - I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand - it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 - minutes.” (_2949-PS, Part E_) - -An hour later, at 6:28 p. m. Goering had an extensively interrupted -telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When -told that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering replied: - - “Goering: Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him; just go - upstairs again and just tell him plainly that SI shall call on - the National Socialists guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will - march in by my order”. (_2949-PS, Part H_) - -After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed -Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a -new person had gone in to talk to him and there might be definite word -in about ten minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows: - - “G: Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes - back, then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich - Chancellery—as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly - can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; - if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power; all - right? - - “S. But if he threatens? - - “G. Yes. - - “S. Well, I see, then we shall be ready (_antreten_). - - “G. Call me via Blitz.” (_2949-PS, Part H_) - -It is plain that Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for -Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan -involved both the use of the National Socialist forces in Austria and -invasion by German troops. - -Later that night, at about 8:00 o’clock, Goering and Seyss-Inquart had -another conversation. This was after the ultimatum had expired. -Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to name -Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows: - - “G: O.K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make - sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the - following which I shall tell you now! Everyone who offers - resistance or organizes resistance, will immediately be - subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of our - invading troops. Is that clear? - - “S: Yes. - - “G: Including leading personalities, it doesn’t make any - difference. - - “S: Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance. - - “G: Yes, it does not matter: The Federal President did not - authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance. - - “S: Yes. - - “G: Well, now you are officially authorized. - - “S: Yes. - - “G: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.” (_2349-PS, Part I_) - -Another historical event—the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent -to the German Government requesting it to send troops into Austria to -help put down disorder—was discussed over the telephone. A conversation -held at 8:48 between Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows: - - “G: Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that - Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps - the radio stations occupied. - - “K: Well, we represent the Government now. - - “G: Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen carefully: - The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. - Take the notes: - - ‘The provisional Austrian Government which after the - dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it its - task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to - the German Government the urgent request, to support it - in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For - this purpose it asks the German Government to send - German troops as soon as possible’. - - “K: Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but - everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the - professional groups (?)” (_2949-PS, Part L_) - -And a few minutes later the conversation continued as follows: - - “G: Then our troops will cross the border today. - - “K: Yes. - - “G: Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible. - - “K: Will send the telegram to SI in the office of the Federal - Chancery. - - “G: Please, show him, the text of the telegram and do tell him - that we are asking him—well, he does not even have to send the - telegram—all he needs to do is to say: agreed. - - “K: Yes. - - “G: Either call me at the Fuehrer’s or at my place. Well, good - luck. Heil Hitler!” (_2949-PS, Part L_) - -It will be recalled that in the first conversation (Part A), held at -3:05 p. m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram -agreed upon. But now the matter was so urgent that Goering dictated the -exact wording of the telegram over the telephone. - -And an hour later, at 9:54 p. m., a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in -Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went as follows: - - “D: I need the telegram urgently. - - “K: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees. - - “D: This is marvelous. Thank you. - - “K: Listen to the radio. News will be given. - - “D: Where? - - “K: From Vienna. - - “D: So Seyss-Inquart agrees? - - “K: _Jawohl!_” (_2949-PS, Part M_) - -(4) _The Order to Invade Austria._ Communications with Austria were now -suspended. But the German military machine had been set in motion. A -Directive, dated 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from Supreme Commander of -the Armed Forces, initialled by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, -ordered the invasion of Austria because of its failure to comply with -the German ultimatum. The directive reads: - - “Re: Operation Otto - - “_Directive No. 2_ - - “1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian - government have not been fulfilled. - - “2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in - front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. - - “The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own - accord. - - “3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of - the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to - directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3. - - “I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all - forces to the full, as quickly as possible. - - (signed) ADOLF HITLER” (_C-182_) - -(5) _Communications with Rome—Avoidance of Disaster._ But at the very -time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this military undertaking, -they still had a question mark in their minds—Italy. Italy had massed -forces on the Italian-Austrian border on the occasion of the 25 July -1934 putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of -Austria. - -At 10:25 p. m. that evening, however, Hitler heard from Prince Philip of -Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just returned from the -Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole affair in a -very-friendly manner. The telephone conversation went thus: - -“Hesen: I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted -the whole thing in a very-friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He -had been informed from Austria, Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had -then said it would be a complete impossibility. It would be a bluff, -such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately -arranged thus and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said -that Austria would be immaterial to him. - -“Fuehrer: Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for -this. - -“H: Yes. - -“F: Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a -quite different agreement with him. - -“H: Yes, I told him that, too. - -“F: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to -go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters. - -“H: Yes, my Fuehrer. - -“F: Listen, I shall make any agreement—I am no longer in fear of the -terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had -gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so -much, never, never shall I forget that. - -“H: Yes, my Fuehrer. - -“F: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need -any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to -him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him. - -“H: Yes, my Fuehrer.” (_2949-PS, Part N_) - -It will be recalled that Jodl referred in his diary (_1780-PS_) to the -letter which Hitler sent to Mussolini. In this letter, dated 11 March -1938, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler -wrote: “I have decided to reestablish order in my Fatherland, order and -tranquility, and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling -its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by its own decision.” He -stated that this was only an act of self-defense, that he had no hostile -intentions toward Italy. (_2510-PS_) - -After the invasion, when in Linz, Austria, Hitler communicated his -gratitude to Mussolini once more, this time by telegraph: “Mussolini, I -will never forget you for this.” (_2467-PS_) - -(6) _The Appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor._ Late in the -evening of March 11, President Miklas appointed Seyss-Inquart as -Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was -made at 11:15 p. m. (_2465-PS_) - -(7) _Later Communications with London—Misleading Explanations._ On -Sunday, 13 March 1938, the day after the invasion, Goering, who had been -left in charge of the Reich by Hitler, telephoned Ribbentrop in London. -Their conversation disclosed the way in which the Nazis soothed and -misled other nations: - - “G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the - administration of the current government procedures (_Fuehrung - der Regierungsgeschaft_). And therefore I wanted to inform you. - There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the - radio. - - “R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn’t it? - - “G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely - overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me - last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw - his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political - things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just - foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist - ministers and the representatives of the people - (_Volksreferenten_) have presented the ultimatum. Later on, more - and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated, - and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist - ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be - completely beaten up against and be subjected to terror and - civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to - provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by - Schuschnigg’s direct order, or with consent the Communists and - the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations, - which were photographed with “Heil Moskau” and so on; naturally; - all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you - have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling - them the Fatherland Front (_Vaterlandische Front_) would fight - to its last man; one could not know that they would capitulate - like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over - the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had - already marched up to the frontier since we could not know - whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual - facts which can be proved by documents. * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “G: No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke - already to these people. I want that you once more,—but no—not - at all once more,—but generally speaking—tell the following to - Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has - given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the - ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, Glaise-Horstenau and - Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an - ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the - others and as far as I know just a military-attache came along, - asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed - to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German - troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore, I want to - state that S-I asked us expressly by phone as by telegram to - send troops because he did not know about the situation in - Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been - distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherland - Front might react since they always had had such a big mouth. - - “R: Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is - everything settled yet? - - “G: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some - companies, in order to secure the airfield and they were - received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17 division - marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to - point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that - they got together and fraternized immediately with the German - troops, wherever they were stationed.” (_2949-PS, Part W_) - -In view of the previous conversations, these are interesting -explanations—that the ultimatum was made by Seyss-Inquart alone and not -by Goering; that Lt. Gen. Muff, the military attache, came along merely -to answer a technical question; and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly -by telephone and by telegram for troops. But perhaps this conversation -can best be understood in light of the actual physical scene of time and -place: - - “G: Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you. - - “R: I shall see you this afternoon. - - “G: The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here - on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air, - drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to make - the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I - can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful - over there. - - “R: That is marvelous.” (_2949-PS, Part W_) - -The British Foreign Office had protested the tactics employed by the -German Government. In a letter dated 12 March 1938 Ambassador Neville -Henderson, at the British Embassy, Berlin, wrote to Lord Halifax, -Foreign Minister, as follows: - - “My Lord, - - “With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th, I have - the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a - letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath in accordance with - the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on - the same evening. - - “The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron von - Neurath at the same time.” (_3045-PS_) - -The enclosure was the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to Von -Neurath and it reads as follows: - - “Dear Reich Minister, - - “My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was - delivered this afternoon at Vienna demanding _inter alia_, the - resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the - Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of - the members were to be National Socialists, and the re-admission - of the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping - order in Vienna. - - “I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to - the German Government that if this report is correct, H.M.G. in - the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms - against such use of coercion backed by force against an - independent State in order to create a situation incompatible - with its national independence. - - “As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been - informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest - reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.” - (_3045-PS_) - -Von Neurath wrote a letter of response dated 12 March 1938. He first -objected to the fact that the British Government was undertaking the -role of protector of Austria’s independence: - - “In the name of the German Government I must point out here that - the Royal British Government has no right to assume the role of - a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of - diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German - Government never left any doubt with the Royal British - Government that the formation of relations between Germany and - Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern - of the German people and that it did not affect third Powers.” - (_3287-PS_) - -Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von -Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events: - - “* * * Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced, on the - evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and arbitrary - resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an election within a - few days which, under the prevailing circumstances, and - especially according to the details provided for the execution - of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of - oppressing politically the predominant majority of the - population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this - procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of - Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s - internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the - then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for - an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore, a - crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of - March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and - in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich - used forceful pressure to bring about this development. - Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former - Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal - President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention; - according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed - candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the - proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of - Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the - matter is that the question of sending military or police forces - from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed - Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the - press, to the German Government, urgently asked for the dispatch - of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace - and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately - threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German - Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to - it. - - “This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the - attitude of the German Government, as asserted in your letter, - could lead to some unforeseeable reactions. A complete picture - of the political situation is given in the proclamation which, - at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the - German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take - place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise - its influence, contrary to the peaceful intentions and - legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping of - events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of - self-government of the German people.” (_3287-PS_) - -In light of the documents already adverted to, this version of events -given by von Neurath is palpably untrue. - -F. _The Invasion and Absorption of Austria._ - -(1) _The Invasion and Immediate Events: Control of Austria in Fact._ In -accordance with the directive of March 11 (_C-182_), the German Army -crossed the Austrian border at daybreak on 12 March 1938. Hitler issued -a proclamation to the German people announcing and purporting to justify -the invasion (_TC-47_). The British Government and the French Government -filed protests. - -The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly -secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz and -they both expressed their joy over events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in -his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. -(_2485-PS_) - -A telegram from the American Legation in Vienna to the Secretary of -State, on 12 March 1938, gave a picture of what was happening in Vienna: - - “Secretary of State, - - Washington. - - 70, March 12, noon. - - “Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets - ‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession National - Socialist Austria and its new government in true indivisible - union’. - - “Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and - impending arrival Austrian legion. - - “SS and SA in undisputed control in Vienna. - - “Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored - arrested. - - “Himmler and Hess here. - - WILEY” (_L-292_) - -(2) _Statutes of Consolidation: Control of Austria in Law._ The -law-making machine was put to work on the task of consolidation. First, -Miklas was caused to resign as President (_2466-PS_). Seyss-Inquart -became both Chancellor and President. He then signed a Federal -Constitutional Law of 13 March 1938, for the Reunion of Austria with the -German Reich, which in turn was incorporated into the Reich Statute of -Reunion passed the same day (_2307-PS_). This Federal Constitutional Law -declared Austria to be a province of the German Reich. - -By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 -of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides: - - “Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of - Austria within the frontier which may be fixed in a treaty - between that State and the principle Allied and Associated - Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, - * * *” - -Similarly, the Austrian invasion violated Article 88 of the Treaty of -St. Germain, which provides: - - “The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with - the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. - Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of - the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or - indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, - particularly, and until her admission to membership of the - League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another - Power.” - -This basic constitutional law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10 -April 1938, concerning the question of reunion. But this was a mere -formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union. It could not -undo Germany’s union with and control over Austria. To illustrate the -way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured, with Austria -occupied by troops, it is not necessary to do more than review some of -the statutes passed within the month. Hitler placed the Austrian Federal -Army under his command and required all members of the Army to take an -oath of allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander (_2936-PS_). -Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an -oath of office swearing obedience to Hitler, Fuehrer of the German Reich -and People; Jewish officials, as defined, were not permitted to take the -oath. (_2311-PS_) - -Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich laws, -including the law of 1933 against formation of new parties and the 1933 -law for the preservation of unity of party and state (2310-PS). Hitler, -Frick, and Goering ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be -the central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria with the -German Reich. (_1060-PS_) - -In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to ensure -acceptability of the German regime, Goebbels established a Reich -Propaganda Office in Vienna (_2935-PS_). The ballot, addressed to -soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German soldier”, asked the -voters whether they agreed with the “accomplishment” and “ratification” -on March 13, 1938, of the reuniting of Austria with Germany (_1659-PS_). -The groundwork was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for -German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13. -(_2307-PS_) - -(3) _The Importance of Austria in Further Aggressions._ Germany’s desire -to consummate the Anschluss with Austria, and its determination to -execute that aim in the way and at the time that it did (with threat of -military force, quickly, and despite political risks), was due to the -importance of Austria in its further plans of aggression. The conference -of the conspirators held on November 5, 1937, which laid plans for -aggressive war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest -of food, through expulsion of a million people, and an increase in -fighting strength in part through the improvement in frontier. -(_386-PS_) - -Austria yielded material resources. Moreover she provided ready cash, -taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government. One of the first -orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by Hitler, Frick, -Schwerin von Krosigk, and Schacht, for the transfer to the Reich of the -assets of the Austrian National Bank. (_2313-PS_) - -Austria yielded human resources. Three months after Anschluss, there was -enacted a decree requiring 21-year-old men to report for active military -service. (_1660-PS_) - -And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position -of the German Army. In a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the -General Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the -Gauleiters, Jodl reviewed the situation in 1938: - - “The Austrian ‘Anschluss’ in its turn, brought with it not only - the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect - both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially - improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the - territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way - right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and - an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), - Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own - strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was - bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigor - before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.” - (_L-172_) - -The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of -their second phase of their aggressions. Czechoslovakia was next. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST - AUSTRIA - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3│ │ 23-24, - │ (a, b); V. │ I │ 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │ - │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │ - │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ - │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │ - │(USA 25) │ III │ 295 - │ │ │ - *812-PS │Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, 22 │ │ - │August 1939 and report from Gauleiter │ │ - │Rainer to Reichskommissar Gauleiter │ │ - │Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on events in the │ │ - │NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March │ │ - │1938. (USA 61) │ III │ 586 - │ │ │ -**1060-PS │Order pursuant to law concerning Reunion│ │ - │of Austria with German Reich, 16 March │ │ - │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │249. (Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ III │ 717 - │ │ │ - *1544-PS │Von Papen’s notes, 26 February 1938, on │ │ - │his parting visit with Chancellor │ │ - │Schuschnigg. (USA 71) │ IV │ 103 - │ │ │ -**1659-PS │Second Order concerning Plebiscite and │ │ - │Election for the Greater German │ │ - │Reichstag of 24 March 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 303. │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ IV │ 170 - │ │ │ - 1660-PS │Decree for registration for active │ │ - │service in Austria in the year 1938 of │ │ - │16 June 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 631. │ IV │ 171 - │ │ │ - *1760-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28 │ │ - │August 1945. (USA 57) │ IV │ 305 - │ │ │ - *1775-PS │Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 │ │ - │February 1938. (USA 73) │ IV │ 357 - │ │ │ - *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ - │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │ │ - │72) │ IV │ 360 - │ │ │ - *2219-PS │Excerpt from letter from Seyss-Inquart │ │ - │to Goering, 14 July 1939. (USA 62) │ IV │ 854 - │ │ │ - *2246-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 │ │ - │September 1936, concerning Danube │ │ - │situation. (USA 67) │ IV │ 930 - │ │ │ - *2247-PS │Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 May │ │ - │1935, concerning intention of Austrian │ │ - │government to arm. (USA 64) │ IV │ 930 - │ │ │ - *2248-PS │Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27 July │ │ - │1935, concerning National Socialism in │ │ - │Austria. (USA 63) │ IV │ 932 - │ │ │ - *2307-PS │Law concerning reunion of Austria with │ │ - │German Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 237. (GB │ │ - │133) │ IV │ 997 - │ │ │ -**2310-PS │First Decree of Fuehrer and Reich │ │ - │Chancellor concerning Introduction of │ │ - │German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March │ │ - │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │247. (Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ IV │ 1004 - │ │ │ -**2311-PS │Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor │ │ - │concerning Administration of the Oath to│ │ - │Officials of Province of Austria, 15 │ │ - │March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part│ │ - │I, p. 245. (Referred to but not offered │ │ - │in evidence.) │ IV │ 1005 - │ │ │ -**2313-PS │Order for Transfer of Austrian National │ │ - │Bank to Reichsbank, 17 March 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 254. │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ IV │ 1006 - │ │ │ -**2367-PS │Hitler’s speech of 1 May 1936, published│ │ - │in Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern │ │ - │German edition, 2-3 May 1936. (Referred │ │ - │to but not offered in evidence.) │ IV │ 1101 - │ │ │ - *2385-PS │Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30 │ │ - │August 1945. (USA 68) │ V │ 23 - │ │ │ - *2461-PS │Official German communique of meeting of│ │ - │Hitler and Schuschnigg, 12 February │ │ - │1938, published in Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (GB │ │ - │132) │ V │ 206 - │ │ │ - *2463-PS │Telegram from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, │ │ - │11 March 1938, published in Documents of│ │ - │German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ - │(USA 703) │ V │ 207 - │ │ │ -**2464-PS │Official Austrian communique of the │ │ - │reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet │ │ - │and general political amnesty, 16 │ │ - │February 1938, published in Documents of│ │ - │German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ V │ 208 - │ │ │ -**2465-PS │Announcement of appointment of │ │ - │Seyss-Inquart as Federal Chancellor, 11 │ │ - │March 1938, published in Documents of │ │ - │German Politics, 1938, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ V │ 209 - │ │ │ -**2466-PS │Official communique of resignation of │ │ - │Austrian President Miklas, 13 March │ │ - │1938, published in Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ V │ 209 - │ │ │ - 2467-PS │Hitler’s telegram to Mussolini from │ │ - │Linz, 13 March 1938, published in │ │ - │Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol.│ │ - │VI, Part 1. │ V │ 210 - │ │ │ -**2469-PS │Official German and Austrian communique │ │ - │concerning equal rights of Austrian │ │ - │National Socialists in Austria, 18 │ │ - │February 1938, published in Documents of│ │ - │German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ V │ 210 - │ │ │ -**2484-PS │Official German communique of visit of │ │ - │Austrian Minister Seyss-Inquart to │ │ - │Hitler, Berlin, 17 February 1938, │ │ - │published in Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ V │ 234 - │ │ │ -**2485-PS │Address by Federal Chancellor │ │ - │Seyss-Inquart from Balcony of City Hall │ │ - │at Linz, 12 March 1938, published in │ │ - │Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI, │ │ - │Part 1, p. 144-145. (Referred to but not│ │ - │introduced in evidence.) │ V │ 234 - │ │ │ - 2510-PS │Hitler letter to Mussolini, 11 March │ │ - │1938, published in Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 135-7, │ │ - │No. 24. │ V │ 244 - │ │ │ -**2799-PS │Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26 July│ │ - │1934, published in Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Vol. II, p. 83, No. 38. │ │ - │(Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ V │ 441 - │ │ │ - 2831-PS │Letter from Office of Extraordinary and │ │ - │Plenipotentiary Ambassador of German │ │ - │Government to Reich Chancellery, │ │ - │inclosing report on Political situation │ │ - │in Austria, 14 January 1937. │ V │ 498 - │ │ │ - *2832-PS │Entry for July 26, 1934 from Ambassador │ │ - │Dodd’s diary. (USA 58) │ V │ 500 - │ │ │ - 2909-PS │Affidavit of August Eigruber, 9 November│ │ - │1945. │ V │ 578 - │ │ │ -**2935-PS │Order concerning establishment of Reich │ │ - │Propaganda Office in Vienna, 31 March │ │ - │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │350. (Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) │ V │ 604 - │ │ │ -**2936-PS │Instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │ - │Chancellor, concerning the Austrian │ │ - │Federal Army, 13 March 1938, published │ │ - │in Documents of German Politics, 1938, │ │ - │Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 150. (Referred to │ │ - │but not offered in evidence.) │ V │ 604 - │ │ │ - *2949-PS │Transcripts of telephone calls from Air │ │ - │Ministry, 11-14 March 1938. (USA 76) │ V │ 628 - │ │ │ - *2968-PS │Memorandum from U. S. Army officer │ │ - │concerning plaque erected in Austrian │ │ - │Chancellery in memoriam to killers of │ │ - │Dollfuss. (USA 60) │ V │ 677 - │ │ │ - 2985-PS │Telephone message of Mr. Hadow, British │ │ - │Legation, Vienna, to Sir John Simon, 26 │ │ - │July 1934. │ V │ 687 - │ │ │ -**2994-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │ - │former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│ │ - │Austrian-German Treaty of 11 July 1936. │ │ - │(USA 66) (Objection to admission in │ │ - │evidence upheld) │ V │ 703 - │ │ │ - 2995-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │ - │former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│ │ - │his visit to Berchtesgaden on 12 │ │ - │February 1938. │ V │ 709 - │ │ │ - 2996-PS │Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, │ │ - │former Chancellor of Austria, concerning│ │ - │events of 11 March 1938. │ V │ 713 - │ │ │ - *3045-PS │Letter, 12 March 1938, to British │ │ - │Embassy enclosing letter from Henderson │ │ - │to Halifax, 11 March 1938. (USA 127) │ V │ 765 - │ │ │ - *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ - 3062-PS │Memorandum found in Goering’s office, 19│ │ - │November 1936, concerning Guido Schmidt,│ │ - │Foreign Minister of Austria under │ │ - │Schuschnigg. │ V │ 868 - │ │ │ - *3254-PS │The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by │ │ - │Seyss-Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA │ │ - │704) │ V │ 961 - │ │ │ - *3270-PS │Goering’s speech on 27 March in Vienna, │ │ - │published in Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 183. (USA │ │ - │703) │ V │ 1047 - │ │ │ - *3271-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler, 19│ │ - │August 1939. (USA 700) │ V │ 1047 - │ │ │ - *3287-PS │Letter from von Neurath to Henderson, 12│ │ - │March 1938. (USA 128) │ V │ 1090 - │ │ │ - *3308-PS │Affidavit by Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt, │ │ - │28 November 1945. (GB 288) │ V │ 1100 - │ │ │ - 3390-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 25│ │ - │October 1937. │ VI │ 105 - │ │ │ - 3392-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 3 │ │ - │September 1937. │ VI │ 109 - │ │ │ - 3395-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 3 │ │ - │September 1937. │ VI │ 113 - │ │ │ - *3396-PS │Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Jury. │ │ - │(USA 889) │ VI │ 114 - │ │ │ - *3397-PS │Letter from Keppler to Seyss-Inquart, 8 │ │ - │January 1938. (USA 702) │ VI │ 115 - │ │ │ - 3400-PS │Minutes of meeting of German │ │ - │Association, 28 December 1918, and │ │ - │Constitution and By-Laws thereof found │ │ - │in personal files of Seyss-Inquart for │ │ - │period of 1918 to 1943. │ VI │ 118 - │ │ │ - *3425-PS │Voluntary statement made by │ │ - │Seyss-Inquart with advice of counsel, 10│ │ - │December 1945. (USA 701) │ VI │ 124 - │ │ │ - 3467-PS │Law on Limitation of travel to Republic │ │ - │Austria 29 May 1933. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 57, p. │ │ - │311. │ VI │ 169 - │ │ │ - *3471-PS │Letter from Keppler to Bodenschatz, 21 │ │ - │February 1938, with enclosures noting │ │ - │activity of Leopold as leader of │ │ - │Austrian Nazis and possible appointment │ │ - │of Klausner as his successor. (USA 583) │ VI │ 195 - │ │ │ - *3472-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 9 │ │ - │February 1938, requesting that Leopold │ │ - │be forbidden to negotiate with │ │ - │Schuschnigg except with approval of │ │ - │Reich authorities. (USA 582) │ VI │ 196 - │ │ │ - *3473-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 6 │ │ - │January 1938, giving details of Nazi │ │ - │intrigue in Austria. (USA 581) │ VI │ 197 - │ │ │ - 3574-PS │Filing notice regarding discussion │ │ - │between Chief of CI and Chief of Foreign│ │ - │CI on 31 January 1938, 2 February 1938, │ │ - │signed Canaris. │ VI │ 265 - │ │ │ - 3576-PS │Letter from Keppler to Goering, 19 │ │ - │February 1938, with enclosure reporting │ │ - │on situation in Austria as of 18 │ │ - │February. │ VI │ 271 - │ │ │ - 3577-PS │Letter presumably from Buerkel to │ │ - │Goering, dated Vienna, 26 March 1938, │ │ - │concerning Aryanization of Jewish-held │ │ - │business in Austria and disposition of │ │ - │resulting funds. │ VI │ 275 - │ │ │ - *C-102 │Document signed by Hitler relating to │ │ - │operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA │ │ - │74) │ VI │ 911 - │ │ │ - *C-103 │Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March 1938,│ │ - │on conduct towards Czech or Italian │ │ - │troops in Austria. (USA 75) │ VI │ 913 - │ │ │ - *C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │ - │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │ - │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │ - │69) │ VI │ 1006 - │ │ │ - *C-182 │Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander │ │ - │Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 March │ │ - │1938. (USA 77) │ VI │ 1017 - │ │ │ - *L-150 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │ - │Ambassador Bullitt and von Neurath, │ │ - │German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 18 │ │ - │May 1936. (USA 65) │ VII │ 890 - │ │ │ - *L-151 │Report from Ambassador Bullitt to State │ │ - │Department, 23 November 1937, regarding │ │ - │his visit to Warsaw. (USA 70) │ VII │ 894 - │ │ │ - *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │ - │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │ - │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │ - │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920 - │ │ │ - *L-273 │Report of American Consul General in │ │ - │Vienna to Secretary of State, 26 July │ │ - │1938, concerning anniversary of │ │ - │assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. │ │ - │(USA 59) │ VII │ 1094 - │ │ │ - L-281 │Text of Schuschnigg radio address of 11 │ │ - │March 1938, contained in telegram from │ │ - │American Legation in Vienna to the │ │ - │Secretary of State, 11 March 1938. │ VII │ 1096 - │ │ │ - L-291 │Telegram from American Embassy Berlin to│ │ - │Secretary of State, 11 March 1938, │ │ - │concerning Austrian situation. │ VII │ 1097 - │ │ │ - *L-292 │Telegram of American Consul General in │ │ - │Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March │ │ - │1938, concerning propaganda dropped over│ │ - │Vienna. (USA 78) │ VII │ 1098 - │ │ │ - L-293 │Telegram from American Legation in │ │ - │Vienna to Secretary of State, 12 March │ │ - │1938. │ VII │ 1098 - │ │ │ - *TC-22 │Agreement between Austria and German │ │ - │Government and Government of Federal │ │ - │State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB 20) │ VIII │ 369 - │ │ │ - *TC-26 │German assurance to Austria, 21 May │ │ - │1935, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ - │Part III, p. 94. (GB 19) │ VIII │ 376 - │ │ │ - TC-47 │Hitler’s Proclamation of Invasion of │ │ - │Austria, 12 March 1938. │ VIII │ 398 - │ │ │ - Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November │ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 643 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 11 │Aggressive Action 1938-39. (Enlargement │ │ - │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 780 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ - │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ - │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ - │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782 - - - 4. THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA - -A. _Development of the Nazi Program of Aggression._ - -In the period 1933-1936 the conspirators had initiated a program of -rearmament designed to give the Third Reich military strength and -political bargaining power to be used against other nations. -Furthermore, beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked on a -preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out, was to last -until March 1939. This program was intended to shorten Germany’s -frontiers, to increase its industrial and food-reserves, and to place it -in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis -could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of -aggression. At the moment, in the early spring of 1938, when the Nazi -conspirators first began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of -Czechoslovakia they had reached approximately the halfway point in this -preliminary program. - -The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 5 -November 1937, Hitler had set forth the program which Germany was to -follow. The events of this conference are contained in the so-called -Hossbach minutes. The question for Germany, as the Fuehrer had informed -his military commanders at this meeting, is where the greatest possible -conquest can be made at the lowest cost (_386-PS_). At the top of his -agenda stood two countries: Austria and Czechoslovakia. On 12 March 1938 -Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the following day it was -annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a redefinition of German -intentions toward Czechoslovakia. - -A little more than a month later Hitler and Keitel met to discuss plans -for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak State. On 21 April -1938, Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretexts which Germany might -develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and overwhelming attack. They -considered the provocation of a period of diplomatic squabbling which, -growing more serious, would lead to the excuse for war. In the -alternative, and this alternative they found to be preferable, they -planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result of an “incident” of -their own creation. Consideration was given to the assassination of the -German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. The -necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans in -Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of -transport and tactics were discussed with a view to overcoming all -Czechoslovak resistance within four days, thus presenting the world with -a fait accompli and forestalling outside intervention. (_388-PS, Item -2_) - -Thus in mid-April 1938 the designs of the Nazi conspirators to conquer -Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of practical planning. - -B. _The Background of Friendly Diplomatic Relations._ - -This conspiracy must be viewed against a background of amicable -German-Czech diplomatic relations. Although they had in the fall of 1937 -determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German -government were bound by a treaty of arbitration and by assurances -freely given to observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. By a formal -treaty signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925, Germany and Czechoslovakia -agreed, with certain exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to -the Permanent Court of International Justice, - - “* * * all disputes of every kind between Germany and - Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict - as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible - to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy. * * *” - (_TC-14_) - -The preamble of this treaty stated: - - “The President of the German Empire and the President of the - Czechoslovak Republic; equally resolved to maintain peace - between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful - settlement of differences which might arise between the two - countries; declaring that respect for the rights established by - treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for - international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights - of a State cannot be modified save with its consent; and - considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful - settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, - without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause - of division between States; have decided to embody in a treaty - their common intentions in this respect. * * *” (_TC-14_) - -Formal and categoric assurances of their good will toward Czechoslovakia -were forthcoming from the Nazi conspirators as late as March 1938. On 11 -and 12 March 1938, at the time of the annexation of Austria, Germany had -a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At -this time Goering assured M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in -Berlin, on behalf of the German Government that German-Czech relations -were not adversely affected by the developments in Austria and that -Germany had no hostile intentions toward Czechoslovakia. As a token of -his sincerity Goering accompanied his assurance with the statement: -“_Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort_” (“I give you my word of honor”) -(_TC-27_). At the same time von Neurath, who was handling German foreign -affairs during Ribbentrop’s stay in London, assured M. Mastny on behalf -of Hitler and the German government that Germany still considered -herself bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925 (_TC-27_). - -C. _Planning for Aggression._ - -Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators proceeded -with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever since the -preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German -policy was the elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In both -countries the Nazi conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist -by propaganda and by fifth column activities, while the actual military -preparations were being developed. The Austrian operation, which -received priority for political and strategic reasons, was carried out -in February and March 1938. Thenceforth _Wehrmacht_ planning was devoted -to Case Green (_Fall Gruen_), the designation given to the operation -against Czechoslovakia. - -The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline form as -early as June 1937. The OKW top secret “Directive for the Unified -Preparation of the Armed Forces for War”, signed by von Blomberg on 24 -June 1937 and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year -beginning 1 July 1937, included as a probable warlike eventuality, for -which a concentration plan was to be drafted, Case Green (“War on two -fronts with the main struggle in the southeast”) (_C-175_). The original -section of this directive dealing with the “probable war” against -Czechoslovakia—it was later revised—opens with this supposition: - - “The war in the east can begin with a surprise German operation - against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of - a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify - such an action politically and in the eyes of international law - must be created beforehand.” (_C-175_) - -After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such -action, the directive continues as follows: - - “2. The task of the German Armed Forces is to make their - preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break - into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest - force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as - rear cover for this attack. - - “The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed - Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning, and for - the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the - rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian - Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base - in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy - armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.” - (_C-175_) - -The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding -principles the following statement: - - “The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude - surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on - the part of the German Armed Forces * * * to make possible the - military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities - should they occur.” (_C-175_) - -It ordered further work on the plan for mobilization without public -announcement “in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able -to begin a war suddenly which will take the enemy by surprise both as -regards strength and time of attack.” (_C-175_). This directive is, of -course, a directive for staff planning. But the nature of the planning, -and the very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from it, -give it a significance that it would not have in another setting. - -Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during -the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-1938. On the political level -this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval -and support of Hitler in the conference with his military -commanders-in-chief on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_). In early March 1938, -before the march into Austria, Ribbentrop and Keitel were concerned over -the extent of the information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to -be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1938 Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, -enclosing for Keitel’s confidential cognizance the minutes of a -conference with Sztojay, the Hungarian ambassador to Germany, who had -suggested an interchange of views (_2786-PS_). An acknowledgment of the -receipt of this letter was signed by Keitel on 5 March. In his letter to -Keitel, Ribbentrop said: - - “I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should - discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, - the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed - about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me - briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect.” - (_2786-PS_) - -D. _Development of Specific Plans._ - -At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, specific plans for -the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time (_388-PS, -Item 2_). This meeting was followed in the late spring and summer of -1938 by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green. These -notes and communications were carefully filed at Hitler’s headquarters -by Major Schmundt, the Fuehrer’s military adjutant, and were captured by -American troops in a cellar at Obersalzberg, Hitler’s headquarters, near -Berchtesgaden. This file, preserved intact, is document (_388-PS_). - -The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any -narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an -unprovoked war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi leaders -displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovak -armament and defense. This interest is reflected in _Item 4_ of the -Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler in General Jodl’s office -of the OKW to Schmundt at Hitler’s headquarters; _Item 12_, Short survey -of Armament of the Czech Army, dated Berlin 9 June 1938 and initialed -“Z” for Zeitzler; and _Item 13_, Questions of the Fuehrer, dated Berlin, -9 June 1938 and classified “Most Secret”. The following are four of the -questions on which Hitler wanted authoritative information: - - “Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army? - - “Question 2: How many battalions, etc., are employed in the - West for the construction of emplacements? - - “Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still - occupied in unreduced strength? - - “Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?” (_388-PS, Item - 13_) - -These questions were answered in detail by the OKW and initialed by -Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl’s staff. - -As a precaution against French and British action during the attack on -Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the -preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier of -Germany. A telegram, presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to -Berlin, read in part as follows: - - “Inform Colonel General von Brauchitsch and General Keitel: * * - * The Fuehrer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of pressing - forward greatly the fortification work in the west.” (_388-PS, - Item 8_) - -In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between Hitler and -his political and military advisers resulted in the issuance of a series -of constantly revised directives for the attack. It was decided that -preparations for X-day, the day of the attack, should be completed no -later than 1 October. - -On the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference of his -principal military and political advisers in the winter garden of the -Reichs Chancellery in Berlin. This conference was the occasion on which -Hitler made known to the inner circle of the Nazi conspirators the -outlines of his plan to attack Czechoslovakia and issued the necessary -instructions. The meeting is described in an affidavit of Fritz -Wiedemann, who at that time was Hitler’s adjutant: - - “FRITZ WIEDEMANN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as - follows: - - “From the month of January 1935 to January 1939 I served as - adjutant to Hitler. In this time my duties were to handle - correspondence and complaints addressed to the Fuehrer’s office. - Occasionally I attended conferences held by the Fuehrer. - - “I recall that on the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a - conference in the winter garden of the Reichs Chancellery of all - the people who were important, from the Foreign Office, the - Army, and the Command Staffs. Those present at this conference, - as I recall, included Goering, Ribbentrop, von Neurath, General - Beck, Admiral Raeder, General Keitel, and General von - Brauchitsch. On this occasion Hitler made the following - statement: ‘It is my unshakable will that Czechoslovakia shall - be wiped off the map.’ Hitler then revealed the outlines of the - plan to attack Czechoslovakia. Hitler addressed himself to the - Generals, saying: ‘So, we will first tackle the situation in the - East. Then I will give you three to four years’ time, and then - we will settle the situation in the West.’ The situation in the - West was meant to be the war against England and France. - - “I was considerably shaken by these statements, and on leaving - the Reichs Chancellery I said to Herr von Neurath: ‘Well, what - do you say to these revelations?’ Neurath thought that the - situation was not so serious as it appeared and that nothing - would happen before the spring of 1939. - - “/s/ Fr. Wiedemann.” - (_3037-PS_) - -In the months after the occupation of the Sudetenland Hitler made no -secret of this meeting. In a speech before the Reichstag on 30 January -1939, Hitler spoke as follows: - - “On account of this intolerable provocation which had been - aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of - our Germans there, I had resolved to solve once and for all, and - this time radically, the Sudeten-German question. On May 28 I - ordered (1) that preparations should be made for military action - against this state by October 2. I ordered (2) the immense and - accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the West.” - (_2360-PS_) - -Hitler also referred to this conference in his meeting with President -Hacha on 15 March 1939. (_2798-PS_) - -Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler issued the -revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is _Item 11_ -in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_). Entitled “Two front war with main -effort in the Southeast,” this directive replaced the corresponding -section, Part 2, Section II, of the “Directive for Unified Preparation -for War” promulgated by von Blomberg on 24 June 1937 (_C-175_). This -directive represented a further development of the ideas for political -and military action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their conference -on 21 April. It is an expansion of a rough draft submitted by Keitel to -Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as _Item 5_ in the Schmundt file -(_388-PS_). It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were made. Three -copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Keitel to General von -Brauchitsch for the Army, to Raeder for the Navy, and to Goering for the -Luftwaffe. In his covering memorandum Keitel noted that its execution -must be assured “as from 1 October 1938 at the latest”. (_388-PS, Item -11_) - -This document, which is the basic directive under which the _Wehrmacht_ -carried out its planning for Case Green, reads as follows: - - “1. _Political Prerequisites._ - - “It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by - military action in the near future. It is the job of the - political leaders to await or bring about the politically and - militarily suitable moment. - - “An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia - or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly - favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may - cause me to take early action. - - “The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a - favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly - the preparations are to be made at once. - - “2. _Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the - Action._ - - “The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended - invasion: - - “_a._ suitable obvious cause and, with it - - “_b._ sufficient political justification, - - “_c._ action unexpected by the enemy, which will find - him prepared to the least possible degree. - - “From a military as well as a political standpoint the most - favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an - incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way - for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral - justification of military action. - - “But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, - must terminate in sudden action on our part—which must have the - elements of surprise as regards time and extent—before the - enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be - surpassed. - - “3. _Conclusions for the Preparation of “Fall Gruen”._ - - _a._ For the _Armed War_ it is essential that the surprise - element as the most important factor contributing to success be - made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures already in - peace-time and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. - Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four - days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to - intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military - situation and which at the same time will give nations with - territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene - immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention - by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, - especially if France—due to the obvious pro-German attitude of - Italy—fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war - by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give - military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are - to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the - land operations within the first few days, a European crisis - will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of - all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action. - - “_b._ The _Propaganda War_ must on the one hand intimidate - Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on - the other hand issue directions to national groups for support - in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of - thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the - date. - - “4. _Tasks of the Armed Forces._ - - “Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following - basis: - - “_a._ The mass of all forces must be employed against - Czechoslovakia. - - “_b._ For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as - rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the - East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, - the Southern frontiers to be watched. - - “_c._ The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed - must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision - and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in - the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them - with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and - timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be - rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time _at - the same time_ as the penetration by the Air Force before the - enemy can become aware of our mobilization. - - “For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be - worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for - approval. - - “5. _Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces._ - - “_a._ _Army_: The basic principle of the surprise attack against - Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time - required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail - nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is - first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns - as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack - by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition of - each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed with - troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to - the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of - readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into - the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and - in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a - breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the - success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten-German - frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian - army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the - sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has - the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of - preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, - of forcing a battle, of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of - occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust - into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest - possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first - successes of the assault columns and the effects of the Air - Force operations. The rear cover provided for the _West_ must be - limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the - present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this - will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held - back for the time being will be decided in my special order. - Preparations must however, be made to enable security - detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during - the strategic concentration ‘Gruen’. Independent of this, a - first security garrison must be improvised from the engineers at - present employed in constructing fortifications and from - formations of the Labor Corps. The _remaining frontiers_ as well - as East Prussia, are to be only weakly protected. But, always - depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a - part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into - the Reich must be taken into account. - - “_b._ _Air Force._ While leaving a minimum of defensive forces - in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a - surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be - flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first - section of the Army * * *.” (_388-PS, Item 11_) - -After detailed instructions for action by the Luftwaffe and by the Navy -the directive continues as follows: - - “In war economy it is essential that in the field of the - armament industry a maximum-deployment of forces is made - possible through increased supplies. In the course of - operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of - the total war-economic strength by rapidly reconnoitering and - restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of - Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations—insofar as - military operations permit.—can be of decisive importance to - us.” (_388-PS, Item 11_) - -In other words, the Nazi conspirators, four months before the date of -their planned attack, were already looking forward to the contribution -which the Czech industrial plant would make to the Nazi war economy. The -last paragraph of this directive reads as follows: - - “All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by - OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the - requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their - effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force. - - “(Signed) ADOLF HITLER - “Certified copy - “(Signed) Zeitzler - “Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.” - (_388-PS, Item 11_) - -Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new directive was -prepared and initialed by Keitel. It does not supersede the 30 May -directive. It reads, in part: - - “The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, - free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political - intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable - political opportunity to realize this aim.” - - * * * * * * - - “However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia - only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation - of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France - will not march and therefore England will not intervene.” - - * * * * * * - - “The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself - will be issued by me from time to time.” - - “K [Initialed by Keitel] - Z [Initialed by Zeitzler]” - (_388-PS, Item 14_) - -The second and third parts of this directive contain general directions -for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of -the possibility that, during the execution of Case Green, France or -England might declare war on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules -which follow this draft in the original have not been translated into -English. These schedules, which constitute _Item 15_ in the Schmundt -file (_388-PS_), give a timetable of specific measures for the -preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated -action. - -Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found in three -entries in General Jodl’s diary written in the spring of 1938 -(_1780-PS_). Although the first entry is not dated, it appears to have -been written several months after the annexation of Austria: - - “After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is - no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be - digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will - have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly - prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because - of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see - memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 - April. - - “The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as - yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop - concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat - and without the slightest cause for it. - - “Because of Germany’s self restraint, its consequences lead to a - loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take - once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for ‘green’ on 30 - May. - - * * * * * * - - “_23 May_: - - “Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further - conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the - Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High - Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War - Diary L).” - - * * * * * * - - “_30 May_: - - “The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final - decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates - military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions - of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an - immediate breakthrough into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day - (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. - Further details are derived from directive for strategic - concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once - more between the Fuehrer’s intuition that we must do it this - year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as - most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not - as yet equal to them.” (_1780-PS_) - -E. _Luftwaffe Participation in Early Planning for Case Green._ - -During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also engaged in -planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further -expansion of the Reich. A Top Secret Document, dated 2 June 1938, was -issued by Air Group Command 3 and entitled “Plan Study 1938: Instruction -for Deployment and Combat: Case Red.” (_R-150_). This is another staff -plan, this time for mobilization and employment of the Luftwaffe in the -event of war with France. It is given significance by the considerable -progress, at this date, in planning for the attack on Czechoslovakia. -Various possibilities under which war with France may occur are noted: -all of them are predicated on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict: - - “France will - - “_a_ either interfere in the struggle between the Reich and - Czechoslovakia in the course of ‘Case Green’, or - - “_b_ start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia. - - “_c_ It is possible but not likely that France will begin the - fight, while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.” - - * * * * * * - - “Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of - ‘Case Green’ or whether she makes the opening move of the war - simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the - German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army, - first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.” - (_R-150_) - -By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green was being -carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the direction of the -Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air Attache in Prague reconnoitered -the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia, south of Upper Silesia, for -suitable landing grounds. This action is disclosed by a report of the -Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938 -(_1536-PS_). This was a Top Secret document, for General Officers only, -of which only two copies were made. Attached as an enclosure was the -report of Major Moericke, the German air attache in Prague, dated 4 -August 1938. The first four paragraphs of the enclosure read: - - “I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to - reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf - for landing possibilities. - - “For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal - with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in - Prague. - - “I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me - to M, particularly about my official position. - - “I used my official car (_Dienst Pkw_) for the journey to - Freudenthal, taking precautions against being observed.” - (_1536-PS_) - -By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia compelled the -issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum entitled -“Extended Case Green,” which consisted of an estimate of possible action -by the Western Powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia (_375-PS_). -This Top Secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the Luftwaffe -General Staff is dated at Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the -assumption that Great Britain and France will declare war on Germany -during Case Green, this study contains an estimate of the strategy and -air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date -for Case Green. The first two sentences read as follows: - - “The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the - Case Green. It is presumed that France will only decide upon war - if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely - assured.” (_375-PS_) - -F. _Negotiations with Italy and Hungary about Case Green._ - -Knowledge of pending action against Czechoslovakia was not confined to a -close circle of high officials of the Reich. During the summer Germany’s -allies, Italy and Hungary, were apprised by one means or another of the -plans of the Nazi conspirators. A captured document from German Foreign -Office files contains a confidential memorandum of a conversation with -the Italian ambassador, Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938 (_2800-PS_). -At the bottom is a handwritten note, headed “For the Reichsminister -[Ribbentrop] only.” This note reads: - - “Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the - Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He - also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take - perhaps a two months’ holiday now which he could not do later - on. - - “Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments Attolico - mentioned that the Roumanian government had refused to grant - application for leave to its Berlin Minister.” (_2800-PS_) - -A month later Mussolini sent a message to Berlin, asking that he be told -the date on which Case Green would take place. The German response is -outlined in a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with -Ambassador Attolico, signed “R” (for Ribbentrop) and dated 23 August -1938: - - “On the voyage of the ‘Patria’ Ambassador Attolico explained to - me that he had instructions to request the notification of a - contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from - the German government. - - “In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against - Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in six - months or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him, that - the German government, in case of an increasing gravity of the - situation or as soon as the Fuehrer made his decision, would - notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible. - In any case, the Italian government will be the first one Who - will receive such a notification. - - “23 Aug 1938 - “R (initial).” - (_2791-PS_) - -Four days later Attolico again asked to be notified of the date of the -pending attack. The conversation is recorded in another German Foreign -Office Memorandum: - - “Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o’clock to - communicate the following: - - “He had received another written instruction from Mussolini - asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of - action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such - notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order ‘to be able - to take in due time the necessary measures on the French - frontier.’ - - “Berlin, 27 August 1938 - “R - - “N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former - demarche, that I could not impart any date to him, that, - however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be - informed of any decision. - - “Berlin, 2 September 1938.” - (_2792-PS_) - -Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was from the -first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. It will be -recalled that in early March 1938 Keitel and Ribbentrop had exchanged -letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi planning -(_2786-PS_). At that time the decision was in the negative. But by -mid-August 1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade -Hungary to join in the attack. - -From August 21st to 26th Admiral Horthy and some of his ministers -visited Germany. Admiral Horthy witnessed the launching of the _Prince -Eugen_ and conferred with Hitler. There were discussions of the -Czechoslovak question. A captured German Foreign Office document, signed -by von Weizsäcker, records the conversations between Hitler and -Ribbentrop and a Hungarian delegation consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and -Kanya aboard the S. S. _Patria_ on 23 August 1938 (_2796-PS_). In this -conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian attitude in the event -of a German attack on Czechoslovakia and suggested that such an attack -would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary. The Hungarians, with -the exception of Horthy, who wished to put the Hungarian intention to -participate on record, proved reluctant to commit themselves. Thereupon -Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop’s statement, and said: - - “Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in - the cooking as well.” (_2796-PS_) - -Von Weizsäcker’s memorandum reads as follows: - - “Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary’s attitude would be if the - Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech - provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two - kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured - if Hungary marches towards the North and perhaps the East. - Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and 1 - or 2 more years’ time for its development should be allowed. - - “Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the - Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the - pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone would therefore not - move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England - would not recklessly risk her Empire. She knew our newly - acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the - above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted - since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop - repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good - opportunity and participate. - - “The Hungarian reply thus, remained a conditional one. Upon, the - question of von Ribbentrop, what purpose the desired General - Staff conferences were to have, not much more was brought - forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of - military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The - clear political basis for such a conference—the time of - Hungarian intervention—was not obtained. - - “In the meantime, more positive language was used by von Horthy - in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts - with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put - Hungary’s intention to participate on record. The Hungarian - Ministers were and remained, even later, more skeptical since - they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary - with its unprotected flanks. - - “When von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the - afternoon, he was very relieved _when the Fuehrer explained to - him, that, in regard to the situation in question, he demanded - nothing of Hungary_. He himself would not know the time. Whoever - wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking - as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs, - he would have no objections.” (_2796-PS_) - -By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to note that in -the event of a German-Czech conflict Hungary would be sufficiently armed -for participation on 1 October. Another captured German Foreign Office -Memorandum reports a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 -August 1938. The last paragraph of this memorandum states: - - “Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness in case of a - German-Czech conflict von Kanya mentioned several days ago that - his country would need a period of one to two years in order to - develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary. During today’s - conversation von Kanya corrected this remark and said that - Hungary’s military situation was much better. His country would - be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in - the conflict by October 1st of this year.” (_2797-PS_) - -The signature to this document is not clear, but it appears to be that -of von Weizsäcker. - -These accounts of the German-Hungarian conference are corroborated by -General Jodl’s diary. The entry for 21-26 August reads as follows: - - “_21-26 August_: - - “Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (_Reichsverweser_). - Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign - Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz. - - “They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war, - after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old - state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the - understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims - against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second - provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If - they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them. - - “Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator - between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe - that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be - indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.” - (_1780-PS_) - -The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff -conference on 6 September. Jodl’s diary entry for that day states: - - “_6 September_: - - “Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a - conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer. - - “Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of - the Fuehrer—especially his order not to give any hint on the - exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.” - (_1780-PS_) - -G. _Final Preparations for the Attack._ - -The setting in which these events took place was that of the Munich Pact -and the international crisis which led to it. As this crisis was -developing in August and September 1938, frantic efforts were being made -by the statesmen of the world to preserve the peace of the world. These -statesmen, unfortunately, were unaware of the plans and designs of the -Nazi conspirators. - -The documents captured by Allied troops reveal the hitherto-unknown -story underlying the Pact of Munich. These papers reveal the fraud and -deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in negotiating the Pact of -Munich as a stepping-stone toward further aggression. The hope for peace -which came with the Munich Pact, which later turned out to be a snare -and a deceit, was a trap carefully set by the Nazi conspirators. The -nature of the trap is indicated by the events of the weeks just -preceding the Munich agreement. - -With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable -increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and -September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were -well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators were devoted to -technical details: the timing of X-day, questions of mobilization, -questions of transport and supply. - -On 26 August Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled “Timing of the X-Order -and the Question of Advance Measures” (_388-PS, Item 17_). This -memorandum demonstrates clearly the complicity of the OKW and of Keitel -and Jodl, in the fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It -reveals the character of the attack that Germany was preparing to -launch. The memorandum reads as follows: - - “_TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES_ - - “The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by - surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to - oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the - demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X - minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming - known to Czechoslovakia on that day. - - “The army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It - intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus - 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid - working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKW _also - demands_ that the X order be given _not later than 1400 on X - minus 1_. - - “To this the following must be said: - - “Operation (Aktion) Green will be set in motion by means of an - ‘incident’ in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation - for military intervention. The fixing of the _exact time_ for - this incident is of the utmost importance. - - “It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable - for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour - which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the - afternoon of X minus 1. - - “It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X - order at 1400 on X minus 1. - - “On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive - an advance warning. - - “If the _Fuehrer_ intends to follow this plan of action, all - further discussion is superfluous. - - “For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for - which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise - appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely - essential advance measures must be given in good time and - camouflaged with the help of the numerous maneuvers and - exercises. - - “Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether - all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy - territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure - from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident. - - “Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is - impossible before the first air-attack, although the - consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming - victims of such an attack (e.g., death of representatives of - friendly or confirmed neutral powers.) - - “If, for technical reasons, the _evening hours_ should be - considered desirable for the incident, then the following day - cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that. - - “In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be - done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and - that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the - incident. (X-Fall) - - “It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great - interest the _Wehrmacht_ has in the incident and that it must be - informed of the Fuehrer’s intentions in good time—insofar as - the _Abwehr_ Section is not also charged with the organization - of the incident. - - “I request that the Fuehrer’s decision be obtained on these - points. - - “J [Jodl] 26/8.” - (_388-PS, Item 17_) - -In handwriting at the bottom of the page are the notes of Schmundt, -Hitler’s adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to -Hitler on 30 August; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines; and -that Jodl was so notified on 31 August. - -On 3 September Keitel and von Brauchitsch met with Hitler at the -Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference (_388-PS, Item -18_). The first three paragraphs of these minutes state: - - “_Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch_: Reports on the exact time of the - transfer of the troops to ‘exercise areas’ for ‘_Gruen_’. Field - units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready - for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out - exercises in opposite directions. - - “_Fuehrer_: Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day - march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere. - - “?: OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 - September.” (_388-PS, Item 18_) - -During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views on the -strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech -defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility of “drawing -in the Henlein people.” The situation in the West still troubled him. -Schmundt noted: - - “The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the Western - fortifications; improvement of advance positions around Aachen - and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions - (1600 artillery pieces.)” (_388-PS, Item 18_) - -Five days later General Stulpnagel asked Jodl for written assurance that -the OKH would be informed five days in advance about the pending action. -In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the -coordination of ground and air operations at the start of the attack. -The 8 September entry in General Jodl’s diary states: - - “_8 September_: - - “General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army - High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan - is to take place. I agree and add that the overall - meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only - for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be - changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE). - - “General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders - whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. - It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere - decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to - his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It - must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is - reserved. - - “I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change - of opinion about political and military potentialities, - according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May - 38, with the last statements. - - “In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other - nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We - must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people - know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the - only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of - officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it - circulate through anterooms as heretofore. - - “1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High - Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present - were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself). - - “We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl), - (X-1, 4 o’clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, - X-1 day, 7 o’clock). The ‘Y time’ has yet to be examined; some - formations have an approach flight of one hour.” (_1780-PS_) - -Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler met with -Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt, -the construction engineer, later joined the conference, which lasted -from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt’s -minutes are _Item 19_ in his file (_388-PS_). In this meeting General -Halder reviewed the missions assigned to four of the German armies being -committed to the attack: the 2d, 10th, 12th, and 14th. With his -characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a -soliloquy on strategic considerations which should be taken into account -as the attack developed. The discussions proceeded as follows: - - “_General Oberst v. Brauchitsch_: Employment of motorized - divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria - and the difficulties in getting other divisions (ready to march) - into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have - to leave on the 20th of Sept, if X-Day remains as planned. - Workers leave on the 23d, by relays. Specialist workers remain - according to decision by Army Command 2. - - “_The Fuehrer_: Doesn’t see why workers have to return home as - early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on - mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around - unnecessarily later on. - - “_General Keitel_: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of - district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be - assembled. - - “_v. Brauchitsch_: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be - drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the - east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.” (_388-PS, Item - 19_) - -From this date forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with the -intricate planning required before the attack. On 11 September Jodl -conferred with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry about methods -of refuting German violations of International Law and exploiting those -of the Czechs. The 11 September entry in the Jodl diary reads as -follows: - - “_11 September_: - - “In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from - the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent - common tasks. - - “The joint preparations for refutation (_Wiederlegung_) of our - own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its - violations by the enemy, were considered particularly - important.” (_1780-PS_) - -This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L, -Jodl’s section of the OKW (_C-2_). Seven copies of this captured -document were prepared and distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the -OKM, the Luftwaffe, and the Foreign Office. In this study anticipated -violations of International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are -listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda -agencies. This document is presented in a tabular form, in which -possible incidents are listed in the left-hand column. In the second -column are given specific examples of the incidents; in the third and -fourth columns the position to be taken toward these incidents under -International Law and under the laws of warfare is set forth; the fifth -column, which is blank, is reserved for the explanation to be offered by -the Propaganda Minister. The first 10 hypothetical incidents, for which -justification must be found, and which are listed in column b of the -table are as follows: - - “1_a_. In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is - destroyed. - - “2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed; - - “3. The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague. - - “4. On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the - firing of gas projectiles is ordered. - - “5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in - the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges, - destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting - wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot. - - “6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to - do road work or to load munitions. - - “7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, - foodstuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the - latter suffer from want. - - “8. Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily - evacuated to the rear area. - - “9. Churches are used for military accommodation. - - “10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over - Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with - Czech aircraft.” (_C-2_) - -From Nurnberg, on 10 September, Hitler issued an order bringing the -_Reichsarbeitsdienst_, the German labor service, under the OKW. This top -secret order, of which 25 copies were made, provides as follows: - - “1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the - Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September. - - “2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this - organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader - (_Reichsarbeitsfuehrer_) and on assignments from time to time to - the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where - questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final - decision in accordance with my instructions. - - “3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to - the departments and personnel immediately concerned. - - “(signed) ADOLF HITLER.” - (_388-PS, Item 20_) - -Four days later, on 14 September, Keitel issued detailed instructions -for the employment of specific RAD units. This order is _Item 21_ in the -Schmundt file. A further order issued by Jodl on 16 September specified -RAD units which would receive military training. This is _Item 24_ in -the Schmundt file. (_388-PS_) - -Two entries in Jodl’s diary give further indications of the problems of -the OKW in this period of mid-September, just two weeks before the -anticipated X-day. The entries for 15 and 16 September read as follows: - - “_15 September_: - - “In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and - Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was - discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on - advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the - situation. - - “_16 September_: - - “General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He - graphically describes the results of the conference between - Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place - on the 21st or 22nd in Godesberg. - - “With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening - by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to - the Ministry of Finance, to line up the VGAD along the Czech - border. - - “In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the - empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the - strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be - transported starting 28 September.” (_1780-PS_) - -The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available which General -Jodl referred to appears as _Item 22_ in the Schmundt file. In this -order Keitel told the railroads to be ready by 28 September but to -continue work on the western fortifications even after 20 September in -the interest of camouflage. The first and fourth paragraphs of this -order provide: - - “The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great - numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization - exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.” - - * * * * * * - - “However, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s directive, every - effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as - large quantities as feasible even after 20 September 1938, and - this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue - the important work of the Lines.” (_388-PS, Item 22_) - -The penultimate stage of the aggression began on 18 September. From that -day until the 28th a series of orders were issued advancing preparations -for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt file -(_388-PS_). On the 18th the commitment schedule for the five -participating armies—the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th—was set forth -(_388-PS, Item 26_). Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five -divisions in the west to protect the German rear during Case Green -(_388-PS, Item 31_). Further discussions were held between the Army and -the Luftwaffe about the time of day for the attack. Conference notes -initialed by Jodl and dated 27 September reveal the difference in views. -These notes are _Item 54_ in the Schmundt file. The first three -paragraphs read: - - “_COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY._ - - “As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a - coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day. - - “The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615. It also - wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, - which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front. - - “Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions. These - could change the time of attack and also limit the area of - operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, - would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to - low ceiling in Bavaria.” (_388-PS, Item 54_) - -A satisfactory solution appears to have been arrived at. The last two -paragraphs read: - - “_Thus it is proposed_: - - “Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air - force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for - limited operations to take place before then, however, only to - an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front. - - “The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them. - - (J)” (_388-PS, Item 54_) - -On the same day, 27 September, Keitel sent a most secret memorandum to -Hess and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of Nazi Party -officials. This memorandum is _Item 32_ in the Schmundt file. It directs -the Party officials and organizations to comply with the demands of the -Army during the secret mobilization in such matters as turning over -equipment and facilities. The first four paragraphs of this message -read: - - “As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and - Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed - Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by - issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words. - - “Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is - necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to - the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are - connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order, - the advance measures or special code names. - - “The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be - met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) - immediately and without being referred to higher authorities. - - “OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate - instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the - Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.” (_388-PS, - Item 32_) - -Two additional entries from Jodl’s diary reveal the extent to which the -Nazi conspirators carried forward their preparations for attack even -during the period of the negotiations which culminated in the Munich -Agreement. The entries for 26 and 27 September read: - - “_26 September_: - - “Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army - High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the - advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet - necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in - before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech - frontier need be given on the 27th only. - - “In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, - Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry - for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with - possible Czech propaganda transmissions. “Question by Foreign - office whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross - Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: - yes. - - “1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs - General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations - and about the Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before - the 30th. - - “It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn - into military engagements because of false reports, before - Prague replied. - - “A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on - account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of - the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the - dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent - fogs. - - “The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander in chief - who is to have priority. - - “The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has - to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about - commitment against Prague. - - “2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in - an important speech at the Sportspalast. - - “_27 September_: - - “1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack - being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the - assembly area by 30 September.” (_1780-PS_) - -The order referred to by General Jodl in the last entry was also -recorded by the faithful Schmundt. It appears as _Item 33_ of the file. -It is the order which brought the Nazi armies to the jumping-off point -for unprovoked aggression: - - “MOST SECRET - “_MEMORANDUM_ - - “At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the - Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from - their exercise areas to their jumping-off points. - - “The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 - divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against ‘_Gruen_’ - on September 30, the decision having been made one day - previously by 1200 noon.” (_388-PS, Item 33_) - -There follows a pencil note by Schmundt: - - “This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major - Schmundt.” (_388-PS, Item 33_) - -H. _The Campaign Within Czechoslovakia._ - -The military preparations for aggression against Czechoslovakia had not -been carried out in vacuo. They had been preceded by a skillfully -conceived campaign designed to promote civil disobedience to the -Czechoslovak State. Using the techniques they had already developed in -other ventures, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money, -propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the -Nazis focussed their attention on the persons of German descent living -in the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on -the north, west, and south. - -The Czechoslovak government’s official report for the prosecution and -trial of German major war criminals, entitled “German Crimes Against -Czechoslovakia,” shows the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue. -(_998-PS_; _3061-PS_) - -Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the -NSDAP. In the years following the First World War a German National -Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close contact with -Hitler’s NSDAP, was active in the Sudetenland. In 1932, ring-leaders of -the _Sudeten Volksport_, an organization corresponding to the Nazi SA, -openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler’s program, the first of which -demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany. Soon thereafter -they were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign -power and were sentenced for conspiracy against the Czech Republic. Late -in 1933 the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia forestalled its -dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several of its chiefs escaped -across the frontier. For a year thereafter Nazi activity in -Czechoslovakia continued underground. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_) - -On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the Nazi -conspirators, Konrad Henlein, an instructor of gymnastics, established -the “German Home Front” (_Deutsche Heimatfront_), which the following -spring became the Sudeten German Party (_Sudeten-deutsche Partei—SDP_). -Profiting from the experience of the Czech National Socialist Party, -Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He rejected -pan-Germanism, and professed his respect for individual liberties and -his loyalty to “honest democracy” and to the Czech state. His party, -none-the-less, was built on the basis of the Nazi _Fuehrerprinzip_, and -he became its Fuehrer. By 1937, when the power of Hitler’s Germany had -become manifest, Henlein and his followers were striking a more -aggressive note, demanding, without definition, “complete Sudeten -autonomy“. The SDP laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which -would, in substance, have created a state within a state. (_998-PS_; -_3061-PS_) - -After the annexation of Austria in March 1938 the Henleinists, who were -now openly organized after the Nazi model, intensified their activity. -Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda started in the Henlein press; the -campaign against “bolshevism” was intensified; terrorism in the -Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm troop organization, -patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS, was established, -known as the FS (_Freiwilliger Selbstschutz_, or Voluntary Vigilantes). -On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary, -Henlein came into the open with his “Karlsbad Program”. In this speech, -which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted the right of -the Sudeten-Germans to profess “German political philosophy”, which, it -was clear, meant National Socialism. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_) - -As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every technique of -the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in the Czech official report, these -included: - -(1) _Espionage._ Military espionage was conducted by the SDP, the FS, -and by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech -defenses were mapped, and information on Czech troop movements was -furnished to the German authorities. - -(2) _Nazification of German Organizations in Czechoslovakia._ The -Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German -population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social and cultural -centers gradually underwent “_Gleichschaltung_”, i.e., “purification”, -by the SDP. Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were -sport societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and -choral societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in -penetrating as many business institutions as possible and in bringing -over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of -factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish -ownership or direction they attempted to secure the cooperation of the -clerical and technical staffs of the institution. - -(3) _German Direction and Leadership._ The Henleinists maintained -permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct -operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany at which -Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity were -camouflaged by being held in conjunction with _Saenger Feste_ (choral -festivals), gymnastic shows and assemblies, and commercial gatherings -such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed -incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of the Henleinists to -supply them. - -(4) _Propaganda._ Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at -Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press. -Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a “nest of Bolshevism” and spread the -false report of “Russian troops and airplanes” centered in Prague. Under -direction from the Reich the Henleinists maintained whispering -propaganda in the Sudetenland, which contributed to the mounting tension -and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled -from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein -press more or less openly espoused Nazi ideology to the German -population. - -(5) _Murder and Terrorism._ The Nazi conspirators provided the -Henleinists, and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to -provoke incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest. -Gendarmes, customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A -boycott was established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen. -The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population, and the Nazi -Gestapo crossed into border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens -across the border to Germany. In several cases political foes of the -Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor -Theodor Lessing in 1933 and the engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were -anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and -had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_) - -Some time afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and -deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the -mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. This statement was -made in a lecture by Konrad Henlein quoted on page 29 of “Four Fighting -Years”, a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. -In this lecture, delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941 in the Auditorium -of the University of Vienna under the auspices of the _Wiener -Verwaltungsakadamie_, he discussed the “fight for the liberation of the -Sudetens” in the following terms: - - “National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten-Germans. Our - struggle was of a different character from that in Germany. - Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of - course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution - in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for - Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle - could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National - Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer, - whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the - leader of the national group in its final struggle. When * * * - in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over - the political leadership of the Sudeten-Germans, I had a - difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party - continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in - the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten-Germans and - in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle - under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to - the outside world? For us Sudeten-Germans only the second - alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our - national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier - to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the - heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism - and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than - doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the - political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the - alliance against the German Reich.” (_2863-PS_) - -I. _Evidence Implicating Nazi Conspirators in Czechoslovak Agitation._ - -The foregoing account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia is the outline -of this conspiracy as it had been pieced together by the Czechoslovak -government early in the summer of 1945. Since then captured documents -and other information made available since the defeat of Germany have -clearly and conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto -could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the Sudetenland -agitation. - -A telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16 March 1938 to -the Foreign Office in Berlin, presumably written by the German Minister, -Eisenlohr, proves conclusively that the Henlein movement was an -instrument of the Nazi conspirators (_3060-PS_). The Henlein party, it -appears from this telegram, was directed from Berlin and from the German -Legation in Prague. It could have no policy of its own; even the -speeches of its leaders had to be coordinated with the German -authorities. This telegram reads as follows: - - “Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out - matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with - Frank separately and received following promises; - - “1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the - German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics - of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied - with implicitly. - - “2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly - with my approval. The editorial staff of “_Zeit_” (Time) is to - be improved. - - “3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which - in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a - line of gradual promotion of Sudeten-German interests. The - objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and - to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the - protection of nationalities (_Volksschutzgesetze_) and - ‘territorial autonomy’ are no longer to be stressed. - - “4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or - desired before Henlein issues important statements on his - program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the - Mission. - - “5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German - agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation. - - “6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will - come to Prague at any time if requested. - - “I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, - as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in - the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries - concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) - and request them to support this uniform direction of the - Sudeten German Party.” (_3060-PS_) - -The dressing-down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had the desired -effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein -addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking an early personal -conversation (_2789-PS_). This letter, dated 17 March 1938, and captured -in the German Foreign Office files, states: - - “Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs: - - “In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in - Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all - those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our - Fuehrer. - - “I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the - sincere thanks of the Sudeten-Germans herewith. - - “We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled - efforts in the service of the Greater German policy. - - “The new situation requires a reexamination of the Sudeten - German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the - opportunity for a very early personal talk. - - “In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have - postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled - for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks. - - “I would appreciate if the Minister, Dr. Eisenlohr, and one of - my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the - requested talks. - - “Heil Hitler, - “Loyally yours, - “/s/ Konrad Henlein.” - (_2789-PS_) - -This letter makes it clear that Henlein was quite aware that the seizure -of Austria made possible the adoption of a new policy toward -Czechoslovakia. It also reveals that he was already in close enough -contact with Ribbentrop and the German minister in Prague to feel free -to suggest “early personal” talks. - -Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein’s suggestion. The -conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in -Berlin on 29 March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred with -Hitler himself. The captured German Foreign Office notes of the -conference on 29 March read as follows: - - “The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to - keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret; - he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer - himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday - afternoon that there were two questions which were of - outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten - German Party * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten - German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally - this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extension and - gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be - emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German - Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the - Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet - (_Reichsregierung_). The Reich Cabinet itself must refuse to - appear toward the Government in Prague or toward London and - Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German - demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the - impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the - Sudeten-Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, - would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid - indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in - this connection were satisfactory. - - “Following these general explanations of the Reich Minister the - demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak - Government as contained in the enclosure were discussed and - approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein - was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the - Reichminister and the Head of the Central Office for Racial - Germans (_mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle_), as - well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local - representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German - Minister in Prague would be to support the demands of the - Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more - private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without exerting - any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party. - - “In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would be useful - if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other - minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The - Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the - discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if - the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear - appropriate. - - “Berlin, 29 March 1938. - “R [Initial]” - (_2788-PS_) - -Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is the list of -those who attended. Konrad Henlein, his principal deputy, Karl Hermann -Frank, and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor -Haushofer and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Lorenz represented the -_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_, the Central Office for Racial Germans. The -Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of eight. These eight -included Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and did most of the -talking, von Mackensen, Weiszacker, and Minister Eisenlohr from the -German Legation at Prague. (_2788-PS_) - -In May Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with the Nazi -conspirators. At this time the plans for Case Green, the attack on -Czechoslovakia, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that -Henlein was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months. -The entry for 22 May 1938 in General Jodl’s diary reads as follows: - - “22 May: Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. - Henlein” (see enclosure). (_1780-PS_) - -The enclosure, unfortunately, is missing. - -It will be recalled that in his speech in Vienna, Henlein had admitted -that he had been selected by the Nazi conspirators in the fall of 1933 -to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans -(_2863-PS_). The foregoing documents show conclusively the nature of -Henlein’s mission. They demonstrate that Henlein’s policy, his -propaganda, even his speeches were controlled by Berlin. Furthermore, -from the year 1935 the Sudeten German Party had been secretly subsidized -by the German Foreign Office. A secret memorandum, captured in the -German Foreign Office files, signed by Woermann and dated Berlin, 19 -August 1938, was occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party for -additional funds. This memorandum reads: - - “MEMORANDUM - - “The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign - Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of - a monthly payment of 15,000 Marks; 12,000 Marks of this are - transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000 - Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party - (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks - assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due - to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The - number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated - has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown - immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially - because due to the necessity for continuous good information, - the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including - the financing of travels of Sudeten-German deputies and agents) - have grown considerably heavier. Under these conditions the - Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly - allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do everything required. - Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied to this office for an - increase of this amount, from 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. - In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted - by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of - the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office, - this desire deserves the strongest support. - - “Herewith submitted to the Dep: Pers(onnel) with a request for - approval. It is requested to increase the payments with - retroactive effect from 1 August.^{*} - - “Berlin, 19 August 1938 - /s/ Woermann - - ^{*} “_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_ (Central Office for Racial - Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept. [handwritten - marginal note].” (_3059-PS_; _also 3061-PS_) - -As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved forward in -the late summer and early fall of 1938, the Nazi command made good use -of Henlein and his followers. About the first of August the Air Attache -at the German Legation in Prague, Major Moericke, acting on instructions -from Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten-German leader -in Freudenthal. With his assistance, and in the company of the local -leader of the FS (the Henlein equivalent of the SS), he reconnoitered -the surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German -use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform -of the Czech army—a fact which, the attache noted, served as excellent -camouflage. - -The Air Attache’s report reads in part as follows: - - “The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten-German Glider Pilots - in Freudenthal and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted - men. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No - hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the - impression that M. knew who I was. - - “At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. - travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.’s - private car for the trip. - - “As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently - well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech - reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on - leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was - entirely in agreement with this—without actually saying so. - - “As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I - photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said ‘Aha, so - you’re looking for airfields!’ I answered that we supposed that, - in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their - airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications and that - I had the intention of looking over the country from that point - of view.” (_1536-PS_) - -In the latter part of the Air Attache’s report reference is made to the -presence of reliable agents and informers (_V-Leute_) apparently drawn -from the ranks of the Henlein Party in this area. It was indicated that -these agents were in touch with the _Abwehrstelle_, the intelligence -office in Breslau. (_1536-PS_) - -In September, when the propaganda campaign was reaching its height, the -Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands for -autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On 19 September the -Foreign Office in Berlin sent the following telegram to the German -Legation in Prague: - - “Please inform deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get - into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start - their demands for autonomy tomorrow. - - “(signed) ALTENBURG” - (_2858-PS_) - -Kundt was Henlein’s representative in Prague. - -As the harassed Czech government sought to stem the disorder in the -Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threatening diplomatic -tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension between the two -countries. Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the -Legation in Prague, dispatched between the 16th and 24th of September -1938, are self-explanatory. The first telegram is dated 16 September: - - “Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were - arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of - Sudeten-Germans since the Fuehrer’s speech of 12 September. I - request you to ascertain the number of Sudeten-Germans arrested - since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of - those arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by the - Gestapo. Cable report. - - “Woermann.” - (_2855-PS_) - -The second telegram is dated 17 September. The first two paragraphs -read: - - “I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the - following: - - “The Reich Government has decided that: - - “(_a_) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent, - Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as - Sudeten-Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning - of the week. - - “(_b_) If any Sudeten-Germans should be executed pursuant to a - death sentence on the basis of martial law, an equal number of - Czechs will be shot in Germany.” (_2854-PS_) - -The third telegram was sent on 24 September: - - “According to information received here Czechs have arrested 2 - German frontier-policemen, seven customs-officials and 30 - railway-officials. As countermeasure all the Czech staff in - Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the - arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please - approach Government there and wire result. - - “(signed) WOERMANN” - (_2853-PS_) - -On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched. The last paragraph -read: - - “Confidential: - - “Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the prevention - of the execution of any sentences passed by military courts - against Sudeten-Germans is, of course, out of question. - - “WOERMANN” - (_2856-PS_) - -In the latter half of September Henlein devoted himself and his -followers wholeheartedly to preparation for the coming German attack. -About 15 September, after Hitler’s provocative Nurnberg speech in which -he accused “this Benes” of “torturing” and planning the “extermination” -of the Sudeten-Germans, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, one of his -principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the Czech -government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the powerful -_Reichssender_ radio station his determination to lead the -Sudeten-Germans “home to the Reich” and denounced “the Hussite Bolshevik -criminals of Prague”. From his headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, -outside Bayreuth, he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi -conspirators, including Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along -the border and began the organization of the Sudeten German Free Corps, -an auxiliary military organization. These events are set forth in the -Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_) - -Henlein’s activities were carried on with the advice and assistance of -the Nazi leaders. Lt. Col. Koechling was assigned to Henlein in an -advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten German Free Corps. In a -conference with Hitler on the night of 17 September Koechling received -far-reaching military powers. At this conference the purpose of the Free -Corps was frankly stated: the “maintenance of disorder and clashes”. -_Item 25_, of the Schmundt file (388-PS), a telegram labeled Most Secret -reads as follows: - - “Last night conference took place between Fuehrer and - Oberstleutnant Koechling. Duration of conference 7 minutes. Lt. - Col. Koechling remains directly responsible to OKW. He will be - assigned to Konrad Henlein in an advisory capacity. He received - far-reaching military plenary powers from the Fuehrer. The - Sudeten German Free Corps remains responsible to Konrad Henlein - alone. Purpose: Protection of the Sudeten-Germans and - maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The Free Corps will be - established in Germany. Armament only with Austrian weapons. - Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as possible.” - (_388-PS, Item 25_) - -General Jodl’s diary gives a further insight into the position of the -Henlein Free Corps. At this time the Free Corps was engaged in active -skirmishing along the Czech border, furnishing incidents and provocation -in the desired manner. Jodl’s entries for 19 and 20 September 1938 -state: - - “_19 September_: - - “Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the - Sudeten German Free Corps. - - “_20 September_: - - “England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, - the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the - Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring - about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to - the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the - Czech Army to the proximity of the border.) By checking with Lt. - Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal - channels. - - “Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives - permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the - approval of the Corps HQ.” (_1780-PS_) - -A report from Henlein’s staff, which was filed in Hitler’s headquarters, -boasted of the offensive operations of the Free Corps in the following -terms: - - “Since 19 Sept.—in more than 300 missions—the Free Corps has - executed its task with an amazing spirit of _attack_ and with a - willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified - self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: - more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s and a large amount of other - weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and - wounded suffered by the _enemy_.” (_388-PS, Item 30_) - -In this document the word “attack” was subsequently crossed out, and the -word “defense” substituted. Similarly “the enemy” was changed to read -“the Czech terrorists”. - -In his headquarters in the castle at Dondorf, Henlein was in close touch -with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence Division of the OKW and with -the SS and SA. The liaison officer between the SS and Henlein was -Oberfuehrer Gottlob Berger, who in later years became prominent in the -SS command. An affidavit executed by Berger reads as follows: - - “I, GOTTLOB BERGER, under oath and being previously sworn, make - the following statement: - - “1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of Oberfuehrer - in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS Liaison Officer - with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Free Corps at their - headquarters in the castle of Dondorf outside Bayreuth. In this - position I was responsible for all liaison between the - Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was - delegated to select from the Sudeten-Germans those who appeared - to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (_Verfuegungs - Truppe_). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with - Henlein included an Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name - I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from the - SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKW - _Abwehr_, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and - conferred with Henlein. - - “2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein’s - headquarters I became familiar with the composition and - activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed - under Henlein’s direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria; - one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area; and possibly - a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed - of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into - Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous - service in the SA and NSKK (Nazi Motor Corps) as well. These - Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free - Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. I do not know its actual - strength, but I believe it to be considerably smaller than the - paper figure. The Corps was armed with Manlicher-Schoenauer - rifles from Army depots in Austria. It was my understanding that - about 18,000 rifles were issued to men under Henlein’s command. - In addition, small numbers of machine guns[1], hand grenades, - and 2 captured antitank guns were placed at Henlein’s disposal. - Part of the equipment furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks, - cooking utensils, and blankets, were supplied by the SA. - - “3. In the days preceding the conclusion of the four-power pact - at Munich I heard of numerous occasions on which the Henlein - Free Corps was engaged in skirmishes with Czech patrols along - the border of the Sudetenland. These operations were under the - direction of Henlein, who went forward from his Headquarters - repeatedly in order to take direct command of his men. - - “The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me - voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this - statement I have signed and executed the same. - - “(Signed) Gottlob Berger” - (_3036-PS_) - ------ - -[1] “(Rifles and machine guns were of doubtful serviceability due to -inferior ammunition).” - -Henlein and his Free Corps were also acting in collaboration with the -SD, (_Sicherheitsdienst_) Himmler’s intelligence organization. An -affidavit executed by Alfred Helmut Naujocks, a member of the SD, reads -as follows: - - “I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and - state as follows: - - “1. In September 1938 I was working in Amt III of the SD. (The - department which was then called Amt III later became Amt VI). - In the course of my work I traveled between Berlin, Hof and - Munich. - - “2. While in Hof, which is on the Czech border, I paid repeated - visits to the SD Service Department, that is, Intelligence - Office, which has been established there. This Service - Department had the task of collecting all political intelligence - emanating from the Czechoslovak border districts and passing it - on to Berlin. Continuous day and night teleprinter - communications had been established from Hof direct to Amt III - of the SD in Berlin. To the best of my recollection the head of - the Hof office was Daufeldt. The head of Amt III in Berlin at - this time was Jost and his assistant was Filbert. - - “3. The bulk of the intelligence we collected came from Henlein - Free Corps, which had its headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, - outside Bayreuth; the distance between Hof and Bayreuth is not - very great, and we had daily access to all intelligence received - by the Free Corps. There was a continuous liaison maintained - with Czech territory by runners. Exploitation of this - Intelligence was carried out every day in Berlin and was placed - before Heydrich and Himmler. - - “4. I remember that the Free Corps made continuous complaints - that they had not received sufficient supply of arms. - Negotiations by letter and teleprint message went on for a - number of days with Berlin until it became quite a nuisance. - After that arms were supplied from the army, but I believe it - was only a small quantity. - - “5. Hof was the center for all intelligence collected by the SD - on the Czechoslovak question. The SD had agents all along the - border in every town. The names of these agents were reported to - Hof, and two motor cars toured the border every day to collect - the intelligence which had been unearthed. In addition, I - remember that two or three companies of the SS-Totenkopf units - were stationed in the neighborhood of Asch. - - “The facts stated above are true: this declaration is made by me - voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this - statement I have signed and executed the same at Nurnberg, - Germany this 20th day of November 1945. - - “(signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks.” - (_3029-PS_) - -Offensive operations along the Czechoslovak border were not confined to -skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two SS _Totenkopf_ battalions -were operating across the border in Czech territory near Asch. _Item 36_ -in the Schmundt file (_388-PS_), an OKW most secret order signed by Jodl -and dated 28 September, states: - - “Those SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch Promontory - (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C - Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when - the Army crosses the German-Czech frontier.” (_388-PS, Item 36_) - -According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl’s diary these SS -Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct orders from -Hitler. (_1780-PS_) - -As the time for X-day approached, the disposition of the Free Corps -became a matter of dispute. On 26 September Himmler issued an order to -the Chief of Staff of the Sudeten German Free Corps directing that the -Free Corps come under control of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the event of -German invasion of Czechoslovakia (_388-PS, Item 37_). On 28 September -Keitel directed that as soon as the German Army crosses the Czech border -the Free Corps will take orders from the OKH. In this most secret order -of the OKW Keitel discloses that Henlein’s men are already operating in -Czechoslovak territory: - - “For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the - principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct - from the Fuehrer and that they carry out their operations only - in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The - advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local - commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the - frontier. - - “Those units remaining forward of the frontier should—in their - own interests—get into communication with the frontier guard as - often as possible. - - “As soon as the army crosses the Czech border the Henlein Free - Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient - to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be - fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.” (_388-PS, Item - 34_) - -On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich settlement would -result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, Keitel ordered that -the Free Corps Henlein in its present composition be placed under -command of Himmler: - - “1. _Attachment of Henlein Free Corps_: - - “The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that - the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed - under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police. - - “It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit - for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of - the police forces for police duties in agreement with the - Reichsfuehrer SS.” (_388-PS, Item 38_) - -J. _Occupation of the Sudetenland under the Terms of the Munich -Agreement._ - -Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact -about to be launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact -with Germany and Italy at Munich on the night of 29 September 1938. This -treaty provided for the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to -Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. (_TC-23_) - -On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland. - -During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the _Wehrmacht_ had been fully -deployed for attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the -assault. With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On -30 September Keitel promulgated Directive #1 on “Occupation of territory -separated from Czechoslovakia” (_388-PS, Item 39_). This directive -contained a timetable for the occupation of sectors of former Czech -territory between 1 and 10 October and specified the tasks of the German -armed forces. The fourth and fifth paragraphs provided: - - “2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks: - - “The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be - maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order - for the rescinding of measures taken is held over. “The entry is - to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into - operation ‘_Gruen_’.” (_388-PS, Item 39_) - -It contained one further provision about the Henlein forces: - - “Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the - Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.” (_388-PS, Item - 39_) - -The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives -giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland and showing -the scope of the preparations of the OKW. Directives specifying the -occupational area of the army and the units under its command; arranging -for communications facilities, exchange facilities, supply, and -propaganda; and giving instructions to the civil departments of the -government were issued over Keitel’s signature on 30 September (_388-PS, -Items 40, 41, 42_). By 10 October von Brauchitsch was able to report to -Hitler that German troops had reached the demarcation line and that the -order for the occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW -requested Hitler’s permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops -from the occupied area and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the -Sudeten-German area as of 15 October. (_388-PS, Items 46, 47, 49_) - -On 18 October, in a formal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, -Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Hitler announced that the civil authorities -would take over responsibility for the Sudeten-German territory on 21 -October and that the OKH would be relieved of executive powers as of -that date (_388-PS, Item 51_). On the same date additional -demobilization of the forces in the Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler -and Keitel. Three days later the OKW requested Hitler’s consent to the -reversion of the RAD from the control of the armed forces. (_388-PS, -Items 52, 53_) - -As the German forces entered the Sudetenland Henlein’s _Sudetendeutsche -Partei_ was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to -Hitler’s protection in mid-September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, -were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the -_Sudetengau_. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still -free the _Sudetendeutsche Partei_ constituted itself as the -_National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der -Tschechoslovakei_ (NSDAP in Czechoslovakia) under the direction of -Kundt, another of Henlein’s deputies. These events are set forth in the -Czechoslovak official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_) - -The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators. - -K. _Planning for the Conquest of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia._ - -With the occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of the -German-speaking Czechs within the Greater Reich it might have been -expected that the Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in the -Nazi program of aggression the conspirators had used as a pretext for -their conquests the union of the _Volksdeutsche_, the people of German -descent, with the Reich. Now, after Munich, substantially all the -_Volksdeutsche_ in Czechoslovakia had been returned to German rule. On -26 September, at the Sportspalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke these words: - - “And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be - solved and which will be solved. It is the last territorial - claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from - which I will not swerve, and which I will satisfy, God willing.” - - * * * * * * - - “I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for - all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people - want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot - go back beyond the limits of our patience. - - “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this - problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for - Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the - moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to - say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other - minorities peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer - be interested in the Czech State. And that as far as I am - concerned I will guarantee. We don’t want any Czechs at all.” - (_2358-PS_) - -Yet no more than two weeks later Hitler and Keitel were preparing -estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak -resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. _Item 48_ of the Schmundt file is a -top secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11 -October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to -the OKW. These were the questions: - - “Question 1: What reinforcements are necessary in the present - situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia? - - “Question 2: How much time is required for the regrouping or - moving up of new forces? - - “Question 3: How much time will be required for the same purpose - if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return - measures? - - “Question 4: How much time would be required to achieve the - state of readiness of October 1st?” (_388-PS, Item 48_) - -Whereupon, in the same telegram, Keitel reported to Hitler the -considered answers of the OKH and the Luftwaffe. - -On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the -Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive -outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was -signed by Hitler and initialed by Keitel. In this Top Secret Order, of -which 10 copies were made, the Nazi conspirators, only three weeks after -the winning of the Sudetenland, were already looking forward to new -conquests: - - “The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for - the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down - by me in a later Directive. - - “Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be - prepared at all times for the following eventualities: - - “1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection - against surprise air attacks. - - “2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. - - “3. The occupation of the Memelland.” - - * * * * * * - - “It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of - Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards - Germany. - - “The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this - contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those - for ‘_Gruen_’; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and - considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned - mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The - organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the - units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so - arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will - be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The - object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the - cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that - at the same time ‘_Grenzsicherung West_’ (the measures of - frontier defense in the West) can be carried out. - - “The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows: - - “_a. Army_ - - “The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and - several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise - type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces - remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must - be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be - worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such - a manner that they may be either committed in securing the - frontiers or sent after the attack army. - - “_b. Air Force_ - - “The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an - early elimination of the Czech Air Force. - - “For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from - peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose - still stronger forces may be required can only be determined - from the development of the military situation in - Czechoslovakia. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the - remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be - prepared.” (_C-136_) - -This order was signed by Hitler and authenticated by Keitel. It was -distributed to the OKH, to Goering’s Luftwaffe, and to Raeder at Navy -headquarters. - -Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Keitel issued an appendix to the -original order stating that by command of the Fuehrer preparations for -the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue. Distribution of this -Top Secret order was the same as for the 21 October order. The order -provides: - - “2. _COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38._ - - “Reference ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia’ the - Fuehrer has given the following additional order: - - “The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the - assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be - expected. - - “To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is - merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking. - - “The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time - Armed Forces _only_, without reinforcements from mobilization. - The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that - the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by - adjustment within the units. - - “Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march must, as - a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior - to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up - systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for - previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will - be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any, - of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the - troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the - approval of the Fuehrer. - - “The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar - general directives. - - “For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the - Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly - occupied territory and only for a short period. - - “Chief of the Supreme Command - of the Armed Forces. - “KEITEL” - (_C-138_) - -This particular copy of the order, an original carbon signed in ink by -Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German naval headquarters. It -bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operational Division of the -Naval War Staff, of Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff, -and of Raeder. - -As the _Wehrmacht_ moved forward with plans for what it clearly -considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part. -In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the -Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in Berlin on 21 January -1939, Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech government a “quick reduction” in -the size of the Czech army. The captured German Foreign Office notes of -this discussion bear the following footnote, in Ribbentrop’s -handwriting: - - “I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in - the Czech army would be decisive in our judgment.” (_2795-PS_) - -L. _Extension of Fifth Column Activity_ - -As in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did -not intend to rely on the _Wehrmacht_ alone to accomplish their -calculated objective of “liquidating” Czechoslovakia. With the German -minority separated from Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the -cry, “home to the Reich.” One sizeable minority, the Slovaks, remained -within the Czechoslovak State. The Czechoslovak Government had made -every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the -cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with -an autonomous cabinet and parliament at Bratislava. Nonetheless, despite -these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators found -men ready to take their money and do their bidding. The following -picture of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak -official report. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_) - -Nazi propaganda and “research” groups had long been interested in -maintaining close connections with the Slovak autonomist opposition. -When Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of -Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence -established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups -within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with -Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more -profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic Peoples Party of -Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. Out of sympathy with the predominantly -anti-clerical government in Prague, some Catholic elements in Slovakia -proved willing to cooperate with the Nazis. In February and July 1938 -the leaders of the Henlein movement conferred with top men of Father -Hlinka’s party and agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance -in pressing their respective claims to autonomy. This understanding -proved useful in the September agitation when, at the proper moment, the -Foreign Office in Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to -tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy. (See _2858-PS_.) - -By this time, mid-summer 1938, the Nazis were in direct contact with -figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the -higher staff of Father Hlinka’s party. These agents undertook to render -impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the -Slovak parties in the government at Prague. Franz Karmasin, later to -become _Volksgruppenfuehrer_, had been appointed Nazi leader in Slovakia -and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak autonomy while on the -Nazi pay roll. On 22 November the Nazis indiscreetly wired Karmasin to -collect his money at the German Legation in person. The telegram, sent -from the German Legation at Prague to Bratislava (Pressburg), reads as -follows: - - “Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin that he - would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is - being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy. - - “HENCKE” (_2859-PS_) - -Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. A captured -memorandum of the German Foreign Office, dated Berlin, 29 November -1939—eight months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia—throws a -revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign Office: - - “_On the question of payments to KARMASIN_ - - “Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the VDA (Peoples’ League for - Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks - monthly. - - “Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans - (_Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle_) has deposited 300,000 Marks for - Karmasin with the German Mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on - which he could fall back in an emergency. - - “Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister - Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to - determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the - payments will continue. - - “Therefore it appears that Karmasin has been provided with - sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up - new demands himself. - - “Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister. - - “/s/ WOERMANN” (_2794-PS_) - -This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the -subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows -that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their -under-cover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds even -after the declaration of the so-called independent State of Slovakia. - -Some time in the winter of 1938-1939 Goering conferred with Durcansky -and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were -accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Goering of their desire for -what they called “independence,” with strong political, economic, and -military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be -solved as it had been in Germany and that the Communist Party would be -prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Goering considered that -the Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, although -his motives were scarcely altruistic. The undated minutes of this -conversation between Goering and Durcansky, captured among the files of -the German Foreign Office, are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic -style: - - “To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out - declaration. Contents: Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude, - that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the - SLOVAKS. The SLOVAKS _never_ want to belong to HUNGARY. The - SLOVAKS want _full independence_ with strongest political, - economic and military ties to Germany. BRATISLAVA to be capital. - The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police - are SLOVAK. - - “An independent SLOVAKIA to be proclaimed at the meeting of the - first SLOVAK Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority - would favour a separation from PRAGUE. Jews will vote for - Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the MARCH, where - a large SLOVAK population lives. - - “The _Jewish problem_ will be solved similarly to that in - Germany. The Communist party to be prohibited. - - “The _Germans_ in SLOVAKIA do not want to belong to Hungary but - wish to stay in SLOVAKIA. - - “The _German influence_ with the SLOVAK Government considerable; - the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has - been promised. - - “At present negotiations with HUNGARY are being conducted by the - SLOVAKS. The CZECHS are more yielding towards the Hungarians - than the SLOVAKS. - - “The Fieldmarshall considers; that the SLOVAK negotiations - towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. - Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy. - - “Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German - Air Force for use against the East.” (_2801-PS_) - -In mid-February 1939 a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It -consisted of Tuca, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in -contact, and Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators -in Slovakia. They conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the Reichs -Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. The captured German -Foreign Office minutes of that meeting read as follows: - - “After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this - meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with ‘My Fuehrer’ and he - voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, - might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech - courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement. - He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak - question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge - the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will - gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the - maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future - association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the - Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view.” - (_2790-PS_) - -It is noteworthy that Tuca addressed Hitler as “My Fuehrer”. During this -meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in planting the -idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. The final sentence of -this document, spoken by Tuca, is conclusive: - - “I entrust the fate of my people to your care.” (_2790-PS_) - -It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis -had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them -drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka’s party. Flattered by the personal -attention of such men as Hitler and Ribbentrop, and subsidized by German -representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools in the hands of the -Nazi conspirators. - -In addition to the Slovaks, the Nazi conspirators made use of the few -Germans still remaining within the mutilated Czech republic. Kundt, -Henlein’s deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority, -created as many artificial “focal points of German culture” as possible. -Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from -Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and -to make it a center of aggressive Naziism. With the assistance of German -civil servants, a deliberate campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech -public and private institutions was carried out, and the Henleinists -gave full cooperation with Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on -Czech soil. The Nazi “political activity” was designed to undermine and -to weaken Czech resistance to the commands from Germany. In the face of -continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and propaganda levels, -the Czech government was unable to take adequate measures against these -trespasses on its sovereignty. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_) - -In early March, with the date for the invasion of Czechoslovakia already -close at hand, fifth column activity moved into its final phase. In -Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in -touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork -for the events of 14 and 15 March. An article by SS-Gruppenfuehrer Karl -Hermann Frank, published in _Boehmen und Maehren_, the official -periodical of the Reichs Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, March 1941, -page 79, reveals with considerable frankness the functions which the FS -and SS served and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities -of these organizations: - - “The SS on March 15, 1939 - - “A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable - without political troops. To these are allotted the special task - of being the advance guard of the political will and the - guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German - folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state. - Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized - its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes (_Freiwilliger - Selbstschutz_), called ‘FS’ for short. This troop was trained - essentially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far - as these could be used in this region at that time. The troop - was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the - homeland, actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first - test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it - had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand. - - “After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS - were transferred essentially to the German student organizations - as compact troop formations in Prague and Brunn, aside from the - isolated German communities which remained in the second - republic. This was also natural because many active students - from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the FS. The student - organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other - Germans, during the crisis of March 1939 * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement - of the planned entry of German troops in various localities, - German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a - quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police - authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding - instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices, - men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to - burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It - was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent - foolish destruction * * *. How significant the many-sided and - comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German - agencies, follows from the fact that many of the men either on - March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the - SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the - Reichsfuehrer SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. - The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as - accomplished in the interest of the SS. - - “Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had - marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had - assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here - placed themselves at once at their further disposition and - became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators. * * *” - (_2826-PS_) - -The background of the German intrigue in Slovakia is outlined in two -British diplomatic despatches (_D-571_, _D-572_) and excerpts from -despatches sent by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin to the -French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939, and published in the -French Yellow Book. (_2943-PS_) - -In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day -the Czechoslovakian government dismissed those members of the Slovak -Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them -Prime Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon -this act of the Czech government as an excuse for intervention. On the -following day, 11 March, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the -Slovak capital. It is related in the report of the British Minister in -Prague to the British government: - - “Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came - at about 10 P. M. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, - into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the - Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of - Slovakia. When M. Sidor (the Prime Minister) showed hesitation, - Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr - Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia - definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her - independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest - himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this - information, but said that he must discuss the situation with - the Government at Prague.” (_D-571_) - -Events were now moving rapidly. Durcansky, one of the dismissed -ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities -of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and -ammunition were brought from German Offices in Engerau, across the -Danube, into Slovakia where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka -Guard to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis -as an excuse for military action. The situation at Engerau is described -in an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks: - - “I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and - state as follows— - - “1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of - 1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in Amt VI, Chief Sector - South East. Early in March, four or five days before Slovakia - declared its independence, Heydrich, who was chief of the SD, - ordered me to report to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal - Police. Nebe had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the - production of explosives which his department was manufacturing - for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives were - small tins weighing approximately 500 grams. - - “2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had been - finished, I carried them by automobile to a small village called - Engerau, just across the border from Pressburg in Slovakia. The - Security Police had a Service Department in this village for the - handling of SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this - office and found there a group of Slovaks, including Karmasin, - Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of these people then - present later became ministers in the new Slovak government. I - was informed that the explosives were to be turned over to the - Hlinka Guards across the border in Slovakia and were to be used - in incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for a - revolution. - - “3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then returned - to Berlin. - - “4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same Slovak - delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and Karmasin, which - I had seen in Engerau. They had flown to Berlin for a conference - with Goering. Heydrich asked me to look after them and to report - to him what developed during the conference with Goering. I - reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It dealt - principally with the organization of the new Slovak state. My - principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks - hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time. - - “The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me - voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the - statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG, - Germany this 20th day of November 1945. - - “(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks - “ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS” - (_3030-PS_) - -At this time the German press and radio launched a violent campaign -against the Czechoslovak government. And, significantly, an invitation -from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed prime -minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A -plane was awaiting him in Vienna. (_998-PS_; _3061-PS_; _2943-PS_) - -M. _Occupation of Czechoslovakia Under Threat of Military Force._ - -At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what -the Nazi leaders liked to call the “liquidation” of Czechoslovakia were -progressing with a gratifying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and -propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close -coordination. As during Case Green of the preceding summer, the Nazi -conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in the attack. It -appears from a letter Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, wrote to -Hitler on 13 March 1939, which was captured in the German Foreign Office -files, that Horthy was flattered by the invitation: - - “Your Excellency, - - “My sincere thanks. - - “I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water - Region—I dislike using big words—is of vital importance to the - life of Hungary. - - “In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been serving - for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm. - The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th - of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be - followed by the big blow on Saturday. - - “I shall never forget this proof of friendship and your - Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times. - - “Your devoted friend. - “(Signed) HORTHY” - - “Budapest. 13.3.1939.” (_2816-PS_) - -From this letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had -already informed the Hungarian government of their plans for military -action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned out, the timetable was -advanced somewhat. - -On the diplomatic level Ribbentrop was active. On 13 March, the same day -on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram -to the German minister in Prague, outlining the course of conduct he -should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure: - - “_Telegram in secret code_ - - “With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today. - - “In case you should get any written communication from President - HACHA, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take - any other action on them but pass them on here by cipher - telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the - Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech - government wants to communicate with you during the next few - days. - - “(Signed) RIBBENTROP”. (_2815-PS_) - -On the afternoon of 13 March, Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky -and by Karmasin, the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in response to -the summons from Hitler. Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler -in his study in the Reichs Chancellery and was presented with an -ultimatum. Two alternatives were given him: either to declare the -independence of Slovakia or to be left, without German assistance, to -the mercies of Poland and Hungary. This decision, Hitler said, was not a -question of days, but of hours. The captured German Foreign Office -minutes of this meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 March show that in -the inducements Hitler held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his -customary disregard for truth: - - “* * * Now he [Hitler] had permitted Minister Tiso to come here - in order to make this question clear in a very short time. - Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains. It - was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was - whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He - did not wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his - people or even a single soldier to something which was not in - any way desired by the Slovak people. He would like to secure - final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not - wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was - preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all. - He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, - but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication of - interior instability. He would not tolerate it, and he had for - that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his - decision. It was not a question of days, but of hours. He had - stated at that time that if Slovakia wished to make herself - independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee - it. He would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it - clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did - not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave - the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was - no longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for - German interests and those did not lie east of the Carpathians. - Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged - to Germany. - - “The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had any - remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for - his part the conception that in this case a decision was a - question of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message - he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on - the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it - to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide - clearly for herself.” (_2802-PS_) - -Those present at this meeting included Ribbentrop, Keitel, State -Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, and Minister of State -Meissner. - -While in Berlin, the Slovaks also conferred separately with Ribbentrop -and with other high Nazi officials. Ribbentrop solicitously handed Tiso -a copy, already drafted in Slovak, of the law proclaiming the -independence of Slovakia. On the night of 13 March a German plane was -placed at Tiso’s disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to -the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed -the independence of Slovakia. - -With Slovak extremists, acting at Nazi bidding, in open revolt against -the Czechoslovak government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to -move against Prague. On the evening of 14 March, at the suggestion of -the German Legation in Prague M. Hacha, the president of the -Czechoslovak republic, and M. Chvalkovsky, his foreign minister, arrived -in Berlin. The atmosphere in which they found themselves was hostile. -Since the preceding weekend the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of -using violence against the Slovaks and especially against members of the -German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio -proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger, that the situation -was intolerable and that it was necessary to smother as quickly as -possible the focus of trouble which Prague had become in the heart of -Europe. - -After midnight on the 15 March, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and -Chvalkovsky were ushered into the Reichs Chancellery. They found there -Hitler, von Ribbentrop, Goering, Keitel, and other high Nazi officials. -The captured German Foreign Office account of this meeting furnishes a -revealing picture of Nazi behaviour and tactics. It must be remembered -that this account of the conference of the night of March 14-15 comes -from German sources, and must be read as an account biased by its -source. - -Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory, even humble. He -thanked Hitler for receiving him and said he knew that the fate of -Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer’s hands. Hitler replied that he -regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin, -particularly because of the great age of the President. (Hacha was then -in his seventies.) But this journey, Hitler told the President, could be -of great advantage to his country, because “it was only a matter of -hours until Germany would intervene.” The conference proceeded as -follows, with Hitler speaking: - - “Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had - kept closer to Germany, it would have been an obligation to - Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation - now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the - Lower Carpathian Mts. Last autumn he had not wanted to draw the - final consequences because he had believed that it was possible - to live together. But even at that time, and also later in his - conversations with Chvalkovsky, he made it clear that he would - ruthlessly smash this state if Benes’ tendencies were not - completely revised. Chvalkovsky understood this and asked the - Fuehrer to have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view, - but the months went by without any change. The new regime did - not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He - observed this from the press, mouth to mouth propaganda, - dismissals of Germans and many other things, which, to him, were - a symbol of the whole situation. At first he had not understood - this but when it became clear to him he drew his conclusions - because, had the development continued in this way, the - relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become - the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not - immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army - was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes - sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State. - Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission, - such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples - which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. - This symptom convinced him that the army would be a severe - political burden in the future. Added to this were the - inevitable development of economic necessities and, further, the - protests from national groups which could no longer endure life - as it was. - - “Last Sunday, therefore, for me the die was cast. I summoned the - Hungarian envoy and notified him that I was withdrawing my - [restraining] hands from that country. We were now confronted - with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to - march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into - the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest - autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever - had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany’s attitude towards - Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after - tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian - people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German - troops. He no longer trusts the government. He believes in the - honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and Chvalkovsky but - doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the - entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, - and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was - ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the - deployment of heavy artillery. - - “At 6 o’clock in the morning the German army would invade - Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air force would - occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The - first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would - lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by - all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the - invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that - case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at - the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, - autonomy and a certain national liberty. - - “We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He - would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also - did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect - Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not - have yielded, the Czech people would have been exterminated. - Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will - that the Czech people should live a full national life and he - believed firmly that a way could be found which would make - far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would - break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in - counter-pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would - then not be possible any more for him to give the promised - alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any - more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would - result in a hatred which would force him because of his instinct - of self-preservation not to grant autonomy any more. The world - would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when - he read the foreign press. It gave him the impression expressed - in a German proverb: ‘The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may - go.’ - - “That was the state of affairs. There were two courses open to - Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and - wished in memory of the past that Czechoslovakia would be - conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which - corresponded with his proposals stated above. - - “That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This - invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the - Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the bloodshed would - also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps - prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a - form of construction which would be much more far-reaching for - Czechoslovakia than she could ever have hoped for in old - Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for - the German people. - - “The hours went past. At 6 o’clock the troops would march in. He - was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to - each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but - planned with all generosity. He would advise him now to retire - with Chvalkovsky in order to discuss what should be done.” - (_2798-PS_) - -In reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German minutes, -said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He expressed doubt -that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to the Czech Army in -the four hours left to him before the German Army crossed the Czech -border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to disarm the Czech -Army. If so, that might be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision -was final, that it was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. -He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding him, which -included Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, for their support. The only -possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the -intervention of the German Army. At this point Hacha and Chvalkovsky -retired from the room. (_2798-PS_) - -A dispatch from the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, published -in the British Blue Book, describes a conversation with Goering in which -the events of this early morning meeting are set forth (_2861-PS_). -Dispatch No. 77 in the French Yellow Book from M. Coulondre, the French -Ambassador, gives another well-informed version of this same midnight -meeting (_2943-PS_). The following account of the remainder of this -meeting is drawn from these two sources, as well as from the captured -German minutes (_2787-PS_). (Cf. also _3061-PS_.) - -When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reichs Chancellery, -he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed medical attention -from a physician who was on hand for that purpose. It appears that he -was given an injection to sustain him during the ordeal. When the two -Czechs returned to the room the Nazi conspirators again told them of the -power and invincibility of the _Wehrmacht_. They reminded him that in -three hours, at 6 in the morning, the German Army would cross the -border. Goering boasted of what the German _Wehrmacht_ would do if Czech -forces resisted the invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Goering -said, his Luftwaffe would blast half Prague into ruins in two hours. And -that, Goering said, would be only the beginning. Under this threat of -imminent and merciless attack by land and air, the President of -Czechoslovakia at 4:30 in the morning signed the document with which the -Nazi conspirators confronted him. This Declaration of 15 March 1939 -reads: - - “the President of the Czechoslovak State * * * entrusts with - entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech - country to the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich.” - (_TC-49_) - -While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the -representatives of the Czech government, the _Wehrmacht_ had in some -areas already crossed the Czech border. The Czech industrial centres of -Maehrisch-Ostrau and Witkowitz, close to the Silesian and Polish -borders, were occupied by German troops and SS units during the early -evening of 14 March. An article in the German military magazine, the -_Wehrmacht_, of 29 March 1939 describes the movement of German troops -during the occupation: - - “From Silesia, Saxony and Northern Bavaria and the Ostmark, - seven Army Corps moved on the morning of March 15 past the - former Czech border. On the evening of March 14 parts of the - VIII Army Corps and the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, under the - command of the Commanding General of the VIII Army Corps, had - already occupied the industrial centers of Witkowitz and - Maehrisch Ostrau. - - “The troops of Army Group 3 under the command of General of - Infantry Blaskowitz were to take Bohemia under their protection, - while the troops of Army Group 5 under General of Inf. List were - given the same mission for Moravia. - - “For this purpose parts of the Air Force (particularly - reconnaissance planes and antiaircraft artillery) as well as - parts of the _SS Verfuegungstruppen_ were placed at the disposal - of the two army groups. - - “On the evening of March 14, the march order was received by the - troops. On March 15 at 6 A. M. the columns moved past the border - and then moved on with utmost precision. * * *” (_3571-PS_) - -(Other descriptions of the military movements of 14 and 15 March are -contained in documents _2860-PS_, _3618-PS_, and _3619-PS_.) - -At dawn on 15 March German troops poured into Czechoslovakia from all -sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed Forces and a -proclamation to the German people, which stated succinctly, -“Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.” (_TC-50_) - -On the following day, in direct contravention of Article 81 of the -Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the -German Reich under the name of the “Protectorate of Bohemia and -Moravia.” This decree, signed in Prague on 16 March 1939 by Hitler, -Lammers, Frick, and Ribbentrop, commenced with this declaration: - - “The Bohemian-Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to - the living space of the German people.” (_TC-51_) - -The remainder of the decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to -which Czechoslovakia henceforth was to be subjugated to Germany. A -German Protector was to be appointed by the Fuehrer for the so-called -Protectorate. The German Government assumed charge of their foreign -affairs and of their customs and their excise. It was specified that -German garrisons and military establishments would be maintained in the -Protectorate. (_TC-51_) - -At the same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia, who at German -insistence had done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that the -independence of their week-old state was in fact qualified. A Treaty of -Protection between Slovakia and the Reich was signed in Vienna on 18 -March and by Ribbentrop in Berlin on 23 March (_1439-PS_). A secret -protocol to this treaty was also signed in Berlin on 23 March by -Ribbentrop for Germany, and by Tuka and Durcansky for Slovakia -(_2793-PS_). The first four articles of this treaty provide: - - “The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed, - after the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of - the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences - resulting from this fact. For this purpose the undersigned - representatives of the two governments have agreed on the - following provisions. - - “ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political - independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its - territory. - - “ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection - undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall - have the right, at all times, to construct military - installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they - deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side by the - frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a - line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the - White Carpathians and the Javornik Mountains. - - “The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to - assure that the land required for these installations shall be - conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore the Government - of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for - imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops - and the supply of military installations. - - “Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces - in the zone described in the first paragraph of this Article. - - “German citizens who, on the basis of private employment - contracts, are engaged in the construction of military - installations in the designated zone shall be subject to German - jurisdiction. - - “ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its - military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces. - - “ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection - agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times - conduct its foreign affairs in close agreement with the German - Government.” (_1439-PS_) - -The secret protocol provided for close economic and financial -collaboration between Germany and Slovakia. Mineral resources and -subsoil rights were placed at the disposal of the German government. -Article I, Paragraph 3, provided: - - “(3) Investigation, development and utilization of the Slovak - natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that - insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia’s own - requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany’s - disposal. The entire soil-research (_Bodenforschung_) will be - placed under the Reich agency for soil-research (_Reichsstelle - fuer Bodenforschung_). The government of the Slovak State will - soon start an investigation to determine whether the present - owners of concessions and privileges have fulfilled the - industrial obligations prescribed by law and it will cancel - concessions and privileges in cases where these duties have been - neglected.” (_2793-PS_) - -In their private conversations the Nazi conspirators gave abundant -evidence that they considered Slovakia a puppet State, in effect a -German possession. A memorandum of information given by Hitler to von -Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939 deals in the main with problems arising -from recently occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia. It states in -part: - - “Col. Gen. Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via Foreign - Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison armed - Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border formed - by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new Slovak - territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed. - - “Slovak shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to us - against payment any arms we want and which are still kept in - Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made - between Army and Czech troops. For this payment these millions - should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia. - - “_Czech Protectorate._ - - “H. Gr. [translator’s note: probably Army groups] shall be asked - again whether the request shall be repeated again for the - delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the - threat of severe penalties. - - “We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia _without_ - paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February - though shall be paid for. - - “Bohemia-Moravia have to make annual contributions to the German - treasury. Their amount shall be fixed on the basis of the - expenses earmarked formerly for the Czech Army.” (_R-100_) - -The German conquest of Czechoslovakia in direct contravention of the -Munich agreement was the occasion for formal protests from the British -(_TC-52_) and French (_TC-53_) governments, both dated 17 March 1939. On -the same day, 17 March 1939, the Acting Secretary of State of the United -States issued a statement which read in part as follows: - - “* * * This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the - principles of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain - from making known this country’s condemnation of the acts which - have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties - of a free and independent people with whom, from the day when - the Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the - people of the United States have maintained specially close and - friendly relations.” (_2862-PS_) - -N. _The Importance of Czechoslovakia in Future Aggressions._ - -With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had -accomplished the program they had set for themselves in the meeting in -Berlin on 5 November 1937 (_386-PS_). This program of conquest had been -intended to shorten Germany’s frontiers, to increase its industrial and -food reserves, and to place it in a position, both industrially and -strategically, from which the Nazis could launch more ambitious and more -devastating campaigns of aggression. In less than a year and a half this -program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi -leaders. - -Of all the Nazi conspirators perhaps Goering was the most aware of the -economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the possession -of Czechoslovakia. The Top Secret minutes of a conference with Goering -in the Air Ministry, held on 14 October 1938—just two weeks after the -occupation of the Sudetenland—reports a discussion of economic -problems. At this date Goering’s remarks were somewhat prophetic: - - “The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General - Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial - assimilation of the Slovakia. Czechia and Slovakia would become - German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The - Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore - have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary - Keppler.” (_1301-PS, Item 10_) - -In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia -into the Reich, Goering again revealed the great interest of the Nazi -leaders in the Czechoslovak economic potential. The minutes dated -Berlin, 27 July 1939, and signed Mueller, of a conference two days -earlier between Goering and a group of officials from the OKW and from -other agencies of the German government concerned with war production, -read as follows: - - “1. In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that - the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy - had taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war - potential by exploitation of the industry there. Letters, such - as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics—S 10 402/39 - of 10 July 39—as well as a letter with similar meaning to the - JUNKERS firm, which might possibly lower the kind and extent of - the armament measures in the Protectorate, are contrary to this - principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, this - should be done only with his consent. In any case, he insists, - in agreement with the directive by Hitler, that the war - potential of the Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in - part or in full and is to be directed towards mobilization as - soon as possible. * * *” (_R-133_) - -In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for war, the -conquest of Czechoslovakia provided the Nazis with new bases from which -to wage their next war of aggression, the attack on Poland. It will be -recalled that the minutes of the conference between Goering and a -pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-39 state Goering’s -conclusions as follows: - - “Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German - Air Force for use against the East.” (_2801-PS_) - -In a conference between Goering, Mussolini, and Ciano on 15 April 1939, -one month after the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Goering told his junior -partners in the Axis of the progress of German preparations for war. He -compared the strength of Germany with the strength of England and -France. He mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in these -words: - - “However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any - case, how dangerous this country could have been, even after - Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s - action the situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated, - among other reasons because of the economic possibilities which - result from the transfer to Germany of the great production - capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That - contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis - against the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not - keep ready a single division for protection against that country - in case of a bigger conflict. This, too, is an advantage by - which both axis countries will, in the last analysis, benefit.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be - viewed as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should - finally join the enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then - attack this country from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 - minutes flying distance from the new Polish industrial center - which had been moved further into the interior of the country, - nearer to the other Polish industrial districts, because of its - proximity to the border. Now by the turn of events it is located - again in the proximity of the border.” (_1874-PS_) - -The absorption of the Sudetenland, effected on 1 October 1938, in -practical effect destroyed Czechoslovakia as a military power. The final -conquest of Czechoslovakia came on 15 March 1939. This conquest had been -the intention and aim of the Nazi leaders during the preparations for -Case Green in the summer of 1938, and had been forestalled only by the -Munich agreement. With Czechoslovakia, less than six months after the -Munich agreement, securely in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had -achieved their objective. Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the -Reich, shortening German frontiers and adding the Czech manufacturing -plant to the German war potential. The puppet state of Slovakia, -conceived in Berlin and independent only in name, had been set up to the -east of Moravia. In this state, which outflanked Poland to the south, -the Nazi army, under the terms of the treaty drafted by Ribbentrop, took -upon itself the establishment of bases and extensive military -installations. From this state in September 1939 units of the German -Army did, in fact, carry out the attack on Poland. - -Logic and premeditation are patent in each step of the German -aggression. Each conquest of the Nazi conspirators was deliberately -planned as a stepping-stone to new and more ambitious aggression. The -words of Hitler in the conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 23 May -1939, when he was planning the Polish campaign, are significant, - - “The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good - use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in - harmony with our aims.” (_L-79_) - -It is appropriate to refer to two other speeches of the Nazi leaders. In -his lecture at Munich on 7 November 1943 Jodl spoke as follows: - - “The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of - 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded - off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now - became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of - more or less favourable strategic premises.” (_L-172_) - -In the speech to his military commanders on 23 November 1939, Hitler -described the process by which he had rebuilt the military power of the -Reich: - - “The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also - was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, - the western fortifications had to be finished. It was not - possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me - from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the - Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The - decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the - erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the - action against Poland was laid.” (_789-PS_) - - * * * * * - -LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE - PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3│ │ - │ (a, c); V. │ I │ 22, 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │ - │report of Intelligence Division, │ │ - │Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938.│ │ - │(USA 84) │ III │ 280 - │ │ │ - *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │ - │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │ - │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ - │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │ - │(USA 25) │ III │ 295 - │ │ │ - *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan │ │ - │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │ │ - │by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ - │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 - │ │ │ - *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │ - │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │ - │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 - │ │ │ - *998-PS │“German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia”. │ │ - │Excerpts from Czechoslovak Official │ │ - │Report for the prosecution and trial of │ │ - │the German Major War Criminals by the │ │ - │International Military Tribunal │ │ - │established according to Agreement of │ │ - │four Great Powers of 8 August 1945. (USA│ │ - │91) │ III │ 656 - │ │ │ - *1301-PS │File relating to financing of armament │ │ - │including minutes of conference with │ │ - │Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October │ │ - │1938, concerning acceleration of │ │ - │rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868 - │ │ │ - *1439-PS │Treaty of Protection between Slovakia │ │ - │and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 March│ │ - │and in Berlin 23 March 1939. 1939 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 606. (GB │ │ - │135) │ IV │ 18 - │ │ │ - *1536-PS │Report of Luftwaffe General Staff, │ │ - │Intelligence Division, 12 August 1938, │ │ - │on reconnaissance by German Air Attache │ │ - │at Prague for airfields in │ │ - │Czechoslovakia, enclosing report of the │ │ - │Air Attache, Major Moericke, 4 August │ │ - │1938. (USA 83) │ IV │ 96 - │ │ │ - *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ - │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │ │ - │72) │ IV │ 360 - │ │ │ - *1874-PS │Notes on conference between Goering, │ │ - │Mussolini and Ciano, 15 April 1939. (USA│ │ - │125) │ IV │ 518 - │ │ │ - 2358-PS │Speech by Hitler in Sportspalast, │ │ - │Berlin, 26 September 1938, from │ │ - │Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, │ │ - │27 September 1938. │ IV │ 1100 - │ │ │ - *2360-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30 │ │ - │January 1939, from Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January │ │ - │1939. (GB 134) │ IV │ 1101 - │ │ │ - *2786-PS │Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel, 4 │ │ - │March 1938. (USA 81) │ V │ 419 - │ │ │ - *2788-PS │Notes of conference in the Foreign │ │ - │Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad │ │ - │Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on │ │ - │program for Sudeten agitation, 29 March │ │ - │1938. (USA 95) │ V │ 422 - │ │ │ - *2789-PS │Letter from Konrad Henlein to │ │ - │Ribbentrop, 17 March 1938. (USA 94) │ V │ 424 - │ │ │ - *2790-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │ - │conference between Hitler, Ribbentrop, │ │ - │Tuca and Karmasin, 12 February 1939. │ │ - │(USA 110) │ V │ 425 - │ │ │ - *2791-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │ - │conversation between Ribbentrop and │ │ - │Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 23 │ │ - │August 1938. (USA 86) │ V │ 426 - │ │ │ - *2792-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of │ │ - │conversations between Ribbentrop and │ │ - │Attolico, 27 August 1938 and 2 September│ │ - │1938. (USA 87) │ V │ 426 - │ │ │ - *2793-PS │Confidential protocol concerning │ │ - │economic and financial collaboration │ │ - │between the German Reich and State of │ │ - │Slovakia. (USA 120) │ V │ 427 - │ │ │ - *2794-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum on │ │ - │payments to Karmasin, 29 November 1939. │ │ - │(USA 108) │ V │ 429 - │ │ │ - *2795-PS │Handwritten postscript by Ribbentrop to │ │ - │German Foreign Office notes of │ │ - │Ribbentrop-Chvalkovsky conversation, 21 │ │ - │January 1939. (USA 106) │ V │ 430 - │ │ │ - *2796-PS │German Foreign Office notes on │ │ - │conversations between Hitler, Ribbentrop│ │ - │and von Weizsäcker and the Hungarian │ │ - │Ministers Imredy and von Kanya, 23 │ │ - │August 1938. (USA 88) │ V │ 430 - │ │ │ - *2797-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum of │ │ - │conversation between Ribbentrop and von │ │ - │Kanya, 25 August 1938. (USA 89) │ V │ 432 - │ │ │ - *2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │ - │meeting between Hitler and President │ │ - │Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1939. │ │ - │(USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433 - │ │ │ -*2800-PS │German Foreign Office notes of a │ │ - │conversation with Attolico, the Italian │ │ - │Ambassador, 18 July 1938. (USA 85) │ V │ 442 - │ │ │ - *2801-PS │Minutes of conversation between Goering │ │ - │and Slovak Minister Durkansky (probably │ │ - │late fall or early winter 1938-39). (USA│ │ - │109) │ V │ 442 - │ │ │ - *2802-PS │German Foreign Office notes of │ │ - │conference on 13 March 1939 between │ │ - │Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime │ │ - │Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117) │ V │ 443 - │ │ │ - *2815-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German │ │ - │Minister in Prague, 13 March 1939. (USA │ │ - │116) │ V │ 451 - │ │ │ - *2816-PS │Letter from Horthy, the Hungarian │ │ - │Regent, to Hitler, dated Budapest, 13 │ │ - │March 1939. (USA 115) │ V │ 451 - │ │ │ - *2826-PS │The SS on March 15, 1939, an article by │ │ - │SS-Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank, in │ │ - │magazine Bohemia and Moravia, May 1941, │ │ - │p. 179. (USA 111) │ V │ 472 - │ │ │ -*2853-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ - │German Legation in Prague, 24 September │ │ - │1938. (USA 100) │ V │ 521 - │ │ │ - *2854-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ - │German Legation in Prague, 17 September │ │ - │1938. (USA 99) │ V │ 521 - │ │ │ - *2855-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ - │German Legation in Prague, 16 September │ │ - │1938. (USA 98) │ V │ 522 - │ │ │ - *2856-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ - │German Legation in Prague, 24 September │ │ - │1938. (USA 101) │ V │ 522 - │ │ │ - *2858-PS │Telegram from German Foreign Office to │ │ - │German Legation in Prague, 19 September │ │ - │1938. (USA 97) │ V │ 523 - │ │ │ - *2859-PS │Telegram from German Legation, Prague, │ │ - │to Consulate at Bratislava, 22 November │ │ - │1938. (USA 107) │ V │ 523 - │ │ │ - *2860-PS │Document No. 10 in the British Blue │ │ - │Book. Speech by Lord Halifax in the │ │ - │House of Lords, 20 March 1939. (USA 119)│ V │ 523 - │ │ │ - *2861-PS │Document No. 12 in the British Blue │ │ - │Book. Dispatch from Sir Nevile Henderson│ │ - │to British Foreign Office, 28 May 1939, │ │ - │relating details of conversation with │ │ - │Goering. (USA 119) │ V │ 524 - │ │ │ - *2862-PS │Document No. 126 in Peace and War. │ │ - │Statement by Acting Secretary of State │ │ - │Sumner Welles, 17 March 1939. (USA 122) │ V │ 525 - │ │ │ -**2863-PS │Lecture by Konrad Henlein, delivered in │ │ - │Vienna, 4 March 1941. Quoted in “Four │ │ - │Fighting Years”, Czechoslovak Ministry │ │ - │of Foreign Affairs, London, 1943, pp. │ │ - │29-30. (Referred to but not offered in │ │ - │evidence.) (USA 92) │ V │ 525 - │ │ │ - 2906-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of meeting│ │ - │between Hitler and Chvalkovsky, the │ │ - │Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, 21 │ │ - │January 1939. │ V │ 571 - │ │ │ - *2943-PS │Documents Numbers 55, 57, 62, 65, 66, │ │ - │73, 77 and 79 in the French Yellow Book.│ │ - │Excerpts from eight dispatches from M. │ │ - │Coulondre, the French Ambassador in │ │ - │Berlin, to the French Foreign Office, │ │ - │between 13 and 18 March 1939. (USA 114) │ V │ 608 - │ │ │ -**3029-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │ - │November 1945, on activities of the SD │ │ - │along the Czechoslovak border during │ │ - │September 1938. (USA 103) (Objection to │ │ - │admission in evidence upheld.) │ V │ 738 - │ │ │ - 3030-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │ - │November 1945, on relationship between │ │ - │the SD and pro-Nazi Slovak groups in │ │ - │March 1939. │ V │ 739 - │ │ │ -**3036-PS │Affidavit of Gottlob Berger on the │ │ - │composition and activity of the Henlein │ │ - │Free Corps in September 1938. (Objection│ │ - │to admission in evidence upheld.) (USA │ │ - │102) │ V │ 742 - │ │ │ - 3037-PS │Affidavit of Fritz Wiedemann, 21 │ │ - │November 1945, on the meeting between │ │ - │Hitler and his principal advisers in │ │ - │Reichs Chancellery on 28 May 1938. │ V │ 743 - │ │ │ - *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ - *3059-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum, 19 │ │ - │August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s │ │ - │Sudeten-German Party between 1935 and │ │ - │1938. (USA 96) │ V │ 855 - │ │ │ - *3060-PS │Dispatch from German Minister in Prague │ │ - │to Foreign Office in Berlin about policy│ │ - │arrangements with Henlein, 16 March │ │ - │1938. (USA 93) │ V │ 856 - │ │ │ - *3061-PS │Supplement No. 2 to the Official │ │ - │Czechoslovak Report entitled German │ │ - │Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” (document│ │ - │998-PS). (USA 126) │ V │ 857 - │ │ │ - 3571-PS │Report of U. S. Military Attache, │ │ - │Berlin, including an article in magazine│ │ - │Wehrmacht, 29 March 1939, describing │ │ - │occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by │ │ - │German troops. │ VI │ 264 - │ │ │ - 3618-PS │Report of U. S. Military Attache in │ │ - │Berlin, 20 March 1939, concerning │ │ - │occupation of Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 389 - │ │ │ - 3619-PS │Report of U. S. Military Attache in │ │ - │Berlin, 19 April 1939, concerning │ │ - │occupation of Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 398 - │ │ │ - 3638-PS │Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 October │ │ - │1938, concerning his conversation with │ │ - │Ciano about the Polish demands made on │ │ - │Czechoslovakia. │ VI │ 400 - │ │ │ - *3842-PS │Statement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March │ │ - │1946, concerning the activities of │ │ - │Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation for │ │ - │occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA 805) │ VI │ 778 - │ │ │ - *C-2 │Examples of violations of International │ │ - │Law and proposed counter-propaganda, │ │ - │issued by OKW, 1 October 1938. (USA 90) │ VI │ 799 - │ │ │ - *C-136 │OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 │ │ - │October 1938, signed by Hitler and │ │ - │initialled by Keitel. (USA 104) │ VI │ 947 - │ │ │ - *C-138 │Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed │ │ - │by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the │ │ - │OKW. (USA 105) │ VI │ 950 - │ │ │ - *C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │ - │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │ - │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │ - │69) │ VI │ 1006 - │ │ │ - *D-571 │Official report of British Minister in │ │ - │Prague to Viscount Halifax, 21 March │ │ - │1939. (USA 112) │ VII │ 88 - │ │ │ - *D-572 │Dispatch from Mr. Pares, British Consul │ │ - │in Bratislava to Mr. Newton, 20 March │ │ - │1939, describing German support of │ │ - │Slovak separatists. (USA 113) │ VII │ 90 - │ │ │ - *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ - │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ - │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 - │ │ │ - *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │ - │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │ - │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │ - │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920 - │ │ │ - *R-100 │Minutes of instructions given by Hitler │ │ - │to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March │ │ - │1939. (USA 121) │ VIII │ 83 - │ │ │ - *R-133 │Notes on conference with Goering in │ │ - │Westerland on 25 July 1939, signed │ │ - │Mueller, dated Berlin 27 July 1939. (USA│ │ - │124) │ VIII │ 202 - │ │ │ - *R-150 │Extracts from Luftwaffe Group Command │ │ - │Three Study on Instruction for │ │ - │Deployment and Combat “Case Red”, 2 June│ │ - │1938. (USA 82) │ VIII │ 268 - │ │ │ - *TC-14 │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and │ │ - │Czechoslovakia, signed at Locarno, 16 │ │ - │October 1925. (GB 14) │ VIII │ 325 - │ │ │ - *TC-23 │Agreement between Germany, the United │ │ - │Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 September │ │ - │1938. (GB 23) │ VIII │ 370 - │ │ │ - *TC-27 │German assurances to Czechoslovakia, 11 │ │ - │and 12 March 1938, as reported by M. │ │ - │Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister to │ │ - │London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21) │ VIII │ 377 - │ │ │ - *TC-49 │Agreement with Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │ - │1939, signed by Hitler, von Ribbentrop, │ │ - │Hacha and Chvalkovsky, from Documents of│ │ - │German Politics, Part VII, pp. 498-499. │ │ - │(GB 6) │ VIII │ 402 - │ │ │ - *TC-50 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the │ │ - │German people and Order of the Fuehrer │ │ - │to the Wehrmacht, 15 March 1939, from │ │ - │Documents of German Politics, Part VII, │ │ - │pp. 499-501. (GB 7) │ VIII │ 402 - │ │ │ - *TC-51 │Decree establishing the Protectorate of │ │ - │Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939. (GB │ │ - │8) │ VIII │ 404 - │ │ │ - *TC-52 │Formal British protest against the │ │ - │annexation of Czechoslovakia in │ │ - │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 │ │ - │March 1939. (GB 9) │ VIII │ 407 - │ │ │ - *TC-53 │Formal French protest against the │ │ - │annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in │ │ - │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 │ │ - │March 1939. (GB 10) │ VIII │ 407 - │ │ │ -Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November │ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 643 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 11 │Aggressive Action 1938-39. (Enlargement │ │ - │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 780 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ - │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ - │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ - │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782 - - - 5. OPENING ADDRESS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM - -_The following address, opening the British presentation of the case -under Count II of the Indictment, was delivered by Sir Hartley -Shawcross, K.C., M.P., British Attorney General and Chief Prosecutor for -the United Kingdom, before the Tribunal on 4 December 1945._ - - PART I - -On an occasion to which reference has already been made Hitler, the -Leader of the Nazi Conspirators who are now on trial before you, said in -reference to their warlike plans: - - “I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war, never - mind whether it be true or not. The victor shall not be asked - later on whether we tell the truth or not. In starting and - making a war not the right is what matters but victory—the - strongest has the right.” (_1014-PS_) - -The British Empire has twice been victorious in wars which have been -forced upon it within the space of one generation but it is precisely -because we realize that victory is not enough; that might is not -necessarily right; that lasting peace and the rule of International Law -is not to be achieved by the strong arm alone, that the British Nation -is taking part in this trial. There are those who would perhaps say that -these wretched men should have been dealt with summarily without trial -by “executive action”; that their personal power for evil broken, they -should be swept aside into oblivion without this elaborate and careful -investigation as to the part they played in plunging the world in war. -_Vae Victis._ Let them pay the penalty of defeat. But that is not the -view of the British Empire or of the British Government. Not so would -the Rule of Law be raised and strengthened on the international as well -as the municipal plane; not so would future generations realize that -right is not always on the side of the big battalions; not so would the -world be made aware that the waging of aggressive war is not only a -dangerous venture but a criminal one. Human memory is short. Apologists -for defeated nations are sometimes able to play upon the sympathy and -magnanimity of their victors so that the true facts, never -authoritatively recorded, become obscured and forgotten. One has only to -recall the circumstances following the last world war to see the dangers -to which, in the absence of any authoritative judicial pronouncement a -tolerant or a credulous people is exposed. With the passage of time the -former tend to discount, perhaps because of their very horror, the -stories of aggression and atrocity which may be handed down; the latter, -misled by fanatical and dishonest propagandists, come to believe that it -was not they but their opponents who were guilty of what they would -themselves condemn. And so we believe that this Tribunal, acting, as we -know it will act notwithstanding its appointment by the victorious -powers, with complete and judicial objectivity, will provide a -contemporary touchstone and an authoritative and impartial record to -which future historians may turn for truth and future politicians for -warning. From this record all generations shall know not only what our -generation suffered but also that our suffering was the result of crimes -against the laws of peoples which the peoples of the world enforced and -will continue in the future to uphold by international cooperation, not -based merely on military alliances but firmly grounded in the rule of -law. - -Nor, though this procedure and this Indictment of individuals may be -novel, is there anything new in the principles which by this prosecution -we seek to enforce. Ineffective though, alas, the sanctions proved -themselves to be, the Nations of the world had, as it will be my purpose -to show, sought to make aggressive war an international crime, and -although previous tradition has sought to punish States rather than -individuals, it is both logical and right that if the act of waging war -is itself an offense against International Law those individuals who -shared personal responsibility for bringing such wars about should -answer personally for the course into which they lead their states. -Again, individual war crimes have long been regarded by International -Law as triable by the Courts of those States whose nationals have been -outraged at least so long as a state of war persists. It would indeed be -illogical in the extreme if those who, although they may not with their -own hands have committed individual crimes, were responsible for -systematic breaches of the laws of war affecting the nationals of many -States should escape. So also in regard to crimes against humanity. The -right of humanitarian intervention on behalf of the rights of man -trampled upon by the State in a manner shocking the sense of mankind has -long been considered to form part of the law of Nations. Here, too, the -Charter merely develops a pre-existing principle. If murder, raping and -robbery are indictable under the ordinary municipal laws of our -countries shall those who differ only from the common criminal by the -extent and systematic nature of their offenses escape accusation? - -It is, as I shall show, the view of the British Government that in these -matters the Tribunal will apply to individuals not the law of the victor -but the accepted principles of international usage in a way which will, -if anything can, promote and fortify the rule of International Law and -safeguard the future peace and security of this war-stricken world. - -By agreement between the Chief Prosecutors it is my task on behalf of -the British Government and of the other States associated on this -Prosecution to present the case on Count 2 of the Indictment and to show -how these Defendants in conspiracy with each other and with persons not -now before this Tribunal planned and waged a war of aggression in breach -of the Treaty obligations by which, under International Law Germany, as -other States, had sought to make such wars impossible. - -That task falls into two parts. The first is to demonstrate the nature -and the basis of the Crime against Peace which, under the Charter of -this Tribunal, is constituted by waging wars of aggression and in -violation of Treaties. The second is to establish beyond doubt that such -wars were waged by these Defendants. - -As to the first, it would no doubt be sufficient to say this. It is not -incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove that wars of aggression and wars -in violation of International Treaties are, or ought to be, -International Crimes. The Charter of this Tribunal has prescribed that -they are crimes and that the Charter is the Statute and the law of this -Court. Yet, though that is the clear and mandatory law governing the -jurisdiction of this Tribunal, we feel that we should not be fully -discharging our task in the abiding interest alike of international -justice and morality unless we showed the position of that provision of -the Charter against the whole perspective of International Law. For just -as some old English Statutes were substantially declaratory of the -Common Law, so this Charter substantially declares and creates a -jurisdiction in respect of what was already the Laws of Nations. - -Nor is it unimportant to emphasize that aspect of the matter lest there -be some, now or hereafter, who might allow their judgment to be warped -by plausible catchwords or by an uninformed and distorted sense of -justice towards these Defendants. It is not difficult to be misled by -such phrases as that resort to war in the past has not been a crime; -that the power to resort to war is one of the prerogatives of the -sovereign State; that the Charter in constituting wars of aggression a -crime has imitated one of the most obnoxious doctrines of National -Socialist jurisprudence, namely _post factum_ legislation; that the -Charter is in this respect reminiscent of Bills of Attainder—and that -these proceedings are no more than a measure of vengeance, subtly -concealed in the garb of judicial proceedings which the Victor wreaks -upon the Vanquished. These things may sound plausible—yet they are not -true. It is, indeed, not necessary to doubt that some aspects of the -Charter bear upon them the imprint of significant and salutary novelty. -But it is our submission and conviction, which we affirm before this -Tribunal and the world that fundamentally the provision of the Charter -which constitutes such wars as these Defendants joined in waging and in -planning a crime is not in any way an innovation. That provision does no -more than constitute a competent jurisdiction for the punishment of what -not only the enlightened conscience of mankind but the Law of Nations -itself constituted an International Crime before this Tribunal was -established and this Charter became part of the public law of the world. - -So first let this be said. Whilst it may be true that there is no body -of international rules amounting to law in the Austinian sense of a rule -imposed by a sovereign upon a subject obliged to obey it under some -definite sanction, yet for fifty years or more the people of the world, -striving perhaps after that ideal of which the poet speaks: - - When the War Drums throb no longer - And the Battle Flags are furled, - In the Parliament of Man, - The Federation of the World - -have sought to create an operative system of rules based on the consent -of nations to stabilize international relations, to avoid war taking -place at all and to mitigate the results of such wars as took place. The -first such treaty was of course the Hague Convention of 1899 for the -Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. This was, indeed, of -little more than precatory effect and we attach no weight to it for the -purpose of this case, but it did establish agreement that in the event -of serious disputes arising between the signatory powers, they would so -far as possible submit to mediation. That Convention was followed in -1907 by another Convention reaffirming and slightly strengthening what -had previously been agreed. These early conventions fell indeed very far -short of outlawing war or of creating any binding obligation to -arbitrate. I shall certainly not ask you to say any crime was committed -by disregarding them. But at least they established that the contracting -powers accepted the general principle that if at all possible war should -be resorted to only if mediation failed. - -Although these Conventions are mentioned in the Indictment I do not rely -on them save to show the historical development of the law. It is -unnecessary, therefore, to argue about their effect, for their place has -been taken by more effective instruments. They were the first steps. - -There were, of course, other individual agreements between particular -States which sought to preserve the neutrality of individual countries -as, for instance, that of Belgium, but those agreements were, in the -absence of any real will to comply with them, entirely inadequate to -prevent the first World War in 1914. - -Shocked by the occurrence of that catastrophe the Nations of Europe, not -excluding Germany, and of other parts of the World came to the -conclusion that in the interests of all alike a permanent organization -of the Nations should be established to maintain the peace. And so the -Treaty of Versailles was prefaced by the Covenant of the League of -Nations. - -I say nothing at this moment of the general merits of the various -provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They have been criticized, some -of them perhaps justly, and they were made the subject of much warlike -propaganda in Germany. But it is unnecessary to enquire into the merits -of the matter, for however unjust one might for this purpose assume the -Treaty to be, it contained no kind of excuse for the waging of war to -secure an alteration in its terms. For not only was it a settlement by -agreement of all the difficult territorial questions which had been left -outstanding by the war itself but it established the League of Nations -which, if it had been loyally supported, could so well have resolved -those international differences which might otherwise have led, as they -did lead, to war. It set up in the Council of the League, in the -Assembly and in the Permanent Court of International Justice, a machine -not only for the peaceful settlement of international disputes but also -for the ventilation of all international questions by frank and open -discussion. At the time the hopes of the world stood high. Millions of -men in all countries—perhaps even in Germany—had laid down their lives -in what they believed and hoped to be a war to end war. Germany herself -entered the League and was given a permanent seat on the Council, on -which, as in the Assembly, German Governments which preceded that of the -Defendant Von Papen in 1932 played their full part. In the years from -1919 to 1932 despite some minor incidents in the heated atmosphere which -followed the end of the war, the peaceful operation of the League -continued. Nor was it only the operation of the League which gave good -ground for hope that at long last the rule of law would replace that of -anarchy in the international field. - -The Statesmen of the world deliberately set out to make wars of -aggression an international Crime. These are no new terms, invented by -the Victors to embody in this Charter. They have figured prominently in -numerous treaties, in governmental pronouncements and in declarations of -Statesmen in the period preceding the Second World War. In treaties -concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other -States—such as Persia (1 October 1927), France (2 May 1935), China (21 -August 1937)—the Contracting Parties undertook to refrain from any act -of aggression whatsoever against the other Party. In 1933 the Soviet -Union became a party to a large number of treaties containing a detailed -definition of aggression. The same definition appeared in the same year -in the authoritative Report of the Committee on Questions of Security -set up in connection with the Conference for the Reduction and the -Limitation of Armaments. But States went beyond commitments to refrain -from wars of aggression and to assist States victims of aggression. They -_condemned_ wars of aggression. Thus in the Anti-War Treaty of -Non-Aggression and Conciliation of 10 October 1933, a number of American -States—subsequently joined by practically all the States of the -American Continent and a number of European countries—the Contracting -Parties solemnly declared that “they condemned wars of aggression in -their mutual relations or in those of other States.” That Treaty was -fully incorporated into the Buenos Aires Convention of December 1936 -signed and ratified by a large number of American countries, including -the United States of America. Previously, in February 1928, the Sixth -Pan-American Conference adopted a Resolution declaring that as “war of -aggression constitutes a crime against the human species * * * all -aggression is illicit and as such is declared prohibited.” In September -1927 the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution -affirming the conviction that “a war of aggression can never serve as a -means of settling international disputes _and is, in consequence, an -international crime_” and declaring that “all wars of aggression are, -and shall always be, prohibited.” The first Article of the Draft Treaty -for Mutual Assistance of 1923 reads: “The High Contracting Parties, -affirming that aggressive war is an international crime, undertake the -solemn engagement not to make themselves guilty of this crime against -any other nation.” In the Preamble to the Geneva Protocol of 1924 it was -stated that “offensive warfare constitutes an infraction of solidarity -and an international crime.” These instruments remained unratified, for -various reasons, but they are not without significance or instruction. - -These repeated condemnations of wars of aggression testified to the fact -that, with the establishment of the League of Nations and with the legal -developments which followed it, the place of war in International Law -had undergone a profound change. War was ceasing to be the unrestricted -prerogative of sovereign States. The Covenant of the League did not -totally abolish the right of war. It left certain gaps which probably -were larger in theory than in practice. In effect it surrounded the -right of war by procedural and substantive checks and delays which, if -the Covenant had been observed, would have amounted to an elimination of -war not only between Members of the League, but also, by virtue of -certain provisions of the Covenant, in the relations of non-Members. -Thus the Covenant restored the position as it existed at the dawn of -International Law, at the time when Grotius was laying the foundations -of the modern law of nations and established the distinction, -accompanied by profound legal consequences in the sphere of neutrality, -between just and unjust wars. - -Neither was that development arrested with the adoption of the Covenant. -The right of war was further circumscribed by a series of -treaties—numbering nearly one thousand—of arbitration and conciliation -embracing practically all the nations of the world. The so-called -Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of -International Justice which conferred upon the Court compulsory -jurisdiction with regard to most comprehensive categories of disputes -and which constituted in effect the most important compulsory treaty of -arbitration in the post-war period, was widely signed and ratified. -Germany herself signed it in 1927; her signature was renewed and -renewed, for a period of five years, by the National-Socialist -Government in July 1933. (Significantly, that ratification was not -renewed on the expiration of its validity in March 1938.) Since 1928 a -considerable number of States signed and ratified the General Act for -the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which was designed to -fill the gaps left by the Optional Clause and the existing treaties of -arbitration and conciliation. - -All this vast network of instruments of pacific settlement testified to -the growing conviction that war was ceasing to be the normal and -legitimate means of settling international disputes. The express -condemnation of wars of aggression, which has already been mentioned, -supplied the same testimony. But there was more direct evidence pointing -in that direction. The Treaty of Locarno of 16th October 1925, to which -I will refer later and to which Germany was a party, was more than a -treaty of arbitration and conciliation in which the parties undertook -definite obligations with regard to the pacific settlement of disputes -that might arise between them. It was, subject to clearly specified -exceptions of self-defense in certain contingencies, a more general -undertaking in which the parties agreed that “they will in no case -attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other”. This -constituted a general renunciation of war and was so considered to be in -the eyes of jurists and of the public opinion of the world. For the -Locarno Treaty was not just one of the great number of arbitration -treaties concluded at that time. It was regarded as the cornerstone of -the European settlement and of the new legal order in Europe in partial, -voluntary and generous substitution for the just rigours of the Treaty -of Versailles. With it the term “outlawry of war” left the province of -mere pacifist propaganda. It became current in the writings on -international law and in official pronouncements of governments. No -jurist of authority and no statesman of responsibility would have -associated himself, subsequent to the Locarno Treaty, with the plausible -assertion that, at least as between the parties, war had remained an -unrestricted right of sovereign States. - -But although the effect of the Locarno Treaty was limited to the parties -to it, it had a wider influence in paving the way towards that most -fundamental and truly revolutionary enactment in modern international -law, namely, the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 27 August -1928, known also as the Pact of Paris, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or -the Kellogg Pact. That Treaty—a most deliberate and carefully prepared -piece of international legislation—was binding in 1939 upon more than -sixty nations, including Germany. It was—and has remained—the most -widely signed and ratified international instrument. It contained no -provision for its termination, and was conceived as the cornerstone of -any future international order worthy of that name. It is fully part of -international law as it stands today, and has in no way been modified or -replaced by the Charter of the United Nations. It is right, in this -solemn hour in the history of the world when the responsible leaders of -a State stand accused of a premeditated breach of this great Treaty -which was—and remains—a source of hope and faith for mankind, to set -out in detail its two operative Articles and its Preamble: - - “The Preamble - - “The President of the German Reich, * * * - - “Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of - mankind; - - “Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of - war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the - end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing - between their peoples may be perpetuated; - - “Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another - should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a - peaceful and orderly progress, and that any signatory Power - which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by - resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this - Treaty; - - “Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other - nations of the world will join in this humane endeavour and by - adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force - bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent - provisions, thus uniting civilized nations of the world in a - common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national - policy; - - * * * * * * - - “Article I - - “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of - their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for - the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as - an instrument of national policy in their relations with one - another. - - “Article II - - “The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or - solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of - whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall - never be sought except by pacific means.” - -In that General Treaty for the Renunciation of War practically the -entire civilized world abolished war as a legally permissible means of -enforcing the law and of changing it. The right of war was no longer of -the essence of sovereignty. Whatever the position may have been in 1914 -or in 1918 (and it is not necessary to discuss it) no International -lawyer of repute, no responsible Statesman, no soldier concerned with -the legal use of Armed Forces could doubt that with the Pact of Paris on -the Statute Book a war of aggression was contrary to positive -International Law. Nor have the repeated violations of the Pact of the -Axis Powers in any way affected its validity. Let this be firmly and -clearly stated. Those very breaches, except to the cynic and the -malevolent, have added to its strength; they provoked the sustained -wrath of people angered by the contemptuous disregard of the great -Statute and determined to vindicate its provisions. The Pact of Paris is -the Law of Nations. This Tribunal will enforce it. - -Let this also be said. The Pact of Paris was not a clumsy enactment -likely to become a signpost for the guilty. It did not enable Germany to -go to war against Poland and yet rely, as against Great Britain and -France, on any immunity from warlike action because of the provisions of -the Pact of Paris. For that Pact laid down expressly in its Preamble -that no State guilty of a violation of its provisions may invoke its -benefits. When on the outbreak of the Second World War Great Britain and -France communicated to the League of Nations the fact that a state of -war existed between them and Germany as from 3 September, 1939, they -declared that by committing an act of aggression against Poland Germany -had violated her obligations assumed not only towards Poland but also -towards other signatories of the Pact of Paris. A violation of the Pact -in relation to one signatory was an attack upon all the other -signatories and they were fully entitled to treat it as such. This point -is to be emphasized lest any of the defendants should seize upon the -letter of the Particulars of Count Two of the Indictment and maintain -that it was not Germany who initiated war with the United Kingdom and -France on 3 September 1939. The declaration of war came from the United -Kingdom and France; the act of war and its commencement came from -Germany in violation of the fundamental enactment to which she was a -party. - -The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, the great constitutional -instrument of an international society awakened to the deadly dangers of -another Armageddon, did not remain an isolated effort soon to be -forgotten in the turmoil of recurrent international crises. It became, -in conjunction with the Covenant of the League of Nations or -independently of it, the starting point for a new orientation of -governments in matters of peace, war and neutrality. It is of importance -to quote some of these statements and declarations. In 1929, His -Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom said, in connection with the -question of conferring upon the Permanent Court of International Justice -jurisdiction with regard to the exercise of belligerent rights in -relation to neutral States: - - “* * * But the whole situation * * * rests, and International - Law on the subject has been entirely built up, on the assumption - that there is nothing illegitimate in the use of war as an - instrument of national policy, and, as a necessary corollary, - that the position and rights of neutrals are entirely - independent of the circumstances of any war which may be in - progress. Before the acceptance of the Covenant, the basis of - the law of neutrality was that the rights and obligations of - neutrals were identical as regards both belligerents, and were - entirely independent of the rights and wrongs of the dispute - which had led to the war, or the respective position of the - belligerents at the bar of world opinion. - - “* * * Now it is precisely this assumption which is no longer - valid as regards states which are members of the League of - Nations and parties to the Peace Pact. The effect of those - instruments, taken together, is to deprive nations of the right - to employ war as an instrument of national policy, and to forbid - the states which have signed them to give aid or comfort to an - offender. As between such states, there has been in consequence - a fundamental change in the whole question of belligerent and - neutral rights. The whole policy of His Majesty’s present - Government (and, it would appear, of any alternative government) - is based upon a determination to comply with their obligations - under the Covenant of the League and the Peace Pact. This being - so, the situation which we have to envisage in the event of a - war in which we were engaged is not one in which the rights and - duties of belligerents and neutrals will depend upon the old - rules of war and neutrality, but one in which the position of - the members of the League will be determined by the Covenant and - the Pact. * * *” (Memorandum on the Signature of His Majesty’s - Government in the United Kingdom of the Optional Clause of the - Statute, Misc. No. 12 (1929), Cmd. 3452, p. 9). - -Chief of Counsel for the United States referred in his opening speech -before this Tribunal to the weighty pronouncement of Mr. Stimson, the -Secretary of State, in which, in 1932, he gave expression to the drastic -change brought about in International Law by the Pact of Paris. It is -convenient to quote the relevant passage in full: - - “War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the - Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal - throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be - the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the - principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights - of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter when two - nations engage in armed conflict either one or both of them must - be wrongdoers—violators of this general treaty law. We no - longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the - punctilios of the duelist’s code. Instead we denounce them as - law-breakers.” - -Nearly ten years later, when numerous independent States lay prostrate, -shattered or menaced in their very existence before the impact of the -war machine of the Nazi State, the Attorney-General of the United -States—subsequently a distinguished member of the highest tribunal of -that great country—gave weighty expression to the change which had been -effected in the law as the result of the General Treaty for the -Renunciation of War. He said on 27 March 1941: - - “* * * The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which Germany, Italy - and Japan covenanted with us, as well as with other nations, to - renounce war as an instrument of policy, made definite the - outlawry of war and of necessity altered the dependent concept - of neutral obligations. - - “* * * The Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Argentine - Anti-War Treaty deprived their signatories of the right of war - as an instrument of national policy or aggression and rendered - unlawful wars undertaken in violation of their provisions. In - consequence, these treaties destroyed the historical and - juridical foundations of the doctrine of neutrality conceived as - an attitude of absolute impartiality in relation to aggressive - wars. * * * - - “It follows that the state which has gone to war in violation of - its obligations acquires no right to equality of treatment from - other states, unless treaty obligations require different - handling of affairs. It derives no rights from its illegality. - - “* * * In flagrant cases of aggression where the facts speak so - unambiguously that world opinion takes what may be the - equivalent of judicial notice, we may not stymie International - Law and allow these great treaties to become dead letters. - Intelligent public opinion of the world which is not afraid to - be vocal and the action of the American States has made a - determination that the Axis Powers are the aggressors in the - wars today which is an appropriate basis in the present state of - international organization for our policy. * * *” - -There is thus no doubt that by the time the National-Socialist State had -embarked upon the preparation of the war of aggression against the -civilized world and by the time it had accomplished that design, -aggressive war had, in virtue of the Pact of Paris and of other -treaties, become illegal beyond all uncertainty and doubt. It is on that -Universal Treaty that Count 2 is principally based. - -The Prosecution has deemed it necessary—indeed imperative—to establish -beyond all possibility of doubt, at what may appear to be excessive -length, that only superficial learning or culpable sentimentality can -assert that there is any significant element of retroactive law in the -determination of the authors of the Charter to treat aggressive war as -conduct which International Law has prohibited and stigmatized as -criminal. We have traced the progressive limitation of the right of war, -the renunciation and condemnation of wars of aggression, and, above all, -the total prohibition and condemnation of all war conceived as an -instrument of national policy. What statesman or politician in charge of -the affairs of a nation could doubt, from 1928 onwards, that aggressive -war, that all war—except in self-defense, or for the collective -enforcement of the law, or against a State which has itself violated the -Pact of Paris—was unlawful and outlawed? What statesman or politician -embarking upon such war could reasonably and justifiably count upon an -immunity other than that by a successful outcome of the criminal -venture? What more decisive evidence of a prohibition laid down by -positive International Law could any lawyer desire than that which has -been adduced here? - -There are, it is true, some small town lawyers who deny the existence of -any International Law. Indeed, as I have said, the rules of the law of -Nations may not satisfy the Austinian test of being imposed by a -sovereign. But the legal regulation of International Relations rests -upon quite different juridical foundations. It depends upon consent, but -upon consent which cannot be withdrawn by unilateral action. In the -International field the source of law is not the command of a sovereign -but the treaty agreement binding upon every state which has adhered to -it. It is indeed true—and the recognition of its truth today by all the -great Powers of the World is vital to our future peace—that as M. -Litvinoff once said, and as Great Britain fully accepts, “Absolute -Sovereignty and entire liberty of action only belong to such states as -have not undertaken International obligations. Immediately a state -accepts International obligations it limits its sovereignty”. - -Yet it may be argued that although war had been outlawed and forbidden -it was not criminally outlawed and forbidden. International Law, it may -be said, does not attribute criminality to states, still less to -individuals. But can it really be said on behalf of these Defendants -that the offense of these aggressive wars, which plunged millions of -peoples to their deaths, which by dint of war crimes and crimes against -humanity brought about the torture and extermination of countless -thousands of innocent civilians; which devastated cities; which -destroyed the amenities—nay the most rudimentary necessities of -civilization in many countries, which has brought the world to the brink -of ruin from which it will take generations to recover—will it -seriously be said that such a war is only an offense, only an -illegality, only a matter of condemnation and not a crime justiciable by -any Tribunal? No Law worthy of the name can permit itself to be reduced -to an absurdity. Certainly the Great Powers responsible for this Charter -have refused to allow it. They drew the inescapable consequences from -the renunciation, prohibition, and condemnation of war which had become -part of the law of Nations. They refused to reduce justice to impotence -by subscribing to the outworn doctrines that the sovereign state can -commit no crime and that no crime can be committed by individuals on its -behalf. Their refusal so to stultify themselves has decisively shaped -the law of this Tribunal. - -If this be an innovation, it is innovation long overdue—a desirable and -beneficent innovation fully consistent with justice, with common sense -and with the abiding purposes of the law of Nations. But is it indeed so -clear an innovation? Or is it no more than the logical development of -the law? There was indeed a time when International lawyers used to -maintain that the liability of a State was, because of its sovereignty, -limited to contractual responsibility. International tribunals have not -accepted that view. They have repeatedly affirmed that a State can -commit a tort; that it may be guilty of trespass, of a nuisance, of -negligence. They have gone further. They have held that a State may be -bound to pay what are in effect penal damages for failing to provide -proper conditions of security to aliens residing within their territory. -In a recent case decided in 1935 between the United States and Canada an -arbitral commission, with the concurrence of its American member, -decided that the United States were bound to pay what amounted to penal -damages for an affront to Canadian sovereignty. On a wider plane the -Covenant of the League of Nations, in providing for sanctions, -recognized the principle of enforcement of the law against collective -units—such enforcement to be, if necessary, of a penal character. There -is thus nothing startlingly new in the adoption of the principle that -the State as such is responsible for its criminal acts. In fact, save -for the reliance on the unconvincing argument of sovereignty, there is -in law no reason why a State should not be answerable for crimes -committed on its behalf. In a case decided nearly one hundred years ago -Dr. Lushington, a great English Admiralty judge, refused to admit that a -State cannot be a pirate. History, very recent history, does not warrant -the view that a State cannot be a criminal. On the contrary, the -immeasurable potentialities for evil inherent in the State in this age -of science and organization would seem to demand imperatively means of -repression of criminal conduct even more drastic and more effective than -in the case of individuals. In so far therefore as the Charter has put -on record the principle of the criminal responsibility of the State it -must be applauded as a wise and far-seeing measure of international -legislation. - -Admittedly, the conscience shrinks from the rigours of collective -punishment, which fall upon the guilty and the innocent alike—although, -it may be noted, most of those innocent victims would not have hesitated -to reap the fruits of the criminal act if it had been successful. -Humanity and justice will find means of mitigating any injustice of -collective punishment. Above all, much hardship can be obviated by -making the punishment fall upon the individuals directly responsible for -the criminal conduct of the State. It is here that the Powers who framed -the Charter took a step which justice, sound legal sense and an -enlightened appreciation of the good of mankind must acclaim without -cavil or reserve. The Charter lays down expressly that there shall be -individual responsibility for the crimes, including the crime against -the peace, committed on behalf of the State. The State is not an -abstract entity. Its rights and duties are the rights and duties of men. -Its actions are the actions of men. It is a salutory principle of the -law that politicians who embark upon a war of aggression should not be -able to seek immunity behind the intangible personality of the State. It -is a salutory legal rule that persons who, in violation of the law, -plunge their own and other countries into an aggressive war, do so with -a halter round their necks. - -To say that those who aid and abet, who counsel and procure a crime are -themselves criminals is a commonplace in our own municipal -jurisprudence. Nor is the principle of individual international -responsibility for offenses against the law of nations altogether new. -It has been applied not only to pirates. The entire law relating to war -crimes—as distinguished from the crime of war—is based on that -principle. The future of International Law and, indeed, of the world, -depends on its application in a much wider sphere—in particular in that -of safeguarding the peace of the world. There must be acknowledged not -only, as in the Charter of the United Nations, fundamental human rights, -but also, as in the Charter of this Tribunal, fundamental human duties. -Of these none is more vital or more fundamental than the duty not to vex -the peace of nations in violation of the clearest legal prohibitions and -undertakings. If this is an innovation, then it is one which we are -prepared to defend and to justify. It is not an innovation which creates -a new crime. International Law had already, before the Charter was -adopted, constituted aggressive war a criminal act. - -There is therefore in this respect no substantial retroactivity in the -provisions of the Charter. It merely fixes the responsibility for a -crime, clearly established as such by positive law, upon its actual -perpetrators. It fills a gap in international criminal procedure. There -is all the difference between saying to a man: “You will now be punished -for an act which was not a crime at the time you committed it”, and -telling him: “You will now pay the penalty for conduct which was -contrary to law and a crime when you executed it though, owing to the -imperfection of international machinery, there was at that time no court -competent to pronounce judgment against you.” If that be retroactivity, -we proclaim it to be most fully consistent with that higher justice -which, in the practice of civilized States, has set a definite limit to -the retroactive operation of laws. Let the defendants and their -protagonists complain that the Charter is in this as in other matters an -_ex parte_ fiat of the victor. These victors, composing as they do the -overwhelming majority of the nations of the world, represent also the -world’s sense of justice which would be outraged if the crime of war, -after this second World War, were to remain unpunished. In thus -interpreting, declaring and supplementing the existing law they are -content to be judged by the verdict of history. _Securus judicat orbis -terrarum._ In so far as the Charter of this Tribunal introduces new law, -its authors have established a precedent for the future—a precedent -operative against all, including themselves. In essence that law, -rendering recourse to aggressive war an international crime, had been -well established when the Charter was adopted. It is only by way of -corruption of language that it can be described as a retroactive law. - -There remains the question, with which it will not be necessary to -detain the Tribunal for long, whether these wars launched by Germany and -her leaders in violation of treaties, agreements or assurances, were -also wars of aggression. A war of aggression is one which is resorted to -in violation of the international obligation not to have recourse to war -or, in cases in which war is not totally renounced, when it is resorted -to in disregard of the duty to utilize the procedure of pacific -settlement which a State has bound itself to observe. There was indeed, -in the period between the two World Wars, a divergence of view among -jurists and statesmen whether it was preferable to attempt in advance a -legal definition of aggression or to leave to the States concerned and -to the collective organs of the international community freedom of -appreciation of the facts in any particular situation that might arise. -Those holding the latter view urged that a rigid definition might be -abused by an unscrupulous State to fit in with its aggressive design; -they feared, and the British Government was for a time among those who -thought so, that an automatic definition of aggression might become “a -trap for the innocent and sign-post for the guilty”. Others held that in -the interest of certainty and security a definition of aggression, like -a definition of any crime in municipal law, was proper and useful; they -urged that the competent international organs, political and judicial, -could be trusted to avoid any particular case a definition of aggression -which might lead to obstruction or to an absurdity. In May 1933 the -Committee on Security Questions of the Disarmament Conference proposed a -definition of aggression on the following lines: - - “The aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to - the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be - considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of - the following actions: - - “(1) declaration of war upon another state; - - “(2) invasion by its armed forces, with or without a - declaration of war, of the territory of another State; - - “(3) attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without - a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of - another State; - - “(4) naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State; - - “(5) provision of support to armed bands formed in its - territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or - refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to - take in its own territory all the measures in its power to - deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.” - -The various treaties concluded in 1933 by the Union of Soviet Socialist -Republics and other States followed closely that definition. So did the -Draft Convention submitted in 1933 by His Majesty’s Government in the -United Kingdom to the Disarmament Conference. - -However, it is unprofitable to elaborate here the details of the problem -or of the definition of aggression. This Tribunal will not allow itself -to be deflected from its purpose by attempts to ventilate in this Court -what is an academic and, in the circumstances, an utterly unreal -controversy as to what is a war of aggression. There is no definition of -aggression, general or particular, which does not cover abundantly and -irresistibly and in every material detail the premeditated onslaught by -Germany upon the territorial integrity and the political independence of -so many States. - -This then being the law—that the peoples of the world by the Pact of -Paris had finally outlawed war and made it criminal—let us turn to the -facts and see how these Defendants under their Leader and with their -associates destroyed the high hopes of mankind and sought to revert to -international anarchy. And first in general terms let this be said, for -it will be established beyond doubt by the documents. From the moment -Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, with the Defendant Von Papen as -Vice-Chancellor, and with the Defendant Von Neurath as his Foreign -Minister, the whole atmosphere of the world darkened. The hopes of the -people began to recede. Treaties seemed no longer matters of solemn -obligation, but were entered into with complete cynicism as a means for -deceiving other States of Germany’s warlike intentions. International -Conferences were no longer to be used as a means for securing pacific -settlements but as occasions for obtaining by blackmail demands which -were eventually to be enlarged by war. The World came to know the War of -Nerves, the diplomacy of the fait accompli, of blackmail and bullying. - -In October 1933 Hitler told his Cabinet that as the proposed Disarmament -Convention did not concede full equality to Germany, “It would be -necessary to torpedo the Disarmament Conference. It was out of the -question to negotiate: Germany would leave the Conference and the -League”. And on the 21st October 1933 she did so, and by so doing struck -a deadly blow at the fabric of security which had been built up on the -basis of the League Covenant. From that time on the record of their -foreign policy became one of complete disregard of all international -obligations and certainly not least of those solemnly concluded by -themselves. As Hitler had expressly avowed, “Agreements are kept only so -long as they serve a certain purpose” (_789-PS_). He might have added -that often the purpose was only to lull an intended victim into a false -sense of security. So patent, indeed, did this eventually become that to -be invited by the Defendant Ribbentrop to enter into a nonaggression -pact with Germany was almost a sign that Germany intended to attack the -state concerned. Nor was it only the formal treaty which they used and -violated as circumstances made expedient. These Defendants are charged, -too, with breaches of the less formal assurances which, in accordance -with diplomatic usage Germany gave to neighboring states. Today with the -advance of science the world has been afforded means of communication -and intercourse hitherto unknown, and as Hitler himself expressly -recognized, International relations no longer depend upon treaties -alone. The methods of diplomacy change. The Leader of one Nation can -speak to the Government and peoples of another. But though the methods -change the principles of good faith and honesty, established as the -fundamentals of civilized society, both in the national and the -International spheres, remain. It is a long time since it was said that -we are part, one of another. And if today the different states are more -closely connected and thus form part of a World Society more than ever -before, so also more than ever before is there that need of good faith -between them. - -Let us see further how these Defendants, Ministers and High Officers of -the Nazi Government individually and collectively comported themselves -in these matters. - - PART II - -In the early hours of the 1st September 1939 under manufactured and, in -any event, inadequate, pretexts, the armed Forces of the German Reich -invaded Poland along the whole length of her Frontiers and thus launched -upon the world the war which was to bring down so many of the pillars of -our civilization. It was a breach of the Hague Conventions (_TC-2_). It -was a breach of the Treaty of Versailles which had established the -Frontiers between Germany and Poland. And however much Germany disliked -that Treaty—although Hitler had stated that he would respect its -territorial provisions—she was certainly not free to break it by -unilateral action. It was a breach of the Arbitration Treaty between -Germany and Poland concluded at Locarno on 16th October 1925 (_TC-15_). -By that Treaty Germany and Poland expressly agreed to refer any matters -of dispute not capable of settlement by ordinary diplomatic machinery to -the decision of an Arbitral Tribunal or of the Permanent Court of -International Justice. But that is not all. It was also a breach of a -more recent and, in view of the repeated emphasis laid on it by Hitler -himself, a more important engagement into which Nazi Germany had -entered. On the 26th January 1934 the German and Polish Governments had -signed a ten-year Pact of Non-aggression (_TC-21_). It was, as the -signatories stated, to introduce “a new era in the political relations -between Poland and Germany”. It was stated in the text of the Pact -itself that “the maintenance and guarantee of lasting Peace between the -two countries is an essential prerequisite for the general peace of -Europe”. The two Governments therefore agreed to base their mutual -relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of 1928. They -declared that - - “In no circumstances * * * will they proceed to the application - of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such - disputes”. (_TC-21_) - -That declaration and agreement was to remain in force for at least ten -years and thereafter would remain valid unless it was denounced by -either Government six months before the expiration of the ten years, or -subsequently a denunciation, with six months notice took place. - -Both at the time of its signature and during the following four years -Hitler spoke of the German-Polish Agreement publicly as though it were a -cornerstone of his foreign policy. By entering into it he persuaded many -people that his intentions were genuinely pacific, for the re-emergence -of an independent Poland had cost Germany much territory and had -separated East Prussia from the Reich. That Hitler should of his own -accord enter into friendly relations with Poland; that in his speeches -on foreign policy he should proclaim his recognition of Poland’s right -to an exit to the sea, and the necessity for Germans and Poles to live -side by side in amity—these facts seemed to the world convincing proof -that Hitler had no “revisionist” aims which would threaten the peace of -Europe, and that he was even genuinely anxious to put an end to the -age-old hostility between the Teuton and the Slav. If his professions -were genuine his policy excluded a renewal of the _Drang nach Osten_ and -thereby would contribute to the stability of Europe. We shall have -occasion enough to see how little truth these pacific professions -contained. The history of the fateful years from 1934 to 1939 shows -quite clearly that the Germans used this Treaty, as they used other -Treaties, merely as an instrument of policy for furthering their -aggressive aims. It is clear from the documents now presented to the -Tribunal that these five years fall into two distinct phases in the -realization of aggressive aims which always underlay the Nazi policy. -There was first the period from the Nazi assumption of power in 1933 -until the autumn of 1937. That was the preparatory period. During that -time there occurred the breaches of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, -the feverish rearmament of Germany, the reintroduction of conscription, -the reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland, and all the -other necessary preparatory measures for future aggression with which my -United States colleagues have already so admirably dealt. During that -time they lulled Poland into a false sense of security. Not only Hitler, -but also the Defendant Goering and the Defendant Ribbentrop made -statements approbating the Pact. In 1935 Goering was saying that “the -pact was not planned for a period of ten years but forever: there need -not be the slightest fear that it would not be continued.” Even though -Germany was steadily building up the greatest war machine that Europe -had ever known, and although, by January 1937, the German military -position was so secure that Hitler could refer openly to his strong -Army, he took pains also to say at the time that “by a series of -agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and thereby contributed -considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely -recall the agreement with Poland which has worked out to the advantage -of both sides. * * *” (_2368-PS_). And so it went on—abroad -protestations of pacific intentions—at home “guns before butter”. - -In 1937, however, this preparatory period drew to a close and Nazi -policy moved from general preparation for future aggression to specific -planning for the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. Two -documents in particular mark this change. - -The first of these was an important “Directive for unified preparation -for War” issued on June 29, 1937, by the Reich-Minister for War (von -Blomberg) and C-in-C of the Armed Forces (_C-175_). This document is -important, not only for its military directions, but for the -appreciation it contained of the European situation and for the -revelation it provides of the Nazi attitude towards it. - - “The general political position”, von Blomberg stated, - “justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an - attack from any side. Grounds for this are, in addition to the - lack of desire for war in almost all Nations, particularly the - Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of - a number of States, and of Russia in particular”. (_C-175_) - -He added, it is true, “The intention of unleashing an European War is -held just as little by Germany”. And it may be that that phrase was -carefully chosen, for Germany hoped to conquer the world in detail: to -fight on one front at a time, not to unleash a general European -conflict. But, he went on, “the politically fluid world situation, which -does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous -preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces (_a_) to counter attack -at any time (yet he had just said that there was no fear of any attack) -and (_b_) to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable -opportunities should they occur”. That phrase is no more than a -euphemistic description of aggressive war. It reveals the continued -adherence of the German military leaders to the doctrine that military -might, and if necessary war, should be an instrument of policy—the -doctrine explicitly condemned by the Kellogg Pact, to which Germany had -adhered. The document goes on to set out the general preparations -necessary for a possible war in the mobilization period 1937/1938. The -document is evidence at least for this—that the leaders of the German -Armed Forces had it in mind to use the military strength which they were -building up for aggressive purposes. “No reason”—they say—“to -anticipate attack from any side * * * there is a lack of desire for -war”. Yet they prepare to “exploit militarily favorable opportunities”. - -Still more important as evidence of the transition to planned aggression -is the record of the important conference which Hitler held at the -Reichs Chancellery on November 5, 1937, at which von Blomberg, Reich -Minister for War, von Fritsch, C-in-C of the Army, Goering, C-in-C of -the Luftwaffe, Raeder, C-in-C of the Navy and von Neurath, then the -Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, were present. The minutes of that -conference have already been put in evidence (_386-PS_). I refer to them -now to emphasize those passages which make apparent the ultimate -intention to wage an aggressive war. As will be remembered, the burden -of Hitler’s argument at that conference was that Germany required more -territory in Europe. Austria and Czechoslovakia were specifically -envisaged. But Hitler realized that the process of conquering these two -countries might well bring into operation the treaty obligations of -Great Britain and France. He was prepared to take the risk. - - “The history of all times: Roman Empire, British Empire, has - proved that every space expansion can only be effected by - breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are - unavoidable: neither formerly nor today has space been found - without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the - proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest - possible conquest can be made at the lowest possible cost”. - -In the course of his address to that Conference Hitler had foreseen and -discussed the likelihood that Poland would be involved if the aggressive -expansionist aims which he put forward brought about a general European -war in the course of their realization by Germany. When, therefore, on -that very day Hitler assured the Polish Ambassador of the value of the -1934 Pact it can only be concluded that its real value in Hitler’s eyes -was that of keeping Poland quiet until Germany had acquired such a -territorial and strategic position that Poland would no longer be a -danger to her. - -That view is confirmed by the events which followed. At the beginning of -February 1938 the change from Nazi preparation for aggression to active -aggression itself took place. It was marked by the substitution of -Ribbentrop for Neurath as Foreign Minister, and of Keitel for Blomberg -as head of OKW. Its first fruits were the bullying of Schuschnigg at -Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938, and the forcible absorption of -Austria in March. Thereafter the Green Plan (_Fall Gruen_) for the -destruction of Czechoslovakia was steadily developed—the plan partially -foiled, or of which the final consummation was at least delayed, by the -Munich Agreement. - -With these developments of Nazi aggression my United States colleagues -have already dealt. But it is obvious that the acquisition of these two -countries, and of their resources in manpower and in the production of -munitions of war, immensely strengthened the position of Germany as -against Poland. It is, therefore, not surprising that, just as the -defendant Goering assured the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, at the -time of the Nazi invasion of Austria that Hitler recognized the validity -of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of 1925, and that Germany -had no designs against Czechoslovakia herself—“I give you my word of -honor” said Goering—so also continued assurances should be given during -1938 to Poland in order to keep that country from interfering with the -Nazi aggression on Poland’s neighbors. - -Thus, on the 20th February 1938 on the eve of his invasion of Austria, -Hitler, referring to the fourth anniversary of the Polish Pact, -permitted himself to say this to the Reichstag: - - “* * * and so a way to a friendly understanding has been - successfully paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig - has today succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the - relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into - a sincere friendly cooperation. Relying on her friendships, - Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which - provides the foundation for the task ahead of us—Peace”. - (_2357-PS_) - -Still more striking are the cordial references to Poland in Hitler’s -speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26 September 1938. He then -said: - - “The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that - of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and - Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted - to prevent this. I know well enough that I should not have been - successful if Poland had had a democratic constitution. For - these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the - most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no - democracy, but a man: and with him I succeeded, in precisely - twelve months, in coming to an agreement which, for ten years in - the first instance, entirely removed the danger of a conflict. - We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting - pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must - live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A - people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the - sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be found, and it will - be ever further extended. Certainly things were hard in this - area. * * * But the main fact is that the two Governments, and - all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples - and in the two countries, possess the firm will and - determination to improve their relations. It was a real work of - peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of - Nations Palace at Geneva”. - -Thus flattery of Poland preceded the annexation of Austria and renewed -flattery of Poland preceded the projected annexation of Czechoslovakia. -The realities behind these outward expressions of goodwill are clearly -revealed in the documents relating to _Fall Gruen_, which are already -before the Tribunal. They show Hitler as fully aware that there was risk -of Poland, England and France being involved in war to prevent the -German annexation of Czechoslovakia, and that this risk though realized -was also accepted. On the 25th August top secret orders to the German -Air Force in regard to the operations to be conducted against England -and France if they intervened pointed out that, as the -French-Czechoslovak Treaty provided for assistance only in the case of -“unprovoked” attack, it would take a day or two for France and England -to decide whether legally the attack was unprovoked or not. A blitzkrieg -accomplishing its aims before effective intervention became possible was -the object to be aimed at. - -On the same day an Air Force memorandum on future organization was -issued to which was attached a map on which the Baltic States, Hungary, -Czechoslovakia and Poland are all shown as part of Germany and -preparations for expanding the Air Force “as the Reich grows in area”, -as well as dispositions for a two-front war against France and Russia -are discussed (_L-43_; _Chart No. 10_). And on the following day von -Ribbentrop is being minuted about the reaction of Poland towards the -Czechoslovak problem: - - “The fact that after the liquidation of the Czech question it - will be generally assumed that Poland will be next in turn” is - recognized but, it is stated, “the later this assumption sinks - in, the better”. (_TC-76_) - -I will pause at the date of the Munich Agreement for a moment and ask -the Tribunal to consider what the evidence of documents and historical -facts shows up to that time. It has made undeniable the fact both of -Nazi aggressiveness and of active aggression. Not only does the -Conference of 1937 reveal Hitler and his associates deliberately -considering the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia, if necessary -by war, but the first of those operations had been carried through in -March 1938 and a large part of the second, under threat of war, though -without actual need for its initiation, in September of the same year. -More ominous still, Hitler had revealed his adherence to his old -doctrines of _Mein Kampf_, those essentially aggressive to the -exposition of which in _Mein Kampf_ long regarded as the Bible of the -Nazi Party we shall draw attention. He is in pursuit of _Lebensraum_ and -he means to secure it by threats of force or, if they fail, by force, by -aggressive war. - -So far actual warfare has been avoided because of the love of peace, the -lack of preparedness, the patience or the cowardice—which you will—of -the democratic Powers. But, after Munich, the questions which filled the -minds of all thinking people with acute anxiety was, “Where will this -end? Is Hitler now satisfied, as he declares he is? Or will his pursuit -of _Lebensraum_ lead to further aggressions, even if he has to make an -openly aggressive war to secure it?” - -It was in relation to the remainder of Czechoslovakia and to Poland that -the answer to these questions was to be given. So far no direct and -immediate threat to Poland had been made. The two documents from which I -have just quoted (_L-43_; _TC-76_) show that high officers of the -defendant Goering’s Air Staff already regarded the extension of the -Reich and, it would appear, the destruction and absorption of Poland as -a foregone conclusion. They were already anticipating, indeed, the last -stage of Hitler’s policy stated in _Mein Kampf_, war to destroy France -and to secure _Lebensraum_ in Russia. And the writer of the Minute to -Ribbentrop already took it for granted that, after Czechoslovakia, -Poland would be attacked. More impressive than these two documents is -the fact that, as I have said, the record of the Conference of November -5, 1937, shows that war with Poland, if she should dare to attempt to -prevent German aggression against Czechoslovakia, had been coolly -contemplated and that the Nazi leaders were ready to take the risk. So -also had the risk of war with England and France under the same -circumstances been considered and accepted. Such a war would, of course, -have been an aggressive war on Nazi Germany’s part. For to force one -State to take up arms to defend another against aggression in order to -fulfill treaty obligations is to initiate aggressive war against the -first State. - -Yet it remains true that until Munich the decision for direct attack -upon Poland and her destruction by aggressive war had apparently not as -yet been taken by Hitler and his associates. It is to the transition -from the intention and preparation of initiating an aggressive war, -evident in regard to Czechoslovakia, to the actual initiation and waging -of aggressive war against Poland that I now pass. That transition -occupies the eleven months from October 1, 1938 to the actual attack on -Poland on September 1, 1939. - -Within six months of the signature of the Munich Agreement the Nazi -Leaders had occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, which by that -agreement they had indicated their willingness to guarantee. On March -14th, 1939, the aged and infirm President of the “Rump” of -Czechoslovakia, Hacha, and his Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, were -summoned to Berlin. At a meeting held between 1.15 and 2.15 a. m. in the -small hours of the 15th March in the presence of Hitler and the -defendants Ribbentrop, Goering, and Keitel, they were bullied and -threatened and informed bluntly that Hitler “had issued the order for -the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia, and for the -incorporation of this country into the German Reich”. It was made quite -clear to them that resistance would be useless and would be crushed “by -force of arms with all available means”. It was thus that the -Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up and that Slovakia was -turned into a German satellite, though nominally independent, state. By -their own unilateral action, on pretexts which had no shadow of -validity, without discussion with the Governments of any other country, -without mediation and in direct contradiction of the sense and spirit of -the Munich Agreement, the Germans acquired for themselves that for which -they had been planning in September of the previous year, and indeed -much earlier, but which at that time they had felt themselves unable -completely to secure without too patent an exhibition of their -aggressive intentions. Aggression achieved whetted the appetite for -aggression to come. There were protests. England and France sent -diplomatic notes. Of course there were protests. The Nazis had clearly -shown their hand. Hitherto they had concealed from the outside world -that their claims went beyond incorporating into the Reich persons of -German Race living in bordering territory. Now for the first time, in -defiance of their own solemn assurances to the contrary, non-German -territory had been seized. This acquisition of the whole of -Czechoslovakia, together with the equally illegal occupation of Memel on -the 22d March, resulted in an immense strengthening of the German -position, both politically and strategically, as Hitler had anticipated -it would when he discussed the matter at his conference on November 5th, -1937. (_386-PS_) - -Long before the consummation by the Nazi Leaders of their aggression -against Czechoslovakia, however, they had already begun to make demands -upon Poland. On October 25th, 1938, that is to say within less than a -month of Hitler’s reassuring speech about Poland already quoted and of -the Munich Agreement itself, M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, -reported to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, that at a luncheon at -Berchtesgaden the day before (October 24th) the defendant Ribbentrop had -put forward demands for the reunion of Danzig with the Reich and for the -building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across -Pomorze, that is, the province which the Germans called the Corridor. -From that moment onwards until the Polish Government had made it plain, -during a visit of the defendant Ribbentrop to Warsaw which ended on -January 27th, 1939, that they would not consent to hand over Danzig to -German Sovereignty negotiations on these German demands continued. Even -after Ribbentrop’s return Hitler thought it worth while in his Reichstag -Speech on January 30th, 1939 to say— - - “We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion - of our nonaggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any - difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace as - to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself - what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which - brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago. - In signing it, the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his - people just as great a service as the leaders of the - National-Socialist State rendered the German people. During the - troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany - and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the - political life of Europe”. - -That utterance, however, was the last friendly word from Germany to -Poland and the last occasion upon which the Nazi Leader mentioned the -German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During February 1939 silence -fell upon German demands. But as soon as the final absorption of -Czechoslovakia had taken place, and Germany had also absorbed Memel, -Nazi pressure upon Poland was at once renewed. In two conversations -between himself and the defendant Ribbentrop, held on March 21st and -March 26th respectively (Polish White Book Number 61 and Number 63), -German demands upon Poland were renewed and further pressed. In view of -the fate which had overtaken Czechoslovakia and of the grave -deterioration in her strategical position towards Germany it is not -surprising that the Polish Government took alarm at these developments. -Nor were they alone in this. The events of March 1939 had at last -convinced both the English and French Governments that the Nazi designs -of aggression were not limited to men of German race and that the -spectre of European war resulting from further aggressions by Nazi -Germany had not been exorcised by the Munich Agreement. - -As a result, therefore, of the concern of Poland, England, and France at -the events in Czechoslovakia and at the newly applied pressure on -Poland, conversations between the English and Polish Governments had -been taking place, and, on 31st March, 1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, -speaking in the House of Commons, stated that His Majesty’s Government -had given an assurance to help Poland in the event of any action which -clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government -accordingly considered it vital to resist (_TC-72, No. 17_). On 6th -April 1939 an Anglo-Polish communique stated that the two countries were -prepared to enter into an Agreement of a permanent and reciprocal -character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance -given by His Majesty’s Government. (_TC-72, No. 18_) - -The justification for such concern is not difficult to find. With the -evidence which we now have of what was happening within the councils of -the German Reich and its armed forces during these months it is manifest -that the German Government were intent on seizing Poland as a whole, -that Danzig—as Hitler was to say himself a month later—“was not the -subject of the dispute at all”. The Nazi Government was intent upon -aggression and the demands and negotiations in respect of Danzig were -merely a cover and excuse for further domination. - -As far back as September 1938 plans for aggressive war against Poland, -England, and France were well in hand. While Hitler, at Munich, was -telling the world that the German people wanted peace and that, having -solved the Czechoslovakian problem, Germany had no more territorial -problems in Europe, the staffs of his armed forces were already -preparing plans. On the 26th September 1938 he had said: - - “We have given guarantees to the States in the West. We have - assured all our immediate neighbours of the integrity of their - territory as far as Germany is concerned. That is no mere - phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest whatever in a - breach of the peace. We want nothing from these peoples.” - -The world was entitled to rely upon these assurances. International -cooperation is impossible unless one can assume good faith in the -leaders of the various States. But within two months of that solemn and -considered undertaking, Hitler and his confederates were preparing for -the seizure of Danzig. To recognize these assurances, these pledges, -these diplomatic moves as the empty frauds they were, one must go back -to enquire what was happening within the inner councils of the Reich -from the time of the Munich Agreement. - -Written some time in September 1938 is an extract from a file on the -Reconstruction of the German Navy (_C-23_). Under the heading “Opinion -on the Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England” it is stated: - - “1. If, according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to - acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only - sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval - communications and secure access to the ocean. - - “2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to - Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world - powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful - means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore, - forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding - preparations for war. - - “3. War against England means at the same time war against the - Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a - large number of countries overseas, in fact, against half to - one-third of the world. - - “It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is - prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and - waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the - ocean.” (_C-23_) - -Here is something which is both significant and new. Until this date the -documents in our possession disclose preparations for war against -Poland, England, and France purporting at least to be defensive measures -to ward off attacks which might result from the intervention of those -powers in the preparatory aggression of Germany in Central Europe. -Hitherto aggressive war against Poland, England, and France has been -contemplated only as a distant objective. Now, for the first time, we -find a war of conquest by Germany against France and England openly -recognized as the future aim, at least of the German Navy. - -On the 24th November 1938 an Appendix was issued by Keitel to a previous -order of the Fuehrer. In this Appendix there are set out the future -tasks for the armed forces and the preparation for the conduct of the -war which would result from those tasks. - - “The Fuehrer has ordered that besides the three eventualities - mentioned in the previous Directive preparations are also to be - made for the surprise occupation by German troops of the Free - State of Danzig. - - “For the preparation the following principles are to be borne in - mind—the primary assumption is the lightning seizure of Danzig - by exploiting a favorable political situation and not war with - Poland * * *. Troops which are going to be used for this purpose - must not be held at the same time for the seizure of Memelland, - so that both operations can take place simultaneously should - such necessity arise.” (_C-137_) - -Thereafter, as the evidence which has already been produced has shown, -final preparations for the invasion of Poland were taking place. On the -3d April 1939, three days before the issue of the Anglo-Polish -communique, Keitel issued to the High Command of the Armed Forces a -Directive in which it was stated that the Directive for the uniform -preparation of war by the armed forces in 1939-40 was being re-issued, -and that the part concerning Danzig would be issued in the middle of -April. The basic principles were to remain the same as in the previous -Directive. Attached to this document were the orders “_Fall Weiss_”, the -code name for the proposed invasion of Poland. Preparations for that -invasion were to be made in such a way that the operation could be -carried out at any time from the 1st September 1939 onwards. (_C-120_) - -On the 11th April Hitler issued his Directive for the uniform -preparations of war by the armed forces 1939-40. In it he says: - - “I shall lay down in a later Directive future tasks of the armed - forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these - for the conduct of war. Until that Directive comes into force - the armed forces must be prepared for the following - eventualities: - - “1. Safeguarding of the frontiers. - - “2. _“Fall Weiss.”_ - - “3. The annexation of Danzig.” - -In an Annex to that document headed “Political Hypotheses and Aims” it -is stated that quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland, -however, change her present policy and adopt a threatening attitude -towards Germany, a final settlement would be necessary, notwithstanding -the pact with Poland. The Free City of Danzig was to be incorporated -into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. The policy -aims to limit the war to Poland and this is considered possible with the -internal crisis in France and resulting British restraint. - -The wording of this document does not directly involve the intention of -immediate aggression. It is a plan of attack “if Poland changes her -policy and adopts a threatening attitude”. But the picture of Poland, -with her inadequate armaments, threatening Germany is ludicrous enough -and the real aim emerges in the sentence “The aim is then to destroy -Polish military strength and to create, in the East, a situation which -satisfies the requirements of defense”—a sufficiently vague phrase to -cover designs of any magnitude. Even now the evidence does not suffice -to prove that the actual decision to attack Poland has been taken. But -all preparations are being set in train in case that decision is -reached. - -It was within three weeks of the date of this last document that Hitler -addressed the Reichstag (April 28th, 1939). In his speech he repeated -the German demands already made to Poland and proceeded to denounce the -German-Polish Agreement of 1934. Leaving aside for the moment the -warlike preparations for aggression, which Hitler had set in train -behind the scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to consider the nature of the -denunciation of an Agreement to which, in the past, Hitler had professed -to attach so high an importance. - -In the first place Hitler’s denunciation was _per se_ ineffectual, since -the text of the Agreement made no provision for its denunciation by -either Party until six months before the expiration of the ten years for -which it was concluded. No denunciation could be legally affective, -therefore, until June or July 1943, and Hitler was speaking on April -28th 1939—more than five years too soon! - -In the second place Hitler’s actual attack on Poland when it came on -September 1st, 1939, was made before the expiration of the six months -period after denunciation required by the Agreement before such a -denunciation became operative. In the third place the grounds for his -denunciation of the Agreement stated by Hitler in his speech to the -Reichstag are entirely specious. However one reads its terms it is -impossible to accept the view that the Anglo-Polish guarantee of mutual -assistance against aggression could render the Pact null and void. If -that were so then certainly the Pacts already entered into by Hitler -with Italy and Japan had already invalidated it, and Hitler might have -spared his breath. But the truth is that the text of the German-Polish -Agreement contains nothing whatever to support Hitler’s contention. - -Why then did Hitler make this trebly invalid attempt to denounce his own -pet diplomatic child? Is there any other possible answer but that, the -Agreement having served its purpose, the grounds which he put forward -were chosen merely in an effort to provide Germany with some -justification for the aggression on which she was intent. - -For Hitler sorely needed some kind of justification, some apparently -decent excuse, since nothing had happened, or was likely to happen, from -the Polish side to provide him with it. So far he had made demands upon -his Treaty partner which Poland, as a sovereign State had every right to -refuse. If dissatisfied with that refusal Hitler was bound, under the -terms of the Agreement itself, to “seek a settlement through other -peaceful means, without prejudice to the possibility of applying those -methods of procedure, in case of necessity, which are provided for such -a case in the other agreements between them that are in force”—a -reference, it can only be supposed, to the German-Polish Arbitration -Treaty signed at Locarno in 1925. - -The very fact, therefore, that as soon as the Nazi leader cannot get -what he wants, but is not entitled to, from Poland by merely asking for -it, and that, on his side, he made no further effort to settle the -dispute “by peaceful means” in accordance with the terms of the -Agreement and of the Kellogg Pact, to which the Agreement pledged both -Parties, in itself creates a strong presumption of aggressive intentions -against Hitler and his associates. That presumption becomes a certainty -when the documents to which I shall now refer are studied. - -On 10th May Hitler issued an order for the capture of economic -installations in Poland and on 16th May the Defendant Raeder, as -Commander in Chief of the Navy, issued a memorandum setting out the -Fuehrer’s instructions to prepare for the operation “Fall Weiss” at any -time from the 1st September 1939. (_C-120_) - -But the decisive document is the record of the Conference held by Hitler -on May 23d, 1939 with various high-ranking officers, including the -defendants Goering, Raeder, and Keitel. Hitler then stated that the -solution of the economic problems could not be found without invasion of -foreign States and attacks on foreign property. - - “Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all: it is a - question of expanding our living space in the East * * *. There - is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with - the decision: to attack Poland at the earliest opportunity. We - cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be - war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of this - isolation will be decisive. The isolation of Poland is a matter - of skillful politics.” (_L-79_) - -He anticipated the possibility that war with England and France might -result. But a two-front war was to be avoided if possible. Yet England -was recognized as the most dangerous enemy. “England is the driving -force against Germany * * * the aim will always be to force England to -her knees.” More than once he repeated that the war with England and -France would be a life and death struggle. All the same, he concluded, -“We shall not be forced into war but we shall not be able to avoid one.” - -On the 14th June, 1939, General Blaskowitz, then Commander in Chief of -the 3d Army Group, issued a detailed battle plan for the “_Fall Weiss_” -(_2327-PS_). The following day Von Brauchitsch issued a memorandum in -which it was stated that the object of the impending operating was to -destroy the Polish Armed Forces. “High Policy demands”—he said—“that -the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve -quick results (_C-126_). The preparations proceeded apace. On the 22d -June Keitel submitted a preliminary timetable for the operation which -Hitler seems to have approved and suggested that the scheduled manouevre -must be camouflaged “in order not to disquiet the population”. On the 3d -July Brauchitsch wrote to Raeder urging that certain preliminary naval -moves should be abandoned in order not to prejudice the surprise of the -attack. On the 12th and 13th August Hitler and Ribbentrop had a -conference with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. - -At the beginning of the conversation Hitler emphasized the strength of -the German position, of its western and eastern fortifications and of -the strategic and other advantages that they held in comparison with -those of England, France, and Poland. - - “Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear - that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on - the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick - liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for - the unavoidable conflict with the Western democracies. If a - hostile Poland remained on Germany’s Eastern frontier, not only - would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also - further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This - would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation. - Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the - neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process - could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one - partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with - an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a - neutral of this kind.” - -Ciano was for postponing the operation. Italy was not ready—she -believed that a conflict with Poland would develop into a general -European war. Mussolini was convinced that conflict with the Western -democracies was inevitable but he was making plans for a period two or -three years ahead. But the Fuehrer said that the Danzig question must be -settled one way or the other by the end of August. “He had, therefore, -decided to use the occasion of the next Polish provocation in the form -of an ultimatum.” On the 22d August Hitler called his Supreme Commanders -together at Obersalzburg and gave the order for the attack: in the -course of what he said he made it clear that the decision to attack had -in fact been made not later than the previous spring. He would give a -spurious cause for starting the war (_1014-PS_; _L-3_). At that time the -attack was timed for the early hours of the 26th August. On the day -before the British Government, in the hope that Hitler might still be -reluctant to plunge the world into war, and in the belief that a formal -treaty would impress him more than the informal assurances which had -been given previously, entered into an agreement for mutual assistance -with Poland, embodying the previous assurances. It was known to Hitler -that France was bound by the Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921, and by the -Guarantee Pact signed at Locarno in 1925 to intervene in Poland’s aid in -case of aggression. For a moment Hitler hesitated. Goering and -Ribbentrop agree that it was this Anglo-Polish Treaty which led him to -call off, or rather postpone the attack. Perhaps he hoped that there was -still some chance of repeating, after all, what he had called the Czech -affair. If so, his hopes were short-lived. - -On the 27th August Hitler accepted Mussolini’s decision not at once to -come into the war, but asked for propaganda support and a display of -military activities to create uncertainty in the minds of the Allies. -Ribbentrop on the same day said that the Armies were marching. - -In the meantime, of course, and particularly in the last month, -desperate attempts had been made by the Western Powers to avert war. You -will have details of them in evidence. Of the intervention of the Pope. -Of President Roosevelt’s message. Of the offer by Mr. Chamberlain to do -our utmost to create the conditions in which all matters in issue could -be the subject of free negotiations and to guarantee the resultant -decisions. This and all the other efforts of honest men to avoid the -horror of a European war were predestined to failure. The Germans were -determined that the day for war had come. On the 31st August Hitler -issued a top secret order for the attack to commence in the early hours -of the 1st September. The necessary frontier incidents duly -occurred—was it for these that Keitel had been instructed by Hitler to -supply Heydrich with Polish uniforms?—and thus, without a declaration -of war, without even giving the Polish Government an opportunity of -seeing Germany’s final demands the Nazi troops invaded Poland. On the 3d -September, Hitler sent a telegram to Mussolini thanking him for his -intervention but pointing out that the war was inevitable and that the -most promising moment had to be picked after cold deliberation -(_1831-PS_). And so Hitler and his Confederates now before this Tribunal -began the first of their wars of aggression for which they had prepared -so long and so thoroughly. They waged it so fiercely that within a few -weeks Poland was overrun. - -On the 23d November 1939 Hitler reviewed the situation to his military -Commanders and in the course of his speech he said this: - - “One year later Austria came; this step was also considered - doubtful. It brought about a tremendous reinforcement of the - Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step - also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of - all the Western fortifications had to be finished * * *. Then - followed the creation of the Protectorate and with that the - basis of action against Poland was laid. But I wasn’t quite - clear at that time whether I should start first against the East - and then in the West or vice versa. The decision came to fight - with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight again - and again. In struggle, I see the fate of all human beings.” - (_789-PS_) - -He was not sure when to attack first. But that sooner or later he would -attack was never in doubt, and he had been warned not only by the -British and French Prime Ministers but even by his confederate Mussolini -that an attack on Poland would bring England and France into the war. He -chose what he considered the opportune moment—and he struck. - -In these circumstances the intent to wage war against England and -France, and to precipitate it by an attack on Poland, is not to be -denied. Here was defiance of the most solemn treaty obligations: here -was neglect of the most pacific assurances. Here was aggression, naked -and unashamed, which was indeed to arouse the horrified and heroic -resistance of all civilized peoples but which was to tear down many of -the pillars of our civilization. - -Once started upon the active achievement of their plan to secure the -domination of Europe, if not of the world, the Nazi Government proceeded -to attack other countries, as occasion offered. The first actually to be -invaded after the attack on Poland were Denmark and Norway. - -On the 9th April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Norway and Denmark -without warning, without any declaration of war. It was a breach of the -Hague Convention of 1907. It was a breach of the Convention of -Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Denmark dated 2d June, -1926. It was, of course, a breach of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. It -was a violation of the Nonaggression Treaty between Germany and Denmark -made on the 31st May 1939. And it was a breach of the most explicit -assurances which had been given. After his annexation of Czechoslovakia -had shaken the confidence of the world, Hitler attempted to reassure the -Scandinavian States. On the 28th April, 1939, he affirmed that he had -never made any request to them which was incompatible with their -sovereignty and independence. On the 31st May, 1939, he signed a -nonaggression Pact with Denmark. - -On the 2d September, the day after he had invaded Poland and seized -Danzig, he again expressed his determination to observe the -inviolability and integrity of Norway in an aide memoire which was -handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo -on that day. (_TC-31_) - -A month later, on the 6th October 1939, he said in a public speech: - - “Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points - of controversy with the Northern States, neither has she any - today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered nonaggression - pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they - do not feel themselves threatened in any way.” - -When the invasion of Norway and Denmark had already begun in the early -morning of the 9th April, a German memorandum was handed to the -Governments of those countries attempting to justify the German action. -Various allegations against the Governments of the invaded countries -were made. It was said that Norway had been guilty of breaches of -neutrality. It was said that she had allowed and tolerated the use of -her territorial waters by Great Britain. It was said that Britain and -France were making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway and that -the Government of that country was prepared to acquiesce in such an -event. - -I do not propose to argue the question whether or not those allegations -were true or false. That question is irrelevant to the issue before this -Court. Even if the allegations were true (and they were patently false), -they would afford no conceivable justification for the action of -invading without warning, without declaration of war and without any -attempt at mediation or conciliation. Aggressive war is none the less -aggressive war because the State which wages it believes that other -states may take similar action. The rape of a nation is not justified -because it is thought she may be raped by another. Nor even in -self-defense are warlike measures justified except after all means of -mediation have failed and force is actually being exercised against the -State concerned. - -In actual fact, with the evidence which we now possess it is clear that -the invasion of these countries was undertaken for quite different -purposes, that it had been planned long before any question of breach of -neutrality or occupation of Norway by England could ever have occurred. -It is clear also that the assurances repeated again and again throughout -the year 1939 were made for no other purpose than to lull suspicion in -those countries and to prevent them taking steps to resist the attack -against them which was under active preparation. - -For some years, Rosenberg, in his capacity of Chief of the Foreign -Affairs Bureau (APA) of the NSDAP, had interested himself in the -promotion of fifth column activities in Norway, and close relationship -was established with the “Nasjonal Samling”, a political group headed by -the now notorious traitor, Vidkun Quisling (_007-PS_). During the winter -of 1938/39, APA was in contact with Quisling and later Quisling -conferred with Hitler, Raeder, and Rosenberg. In August 1939 a special -14 day course was held at the school of the office of Foreign Relations -in Berlin for 25 followers whom Quisling had selected to attend. The -plan was to send a number of selected and “reliable” men to Germany for -a brief military training in an isolated camp. These were to be area and -language specialists to German special troops who were taken to Oslo on -coal barges to undertake political action in Norway. The object was a -coup in which Quisling would seize his leading opponents in Norway, -including the King, and prevent all military resistance from the -beginning. Simultaneously Germany was making military preparations. On -the 2d September, 1939; Hitler had assured Norway of his intention to -respect her neutrality, and on 6th October he said that the Scandinavian -States were not menaced in any way, yet on 3d October 1939 Raeder was -pointing out that the occupation of bases, if necessary by force, would -greatly improve the strategic and economic position (_1546-PS_). On the -9th October Doenitz was recommending Trondheim as the main base with -Narvik as an alternative base for fuel supplies. Rosenberg was reporting -shortly afterwards on the possibility of a coup d’état by Quisling -immediately supported by German military and naval forces. On the 12th -December 1939 Raeder advised Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, -that if Hitler was favourably impressed by Quisling, OKW should prepare -for the occupation of Norway, if possible with Quisling’s assistance, -but if necessary entirely by force. Hitler agreed but there was a doubt -whether action should be taken against the Low Countries or Scandinavia -first. Weather conditions delayed the march against the Low Countries. -In January instructions were given to the Germany Navy for the attack on -Norway, and on March 1st, 1940, a Directive for the occupation was -issued by Hitler. The general objective was not said to be to prevent -occupation by English Forces but in vague and general terms to prevent -British encroachment in Scandinavia and the Baltic and “to guarantee our -ore bases in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line -against Britain.” But the Directive went on: - - “* * * on principle we will do our utmost to make the operation - appear as a peaceful occupation the object of which is the - military protection of the Scandinavian States * * * it is - important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western - opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. * * * In - case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept - secret the leader and the troops will be deceived with - fictitious objectives.” - -The form and success of the invasion are well known. In the early hours -of the 9th April 7 cruisers, 14 destroyers, and several torpedo boats -and other small craft carried advance elements of 6 divisions totalling -about 10,000 men, forced an entry and landed troops in the outer Oslo -Fjord, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. A small -number of troops were also landed at Arendal and Egersund on the -southern coast. In addition airborne troops were landed on aerodromes -near Oslo and Stavanger. The German attack came as a surprise and all -the invaded towns along the coast were captured according to plan with -only slight losses. Only the plan to capture the King and members of the -Government and the Parliament failed. Brave as the resistance was that -was hurriedly organized throughout the country, nothing could be done in -the face of the long-planned surprise attack and on 10 June military -resistance ceased. So was another act of aggression brought to -completion. - -Almost exactly a month after the attack on Norway, on the 10th May 1940 -the German Armed Forces, repeating what had been done 25 years before, -streamed into Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg according to -plan—the plan that is, of invading without warning and without -declaration of War. - -What was done was of course a breach of the Hague Convention of 1907, -and is so charged. It was a violation of the Locarno Agreement and -Arbitration Convention with Belgium of 1925 which the Nazi Government -affirmed in 1935, only illegally to repudiate it two years later. By -that agreement all questions incapable of settlement by ordinary -diplomatic means were to be settled by arbitration. You will see the -comprehensive terms of these agreements. It was a breach of the Treaty -of Arbitration and Conciliation signed between Germany and the -Netherlands on the 20th May 1926; it was a violation of the similar -Treaty with Luxembourg on the 11th September 1929. It was a breach of -the Briand-Kellogg Pact. But those Treaties had not perhaps derived in -the minds of the Nazi Rulers of Germany any added sanctity from the fact -that they had been solemnly concluded by the Governments of pre-Nazi -Germany. - -Let us consider the specific assurances and undertakings which the Nazi -Rulers themselves gave to the States which lay in the way of their plans -against France and England and which they always intended to attack. Not -once, not twice, but eleven times the clearest assurances were given to -Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. On those assurances solemnly -and formally expressed, those countries were entitled to rely. In -respect of their breach these Defendants are charged. On the 30th -January, 1937 Hitler said: - - “As for the rest, I have more than once expressed the desire and - the hope of entering into similar good and cordial relations - with our neighbours. Germany has, and here I repeat this - solemnly, given the assurance time and time again, that, for - instance, between her and France there cannot be any humanly - conceivable points of controversy. The German Government has - further given the assurance to Belgium and Holland that it is - prepared to recognize and to guarantee the inviolability and - neutrality of these territories.” - -After Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland and had repudiated the -Locarno Pact, England and France sought to reestablish the position of -security for Belgium which Hitler’s action had threatened. They, -therefore, themselves gave to Belgium on the 24th April 1937, a specific -guarantee that they would maintain in respect of Belgium, undertakings -of assistance which they had entered into with her both under the -Locarno Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. On the 13th -October 1937 the German Government also made a declaration assuring -Belgium of its intention to recognize the inviolability and integrity of -that country. - -It is, perhaps, convenient to deal with the remaining assurances as we -review the evidence which is available as to the preparations and -intentions of the German Government prior to their invasion of Belgium -on the 10th May 1940. - -As in the case of Poland, as in the case of Norway and Denmark, so also -here the dates speak for themselves. - -As early as August 1938 steps were being made to utilize the Low -Countries as defense bases for decisive action in the West in the event -of France and England opposing Germany in its aggression upon -Czechoslovakia. - -In an air force letter dated 25th August 1938 which deals with the -action to be taken if England and France should interfere in the -operation against Czechoslovakia, it is stated: - - “It is not expected for the moment that other States will - intervene against Germany. The Dutch and the Belgian area - assumes in this connection much more importance for the - prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the world - war. This mainly is an advance base for the air war.” (_375-PS_) - -In the last paragraph of that order it is stated “Belgium and the -Netherlands when in German hands represent an extraordinary advantage in -the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against -France.” (_375-PS_) - -That was in August 1938. Eight months later (on the 28th April 1939) -Hitler is declaring again, “I was pleased that a number of European -states availed themselves of this declaration by the German Government -to express and emphasize their desire to have absolute neutrality.” - -A month later, on the 23d May, 1939, Hitler held the conference in the -Reich Chancellery, to which we have already referred. The Minutes of -that meeting report Hitler as saying: - - “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed - force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England - and France enter the war between Germany and Poland they will - support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality. * * * - Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we - must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at - securing new defense lines on Dutch soil up to the Zuyder Zee”. - (_L-79_) - -Even after that he was to give his solemn declarations that he would -observe Belgian neutrality. On the 26th August 1939 when the crisis in -regard to Danzig and Poland was reaching its climax, declarations -assuring the Governments concerned of the intention to respect their -neutrality were handed by the German Ambassadors to the King of the -Belgians, the Queen of the Netherlands, and to the Government of the -Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg in the most solemn form. But to the Army—“If -Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held”—it was said—“a -successful war against England will be secured.” - -On the 1st September Poland was invaded, and two days later England and -France came into the War against Germany in pursuance of the treaty -obligation already referred to. On the 6th October Hitler renewed his -assurances of friendship to Belgium and Holland. But on the 9th October, -before any kind of accusation had been made by the German Government of -breaches of neutrality by Belgium, the Netherlands, or Luxembourg, -Hitler issued a directive for the conduct of the war. - -In that directive he stated: - - “1. If it becomes evident in the near future that England and - France acting under her leadership, are not disposed to end the - war, I am determined to take firm and offensive action without - letting much time elapse. - - “2. A long waiting period results not only in the ending of the - advantage to the Western Powers, of Belgium and perhaps also of - Dutch neutrality, but also strengthens the military power of our - enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the - neutrals in German final victory to wane, and does not help to - bring Italy to our aid as brothers-in-arms. - - “3. I therefore issue the following orders for the further - conduct of military operations: - - “(_a_) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the - Northern flank of the Western front crossing the area of - Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out - as soon and as forcefully as possible. - - “(_b_) The object of this attack is to defeat as many strong - sections of the French Fighting Army as possible, and her ally - and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as - great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as - possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging - aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample - coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr.” - -Nothing could state more clearly or more definitely the object behind -the invasion of these countries than that document. - -On the 15th October 1939 Keitel wrote a most secret letter concerning -_Fall Gelb_, which was the code name for the operation against the Low -Countries. In it he stated: - - “The protection of the Ruhr area by moving A/C reporting service - and the air defense as far forward as possible in the area of - Holland is significant for the whole conduct of the war. The - more Dutch territory we occupy the more effective can the - defense of the Ruhr area be made. This point of view must - determine the choice of objectives of the army even if the army - and navy are not directly interested in such territorial gain. - It must be the object of the army’s preparations, therefore, to - occupy on receipt of a special order the territory of Holland in - the first instance in the area of the Grebbe-Marse line. It will - depend on the military and political attitude of the Dutch as - well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether objects - can and must be further extended.” (_C-62_) - -The operation had apparently been planned to take place at the beginning -of November. We have in our possession a series of 17 letters dated from -7th November until the 9th May postponing almost from day to day the -D-day of the operation, so that by the beginning of November all the -major plans and preparations had been made. (_C-72_) - -On the 10th January 1940 a German aeroplane force landed in Belgium. In -it was found the remains of a half-burnt operation order setting out -considerable details of the Belgian landing grounds that were to be -captured (_TC-58_). Many other documents have been found which -illustrate the planning and preparation for this invasion in the latter -half of 1939 and early 1940, but they carry the matter no further, and -they show no more clearly than the evidence to which I have already -referred, the plans and intention of the German Governments and its -armed forces. - -On the 10th May 1940 at about 0500 hours in the morning the German -invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg began. - -Once more the forces of aggression marched on. Treaties, assurances, the -rights of Sovereign States meant nothing. Brutal force, covered by as -great an element of surprise as the Nazis could secure, was to seize -that which was deemed necessary for striking the mortal blow against -England, the main Enemy. The only fault of these unhappy countries was -that they stood in the path of the German invader. But that was enough. - -On the 6th April 1941 German armed forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. -Again the blow was struck without warning and with the cowardice and -deceit which the World now fully expected from the self-styled -“_Herrenvolk_”. It was a breach of the Hague Convention of 1899. It was -a breach of the Pact of Paris of 1928. It was a breach of a specific -assurance given by Hitler on the 6th October 1939. - -“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss”, he said, “I -informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country -will also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in Peace -and Friendship with her”. (_TC-43_) - -But the plan for aggression against Yugoslavia had, of course, been in -hand well before that. In the aggressive action eastward towards the -Ukraine and the Soviet territories security of the Southern flank and -the lines of communication had already been considered. - -The history of events leading up to the invasion of Yugoslavia by -Germany is well known. At 3 o’clock on the morning of the 28th October -1940 a 3-hour ultimatum had been presented by the Italian Government to -the Greek Government and the presentation of this ultimatum was followed -by the aerial bombardment of Greek provincial towns and the advance of -Italian troops into Greek territory. The Greeks, not prepared for such -an assault, were at first forced to withdraw. Later the Italian advance -was first checked, then driven towards the Albanian frontier, and by the -end of 1940 the Italian Army had suffered severe reverses at Greek -hands. - -Of German intentions there is the evidence of what occurred when, on -12th August 1939, Hitler held his meeting with Ciano. - -You will remember Hitler said: - - “Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the - neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process - could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one - partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with - an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a - neutral of this kind.” (_TC-77_) - -Later again on the second day of the conversation, 13th August, he said: - - “In general, however, from success by one of the Axis partners - not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the - other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy - carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia, - Spain and Albania and each time against the wishes of the - Democratic Entente. These individual actions have not only - strengthened Italian local interests but have also reinforced - her general position. The same was the case with German action - in Austria and Czechoslovakia. * * * The strengthening of the - Axis by these individual operations was of the greatest - importance for the unavoidable clash with the Western Powers.” - -Once again we see the same procedure being followed. That meeting had -taken place on the 12/13th August, 1939. Less than two months later, on -6 October 1939 Hitler was giving his assurance to Yugoslavia that -Germany only desired to live in peace and friendship with the Yugoslav -State, the liquidation of which by his Axis partner he had himself -suggested. - -On the 28th October 1940 the Italians presented a 3 hour ultimatum to -Greece and commenced war against her. Eventually the advance was -checked, then driven back, and the Italians suffered considerable -reverses at Greek hands. - -We have an undated letter from Hitler to Mussolini which must have been -written about the time of the Italian aggression against Greece. -(_2762-PS_) - - “Permit me at the beginning of this letter to assure you that - within the last 14 days my heart and my thoughts have been more - than ever with you. Moreover, Duce, be assured of my - determination to do everything on your behalf which might ease - the present situation for you. * * * When I asked you to receive - me in Florence, I undertook the trip in the hope of being able - to express my views prior to the beginning of the threatening - conflict with Greece, about which I had only received general - information. First, I wanted to request you to postpone the - action, if possible until a more favorable time of year, at all - events, however, until after the American presidential election. - But in any case, however, I wanted to request you, Duce, not to - undertake this action without a previous lightning-like - occupation of Crete and, for this purpose, I also wanted to - submit to you some practical suggestions in regard to the - employment of a German parachute division and a further airborne - division. * * * Yugoslavia must become disinterested, if - possible, however from our point of view interested in - cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without - assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful - operation in the Balkans. * * * Unfortunately I must stress the - fact that waging war in the Balkans before March is impossible. - Hence it would also serve to make any threatening influence upon - Yugoslavia of no purpose, since the Serbian General Staff is - well aware of the fact that no practical action could follow - such a threat before March. Here Yugoslavia must, if at all - possible, be won over by other means and other ways.” - -On the 12th November in his Top Secret Order No. 18 Hitler ordered the -OKH to make preparations to occupy Greece and Bulgaria if necessary. -Approximately 10 divisions were to be used in order to prevent Turkish -intervention. To shorten the time the German divisions in Rumania were -to be increased. - -On the 13th December 1940 Hitler issued an order to OKW, OKL, OKH, OKM -and General Staff on the operation Marita, which was the invasion of -Greece. In that order it is stated that the invasion of Greece is -planned and is to commence as soon as the weather becomes advantageous. -Further orders were issued on the 13th December and 11th January. -(_448-PS_; _1541-PS_) - -On the 28th January Hitler saw Mussolini. Jodl, Keitel, and Ribbentrop -were present at the meeting and it is from Jodl’s notes of what took -place that we know that Hitler stated that one of the purposes of German -troop concentrations in Rumania was for use in his plan for the -operation against Greece. - -On the 1st March 1941 German troops entered Bulgaria and moved towards -the Greek frontier. In the face of this threat of an attack on Greece by -German as well as Italian forces British forces were landed in Greece on -the 3d March in accordance with the declaration which had been given by -the British Government on the 13th April 1939 that Great Britain would -feel bound to give Greece and Rumania respectively all the support in -her power in the event of either country becoming the victim of -aggression and resisting such aggression. Already the Italian aggression -had made this pledge operative. - -On the 25th March 1941 Yugoslavia joined the 3-Power Pact which had -already been signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. The preamble of the -Pact stated that the 3 Powers would stand side by side and work -together. - -On the same day Ribbentrop wrote two notes to the Yugoslav Prime -Minister; assuring him of Germany’s full intention to respect the -sovereignty and independence of his country. That declaration was yet -another example of the treachery employed by German diplomacy. We have -seen already the preparations that had been made. We have seen Hitler’s -efforts to tempt the Italians into an aggression against Yugoslavia. We -have seen in January his orders for his own preparation to invade -Yugoslavia and Greece and now on the 25th March he is signing a pact -with that country and his Foreign Minister is writing assurances of -respect for her sovereignty and territorial integrity. - -As a result of the signing of that Pact the anti-Nazi element in -Yugoslavia immediately accomplished a coup d’état and established a new -Government. Thereupon the decision was taken to invade immediately and -on the 27th March, two days after the 3-Power Pact had been signed by -Yugoslavia, Hitler issued instructions that Yugoslavia was to be invaded -and used as a base for the continuance of the combined German and -Italian offensive against Greece. (_C-127_) - -Following this, further deployment and other instructions for the action -Marita were issued by Von Brauchitsch on the 30th March 1941. (_R-95_) - -It is stated that “the orders issued with regard to the operation -against Greece remain valid so far as not affected by this order. On the -5th April, weather permitting, the Air Forces are to attack troops in -Yugoslavia, while simultaneously the attack of the 12th Army begins -against both Yugoslavia and Greece” (_R-95_). As we now know, the -invasion actually commenced in the early hours of the 6th April. - -Treaties, Pacts, Assurances—obligations of any kind—are brushed aside -and ignored wherever the aggressive interests of Germany are concerned. - -I turn now to the last act of aggression in Europe with which these Nazi -conspirators are charged—the attack upon Russia. In August 1939 Germany -although undoubtedly intending to attack Russia at some convenient -opportunity, sufficiently deceived the Russian Government to secure a -pact of nonaggression between them. It followed, therefore, that when -Belgium and the Low Countries were occupied and France collapsed in June -1940, England—although with the inestimably valuable moral and economic -support of the United States of America—was left alone as the sole -representative of Democracy in the face of the forces of aggression. -Only the British Empire stood between Germany and the achievement of her -aim to dominate the Western world. Only the British Empire—only England -as its citadel. But it was enough. The first, and possibly the decisive, -military defeat which the enemy sustained was in the campaign against -England, and that defeat had a profound influence on the future course -of the war. On the 16th July 1940 Hitler issued to Keitel and Jodl a -Directive for the invasion of England. It started off by stating—and -Englishmen will be forever proud of it—that - - “Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation, shows - no signs of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to - prepare a landing operation against England and if necessary to - carry it out. The aim is * * * to eliminate the English homeland - as a base for the carrying on of the war against Germany. The - preparations for the entire operation must be completed by - mid-August.” (_442-PS_) - -But the first essential condition for that plan was “that the English -Air Force must morally and actually be so far overcome that it does not -any longer show any considerable aggressive force against the German -attack.” (_442-PS_) - -The German Air Force made the most strenuous efforts to realize that -condition, but, in one of the most splendid pages of our history, it was -decisively defeated. And although the bombardment of England’s towns and -villages was continued throughout that dark winter of 1940-41 the enemy -decided in the end that England was not to be subjugated by these means, -and accordingly Germany turned back to the East, the first major aim -achieved. - -On the 22d June 1941, German Armed Forces invaded Russia—without -warning, without declaration of war. It was a breach of the Hague -Conventions; it was a violation of the Pact of Paris of 1928: it was in -flagrant contradiction of the Treaty of nonaggression which Germany and -Russia had signed on the 23d August 1939. - -But that Treaty, perhaps more blatantly than any other, was made without -any intention of being observed and only for the purpose of assisting -the German Government to carry out their aggressive plans against the -Western democracies before eventually turning east in their own good -time. - -Hitler himself in referring to the Agreement said agreements were only -to be kept as long as they served a purpose. Ribbentrop was more -explicit. In an interview with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on 23d -February 1941 he made it clear that the object of the Agreement had -merely been to avoid a two-front war. (_1834-PS_) - -In contrast to what Hitler and Ribbentrop were planning within the -councils of Germany, we know what they were saying to the rest of the -world. - -On the 19th July Hitler spoke in the Reichstag: - - “In these circumstances I consider it proper to negotiate as a - first priority a sober definition of interests with Russia. It - would be made clear once and for all what Germany believes she - must regard as her sphere of interest to safeguard her future - and, on the other hand, what Russia considers important for her - existence. - - “From the clear delineation of the sphere of interest on either - side, there followed the new regulation of Russo-German - relations. Any hope that now at the end of the term of the - agreement a new Russo-German tension could arise is childish. - Germany has taken no step which would lead her outside her - sphere of interest, nor has Russia. But England’s hope, to - achieve an amelioration of her own position through the - engineering of some new European crisis, is, in so far as it is - concerned with Russo-German relations, an illusion. - - “British statesmen perceive everything somewhat slowly, but they - too will learn to understand this in course of time.” - -Yet it was not many months after that that the arrangements for -attacking Russia were put in hand. Raeder gives us the probable reasons -for this sudden decision in a note to Admiral Assmann. - - “The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the Autumn - of 1940 could no longer be attained, a realization which the - Fuehrer no doubt gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who - were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on - England (our own losses), surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back - as August and September, to consider whether, even prior to - victory in the West, an Eastern campaign would be feasible with - the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the - continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear, - however, until well into September.” - -He may not have told the Navy of his intentions until later in -September, but by the beginning of that month he had undoubtedly spoken -of them to Jodl. - -Dated 6th September 1940 we have a directive of the OKW signed by Jodl: -“Directions are given for the occupation forces in the east to be -increased in the following weeks. For security reasons this should not -create the impression in Russia that Germany is preparing for an Eastern -offensive.” Directives are given to the German Intelligence Service -pertaining to the answering of questions by the Russian Intelligence -Service. “The total strength of the German troops in the East to be -camouflaged by frequent changes in this area. The impression is to be -created that the bulk of the troops in the south have moved whilst the -occupation in the north is only very small.” (_1229-PS_) - -Thus we see the beginning of the operations. - -On the 12th November 1940 Hitler issued a directive signed by Jodl in -which he stated that the political task to determine the attitude of -Russia had begun, but without reference to the result of preparations -against the East, which had been ordered orally before it could be -carried out. - -On the same day Molotov visited Berlin. At the conclusion of -conversations between himself and the German Government a communique was -issued in the following terms: - - “The exchange of ideas took place in an atmosphere of mutual - trust and led to a mutual understanding on all important - questions interesting Germany and the Soviet Union.” - -It is not to be supposed that the USSR would have taken part in those -conversations or agreed to that communique if it had been realized that -on the very day orders were being given for preparations to be made for -the invasion of Russia and that the order for the operation “Barbarossa” -was in preparation. Four days later that order was issued—“The German -armed forces have to be ready to defeat Soviet Russia in a swift -campaign before the end of the War against Great Britain” (_446-PS_). -And later in the same instruction, - - “All orders which shall be issued by the High Commanders in - accordance with this instruction have to be clothed in such - terms that they may be taken as measures of precaution in case - Russia should change her present attitude towards ourselves.” - (_446-PS_) - -Keeping up the pretense of friendliness, on the 10th January, -1941—after the Plan Barbarossa for the invasion of Russia had been -decided upon—the German-Russo frontier treaty was signed. On the 3d -February 1941 Hitler held a conference, attended by Keitel and Jodl, at -which it was provided that the whole operation was to be camouflaged as -if it was part of the preparations for the “Seelowe” as the plan for -invasion of England was called. By March 1941 the plans were -sufficiently advanced to include provision for dividing the Russian -territory into 9 separate States to be administered under Reich -Commissars under the general control of Rosenberg. At the same time -detailed plans for the economic exploitation of the country were made -under the supervision of Goering, to whom the responsibility was -delegated by Hitler. You will hear something of the details of these -plans. It is significant that on the 2d May 1941 a conference of the -State Secretaries on the Plan Barbarossa noted: - - “1. The war can only be continued if all armed forces are fed - out of Russia in the third year of the war. - - “2. There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people - will be starved to death if we take out of the country the - things necessary for us.” - -But this apparently created no concern. The plan Oldenberg, as the -scheme for economic organization was called, went on. By the 1st May the -D date of the operation was fixed. By the 1st June preparations were -virtually complete and an elaborate time table was issued. It was -estimated that although there would be heavy frontier battles, lasting -perhaps 4 weeks, after that no serious opposition was to be expected. - -On the 22d June at 3.30 in the morning the German Armies marched again. -As Hitler said in his Proclamation: - - “I have decided to give the fate of the German People and of the - Reich and of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers.” - -The usual false pretexts were of course given. Ribbentrop stated on the -28th June that the step was taken because of the threatening of the -German frontiers by the Red Army. It was untrue and Ribbentrop knew it -was untrue. On the 7th June his Ambassador in Moscow was reporting to -him that “All observations show that Stalin and Molotov who are alone -responsible for Russian foreign policy are doing everything to avoid a -conflict with Germany”. The staff records which you will see make it -clear that the Russians were making no military preparations and that -they were continuing their deliveries under the Trade Agreement to the -very last day. The truth was, of course, that the elimination of Russia -as a political opponent and the incorporation of the Russian territory -in the German _Lebensraum_ had long been one of the cardinal features of -Nazi policy, subordinated latterly for what Jodl called diplomatic -reasons. - -And so, on the 22d June, the Nazi armies were flung against the Power -with which Hitler had so recently sworn friendship and Germany embarked -on that last act of aggression which, after long and bitter fighting, -was eventually to result in Germany’s own collapse. - - PART III - -This then is the case against these Defendants, as amongst the rulers of -Germany, under Count 2 of this Indictment. It may be said that many of -the documents which have been referred to were in Hitler’s name, that -the orders were Hitler’s orders, that these men were mere instruments of -Hitler’s will. But they were the instruments without which Hitler’s will -could not be carried out. And they were more than that. These men were -no mere willing tools, although they would be guilty enough if that had -been their role. They are the men whose support had built Hitler up into -the position of power he occupied: they are the men whose initiative and -planning perhaps conceived and certainly made possible the acts of -aggression made in Hitler’s name, and they are the men who enabled -Hitler to build up the Army, Navy and Air Force by which these -treacherous attacks were carried out, and to lead his fanatical -followers into peaceful countries to murder, to loot and to destroy. -They are the men whose cooperation and support made the Nazi Government -of Germany possible. The Government of a totalitarian country may be -carried on without the assistance of representatives of the people. But -it cannot be carried on without any assistance at all. It is no use -having a leader unless there are also people willing and ready to serve -their personal greed and ambition by helping and following him. The -dictator who is set up in control of the destinies of his country does -not depend upon himself alone either in acquiring power or in -maintaining it. He depends upon the support and backing which lesser -men, themselves lusting to share in dictatorial power, anxious to bask -in the adulation of their leader, are prepared to give. In the Criminal -Courts, where men are put upon their trial for breaches of the municipal -laws, it not infrequently happens that of a gang indicted together in -the Dock, one has the master mind, the leading personality. But it is no -excuse for the common thief to say “I stole because I was told to -steal”; for the murderer to plead “I killed because I was asked to -kill”. These men are in no different position for all that it was -nations they sought to rob, whole peoples they tried to kill. “The -warrant of no man excuseth the doing of an illegal act.” Political -loyalty, military obedience are excellent things. But they neither -require nor do they justify the commission of patently wicked acts. -There comes a point where a man must refuse to answer to his leader if -he is also to answer to his conscience. Even the common soldier, serving -in the ranks of his Army is not called upon to obey illegal orders. But -these men were no common soldiers: they were the men whose skill and -cunning, whose labour and activity made it possible for the German Reich -to tear up existing treaties, to enter into new ones and to flout them, -to reduce international negotiations and diplomacy to a hollow mockery, -to destroy all respect for and effect in International Law and finally -to march against the peoples of the world to secure that domination in -which as arrogant members of their self-styled master race they -professed their belief. If the crimes were in one sense the crimes of -Nazi Germany, they also are guilty as the individuals who aided, -abetted, counselled, procured and made possible the commission of what -was done. - -The sum total of the crime these men have committed—so awful in its -comprehension—has many aspects. Their lust and sadism, their deliberate -slaughter and the degradation of so many millions of their fellow -creatures that the imagination reels incomprehensively, are but one side -only of this matter. Now that an end has been put to this nightmare and -we come to consider how the future is to be lived, perhaps their guilt -as murderers and robbers is of less importance and of less effect to -future generations of mankind than their crime of fraud—the fraud by -which they placed themselves in a position to do their murder and their -robbery. This is the other aspect of their guilt. The story of their -“diplomacy”, founded upon cunning, hypocrisy and bad faith, is a story -less gruesome but no less evil and deliberate. And should it be taken as -a precedent of behaviour in the conduct of international relations, its -consequences to mankind will no less certainly lead to the end of -civilized society. Without trust and confidence between Nations, without -the faith that what is said is meant and what is undertaken will be -observed, all hope of peace and of security is dead. The Governments of -the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, of the USA, of the -USSR, and of France, backed by and on behalf of every other peace-loving -Nation of the world, have therefore joined to bring the inventors and -perpetrators of this Nazi conception of international relationship -before the bar of this Tribunal. - -They do so that these Defendants may be punished for their crimes. They -do so also that their conduct may be exposed in its naked wickedness. -And they do so in the hope that the conscience and good sense of all the -world will see the consequences of such conduct and the end to which -inevitably it must always lead. Let us once again restore sanity and -with it also the sanctity of our obligations towards each other. - - - 6. AGGRESSION AS A BASIC NAZI IDEA: MEIN KAMPF - -Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_, which became the Nazi statement of faith, gave to -the conspirators adequate foreknowledge of the unlawful aims of the Nazi -leadership. It was not only Hitler’s political testament; by adoption it -became theirs. - -_Mein Kampf_ may be described as the blueprint of the Nazi aggression. -Its whole tenor and content demonstrate that the Nazi pursuit of -aggressive designs was no mere accident arising out of an immediate -political situation in Europe and the world. _Mein Kampf_ establishes -unequivocally that the use of aggressive war to serve German aims in -foreign policy was part of the very creed of the Nazi party. - -A great German philosopher once said that ideas have hands and feet. It -became the deliberate aim of the conspirators to see to it that the -idea, doctrines, and policies of _Mein Kampf_ should become the active -faith and guide for action of the German nation, and particularly of its -malleable youth. From 1933 to 1939 an extensive indoctrination in the -ideas of _Mein Kampf_ was pursued in the schools and universities of -Germany, as well as in the Hitler Youth, under the direction of Baldur -von Schirach, and in the SA and SS, and amongst the German population as -a whole, by the agency of Rosenberg. - -A copy of _Mein Kampf_ was officially presented by the Nazis to all -newly married couples in Germany. [A copy of _Mein Kampf_ (_D-660_) -submitted by the prosecution to the tribunal contains the following -dedication on the fly-leaf: - - “To the newly married couple, Friedrich Rosebrock and Else - Geborene Zum Beck, with best wishes for a happy and blessed - marriage. Presented by the Communal Administration on the - occasion of their marriage on the 14th of November, 1940. For - the Mayor, the Registrar.” - -This copy of _Mein Kampf_, which was the 1945 edition, contains the -information that the number of copies published to date amount to -6,250,000.] - -As a result of the efforts of the conspirators, this book, blasphemously -called “The Bible of the German people,” poisoned a generation and -distorted the outlook of a whole people. For as the SS General von dem -Bach-Zelewski testified before the Tribunal, [on 7 January 1946] if it -is preached for years, as long as ten years, that the Slav peoples are -inferior races and that the Jews are subhuman, then it must logically -follow that the killing of millions of these human beings is accepted as -a natural phenomenon. From _Mein Kampf_ the way leads directly to the -furnaces of Auschwitz and the gas chambers of Maidanek. - -What the commandments of _Mein Kampf_ were may be indicated by -quotations from the book which fall into two main categories. The first -category is that of general expression of Hitler’s belief in the -necessity of force as the means of solving international problems. The -second category is that of Hitler’s more explicit declarations on the -policy which Germany should pursue. - -Most of the quotations in the second category come from the last three -chapters—13, 14, and 15—of Part II of _Mein Kampf_, in which Hitler’s -views on foreign policy were expounded. The significance of this may be -grasped from the fact that Part II of _Mein Kampf_ was first published -in 1927, less than two years after the Locarno Pact and within a few -months of Germany’s entry into the League of Nations. The date of the -publication of these passages, therefore, brands them as a repudiation -of the policy of international cooperation embarked upon by Stresseman, -and as a deliberate defiance of the attempt to establish, through the -League of Nations, the rule of law in international affairs. - -The following are quotations showing the general view held by Hitler and -accepted and propagated by the conspirators concerning war and -aggression generally. On page 556 of _Mein Kampf_, Hitler wrote: - - “The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by Heaven - on our forefathers. But they had to conquer it by risking their - lives. So also in the future our people will not obtain - territory, and therewith the means of existence, as a favour - from any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a - triumphant sword.” - -On page 145, Hitler revealed his own personal attitude toward war. Of -the years of peace before 1914 he wrote: - - “Thus I used to think it an ill-deserved stroke of bad luck that - I had arrived too late on this terrestrial globe, and I felt - chagrined at the idea that my life would have to run its course - along peaceful and orderly lines. As a boy I was anything but a - pacifist and all attempts to make me so turned out futile.” - -On page 162 Hitler wrote of war in these words: - - “In regard to the part played by humane feeling, Moltke stated - that in time of war the essential thing is to get a decision as - quickly as possible and that the most ruthless methods of - fighting are at the same time the most humane. When people - attempt to answer this reasoning by highfalutin talk about - aesthetics, etc., only one answer can be given. It is that the - vital questions involved in the struggle of a nation for its - existence must not be subordinated to any aesthetic - considerations.” - -Hitler’s assumption of an inevitable law of struggle for survival is -linked up in Chapter II of Book I of _Mein Kampf_, with the doctrine of -Aryan superiority over other races and the right of Germans in virtue of -this superiority to dominate and use other peoples for their own ends. -The whole of Chapter II of _Mein Kampf_ is dedicated to this “master -race” theory and, indeed, many of the later speeches of Hitler were -mainly repetitive of Chapter II. - -On page 256, the following sentiments appear: - - “Had it not been possible for them to employ members of the - inferior race which they conquered, the Aryans would never have - been in a position to take the first steps on the road which led - them to a later type of culture; just as, without the help of - certain suitable animals which they were able to tame, they - would never have come to the invention of mechanical power, - which has subsequently enabled them to do without these beasts. - For the establishment of superior types of civilization the - members of inferior races formed one of the most essential - prerequisites.” - -In a later passage in _Mein Kampf_, at page 344, Hitler applies these -general ideas to Germany: - - “If in its historical development the German people had - possessed the unity of herd instinct by which other people have - so much benefited, then the German Reich would probably be - mistress of the globe today. World history would have taken - another course, and in this case no man can tell if what many - blinded pacifists hope to attain by petitioning, whining and - crying may not have been reached in this way; namely, a peace - which would not be based upon the waving of olive branches and - tearful misery-mongering of pacifist old women, but a peace that - would be guaranteed by the triumphant sword of a people endowed - with the power to master the world and administer it in the - service of a higher civilization.” - -These passages emphasize clearly Hitler’s love of war and scorn of those -whom he described as pacifists. The underlying message of this book, -which appears again and again, is, firstly, that the struggle for -existence requires the organization and use of force; secondly, that the -Aryan-German is superior to other races and has the right to conquer and -rule them; thirdly, that all doctrines which preach peaceable solutions -of international problems represent a disastrous weakness in a nation -that adopts them. Implicit in the whole of the argument is a fundamental -and arrogant denial of the possibility of any rule of law in -international affairs. - -It is in the light of these general doctrines of _Mein Kampf_ that the -more definite passages should be considered, in which Hitler deals with -specific problems of German foreign policy. The very first page of the -book contains a remarkable forecast of Nazi policy: - - “German-Austria must be restored to the great German Motherland. - And not, indeed on any grounds of economic calculation - whatsoever. No, no. Even if the union were a matter of economic - indifference, and even if it were to be disadvantageous from the - economic standpoint, still it ought to take place. People of the - same blood should be in the same Reich. The German people will - have no right to engage in a colonial policy until they shall - have brought all their children together in one State. When the - territory of the Reich embraces all the Germans and finds itself - unable to assure them a livelihood, only then can the moral - right arise, from the need of the people, to acquire foreign - territory. The plough is then the sword; and the tears of war - will produce the daily bread for the generations to come.” - -Hitler, at page 553, declares that the mere restoration of Germany’s -frontiers as they were in 1914 would be wholly insufficient for his -purposes: - - “In regard to this point I should like to make the following - statement: To demand that the 1914 frontiers should be restored - is a glaring political absurdity that is fraught with such - consequences as to make the claim itself appear criminal. The - confines of the Reich as they existed in 1914 were thoroughly - illogical; because they were not really complete, in the sense - of including all the members of the German nation. Nor were they - reasonable, in view of the geographical exigencies of military - defense. They were not the consequence of a political plan which - had been well considered and carried out, but they were - temporary frontiers established in virtue of a political - struggle that had not been brought to a finish; and indeed, they - were partly the chance result of circumstances.” - -In further elaboration of Nazi policy, Hitler does not merely denounce -the Treaty of Versailles; he desires to see a Germany which is a world -power with territory sufficient for a future German people of a -magnitude which he does not define. On page 554 he declares: - - “For the future of the German nation the 1914 frontiers are of - no significance * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “We National Socialists must stick firmly to the aim that we - have set for our foreign policy, namely, that the German people - must be assured the territorial area which is necessary for it - to exist on this earth. And only for such action as is - undertaken to secure those ends can it be lawful in the eyes of - God and our German posterity to allow the blood of our people to - be shed once again. Before God, because we are sent into this - world with the commission to struggle for our daily bread, as - creatures to whom nothing is donated and who must be able to win - and hold their position as lord of the earth only through their - own intelligence and courage. “And this justification must be - established also before our German posterity, on the grounds - that for each one who has shed his blood the life of a thousand - others will be guaranteed to posterity. The territory on which - one day our German peasants will be able to bring forth and - nourish their sturdy sons will justify the blood of the sons of - the peasants that has to be shed today. And the statesmen who - will have decreed this sacrifice may be persecuted by their - contemporaries, but posterity will absolve them from all guilt - for having demanded this offering from their people.” - -At page 557 Hitler writes: - - “Germany will either become a world power or will not continue - to exist at all. But in order to become a world power, it needs - that territorial magnitude which gives it the necessary - importance today and assures the existence of its citizens.” - - * * * * * * - - “We must take our stand on the principles already mentioned in - regard to foreign policy, namely, the necessity of bringing our - territorial area into just proportion with the number of our - population. From the past we can learn only one lesson, and that - is that the aim which is to be pursued in our political conduct - must be twofold, namely: (1) the acquisition of territory as the - objective of our foreign policy and (2) the establishment of a - new and uniform foundation as the objective of our political - activities at home, in accordance with our doctrine of - nationhood.” - -Now, these passages from _Mein Kampf_ raise the question, where did -Hitler expect to find the increased territory beyond the 1914 boundaries -of Germany? To this Hitler’s answer is sufficiently explicit. Reviewing -the history of the German Empire from 1871 to 1918, he wrote, on page -132: - - “Therefore, the only possibility which Germany had of carrying a - sound territorial policy into effect was that of acquiring new - territory in Europe itself. Colonies cannot serve this purpose - so long as they are not suited for settlement by Europeans on a - large scale. In the nineteenth century it was no longer possible - to acquire such colonies by peaceful means. Therefore, any - attempt at such colonial expansion would have meant an enormous - military struggle. Consequently it would have been more - practical to undertake that military struggle for new territory - in Europe, rather than to wage war for the acquisition of - possessions abroad. - - “Such a decision naturally demanded that the nation’s undivided - energies should be devoted to it. A policy of that kind, which - requires for its fulfillment every ounce of available energy on - the part of everybody concerned, cannot be carried into effect - by half measures or in a hesitant manner. The political - leadership of the German Empire should then have been directed - exclusively to this goal. No political step should have been - taken in response to other considerations than this task and the - means of accomplishing it. Germany should have been alive to the - fact that such a goal could have been reached only by war, and - the prospect of war should have been faced with calm and - collected determination. The whole system of alliances should - have been envisaged and valued from that standpoint. - - “If new territory were to be acquired in Europe it must have - been mainly at Russia’s cost, and once again the new German - Empire should have set out on its march along the same road as - was formerly trodden by the Teutonic Knights, this time to - acquire soil for the German plough by means of the German sword - and thus provide the nation with its daily bread.” - -To this program of expansion in the East Hitler returns again, at the -end of _Mein Kampf_. After discussing the insufficiency of Germany’s -pre-war frontiers, he again points the path to the East and declares -that the _Drang nach Osten_, the drive to the East, must be resumed: - - “Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line - through the line of conduct followed by pre-war Germany in - foreign policy. We put an end to the perpetual Germanic march - towards the South and West of Europe and turn our eyes towards - the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to the colonial and - trade policy of pre-war times and pass over to the territorial - policy of the future. But when we speak of new territory in - Europe today we must principally think of Russia and the border - states subject to her.” - -Hitler was shrewd enough to see that his aggressive designs in the East -might be endangered by a defensive alliance between Russia, France, and -perhaps England. His foreign policy, as outlined in _Mein Kampf_, was to -detach England and Italy from France and Russia and to change the -attitude of Germany towards France from the defensive to the offensive. - -On page 570 of _Mein Kampf_ he wrote: - - “As long as the eternal conflict between France and Germany is - waged only in the form of a German defense against the French - attack, that conflict can never be decided, and from century to - century Germany will lose one position after another. If we - study the changes that have taken place, from the twelfth - century up to our day, in the frontiers within which the German - language is spoken, we can hardly hope for a successful issue to - result from the acceptance and development of a line of conduct - which has hitherto been so detrimental for us. - - “Only when the Germans have taken all this fully into account - will they cease from allowing the national will-to-live to wear - itself out in merely passive defense; but they will rally - together for a last decisive contest with France. And in this - contest the essential objective of the German nation will be - fought for. Only then will it be possible to put an end to the - eternal Franco-German conflict which has hitherto proved so - sterile. - - “Of course it is here presumed that Germany sees in the - suppression of France nothing more than a means which will make - it possible for our people finally to expand in another quarter. - Today there are eighty million Germans in Europe. And our - foreign policy will be recognized as rightly conducted only - when, after barely a hundred years, there will be 250 million - Germans living on this Continent, not packed together as the - coolies in the factories of another Continent but as tillers of - the soil and workers whose labour will be a mutual assurance for - their existence.” - -_Mein Kampf_, taken in conjunction with the facts of Nazi Germany’s -subsequent behavior towards other countries, shows that from the very -first moment that they attained power, and indeed long before that time, -Hitler and his confederates were engaged in planning and fomenting -aggressive war. - -Events have proved that _Mein Kampf_ was no mere literary exercise to be -treated with easy indifference, as unfortunately it was treated for so -long. It was the expression of a fanatical faith in force and fraud as -the means to Nazi dominance in Europe, if not in the whole world. In -accepting and propagating the jungle philosophy of _Mein Kampf_, the -Nazi conspirators deliberately set about to push civilization over the -precipice of war. - - - 7. TREATY VIOLATIONS - -It might be thought, from the melancholy story of broken treaties and -violated assurances, that Hitler and the Nazi Government did not even -profess that it is necessary or desirable to keep the pledged word. -Outwardly, however, the professions were very different. With regard to -treaties, on the 18 October 1933, Hitler said, “Whatever we have signed -we will fulfill to the best of our ability.” - -The reservation is significant—“Whatever we have signed.” - -But, on 21 May 1935, Hitler said, “The German Government will -scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed, even though it -was concluded before their accession to power and office.” - -On assurances Hitler was even more emphatic. In the same speech, the -Reichstag Speech of 21 May 1935, Hitler accepted assurances as being of -equal obligation, and the world at that time could not know that that -meant of no obligation at all. What he actually said was, - - “And when I now hear from the lips of a British statesman that - such assurances are nothing and that the only proof of sincerity - is the signature appended to collective pacts, I must ask Mr. - Eden to be good enough to remember that it is a question of - assurance in any case. It is sometimes much easier to sign - treaties with the mental reservations that one will consider - one’s attitude at the decisive hour than to declare before an - entire nation and with full opportunity one’s adherence to a - policy which serves the course of peace because it rejects - anything which leads to war.” - -And then he proceeded with the illustration of his assurance to France. - -In this connection the position of a treaty in German law should not be -forgotten. The appearance of a treaty in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ makes -it part of the statute law of Germany, so that a breach thereof is also -a violation of German domestic law. - -(This section deals with fifteen only of the treaties which Hitler and -the Nazis broke. The remainder of the 69 treaties which the German Reich -violated between 1933 and 1941 are dealt with in other sections of this -chapter.) - -A. _Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, -signed at the Hague on the 29th of July, 1899._ - -The Hague Conventions are of course only the first gropings towards the -rejection of the inevitability of war. They do not render the making of -aggressive war a crime, but their milder terms were as readily broken as -more severe agreements. - -On 29 July, 1899, Germany, Greece, Serbia, and 25 other nations signed a -convention (_TC-1_). Germany ratified the convention on 4 September -1900, Serbia on the 11 May 1901, Greece on the 4 April 1901. - -By Article 12 of the treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated -Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, signed at the St. -Germaine-en-Laye on 10 September 1919, the new Kingdom succeeded to all -the old Serbian treaties, and later changed its name to Yugoslavia. - -The first two articles of this Hague Convention read: - - “Article 1: With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse - to force in the relations between states, the signatory powers - agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement - of International differences. - - “Article 2: In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before - an appeal to arms the signatory powers agree to have recourse, - as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation - of one or more friendly powers.” (_TC-1_) - -B. _Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, -signed at the Hague on 18 October 1907._ - -This Convention (_TC-2_) was signed at the Hague by 44 nations, and it -is in effect as to 31 nations, 28 signatories, and three adherents. For -present purposes it is in force as to the United States, Belgium, -Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Japan, -Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Russia. - -By the provisions of Article 91 it replaces the 1899 Convention as -between the contracting powers. As Greece and Yugoslavia are parties to -the 1899 convention and not to the 1907, the 1899 Convention is in -effect with regard to them, and that explains the division of countries -in Appendix C. - -The first article of this treaty reads: - - “1: With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to - force in the relations between States, the contracting powers - agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement - of international differences.” (_TC-2_) - -C. _Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, signed at the -Hague on 18 October 1907._ - -This Convention (_TC-3_) applies to Germany, Poland, Norway, Denmark, -Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Russia. It relates to a -procedural step in notifying one’s prospective opponent before opening -hostilities against him. It appears, to have had its immediate origin in -the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, when Japan attacked Russia without any -previous warning. It will be noted that it does not fix any particular -lapse of time between the giving of notice and the commencement of -hostilities, but it does seek to maintain an absolutely minimum standard -of International decency before the outbreak of war. - -The first article of this treaty reads: - - “The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between them - must not commence without a previous and explicit warning in the - form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an - ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.” (_TC-3_) - -D. _Convention 5, Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and -Persons in Case of War on Land, signed at the Hague on 18 October 1907._ - -Germany was an original signatory to this Convention (_TC-4_), and the -treaty is in force as a result of ratification or adherence between -Germany and Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the -USSR, and the United States. - -Article 1 reads: - - “The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.” (_TC-4_) - -A point arises on this Convention. Under Article 20, the provisions of -the present Convention do not apply except between the contracting -powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the -Convention. - -As Great Britain and France entered the war within two days of the -outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, and one of these powers -had not ratified the Convention, it is arguable that its provisions did -not apply to the Second World War. - -Since there are many more important treaties to be considered, the -charge will not be pressed that this treaty was likewise breached. The -terms of Article 1 are cited merely as showing the state of -International opinion at the time, and as an element in the aggressive -character of the war. - -E. _Treaty of Peace between the Allies and the Associated Powers of -Germany, signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919._ - -Part I of this treaty (_TC-5 thru TC-10_) contains the Covenant of the -League of Nations, and Part II sets the boundaries of Germany in Europe. -These boundaries are described in detail. Part II makes no provision for -guaranteeing these boundaries. Part III, Articles 31 to 117, contains -the political clauses for Europe. In it, Germany guarantees certain -territorial boundaries in Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Czechoslovakia, -France, Poland, Memel, Danzig, etc. - -This treaty is interwoven with the next, which is the Treaty of -Restoration of Friendly Relations between the United States and Germany. -Parts I, II, and III of the Versailles Treaty are not included in the -United States Treaty. Parts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV -are all repeated _verbatim_ in the United States Treaty from the Treaty -of Versailles. This case is concerned with Part V, which are the -military, naval, and air clauses. Parts VII and XIII are not included in -the United States Treaty. - -(1) _Territorial Guarantees._ - -(_a_) _The Rhineland._ The first part with which this case is concerned -is Articles 42 to 44 dealing with the Rhineland (_TC-5_). These are -repeated in the Locarno Treaty. They read as follows: - - “Article 42: Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any - fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the - right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east - of the Rhine. - - “Article 43: In the area defined above the maintenance and the - assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and - military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all - permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden. - - “Article 44: In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the - provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as - committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the - present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the - world.” - -(The speech by Hitler on 7 March 1936, giving his account of the breach -of this treaty (_2289-PS_), is discussed in Section 2, _supra_.) - -(_b_) _Austria._ The next part of the Treaty deals with Austria: - - “Article 80: Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the - independence of Austria within the frontiers which may be fixed - in a treaty between that State and the principal Allied and - Associated powers; she agrees that this independence shall be - inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the - League of Nations.” (_TC-6_) - -(The proclamation of Hitler dealing with Austria (_TC-47_), is discussed -in Section 3 _supra_.) - -(_c_) _Memel._ Germany also gave guarantee with respect to Memel: - - “Germany renounces, in favor of the principal Allied and - Associated powers, all rights and title over the territories - included between the Baltic, the Northeastern frontier of East - Prussia as defined in Article 28 of Part II (Boundaries of - Germany) of the present treaty, and the former frontier between - Germany and Russia. Germany undertakes to accept the settlement - made by principal Allied and Associated powers in regard to - these territories, particularly insofar as concerns the - nationality of inhabitants.” (_TC-8_) - -The formal document by which Germany incorporated Memel into the Reich, -reads as follows: - - “The transfer Commissioner for the Memel territory, _Gauleiter - und Oberpraesident_ Erich Koch, effected on 3 April 1939, during - a conference at Memel, the final incorporation of the late Memel - territory into the National Socialist Party Gau of East Prussia - and into the state administration of the East Prussian - _Regierungsbezirk_ of Grunbinnen.” (_TC-53-A_) - -(_d_) _Danzig._ Article 100 of the treaty relates to Danzig: - - “Germany renounces, in favor of the principal Allied and - Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territory - comprised within the following limits * * * (The limits are set - out and are described in a German map attached to the Treaty.) - (_TC-9_) - -(_e_) _Czechoslovakia._ In Article 81, Germany made pledges regarding -Czechoslovakia: - - “Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the - Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete - independence of the Czechoslovak State, which will include the - autonomous territory of the Ruthenians to the South of the - Carpathians. Germany hereby recognizes the frontiers of this - State as determined by the principal Allied and Associated - Powers and other interested states.” (_TC-7_) - -Captured minutes of the German Foreign Office record in detail the -conference between Hitler and President Hacha, and Foreign Minister -Chvalkowsky of Czechoslovakia, at which Goering and Keitel were present -(_2798-PS_). The agreement subsequently signed by Hitler and Ribbentrop -for Germany, and by Dr. Hacha and Dr. Chvalkowsky for Czechoslovakia, -reads as follows: - - “Text of the Agreement between the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor - Adolf Hitler and the President of the Czechoslovak State, Dr. - Hacha. - - “The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor today received in Berlin, at - their own request, the President of the Czechoslovak State, Dr. - Hacha, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Chvalkowsky, - in the presence of Herr Von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of - the Reich. At this meeting the serious situation which had - arisen within the previous territory of Czechoslovakia owing to - the events of recent weeks, was subjected to a completely open - examination. The conviction was unanimously expressed on both - sides that the object of all their efforts must be to assure - quiet, order and peace in this part of Central Europe. The - President of the Czechoslovak State declared that, in order to - serve this end and to reach a final pacification, he confidently - placed the fate of the Czech people and of their country in the - hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich. The Fuehrer accepted - this declaration and expressed his decision to assure to the - Czech people, under the protection of the German Reich, the - autonomous development of their national life in accordance with - their special characteristics. In witness whereof this document - is signed in duplicate.” (_TC-49_) - -Hitler’s proclamation to the German people, dated 15 March 1939, reads -as follows: - - “Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the German people, 15 March - 1939. - - “To the German People: - - “Only a few months ago Germany was compelled to protect her - fellow-countrymen, living in well-defined settlements, against - the unbearable Czechoslovakian terror regime; and during the - last weeks the same thing has happened on an ever-increasing - scale. This is bound to create an intolerable state of affairs - within an area inhabited by citizens of so many nationalities. - - “These national groups, to counteract the renewed attacks - against their freedom and life, have now broken away from the - Prague Government. Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist. - - “Since Sunday at many places wild excesses have broken out, - amongst the victims of which are again many Germans. Hourly the - number of oppressed and persecuted people crying for help is - increasing. From areas thickly populated by German-speaking - inhabitants, which last autumn Czechoslovakia was allowed by - German generosity to retain, refugees robbed of their personal - belongings are streaming into the Reich. - - “Continuation of such a state of affairs would lead to the - destruction of every vestige of order in an area in which - Germany is vitally interested particularly as for over one - thousand years it formed a part of the German Reich. - - “In order definitely to remove this menace to peace and to - create the conditions for a necessary new order in this living - space, I have today resolved to allow German troops to march - into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terror gangs and - the Czechoslovakian forces supporting them, and protect the - lives of all who are menaced. Thus they will lay the foundations - for introducing a fundamental reordering of affairs which will - be in accordance with the 1,000-year old history and will - satisfy the practical needs of the German and Czech peoples”. - (_TC-50_) - -A footnote contains an order of the Fuehrer to the German armed forces -of the same date, in which they are told to march in to safeguard lives -and property of all inhabitants and not to conduct themselves as -enemies, but as an instrument for carrying out the German Reich -Government’s decision. (_TC-50_) - -Next came the decree establishing the Protectorate of Bohemia and -Moravia. (_TC-51_) - -In a communication from Foreign Minister Halifax to Sir Neville -Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, the British Government -protested against these actions: - - “Foreign Office, March 17, 1939: - - “Please inform German Government that His Majesty’s Government - desire to make it plain to them that they cannot but regard the - events of the past few days as a complete repudiation of the - Munich Agreement and a denial of the spirit in which the - negotiators of that Agreement bound themselves to cooperate for - a peaceful settlement. - - “His Majesty’s Government must also take this occasion to - protest against the changes effected in Czechoslovakia by German - military action, which are, in their view, devoid of any basis - of legality.” (_TC-52_) - -The French Government also made a protest on the same date: - - “* * * The French Ambassador has the honor to inform the - Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich of the formal protest - made by the Government of the French Republic against the - measures which the communication of Count de Welzeck records. - - “The Government of the Republic consider, in fact, that in face - of the action directed by the German Government against - Czechoslovakia, they are confronted with a flagrant violation of - the letter and the spirit of the agreement signed at Munich on - September 9, 1938. - - “The circumstances in which the agreements of March 15 have been - imposed on the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic do not, in - the eyes of the Government of the Republic, legalize the - situation registered in that agreement. - - “The French Ambassador has the honor to inform His Excellency, - the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, that the - Government of the Republic can not recognize under these - conditions the legality of the new situation created in - Czechoslovakia by the action of the German Reich.” (_TC-53_) - -(2) _Armament Limitations._ Part V of the Treaty, containing Military, -Naval and Air Clauses reads as follows: - - “In order to render possible the initiation of a general - limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes - strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which - follow. - - “Section 1. Military Clauses. Effectives and Cadres of the - German Army * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “Article 159. The German military forces shall be demobilized - and reduced as prescribed hereinafter. - - “Article 160. By a date which must not be later than March 31, - 1920, the German Army must not comprise more than seven - divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry. - - “After that date, the total number of effectives in the army of - the States constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000 men, - including officers and establishments of depots. The army shall - be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the - territory and to the control of the frontier. - - “The total effective strength of officers, including the - personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed - 4,000.” - - * * * * * * - - (2) “Divisions and Army Corps headquarters staffs, shall be - organized in accordance with Table Number 1 annexed to this - Section. The number and strength of units of infantry, - artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down in - the aforesaid table constitute maxima which must not be - exceeded.” - - * * * * * * - - “The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped or - of other organizations for the command of troops or for - preparation for war is forbidden. - - “The great German General Staff and all similar organizations - shall be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.” - (_TC-10_) - -Article 163 provides the steps by which the reduction will take place. -Chapter 2 which deals with armament, provides that up till the time at -which Germany is admitted as a member of the League of Nations, the -armaments shall not be greater than the amount fixed in Table Number 11. -In other words, Germany agrees that after she has become a member of the -League of Nations, the armaments fixed in the said table shall remain in -force until they are modified by the Council of the League of Nations. -Furthermore, she hereby agrees strictly to observe the decisions of the -Council of the League on this subject. (_TC-10_) - -Article 168 reads: - - “The manufacture of arms, munitions or any war material shall - only be carried out in factories or works, the location of which - shall be communicated to and approved by the governments of the - Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the number of which - they retain the right to restrict. * * *” (_TC-10_) - -Article 173, under the heading “Recruiting and Military Training”, deals -with one matter, the breach of which is of great importance: - - “Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in - Germany. The German Army may only be reconstituted and recruited - by means of voluntary enlistment.” (_TC-10_) - -The succeeding articles deal with the method of enlistment in order to -prevent a quick rush through the army of men enlisted for a short time. - -Article 180 provides: - - “All fortified works, fortresses and field works situated in - German territory to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to - the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled. * * *” - (_TC-10_) - -Article 181 contains naval limitations: - - “After a period of two months from the coming into force of the - present Treaty the German naval forces in commission must not - exceed: - - Six battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type - - Six light cruisers - - Twelve destroyers - - Twelve torpedo boats - - or an equal number of ships constructed to replace them as - provided in Article 190. - - “No submarines are to be included. - - “All other warships, except where there is provision to the - contrary in the present Treaty, must be placed in reserve or - devoted to commercial purposes.” (_TC-10_) - -Article 183 limits naval personnel to fifteen thousand, including -officers and men of all grades and corps. - -Article 191 provides: - - “The construction or acquisition of any submarines, even for - commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany.” (_TC-10_) - -Article 198, the first of the Air Clauses, commences: - - “The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or - naval air forces.” (_TC-10_) - -The formal statement made at the German Air Ministry about the -reinauguration of the Air Corps is reproduced in _TC-44_. The public -proclamation of compulsory military service is contained in _TC-45_. - -F. _Treaty between the United States and Germany Restoring Friendly -Relations._ - -The purpose of this treaty (_TC-11_) was to complete the official -cessation of hostilities between the United States of America and -Germany; it also incorporated certain parts of the Treaty of Versailles. -The relevant portion is Part 5, which repeats the clauses of the Treaty -of Versailles which have been discussed immediately above. - -G. _Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great -Britain, and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925._ - -Several treaties were negotiated at Locarno; they all go together and -are to a certain extent mutually dependent. At Locarno, Germany -negotiated five treaties: (_a_) the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between -Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy (_TC-12_); (_b_) the -Arbitration Convention between Germany and France; (_c_) the Arbitration -Convention between Germany and Belgium; (_d_) the Arbitration Treaty -between Germany and Poland; and (_e_) an Arbitration Treaty between -Germany and Czechoslovakia. - -Article 10 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (_TC-12_) provided that it -should come into force as soon as ratifications were deposited at Geneva -in the archives of the League of Nations, and as soon as Germany became -a member of the League of Nations. The ratifications were deposited on -14 September 1926, and Germany became a member of the League of Nations. - -The two arbitration conventions and the two arbitration treaties -provided that they shall enter into force under the same conditions as -the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. (Article 21 of the arbitration -conventions and Article 22 of the arbitration treaties.) - -The most important of the five agreements is the Treaty of Mutual -Guarantee (_TC-12_). One of the purposes was to establish in perpetuity -the borders between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France. It -contains no provision for denunciation or withdrawal therefrom and -provides that it shall remain in force until the Council of the League -of Nations decides that the League of Nations ensures sufficient -protection to the parties to the Treaty—an event which never happened -in which case the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee shall expire one year -later. - -The general scheme of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is that Article 1 -provides that the parties guarantee three things: the border between -Germany and France, the border between Germany and Belgium, and the -demilitarization of the Rhineland. - -Article 2 provides that Germany and France, and Germany and Belgium -agree that they will not attack or invade each other, with certain -inapplicable exceptions; and Article 3 provides that Germany and France, -and Germany and Belgium agree to settle all disputes between them by -peaceful means. (_TC-12_) - -The first important violation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee appears -to have been the entry of German troops into the Rhineland on 7 March -1936. The day after, France and Belgium asked the League of Nations -Council to consider the question of the German reoccupation of the -Rhineland and the purported repudiation of the treaty. On 12 March, -after a protest from the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Belgium, -France, Great Britain, and Italy recognized unanimously that the -reoccupation was a violation of this treaty. On 14 March, the League -Council duly and properly decided that reoccupation was not permissible -and that the Rhineland clauses of the pact were not voidable by Germany -because of the alleged violation by France in the Franco-Soviet Mutual -Assistance Pact. - -That is the background to the treaty. The relevant articles are 1, 2, -and 3, already mentioned; 4, which provides for the bringing of -violations before the Council of the League, as was done; and 5, which -deals with the clauses of the Versailles Treaty already mentioned. It -provides: - - “The provisions of Article 3 of the present Treaty are placed - under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as provided - by the following stipulations: - - “If one of the Powers referred to in Article 3 refuses to submit - a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral - or judicial decision and commits a violation of Article 2 of the - present Treaty or a breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of - Versailles, the provisions of Article 4 of the present Treaty - shall apply.” (_TC-12_) - -That is the procedure requiring reference to the League in the case of a -flagrant breach or of more stringent action. - -It may be recalled that Hitler had promised that the German Government -would scrupulously maintain their treaties voluntarily signed, even -though they were concluded before Hitler’s accession to power. No one -has ever argued that Stresemann was in any way acting involuntarily when -he signed this Locarno Pact on behalf of Germany, along with the other -representatives. (The signature is not in Stresemann’s name, but by Herr -Hans Luther.) This treaty, which repeats the violated provisions of the -Versailles Treaty, was freely entered into and binds Germany in that -regard. Article 8 deals with the preliminary enforcement of the Treaty -by the League: - - “The present Treaty shall be registered at the League of Nations - in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It shall remain - in force until the Council, acting on a request of one or other - of the High Contracting Parties notified to the other signatory - Powers three months in advance, and voting at least by a - two-thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures - sufficient protection to the High Contracting Parties; the - Treaty shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period - of one year from such decision.” (_TC-12_) - -Thus, in signing this Treaty, the German representative clearly placed -the question of repudiation or violation of the Treaty in the hands of -others. Germany was at the time a member of the League, and a member in -the Council of the League. Germany left the question of repudiation or -violations to the decision of the League. - -H. _Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, signed at -Locarno in October 1925._ - -Article I is the governing clause of this treaty (_TC-14_). It provides: - - “All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia - with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to their - respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle - amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted - for decision either to an arbitral tribunal, or to the Permanent - Court of International Justice as laid down hereafter. It is - agreed that the disputes referred to above include, in - particular, those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the - League of Nations. This provision does not apply to disputes - arising out of or prior to the present Treaty and belonging to - the past. Disputes for the settlement of which a special - procedure is laid down on other conventions in force between the - High Contracting Parties, shall be settled in conformity with - the provisions of those Conventions.” - -This treaty was registered with the Secretariat of the League in -accordance with Article 22, the second sentence of which shows that the -Treaty was entered into and its terms in force under the same conditions -as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. (_TC-12_) - -This is the Treaty to which President Benes unsuccessfully appealed -during the crisis in the Autumn of 1938. - -I. _Arbitration Convention Between Germany and Belgium, signed at -Locarno, October 1925._ - -(This treaty, _TC-13_, is discussed in Section 10 of this chapter -dealing with the invasion of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg.) - -J. _Arbitration Treaty Between Germany and Poland, signed at Locarno, 16 -October 1925._ - -(This treaty, _TC-15_, is discussed in Section 8 of this chapter dealing -with the invasion of Poland.) - -K. _Declaration of the Assembly of the League of Nations of 24 September -1927._ - -Germany had become a member of the League of Nations on 10 September -1926, a year before this Declaration was made. - -The importance of this Declaration is not only its effect on -International Law, but to the fact that it was unanimously adopted by -the Assembly of the League of Nations, of which Germany was a free and -active member at the time. Referring to the unanimous adoption of the -Declaration, M. Sokal, the Polish Rapporteur, had this to say: - - “The Committee was of opinion that, at the present juncture, a - solemn resolution passed by the Assembly, declaring that wars of - aggression must never be employed as a means of settling - disputes between States, and that such wars constitute an - international crime, would have a salutary effect on public - opinion, and would help to create an atmosphere favorable to the - League’s future work in the matter of security and disarmament. - - “While recognizing that the draft resolution does not constitute - a regular legal instrument, which would be adequate in itself - and represent a concrete contribution towards security, the - Third Committee unanimously agreed as to its great moral and - educative value.” (_TC-18_) - -M. Sokal then asked the Assembly to adopt the draft resolution, the -terms of which show what so many nations, including Germany, had in mind -at that time. The resolution recited that the Assembly— - - “* * * recognizing the solidarity which unites the community of - nations, being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of - general peace, being convinced that a war of aggression can - never serve as a means of settling international disputes, and - in consequence an international crime; considering that the - solemn renunciation of all wars of aggression would tend to - create an atmosphere of general confidence calculated to - facilitate the progress of the work undertaken with a view to - disarmament: - - “Declares: 1. That all wars of aggression are and shall always - be prohibited. - - “2. That every pacific means must be employed to settle disputes - of every description, which may arise between States. - - “That the Assembly declares that the States Members of the - League are under an obligation to conform to these principles.” - (_TC-18_) - -The fact of the solemn renunciation of war was taken in the form of a -roll call, and the President announced that: - - “All the delegations having pronounced in favour of the - declaration submitted by the Third Committee, I declare it - unanimously adopted.” (_TC-18_) - -L. _The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928._ - -(This treaty, _TC-19_, is discussed in Sir Hartley Shawcross’s opening -address for Great Britain, to be found in Section 5, _supra_.) - -M. _Assurances._ - -(1) _Austria._ On 21 May 1935 Hitler made a speech containing this -assurance: - - “Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the domestic - affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to attach that country - to her. The German people and the German Government have, - however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of the - simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent, - that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed not - only to foreign nations, but to the German people everywhere. - - “I myself believe that no regime which is not anchored in the - people, supported by the people, and desired by the people, can - exist permanently.” (_TC-26_) - -Similarly, in the Agreement between the German Government and the -Government of the Federal State of Austria, on July 11, 1936, paragraph -one stated as follows: - - “The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the - Federal State of Austria in the sense of the pronouncements of - the German Leader and Chancellor of the 21st May, 1935.” - (_TC-22_) - -(2) _Czechoslovakia._ The German Assurance to Czechoslovakia is -contained in the letter from M. Jan Masaryk to Viscount Halifax on the -date of 12 March 1938 (_TC-27_). The first paragraph shows that Field -Marshall Goering used the expression “_Ich gebe Ihnen Mein Ehrenwort_.” -That means, “I give my word of honor.” The third paragraph shows that -Goering had asked that there would not be a mobilization of the -Czechoslovak Army. The fourth paragraph reads: - - “M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding - assurances on this subject, and today he spoke with Baron von - Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on behalf of Herr - Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the - German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno - in October 1925.” (_TC-27_) - -So that in 1935 Baron von Neurath was speaking on behalf of Germany on -an agreement voluntarily concluded. Had there been the slightest doubt -of that question, von Neurath gave the assurance on behalf of Hitler -that Germany still considered itself bound by the German-Czechoslovakia -Arbitration Convention on the 12 March 1938, six months before Dr. Benes -made a hopeless appeal to it before the crisis in the Army in 1938. - -Czechoslovakia’s difficult position is set out in the pregnant last -paragraph: - - “They can not however fail to view with great apprehension the - sequel of events in Austria between the date of the bi-lateral - agreement between Germany and Austria, 11 July 1936, and - yesterday, 11 March 1938.” (_TC-27_) - -On 26 September 1938, Hitler made an assurance to Czechoslovakia which -contains important points as to the alleged German policy of getting -Germans together in the Reich, for which the Nazi conspirators had -purported to request a considerable time: - - “I have a little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain - for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German - people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I - can not go back beyond the limits of our patience.” (_TC-28_) - -(This occurred between the Godesberg Treaty and the Munich Pact). - - “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this - problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for - Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the - moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to - say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their - other minorities peacefully, and without oppression, I will no - longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I - am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs. But - I must also declare before the German people that in the - Sudeten-German problem my patience is now at an end. I made an - offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the realization of - what he had already promised. He now has peace or war in his - hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the - Germans their freedom, or we will get this freedom for - ourselves.” (_TC-28_) - -The Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938 (_TC-23_) was signed by -Hitler, later by Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Daladier, and Mussolini. It is -largely a procedural agreement by which the entry of German troops into -Sudeten-Deutsche territory is regulated. That is shown by the -preliminary clause: - - “Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into - consideration the agreement which has been already reached in - principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten-German - territory have agreed on the following terms and conditions - governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, - and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for - the steps necessary to secure fulfillment.” (_TC-23_) - -Article 4 states that “The occupation by stages of the predominantly -German territory by German troops will begin on 1 October.” The four -territories are marked on the attached map. Article 6 provides that “The -final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the -international commission.” (_TC-23_) - -The agreement provides also for various rights of option and release -from the Czech forces of Sudeten-Germans (TC-23). That was what Hitler -was asking for in the somewhat rhetorical passage previously referred to -(_TC-28_). - -There is an annex to the Munich Agreement which is most significant: - - “Annex to the Agreement: - - “His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the French - Government have entered into the above Agreement on the basis - that they stand by the offer contained in Paragraph 6 of the - Anglo-French Proposal of the 19th September, relating to an - international guarantee of the new boundaries of the - Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. - - “When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in - Czechoslovakia has been settled Germany and Italy, for their - part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.” (_TC-23_) - -The provision concerns “the Polish and Hungarian minorities,” not the -question of Slovakia. That is why that the German action of the 15th of -March was a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of that -Agreement. (For fuller discussion see Section 4 of this Chapter relating -to aggression against Czechoslovakia.) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO TREATY VIOLATIONS - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections V; VI; │ │ 29, 30, - │ Appendix C. │ I │ 73 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ -*2289-PS │Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag, 7 │ │ - │March 1936, published in Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Berlin Edition, No. 68, 8 │ │ - │March 1936. (USA 56) │ IV │ 994 - │ │ │ -*2798-PS │German Foreign Office minutes of the │ │ - │meeting between Hitler and President │ │ - │Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1939. │ │ - │(USA 118; GB 5) │ V │ 433 - │ │ │ -*TC-1 │Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement │ │ - │of International Disputes signed at The │ │ - │Hague, 29 July 1899. (GB 1) │ VIII │ 273 - │ │ │ -*TC-2 │Hague Convention (1) for Pacific │ │ - │Settlement of International │ │ - │Disputes—1907. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 276 - │ │ │ -*TC-3 │Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening│ │ - │of Hostilities. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 279 - │ │ │ -*TC-4 │Hague Convention (5) Respecting Rights │ │ - │and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons│ │ - │in War on Land. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 282 - │ │ │ -*TC-5 │Versailles Treaty, Article 42-44. (GB 3)│ VIII │ 288 - │ │ │ -*TC-6 │Versailles Treaty, Section VI, Article │ │ - │80, Austria. (GB 3) │ VIII │ 289 - │ │ │ -*TC-7 │Versailles Treaty, Section VII, Article │ │ - │81, Czecho-Slovak State. (GB 3) │ VIII │ 289 - │ │ │ -*TC-8 │Versailles Treaty, Section X, Article │ │ - │99, Memel. (GB 3) │ VIII │ 289 - │ │ │ -*TC-9 │Versailles Treaty, Section XI, Article │ │ - │100, Free City of Danzig. (GB 3) │ VIII │ 290 - │ │ │ -*TC-10 │Versailles Treaty, Part V, Military, │ │ - │Naval and Air Clauses. (GB 3) │ VIII │ 291 - │ │ │ -*TC-11 │Treaty between the United States and │ │ - │Germany restoring friendly relations, 25│ │ - │August 1921. (USA 12) │ VIII │ 308 - │ │ │ -*TC-12 │Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between │ │ - │Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain │ │ - │and Italy, done at Locarno, 16 October │ │ - │1925. (GB 13) │ VIII │ 313 - │ │ │ -*TC-13 │Arbitration Convention between Germany │ │ - │and Belgium at Locarno, 16 October 1925.│ │ - │(GB 15) │ VIII │ 320 - │ │ │ -*TC-14 │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and │ │ - │Czechoslovakia, signed at Locarno, 16 │ │ - │October 1925. (GB 14) │ VIII │ 325 - │ │ │ -*TC-15 │Arbitration. Treaty between Germany and │ │ - │Poland at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB │ │ - │16) │ VIII │ 331 - │ │ │ -*TC-18 │Declaration concerning wars of │ │ - │aggression; resolution of 3rd Committee │ │ - │of League of Nations, 24 September 1927.│ │ - │(GB 17) │ VIII │ 357 - │ │ │ -*TC-19 │Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp. │ │ - │97-101. (GB 18) │ VIII │ 359 - │ │ │ -*TC-21 │German-Polish Declaration, 26 January │ │ - │1934. (GB 24) │ VIII │ 368 - │ │ │ -*TC-22 │Agreement between Austria and German │ │ - │Government and Government of Federal │ │ - │State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB 20) │ VIII │ 369 - │ │ │ -*TC-23 │Agreement between Germany, the United │ │ - │Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 September │ │ - │1938. (GB 23) │ VIII │ 370 - │ │ │ -*TC-25 │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany │ │ - │and USSR and announcement of 25 │ │ - │September 1939 relating to it. (GB 145) │ VIII │ 375 - │ │ │ -*TC-26 │German assurance to Austria, 21 May │ │ - │1935, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ - │Part III, p. 94. (GB 19) │ VIII │ 376 - │ │ │ -*TC-27 │German assurances to Czechoslovakia, 11 │ │ - │and 12 March 1938, as reported by M. │ │ - │Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister to │ │ - │London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21) │ VIII │ 377 - │ │ │ -*TC-28 │German assurance to Czechoslovakia, 26 │ │ - │September 1938, from Documents of German│ │ - │Politics, Part VI, pp. 345-346. (GB 22) │ VIII │ 378 - │ │ │ -*TC-44 │Notice by German government of existence│ │ - │of German Air Force, 9 March 1935. (GB │ │ - │11) │ VIII │ 386 - │ │ │ - TC-45 │Proclamation to German People of 16 │ │ - │March 1935. │ VIII │ 388 - │ │ │ - TC-46 │German memorandum to Signatories of │ │ - │Locarno Pact reasserting full German │ │ - │sovereignty over Rhineland, 7 March │ │ - │1936. │ VIII │ 394 - │ │ │ - TC-47 │Hitler’s Proclamation of Invasion of │ │ - │Austria, 12 March 1938. │ VIII │ 398 - │ │ │ -*TC-49 │Agreement with Czechoslovakia, 15 March │ │ - │1939, signed by Hitler, von Ribbentrop, │ │ - │Hacha and Chvalkovsky, from Documents of│ │ - │German Politics, Part VII, pp. 498-499. │ │ - │(GB 6) │ VIII │ 402 - │ │ │ -*TC-50 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the │ │ - │German people and Order of the Fuehrer │ │ - │to the Wehrmacht, 15 March 1939, from │ │ - │Documents of German Politics, Part VII, │ │ - │pp. 499-501. (GB 7) │ VIII │ 402 - │ │ │ -*TC-51 │Decree establishing the Protectorate of │ │ - │Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939. (GB │ │ - │8) │ VIII │ 404 - │ │ │ -*TC-52 │Formal British protest against the │ │ - │annexation of Czechoslovakia in │ │ - │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 │ │ - │March 1939. (GB 9) │ VIII │ 407 - │ │ │ -*TC-53 │Formal French protest against the │ │ - │annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in │ │ - │violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 │ │ - │March 1939. (GB 10) │ VIII │ 407 - │ │ │ -*TC-53-A │Marginal note to decree of final │ │ - │incorporation of Memel with German │ │ - │Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents of │ │ - │German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. (GB │ │ - │4) │ VIII │ 408 - │ │ │ -*TC-54 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to German │ │ - │Armed Forces, 1 September 1939. (GB 73) │ VIII │ 408 - │ │ │ -*TC-54-A │“Danzig’s return to the Reich”, from │ │ - │Documents of German Politics, Part VII, │ │ - │p. 575. (GB 73) │ VIII │ 409 - │ │ │ - TC-62 │German declaration of war on U.S.A., 11 │ │ - │December 1941, from Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Part IV, p. 497. │ VIII │ 432 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ - │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ - │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782 - - - 8. AGGRESSION AGAINST POLAND, DANZIG, ENGLAND - AND FRANCE - -A. _Treaties Breached._ - -In addition to the general treaties involved—The Hague Convention in -respect of the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (_TC-2_); -other Hague Conventions of 1907 (_TC-3_; _TC-4_); the Versailles Treaty -(_TC-9_) in respect of the Free City of Danzig; and the Kellogg-Briand -Pact (_TC-19_)—two specific agreements were violated by the German -attack on Poland. These were the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and -Poland, signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925, and the Declaration of -Non-Aggression which was entered into between Germany and Poland on 26 -January 1934. - -The German-Polish Arbitration Treaty (_TC-15_) declares in the preamble -and Articles 1 and 2: - - “The President of the German Empire and the President of the - Polish Republic: - - “Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland - by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might - arise between the two countries; - - “Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or - resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for - international tribunals; - - “Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State cannot be - modified save with its consent; - - “And considering that sincere observance of the methods of - peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of - resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become - the cause of division between States; - - “Have decided . . .” - - “Article 1: All disputes of every kind between Germany and - Poland with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to - their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to - settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be - submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the - Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down - hereafter.” - - “Article 2: Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure - before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute - may, by agreement between the Parties, be submitted, with a view - to amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission, - styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in - accordance with the present Treaty.” (_TC-15_) - -Thereafter the treaty goes on to lay down the procedure for arbitration -and for conciliation. Germany, however, in September 1939 attacked and -invaded Poland without having first attempted to settle its disputes -with Poland by peaceful means. - -The second specific treaty, the German-Polish Declaration of 26 January -1934, reads in part: - - “The German Government and the Polish Government consider that - the time has come to introduce a new era in the political - relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding - between the States. They have therefore decided to establish by - the present declaration a basis for the future shaping of those - relations. - - “The two Governments assume that the maintenance and assurance - of a permanent peace between their countries is an essential - condition for general peace in Europe.” - - * * * * * * - - “The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of ten - years counting from the day of exchange of instruments of - ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two - governments six months before the expiration of that period of - time, it shall continue in effect but can then be denounced by - either government at a time of six months and at any time in - advance.” (TC-21) - -B. _German Intentions Before March 1939._ - -It has been previously shown that the actions against Austria and -Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the preparation for further -aggression. Even at that time, before the Germans had seized the whole -of Czechoslovakia, they were perfectly prepared to fight England, -Poland, and France, if necessary, to achieve those aims. They -appreciated the whole time that they might well have to do so. -Furthermore, although not until after March 1939, did they commence upon -their immediate and specific preparations for a specific war against -Poland, nevertheless, they had for a considerable time before had it in -mind specifically to attack Poland once Czechoslovakia was completely -theirs. - -During this period also—and this happens throughout the whole story of -the Nazi regime in Germany—as afterwards, while they were making their -preparations and carrying out their plans, they were giving to the -outside world assurance after assurance so as to lull them out of any -suspicion of their real object. - -When the agreement with Poland was signed in January 1934, Hitler had -this to say: - - “When I took over the Government on the 30th of January, the - relations between the two countries seemed to me more than - unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing differences - which were due to the Territorial Clauses of the Treaty of - Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom would - gradually crystalize into a state of hostility which, if - persisted, might too easily acquire the character of a dangerous - traditional enmity.” - - * * * * * * - - “In the spirit of this Treaty the German Government is willing - and prepared to cultivate economic relations with Poland in such - a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable suspicion can be - succeeded by a period of useful cooperation. It is a matter of - particular satisfaction to us that in this same year the - National Socialist Government of Danzig has been enabled to - effect a similar clarification of its relations with its Polish - neighbor.” (_TC-70_) - -That was in 1934. Three years later, again on 30 January, speaking in -the Reichstag, Hitler said: - - “By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tension - and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the - European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland - which has worked out to the advantage of both sides. True - statesmanship will not overlook reality but consider them. The - Italian nation and the new Italian state are realities. The - German nation and the German Reich are equally realities, and to - my own fellow citizens I would say that the Polish nation and - the Polish state have also become a reality.” (_2868-PS_) - -That was on 30 January 1937. - -On 24 June 1937, a “Top Secret Order (_C-175_) was issued by the Reich -Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, signed “Von -Blomberg”. There is the notation at the top, “Written by an Officer. -Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it in -principle are to be written by an officer.” With it is enclosed a -Directive for the Unified Preparation for War of the Armed Forces, to -come into force on 1 August 1937. The enclosed directive is divided into -Part 1, “General Guiding Principle”; Part 2, “Likely Warlike -Eventualities”; Part 3, “Special Preparations”. The substance of the -document justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an -attack from any side. - -The second paragraph states: - - “* * * The intention to unleash a European war is held just as - little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world - situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands - a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces. - - “To counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military - exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they - occur.” (_C-175_) - -The preparations which are to be made are then set forth: - - “* * * The further working on mobilization without public - announcement in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to - begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength - and time.” - - * * * * * * - - “Special preparations are to be made for the following - eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike - entanglement with Red Spain.” (_C-175_) - -Another passage shows clearly how they appreciated at that time that -their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve them -in war. - - “* * * England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against - us.” (_C-175_) - -Part 2 of this directive, dealing with “Probable warlike -eventualities—Concentrations,” states: - - “1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West. - - “Suppositions. In the West France is the opponent. Belgium may - side with France, either at once or later or not at all. It is - also possible that France may violate Belgium’s neutrality if - the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of - Luxembourg.” (_C-175_) - -Part 3, which deals in part with “Special Case—Extension Red-Green,” -declares: - - “The military political starting point used as a basis for - concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either - England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our opponents. - Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an - unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will - therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above - all England and Poland.” (_C-175_) - -The date of this order is June 1937, and it seems clear that at that -date, anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the -probability, of fighting England and Poland and France, and were -prepared to do so. On 5 November 1937, Hitler held his conference in the -Reichschancellery, the minutes of which, referred to as the Hossbach -notes, contain the remarks made by Hitler in respect of England, Poland, -and France: - - “The Fuehrer then stated: ‘The aim of German policy is the - security and preservation of the nation and its propagation. - This is consequently a problem of space’.” (_386-PS_) - -Hitler then went on to discuss what he described as “participation in -world economy”, and declared: - - “The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the - securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times - has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of - nations.” (_386-PS_) - - * * * * * * - - “The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has - proved that every space expansion can only be effected by - breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are - unavoidable. Neither formerly nor today has space been found - without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the - proprietor.” (_386-PS_) - -On the same day as this Hossbach meeting in the Reichschancellery was -taking place, a communique was being issued as a result of the Polish -ambassador’s audience with Hitler (_TC-73 No. 33_). In the course of -this conversation, the communique stated: - - “It was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet - with difficulty because of the Danzig question.” (_TC-73 No. - 33_) - -On 2 January 1938, some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the -Fuehrer. This document is headed, “Very Confidential—Personal Only”, -and is entitled “Deduction on the report, German Embassy, London, -regarding the future form of Anglo-German relations.” It states in part: - - “With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a - status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a - military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an - agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British - politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that - has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will - Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate - camps and will they march against each other one day? To answer - this question, one must realize the following: - - “Change of the status quo in the east in the German sense can - only be carried out by force. So long as France knows that - England, which so to speak has, taken on a guarantee to aid - France against Germany, is on her side, France’s fighting for - her eastern allies is probable in any case, always possible, and - thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies then - even if England does not want war. England, believing she must - attend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in - automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between - England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who - could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way - of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows therefore - that war between Germany and England on account of France can be - prevented only if France knows from the start that England’s - forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common - victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby - France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-France - coalition would never tolerate. - - “This position would arise for instance if England, through - insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by - a superior coalition of powers, e.g., Germany, Italy, Japan, - thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would - not be able to assure France of sufficient support in Europe:” - -The writer goes on to discuss the possibility of a strong partnership -between Italy and Japan, and then reaches a summary: - - “Paragraph five: Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us. - - “1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to - the protection of the interests of our friends. - - “2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted - tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a - tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan; also the - winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours - directly or indirectly. - - “Close and confidential cooperation of the diplomats of the - three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we - confront England be it in a settlement or in war. England is - going to be a hard, astute opponent in this game of diplomacy. - - “The particular question whether in the event of a war by - Germany in central Europe France and thereby England would - interfere, depends on the circumstances and the time at which - such a war commences and ceases, and on military considerations - which cannot be gone into here.” (_TC-75_) - -Whoever it was who wrote that document, appears to have been on a fairly -high level, because he concludes by saying, “I should like to give the -Fuehrer some of these viewpoints verbally.” (_TC-75_) - -On 20 February 1938, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag. In that speech he -said: - - “In the fifth year following the first great foreign political - agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification - to be able to state that in our relations with the state with - which we had had perhaps the greatest difference, not only has - there been a ‘detente,’ but in the course of the years there has - been a constant improvement in relations. This good work, which - was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood - the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations finally - gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed - a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, - this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European - peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State - respects the national conditions in this state, and both the - city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way - to an understanding has been successfully paved, an - understanding which beginning with Danzig has today, in spite of - the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally - taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and - Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly - cooperation. - - “To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone - unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for - the task which is ahead of us—peace.” (_2357-PS_) - -A memorandum dated 2 May 1938, and entitled, “Organizational Study -1950,” originated in the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff -of the General Staff of the Air Force. Its purpose was said to be: “The -task is to search, within a framework of very broadly-conceived -conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air -Force.” (_L-43_). The result gained is termed, “Distant Objective.” From -this is deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the -process, which is called, “Final Objective 1942.” This in turn yields -what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of -the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaus, Air Divisions, -etc. (_L-43_) - -The Table of Contents is divided into various sections. Section I is -entitled, “Assumptions.” In connection with the heading “Assumption I, -frontier of Germany”, a map is enclosed (_Chart No. 10_). The map shows -that on 2 May 1938 the Air Force was in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, -Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, all of which are shown as -within the boundaries of the Reich. - -The following is a pertinent extract from the memorandum: - - “Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of - the assumptions for war and peace made in Section 1: - - “1. Attack Forces: Principal adversaries: England, France, and - Russia.” (_L-43_) - -The study then goes on to show all the one hundred forty-four -_Geschwader_ employed against England, very much concentrated in the -Western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such -a way that by making full use of their range, they can reach all English -territory down to the last corner. Under the paragraph “Assumption” -double heading 2, the “Organization of Air Force in peacetime” is shown -and seven group commands are indicated: (1) Berlin; (2) Brunswick; (3) -Munich; (4) Vienna; (5) Budapest; (6) Warsaw; and (7) Koenigsberg. -(_L-43_) - -Finally, the study declares: - - “The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force - grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have - locally bound commands * * *” (_L-43_) - -The original of this document is signed by an officer who is not at the -top rank in the German Air Force, and the inferences that can be drawn -from it should therefore not be over-emphasized. At least, however, it -shows the lines upon which the General Staff of the Air Force were -thinking at that time. - -On the 26 August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister -succeeding von Neurath, a document was addressed to him as “The Reich -Minister, via the State Secretary.” The document reads as follows: - - “The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, - might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente. - Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding - Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to - herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and - through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, - suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have - to take place step by step and would have to lead to a loss of - power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an - annexation of territory. - - “The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any - immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and - not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. - Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be - plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the - desired developments. - - “For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present - of the right for autonomy of the Sudeten-Germans, which we have - intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. - The international conviction that the choice of nationality was - being withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework, - notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of - dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be - finally speeded up by the mechanical means as well. The fate of - the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be - clearly decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely - sealed. - - “This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be - recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is - unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of - boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and - northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact [is] that after - the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally - assumed that Poland will be the next in turn. - - “But the later this assumption sinks in in international - politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however, - it is important for the time being, to carry on the German - policy, under the well known and proved slogans of ‘the right to - autonomy’ and ‘Racial unity’. Anything else might be interpreted - as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our - plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically, - than our forces could stand up to.” (_TC-76_) - -That was on 26 August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was leading up to -the Munich settlement. While at Munich, a day or two before the Munich -agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. On 26 September he -said: - - “I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this - problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for - Germany in Europe.” (_TC-29_) - -A letter from Admiral Carl, dated some time in September, with no -precise date, and entitled “Opinion on the ‘Draft Study of Naval Warfare -against England’,” stated as follows: - - “There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.” - - * * * * * * - - “If according to the Fuehrer’s decision Germany is to acquire a - position as a world power who needs not only sufficient colonial - possessions but also secure naval communications and secure - access to the ocean.” (_C-23_) - -That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich agreement in -September 1938. The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the -Nazi Government had hoped and intended. As a result, the conspirators -were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive action -against Poland or elsewhere. But with the advantages that were gained by -the seizure of Czechoslovakia, it is obvious now that they intended and -had taken the decision to proceed against Poland so soon as -Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied. As Jodl and Hitler said on -subsequent occasions, Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for the -attack on Poland. - -It is known now from what Hitler said in talking to his military -commanders at a later date, that, in his own words, from the first he -never intended to abide by the Munich agreement, but that he had to have -the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed -in full force against Poland, after September 1938 they did at once -begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig until the whole of -Czechoslovakia had been taken in March. Immediately after the -Sudetenland had been occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up -trouble with Poland, which would and was to eventually lead to the Nazi -excuse or justification for their attack on that country. - -The earlier discussions between the German and Polish governments on the -question of Danzig, which commenced almost immediately after the Munich -crisis in September 1938, began as cautious and friendly discussions, -until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March -of the following year. A document taken from the Official Polish White -Book, gives an account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand -Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on 25 October, where Ribbentrop had discussions -with M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Germany. The report states: - - “In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at the Grand - Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von - Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of - issues (_Gesamtloesung_) between Poland and Germany. This - included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland - would be assured the retention of railway and economic - facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an - extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In - exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an - extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years - and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers.” - - * * * * * * - - “Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I - could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion - of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to - communicate the substance of this conversation to you.” (_TC-73 - No. 44_) - -It seems clear that the whole question of Danzig, as indeed Hitler -himself said, was no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as an -excuse, a justification, not for the seizure of Danzig but for the -invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland. As the story unfolds it -will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi conspirators -were really aiming at, only providing themselves with some kind of -crisis which would afford some kind of justification for attacking -Poland. - -Another document taken from the Polish White Book (_TC-73 No. 45_) sets -out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave to -Mr. Lipski to hand to the German government in reply to the suggestions -put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on 24 October. The first part -reviews the history of Polish-German relationship and emphasizes the -needs of Poland in respect to Danzig. Paragraph 6 of the document -states: - - “In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish - government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the - right of the German population of the city and the surrounding - villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that - in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is - connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the - majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely - bound up with Poland.” (_TC-73 No. 45_) - -The document then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the statute, -and continues as follows: - - “Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and - desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a - friendly understanding with the government of the German Reich, - the Polish government proposes the replacement of the League of - Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral - Polish-German Agreement. This agreement should guarantee the - existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of - national and cultural life to its German majority, and also - should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the - complications involved in such a system, the Polish government - must state that any other solution, and in particular any - attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must - inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form - of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of - Polish-German understanding in all its aspects. - - “In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am - ready to have final conversations personally with the governing - circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you - should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that - my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would - be dangerous for the future.” (_TC-73 No. 45_) - -The first stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful from -the German point of view. The Nazis had put forward a proposal, the -return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have -known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable and the Polish -government had warned the Nazi government that it would be. The Poles -had offered to enter into negotiations, but they had not agreed, which -is exactly what the German government had hoped for. They had not agreed -to the return of Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the -crisis had been accomplished. - -Shortly afterwards, within a week or so, and after the Polish government -had offered to enter into discussions with the German government, -another top secret order was issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed -Forces, signed by Keitel (_C-137_). Copies went to the OKH, OKM, and -OKW. The order is headed “First Supplement to Instruction dated 21 -October 1938,” and reads: - - “The Fuehrer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies - mentioned in the instructions of 21 October 1938, preparations - are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be - occupied by German troops by surprise. - - “The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condition - is _quasi-revolutionary_ occupation of Danzig, exploiting a - politically favorable situation, _not a war against Poland_.” - (_C-137_) - -The remainder of Czechoslovakia had not yet been seized, and therefore -the Nazis were not yet ready to go to war with Poland. But Keitel’s -order shows how the German government answered the Polish proposal to -enter into discussions. - -On 5 January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. (_TC-73 No. -48_). Ribbentrop was also present. In the first part of that -conversation, of which that document is an account, Hitler offered to -answer any questions. He said he had always followed the policy laid -down by the 1934 agreement. He discussed the question of Danzig and -emphasized that in the German view it must sooner or later return to -Germany. The conversation continued: - - “Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult - problem. He added that in the Chancellor’s suggestion he did not - see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish - opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest - spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this - matter. - - “In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this - problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite - new, some new form, for which he used the term ‘_Korperschaft_,’ - which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the - German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In - addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be - quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and - nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the - Polish Government.” (_TC-73 No. 48_) - -It will be recalled that in the previous document discussed (_C-137_) -orders had already been issued for preparations to be made for the -occupation of Danzig by surprise. Yet some six weeks later Hitler -assured the Polish Foreign Minister that there would be no fait accompli -and that he should be quite at his ease. - -On the day after the conversation between Beck and Hitler, Beck and -Ribbentrop conferred, as follows: - - “Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that - whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts - with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today for - the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in - regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the - Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement.” - - * * * * * * - - “In answer M. Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany - was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy - towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of - friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of - clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and - interests of the two parties concerned.” (_TC-73 No. 49_) - -Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with that one expression of good -faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, he was in Warsaw and -made another speech, of which the following is a pertinent extract: - - “In accordance with the resolute will of the German National - Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly - relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing - agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German - foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles - worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take - the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all - other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of - events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard - to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of - both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the - future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual - relations.” (_2530-PS_) - -Hitler spoke in the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, and gave further -assurances of the good faith of the German Government. (_TC-73 No. 57_) - -In March 1939 the remainder of Czechoslovakia was seized and the -Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was set up. That seizure, as was -recognized by Hitler and Jodl, had immensely strengthened the German -position against Poland. Within a week of the completion of the -occupation of Czechoslovakia heat was beginning to be applied on Poland. - -On 21 March M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador, saw Ribbentrop. The nature -of the conversation was generally very much sharper than that of the -discussion between Ribbentrop and Beck a little time back at the Grand -Hotel, Berchtesgaden: - - “I saw M. Von Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked - me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in - their entirety. - - “He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students’ - demonstrations during Count Ciano’s visit.” - - * * * * * * - - “Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at - Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler - put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland’s frontiers in - exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the - Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between - you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed - out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these - suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an - unfavorable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had - received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his - suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the - Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was - still in favor of good relations with Poland, and had expressed - a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject - of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was - under the impression that difficulties arising between us were - also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich’s real aims. The - problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his - opinion our two States were dependent on each other.” - - * * * * * * - - “I [Lipski] stated that now, during the settlement of the - Czechoslovakian question, there was no understanding whatever - between us. The Czech issue was already hard enough for the - Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes with the - Czechs they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to - Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community - of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had - given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our - long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in - the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the - protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against - Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious - blow to our relations. - - “Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this - could be discussed. - - “I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation - between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might - go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter. - He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the - Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was - rejecting all his offers. - - “Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his - conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania. - - “Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the - latter’s return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel - question, which called for a solution.” (_TC-73 No. 61_) - -That conversation took place on 21 March. The world soon learned what -the solution to Memel was. On the next day German armed forces marched -in. - -As a result of these events, considerable anxiety was growing both in -the government of Great Britain and the Polish government, and the two -governments therefore had been undertaking conversations between each -other. On 31 March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the -House of Commons. He explained the results of the conversations that had -been taking place between the British and Polish Governments: - - “As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding - with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the - position of His Majesty’s government in the meantime before - those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the - House that during that period, in the event of any action which - clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish - government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their - national forces, His Majesty’s government would feel themselves - bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their - power. They have given the Polish government an assurance to - this effect. - - “I may add that the French government have authorized me to make - it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as - do His Majesty’s Government.” (_TC-72 No. 17_) - -On 6 April, a week later, a formal communique was issued by the -Anglo-Polish governments, which repeated the assurance the Prime -Minister had given a week before, and in which Poland assured Great -Britain of her support should Great Britain be attacked. (_TC-72 No. -18_) - -The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain -were feeling at that time appears to have been justified. During the -same week, on 3 April, an order, signed by Keitel, emanated from the -High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3 April 1939. The -subject is “Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40.” The order reads: - - “Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed - Forces for 1939/40 is being reissued. - - “Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued - in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged. - - “Part II ‘_Fall Weiss_’ [the code name for the operation against - Poland] is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will - be appended later. - - “The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to ‘_Fall - Weiss_’: - - “1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operations - can be carried out at any time from 1st September 1939 onwards. - - “2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to - draw up a precise timetable for ‘_Fall Weiss_’ and to arrange by - conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches - of the armed forces. - - “3. The plan of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details - for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by the 1st of - May, 1939.” (C-120) - -This order was distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. - -Another document, dated 11 April, and signed by Hitler, is annexed. It -reads: - - “I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the - Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with - these for the conduct of the war. - - “Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be - prepared for the following eventualities: - - “I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and - protection against surprise air attacks. - - “II. ‘_Fall Weiss_’. - - “III. The annexation of Danzig. - - “Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military - authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike - development.” (_C-120_) - -Again, copies of that document went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. Annex I to -this order, which concerns the safeguarding of the frontiers of the -German Reich, declares: - - “* * * Legal Basis: It should be anticipated that a state of - Defense or State of War, as defined in the Reichdefense law of - the 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures - and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be - based on the laws valid in peacetime.” (_C-120_) - -The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by -the Anglo-Polish communique of 6 April, was seized upon by the Nazi -government to urge on the crisis which they were developing in Danzig -between themselves and Poland. - -On 28 April the German government issued a memorandum in which they -alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was incompatible with the 1934 -Agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering -into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had -unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement. The following are pertinent -passages from that memorandum: - - “The German government have taken note of the Polish-British - declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations - recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According - to this declaration there had been concluded between the Polish - government and the British government a temporary understanding - to be released shortly by a permanent agreement which will - provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great - Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two - states being directly or indirectly threatened.” (_TC-72 No. - 14_) - -The memorandum goes on to set out in the next three paragraphs the -history of German friendship towards Poland. It continues: - - “* * * The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish - government with the British government is in such obvious - contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago - that the German government can take note only with surprise and - astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy. - - “Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may - be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement - is intended as a regular Pact of Alliance, which, by reason of - its general sense and of the present state of political - relations, is directed exclusively against Germany. - - “From the obligation now accepted by the Polish government, it - appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take - an active part in any possible German-British conflict, in the - event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict - not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open - blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in - the 1934 declaration.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Polish government, however, by their recent decision to - accede to an alliance directed against Germany have given it to - be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third - power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German government. - In view of this, the German government are obliged to conclude - that the Polish government do not at present attach any - importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by - means of direct, friendly discussion with the German government. - The Polish government have thus abandoned the path traced out in - 1934 to the shaping of German-Polish relations.” (_TC-72 No. - 14_) - -All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that -orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed -Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable. - -The memorandum goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations -and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st which the German -government had made for the return of Danzig, the autobahn, and the -railway. It mentions the promise by Germany of the twenty-five year -guarantee, and continues: - - “The Polish government did not avail themselves of the - opportunity offered to them by the German government for a just - settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of - Poland’s frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent - strengthening of the friendly, neighbourly relations between the - two countries. The Polish government even rejected German - proposals made with this object. - - “At the same time the Polish government accepted, with regard to - another state, political obligations which are not compatible - either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the - German-Polish declaration of the 26 of January, 1934. Thereby, - the Polish government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this - declaration null and void.” (_TC-72 No. 14_) - -In the last paragraph the German government says, that nevertheless, -they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland. - -On the same day that memorandum was issued, 28 April, Hitler made a -speech in the Reichstag, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of -the memorandum. He repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in -March, and went on to say that the Polish government have rejected his -offer. He expressed his disappointment: - - “I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the - Polish government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The - worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia, a year ago, - believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign, - that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has - not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in - any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very - regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was - really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me. - This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a - question which intimately affects the German people, by a truly - unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both - countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving - party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party, - because it should be beyond all doubt, that Danzig will never - become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany, - which was merely invented by the International Press, led, as - you know, to the so-called guarantee offer, and to an obligation - on the part of the Polish government for mutual assistance. * * - *” (_TC-72 No. 13_) - -The speech demonstrates how completely dishonest was everything that the -German government was saying at that time. Hitler, who may very well -have had a copy of the orders for “_Fall Weiss_” in his pocket as he -spoke, announced publicly, that the intention to attack by Germany was -an invention of “the International Press.” - -In answer to that memorandum and that speech, the Polish government -issued a memorandum on 5 May. It sets out the objectives of the 1934 -agreement to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly -relationship between the two countries; to solve difficulties by -arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish government states its -awareness of the difficulties about Danzig and declares that it has long -been ready to carry out discussions. The Polish government sets out -again its part of the recent discussions. The Polish government states -that it communicated its views to the German government on 26 March, and -that it then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German -governments of the City of Danzig, based on the principles of freedom -for the local population in internal affairs. The Poles stated their -preparedness to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway -facilities. They received no reply to those proposals. The Polish -position is summarized in one sentence: - - “It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates - demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands - unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration - of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and - dignity of Poland” (_TC-72 No. 16_). - -The Polish government proceeds to reject the German accusation that the -Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish -agreement. It states that Germany herself has entered into similar -agreements with other nations, and lastly it announces that it is still -willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do -so. (_TC-72 No. 16_) - -The German answer was contained in a letter from the Supreme Commander -of the Armed Forces, is signed by Hitler, and dated 10 May (_C-120_). -Copies went to the various branches of the OKW, and with them apparently -were enclosed “Instructions for the economic war and the protection of -our own economy.” Not only were military preparations being carried out -throughout these months and weeks, but economic and every other kind of -preparation was being made for war at the earliest moment. - -This period of preparation, up to May 1939, concluded with the -conference in the Reichschancellery on 23 May. The report of this -meeting is known as the Schmundt Minutes (_L-79_). In his address to the -conference Hitler cried out for _lebensraum_ and said that Danzig was -not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding their living room -in the east, and he said that the decision had been taken to attack -Poland. - -Goering, Raeder and Keitel, among many others, were present. The -following is a significant paragraph: - - “If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against - Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack - England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer - doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England.” - (_L-79_) - -So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack -Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France. - -C. _Final Preparations: June-September 1939_ - -(1) _Final Preparations of the Armed Forces._ A precise timetable for -the attack had been called for. On 22 June 1939 it was ready. It -provided as follows: - - “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the - Fuehrer and Supreme Commander a ‘preliminary timetable’ for - ‘_Fall Weiss_’ based on the particulars so far available from - the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days - preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not - included in this timetable. - - “The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in - agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force - and made the following comments on individual points:— - - “1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up - reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers - scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, - employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be - told that men are being called up for the autumn maneuvers and - for the exercise units it is intended to form for these - maneuvers. - - “It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to - subordinate establishments.” (_C-126_) - -All this became relevant later, when the German government made -allegations of mobilization on the part of the Poles. This order shows -that in June the Germans were mobilizing, only doing so secretly. The -order continues: - - “For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area - of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed - should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried - out.” (_C-126_) - -The order is signed by Keitel. - -A short letter, dated 2 August, which is attached to that order, reads -in part: - - “Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of - U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of - precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out ‘_Fall - Weiss_’ remaining unchanged. F.O. U-Boats [Doenitz] is handing - in his Operation Orders by 12 August.” (_C-126_) - -Another letter, dated 27 July, contains orders for the Air and Sea -Forces for the occupation of the German Free City of Danzig. It -provides: - - “The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has - ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the - Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy the Danzig - Free State immediately in order to protect the German - population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of - Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force - of arms.” (_C-30_) - -The letter then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this -again becomes more relevant in the subsequent discussion of the -diplomatic action of the last few days before the war, when Germany was -making specious offers for the settlement of the question by peaceful -means. This letter is evidence that the decision had been taken, and -that nothing would change that decision. During July, right up to the -time of the war, steps were being taken to arm the population of Danzig -and to prepare them to take part in the coming occupation. - -The reports which were coming back almost daily during this period from -Mr. Shepherd, British Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign -Minister, and published in the British Blue Book, show the kind of thing -that was happening. The report dated 1 July 1939 reads as follows: - - “Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived - here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig _Heimwehr_. - - “All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which constitute a - popular public promenade on western fringe of the city, have - been closed with barbed wire and ‘_verboten_’ notices. - - “The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards: ‘Comrades - keep your mouths shut lest you regret consequence.’ - - “Master of British steamer ‘High Commissioner Wood’ whilst he - was roving Koenigsberg from 28th June to 30th June, observed - considerable military activity, including extensive shipment of - camouflaged covered lorries and similar material by small - coasting vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized steamers, - loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, etc., left - Koenigsberg, ostensibly returning to Hamburg after maneuvers, - but actually proceeding to Stettin.” (_TC-71_). - -And again, as another example, the report dated 10 July states: - - “The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me - that on 8th July he personally saw about thirty military lorries - with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofsberg, where - numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There - were also eight large anti-aircraft guns in position, which he - estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber, and three - six-barreled light anti-aircraft machine guns. There were about - 500 men drilling with rifles, and the whole place is extensively - fortified with barbed wire.” (_TC-71_). - -On 12 and 13 August, when preparations were practically complete, Hitler -and Ribbentrop at last disclosed their intentions to their allies, the -Italians. It will be recalled that one of the passages in Hitler’s -speech on 23 May, in regard to the proposed attack on Poland, had said, -“Our object must be kept secret even from the Italians and the -Japanese.” (_L-79_). Now, when the preparations were complete, Hitler -disclosed his intentions to his Italian comrades in the hope that they -would join him. Ciano was surprised at Hitler’s attempt to persuade the -Italians to come into the war with him. He had no idea, as he said, of -the urgency of the matter, and they are not prepared. He therefore tried -to dissuade Hitler from starting off until the Duce could have a little -more time to prepare himself. (_TC-77_) - -The minutes of that meeting show quite clearly the German intention to -attack England and France ultimately, if not at the same time as Poland. -In trying to show the strength of Germany and its certainty of winning -the war as a means of persuading the Italians to come in, Hitler -declared: - - “At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements - in prospect. Some time would elapse before any of the ships now - under construction could be taken into service. As far as the - land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription - 60,000 men had been called to the colors. If England kept the - necessary troops in her own country she could send to France, at - the most, two infantry divisions and one armored division. For - the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any - fighters since, at the outbreak of war, the German Air Force - would at once attack England and the English fighters would be - urgently needed for the defense of their own country. - - “With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in - the event of a general war, after the destruction of - Poland—which would not take long—Germany would be in a - position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall - and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her - available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier - and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line, for the life and death - struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that - the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian - fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano - showed signs of extreme doubt. The Polish Army was most uneven - in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were - large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in - anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense and at the moment neither - France nor England could help her in this respect. - - “If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western - powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and - German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to - the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas - was different. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the - position of the Polish State. Out of 34 million inhabitants, one - and one-half million were German, about four million were Jews, - and nine million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much - less in number than the total population and, as already said, - their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these - circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in - the shortest time. - - “Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it - clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would - stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick - liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for - the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a - hostile Poland remained on Germany’s eastern frontier, not only - would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also - further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This - would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation.” - - * * * * * * - - “Coming back to the Danzig question, the Fuehrer said that it - was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement - with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, - but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid - giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be - taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had - justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and - northeasterly direction of a German policy. The east and - northeast, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been - Germany’s undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, - as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy. - For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and - timber from these eastern regions.” (_TC-77_) - -Now the truth of this matter appears. It is not the persecution of -German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but economic reasons—the -need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland. The minutes of the -Italo-German meeting continue: - - “In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, - although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig - was a Nurnberg of the North, an ancient German city awakening - sentimental feelings for every German, and the Fuehrer was bound - to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. - To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that - Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority - was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be - difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over - anything of this kind. - - “Count Ciano, in replying to the Fuehrer’s statement, first - expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the - completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in - the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during - his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side - that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the - contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion the Danzig - question would be settled in the course of time. On these - grounds, the Duce, in view of his conviction that a conflict - with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he - should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans - for a period of two or three years. If immediate conflict were - unavoidable, the Duce, as he had told Ciano, would certainly - stand on the German side, but for various reasons he would - welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later - time. - - “Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of Italy - in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict - with Poland would not be limited to that country but would - develop into a general European war.” (_TC-77_) - -Thereafter, Ciano tried to dissuade Hitler from any immediate action. He -argued further: - - “For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should - make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful - intentions of Italy and Germany.” (_TC-77_) - -The Fuehrer’s answer was clear: - - “The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem - no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, - the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe - become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made - air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the - condition of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass - by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible - for motorized forces. From September to May, Poland was a great - marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. - Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany - would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously - could not bombard or destroy the place.” (_TC-77_) - -The Germans could not possibly bombard or destroy any place such as -Danzig where there happened to be Germans living. The discussion -continued: - - “Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer’s view, the - Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this - settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. - To the question of Ciano’s as to what solution the Fuehrer - proposed, Hitler answered that Poland must give up political - control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would - obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior must - contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted - whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since, up to - the present, the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer - had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to - Obersalzberg. They were extremely favorable to Poland. In return - for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete - guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a - connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would - have given a frontier guarantee, a 25-year pact of friendship - and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck - had received the proposal with the remark that he was willing to - examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of - English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen - clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia, - and even proposed to advance to Berlin.” (_TC-77_) - -The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the following -day: - - “The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions: (1) - in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately - attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her - political intention, she must be forced to do so.” - - * * * * * * - - “As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist - further in the world through lack of space; not only was there - no more space, but existing space was completely blockaded by - its present possessors; they sat like misers with their heaps of - gold and deluded themselves about their riches. The Western - Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and - would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This - psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing - about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and - death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more - easily because their interests did not clash on any point. - - “The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for - which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had - summed up the position to him in the words that Italy already - was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, - the Fuehrer said that Germany must take the old German road - eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic - reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims - to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognized it - and had said as much in his well-known letter to Mazzini. The - interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different - directions and there never could be a conflict between them. - - “Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in - yesterday’s conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would - have their backs free for work against the West. The Fuehrer - said that Poland must be struck down so that for 50 years she - would be incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the - West could be settled. - - “Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation - of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would - give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite - information on one point in order that the Duce might have all - the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no - decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with - Poland could be localized on the basis of long experience. - He—Ciano—quite saw that so far the Fuehrer had always been - right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini - had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of - precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the following - question: - - “The Fuehrer had mentioned two conditions under which he would - take Poland (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation, - and (2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The - first of these conditions depended on the decision of the - Fuehrer, and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The - second condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano - therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have - satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realized - that this date depended upon climatic conditions. - - “The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made - clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the - decisive part of military operations against Poland could be - carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation - would need another four weeks, it could be finished at the end - of September or the beginning of October. These could be - regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore, that the last - dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of - August. - - “Finally, the Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his youth he had - favored German-Italian cooperation, and that no other view was - expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and - Italy were naturally suited for collaboration, since there were - no conflicts of interest between them. He was personally - fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there - was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in - history; that he could be this man’s friend was for him a matter - of great personal satisfaction, and if the hour of common battle - struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce.” - (_TC-77_) - -(2) _Economic Preparations._ If the military preparations were -throughout this period nearing their completion, at the same time the -economists had not been idle. A letter dated 25 August 1939, from Funk -to the Feuhrer, reads: - - “My Fuehrer! - - “I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most friendly and - kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How happy and how - grateful to you we ought to be for being granted the favor of - experiencing these overwhelmingly great and world-changing times - and taking part in the mighty events of these days. - - “The information given to me by Field Marshal Goering, that you, - my Fuehrer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures - prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the - relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through - emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to - you with all respect that I have succeeded by means of - precautions taken during the last few months, in making the - Reichsbank internally so strong and externally so unassailable, - that even the most serious shocks in the international money and - credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime I - have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of - the Reichsbank and of the whole of German economy abroad which - it was possible to lay hands on. Under the proposals I have - prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is - not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public - works which are not of importance for the war effort, we will be - in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy, - without any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the - General Plenipotentiary for Economy appointed by you to make - this report and solemn promise to you, my Fuehrer. - - “Heil my Fuehrer /signed/ Walter Funk.” (_699-PS_) - -It is difficult in view of that letter to see how Funk can claim that he -did not know of the preparations and of the intentions of the German -government to wage war. - -(3) _The Obersalzburg Speech._ On 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed his -commanders in chief at Obersalzburg. (_1014-PS_). At this date -preparations were complete. In the course of his speech Hitler declared: - - “Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were - determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers.” - - * * * * * * - - “Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination - of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war - should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be - the primary objective.” - - * * * * * * - - “I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war—never - mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be - asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and - making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.” - - * * * * * * - - “It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come - sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but - I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few - years, and only afterwards against the East.” (_1014-PS_) - -These passages emphasize the intention of the Nazi government not only -to conquer Poland but ultimately, in any event, to wage aggressive war -against the Western Democracies. - -In another significant passage, Hitler stated: - - “We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us - with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which - demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute - some _Schweinehund_ will make a proposal for mediation. - - “The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for - the destruction of England’s hegemony. The way is open for the - soldier, after I have made the political preparations.” - - * * * * * * - - “Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance - that the armed forces will do their duty.” (_798-PS_) - -(4) _Diplomatic Preparations: Provoking the Crisis._ On 23 August 1939, -the Danzig Senate passed a decree whereby Gauleiter Forster was -appointed head of the State of the Free City of Danzig, a position which -did not exist under the statute setting up the constitution of the Free -City. (_TC-72 No. 62_). That event was, of course, aimed at stirring up -feeling in the Free City at that time. - -At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured by the Nazi -Government with the aid of the SS. The affidavit of General Lahousen -(_Affidavit A_) refers to the provision of Polish uniforms to the SS -Forces for these purposes, so that dead Poles could be found lying about -on the German side of the frontier. Three short reports found in the -British Blue Book corroborate this affidavit. They are reports from the -British ambassador in Warsaw. - -The first of them is dated 26 August, and reads: - - “Series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German - frontier. - - “Polish patrol met party Germans one kilometre from East - Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish patrol - replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned. - - “German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo, - twice near Rybnik and twice elsewhere, firing shots and - attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and - hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin. - - “_Gazeta Polska_, in inspired leader, today says these are more - than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of aggression of - para-military disciplined detachments supplied with regular - army’s arms, and in one case it was a regular army detachment. - Attacks more or less continuous. - - “These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong - attitude of defence. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of - aggression came from German side. This was best answer to - ravings of German press. - - “Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment - has since shot Pole across frontier and wounded another.” - (_TC-72 No. 53_) - -The next report is dated the same date, 26 August and reads: - - “Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted - by Herr Hitler to French Ambassador that twenty-four Germans - were recently killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. Story is - without any foundation whatever.” (_TC-72 No. 54_) - -The report of the next day, 27 August, reads as follows: - - “So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment - of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration, - if not complete falsification. - - “2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by - Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascertain, - the rest of Poland is still completely calm. - - “3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods - regarding Czechoslovakia last year. - - “4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German - provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since March - [when the rest of Czechoslovakia was seized] exacerbated feeling - between the two nationalities. I suppose this has been done with - object (a) creating war spirit in Germany (b) impressing public - opinion abroad (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent - aggression in Poland. - - “5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter - objects. - - “6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr - Hitler. - - “7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is - apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of - Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount to more - than 10 per cent of population in any commune. - - “8. In face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that, if - Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of - destroying Polish independence. - - “9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for - Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove - that Herr Hitler’s allegations regarding German minority are - false.” (_TC-72 No. 55_) - -Further corroboration of General Lahousen’s affidavit is contained in a -memorandum of a conversation between the writer and Keitel. That -conversation with Keitel took place on 17 August, and went as follows: - - “I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he - would not pay any attention to this action, as the Fuehrer had - not informed him, and had only let him know that we were to - furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct - the General Staff. He says that he does not think much of - actions of this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done - if they have been ordered by the Fuehrer, that he could not ask - the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this special - action. In regard to Dirschau, he has decided that this action - would be executed only by the Army.” (_795-PS_) - -That was the position at the end of the third week in August 1939. On 22 -August the Russian-German Non-aggression Pact was signed in Moscow. The -orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that -treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of 25 of -August. - -(5) _Pleas for peace._ On the same date, 22 August, news reached England -that the German-Russian agreement was being signed. The significance of -that pact from a military point of view as to Germany was obvious, and -the British government immediately made their position clear in one last -hope, that the German government might possibly think better. The Prime -Minister wrote to Hitler as follows: - - “Your Excellency. - - “Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures - taken by His Majesty’s Government, and announced in the press - and on the wireless this evening. - - “These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, - been rendered necessary by the military movements which have - been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the - announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some - quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great - Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need - be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may - prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it can - not alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland, which His - Majesty’s Government have stated in public repeatedly and - plainly, and which they are determined to fulfill. - - “It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made - their position clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have - been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that - allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this - occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding. - - “If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to - employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is - impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It - would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, - it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the - several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been - secured.” (_TC-72 No. 56_). - -The Prime Minister therefore urged the German government to try to solve -the difficulty without recourse to the use of force. He suggested that a -truce should be declared while direct discussions between the two -governments, Polish and German, might take place. Prime Minister -Chamberlain concluded: - - “At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a - catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the - grave consequences to humanity, which may follow from the action - of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with - the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put - before you.” (_TC-72 No. 56_). - -On the following day, 23 August, Hitler replied to Prime Minister -Chamberlain. He started off by saying that Germany has always sought -England’s friendship, and went on to say that Germany, “like every other -State, possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to -renounce.” The letter continued as follows: - - “Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig, and of - the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a - proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations - disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against - Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Roumania, - Hungary, etc., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations, - which were subsequently given, had, however, dispelled Polish - inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would - have been tolerable for Germany also. - - “The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she - would render assistance to that country in all circumstances - regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, - could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement - thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave - of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German - inhabitants living in Poland. - - “The atrocities which then have been taking place in that - country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a - great power such as the German Reich, which is expected to - remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has - been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations - towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the - character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic - strangulation.” - - * * * * * * - - “Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of - the Germans.” - - * * * * * * - - “The German Reich government has received information to the - effect that the British government has the intention to carry - out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements - contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against - Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since - Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures - other than those of a defensive character against England, or - France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, - and does not in the future intend, to attack England, or France, - it follows that this announcement, as confirmed by you, Mr. - Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a - contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich. I, - therefore, inform your Excellency that in the event of these - military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order - immediate mobilization of the German forces.” - - * * * * * * - - “The question of the treatment of European problems on a - peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but - primarily on those who since the crime committed by the - Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any - peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of - the responsible powers can there be any real change in the - relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life - fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by - British diplomacy—at any rate up to the present—has, however, - convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be - any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be - happier than I.” (_TC-72 No. 60_). - -On 25 August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance was -signed in London. Each government undertook to give assistance to the -other in the event of aggression against either by any third power. -(_TC-73 No. 91_) - -A few days later the French Prime Minister Daladier addressed a letter -to Hitler, which reads as follows: - - “The French ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your - personal communication * * *. - - “In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility - which two heads of the governments can possibly take upon - themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great - nations, who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to - you personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of - peace still rests in your hands. - - “You cannot doubt what are my own feelings towards Germany, nor - France’s peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has - done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not - only peace, but also sincere cooperation in their own interests, - as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you - credit the French people with a lower sense of honor, than I - credit the German Nation with; you cannot doubt that France - loyally fulfills her obligations towards other powers, such as - Poland, which as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace - with Germany. - - “These two convictions are fully compatible. - - “Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution - of the international crisis, with all honor and dignity for all - nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides. - - “Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all - her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland’s - readiness, which she has always shown to submit to the mutual - application of a method of open settlement, as it can be - imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With - the clearest conscience I can assure you that among the - differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over, - the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be - submitted to such a method, the purpose of reaching a peaceful - and just solution. - - “Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in - France’s clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies, - which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my - country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not - prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state - of mind. - - “In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no high-minded - human being could understand it, if a war of destruction was - started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful - settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace - could in all certainty work for this aim, without any prejudice - to German honor. I, who desire good harmony between the French - and the German people, and who am on the other hand bound to - Poland by bonds of friendship, and by a promise, am prepared, as - head of the French government, to do everything an upright man - can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion. - - “You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I - do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war - have left in the conscience of the peoples; without any regard - to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your - outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road - of peace, towards the fulfillment of its task in the common work - of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion. - - “If French and German blood should be shed again, as it was shed - 25 years ago, in a still longer and more murderous war, then - each of the two nations will fight, believing in its own - victory. But the most certain victors will be—destruction and - barbarity.” (_TC-78_) - -On 27 August Hitler replied to M. Daladier’s letter of 26 August. The -sense of it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British -Prime Minister in answer to the letter which he had received from him -earlier in the week. (_TC-79_) - -After the letters from Chamberlain and Daladier, the German Government -could no longer be in any doubt as to the position of both the British -and French Governments in the event of German aggression against Poland. -But the pleas for peace did not end there. On 24 August President -Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and to the President of the Polish -Republic (_TC-72 No. 124_). His letter stated in part: - - “In the message which I sent to you on the 14th April, I stated - that it appeared to me that the leaders of great nations had it - in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that - impended, but that unless the effort were immediately made with - good will on all sides to find a peaceful and constructive - solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world - was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe - appears to be very near at hand indeed. - - “To the message which I sent you last April I have received no - reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world - peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all - other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with - the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster - to all peoples may yet be averted. - - “I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging - the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Government of - Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any - positive act of hostility for a reasonable stipulated period, - and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the - controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three - following methods: - - “First, by direct negotiation; - - “Second, by the submission of these controversies to an - impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or - - “Third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies - through the procedure of conciliation.” (_TC-72 No. 124_). - -Hitler’s answer to that letter was the order to his armed forces to -invade Poland on the following morning. The reply to Mr. Roosevelt’s -letter from the President of the Polish Republic, however, was an -acceptance of the offer to settle the differences by any of the peaceful -methods suggested. (_TC-72 No. 126_) - -On 25 August, no reply having been received from the German Government, -President Roosevelt wrote again: - - “I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply - to the message which I addressed to your Excellency and to him - last night.” - -The Polish reply is then set out. - - “Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims - and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable. - - “In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it - plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon the basis set - forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has - arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by - direct negotiation or the process of conciliation. - - “Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may still be - restored that the nations of the modern world may even now - construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier - relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will - agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the - Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, - will accept.” (_TC-72 No. 127_) - -But Germany would not accept those proposals, nor would it pay heed to -the Pope’s appeal on the same date, 24 August (_TC-72 No. 139_). It is -an appeal in similar terms. There was yet a further appeal from the Pope -on 31 August: - - “The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations - may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world - continues to pray for.” (_TC-72 No. 141_). - -Those negotiations, on the last days of August, to which the Pope -referred as “pending negotiations”, were unhappily, completely bogus -negotiations insofar as Germany was concerned. They were put forward -simply as an endeavor to dissuade England, either by threat or by bribe, -from meeting her obligations to Poland. The final German “offers” were -no offers in the accepted sense of the word. There was never any -intention behind them of entering into discussions, negotiation, -arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with Poland. They -were merely an attempt to make it easier to seize and conquer Poland -than it would likely be if England and France were to observe the -obligations they had undertaken. - -(6) _Events of the Last Week in August, 1939._ This was the progress of -those last negotiations: On 22 August the German-Soviet Pact was signed. -On 24 August, orders were given to the German armies to march the -following morning. After those orders had been given, the news -apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish -Governments had signed a formal pact of nonaggression and of mutual -assistance. Up until that time, the position was that the British Prime -Minister had made a statement in the House of Commons and a joint -communique had been issued, on 6 April, that the two nations would in -fact assist one another if either were attacked; but no formal agreement -had been signed. - -Now, on 24 August, after the orders to march had been given by Hitler, -the news came that such a formal document had been signed. The invasion -was thereupon postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort -to keep England and France out of the war—not to cancel the war, but -solely to keep England and France out of it. On 25 August, having -postponed the invasion, Hitler issued a verbal communique to Sir Neville -Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin, which was a mixture of -bribe and threat, and with which he hoped to persuade England to keep -out. - -On 28 August, Sir Neville Henderson handed the British Government’s -reply to that communique to Hitler. That reply stressed that the -differences ought to be settled by agreement. The British Government put -forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed, and that any -agreement reached should be guaranteed by other powers. Whether or not -these proposals would have been acceptable or unacceptable to Germany -are of no great matter. For once it had been made clear—as it was in -the British Government’s reply of 28 August—that England would not be -put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, the German -Government had no concern with further negotiation but was concerned -only to afford itself some kind of justification and to prevent itself -from appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to reason that -were being put forward. - -On 29 August, at 7:15 p. m. in the evening, Hitler handed to Sir Neville -Henderson the German Government’s answer to the British Government’s -reply of the 28th. It seems quite clear that the whole object of this -letter was to put forward something which was quite unacceptable. Hitler -agreed to enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British -Government, but he demanded that those conversations must be based upon -the return to the Reich, of Danzig and also of the whole of the -Corridor. - -It will be recalled that hitherto, even when he had alleged that Poland -had renounced the 1934 agreement, Hitler had put forward as his demands -the return of Danzig alone, plus the arrangement for an -extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to -East Prussia. That demand was unacceptable at that time. To make quite -certain of refusal, Hitler now demanded the whole of the Corridor. There -was no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole territory must -become German. - -Even so, to make doubly certain that the offer would not be accepted, -Hitler stated: “On those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion, -but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with -full powers from the Polish Government to be here in Berlin by midnight -tomorrow night, the 30th of August.” - -This offer was made at 7:15 p. m. on the evening of the 29th. That offer -had to be transmitted, first, to London; and from London to Warsaw; and -from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their -Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible, if -indeed it were possible, to get authority to the Polish Ambassador in -Berlin by midnight the following night. It allowed Poland no opportunity -for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Neville Henderson described -it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum. - -At midnight on 30 August, at the time by which the Polish -Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville Henderson handed a -further message to Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been -handed to him the previous evening. Ribbentrop read out in German a -two- or three-page document which purported to be the German proposal to -be discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish Government. -He read it out quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the -British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish -Ambassador. So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles -ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously -and magnanimously offering to discuss. - -On the following day, 31 August, Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, saw -Ribbentrop, and could get no further than to be asked whether he came -with full powers. When he replied that he did not, Ribbentrop said that -he would put the position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it -was much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that time, -because on 31 August Hitler had already issued his Directive No. 1 for -the conduct of war, in which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to -five the following morning, 1 September. And on the evening of 31 -August, at 9 o’clock, the German radio broadcast the proposals which -Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Neville Henderson the night before, -saying that these were the proposals which had been made for discussion, -but that as no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived to discuss them, the -German Government assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at -9 o’clock on the evening of 31 August was the first that the Poles had -ever heard of the proposal, and it was the first that the British -Government or its representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than -what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused to -give a written copy on the evening of the 30th. - -After that broadcast, at 9:15—perhaps while the broadcast was still in -its course—a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Neville -Henderson for the first time. - -This summary of events during that last week of August 1939 is based -upon the contents of several documents which will now be alluded to. - -In a pre-trial interrogation on 29 August 1945, Goering was asked the -question: - - “When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London - brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the end of March or the - beginning of April, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful - solution was impossible?” (_TC-90_) - -This was Goering’s answer: - - “Yes, it seemed impossible according to my conviction, but not - according to the convictions of the Fuehrer. When it was - mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had given her guarantee to - Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Rumania, but - then when the Russians took Bessarabia nothing happened, and - this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At - this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The - guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of - the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to - Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that - he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then - whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, ‘No, I - will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.’ - So then I asked him, ‘Do you think that it will be any different - within four or five days?’ At this same time—I don’t know - whether you know about that, Colonel—I was in connection with - Lord Halifax by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic - channels to do everything to stop war with England. After the - guarantee I held an English declaration of war inevitable. I - already told him in the Spring of 1939 after occupying - Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on if he tried to solve - the Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of - England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate.” (_TC-90_) - -The interrogation of Goering proceeded as follows: - - “Question: ‘Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign - against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed - by the end of August 1939?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’ - - “Question: ‘And that the final issuance of the order for the - campaign against Poland came some time between the 15th and 20th - of August 1939 after the signing of the treaty with Soviet - Russia.’ [The dates obviously are wrong]. - - “Answer: ‘Yes, that is true.’ - - “Question: ‘Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign - was ordered for the 25th of August, but on the 24th of August in - the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order - to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the - English Ambassador?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes.’” (_TC-90_) - -In this interrogation Goering purported not to have wanted war with -England. It will be recalled, however, that after the speech of Hitler -on 22 August to his commanders-in-chief, Goering got up and thanked the -Fuehrer for his exhortation and assured him that the armed forces would -play their part. (_798-PS_) - -Hitler’s verbal communique, as it is called in the British Blue Book, -which he handed to Sir Neville Henderson on 25 August, after he had -heard of the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to -keep England from aiding Poland, commences by stating Hitler’s desire to -make one more effort to prevent war. In the second paragraph he asserts -again that Poland’s provocations were unbearable: - - “Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these - Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more, - to do so in the interests of quiet and order, but also in the - interests of European peace. - - “The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The - British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the - least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At - the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and - incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would - be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last - war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts. - Agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change - in foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long - time. Russia and Germany would never again take up arms against - each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia - would also render Germany secure economically for the longest - period of war.” (_TC-72 No. 68_) - -Then comes the bribe. - - “The Fuehrer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved - and will be solved. He is however prepared and determined after - the solution of this problem to approach England once more with - a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions, - and in this case also he will be capable of being great in his - action. And then magnanimously he accepts the British Empire and - is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued - existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its - disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which are - limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means. * * *” (_TC-72 - No. 68_) - -Again Hitler stressed irrevocable determination never to enter into war -with Russia. He concluded as follows: - - “If the British Government would consider these ideas a blessing - for Germany and also for the British empire, a peace might - result. If it rejects these ideas there will be war. In no case - will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it. The - Fuehrer repeats that he himself is a man of ad infinitum - decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last - offer.” (_TC-72 No. 68_) - -The British Government was not of course aware of the real object that -lay behind that message, and, taking it at its face value, wrote back oh -28 August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They -agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, as follows: - - “In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government a reasonable - solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and - should be effected by agreement between the two countries on - lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential - interests, and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of - April the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these - interests to Poland. - - “But as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the - German Chancellor of the 22nd of August, His Majesty’s - Government consider it essential for the success of the - discussions which would precede the agreement that it should be - understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be - guaranteed by other powers. His Majesty’s Government would be - ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective - operation of such a guarantee.” - - * * * * * * - - “His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make their own - attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between - Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will - not think that, because His Majesty’s Government are scrupulous - concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to - use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution - which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.” (_TC-72 - No. 74_) - -That reply knocked the German hopes on the head. The Nazis had failed -despite their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing -her obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out -of their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving face as much as -possible. - -In his interview with Hitler, Sir Neville Henderson emphasized the -British attitude that they were determined in any event to meet their -obligations to Poland. The interview concluded as follows: - - “In the end I asked him two straight questions: Was he willing - to negotiate direct with the Poles? and Was he ready to discuss - the question of any exchange of population? He replied in the - affirmative as regards the latter. There I have no doubt that he - was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers. - As regards to the first, he said he could not give me an answer - until after he had given the reply of His Majesty’s Government - the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In - this connection he turned to Ribbentrop and said, ‘We must - summon Field Marshal Goering to discuss it with him.’” (_TC-72 - No. 75_) - -The German reply, as outlined before, was handed to Sir Neville -Henderson at 7.15 P. M. on 29 August. The reply sets out the suggestion -submitted by the British Government in a previous note, and goes on to -say that the German Government is prepared to enter into discussion on -the basis that the whole of the Corridor as well as Danzig shall be -returned to the Reich. The reply continues: - - “The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the - revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this territory - which has always been recognized as being necessary; viz., - return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding - of the existence of the German national group in the territories - remaining to Poland.” (_TC-72 No. 78_) - -It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that the right to the -Corridor has been “recognized” for so long. On 28 April, Hitler demands -consisted only of Danzig, the Autobahn, and the railway. But now -Hitler’s aim was to manufacture justification and to put forth proposals -which under no circumstances could either Poland or Great Britain -accept. The note states: - - “The British Government attach importance to two considerations: - (1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be - eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2) - that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it - would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded - in the economic and political sphere by means of international - guarantees. - - “On this subject, the German Government makes the following - declaration: - - “Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, - they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English proposal - and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already - been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made - upon them by the written statement received from the British - Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in - accordance with the general lines indicated to the British - Ambassador.” - - * * * * * * - - “For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government - have never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital - interests of questioning the existence of an independent Polish - State. The German Government, accordingly, in these - circumstances agree to accept the British Government’s offer of - their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a - Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of - this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939. - - “The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a - solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place - these at the disposal of the British Government before the - arrival of the Polish negotiators.” (_TC-72 No. 78_) - -That was at 7:15 in the evening of 29 August. As previously explained, -insufficient time was allowed for the Polish Emissary to reach Berlin by -midnight the following night. - -Sir Neville Henderson’s account of his interview on the evening of 29 -August summarizes what took place then: - - “I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but - after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von - Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress - urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were - standing face to face.” (_TC-72 No. 79_) - -Again the British Government replied and Sir Neville Henderson handed -this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight of 30 August, -at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. The reply stated that -the British Government reciprocated the desire for improved relations. -It stressed again that it cannot sacrifice its interest to other friends -in order to obtain an improvement in the situation. It understood that -the German Government accepts the condition that the settlement should -be subject to international guarantee. The British Government makes a -reservation as to the demands that the Germans put forward in their last -letter, and is informing the Polish Government immediately. Lastly, the -British understand that the German Government is drawing up the -proposals. (_TC-72 No. 89_) - -Sir Neville Henderson gave this account of that interview at midnight on -30 August: - - “I told Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s - Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to - accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested that - he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals - were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him - proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to - immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if basis - afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty’s Government could - be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize - negotiations. - - “Herr von Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document - which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Imagining that - he would eventually hand it to me I did not attempt to follow - too closely the sixteen or more articles which it contained. - Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points - were: * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in - accordance with undertaking the German reply of yesterday, he - asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had - not arrived in Berlin by midnight. - - “I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request - for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 30th August - constituted in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he and Herr - Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied, saying that - idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination. Why then I - asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of - proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr - Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for - communication to Polish Government. In the most violent terms - Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador - to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for - interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally - inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those - were his personal views he would bring all that I had said to - Herr Hitler’s notice. It was for Chancellor to decide. - - “We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von - Ribbentrop’s demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping - Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against - Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly - surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler - himself had admitted to me yesterday.” (_TC-72 No. 92_) - -Henderson of course did not know at that time that Germany had also -given the orders to attack Poland some days before. On the following -day, 31 August, at 6:30 in the evening, M. Lipski, the Polish -Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop. This is M. Lipski’s -account of the conversation: - - “I carried out my instructions. M. von Ribbentrop asked if I had - special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I said - no. He then asked whether I had been informed that on London’s - suggestion the German Government had expressed their readiness - to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish Government, - furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to have - arrived on the preceding day, August 30. I replied that I had no - direct information on the subject. In conclusion M. von - Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to - negotiate. He would communicate my demarche to the Chancellor.” - (_TC-73 No. 112_) - -But it was too late. The orders had already been given on that day to -the German Army to invade. A “Most Secret order” signed by Hitler, -described as his “Direction No. 1 for the conduct of the war,” dated 31 -August 1939, reads in part: - - “Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by - peaceful means of a situation of the Eastern Frontier which is - intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a - solution by force. - - “The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with - the preparations made for ‘_Fall Weiss_’, with the alterations - which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it - has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions. - - “Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged. - - “Date of attack—1 September 1939 - - “Time of attack—04:45 [inserted in red pencil] - - “This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of - Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge. - - “In the West it is important that the responsibility for the - opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England - and France. At first purely local action should be taken against - insignificant frontier violations.” (_C-126_) - -That evening, 31 August, at nine o’clock, the German radio broadcast the -terms of the German proposals about which they were willing to enter -into discussions with the Polish Government. The proposals were set out -at length. By this time, neither Sir Neville Henderson nor the Polish -Government nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of -them. This is a document which seems difficult to explain other than as -an exhibition or an example of hypocrisy. The second paragraph states: - - “Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able - to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding - available to the British Government by the time the Polish - negotiator arrived in Berlin.” - -The manner in which they did that has been shown. The German Broadcast -continued, that instead of the arrival of an authorized Polish -personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to -their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish -mobilization; and that only toward 12 o’clock on the night of 30 August -1939 did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness -to help towards the commencement of negotiations. The fact that the -Polish negotiator expected by the Reich did not arrive, removed the -necessary conditions for informing His Majesty’s Government of the views -of the German Government as regards the possible basis for negotiation. -Since His Majesty’s Government themselves had pleaded for direct -negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign -Affairs, Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the -presentation of the last British note, precise information as to the -text of the German proposals which will be regarded as a basis for -negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish Plenipotentiary. -The Broadcast thereafter went on to set out the Nazi version of the -story of the negotiations over the last few days. (_TC-73 No. 113_) - -On 1 September, when his armies were already crossing the Polish -frontier, Hitler issued this proclamation to his Armed Forces: - - “The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neighborly - relations as aimed at by me, wants to force the issue by way of - arms. - - “The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror - and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation - which cannot be tolerated by a great power show that Poland is - no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an - end to these mad acts I can see no other way but from now - onwards to meet force with force. - - “The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up - the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the German - people. - - “I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of - the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the - last. - - “Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the - representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany. - - “Long live our people and the Reich.” (_TC-54_) - -So that at last Hitler had kept his word to his generals. He had -afforded them their propagandistic justification, and at that time, -anyway, it did not matter what people said about it afterwards. - - “The view shall not appear, asked later on, whether we told the - truth or not. Might is what counts—or victory is what counts - and not right.” (_1014-PS_) - -On that day, 1 September, when news came of this invasion of Polish -ground, the British Government, in accordance with their treaty -obligations, sent an ultimatum to the German Government, in which it -stated: - - “I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the - German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government - satisfactory assurances that the German Government have - suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared - promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His - Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without - hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland.” (_TC-72 No. - 110_) - -At 9 o’clock on 3 September the British Government handed a final -ultimatum to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. It read in part: - - “* * * Although this communication was made more than - twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but German - attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have - accordingly the honor to inform you that, unless not later than - eleven o’clock, British Summer Time, today 3d September, - satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by - the German Government, and have reached His Majesty’s Government - in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries - as from that hour.” (_TC-72 No. 118_) - -And so it was that at 11 o’clock on 3 September a state of war existed -between Germany and England and between Germany and France. The plans, -preparations, intentions, and determination to carry out this assault -upon Poland which had been going on for months, for years before, had -come to fruition despite all appeals to peace, all appeals to reason. It -mattered not what anybody but the German Government had in mind or -whatever rights anybody else but the German nation thought they had. If -there is any doubt left about this matter, two more documents remain for -consideration. Even now, on 3 September, Mussolini offered some chance -of peace. At 6:30 hours on 3 September Mussolini sent a telegram to -Hitler: - - “The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the - Duce’s order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor - and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs: - - “Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision - to the Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference - with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice - which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present. 2. - Calling the conference within two or three days. 3. Solution of - the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favorable - for Germany as matters stand today. - - “This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost - exponent in France. - - “Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already - securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany - has had already its ‘moral satisfaction.’ If it would accept the - plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the - same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of - being universal and of extremely long duration.” (_1831-PS_) - -Perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what all Germany’s aims were, -for his offer was turned down in the illuminating letter which Hitler -was to write in reply: - - “Duce: - - “I first want to thank you for your last attempt at mediation. I - would have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that - there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that - the conference would be successful. Because, for the last two - days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid - advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate - the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues. - Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if - England would not have been determined to wage war under all - circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, - Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for - more than one-half year or one year. Under these circumstances, - I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was - better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German - armed forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all fields that the - Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether - this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England - and France would have armed their allies, to such an extent that - the crushing technical superiority of the German Armed Forces - could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce, - that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own - fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware - that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one - has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance - in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed - and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a - rock. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you - think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge - this in advance with, sincere thanks. But I believe also—even - if we march now over different roads—that fate will finally - join us. If the National Socialist Germany were destroyed by the - Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a - grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of - the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, - think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to - make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all - unimportant things, that we do not waste any man in unimportant - tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational - considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor, - has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be - either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations - proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops - are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air - force is complete, although scarcely one-third of it is in - Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here - sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can - confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation. - Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have - given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in - the future.” (_1831-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST - POLAND, DANZIG, ENGLAND AND FRANCE - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ - │ 4; V. │ I │ 26, 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *386-PS │Notes on a conference with Hitler in the│ │ - │Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November │ │ - │1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ - │Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. │ │ - │(USA 25) │ III │ 295 - │ │ │ - *388-PS │File of papers on Case Green (the plan │ │ - │for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept │ │ - │by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, │ │ - │April-October 1938. (USA 26) │ III │ 305 - │ │ │ - *699-PS │Letter from Funk to Hitler, 25 August │ │ - │1939, reporting on economic affairs. (GB│ │ - │49) │ III │ 509 - │ │ │ - *789-PS │Speech of the Fuehrer at a conference, │ │ - │23 November 1939, to which all Supreme │ │ - │Commanders were ordered. (USA 23) │ III │ 572 - │ │ │ - *795-PS │Keitel’s conference, 17 August 1939, │ │ - │concerning giving Polish uniforms to │ │ - │Heydrich. (GB 54) │ III │ 580 - │ │ │ - *798-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ - │at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA │ │ - │29) │ III │ 581 - │ │ │ - *1014-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ - │22 August 1939. (USA 30) │ III │ 665 - │ │ │ - *1639-A-PS │Mobilization book for the Civil │ │ - │Administration, 1939 Edition, issued │ │ - │over signature of Keitel. (USA 777) │ IV │ 143 - │ │ │ - *1780-PS │Excerpts from diary kept by General │ │ - │Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA │ │ - │72) │ IV │ 360 - │ │ │ - 1796-PS │Notes to the War Diary from March 1939 │ │ - │to January 1940. │ IV │ 370 - │ │ │ - 1822-PS │Telegram from Minister of Foreign │ │ - │Affairs in Rome to Minister of Foreign │ │ - │Affairs in Berlin, 25 August 1939, │ │ - │concerning conference with Mussolini and│ │ - │Ciano. │ IV │ 459 - │ │ │ - 1823-PS │Hitler reply to Mussolini, 27 August │ │ - │1939, concerning attitude of Italy in │ │ - │conference of 25 August 1939. │ IV │ 462 - │ │ │ - 1828-PS │Memorandum handed to German Foreign │ │ - │Office by Count Magistrate in Rome, 7 │ │ - │August 1939. │ IV │ 463 - │ │ │ - *1831-PS │Correspondence between Hitler and │ │ - │Mussolini, September 1939. (GB 75) │ IV │ 463 - │ │ │ - 1832-PS │Telephone report of Reich Minister for │ │ - │Foreign Affairs in Rome, 27 August 1939.│ IV │ 468 - │ │ │ - 1889-PS │Account of conference of Fuehrer and │ │ - │Italian Ambassador Attolico, 31 August │ │ - │1939. │ IV │ 528 - │ │ │ - *2327-PS │Two top secret memoranda, 14 June 1939, │ │ - │concerning operation “Fall Weiss”. (USA │ │ - │539) │ IV │ 1035 - │ │ │ - *2357-PS │Speech by Hitler before Reichstag, 20 │ │ - │February 1938, published in Documents of│ │ - │German Politics, Part VI, 1, pp. 50-52. │ │ - │(GB 30) │ IV │ 1099 - │ │ │ - *2368-PS │Hitler’s speech before Reichstag, 30 │ │ - │January 1937, published in Documents of │ │ - │German Politics, Part VI, 2, p. 42. (GB │ │ - │26) │ IV │ 1102 - │ │ │ - *2530-PS │Ribbentrop’s speech in Warsaw, 25 │ │ - │January 1939, published in Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, 1 February 1939. (GB 36) │ V │ 267 - │ │ │ - *2751-PS │Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 │ │ - │November 1945. (USA 482) │ V │ 390 - │ │ │ - 2817-PS │Telegram from German Embassy, Rome, to │ │ - │Ribbentrop, concerning answer of Duce to│ │ - │Hitler’s second letter, 27 August 1939. │ V │ 452 - │ │ │ - *2818-PS │Secret additional protocol to the │ │ - │Friendship and Alliance Pact between │ │ - │Germany and Italy. (GB 292) │ V │ 453 - │ │ │ - 2834-PS │Letter from Mussolini to Fuehrer, 25 │ │ - │August 1939. │ V │ 502 - │ │ │ - *2835-PS │German Foreign Office memorandum on │ │ - │conversation between Ribbentrop and the │ │ - │Duce, 10 March 1940. (GB 291) │ V │ 502 - │ │ │ - *2846-PS │Affidavit of Edwin Lahousen, 13 November│ │ - │1945. │ V │ 507 - │ │ │ - *2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │ - │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941.│ │ - │(USA 156) │ V │ 566 - │ │ │ - *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ - *C-23 │Unsigned documents found in official │ │ - │Navy files containing notes year by year│ │ - │from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of │ │ - │the German Navy, and dated 18 February │ │ - │1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA│ │ - │49) │ VI │ 827 - │ │ │ - *C-30 │Air-Sea Forces Orders for Occupation │ │ - │Danzig, 27 July 1939. (GB 46) │ VI │ 831 - │ │ │ - *C-120 │Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 for │ │ - │“Fall Weiss”, operation against Poland. │ │ - │(GB 41) │ VI │ 916 - │ │ │ - *C-126 │Preliminary Time Table for “Fall Weiss” │ │ - │and directions for secret mobilization. │ │ - │(GB 45) │ VI │ 932 - │ │ │ - *C-137 │Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 to│ │ - │Hitler Order of 21 October 1938. (GB 33)│ VI │ 949 - │ │ │ - *C-142 │Intention of the Army High Command and │ │ - │Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA 538)│ VI │ 956 - │ │ │ - *C-172 │Order No. 1 for “Fall Weiss” signed by │ │ - │Doenitz. (GB 189) │ VI │ 1002 - │ │ │ - *C-175 │OKW Directive for Unified Preparation │ │ - │for War 1937-1938, with covering letter │ │ - │from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA │ │ - │69) │ VI │ 1006 - │ │ │ - *D-738 │Memorandum on second conference between │ │ - │German Foreign Minister with Hungarian │ │ - │Prime and Foreign Minister on 1 May │ │ - │1939. (GB 290) │ VII │ 193 - │ │ │ - *L-43 │Air Force “Organizational Study 1950”, 2│ │ - │May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. 10.) │ VII │ 788 - │ │ │ - *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ - │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ - │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 - │ │ │ - *L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │ - │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │ - │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │ - │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VIII │ 920 - │ │ │ - *R-100 │Minutes of instructions given by Hitler │ │ - │to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March │ │ - │1939. (USA 121) │ VIII │ 83 - │ │ │ - *TC-2 │Hague Convention (1) for Pacific │ │ - │Settlement of International │ │ - │Disputes—1907. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 276 - │ │ │ - *TC-3 │Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening│ │ - │of Hostilities. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 279 - │ │ │ - *TC-9 │Versailles Treaty, Section XI, Article │ │ - │100, Free City of Danzig. (GB 3) │ VIII │ 290 - │ │ │ - *TC-15 │Arbitration Treaty between Germany and │ │ - │Poland at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB │ │ - │16) │ VIII │ 331 - │ │ │ - *TC-18 │Declaration concerning wars of │ │ - │aggression; resolution of 3rd Committee │ │ - │of League of Nations, 24 September 1927.│ │ - │(GB 17) │ VIII │ 357 - │ │ │ - *TC-19 │Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp. │ │ - │97-101. (GB 18) │ VIII │ 359 - │ │ │ - *TC-21 │German-Polish Declaration, 26 January │ │ - │1934. (GB 24) │ VIII │ 368 - │ │ │ - *TC-28 │German assurance to Czechoslovakia, 26 │ │ - │September 1938, from Documents of German│ │ - │Politics, Part VI, pp. 345-346. (GB 22) │ VIII │ 378 - │ │ │ - *TC-29 │German assurances to Poland, 26 │ │ - │September 1938, from Documents of German│ │ - │Politics, Part VI, p. 336. (GB 32) │ VIII │ 378 - │ │ │ - *TC-53-A │Marginal note to decree of final │ │ - │incorporation of Memel with German │ │ - │Reich, 23 March 1939, from Documents of │ │ - │German Politics, Part VII, p. 552. (GB │ │ - │4) │ VIII │ 408 - │ │ │ - *TC-54 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to German │ │ - │Armed Forces, 1 September 1939. (GB 73) │ VIII │ 408 - │ │ │ - *TC-70 │Hitler’s Reichstag speech concerning │ │ - │agreement with Poland, 30 January 1934, │ │ - │from Voelkischer Beobachter, 31 January │ │ - │1934. (GB 25) │ VIII │ 433 - │ │ │ - *TC-71 │Reports of British Consul in Danzig, │ │ - │July 1939. (GB 47) │ VIII │ 434 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 13 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s Reichstag │ │ - │speech, 28 April 1939. (GB 43) │ VIII │ 438 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 14 │British Blue Book. German memorandum │ │ - │renouncing 1934 agreement, 28 April │ │ - │1939. (GB 42) │ VIII │ 441 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 16 │British Blue Book. Polish Government’s │ │ - │reply, 5 May 1939, to 28 April memo. (GB│ │ - │44) │ VIII │ 445 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 17 │British Blue Book. British Prime │ │ - │Minister’s statement in House of │ │ - │Commons, 31 March 1939. (GB 39) │ VIII │ 450 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 18 │British Blue Book. Anglo-Polish │ │ - │communique issued 6 April 1939. (GB 40) │ VIII │ 450 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 53 │British Blue Book. Report of British │ │ - │Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB │ │ - │51) │ VIII │ 451 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 54 │British Blue Book. Report of British │ │ - │Ambassador, Warsaw, 26 August 1939. (GB │ │ - │52) │ VIII │ 452 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 55 │British Blue Book. Report of British │ │ - │Ambassador, Warsaw, 27 August 1939. (GB │ │ - │53) │ VIII │ 452 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 56 │British Blue Book. British Prime │ │ - │Minister’s letter to Hitler, 22 August │ │ - │1939. (GB 55) │ VIII │ 453 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 60 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s reply to │ │ - │British Prime Minister, 23 August 1939. │ │ - │(GB 56) │ VIII │ 455 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 62 │British Blue Book. Danzig Senate Decree │ │ - │appointing Forster Head of State, 23 │ │ - │August 1939. (GB 50) │ VIII │ 457 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 68 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s verbal │ │ - │communique to Sir Neville Henderson, 25 │ │ - │August 1939. (GB 65) │ VIII │ 458 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 74 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │ - │reply, 28 August 1939, to Hitler’s │ │ - │message of 25 August. (GB 66) │ VIII │ 460 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 75 │British Blue Book. Hitler and Sir N. │ │ - │Henderson conversation, 28 August 1939. │ │ - │(GB 67) │ VIII │ 463 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 78 │British Blue Book. Hitler’s reply to │ │ - │British Government, 29 August 1939. (GB │ │ - │68) │ VIII │ 466 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 79 │British Blue Book. Hitler and Sir N. │ │ - │Henderson conversation, 29 August 1939. │ │ - │(GB 69) │ VIII │ 469 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 89 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │ - │reply, 30 August 1939, to German │ │ - │communication of 29 August. (GB 70) │ VIII │ 470 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 92 │British Blue Book. Ribbentrop and Sir N.│ │ - │Henderson conversation, midnight 30 │ │ - │August 1939. (GB 71) │ VIII │ 472 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 110 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │ - │ultimatum, 1 September 1939. (GB 74) │ VIII │ 473 - │ │ │ - TC-72 No. 113 │British Blue Book. Copy German proposals│ │ - │handed to Sir N. Henderson 9:15 P.M., 31│ │ - │August 1939. │ VIII │ 474 - │ │ │ - TC-72 No. 118 │British Blue Book. British Government’s │ │ - │final ultimatum, 3 September 1939. │ VIII │ 474 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 124 │British Blue Book. President Roosevelt’s│ │ - │appeal to Hitler, 24 August 1939. (GB │ │ - │59) │ VIII │ 475 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 126 │British Blue Book. President Moscicki’s │ │ - │reply to President Roosevelt, │ │ - │25 August 1939. (GB 60) │ VIII │ 476 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 127 │British Blue Book. President Roosevelt’s│ │ - │second appeal to Hitler, 25 August 1939.│ │ - │(GB 61) │ VIII │ 477 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 139 │British Blue Book. The Pope’s appeal, 24│ │ - │August 1939. (GB 62) │ VIII │ 477 - │ │ │ - *TC-72 No. 141 │British Blue Book. The Pope’s appeal, 31│ │ - │August 1939. (GB 63) │ VIII │ 480 - │ │ │ - *TC-73 No. 33 │Polish White Book. German-Polish │ │ - │communique, 5 November 1937. (GB 27) │ VIII │ 480 - │ │ │ - *TC-73 No. 44 │Polish White Book. Lipski, Ribbentrop │ │ - │luncheon, conversation, 24 October 1938.│ │ - │(GB 27-A) │ VIII │ 483 - │ │ │ - *TC-73 No. 45 │Polish White Book. Beck’s instructions │ │ - │to Lipski, 31 October 1938. (GB 27-B) │ VIII │ 484 - │ │ │ - *TC-73 No. 48 │Polish White Book. Beck and Hitler │ │ - │conversation, 5 January 1939. (GB 34) │ VIII │ 486 - │ │ │ - *TC-73 No. 49 │Polish White Book. Beck and Ribbentrop │ │ - │conversation, 6 January 1939. (GB 35) │ VIII │ 488 - │ │ │ - *TC-73 No. 57 │Polish White Book. Hitler’s Reichstag │ │ - │speech, 30 January 1939. (GB 37) │ VIII │ 488 - │ │ │ - *TC-73 No. 61 │Polish White Book. Ribbentrop and Lipski│ │ - │conversation, 21 March 1939. (GB 38) │ VIII │ 489 - │ │ │ - *TC-73 No. 91 │Polish White Book. Anglo-Polish │ │ - │Agreement, 25 August 1939. (GB 57) │ VIII │ 492 - │ │ │ - *TC-73 No. 112 │Polish White Book. Ribbentrop-Lipski │ │ - │conversation, 31 August 1939. (GB 72) │ VIII │ 494 - │ │ │ - TC-73 No. 113 │Polish White Book. German broadcast 9 │ │ - │P.M. 31 August 1939. │ VIII │ 495 - │ │ │ - *TC-75 │Memo for the Fuehrer, 2 January 1938, │ │ - │concerning Anglo-German relations. (GB │ │ - │28) │ VIII │ 513 - │ │ │ - *TC-76 │Note for Reichsminister, 26 August 1938.│ │ - │(GB 31) │ VIII │ 515 - │ │ │ - *TC-77 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │ - │Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August │ │ - │1939. (GB 48) │ VIII │ 516 - │ │ │ - *TC-78 │French Prime Minister’s letter to │ │ - │Hitler, 26 August 1939. (GB 58) │ VIII │ 529 - │ │ │ - *TC-79 │Hitler’s reply to French Prime Minister,│ │ - │27 August 1939. (GB 58) │ VIII │ 531 - │ │ │ - *TC-90 │Goering’s interrogation, 29 August 1945.│ │ - │(GB 64) │ VIII │ 534 - │ │ │ - *TC-91 │Ribbentrop’s interrogation, 29 August │ │ - │1945. (GB 276) │ VIII │ 535 - │ │ │ - Affidavit A │Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January │ │ - │1946, substantially the same as his │ │ - │testimony on direct examination before │ │ - │the International Military Tribunal at │ │ - │Nurnberg 30 November and 1 December │ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 587 - │ │ │ - *Chart No. 10 │1938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion │ │ - │1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29) │ VIII │ 779 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ - │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ - │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ - │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782 - - - 9. AGGRESSION AGAINST NORWAY AND DENMARK - -In the early hours of the morning of 9 April 1940 Nazi Germany invaded -Norway and Denmark. Those invasions constituted wars of aggression, and -also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and -assurances. - -A. _Treaties and Assurances Violated._ - -The invasions constituted violations of the Hague Convention and of the -Kellogg-Briand Pact. In addition there were specific agreements between -Germany and Norway and Denmark. There was the Treaty of Arbitration and -Conciliation between Germany and Denmark, which was signed at Berlin on -2 June, 1926 (_TC-17_). The first Article of that Treaty is in these -terms: - - “The Contracting Parties undertake to submit to the procedure of - arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present - Treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise - between Germany and Denmark and which it has not been possible - to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy or to bring - with the consent of both Parties before the Permanent Court of - International Justice. - - “Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has been - laid down in other Conventions in force between the Contracting - Parties shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of - such Conventions.” (_TC-17_) - -The remaining Articles deal with the machinery for arbitration. - -There was also the treaty of nonaggression between Germany and Denmark -which was signed by Ribbentrop on 31 May 1939, ten weeks after the Nazi -seizure of Czechoslovakia (_TC-24_). The preamble and Articles 1 and 2 -read as follows: - - “His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland and the Chancellor - of the German Reich, - - “Being firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and - Germany in all circumstances, have agreed to confirm this - resolve by means of a treaty and have appointed as their - Plenipotentiaries: His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland - and the Chancellor of the German Reich. - - “Article I: The Kingdom of Denmark and the German Reich shall in - no case resort to war or to any other use of force one against - the other. - - “Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be taken - by a third Power against one of the Contracting Parties, the - other Contracting Party shall not support such action in any - way. - - “Article II: The Treaty shall come into force on the exchange of - the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a - period of ten years from that date.” (_TC-24_) - -The Treaty is dated 31 May 1939. At the bottom of the page there appears -the signature of Ribbentrop. The invasion of Denmark by the Nazi forces -less than a year after the signature of this treaty showed the utter -worthlessness of treaties to which Ribbentrop put his signature. - -With regard to Norway, Ribbentrop and the Nazi conspirators were party -to a similar perfidy. Hitler gave an assurance to Denmark, Norway, and -the Netherlands on 28 April 1939 (_TC-30_). That, of course, was after -the annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world, -and was presumably an attempt to try to reassure the Scandinavian -States. Hitler said: - - “I have given binding declarations to a large number of States. - None of these States can complain that even a trace of a demand - contrary thereto has ever been made to them by Germany. None of - the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend that a - request has ever been put to them by the German Government or by - the German public opinion which was incompatible with the - sovereignty and integrity of their State. - - “I was pleased that a number of European States availed - themselves of these declarations by the German Government to - express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality. - This applies to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, etc.” - (_TC-30_) - -A further assurance was given by the Nazi Government on 2 September -1939, the day after the Nazi invasion of Poland. On that day an aide -memoire was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German -Minister in Oslo. It reads: - - “The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the - friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under - no circumstances, to prejudice the inviolability and integrity - of Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. - In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally - expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable - neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches - of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. - Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ - from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party - recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled - to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the - resulting situation might dictate.” (_TC-31_) - -There followed a further German assurance to Norway in a speech by -Hitler on 6 October 1939 in which he said: - - “Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points - of controversy with the Northern States; neither has she any - today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered nonaggression - pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they - do not feel themselves threatened in any way.” (_TC-32_) - -These treaties and assurances were the diplomatic background to the Nazi -aggression on Norway and Denmark. These assurances were simply given to -lull suspicion and cause the intended victims of Nazi aggression to be -unprepared to meet the Nazi attack. For it is now known that as early as -October 1939 the conspirators were plotting the invasion of Norway, and -that the most active conspirators in that plot were Raeder and -Rosenberg. - -B. _Early Planning for Invasion._ - -The Norwegian invasion is in one respect not a typical Nazi aggression, -in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it. The chief -instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg; Raeder because he -thought Norway strategically important, and because he coveted glory for -his Navy; Rosenberg because of his political connections in Norway, -which he sought to develop. And in the Norwegian, Vidkun Quisling, -Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth Column agent. - -The early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to invade Norway are disclosed -in a letter which Raeder wrote on 10 January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, -the official German Naval historian (_C-66_). It is headed “Memorandum -for Admiral Assmann for his own information; not to be used for -publications.” The first part deals with “Barbarossa” (the plan to -invade Russia). The next part is headed “(b) _Weseruebung_,” which was -the code name for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. The following is a -pertinent passage from the letter: - - “During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October - 1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a - detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an - occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this - letter on to C/SKl (the Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff) - for their information and prepared some notes based on this - letter for my report to the Fuehrer, which I made on the 10th of - October 1939, since my opinion was identical with that of - Admiral Carls, while at that time the SKl was more dubious about - the matter. In these notes, I stressed the disadvantages which - an occupation of Norway by the British would have for - us—control of the approaches to the Baltic, outflanking of our - naval operations and of air attacks on Britain, pressure on - Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation - of the Norwegian coast—outlet to the North Atlantic, no - possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917-18. - Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered; - I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our - correspondence thought that Narvik could be excluded. The - Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; - he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to - consider the question himself.” (_C-66_) - -This report of Raeder shows that the evolution of this Nazi campaign -against Norway affords a good example of the participation of the German -High Command in the Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive neighbors. - -Before this report of October 1939 was made to the Fuehrer, Raeder -sought a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion. On 3 October 1939, he -made out a questionnaire headed, “Gaining of Bases in Norway (extract -from War Diary)” (_C-122_). It reads: - - “The Chief of the Naval War Staff considers it necessary that - the Fuehrer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of - the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the - operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it - is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure - of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic - and operational position. The following questions must be given - consideration: - - “(_a_) What places in Norway can be considered as bases? - - “(_b_) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s - will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting? - - “(_c_) What are the possibilities of defense after the - occupation? - - “(_d_) Will the harbors have to be developed completely as - bases, or have they already advantages suitable for supply - position?” - - “F.O.U.-boats” [a reference to Doenitz] “already considers such - harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for - Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.”) - - “(_e_) What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of - the war at sea in gaining bases in North Denmark, e.g. Skagen?” - (_C-122_) - -A memorandum written by Doenitz on Norwegian bases presumably relates to -the questionnaire of Raeder, which was in circulation about that time. -Doenitz’s document is headed, “Flag Officer Submarines, Operations -Division,” and is marked “Most Secret.” The subject is “Base in Norway.” -Then there are set out “suppositions”, “advantages and disadvantages”, -and then “conclusions”. The last paragraph (III) reads: - - “The following is therefore proposed: - - “(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including: - - “_a._ Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen, - provisions. - - “_b._ Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encounter. - - “_c._ Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews. - - “_d._ Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units. - - “Secondly, establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in - Narvik as an alternative.” (_C-5_) - -In October 1939 Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression -and had not yet committed himself to it. Raeder persevered in pressing -his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a -powerful ally in Rosenberg. - -C. _Use of the Fifth Column: Quisling._ - -The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a -political weapon are now proven historical facts. Should further proof -be required, it is found in a “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign -Affairs Bureau of the Party (_Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP_) from -1933 to 1943” (_007-PS_). This was Rosenberg’s Bureau. The report reads: - - “When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (_Aussenpolitische Amt_) was - established on the 1st of April 1933, the Fuehrer directed that - it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but - should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and - suggestions. - - “Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted - by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the - newly-established Bureau devoted particular attention to - internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the - effects of World Bolshevism primarily in other European - countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated - groups inclining towards National Socialism in combatting - Bolshevism, focussing its main attention on Nations and States - bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand, those Nations - and states constituted an _Insulating Ring_ encircling the - Bolshevist neighbor; on the other hand they were the laterals of - German living space and took up a flanking position towards the - Western Powers, especially Great Britain. In order to wield the - desired influence by one means or another, the Bureau was - compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into - consideration the completely different living conditions, the - ties of blood, intellect and history of the movements observed - by the Bureau in those countries. - - “In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based - on economic consideration, had become progressively more - dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the Bureau put - the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations - with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic - Society in Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions - of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, - especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely - political cooperation in Sweden and Denmark, an association - based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very - close relations were established with its founder, which led to - further consequences.” (_007-PS_) - -There follows an account of the activity of Rosenberg’s Bureau in -various parts of the world. The last paragraph of the main body of the -report reads in part: - - “With the outbreak of war, the Bureau was entitled to consider - its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal - connections in many lands can be resumed under a different - guise.” (_007-PS_) - -The Annex to the report shows what the “exploitation of personal -connections” involved. Annex One to the document is headed, “To Brief -Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party -from 1933 to 1943.” The subheading is “The Political Preparation of the -Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years 1939-1940”. The annex -reads: - - “As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in - Scandinavia, only ‘_Nasjonal Samling_’ led in Norway by the - former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve, Vidkun - Quisling, deserved serious political attention. This was a - fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater - Germanic Community. Naturally, all ruling powers were hostile - and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success among the - population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with Quisling - and attentively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious - energy on the middle class, which had been taken in tow by the - English. - - “From the beginning, it appeared probable that without - revolutionary events, which would stir the population from their - former attitude, no successful progress of _Nasjonal Samling_ - was to be expected. During the winter 1938-1939, Quisling was - privately visited by a member of the Bureau. - - “When the political situation in Europe came to a head in 1939, - Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the Nordic - Society in Luebeck in June. He expounded his conception of the - situation, and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He - emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive - importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area, and to the - advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the - Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater German - Reich and Great Britain. - - “Assuming that his statement would be of special interest to the - Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons, - Quisling was referred to State Secretary Koerner by the Bureau. - The Staff Director of the Bureau handed the Chief of the Reich - Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to the Fuehrer.” - (_007-PS_) - -This document is another illustration of the close interweaving between -the political and military leadership of the Nazi State. Raeder, in his -report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his collaboration with Rosenberg -(_C-66_). The second paragraph of the Raeder report, headed -“_Weseruebung_,” reads as follows: - - “In the further developments, I was supported by Commander - Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-Chief personally—in - conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in - touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the - beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me—with - the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” (_C-66_) - -The details of the manner in which Raeder made contact personally with -Quisling are not clear. In a report from Rosenberg to Raeder, however, -the full extent of Quisling’s preparedness for treachery and his -potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed -to Raeder. The second paragraph of this report reads as follows: - - “The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a report, would - be provided by the fact that the Storthing (the Norwegian - Parliament) had, in defense of the constitution, passed a - resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative - on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a - long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest - relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of - a letter which he had received only a short time previously from - the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter, - Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that, if things - went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished.” - (_C-65_) - -Then came the details of a plot to overthrow the government of Norway by -the traitor Quisling, in collaboration with Rosenberg: - - “A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of - a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians - to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a - purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with - experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practiced - in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with - all speed to Norway, where details would then require to be - further discussed. Some important centers in Oslo would have to - be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German - Fleet, together with suitable contingents of the German Army, - would go into operation when summoned specially by the new - Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to - Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been - carried out with instantaneous success—would immediately bring - him the approval of those sections of the Army with which he at - present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he - has never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the - King is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an - accomplished fact. * * * - - “Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required - which accord with German calculations.” (_C-65_) - -Subsequent developments are indicated in a report by Raeder of his -meeting with Hitler on 12 December 1939 at 1200 hours, in the presence -of Keitel, Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler. -The report is headed “Norwegian Question”, and the first sentence reads: - - “C-in-C Navy” (Raeder) “has received Quisling and Hagelin. - Quisling creates the impression of being reliable.” (_C-64_) - -There then follows, in the next, two paragraphs, a statement of -Quisling’s views. The fourth paragraph reads: - - “The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that - he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg - once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a - long while. C-in-C Navy” [Raeder] “suggests that if the Fuehrer - forms a favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission - to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out - of the occupation. - - “(_a_) By peaceful means; that is to say, German forces summoned - by Norway, or - - “(_b_) To agree to do so by force.” (_C-64_) - -It was at a meeting on 12 December that Raeder made the above report to -Hitler. - -Raeder’s record of these transactions reports the next event: - - “Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to - Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the - Fuehrer by me, with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” - (_C-66_) - -A note at the bottom of the page states: - - “At the crucial moment, R” (presumably Rosenberg) “hurt his - foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the - 14th of December.” (_C-66_) - -That is Raeder’s note, and it indicates the extent of his contact in -this conspiracy. - -The report continues: - - “On the grounds of the Fuehrer’s discussion with Quisling and - Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December, the Fuehrer - gave the order that the preparations for the Norwegian operation - were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. - - “Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the - development of the Norwegian question, and continued to be - somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations, which were - undertaken by Captain Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed - Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War - Staff.” (_C-66_) - -Raeder’s note referring to the “crucial” moment was an appropriate one, -for on the same day that it was written, 14 December, Hitler gave the -order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by -the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. - -Rosenberg’s report on the activities of his organization deals with -further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December. The -extract reads: - - “Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer on 16 - December, and once more on 18 December. In the course of this - audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally - would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway, as well as - of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the - theatre of war and to draw still other nations into the - conflict. * * *” - - “Should the enemy attempt to extend the war however, with the - aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the - Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself - against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance - increasing enemy propaganda activity, he promised Quisling - financial support of his movement, which is based on Greater - German ideology. Military exploitation of the question now - raised was assigned to the special military staff, which - transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg - was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were - to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [Ribbentrop’s - organization], the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Ribbentrop] - being kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau - [Rosenberg’s organization]. - - “Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison - with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was - assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo. Orders were given that - the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy.” (_007-PS_) - -Here again is a further indication of the close link between the Nazi -politicians and the Nazi service chiefs. - -D. _Operational Planning_ - -The information available on the events of January 1940 is not full, but -it is clear that the agitation of Raeder and Rosenberg bore fruit. An -order signed by Keitel, dated 27 January 1940, marked “Most Secret, five -copies; reference, Study ‘N’”, (an earlier code name for the -_Weseruebung_ preparations) and classified "Access only through an -officer,” stated: - - “C-in-C of the Navy [Raeder] has a report on this * * * - - “The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes - that Study ‘N’ should be further worked on under my direct and - personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the - general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has - commissioned me to take over the direction of further - preparations. - - “A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the - Armed Forces Headquarters for this purpose, and this represents - at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff.” - - * * * * * * - - “All further plans will be made under the cover name - ‘_Weseruebung_.’” (_C-63_) - -The importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and -to the date of this important decision, is this: Prior to this date, 27 -January 1940, the planning of the various aspects of the invasion of -Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively small group, whose -aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking the -operation. The issuance of this directive of Keitel’s on 27 January -1940, was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed -Forces, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that was -pressing for the Norwegian adventure, and had turned the combined -resources of the German military machine to the task of producing -practical and coordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. From -January onward the operational planning for the invasion of Norway and -Denmark was started through the normal channels. - -Certain entries in the diary of Jodl reveal how the preparations -progressed (_1809-PS_). The entry for 6 February commences: - - “New idea: Carry out ‘H’ [_Hartmundt_, another code word for the - Norwegian and Danish invasion] and Weser Exercise only and - guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration of the war.” - (_1809-PS_) - -The entry for 21 February reads: - - “Fuehrer has talked with General von Falkenhorst, and charges - him with preparation of ‘Weser Exercise.’ Falkenhorst accepts - gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the armed - forces.” (_1809-PS_) - -The entry for 28 February reads: - - “I propose, first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer, - that Case Yellow [the code name for the invasion of the - Netherlands] and Weser Exercise [the invasion of Norway and - Denmark] must be prepared in such a way that they will be - independent of one another as regards both time and forces - employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this is in any way - possible.” (_1809-PS_) - -It will be observed that the new idea of 6 February, that the neutrality -of Belgium might be preserved, had been abandoned by 28 February. - -The entry for 29 February reads: - - “Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen - and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal - batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, _Chef - Landesverteidigung_, instructed to make out immediately the - order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed - Forces to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening - of the staff.” (_1809-PS_) - -Then came Hitler’s order to complete the preparations for the invasion -of Norway and Denmark (_C-174_). It bears the date of 1 March 1940, and -reads as follows: - - “The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Most - Secret. - - “Directive for _Fall Weseruebung_. - - “The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the - making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and - Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces—_Fall Weseruebung_. - This operation should prevent British encroachment on - Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore - base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start - line against Britain. - - “In view of our military and political power in comparison with - that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the - _Fall Weseruebung_ will be kept as small as possible. The - numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and - surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make - the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of - which is the military protection of the neutrality of the - Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted - to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If - necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will - provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance - should be met with, all military means will be used to crush - it.” - - * * * * * * - - “I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the - operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of - the 21st Army Corps, General von Falkenhorst. * * *” - - “The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway - must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations - must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy - seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply - immediately our own counter-measures. - - “It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as - the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our - measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport and - of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be - made with this factor in mind. - - “In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept - secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with - fictitious objectives.” (_C-174_) - -The section on “The Occupation of Denmark” which is given the code name -of “_Weseruebung Sued_”, provides: - - “The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of - Fuenen immediately after occupation of Seeland. - - “Added to this, having secured the most important places, the - Group will break through as quickly as possible from Fuenen to - Skagen and to the east coast.” (_C-174_) - -There then follow other instructions with regard to the operation. - -The section on “The Occupation of Norway”, given the code name of -“_Weseruebung Nord_”, provides: - - “The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most - important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations. - - “The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the - transport by sea of the landing troops. * * * The Air Force, - after the occupation has been completed, will ensure air defense - and will make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against - Britain.” (_C-174_) - -Whilst these preparations were being made, and just prior to the final -decision of Hitler, reports were coming in through Rosenberg’s -organization from Quisling. The third paragraph in Annex I, the section -dealing with Norway, has this information: - - “Quisling’s reports, transmitted to his representative in - Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of - intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent - of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January. - These increasingly better substantiated communications were in - sharpest contrast to the views of the German Legation in Oslo, - which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian - Nygardszvold Cabinet, and was convinced of that government’s - intention and readiness to defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in - Norway knew that Quisling’s representative for Germany - maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in - gaining a foothold within governmental circles of the - Nygardszvold cabinet and in listening to the cabinet members’ - views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau - [Rosenberg’s bureau], which conveyed the news to the Fuehrer - through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the 16th to - 17th of February, English destroyers attacked the German steamer - ‘Altmark’ in Jessingjord.* * *” (_007-PS_) - -(That is a reference to the action by the British destroyer _Cossack_ -against the German naval auxiliary vessel _Altmark_, which was carrying -three hundred British prisoners, captured on the high seas, to Germany -through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of the British -delegation with regard to that episode is that the use that was being -made by the _Altmark_ of Norwegian territorial waters was in fact a -flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality, and that the action -taken by H.M.S. _Cossack_, which was restricted to rescuing the three -hundred British prisoners on board, no attempt being made to destroy the -_Altmark_ or to capture the armed guards on board her, was fully -justified under international law.) - -The Rosenberg report continues: - - “The Norwegian Government’s reaction to this question permitted - the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived - at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such - assumption was confirmed by reports of Section Scheidt, who in - turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even - after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the - opposite view, and went on record as believing in the good - intentions of the Norwegians.” (_007-PS_) - -And so the Nazi Government preferred the reports of the traitor Quisling -to the considered judgment of German diplomatic representatives in -Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler -decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the -preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl’s diary. The entry -for 3 March relates: - - “The Fuehrer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of - a swift entry into N [Norway] with strong forces. - - “No delay by any branch of the armed forces. Very rapid - acceleration of the attack necessary.” (_1809-PS_) - -The last entry for 3 March reads: - - “Fuehrer decides to carry out ‘Weser Exercise’ before case - ‘Yellow’ with a few days interval.” (_1809-PS_) - -Thus, the important issue of strategy which had been concerning the -German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the -fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Country. -It will be observed from those entries of 3 March that by that date -Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of aggression -against Norway. - -The entry in Jodl’s diary for 5 March reads: - - “Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about ‘Weser - Exercise.’ Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till - now. Won’t listen to anyone and wants to show that all - preparations so far made are worthless. - - “Result: (_a_) Stronger forces to Narvik. - - “(_b_) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in - Trondheim). - - “(_c_) Christiansand can be left out at first. - - “(_d_) Six divisions envisaged for Norway. - - “(_e_) A foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen.” - (_1809-PS_) - -The entry for 13 March is one of the most remarkable in the -documentation of this case. - - “Fuehrer does not give order yet for ‘W’ [Weser Exercise]. He is - still looking for an excuse.” (_1809-PS_) - -The entry of the next day, 14 March, shows a similar preoccupation on -the part of Hitler with the search for an excuse for this aggression. It -reads: - - “English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen - submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations - or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided - what reason to give for ‘Weser Exercise.’” (_1809-PS_) - -The entry for 21 March reads: - - “Misgivings of Task Force 21 [Falkenhorst’s Force, detailed to - conduct the invasion] about the long interval between taking up - readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic - negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as - otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If - resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political - plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken, - and even exaggerate them.” (_1809-PS_) - -The entry of 28 March reads: - - “Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the - Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the - other two commanders are worrying about matters which are none - of their business. Franke sees more disadvantages than - advantages. - - “In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and roundly - declares that he won’t stand for the Navy clearing out of the - Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo will have - to remain occupied by naval forces.” (_1809-PS_) - -The entry for 2 April reads: - - “Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the - Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm - preparations completed. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser - Exercise for April 9th.” (_1809-PS_) - -The entry for 4 April reads: - - “Fuehrer drafts the proclamation. Piepenbrock, Chief of Military - Intelligence 1, returns with good results from the talks with - Quisling in Copenhagen.” (_1809-PS_) - -From the large number of operation orders that were issued in connection -with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, two may be cited to -illustrate the extent of the secrecy and deception that was used by the -conspirators in the course of that aggression. The first dated 4 April -1940, reads in part: - - “* * * The barrage-breaking vessels (_Sperrbrechers_) will - penetrate inconspicuously, and with lights on, into Oslo Fjord, - disguised as merchant steamers. - - “Challenge from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be - answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. - I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the - operation before zero hour.” (_C-115_) - -An order for reconnaissance forces, dated 24 March 1940, entitled -“Behavior during entrance into the harbor,” reads in part: - - “The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as - possible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be - answered in English. In answer to questions a text with - something like the following content will be chosen: - - “Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent. - - “Challenges to be answered with names of British warships: - - “Koeln H.M.S. Cairo - “Koenigsberg H.M.S. Calcutta - “Bromso H.M.S. Faulkner - “Karl Peters H.M.S. Halcyon - “Leopard British destroyer - “Wolf British destroyer - “E-boats British motor torpedo boats - - “Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be - illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke.” (_C-115_) - -An order dated 24 March 1940, classified “Most Secret,” provides: - - “Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our - own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of - passing craft. To challenge in case of the ‘Koeln’ H.M.S. Cairo. - Then to order to stop: (1) Please repeat last signal. (2) - Impossible to understand your signal. In case of a warning shot: - Stop firing. British ship. Good friend. In case of an inquiry as - to destination and purpose: Going Bergen. Chasing German - steamers.” (_C-115_) - -Doenitz’s order in connection with this operation is headed “Top Secret, -Operation Order ‘_Hartmut_.’” - - “Occupation of Denmark and Norway. This order comes into force - on the codeword ‘_Hartmut_.’ With its coming into force the - orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their - validity. - - “The day and hour are designated as ‘Weser-Day’ and - ‘Weser-Hour’, and the whole operation is known as - ‘_Weseruebung_’. - - “The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the - rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously - Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side. - * * * The naval force will as they enter the harbor fly the - British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at - Narvik.” (_C-151_) - -E. _Nazi Justification of Invasion._ - -On 9 April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost -unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions -had already begun, a German memorandum was handed to the governments of -Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action (_TC-55_). -That memorandum alleges that England and France were guilty in their -maritime warfare of breaches of international law; that Britain and -France are making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway; and that -the government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation. -The memorandum further states: - - “The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil - as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use - of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations - against England, so long as it is not forced to do so by - measures taken by England and France. German military operations - aim much more exclusively at protecting the north against - proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French - forces.” (_TC-55_) - -In connection with that statement it may be recalled that in his -operation order on 1 March Hitler had given orders to the Air Force to -make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain. That was on -1 March. And this is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on 9 -April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to Norway and -Denmark are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and -military threat: - - “The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian - Government and the Norwegian people will respond with - understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to - it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all - possible means by the German forces employed, and would - therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal - Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures - with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German - troops can take place without friction and difficulty. In the - spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always - existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian - Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her - measures the territorial integrity and political independence of - the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future.” (_TC-55_) - -What the Nazis meant by “protection of the kingdom of Norway” was shown -by their conduct on 9 April. - -A report by the Commander in Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces states: - - “* * * The Germans, considering the long lines of communications - and the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the - necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order - to paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their - country and at the same time to prevent allied intervention it - was planned to capture all the more important towns along the - coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament - and other military and civilian people occupying important - positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could - be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new - government with Quisling as the head.” - - * * * * * * - - “The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns - along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight - losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser ‘Blucher’, - carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division, - technical staffs and specialists who were to take over the - control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and - members of the Government and Parliament failed in spite of the - surprise of the attack; resistance was organized throughout the - country.” (_TC-56_) - -What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the -Royal Danish Government (_D-628_). An extract from it reads: - - “Extracts from the Memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude - towards Denmark before and during the occupation, prepared by - the Royal Danish Government. - - “On the 9th of April, 1940 at 4.20 hours the German Minister - appeared at the private residence of the Danish Minister for - Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air Attache of the Legation. - The appointment had been made by a telephone call from the - German Legation to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for - Foreign Affairs at 4.00 o’clock the same morning. The Minister - said at once that Germany had positive proof that Great Britain - intended to occupy bases in Denmark and Norway. Germany had to - safeguard Denmark against this. For this reason German soldiers - were now crossing the frontier and landing at various points in - Zealand including the port of Copenhagen; in a short time German - bombers would be over Copenhagen; their orders were not to bomb - until further notice. It was now up to the Danes to prevent - resistance as any resistance would have the most terrible - consequences. Germany would guarantee Denmark’s territorial - integrity and political independence. Germany would not - interfere with the internal government of Denmark, but wanted - only to make sure of the neutrality of the country. For this - purpose the presence of the German Wehrmacht in Denmark was - required during the war. - - “The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the - allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was - completely without foundation; there was no possibility of - anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested - against the violation of Denmark’s neutrality which according to - the German Minister’s statement was in progress. The Minister - for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could not give a - reply to the demands, which had to be submitted to the King and - the Prime Minister, and further observed that the German - Minister knew, as everybody else, that the Danish armed forces - had orders to oppose violations of Denmark’s neutrality so that - fighting presumably already took place. In reply the German - Minister expressed that the matter was very urgent, not least to - avoid air bombardment.” (_D-628_) - -What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the British -Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary (_D-627_). That -dispatch reads: - - “The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced together by - members of my staff from actual eye-witnesses or from reliable - information subsequently received and are given below. Early in - the morning towards 5 o’clock three small German transports - steamed into the approach to Copenhagen harbor, whilst a number - of airplanes circled overhead. The northern battery, guarding - the harbor approach, fired a warning shot at these planes when - it was seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this, - the Danes offered no further resistance, and the German vessels - fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor. Some of these - airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the town urging the - population to keep calm and cooperate with the Germans. I - enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which is written in a - bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-German disregard of - detail, together with a translation. Approximately 800 soldiers - landed with full equipment, and marched to Kastellet, the old - fortress of Copenhagen and now a barracks. The door was locked, - so the Germans promptly burst it open with explosives and - rounded up all the Danish soldiers within, together with the - womenfolk employed in the mess. The garrison offered no - resistance, and it appears that they were taken completely by - surprise. One officer tried to escape in a motor car, but his - chauffeur was shot before they could get away. He died in - hospital two days later. After seizing the barracks, a - detachment was sent to Amalienborg, the King’s palace, where - they engaged the Danish sentries on guard, wounding three, one - of them fatally. Meanwhile, a large fleet of bombers flew over - the city at low altitudes.” - - * * * * * * - - “It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in - Jutland. It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded Jutland - from the south at dawn on the 9th April and were at first - resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered casualties. The - chances of resistance were weakened by the extent to which the - forces appear to have been taken by surprise. The chief - permanent official of the Ministry of War, for instance, motored - into Copenhagen on the morning of the 9th April and drove - blithely past a sentry who challenged him, in blissful ignorance - that this was not one of his own men. It took a bullet, which - passed through the lapels of his coat, to disillusion him.” - (_D-627_) - -The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish governments spoke of -the German desire to maintain the territorial integrity and political -independence of those two small countries. Two documents indicate the -kind of territorial integrity and political independence the Nazi -conspirators contemplated for the victims of their aggression. An entry -in Jodl’s diary for 19 April reads: - - “Renewed crisis. Envoy Braver is recalled: since Norway is at - war with us, the task of the Foreign Office is finished. In the - Fuehrer’s opinion, force has to be used. It is said that - Gauleiter Terboven will be given a post. Field Marshal - [presumably a reference to Goering] is moving in the same - direction. He criticizes as defects that we didn’t take - sufficiently energetic measures against the civilian population, - that we could have seized electrical plant, that the Navy didn’t - supply enough troops. The Air Force can’t do everything.” - (_1809-PS_) - -It will be seen from that entry and the reference to Gauleiter Terboven -that already by 19 April, rule by Gauleiters had replaced rule by -Norwegians. - -A memorandum dated 3 June 1940, signed by Fricke, at that date the head -of the Operations Division of the German Naval War Staff, which was a -key appointment in the very nerve center of German naval operations, -relates to questions of territorial expansion and bases (_C-41_). It -reads: - - “These problems are preeminently of a political character and - comprise an abundance of questions of a political type, which it - is not the Navy’s province to answer, but they also materially - affect the strategic possibilities open—according to the way in - which this question is answered—for the subsequent use and - operation of the Navy. - - “It is too well known to need further mention that Germany’s - present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and in - the Baltic—bordered as it is by a whole series of States and - under their influence—is an impossible one for the future of - Greater Germany. If, over and above this, one extends these - strategic possibilities to the point that Germany shall not - continue to be cut off for all time from overseas by natural - geographical facts, the demand is raised that somehow or other - an end shall be put to this state of affairs at the end of the - war. - - “The solution could perhaps be found among the following - possibilities. - - “1. The territories of Denmark, Norway and Northern France - acquired during the course of the war continue to be so occupied - and organized that they can in future be considered as German - possessions. - - “This solution will recommend itself for areas where the - severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy - and where a gradual ‘Germanizing’ of the territory appears - practicable. - - “2. The taking over and holding of areas which have no direct - connection with Germany’s main body, and which, like the Russian - solution in Hango, remain permanently as an enclave in the - hostile State. Such areas might be considered possibly around - Brest and Trondjem. - - “3. The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas acquired - in this war should result in the existing population of these - areas feeling themselves politically, economically and - militarily to be completely dependent on Germany. If the - following results are achieved—that expansion is undertaken (on - a scale I shall describe later) by means of the military - measures for occupation taken during the war, that French powers - of resistance (popular unity, mineral resources, industry, Armed - Forces) are so broken that a revival must be considered out of - the question, that the smaller States such as the Netherlands, - Denmark and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which will - enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to occupy - these countries again, then in practice the same, but - psychologically much more, will be achieved.” (_C-41_) - -Then Fricke recommends: - - “The solution given in 3, therefore, appears to be the proper - one, that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium, part of North - and East France, to allow the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway to - exist on the basis indicated above.” - - * * * * * * - - “Time will show how far the outcome of the war with England will - make an extension of these demands possible.” (_C-41_) - -The submission of the prosecution is that that and other documents which -have been submitted tear apart the veil of Nazi pretense. These -documents reveal the menace behind the good-will of Goering; they expose -as fraudulent the diplomacy of Ribbentrop; they show the reality behind -the ostensible political ideology of tradesmen in treason like -Rosenberg; and finally and above all, they render sordid the -professional status of Keitel and of Raeder. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST - NORWAY AND DENMARK - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ - │ 5; V. │ I │ 27, 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *004-PS │Report submitted by Rosenberg to Deputy │ │ - │of the Fuehrer, 15 June 1940, on the │ │ - │Political Preparation of the Norway │ │ - │Action. (GB 140) │ III │ 19 - │ │ │ - *007-PS │Report on activities of the Foreign │ │ - │Affairs Bureau from 1933 to 1943 signed │ │ - │Rosenberg. (GB 84) │ III │ 27 - │ │ │ - *957-PS │Rosenberg’s letter to Ribbentrop, 24 │ │ - │February 1940. (GB 139) │ III │ 641 - │ │ │ - 1546-PS │Raeder memorandum, 9 April 1940, │ │ - │concerning occupation of Norway. │ IV │ 104 - │ │ │ - *1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940│ │ - │to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377 - │ │ │ - *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ - 3596-PS │Covering memorandum and notes of │ │ - │conversation on 8 August 1940, between │ │ - │Chief Custodian of Army Archives GOES │ │ - │and Major-General Himmler. │ VI │ 299 - │ │ │ - *C-5 │Memorandum to Supreme Command of the │ │ - │Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, │ │ - │concerning base in Norway. (GB 83) │ VI │ 815 - │ │ │ - *C-41 │Memorandum by Fricke, 3 June 1940, on │ │ - │questions of territorial expansion and │ │ - │bases. (GB 96) │ VI │ 868 - │ │ │ - *C-63 │Keitel order on preparation for │ │ - │“Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB 87) │ VI │ 883 - │ │ │ - *C-64 │Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on │ │ - │meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB│ │ - │86) │ VI │ 884 - │ │ │ - *C-65 │Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder concerning │ │ - │visit of Quisling. (GB 85) │ VI │ 885 - │ │ │ - *C-66 │Memorandum from Raeder to Assmann, 10 │ │ - │January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” │ │ - │and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81) │ VI │ 887 - │ │ │ - *C-115 │Naval deception and camouflage in │ │ - │invasion of Norway taken from file of │ │ - │naval operation orders for operation │ │ - │“Weseruebung”. (GB 90) │ VI │ 914 - │ │ │ - *C-122 │Extract from Naval War Diary. │ │ - │Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 October│ │ - │1939. (GB 82) │ VI │ 928 - │ │ │ - *C-151 │Details for execution of operation │ │ - │“Weseruebung”, 3 March 1940, signed by │ │ - │Doenitz. (GB 91) │ VI │ 965 - │ │ │ - *C-174 │Hitler Order for operation │ │ - │“Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89) │ VI │ 1003 - │ │ │ - *D-627 │Dispatch from British Minister in │ │ - │Copenhagen to Foreign Secretary, 25 │ │ - │April 1940. (GB 95) │ VII │ 97 - │ │ │ - *D-628 │Memorandum concerning Germany’s attitude│ │ - │towards Denmark before and during │ │ - │occupation. (GB 94) │ VII │ 98 - │ │ │ - *D-629 │Letter from Keitel to Ribbentrop, 3 │ │ - │April 1940. (GB 141) │ VII │ 99 - │ │ │ - *L-323 │Entry in Naval War Diary concerning │ │ - │operation “Weseruebung”. (USA 541) │ VII │ 1106 - │ │ │ - *M-156 │Year Book of the Ausland (Foreign) │ │ - │Organization of the NSDAP for 1942. (GB │ │ - │284) │ VIII │ 49 - │ │ │ - *TC-17 │Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation │ │ - │between Germany and Denmark, signed at │ │ - │Berlin, 2 June 1926. (GB 76) │ VIII │ 346 - │ │ │ - *TC-24 │Treaty of nonaggression between German │ │ - │Reich and Kingdom of Denmark, 31 May │ │ - │1939. (GB 77) │ VIII │ 373 - │ │ │ - *TC-30 │German assurance to Denmark, Norway, │ │ - │Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April │ │ - │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ - │Part VII, I, pp. 139, 172-175. (GB 78) │ VIII │ 379 - │ │ │ - *TC-31 │German assurance to Norway, 2 September │ │ - │1939. (GB 79) │ VIII │ 380 - │ │ │ - *TC-32 │German assurance to Norway, 6 October │ │ - │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ - │Vol. VII, p. 350. (GB 80) │ VIII │ 381 - │ │ │ - *TC-55 │German ultimatum to Norway and Denmark, │ │ - │9 April 1940, from Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Part VIII, pp. 21-31. (GB 92) │ VIII │ 410 - │ │ │ - *TC-56 │German Plans for Invasion of Norway, 1 │ │ - │October 1945. (GB 93) │ VIII │ 414 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ - │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ - │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ - │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782 - - - 10. AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, - AND LUXEMBOURG - -The independence of Belgium, which for so many centuries was the cockpit -of Europe, was guaranteed by the great European powers in 1839. That -guarantee was observed for 75 years, until it was broken by the Germans -in 1914, who brought all the horrors of war, and the even greater -horrors of German occupation, to Belgium. History was to repeat itself -in a still more catastrophic fashion some 25 years after, in 1940. - -Among the applicable treaties are the Hague Convention of 1907 (_TC-3_; -_TC-4_), the Locarno Arbitration and Conciliation Convention of 1925, in -which Belgium’s independence and neutrality were guaranteed by Germany; -the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, by which all the Powers renounced -recourse to war; and the Hague Convention of Arbitration and -Conciliation May 1926 between Germany and the Netherlands (_TC-16_). -Article I of the latter treaty provides: - - “The contracting parties” (the Netherlands and the German Reich) - “undertake to submit all disputes of any nature whatever which - may arise between them which it has not been possible to settle - by diplomacy, and which have not been referred to the Permanent - Court of International Justice, to be dealt with by arbitration - or conciliation as provided.” (_TC-16_) - -Subsequent clauses deal with the machinery of conciliation. The last -article, Article 21, provides that the Convention shall be valid for ten -years, and then shall remain in force for successive periods of five -years until denounced by either party. And this treaty never was -denounced by Germany at all. - -The last of the applicable treaties, all of which belong to the days of -the Weimar Republic, is the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation -between Germany and Luxembourg, executed at Geneva in 1929 (_TC-20_). -The first few words of Article 1 are familiar: - - “The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means - all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them - and which it may not be possible to settle by - -Then follow clauses dealing with the machinery for peaceful settlement -of disputes, which are in the common form. - -Those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium at the -time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933. Hitler adopted and -ratified the obligations of Germany under the Weimar Republic with -regard to the treaties which had been entered into. Nothing more -occurred to alter the position of Belgium until March 1936. Germany -reoccupied the Rhineland and announced the resumption of conscription. -And Hitler, on 7 March 1936 purported in a speech to repudiate the -obligations of the German Government under the Locarno Pact, the reason -being given as the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. There -was no legal foundation for this claim that Germany was entitled to -renounce obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was left in the -air, in the sense that it had itself entered into various obligations -under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations -acknowledged, and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of -Germany to observe the Pact, had been renounced. - -And so on 30 January 1937, perhaps because Hitler realized the position -of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler gave solemn assurance—he used -the word “solemn”—which amounted to a full guarantee (_TC-33_). In -April 1937, France and England released Belgium from her obligations -under the Locarno Pact. Belgium gave guarantees of strict independence -and neutrality, and France and England gave guarantees of assistance -should Belgium be attacked. It was because of those facts that Germany, -on 13 October 1937, gave a clear and unconditional guarantee to Belgium: - - “I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the - following communication to Your Excellency: The German - Government has taken cognizance with particular interest of the - public declaration in which the Belgium Government defines the - international position of Belgium. For its part, it has - repeatedly given expressions, especially through the declaration - of the Chancellor of the German Reich in his speech of January - 30th, 1937, to its own point of view. The German Government has - also taken cognizance of the declaration made by the British and - French Governments on the 24th of April 1937 * * * - - “Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of - Locarno may still take some time, and being desirous of - strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the - German Government regards it as appropriate to define now its - own attitude towards Belgium. To this end, it makes the - following declaration: First, the German Government has taken - note of the views which the Belgian Government has thought fit - to express. That is to say, (_a_) of the policy of independence - which it intends to exercise in full sovereignty; (_b_) of its - determination to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its - forces against any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian - territory from being used for purposes of aggression against - another state as a passage or as a base of operation by land, by - sea, or in the air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an - efficient manner to this purpose. Two: The German Government - considers that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are - common interests of the Western Powers. It confirms its - determination that in no circumstances will it impair this - inviolability and integrity and that it will at all times - respect Belgian territory except, of course, in the event of - Belgium’s taking part in a military action directed against - Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved. The - German Government, like the British and French Governments, is - prepared to assist Belgium should she be subjected to an attack - or to invasion. * * *” (_TC-34_) - -The following reply was made: - - “The Belgian Government has taken note with great satisfaction - of the declaration communicated to it this day by the German - Government. It thanks the German Government warmly for this - communication.” (_TC-34_) - -Thus, in October 1937, Germany gave a solemn guarantee to this small -nation of its peaceful aspiration towards her, and its assertion that -the integrity of the Belgian frontier was a common interest between her -and Belgium and the other Western Powers. Yet eighteen months afterwards -Germany had violated that assurance. - -That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the leaders -and to the high command of Germany can be seen from a document which -came into existence on 24 August 1938, at the time when the -Czechoslovakia drama was unfolding, and when it was uncertain whether -there would be war with the Western Powers. This Top Secret document is -addressed to the General Staff of the 5th Section of the German Air -Force, and deals with the subject, “Extended Case Green—Appreciation of -the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.” Apparently some -staff officer had been asked to prepare this appreciation. The last -paragraph (No. H) reads: - - “Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy. * * * - - “Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent - an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war - against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is - held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the - conditions under which an occupation of this area could be - carried out and how long it would take, and in this case it - would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great - Britain.” (_375-PS_) - -It was apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared this -document, and assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German -nation and the High Command would not pay the smallest attention to the -fact that Germany had given her word not to invade Holland or Belgium. -It was recommended as a militarily advantageous thing to do, with the -knowledge that, if the commanders and the Fuehrer agreed with that view, -treaties would be completely ignored. Such was the honor of the German -Government and of its leaders. - -In March of 1939, the remainder of Czechoslovakia had been peacefully -annexed, and the time had come for further guarantees. Assurances which -were accordingly given to Belgium and the Netherlands on the 28th of -April 1939 (_TC-30_). A guarantee was also made to Luxembourg in a -speech by Hitler in the Reichstag, in which he dealt with a -communication from Mr. Roosevelt, who was feeling a little uneasy as to -Hitler’s intentions (_TC-42-A_). In “The Nazi Plan,” a motion picture -shown to the Tribunal by the American prosecution (_3054-PS_), the -delivery by Hitler of this part of this speech was shown. Hitler -appeared in one of his jocular moods, as his words were greeted and -delivered in a jocular vein. The film shows that Goering, who sits above -Hitler in the Reichstag, appreciated very much the joke, the joke being -this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany could -possibly go to war with any of its neighbors. - -In this speech Hitler declared: - - “Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an - assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the - territory or possessions of the following independent nations, - and above all, that they will not march into them. And he goes - on to name the following as the countries in question: Finland, - Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, - Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, - Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, - Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia, Syria, - Palestine, Egypt, and Iran. - - “Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the - case of the countries listed, firstly, whether they feel - themselves threatened, and secondly and particularly, whether - this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result - of a demarche by them or at least with their consent. - - “The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the - form of a blunt rejection. Actually, this counter-question of - mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations - listed, since they are not at present in possession of their - liberty (as for instance Syria), but are occupied by the - military forces of democratic states, and therefore, deprived of - all their rights. - - “Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany - have received much more binding assurances and, above all, much - more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his - peculiar telegram.” (_TC-42-A_) - -Although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is suggesting in the -presence, among others, of Goering, as being quite absurd that Germany -should nurture any warlike feeling against its neighbors. The hollow -falsity of that declaration and of the preceding guarantee is shown by -the minutes of Hitler’s conference of the 23rd of May (_L-79_). The -first page shows that those present included the Fuehrer, Goering, -Raeder, von Brauchitsch, Keitel, Warlimont (Jodl’s deputy), and various -others. The purpose of the conference was an analysis of the situation, -which proceeded in this fashion: - - “What will this struggle be like?” - - * * * * * * - - “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed - force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.” - - * * * * * * - - “Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, - we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at - securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.” - (_L-79_) - -In Hitler’s speech on 22 August, the following passage occurred: - - “Attack from the West from the Maginot Line: I consider this - impossible. - - “Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and - Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well - as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available - means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of - these countries.” (_798-PS_) - -Nevertheless, a further assurance was given by the Ambassador of Germany -to the Belgian Government: - - “In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am - expressly instructed by the Head of the German Reich to transmit - to Your Majesty the following communication: - - “Though the German Government is at present doing everything in - its power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at - issue between the Reich and Poland, it nevertheless desires to - define clearly, here and now, the attitude which it proposes to - adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become - inevitable. - - “The German Government is firmly determined to abide by the - terms of the declaration contained in the German note of October - 13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will in no - circumstances impair the inviolability of Belgium and will at - all times respect Belgium territory. The German Government - renews this undertaking; however, in, the expectation that the - Belgium Government, for its part, will observe an attitude of - strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no violations - on the part of a third power, but that, on the contrary, she - will oppose it with all the forces at her disposal. It goes - without saying that if the Belgium Government were to adopt a - different attitude, the German Government would naturally be - compelled to defend its interests in conformity with the new - situation thus created.” (_TC-36_) - -It seems likely that the decision having been made to violate Belgian -neutrality, those last words were put in to afford some excuse in the -future. - -A similar document assurance was communicated to Her Majesty the Queen -of the Netherlands on the same day, 26 August 1939 (_TC-40_). Likewise -assurances were given to Luxembourg at the same time. It is in the same -terms as the other two assurances, and amounts to a complete guarantee -with the sting in the tail (_TC-42_). Poland was occupied by means of a -lightning victory, and in October 1939 German armed forces were free for -other tasks. The first step that was taken, so far as the Netherlands -and Belgium are concerned, was a German assurance on 6 October 1939, as -follows: - - “Belgium. - - “Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I - tried to create friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced any - revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any - demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in - Belgium as a threat.” (_TC-32_) - -A similar assurance was made to the Netherlands on the same day: - - “The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional - friendship with Holland. It has not taken over any existing - differences between the two countries and has not created any - new ones.” (_TC-32_) - -The value of these pledges of Germany’s good faith is shown by an order -issued on the very next day, 7 October. This order was from the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, and was addressed to -various Army Groups. The third paragraph provided: - - “The Dutch Border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only. - - “At the same time, Army Group B has to make all preparations - according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and - Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands.” - (_2329-PS_) - -Two days later, on 9 October, Hitler directed that: - - “Preparations should be made for offensive action on the - northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of - Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out - as soon and as forcefully as possible. * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “The object of this attack is to acquire as great an area of - Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible.” (_C-62_) - -That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to the -Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister -and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Goering. On 15 October 1939, a -supplementary order was issued from the Supreme Command of the Armed -Forces. It was signed by Keitel in his familiar red pencil signature, -and was addressed to Raeder, Goering, and the General Staff of the Army. -It declared, in part: - - “It must be the object of the Army’s preparations, therefore, to - occupy—on receipt of a special order—the territory of Holland, - in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas line.” (_C-62_) - -The second paragraph deals with the taking possession of the -West-Frisian islands. - -It is clear that from that moment the decision to violate the neutrality -of these three countries had been made. All that remained was to work -out the details, to wait until the weather became favorable, and in the -meantime, to give no hint that Germany’s word was about to be broken -again. Otherwise, these small countries might have had some chance of -combining with themselves and their neighbors. - -Another Keitel directive, again sent to the Supreme Commanders of the -Army, Navy, and Air Forces, gives details of how the attack is to be -carried out. The following are pertinent passages: - - “Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended - against Holland may be carried out without a special order which - the general attack will start. - - “The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be anticipated - ahead of time.” - - * * * * * * - - “Wherever there is no resistance, the entry should carry the - character of a peaceful occupation.” - - * * * * * * - - “At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian islands - situated just off the coast, for the present without Texel, is - to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line.” - - “The 7th Airborne Division will be committed for the airborne - operation only after the possession of bridges across the Albert - Canal” (in Belgium) “has been assured.” (_440-PS_) - -In addition to Belgium and Holland, the document, in paragraph (5) and -(6)(b) mentions Luxembourg. The signature of Keitel is typed. It is -authenticated by a staff officer. - -A later order of 28 November 1939, over the signature of Keitel, in the -usual red pencil, is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Airforce. It -states that if a quick breakthrough should fail north of Liege, other -machinery for carrying out the attack will be used. Paragraph 2 shows -clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It speaks of “The -occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbor, or of some -other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea and air -warfare,” and “_b_ Taking of one or more Maas crossings between Namur -and Dinant * * *.” (_C-10_) - -From November until March of 1940 the High Command and the Fuehrer were -waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as they called it. That -referred to the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. The -successive postponements are shown in a series of orders which range in -date from 7 November 1939 until 9 May 1940, and which are all signed -either by Keitel or by Jodl. (_C-72_) - -On 10 January 1940, a German airplane made a forced landing in Belgium. -The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in -possession, but they were only partially successful. Among the papers -which were captured is an order to the Commander of the Second Army -Group, Air Force Group—Luftflotte—the Second Air Force Fleet, clearly -for offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. It deals with -the disposition of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the -Liege-Antwerp Line. Then it deals with the disposition of the Dutch -Army. The German Western Army is accordingly directing its attack -between the North Sea and the Moselle, with the strongest possible -air-force support, through the Belgo-Luxembourg region. The rest -consists of operational details as to the bombing of the various targets -in Belgium and in Holland. (_TC-58_) - -The nature of the Army’s planning is shown in the 1 February 1940 entry -in Jodl’s diary, which reads in part as follows: - - “1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have - to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute - force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the town. - - “2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent - action against the Dutch air force.” (_1809-PS_) - -The entry for 2 February 1940 states that “landings can be made in the -centre of The Hague.” On 26 February Jodl wrote: “Fuehrer raises the -question whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or -after case ‘Yellow.’” On 3 March, he recorded the answer: “Fuehrer -decides to carry out Weser Exercise before case ‘Yellow’, with a few -days’ interval.” And on May 8, two days before the invasion, Jodl made -this entry: - - “Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, - evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according - to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked - for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused.” - (_1809-PS_) - -In other words, the Germans objected because the Dutch were actually -making some preparation to resist their endeavor. Furthermore, the Dutch -armies, according to the Germans’ own intelligence reports, were still -adhering properly to their neutrality. - -At 4:30 a. m. on 10 May, the months of planning bore fruit, and Holland, -Belgium, and Luxembourg were violently invaded with all the fury of -modern warfare. No warning was given by Germany and no complaint was -made by Germany of any breaches of neutrality before this action was -taken. - -After the invasion of each of the three countries was a fait accompli, -the German Ambassador called upon representatives of the three -Governments some hours later and handed them documents which were -similar in each case, and which are described as memoranda or -ultimatums. An account of what happened in Belgium is contained in an -official Belgian report: - - “From 4:30 information was received which left no shadow of - doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the - east. At five o’clock came news of the bombing of two - Netherlands aerodromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, - the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the - bombing of the Jemelle station.” - - * * * * * * - - “At 8:30 the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of Foreign - Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he began to take a - paper from his pocket. M. Spaak” [Belgian Foreign Minister] - “stopped him ‘I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak - first.’ And in an indignant voice, he read the Belgian - Government’s protest: ‘Mr. Ambassador, the German Army has just - attacked our country. This is the second time in twenty-five - years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a - neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps - even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no - note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the - Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium - has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by - her on October 13th, 1937, and renewed spontaneously at the - beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by - Germany, for which there is no justification whatever, will - deeply shock the conscience of the world. The German Reich will - be held responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend - herself. Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be - vanquished’.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought: - ‘I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,’ he said, ‘to - make the following declaration: In order to forestall the - invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, for which Great - Britain and France have been making preparations clearly aimed - at Germany, the Government of the Reich is compelled to ensure - the neutrality of the three countries mentioned by means of - arms. For this purpose, the Government of the Reich will bring - up an armed force of the greatest size, so that resistance of - any kind will be useless. The Government of the Reich guarantees - Belgium’s European and colonial territory, as well as her - dynasty, on condition that no resistance is offered. Should - there be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of - her country and loss of her independence. It is therefore, in - the interests of Belgium that the population be called upon to - cease all resistance and that the authorities be given the - necessary instructions to make contact with the German Military - Command.” - - * * * * * * - - “In the middle of this communication, M. Spaak, who had by his - side the Secretary-General of the Department, interrupted the - Ambassador: ‘Hand me the document’, he said. ‘I should like to - spare you so painful a task.’ After studying the note, M. Spaak - confined himself to pointing out that he had already replied by - the protest he had just made. * * *” (_TC-58_) - -The so-called ultimatum, which was delivered some hours after the -invasion had started, read in part as follows: - - “The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts as to - what was the chief aim of the British and French war policy. It - consists of the spreading of the war to other countries, and of - the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops - for England and France. - - “The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy - Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new - front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany’s last - minute action which upset the project. Germany has furnished - documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world. - - “Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia - miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war - expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the - retreat in flight of the British troops from Norway was still - going on, the English Prime Minister announced that, as a result - of the altered situation in Scandinavia, England was once more - in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the full weight - of her navy to the Mediterranean, and that English and French - units were already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean - now became the center of English-French war propaganda. This was - partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of - prestige before their own people and before the world, and - partly to make it appear that the Balkans had been chosen for - the next theater of war against Germany. - - “In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the - Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another - purpose. It was nothing but a diversion manoeuvre in grand - style, to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next - English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government has long - been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully - prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the - West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region - of the Ruhr. - - “Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of - Belgium and Holland, it being of course understood that these - two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England - and France would maintain the strictest neutrality. - - “Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.” - (_TC-57_) - -The so-called ultimatum goes on to complain of the hostile expressions -in the Belgian and the Netherlands Press, and to allege attempts by the -British Intelligence to bring a revolution into Germany with the -assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands. Reference is made to military -preparation of the two countries, and it is pointed out that Belgium has -fortified the Belgian frontier. A complaint was made in regard to -Holland, that British aircraft had flown over the Netherlands country. -Other charges were made against the neutrality of these two countries, -although no instances were given (_TC-57_). The document continued: - - “In this struggle for existence forced upon the German people by - England and France, the Reich Government is not disposed to - await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow - them to carry the war over Belgium and the Netherlands into - German territory. It has therefore now issued the command to - German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all - the military means at the disposal of the Reich.” (_TC-57_) - -It is unnecessary, in view of the documents previously adverted to, to -emphasize the falsity of that statement. It is now known that for months -preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three -countries. This document is merely saying, “The orders to do so have now -been issued.” - -A similar document, similar in terms altogether, was handed to the -representatives of the Netherlands Government; and a memorandum was sent -to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the -document handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands. The -second paragraph of the latter declared: - - “In defense against the imminent attack, the German troops have - now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two - countries * * *”. (_TC-60_) - -The protest of the Belgium Government against the crime which was -committed against her is contained in _TC-59_. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST - BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND LUXEMBOURG - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ - │ 5; V. │ I │ 27, 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *375-PS │Case Green with wider implications, │ │ - │report of Intelligence Division, │ │ - │Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938.│ │ - │(USA 84) │ III │ 280 - │ │ │ - *440-PS │Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 │ │ - │November 1939, for the conduct of the │ │ - │war. (GB 107) │ III │ 397 - │ │ │ - *798-PS │Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, │ │ - │at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA │ │ - │29) │ III │ 581 - │ │ │ - *1809-PS │Entries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940│ │ - │to May 1940. (GB 88) │ IV │ 377 - │ │ │ - *2329-PS │Order by Commander in Chief of the Army,│ │ - │7 October 1939. (GB 105) │ IV │ 1037 - │ │ │ - *3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ - *C-10 │OKW directive, 28 November 1939, signed │ │ - │by Keitel, subject: Employment of 7th │ │ - │Flieger Division. (GB 108) │ VI │ 817 - │ │ │ - *C-62 │Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war, │ │ - │signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939; │ │ - │directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 on │ │ - │Fall “Gelb”. (GB 106) │ VI │ 880 - │ │ │ - *C-72 │Orders postponing “A” day in the West, │ │ - │November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109) │ VI │ 893 - │ │ │ - *L-52 │Memorandum and Directives for conduct of│ │ - │war in the West, 9 October 1939. (USA │ │ - │540) │ VII │ 800 - │ │ │ - *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ - │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ - │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 - │ │ │ - *TC-3 │Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening│ │ - │of Hostilities. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 279 - │ │ │ - *TC-4 │Hague Convention (5) Respecting Rights │ │ - │and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons│ │ - │in War on Land. (GB 2) │ VIII │ 282 - │ │ │ - *TC-13 │Arbitration Convention between Germany │ │ - │and Belgium at Locarno, 16 October 1925.│ │ - │(GB 15) │ VIII │ 320 - │ │ │ - *TC-16 │Convention of Arbitration and │ │ - │conciliation between Germany and the │ │ - │Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 20 May│ │ - │1926. (GB 97) │ VIII │ 337 - │ │ │ - *TC-19 │Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp. │ │ - │97-101. (GB 18) │ VIII │ 359 - │ │ │ - *TC-20 │Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation │ │ - │between Germany and Luxembourg, signed │ │ - │at Geneva, 11 September 1929. (GB 98) │ VIII │ 362 - │ │ │ - *TC-30 │German assurance to Denmark, Norway, │ │ - │Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April │ │ - │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ - │Part VII, I, pp. 139, 172-175. (GB 78) │ VIII │ 379 - │ │ │ - *TC-32 │German assurance to Norway, 6 October │ │ - │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ - │Vol. VII, p. 350. (GB 80) │ VIII │ 381 - │ │ │ - *TC-33 │German assurance to Belgium and the │ │ - │Netherlands, 30 January 1937, from │ │ - │Documents of German Politics, Part IV, │ │ - │pp. 42-43. (GB 99) │ VIII │ 381 - │ │ │ - *TC-34 │German Declaration to the Belgian │ │ - │Minister of 13 October 1937. (GB 100) │ VIII │ 381 - │ │ │ - *TC-36 │Declaration made by Ambassador of │ │ - │Germany on 26 August 1939. (GB 102) │ VIII │ 382 - │ │ │ - TC-37 │German assurance to Belgium, 6 October │ │ - │1939, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ - │Vol. VII, p. 351. │ VIII │ 383 - │ │ │ - *TC-40 │Declaration of German Minister to the │ │ - │Netherlands, 26 August 1939. (GB 103) │ VIII │ 383 - │ │ │ - TC-41 │German assurance to the Netherlands, 6 │ │ - │October 1939, from Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Vol. VII, p. 351. │ VIII │ 384 - │ │ │ - *TC-42 │German assurance to Luxembourg, 26 │ │ - │August 1939. (GB 104) │ VIII │ 384 - │ │ │ - *TC-42-A │German assurance to Luxembourg, 28 April│ │ - │1939. (GB 101) │ VIII │ 385 - │ │ │ - *TC-57 │German ultimatum to Belgium and the │ │ - │Netherlands, 9 May 1940, from Documents │ │ - │of German Politics, Part VIII, pp. │ │ - │142-150. (GB 112) │ VIII │ 416 - │ │ │ - *TC-58 │“Belgium, the official account of what │ │ - │happened 1939-1940”. (GB 111) │ VIII │ 421 - │ │ │ - *TC-58-A │Secret instruction to the Commander of │ │ - │2nd Luftflotte found in German Aeroplane│ │ - │of 10 January 1940. (GB 110) │ VIII │ 423 - │ │ │ - *TC-59 │Protest from Belgium, 10 May 1940, │ │ - │following German aggression. (GB 111) │ VIII │ 429 - │ │ │ - *TC-60 │German memorandum to Luxembourg, 9 May │ │ - │1940, from Documents of German Politics,│ │ - │Part VIII, pp. 150-151. (GB 113) │ VIII │ 431 - │ │ │ - Affidavit H │Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November │ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 643 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 12 │German Aggression. (Enlargement │ │ - │displayed to Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 781 - │ │ │ -**Chart No. 13 │Violations of Treaties, Agreements and │ │ - │Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to │ │ - │Tribunal.) │ VIII │ 782 - - - 11. AGGRESSION AGAINST GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA - -A. _Treaties and Assurances Breached._ - -The invasions of Greece and of Yugoslavia by the Germans, which took -place in the early hours of the morning of 6 April 1941, constituted -direct breaches of The Hague Convention of 1899 on the Pacific -Settlement of International Disputes, and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of -1928. In the case of Yugoslavia, the invasion further constituted a -breach of an express assurance by the Nazis. The assurance was -originally given in a German Foreign Office release made in Berlin on 28 -April 1938 (_2719-PS_), but was subsequently repeated by Hitler himself -on 6 October 1939 in a speech he made in the Reichstag. The German -Foreign Office release on 28 April 1938 reads, in part: - - “Berlin, 28 April 1938. The State Secretary of the German - Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives. - - “As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich, we - have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, - Liechtenstein, and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us - as final and inviolable. On this point the following special - declarations have been made:” - - * * * * * * - - “3. Yugoslavia. - - “The Yugoslav Government have been informed by authoritative - German quarters that German policy has no aims beyond Austria, - and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case remain - untouched. In his speech made at Graz on 3 April, the Fuehrer - and Chancellor stated that, in regard to the reunion of Austria, - Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. - We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all - anxiety about providing military protection for them.” - (_2719-PS_) - -In a speech made on the occasion of the dinner in honor of the Prince -Regent of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler declared: - - “The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a - spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of - the tragic confusion of the world war. The German soldier then - learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. - I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual - respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural and - economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’s - present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and - at the same time on that account we derive from it the hope that - German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in - the future and to grow ever closer. - - “In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also - perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange - of views which, and of this I am convinced, in this sense can - only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this - all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship - of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that, owing to historical events, - we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all - time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two - peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm - to our nerve-wracked continent. This peace is the goal of all - who are disposed to perform really constructive work.” (_TC-92_) - -As is now known this speech was made at the time when Hitler had already -decided upon the European war. It occurred a week after the -Reichschancellery conference recorded in the Schmundt note (_L-79_). The -reference to “nerve-wracked continent” might perhaps be attributed to -the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been conducting for many -months. The German Assurance to Yugoslavia on 6 October 1939 was in -these terms: - - “Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed - Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country - would also be an unalterable one, and that we only desire to - live in peace and friendship with her.” (_TC-43_) - -B. _Planning for Invasion: Collaboration with Italy and Bulgaria._ - -Despite the obligation of Germany, under the Convention of 1899, and the -Kellogg-Briand Pact, and under the foregoing Assurance which I have -read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as is now known, been -sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at -Obersalzberg, 12 and 13 August 1939 (_TC-77_). The effect of the meeting -was that Hitler and Ribbentrop, only two months after the dinner to the -Prince Regent, were seeking to persuade Italy to make war on Yugoslavia -at the same time that Germany was to commence hostilities against -Poland, which Hitler had decided to do in the very near future. Ciano -while evidently in entire agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the -desirability of liquidating Yugoslavia, and while himself anxious to -secure Salonika, stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general -European war. Thus, despite all the persuasion which Hitler and -Ribbentrop exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the Nazi -conspirators to reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia, since in -fact Italy maintained its position and did not enter the war when -Germany invaded Poland, and since the Germans themselves were not yet -ready to strike in the Balkans. If was apparently for this reason that -on 6 October, through Hitler’s speech, the Nazis repeated the assurance -they had made in April 1938. It is a matter of history that after the -defeat of the Allied Armies in May and June 1940, the Italian Government -declared war on France and that subsequently, at three o’clock in the -morning on 28 October 1940, the Italian Minister at Athens presented the -Greek Government with a 3 hour ultimatum, upon the expiration of which -Italian troops were already invading the soil of Greece. - -This event was reported by the British Minister at Athens in these -words: - - “The president of the council has assured himself an outstanding - place in Greek history and, whatever the future may bring, his - foresight in quietly preparing his country for war and his - courage in rejecting without demur the Italian ultimatum when - delivered in the small hours of that October morning, will - surely obtain an honorable mention in the story of European - statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is completely defeated - and this reflects the purpose of the whole Greek nation.” - -A letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which is undated but which—this is -clear from the contents—must have been written shortly after the -Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November [transcriber's note: October] -1940, contained these sentiments: - - “Jugoslavia must become disinterested, if possible however from - our point of view interested in cooperating in the liquidation - of the Greek question. Without assurances from Jugoslavia, it is - useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans. - - “Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war in the - Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore, any threatening - move towards Jugoslavia would be useless, since the - impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March - is well known to the Serbian general staff. Therefore, - Jugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means - and other ways.” (_2762-PS_) - -It was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive -in the Spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the -north. It was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be -induced to cooperate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested -attitude towards the liquidation of the other Balkan States. These facts -are disclosed in a “Top Secret Directive” issued from the Fuehrer’s -Headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by Jodl, and dated 12 November -1940. This order reads, in part: - - “_Directive No. 18._ - - “The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of - the war in the near future are to be made along the following - lines.* * *” (_444-PS_) - -After sections dealing with operations against Gibraltar and an -offensive against Egypt, the order continues: - - “_Balkans_ - - “The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for - occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of - need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use - of German air force units against targets in the Eastern - Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases - which are threatening the Rumanian oil area. - - “In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep - Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate - strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning - and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to - count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving - these forces into position. - - “So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, - preparations will be made for an early increase in the German - Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted - to me. - - “_The commander-in-chief of the Air Force_ will make - preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South - East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern - border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground - operations.” (_444-PS_) - -The positions of the Italian invading forces in Greece in December 1940 -may be summarized in the words in which the British Minister reported to -Foreign Secretary Eden: - - “The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the - highest, and our own naval and land successes at Tarento and in - the Western Desert have done much to maintain it. With - relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and - modern facilities they have driven back or captured superior - Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the - bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not - unworthy of the ancient tradition of their country and that - they, like their distant forbears, are prepared to fight against - odds to maintain their freedom.” - -In fact, the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that -Hitler came to the rescue with the order for the German attack on -Greece. - -This Directive of 13 December 1940, which is Top Secret Directive number -20, dealing with Operation _Marita_, bears a distribution list which -shows that copies went to the Commander of the Navy (Raeder), to the -Commander of the Air Force (Goering), to the Supreme Commander of the -Armed Forces (Keitel), and to the Command Staff (Jodl). The first two -paragraphs state: - - “The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. - Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly - necessary that the British endeavour be foiled to create air - bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be - dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil - fields. - - “My plan, therefore, is (_a_) to form a slowly increasing task - force in Southern Rumania within the next months. (_b_) After - the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send - the task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by - way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek - mainland (Operation _Marita_). The support of Bulgaria is to be - expected.” (_1541-PS_) - -The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and paragraph 4 -deals with the operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states: - - “The Military preparations which will produce exceptional - political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of all - the necessary measures by the General Staff. The transport - through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported step - by step by the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and are to be - explained at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission - in Rumania. - - “Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may - point to our intentions as well as notification of the Italians - are each subject to my consent, also the sending of scouting - missions and advanced parties.” (_1541-PS_) - -Another “Top Secret Directive” carries the plan a little farther. It -deals with decisive action in support of the Italian forces in Tripoli -and in Albania. The first short paragraph reads: - - “The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations - demands for strategical political and psychological reasons - German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by - England against our allies.” (_448-PS_) - -Paragraph three, after dealing with the forces to be transferred to -Albania, sets out what the duties of the German forces will be: - - “_a._ To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an - emergency case, should new crises arise there. - - “_b._ To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later - attacking with the aim: - - “To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a - far-reaching operation. - - “To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in order - to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s Army.” - (_448-PS_) - -That directive was signed by Hitler, and, as shown on the original, was -initialed by both Keitel and Jodl. A copy went to Raeder, and the copy -sent to Foreign Intelligence presumably reached Ribbentrop. - -A conference took place on 19 and 20 January between Keitel and the -Italian General, Guzzoni. This was followed by a meeting between Hitler -and Mussolini, at which Ribbentrop, Keitel, and Jodl were present. In -the speech which the Fuehrer made on 20 January 1941, after the -conference with the Italians, he declared: - - “* * * The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold - purpose: - - “_a._ An operation against Greece. - - “_b._ Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey. - - “_c._ Safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania. - - “Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, - altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far - from our base requires a long time. - - “Desirable that this deployment is completed without - interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late - as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the - last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest - possible moment.” (_C-134_) - -At a conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians, on 8 -February, the following plans were discussed: - - “Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives of - the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme - Command—General Field Marshal List—in connection with the - possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their - commitment against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she - should involve herself in the war.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all - measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the - operations and to assure in this way the most favorable - conditions for the execution of the German operations as - planned. - - “The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be - suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to - take the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration - when the three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to - assure the success of the military operations.” (_1746-PS_) - -A further top secret directive of 19 February sets the date for the -Operation _Marita_ (_C-59_). It states that the bridge across the Danube -is to be begun on 28 February, the river crossed on 2 March, and the -final orders to be issued on 26 February at the latest. On the original -of this order the actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of -Keitel. - -The position of Bulgaria at this moment was this: Bulgaria adhered to -the Three-Power Pact on 1 March 1941. On the same day the entry of -German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan _Marita_ -and associated directives already referred to. The landing of British -troops in Greece on 3 March, in accordance with the guarantee given in -the spring of 1939 by the British Government, may have accelerated the -movement of the German forces. In any event, as has been shown, the -invasion of Greece had been planned long beforehand and was already in -progress at this time. - -A short extract from a report by Raeder on an interview with Hitler, -which the original shows took place in the presence of Keitel and Jodl -at 1600 hours on 18 March, shows the ruthless nature of the German -intentions: - - “The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of - Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful - settlement. - - “_Fuehrer_: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any - settlement.” (_C-167_) - -This report shows, it seems clear, that the Nazi conspirators, in -accordance with their principle of liquidating any neutral which did not -remain disinterested, had made every preparation by the end of January -and were at this date in the process of moving the necessary troops to -ensure the final liquidation of Greece, which was already at war with, -and getting the better of, their Italian allies. - -C. _Lulling the Unsuspecting Victim._ - -They were not yet, however, ready to deal with Yugoslavia, towards which -their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the unsuspecting -victim. On 25 March, in accordance with this policy, the adherence of -Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact was secured. This adherence followed -a visit on 15 February 1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic and the -Foreign Minister Cinkar-Markvic to Ribbentrop at Salzburg and -subsequently to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers -were induced to sign the Pact at Vienna on 25 March. On this occasion -Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of assurance. The first made this -guarantee: - - “Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade. - - “At the same time, when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia - to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the governments of the Axis - Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following - identical notes: - - “‘Mr. Prime Minister: - - “‘In the name of the German Government and at its behest, I have - the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following: - - “‘On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the - Tri-Partite Pact, the German Government confirms its - determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial - integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.’” (_2450-PS_) - -That letter was signed by Ribbentrop, who was present at the meeting in -August 1939 when he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade -Yugoslavia. It was in fact 11 days after this letter was written that -the Germans did invade Yugoslavia, and two days after the letter was -written that they issued the necessary order. - -The second letter reads: - - “Mr. Prime Minister: - - “With reference to the conversations that occurred in connection - with the Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the - honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the - Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung], that in the agreement between - the Axis powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government, the - governments of the Axis powers during this war will not direct a - demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of - troops through Yugoslavian national territory.” (_2450-PS_) - -The position at this stage, 25 March 1941, was therefore that German -troops were already in Bulgaria moving towards the Greek frontier, while -Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler’s own term in his letter to Mussolini, -“become disinterested” in the cleaning up of the Greek question. - -The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three-Power Pact -appears very clearly from an extract from the minutes of a meeting -between Hitler and Ciano. The first paragraph states: - - “The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia’s - joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of her - position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed - military action against Greece, for, if one considers that for - 350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication - through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav - border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia - an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an - extremely foolhardy venture.” (_2765-PS_) - -Again, it is a matter of history that on the night of 26 March 1941, -when the two Yugoslav ministers returned to Belgrade, General Simovic -and his colleagues effected their removal by a _coup d’état_, and -Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of 27 March ready to defend, if need -be, its independence. - -D. _Further Planning for Attack._ - -The Nazis reacted rapidly to this altered situation, and the immediate -liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on. A conference of Hitler and the -German High Command on the situation in Yugoslavia took place on 27 -March 1941. Those present included the Fuehrer; the Reich Marshall -(Goering); Chief, OKW, (Keitel); and the Chief of the _Wehrmacht -Fuehrungstab_, (Jodl). A report of the conference notes that “later on -the following persons were added,” and among them is included Ribbentrop -(_1746-PS_). Hitler’s statement proceeded as follows: - - “The Fuehrer describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the _coup - d’état_. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in - regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard to - the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were - never pro-German.” - - * * * * * * - - “The present moment is for political and military reasons - favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the - country and the country’s attitude toward us, for if the - overthrow of the Government would have happened during the - Barbarossa action, the consequences for us probably would have - been considerably more serious.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty - declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in - order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. - No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. - Assurances of the Yugoslav government, which cannot be trusted - anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will - start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready. - - “It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. - An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate - in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia - is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of - Bulgaria too. Roumania’s main task is the protection against - Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already - been notified. During the day a message will still be addressed - to the Duce. - - “Politically, it is especially important that the blow against - Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the - military destruction is done in a lightning-like undertaking. In - this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the - campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a - favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to - our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment - (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against - Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary and - Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to - these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, - and Macedonia for Bulgaria. - - “This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all - preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav - collapse will take place within the shortest time.” (_1746-PS_) - -Thus it appears that two days after Yugoslavia had signed the -Tri-Partite Pact and the Nazis had given assurances, simply because -there had been a _coup d’état_ and it was possible that the operations -against Greece might be affected, the destruction of Yugoslavia was -decided on without any question of taking the trouble to ascertain the -views of the new Government. - -The report of the meeting continues: - - “5. The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as - possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force - ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in - attacks by waves.” (_1746-PS_) - -It is again a matter of history that the residential areas of Belgrade -were bombed at 7 o’clock on the following Sunday morning, 6 April 1941. - -At that same meeting of 27 March 1941 a tentative plan, drawn up by -Jodl, was offered: - - “In the event that the political development requires an armed - intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to - attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to - destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national - territory.” (_1746-PS_) - -An order (Directive No. 25) was issued after the meeting of 27 March. -The first paragraph reads: - - “The military putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political - situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her - protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as an - enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.” - (_C-127_) - -As another result of the meeting, a telegram, containing a letter from -Hitler to Mussolini, was forwarded to the German Ambassador in Rome by -Hitler and Ribbentrop. It was written to advise Mussolini of the course -decided on, and under the guise of somewhat fulsome language the Duce -was given his orders. The first five paragraphs read: - - “Duce, Events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest - means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which - may result from it. - - “(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as a - dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from - the purely military point of view, German intervention in the - war in Thrace would not be at all justified, as long as the - attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous and she could threaten - the left flank of the advancing columns, on our enormous front. - - “(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly have - endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together - by mutual interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet - with success, or they were begun too late to produce any - definite result. Today’s reports leave no doubt as to the - imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. - - “(3) I don’t consider this situation as being catastrophic, but - nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid any - mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our whole - position. - - “(4) Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary - measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary - military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has - been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request - you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in - the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that - you should cover and screen the most important passes from - Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces. - - “These measures should not be considered as designed for a long - period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent - for at least fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising. - - “I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce - your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available - means and with utmost speed. - - “(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which - we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only - personalities who necessarily must be notified know anything - about them. These measures will completely lose their value - should they become known.” (_1835-PS_) - -Hitler continues with a further emphasis on the importance of secrecy. -An operational order (_R-95_) followed, which was signed by General von -Brauchitsch, and which merely passed to the Armies the orders contained -in Directive No. 25. (_C-127_) - -E. _Explanations._ - -The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place in the morning of 6 -April 1941. On that day Hitler issued a proclamation (_TC-93_). The -following passage is an extract: - - “From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s - steadfast endeavor to make the Balkans a theatre of war. British - diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War, - succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her, - and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes. - - “The documents published today [the German ‘White Book’] afford - a glimpse of a practice which, in accordance with very old - British recipes, is a constant attempt to induce others to fight - and bleed for British interests. - - “In the face of this I have always emphasized that: - - “(1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek people - but that - - “(2) We shall never, as in the World War, tolerate a power - establishing itself on Greek territory with the object at a - given time of being able to advance thence from the southeast - into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free - of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in - the south.” - - * * * * * * - - “In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has - been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power above - all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have - consciously put out of mind everything that once took place - between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian - people the hand of the German people, but in addition have made - efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all - difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and - various Nations allied to Germany.” (_TC-93_) - -One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler must -momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August 1939, and -the meeting with Ribbentrop and the others on 27 March, a few days -earlier. - -In a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943, he sets out his -views, two and a half years later on the action taken in April, 1941. In -Paragraph 11 he stated: - - “What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of - affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in - consequence of the ‘extra-turn’ of the Italians against Greece. - The attack, which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from - Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all - agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part - which—taking a long view of the matter—would have become - necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on - Greece from the North was not executed merely as an operation in - aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from - gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil - area from that country.” (_L-172_) - -F. _Summary._ - -To summarize: The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as -November or December 1940 and was scheduled for the end of March or the -beginning of April, 1941. No consideration was at any time given to any -obligations under treaties or conventions which might make such invasion -a breach of International Law. Care was taken to conceal the -preparations so that the German Forces might have an unsuspecting -victim. - -In the meanwhile, Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due course, -was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was made to -secure her cooperation for the offensive against Greece, or at least to -ensure that she would abstain from any interference. - -The _coup d’état_ of General Simovic upset this plan and it was then -decided that, irrespective of whether or not his Government had any -hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the Greeks, -Yugoslavia must be liquidated. - -It was not worth while to the Nazis to take any steps to ascertain -Yugoslavia’s intentions, for it would be so little trouble, now that the -German troops were deployed, to destroy her militarily and as a national -unit. Accordingly, in the early hours of Sunday morning, 6 April 1941, -German troops marched into Yugoslavia without warning and into Greece -simultaneously. The formality was observed of handing a note to the -Greek Minister in Berlin, informing him that the German forces were -entering Greece to drive out the British. M. Koryzis, the Greek -Minister, in replying to information of the invasion from the German -Embassy, replied that history was repeating itself and that Greece was -being attacked by Germany in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, -he said, the same reply as it had given to the Italians in the preceding -October. - -G. _The Pattern of Aggression._ - -There is one common factor which runs through the whole of the Nazi -aggressions. It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression, -which was used with singular consistency, not only by the Nazis -themselves, but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was -essentially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise, -even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into the -country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus, there -was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland. - -The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small hours of the -night of April 8-9 1940, and was well under way as a military operation, -before the diplomatic explanations and excuses were presented to the -Danish Foreign Minister, at 4:20 a. m. on the morning of the 9th, and to -the Norwegian Minister, between half past four and five on that morning. - -The invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland began not later than -five o’clock, in the small hours of 10 of May, 1940, while the formal -ultimatum, delivered in each case with the diplomatic excuses and -explanations, was not presented until afterwards. In the ease of Holland -the invasion began between three and four in the morning. It was not -until about six, when The Hague had already been bombed, that the German -Minister asked to see M. van Kleffens. In the case of Belgium, where the -bombing began at five, the German Minister did not see M. Spaak until -eight. The invasion of Luxembourg began at four and it was at seven when -the German Minister asked to see M. Beck. - -Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o’clock on the morning of 28 -October 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented a three hour -ultimatum to General Metaxas. - -The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, also, both began in the small -hours of 6 April 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia no diplomatic exchange -took place even after the event, but a proclamation was issued by Hitler -at five o’clock that Sunday morning, some two hours before Belgrade was -bombed. In the case of Greece, it was at twenty minutes past five that -M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering Greek -territory. - -The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried out is, -in itself, further evidence of the essentially aggressive and -treacherous character of the Nazi regime: to attack without warning at -night to secure an initial advantage, and to proffer excuses or reasons -afterwards. This is clearly the method of the State which has no respect -for its own pledged word, nor for the rights of any people but its own. - -It is impossible not to speculate whether this technique was evolved by -the “honest broker” himself or by his honest clerk, Ribbentrop. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST - GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ - │ 5; V. │ I │ 27, 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s│ │ - │Headquarters signed by Hitler and │ │ - │initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940, │ │ - │concerning plans for prosecution of war │ │ - │in Mediterranean Area and occupation of │ │ - │Greece. (GB 116) │ III │ 403 - │ │ │ - *448-PS │Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by │ │ - │Keitel and Jodl, 11 January 1941, │ │ - │concerning participation of German │ │ - │Forces in the Fighting in the │ │ - │Mediterranean Theater of Operations. (GB│ │ - │118) │ III │ 413 - │ │ │ -*1195-PS │Keitel Order, 12 April 1941, for │ │ - │provisional directions for partition of │ │ - │Yugoslavia. (GB 144) │ III │ 838 - │ │ │ -*1541-PS │Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13 │ │ - │December 1940. (GB 117) │ IV │ 101 - │ │ │ -*1746-PS │Conference between German and Bulgarian │ │ - │Generals, 8 February 1941; speech by │ │ - │Hitler to German High Command on │ │ - │situation in Yugoslavia, 27 March 1941; │ │ - │plan for invasion of Yugoslavia, 28 │ │ - │March 1941. (GB 120) │ IV │ 272 - │ │ │ -*1834-PS │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │ │ - │and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469 - │ │ │ -*1835-PS │Letter from Hitler to Mussolini, 28 │ │ - │March 1941. (GB 126) │ IV │ 475 - │ │ │ -*1842-PS │Meeting of Mussolini and Ribbentrop in │ │ - │Rome, 19 September 1940. (GB 143) │ IV │ 477 - │ │ │ -*1871-PS │Report on Hitler and Ciano meeting, 12 │ │ - │August 1939. (GB 142) │ IV │ 508 - │ │ │ -*2450-PS │Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime │ │ - │Minister of Yugoslavia, as published in │ │ - │Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, │ │ - │26 March 1941. (GB 123) │ V │ 186 - │ │ │ - 2719-PS │German assurance to Yugoslavia; official│ │ - │announcement by German Foreign Office, │ │ - │28 April 1938, to German Diplomatic │ │ - │Representatives, published in Documents │ │ - │of the Origin of War, 1939, No. 2, p. │ │ - │324. │ V │ 378 - │ │ │ -*2762-PS │Letter from Hitler to Mussolini │ │ - │(probably early November 1940). (GB 115)│ V │ 410 - │ │ │ -*2765-PS │Extract from notes of conference between│ │ - │Hitler and Ciano in Vienna, 25 March │ │ - │1941. (GB 124) │ V │ 411 - │ │ │ -*2987-PS │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA │ │ - │166) │ V │ 689 - │ │ │ -*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ -*C-59 │Order signed by Warlimont for execution │ │ - │of operation “Marita”, 19 February 1941.│ │ - │(GB 121) │ VI │ 879 - │ │ │ -*C-127 │Extract from Directive No. 25 by Hitler,│ │ - │27 March 1941. (GB 125) │ VI │ 938 - │ │ │ -*C-134 │Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum on│ │ - │conference between German and Italian │ │ - │Generals on 19 January and subsequent │ │ - │speech by Hitler, 20 January 1941. (GB │ │ - │119) │ VI │ 939 - │ │ │ - C-147 │Extracts from Directive No. 18, signed │ │ - │by Hitler, 12 November 1940. │ VI │ 957 - │ │ │ -*C-167 │Report of meeting between Raeder and │ │ - │Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 977 - │ │ │ -*L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ - │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ - │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 - │ │ │ -*R-95 │Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, 30│ │ - │March 1941, concerning deployment │ │ - │instructions for “Action 25” and │ │ - │supplementary instruction for action │ │ - │“Marita”. (GB 127) │ VIII │ 70 - │ │ │ - TC-43 │German assurance to Yugoslavia, 6 │ │ - │October 1939, from Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, Vol. VII, p. 352. │ VIII │ 386 - │ │ │ -*TC-77 │Memorandum of conversation between │ │ - │Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano, 12 August │ │ - │1939. (GB 48) │ VIII │ 516 - │ │ │ -*TC-92 │Hitler’s address at dinner for Prince │ │ - │Regent of Yugoslavia, 1 June 1939. (GB │ │ - │114) │ VIII │ 536 - │ │ │ -*TC-93 │Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the │ │ - │German people, 6 April 1941, from │ │ - │Documents Concerning the Conflict with │ │ - │Yugoslavia and Greece. (GB 114) │ VIII │ 537 - - - 12. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. - -A. _Inception of the Plan._ - -The point of departure for the story of the aggression against the -Soviet Union is the date, 23 August 1939. On that day—just a week -before the invasion of Poland—the Nazi conspirators caused Germany to -enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. This Treaty -(_TC-25_) contained two significant articles: - - “Article 1: The two contracting parties undertake to refrain - from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack - against one another, whether individually or jointly with other - powers.” - - * * * * * * - - “Article 5: Should disputes or conflicts arise between the - contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, - the two partners would clear away these disputes or conflicts - solely by friendly exchanges of views or if necessary by - arbitration commission.” (_TC-25_) - -The Treaty was signed for the U.S.S.R. by the Soviet Foreign Minister -Molotov, and for the German Government by Ribbentrop. Its announcement -came as somewhat of a surprise to the world, since it appeared to -constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy. The -explanation for this about face was provided, however, by Ribbentrop -himself, in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador, -Oshima, at Fuchel on 23 February 1941. A report of that conference was -forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field for -their strictly confidential and purely personal information (_1834-PS_). -Ribbentrop told Oshima the reason for the Pact with the U.S.S.R. in the -following words: - - “Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with - Russia—a necessity for avoiding a two-front war. Perhaps this - moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the - interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as - rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the - treaty with Russia.” (_1834-PS_) - -In view of this spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazi -Conspirators in entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and -nonaggression, it is not surprising to find that they regarded it, as -they did all Treaties and Pledges, as binding on them only so long as it -was expedient for them to do so. That they did so regard it is evident -from the fact that, even while the campaign in the West was still in -progress, they began to consider the possibility of launching a war of -aggression against the U.S.S.R. In a speech to the Reichsleiters and -Gauleiters at Munich in November 1943, Jodl admitted that: - - “Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily - growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the - Bolshevik East—that danger which has been only too little - perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had - deliberately to be ignored. However, the Fuehrer himself has - always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as - during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental - decision to take steps against this danger the moment our - military position made it at all possible.” (_L-172_) - -At the time this statement was made, however, the Western Campaign was -still in progress and so any action in the East necessarily had to be -postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however, the -Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiegne and the campaign in the -West, with the exception of the war against Britain, came to an end. The -view that Germany’s key to political and economic dominance lay in the -elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor, and in the -acquisition of _lebensraum_ at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi -ideology. This idea had never been completely forgotten, even while the -war in the West was in progress. Now, flushed with the recent success of -their arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat -Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials, the -Nazi conspirators began serious consideration of the means for achieving -their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union. The situation -in which Germany now found herself made such action appear both -desirable and practicable. - -As early as August of 1940, General Thomas received a hint from Goering -that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already under -way. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the _Wirtschaft Rustung Amt_, -or Office for Economy and Armaments, of the OKW (_Wi Rue Amt_). General -Thomas tells about receiving this information from Goering in his draft -of a work entitled “Basic Facts For a History of German War and -Armaments Economy,” which he prepared during the Summer of 1944 -(_2353-PS_). On pages 313 to 315 of this work, Thomas discusses the -Russo-German trade agreement of 1939 and relates that, since the Soviets -were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were -requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in Germany -until early 1940 for increased delivery on the part of the Germans. -However, at page 315 he has the following to say about the change of -heart expressed by the German leaders in August of 1940: - - “On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with - Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired - punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later - on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying - the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to - give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy.” - (_2353-PS_) - -This statement will be referred to again later in the discussion of -preparations for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory. At that -time too, evidence will be presented that in November of 1940 Goering -categorically informed Thomas that a campaign was planned against the -U.S.S.R. - -Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of the Soviet -Union necessarily entailed, even this many months in advance of the date -of execution, certain activity in the East in the way of construction -projects and strengthening of forces. Such activity could not be -expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet intelligence service. -Counter-intelligence measures were obviously called for. In an OKW -directive signed by Jodl and issued to the Counter-Intelligence Service -Abroad on 6 September 1940, such measures were ordered (_1229-PS_). This -directive pointed out that the activity in the East must not be -permitted to create the impression in the Soviet Union that an offensive -was being prepared and outlined the line for the counter-intelligence -people to take to disguise this fact. The text of the directive -indicates, by necessary implication, the extent of the preparations -already underway. It provides: - - “The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to - come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map - is supposed to be reached. - - “These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that - we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, - Russia will realize that strong and highly trained German troops - are stationed in the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and - in the Protekterat; she should draw the conclusion that we can - at any time protect our interests—especially on the - Balkan—with strong forces against Russian seizure. - - “For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the - answer to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the - following directives apply: - - “1. The respective total strength of the German troops in the - East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a - frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be - explained by movements into training camps, regroupings. - - “2. The impression is to be created that the center of the - massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernement, - in the Protekterat and in Austria, and that the massing in the - North is relatively unimportant. - - “3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, - especially of the armored divisions, things are to be - exaggerated, if necessary. - - “4. By suitable news the impression to be created that the - _antiaircraft protection_ in the East has been increased - considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that - it continues to be increased with captured French material on - all important targets. - - “5. Concerning improvements on _railroads_, _roads_, - _airdromes_, _etc._, it is to be stated that the work is kept - within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly - won Eastern territories, and serves primarily economical - traffic. - - “The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent - correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of - garrisons, etc., will be made available to the defense for - purposes of counter espionage. - - “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, - - By order of - /signed/ Jodl.” (_1229-PS_) - -Early in November 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders and called -for a continuation of preparations, promising further and more definite -instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced a general outline -of the army’s operational plans. This order was contained in a Top -Secret directive from the Fuehrer’s Headquarters No. 18, dated 12 -November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed by Jodl (_444-PS_). The -directive begins by saying that: - - “The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the - prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along - the following lines.” (_444-PS_) - -It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding -relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.: - - “* * * 5. _Russia_ - - “Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of - clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of - the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East - which have already been verbally ordered will be continued. - - “Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general - outline of the Army’s operational plans has been submitted to, - and approved by me.” (_444-PS_) - -On 5 December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that -time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer concerning the progress of -the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A report of this -conference with Hitler is set forth in a folder containing many -documents, all labelled annexes and all bearing on _Fall Barbarossa_ -(_1799-PS_). This folder was discovered with the War Diary of the -_Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab_ and was apparently an inclosure to that Diary. -Annex No. 1, dated 5 December 1940, indicates the state which planning -for this aggression had reached six and a half months before it -occurred: - - “Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940. - - “The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about - the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the - geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in - the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed - operational plans and adds the following: The most important - goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed - front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian - air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German - Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be - enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial - territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the - annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its - regeneration. - - “The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a - way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.” - - * * * * * * - - “It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions - in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned - for the entire operation is sufficient.” (_1799-PS_) - -B. _Plan Barbarossa._ - -By 18 December 1940 the general outline of the army’s operational plans -having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the -High Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces for -_Barbarossa_—Directive No. 21—was issued (_446-PS_). This directive -marks the first time the plan to invade the U.S.S.R. was specifically -referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret. -It also marked the first use of the code word _Barbarossa_ to denote the -operation against the Soviet Union. One of the most significant passages -in that directive is the opening sentence: - - “The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia - in a quick campaign even before the end of the war against - England. (Case Barbarossa).” (_446-PS_) - -The directive continues: - - “Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not - yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed not - later than 15 May 1941.” - - * * * * * * - - “Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an - attack will not be recognized.” (_446-PS_) - -The directive then outlined the broad strategy on which the intended -invasion was to proceed and the parts which the Army, Navy, and Air -Forces were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by -the Commanders-in-Chief. The directive concluded as follows: - - “V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on - their further plans based on this letter of instructions. - - “The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces - are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in - regard to their time.” (_446-PS_) - -The directive is signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Keitel, -Warlimont, and one illegible signature. - -It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well -as from its history, which has been outlined, that this directive was no -mere staff planning exercise. It was an order to prepare for an act of -aggression which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The -various services which received the order understood it as an order to -prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. -This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they -immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth -in the basic directive. - -C. _Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation of -Barbarossa._ - -The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early compliance -of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21 (_446-PS_) which ordered -progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High -Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary contains a -substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy’s part -in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself -to play that part (_C-35_). The following passage shows that the Navy -was actively preparing for the attack at this early date: - - “_30 January 1941_ - - 7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the - “Barbarossa” case to be submitted to the High Command of the - Armed Forces”. (_C-35_) - -”Ia” is, in this case, the abbreviation for a deputy head of the -Operations Division of the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the -Navy’s objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many -tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently typical to -give an idea of all: - - “II. _Objectives of War Against Russia._ - - * * * * * * - - _d._ To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as: - - “1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air - force units against strong points and combat vessels in the - Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.” (_C-35_) - -This document indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was -being carried out to implement _Barbarossa_ almost six months before the -operation actually got underway. It is but another piece in the mosaic -of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the -invasion of the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack. - -Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at -least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming -campaign (_C-33_). The entry for 19 February 1941 is typical: - - “In regard to the impending operation ‘Barbarossa’ for which all - S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can - only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa - operations.” (_C-33_) - -On 3 February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress -thus far made in the planning for _Barbarossa_. The conference also -discussed the plans for _Sonnenblume_, which was the code name for the -North African Operation. Attending this conference were, in addition to -Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; -the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Jodl; the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army -General Staff, Halder; as well as several others including, Colonel -Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant (_872-PS_). During the course of this -conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about -enemy strength as compared with German strength, and about the general -overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated -at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. An extract from this -report, although written in a semishorthand form, is at least -sufficiently clear to disclose that elaborate timetables had already -been set up for the deployment of troops, as well as for industrial -operations: - - “_The intended time period_ was discussed with a plan. - - 1st Deployment Staffel (_Aufmarschstaffel_) - - 2nd “ “ “ - - transfer now, Front—Germany—East from the middle of March will - give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups - and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There - are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear - area. From now on, Attila [the code word for the operation for - the occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out only - under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport - movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached - about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the - middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main - part of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code - word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa and - Gibraltar.] - - “_In industry_ the full capacity timetable is in force. No more - camouflage. - - “From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces - from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code word for the - planned operation against England] can no longer be carried - out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite - recognizable. - - “The full capacity timetable remains. 8 Marita [Marita was the - code word for the action against Greece] divisions complete the - picture of the disposition of forces on the plan. - - “_C-in-C Army_ requested that he no longer have to employ 5 - control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as - reserves for commanders in the West. - - “_Fuehrer_ When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its - breath and make no comment.” (_872-PS_) - -This much, when read with the conference conclusions, is sufficient to -show that the Army as well as the Navy regarded _Barbarossa_ as an -action directive and were far along with their preparations even as -early as February 1941—almost five months prior to 22 June, the date -when the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized -the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affected -_Barbarossa_, as follows: - - “_Conclusions_: - - “1. _Barbarossa_ - - “_a._ The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the - operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must - be remembered that the _main aim_ is to gain possession - of the Baltic States and Leningrad. - - “_b._ The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the - plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon - as possible. - - “_c._ Agreements with neighbouring states, who are - taking part, may not be concluded until there is no - longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is - Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw. - - “_d._ It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out - Attila (auxiliary measure). - - “_e._ The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be - camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary - measure Marita.” (_872-PS_) - -As the plans for the invasion became more detailed, involved, and -complete, more and more agencies outside the Armed Forces had to be -brought into the picture, let in on the secret, and assigned their -respective parts. For example, early in March, 1941, Keitel drafted a -letter to be sent to Reich Minister Todt, then Reich Minister of -Armaments and Munitions and head of the organization Todt. In this -letter Keitel explained the principles on which the camouflage for the -operation was based and requested that the organization Todt follow the -same line (_874-PS_). This letter illustrates the elaborate deceit with -which the Nazi conspirators sought to hide the preparations for their -treacherous attack: - - “_Top Secret_ - “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. - “Hq. of the Fuehrer 9 March 41 - DRAFT - - “Honorable Reich Minister! (TODT) - - “For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed - Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and - deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the - success of the operations. - - “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding - rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed - directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at - continuing preparations for the attack against England in an - increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for - deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary - maneuvre to divert from plans which are being pursued for an - attack against England. In order to insure success for these - measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are - being also followed on the part of the Organization Todt. - - “K. J. W.” - [Initials of - Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (_874-PS_) - -On 13 March 1941 Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer -Order #21 (_446-PS_), which was issued in the form of “Directives for -Special Areas” (_447-PS_). This detailed operational order, which was -issued more than three months in advance of the attack, indicates how -complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. -Section I of the directive is headed “Area of Operations and Executive -Power” and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It -states that while the campaign is in progress, the Supreme Commander of -the Army has the executive power in territory through which the army is -advancing. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is -entrusted with “special tasks.” This assignment is discussed in -paragraph 2b: - - “* * * _b._ In the area of operations, the _Reichsfuehrer SS_ - is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with _special tasks_ for - the preparation of the _political administration_, tasks which - result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two - opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the - Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own - responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme - Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him - shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the - Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks - military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be - arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.” - (_447-PS_) - -The order then states that, in time, political administration will be -set up under Commissioners of the Reich. The relationship of these -officials to the army is discussed in paragraphs 2c and 3: - - “_c._ As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient - depth, it is to be _limited in the rear_. The newly occupied - territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given - its own _political_ administration. For the present, it is to be - divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions - of the Army Groups, into _North_ (_Baltic countries_), _Center_ - (_White Russia_) _and South_ (_Ukraine_). In these territories - _the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners - of the Reich_ who receive their orders from the Fuehrer. - - “3. For the execution of all _military tasks_ within the areas - under political administration in the rear of the area of - operations, _commanding officers_ who are responsible to the - Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command. - - “The commanding officer is the _supreme representative of the - Armed Forces_ in the respective areas and the bearer of the - _military sovereign rights_. He has _the tasks of a Territorial - Commander_ and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a - Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily - for the following tasks. - - “_a._ Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in - order to support him in his political task. - - “_b._ Exploitation of the country and securing its economic - values for use by German industry (see par. 4). (_447-PS_) - -The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of -economy in the conquered territory. This provision is also contained in -Section I, paragraph 4: - - “4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of _the - administration of economy_ in the area of operations and in the - territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who - has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rue Amt’ with the execution - of the task. Special orders on that will come from the - OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt.” (_447-PS_) - -The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and -communication traffic. Section III of the order deals with the relations -with certain other countries and states, in part, as follows: - - “III. _Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and - Finland._ - - 9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made - by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to - the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should - become necessary during the course of the operations to grant - special rights, applications for this purpose are to be - submitted to the OKW.” (_447-PS_) - -The document closes with a section regarding Sweden: - - “IV. _Directives regarding Sweden._ - - 12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no - special authority is to be granted the commander of the German - troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the - immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and - attacks. - - “The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces - - “signed: KEITEL” - (_447-PS_) - -As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21 -(_446-PS_), the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take -place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi -conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans and -were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this -postponement is found in a document (_C-170_) which has been identified -by Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff -War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the -Admiralty files and contains file references to the papers which were -the basis for each entry. This item dated 3 April 1941 reads as follows: - - “_Balkan Operations delayed ‘Barbarossa’ at first for about five - weeks._ All measures which can be construed as _offensive - actions_ are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order.” - (_C-170_) - -By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out -to permit the Fuehrer definitely to set D-Day as 22 June—more than -seven weeks away. A “Top Secret” report of a conference with the Chief -of the Section _Landsverteidigung_ of the _Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab_ on 30 -April 1941 states, in the first two paragraphs: - - “1. _Timetable Barbarossa_: - - The Fuehrer has decided: - - _Action Barbarossa_ begins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop - movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations - the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas. - - “2. _Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa: - Sector North_: German and Russian forces approximately of the - same strength. - - _Sector Middle_: Great German superiority. - - _Sector South_: Russian superiority.” (_873-PS_) - -Early in June, approximately three weeks before D-Day, preparations for -the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to -issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and -missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This timetable (_C-39_) was -prepared in 21 copies. The copy reproduced here was the third copy, -which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form -of a transmittal and reads as follows: - - “_Top Military Secret_ - “Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L (I op) - “Fuehrer’s Headquarters - (no date) - “Top Secret (_Chefsache_) - _Only through officer_ - - “_21 copies_ - 3rd copy Ob. d. m. - I op.00845/41 - Received 6 June - Enclosures:— - - “The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a - foundation for further preparations for ‘Barbarossa’. If - alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme - Command of the Armed Forces must be informed. - - “Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - - signed: Keitel” - (_C-39_) - -The document then proceeds to outline the state of preparations as of 1 -June 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that -date under six headings: General; Negotiations with Friendly States; -Army; Navy; Air Force, and Camouflage. The remainder of the document is -in tabular form with six columns headed from left to right at the top of -each page—Date; Serial No.; Army; Navy; OKW; Remarks. The item -appearing under date 21 June and Serial No. 29, provides in the columns -for Army, Navy, and Air Forces that, “Till 1300 hours latest time at -which operation can be cancelled (_spaetester Anhaltetermin_)” (_C-39_). -Under the column headed OKW appears the note: “Cancelled by code word -‘Altona’ or further confirmation of start of attack by code word: -‘Dortmund’” (_C-39_). In the Remarks column appears the statement that: -“Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main -effort (_Schwerpunkt_), concentration of armour and artillery must be -reckoned with” (_C-39_). The entry for 22 June, under serial number 31, -gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force, -Navy, and OKW and provides as follows: - - “_Invasion Day_ - - “H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing - of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours”. (_C-39_) - -In the Remarks column it is stated that: - - “Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to - weather on the part of the Air Force.” (_C-39_) - -The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and -give great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various -components of the Armed Forces. - -On 9 June 1941 the order of the Fuehrer went out for final reports on -Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941—8 days before “D-Day” -(_C-78_). This order, signed by Hitler’s Adjutant, Schmundt, reads as -follows: - - “TOP SECRET - Only by Officer - “Office of Wehrmacht Adjutant - “at Berchtesgaden - 9th June 1941 - - “_To the Fuehrer_ - - Br. B. No. 7 Top Secret - - “_Top Secret_ - - “_Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’_ - - “1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have - ordered reports on ‘Barbarossa’ by the Commanders of Army - Groups, armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank. - - “2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the - Reich Chancellery, Berlin. - - “3. _Time Table._ - “_a._ 11.00 hrs. “Silver Fox” - “_b._ 12.00 hrs-14.00 hrs. Army Group South - “_c._ 14.00 hrs-15.30 hrs. Lunch party for all - participants in - conference - “_d._ From 15.30 hrs. Baltic, Army Group - North, Army Group - “Center” in this - order. - - Participants see enclosed list of participants. - - (list of names, etc. follows) - - “(signed) Schmundt - Colonel of the General Staff and Chief - Wehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer”. - (_C-78_) - -There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they -will report. The list includes a large number of the members of the High -Command and General Staff Group as of that date. Among those to -participate were Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder. - -The foregoing documents are sufficient to establish the premeditation -and calculation which marked the military preparations for the invasion -of the U.S.S.R. Starting almost a full year before the launching of the -attack, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail -of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all that thoroughness -and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German -character. The leading roles were performed in this preparation by the -military figures—Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder. - -D. _Plans for the Economic Exploitation and Spoliation of the U.S.S.R._ - -Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely -military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning was -undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to insure that their aggression -would prove economically profitable. The motives which led the -conspirators to plan and launch attack were both political and economic. -The economic basis may be simply summarized as the greed of the Nazi -conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies which their -neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as needing for -the maintenance of their war machine. To the Nazi conspirators a need -was translated as a right, and they early began planning and preparing -with typical care and detail to insure that every bit of the plunder -which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression -would be exploited to their utmost benefit. - -As early as August 1940 General Thomas, Chief of the _Wi Rue Amt_, -received a hint from Goering about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R., -which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. In -November 1940—8 months before the attack—Thomas was categorically -informed by Goering of the planned operation in the East, and -preliminary preparations were commenced for the economic plundering of -the territories to be occupied in the course of such operation -(_2353-PS_). Goering played the overall leading role in this activity by -virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan. Thomas -describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning in these -terms: - - “* * * In November, 1940, the Chief of the _Wi Rue_ together - with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General - von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action - planned in the East. - - “By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for - the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at - the end of 1940. - - “The preliminary preparations for the action in the East - included first of all the following tasks: - - “1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament - industry, its location, its capacity and its associate - industries. - - “2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament - centers and their dependency one on the other. - - “3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of - the Soviet Union. - - “4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum - (crude oil). - - “5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament - industries in the Soviet Union. - - “These points were concentrated in one big compilation ‘War - Economy of the Soviet Union’ and illustrated with detailed maps, - etc.” - - “Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important - factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the - German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy - Organization. - - “For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was - created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later - on in charge of Brigadier General Schubert. The work was carried - out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office, - resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with - the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any - other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these - intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of - material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for - carrying out the operations and for administering the - territory.” (_2353-PS_) - -By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a -point where a broader plan of organization was needed. General Thomas -held a conference, with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for -such a plan. A memorandum of this conference classified Top Secret and -dated 1 March 1941, reads as follows: - - “The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be - drafted for the Reich Marshal. - - “Essential Points: - - “1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich - Marshal. _Purpose_: Support and extension of the measures of the - four-year plan. - - “2. The organization must include everything concerning war - economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a - special mission of State Secretary Backe. - - “3. Clear statement that _the organization is to be independent - of the military or civil administration_. Close cooperation, but - instructions direct from the central office in Berlin. - - “4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps: - - _a._ Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front - lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to - secure the removal of important goods. - - _b._ Administration of the occupied industrial districts and - exploitation of economically complimentary districts. - - “5. In view of the extended field of activity, the term _war - economy_ inspection is to be used preferably, instead of - armament inspection. - - “6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization - must be generously equipped and personnel must be - correspondingly numerous. _The main mission of the organization_ - will consist of _seizing raw materials and taking over all_ - _important concerns_. For the latter mission reliable persons - from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the - beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can - only be performed by the aid of their experiences, (for example, - lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum). - - “After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was - instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization - within one week. - - “Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building - is essential. An officer must still be appointed for Wi and Rue, - with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact. - Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of - the new plan regarding Russia. - - “Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the - second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are - ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to - report to the Office Chief at the end of next week. - - “(signed:) Hamann”. - (_1317-PS_) - -Hamann, who signed the report is listed among those attending as a -Captain, was apparently the junior officer present. Presumably it fell -naturally to his lot to prepare the minutes of the meeting. - -The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was -organizing at the direction of Goering was clearly recognized by Keitel -in his operational order of 13 March 1941 (_447-PS_). The order stated -that the Fuehrer had entrusted the uniform direction of the -administration of economy in the area of operations and political -administration to the Reichsmarshal (Goering) who in turn had delegated -his authority to the Chief of the _Wi Rue Amt_ (Thomas). (_447-PS_) - -The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on -28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a -conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain -the organizational set-up of Economic Staff _Oldenburg_. (_Oldenburg_ -was the code name given to this economic counterpart of _Barbarossa_.) -Section I of the report of this conference (_1157-PS_) deals with the -general organization of Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ as it had developed. -The report begins: - -“_Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours on 29th - April 1941_ - I. - _Welcome_ - - “Purpose of meeting: introduction to the organizational - structure of the economic sector of the action. - - “_Barbarossa—Oldenburg_ - - “As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, - has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand - of _all_ economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal - with the overall direction of the economic administration in the - area of operations and in the areas under political - administration. - - “The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic - general staff, working under the director of the industrial - armament office (_Chef Wi Rue Amt_). - - “Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the - supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the - _Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties_ under the command - of Major General (Generalleutnant) Schubert. - - “His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are: - - 5 economic inspectorates - - 23 economic commands - - 12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important - places within the area of the economic commands. - - “These offices are used in the _military rear area_; the idea is - that in the territory of each Army Group an economic - inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander - of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will - supervise the economic exploitation of the territory. - - “A distinction must be made between the military rear area on - the one hand and the battle area proper and the rear area of the - army on the other hand. In the last economic matters are dealt - with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands, - i.e. the liaison officer of the industrial armament office - within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army - headquarters commands. For the battle area he has attached to - him: technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops - for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in - particular tractors and means of production. - - “In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, - the rear area of the Army, group IV Econs at the various field - commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of - the industrial armaments office in order to support the army - headquarters commands specialists responsible for supplying the - troops from the country’s resources and for preparing the - subsequent general economic exploitation. - - “While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, - economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in - the locality. - - “The new feature inherent in the organization under the command - of the Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ is that it does not only deal - with military industry, but comprises the _entire_ economic - field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated - as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite - generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, etc. - - “This also corresponds with the internal organization of the - individual offices which, from the Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ - down to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision - into three large groups, i.e. - - “_Group H_ dealing with troop requirements, armaments, - industrial transport organization. - - “_Group L_ which concerns itself with all questions of feed and - agriculture, and - - “_Group W_ which is in charge of the entire field of trade and - industry, including raw materials and suppliers; further - questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, - commerce and exchange of commodities and manpower allocation. - - “Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and - Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within - the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v. - Hanneken.” (_1157-PS_) - -The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, personnel -and staffing problems, and similar details. - -These documents portray the calculated method with which the Nazi -conspirators prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended -victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage an -attack on a neighbor they had pledged to security, but that they also -intended to strip that neighbor of its food, its factories, and all its -means of livelihood. The Nazi conspirators made these plans for plunder -being fully aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin -and starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. (The -story of how this plot was executed forms a part of the case to be -presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff.) - -E. _Preparation for the Political Phase of the Aggression._ - -As has already been indicated, and as will be later more fully -developed, there were both economic and political motives for the action -of the Nazi conspirators in invading the Soviet Union. The economic -aspects have been discussed. Equally elaborate planning was engaged in -by the Nazi conspirators to insure the effectuation of the political aim -of their aggression. That political aim may be described as the -elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a powerful political factor in Europe, -and the acquisition of _Lebensraum_. For the accomplishment of these -purposes the Nazi conspirators selected as their agent Rosenberg. - -As early as 2 April 1941 Rosenberg, or a member of his staff, prepared a -memorandum on the U.S.S.R. (_1017-PS_). This memorandum speculates on -the possibility of a disagreement with the U.S.S.R. which would result -in a quick occupation of an important part of that country. The -memorandum then considers what the political goal of such occupation -should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal. This memorandum -begins: - - “_Subject: The U.S.S.R._ - - “Bolshevik Russia, just as the one-time Czarist Russia, is a - conglomeration of peoples of very different types, which has - come into being through the annexation of states of a related or - even of an essentially alien character. - - “A military conflict with the U.S.S.R. will result in an - extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large - section of the U.S.S.R. It is very probable that military action - on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse - of the U.S.S.R. The occupation of these areas would then present - not so many military as administrative and economic - difficulties. Thus arises the first question: - - “Is the occupation to be determined by purely military and/or - economic needs, or is the laying of political foundations for a - future organization of the area also a factor in determining how - far the occupation shall be extended? If so, it is a matter of - urgency to fix the _political_ goal which is to be attained, for - it will, without doubt, also have an effect on military - operations. - - “If the Political overthrow of the Eastern Empire, in the weak - condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of - military operations, one may conclude that: - - “1. The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions; - - “2. From the very beginning, the treatment of individual - sections of territory should, as regards administration, as well - as economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we - are striving to attain; - - “3. Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas, - such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for - the continuation of the war against England, the maintenance of - production which this necessitates and the great directives for - the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all - together in one place. - - “It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the - arguments which follow of course only hold good once the - supplies from the area to be occupied which are essential to - Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been - assured. - - “Anyone who knows the East, sees in a map of Russia’s population - the following national or geographical units: - - “_a._ Greater Russia with Moscow as its centre. - - “_b._ White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital. - - “_c._ Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. - - “_d._ The Ukraine and the Crimea with Kiev as its centre. - - “_e._ The Don area with Rostov as its capital. - - “_f._ The area of the Caucasus. - - “_g._ Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan.” (_1017-PS_) - -The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or -geographical units thus listed in some detail. At the end of the paper -the writer sums up his thoughts and briefly outlines his plan in these -terms: - - “_Summary_ - - “The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from - the points briefly outlined here: - - “1. The creation of a central department for the occupied areas - of the U.S.S.R., to be confined more or less to wartime. - - “Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich - authorities, it would be the task of this department— - - “_a._ To issue binding political instructions to the separate - administration area, having in mind the situation existing at - the time and the goal which is to be achieved. - - “_b._ To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from - all the occupied areas. - - “_c._ To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying - out, in main outline, of the primarily important questions for - all areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, - transport, and the production of oil, coal and food; - - “2. The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in the - separate administration area, grouped together by race or by - reason of political economy, for the carrying out of the totally - dissimilar tasks assigned to them. - - “As against this, an administrative department, regulating - matters in principle, and to be set up on a purely economic - basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be - inadequate, and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would - be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas, - dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede - the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being - run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent - it. - - “The question therefore arises, whether the opinions which have - been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be - taken into consideration from the very beginning when organizing - the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy. - In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of - administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of - the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally - different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of - the U.S.S.R. would require different treatment from that which - has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe. - - “2.4.41” (_1017-PS_) - -It is evident that the “presently envisaged” administration operating on -a purely economic basis, to which this memorandum objects, was the -Economic Staff _Oldenburg_ which was set up under Goering and Thomas. - -Rosenberg’s statement of the political purpose of the invasion and his -analysis of methods for achieving it apparently did not fall on deaf -ears. By a Fuehrer Order dated 20 April 1941 he was named “Commissioner -for the Central Control of Questions Connected with the East-European -Region”. This order is part of a correspondence file regarding -Rosenberg’s appointment (_865-PS_). Hitler’s order reads as follows: - - “I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my Commissioner for the - central control of questions connected with the East-European - Region. - - “An office, which is to be established in accordance with his - orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the - carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him. - - “The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the - Reich Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum. - - “Fuehrer’s Headquarters 20th April 1941. - “The Fuehrer - (signed) Adolf Hitler - “Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery - (signed) Dr. Lammers” - (_865-PS_) - -This particular copy of the Fuehrer’s Order was enclosed in a letter -which Dr. Lammers wrote to Keitel requesting cooperation for Rosenberg -and asking that Keitel appoint a Deputy to work with Rosenberg. This -letter reads as follows: - - “The Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery - “Berlin W8 21st April 1941 - VossStrasse 6 - - At present Fuehrer - Headquarters, mail - without exception to - be sent to the Berlin - address. - - “To: The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, - General Field Marshal Keitel - - “Personal. By courier. - - “My dear General Field Marshal. - - “Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer’s Decree by - which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his - Commissioner for the central control connected with the - East-European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is - to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency - with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be - authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest cooperation of - the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, - and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities - to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of - the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time - being only those of the highest Reich Authorities should be - informed, on whose cooperation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will - primarily depend. There are: the Commissioner for the Four Year - plan, the Reich Minister of Economics and you, yourself. - - “Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s - wishes, to place your cooperation at the disposal of - Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in the carrying out of the task imposed - upon him. - - “It is recommended in the interests of secrecy, that you name a - representative in your office, with whom the office of the - Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual - deputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the - contents of this letter. - - “I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of - this letter. - - “Heil Hitler, - Yours very sincerely, - Dr. Lammers.” - (_865-PS_) - -Keitel wrote Lammers acknowledging receipt of his letter and telling of -his compliance with the request: - - “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. - “25 April 1941 - “Most Secret - “By courier - - “To: - - “The Head of the Reich Chancellery, - - Reich Minister Dr. Lammers. - - “Personal - - “Dear Reich Minister. - - “I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer’s Decree in - which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his - Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with - the East-European Region. I have named General of the Artillery - Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff as my permanent - Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy. - - “Heil Hitler - “Yours very sincerely, - “K. - 25/4” - (_865-PS_) - -Keitel also wrote Rosenberg, telling of his compliance with Lammers’ -request: - - “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - “25th April 1941 - “Most Secret - “By courier - - “To: - - “Reichsleiter Rosenberg - - “_Personal._ - - “Dear Reichsleiter, - - “The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the - Fuehrer’s Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner - for the central control of questions connected with the - East-European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery - Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy, - Major General Warlimont with the solving of these questions, as - far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now - I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to deal with him - only. - - “Heil Hitler - “Yours very sincerely, - “K. - 25/4” (_865-PS_) - -Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler, Rosenberg began -building his organization, conferring with the various ministries, -issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed plans and -preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission. Although -Rosenberg’s files, which were captured intact, were crowded with -documents evidencing both the extent of the preparation and its purpose, -the citation of a small number which are typical should be sufficient. -All the documents now discussed were found in Rosenberg’s files. - -In a memorandum dated 8 May 1941, entitled “General Instructions for all -Reichcommissars in the occupied Eastern Territories”, Rosenberg gives -instructions to his chief henchmen and outlines clearly the political -aims and purposes of the attack. In the second two paragraphs of the -English translation the following remarks appear: - - “The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free - the German Reich from the Great Russian (_gross-russisch_) - pressure for centuries to come. This does not only correspond - with German interests, but also with historical justice, for - Russian Imperialism was in a position to accomplish its policy - of conquest and oppression almost unopposed, whilst it - threatened Germany again and again. Therefore, the German Reich - has to beware of starting a campaign against Russia with a - historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a Great - Russian Empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all - historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow - and Petersburg have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the - situation today. This has been done on the part of the National - Socialist movement to correspond to the Leader’s political - testament as laid down in his book, that now the military and - political threat, from the East shall be eliminated forever. - - “Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its - historical and racial conditions into Reichs-Commissariats, each - of which bears within itself a different political aim. The - Reich Commissariat Eastland (_Ostland_) including White Ruthenia - will have the task, to prepare, by way of development into a - Germanized Protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with - Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in - alliance with Germany and Caucasia with the contiguous Northern - Territories a Federal State with a German plenipotentiary. - Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future. - These general viewpoints are explained in the following - instructions for each Reich Commissar. Beyond that there are - still a few general considerations which possess validity for - all Reich Commissars.” (_1030-PS_) - -The fifth paragraph presents an interesting rationalization of a -contemplated robbery: - - “The German people has achieved, in the course of centuries, - tremendous accomplishments in the Eastern European area. Nearly - its entire real estate property was confiscated without - indemnification, hundreds of thousands (in the South, on the - Volga) starved or were deported or, like in the Baltic - territories, were cheated out of the fruits of their cultural - work during the past 700 years. The German Reich will now have - to proclaim the principle, that after the occupation of the - Eastern Territories, the former German assets have become - property of the people of Greater Germany, irrespective of the - consent of the former individual proprietors where the German - Reich may reserve the right (assuming that it has not already - been done during resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The - manner of compensation and restitution of this national - property, will be subject to different treatment by each Reich - Commissariat.” (_1030-PS_) - -“An Instruction for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White -Russia” (_1029-PS_) is typical of the directives issued to each of the -appointed commissioners. This order is amazingly frank in outlining the -intentions of the Nazi conspirators toward the country they intended to -occupy in the course of their aggression. It begins: - - “All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have, constantly been - in close relationship with the German people. A 700 year old - history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the - races living there in a European direction, and has added this - region to the living space of Greater Germany. - - “The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania - and White Russia [last words added in pencil] must be to strive - to achieve the form of a German Protectorate, and then transform - the region into part of the Greater German Reich by germanizing - racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic races and - banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must become a - Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater Germany. - - “For certain cattle-raising products, the Baltic region was a - land of surplus, and the Reich Commissar must endeavor to make - this surplus once more available to the German people, and, if - possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of - germanizing or resettling, the Esthonian people are strongly - germanized to the extent of 50% by Danish, German and Swedish - blood and can be considered as a kindred nation. In Latvia, the - section capable of being assimilated is considerably smaller - than in Esthonia. In this country stronger resistance will have - to be reckoned with and banishment on a larger scale will have - to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be reckoned - with in Lithuania, for here too the emigration of racial Germans - is called for in order to promote very intensive Germanization - (on the East Prussian border).” - - * * * * * * - - “The task of a Reich Commissar with his seat of office in Riga - will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one. A - country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights built - up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of a constant influx - of German blood, together with Swedish elements, was a - predominantly Germanized land, is to be established as a mighty, - German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are - available everywhere, and the German Reich will be able to - guarantee the right to a later emigration to all those who have - distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of - those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who - fought in the Baltic campaign never once lost courage, fought on - in the hour of despair and delivered Baltic civilization from - Bolshevism. For the rest, the solution of the colonization - problem is not a Baltic question, but one which concerns Greater - Germany, and it must be settled on these lines.” (_1029-PS_) - -These two directives are sufficiently typical of the lot to show the -extent of the planning and preparation for this phase of the aggression -as well as the political purpose it was hoped would be achieved thereby. -They are reinforced by a later report of Rosenberg’s. On 28 June 1941, -less than a week after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared a full -report of his activities since his appointment on the 20th of April -(_1039-PS_). This report makes disclosures concerning the number of -conspirators who worked with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and -preparation for this phase of the aggression and the extent to which -practically all the ministries and offices of both the State and the -Party were involved in this operation. The report was found in -Rosenberg’s files and, although it is rather long, it is of sufficient -importance in implicating persons, groups and organizations to justify -quotation in full: - - “_Report on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions_ - - “Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich - offices regarding the Fuehrer’s decree of 20.4.1941 a conference - with the Chief of the OKW [Armed Forces High Command] took - place. After presentation of the various political aims in the - proposed Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal - requirements for the East, the Chief of the OKW explained that a - deferment (_OK-stellung_) would be too complicated in this case - and that this matter could be carried out best by direct - cancellation (_Abkommandierung_) by command of the Chief of the - OKW. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel then issued an appropriate - command which established the basis for the coming requirements. - He named as deputy and liaison officer General Jodl and Maj. - Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative - in all questions of the Eastern Territory were carried on by the - gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my - office. - - “A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that - under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no - way deal with any representatives of people of the East-European - area. I asked him to do this insofar as the Military - intelligence required it, and then to name persons to me who - could count as political personalities over and above the - military intelligence in order to arrange for their eventual - commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my - wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants - would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed - in accordance with my indications. - - “Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and - Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political - conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we - agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme - Commander of the Army, respectively to the chief quartermaster - and to the army groups for questions relative to political - configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has - been done. - - “Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of - Economy (_Reichswirtschaftsminister_) Funk, who appointed as his - permanent deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost - daily conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with - reference to the war-economic intentions of the Economic - Operational Staff (_Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab_) East. In this - connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State - Secretary (_Staatssekretaer_) Koerner, State Secretary Backe, - Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert and others. - Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions as - regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few - problems regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich - ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and will be - subject, after submission, to a decision of the Fuehrer. In - principle I declared that I am in no way intended to found an - economic department in my office, economics would rather be - handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall and - the persons appointed by him, however the two responsible - department heads, namely Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer - for industrial economics and Ministerial Director Riecke for - food economies, would be placed in my office as permanent - liaison men, to coordinate here political aims with the economic - necessities, in a department which would have to unite yet other - persons for such coordinating work, depending on later and for - work (political leadership of labor unions, construction etc.). - After notification of the Reich foreign minister, the latter - appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my - office. For the requested representation in the political - department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. - Leibbrandt) the foreign ministry released General Counsel Dr. - Braeutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks Russian, - and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations which if necessary - will be placed before the Fuehrer are under way with the foreign - office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its - representatives to the future Reich commissioners. - - “The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary Gutterer as - permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to - the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays, - speeches, proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a - great number of substantial works for propaganda would be - delivered and the papers prepared by the propaganda ministry - would be modified here if necessary. The whole practical - employment of propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the - Reich ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda. For the - sake of closer cooperation the propaganda ministry assigns yet - another person directly to my department ‘Enlightenment and - Press’ (_Aufklaerung und Presse_) and in addition appoints a - permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been - going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my - office in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology - takes place continually every day. - - “Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge - concerning future transmission of communication and setting up - of all technical necessities in future occupied territories; - with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with - Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form - on the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the - commissariats. According to the present estimate there will be - four Reichs Kommissariats, as approved by the Fuehrer. I shall - propose to the Fuehrer for political and other reasons to set up - a suitable number of General Commissariats (24) Main - Commissariats (about 80) and Regional (_Gebiet_) Commissariats - (over 900). A General Commissariat would correspond to a former - Generalgovernment, a Main Commissariat to a Maingovernment. A - Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4 Districts (_Kreise_). In - view of the huge spaces that is the minimum number which appears - necessary for a future civil government and/or administration. A - portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis - of the above-named command of the Chief of the OKW. - - “In the same manner conferences have taken place with the Reich - Physicians Leader (_Reichsaerztefuehrer_) Dr. Conti, the - Inspector of the Army Veterinary Service, and all specialists - belonging thereto. The difficulties of medical and veterinary - supply were thoroughly discussed and the measures were - previewed, in order to insure well-prepared employment of the - forces mentioned after the end of the operations. A conference - with Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment first of - all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction Service, whereupon - Dr. Todt proposed to unite administratively under one leadership - the whole Construction Service. - - “Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his chief of - staff Rienhardt regarding the publication of four German - newspapers in the Reich Commissariats to start with. Furthermore - a number of newspapers in the prospective native tongues were - considered. According to the latest information the technical - forces, for this work are already at the border and may be - committed at any time to determine whether the prerequisites for - printing shops are present. - - “Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader - (_Korpsfuehrer_) Huehnlein and with the Reich youth leadership - to assure a necessary and suitable mobilization. Intensive talks - also took place with the Chief of Staff (_Stabschef_) of the SA. - He was asked to make available a number of the most reliable SA - leaders for this gigantic territory, which he agreed to do. The - personnel suggestions together with other suggestions will be - submitted to the Fuehrer. The same agreement has been reached - with the Reich organizational leader - (_Reichsorganisationsleiter_), who has instructed the commander - of Kroessinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the swelling channelling of - requested persons, to admit them into Kroessinsee for schooling - and instruction on the whole problem and prepare them in the - best manner for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party - member Marrenbach was then employed in order to take over - already now the leadership of Russian labor unions in connection - with the Wehrmacht. That appeared as an eminently important - problem, particularly also in connection with the economic - leadership, because the labor unions undoubtedly have been a - powerful support of the Soviets and especially have the - commitment of the German Labor Front appeared necessary under - certain conditions. - - “Lengthy discussions regarding the relationship of the Police to - the new order in the East have taken place. Certain proposed - changes thereto have been suggested by the Reichsfuehrer SS and - on his order by Gruppenfuehrer [SS Lt Gen] Heydrich which do not - appear supportable to me for the complete authority of the - German Reich government in the East. Also the documents of this - problem will have to be laid before the Fuehrer for decision. - - “Aside from these negotiations I received the responsible - deputies of the entire propaganda, namely Ministerial Director - Fritsche, Ambassador Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of - Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe OKW, and others. Without - going into details of political objectives I instructed the - above-named persons in confidence about the necessary attitude, - with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the - press, without issuing any statements. - - “The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern question - prepared long ago appeared in my office, which I turned over to - the propaganda deputies. I enclose a few samples thereof. These - pamphlets, which may later be turned over to the press for - development, deal with the whole structure and organization of - the USSR, the economic possibilities of the East, Agriculture, - the peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of the Komintern since - 1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1933, statistical - results of the poll taken among the Germans in Russia, the - history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus, of Turkestan. Extensive - works are in preparation for the foundation of legal - administration: German law in the Ukraine, German art in the - Ukraine, influence of the German language on the Ukrainian - language, the Ukrainians from the viewpoint of the Germans. In - addition a number of articles are being prepared in Russian - language which have the purpose of enlightening the people of - the Soviet Union about true conditions in Germany. These - articles are also suitable as the basis for newspaper articles - in the newly occupied territories. Finally, after extensive - work, an ethnological map of the East based on the most recent - statistical reports has been printed in great number and made - available to all offices. This map can be used as the basis of - eventual fixing of boundaries in the north as well as in the - south, and offers points of departure for fixing the boundaries - of the future Reich Commissariats. - - “As a result of these conferences, conducted for the most part - by myself, continuous consultation and organizational - preparation is under way through my office and through those of - the liaison men delegated from the other offices of the Party - and the State. I may say that all the work, inasmuch as it is at - all possible under present condition, is in full swing. Aside - from the General and Chief commissariats more than 900 Regional - Commissariats are planned, which must all be manned by political - leaders, representatives of the department and officials of the - Reich Ministry of the Interior. The work in the East differs - basically from the conditions in the West. Whereas we can count - on every technical installation and a cultured population here - in the big cities, that is not the case in the East. There - literally everything will have to be prepared and taken along, - additionally for the gigantic spaces—not only an auto park but - a great number of typewriters, office material, above all - medical supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does - not appear possible to accomplish such a project suddenly in 14 - days, therefore all these arrangements had to be set in full - motion already now on my responsibility on the basis of the - Fuehrer’s decree. - - “The structure of my office itself is temporarily organized as - follows in carrying out the Fuehrer’s order. I have requested - Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Dr. Meyer as my permanent - representative. He has negotiated personally and thoroughly, - through the whole time with all pertinent offices, in order to - develop all aspects down to the details. A political department - has been founded for the execution of the substantial work, - under my co-worker of many years Dr. Leibbrandt (deputy General - Consul Dr. Braeutigam), who prepares the various books and - pamphlets for information. A great number of propaganda leaflets - have been composed by him which will then have been scattered - over the Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also - for a specific time other leaflets are ready which are addressed - directly to the individual races. I do not care to decide on - this date for myself, and will lay these originals before the - Fuehrer at the first opportunity with the request to check the - contents and determine the time of the eventually approved - appeals. The political department is also undertaking a thorough - investigation of all those, with the exception of Russians, who - eventually can be used as advisors for the administration of the - various nationalities. Continuous discussions about this subject - are under way with representatives of the OKW, the propaganda - ministry, etc. Secondly a department of economic—political - cooperation has been founded under direction of - Oberbereichsleiter Malletke. A department of ‘Law, Finance, and - Administration’ has been taken over by Regierungspraesident - Runte. A department for Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied - since the development of this question does not appear urgent. - Also the department ‘Enlightenment and Press’. It is occupied by - Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy Job Zimmermann. - Integrated here are co-workers who command the Russian, - Ukrainian, and other languages. The wishes of the Reich Press - Chief (_Reichspressechef_) for setting up one press chief for - each Reichskommissar are under discussion in order to decide - them in that sense if possible. - - “Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the - military action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report - from me, I shall be able to report to the Fuehrer far-reaching - preparations, up to those points of special and personal nature - which the Fuehrer alone can decide.” (_1039-PS_) - -(As a part of the case to be presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff, -it will be shown how all this planning and preparation for the -elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor were actually carried -out. The planned execution of intelligentsia, and other Russian leaders -was, for example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to -destroy the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early -resurrection as a European Power.) - -Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the -Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans -and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the -U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world, Hitler issued a -proclamation on the day of the attack, which declared: “I have therefore -today decided to give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our -soldiers.” - -This announcement told the world that the die had been cast; that the -plans darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and -continuously developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. The -Nazi conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared -this war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it. - -F. _The Motives for the Attack._ - -It should first be pointed out that not only was Germany bound by solemn -covenant not to attack the U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period -from August 1939 to the invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union was faithful -to its agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions -toward the territories of the German Reich. General Thomas, for example, -points out in his draft of “Basic Facts for a History of the German War -and Armaments Economy” (_2353-PS_), that insofar as the German-Soviet -trade agreement of 11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out -their deliveries thereunder up to the very end. Thomas points out that -deliveries by the Soviets were usually made quickly and well, and since -the food and raw material being thus delivered was considered essential -to the German economy, efforts were made to keep up their side too. -However, as preparations for the campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared -less about maintaining their obligations. At page 315 of his book Thomas -says: - - “Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as - preparations for the campaign in the East were already under - way. - - “The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up - to the start of the attack; even during the last few days, - transports of India-rubber from the Far East were completed by - Express transit trains.” (_2353-PS_) - -Again at page 404, Thomas brings this point out even more forcefully: - - “In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June, 1941, the - negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of - attention. The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to - camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed - in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the - Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered - orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of - individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible - for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was - necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous - individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate - Russian orders with those of the German from the standpoint of - priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, - German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders, - even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the - time set for manufacture and delivery. Since in May especially, - large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were - instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian - Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour - during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be - delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German - attack.” (_2353-PS_) - -Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to its treaty obligations with -Germany, but she had no aggressive intentions toward German territory. A -file on Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High -Command, covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack -(_C-170_), demonstrates this point conclusively. It will be sufficient -to quote a few entries, which include reports from the German ambassador -in Moscow as late as June 1941. Entry 165 reads: - - “165 A 22.29 4 June - - “Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia. - Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian - government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict - with Germany.” (_C-170_) - -Entry 167 reads: - - “167 A 22.53 6 June - - “Ambassador in Moscow reports * * * Russia will only fight if - attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more - serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made - quietly—as far as can be recognized only defensive. Russian - policy still strives as before to produce the best possible - relationship to Germany as good.” (_C-170_) - -Entry 169 also reiterates this point: - - “169 A 22.65 7 June - - “From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow * * *. All - observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are - responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to - avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the - Government, as well as the attitude of the press, which reports - all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, - support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty - with Germany proves the same thing.” (_C-170_) - -The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union -could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. No doubt, as has -been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning and -preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi -conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of -them, however, appear to blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The -pattern into which these varied reasons fall is the traditional Nazi -ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This -Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative, “_Drang Nach Osten_,” -had been a cardinal principle of the Party almost since its birth, and -rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic -aggrandizement. Politically, such action meant elimination of the -powerful force to the East, which might constitute a threat to German -ambition, and acquisition of _Lebensraum_. Economically, it offered -opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, -and other supplies. Undoubtedly the demands of the German War economy -for food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness of the -economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was -experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators -the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a -political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent. - -As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in _Mein -Kampf_, where he stated, at page 641 of the Houghton Mifflin English -edition: - - “There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special - examination the relation of Germany to Russia: - - “1. Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern - of all German foreign affairs; and - - “2. This question is also the touchstone for the political - capacity of the young National Socialist movement to think - clearly and to act correctly.” - -Again, at page 654 of the same edition: - - “And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath - the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up - where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless - German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward - the land in the east. At long last we break off the colonial and - commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil - policy of the future. - - “If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in - mind only Russia and her vassal border states.” - -The political portion of this dichotomy of purpose is clearly reflected -in the stated purposes, previously discussed, of the organization which -Rosenberg set up to administer the occupied Eastern Territories. In a -speech which Rosenberg delivered, two days before the attack, to the -people most interested in the problem of the East, he restated in his -usual somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and -its interrelationship with the economic goal (_1058-PS_). A short -extract from that speech reads as follows: - - “The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without - a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims on the East; - and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will - have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. - We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to - feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus - territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any - feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without - any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard - years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to - determine to which extent industries can still be maintained - there (Wagon Factories, etc.). The consideration and execution - of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German - Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, - as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the - evacuation into consideration. The conversion of Russian - dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest - characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a - coming Russia later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years. For the - Russian soul has been torn in the struggle of the last 200 - years. The original Russians are excellent artistic craftsmen, - dancers and musicians. They have certain hereditary talents, but - these talents are different from these of the Western people. - The fight between Turgenjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the - nation. The Russian soul found no outlet, either way. If we now - close the West to the Russians, they might become conscious of - their own inborn, proper forces and of the area to which they - belong. An historian will maybe see this decision in a different - light, in hundreds of years than it might appear to a Russian - today.” (_1058-PS_) - -As has been indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat -Britain had served further to strengthen them in their belief in the -political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European factor -before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of -Europe. - -The economic motive for the aggression was disclosed in the previous -discussion of the organization set up under Goering and General Thomas -to carry out the economic exploitation of the territory to be occupied. -The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable. If any -doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion was -to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine, -regardless of the consequences to the Russian people which such robbery -would entail, that doubt is dispelled by a memorandum showing clear and -conscious recognition by the Nazis that their plans would no doubt -result in starving to death millions of people. (_2718-PS_) - -On 20 June 1941 General Thomas wrote a memorandum along a similar line, -in which he stated that Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler’s present -conception of the German economic policy concerning raw materials -(_1456-PS_). This policy expressed the theory that less manpower would -be used in the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be -necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This -memorandum reads, in part: - - “The following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which - Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed - later on by Field Marshal Keitel: - - “1. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our - autarchical endeavors. It is impossible to try and manufacture - everything we lack, by synthetic procedures, or other measures. - For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel economy - to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All these - autarchical endeavors ask for a tremendous amount of manpower, - and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose - another way. What one does not have, but needs, one must - conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one single - time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed - for the running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim - must also be to secure all territories, which are of special - interest to us for the war economy, by conquering them. - - “At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the - statement where I made it clear that a completely autarchical - economy is impossible for us, because the need of men will be - too great. Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the - necessary reserves for missing stocks respectively to secure the - delivery in wartime through economic alliances.” (_1456-PS_) - -On this macabre note the story of this aggression comes to an end. In -view of the solemn pledge of nonaggression; the base and sinister -motives involved; the months of secret planning and preparation; and the -suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought; it may perhaps not be -too much to say that in the history of relations between sovereign -nations, a blacker chapter has never been written than the one which -tells of the Nazi conspirators’ unprovoked invasion of the territory of -the Soviet Union. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST - THE USSR - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a) │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ - │ 6; V. │ I │ 27, 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *444-PS │Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s│ │ - │Headquarters signed by Hitler and │ │ - │initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940, │ │ - │concerning plans for prosecution of war │ │ - │in Mediterranean Area and occupation of │ │ - │Greece. (GB 116) │ III │ 403 - │ │ │ - *446-PS │Top Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed │ │ - │by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, │ │ - │Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, │ │ - │concerning the Invasion of Russia (case │ │ - │Barbarossa). (USA 31) │ III │ 407 - │ │ │ - *447-PS │Top Secret Operational Order to Order │ │ - │No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941,│ │ - │concerning Directives for special areas.│ │ - │(USA 135) │ III │ 409 - │ │ │ - *864-PS │Top Secret Note, 20 October 1939, on │ │ - │conference between Hitler and Chief OKW │ │ - │concerning future relations of Poland to│ │ - │Germany, 17 October 1939. (USA 609) │ III │ 619 - │ │ │ - *865-PS │Correspondence between Keitel, Rosenberg│ │ - │and Lammers, April 1941, concerning │ │ - │appointment of Jodl and Warlimont as OKW│ │ - │representatives with Rosenberg. (USA │ │ - │143) │ III │ 621 - │ │ │ - *872-PS │Memorandum of Discussion between the │ │ - │Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case │ │ - │“Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” (African │ │ - │operation). (USA 134) │ III │ 626 - │ │ │ - *873-PS │Top secret memorandum of discussion with│ │ - │the Chief “L”, 30 April 1941, about the │ │ - │invasion of Russia. (USA 137) │ III │ 633 - │ │ │ - 874-PS │Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J, │ │ - │and W, 9 March 1941, concerning │ │ - │Deception measures. │ III │ 634 - │ │ │ - 876-PS │Letter from Keitel, 12 May 1941, │ │ - │concerning Deception of the enemy. │ III │ 635 - │ │ │ - 886-PS │Fuehrer decree, 13 May 1941, on │ │ - │courts-martial and treatment of enemy │ │ - │civilians in the district “Barbarossa”, │ │ - │signed by Keitel for Hitler, and │ │ - │initialled by Jodl. │ III │ 637 - │ │ │ -*1017-PS │Memorandum entitled “Memorial No. 1 │ │ - │regarding USSR”, 2 April 1941, found in │ │ - │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 142) │ III │ 674 - │ │ │ -*1019-PS │Appendix to Memorandum No. 2. │ │ - │Recommendation as to the personnel for │ │ - │the Reich Commissariats in the East and │ │ - │for the Political Central Office in │ │ - │Berlin, 7 April 1941. (USA 823) │ III │ 681 - │ │ │ -*1029-PS │Paper entitled “Instructions for a Reich│ │ - │Commissar in the Baltic States”, 8 May │ │ - │1941, found in Rosenberg’s “Russia │ │ - │File”. (USA 145) │ III │ 690 - │ │ │ -*1030-PS │General instructions for all Reich │ │ - │Commissars in the Occupied Eastern │ │ - │Territories, 8 May 1941, found in │ │ - │Rosenberg file. (USA 144) │ III │ 692 - │ │ │ - 1034-PS │Minutes of discussion concerning │ │ - │Construction and Administration, 22 June│ │ - │1941. │ III │ 693 - │ │ │ -*1039-PS │Report concerning preparatory work │ │ - │regarding problems in Eastern │ │ - │Territories, 28 June 1941, found in │ │ - │Rosenberg’s “Russia File”. (USA 146) │ III │ 695 - │ │ │ -*1058-PS │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, by │ │ - │Rosenberg before people most intimately │ │ - │concerned with Eastern Problem, found in│ │ - │his “Russia File”. (USA 147) │ III │ 716 - │ │ │ - 1156-PS │Report to Goering from Chief of Office │ │ - │for War Mobilization of Economy, 19 │ │ - │March 1941. │ III │ 808 - │ │ │ -*1157-PS │Report on conference, 29 April 1941, │ │ - │concerning top secret plan for Economic │ │ - │exploitation of Soviet Areas (Oldenburg │ │ - │Plan). (USA 141) │ III │ 811 - │ │ │ -*1229-PS │OKW Directive to the German Intelligence│ │ - │Service in the East, signed by Jodl, 6 │ │ - │September 1940. (USA 130) │ III │ 849 - │ │ │ - 1316-PS │Top secret note for files on conference │ │ - │of 21 March 1941 concerning employment │ │ - │of Quartermaster General. │ III │ 908 - │ │ │ -*1317-PS │Top secret notes taken by Hamann of a │ │ - │discussion of the economic exploitation │ │ - │of Russia, presided over by General │ │ - │Thomas, 28 February 1941. (USA 140) │ III │ 911 - │ │ │ -*1456-PS │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel │ │ - │consulted about resources of USSR. (USA │ │ - │148) │ IV │ 21 - │ │ │ -*1517-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning │ │ - │discussion with the Fuehrer, 14 December│ │ - │1941. (USA 824) │ IV │ 55 - │ │ │ -*1799-PS │Annex 1 to report of Chief of General │ │ - │Staff of the Army, 5 December 1940, │ │ - │concerning planned operation in the │ │ - │East. (USA 131) │ IV │ 374 - │ │ │ -*1834-PS │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │ │ - │and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469 - │ │ │ -*2353-PS │Extracts from General Thomas’ Basic │ │ - │Facts for History of German War and │ │ - │Armament Economy. (USA 35) │ IV │ 1071 - │ │ │ -*2718-PS │Memorandum “About the result of today’s │ │ - │discussion with State Secretaries about │ │ - │Barbarossa”, 2 May 1941. (USA 32) │ V │ 378 - │ │ │ - 3014-PS │Affidavit of General Ernst Koestring, │ │ - │former German military attache in │ │ - │Moscow, concerning planning for the │ │ - │attack on the USSR in early August 1940.│ V │ 734 - │ │ │ - 3031-PS │Affidavit of General Warlimont, 21 │ │ - │November 1945, stating that first │ │ - │directive for campaign against USSR was │ │ - │issued in August 1940. │ V │ 740 - │ │ │ - 3032-PS │Affidavit of General Walter Warlimont, │ │ - │21 November 1945, stating that the │ │ - │projected campaign against USSR was │ │ - │first made known to him at conference │ │ - │with Jodl, 29 July 1940. │ V │ 741 - │ │ │ -*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ - 3579-PS │Memorandum, signed Schnurre, on the │ │ - │status of deliveries under │ │ - │German-Russian economic agreement, 28 │ │ - │September 1940. │ VI │ 276 - │ │ │ -*C-33 │Entries in Naval War Diary, concerning │ │ - │operation “Barbarossa” and “Marita”. │ │ - │(USA 133) │ VI │ 846 - │ │ │ -*C-35 │Entry in Naval War Diary, January 1941, │ │ - │p. 401. (USA 132) │ VI │ 852 - │ │ │ - C-37 │References to operation “Barbarossa” in │ │ - │the German Naval War Diary, June 1941. │ VI │ 854 - │ │ │ -*C-38 │Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting │ │ - │decision on action against enemy │ │ - │submarines and Order to attack Soviet │ │ - │submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223) │ VI │ 855 - │ │ │ -*C-39 │Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by │ │ - │Hitler and signed by Keitel. (USA 138) │ VI │ 857 - │ │ │ -*C-50 │Covering letters and Order of 13 May │ │ - │1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless │ │ - │treatment of civilians in the USSR for │ │ - │offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB│ │ - │162) │ VI │ 871 - │ │ │ - C-51 │Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941, │ │ - │for destruction of all copies of Order │ │ - │of 13 May 1941 (document C-50) without │ │ - │affecting its validity. │ VI │ 875 - │ │ │ - C-53 │Order signed by Keitel, 20 September │ │ - │1940, concerning Military Missions to │ │ - │Rumania. │ VI │ 877 - │ │ │ - C-54 │Fuehrer Order, 23 May 1941, concerning │ │ - │military activities in Rumania. │ VI │ 877 - │ │ │ -*C-77 │Memorandum from Chief of High Command to│ │ - │Navy High Command, 18 May 1941. (GB 146)│ VI │ 908 - │ │ │ -*C-78 │Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, │ │ - │convening conference on Barbarossa on 14│ │ - │June. (USA 139) │ VI │ 909 - │ │ │ - C-150 │Letter from Hitler to General Antonescu,│ │ - │18 June 1941. │ VI │ 963 - │ │ │ -*C-170 │File of Russo-German relations found in │ │ - │OKM files covering period 25 August 1939│ │ - │to 22 June 1941. (USA 136) │ VI │ 977 - │ │ │ -*L-172 │“The Strategic Position at the Beginning│ │ - │of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture │ │ - │delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at │ │ - │Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)│ VII │ 920 - │ │ │ -*TC-25 │Non-aggression Treaty between Germany │ │ - │and USSR and announcement of 25 │ │ - │September 1939 relating to it. (GB 145) │ VIII │ 375 - │ │ │ - Statement XIV │Hungarian Relations with Germany Before │ │ - │and During the War by Nicholas Horthy, │ │ - │Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946. │ VIII │ 756 - │ │ │ - Statement XV │Why Hungary Went to War Against the │ │ - │Soviet Union by Nicholas Horthy, Jr., │ │ - │Nurnberg, 3 May 1946. │ VIII │ 767 - - - 13. COLLABORATION WITH ITALY AND JAPAN AND - AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: - NOVEMBER 1936 TO DECEMBER 1941 - -In the course of two years, the swastika had been carried forward by -force of arms from a tightly controlled and remilitarized Germany to the -four corners of Europe. The conspirators then projected the Nazi plan -upon a universal screen, involving the old World of Asia and the New -World of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of -aggression that were planned in Berlin and launched across the frontiers -of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender -ceremonies aboard a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay -of Tokyo. - -A. _Formal German—Japanese—Italian Alliances._ - -The first formal alliance between Hitler’s Germany and the Japanese -Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November -1936 (_2508-PS_). This agreement, on its face, was directed against the -activities of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered -to by Italy on 6 November 1937 (_2506-PS_). - -It is an interesting fact—especially in light of the evidence to be -presented regarding Ribbentrop’s active participation in collaboration -with the Japanese—that Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for -Germany, at Berlin, even though at that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop -was not the German Foreign Minister, but simply Hitler’s Special -Ambassador Plenipotentiary. - -On 27 September 1940, some four years after the Anti-Comintern Pact was -signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German, -Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin—a -ten-year military-economic alliance (_2643-PS_). Again Ribbentrop signed -for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign Minister: This -Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to support of, and -collaboration with each other in the establishment of a “new order” in -Europe and East Asia. The agreement stated, in part: - - “The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it as a - condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation of the - world be given its own proper place. They have therefore decided - to stand together and to cooperate with one another in their - efforts in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, - wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a - new order of things calculated to promote the prosperity and - welfare of the peoples there. Furthermore, it is the desire of - the three Governments to extend this cooperation to such nations - in other parts of the world as are inclined to give to their - endeavors a direction similar to their own, in order that their - aspirations towards world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be - realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy, and - Japan have agreed as follows: - - “Article 1: Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of - Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe. - - “Article 2: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the - leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in - Greater East Asia. - - “Article 3: Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to cooperate in - their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake to - assist one another with all political, economic and military - means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a - Power at present not involved in the European war or in the - Chinese-Japanese conflict.” - - * * * * * * - - “Article 6: The present Pact shall come into force immediately - upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the - date of its coming into force.” (_2643-PS_) - -The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold announcement to -the world that the leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy had cemented a -full military alliance to achieve world domination and to establish the -“new order” presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the -Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria -early in 1938. - -A statement by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States at -the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, is relevant in this -connection. Mr. Hull declared: - - “The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of the - Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation - which has existed for several years. Announcement of the - alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long - existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly - called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of - conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has - been fully taken into account by the Government of United States - in the determining of this country’s policies.” (_2944-PS_) - -No attempt is made here to trace the relationships and negotiations -leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 November 1940. Nevertheless, one -example of the type of German-Japanese relationship existing before the -formalization of the Tripartite Pact is noteworthy—the record of a -conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and General Oshima, -Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. This record, which is signed by Himmler -in crayon, reads: - - “_File Memorandum_ - - “Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over - the following subjects: - - “1. The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially - because it had been spiritually warranted in all its features. - - “2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the - triangle Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also - told me that, together with German counter-espionage (_Abwehr_), - he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the - disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the - Ukraine. However, this organization was to become effective only - in case of war. - - “3. Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians - with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the - mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he - had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier.” - (_2195-PS_) - -B. _Nazi Encouragement of Aggression by Japan_ - -The Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic alliance with -Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to aggression against -those nations with whom they were at war and against those with whom -they contemplated war. In this the Nazi conspirators pursued a course -strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with the -other member of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940, in fulfillment of -her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her “stab in the back” -by declaring war against France and Great Britain. The Nazi conspirators -set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other side of the -world. - -The nations against whom the German-Japanese collaboration was aimed, at -various times, were the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of -Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America. - -(1) _Exhortations to Attack the British Commonwealth._ At least as early -as 23 February 1941 the Nazi conspirators undertook to exploit their -alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the -British Commonwealth. Again the figure of Ribbentrop appears. On that -date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the -Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open -hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible. -(_1834-PS_) - -As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation of the -report of that conference, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an -extract of the record of this conference to his various ambassadors and -ministers for their “strictly confidential and purely personal -information,” with the further note that “these statements are of -fundamental significance for orientation in the general political -situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.” The report stated, in -part: - - “Strictly secret - “Extract - - “from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister - with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.” - - * * * * * * - - “After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM [Reich - Foreign Minister] declared that Ambassador Oshima had been - proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in - the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in - the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He [the RAM] - regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which - he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, - had come into being only after various detours, but public - opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main - thing was, however, that they are together now. - - “* * * Now the _German-Japanese alliance_ has been concluded. - Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the - Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of - its further _development_ now stands in the foreground. How is - the situation in this respect? (_1834-PS_) - -Ribbentrop subsequently proceeded to shape the argument for Japanese -intervention against the British. First outlining the intended air and -U-boat warfare against England, he said: - - “* * * Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape - overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, - however, depends on various factors, above all on weather - conditions.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. - Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a - combined English-American air force at any time. The number of - pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our - airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned - ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about - the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. - On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be - greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond - its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the - ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense - stock of material), production would now be concentrated on - submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns. - - “Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won - today militarily, economically and politically. We had the - desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for - peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully - convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick - and victorious end. To this end the cooperation with Japan was - of importance. However, Japan in its own interest, should come - in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s key - position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus - secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could - acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick - action: - - “1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the - center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, - etc.) The effect upon the morale of the British people would be - very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of - the war. - - “2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America - out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet - and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West - of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan - would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not - even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of - lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was - very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would - have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines - without America being able to do anything about it. - - “3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the - interest of Japan also to secure for herself already during the - war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time - of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and - said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.” - (_1834-PS_) - -The subtlety of Ribbentrop’s argument is noteworthy. First he told the -Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already practically won the war by -herself. Nevertheless, he suggested that the war could be successfully -terminated more quickly with Japan’s aid and that the moment was -propitious for Japan’s entry. Then, referring to the spoils of conquest, -he indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself -during the war the positions she wanted, implying that she would have to -earn her share of the booty. - -The remainder of Ribbentrop’s argument shows something of the real -nature of the German-Japanese alliance: - - “The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was - Japan’s friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the - Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had - been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of - interest in China. Germany’s victory on the continent has - brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great - advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the - Far East (Indo-China). England too was considerably weakened; - Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, - Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the - future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical - situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final - battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia - should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in - this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan would find itself - confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all - in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined - now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The - interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat - of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic - idea. “Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements - and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its - imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the - great problems which would arise after the war for the parties - of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in - Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a - bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, - but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, - particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich - Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of - trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a - liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the - leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of - interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for - example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements - directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, - as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and - make trade agreements with the independent countries within the - Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, - etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each - should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to - third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this - thought.” (_1834-PS_) - -The instigation to war by Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, is -clear. The participation of the German military representatives in the -encouragement and provocation of wars of aggression is shown in a Top -Secret order signed by Keitel as Chief of the OKW and entitled “Basic -Order No. 24 Regarding Collaboration with Japan” (_C-75_). It is dated 5 -March 1941, about a week and a half after Ribbentrop’s conference with -Oshima, just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest -commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign -Office. Two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten -notations presumably made by the recipients, were turned up by the -prosecution. Document _C-75_ is Copy No. 2 of the order, distributed to -the Naval War Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (the OKM). -Copy No. 4, designed for the _Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab_—the Operations -Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces—was found in the OKW -files at Flensburg. The head of this Operations Staff was Jodl. - -Basic Order No. 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration -with Japan (_C-75_). It reads: - - “TOP SECRET - “Only by Officer - - “Armed Forces High Command (OKW) - - Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.) - - No. 44 282/41 Top Secret - - “Fuehrer’s Headquarters - 5 March 1941 - [Various handwritten notations and stamps] - “14 copies - “2nd copy - “Basic Order No. 24 - regarding collaboration with Japan - - “The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding - collaboration with Japan: - - “1. It must be the _aim_ of the collaboration based on the Three - Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible _to take active - measures in the Far East_. Strong British forces will thereby be - tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the - United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific. - - “The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of - success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness - for war on the part of its adversaries. The “Barbarossa” - operation will create particularly favorable political and - military prerequisites for this. [Marginal note—“slightly - exaggerated”] - - “2. _To prepare the way_ for the collaboration it is essential - to strengthen the _Japanese military potential_ with all means - available. - - “For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed - Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with - Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat - experience and for assistance in military economics and in - technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor - should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should - naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have - the most immediate application in waging war. - - “In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to himself. - - “3. The _harmonizing of the operational plans of the two - parties_ is the responsibility of the Navy High Command. - - “This will be subject to the following guiding principles: - - “_a._ The _common aim_ of the conduct of war is to be stressed - as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the - United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no - political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which - would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese - intentions. - - “_b._ The great successes achieved by Germany in _mercantile - warfare_ make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong - Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every - opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be - exploited. - - “_c._ The _raw material situation_ of the _pact powers_ demands - that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which - it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the - United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out - even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of - vital importance to Germany. - - “_d._ The _seizure of Singapore_ as the key British position in - the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire - conduct of war of the Three Powers. - - “In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval - power—extending to those of American naval power only if the - entry of the United States into the war cannot be - prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power - in that region and also, just like the attack on sea - communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds - (Australia). - - “A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet - be fixed. - - “4. In the _military commissions_ to be formed in accordance - with the _Three Power Pact_, only such questions are to be dealt - with as equally concern the _three_ participating powers. These - will include primarily the problems of _economic warfare_. - - “The working out of the details is the responsibility of the - “Main Commission” with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High - Command. - - “5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the - Barbarossa operation. - - “The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command - - “Signed in draft: Keitel - - “Correctness certified by - JUNGE - Lieutenant Commander” (_C-75_) - -It appears from this document that the Nazi conspirators’ cardinal -operational principle in their collaboration with Japan was, as early as -March 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and -other British Far Eastern bases. - -A meeting was held on 18 March 1941, about two weeks after the issuance -of Basic Order No. 24 (_C-75_) and was attended by Hitler, Raeder, -Keitel, and Jodl. The top secret record of this meeting discloses that -Raeder, then Commander in Chief of the Navy, made the following -calculations: - - “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, - since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole - English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war - against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-à-vis the - Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, - but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she - will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. - Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring - Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East - Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England are thereby - solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies). - - “Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U. S. A. She can - do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.” - (_C-152_) - -The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff -conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the -activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge -their immediate attack on Singapore. Another passage in the record of -this meeting establishes this: - - “Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but - according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will - only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.” - (_C-152_) - -Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to -eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the -contract. - -Meanwhile, Ribbentrop continued to make further efforts to induce the -Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On 29 March -1941, he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was then -in Berlin. The following is a report of their conversations, found in -the German Foreign Office Archives: - -“REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS - (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH - 1941. - - “The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about - the latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where - they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would - probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry - the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how - the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, - namely, that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia - ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive - assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on - Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia. - The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern - frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at - any time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia would try - to avoid development leading to war. Should Germany however - enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished - off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even - less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on - Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an - undertaking because of possible fears of Russia. - - “He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would - develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify - his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) - wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case, that a conflict - with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any - case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his - return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was - impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a - conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be - considered possible.” - - * * * * * * - - “Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view - of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by - submarines, based on the Philippines, and of the intervention of - the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again - discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter - had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its - hands so full in the English home waters and in the - Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single - ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the - U. S. submarines as so bad that Japan need not bother about them - at all. - - “Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very - low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held - the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it - would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it - was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with - their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might - perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused - considerable worry in Japan. - - “The RAM replied that America could not do anything against - Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this - reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on - active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could - not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was - the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the - American president, of course, this would mean a considerable - loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he - would have nothing to offset such a loss. - - “In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing - everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as - if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of - England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his - attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words - and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He - assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, - but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American - elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the - attack on Singapore. - - “In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based - on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against - Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. - (“Nothing succeeds like success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed - here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, - addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the - Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation will be - united.” The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, - as an Oriental, he believed in fate, which would come, whether - you wanted it or not.” - - * * * * * * - - “Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in - the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to - him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written - promise of assistance. - - “The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions - with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of - Singapore in order that the Fuehrer—who probably must be - considered the greatest expert on military questions at the - present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack - against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would - be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their - European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of divebombers - from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in - Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear - from Singapore immediately. - - “Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the - British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications. - - “The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed new - methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, - such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could - make available to the Japanese. - - “Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger, - expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, - were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need - three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious - Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he - could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for - six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still - more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for - a year, the situation with America would become extremely - critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it. - - “If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East - Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on - this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be - brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years. - - “The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the - Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of - Singapore.” (_1877-PS_) - -On 5 April, about a week after the conference just noted, Ribbentrop -again met with Matsuoka and again pushed the Japanese another step along -the road to aggressive war. The notes of this conference, which were -also found in German Foreign Office Archives, reveal the following -exchange: - - “* * * In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now - awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take - action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the - Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, - to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer - had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, - with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the - resignation from the League of Nations.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich - would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient - traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which - in its time was the only dominant power on the European - Continent. - - “In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized - the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him - from his trip: - - “1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year - the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede - it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also - have to resign herself to this fact. - - “2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and - Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the - long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far - East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa. - - “3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it - would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry - into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than - in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which - would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national - objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for - her to play a really leading role in East Asia.” (_1882-PS_) - -Here again, in the portions just quoted, Ribbentrop is seen pursuing the -same tack previously noted: Germany has already won the war for all -practical purposes. Japan’s entry will hasten the inevitable end. _And_ -Japan had better get the positions she wants _during_ the war. -Ribbentrop’s assurances, (_1877-PS_) that Japan likewise had nothing to -fear from the Soviet Union if Japan entered the conflict, and his -continual references to the weakness of the United States scattered -throughout his conversations, were other means used to hurry along the -Japanese. - -The success of the Nazi methods is shown in a top secret report, dated -24 May 1941, from the German Military Attache in Tokyo to the -Intelligence Division of the OKW. The last sentence in paragraph 1, -states: - - “The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.” - (_1538-PS_) - -The fact appears from this sentence that the German military were -keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans against -Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered. - -(2) _Exhortations to Japanese Aggression Against the U.S.S.R._ - -The Nazi conspirators also directed their efforts to induce a Japanese -“stab in the back” against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here -again Ribbentrop appears as a central figure. - -For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 regarding -collaboration with Japan (_C-75_), the Nazi conspirators had been -preparing “_Fall Barbarossa_”, the plan for attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic -Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any -intimation of the Barbarossa operation”. (_C-75_) - -In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 -March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, -Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. Ribbentrop assured -Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern -frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time. -Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would -try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with -the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered -possible. (_1877-PS_) - -Whatever conclusions the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in -April 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their -aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of -Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941, Ribbentrop -despatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo -(_2896-PS_). Pertinent passages in that telegram read as follows: - - “Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador - in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient - if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In - summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as in the past, - full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese - Foreign Minister, first of all because the present Japanese - government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its - nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the - Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion - to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as - reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect - close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own - observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war - situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the - matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her - military preparations are completed.” - - * * * * * * - - “However, I ask you to employ all available means in further - insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the - soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to - Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. - The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands - on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the - collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power - Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question - of England’s collapse or the total destruction of the English - islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America - totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced - with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the - British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact - countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying - through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of - course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the - countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and - encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I - ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in - detail on the political situation there.” (_2896-PS_) - -Ott’s reply to this telegram (_2897-PS_), dated 13 July 1941, was as -follows: - - “Telegram - (Secret Cipher System) - “Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 hrs. - Arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs. - As fast as possible! - “#1217 dated 13.7 - for Minister for Foreign Affairs. - - Answer to telegram 10, #108 Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs - - Arrived Tokyo 12 July 1941 - - “I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into - the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using - arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram - cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the - Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly - business men. I believe that, according to military - preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The - greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the - disunity among Activist groups which, without unified command, - follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the - changed situation. - - Ott.” (_2897-PS_) - -On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce -the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. Three documents, -covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943, record these -exhortations. - -The first discussion occurred between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese -Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter of background, it may -be noted that at that time German armies were sweeping forward in the -U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastapol had just been announced. The -discussion proceeded as follows: - - “_Notes concerning the discussion between the Minister for - Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort, on 9 July - 1942._ - - “He, the German Foreign Minister, had asked to see the - Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described, - because now a question of fateful importance had arisen - concerning the joint conduct of the war: if Japan felt itself - sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack - Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that, if Japan - attacked Russia now, it would lead to her (Russia’s) final moral - collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present - system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an - opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once and for all - the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He had discussed this - question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same - opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan - should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for - such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese - operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the halfway - mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is - not mutually profitable.” (_2911-PS_) - -Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima had another conference on 6 March 1943. -It is noted, again for background, that the strategic military situation -in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat. In the -previous month, February 1943, the Soviet Armies had completely defeated -the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted severe losses. To the -north and west their winter offensive had recovered large areas from the -hands of the invaders. In addition, combined U. S. and British forces -had already landed in North Africa. The tone of Ribbentrop’s argument -reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese refrain -of “so sorry please” likewise appears to have crept in. It is noted, in -this regard, that the month of February 1943 had also seen the end of -organized Japanese resistance on the island of Guadalcanal. The -conference went as follows: - - “Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a telegram from - Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his government to the - Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) the following: The - suggestion of the German Government, to attack Russia, was the - subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government - and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was - discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the - following: the Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the - danger which threatens from Russia, and completely understands - the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also - enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for - the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, - to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it - would be in the common interest not to start the war against - Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would - never disregard the Russian question. - - “The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive - again in the future on other fronts. - - “The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the - Ambassador, of how the continued waging of the war is envisaged - in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common - enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly - behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that - all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their - forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. - It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot - overstrain the German national strength. He has worried silently - that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and - who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight - victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself - further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts.” - - * * * * * * - - “Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on - Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on - the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a - maritime problem, and on all fronts—except those in - China—there are mostly very few ground forces committed. - Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair, and - he asked himself whether the necessary forces would not be ready - for that”. (_2954-PS_) - -Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about -three weeks later, on 18 April 1943. The top secret notes of this -conference reveal the following: - - “The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that - without any doubt this year presented the most favorable - opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had - sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, - which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the - moment.” (_2929-PS_) - -(3) _Nazi Preparations and Collaboration with the Japanese Against the -United States._ The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the -Japanese against the United States present a twofold aspect: one of -preparations by the Nazis themselves for attack from across the -Atlantic; the other of the fomenting of war in the Pacific. - -In the previous discussion of the Nazi exhortations to the Japanese to -war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., reference has -been made to certain documents relating to the United States. Those -documents will be taken up again, in their relevant passages, to show -their particular application. In the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging -the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., documents have been introduced -chronicling conferences which took place after the dates of 7 December -and 11 December 1941 when the Japanese and German Governments, -respectively, initiated and declared aggressive war against the United -States. These documents have indicated that Nazi awareness and -acceptance of the direction in which their actions were leading, as well -as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with -the Japanese. - -(_a_) _Preliminary Nazi Preparations Against the United States._ The -Nazi conspirators’ intentions against the United States must be viewed -in the focus of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments -elsewhere. That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war -against the United States was intimated by Goering in a speech on 8 July -1938, when the Nazi conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria -and were perfecting their plans for occupation of Czechoslovakia. This -speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry and the -copy which the prosecution has obtained was transmitted as the enclosure -to a secret memorandum from Goering’s adjutant to General Udet, who was -then in charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe (_R-140_). The -statement in the covering memorandum notes that the enclosure is a “copy -of the shorthand minutes of the conference”. In the course of his long -speech, Goering called for increased aircraft production and referred to -the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. He -continued: - - “I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons - of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely - happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to - stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there.” - (_R-140_) - -Goering’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at -that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi conspirators’ -schedule of aggression that has already been outlined. During the period -of their preparation for and waging of aggressive war in Europe, up -through the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only -reasonable to believe that the Nazi conspirators were not disposed to -involve the United States in war—_at that time_. - -Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940, the prosecution of war against -the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. -This is clearly shown in a document which was found in the files of the -OKL, the German Air Force (_376-PS_). This memorandum is marked -“_Chefsache_”—the German designation for Top Secret—and is directed -from a Major von Falkenstein to an unspecified General, presumably a -Luftwaffe General. Falkenstein, who was a Major of the General Staff, -was at that time the Luftwaffe Liaison Officer with the Operations Staff -of the OKW, which was the staff headed by Jodl. His memorandum, which he -characterizes as a “brief resumé of the military questions current -here”, is dated 29 October 1940. It covers several questions. Paragraph -5 states: - - “5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the - occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the - prosecution of war against America at a later date. - Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. - Essential conditions are at the present:— - - “a. No operational commitment - - “b. Portuguese neutrality - - “c. Support of France and Spain - - “A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding - air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF. - - “Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic - Kurfurst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel - Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he - desires.” (_376-PS_) - -The Nazi Military interest in the United States is further indicated by -paragraph 7: - - “7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, - especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in - his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American - aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The - matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I - pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have - taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own - merits.” (_376-PS_) - -Again in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from -early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Fuehrer signed -an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the -United States. This top secret order, found in files of the German Navy, -reads: - - “By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for - the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following - principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material - supplies: - - “1. _In general_: The military domination of Europe after the - defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the _Army_ to be - considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced - strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be - greatly increased. - - “_Naval_ armament must be restricted to those measures which - have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against - England and, should the case arise, against America. “The main - effort in armament will be shifted to the _Air Force_, which - must be greatly increased in strength.” (_C-74_) - -(_b_) _Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States._ From -the documents just quoted, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were -making at least preliminary military plans of their own against the -United States. The Nazi over-all plan with regard to the United States, -however, was a complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the -Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the -Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the -Pacific-Far East, they again considered war against the United States. - -It will be recalled that in Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration -with the Japanese (_C-75_), which was issued on 5 March 1941, the Nazi -policy was stated in subparagraph 3_a_ as aiming at “forcing England to -the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the -war”. Nevertheless the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated within the -framework of that policy the possibility of the United States’ entry -into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were instigating. This -could result from an attack by Japan on United States’ possessions -practically simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire (as -actually happened). Other possibilities of involvement of the United -States were also discussed. Thus, Basic Order No. 24 stated in -subparagraph 3 (_c_): - - “_c. The raw material situation of the pact powers_ demands that - Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it - needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United - States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even - after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital - importance to Germany.” (_C-75_) - -The order continues, in the unnumbered paragraph immediately below -subparagraph 3 (_d_): - - “In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval - power—extending to those of American naval power only if the - entry of the United States into the war cannot be - prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power - in that region and also, just like the attack on sea - communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds - (Australia).” (_C-75_) - -In these passages there is a clear envisionment of U.S. involvement, as -well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to United States’ -interests if Japan were to capture Singapore was also clearly envisaged -by Raeder in his meeting of March 1941 with Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in -which he stated: - - “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, - since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole - English Fleet contained: unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war - against Japan: inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the - Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, - but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she - will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. - Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring - Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East - Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby - solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies). - - “Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do - so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.” - (_C-152_) - -Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of U.S. involvement as a -result of the course of aggression that he was urging on the Japanese. -In his meeting of 23 February 1941 with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, -the notes of which are contained in (_1834-PS_), Ribbentrop assured -Matsuoka that a surprise intervention by Japan was bound to keep the -United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not risk -either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Philippines as the -result of a declaration of war. Two paragraphs later, Ribbentrop -practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be -involved: - - “The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America - should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this - would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war - sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to - avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be - by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of - the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister - further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the - British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be - cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary - to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to - send their Navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far - East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries - of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, - the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would - then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this that - unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but - he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.” - (_1834-PS_) - -In the paragraphs that follow, Ribbentrop again stresses the mutual -interdependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and suggests coordinated -action. He indulged in a typical bit of Nazi cynicism: - - “The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, - explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting - powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the - U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy - were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the - Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but - also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes - of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation and under certain - conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public - opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America - found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the - signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in - propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the - time.” (_1834-PS_) - -Again on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop—this time in a conference with the -Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka—discussed the possible involvement -of the United States. (_1877-PS_) - -The Nazi conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the -Japanese to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United -States and could lead the U.S. to involvement in the contemplated Far -Eastern conflict. This fact is clear from the report of the conference -between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4 -April 1941 (_1881-PS_). The report states, in part: - - “* * * Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Fuehrer - should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as - broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military - Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly - concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making - available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as - the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do - her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that - the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese - Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United - States, because in that case America probably would side with - Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed that the United - States would be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering - the war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, - however, to count on the worst situation, that is, with war - against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would - extend for five years or longer and would take the form of - guerrilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the - South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her - guerrilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a - question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the - technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as - periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan. - - “To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it - that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal - of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning - Navy and Army, which were needed by the Japanese. - - “The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too - considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but - that it had already made allowances for such a contingency.” - - * * * * * * - - “Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Fuehrer might - give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German - authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the - latest improvement and inventions, which are of interest to - them, because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a - conflict with the United States. - - “As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained - further that he has always declared in his country that sooner - or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if - Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion - this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His - argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not - decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon - herself of a fight against America?” (_1881-PS_) - -The passages just quoted show not only a realization of the probable -involvement of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict that the -Nazis were urging, but also a knowledge on their part that the Japanese -Army and Navy were actually preparing war plans against the United -States. Furthermore, the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war -plans were. This fact is revealed in a secret telegram from the German -military-attache in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941 (_1538-PS_). The attache -reports the conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the war in -the event Germany should become involved in war with the United States. -In paragraph 1, this sentence appears: - - “Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.” - (_1538-PS_). - -A review of the Nazi position with regard to the United States at this -point, the Spring of 1941, shows that in view of their press of -commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R., -set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was -naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in war at -that time. Nevertheless they had been considering their own preliminary -plans against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic Islands -document (_376-PS_). They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to -aggression against the British Commonwealth, just as they would urge -them to attack the U.S.S.R. soon after the launching of the Nazi -invasion. They were aware that the course along which they were pushing -the Japanese in the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the -United States. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler -this in so many words, and their own military men had fully realized the -implications of the move against Singapore. They knew also that the -Japanese Army and Navy were preparing operational plans against the -United States. They knew at least part of those plans. - -The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things. They accepted the -risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese and -pushed their Eastern allies still farther along that course. On 4 April -1941, Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the event Japan -were to become involved in war with the United States, Germany would -immediately take the consequences and strike without delay. The -following is a passage from the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka conference -in Berlin on 4 April 1941: - - “In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out - that Germany on her part would immediately take the - consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United - States. It did not matter with whom the United States would - first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would - always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an - understanding with the other country subsequently, but to - liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would - strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a - conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the - tripartite powers lies in their joined action. Their weakness - would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.” - (_1881-PS_) - -Hitler then encouraged Matsuoka in his decision to strike against the -United States: - - “The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation - of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the - clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed - Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit - favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow - unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and - full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by - events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to - instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be - it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers - come to them, but who will bravely face them.” (_1881-PS_) - -Here, in the passages just quoted, were assurance, encouragement, and -abetment by the head of the German State, the leading Nazi -co-conspirator, in April 1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of -support did not end there. Another telegram from the German Ambassador -in Tokyo regarding conversations with the Japanese Foreign Minister, -dated 30 November 1941, one week before Pearl Harbor, read as follows: - - “The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his viewpoint - that the difference of opinion between Japan and the U.S. is - very great. The Japanese Government since it sent Ambassador - Kurusu has taken a firm stand, as he told me. He is convinced - that this position is in our favor and makes the United States - think that her entry into the European war would be risky - business. The new American proposal of 25 November showed great - divergences in the viewpoints of the two nations. These - differences of opinion concern, for example, the further - treatment of the Chinese question. The biggest (one word - missing) however resulted from the U. S. attempt to make the - three-power agreement ineffective. U. S. suggested to Japan to - conclude treaties of nonaggression with the U. S., the British - Empire, the Soviet Union, and other countries in order to - prevent Japan’s entry into the war on the side of the Axis - powers. Japan, however, insisted upon maintaining her treaty - obligations and for this reason American demands are the - greatest obstacles for adjusting Japanese-American relations. He - avoided discussing concessions promised by the U. S. and merely - mentioned that grave decisions were at stake. “The U.S. is - seriously preparing for war and is about to operate a - considerable part of its fleet from Southern Pacific bases. The - Japanese Government is busy working out an answer in order to - clarify its viewpoint. But he has no particulars at that moment. - He thinks the American proposals, as a whole, unacceptable. - - “Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations and she - hopes that in that case Germany and Italy, according to the - Three Power Agreement, would stand at her side. I answered that - there could be no doubt about Germany’s future position. The - Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he understood - from my words that Germany in such a case would consider her - relationship to Japan as that of a community of fate. I - answered, according to my opinion, Germany was certainly ready - to have mutual agreement between the two countries over this - situation. - - “Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was possible that - he would come back to this point soon. The conversation with the - Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed the impression that the U. - S. note, in fact, is very unsatisfactory even for the - compromise-seeking politicians here. For these circles America’s - position, especially in the China question, is very - disappointing. The emphasis upon the Three Power Pact as being - the main obstacle between successful Japanese-U. S. negotiations - seems to point to the fact that the Japanese Government is - becoming aware of the necessity of close cooperation with the - Axis powers.” (_2898-PS_) - -Extracts from the handwritten diary of Count Galleazzo Ciano during the -period 3 December to 8 December 1941 fill in the picture (_2987-PS_). -These are taken from notes which Ciano jotted down in the course of his -daily business as Foreign Minister of Italy. The entries for 3, 4, and 5 -December read: - - “_December 3._ - - _Wednesday_ - - “Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an audience - with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of - the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion - that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the - appropriate clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy - declare war on America immediately after the outbreak of - hostilities and proposes the signature of an agreement not to - conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this - request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest - assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before - giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication and - said: “We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war - which I predicted as early as September 1939.” What does this - new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has - succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war - immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by - letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event - also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and - further removed, and that it is now easy—much too easy—to - predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is - on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin’s - answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the - southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to - give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive. - - “_December 4._ - - _Thursday_ - - “Berlin’s reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. - Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but - the idea of provoking America’s intervention pleases the Germans - less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about - it. * * *” - - “_December 5._ - - _Friday_ - - “A night interrupted by Ribbentrop’s restlessness. After - delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the - Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackenson to my - house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to - Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate - peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and - the latter was very glad I hadn’t * * *.” (_2987-PS_) - -It appears from the last entry that some sort of agreement was reached. -On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan without previous warning or -declaration of war commenced an attack against the United States at -Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the -Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 December, four days after the -Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on -the United States. (_2507-PS_) - -The same day, 11 December 1941, the Congress of the United States -resolved that “the state of war between the United States and the -Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United States -is hereby formally declared”. (_2945-PS_) - -It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and -declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators in -their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in motion a force -reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. While -maintaining their preference that the United States not be involved in -the war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct possibility, -even probability of such involvement as a result of the actions they -were encouraging; they were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans -for attack against the United States; and they accepted the consequences -by assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United -States should a U.S.-Japanese conflict result. In dealing with captured -documents of the enemy, the completeness of the plan is necessarily -obscured. But those documents which have been discovered, and introduced -into evidence before the Tribunal, show that the Japanese attack was the -proximate and foreseeable consequence of their collaboration policy, and -that their exhortations and encouragement of the Japanese as surely led -to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself had been mentioned. - -The entry in the Ciano Diary for 8 December 1941 gives an interesting -sidelight on Ribbentrop’s reaction to the Japanese sneak attack: - - “_December 8._ - - _Monday._ - - “A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about - the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I - am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final - advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain: that - America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will be - so long that she will be able to realize all her potential - force. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased - about the event. He ended by admitting that in the “long run” I - may be right. Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has - favored a definite clarification of relations between America - and the Axis.” (_2987-PS_) - -A conference was held between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on -14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich -Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop. The subject matter was the Pearl Harbor -attack. The top secret notes of this conference read in part: - - “* * * First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the - Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. - With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the - achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now - obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms. - - “General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and - emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now - come about between Germany and Japan. - - “The Fuehrer continues: “You gave the right declaration of war!” - This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly - and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as - long as possible. But if one sees that the other is interested - only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is - not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike—as - hard as possible, indeed—and not waste time declaring war. It - was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the - Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times, - for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then - realized, that the other did not want to come to an agreement, - he struck suddenly and without formalities. He would continue to - go this way in the future.” (_2932-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COLLABORATION WITH - ITALY AND JAPAN AND AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: NOVEMBER - 1936 TO DECEMBER 1941 - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (a). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) │ │ - │ 7; V. │ I │ 28, 29 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *376-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by Major │ │ - │Falkenstein, 29 October 1940, concerning│ │ - │current military questions, including │ │ - │question of occupation of Atlantic │ │ - │Islands referring to the United States. │ │ - │(USA 161) │ III │ 288 - │ │ │ -*1538-PS │Report from German Military Attache in │ │ - │Tokyo to Office Foreign Intelligence, 24│ │ - │May 1941. (USA 154) │ IV │ 100 - │ │ │ -*1834-PS │Report on conference between Ribbentrop │ │ - │and Oshima, 23 February 1941. (USA 129) │ IV │ 469 - │ │ │ -*1866-PS │Record of conversation between Reich │ │ - │Foreign Minister and the Duce, 13 May │ │ - │1941. (GB 273) │ IV │ 499 - │ │ │ -*1877-PS │Report on conversation between │ │ - │Ribbentrop and Matsuoka in Berlin, 29 │ │ - │March 1941. (USA 152) │ IV │ 520 - │ │ │ -*1881-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and │ │ - │Matsuoka in presence of Ribbentrop, in │ │ - │Berlin, 4 April 1941. (USA 33) │ IV │ 522 - │ │ │ -*1882-PS │Notes on conference between Ribbentrop │ │ - │and Matsuoka in Berlin, 5 April 1941. │ │ - │(USA 153) │ IV │ 526 - │ │ │ -*2195-PS │File memorandum on conversation with │ │ - │Oshima, 31 January 1939, signed Himmler.│ │ - │(USA 150) │ IV │ 852 - │ │ │ - 2506-PS │Protocol of Adherence by Italy to │ │ - │Anti-Comintern Pact, 6 November 1937, │ │ - │published in Documents of German │ │ - │Politics, 1940, 4th edition. │ V │ 239 - │ │ │ -*2507-PS │Note from Ribbentrop to U. S. Charge │ │ - │d’Affaires in Berlin, 11 December 1941, │ │ - │containing German Declaration of War on │ │ - │United States, published in Documents of│ │ - │German Politics, Vol. IX, Part 1, No. │ │ - │74, pp. 497-9. (USA 164) │ V │ 241 - │ │ │ -*2508-PS │German-Japanese Agreement against the │ │ - │Communist International, 25 November │ │ - │1936, signed by Ribbentrop. Documents of│ │ - │German Politics, Vol. 4. (GB 147) │ V │ 242 - │ │ │ -*2643-PS │Announcement concerning Three-Power Pact│ │ - │between Germany, Italy and Japan, 27 │ │ - │September 1940, signed by Ribbentrop for│ │ - │Germany. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part │ │ - │II, No. 41, p. 279. (USA 149) │ V │ 355 - │ │ │ -*2896-PS │Telegram from Ribbentrop to German │ │ - │Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott, 10 July 1941. │ │ - │(USA 155) │ V │ 564 - │ │ │ -*2897-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador in │ │ - │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 13 July 1941.│ │ - │(USA 156) │ V │ 566 - │ │ │ -*2898-PS │Telegram from German Ambassador to │ │ - │Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop, 30 November │ │ - │1941. (USA 163) │ V │ 566 - │ │ │ -*2911-PS │Notes on conversation between Ribbentrop│ │ - │and Oshima, 9 July 1942. (USA 157) │ V │ 580 - │ │ │ -*2929-PS │Notes on conversation between Ribbentrop│ │ - │and Oshima, 18 April 1943. (USA 159) │ V │ 603 - │ │ │ -*2932-PS │Notes on conference between Hitler and │ │ - │Oshima, 14 December 1941. (USA 165) │ V │ 603 - │ │ │ - 2944-PS │Statement by U. S. Secretary of State, │ │ - │27 September 1940, published in Peace │ │ - │and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, │ │ - │1931-1941. │ V │ 624 - │ │ │ - 2945-PS │Joint resolution by the U. S. Senate and│ │ - │House of Representatives declaring state│ │ - │of war with Germany, 11 December 1941, │ │ - │published in Peace and War, U. S. │ │ - │Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. │ V │ 625 - │ │ │ -*2954-PS │Minutes of conversation between │ │ - │Ribbentrop and Oshima, 6 March 1943. │ │ - │(USA 158; GB 150) │ V │ 658 - │ │ │ -*2987-PS │Entries in diary of Count Ciano. (USA │ │ - │166) │ V │ 689 - │ │ │ -*3054-PS │“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion │ │ - │picture composed of captured German │ │ - │film. (USA 167) │ V │ 801 - │ │ │ - 3598-PS │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│ │ - │Tokyo to Berlin, 30 November 1941. VI │ 308 │ - │ │ │ - 3599-PS │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│ │ - │Rome to Tokyo, 3 December 1941. │ VI │ 310 - │ │ │ - 3600-PS │Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic message,│ │ - │Tokyo to Berlin, 6 December 1941. │ VI │ 312 - │ │ │ - 3733-PS │Minutes of interview held on 19 August │ │ - │1941, between Vice-Minister Aman and │ │ - │Ambassador Ott. │ VI │ 545 - │ │ │ -*3780-PS │Record of Fuehrer’s conference with │ │ - │Oshima, 27 May 1944, concerning Japanese│ │ - │treatment of American terror pilots. (GB│ │ - │293) │ VI │ 655 - │ │ │ -*3817-PS │File of correspondence and reports by │ │ - │Dr. Haushofer on Asiatic situation. (USA│ │ - │790) │ VI │ 752 - │ │ │ -*C-74 │Top Secret Order concerning personnel │ │ - │and materiel program, signed by Hitler, │ │ - │14 July 1941. (USA 162) │ VI │ 905 - │ │ │ -*C-75 │OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, signed│ │ - │Keitel, 5 March 1941, concerning │ (USA │ - │collaboration with Japan. │ 151) │ VI - │ │ │ - C-147 │Extracts from Directive No. 18, signed │ │ - │by Hitler, 12 November 1940. │ VI │ 957 - │ │ │ -*C-152 │Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18 │ │ - │March 1941, concerning audience of │ │ - │C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March │ │ - │1941. (GB 122) │ VI │ 966 - │ │ │ -*D-656 │Extract of 29 November 1941 from │ │ - │Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by │ │ - │Japanese Government between 1 July and 8│ │ - │December 1941. (GB 148) │ VII │ 160 - │ │ │ -*D-657 │Extract of 8 December 1941 from │ │ - │Intercepted Diplomatic Messages sent by │ │ - │Japanese Government between 1 July and 8│ │ - │December 1941. (GB 149) │ VII │ 163 - │ │ │ -*R-140 │Secret letter from Goering’s adjutant, │ │ - │Major Conrath, 11 July 1938, enclosing │ │ - │transcript of Goering’s speech of 8 July│ │ - │to representatives of aircraft industry.│ │ - │(USA 160) │ VIII │ 221 - - - - - Chapter X - THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM, - THE ILLEGAL USE OF PRISONERS - OF WAR, AND THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY - OF SAUCKEL AND SPEER THEREFOR - - -In general terms, the basic elements of the Nazi foreign labor policy -consisted of mass deportation and mass enslavement. It was a policy of -underfeeding and overworking foreign laborers, of subjecting them to -every form of degradation and brutality. It was a policy which compelled -foreign workers and prisoners of war to manufacture armaments and to -engage in other operations of war directed against their own countries. -It was, in short, a policy which constituted a flagrant violation of the -laws of war and the laws of humanity. - -Fritz Sauckel and Albert Speer are principally responsible for the -formulation of this policy and for its execution. Sauckel, the Nazi’s -Plenipotentiary General for Manpower, directed the recruitment, -deportation, and allocation of foreign civilian labor. Sanctioning and -directing the use of force as a means of recruitment, he was responsible -for the mistreatment of the enslaved millions. Speer—as Reichsminister -for Armaments and Munitions, Director of the Organization Todt, and -member of the Central Planning Board—bears responsibility for the -determination of the numbers of foreign slaves required by the German -war machine, for the decision to recruit by force, and for the use and -brutal treatment of foreign civilians and prisoners of war in the -manufacture of armaments and munitions, in the construction of -fortifications, and in active military operations. - -Hermann Goering, as Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan, is -also responsible for all the crimes involved in the Nazi slave labor -program. In addition, Alfred Rosenberg as Reichsminister for the -Occupied Eastern Territories, Hans Frank as Governor-General of the -Government-General of Poland, Artur Seyss-Inquart as Reichskommissar for -the Occupied Netherlands, and Wilhelm Keitel as chief of the OKW share -responsibility for the recruitment by force and terror and for the -deportation to Germany of the citizens of the areas overrun or -subjugated by the _Wehrmacht_. - - 1. PLANNING FOR THE USE OF SLAVE LABOR - -The use of vast numbers of foreign workers was planned before Germany -went to war and was an integral part of the conspiracy for waging -aggressive war. On 23 May 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler’s study at -the Reichs Chancellery. Goering, Raeder, and Keitel were present. -According to the minutes of this meeting, (_L-79_) Hitler stated that he -intended to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. He further -stated: - - “* * * If fate brings us into contact with the West, the - possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. - We shall be able to rely upon record harvests, even less in time - of war than in peace. - - “The population of non-German areas will perform no military - service, and will be available as a source of labor”. (_L-79_) - -The slave labor program was designed to achieve two purposes. The -primary purpose was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war -machine by compelling foreign workers, in effect, to make war against -their own countries and its allies. The secondary purpose was to destroy -or weaken peoples deemed inferior by the Nazi racialists, or deemed -potentially hostile by the Nazi planners of world supremacy. These -purposes were expressed by the conspirators themselves. In Sauckel’s -Labor Mobilization Program (_016-PS_) which he sent to Rosenberg on 20 -April 1942, Sauckel declared: - - “* * * The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to - use all the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured - for us by our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of - Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for - the nutrition of the Homeland. The raw materials as well as the - fertility of the conquered territories and their human labor - power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the - profit of Germany and their allies.” (_016-PS_) - -The theory of the “master race,” which underlay the conspirators’ labor -policy in the East, was expressed in the following words by Erich Koch, -Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, at a meeting of the National Socialist -Party on 5 March 1943 in Kiev: - - “1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just * * *. - - “2. I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not - come to spread bliss. I have come to help the Fuehrer. The - population must work, work, and work again * * * for some people - are getting excited, that the population may not get enough to - eat. The population cannot demand that, one has only to remember - what our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad * * *. We - definitely did not come here to give out manna. We have come - here to create the basis for victory. - - “3. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest - German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more - valuable than the population here”. (_1130-PS_) - -And in a speech delivered to a group of SS Generals on 4 October 1943 at -Posen, Himmler stated: - - “* * * What happens to a Russian, to a Czech, does not interest - me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of - good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping - their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations - live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so - far as we need them as slaves for our _Kultur_: otherwise, it is - of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down - from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me - only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished * - * *.” (_1919-PS_) - -A Top Secret memorandum prepared for the Ministry of the Occupied -Eastern Territories on 12 June 1944, and approved by Rosenberg, contains -the following plans: - - “The Army Group ‘Center’ has the intention to apprehend - 40-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army - territory and to transport them to the Reich * * *.” - - “It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to the German - trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers after 2 - years’ training. This is to be arranged through the Organization - Todt which is especially equipped for such a task through its - technical and other set-ups. This action is being greatly - welcomed by the German trade since it represents a decisive - measure for the alleviation of the shortage of apprentices.” - - * * * * * * - - “1. This action is not only aimed at preventing a direct - reinforcement of the enemy’s military strength, but also at a - reduction of his biological potentialities as viewed from the - perspective of the future. These ideas have been voiced not only - by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS but also by the Fuehrer. - Corresponding orders were given during last year’s withdrawals - in the southern sector * * *.”(_031-PS_) - -Rosenberg’s approval is at the end of the document: - - “regarding the above—Obergruppenfuehrer Berger received the - memorandum on June 14. Consequently the Reichsminister has - approved the Action.” (_031-PS_) - - 2. EXECUTION OF THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM - -The purposes of the slave labor program, namely, the strengthening of -the Nazi war machine and the destruction or weakening of peoples deemed -inferior, were achieved by the impressment and deportation of millions -of persons into Germany for forced labor, by the separation of husbands -from their wives and children from their parents, and by the imposition -of conditions so inhuman that countless numbers perished. - -A. _Poland._ - -Poland was the first victim. Frank, as Governor of the -Government-General of Poland, announced that under his program 1,000,000 -workers were to be sent to Germany, and recommended that police surround -Polish villages and seize the inhabitants for deportation. These -intentions appear in the following letter from Frank to Goering, dated -25 January 1940 (_1375-PS_): - - “1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the - defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to - carry on a long term economic policy in the - General-Gouvernement. Rather, it is necessary so to steer the - economy of the General Gouvernement that it will, in the - shortest possible time, accomplish results representing the - maximum that can be gotten out of the economic strength of the - General-Gouvernement for the immediate strengthening of our - capacity for defense. - - “2. In particular the following performances are expected of the - total economy of the General-Gouvernement * * *.” - - “(g) Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and - female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich—among - them at least 7,500,000 [sic] agricultural workers of which at - least 50% must be women—in order to guarantee agricultural - production in the Reich and as a replacement - -The methods by which these workers were to be supplied were outlined by -Frank in his diary entry for Friday, 10 May 1940 (_2233-A-PS_): - - “* * * Then the Governor-General deals with the problem of the - _Compulsory Labor Service_ of the Poles. Upon the demands from - the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be - exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not - voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This - compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female - Poles. Because of these measures a certain disquietude had - developed which, according to individual reports, was spreading - very much, and which might produce difficulties everywhere. - General Fieldmarshal Goering some time ago pointed out in his - long speech the necessity to deport into the Reich a million - workers. The supply so far was 160,000. However, great - difficulties had to be overcome. Therefore it would be advisable - to consult the district and town chiefs in the execution of the - compulsion, so that one could be sure from the start that this - action would be reasonably successful. The arrest of young Poles - when leaving church service or the cinema would bring about an - increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he had - no objections at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet often - loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The best - method for this, however, would be the organization of a raid, - and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the - street and to question him what he was doing, where he was - working etc.” (_2233-A-PS_) - -Another entry in the diary of Frank, for 16 March 1940, contains the -following discourse on methods: - - “* * * The Governor-General remarks that he had long - negotiations in Berlin with representatives of the Reich - Ministry for Finance and the Reich Ministry for Food. One has - made the urgent demand there that _Polish farm workers_ should - be sent to the Reich in greater numbers. He has made the - statement in Berlin that he, if it is demanded from him, can - naturally exercise force in such a manner that he has the police - surround a village and get the men and women, in question, out - by force, and then send them to Germany. But one can also work - differently, besides these police measures, by retaining the - unemployment compensation of those workers in question.” - (_2233-B-PS_) - -The instruments of force and terror used to carry out this program -reached into many phases of Polish life. German labor authorities raided -churches and theatres, seized those present, and shipped them to -Germany. These facts appear in a memorandum to Himmler dated 17 April -1943, written by Dr. Lammers, chief of the Reichs Chancellery, with -regard to the situation in the Government General of Poland: - - “* * * As things were, the utilization of manpower had to be - enforced by means of more or less forceful methods, such as the - instances when certain groups appointed by the Labor Offices, - caught Church and Movie-goers here and there and transported - them into the Reich. That such methods not only undermine the - people’s willingness to work and the people’s confidence to such - a degree that it cannot be checked even with terror, is just as - clear as the consequences brought about by a strengthening of - the political resistance movement”. (_2220-PS_) - -Polish farmland was confiscated with the aid of the SS, distributed to -German inhabitants, or held in trust for the German community. The farm -owners were thereupon employed as laborers or transported to Germany -against their will. A report of the SS entitled “Achievement of -Confiscations of Polish Agricultural Enterprises with the Purpose to -Transfer the Poles to the old Reich and to Employ Them as Agricultural -Workers,” contains these disclosures: - - “* * * It is possible without difficulty to accomplish the - confiscation of small agricultural enterprises in the villages - in which larger agricultural enterprises have been already - confiscated and are under the management of the East German - Corporation for agricultural development. * * * _The former - owners of Polish farms, together with their families will be - transferred to the old Reich by the employment agencies for - employment as farm workers._ In this way many hundreds of Polish - agricultural workers can be placed at the disposal of - agriculture in the old Reich in the shortest and simplest - manner. This way the most pressing shortage is removed that is - now in a very disagreeable manner felt especially in the - root-crop districts.” (_1352-PS_) - -Pursuant to the directions of Sauckel, his agents and the SS deported -Polish men to Germany without their families, thereby accomplishing the -basic purposes of the program: supplying labor for the German war effort -and weakening the reproductive potential of the Polish people. Thus, in -a letter from Sauckel to the Presidents of the “Landes” Employment -Offices, dated 26 November 1942, it is stated that: - - “In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, - Jews who are still in employment are, from now on, to be - evacuated from the territory of the Reich and are to be replaced - by Poles, who are being deported from the General-Gouvernement.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure - will be put into concentration camps and put to work where they - are criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles where they - are suitable for labor, will be transported—without - family—into the Reich, particularly to Berlin; there they will - be put at the disposal of the labor allocation offices to work - in armament factories instead of the Jews who are to be - replaced.” (_L-61_) - -The Nazi campaign of force, terror, and abduction was described in a -letter to Frank written by the Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee, -at Cracow, in February 1943. The letter states: - - “The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong - methods of finding labor which have been used more and more - frequently in recent months. - - “The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns - and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at - night in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the - inhabitants. Everybody is exposed to the danger, to be seized - anywhere and at any time by members of the police, suddenly and - unexpectedly and to be brought into an assembly camp. None of - his relatives knows what has happened to him, only months later - one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.” - (_1526-PS_) - -And in enclosure 5 of the letter it is related that: - - “In November of last year an inspection of all males of the age - groups 1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of Zaleschozyki - (district of Czortkow). After the men had appeared for - inspection, all those who were chosen were arrested at once, - loaded into trains and sent to the Reich. Such recruiting of - laborers for the Reich also took place in other areas of this - district. Following some interventions the action was then - stopped”. (_1526-PS_) - -The resistance of the Polish people to this Nazi enslavement program and -the necessity for increased force were described by Sauckel’s deputy -Timm at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, Hitler’s wartime -planning agency, which was composed of Speer, Field Marshal Milch, and -State Secretary Koerner. The Central Planning Board was the highest -level economic planning agency, and exercised production controls by -allocating raw materials and labor to industrial users. Timm’s -statement, which was made at the 36th conference of the Board, is as -follows: - - “* * * Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is - extraordinarily serious. It is well known that vehement battle - occurred just because of these actions. The resistance against - the administration established by us, is very strong. Quite a - number of our men have been exposed to increased dangers, and it - was just in the last two or three weeks that some of them were - shot dead, e.g. the Head of the Labor Office of Warsaw who was - shot in his office, and yesterday another man again. This is how - matters stand presently, and the recruiting itself even if done - with the best will remains extremely difficult unless police - reinforcements are at hand.” (_R-124_) - -B. _The Occupied Eastern Territories._ - -Deportation and enslavement of civilians reached unprecedented levels in -the Occupied Eastern Territories as a direct result of labor demands -made by Sauckel on Rosenberg, Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern -Territories, on Rosenberg’s subordinates, and on the Armed Forces. On 5 -October 1942, for example, Sauckel wrote to Rosenberg stating that -2,000,000 more foreign laborers were required, and that the majority of -these would have to be drafted from the recently occupied Eastern -Territories and especially from the Ukraine. The letter, (_017-PS_) -reads as follows: - - “The Fuehrer has worked out new and most urgent plans for the - armament which require the quick mobilization of two more - million foreign labor forces. The Fuehrer therefore has granted - me, for the execution of my decree of 21 March 1942, new powers - for my new duties, and has especially authorized me to take - whatever measures I think are necessary in the Reich, the - Protectorate, the General-Gouvernement, as well as in the - occupied territories, in order to assure at all costs an orderly - mobilization of labor for the German armament industry. The - additional required labor forces will have to be drafted for the - majority from the recently occupied Eastern Territories, - especially from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Therefore, the - Reichskommissariat Ukraine must furnish: - - “225,000 labor forces by 31 December 1942 and 225,000 more by 1 - May 1943. - - “I ask you to inform Reichskommissar Gauleiter party fellow - member Koch about the new situation and requirements and - especially to see to it that he will support personally in any - possible way the execution of this new requirement. - - “I have the intention to visit Party member Koch shortly and I - would be grateful to you if you could inform me as to where and - when I could meet him for a personal discussion. - - “Right now though, I ask that the procurement be taken up at - once with every possible pressure and the commitment of all - powers especially also of the experts of the labor offices. All - the directives which had limited temporarily the procurement of - Eastern laborers are annulled. The Reichs procurement for the - next months must be given priority over all other measures. - - “I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution - of this new requirement, but I am convinced that with the - ruthless commitment of all resources, and with the full - cooperation of all those interested, the execution of the new - demands can be accomplished for the fixed date. I have already - communicated the new demands to the Reichskommissar Ukraine via - mail. In reference to our long distance phone call of today I - will send you the text of the Fuehrer’s decree at the beginning - of next week.” (_017-PS_) - -Again on 17 March 1943 Sauckel wrote Rosenberg, demanding the -importation of another 1,000,000 men and women from the Eastern -territories within the following four months (_019-PS_). Sauckel said: - - “After a protracted illness my Deputy for Labor Supply in the - occupied Eastern Territories, State Councillor Peukert, is going - there to regulate the labor supply both for Germany and the - territories themselves. - - “I ask you sincerely, dear party member Rosenberg, to assist him - to your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of Peukert’s - mission. Already now I may thank you for the hitherto good - reception accorded to Peukert. He himself has been charged by me - with the absolute and completely unreserved cooperation with all - bureaus of the Eastern Territories. - - “Especially the labor supply for the German agriculture, and - likewise for the most urgent armament production programs - ordered by the Fuehrer make the fastest importation of - approximately 1 million women and men from the Eastern - Territories within the next four months a must. Starting 15 - March the daily shipment must have reached 5,000 female and male - workers respectively, while beginning of April this number has - to be stepped up to 10,000. This is a requisite of the most - urgent programs, and the spring tillage, and other agricultural - tasks are not to suffer for the detriment of the nutrition and - of the armed forces. - - “I have foreseen the allotment of the draft quotas for the - individual territories in agreement with your experts for the - labor supply as follows:— - - “Daily quota starting 15 March 1943: - - _People_ - “From General Commissariat White Ruthenia 500 - “Economic Inspection Center 500 - “Reichs Commissariat Ukraine 3,000 - “Economic Inspection South 1,000 - ——— - Total 5,000 - - “Starting 1 April 1943 the daily quota is to be doubled - corresponding to the doubling of the entire quota. - - “I hope to visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the - end of the month, and ask you once more for your kind support.” - (_019-PS_) - -Sauckel travelled to Kauen in Lithuania to press his demands. A synopsis -of a report of the City Commissioner of Kauen and minutes of a meeting -in which Sauckel participated, reveal that: - - “In a lecture which the Plenipotentiary for the - _Arbeitseinsatz_, Gauleiter Sauckel made on 18 July 1943 in - Kauen and in an official conference following it, between - Gauleiter Sauckel and the General Commissar, the pool of labor - in the Reich was again brought up urgently: Gauleiter Sauckel - again demanded that Lithuanian labor be furnished in greater - volume for the purposes of the Reich.” (_204-PS_) - -Sauckel also visited Riga, Latvia, to assert his demands. The purpose of -this visit is described in a letter from the Reich Commissar for the -Ostland to the Commissioner General in Riga, dated 3 May 1943. The -letter states, in part: - - “In reference to the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary - General for manpower, Gauleiter Sauckel on the occasion of his - visit to Riga on 21 April 1943, and in view of the critical - situation and in disregard of all contrary considerations, it - was decided that a total of 183,000 workers have to be supplied - from the Ostland for the Reich territory. This task must - absolutely be accomplished within the next four months and at - the latest must be completed by the end of August.” (_2280-PS_) - -Sauckel asked the German Army for assistance in the recruitment and -deportation of civilian labor from the Eastern Territories. A secret -organization order of the Army Group South, dated 17 August 1943, is to -the following effect: - - “The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Employment ordered the - recruitment and employment of all born during two years for the - whole, newly occupied Eastern territory in Decree Az. VI A - 5780.28 (Inclosure 1), copy of which is inclosed. The Reich - Minister for Armament and Munition approved this order. - - “According to this order by the Plenipotentiary General for - Labor Employment (BGA) you have to recruit and to transport to - the Reich immediately all labor forces in your territory born - during 1926 and 1927. The decree relative labor duty and labor - employment in the theater of operations of the newly occupied - Eastern territory of the 6 February 1943 and the executive - orders therefore are the authority for the execution of this - measure. Enlistment must be completed by 30 Sept. 43 at the - latest.” (_3010-PS_) - -Clearly, the demands made by Sauckel did result in the deportation of -civilians from the occupied Eastern territories. Speer has stated in a -record of conferences with Hitler on 10, 11, and 12 August 1942 that: - - “Gauleiter Sauckel promises to make Russian labor available for - the fulfillment of the iron and coal program and reports - that—if required—he can supply a further million Russian - laborers for the German armament industry up to and including - October 1942. So far, he has already supplied 1 million for - industry and 700,000 for agriculture. In this connection the - Fuehrer states that the problem of providing labor can be solved - in all cases and to any extent; he authorizes Gauleiter Sauckel - to take all measures required. - - “He would agree to any necessary compulsion (_zwangsmassnahmen_) - in the East as well as in the West if this question could not be - solved on a voluntary basis.” (_R-124_) - - 3. VIOLENT METHODS OF DEPORTATION FOR SLAVE LABOR - -In order to meet these demands, the Nazi conspirators made terror, -violence, and arson the staple instruments of their policy of -enslavement. Twenty days after Sauckel’s demands of 5 October 1942, a -high official in Rosenberg’s Ministry by the name of Braeutigam, in a -Top Secret memorandum dated 25 October 1942 described measures taken to -meet these demands: - - “* * * We now experienced the grotesque picture of having to - recruit millions of laborers from the Occupied Eastern - Territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger like - flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within - Germany. Now the food question no longer existed. In the - prevailing limitless abuse of the Slavic humanity ‘recruiting’ - methods were used which probably have their origin in the - blackest periods of the slave trade. A regular manhunt was - inaugurated. Without consideration of health or age the people - were shipped to Germany where it turned out immediately that - more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious - illnesses and other incapabilities for work.” (_294-PS_) - -Rosenberg on 21 December 1942 wrote to Sauckel, the instigator of these -brutalities, as follows: - - “The reports I have received show, that the increase of the - guerilla bands in the occupied Eastern Regions is largely due to - the fact that the methods used for procuring laborers in these - regions are felt to be forced measures of mass deportations, so - that the endangered persons prefer to escape their fate by - withdrawing into the woods or going to the guerilla bands.” - (_018-PS_) - -An attachment to Rosenberg’s letter, consisting of parts excerpted from -letters of residents of the Occupied Eastern territories by Nazi -censors, relates that: - - “At our place, new things have happened. People are being taken - to Germany. On Dec. 5, some people from the Kowkuski district - were scheduled to go, but they didn’t want to and the village - was set afire. They threatened to do the same thing in - Borowytschi, as not all who were scheduled to depart wanted to - go. Thereupon 3 truck loads of Germans arrived and set fire to - their houses. In Wrasnytschi 12 houses and in Borowytschi 3 - houses were burned. - - “On Oct. 1 a new conscription of labor forces took place. From - what has happened, I will describe the most important to you. - You can not imagine the bestiality. You probably remember what - we were told about the Soviets during the rule of the Poles. At - that time we did not believe it and now it seems just as - incredible. The order came to supply 25 workers, but no one - reported. All had fled. Then the German militia came and began - to ignite the houses of those who had fled. The fire became very - violent, since it had not rained for 2 months. In addition the - grain stacks were in the farm yards. You can imagine what took - place. The people who had hurried to the scene were forbidden to - extinguish the flames, beaten and arrested, so that 7 homesteads - burned down. The policemen meanwhile ignited other houses. The - people fell on their knees and kiss their hands, but the - policemen beat them with rubber truncheons and threaten to burn - down the whole village. I don’t know how this would have ended - if I Sapurkany had not intervened. He promised that there would - be laborers by morning. During the fire the militia went through - the adjoining villages, seized the laborers and brought them - under arrest. Wherever they did not find any laborers, they - detained the parents, until the children appeared. That is how - they raged throughout the night in Bielosirka. The workers which - had not yet appeared till then, were to be shot. All schools - were closed and the married teachers were sent to work here, - while the unmarried ones go to work in Germany. They are now - catching humans like the dog-catchers used to catch dogs. They - are already hunting for one week and have not yet enough. The - imprisoned workers are locked in at the schoolhouse. They cannot - even go out to perform their natural functions, but have to do - it like pigs in the same room. People from many villages went on - a certain day to a pilgrimage to the monastery Potschaew. They - were all arrested, locked in, and will be sent to work. Among - them there are lame, blind and aged people”. (_018-PS_) - -Rosenberg, nevertheless, countenanced the use of force in order to -furnish slave labor to Germany and admitted his responsibility for the -“unusual and hard measures” that were employed. The transcript of an -interrogation of Rosenberg under oath on 6 October 1945, contains the -following admissions: - - “* * * Q. You recognized, did you not, that the quotas set by - Sauckel could not be filled by voluntary labor, and you didn’t - disapprove of the impressment of forced labor; isn’t that right? - - “A. I regretted that the demands of Sauckel were so urgent that - they could not be met by a continuation of voluntary recruitment - and thus I submitted to the necessity of forced impressment.” - - * * * * * * - - “Q. The letters that we have already seen between you and - Sauckel, do not indicate, do they, any disagreement on your part - with the principle of recruiting labor against their will; they - indicate, as I remember, that you were opposed to the treatment - that was later accorded these workers; that you did not oppose - their initial impressment. - - “A. That is right. In those letters I mostly discussed the - possibility of finding the least harsh methods of handling the - matter; whereas, in no way, I placed myself in opposition to the - orders that he was carrying out for the Fuehrer.” - -Moreover, in a letter dated 21 December 1942 Rosenberg stated: - - “* * * Even if I do not close my eyes to the necessity that the - numbers demanded by the Reichs Minister for weapons and - ammunition as well as by the agricultural economy justify - unusual and hard measures, I have to ask, due to the - responsibility for the occupied Eastern Territories which lies - upon me, that in the accomplishment of the ordered tasks such - measures be excluded, the toleration and prosecution of which - will some day be held against me, and my collaborators.” - (_018-PS_) - -Arson was used as a terror device in the Ukraine to enforce conscription -measures. One instance is reported in a document from an official of the -Rosenberg Ministry dated 29 June 1944, enclosing a copy of a letter from -Paul Raab, a district commissioner in the territory of Wassilkow, to -Rosenberg. Raab’s letter reads as follows: - - “According to a charge by the Supreme Command of the Armed - Forces I burned down a few houses in the territory of - Wassilkow/Ukr. belonging to insubordinate people ordered for - work-duty (_Arbeitseinsatzpflichtigen_). This accusation is - true.” - - * * * * * * - - “During the year 1942, the conscription of workers was - accomplished by way of propaganda. Only very rarely was force - necessary. Only in August 1942, measures had to be taken against - 2 families in the villages Glewenka and Salisny-Chutter, each of - which were to supply one person for labor. Both were requested - in June for the first time, but didn’t obey although requested - repeatedly. They had to be brought up by force, but succeeded - twice to escape from the collecting camp, or when being on - transport. Before the second arrest, the fathers of both of the - men were taken into custody, to be kept as hostages and to be - released only when their sons would show up. When, after the - second escape, rearrest of both the fathers and boys was - ordered, the police patrols ordered to do so, found the houses - to be empty.” - - * * * * * * - - “That time I decided to take measures to show the increasingly - rebellious Ukrainian youth that our orders have to be followed. - I ordered the burning down of the houses of the fugitives.” - - * * * * * * - - “After the initial successes, a passive resistance of the - population started, which finally forced me to start again on - making arrests, confiscations, and transfers to labor camps. - After a while a transport of people, obliged to work, overran - the police in the railroad station in Wassilkow and escaped. I - saw again the necessity for strict measures. A few ring leaders, - which of course escaped before they were found in Plissezkoje - and in Mitnitza. After repeated attempts to get hold of them, - their houses were burned down.” - - * * * * * * - - “My actions against fugitive people obliged to work - (_Arbeitseinsatzpflichtige_), were always reported to district - commissioner Doehrer, in office in Wassilkow, and to the - general-commissioner (_Generalkommissar_) in Kiev. Both of them - know the circumstances and agreed with my measures, because of - their success.” (_254-PS_) - -The village of Biloserka in the Ukraine was also the victim of arson as -has already been related in the quotation from the enclosure to -Rosenberg’s letter of 21 December 1942 to Sauckel (_018-PS_). Additional -proof of resort to arson in this village is furnished by other -correspondence originating within the Rosenberg Ministry and dated 12 -November 1943: - - “But even if Mueller had been present at the burning of houses - in connection with the national conscription in Biloserka, this - should by no means lead to the relief of Mueller from office. It - is mentioned specifically in a directive of the Commissioner - General in Lusk of 21 Sept 1942, referring to the extreme - urgency of the national conscription. - - ‘Estates of those who refuse to work are to be burned, their - relatives are to be arrested as hostages and to be brought to - forced labor camps.’” (_290-PS_) - -The SS was directed to participate in the abduction of slave laborers, -and in the case of raids on villages or burning of villages, to turn the -entire population over for slave labor in Germany. A secret SS order -dated 19 March 1943 (_3012-PS_) states: - - “The activity of the labor offices, resp. of recruiting - commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. - It will not be possible always to refrain from using force. - During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment - Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that whatever prisoners - can be released, they should be put at the disposal of the - Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching (_Uberholung_) - villages, resp., when it has become necessary to burn down - villages, the whole population will be put at the disposal of - the Commissioner by force.” (_3012-PS_) - -From Shitomir, where Sauckel appealed for more workers for the Reich, -the Commissioner General reported on the brutality of the conspirators’ -program, which he described as a program of coercion and slavery. This -is revealed in a secret report of a conference between the Commissioner -General of Shitomir and Rosenberg in Winniza on 17 June 1943 (_265-PS_). -The report is dated 30 June 1943 and is signed by Leyser. It reads as -follows: - - “The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no - doubt, well known to the Reichs Minister through reports and his - own observations. Therefore, I shall not report them. It is - certain that a recruitment of labor, in this sense of the word, - can hardly be spoken of. In most cases, it is nowadays a matter - of actual conscription by force.” - - * * * * * * - - “But as the Chief Plenipotentiary for the mobilization of labor - explained to us the gravity of the situation, we had no other - device. I consequently have authorized the commissioners of the - areas to apply the severest measures in order to achieve the - imposed quota. The deterioration of morale in conjunction with - this does not necessitate any further proof. It is nevertheless - essential to win the war on this front too. The problem of labor - mobilization cannot be handled with gloves.” (_265-PS_) - -These recruitment measures enslaved so many citizens of occupied -countries that entire areas were depopulated. Thus, a report from the -Chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk, dated 28 June -1943, to Ministerialdirektor Riecke, a top official in the Rosenberg -Ministry states: - - “The recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had - disastrous effects. The recruitment measures in the last months - and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable - political and economic effect. From White Ruthenia, approx. - 50,000 people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another - 130,000 are to be obtained. Considering the 2.4 million total - population these figures are impossible. * * * - - “Due to the sweeping drives (_Grossaktionen_) of the SS and - police in November 1942, about 115,000 hectar farmland is not - used, as the population is not there and the villages have been - razed. * * *” (_3000-PS_) - -The conspirators’ policy, of permanently weakening the enemy through the -enslavement of labor and breaking up of families, was applied in the -Occupied Eastern Territories after Rosenberg’s approval of a plan for -the apprehension and deportation of 40,000 to 50,000 youths of the ages -from 10 to 14. The stated purpose of this plan, approved by Rosenberg, -was to prevent a reinforcement of the enemy’s military strength and to -reduce the enemy’s biological potentialities. (_031-PS_) - -Further evidence of the Nazi conspirators’ plan to weaken their enemies -in utter disregard of the rules of International Law is contained in a -secret order issued by a rear-area Military Commandant, to the District -Commissar at Kasatin on 25 December 1943. The order provided in part -that: - - “1. The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of - age and the cattle are to be shipped back from the district East - of the line Belilowka-Berditschen-Shitomir (places excluded).” - (_1702-PS_) - -The program of enslavement and its accompanying measures of brutality -were not limited to Poland and the Eastern Occupied Territories, but -extended to Western Europe as well. Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Belgians, and -Italians all came to know the Nazi slavemasters. In France these -slavemasters intensified their program in the early part of 1943 -pursuant to instructions which Speer telephoned to Sauckel from Hitler’s -headquarters at eight in the evening of 4 January 1943. These -instructions are found in a note for the files signed by Sauckel, dated -5 January 1943, which states: - - “1. On 4 January 1943 at 8 p. m. Minister Speer telephones from - the Fuehrer’s headquarters and communicates that on the basis of - the Fuehrer’s decision, it is no longer necessary to give - special consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of - specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed - with emphasis and sharpened measures.” (_556-13-PS_) - -To overcome the resistance to his enslavement program, Sauckel -improvised new impressment measures which were applied in both France -and Italy by his own agents and which he himself labelled as grotesque. -At a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944 Sauckel -stated: - - “The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim - that no executive had been provided within these areas in order - to recruit in a sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians and - Italians and to dispatch them to work. Thereupon I even - proceeded to employ and train a whole batch of French male and - female agents who for good pay just as was done in olden times - for “shanghaiing” went hunting for men and made them drunk by - using liquor as well as words, in order to dispatch them to - Germany. - - “Moreover, I charged some able men with founding a special labor - supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and - arming with the help of the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, a - number of natives, but I still have to ask the Munitions - Ministry for arms for the use of these men. For during the last - year alone several dozens of very able labor executive officers - have been shot dead. All these means I have to apply, grotesque - as it sounds, to refute the allegation there was no executive to - bring labor to Germany from these countries.” (_R-124_) - -As in France, the slave hunt in Holland was accompanied by terror and -abduction. The “Statement of the Netherlands Government in view of the -Prosecution and Punishment of the German Major War Criminals”, -(_1726-PS_) contains the following account of the deportation of -Netherlands workmen to Germany: - - “Many big and reasonably large business concerns, especially in - the metal industry, were visited by German commissions who - appointed workmen for deportation. This combing out of the - concerns was called the “Sauckel-action”, so named after its - leader, who was charged with the appointment of foreign workmen - in Germany. - - “The employers had to cancel the contracts with the appointed - workmen temporarily, and the latter were forced to register at - the labour offices, which then took care of the deportation - under supervision of German ‘_Fachberater_.’ - - “Workmen who refused (relatively few) were prosecuted by the - _Sicherheitsdeinst_ (SD). If captured by this service, they were - mostly lodged for some time in one of the infamous prisoners - camps in the Netherlands and eventually put to work in Germany. - - “In this prosecution the _Sicherheitsdienst_ was supported by - the German Police Service, which was connected with the labour - offices, and was composed of members of the N.S.B. and the like. - - “At the end of April 1942 the deportation of working labourers - started on a grand scale. Consequently in the months of May and - June the number of deportees amounted to not less than 22,000, - resp. 24,000 of which many were metal workers. - - “After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October 1942 - another top was reached (2,600). After the big concerns, the - smaller ones had, in their turn, to give up their personnel. - - “This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started a - ruthless campaign for manpower, passing by the labour offices. - Without warning, they lined off whole quarters of the towns, - seized people in the streets or in the houses and deported them. - - “In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids (razzia’s) took - place on 10 and 11 November, the amount of people thus deported - was estimated at 50,000 and 5,000 respectively. - - “In other places where the raids were held later, the numbers - were much lower, because one was forewarned by the events. The - exact figures are not known as they have never been published by - the occupants. - - “The people thus seized were put to work partly in the - Netherlands, partly in Germany * * *.” (_1726-PS_) - -A document found in the OKH files furnishes further evidence of the -seizure of workers in Holland. This document contains the partial text -of a lecture delivered by a Lieutenant Haupt of the German _Wehrmacht_ -concerning the situation of the war economy in the Netherlands: - - “There had been some difficulties with the _Arbeitseinsatz_, - i.e., during the man-catching action (_Menchenfang Aktion_) - which became very noticeable because it was unorganized and - unprepared. People were arrested in the streets and taken out of - their homes. It has been impossible to carry out a unified - release procedure in advance, because for security reasons, the - time for the action had not been previously announced. - Certificates of release, furthermore, were to some extent not - recognized by the officials who carried out the action. Not only - workers who had become available through the stoppage of - industry but also those who were employed in our installations - producing things for our immediate need. They were apprehended - or did not dare to go into the streets. In any case it proved to - be a great loss to us. * * *” (_3003-PS_) - - 4. RESULTS OF THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM - -The hordes of displaced persons in Germany today reflect the extent to -which the Nazi conspirators’ labor program succeeded. The best available -Allied and German data reveal that as of January 1945 approximately -4,795,000 foreign civilian workers had been put to work for the German -war effort in the old Reich, among them slave laborers of more than 14 -different nationalities. An affidavit executed by Edward L. Deuss, an -economic analyst, contains the following statistical summation: - -“_APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS PUT TO WORK FOR THE GERMAN WAR EFFORT - IN THE OLD REICH_” - [Status January 1945] - - Nationality │ Workers │ P/W’s │ Politicals │ Total - │ │ │ │ - Russians │ 1,900,000│ 600,000│ 11,000│ 2,500,000 - │ 764,000│ 750,000│ │ 1,525,000 - Poles │ 851,000│ 60,000│ │ 911,000 - Italians │ 227,000│ 400,000│ │ 627,000 - Dutch │ 274,000│ │ 2,300│ 277,000 - Belgians │ 183,000│ 63,000│ 8,900│ 254,000 - Yugoslavs │ 230,000│ │ │ 230,000 - Czechoslovaks │ 140,000│ │ │ 140,000 - Balts │ 130,000│ │ │ 130,000 - Greeks │ 15,000│ │ │ 15,000 - Luxembourgers │ 14,000│ │ 1,000│ 15,000 - Hungarians │ 10,000│ │ │ 10,000 - Rumanians │ 5,000│ │ │ 5,000 - Bulgarians │ 2,000│ │ │ 2,000 - Others │ 50,000│ │ │ 50,000 - │ ————│ ————│ ————│ ———— - Totals │ 4,795,000│ 1,873,000│ 23,200│ 6,691,000 - - “Note: Of the estimated 6,691,000 approximately 2,000,000 - civilian foreigners and 245,000 prisoners of war were employed - directly in the manufacture of armaments and munitions (end - products or components) on the 31 December 1944, according to - Speer Ministry tabulations. The highest number of prisoners of - war so employed was 400,000 in June 1944, the decrease to - December 1944 being accounted for in part by a change in status - from prisoners to civilian workers. A figure of 2,070,000 - Russians uncovered in the American, British and French zones, - given in ‘Displaced Persons Report No. 43,’ of the Combined - Displaced Persons’ Executive, c/o G-5 Division, USFET, 30 - September 1945, was increased by 430,000 to allow for Russians - estimated to have been found on German territory conquered by - the Red Army.” - - * * * * * * - - “The designation ‘Politicals’ at the head of the third column in - the table should be taken to mean persons who upon being - uncovered in Germany by the Allied forces asserted that they - were arrested in their native countries for subversive - activities against the Nazis, and were transported to Germany - for incarceration. The figures do not include racial or - religious deportees, nor persons imprisoned for crimes allegedly - committed in Germany * * *.” (_2520-PS_) - -Only a small proportion of the foreign workers brought to Germany were -volunteers. At the 1 March 1944 meeting of the Central Planning Board, -Sauckel made clear the vast scale of slavery. He stated: - - “* * * Out of five million foreign workers who arrived in - Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” (_R-124_) - - 5. CONDITIONS OF DEPORTATION AND SLAVE LABOR - -The Nazi conspirators were not satisfied to tear 5,000,000 persons from -their families, their homes, and their country. They insisted that these -5,000,000 wretches, while being deported to Germany or after their -arrival, be degraded, beaten, and permitted to die for want of food, -clothing, and adequate shelter. Conditions of deportation are vividly -described in a report to Rosenberg concerning treatment of Ukrainian -labor (_054-PS_): - - “The starosts esp. village elders are frequently corruptible, - they continue to have the skilled workers, whom they drafted, - dragged from their beds at night to be locked up in cellars - until they are shipped. Since the male and female workers often - are not given any time to pack their luggage, etc., many skilled - workers arrive at the Collecting Center for Skilled Workers with - equipment entirely insufficient (without shoes, only two - dresses, no eating and drinking utensils, no blankets, etc.). In - particularly extreme cases new arrivals therefore have to be - sent back again immediately to get the things most necessary for - them. If people do not come along at once, threatening and - beating of skilled workers by the above-mentioned militia is a - daily occurrence and is reported from most of the communities. - In some cases women were beaten until they could no longer - march. One bad case in particular was reported by me to the - commander of the civil police here (Colonel Samek) for severe - punishment (place Sozolinkow, district Dergatschi). The - encroachments of the starosts and the militia are of a - particularly grave nature because they usually justify - themselves by claiming that all that is done in the name of the - German Armed Forces. In reality the latter have conducted - themselves throughout in a highly understanding manner toward - the skilled workers and the Ukrainian population. The same, - however, can not be said of some of the administrative agencies. - To illustrate this be it mentioned, that a woman once arrived - being dressed with barely more than a shirt.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * On the basis of reported incidents, attention must be - called to the fact that it is irresponsible to keep workers - locked in the cars for many hours so that they cannot even take - care of the calls of nature. It is evident that the people of a - transport must be given an opportunity from time to time in - order to get drinking water, to wash, and in order to relieve - themselves. Cars have been showed in which people had made holes - so that they could take care of the calls of nature. When - nearing bigger stations persons should, if possible, relieve - themselves far from these stations.” - - * * * * * * - - “The following abuses were reported from the delousing stations: - - “In the women’s and girls’ shower rooms, services were partly - performed by men or men would mingle around or even helped with - the soaping; and vice versa, there were female personnel in the - men’s shower rooms; men also for some time were taking - photographs in the women’s shower rooms. Since mainly Ukrainian - peasants were transported in the last months, as far as the - female portion of these are concerned, they were mostly of a - high moral standard and used to strict decency, they must have - considered such a treatment as a national degradation. The - above-mentioned abuses have been, according to our knowledge, - settled by the intervention of the transport commanders. The - reports of the photographing were made from Halle; the reports - about the former were made from Kiewerce. Such incidents in - complete disregard of the honor and respect of the Greater - German Reich may still occur again here or there.” (_054-PS_) - -Sick and infirm citizens of the occupied countries were taken -indiscriminately with the rest. Those who managed to survive the trip -into Germany, but who arrived too sick to work, were returned like -cattle, together with those who fell ill at work, because they were of -no further use to the Germans. The return trip took place under the same -conditions as the initial journey, and without any kind of medical -supervision. Death came to many, and their corpses were unceremoniously -dumped out of the cars with no provision for burial. Thus, the report -continues: - - “* * * Very depressing for the morale of the skilled workers and - the population is the effect of those persons shipped back from - Germany for having become disabled or not having been fit for - labor commitment from the very beginning. Several times already - transports of skilled workers on their way to Germany have - crossed returning transports of such disabled persons and have - stood on the tracks alongside of each other for a longer period - of time. Those returning transports are insufficiently cared - for. Nothing but sick, injured of weak people, mostly 50-60 to a - car, are usually escorted by 3-4 men. There is neither - sufficient care or food. The returnees made frequently - unfavourable—but surely exaggerated—statements relative to - their treatment in Germany and on the way. As a result of all - this and of what the people could see with their own eyes, a - psychosis of fear was evoked among the specialist workers resp. - the whole transport to Germany. Several transport leaders of the - 62d and the 63d in particular reported thereto in detail. In one - case the leader of the transport of skilled workers observed - with own eyes how a person who died of hunger was unloaded from - a returning transport on the side track. (1st Lt. Hofman of the - 63rd transport Station Darniza). Another time it was reported - that 3 dead had to be deposited by the side of the tracks on the - way and had to be left behind unburied by the escort. It is also - regrettable that these disabled persons arrive here without any - identification. According to the reports of the transport - commanders one gets the impression that these persons unable to - work are assembled, penned into the wagons and are sent off - provided only by a few men escort, and without special care for - food and medical or other attendance. The Labor Office at the - place of arrival as well as the transport commanders confirm - this impression.” (_054-PS_) - -Mothers in childbirth shared cars with those infected with tuberculosis -or venereal diseases. Babies when born were hurled out of windows. Dying -persons lay on the bare floors of freight cars without even the small -comfort of straw. These conditions are revealed in an interdepartmental -report prepared by Dr. Gutkelch in Rosenberg’s Ministry, dated 30 -September 1942, from which the following quotation is taken: - - “How necessary this interference was is shown by the fact that - this train with returning laborers had stopped at the same place - where a train with newly recruited Eastern laborers had stopped. - Because of the corpses in the train-load of returning laborers, - a catastrophe might have been precipitated had it not been for - the mediation of Mrs. Miller. In this train women gave birth to - babies who were thrown out of the windows during the journey, - people having tuberculosis and venereal diseases rode in the - same car, dying people lay in freight cars without straw, and - one of the dead was thrown on the railway embankment. The same - must have occurred in other returning transports.” (_084-PS_) - -Some aspects of Nazi transport were described by Sauckel himself in a -decree which he issued on 20 July 1942, (_2241-PS_). The original decree -is published in section B1a, page 48e of a book entitled “_Die -Beschaeftigung von auslaendischen Arbeitskraeften in Deutschland_.” The -decree reads, in part, as follows: - - “According to reports of transportation commanders - (_Transportleiters_) presented to me, the special trains - provided by the German railway have frequently been in a really - deficient condition. Numerous windowpanes have been missing in - the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories have been - partly employed so that the workers had to fit up an emptied - compartment as a lavatory. In other cases, the coaches were not - heated in winter so that the lavatories quickly became unusable - because the water system was frozen and the flushing apparatus - was therefore without water.” (_2241-PS_) - -Many of the foregoing documents, it will be noted, consist of complaints -by functionaries of the Rosenberg ministry or by others concerning the -conditions under which foreign workers were recruited and compelled to -live. These documents establish not only the facts therein recited, but -also show that the Nazi conspirators had knowledge of such conditions. -Notwithstanding their knowledge of these conditions, however, the Nazi -conspirators continued to countenance and assist in the enslavement of a -vast number of citizens of occupied countries. - -Once within Germany, slave laborers were subjected to treatment of an -unusually brutal and degrading nature. The character of Nazi treatment -was in part made plain by the conspirator’s own statements. Sauckel -declared on one occasion: - - “All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as - to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest - conceivable degree of expenditure.” (_016-PS_) - -Force and brutality as instruments of production found a ready adherent -in Speer who, in the presence of Sauckel, said at a meeting of the -Central Planning Board: - - “We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the - sick-list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in factories - where doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men. - There is nothing to be said against SS and police taking drastic - steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration - camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen several times and - the news will soon go round.” (_R-124_) - -At a later meeting of the Central Planning Board, Field Marshall Milch -agreed that so far as workers were concerned, - - “The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s - trustworthy hands.” (_R-124_) - -Milch made particular reference to foreign workers by stating: - - “It is therefore not possible to exploit fully all the - foreigners unless we compel them by piece-work or we have the - possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are not - doing their bit.” (_R-124_) - -The policy as actually executed was even more Draconian than the policy -as planned by the conspirators. Impressed workers were underfed and -overworked. They were forced to live in grossly overcrowded camps where -they were held as virtual prisoners and were otherwise denied adequate -shelter. They were denied adequate clothing, adequate medical care and -treatment and, as a result, suffered from many diseases and ailments. -They were generally forced to work long hours up to and beyond the point -of exhaustion. They were beaten and subjected to inhuman indignities. - -An example of this mistreatment is found in the conditions which -prevailed in the Krupp factories. Foreign laborers at the Krupp Works -were given insufficient food to enable them to perform the work required -of them. A memorandum upon Krupp stationery to Mr. Hupe, director of the -Krupp Locomotive Factory in Essen, dated 14 March 1942, states: - - “During the last few days we established that the food for the - Russians employed here is so miserable, that the people are - getting weaker from day to day. - - “Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to - place a piece of metal for turning into position for instance, - because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist - at all places of work where Russians are employed.” (_D-316_) - -The condition of foreign workers in Krupp workers camps is described in -detail in an affidavit executed in Essen, Germany, on 15 October 1945 by -Dr. Wilhelm Jager, who was the senior camp doctor. Dr. Jager makes the -following statement: - - “* * * Conditions in all these camps were extremely bad. The - camps were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were twice - as many people in a barrack as health conditions permitted. At - Kramerplatz, the inhabitants slept in treble-tiered bunks, and - in the other camps they slept in double-tiered bunks. The health - authorities prescribed a _minimum_ space between beds of 50 cm. - but the bunks in these camps were separated by a _maximum_ of - 20-30 cm. - - “The diet prescribed for the eastern workers was altogether - insufficient. They were given 1,000 calories a day less than the - minimum prescribed for any German. Moreover, while German - workers engaged in the heaviest work received 5,000 calories a - day, the eastern workers in comparable jobs received only 2,000 - calories. The eastern workers were given only 2 meals a day and - their bread ration. One of these two meals consisted of a thin, - watery soup. I had no assurance that the eastern workers, in - fact, received the minimum which was prescribed. Subsequently, - in 1943, when I undertook to inspect the food prepared by the - cooks, I discovered a number of instances in which food was - withheld from the workers. - - “The plan for food distribution called for a small quantity of - meat per week. Only inferior meats, rejected by the veterinary - such as horse meat or tuberculin infested was permitted for this - purpose. This meat was usually cooked into a soup. - - “The clothing of the eastern workers was likewise completely - inadequate. They worked and slept in the same clothing in which - they had arrived from the east. Virtually all of them had no - overcoats and were compelled, therefore, to use their blankets - as coats in cold and rainy weather. In view of the shortage of - shoes many workers were forced to go to work in their bare feet, - even in the winter. Wooden shoes were given to some of the - workers, but their quality was such as to give the workers sore - feet. Many workers preferred to go to work in their bare feet - rather than endure the suffering caused by the wooden shoes. - Apart from the wooden shoes, no clothing of any kind was issued - to the workers until the latter part of 1943, when a single blue - suit was issued to some of them. To my knowledge, this - represented the sole issue of clothing to the workers from the - time of their arrival until the American forces entered Essen. - - “Sanitary conditions were exceedingly bad. At Kramerplatz, where - approximately 1,200 eastern workers were crowded into the rooms - of an old school, the sanitary conditions were atrocious in the - extreme. Only 10 children’s toilets were available for the 1,200 - inhabitants. At Dechenschule, 15 children’s toilets were - available for the 400-500 eastern workers. Excretion - contaminated the entire floors of these lavatories. There were - also few facilities for washing. The supply of bandages, - medicine, surgical instruments, and other medical supplies at - these camps was likewise altogether insufficient. As a - consequence, only the very worst cases were treated. - - “The percentage of eastern workers who were ill was twice as - great as among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly - widespread among the eastern workers. The T. B. rate among them - was 4 times the normal rate of (2 percent eastern workers, - German .5 percent). At Dechenschule approximately 2½ percent of - the workers suffered from open T. B. These were all active T. B. - cases. The Tartars and Kirghis suffered most; as soon as they - were overcome by this disease they collapsed like flies. The - cause was bad housing, the poor quality and insufficient - quantity of food, overwork, and insufficient rest. - - “These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever. Lice - the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas, bugs - and other vermin tortured the inhabitants of these camps. As a - result of the filthy conditions of the camps nearly all eastern - workers were afflicted with skin disease. The shortage of food - also caused many cases of Hunher-Oedem, Nephritis, and - Shighakruse. - - “It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go to - work unless a camp doctor had prescribed that they were unfit - for work. At Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germanistrasse, - Kapitanlehmannstrasse, and Dechenschule, there was no daily sick - call. At these camps, the doctors did not appear for two or - three days. As a consequence, workers were forced to go to work - despite illnesses.” - - * * * * * * - - “Camp Humboldstrasse has been inhabitated by Italian prisoners - of war. After it had been destroyed by an air raid, the Italians - were removed and 600 Jewish females from Buchenwald - Concentration Camp were brought in to work at the Krupp - factories. Upon my first visit at Camp Humboldstrasse, I found - these females suffering from open festering wounds and other - diseases. - - “I was the first doctor they had seen for at least a fortnight. - There was no doctor in attendance at the camp. There was no - medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and went about - in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a - sack with holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn. - The camp was surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded by SS - guards. - - “The amount of food in the camp was extremely meagre and of very - poor quality. The houses in which they lived consisted of the - ruins of former barracks and they afforded no shelter against - rain and other weather conditions. I reported to my superiors - that the guards lived and slept outside their barracks as one - could not enter them without being attacked by 10, 20 and up to - 50 fleas. One camp doctor employed by me refused to enter the - camp again after he had been bitten very badly. I visited this - camp with a Mr. Green on two occasions and both times we left - the camp badly bitten. We had great difficulty in getting rid of - the fleas and insects which had attacked us. As a result of this - attack by insects of this camp, I got large boils on my arms and - the rest of my body. I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to - undertake the necessary steps to de-louse the camp so as to put - an end to this unbearable, vermin-infested condition. Despite - this report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary - conditions at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later. - - “When foreign workers finally became too sick to work or were - completely disabled they were returned to the Labour Exchange in - Essen and from there, they were sent to a camp at - Friedrichsfeld. Among persons who were returned over to the - Labour Exchange were aggravated cases of tuberculosis, malaria, - neurosis, career which could not be treated by operation, old - age, and general feebleness. I know nothing about conditions at - this camp because I have never visited it. I only know that it - was a place to which workers who no longer of any use to Krupp - were sent. - - “My colleagues and I reported all of the foregoing matters to - Mr. Ihh, Director of Friedrich Krupp A. G. Dr. Wiels, personal - physician of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Senior Camp - Leader Kupke, and at all times to the health department. - Moreover, I know that these gentlemen personally visited the - camps. - - “(Signed) Dr. Wilhelm Jager.” (_D-288_) - -The conditions just described were not confined to the Krupp factories -but existed throughout Germany. A report of the Polish Main Committee to -the Administration of the Government-General of Poland, dated 17 May -1944, describes in similar terms the situation of Polish workers in -Germany (_R-103_): - - “The cleanliness of many overcrowded camp rooms is contrary to - the most elementary requirements. Often there is no opportunity - to obtain warm water for washing; therefore the cleanest parents - are unable to maintain even the most primitive standard of - hygiene for their children or often even to wash their only set - of linen. A consequence of this is the spreading of scabies - which cannot be eradicated * * * - - “We receive imploring letters from the camps of Eastern workers - and their prolific families beseeching us for food. The quantity - and quality of camp rations mentioned therein—the so-called - fourth grade of rations—is absolutely insufficient to maintain - the energies spent in heavy work. 3.5 kg. of bread weekly and a - thin soup at lunch time, cooked with swedes or other vegetables - without any meat or fat, with a meager addition of potatoes now - and then is a hunger ration for a heavy worker. - - “Sometimes punishment consists of starvation which is inflicted, - i.e. for refusal to wear the badge, ‘East’. Such punishment has - the result that workers faint at work (Klosterteich Camp, - Gruenheim, Saxony). The consequence is complete exhaustion, an - ailing state of health and tuberculosis. The spreading of - tuberculosis among the Polish factory workers is a result of the - deficient food rations meted out in the community camps because - energy spent in heavy work cannot be replaced * * *. - - “The call for help which reaches us, brings to light starvation - and hunger, severe stomach intestinal trouble especially in the - case of children resulting from the insufficiency of food which - does not take into consideration the needs of children. Proper - medical treatment or care for the sick are not available in the - mass camps. * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “In addition to these bad conditions, there is lack of - systematic occupation for and supervision of these hosts of - children which affects the life of prolific families in the - camps. The children, left to themselves without schooling or - religious care, must run wild and grow up illiterate. Idleness - in rough surroundings may and will create unwanted results in - these children * * *. An indication of the awful conditions this - may lead to is given by the fact that in the camps for Eastern - workers—(camp for Eastern workers, ‘Waldlust’, Post Office - Lauf, Pegnitz)—there are cases of 8-year old delicate and - undernourished children put to forced labor and perishing from - such treatment. - - “The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the state - of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by the many - cases of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from - the Reich to the General-Government as unfit for work. Their - state of health is usually so bad that recovery is out of the - question. The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting - from overwork and a starvation diet is not recognized as an - ailment until the illness betrays itself by high fever and - fainting spells. - - “Although some hostels for unfit workers have been provided as a - precautionary measure, one can only go there when recovery may - no longer be expected—(Neumarkt in Bavaria). Even there the - incurables waste away slowly, and nothing is done even to - alleviate the state of the sick by suitable food and medicines. - There are children there with tuberculosis whose cure would not - be hopeless and men in their prime who if sent home in time to - their families in rural districts, might still be able to - recover. - - “No less suffering is caused by the separation of families when - wives and mothers of small children are away from their families - and sent to the Reich for forced labor.* * *” - - * * * * * * - - “If, under these bad conditions, there is no moral support such - as is normally based on regular family life, then at least such - moral support which the religious feelings of the Polish - population require should be maintained and increased. The - elimination of religious services, religious practice and - religious care from the life of the Polish workers, the - prohibition of church attendance at a time when there is a - religious service for other people and other measures show a - certain contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings - and opinions of the workers.” (_R-103_) - -Particularly harsh and brutal treatment was reserved for workers -imported from the conquered Eastern territories. They lived in bondage, -were quartered in stables with animals, and were denied the right of -worship and the pleasures of human society. A document entitled -“Directives on the Treatment of Foreign Farmworkers of Polish -Nationality”, issued by the Minister for Finance and Economy of Baden on -6 March 1941, describes this treatment (_EC-68_): - - “The agencies of the Reich Food Administration - (_Reichsnaehrstand_) State Peasant Association of Baden have - received the result of the negotiations with the Higher SS and - Police Officer in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941, with great - satisfaction. Appropriate memoranda have already been turned - over to the District Peasants’ Associations. Below, I promulgate - the individual regulations, as they have been laid down during - the conference and how they are now to be applied accordingly: - - “1. Fundamentally, farmworkers of Polish nationality no longer - have the right to complain, and thus no complaints may be - accepted any more by any official agency. - - “2. The farmworkers of Polish nationality may not leave the - localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew from 1 - October to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours, and from 1 - April to 30 September from 2100 hours to 0500 hours. - - “3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are - possible for riding to the place of work in the field if a - relative of the employer or the employer himself is present. - - “4. The visit of churches, regardless of faith, is strictly - prohibited, even when there is no service in progress. - Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is - permitted. - - “5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures or other cultural - entertainment are strictly prohibited for farmworkers of Polish - nationality. - - “6. The visit of restaurants is strictly prohibited to - farmworkers of Polish nationality except for one restaurant in - the village, which will be selected by the Rural Councillor’s - office (_Landratsamt_), and then only one day per week. The day, - which is determined as the day to visit the restaurant, will - also be determined by the _Landratsamt_. This regulation does - not change the curfew regulation mentioned above under No. 2. - - “7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly - prohibited, and where it is established, it must be reported. - - “8. Gatherings of farmworkers of Polish nationality after work - is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or - in the living quarters of the Poles. - - “9. The use of railroads, buses or other public conveyances by - farmworkers of Polish nationality is prohibited. - - “10. Permits to leave the village may only be granted in very - exceptional cases, by the local police authority (Mayor’s - office). However, in no case may it be granted if he wants to - visit a public agency on his own, whether it is a labor office - or the District Peasants Association or whether he wants to - change his place of employment. - - “11. Arbitrary change of employment is strictly prohibited. The - farmworkers of Polish nationality have to work daily so long as - the interests of the enterprise demands it, and as it is - demanded by the employer. There are no time limits to the - working time. - - “12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment - toward farmworkers of Polish nationality, if instructions and - good words fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any - such case by an official agency. - - “13. Farmworkers of Polish nationality should, if possible, be - removed from the community of the home and they can be quartered - in stables, etc. No remorse whatever should restrict such - action. - - “14. Report to the authorities is compulsory in all cases, when - crimes have been committed by farmworkers of Polish nationality, - which are to sabotage the enterprise or slow down work, for - instance unwillingness to work, impertinent behavior; it is - compulsory even in minor cases. An employer, who loses his Pole - who must serve a longer prison sentence because of such a - compulsory report, will receive another Pole from the competent - labor office on request with preference. - - “15. In all other cases, only the state police is still - competent. - - “For the employer himself, severe punishment is contemplated if - it is established that the necessary distance from farmworkers - of Polish nationality has not been kept. The same applies to - women and girls. Extra rations are strictly prohibited. - Noncompliance to the Reich tariffs for farmworkers of Polish - nationality will be punished by the competent labor office by - the taking away of the worker.” (_EC-68_) - -The women of the conquered territories were led away against their will -to serve as domestics. Sauckel described this program as follows: - - “* * * In order to relieve considerably the German housewife, - especially the mother with many children and the extremely busy - farmwoman, and in order to avoid any further danger to their - health, the Fuehrer also charged me with procurement of - 400,000-500,000 selected, healthy and strong girls from the - territories of the East for Germany.” (_016-PS_) - -Once captured, these Eastern women, by order of Sauckel, were bound to -the household to which they were assigned, permitted at the most three -hours of freedom a week, and denied the right to return to their homes. -The decree issued by Sauckel containing instructions for housewives -concerning Eastern household workers, provides in part, as follows: - - “* * * There is no claim for free time. Female domestic workers - from the East may, on principle, leave the household only to - take care of domestic tasks. As a reward for good work, however, - they may be given the opportunity to stay outside the home - without work for 3 hours once a week. This leave must end with - the onset of darkness, at the latest at 20:00 hours. It is - prohibited to enter restaurants, movies, or other theatres and - similar establishments provided for German or foreign workers. - Attending church is also prohibited. Special events may be - arranged for Eastern domestics in urban homes by the German - Workers’ Front, for Eastern domestics in rural homes by the - Reich Food Administration with the German Women’s League - (_Deutsches Frauenwerk_). Outside the home, the Eastern domestic - must always carry her work card as a personal pass. - - “10. Vacations, Return to Homes. - - “Vacations are not granted as yet. The recruiting of Eastern - domestics is for an indefinite period.” (_3044-B-PS_) - -At all times the shadow of the Gestapo and the concentration camp -hovered over the enslaved workers. As with the other major programs of -the Nazi conspirators, Himmler’s black-shirted SS formations were the -instruments employed for enforcement. A secret order dated 20 February -1942, issued by Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler to SD and security police -officers spells out the violence which was applied against the Eastern -workers. (_3040-PS_): - - “III. Combatting violations against discipline. - - “(1) According to the equal status of the manpower from the - original Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a - strict discipline must be exercised in the quarters and at the - working place. Violations against discipline, including work - refusal and loafing at work, will be fought exclusively by the - secret State police. The smaller cases will be settled by the - leader of the guard according to instruction of the State police - administration offices with measures as provided for in the - enclosure. To break acute resistance, the guards shall be - permitted to use also physical power against the manpower. But - this may be done only for a cogent cause. - - The manpower should always be informed about the fact that they - will be treated decently when conducting themselves with - discipline and accomplishing good work. - - “(2) In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures - at the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the - State police office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they - will be treated, as a rule, only with strict measures, that is - with transfer to a concentration camp or with special treatment. - - “(3) The transfer to a concentration camp is done in the usual - manner. - - “(4) In especially severe cases special treatment is to be - requested at the Reich Security Main Office, stating personnel - data and the exact history of the act. - - “(5) Special treatment is hanging. It should not take place in - the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of manpower - from the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the - special treatment; at that time they are warned about the - circumstances which led to this special treatment. - - “(6) Should special treatment be required within the camp for - exceptional reasons of camp discipline, this is also to be - requested.” - - * * * * * * - - “VI. Sexual Intercourse. - - “Sexual intercourse is forbidden to the manpower of the original - Soviet Russian territory. By means of their closely confined - quarters they have no opportunity for it. Should sexual - intercourse be exercised nevertheless—especially among the - individually employed manpower on the farms—the following is - directed: - - “(1) For every case of sexual intercourse with German countrymen - or women, special treatment is to be requested for male manpower - from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a - concentration camp for female manpower. - - “(2) When exercising sexual intercourse with other foreign - workers, the conduct of the manpower from the original Soviet - Russian territory is to be punished as severe violation of - discipline with transfer to a concentration camp.” - - * * * * * * - - “VIII. Search. - - “(1) Fugitive workers from the original Soviet Russian territory - are to be announced principally in the German search book - (_Fanndungsbuch_). Furthermore, search measures are to be - decreed locally. - - “(2) When caught, the fugitive must receive special treatment * - * *.” (_3040-PS_) - - 6. USE OF SLAVE LABOR IN GERMAN WAR INDUSTRIES - -The primary purpose of the slave labor program was to compel the people -of the occupied countries to work for the German war economy. The decree -appointing Sauckel Plenipotentiary-General for Manpower declares the -purpose of the appointment to be to facilitate acquisition of the -manpower required for German war industries, and in particular the -armaments industry, by centralizing under Sauckel responsibility for the -recruitment and allocation of foreign labor and prisoners of war in -these industries (_1666-PS_). This decree, signed by Hitler, Lammers and -Keitel, and dated 21 March 1942, provides: - - “In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war - industries as a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is - necessary that the utilization of all available manpower, - including that of workers recruited (_angeworbenen_) abroad and - of prisoners of war, should be subject to a uniform control, - directed in a manner appropriate to the requirements of war - industry, and further that all still incompletely utilized - manpower in the Greater German Reich, including the - Protectorate, and in the General Government and in the occupied - territories should be mobilized. - - “_Reichsstatthalter_ and _Gauleiter_ Fritz Sauckel will carry - out this task within the framework of the Four Year Plan, as - Plenipotentiary General, for the utilization of labor. In that - capacity he will be directly responsible to the Commissioner for - the Four Year Plan. - - “Section III (Wages) and Section V (Utilization of labor) of the - Reich Labor Ministry, together with their subordinate - authorities, will be placed at the disposal of the - Plenipotentiary General for the accomplishment of his task.” - (_1666-PS_) - -Sauckel’s success can be gauged from a letter he wrote to Hitler on 15 -April 1943, containing a report on one year’s activities: - - “1. After one year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the - Direction of Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign - workers were given to the German war economy from 1 April of - last year to 31 March this year. - - “2. The 3,638,056 are distributed amongst the following branches - of the German war economy - - Armament—1,568,801.” (_407-VI-PS_) - -Further evidence of this use of enslaved foreign labor is found in a -report of a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 16 February 1944, -during which Field Marshal Milch stated: - - “The armament industry employs foreign workmen to a large - extent; according to the latest figures—40 percent.” (_R-124_) - -Moreover, according to tabulations of Speer’s Ministry, as of 31 -December 1944 approximately two million civilian foreign workers were -employed directly in the manufacture of armaments and munitions (end -products or components). (_2520-PS_) - -Sauckel, Speer, and Keitel also succeeded in forcing foreign labor to -construct military fortifications. Thus, citizens of France, Holland, -and Belgium were compelled against their will to engage in the -construction of the “Atlantic Wall”. Hitler, in an order dated 8 -September 1942, initialed by Keitel, decreed that: - - “The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be - erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that in - the occupied territory all available workers should be committed - and should give the fullest extent of their productive - capacities. The previous allotment of domestic workers is - insufficient. In order to increase it, I order the introduction - of compulsory labor and the prohibition of changing the place of - employment without permission of the authorities in the occupied - territories. Furthermore, the distribution of food and clothing - ration cards to those subject to labor draft should in the - future depend on the possession of a certificate of employment. - Refusal to accept an assigned job, as well as abandoning the - place of work without the consent of the authorities in charge, - will result in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration - cards. The GBA (Deputy General for _Arbeitseinsatz_) in - agreement with the military commander as well as the Reich - Commissar, will issue the corresponding decrees for execution.” - (_556-2-PS_) - -Sauckel boasted to Hitler concerning the contribution of the forced -labor program to the construction of the Atlantic Wall by Speer’s -Organization Todt (OT). In a letter to Hitler dated 17 May 1943, Sauckel -wrote: - - “* * * In addition to the labor allotted to the total German - economy by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the - Organization Todt was supplied with new labor continually. * * * - - “Thus, the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make - possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall.” (_407-VIII-PS_) - -Similarly, Russian civilians were forced into labor battalions and -compelled to build fortifications to be used against their own -countrymen. A memorandum of the Rosenberg Ministry states that: - - “* * * men and women in the theaters of operations have been and - will be conscripted into labor battalions to be used in the - construction of fortifications * * *.” (_031-PS_) - -In addition, the Nazi conspirators compelled Prisoners of War to engage -in operations of war against their own country and its Allies. At a -meeting of the Central Planning Board held on February 19, 1943, -attended by Speer, Sauckel, and Field Marshal Milch, the following -conversation occurred: - - “Sauckel: If any prisoners are taken, there, they will be - needed. - - “Milch: We have made a request for an order that a certain - percentage of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be - Russians. 50,000 will be taken altogether; 30,000 are already - employed as gunners. This is an amusing thing that Russians must - work the guns.” (_R-124_) - -(At this point a series of official German Army photographs were offered -in evidence. The first one shows Russian Prisoners of War acting as -ammunition bearers during the attack upon Tschudowo. The second group -consists of a series of official German Army photographs taken in July -and August 1941 showing Russian prisoners of war in Latvia and the -Ukraine being compelled to load and unload ammunition trains and trucks -and being required to stack ammunition.) - -This use of prisoners of war was in flagrant disregard of the rules of -international law, particularly Article 6 of the Regulations annexed to -Hague Convention Number 4 of 1907, which provides that the tasks of -prisoners of war shall have no connection with the operations of war. - -The Nazi conspirators made extensive use of prisoners of war not only in -active operations of war but also in the German armament industry. A -secret letter from the Reichminister of Labor to the Presidents of the -Regional Labor Exchange Offices refers to an order of Goering to the -effect that: - - “Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are to be - taken from among the French PWs not yet employed in armament - industry, and are to be assigned to the armament industry - (airplanes industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting - therefrom will be filled by Soviet PWs. The transfer of the - above-named French PWs is to be accomplished by 1 October.” - (_3005-PS_) - -A similar policy was followed with respect to Russian prisoners of war. -In a secret memorandum issued from Hitler’s headquarters on 31 October -1942, Keitel directed the execution of Hitler’s order to use such -prisoners in the German war economy (_EC-194_): - - “The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous - hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The - expected relief through discharges from the armed forces is - uncertain as to the extent and date; however, its possible - extent will by no means correspond to expectations and - requirements in view of the great demand. - - “The Fuehrer has now ordered that even the working power of the - Russian prisoner of war should be utilized to a large extent by - large scale assignment for the requirements of the war industry. - The prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment. Also - very small wages are to be planned for the most modest supply - with a few consumers’ goods (_Genussmittel_) for every day’s - life, eventual rewards for production.” - - * * * * * * - - “II. _Construction and Armament Industry._ - - “_a._ Work units for constructions of all kind, particularly for - the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, - unloading units for essential war plants). - - “_b._ Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in - such a way that their personnel should consist in the majority - of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (eventually - after withdrawal and other employment of the German workers). - - “III. _Other War Industries._ - - “_a._ Mining as under II _b._ - - “_b._ Railroad construction units for building tracks etc. - - “_c._ Agriculture and forestry in closed units. The utilization - of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of - above examples by: - - “To I. The armed forces - - “To II. The Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition and the - Inspector General for the German road system in agreement with - the Reich Minister for Labor and Supreme Commander of the Armed - Forces (_Wi Rue Amt_). Deputies of the Reich Minister for Arms - and Ammunition are to be admitted to the prisoner of war camps - to assist in the selection of skilled workers.” (_EC-194_) - -Goering, at a conference at the Air Ministry on 7 November 1941, also -discussed the use of prisoners of war in the armament industry. The Top -Secret notes on Goering’s instructions as to the employment and -treatment of prisoners of war in many phases of the German war industry -read as follows (_1206-PS_): - - “The Fuehrer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of - war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5 - million prisoners of war—employed so far 2 million.” - - * * * * * * - - “For 4) _In the Interior and the Protectorate_, it would be - ideal if entire factories could be manned by Russian PW’s except - the employees necessary for direction. For employment in the - Interior and the Protectorate the following are to have - priority: - - “_a._ _At the top coal mining industry._ - - “Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability - for employment of Russians. At times manning the entire plant - with Russian laborers. - - “_b._ _Transportation_ (construction of locomotives and cars, - repair shops). - - “Railroad-repair and industry workers are to be sought out from - the PW’s. Railroad is most important means of transportation in - the East. - - “_c._ _Armament industries_ - - “Preferably factories of armor and guns. Possibly also - construction of parts for airplane engines. Suitable complete - sections of factories to be manned exclusively by Russians. For - the remainder employment in columns. Use in factories of tool - machinery, production of farm tractors, generators, etc. In - emergency, erect in individual places barracks for occasional - workers which are used as unloading details and similar - purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior through communal - authorities.) - - “OKW/AWA is competent for _transporting_ Russian PW’s employment - through “_Planning Board for Employment of all PW’s_ - (_Planstelle fuer den Einsatz fuer alle Kriegsgefangenen_).” If - necessary, offices of Reich Commissariates. - - “No employment where _danger to men_ or their supply exists, - i.e. factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, - etc. No contact with German population, especially no - ‘solidarity.’ German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians. - - “Food is a matter of the Four Years’ Plan. Supply their own food - (cats, horses, etc.) - - “_Clothes_, _billeting_, _messing_ somewhat better than at home - where part of the people live in caverns. - - “_Supply of shoes_ for Russians as a rule wooden shoes, if - necessary install Russian shoe repair shops. - - “Examination of _physical fitness_, in order to avoid - importation of diseases. - - “_Clearing of mines_ as a rule by Russians if possible by - selected Russian engineers.” (_1206-PS_) - -Speer also sponsored and applied the policy of using prisoners of war in -the armament industry. In a speech to the Nazi Gauleiters on 24 February -1942, Speer said: - - “I therefore proposed to the Fuehrer at the end of December that - all my labor force, including specialists be released for mass - employment in the East. Subsequently the remaining PW’s, about - 10,000 were put at disposal of the armaments industry by me.” - (_1435-PS_) - -Speer also reported at the 36th meeting of the Central Planning Board, -held on 22 April 1943, that only 30% of the Russian prisoners of war -were engaged in the armament industry. This he found unsatisfactory. -Speer continued: - - “There is a specified statement showing in what sectors the - Russian PW’s have been distributed, and this statement is quite - interesting. It shows that the armaments industry only received - 30%. I always complained about this.” - - * * * * * * - - “The 90,000 Russian PW’s employed in the whole of the armaments - industry are for the greatest part skilled men.” (_R-124_) - -Sauckel, who was appointed Plenipotentiary General for the utilization -of labor for the express purpose, among others, of integrating prisoners -of war into the German war industry, made it plain that prisoners of war -were to be compelled to serve the German armament industry. His labor -mobilization program contains the following statement: - - “All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well - as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely - incorporated into the German armament and nutrition industries. - Their production must be brought to the highest possible level.” - (_016-PS_) - - 7. THE CONCENTRATION CAMP PROGRAM OF EXTERMINATION THROUGH WORK - -A special Nazi program combined the brutality and the purposes of the -slave labor program with those of the concentration camp. The Nazis -placed Allied nationals in concentration camps and forced them, along -with the other inmates of the concentration camps, to work in the -armaments industry under conditions designed to exterminate them. This -was the Nazi program of extermination through work. - -The program was initiated in the spring of 1942. It was outlined as -follows in a letter to Himmler, dated 30 April 1942, from his -subordinate Pohl, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS: - - “Today I report about the present situation of the concentration - camps and about measures I have taken to carry out your order of - the 3rd March 1942.” - - * * * * * * - - “1. The war has brought about a marked change in the structure - of the concentration camps and has changed their duties with - regard to the employment of the prisoners. The custody of - prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or - prevention is no longer the main consideration. The mobilization - of all prisoners who are fit for work for purposes of the war - now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace, - come to the foreground more and more. - - “2. From this knowledge some necessary measures result with the - aim to transform the concentration camps into organizations more - suitable for the economic tasks, whilst they were formerly - merely politically interested. - - “3. For this reason I have gathered together all the leaders of - the former inspectorate of Concentration Camps, all Camp - Commanders, and all managers and supervisors of work on the 23rd - and 24th of April, 1942; I have explained personally to them - this new development. I have compiled in the order attached the - main essentials, which have to be brought into effect with the - utmost urgency if the commencement of work for purposes of the - armament industry is not to be delayed.” (_R-129_) - -The order referred to in paragraph 3 above set the framework for a -program of relentless exploitation, providing in part as follows: - - “4. The camp commander alone is responsible for the employment - of the labor available. This employment must be, in the true - meaning of the word, exhaustive, in order to obtain the greatest - measure of performance. Work is allotted by the Chief of the - Department D centrally and alone. The camp-commanders themselves - may not accept on their own initiative work offered by third - parties and may not negotiate about it. - - “5. There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends - on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind - of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp commanders alone. - - “6. Any circumstances which may result in a shortening of - working hours (e.g. meals, roll-calls) have therefore to be - restricted to the minimum which cannot be condensed any more. It - is forbidden to allow long walks to the place of working and - noon intervals only for eating purposes.” (_R-129_) - -This armaments production program was not merely a scheme for mobilizing -the manpower potential of the camps. It was directly integrated into the -larger Nazi program of extermination. A memorandum of an agreement -between Himmler and the Minister of Justice, Thierack sets for the Nazi -objective of extermination through work: - - “* * * 2. The delivery of anti-social elements from the - execution of their sentence to the Reich Fuehrer of SS to be - worked to death. Persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, - Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, - Czechs and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to - the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all the - worst anti-social elements amongst those just mentioned are to - be handed over. I shall inform the Fuehrer of this through - Reichsleiter Bormann.” - - * * * * * * - - “14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of - the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in - future Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians are no - longer to be judged by the ordinary courts, so far as punishable - offenses are concerned, but are to be dealt with by the Reich - Fuehrer of SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor to - Poles whose names are announced or entered in the German Racial - Lists.” (_654-PS_) - -In September, 1942, Speer arranged to bring this new source of labor -within his jurisdiction. Speer convinced Hitler that significant -production could be obtained only if the concentration camp prisoners -were employed in factories under the technical control of the Speer -Ministry instead of in camps. In fact, without Speer’s cooperation, it -would have been difficult to utilize the prisoners on any large scale -for war production since he would not allocate to Himmler the machine -tools and other necessary equipment. Accordingly, it was agreed that the -prisoners were to be exploited in factories under Speer’s control. To -compensate Himmler for surrendering this jurisdiction to Speer, Speer -proposed, and Hitler agreed, that Himmler would receive a share of the -armaments output, fixed in relation to the man hours contributed by his -prisoners. The minutes of Speer’s conference with Hitler on 20, 21, 22 -September 1942, are as follows (_R-124_): - - “* * * I pointed out to the Fuehrer that, apart from an - insignificant amount of work, no possibility exists of - organizing armament production in the concentration camps, - because: - - “1. the machine tools required are missing, - - “2. there are no suitable premises. - - “Both these assets would be available in the armaments industry, - if use could be made of them by a second shift. - - “The Fuehrer agrees to my proposal, that the numerous factories - set up outside towns for ARP reasons, should release their - workers for supplementing the second shift in town factories and - should in return be supplied with labor from the concentration - camps—also two shifts. - - “I pointed out to the Fuehrer the difficulties which I expect to - encounter if Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should be able, as he - requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these - factories. The Fuehrer, too, does not consider such an influence - necessary. - - “The Fuehrer however agrees that Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should - draw advantages from making his prisoners available; he should - get equipment for his division. - - “I suggest to give him a share in kind (war equipment) in ratio - to the working hours done by his prisoners. A 3-5% share is - discussed, the equipment also being calculated according to - working hours. The Fuehrer would agree to such a solution. - - “The Fuehrer is prepared to order the additional delivery of - this equipment and weapons to the SS, according to a list - submitted to him.” (_R-124_) - -After a demand for concentration camp labor had been created, and a -mechanism set up by Speer for exploiting this labor in armament -factories, measures were evolved for increasing the supply of victims -for extermination through work. A steady flow was assured by the -agreement between Himmler and the Minister of Justice mentioned above. -This was implemented by such programs as the following, expressed in -Sauckel’s letter of 26 November 1942 to Presidents of Landes Employment -Offices regarding the program for the evacuation of Poles from the -Lublin district: - - “The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure - will be put into concentration camps and put to work where they - are criminal or asocial elements.” (_L-61_) - -General measures were supplemented by special drives for persons who -would not otherwise have been sent to concentration camps. For example, -for “reasons of war necessity” Himmler ordered on 17 December 1942 that -at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work should be transferred -immediately to concentration camps, (_1063-D-PS_). The order provided -that: - - “For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here, - the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police on 14 - December 1942 has ordered that until the end of January 1943, at - least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work, are to be sent to the - concentration camps. In order to reach this number, the - following measures are required: - - “1. As of now (so far until 1 Feb. 1943) all eastern workers or - such foreign workers who have been fugitives, or who have broken - contracts, and who do not belong to allied, friendly or neutral - States are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest - concentration camps * * *. - - “2. The commanders and the commandants of the security police - and the security service, and the chiefs of the State Police - Headquarters will check immediately on the basis of a close and - strict ruling - - _a._ the prisons - - _b._ the labor reformatory camps - - “All prisoners qualified for work, if it is essentially and - humanly possible, will be committed at once to the nearest - concentration camp, according to the following instructions, for - instance also if penal procedures were to be established in the - near future. Only such prisoners who in the interest of - investigation procedures are to remain absolutely in solitary - confinement can be left there. - - “_Every single laborer counts!_” (_1063-D-PS_) - -Measures were also adopted to insure that extermination through work was -practiced with maximum efficiency. Subsidiary concentration camps were -established near important war plants. Speer has admitted that he -personally toured Upper Austria and selected sites for concentration -camps near various munitions factories in the area. This admission -appears in the transcript of an interrogation of Speer under oath on 18 -October 1945, in which Speer stated: - - “The fact that we were anxious to use workers from concentration - camps in factories and to establish small concentration camps - near the factories in order to use the manpower that was - available there was a general fact. But it did not only come up - in connection with this trip.” [i.e. Speer’s trip to Austria]. - (_3720-PS_) - -Goering endorsed this use of concentration camp labor and asked for -more. In a teletype which Goering sent to Himmler on 14 February 1944, -he stated: - - “At the same time I ask you to put at my disposal as great a - number of concentration camp (KZ-) convicts as possible for air - armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful - according to previous experience. The situation of the air war - makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of - this kind concentration camp (KZ-) convicts can be especially - well concentrated at work and in the camp.” (_1584-I-PS_) - -Speer subsequently assumed responsibility for this program, and Hitler -promised Speer that if the necessary labor for the program could not be -obtained, a hundred thousand Hungarian Jews would be brought in by the -SS. Speer’s record of conferences with Hitler on April 6 and 7, 1944, -contain the following quotation: - - “* * * Suggested to the Fuehrer that, due to lack of builders - and equipment, the second big building project should not be set - up in German territory, but in close vicinity to the border on - suitable soil (preferable on gravel base and with transport - facilities) on French, Belgian or Dutch territory. The Fuehrer - agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set up behind a - fortified zone. For the suggestion of setting this plant up in - French territory speaks mainly the fact that it would be much - easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the - Fuehrer asks an attempt be made to set up the second works in a - safer area, namely in the Protectorate. If it should prove - impossible there, too, to get hold of the necessary workers, the - Fuehrer himself will contact the Reichsfuehrer SS and will give - an order that the required 100,000 men are to be made available - by bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the fact that the - building organization of the _Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien - Silesia_ was a failure, the Fuehrer demands that these works - must be built by the O.T. exclusively and that the workers - should be made available by the Reichsfuehrer SS. He wants to - hold a meeting shortly in order to discuss details with all the - men concerned.” (_R-124_) - -The character of the treatment inflicted on Allied nationals and other -victims of concentration camps while they were being worked to death is -described in an official report prepared by a U.S. Congressional -Committee which inspected the liberated camps at the request of General -Eisenhower (_L-159_). The report states in part: - - “* * * The treatment accorded to these prisoners in the - concentration camps was generally as follows: They were herded - together in some wooden barracks not large enough for one-tenth - of their number. They were forced to sleep on wooden frames - covered with wooden boards in tiers of two, three and even four, - sometimes with no covering, sometimes with a bundle of dirty - rags serving both as pallet and coverlet. - - “Their food consisted generally of about one-half of a pound of - black bread per day and a bowl of watery soup for noon and - night, and not always that. Owing to the great numbers crowded - into a small space and to the lack of adequate sustenance, lice - and vermin multiplied, disease became rampant, and those who did - not soon die of disease or torture began the long, slow process - of starvation. Notwithstanding the deliberate starvation program - inflicted upon these prisoners by lack of adequate food, we - found no evidence that the people of Germany as a whole were - suffering from any lack of sufficient food or clothing. The - contrast was so striking that the only conclusion which we could - reach was that the starvation of the inmates of these camps was - deliberate. - - “Upon entrance into these camps, newcomers were forced to work - either at an adjoining war factory or were placed ‘in commando’ - on various jobs in the vicinity, being returned each night to - their stall in the barracks. Generally a German criminal was - placed in charge of each ‘block’ or shed in which the prisoners - slept. Periodically he would choose the one prisoner of his - block who seemed the most alert or intelligent or showed the - most leadership qualities. These would report to the guards’ - room and would never be heard from again. The generally-accepted - belief of the prisoners was that these were shot or gassed or - hanged and then cremated. A refusal to work or an infraction of - the rules usually meant flogging and other types of torture, - such as having the fingernails pulled out, and in each case - usually ended in death after extensive suffering. The policies - herein described constituted a calculated and diabolical program - of planned torture and extermination on the part of those who - were in control of the German Government * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “On the whole, we found this camp to have been operated and - administered much in the same manner as Buchenwald had been - operated and managed. When the efficiency of the workers - decreased as a result of the conditions under which they were - required to live, their rations were decreased as punishment. - This brought about a vicious circle in which the weak became - weaker and were ultimately exterminated.” (_L-159_) - -Such was the cycle of work, torture, starvation and death for -concentration camp labor—labor which Goering, while requesting that -more of it be placed at his disposal, said had proved very useful; labor -which Speer was “anxious” to use in the factories under his control. - - 8. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUCKEL - -Sauckel bears special responsibility for the Nazi slave labor program -and the manner in which it was executed. Sauckel was appointed as -Plenipotentiary General for Manpower because he was an old and trusted -Nazi. He has certified, on 17 November 1945, that he held the following -positions: - - “1. Member of _Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei_ - (1925-1945). (Member of National Socialist German Workers Party. - Member No. 1395.) - - 2. Member of Reichstag (_Mitglied des Reichstags_) (1933-1945). - - 3. Gauleiter of Thuringia (1927-1945). - - 4. Member of Thuringian legislature (_Landtag_) (1927-1933/34). - - 5. Minister of Interior and head of Thuringian State Ministry - (May 1933). - - 6. _Reichsstatthalter_ for Thuringia (1933-1945). - - 7. SA Obergruppenfuehrer (November 1937-1945). - - 8. SS Obergruppenfuehrer (January 1942-1945). - - 9. Administrator Berlin-Suhler Waffen & Fahrzeugwerke (1935). - - 10. Head of Gustloff-Werke Nationalsozialistische - Industrie-Stiftung (1936). Honorary Head of Foundation. - - 11. General Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation - (_Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz_) (21 March - 1942-1945).” (_2974-PS_) - -Sauckel’s official responsibilities are borne out by other evidence. His -appointment as Plenipotentiary-General for Manpower was effected by a -decree of 21 March 1942 signed by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel. By that -decree (_1666-PS_) Sauckel was given authority as well as responsibility -subordinate only to that of Hitler and Goering for all matters relating -to recruitment, allocation, and handling of foreign and domestic -manpower. Goering, to whom Sauckel was directly responsible, abolished -the recruitment and allocation agencies for the Four Year Plan, -delegated their powers to Sauckel and placed his far-reaching authority, -as deputy for the Four Year Plan, at Sauckel’s disposal. This was the -result of Goering’s decree dated 27 March 1942 (_1666-PS_) and providing -as follows: - - “In pursuance of the Fuehrer’s Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I, - 179), I decree as follows: - - “1. My manpower sections (_Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz_) - are hereby abolished (circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/St M. Dev. - 265). Their duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower, - regulations for labor conditions (_Arbeitsbedingungen_)) are - taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz, - who is directly under me. - - “2. The Plenipotentiary General for _Arbeitseinsatz_ will be - responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) - employed in the Reich Territory, having regard to the - requirements of _Arbeitseinsatz_. - - “3. The Plenipotentiary General for _Arbeitseinsatz_ is part of - the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required, - or existing laws required to be modified, he will submit - appropriate proposals to me. - - “4. The Plenipotentiary General for _Arbeitseinsatz_ will have - at his disposal for the performance of his task the right - delegated to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the - higher Reich authorities, their branches and the Party offices, - and their associated organisms and also the Reich Protector, the - General Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil - administrations. In the case of ordinances and instructions of - fundamental importance a report is to be submitted to me in - advance.” (_1666-PS_) - -By a Hitler decree of 30 September 1942 Sauckel was given extraordinary -powers over the civil and military authorities of the territories -occupied by Germany. The decree (_1903-PS_) provided as follows: - - “I herewith authorize the Deputy General for the - _Arbeitseinsatz_, Reich-governor and district leader (Gauleiter) - Fritz Sauckel to take all necessary measures for the enforcement - of my decree referring to a Deputy General for the - _Arbeitseinsatz_ of 21 March 1942 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, I, page - 179) according to his own judgment in the Greater German Reich, - in the Protectorate, and in the Government General - (_General-gouvernement_) as well as in the occupied territories, - measures which will safeguard under all circumstances the - regulated deployment of labor (_Geordneter Arbeitseinsatz_) for - the German war-economy. For this purpose he may appoint - commissioners (_Beauftragte_) to the bureaux of the military and - civilian administration. These are subordinated directly to - Deputy General for the _Arbeitseinsatz_. In order to carry out - their tasks, they are entitled to issue directives to the - competent military and civilian authorities in charge of the - _Arbeitseinsatz_ and of wage-policy. - - “More detailed directives will be issued by the Deputy General - for the _Arbeitseinsatz_. - - “Fuehrer-Headquarters, 30 Sept. 1942. - - “The Fuehrer - “(signed) Adolph Hitler.” (_1903-PS_) - -Within a month after his appointment, Sauckel sent Rosenberg his “Labor -Mobilization Program”, which might more appropriately be termed -Sauckel’s “Charter of Enslavement.” This program envisaged the forcible -recruitment and the maximum exploitation of the entire labor resources -of the conquered areas and of prisoners of war in the interests of the -Nazi war machine, at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure to the -German State. Sauckel explained his plans in these terms: - - “It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous - number of foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The - greatest pool for that purpose are the occupied territories of - the East. Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the - human reserves of the Conquered Soviet Territory to the fullest - extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount - of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute - conscription or forced labor. - - “Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied - territories, we must, therefore, requisition skilled or - unskilled male and female labor from the Soviet territory from - the age of 15 up for the labor mobilization * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the - use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men - and women, has become an undisputable necessity for the solution - of the mobilization of labor program in this war.” (_016-PS_) - -Sauckel proceeded to implement this “Charter of Enslavement” with -certain basic directives. In Regulation No. 4, which he issued on 7 May -1942, Sauckel provided that if voluntary recruitment of foreign workers -was unsuccessful, compulsory service should be instituted. This -regulation provides: - - “The recruitment of foreign labor will be done on the - fundamental basis of volunteering. Where, however, in the - occupied territories the appeal for volunteers does not suffice, - obligatory service and drafting must, under all circumstances, - be resorted to. This is an indisputable requirement of our labor - situation.” (_3044-PS_) - -Sauckel provided also for the allocation of foreign labor in the order -of its importance to the Nazi war machine. Sauckel’s regulation No. 10 -of 22 August 1942 had these aims: - - “* * * 3. The resources of manpower that are available in the - occupied territories are to be employed primarily to satisfy the - requirements of importance for the war, in Germany itself. In - allocating the said labor resources in the Occupied Territories, - the following order of priority will be observed: - - “(_a_) Labor required for the troops, the occupation - authorities, and the civil authorities; - - “(_b_) Labor required for the German armaments (_Ruestungen_); - - “(_c_) Labor required for food and agriculture; - - “(_d_) Labor required for industrial work other than armaments, - which is in the interest of Germany; - - “(_e_) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of - the population of the territory in question.” (_3044-A-PS_) - -Sauckel and agencies subordinate to him exercised exclusive authority -over the recruitment of workers from every area in Europe occupied by, -controlled by, or friendly to the German nation. Sauckel affirmed this -authority in the following decree: - - “The recruitment of foreign labor in the areas occupied by - Germany, in allied, friendly or neutral states will be carried - out exclusively by my commissioners, or by the competent German - military or civil agencies for the tasks of labor mobilization.” - - * * * * * * - - “For the carrying out of recruitment in allied, friendly or - neutral foreign countries, my commissioners are solely - responsible.” (_3044-PS_) - -Sauckel participated in the formulation of overall labor requirements -for Germany and assigned quotas to be filled by and with the assistance -of the individuals and agencies mentioned above, with knowledge that -force and brutality were the only means whereby his demands could be -met. Thus, the Lammer’s report states (_1292-PS_): - - “1. A conference took place with the Fuehrer today which was - attended by: - - “The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor Gauleiter - Sauckel, - - “The Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer, - - “The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field - Marshal Keitel, General Field Marshal Milch, - - “The Acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture State - Secretary Backe, - - “The Minister of the Interior, Reichfuehrer SS Himmler, and - myself. - - (The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National - Economy had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate - prior to the Conference, but the Fuehrer did not wish their - attendance.) - - “The Fuehrer declared in his introductory remarks: - - ‘I want a clear picture: - - (1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of - German War Economy? - - (_a_) For the maintenance of present output? - - (_b_) To increase its output? - - (2) How many workers can be obtained from Occupied - Countries, or how many can still be gained in the Reich - by suitable means (increased output)? For one thing, it - is this matter of making up for losses by death, - infirmity, the constant fluctuation of workers, and so - forth, and further it is a matter of procuring - additional workers.’ - - “The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Sauckel, - declared that, in order to maintain the present pool of workers, - he would have to add at least 2½ but probably 3 million new - workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall off. - Reichsminister Speer declared that he needs an additional 1.3 - million laborers. However, this would depend on whether it will - be possible to increase production of iron ore. Should this not - be possible, he would need no additional workers. Procurement of - additional workers from Occupied Territory would, however, be - subject to the condition that these workers will not be - withdrawn from armament and auxiliary industries already working - there. For this would mean a decrease of production of these - industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for instance, who - are already working in France in industries mentioned above, - must be protected against being sent to work in Germany by the - Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor. The Fuehrer agreed - with the opinions of Reichsminister Speer and emphasized that - the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of - Labor should order no circumstances which would lead to the - withdrawal of workers from armament and auxiliary industries - working in occupied territories, because such a shift of workers - would only cause disturbance of production in occupied - countries. - - “The Fuehrer further called attention to the fact that at least - 250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air - attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna - alone, 2,000-2,500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary - for the Employment of Labor must add at least 4 million workers - to the manpower pool, considering that he requires 2½ million - workers for maintenance of the present level, that Reich - Minister Speer needs 1.3 million additional workers, and that - the above-mentioned preparations for security measures against - air attacks call for 0.25 million laborers.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Reichsfuehrer SS explained that the enforcement agents put - at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping - the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working - them harder. The Reichsfuehrer SS made immediately available - 2,000 to 2,500 men from concentration camps for air raid - preparations in Vienna.” - - * * * * * * - - “_Results of the Conference_: - - “(1) The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor shall procure - at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories.” - (_1292-PS_) - -Moreover, Sauckel, in requesting the assistance of the Army for the -recruitment of 1,000,000 men and women from the occupied Eastern -territories, informed Keitel that prompt action was required; and that, -as in all other occupied countries, pressure had to be used if other -measures were not successful (_3012-PS_). Finally, Sauckel was informed -by Rosenberg that the enslavement of foreign labor was achieved by force -and brutality (_018-PS_). Notwithstanding his knowledge of conditions, -Sauckel continued to request greater supplies of manpower from the areas -in which the most ruthless methods had been applied. Indeed, when German -Field Commanders on the Eastern Front attempted to resist Sauckel’s -demands, because forced recruitment was swelling the ranks of the -partisans and making the army’s task more difficult, Sauckel sent a -telegram to Hitler, dated 10 March 1943, in which he implored him to -intervene: - - “Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which - oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of - workers in the East is not possible any more, then the German - war industry and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the - full extent.” (_407-II-PS_) - -In addition to being responsible for the recruitment of foreign civilian -labor by force, Sauckel was responsible for the conditions under which -foreign workers were deported to Germany and for the treatment to which -they were subjected within Germany. The conditions under which Sauckel’s -slaves were transported to Germany, were known to Sauckel (_2241-PS_). -Moreover, he accepted responsibility for these conditions. Regulation -Number 4 of 7 May 1942, issued by Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for -the Mobilization of Labor, deals with recruitment, care, lodging, -feeding, and treatment of foreign workers of both sexes (_3044-PS_). By -this decree, Sauckel expressly directed that the assembly and operation -of rail transports and the supplying of food therefor was the -responsibility of his agents until the transports arrived in Germany. By -the same regulation, Sauckel directed that within Germany the care of -foreign industrial workers was to be carried out by the German Labor -Front and that care of foreign agricultural workers was to be carried -out by the Reich Food Administration. By the terms of the regulation, -Sauckel reserved for himself ultimate responsibility for all aspects of -care, treatment, lodging, and feeding of foreign workers while in -transit to and within Germany. The regulation reads (_3044-PS_): - - “The care of foreign labor will be carried out. - - “_a._ up to the Reichs border - “by my commissioners or—in the occupied areas by the competent - military or civil labor mobilization agencies. Care of the labor - will be carried out in cooperation with the respective competent - foreign organization. - - “_b._ Within the area of the Reich - “1. By the German Labor Front in the cases of non-agricultural - workers. - “2. By the Reich Food administration in the case of agricultural - workers. - “The German Labor Front and the German Food Administration are - bound by my directives in the carrying out of their tasks of - caring for the workers. - - “The agencies of the labor mobilization administration are to - give far-reaching support to the German Labor Front and the - German Food Administration in the fulfillment of their assigned - tasks. - - “My competence for the execution of the care of foreign labor is - not prejudiced by the assignment of these tasks to the German - Labor Front and the Reichs Food Administration.” - - * * * * * * - - “_b._ Composition and operation of the transports. - - “The composition and operations of the transports up to the - place of work is the task of my representatives, in the occupied - territories of the labor mobilization agencies of the military - and civil administration. In the countries in which foreign - representatives are to direct the transports up to the frontier, - the German recruiting agency must take part in the supervision - and care of the transports.” - - * * * * * * - - “_c._ Supply for the Transports. - - “The food supply for the industrial workers in transit within - the Reich, is the duty of the (DAF) German workers front, office - for labor mobilization. - - For the rest, my offices effect the supply for the transport.” - (_3044-PS_) - -Sauckel, in an agreement with Ley, the head of the German Labor Front -(DAF) dated 2 June 1943, again emphasized his ultimate responsibility by -creating a central inspectorate charged with examining the working and -living conditions of foreign workers, and reporting thereon to Sauckel’s -agency (_1913-PS_). The agreement reads in part as follows: - - “* * * 2. The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, - Reichsorganisationleiter Dr. Ley, in collaboration with the - Plenipotentiary General for the _Arbeitseinsatz_, Gauleiter - Sauckel, will establish a ‘central inspection’ for the - continuous supervision of all measures concerning the care of - the foreign workers mentioned under 1. This will have the - designation: - - ‘Central inspection for care of foreign workers.’ - - “The central inspection for the care of foreign workers - exercises its functions upon directives and in the name of the - Plenipotentiary General for the _Arbeitseinsatz_ and of the - Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front. In order to avoid all - duplication of work, it will be its sole responsibility, to - scrutinize all measures taken for the care of foreign workers - employed in the factories and camps, also to remove immediately - all defects discovered—as far as possible—on the spot and to - issue the necessary instructions for this. - - “The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the - _Arbeitseinsatz_ to empower the members of his staff and the - presidents of the state employment offices to get direct - information on the conditions regarding the employment of - foreigners in the factories and camps, will remain untouched. - - “3. The central inspection for the care of foreign workers will - be continuously in touch with the main office VI of the - Plenipotentiary General for the _Arbeitseinsatz_. It will - instruct the office on the general observations made and will - make suggestions for changes, if that should become necessary. - - “4. The offices of the administration of the _Arbeitseinsatz_ - will be constantly informed by the ‘central inspection for the - care of foreign workers’ of its observations, in particular - immediately in each case in which action of State organizations - seems to be necessary.” (_1913-PS_) - -Sauckel was also responsible for compelling citizens of the occupied -countries against their will to manufacture implements of war for use in -operations against their own country and its allies. These functions -were included in the terms of Sauckel’s appointment. (_1666-PS_) - -In a series of reports to Hitler, Sauckel described how successful he -had been in carrying out his program. One such report, dated 14 April -1943, states that in a single year Sauckel had incorporated 1,622,829 -prisoners of war into the German economy: - - “My Fuehrer, - - * * * * * * - - “1. After having been active as Plenipotentiary for - _Arbeitseinsatz_ for one year I have the honor to report to you - that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added to the German - war economy between April 1st. of the last year and March 31st - of this year.” - - * * * * * * - - “Besides the foreign civilian workers another 1,622,829 - prisoners of war are employed in the German economy.” - (_407-V-PS_) - -A subsequent report dated 3 June 1943, states that 846,511 additional -foreign laborers and prisoners of war were incorporated into the German -war industry: - - “My Fuehrer: - - “1. I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of - the _Arbeitseinsatz_ for the first five months of 1943. For the - first time the following number of new foreign laborers and - prisoners of war were employed in the German war industry: * * * - Total: 846,511”. (_407-IX-PS_) - - 9. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL CONSPIRATORS - -In addition, the following conspirators who were informed by Sauckel of -the quotas of foreign laborers which he required, collaborated with -Sauckel and his agents in filling these quotas: - -A. _Keitel, Chief of the OKW._ - -The record of a telephone conversation of the Chief of the Economic -Staff East of the German Army, dated 11 March 1943, reads in part as -follows (_3012-PS_): - - “The plenipotentiary for the _Arbeitseinsatz_, Gauleiter - Sauckel, points out to me in an urgent teletype, that the - _Arbeitseinsatz_ in German agriculture as well as all the most - urgent armament programs, ordered by the Fuehrer, make the most - rapid procurement of approx. 1 million women and men from the - newly occupied territories an imperative necessity. For this - purpose, Gauleiter Sauckel demands the shipment of 5,000 workers - daily beginning 15 March, 10,000 workers male and female - beginning 1 April from the newly occupied territories. - - “The daily quota of 5,000 (10,000) workers was distributed with - the consent of the GBA as follows: - - Reich Commissioner Ukraine daily 3,000 (6,000) workers. - - Wl Jn South daily 1,000 (2,000) workers. - - Wl Jn Center daily 500 (1,000) workers. - - Commissioner General White Ruthenia daily 500 (1,000) workers. - - “In consideration of the extraordinary losses of workers, which - occurred in German war industry because of the developments of - the past months, it is now necessary, that the recruiting of - workers be taken up again everywhere with all emphasis. The - tendency momentarily noticeable in that territory, to limit - and/or entirely stop the Reich recruiting program is absolutely - not bearable in view of this state of affairs. Gauleiter - Sauckel, who is informed about these events, has because of - this, turned immediately to General Fieldmarshal Keitel on 10 - March 1943, in a teletype, and has emphasized on this occasion, - that, as in all other occupied territories, there, where all - other methods fail, by order of the Fuehrer a certain pressure - must be used.” (_3012-PS_) - -Confirmation of Keitel’s collaboration with Sauckel is also found in the -transcript of an interrogation under oath of Sauckel held on the morning -of 5 October 1945: - - “Q. Was it necessary in order to accomplish the completion of - the quotas given to have liaison with the OKW? - - “A. I remember that the Fuehrer had given directives to Marshal - Keitel, telling him that my task was a very important one, and - I, too, have often conferred with Keitel after such discussions - with the Fuehrer, when I asked him for his support. - - “Q. It was his task to supervise the proper performance of the - military commanders in the occupied countries in carrying out - their missions, was it not? - - “A. Yes, the Fuehrer had told me that he would inform the Chief - of the OKW, and the Chief of the Reichs chancellery, as to these - missions. The same applies to the Foreign Minister.” (_3722-PS_) - -B. _Alfred Rosenberg, Reichs Minister for the Occupied Eastern -Territories._ - -The following colloquy is taken from the transcript of an interrogation -under oath of Alfred Rosenberg on the afternoon of 6 October 1945: - - “Q. Isn’t it a fact, that Sauckel would allocate to the various - areas under your jurisdiction the number of persons to be - obtained for labor purposes? - - “A. Yes. - - “Q. And that thereafter, your agents would obtain that labor, in - order to meet the quota which had been given; isn’t that right? - - “A. Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which one - couldn’t fulfill unless one looked very closely into the matter. - - “Q. Never mind about Sauckel’s desires being far-reaching or not - being far-reaching. That has nothing to do with it. You were - given quotas for the areas over which you had jurisdiction, and - it was up to you to meet that quota? - - “A. Yes; it was the responsibility of the administrative - officials to receive this quota and to distribute the allotments - over the districts in such a way, according to number and - according to the age groups, so they would be most reasonably - met. - - “Q. These administrative officials were part of your - organization, isn’t that right? - - “A. They were functionaries or officials of the Reichskommissar - for the Ukraine, but, as such, they were placed in their office - by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories.” - (_3719-PS_) - -Corroboration is to be found in letters written by Sauckel to Rosenberg -requesting the latter’s assistance in the recruitment of additional -foreign laborers. (_017-PS_; _019-PS_) - -C. _Seyss-Inquart, Reichscommissar for the Occupied Netherlands._ - -The transcript of an interrogation under oath of Sauckel on the morning -of 5 October 1945, reads in part, as follows: - - “Q. For a moment, I want to turn our attention to Holland. It is - my understanding that the quotas for the workers from Holland - were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to the - Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to fulfill, is that correct? - - “A. Yes, that is correct. - - “Q. After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his - mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives; was - it not? - - “A. Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do and the - same applied to other countries.” (_3722-PS_) - -D. _Frank, Governor-General of the Government-General of Poland._ - -The transcript of interrogation under oath of Sauckel on the morning of -5 October 1945 reveals the part played by Frank: - - “Q. Was the same procedure substantially followed of allocating - quotas in the General Government Poland? - - “A. Yes. I have to basically state again that the only - possibility I had in carrying through these missions was to get - in touch with the highest German military authority in the - respective country and to transfer to them the orders of the - Fuehrer and ask them very urgently, as I have always done, to - fulfill these orders. - - “Q. Such discussions in Poland, of course, were with the General - Governor Frank? - - “A. Yes. I spent a morning and afternoon in Krakov twice or - three times, and I personally spoke to General Governor Frank. - Naturally, there was also present Secretary Dr. Goebble.” - (_3722-PS_) - -E. _The SS, as in all matters involving the use of force and brutality, -extended its assistance._ - -This is clearly indicated in Reichschancellor Lammers’ report of a -conference with Hitler attended by, among others, Sauckel, Speer, and -Himmler (the Reichsfuehrer SS). The conference proceeded as follows: - - “The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared - that he will attempt with fanatical determination to obtain - these workers. Until now, he has always kept his promises as to - the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of - intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for - 1944. He will do everything in his powers to furnish the - requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends - primarily on what _German_ enforcement agents will be made - available. His project cannot be carried out with domestic - enforcement agents. The Reichsfuehrer SS explained that the - enforcement agents put at his disposal are extremely few, but - that he would try helping the Sauckel project to succeed by - increasing them and working them harder.” (_1292-PS_) - - 10. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SPEER - -The use of prisoners of war in the manufacture of arms and munitions, -allocated thereto by Sauckel, was confirmed by Speer. Speer stated in an -interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945 that 40% of all prisoners of -war were employed in the production of weapons and munitions and in -subsidiary industries: - - “* * * A. In the last phase of production, that is, in the year - 1944 when everything collapsed, I had 40% of all prisoners of - war employed in the production. I wanted to have this percentage - increased. - - “Q. And when you say employed in the production, you mean in - these subsidiary industries that you have discussed and also in - the production of weapons and munitions, is that right? - - “A. Yes. That is the total extent of my task.” (_3720-PS_) - -The minutes of the 36th Meeting of the Central Planning Board, of 22 -April 1943, report Speer’s statement that: - - “* * * 90,000 Russian prisoners of war employed in the whole of - the armament industry are for the greatest part skilled men.” - (_R-124_) - -Speer actively participated in the planning and execution of the vast -program of forcible deportation and enslavement of the citizens of the -occupied countries. As Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and -Chief of the Organization Todt, both of which positions he acquired on -15 February 1942, and by virtue of his later acquisition of control over -the armament offices of the Army, Navy and Airforce and the production -offices of the Ministry of Economics, Speer was responsible for the -entire war production of the Reich, as well as for the construction of -fortifications and installations for the _Wehrmacht_. Proof of the -positions held by Speer is supplied by his signed statement. (_2980-PS_) - -The industries under Speer’s control were the most important users of -manpower in Germany. According to Sauckel, Speer’s labor requirements -received unconditional priority over all other demands for labor. In an -interrogation under oath on 22nd September 1945, Sauckel stated: - - “The others I only got whatever was left. Because Speer told me - once in the presence of the Fuehrer that I am here to work for - Speer and that mainly I am his man.” (_3721-PS_) - -Speer has admitted under oath that he participated in the discussions -during which the decision to use foreign forced labor was made, that he -concurred in the decision, and that it was the basis for the program of -bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion. The transcript of -the interrogation under oath of Speer, on 18 October 1945, contains the -following colloquy: - - “Q. But is it clear to you Mr. Speer, that in 1942 when the - decisions were being taken concerning the use of forced foreign - labor that you participated in the discussions yourself? - - “A. Yes. - - “Q. So that I take it that the execution of the program of - bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion under - Sauckel was based on earlier decisions that had been taken with - your agreement? - - “A. Yes, but I must point out that only a very small part of the - manpower that Sauckel brought into Germany was made available to - me; a far larger part of it was allocated to other departments - that demanded them.” (_3720-PS_) - -This admission is confirmed by minutes of Speer’s conferences with -Hitler on 10, 11, and 12 August 1942 (_R-124_). In these meetings Speer -related the outcome of negotiations concerning the forcible recruitment -of a million Russian laborers for the German armaments industry, and -stated that Hitler would agree to any necessary compulsion. - -The use of force was again discussed by Hitler and Speer on 4 January -1943. It was decided that stronger measures were to be used to -accelerate the conscription of French civilian workers. (_556-13-PS_). - -Speer demanded foreign workers for the industries under his control and -used these workers with the knowledge that they had been deported by -force and were being compelled to work. Speer has stated under oath, in -an interrogation on 18 October 1945 that: - - “I do not wish to give the impression that I want to deny the - fact that I demanded manpower and foreign manpower from Sauckel - very energetically.” (_3720-PS_) - -Speer also admitted, in the course of the same interrogation, that he -knew he was obtaining foreign labor, a large part of which was forced -labor: - - “Q. So that during the period when you were asking for labor, it - seems clear, does it not, that you knew that you were obtaining - foreign labor as well as domestic labor in response to your - requests and that a large part of the foreign labor was forced - labor. - - “A. Yes. - - “Q. So that, simply by way of illustration, suppose that on - January 1, 1944 you required 50,000 workers for a given purpose, - would you put in a requisition for 50,000 workers, knowing that - in that 50,000 there would be forced foreign workers? - - “A. Yes.” (_3720-PS_) - -Speer has furthermore stated under oath that he knew at least as early -as September 1942 that workers from the Ukraine were being forcibly -deported for labor in Germany. He also knew that the great majority of -the workers of the Western occupied countries were slave laborers forced -against their will to come to Germany. These facts are revealed in his -interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945: - - “Q. When did you first find out then that some of the manpower - from the Ukraine was not coming voluntarily? - - “A. It is rather difficult to answer this here, that is, to name - a certain date to you. However, it is certain that I knew that - at some particular point of time that the manpower from the - Ukraine did not come voluntarily. - - “Q. And does that apply also to the manpower from other occupied - countries, that is, did there come a time when you knew that - they were not coming voluntarily? - - “A. Yes. - - “Q. When, in general, would you say that time was, without - placing a particular month of the year? - - “A. As far as the Ukraine situation goes, I believe that they - did not come voluntarily any more after a few months, because - immense mistakes were made in their treatment by us. I should - say offhand that this time was either in July, August or - September of 1942. - - * * * * * * - - “Q. But many workers did come from the West, did they not, to - Germany? - - “A. Yes. - - “Q. That means then that the great majority of the workers that - came from the Western countries, the Western occupied countries, - came against their will to Germany. - - “A. Yes.” (_3720-PS_) - -This admission is borne out by other evidence. In April 1943 Speer was -informed at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, that in all -countries conscription for work in Germany could be carried out only -with the active assistance of the police, and that the prevailing -methods of recruitment had provoked such violence that many German -recruiting agents had been killed (_R-124_). Again, at a meeting with -Hitler to discuss overall manpower requirements for 1944, Speer was -informed by Sauckel that labor requirements for the German war economy -(including Speer’s requirements of 1,300,000 additional laborers) could -be met only if German enforcement agents were furnished to carry out the -enslavement program in the occupied countries. (_1292-PS_) - -Notwithstanding his knowledge that foreign workers were being -conscripted and deported for use as slave laborers in Germany, Speer -formulated requirements for the foreign workers and requested their -allocation to industries subject to his control. At another meeting of -the Central Planning Board, Speer stated: - - “_Speer_: Now, the labor problem in Germany. I believe it is - still possible to transfer some from the western territories. - The Fuehrer stated only recently he wishes to dissolve these - foreign volunteers as he had the impression that the army groups - were carting around with them a lot of ballast. Therefore, if we - cannot settle this matter ourselves, we shall have to call a - meeting with the Fuehrer to clear up the coal situation. Keitel - and Zeitzler will be invited to attend in order to determine the - number of Russians from the rear army territories who can be - sent to us. However, I see another possibility; we might - organize another drive to screen out workers for the mines from - the Russian Ps/W in the Reich. But this possibility is none too - promising.” (_R-124_) - -At another meeting of the Central Planning Board, Speer rejected a -suggestion that labor for industries under his control be furnished from -German sources instead of from foreign countries, for these reasons: - - “_Speer_: We do it that way: Kehrl collects the demands for - labor necessary to complete the coal-and-iron-plan and - communicates the numbers to Sauckel. Probably there will be a - conference at the Reich Marshal’s in the next week, and an - answer from Sauckel should have arrived by then. The question of - recruitment for the armaments industry will be solved together - with Weger. - - “_Kehrl_: I wish to urge that the allotments to the mines should - not be made dependent on the recruitment of men abroad. We were - completely frustrated these last three months because this - principle had been applied. We ended December with a deficit of - 25,000 and we never get replacements. The number must be made up - by men from Germany. - - “_Speer_: No, nothing doing!” (_R-124_) - -Speer also advocated terror and brutality as a means of maximizing -production by slave laborers who worked in the industries under his -control. In the course of a discussion concerning the supply and -exploitation of labor, Speer stated: - - “_Speer_: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained - that the sick list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in - factories where doctors are on the staff who are examining the - sick men. There is nothing to be said against SS and Police - taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into - concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen - several times and the news will soon go round.” (_R-124_) - -Speer is also guilty of compelling Allied nationals and prisoners of war -to engage not only in the production of armaments and munitions, but -also in direct military operations, against their own country and its -actively resisting allies. Speer, as Chief of the Organization Todt, is -accountable for its policies which were in direct conflict with the laws -of war. The Organization Todt, in violation of the laws of war, -impressed allied nationals into its service. Proof of its activity is -furnished by an International Labor Office Study of Exploitation of -Foreign Labor by Germany: - - “The methods used for the recruitment of foreign workers who - were destined for employment in the Organization did not greatly - differ from the methods used for the recruitment of foreigners - for deportation to Germany. The main difference was that, since - the principal activities of the Organization lay outside the - frontiers of Germany, foreigners were not transported to - Germany, but had either to work in their own country or in some - other occupied territory. - - “In the recruitment drives for foreign workers for the - Organization methods of compulsion as well as methods of - persuasion were used, the latter usually with very little result - * * *.” (_L-191_) - -Similar violations of the laws of warfare are disclosed in -(_407-VIII-PS_). - -As Chief of German war production, Speer sponsored and approved the use -of prisoners of war in the production of armaments and munitions which -were used against their own country and its actively resisting allies. -This fact has been demonstrated by the evidence already discussed. To -recapitulate: - -1. After Speer assumed responsibility for armament production, his -primary concern in his discussions with his co-conspirators was to -secure a larger allocation of prisoners of war for his armament -factories. In a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 22 April 1943, -Speer complained that only 30% of the Russian prisoners of war were -engaged in the armament industry. (_R-124_) - -2. In an earlier speech, Speer stated that 10,000 prisoners of war were -put at the disposal of the armaments industry upon his orders. -(_1435-PS_) - -3. Finally, Speer advocated returning escaped prisoners of war to -factories as convicts. He said, at a meeting of the Central Planning -Board: - - “We have to come to an arrangement with the Reichsfuehrer SS as - soon as possible so that prisoners of war he picks up are made - available for our purposes. The Reichsfuehrer SS gets from 30 to - 40,000 men per month. First of all they have to be divided up. - From what classes do these people come, anyhow? There certainly - is a certain percentage of miners among these people who are - picked up. These few thousand men have to go to the mines - automatically. Certainly, some educational work has to be done. - The men should be put into the factories as convicts. But they - have to return to the factories where they were before * * *.” - (_R-124_) - -Speer is also guilty of having approved and sponsored the program for -using concentration camp labor in Nazi armament factories, which was -part of the larger program of extermination through work. The proof of -this activity may be summarized and supplemented as follows: - -1. Speer proposed measures for the exploitation of the concentration -camp labor in armament factories under his jurisdiction. At a meeting -with Hitler Speer proposed and Hitler agreed that armament production -should not be established within concentration camps but that -concentration camp labor should be made available to established -armament factories. (_R-124_) - -2. Speer, by arranging for the use of concentration camp laborers in -factories under his control, created an increasing demand for such -labor. This demand was filled in part by placing in concentration camps -persons who would not ordinarily have been sent there. (_1063-D-PS_) - -3. Speer participated in the exploitation of the victims of the Nazi -program of extermination through work. He personally selected sites for -subsidiary concentration camps which were established near factories in -Upper Austria, and knew and approved of the general practice of locating -concentration camps near industrial plants which they supplied with -labor (Speer’s interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945. (_3720-PS_) - -Speer visited the concentration camp Mauthaussen and factories such as -those of Krupp, where concentration camp labor was exploited under -barbarous conditions. Despite personal and first-hand knowledge of these -conditions, Speer continued to direct the use of concentration camp -labor in factories under his jurisdiction. In Speer’s interrogation -under oath on 18 October 1945, he stated: - - “Q. But, in general, the use of concentration camp labor was - known to you and approved by you as a source of labor? - - “A. Yes. - - “Q. And you knew also, I take it, that among the inmates of the - concentration camps there were both Germans and foreigners? - - “A. I didn’t think about it at that time. - - “Q. As a matter of fact you visited the Austrian concentration - camp personally, did you not?” - - “A. I didn’t—well I was in Mauthaussen once but at that time I - was not told just to what categories the inmates of the - concentration camps belonged. - - “Q. But in general everybody knew, did they not, that foreigners - who were taken away by the Gestapo, or arrested by the Gestapo, - as well as Germans, found their way into the concentration - camps? - - “A. Of course, yes. I didn’t mean to imply anything like that.” - - * * * * * * - - “Q. Did you ever discuss, by the way, the requirements of Krupp - for foreign labor? - - “A. It is certain that it was reported to me what Krupp had in - foreign workers. - - “Q. Did you ever discuss it with any of the members of the Krupp - first? - - “A. I cannot say that exactly, but during the time of my - activities I visited the Krupp factory more than once and it is - certain that this was discussed, that is, the lack of manpower.” - (_3720-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE SLAVE LABOR - PROGRAM, THE ILLEGAL USE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND THE SPECIAL - RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUCKEL AND SPEER THEREFOR - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (b, c). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections III; │ │ 15, 39, - │ VIII (B, C, H); X; Appendix A. │ I │ 41, 50, - │ │ │ - 3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting │ │ - │ the Laws and Customs of War on Land,│ │590, 597, - │ Annex, Articles 6, 46, 52. │ VI │ 598 - │ │ │ - 3738-PS │Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to │ │ - │ treatment of Prisoners of War, │ │ - │ Articles 2, 3, 6. │ VI │ 600, 601 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document │ │ - │was received in evidence at the │ │ - │Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**)│ │ - │before a document number indicates │ │ - │that the document was referred to │ │ - │during the trial but was not formally │ │ - │received in evidence, for the reason │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document. The USA │ │ - │series number, given in parentheses │ │ - │following the description of the │ │ - │document, is the official exhibit │ │ - │number assigned by the court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *016-PS │Sauckel’s Labor Mobilization Program, │ │ - │20 April 1942. (USA 168) │ III │ 46 - │ │ │ - *017-PS │Letter from Sauckel to Reichminister │ │ - │for the Occupied Eastern Territories, │ │ - │5 October 1942, concerning │ │ - │mobilization of foreign labor forces. │ │ - │(USA 180) │ III │ 60 - │ │ │ - *018-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Sauckel, 21 │ │ - │December 1942, concerning labor in the│ │ - │East. (USA 186) │ III │ 61 - │ │ │ - *019-PS │Letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 17 │ │ - │March 1943, concerning draft of │ │ - │workers from the East. (USA 181) │ III │ 65 - │ │ │ - *031-PS │Memorandum, 12 June 1944, concerning │ │ - │evacuation of youths from the │ │ - │territory of Army Group “Center”, and │ │ - │interoffice memorandum, Ministry for │ │ - │Occupied Eastern Territories, 14 June │ │ - │1944. (USA 171) │ III │ 71 - │ │ │ - *054-PS │Report to Reich Ministry for Occupied │ │ - │Eastern Territories, 7 October 1942, │ │ - │concerning treatment of Ukrainian │ │ - │Specialists. (USA 198) │ III │ 90 - │ │ │ - *084-PS │Interdepartmental report of Ministry │ │ - │for Occupied Eastern Territories, 30 │ │ - │September 1942, concerning status of │ │ - │Eastern laborers. (USA 199) │ III │ 130 - │ │ │ - *204-PS │Memorandum of conference, │ │ - │18 February 1944, concerning release │ │ - │of Indigenous Labor for purposes of │ │ - │the Reich. (USA 182) │ III │ 215 - │ │ │ - *254-PS │Letter from Raab to Reichminister for │ │ - │Occupied Eastern Territories, 7 June │ │ - │1944, concerning burning of houses in │ │ - │Wassilkow district. (USA 188) │ III │ 231 - │ │ │ - *265-PS │Memorandum of oral report by Lyser to │ │ - │Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on situation │ │ - │in district Shitomir. (USA 191) │ III │ 234 - │ │ │ - *290-PS │Letter from Rosenberg Ministry, 12 │ │ - │November 1943, concerning burning of │ │ - │houses in Mueller’s district. (USA │ │ - │189) │ III │ 240 - │ │ │ - *294-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by │ │ - │Brautigam, 25 October 1942, concerning│ │ - │conditions in Russia. (USA 185) │ III │ 242 - │ │ │ - *407-II-PS │Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 10 │ │ - │March 1943, concerning difficulty in │ │ - │recruiting of workers in former Soviet│ │ - │territories. (USA 226) │ III │ 389 - │ │ │ - *407-V │ │ │ - and VI-PS │Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 15 │ │ - │April 1943, concerning labor │ │ - │questions. (USA 209; USA 228) │ III │ 391 - │ │ │ - *407-VIII-PS │Telegram from Sauckel to Hitler, 17 │ │ - │May 1943, concerning foreign labor. │ │ - │(USA 210) │ III │ 394 - │ │ │ - *407-IX-PS │Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 3 June │ │ - │1943, concerning foreign labor │ │ - │situation. (USA 229) │ III │ 395 - │ │ │ - *556-2-PS │Order initialled by Keitel, 8 │ │ - │September 1942, for civilians to work │ │ - │on “West Wall”. (USA 194) │ III │ 443 - │ │ │ - *556-13-PS │Sauckel note for the files, 5 January │ │ - │1943. (USA 194) │ III │ 444 - │ │ │ - *654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, │ │ - │on discussion with Himmler concerning │ │ - │delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │ - │extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467 - │ │ │ - *1063-D-PS │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942, │ │ - │concerning prisoners qualified for │ │ - │work to be sent to concentration │ │ - │camps. (USA 219) │ III │ 778 - │ │ │ - *1130-PS │Note, 11 April 1943, and report of │ │ - │speech by Koch in Kiev on 5 March │ │ - │1943, concerning treatment of civilian│ │ - │population in Ukraine. (USA 169) │ III │ 797 - │ │ │ - *1206-PS │Notes of Goering’s remarks at the Air │ │ - │Ministry, 7 November 1941, concerning │ │ - │employment of laborers in war │ │ - │industries. (USA 215) │ III │ 841 - │ │ │ - *1292-PS │Memorandum of conference with Hitler, │ │ - │4 January 1944, concerning allocation │ │ - │of labor, 1944. (USA 225) │ III │ 866 - │ │ │ - *1352-PS │Reports concerning the confiscation of│ │ - │Polish agricultural properties, 16 and│ │ - │29 May 1940, signed Kusche. (USA 176) │ III │ 916 - │ │ │ - *1375-PS │Letter from Frank to Goering, 25 │ │ - │January 1940. (USA 172) │ III │ 925 - │ │ │ - 1381-PS │Secret report of the Reich Ministry │ │ - │for the Occupied Eastern Territories │ │ - │on Political and Economic Situation in│ │ - │these Territories, December 1942. │ III │ 932 - │ │ │ - *1435-PS │Speech of Speer to Gauleiters, 24 │ │ - │February 1942. (USA 216) │ IV │ 16 - │ │ │ - *1526-PS │Letter from Ukrainian Main Committee │ │ - │to Frank, February 1943. (USA 178) │ IV │ 79 - │ │ │ - *1584-I-PS │Teletype from Goering to Himmler, 14 │ │ - │February 1944, concerning formation of│ │ - │7th Airforce Group squadron for │ │ - │special purposes. (USA 221) │ IV │ 117 - │ │ │ - *1666-PS │Decree appointing Sauckel General │ │ - │Plenipotentiary for Manpower, 21 March│ │ - │1942 and decree of Goering conferring │ │ - │certain powers on Sauckel, 27 March │ │ - │1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, │ │ - │pp. 179-180. (USA 208) │ IV │ 182 - │ │ │ - *1702-PS │Report on evacuation of Kasatin │ │ - │November-December 1943. (USA 193) │ IV │ 205 - │ │ │ - *1726-PS │Statement of Netherlands Government in│ │ - │view of Prosecution and punishment of │ │ - │the German Nazi War Criminals. (USA │ │ - │195) │ IV │ 227 - │ │ │ - *1742-PS │Directives to Army Commands from │ │ - │Goering, 26 October 1942, concerning │ │ - │combatting of partisan activities. │ │ - │(USA 789) │ IV │ 262 - │ │ │ - *1903-PS │Decree of Fuehrer on execution of │ │ - │decree concerning Deputy General for │ │ - │mobilization of labor. Decrees, │ │ - │Regulations, Announcements, Vol. II, │ │ - │p. 510. (USA 206) │ IV │ 546 - │ │ │ - *1913-PS │Agreement between Plenipotentiary │ │ - │General for Arbeitseinsatz and German │ │ - │Labor Front concerning care of │ │ - │non-German workers. 1943 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 588. │ │ - │(USA 227) │ IV │ 547 - │ │ │ - *1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS │ │ - │Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA │ │ - │170) │ IV │ 558 - │ │ │ - *2220-PS │Lammers report to Himmler, 12 April │ │ - │1943, concerning the situation in the │ │ - │Government General. (USA 175) │ IV │ 855 - │ │ │ - *2233-A-PS │Frank Diary, │ │ - │Abteilungsleitersitzungen, 1939-1940. │ │ - │Minutes of conferences, December and │ │ - │May 1940. (USA 173) │ IV │ 883 - │ │ │ - *2233-B-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part I. │ │ - │January-March. (USA 174) │ IV │ 885 - │ │ │ - *2241-PS │Sauckel Order, 20 July 1942, │ │ - │concerning employment of foreign labor│ │ - │forces in Germany. (USA 200) │ IV │ 923 - │ │ │ - *2280-PS │Letter from Reichs Commissar for │ │ - │Ostland, 3 May 1943, concerning │ │ - │recruiting of manpower in Baltic │ │ - │Countries for Reich territories. (USA │ │ - │183) │ IV │ 969 - │ │ │ - *2520-PS │Affidavit of Edward L. Deuss, 1 │ │ - │November 1945, concerning approximate │ │ - │number of foreigners put to work for │ │ - │German War Effort in Old Reich. (USA │ │ - │197) │ V │ 257 - │ │ │ - *2974-PS │Statement by Fritz Sauckel concerning │ │ - │positions held. (USA 15) │ V │ 680 - │ │ │ - *2980-PS │Statement of Albert Speer, concerning │ │ - │positions held. (USA 18) │ V │ 685 - │ │ │ - *3000-PS │Report, from Chief of Main Office III │ │ - │with the High Command in Minsk to │ │ - │Reicke, 28 June 1943, on experiences │ │ - │in political and economic problems in │ │ - │the East, particularly White Ruthenia.│ │ - │(USA 192) │ V │ 726 - │ │ │ - *3003-PS │Report of Lt. Haupt concerning the │ │ - │situation of war economy in │ │ - │Netherlands. (USA 196) │ V │ 726 - │ │ │ - *3005-PS │Letter from Reich Labor Ministry to │ │ - │Presidents of Regional Labor Offices, │ │ - │26 August 1941, concerning use of │ │ - │Russian PWs. (USA 213) │ V │ 727 - │ │ │ - *3010-PS │Secret organization order from │ │ - │Economic Inspection South, 17 August │ │ - │1943, concerning recruitment of │ │ - │Workers for the Reich. (USA 184) │ V │ 728 - │ │ │ - *3012-PS │Order signed Christiansen, 19 March │ │ - │1943, to all group leaders of Security│ │ - │Service, and record of telephone │ │ - │conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March│ │ - │1943. (USA 190) │ V │ 731 - │ │ │ - *3040-PS │Secret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20 │ │ - │February 1942, concerning commitment │ │ - │of manpower from the East. (USA 207) │ V │ 744 - │ │ │ - *3044-PS │Sauckel Order Number 4, 7 May 1942, │ │ - │published in Decrees, Regulations, │ │ - │Announcements. (USA 206) │ V │ 756 - │ │ │ - 3044-A-PS │Sauckel Order Number 10, 22 August │ │ - │1942, published in Decrees, │ │ - │Regulations, Announcements. │ V │ 764 - │ │ │ - 3044-B-PS │Instructions concerning Eastern │ │ - │Household workers, published in │ │ - │Decrees, Regulations, Announcements. │ V │ 765 - │ │ │ - 3057-PS │Statement of Fritz Sauckel, 5 │ │ - │September 1945. │ V │ 853 - │ │ │ -**3719-PS │Testimony of Alfred Rosenberg, 6 │ │ - │October 1945. (USA 187) (Referred to │ │ - │but not offered in evidence.) │ VI │ 436 - │ │ │ - *3720-PS │Testimony of Albert Speer, 18 October │ │ - │1945. (USA 220) │ VI │ 438 - │ │ │ - *3721-PS │Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 │ │ - │September 1945. (USA 230) │ VI │ 458 - │ │ │ - *3722-PS │Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 5 October │ │ - │1945. (USA 224) │ VI │ 459 - │ │ │ - *3787-PS │Report of the Second Meeting of the │ │ - │Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939. │ │ - │(USA 782) │ VI │ 718 - │ │ │ - *3819-PS │Letter from Sauckel to Fuehrer, 17 │ │ - │March 1944; letter from Speer to │ │ - │Fuehrer, 5 April 1944; and Minutes of │ │ - │conference on 11 July 1944 concerning │ │ - │Labor Problem. (GB 306) │ VI │ 760 - │ │ │ - *D-288 │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, 15 │ │ - │October 1945. (USA 202) │ VII │ 2 - │ │ │ - D-305 │Affidavit of Heinrich Buschhauer, 5 │ │ - │October 1945. │ VII │ 13 - │ │ │ - *D-316 │Memorandum to Mr. Hupe, 14 March 1942,│ │ - │concerning employment of Russians. │ │ - │(USA 201) │ VII │ 20 - │ │ │ - *EC-68 │Confidential letter from Minister of │ │ - │Finance and Economy, Baden, containing│ │ - │directives on treatment of Polish │ │ - │Farmworkers, 6 March 1941. (USA 205) │ VII │ 260 - │ │ │ - *EC-194 │Secret memorandum of Keitel concerning│ │ - │use of prisoners of war in the war │ │ - │industry, 31 October 1941. (USA 214) │ VII │ 336 - │ │ │ - *L-61 │Express letter from Sauckel to │ │ - │Presidents of Landes Employment │ │ - │Offices, 26 November 1942, concerning │ │ - │employment of Jews and exchange of │ │ - │Jews in essential employment against │ │ - │Polish labor. (USA 177) │ VII │ 816 - │ │ │ - *L-79 │Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, │ │ - │“Indoctrination on the political │ │ - │situation and future aims”. (USA 27) │ VII │ 847 - │ │ │ - *L-191 │“The Exploitation of Foreign Labor by │ │ - │Germany” (International Labor Office │ │ - │Study). (USA 231) │ VII │ 1026 - │ │ │ - *R-103 │Letter from Polish Main Committee to │ │ - │General Government of Poland on │ │ - │situation of Polish workers in the │ │ - │Reich, 17 May 1944. (USA 204) │ VIII │ 104 - │ │ │ - *R-124 │Speer’s conference minutes of Central │ │ - │Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning │ │ - │labor supply. (USA 179) │ VIII │ 146 - │ │ │ - *R-129 │Letter and enclosure from Pohl to │ │ - │Himmler, 30 April 1942, concerning │ │ - │concentration camps. (USA 217) │ VIII │ 198 - │ │ │ - Statement XII │Political Testament of Robert Ley │ │ - │written in Nurnberg Prison, October │ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 742 - │ │ │ - Statement XIII │Outline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley, │ │ - │written in Nurnberg Prison, 24 October│ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 751 - - - - - Chapter XI - CONCENTRATION CAMPS - - -The Concentration Camp, used against the people of Germany and allied -nationals, was one of the fundamental institutions of the Nazi regime. -It was a pillar of the system of terror by which the Nazis consolidated -their power over Germany. It was a primary weapon in the battle against -the Jews, against the Christian church, against labor, against those who -wanted peace, against opposition or non-conformity of any kind. It -involved the systematic use of terror to achieve the cohesion within -Germany which was necessary for the execution of the conspirators’ plans -for aggression. It was the final link in a chain of terror and -repression which involved the SS and the Gestapo and which resulted in -the apprehension of victims and their confinement without trial, often -without charges, generally with no indication of the length of their -detention. - -The SS through its espionage system tracked down the victims; the -criminal police and the Gestapo seized them and brought them to the -concentration camps; and the concentration camps were administered by -the SS. No attempt will be made to present a complete catalogue of -individual brutalities. The emphasis will rather be upon the fundamental -purposes for which these camps were used, the techniques of terror which -were employed, the large number of their victims, and the death and -anguish which they caused. - - 1. THE BEGINNING OF “PROTECTIVE CUSTODY” - -The Nazis realized early that without the most drastic repression of -actual and potential opposition they could not consolidate their power -over the German people. Immediately after Hitler became Chancellor, the -conspirators promptly destroyed civil liberties by issuing the -Presidential Emergency Decree of 28 February 1933 (_1390-PS_). It was -this decree which was the basis for “_Schutzhaft_”, that is, “protective -custody”—the power of the Gestapo to imprison people without judicial -proceedings. This is made clear by a typical order for protective -custody: - - “_Order of Protective Custody._ Based on Article 1 of the Decree - of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State of - 28 February 1933 (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ I, p. 83), you are taken - into protective custody in the interest of public security and - order. - - “Reason: Suspicion of activities inimical toward the State.” - (_2499-PS_) - -Goering, in a book entitled “_Aufbau Einer Nation_” and published in -1934, sought to give the impression that the camps originally were -directed at those whom the Nazis considered “Communists” and “Social -Democrats”. At page 89 of this book he stated: - - “We had to deal ruthlessly with these enemies of the State. It - must not be forgotten that at the moment of our seizure of power - over 6 million people officially voted for Communism and about 8 - million for Marxism in the Reichstag elections in March. - - “Thus the concentration camps were created, to which we had to - send first thousands of functionaries of the Communist and - Social Democratic parties.” (_2324-PS_) - -In practical operations, the power to order confinement was almost -without limit: Frick, in an order which he issued on 25 January 1938, as -Minister of Interior, made this clear. Article 1 of this order provided: - - “Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of the - Secret State Police against persons who endanger the security of - the people and the State through their attitude in order to - counter all aspirations of enemies of the people and State.” - (_1723-PS_) - -This order further provides: - - “* * * In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the - cooperation between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to the - following and ordain: - - “1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer - to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the - National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of - all kinds directed against both. The successful solution of this - mission forms one of the most essential prerequisite for the - unhampered and frictionless work of the Party. The Gestapo, in - their extremely difficult task, is to be granted support and - assistance in every possible way by the NSDAP.” (_1723-PS_) - -A. _Persecution of Pacifists._ - -The conspirators, then, were directing their apparatus of terror against -the “enemies of the State”, against “disintegrating forces”, and against -those people who endangered the State “with their attitudes”. Whom did -they consider as belonging in these broad categories? First, they were -the men in Germany who wanted peace. In this connection an affidavit by -Gerhart H. Segar declares as follows: - - “* * * 2. During the period after World War I up until my - commitment to the Leipzig jail and Oranienburg concentration - camp in the spring of 1933 following the Nazis’ accession to - power in January of that year, my business and political - affiliations exposed me to the full impact of the Nazi theories - and practice of violent regimentation and terroristic tactics. - My conflict with the Nazis by virtue of my identification with - the peace movement, and as duly elected member of the Reichstag - representing a political faith (Social Democratic Party) hostile - to National Socialism, clearly demonstrated that, even in the - period prior to 1933, the Nazis considered crimes and terrorism - a necessary and desirable weapon in overcoming democratic - opposition * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * (e). That the Nazis had already conceived the device of - the concentration camp as a means of suppressing and regimenting - opposition elements was forcefully brought to my attention - during the course of a conversation which I had with Dr. Wilhelm - Frick in December 1932. Frick at that time was Chairman of the - Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag of which I was a - member. When I gave an emphatic answer to Frick concerning the - particular matter discussed, he replied, ‘Don’t worry, when we - are in power we shall put all of you guys into concentration - camps.’ When the Nazis came into power, Frick was appointed - Reichminister of Interior and promptly carried out his threat in - collaboration with Goering, as Chief of the Prussian State - Police, and Himmler.” (_L-83_) - -Thus, even before the Nazis had seized power in Germany they had -conceived of the plan to repress any potential opposition by terror. - -Frick’s statement to Gerhart Segar is completely consistent with an -earlier statement which he made on 18 October 1929. Frick at that time -declared: - - “This fateful struggle will first be taken up with the ballot, - but this cannot continue indefinitely, for history has taught us - that in a battle, blood must be shed, and iron broken. The - ballot is the beginning of this fateful struggle. We are - determined to promulgate by force that which we preach. Just as - Mussolini exterminated the Marxists in Italy, so must we also - succeed in accomplishing the same through dictatorship and - terror.” (_2513-PS_) - -There are many additional cases of the use of the concentration camp -against the men who wanted peace. There was, for example, a group called -the “_Bibel Forscher_” (Bible Research Workers), most of whom were -Jehovah’s Witnesses. Since they were pacifists, the conspirators -provided not only for their prosecution in the regular courts, but also -for confining them in concentration camps after they had served the -judicial sentences. An order by the Secret State Police, Berlin, dated 5 -August 1937, provided: - - “The Reichsminister of Justice had informed me that he does not - share the opinion voiced by subordinate departments on various - occasions, according to which, the arrest of the - _Bibelforschers_ after they have served a sentence, is supposed - to jeopardize the authority of the law courts. He is fully aware - of the necessity for measures by the State Police after the - sentence has been served. He asks, however, not to bring the - _Bibelforschers_ into protective custody under circumstances - detrimental to the respect of the law courts * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “2. If information regarding the impending release of a - _Bibelforscher_ from arrest is received from the authorities - carrying out the sentence, my decision regarding the ordering of - measures by the State Police, will be asked for in accordance - with my circular decree dated 22.4.37, so that transfer to a - concentration camp can take place immediately after the sentence - has been served. Should a transfer into a concentration camp - immediately after the serving of the sentence not be possible, - _Bibelforschers_ will be detained in police prisons.” (_D-84_) - -B. _Persecution of Trade Union Members._ - -Labor unions, traditionally opposed to wars of aggression, also felt the -full force of Nazi terror. The concentration camp was an important -weapon in the campaign against the trade unions. Goering made it plain, -for instance, that members of the Social Democratic Party were to be -confined in concentration camps (_2324-PS_). Labor leaders were largely -members of that party and soon learned the meaning of “protective -custody”. - -In this connection, an order that one Joseph Simon should be placed in -protective custody, is pertinent (_2330-PS_). The “reasons” given were -as follows: - - “Simon was for many years a member of the Socialist Party and - temporarily a member of the Union Socialiste Populaire. From - 1907 to 1918 he was _Landtag_ deputy of the Socialist Party; - from 1908 to 1930 Social Democratic City Counsellor (_Stadtrat_) - in Nurnberg. In view of the decisive role which Simon played in - the international trade unions and in regard to his connection - with international Marxist leaders and central agencies, which - he continued after the national recovery, he was placed under - protective custody on 3 May 1933, and was kept, until 25 January - 1934, in the Dachau concentration camp. Simon is under the - urgent suspicion that even after this date he played an active - part in the illegal continuation of the Socialist Party. He took - part in meetings which aimed at the illegal continuation of the - Socialist Party and propagation of illegal Marxist printed - matter in Germany. - - “Through this radical attitude which is hostile to the State, - Simon directly endangers public security and order.” (_2330-PS_) - -Further instances of this persecution of members of trade unions are -contained in (_2334-PS_) and (_2928-PS_). - -C. _Persecution of Jews._ - -Thousands of Jews, were, of course, confined in concentration camps. -(For a fuller discussion of this point see Chapter XII.) Among the -wealth of evidence showing the confinement of Germans only because they -were Jews, a teletype from SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich is typical. This -order is dated 10 November 1938, and is addressed to all headquarters of -the State Police and all districts and sub-districts of the SD -(_3051-PS_). Paragraph 5 of this teletype, which was entitled “Measures -against Jews tonight,” provided: - - “* * * 5. Inasmuch as in the course of the events of this night - the employment of officials used for this purpose would be - possible, in all districts as many Jews, especially rich ones, - are to be arrested as can be accommodated in the existing - prisons. For the time being only healthy men not too old are to - be arrested. Upon their arrest, the appropriate concentration - camps should be contacted immediately, in order to confine them - in these camps as fast as possible.” (_3051-PS_) - -Himmler in 1943 indicated that use of the concentration camp against the -Jews had been motivated, not simply by Nazi racialism, but also by a -fear that the Jews might have been an obstacle to aggression. In a -speech delivered at a meeting of the SS Major Generals at Posen on 4 -October 1943, Himmler sought to justify the Nazi anti-Jewish policy: - - “I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the - Jewish race. It’s one of those things it is easy to talk - about—‘The Jewish race is being exterminated’, says one party - member, ‘that’s quite clear, it’s in our program, elimination of - the Jews, and we’re doing it, exterminating them’. And then they - come, 80 million worthy Germans, and each one has his decent - Jew. Of course, the others are vermin, but this one is an A-1 - Jew. Not one of all those who talk this way has witnessed it, - not one of them has been through it. Most of you must know what - it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or - 1,000. To have stuck it out and at the same time—apart from - exceptions caused by human weakness—to have remained decent - fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory - in our history which has never been written and is never to be - written, for we know how difficult we should have made it for - ourselves, if—with the bombing raids, the burden and - deprivations of war—we still had Jews today in every town as - secret saboteurs, agitators and trouble-mongers.” (_1919-PS_) - -It is clear from the foregoing evidence that prior to the launching of a -Nazi aggression, the concentration camp had been one of the principal -weapons by which the conspirators achieved the social cohesion which was -needed for the execution of their plans for aggression. After the -conspirators launched their aggression and their armies swept over -Europe, they brought the concentration camp and the whole system of Nazi -terror to occupied countries. In addition, they brought the citizens of -the occupied countries to Germany and subjected them to the whole -apparatus of Nazi brutality. In a communication to Himmler dated 16 -December 1942, Mueller, for the Chief of the Security Police and SD, -deals with the seizure of Polish Jews for deportation to concentration -camps in Germany. I should like to quote the body of this communication: - - “In connection with the increase in the transfer of labor to the - _concentration camps_, ordered to be completed by 30 January - 1943, the following procedure may be applied in the Jewish - section. - - “1. Total number: 45,000 Jews. - - “2. Start of transportation: 11 January 1943; End of - transportation: 31 January 1943. (The Reich railroads are unable - to provide special trains for the evacuation during the period - from 15 December 1942 to 10 January 1943 because of the - increased traffic of armed forces leave trains). - - “3. Composition: The 45,000 Jews are to consist of 30,000 Jews - from the district of _Byalystock_. 10,000 Jews from the Ghetto - _Theresienstadt_, 5,000 of whom are Jews fit for work who - heretofore had been used for smaller jobs required for the - Ghetto, and 5,000 Jews who are generally incapable of working, - also over 60 year old Jews * * *. As heretofore only such Jews - would be taken for the evacuation who do not have any particular - connections and who are not in possession of any high - decorations. 3,000 Jews from the occupied Dutch territories, - 2,000 Jews from Berlin—45,000. The figure of 45,000 includes - the invalid (old Jews and children). _By use of a practical - standard_, the screening of the arriving Jews in Auschwitz - should yield at least 10,000 to 15,000 people fit for work.” - (_R-91_) - -The Jews of Hungary suffered the same fate. Between 19 March 1944 and 1 -August 1944 more than 400,000 Hungarian Jews were rounded up. Many of -these were put in wagons and sent to extermination camps. An affidavit -made in London by Dr. Rudolph Kastner, a former official of the -Hungarian Zionist Organization, states in part: - - “19 March 1944: Together with the German military occupation - arrived in Budapest a ‘Special Section Commando’ of the German - Secret Police with the sole object of liquidating the Hungarian - Jews * * * They arrested and later deported to Mauthausen, all - the leaders of Jewish political and business life and - journalists, together with the Hungarian democratic and - anti-Fascist politicians * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “Up to 27 June 1944, 475,000 Jews were deported.” - - * * * * * * - - “According to statements of Krumey and Wislicseny in February or - March 1945 a conference of the officers of IV.B. was called to - Berlin by Eichmann in the spring of 1942. He then informed them - that the government decided in favor of the complete - annihilation of the European Jews and that this will be carried - out silently in the gas-chambers. ‘Victory is ours,’ declared - Eichmann. ‘The end of the war is near. We must hurry as this is - the last chance to free Europe of the Jews. After the war it - will not be possible to utilize such methods.’” - - * * * * * * - - “Commanders of the death-camps gassed only on direct or indirect - instructions of Eichmann. The particular officer of IV.B. who - directed the deportations from some particular country had the - authority to indicate whether the train should go to a death - camp or not, and what should happen to the passengers. The - instructions were usually carried by the SS-NCO escorting the - train. The letters ‘A’ or ‘M’ on the escorting instruction - documents indicated Auschwitz or Majdanek; it meant that the - passengers were to be gassed. * * * Regarding Hungarian Jews the - following general ruling was laid down in Auschwitz: children up - to the age of 12 or 14, older people above 50, as well as the - sick, or people with criminal records (who were transported in - specially marked wagons) were taken immediately on their arrival - to the gas chambers. - - “The others passed before an SS doctor who, on sight indicated - who was fit for work, and who was not. Those unfit were sent to - the gas chambers, while the others were distributed in various - labor camps.” (_2605-PS_) - - 2. “CHARGES” AGAINST CONCENTRATION CAMP INMATES - -In the Eastern territories, these victims were apprehended for -extermination in concentration camps without any charges having been -made against them. In the Western occupied territories, charges were -apparently made against some of the victims. Some of the charges which -the Nazis considered sufficient basis for confinement in a concentration -camp are illustrated in a summary of the file of the dossier of 25 -persons arrested in Luxembourg for commitment to various concentration -camps and sets forth the charges made against each person (_L-215_). -These charges read as follows: - - “Name Charge Place of - Confinement - - HENRICY— By associating with members of illegal Natzweiler - resistance movements and making money for - them violating legal foreign exchange - rates, by harming the interests of the - Reich and being expected in the future to - disobey official administrative - regulations and act as an enemy of the - Reich. - - - KRIER— By being responsible for advanced sabotage Buchenwald - of labor and causing fear because of his - political and criminal past. Freedom - would only further his anti-social urge. - - - * * * * * * * * - - - MONTI— By being strongly suspected of aiding Sachsenhausen - desertion. - - - JUNKER— Because as a relative of a deserter he is Sachsenhausen - expected to endanger the interests of the - German Reich if allowed to go free. - - - JAEGER— Because as a relative of a deserter he is Sachsenhausen - expected to take advantage of every - occasion to harm the German Reich. - - - * * * * * * * * - - - LUDWIG— For being strongly suspected of aiding Dachau - desertion.” (_L-215_) - - 3. USE OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS FOR PRISONERS OF WAR - -Not only civilians of the occupied territories, but also prisoners of -war were subjected to the concentration camp. A memorandum to all -officers of the State Police, signed by Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo, -dated 9 November 1941, discusses the “Transportation of Russian -Prisoners of War, Destined for Execution, into the Concentration Camps.” -(_1165-PS_). This memorandum states in part: - - “The commandants of the concentration camps are complaining that - 5 to 10% of the Soviet Russians destined for execution are - arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the - impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such - prisoners in this way. - - “It was particularly noted that, when marching, for example, - from the railroad station to the camp, a rather large number of - PWs collapsed on the way from exhaustion, either dead or half - dead, and had to be picked up by a truck following the convoy. - - “It cannot be prevented that the German people take notice of - these occurrences. - - “Even if the transportation to the camps is generally taken care - of by the Wehrmacht, the population will attribute this - situation to the SS. - - “In order to prevent, if possible, similar occurrences in the - future, I therefore order that, effective from today on, Soviet - Russians, declared definitely suspect and obviously marked by - death (for example with typhus) and who therefore would not be - able to withstand the exertions of even a short march on foot, - shall in the future, as a matter of basic principle, be excluded - from the transport into the concentration camps for execution.” - (_1165-PS_) - -Additional evidence of the confinement of Russian prisoners of war in -concentration camps is found in an official report of the investigation -of the Flossenburg concentration camp by Headquarters Third United -States Army, Judge Advocate Section, War Crimes Branch, dated 21 June -1945 (_2309-PS_). This report states: - - “In 1941 an additional stockade was added at the Flossenburg - Camp, to hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. From these 2,000 - prisoners only 102 survived.” (_2309-PS_) - -Soviet prisoners of war found their allies in the concentration camps. -The same official report continues: - - “The victims of Flossenburg included among the Russian, - civilians and prisoners of war, German nationals, Italians, - Belgians, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, British and American - prisoners of war. No practical means was available to complete a - list of victims of this camp, however, since the foundation of - the camp in 1938 until the day of liberation it is estimated - that more than 29,000 inmates died.” (_2309-PS_) - -Escaped prisoners of war were sent to concentration camps, which were -specially set up as extermination centers. A communication from the -Secret State Police Office, Cologne, dated 4 March 1944, transmitted the -following orders of the OKW—for which Keitel is responsible—concerning -escaped prisoners of war: - - “1. Every captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer or - a non-working non-commissioned officer, except British and - American prisoners of war, is to be turned over to the Chief of - the Security Police and of the Security Service under the - classification ‘Step III’ regardless of whether the escape - occurred during a transport, whether it was a mass escape or an - individual one. - - “2. Since the transfer of the prisoners of war to the Security - Police and Security Service may not become officially known to - the outside under any circumstances other prisoners of war may - by no means be informed of the capture. The captured prisoners - are to be reported to the Army Information Bureau as ‘escaped - and not captured’. Their mail is to be handled accordingly. - Inquiries of representatives of the Protective Power of the - International Red Cross, and of other aid societies will be - given the same answer.” (_1650-PS_) - -The same communication carried a copy of an order of SS General Mueller, -acting for the Chief of the Security Police and SD, which directed the -Gestapo to transport escaped prisoners directly to Mauthausen. The first -two paragraphs of Mueller’s order provide: - - “The State Police Directorates will accept the captured escaped - officer prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camp - commandants and will transport them to the Concentration Camp - Mauthausen following the procedure previously used, unless the - circumstances render a special transport imperative. The - prisoners of war are to be put in irons on the transport—not on - the station if it is subject to view by the public. The camp - commandant at Mauthausen is to be notified that the transfer - occurs within the scope of the action ‘Kugel’. The State Police - Directorates will submit semi-yearly reports on these transfers - giving merely the figures, the first report being due on 5 July - 1944 (sharp). * * * For the sake of secrecy, the Supreme Command - of the Armed Forces has been requested to inform the prisoner of - war camps to turn the captured prisoners over to the local State - Police Office and not to send them directly to Mauthausen.” - (_1650-PS_) - -It is no coincidence that the literal translation for the German word -“_Kugel_” is “bullet”, since Mauthausen, where the escaped prisoners -were sent, was an extermination center. - - 4. THE NETWORK OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS - -Nazi conquest was marked by the establishment of concentration camps -over all of Europe. The following report on the location of -concentration camps, signed by Pohl, an SS General who was in charge of -concentration camp labor policies, indicates the scope of these -activities: - - “1. At the outbreak of war there existed the following - concentration camps: - - a Dachau, 1939, 4,000 prisoners, today 8,000. - - b Sachsenhausen, 1939, 6,500 prisoners, today 10,000. - - c Buchenwald, 1939, 5,300 prisoners, today 9,000. - - d Mauthausen, 1939, 1,500 prisoners, today 5,500. - - e Flossenburg, 1939, 1,600 prisoners, today 4,700. - - f Ravensbrueck, 1939, 2,500 prisoners, today 7,500. - - “2. In the years 1940 to 1942 nine further camps were erected, - viz.: - - a. Auschwitz (Poland) - - b. Neuengamme - - c. Gusen (Austria) - - d. Natzweiler (France) - - e. Gross-Rosen - - f. Lublin (Poland) - - g. Niederhagen - - h. Stutthof (near Danzig) - - i. Arbeitsdorf.” (_R-129_) - -In addition to these camps in occupied territory, there were many -others. The official report by the Headquarters, Third U. S. Army, Judge -Advocate Section, War Crimes Branch, contains the following evidence: - - “Concentration Camp Flossenburg was founded in 1938 as a camp - for political prisoners. Construction was commenced on the camp - in 1938 and it was not until April 1940 that the first transport - of prisoners was received. From this time on prisoners began to - flow steadily into the camp. * * * Flossenburg was the mother - camp and under its direct control and jurisdiction were 47 - satellite camps or outer-commandos for male prisoners and 27 - camps for female workers. To these outer-commandos were supplied - the necessary prisoners for the various work projects - undertaken. - - “Of all these outer-commandos Hersbruck and Leitmeritz (in - Czechoslovakia), Oberstaubling, Mulsen and Sall, located on the - Danube, were considered to be the worst.” (_2309-PS_) - - 5. THE CONCENTRATION CAMP AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TERROR - -The savage treatment which was inflicted in these concentration camps -upon allied nationals, prisoners of war, and other victims of Nazi -terror has been depicted in motion picture evidence. Verbal discussion -of this subject may therefore be brief. - -The minutes of the Central Planning Committee, on which Speer sat, and -where the high strategy of Nazi armament production was formulated, -record a conference on the question of squeezing more work out of slave -laborers. Speer, who was not generally considered a fanatic like Frick, -or a man of Blood and Iron like Goering, handled the problem in this -fashion: - - “Speer: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained - that the sick list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in - factories where doctors are on the staff who are examining the - sick men. There is nothing to be said against SS and Police - taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into - concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen - several times and the news will soon go around.” (_R-124_) - -The deterrent effect of the concentration camps upon the public was -carefully planned. To heighten the atmosphere of terror surrounding the -concentration camps, they were shrouded in secrecy. What went on behind -the barbed wire enclosures was a matter of fearful conjecture in Germany -and the countries under Nazi control. - -This was the policy from the very beginning, when the Nazis first came -into power in Germany and set up their concentration camp system. An -order issued in 1 October 1933 by the Camp Commander of Dachau -prescribes a program of floggings, solitary confinement, and executions -for the inmates for infractions of the rules. (_778-PS_) Among the -rules were those prescribing a rigid censorship concerning conditions -within the camp: - - “By virture of the law on revolutionaries, the following - offenders, considered as _agitators, will be hung_. Anyone who, - for the purpose of agitating, does the following in the camp, at - work, in the quarters, in the kitchens and workshops, toilets - and places of rest: politicizes, holds inciting speeches and - meetings, forms cliques, loiters around with others; who for the - purpose of supplying the propaganda of the opposition with - atrocity stories, collects true or false information about the - concentration camp and its institution; receives such - information, buries it, talks about it to others, smuggles it - out of the camp into the hands of foreign visitors or others by - means of clandestine or other methods, passes it on in writing - or orally to released prisoners or prisoners who are placed - above them, conceals it in clothing or other articles, throws - stones and other objects over the camp wall containing such - information; or produces secret documents; who, for the purpose - of agitating, climbs on barracks’ roofs and trees, seeks contact - with the outside by giving light or other signals, or induces - others to escape or commit a crime, gives them advices to that - effect or supports such undertakings in any way whatsover.” - (_778-PS_) - -Censorship concerning the camps was complemented by an officially -inspired rumor campaign outside the camps. Concentration camps were -spoken of in whispers, and the whispers were spread by agents of the -secret police. A “Top Secret” order, relating to concentration camps, -issued by the Head of the Gestapo and distributed to appropriate police -officers, and dated 26 October 1939, provides: - - “In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following - must, in future, be observed in each individual case * * * - - “3. _The length of the period of custody must in no case be made - known_, even if the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German - Police or the Chief of the Security Police and the SD has - already fixed it. - - “The term of commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly - announced as ‘until further notice.’ - - “In most serious cases, there is no objection to the increasing - of the deterrent effect by the spreading of cleverly carried out - _rumour propaganda_, more or less to the effect that, according - to hearsay, in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested - man will not be released for 2 or 3 years. - - “4. In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the - German Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a - concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in future, also be - transmitted to the State Police District Office concerned. In - this case too, there is no objection to spreading the rumor of - this increased punishment as laid down in Section 3, paragraph - 3, in so far as this appears suitable, to add to the deterrent - effect. - - “5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to - be chosen for the spreading of such news.” (_1531-PS_) - - 6. THE TREATMENT OF CONCENTRATION CAMP VICTIMS - -The deterrent effect of the concentration camps was based on the promise -of savage brutality. This promise was fulfilled, to an extent which -defies description. Once in the custody of the SS guards, the victim was -beaten, tortured, starved, and often murdered through the so-called -“extermination through work” program, or through mass execution gas -chambers and furnaces of the camps (which were portrayed in the motion -picture evidence). The reports of official government investigations -furnish additional evidence of conditions within the concentration -camps. The official report concerning the concentration camp -Flossenberg, prefaced by the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the -United States Army, dated 21 June 1945, and supported by attached -affidavits and testimony, contains this description: - - “The work at these camps mainly consisted of underground labor, - the purpose being the construction of large underground - factories, storage rooms, etc. This labor was performed - completely underground and as a result of the brutal treatment, - working and living conditions, a daily average of 100 prisoners - died. To the one camp Oberstaubling, 700 prisoners were - transported in February 1945 and on the 15th of April 1945 only - 405 of these men were living. During the 12 months preceding the - liberation, Flossenburg and the branch camps under its control - accounted for the death of 14,739 male inmates and 1,300 women. - These figures represent the deaths as were obtained from the - available records in the camp, however, they are in no way - complete as many secret mass executions and deaths took place. - In 1941 an additional stockade was added at the Flossenburg - camp, to hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. From these 2,000 - prisoners only 102 survived. - - “Flossenburg Concentration Camp can best be described as a - factory dealing in death. Although this camp had in view the - primary object of putting to work the mass slave labor, another - of its primary objectives was the elimination of human lives by - the methods employed in handling the prisoners. - - “Hunger and starvation rations, sadism, housing facilities, - inadequate clothing, medical neglect, disease, beatings, - hangings, freezing, hand hanging, forced suicides, shooting, all - played a major role in obtaining their objective. Prisoners were - murdered at random; spite killings against Jews were common. - Injections of poison and shooting in the neck were everyday - occurrences. Epidemics of typhus and spotted fever were - permitted to run rampant as a means of eliminating prisoners. - Life in this camp meant nothing. Killing became a common thing, - so common that a quick death was welcomed by the unfortunate - ones.” - - * * * * * * - - “On Christmas 1944 a number of prisoners were hung at one time. - The prisoners were forced to view this hanging. By the side of - the gallows was a decorated Christmas tree and as expressed by - one prisoner ‘it was a terrible sight, that combination of - prisoners hanging in the air and the glistening Christmas tree’. - - “In March or April, 13 American or British parachutists were - hung. They had been delivered to this camp sometime before and - had been captured while trying to blow up bridges.” - - * * * * * * - - “On April 20, 1945, approximately 15,000 prisoners were - assembled to make a forced march in the direction of - Concentration Camp Dachau. The evacuation of these prisoners was - caused by the impending capture of the camp by the Allies. These - 15,000 prisoners were lined up in three groups and started on - this march. Only those prisoners who could walk were taken and - before leaving Flossenburg, many were executed, as also were - those who collapsed in rank awaiting the movement to start the - trek. No provision was made for the feeding of these prisoners - or sleeping on this trip. They marched in long columns guarded - by SS Guards. - - “Thousands were killed on the way and the paths which they took - were littered with the dead. Groups of from 5 to 50 were taken - out and forced to dig pits and then were shot. Many graves were - not even covered. As the already starved and weakened prisoners - fell from exhaustion, a group of SS guards bringing up the rear - would kill them by a shot in the back of the head. All who fell - out of line were immediately executed in this manner. Death was - also caused by beatings or bashings in the skulls. - - “The prisoners marched from Friday till Monday during which time - they received only 100 grams of bread. They marched in the rain - and slept in the fields in the mud and water. Many died from - exhaustion. On the 23rd day of April 1945, between the towns of - Cham and Roding, they were liberated by the American troops.” - (_2309-PS_) - -Conditions at Mauthausen, one of the most notorious extermination -centers, are thus described in an official report of the office of the -Judge Advocate General of the Third United States Army, dated 17 June -1945: - - “V. _Conclusions._ There is no doubt that Mauthausen was the - basis for long term planning. It was constructed as a gigantic - stone fortress on top of a mountain flanked by small barracks. - - “Mauthausen, in addition to its permanency of construction had - facilities for a large garrison of officers and men, and had - large dining rooms and toilet facilities for the staff. It was - conducted with the sole purpose in mind of exterminating any - so-called prisoner who entered within its walls. The so-called - branches of Mauthausen were under direct command of the SS - officials located there. All records, orders, and administrative - facilities were handled for these branches through Mauthausen. - The other camps, including Gusen and Ebensee, its two most - notorious and largest branches, were not exclusively used for - extermination but prisoners were used as tools in construction - and production until they were beaten or starved into - uselessness, whereupon they were customarily sent to Mauthausen - for final disposal.” (_2176-PS_) - -It is clear from both the motion picture and these reports, which could -be supplemented by many similar ones, that the brutal conditions in all -concentration camps followed the same general pattern. The widespread -incidence of these conditions makes it clear that they were not the -result of sporadic excesses on the part of individual jailers, but were -the result of policies deliberately imposed from above. - -The crimes committed by the Nazis in the concentration camp were on so -vast a scale that individual atrocities pale into insignificance. But -there are two exhibits in the possession of the prosecution which -illustrate the contempt in which the Nazis held human values. The first -is a frame showing sections of human skin, taken from human bodies in -Buchenwald Concentration Camp and preserved as ornaments. (This was -offered by the prosecution as a physical exhibit.) They were selected -because of the tattooing which appeared on the skin. Attached to this -exhibit is an extract of an official U. S. Army report describing the -circumstances under which this exhibit was obtained (_3420-PS_): - - “Mobile Field Interrogation Unit No. 2 - - PW INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - - “No. 2/20 - - 19 December 1944 - “Address Briefs and Requests to HQ, FID, MIS, APO 887 - “_EXTRACT_ - - “13. _Concentration Camp, Buchenwald._ - - “_Preamble._ The author of this account is PW Andreas - Pfaffenberger, 1 Coy, 9 Landesschuetzen Bn. 43 years old and of - limited education, he is a butcher by trade. The substantial - agreement of the details of his story with those found in PWIS - (H)/LF/736 establishes the validity of his testimony. - - “PW has not been questioned on statements which, in the light of - what is known, are apparently erroneous in certain details, nor - has any effort been made to alter the subjective character of - PW’s account, which he wrote without being told anything of the - intelligence already known. Results of interrogation on - personalities at Buchenwald have already been published (PWIB No - 2/12 Item 31).” - - * * * * * * - - “In 1939, all prisoners with tattooing on them were ordered to - report to the dispensary. No one knew what the purpose was. But - after the tattooed prisoners had been examined, the ones with - the best and most artistic specimens were kept in the - dispensary, and then killed by injections, administered by Karl - Beigs, a criminal prisoner. The corpses were then turned over to - the pathological department, where the desired pieces of - tattooed skin were detached from the bodies and treated. The - finished products were turned over to SS Standartenfuehrer - Koch’s wife, who had them fashioned into lampshades and other - ornamental household articles. I myself saw such tattooed skins - with various designs and legends on them, such as “Hans’l und - Gret’l”, which one prisoner had had on his knee, and ships from - prisoners’ chests. This work was done by a prisoner named - Wernerbach.” (_3420-PS_) - -The following certificate is also attached to the exhibit: - - “I, George C. Demas, Lieut., USNR., associated with the United - States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, - hereby certify that the attached exhibit, consisting of - parchment, was delivered by the War Crimes Section, Judge - Advocate General, U. S. Army, to me in my above capacity, in the - usual course of official business, as an exhibit found in - Buchenwald Camp and captured by military forces under the - command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces.” - (_3421-PS_) - -This is the conclusion reached in an official U. S. Army report attached -to the exhibit: - - “Based on the findings in paragraph 2, all three specimens are - tattooed human skin”. (_3423-PS_) - -One more example of this pathological phase of Nazi culture, another -Nazi trophy, is a human head with the skull bone removed, shrunken, -stuffed, and preserved. (This was offered by the prosecution as a -physical exhibit.) This head probably belonged to a foreign worker, -kidnapped by Sauckel to work in Speer’s armament industry. The Nazis had -one of their many victims decapitated after having had him hanged for -fraternizing with a German woman; they fashioned this ornament from his -head. This represents the end product of the Nazi system, representing -both the degradation of the Nazi “master” and the anguish of his victim. -The official U. S. Army report attached to this exhibit deals with the -manner in which this exhibit was acquired. It reads in part: - - “There I also saw the shrunken heads of two young Poles who had - been hanged for having relations with German girls. The heads - were the size of a fist, and the hair and the marks of the rope - were still there.” (_3423-PS_) - - 7. THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS - -No accurate estimate of how many persons died in the concentration camps -can be made. Although the Nazis were generally meticulous record -keepers, the records they kept about concentration camps appear to have -been incomplete. - -Occasionally there is a death book, or a set of index cards, but for the -most part, the victims apparently faded into an unrecorded death. The -scale of the concentration camp operations is suggested by a set of -seven books, the death ledger of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp -(physically offered to the court). Each book bears on its cover -“_Totenbuch_” or Death Book—Mauthausen. In these books were recorded -the names of some of the inmates who died or were murdered in this camp. -The books cover the period from January 1939 to April 1945. They give -the name, place of birth, the assigned cause of death and time of death -of each individual recorded. In addition each corpse is assigned a -serial number. Addition of the serial numbers for the five-year period -produces a total figure of 35,318. - -Examination of the books reveals the camp’s routine of death. For -example, pages 568 to 582 of Volume 5 cover death entries made for 19 -March 1945 between fifteen minutes past one in the morning until 2 -o’clock in the afternoon. In this space of 12¾ hours, 203 persons are -reported as having died. They were assigned serial numbers running from -8390 to 8593. The names of the dead are listed. The victims are all -recorded as having died of the same ailment—“heart trouble”. They died -at brief intervals. They died in alphabetical order. The first who died -was a man named Ackermann who died at one fifteen A.M. The last was a -man named Zynger who died at 2 o’clock P.M. - -At twenty minutes past two o’clock on the afternoon of the same day, 19 -March 1945, the fatal roll call began again, and continued until half -past four o’clock. In a space of two hours, 75 more persons died. Once -again they died from heart failure and in alphabetical order. The -entries are recorded in the same volume, from pages 582 through 586. - -Another death book was found at Camp Mauthausen. This is a single -volume, which has on its cover the words—“Death Book—Prisoners of -War”. Pages 234 through 246 contain entries recording the names of 208 -prisoners of war, apparently Russians, who at 15 minutes past midnight -on the 10th day of May 1942, were executed at the same time. The book -notes that the execution was directed by the Chief of the SD and the -SIPO (Heydrich). - -It is common knowledge that the anguish of the concentration camp was -spread, not only over the Continent of Europe, but over all the world. -Even today all over the world people are still seeking word of their -friends and relatives who vanished into the Nazi concentration camps and -left no trace behind. This fact is emphasized by the 23 November 1945 -issue of the weekly newspaper, “_Aufbau_”, published in the German -language in New York City. On the back pages—8, 9, 10, and 11—are -published both notices requesting information about friends and -relatives, and notices announcing the deaths of persons who were last -heard of in a Nazi concentration camp. The personal tragedies, which -these notices represent, multiplied an incalculable number of times, is -part of the legacy which the Nazi conspirators have left to the world. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (b, c). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections III; │ │ 15, 31, - │ VIII (A, C); X. │ I │ 41, 53 - │ │ │ - 3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the │ │ - │ Laws and Customs of War on Land, │ │ - │ Annex, Article 46. │ VI │ 597 - │ │ │ - 3738-PS │Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to │ │ - │ treatment of Prisoners of War, │ │ - │ Articles 2, 3. │ VI │ 600 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *374-PS │TWX Series of Orders signed by Heydrich │ │ - │and Mueller, issued by Gestapo │ │ - │Headquarters Berlin, 9-11 November 1938,│ │ - │concerning treatment of Jews. (USA 729) │ III │ 277 - │ │ │ - *392-PS │Official NSDAP circular entitled “The │ │ - │Social Life of New Germany with Special │ │ - │Consideration of the German Labor │ │ - │Front”, by Prof. Willy Mueller (Berlin, │ │ - │1938). (USA 326) │ III │ 380 - │ │ │ - *641-PS │Report of Public Prosecutor General in │ │ - │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder │ │ - │of Dr. Strauss in Dachau by an SS guard.│ │ - │(USA 450) │ III │ 453 - │ │ │ -*642-PS │Report to Public Prosecutor General in │ │ - │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder │ │ - │of Hausmann in Dachau by an SS guard. │ │ - │(USA 451) │ III │ 454 - │ │ │ - *644-PS │Report to Public Prosecutor General in │ │ - │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder │ │ - │of Schloss in Dachau by an SS guard. │ │ - │(USA 452) │ III │ 455 - │ │ │ - *645-PS │Report to Public Prosecutor General in │ │ - │Munich, 1 June 1933, concerning murder │ │ - │of Nefzger in Dachau by an SS guard. │ │ - │(USA 453) │ III │ 457 - │ │ │ - *778-PS │Disciplinary and Penal Measures for │ │ - │Concentration Camp Dachau and Service │ │ - │Regulations for the Camp Personnel, │ │ - │signed by Eicke, 1 October 1933. (USA │ │ - │247) │ III │ 550 - │ │ │ - 833-PS │Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head of│ │ - │the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, concerning │ │ - │prosecution of crimes against the Reich │ │ - │or occupying forces in the occupied │ │ - │territories. │ III │ 600 - │ │ │ -*1063-A-PS │Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2 January│ │ - │1941, concerning classification of │ │ - │concentration camps. (USA 492) │ III │ 775 - │ │ │ -*1063-B-PS │Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26 July │ │ - │1943, concerning establishment of Labor │ │ - │Reformatory camps. (USA 492) │ III │ 777 - │ │ │ -*1063-D-PS │Mueller’s order, 17 December 1942, │ │ - │concerning prisoners qualified for work │ │ - │to be sent to concentration camps. (USA │ │ - │219) │ III │ 778 - │ │ │ - 1063-E-PS │Copy of Mueller’s order, 25 June 1942, │ │ - │concerning increased shipments to │ │ - │concentration camps. │ III │ 780 - │ │ │ - 1151-P-PS │Letter from WVHA, 28 March 1942, │ │ - │concerning “Action 14 F 13” from files │ │ - │of Gross Rosen Concentration camp. │ III │ 808 - │ │ │ -*1165-PS │Letter from Commandant of concentration │ │ - │Camp Gross Rosen, 23 October 1941, and │ │ - │letter of Mueller to all Gestapo │ │ - │offices, 9 November 1941, concerning │ │ - │execution of Russian PWs. (USA 244) │ III │ 821 - │ │ │ -*1166-PS │Interoffice memorandum of WVHA, 15 │ │ - │August 1944, concerning number of │ │ - │prisoners and survey of prisoners’ │ │ - │clothing. (USA 458) │ III │ 824 - │ │ │ - 1216-PS │Typewritten memorandum, “Important │ │ - │Incidents in Concentration camp Dachau”.│ III │ 846 - │ │ │ - 1390-PS │Decree of the Reich President for the │ │ - │Protection of the People and State, 28 │ │ - │February 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, │ │ - │Part I, p. 83. │ III │ 968 - │ │ │ -*1531-PS │Directive from RSHA, 26 October 1939, │ │ - │concerning execution of protective │ │ - │custody, and directive, 12 June 1942, │ │ - │concerning third degree. (USA 248) │ IV │ 93 - │ │ │ -*1584-I-PS │Teletype from Goering to Himmler, 14 │ │ - │February 1944, concerning formation of │ │ - │7th Airforce Group squadron for special │ │ - │purposes. (USA 221) │ IV │ 117 - │ │ │ -*1584-III-PS │Correspondence between Himmler and │ │ - │Goering, 9 March 1944, concerning use of│ │ - │concentration camp inmates in aircraft │ │ - │industry. (USA 457) │ IV │ 118 - │ │ │ - 1616-PS │Letter from Dr. Rascher to Himmler, 17 │ │ - │February 1943, concerning freezing │ │ - │experiments. │ IV │ 133 - │ │ │ -*1650-PS │Directive to State Police Directorates │ │ - │from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, 4 │ │ - │March 1944, concerning captured escaped │ │ - │PWs except British and American PWs. │ │ - │(USA 246) │ IV │ 158 - │ │ │ -*1723-PS │Order concerning cooperation of Party │ │ - │offices with the Secret State Police, 25│ │ - │January 1938, published in Decrees, │ │ - │Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol. │ │ - │II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206) │ IV │ 219 - │ │ │ -*1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS Gruppenfuehrers, │ │ - │4 October 1943. (USA 170) │ IV │ 558 - │ │ │ - 1956-PS │Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State │ │ - │Police, published in The Archives, │ │ - │January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1342. │ IV │ 598 - │ │ │ - 2107-PS │Law on Secret State Police of 10 │ │ - │February 1936. 1936 Preussische │ │ - │Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22. │ IV │ 732 - │ │ │ - 2108-PS │Decree for execution of Law on Secret │ │ - │State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936 │ │ - │Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24. │ IV │ 732 - │ │ │ - 2169-PS │Quarterly report of the SS medical │ │ - │officer of Hmb. Neuengamme concentration│ │ - │camp, 29 March 1945. │ IV │ 799 - │ │ │ - 2171-PS │U. S. Government report B-2833 on │ │ - │Numerical Expansion of Buchenwald │ │ - │Concentration Camp, during years │ │ - │1937-1945. │ IV │ 800 - │ │ │ -*2176-PS │Report on Mauthausen concentration camp,│ │ - │by investigating officer, Office of │ │ - │Judge Advocate, Third U. S. Army, 17 │ │ - │June 1945. (USA 249). │ IV │ 836 - │ │ │ - 2187-PS │Order from Main SS economic │ │ - │administration office, 14 July 1943, │ │ - │concerning beating of female prisoners. │ IV │ 842 - │ │ │ -*2189-PS │Orders from Department D of Economic and│ │ - │Administrative Main Office, 11 August │ │ - │1942, concerning punishment by beating. │ │ - │(USA 460) │ IV │ 842 - │ │ │ - 2222-PS │Report of investigation of Buchenwald │ │ - │Concentration Camp, by Judge Advocate │ │ - │Section, Third United States Army, 25 │ │ - │May 1945. │ IV │ 860 - │ │ │ -*2285-PS │Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French │ │ - │officers, about shooting of prisoners at│ │ - │Mauthausen. (USA 490) │ IV │ 991 - │ │ │ -*2309-PS │Report by Headquarters Third United │ │ - │States Army, 21 June 1945, concerning │ │ - │Flossenburg Concentration Camp. (USA │ │ - │245) │ IV │ 999 - │ │ │ -*2324-PS │Extracts from Reconstruction of a │ │ - │Nation, by Hermann Goering, 1934. (USA │ │ - │233) │ IV │ 1033 - │ │ │ -*2330-PS │Order of Protective Custody, Police │ │ - │Directorate of Nurnberg-Fuerth of Josef │ │ - │Simon, Chairman of German Shoemaker’s │ │ - │Union, 29 August 1935. (USA 237) │ IV │ 1038 - │ │ │ -*2334-PS │Affidavits of Lorenz Hagen, Chairman of │ │ - │Local Committee, German Trade Unions, │ │ - │Nurnberg. (USA 238) │ IV │ 1041 - │ │ │ - 2344-PS │Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering, │ │ - │1934, p. 89. │ IV │ 1065 - │ │ │ - 2347-PS │Court decisions from 1935 │ │ - │Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp. │ │ - │577-578, 20 July 1935. │ IV │ 1066 - │ │ │ - 2476-PS │Affidavit of Josef Buehler, 4 November │ │ - │1945. │ V │ 228 - │ │ │ -*2477-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │ - │November 1945. (USA 518) │ V │ 229 - │ │ │ - 2478-PS │Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 │ │ - │November 1945. │ V │ 230 - │ │ │ -*2499-PS │Original Protective Custody Order served│ │ - │on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March 1935. (USA │ │ - │232) │ V │ 236 - │ │ │ -*2513-PS │Extract from The National Socialist │ │ - │Workers’ Party as an Association Hostile│ │ - │to State and to Republican Form of │ │ - │Government and Guilty of Treasonable │ │ - │Activity. (USA 235) │ V │ 252 - │ │ │ - 2533-PS │Extract from article “Legislation and │ │ - │Judiciary in Third Reich”, from Journal │ │ - │of the Academy for German Law, 1936, pp.│ │ - │141-142. │ V │ 277 - │ │ │ -*2605-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, former │ │ - │President of the Hungarian Zionist │ │ - │Organization, 13 September 1945. (USA │ │ - │242) │ V │ 313 - │ │ │ - 2615-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 │ │ - │November 1945. │ V │ 338 - │ │ │ - 2655-PS │Concordat between the Holy See and the │ │ - │German Reich, Article 31. 1933 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, p. 679, │ │ - │687-8. │ V │ 364 - │ │ │ -*2663-PS │Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag, 30 │ │ - │January 1939, quoted from Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Munich edition, 1 February │ │ - │1939. (USA 268) │ V │ 367 - │ │ │ -*2745-PS │Order for commitment to concentration │ │ - │camp, 7 July 1943, Kaltenbrunner’s │ │ - │signature. (USA 519) │ V │ 383 - │ │ │ -*2753-PS │Affidavit of Alois Hoellriegl, 7 │ │ - │November 1945. (USA 515) │ V │ 393 - │ │ │ -*2928-PS │Affidavit of Mathias Lex, deputy │ │ - │president of the German Shoemakers │ │ - │Union. (USA 239) │ V │ 594 - │ │ │ -*3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to │ │ - │all stations of State Police, 10 │ │ - │November 1938, on measures against Jews,│ │ - │and one order from Heydrich on │ │ - │termination of protest actions. (USA │ │ - │240) │ V │ 797 - │ │ │ -*3249-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Franz Blaha, 24 │ │ - │November 1945. (USA 663) │ V │ 949 - │ │ │ -*3420-PS │U. S. Army report on human skin exhibits│ │ - │at Buchenwald Concentration Camp. (USA │ │ - │252) │ VI │ 122 - │ │ │ -*3421-PS │Certificate accompanying human skin │ │ - │exhibit. (USA 253) │ VI │ 123 - │ │ │ -*3423-PS │U. S. Army report on identification of │ │ - │tattooed human skins. (USA 252) │ VI │ 123 - │ │ │ -*3590-PS │Charges and findings against Weiss and │ │ - │others tried by U. S. Military Court at │ │ - │Dachau. (USA 664) │ VI │ 288 - │ │ │ -*3601-PS │Affidavit of Sidney Mendel, 28 December │ │ - │1945, concerning the connection of │ │ - │Frick’s Ministry of Interior with │ │ - │concentration camps. (GB 324) │ VI │ 313 - │ │ │ -*3751-PS │Diary of the German Minister of Justice,│ │ - │1935 concerning prosecution of church │ │ - │officials and punishment in │ │ - │concentration camps. (USA 828; USA 858) │ VI │ 636 - │ │ │ -*3762-PS │Affidavit of SS Colonel Kurt Becher, 8 │ │ - │March 1946, concerning the │ │ - │responsibility of Kaltenbrunner for │ │ - │concentration camp executions. (USA 798)│ VI │ 645 - │ │ │ -*3844-PS │Statement of Josef Niedermayer, 7 March │ │ - │1946, concerning Kaltenbrunner’s part in│ │ - │“bullet” orders at Mauthausen │ │ - │concentration camp. (USA 801) │ VI │ 782 - │ │ │ -*3846-PS │Interrogation of Johann Kanduth, 30 │ │ - │November 1945, concerning crematorium at│ │ - │Mauthausen and the activities of │ │ - │Kaltenbrunner there. (USA 796) │ VI │ 788 - │ │ │ -*3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │ - │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │ - │execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │ - │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │ - │819) │ VI │ 787 - │ │ │ -*3870-PS │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April │ │ - │1946, concerning Mauthausen │ │ - │Concentration Camp and dying statement │ │ - │of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA │ │ - │797) │ VI │ 790 - │ │ │ -*D-84 │Gestapo instructions to State Police │ │ - │Departments, 5 August 1937, regarding │ │ - │protective custody for Bible students. │ │ - │(USA 236) │ VI │ 1040 - │ │ │ -*D-569 │File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer SS,│ │ - │the OKW, Inspector of Concentration │ │ - │Camps, Chief of Security Police and SD, │ │ - │dating from 29 October 1941 through 22 │ │ - │February 1944, relative to procedure in │ │ - │cases of unnatural death of Soviet PW, │ │ - │execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277) │ VII │ 74 - │ │ │ -*D-728 │Circular, 15 March 1945, from NSDAP │ │ - │Gauleitung Hessen-Nassau to the │ │ - │“Kreis”-Leaders of the Gau, concerning │ │ - │Action by the Party to keep Germans in │ │ - │check until end of the War. (GB 282) │ VII │ 174 - │ │ │ -*D-745-A │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 8 March │ │ - │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ - │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ - │811) │ VII │ 208 - │ │ │ -*D-745-B │Deposition of Anton Kaindl, 19 March │ │ - │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ - │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ - │812) │ VII │ 209 - │ │ │ -*D-746-A │Deposition of Fritz Suhren, 8 March │ │ - │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ - │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ - │813) │ VII │ 209 - │ │ │ -*D-746-B │Deposition of Fritz Suhren, │ │ - │19 March 1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ - │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ - │814) │ VII │ 210 - │ │ │ -*D-748 │Affidavit of Karl Totzauer, 15 March │ │ - │1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ - │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ - │816) │ VII │ 211 - │ │ │ -*D-749-B │Statement of Rudolf Hoess, │ │ - │20 March 1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ - │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ - │817) │ VII │ 212 - │ │ │ -*D-750 │Deposition of August Harbaum, │ │ - │19 March 1946, concerning SS personnel │ │ - │supervising concentration camps. (USA │ │ - │818) │ VII │ 213 - │ │ │ -*L-83 │Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July │ │ - │1945. (USA 234) │ VII │ 859 - │ │ │ -*L-215 │File of orders and dossiers of 25 │ │ - │Luxembourgers committed to concentration│ │ - │camps at various times in 1944. (USA │ │ - │243) │ VII │ 1045 - │ │ │ -*R-91 │Telegram from Mueller, SS Gruppenfuehrer│ │ - │to Reichsfuehrer SS, 16 December 1942. │ │ - │(USA 241) │ VIII │ 60 - │ │ │ -*R-124 │Speer’s conference minutes of Central │ │ - │Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning │ │ - │labor supply. (USA 179) │ VIII │ 146 - │ │ │ -*R-129 │Letter and enclosure from Pohl to │ │ - │Himmler, 30 April 1942, concerning │ │ - │concentration camps. (USA 217) │ VIII │ 198 - - - - - Chapter XII - THE PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS - - -It had long been a German theory that the First World War ended in -Germany’s defeat because of a collapse behind the lines. In planning for -future wars it was determined that the home front must be secured to -prevent a repetition of this 1918 debacle. Unification of the German -people was essential to successful planning and waging of war. Hence, -the Nazi political goal must be sought:—“One race, one State, one -Fuehrer.” Free trade unions must be abolished, political parties (other -than the NSDAP) must be outlawed, civil liberties must be suspended, and -opposition of every kind must be swept away. Loyalty to God, church, and -scientific truth was declared to be incompatible with the Nazi regime. - -The anti-Jewish policy was part of this plan for unification because it -was the conviction of the Nazis that the Jews would not contribute to -Germany’s military program, but on the contrary would hamper it. The Jew -must therefore be eliminated. This view is clearly borne out by a -statement contained in a speech of Himmler’s at a meeting of SS Major -Generals on 4 October 1943: - - “We know how difficult we should have made it for ourselves if - with the bombing raids, the burdens and deprivations of war, we - still had the Jews today in every town as secret saboteurs, - agitators, and trouble-mongers; we would now probably have - reached the 1916-17 stage when the Jews were still in the German - national body.” (_1919-PS_) - -The treatment of the Jews within Germany was as much a part of the Nazi -plan for aggressive war as was the building of armaments and the -conscription of manpower. - - 1. HATE-PROPAGANDA AGAINST JEWS - -The objective of the elimination and extermination of the Jews, could -not be accomplished without certain preliminary measures. One of these -was the indoctrination of the German people with hatred against the -Jews. - -The first evidence of the Party policies in this direction was expressed -in the Party program of February 1920 (_1708-PS_). Paragraphs (4) and -(6) of that program declared: - - “* * * Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of - the race can only be one who is of German blood without - consideration of confession.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * The right to determine matters concerning administration - and law belongs only to the citizen; therefore, we demand that - every public office of any sort whatsoever, whether in the - Reich, the county or municipality, be filled only by citizens.” - (_1708-PS_) - -Hitler, at page 724 and 725 of _Mein Kampf_, spoke of the Jew. If the -National Socialist movement was to fulfill its task, he declared: - - “It must open the eyes of the people with regard to foreign - nations and must remind them again and again of the true enemy - of our present day world. In the place of hate against - Aryans—from whom we may be separated by almost everything, to - whom, however, we are tied by common blood or the great tide of - a common culture—it must dedicate to the general anger the evil - enemy of mankind as the true cause of all suffering. - - “It must see to it, however, that at least in our country he be - recognized as the most mortal enemy and that the struggle - against him may show, like a flaming beacon of a better era, to - other nations too, the road to salvation for a struggling Aryan - mankind.” (_2662-PS_) - -A flood of abusive literature of all types and for all age groups was -published and circulated throughout Germany. Illustrative of this type -of publication is the book _Der Giftpilz_. (_1778-PS_). This book brands -the Jew as a persecutor of the labor class, a race defiler, a devil in -human form, a poisonous mushroom, and a murderer. This particular book -was used to instruct school children to recognize the Jew by caricatures -of his physical features, (pages 6 and 7); and to teach them that the -Jew abuses little boys and girls, (page 30), and that the Jewish Bible -permits all crimes (pages 13-17). Streicher’s periodical, _Der -Stuermer_, (issue no. 14 for April 1937) in particular, went to such -extremes as to publish the statement that Jews at the ritual celebration -of their Passover slaughtered Christians: - - “The numerous confessions made by the Jews show that the - execution of ritual murders is a law to the Talmud Jew. The - former chief rabbi, and later monk, Teofite, declared that the - ritual murders take place especially on the Jewish Purim in - memory of the Persian murders, and Passover in memory of the - murder of Christ. The instructions are as follows: - - “The blood of the victims is to be tapped by force. On Passover - it is to be used in wine and matzos. Thus, a small part of the - blood is to be poured into the dough of the matzos and into the - wine. The mixing is done by the Jewish head of the family. The - procedure is as follows: - - “The family head empties a few drops of the fresh and powdered - blood into the glass, wets the fingers of the left hand with it - and sprays, blesses, with it everything on the table. The head - of the family then says, ‘Thus we ask God to send the ten - plagues to all enemies of the Jewish faith.’ Then they eat, and - at the end the head of the family exclaims, ‘May all Gentiles - perish, as the child whose blood is contained in the bread and - wine.’ - - “The fresh, or dried and powdered blood of the slaughtered is - further used by young married Jewish couples, by pregnant - Jewesses, for circumcision and so on. Ritual murder is - recognized by all Talmud Jews. The Jew believes he absolves - himself thus of his sins.” (_2699-PS_) - -The Jew-baiting publication, _Der Stuermer_, was published by -Streicher’s publishing firm (_2697-PS_). In one issue of this -periodical, Streicher, speaking of the Jewish faith, said: - - “The Holy Scripture is a horrible criminal romance abounding - with murder, incest, fraud and indecency.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Talmud is the great Jewish book of crimes that the Jew - practices in his daily life.” (_2698-PS_) - -This propaganda campaign of hate, of which the above quotations are but -random samples, was too widespread and notorious to require further -elaboration. - - 2. DISCRIMINATORY DECREES AGAINST JEWS - -When the Nazi Party gained control of the German State, the conspirators -used the means of official decrees as a weapon against the Jews. In this -way the force of the state was applied against them. - -Jewish immigrants were denaturalized (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, -page 480, signed by Frick and Neurath). - -Native Jews were precluded from citizenship (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -Part I, page 1146, signed by Frick). - -Jews were forbidden to live in marriage or to have extra-marital -relations with persons of German blood (1935 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part -I, page 1146, signed by Frick and Hess). - -Jews were denied the right to vote (1936 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, -page 133, signed by Frick). - -Jews were denied the right to hold public office or civil service -positions (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 277, signed by Frick). - -Jews were relegated to an inferior status by the denial of common -privileges and freedoms. Thus, they were denied access to certain city -areas, sidewalks, transportation, places of amusement, restaurants (1938 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1676). - -Progressively, more and more stringent measures were applied, even to -the denial of private pursuits. They were excluded from the practice of -dentistry (1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 47, signed by Hess). - -The practice of law was denied to them (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part -I, page 1403, signed by Frick and Hess). - -The practice of medicine was forbidden them (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -Part I, page 969, signed by Frick and Hess). - -They were denied employment by press and radio (1933 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 661). - -They were excluded from stock exchanges and stock brokerage (1934 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 661). - -They were excluded from farming (1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page -685). - -In 1938 they were excluded from business in general and from the -economic life of Germany (1938 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1580, -signed by Goering). - -The Jews were also forced to pay discriminatory taxes and huge atonement -fines. Their homes, bank accounts, real estate, and intangibles were -expropriated. - -A report of a conference under the chairmanship of Goering, and attended -by Funk, among others, which was held at 11 o’clock on 12 November 1938 -at the Reich Ministry for Air, quotes Goering as saying: - - “One more question, gentlemen, what would you think the - situation would be if I’d announced today that Jewry shall have - to contribute this one billion as a punishment.” - - * * * * * * - - “I shall choose the wording this way that German Jewry shall, as - punishment for their abominable crimes, etc., etc., have to make - a contribution of one billion; that’ll work. The pigs won’t - commit another murder. I’d like to say again that I would not - like to be a Jew in Germany.” (_1816-PS_) - -Following these whimsical remarks a decree was issued over the signature -of Goering, fining German Jews the sum of one billion Reichsmarks (1938 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 1579, dated 12 November 1938, signed -by Goering). - -Similar decrees are contained in 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page -282, signed by Goering; and in 1941 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page -722, signed by Frick and Bormann. - -Finally, in 1943, the Jews were placed beyond the protection of any -judicial process by a decree signed by Bormann and Frick, among others; -the police were made the sole arbiters of punishment and death (1943 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, page 372, signed by Frick and Bormann). - - 3. ANTI-JEWISH BOYCOTTS, RAIDS, AND VIOLENCE - -Simultaneously with the passage of these decrees and their execution, -still another weapon was wielded by the Party and the party-controlled -state. This was the openly sponsored and official anti-Jewish boycotts. -The published diary of Joseph Goebbels, at page 290, contains this entry -for 29 March 1933: - - “The boycott appeal is approved by the entire cabinet.” - (_2409-PS_) - -Again, on 31 March 1933, he wrote: - - “We are having a last discussion among a very small circle and - decide that the boycott is to start tomorrow with all severity.” - (_2409-PS_) - -Streicher and Frank, together with Himmler, Ley, and others, were -members of a central committee who conducted the 1933 boycott against -the Jews. Their names are listed in National Socialist Party -correspondence for 29 March 1933. (_2156-PS_) - -In this early 1933 violence against the Jews, raids were conducted on -synagogues by uniformed Nazis. Attending members of the synagogues were -assaulted, and religious insignia and emblems were desecrated. A report -of such an occurrence was contained in an official dispatch from the -American Consul General in Leipzig, dated 5 April, 1943, which stated: - - “In Dresden several weeks ago uniformed Nazis raided the Jewish - prayer house, interrupted the evening religious service, - arrested 25 worshippers, and tore the holy insignia or emblems - from their headcovering worn while praying.” (_2709-PS_) - -At a meeting in Nurnberg, before the representatives of the German -press, Streicher and Mayor Liebel of Nurnberg revealed in advance to the -gathered members of the press that the Nurnberg synagogue was to be -destroyed. The minutes of this meeting, dated 4 August 1938, read as -follows: - - “The breaking up of the synagogue - (information must still be secret) - - “On August 10, 1938 at 10 o’clock a. m., the breakup of the - synagogues will commence. Gauleiter Julius Streicher will - personally set the crane into motion with which the Jewish - symbols, Star of David, etc., will be torn down. This should be - arranged in a big way. Closer details are still unknown.” - (_1724-PS_) - -Streicher himself supervised the demolition, according to a newspaper -account of 11 August 1938, which described the scene: - - “In Nurnberg the Synagogue is being demolished; Julius Streicher - himself inaugurates the work by a speech lasting more than an - hour and a half. By his order then—so to speak as a prelude of - the demolition—the tremendous Star of David came off the - cupola.” (_2711-PS_) - -These accounts of violence were not localized anti-Semitic -demonstrations, but were directed and ordered from a centralized -headquarters in Berlin. This fact is established by a series of teletype -messages sent by the Berlin Secret State Police Headquarters to police -chiefs throughout Germany on 10 November 1938, which contained -instructions pertaining to the prearranged demonstration (_3051-PS_). -One of these confidential orders, signed by Heydrich, provides: - - “Because of the attempt on the life of the Secretary of the - Legation von Rath in Paris tonight, 9-10 November 1938, - demonstrations against Jews are to be expected throughout the - Reich. The following instructions are given on how to treat - these events: - - “1. The Chiefs of the State Police, or their deputies, must get - in telephonic contact with the political leaders who have - jurisdiction over their districts and have to arrange a joint - meeting with the appropriate inspector or commander of the Order - Police to discuss the organization of the demonstrations. At - these discussions the political leaders have to be informed that - the German police has received from the Reichsfuehrer SS and - Chief of the German Police the following instructions, in - accordance with which the political leaders should adjust their - own measures. - - “_a._ Only such measures should be taken which do not involve - danger to German life or property. (For instance synagogues are - to be burned down only when there is no danger of fire to the - surroundings.) - - “_b._ Business and private apartments of Jews may be destroyed - but not looted. The police is instructed to supervise the - execution of this order and to arrest looters.” (_3051-PS_) - - 4. THE PROGRAM FOR THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF JEWRY - -At this point the gradual and mounting campaign against the Jews was -prepared for the achievement of its ultimate violent ends. The German -people had been indoctrinated, and the seeds of hatred had been sown. -The German state was armed and prepared for conquest. The force of world -opinion could now safely be ignored. Already the Nazi conspirators had -forced out of Germany 200,000 of its former 500,000 Jews. The -Nazi-controlled German state was therefore emboldened, and Hitler in -anticipation of the aggressive wars already planned cast about for a -provocation. - -In his speech before the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, Hitler declared: - - “If the international Jewish financiers within and without - Europe succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world - war, the result will not be the Bolshevication of the world and - the victory of Jewry, but the obliteration of the Jewish race in - Europe.” (_2663-PS_) - -The chief editor of the official organ of the SS, the “_Schwarze -Korps_,” expressed similar sentiments on 8 August 1940: - - “Just as the Jewish question will be solved for Germany only - when the last Jew has been deported, so the rest of Europe - should also realize that the German peace which awaits it must - be a peace without Jews.” (_2668-PS_) - -Other officials of the Party and State voiced the same views. Rosenberg -wrote for the publication “World Struggle,” which in the April and -September 1941 issues declared: - - “The Jewish question will be solved for Europe only when the - last Jew has left the European continent.” (_2665-PS_) - -Hans Frank entered this apologetic note in his diary: - - “Of course, I could not eliminate all lice and Jews in only a - year’s time. But in the course of time, and above all, if you - will help me, this end will be attained.” (_2233-C-PS_) - -A. _Registration._ - -The first step in accomplishing the purpose of the Nazi Party and the -Nazi-dominated state, to eliminate the Jew, was to require a complete -registration of all Jews. Inasmuch as the anti-Jewish policy was linked -with the program of German aggression, such registration was required -not only within the Reich, but successively within the conquered -territories. For example, registration was required, by decree, within -Germany (_Reichsgesetzblatt_ Part I, 1938, page 922, 23 July, signed by -Frick); within Austria (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Volume 1, 1940, page 694, -29 April); within Poland (_Kurjer Krakowski_, 24 October, 1939); in -France (_Journal Official_ No. 9, page 92, 30 September, 1940); in -Holland (_Verordnungsblatt_, No. 16, 10 January, 1941, signed by -Seyss-Inquart). - -B. _Segregation into Ghettos._ - -The second step was to segregate and concentrate the Jews within -restricted areas, called ghettos. This policy was carefully worked out, -as is illustrated by the confidential statement taken from the files of -Rosenberg (_212-PS_). This memorandum of Rosenberg’s, entitled -“Directions for Handling of the Jewish Question”, states: - - “The first main goal of the German measures must be strict - segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. In the - execution of this, first of all, is the seizing of the Jewish - population by the introduction of a registration order and - similar appropriate measures * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * All rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They - are to be placed in ghettos and at the same time are to be - separated according to sexes. The presence of many more or less - closed Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Ukraine - makes this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen - which make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower in case - labor needs are present. These ghettos can be placed under the - supervision of a Jewish self-government with Jewish officials. - The guarding of the boundaries between the ghettos and the outer - world, is, however, the duty of the Police. - - “Also, in the cases in which a ghetto could not yet be - established, care is to be taken through strict prohibitions and - similar suitable measures that a further intermingling of blood - of the Jews and the rest of the populace does not continue.” - (_212-PS_) - -In May 1941 Rosenberg, as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern -Territories, issued directions confining the Jews to ghettos in the -Ukraine: - - “After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, - the Jewish question will have to have a decisive solution, - through the institution of ghettos.” (_1028-PS_) - -The policies set forth in the foregoing utterances of Rosenberg were not -accidental, isolated, or the views of one individual. They were the -expressed State policies. Von Schirach played his part in the program of -ghettoization. His speech before the European Youth Congress held in -Vienna on 14 September 1942 was reported on page 2, column 2 of the -Vienna edition of the “_Voelkischer Beobachter_” of 15 September, as -follows: - - “Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to - European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven - from this city, which was once the European metropolis of Jewry, - tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto - of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply: I see in this an - action contributing to European culture.” (_3048-PS_) - -One of the largest ghettos was within the city of Warsaw. The official -report made by SS Major General Stroop concerning this ghetto is -entitled “The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More.” (_1061-PS_) - -The report thus describes the ghetto: - - “The Ghetto thus established in Warsaw was inhabited by about - 400,000 Jews. It contained 27,000 apartments with an average of - 2½ rooms each. It was separated from the rest of the city by - partition and other walls, and by walling-up of the - thoroughfares, windows, doors, open spaces, etc. * * *” - (_1061-PS_) - -Conditions within this ghetto are indicated in the statement of the -report that an average of six persons lived in every room. (_1061-PS_) - -Himmler received a report from the SS Brigade Fuehrer Group A, dated 15 -October 1941, which further illustrates the establishment and operation -of the ghettos. (_L-180_) The report states: - - “Apart from organizing and carrying out measures of execution, - the creation of ghettos was begun in the larger towns at once - during the first day of operations. This was especially urgent - in Knowno because there were 30,000 Jews in a total population - of 152,400.” - - * * * * * * - - “In Riga the so-called ‘_Moskau Suburb_’ was designated as a - ghetto. This is the worst dwelling district of Riga, already now - mostly inhabited by Jews. The transfer of the Jews into the - ghetto district proved rather difficult because the Latvians - dwelling in that district had to be evacuated and residential - space in Riga is very crowded. 24,000 of the 28,000 Jews living - in Riga have been transferred into the ghetto so far. In - creating the ghetto, the Security Police restricted themselves - to mere policing duties, while the establishment and - administration of the ghetto as well as the regulation of the - food supply for the inmates of the ghetto were left to civil - administration; the labor officers were left in charge of Jewish - labor. - - “In the other towns with a larger Jewish population ghettos - shall be established likewise.” (_L-180_) - -Jews were forced into ghettos in the Polish Province of Galicia. The -conditions in these ghettos are described in the report from Katzmann, -Lt. General of Police, to Krueger, General of the Police East, dated 20 -June 1943, and entitled “Solution of Jewish Question in Galicia.” -(_L-18_): - - “Nothing but catastrophical conditions were found in the ghettos - of Rawa-Ruska and Rohatyn * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * The Jews of Rawa-Ruska, fearing the evacuation, had - concealed those suffering from spotted fever in underground - holes. When evacuation was to start the police found that 3,000 - Jews suffering from spotted fever lay about in this ghetto. In - order to destroy this center of pestilence at once every police - officer inoculated against spotted fever was called into action. - Thus we succeeded to destroy this plague-boil, losing thereby - only one officer. Almost the same conditions were found in - Rohatyn * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “Since we received more and more alarming reports on the Jews - becoming armed in an ever-increasing manner, we started during - the last fortnight in June 1943 an action throughout the whole - of the district of Galicia with the intent to use strongest - measures to destroy the Jewish gangsterdom. Special measures - were found necessary during the action to dissolve the ghetto in - Lwow where the dug-out mentioned above had been established. - Here we had to act brutally from the beginning, in order to - avoid losses on our side; we had to blow up, or to burn down - several houses. On this occasion the surprising fact arose that - we were able to catch about 20,000 Jews instead of 12,000 Jews - who had registered. We had to pull at least 3,000 Jewish corpses - out of every kind of hiding places; they had committed suicide - by taking poison. * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single - SS-Police officer during these actions, mood and spirit of the - men were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy from the first to - the last day * * *.” (_L-18_) - -These acts of removal and slaughter were not entirely without profit. -The report continues: - - “Together with the evacuation action, we executed the - confiscation of Jewish property. Very high amounts were - confiscated and paid over to the Special Staff ‘Reinhard’. Apart - from furniture and many textile goods, the following amounts - were confiscated and turned over to Special Staff ‘Reinhard’ * * - * - - “20.952 kilograms of gold wedding rings. - 7 Stamp collections, complete. - 1 Suit case with pocket knives. - 1 basket of fountain pens and propelled pencils. - 3 bags filled with rings—not genuine. - 35 wagons of furs.” (_L-18_) - -The thoroughness of the looting is illustrated by an item listing 11.73 -kilograms of gold teeth and inlays. (_L-18_) - -By the end of 1942, Jews in the General Government of Poland had been -crowded into fifty-five localities, whereas before the German invasion -there had been approximately 1,000 Jewish settlements within this same -area. This fact is reported in the 1942 Official Gazette for the General -Government, No. 94, page 665, 1 November 1942. - -C. _Forced Labor._ - -The Jews, having been registered and confined within the ghettos, now -furnished a reservoir for slave labor. The difference between slave -labor and “labor duty” was this: the latter group were entitled to -reasonable compensation, stated working hours, medical care and -attention, and other social security measures, while the former were -granted none of these advantages, being in fact, on a level below that -of slaves. - -Rosenberg set up within his organization for the Occupied Eastern -Territories a department which, among other things, was to seek a -solution for the Jewish problem by means of forced labor. His plans, -contained in a memorandum entitled “General Organizations and Tasks of -our Office for the General Handling of Problems in the Eastern -Territory,” and dated 29 April 1941, read as follows: - - “A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for - which a temporary solution will have to be determined (forced - labor for the Jews, creation of Ghettos, etc.).” (_1024-PS_) - -Thereafter Rosenberg issued instructions that Jewish forced labor should -be utilized for every manual labor task: - - “The standing rule for the Jewish labor employment is the - complete and unyielding use of Jewish manpower regardless of age - in the reconstruction of the occupied eastern territories.” - - * * * * * * - - “Violations against German measures, especially against the - forced labor regulations, are to be punished by death to the - Jews.” (_212-PS_) - -From the ghettos Jewish labor was selected and sent to a concentration -area. Here the usable Jews were screened from those considered -worthless. For example, a contingent of 45,000 Jews could be expected to -yield 10,000 to 15,000 usable laborers. This estimate is based on an -RSHA telegram to Himmler, marked “Urgent” and “Secret”, and dated 16 -December 1942. - - “In the total of 45,000 are included physically handicapped and - others (old Jews and children). In making a distribution for - this purpose, at least 10,000 to 15,000 laborers will be - available when the Jews arriving at Auschwitz are assigned.” - (_1472-PS_) - -The report from Lieutenant General of Police, Katzmann, to General of -the Police East, Krueger, clearly outlines the nature of the Jewish -forced labor: - - “The best remedy consisted of the formation, by the SS and - Police Leader, of forced labor camps. The best opportunity for - labor was offered by the necessity to complete the ‘Dg.4’ road - which was extremely important and necessary for the whole of the - southern part of the front, and which was in a catastrophically - bad condition. On October 15th 1941, the establishment of camps - along the road was commenced, and despite considerable - difficulties there existed, after a few weeks only, seven camps - containing 4,000 Jews.” - - * * * * * * - - “Soon more camps followed these first ones, so that after a very - short time the completion of fifteen camps of this kind could be - reported to the Superior Leader of SS and Police. In the course - of time about 20,000 Jewish laborers passed through these camps. - Despite the hardly imaginable difficulties occurring at this - work I can report today that about 160 kilometers of the road - are completed.” - - * * * * * * - - “At the same time all other Jews fit for work were registered - and distributed for useful work by the labor agencies. - - * * * When the Jews were marked by the Star of David, as well as - when they were registered by the labor agencies, the first - symptoms appeared in their attempts to dodge the order of the - authorities. The measures which were introduced thereupon led to - thousands of arrests. It became more and more apparent that the - civil administration was not in a position to solve the Jewish - problem in an approximately satisfactory manner. Then, for - instance, the municipal administration at Lwow had no success in - their attempts to house the Jews within a closed district which - would be inhabited only by Jews. This question, too, was solved - quickly by the SS and Police Leaders through subordinate - officials. This measure became the more urgent as in the winter, - 1941, big centers of spotted fever were noted in many parts of - the town.” - - * * * * * * - - “During this removal of the Jews into a certain quarter of the - town several sluices were erected at which all the work-shy and - asocial Jewish rabble were caught during the screening and - treated in a special way. Owing to the peculiar fact that almost - 90% of artisans working in Galicia were Jews, the task to be - solved could be fulfilled only step by step, since an immediate - evacuation would not have served the interest of War Economy.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * Cases were discovered where Jews, in order to acquire any - certificate of labor, not only renounced all wages, but even - paid money themselves. Moreover, the organizing of Jews for the - benefit of their employers grew to such catastrophical extent - that it was deemed necessary to interfere in the most energetic - manner for the benefit of the German name. Since the - administration was not in a position and showed itself too weak - to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply took over - the entire disposition of labor for Jews. The Jewish labor - agencies, which were manned by hundreds of Jews, were dissolved. - All certificates of labor given by firms or administrative - offices were declared invalid, and the cards given to the Jews - by the labor agencies were revalidated by the police offices by - stamping them. In the course of this action, again, thousands of - Jews were caught who were in possession of forged certificates - or who had obtained, surreptitiously, certificates of labor by - all kinds of pretexts. These Jews also were exposed to special - treatment.” (_L-18_) - -D. _Extermination._ - -(At this point a strip of motion picture footage taken, presumably, by a -member of the SS, and captured by the United States military forces in -an SS barracks near Augsburg, Germany, was shown to the tribunal. The -film depicts what is believed to be the extermination of a ghetto by -Gestapo agents, assisted by military units. - -The following scenes are representative: - -Scene 2: A naked girl running across the courtyard. - -Scene 3: An older woman being pushed past the camera, and a man in SS -uniform standing at the right of the scene. - -Scene 5: A man with a skull cap and a woman are manhandled. - -Scene 14: A half-naked woman runs through the crowd. - -Scene 15: Another half-naked woman runs out of the house. - -Scene 16: Two men drag an old man out. - -Scene 18: A man in German military uniform, with his back to the camera, -watches. - -Scene 24: A general shot of the street, showing fallen bodies and naked -women running. - -Scene 32: A shot of the street, showing five fallen bodies. - -Scene 37: A man with a bleeding head is hit again. - -Scene 39: A soldier in German military uniform, with a rifle, stands by -as a crowd centers on a man coming out of the house. - -Scene 44: A soldier with a rifle, in German military uniform, walks past -a woman clinging to a torn blouse. - -Scene 45: A woman is dragged by her hair across the street.) - -The means of accomplishing the extermination of the Jews are discussed -in the diary of Hans Frank, then Governor-General of Occupied Poland -(_2233-D-PS_). In a cabinet session on Tuesday, 16 December 1941 in the -Government Building at Cracow, Frank made a closing address, as follows: - - “As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite - frankly that they must be done away with in one way or another. - The Fuehrer said once: ‘Should united Jewry again succeed in - provoking a world-war, the blood of not only the nations which - have been forced into the war by them, will be shed, but the Jew - will have found his end in Europe’. I know that many of the - measures carried out against the Jews in the Reich at present - are being criticized. It is being tried intentionally, as is - obvious from the reports on the morale, to talk about cruelty, - harshness, etc. Before I continue, I want to beg you to agree - with me on the following formula: We will principally have pity - on the German people only, and nobody else in the whole world. - The others, too, had no pity on us. As an old - National-Socialist, I must say: This war would only be a partial - success if the whole lot of Jewry would survive it, while we - would have shed our best blood in order to save Europe. My - attitude towards the Jews will, therefore, be based only on the - expectation that they must disappear. They must be done away - with. I have entered negotiations to have them deported to the - East. A great discussion concerning that question will take - place in Berlin in January, to which I am going to delegate the - State Secretary Dr. Buehler. That discussion is to take place in - the Reich Security Main Office with SS-Lt. General Heydrich. A - great Jewish migration will begin, in any case. - - “But what should be done with the Jews? Do you think they will - be settled down in the ‘Ostland’, in villages? This is what we - were told in Berlin: Why all this bother? We can do nothing with - them either in the ‘Ostland’ nor in the ‘Reichskommissariat’. So - liquidate them yourself. - - “Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourself of all feeling of - pity. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and - wherever it is possible, in order to maintain there the - structure of the Reich as a whole. This will, naturally, be - achieved by other methods than those pointed out by Bureau Chief - Dr. Hummel. Nor can the judges of the Special Courts be made - responsible for it, because of the limitations of the framework - of the legal procedure. Such outdated views cannot be applied to - such gigantic and unique events. We must find at any rate a way - which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are working in that - direction. - - “The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant - gluttons. We have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the - General Government, perhaps with the Jewish mixtures and - everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews. We cannot shoot or - poison those 3,500,000 Jews, but we shall nevertheless be able - to take measures, which will lead, somehow, to their - annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic measures - to be determined in discussions from the Reich. The General - Government must become free of Jews, the same as the Reich. - Where and how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices - which we must appoint and create here. Their activities will be - brought to your attention in due course.” (_2233-D-PS_) - -This was not the planning and scheming of an irresponsible individual, -but the expression by the Governor-General of Occupied Poland, of the -official policy of the German State. - -Rosenberg’s notion of the means to be taken against the Jews is -expressed in a secret “Document Memorandum for the Fuehrer—Concerning: -Jewish Possessions in France,” dated 18 December 1941. Rosenberg urges -plundering and death: - - “* * * In compliance with the order of the Fuehrer for - protection of Jewish cultural possessions, a great number of - Jewish dwellings remained unguarded. Consequently, many - furnishings have disappeared because a guard could, naturally, - not be posted. In the whole East the administration has found - terrible conditions of living quarters, and the chances of - procurement are so limited that it is not practical to procure - any more. Therefore, I beg the Fuehrer to permit the seizure of - all Jewish home furnishings of Jews in Paris, who have fled or - will leave shortly, and that of Jews living in all parts of the - occupied West, to relieve the shortage of furnishings in the - administration in the East. - - “2. A great number of leading Jews were, after a short - examination in Paris, again released. The attempts on the lives - of members of the armed forces have not stopped; on the contrary - they continue. This reveals an unmistakable plan to disrupt the - German-French cooperation, to force Germany to retaliate, and, - with this, evoke a new defense on the part of the French against - Germany. I suggest to the Fuehrer that, instead of executing 100 - Frenchmen, we substitute 100 Jewish bankers, lawyers, etc. It is - the Jews in London and New York who incite the French communists - to commit acts of violence, and it seems only fair that the - members of this race should pay for this. It is not the little - Jews, but the leading Jews in France, who should be held - responsible. That would tend to awaken the Anti-Jewish - sentiment. - - “(Signed) A. Rosenberg.” (_001-PS_) - -(1) _Starvation._ Chief among the methods utilized for the annihilation -of the Jewish people was starvation. Policies were designed and adopted -to deprive the Jews of the most elemental necessities of life. Hans -Frank, then Governor-General of Poland, wrote in his diary that hunger -rations were introduced in the Warsaw Ghetto (_2233-E-PS_). Referring to -the new food regulations of August 1942, he noted that by these food -regulations more than one million Jews were virtually condemned to -death. - - “That we sentence 1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should be - noted only marginally. It is a matter of course that should the - Jews not starve to death it would we hope result in a speeding - up of the anti-Jewish measures.” (_2233-E-PS_) - -In pursuance of the deliberate policy of Jewish starvation, Jews were -prohibited from pursuing agricultural activities in order to cut them -off from access to sources of food. A document entitled “Provisional -Directives on the Treatment of Jews”, issued by the Reichscommissar for -the Ostland, provided: - - “Jews must be cleaned out from the countryside. The Jews are to - be removed from all trades, especially from trade with - agricultural products and other foodstuffs.” (_1138-PS_) - -Jews were also excluded from the purchase of basic food, such as wheat -products, meat, eggs, and milk. A decree dated 18 September 1942, from -the Ministry of Agriculture, provided: - - “Jews will no longer receive the following foods, beginning with - the 42nd distribution period (19 October 1942): meat, meat - products, eggs, wheat products (cake, white bread, wheat rolls, - wheat flour, etc.) whole milk, fresh skimmed milk, as well as - such food distributed not on food ration cards issued uniformly - throughout the Reich but on local supply certificates or by - special announcement of the nutrition office on extra coupons of - the food cards. Jewish children and young people over ten years - of age will receive the bread ration of the normal consumer.” - (_1347-PS_) - -The sick, the old, and pregnant mothers were excluded from the special -food concessions allotted to non-Jews. Seizure by the State Police of -food shipments to Jews from abroad was authorized, and Jewish ration -cards were distinctly marked with the word “Jew” in color across the -face of the cards, so that the store-keepers could readily identify and -discriminate against Jewish purchasers. - -According to page 110 of an official document of the Czechoslovakian -government published in 1943 and entitled “Czechoslovakia Fights Back,” -Jewish food purchases were confined to certain areas, to certain days, -and to certain hours. As might be expected, the period permitted for the -purchases occurred during the time when food stocks were likely to be -exhausted. (_1689-PS_) - -By Special Order No. 44 for the Eastern Occupied Territories, dated 4 -November 1941, Jews were limited to rations as low as only one-half of -the lowest basic category of other people, and the Ministry of -Agriculture was empowered to exclude Jews entirely or partially from -obtaining food thus exposing the Jewish community to death by -starvation. A bulletin issued by the Polish Ministry of Information, -dated 15 December 1942, concludes that upon the basis of the nature of -the separate rationing and the amount of food available to Jews in the -Warsaw and Cracow ghettos, the system was designed to bring about -starvation: - - “In regard to food supplies they are brought under a completely - separate system, which is obviously aimed at depriving them of - the most elemental necessities of life.” (_L-165_) - -(2) _Annihilation._ Annihilation within the ghettos is illustrated and -glorified in the report of Major General of the Police Stroop, entitled -“The Warsaw Ghetto is No More.” (_1061-PS_) - -This report bound in leather profusely illustrated, typed on heavy bond -paper, and almost 75 pages in length, is the almost unbelievable recital -of a proud accomplishment by Stroop, who signed the report with a bold -hand. Stroop in his report first pays tribute to the bravery and heroism -of the German forces who participated in the ruthless actions against a -defenseless group of Jews numbering, to be exact 56,065—including -infants and women. His report relates day-by-day progress in the -accomplishment of his mission—to destroy and to obliterate the Warsaw -Ghetto. According to this report, the ghetto, which was established in -Warsaw in November 1940, was inhabited by about 400,000 Jews; and prior -to the action for the destruction of this Ghetto, some 316,000 had -already been deported. - -These are some of the boastful and vivid account’s of the scenes within -the Warsaw Ghetto: - - “The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could be broken - only by relentlessly using all our forces and energy by day and - night. On 23 April 1943 the Reichsfuehrer SS issued through the - Higher SS and Police Fuehrer East at Cracow his order to - complete the combing out of the Warsaw Ghetto with the greatest - severity and relentless tenacity. I therefore decided to destroy - the entire Jewish residential area by setting every block on - fire, including the blocks of residential buildings near the - armament works. One concern after the other was systematically - evacuated and subsequently destroyed by fire. The Jews then - emerged from their hiding places and dugouts in almost every - case. Not infrequently, the Jews stayed in the burning buildings - until, because of the heat and the fear of being burned alive, - they preferred to jump down from the upper stories after having - thrown mattresses and other upholstered articles into the street - from the burning buildings. With their bones broken, they still - tried to crawl across the street into blocks of buildings which - had not yet been set on fire or were only partially in flames. - Often the Jews changed their hiding places during the night, by - moving into the ruins of burnt-out buildings, taking refuge - there until they were found by our patrols. Their stay in the - sewers also ceased to be pleasant after the first week. - Frequently from the street, we could hear loud voices coming - through the sewer shafts. Then the men of the Waffen SS, the - Police or the _Wehrmacht_ Engineers courageously climbed down - from the shafts to bring out the Jews and not infrequently they - then stumbled over Jews already dead, or were shot at. It was - always necessary to use smoke candles to drive out the Jews. - Thus one day we opened 183 sewer entrance holes, and at a fixed - time lowered smoke candles into them, with the result that the - bandits fled from what they believed to be gas in the center of - the former Ghetto, where they could then be pulled out of the - sewer holes there. A great number of Jews who could not be - counted were exterminated by blowing up sewers and dugouts. - - “The longer the resistance lasted the tougher the men of the - Waffen SS, Police, and _Wehrmacht_ became. They fulfilled their - duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship, and stood together - as models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often - lasted from early morning until late at night. At night search - patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels - of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they - caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for - supplementing their stores from abandoned dugouts and for - contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them. - - “Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen SS - had only been trained for three to four weeks before being - assigned to this action, high credit should be given to the - pluck, courage and devotion to duty which they showed. It must - be stated that the _Wehrmacht_ Engineers, too, executed the - blowing up of dugouts, sewers and concrete buildings with - indefatigability and great devotion to duty. Officers and men of - the police, a large part of whom had already been at the front, - again excelled by their dashing spirit. - - “Only through the continuous and untiring work of all involved - did we succeed in catching a total of 56,065 Jews whose - extermination can be proved. To this should be added the number - of Jews who lost their lives in explosions or fires, but whose - number could not be ascertained.” (_1061-PS_) - -At the beginning of his report Stroop lists the losses of German troops: - - “For the Fuehrer and their country the following fell in the - battle for the destruction of Jews and bandits in the former - ghetto of Warsaw * * *” [Fifteen names are thereafter listed]. - - “Furthermore, the Polish police sergeant Julian Zielinski, born - 13 November 1891, 8th Commissariat, fell on 19 April 1943 while - fulfilling his duty. They gave their utmost, their life. We - shall never forget them. - - “The following were wounded * * *” [There follow the names of 60 - Waffen SS personnel] “11 watchmen from training camps, probably - Lithuanians; 12 Security Police officers in SS units; 5 men of - the Polish Police; and 2 regular army personnel, engineers.” - (_1061-PS_) - -The story continues in the daily teletype reports, from which the -following are excerpts: - - “Our setting the block on fire achieved the result in the course - of the night that those Jews whom we had not been able to find - despite all our search operations left their hideouts under the - roofs, in the cellars, and elsewhere, and appeared on the - outside of the buildings, trying to escape the flames. Masses of - them—entire families—were already aflame and jumped from the - windows or endeavored to let themselves down by means of sheets - tied together or the like. Steps had been taken so that these - Jews as well as the remaining ones were liquidated at once.” - - * * * * * * - - “When the blocks of buildings mentioned above were destroyed, - 120 Jews were caught and numerous Jews were destroyed when they - jumped from the attics to the inner courtyards, trying to escape - the flames. Many more Jews perished in the flames or were - destroyed when the dugouts and sewer entrances were blown up.” - - * * * * * * - - “Not until the blocks of buildings were well aflame and were - about to collapse did a further considerable number of Jews - emerge, forced to do so by the flames and the smoke. Time and - again the Jews try to escape even through burning buildings. - Innumerable Jews whom we saw on the roofs during the - conflagration perished in the flames. Others emerged from the - upper stories in the last possible moment and were only able to - escape death from the flames by jumping down. Today we caught a - total of 2,283 Jews, of whom 204 were shot, and innumerable Jews - were destroyed in dugouts and in the flames.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Jews testify that they emerge at night to get fresh air, - since it is unbearable to stay permanently within the dugouts - owing to the long duration of the operation. On the average the - raiding parties shoot 30 to 50 Jews each night. From these - statements it was to be inferred that a considerable number of - Jews are still underground in the Ghetto. Today we blew up a - concrete building which we had not been able to destroy by fire. - In this operation we learned that the blowing up of a building - is a very lengthy process and takes an enormous amount of - explosives. The best and only method for destroying the Jews - therefore still remains the setting of fires.” - - * * * * * * - - “Some depositions speak of three to four thousand Jews who still - remain in underground holes, sewers, and dugouts; The - undersigned is resolved not to terminate the large-scale - operation until the last Jew has been destroyed.” (_1061-PS_) - -The teletype message of 15 May 1945 indicates that the operation is in -its last stage: - - “A special unit once more searched the last block of buildings - which was still intact in the Ghetto, and subsequently destroyed - it. In the evening the chapel, mortuary, and all other buildings - in the Jewish cemetery were blown up or destroyed by fire.” - (_1061-PS_) - -On 24 May 1943 the final figures were compiled by Major General Stroop: - - “Of the total of 56,065 caught, about 7,000 were destroyed in - the former Ghetto during large-scale operation. 6,929 Jews were - destroyed by transporting them to T.II [believed to be Treblinka - Camp No. 2]. The sum total of Jews destroyed is therefore - 13,929. Beyond the number of 56,065 an estimated number of 5 to - 6,000 Jews were destroyed by being blown up or by perishing in - the flames.” (_1061-PS_) - -It was not always necessary, or perhaps desirable, to place the Jews -within Ghettos to effect elimination. In the Baltic States a more direct -course of action was followed. According to a report by SS Brigade -Fuehrer Stahlecker to Himmler, dated 15 October 1941, entitled “Action -Group A,” which was found in Himmler’s private files, 135,567 persons, -nearly all Jews, were murdered in accordance to basic orders directing -the complete annihilation of Jews. SS Brigade Fuehrer Stahlecker -continues his report: - - “* * * To our surprise it was not easy at first to set in motion - an extensive pogrom against the Jews. Klimatis, the leader of - the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this - purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis - of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment acting in - Kowno and in such a way that no German order or German - instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first - pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June the Lithuanian partisans - did away with more than 1,500 Jews, setting fire to several - synagogues or destroying them by other means and burning down a - Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During - the following nights about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a - similar way. * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “It was possible, though, through similar influences on the - Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against the Jews - also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were destroyed - and about 400 Jews were killed.” (_L-180_) - -Nazi ingenuity reached its zenith with the construction and operation of -the gas van as a means of mass annihilation of the Jews. A description -of the operation of these vehicles of death is fully set forth in a -captured Top Secret document dated 16 May 1942, addressed to SS -Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff, 8 Prince Albrecht-Strasse, Berlin, from Dr. -Becker, SS Untersturmfuehrer. The report reads in part: - - “The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While - the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the - weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (_Saurer_) - stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance - for only one half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply - skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is - only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at - the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that - place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of - execution is usually 10 to 15 km away from the highways and is - difficult of access because of its location; in damp or wet - weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be - executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize - immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be - avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load - them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot. - - “I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as - house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each - side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, - such as one often sees on farm houses in the country. The vans - became so well-known, that not only the authorities but also the - civilian population called the van ‘death van’, as soon as one - of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion the van cannot be - kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.” - - * * * * * * - - “Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and - highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course - of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should be brought - to Berlin for repair. Transportation to Berlin would be much too - expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to save those - expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks soldered and if - that should no longer be possible, to notify Berlin immediately - by radio, that Pol. Nr. is out of order. Besides that I ordered - that during application of gas all the men were to be kept as - far away from the vans as possible, so they should not suffer - damage to their health by the gas which eventually would escape. - I should like to take this opportunity to bring the following to - your attention: several commands have had the unloading after - the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to the - attention of the commanders of those S.K. concerned the immense - psychological injuries and damages to their health which that - work can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least - later on. The men complained to me about headaches which - appeared after each unloading. Nevertheless they don’t want to - change the orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for - that work, could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the - men from those damages, I request orders be issued accordingly. - - “The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In - order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses - the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons - to be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by - dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by - correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the - prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and - excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed. - - “Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be - reached with further news. - - “Signed: Dr. Becker, SS Untersturmfuehrer.” (_501-PS_) - -A letter signed by Hauptsturmfuehrer Truehe on the subject of S-vans, -addressed to the Reich Security Main Office, Room 2-D-3-A, Berlin, and -marked “Top Secret,” establishes that the vans were used for the -annihilation of the Jews. The message reads: - - “A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, - arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security - Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia. - - “The three S-vans which are there are not sufficient for that - purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (five tons). At - the same time I request the shipment of twenty gas hoses for the - three S-vans on hand (two Diamond, one Saurer), since the ones - on hand are leaky already. - - (signed) The Commandant of the Security Police and the Security - Service, Ostland.” (_501-PS_) - -It appears that a certain amount of discord existed between officials of -the German government as to the proper means and methods to be used in -connection with the extermination program. A secret report dated 18 June -1943, addressed to Rosenberg, complained that five thousand Jews killed -by the police and SS might have been used for forced labor, and chided -them for failing to bury the bodies of those liquidated: - - “The fact that Jews receive special treatment requires no - further discussion. However, it appears hardly believable that - this is done in the way described in the report of the General - Commissioner of 1 June 1943. What is Katyn against that? Imagine - only that these occurrences would become known to the other side - and exploited by them! Most likely such propaganda would have no - effect only because people who hear and read about it simply - would not be ready to believe it.” - - * * * * * * - - “To lock men, women, and children into barns and to set fire to - them does not appear to be a suitable method of combatting - bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population. This - method is not worthy of the German cause and hurts our - reputation severely.” (_R-135_) - -Gunther, the prison warden at Minsk, in a letter dated 31 May 1943, -addressed to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia, was critical -by implication. This letter, entitled, “Action Against Jews,” reads: - - “On 13 April 1943 the former German dentist Ernst Israel - Tichauer and his wife, Elisa Sara Tichauer, nee Rosenthal, were - committed to the court prison by the Security Service. Since - that time all German and Russian Jews who were turned over to us - had their golden bridgework, crowns, and fillings pulled or - broken out. This happens always one to two hours before the - respective action. - - “Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews have been - finished off. On the basis of a definite investigation gold was - taken only in two actions—on 14 April 1943 from 172, and on 27 - April 1943 from 164 Jews. About fifty percent of the Jews had - gold teeth, bridgework, or fillings. _Hauptscharfuehrer_ Rube of - the Security Service was always personally present and he took - the gold along, too. - - “Before 13 April 1943 this was not done. - - (signed) Gunther, Prison Warden.” (_R-135_) - -The foregoing letter was forwarded to Rosenberg, as Reich Minister for -the Occupied Eastern Territories, on June 1943. The covering letter to -Rosenberg reads: - - “The enclosed official report from the warden of the prison in - Minsk is submitted to the Reich Minister and the Reich Commissar - for Information. - - “(signed) The General Commissar in Minsk.” (_R-135_) - -A further complaint is contained in a secret letter addressed to General -of Infantry, Thomas, Chief of the International Armament Department, -dated 2 December 1941 (_3257-PS_). The writer of this letter -apprehensively stated his reason for not forwarding the communication -through official channels: - - “For the personal information of the Chief of the Industrial - Armament Department I am forwarding a total account of the - present situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in which the - difficulties and tensions encountered so far and the problems - which give rise to serious anxiety are stated with unmistakable - clarity. - - “Intentionally I have desisted from submitting such a report - through official channels or to make it known to other - departments interested in it because I do not expect any results - that way, but to the contrary am apprehensive that the - difficulties and tensions and also the divergent opinions might - only be increased due to the peculiarity of the situation.” - - * * * * * * - - “Jewish problem: - - “Regulation of the Jewish question in the Ukraine was a - difficult problem because the Jews constituted a large part of - the urban population. We therefore have to deal—just as in the - General Government—with a mass problem of policy concerning the - population. Many cities had a percentage of Jews exceeding fifty - percent. Only the rich Jews had fled from the German troops. The - majority of Jews remained under German administration. The - latter found the problem more complicated through the fact that - these Jews represented almost the entire trade and even a part - of the manpower in small and medium industries besides the - business which had in part become superfluous as a direct or - indirect result of the war. The elimination therefore - necessarily had far-reaching economic consequences and even - direct consequences for the armament industry (production for - supplying the troops).” - - * * * * * * - - “The attitude of the Jewish population was anxious—obliging - from the beginning. They tried to avoid everything that might - displease the German administration. That they hated the German - administration and army inwardly goes without saying and cannot - be surprising. However, there is no proof that Jewry as a whole - or even to a greater part was implicated in acts of sabotage. - Surely there were some terrorists or saboteurs among them just - as among the Ukrainians. But it cannot be said that the Jews as - such represented a danger to the German armed forces. The output - produced by Jews who, of course, were prompted by nothing but - the feeling of fear, was satisfactory to the troops and the - German administration. - - “The Jewish population remained temporarily unmolested shortly - after the fighting. Only weeks, sometimes months later, - specially detached formations of the police executed a planned - shooting of Jews. The action as a rule proceeded from east to - west. It was done entirely in public with the use of the - Ukrainian militia, and unfortunately in many instances also with - members of the armed forces taking part voluntarily. The way - these actions, which included men and old men, women, and - children of all ages were carried out was horrible. The great - masses executed make this action more gigantic than any similar - measure taken so far in the Soviet Union. So far about 150,000 - to 200,000 Jews may have been executed in the part of the - Ukraine belonging to the Reichskommissariat; no consideration - was given to the interests of economy. - - “Summarizing, it can be said that the kind of solution of the - Jewish problem applied in the Ukraine which obviously was based - on the ideological theories as a matter of principle had the - following results: - - “(_a_) Elimination of a part of partly superfluous eaters in the - cities. - - “(_b_) Elimination of a part of the population which hated us - undoubtedly. - - “(_c_) Elimination of badly needed tradesmen who were in many - instances indispensable even in the interests of the armed - forces. - - “(_d_) Consequences as to foreign policy—propaganda which are - obvious. - - “(_e_) Bad effects on the troops which in any case get indirect - contact with the executions. - - “(_f_) Brutalizing effect on the formations which carry out the - execution—regular police.” (_3257-PS_) - -Lest it be thought that these conditions existed only in the East, the -official Netherlands government report by the Commissioner for -Repatriation as relates similar treatment of the Jews in the West -(_1726-PS_). The German measures taken against the Dutch -Jews—discriminatory decrees, anti-semitic demonstrations, burning of -synagogues, purging of Jews from the economic life of their country, -food restrictions, forced labor, concentration camp confinement, -deportation, and death—all these measures follow the same pattern that -was effected throughout Nazi-occupied Europe. The official Netherlands -report states that full Jews, liable to deportation, numbered 140,000. -The total number of actual Jewish deportees was 117,000, representing -more than eighty-three per cent of all the Jews in the Netherlands. Of -these, 115,000 were deported to Poland for slave labor, and after -departure all trace of them was lost. Regardless of victory or defeat to -Germany, the Jew was doomed. It was the expressed intent of the Nazi -state that whatever the German fate might be the Jew would not survive. -(_1726-PS_) - -A Top Secret message from the commandant of the SIPO and SD for the -Radom District, addressed to SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Thiel on the subject, -“Clearance of Prisons,” reads as follows: - - “I again stress the fact that the number of inmates of the SIPO - and SD prisons must be kept as low as possible. In the present - situation, particularly, those suspects handed over by the civil - police need only be subjected to a short, formal interrogation, - provided there are no serious grounds for suspicion. They are - then to be sent by the quickest route to a concentration camp, - should no court-martial proceeding be necessary or should there - be no question of discharge. Please keep the number of - discharges very low. Should the situation at the front - necessitate it, early preparations are to be made for the total - clearance of prisons. Should the situation develop suddenly in - such a way that it is impossible to evacuate the prisoners, the - prison inmates are to be liquidated and their bodies disposed of - as far as possible (burning, blowing up the building, etc.). If - necessary, Jews still employed in the armament industry or on - other work are to be dealt with in the same way. - - “The liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy, be it the WB - [perhaps means ‘West-Bund,’ or ‘Western Ally’] or the Red Army, - must be avoided under all circumstances, nor may they fall into - their hands alive.” (_L-53_) - -(3) _Mass Disposal of Jews in Concentration Camps._ The concentration -camps were utilized to dispose of literally millions of Jews, who died -by mass shooting, gas, poison, starvation, and other means. The part -which the concentration camps played in the annihilation of the Jewish -people is indicated in an official Polish report on Auschwitz -Concentration Camp (_L-161_). In Auschwitz during July 1944 Jews were -killed at the rate of 12,000 daily: - - “* * * During July 1944, they were being liquidated at the rate - of 12,000 Hungarian Jews daily, and as the crematory could not - deal with such numbers, many bodies were thrown into large pits - and covered with quick lime.” (_L-161_) - -The official Polish Government Commission Report on the Investigation of -German crimes in Poland describes the concentration camp at Treblinka in -these terms: - - “* * * In March 1942, the Germans began to erect another camp, - Treblinka B, in the neighborhood of Treblinka A, intended to - become a place of torment for Jews. - - “The erection of this camp was closely connected with the German - plans aiming at a complete destruction of the Jewish population - in Poland which necessitated the creation of a machinery by - means of which the Polish Jews could be killed in large numbers. - Late in April 1942, the erection of the first three chambers was - finished in which these general massacres were to be performed - by means of steam. Somewhat later the erection of the real death - building was finished, which contains ten death chambers. It was - opened for wholesale murders early in autumn 1942 * * *.” - (_3311-PS_) - -The report of the Polish commission describes graphically the procedure -for extermination within the camp: - - “* * * The average number of Jews dealt with at the camp in - summer 1942 was about two railway transports daily, but there - were days of much higher efficiency. From autumn 1942 this - number was falling. - - “After unloading in the siding all victims were assembled in one - place where men were separated from women and children. In the - first days of the existence of the camp the victims were made to - believe that after a short stay in the camp, necessary for - bathing and disinfection, they would be sent farther east, for - work. Explanations of this sort were given by SS men who - assisted at the unloading of the transports and further - explanations could be read in notices stuck up on the walls of - the barracks. But later, when more transports had to be dealt - with, the Germans dropped all pretenses and only tried to - accelerate the procedure. - - “All victims had to strip off their clothes and shoes, which - were collected afterwards, whereupon all victims, women and - children first, were driven into the death chambers. Those too - slow or too weak to move quickly were driven on by rifle-butts, - by whipping and kicking, often by Sauer himself. Many slipped - and fell, the next victims pressed forward and stumbled over - them. Small children were simply thrown inside. After being - filled up to capacity the chambers were hermetically closed and - steam was let in. In a few minutes all was over. The Jewish - menial workers had to remove the bodies from the platform and to - bury them in mass graves. By and by, as new transports arrived, - the cemetery grew, extending in eastern direction. - - “From reports received, it may be assumed that several hundred - thousands of Jews have been exterminated in Treblinka.” - (_3311-PS_) - -An official United States government report issued by the Executive -Office of the President of the United States, War Refugee Board, on the -German camps at Auschwitz and Birkenau, sets forth the number of Jews -gassed in Birkenau in the two-year period between April 1942 and April -1944. The figure printed in this report is not a typographical error. -The number is 1,765,000. (_L-22_) - - 5. RESULTS OF THE EXTERMINATION PROGRAM - -The huge scale of the Jewish eliminations is also reflected in the -bookkeeping and statistics of the Germans themselves. The 16 December -1941 entry in the diary of Hans Frank contains these figures: - - “The Jews for us also represent extraordinarily malignant - gluttons. - - “We have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in General - Government—perhaps with the Jewish mixtures, and everything - that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews.” (_2233-D-PS_) - -On 25 January 1944, three years and one month later, Frank wrote in his -diary these words: - - “At the present time we still have in the General Government - perhaps 100,000 Jews.” (_2233-F-PS_) - -Thus, in this period of three years, according to the records of the -then Governor-General of Occupied Poland, between 2,400,000 and -3,400,000 Jews had been eliminated. - -The total number of Jews who died by Nazi hands can never be definitely -ascertained. It is known, however, that 4 million Jews died in -concentration camps, and that 2 million Jews were killed by the State -Police in the East, making a total of 6 million murdered Jews. The -source of these figures is Adolph Eichmann, Chief of the Jewish Section -of the Gestapo. The figures are contained in an affidavit made by Dr. -Wilhelm Hoettl, Deputy Group Leader of the Foreign Section of the -Security Section, AMT VI, of the RSHA. Hoettl, in his affidavit, states -as follows: - - “Approximately 4 million Jews had been killed in the various - concentration camps, while an additional 2 million met death in - other ways, the major part of which were shot by operational - squads of the Security Police during the campaign against - Russia.” (_2738-PS_) - -Hoettl describes the source of his information as follows: - - “According to my knowledge, Eichmann was at that time the leader - of the Jewish Section of the Gestapo, and in addition to that he - had been ordered by Himmler to get a hold of the Jews in all the - European countries and to transport them to Germany. Eichmann - was then very much impressed with the fact that Rumania had - withdrawn from the war in those days. Moreover, he had come to - me to get information about the military situation which I - received daily from the Hungarian Ministry of War and from the - Commander of the Waffen-SS in Hungary. He expressed his - conviction that Germany had now lost the war and that he - personally had no further chance. He knew that he would be - considered one of the main war criminals by the United Nations, - since he had millions of Jewish lives on his conscience. I asked - him how many that was, to which he answered that although the - number was a great Reich secret, he would tell me since I, as a - historian, would be interested, and that he would probably not - return anyhow from his command in Rumania. He had, shortly - before that, made a report to Himmler, as the latter wanted to - know the exact number of Jews who had been killed.” (_2738-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PERSECUTION OF - THE JEWS - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (b, c). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (D) 3│ │ - │ (d); X (B). │ I │ 20, 55 - │ │ │ - 3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the │ │ - │ Laws and Customs of War on Land, │ │ - │ Annex, Article 46. │ VI │ 597 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *001-PS │Memorandum for the Fuehrer signed │ │ - │Rosenberg, 18 December 1941, concerning │ │ - │Jewish possessions in France. (USA 282) │ III │ 1 - │ │ │ - *014-PS │Report to Fuehrer, 20 March 1941, │ │ - │concerning shipment of Jewish property. │ │ - │(USA 784) │ III │ 40 - │ │ │ - *015-PS │Letter and report of Rosenberg to │ │ - │Hitler, 16 April 1943, concerning │ │ - │seizure of ownerless Jewish art │ │ - │possessions. (USA 387) │ III │ 41 - │ │ │ - *025-PS │Conference report of 4 September 1942 │ │ - │concerning the importation of domestic │ │ - │workers from the East into the Reich. │ │ - │(USA 698) │ III │ 67 - │ │ │ - 041-PS │Memorandum, Rosenberg to Hitler, 3 │ │ - │October 1942, concerning seizure of │ │ - │Jewish property. │ III │ 80 - │ │ │ - 053-PS │Interoffice report from Hans Koch to │ │ - │Rosenberg, 5 October 1941, concerning │ │ - │political situation in Ukraine. │ III │ 83 - │ │ │ - *069-PS │Letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, 17 │ │ - │January 1939, enclosing order of 28 │ │ - │December 1938, concerning decisions on │ │ - │Jewish question. (USA 589) │ III │ 116 - │ │ │ - 078-PS │Regulations issued by Heydrich, 28 June │ │ - │1941, for treatment of political │ │ - │prisoners of war. │ III │ 123 - │ │ │ - *136-PS │Certified copy of Hitler Order, 29 │ │ - │January 1940, concerning establishment │ │ - │of “Hohe Schule”. (USA 367) │ III │ 184 - │ │ │ - *141-PS │Goering Order, 5 November 1940, │ │ - │concerning seizure of Jewish art │ │ - │treasures. (USA 368) │ III │ 188 - │ │ │ - *154-PS │Letter from Lammers to high State and │ │ - │Party authorities, 5 July 1942, │ │ - │confirming Rosenberg’s powers. (USA 370)│ III │ 193 - │ │ │ - 155-PS │“Einsatzstab”, administrative │ │ - │regulations, 30 September 1942. │ III │ 194 - │ │ │ - *171-PS │Undated report on “Library for │ │ - │Exploration of the Jewish Question” by │ │ - │the Hohe Schule District Office. (USA │ │ - │383) │ III │ 200 - │ │ │ - 197-PS │Memorandum of a conference in HQ OKH │ │ - │Quartermaster General, 27 August 1941, │ │ - │concerning transfer of administration of│ │ - │Ukraine from Wehrmacht to civilian │ │ - │authorities; signed by Labs, Ministerial│ │ - │Director. │ III │ 210 - │ │ │ - *212-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg file │ │ - │concerning instructions for treatment of│ │ - │Jews. (USA 272) │ III │ 222 - │ │ │ - 285-PS │Henlein letter to Rosenberg, 31 October │ │ - │1938. │ III │ 238 - │ │ │ - 286-PS │Rosenberg letter to Henlein, 15 October │ │ - │1938. │ III │ 239 - │ │ │ - *374-PS │TWX Series of Orders signed by Heydrich │ │ - │and Mueller, issued by Gestapo │ │ - │Headquarters Berlin, 9-11 November 1938,│ │ - │concerning treatment of Jews. (USA 729) │ III │ 277 - │ │ │ - 406-PS │Memorandum by Gauleiter Streicher, 14 │ │ - │April 1939, concerning certain acts │ │ - │against Jews. │ III │ 388 - │ │ │ - *501-PS │Collection of four documents on │ │ - │execution by gas, June 1942, one signed │ │ - │by Dr. Becker, SS Untersturmfuehrerat │ │ - │Kiev, 16 May 1942. (USA 288) │ III │ 418 - │ │ │ - *502-PS │Order, 17 July 1941, entitled │ │ - │“Regulations for the Commandos of the │ │ - │Chief of the SIPO and SD which are to be│ │ - │activated in Stalags”. (USA 486) │ III │ 422 - │ │ │ - 579-PS │Three letters, District Commissioner, │ │ - │Employment Director at Riga, and │ │ - │Economic Directorate in Latvia, 21 July │ │ - │1941, 10 February 1942 and 6 July 1942, │ │ - │concerning forced Jewish labor in Riga │ │ - │and Latvia. │ III │ 444 - │ │ │ - *654-PS │Thierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, on │ │ - │discussion with Himmler concerning │ │ - │delivery of Jews to Himmler for │ │ - │extermination through work. (USA 218) │ III │ 467 - │ │ │ - 682-PS │Thierack’s notes on discussion with │ │ - │Goebbels, 14 September 1942, concerning │ │ - │groups to be exterminated. │ III │ 496 - │ │ │ - *701-PS │Letter from Minister of Justice to │ │ - │Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning │ │ - │Poles and Jews who are released from │ │ - │Penal institutions of Department of │ │ - │Justice. (USA 497) │ III │ 510 - │ │ │ - 765-PS │Teletype message from Heydrich to all SD│ │ - │and Police, 10 November 1938, concerning│ │ - │“Measures against Jews tonight”. │ III │ 545 - │ │ │ - 841-PS │Secret Order of Goering, 28 December │ │ - │1938, concerning Jewish problem. │ III │ 606 - │ │ │ - 847-PS │Hitler Decree, 5 July 1942, stating │ │ - │Rosenberg’s powers. │ III │ 610 - │ │ │ - 878-PS │Draft of Order signed by Keitel, 12 │ │ - │September 1941, providing that Jews may │ │ - │be put in labor-columns. │ III │ 636 - │ │ │ - *998-PS │“German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia”. │ │ - │Excerpts from Czechoslovak Official │ │ - │Report for the prosecution and trial of │ │ - │the German Major War Criminals by the │ │ - │International Military Tribunal │ │ - │established according to Agreement of │ │ - │four Great Powers of 8 August 1945. (USA│ │ - │91) │ III │ 656 - │ │ │ - 1012-PS │Teletype from OKH to Military Commander │ │ - │of France, 3 February 1942, concerning │ │ - │consultation of Hitler and Keitel about │ │ - │shooting of Jews and Communists. │ III │ 664 - │ │ │ - 1015-B-PS │Report on activities of Special Staff │ │ - │for Pictorial Art, October 1940 to July │ │ - │1944. │ III │ 666 - │ │ │ - *1024-PS │Memorandum, 29 April 1941, concerning │ │ - │organization for handling problems in │ │ - │the Eastern Territories. (USA 278) │ III │ 685 - │ │ │ - *1028-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg file, 7 May │ │ - │1941, concerning instructions for a │ │ - │Reichskommissar in the Ukraine. (USA │ │ - │273) │ III │ 690 - │ │ │ - *1061-PS │Official report of Stroop, SS and Police│ │ - │Leader of Warsaw, on destruction of │ │ - │Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. (USA 275) │ III │ 718 - │ │ │ - *1138-PS │Enclosure in letter from Reich │ │ - │Commissioner for Baltic States to │ │ - │Rosenberg, 13 August 1941, concerning │ │ - │provisional directives on treatment of │ │ - │Jews in area of Reichskommissariat │ │ - │Ostland. (USA 284) │ III │ 800 - │ │ │ - *1166-PS │Interoffice memorandum of WVHA, 15 │ │ - │August 1944, concerning number of │ │ - │prisoners and survey of prisoners’ │ │ - │clothing. (USA 458) │ III │ 824 - │ │ │ - 1189-PS │Special Order No. 44, 4 November 1941, │ │ - │concerning feeding of civilian │ │ - │population in Occupied Eastern │ │ - │Territories. │ III │ 833 - │ │ │ - *1301-PS │File relating to financing of armament │ │ - │including minutes of conference with │ │ - │Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October │ │ - │1938, concerning acceleration of │ │ - │rearmament. (USA 123) │ III │ 868 - │ │ │ - *1347-PS │Extract of decree, 18 September 1942, │ │ - │Ministry of Agriculture, concerning food│ │ - │supply for Jews. (USA 285) │ III │ 914 - │ │ │ - 1384-PS │Stenographic report of Hitler discussion│ │ - │with Keitel and Zeitzler, 8 June 1943. │ III │ 959 - │ │ │ - 1412-PS │Decree relating to payment of fine by │ │ - │Jews of German nationality, 12 November │ │ - │1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.│ │ - │1579. │ IV │ 6 - │ │ │ - 1415-PS │Police regulation concerning appearahce │ │ - │of Jews in public, 28 November 1938. │ │ - │1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1676.│ IV │ 6 - │ │ │ - *1472-PS │Copy of telegram from Mueller to │ │ - │Himmler, 16 December 1942, concerning │ │ - │recruiting Jewish labor. (USA 279) │ IV │ 49 - │ │ │ - *1517-PS │Memorandum from Rosenberg concerning │ │ - │discussion with the Fuehrer, 14 December│ │ - │1941. (USA 824) │ IV │ 55 - │ │ │ - *1689-PS │“Czechoslovakia Fights Back”, a document│ │ - │of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign │ │ - │Affairs, 1943. (USA 286) │ IV │ 198 - │ │ │ - *1708-PS │The Program of the NSDAP. National │ │ - │Socialistic Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. (USA│ │ - │255; USA 324) │ IV │ 208 - │ │ │ - *1724-PS │Announcement in Press Conference, 4 │ │ - │August 1938 of breaking up of synagogue.│ │ - │(USA 266) │ IV │ 224 - │ │ │ - *1726-PS │Statement of Netherlands Government in │ │ - │view of Prosecution and punishment of │ │ - │the German Nazi War Criminals. (USA 195)│ IV │ 227 - │ │ │ - *1778-PS │Book “The Poisonous Mushroom”, published│ │ - │in Nurnberg 1938, concerning Jews. (USA │ │ - │257) │ IV │ 358 - │ │ │ - *1816-PS │Stenographic report of the meeting on │ │ - │The Jewish Question, under the │ │ - │Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, 12│ │ - │November 1938. (USA 261) │ IV │ 425 - │ │ │ - *1919-PS │Himmler’s speech to SS Gruppenfuehrers, │ │ - │4 October 1943. (USA 170) │ IV │ 558 - │ │ │ - *1948-PS │Letter from Governor in Vienna, 7 │ │ - │November 1940, evidencing RSHA │ │ - │instructions to recruit Jews from forced│ │ - │labor. (USA 680) │ IV │ 586 - │ │ │ - 2000-PS │Law for protection of German blood and │ │ - │German honor, 15 September 1935. 1935 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 100, p. │ │ - │1146. │ IV │ 636 - │ │ │ - *2124-PS │Decree introducing the Nurnberg Racial │ │ - │Laws into Austria, 20 May 1938. 1938 │ │ - │Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 594. (GB │ │ - │259) │ IV │ 755 - │ │ │ - 2153-PS │Defeat the Enemy of the World, published│ │ - │in National Socialist Party │ │ - │Correspondence No. 358, 30 March 1933. │ │ - │(GB 166) │ IV │ 760 - │ │ │ - *2154-PS │Streicher decrees, published in National│ │ - │Socialist Party Correspondence, No. 359,│ │ - │31 March 1933. (GB 167) │ IV │ 760 - │ │ │ - *2156-PS │Announcement of Central Committee for │ │ - │defense against Jewish horror and │ │ - │boycott agitation, 29 March 1933, │ │ - │published in National Socialist Party │ │ - │Correspondence No. 357. (USA 263) │ IV │ 761 - │ │ │ - *2233-C-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part IV. │ │ - │October-December. (USA 271) │ IV │ 890 - │ │ │ - *2233-D-PS │Frank Diary. Regierungsitzungen. 1941. │ │ - │October-December. Entry of 16 December │ │ - │1941 at pp. 76-77. (USA 281) │ IV │ 891 - │ │ │ - *2233-E-PS │Frank Diary. │ │ - │Regierungs-Hauptabteilungsleiter-Sitzung│ │ - │en. 1942. Entry of 24 August 1942. (USA │ │ - │283) │ IV │ 893 - │ │ │ - *2233-F-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1 January 1944-28│ │ - │February 1944. Entry of 25 January 1944 │ │ - │at p. 5. (USA 295) │ IV │ 902 - │ │ │ - 2237-PS │Letter from Reich Commissar for Reunion │ │ - │of Austria with the German Reich to │ │ - │Goering, 18 November 1938, concerning │ │ - │actions against the Jews in November │ │ - │1938. │ IV │ 918 - │ │ │ - *2409-PS │Extracts from The Imperial House to the │ │ - │Reich Chancellery by Dr. Joseph │ │ - │Goebbels. (USA 262) │ V │ 83 - │ │ │ - 2583-PS │Quotation from speech made by Streicher,│ │ - │31 October 1939. │ V │ 311 - │ │ │ - 2602-PS │Telegram, Wilson to Secretary of State, │ │ - │Washington, 10 November 1938. │ V │ 311 - │ │ │ - 2603-PS │Letter from Kemp, U. S. Consul General │ │ - │in Bremen, to Secretary of State, 10 │ │ - │November 1938, concerning Anti-Jewish │ │ - │demonstrations in Bremen. │ V │ 312 - │ │ │ - 2604-PS │Report of American Consul General to │ │ - │Wilson, U. S. Ambassador in Berlin, 12 │ │ - │November 1938, concerning Anti-semitic │ │ - │persecution in Stuttgart Consular │ │ - │District. │ V │ 312 - │ │ │ - *2605-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, former │ │ - │President of the Hungarian Zionist │ │ - │Organization, 13 September 1945. (USA │ │ - │242) │ V │ 313 - │ │ │ - 2613-PS │Extracts from “The Black Book of │ │ - │Poland”. │ V │ 332 - │ │ │ - 2617-A-PS │Reports of Department Interior │ │ - │Administration from the Office of Chief │ │ - │of District Warsaw, published by The │ │ - │General Government for Poland, 1940, p. │ │ - │59. │ V │ 339 - │ │ │ - *2662-PS │Extract from Mein Kampf, 39th edition, │ │ - │1933, pp. 724-725. (USA 256) │ V │ 366 - │ │ │ - *2663-PS │Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag, 30 │ │ - │January 1939, quoted from Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, Munich edition, 1 February │ │ - │1939. (USA 268) │ V │ 367 - │ │ │ - *2665-PS │The Jewish Question Past and Present, │ │ - │from World Battle. (USA 270) │ V │ 367 - │ │ │ - *2668-PS │“And Don’t Forget the Jews”, from the │ │ - │Black Corps, 8 August 1940, No. 32, p. │ │ - │2. (USA 269) │ V │ 367 - │ │ │ - 2671-PS │Decree regarding the Designation of │ │ - │Business Enterprises in the Government │ │ - │General, from Verordnungsblatt of │ │ - │Governor-General for Occupied Polish │ │ - │Territory, No. 8, p. 61, 30 November │ │ - │1939. │ V │ 367 - │ │ │ - 2672-PS │Decree concerning designation of Jews │ │ - │and Jewesses in the Government General, │ │ - │from Verordnungsblatt of the │ │ - │Governor-General for Occupied Polish │ │ - │Territory, 1939, p. 61. │ V │ 368 - │ │ │ - 2673-PS │Extract from “The Archive”, No. 90, 30 │ │ - │October 1941, p. 495. │ V │ 369 - │ │ │ - 2682-PS │Excerpts from Voelkischer Beobachter │ │ - │concerning restriction against Jews, 5 │ │ - │December 1938, No. 339, p. 5. │ V │ 369 - │ │ │ - 2683-PS │Universities barred for Jews, published │ │ - │in Voelkischer Beobachter, 16 November │ │ - │1938. │ V │ 371 - │ │ │ - *2697-PS │Article: “The Chosen People of the │ │ - │Criminals” from Der Stuermer, No. 2, │ │ - │January 1935. (USA 259) │ V │ 372 - │ │ │ - *2698-PS │Article: “Two little Talmud Jews”, from │ │ - │Der Stuermer, No. 50, December 1938. │ │ - │(USA 260) │ V │ 372 - │ │ │ - *2699-PS │Article on Ritual Murder, from Der │ │ - │Stuermer, No. 14, April 1937. (USA 258) │ V │ 372 - │ │ │ - 2700-PS │Article: “The Ritual Murder”, from Der │ │ - │Stuermer, No. 28, July 1938. │ V │ 373 - │ │ │ - 2704-PS │Decree concerning Prohibition of Jewish │ │ - │Religious Slaughter, from │ │ - │Verordnungsblatt of the Governor-General│ │ - │for Occupied Polish Territory, 1939, p. │ │ - │7. │ V │ 373 - │ │ │ - *2709-PS │Report by Ralph C. Busser, American │ │ - │Consul-General in Leipzig, 5 April 1933,│ │ - │concerning Anti-Jewish movement in │ │ - │Central Germany. (USA 265) │ V │ 375 - │ │ │ - 2710-PS │Adolf Hitler Speaks, quoted from │ │ - │Voelkischer Beobachter, 26 February │ │ - │1938, No. 57, p. 4. │ V │ 376 - │ │ │ - *2711-PS │Article: “Symbolic Action”, published in│ │ - │Fraenkische Tageszeitung-Nurnberg, 11 │ │ - │August 1938. (USA 267) │ V │ 376 - │ │ │ - 2712-PS │Anti-Jewish demonstrations throughout │ │ - │the Reich, from Voelkischer Beobachter, │ │ - │11 November 1938, No. 315, p. 2. │ V │ 376 - │ │ │ - 2715-A-PS │Anti-semitic demonstrations in the │ │ - │Entire Reich, published in Voelkischer │ │ - │Beobachter, No. 315, 11 November 1938, │ │ - │p. 2. │ V │ 377 - │ │ │ - 2736-PS │Time without Precedent, by Dr. Joseph │ │ - │Goebbels, 4th edition, 1942, p. 531. │ V │ 380 - │ │ │ - 2737-PS │The Party Program, Nature, Fundamentals │ │ - │and Goals of the NSDAP, by Alfred │ │ - │Rosenberg, 25th Printing, 1943, p. 27. │ V │ 380 - │ │ │ - *2738-PS │Affidavit of Wilhelm Hoettl, 26 November│ │ - │1945. (USA 296) │ V │ 380 - │ │ │ -**3047-PS │File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s │ │ - │train on 12 September 1939; report on │ │ - │execution of Jews in Borrisow; and │ │ - │entries from diary of Admiral Canaris. │ │ - │(USA 80) (Referred to but not offered in│ │ - │evidence.) │ V │ 766 - │ │ │ - *3048-PS │Speech by von Schirach before European │ │ - │Youth Congress in Vienna, published in │ │ - │Voelkischer Beobachter, 15 September │ │ - │1942. (USA 274) │ V │ 776 - │ │ │ - *3051-PS │Three teletype orders from Heydrich to │ │ - │all stations of State Police, 10 │ │ - │November 1938, on measures against Jews,│ │ - │and one order from Heydrich on │ │ - │termination of protest actions. (USA │ │ - │240) │ V │ 797 - │ │ │ - *3058-PS │Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11 │ │ - │November 1938, reporting action against │ │ - │the Jews. (USA 508) │ V │ 854 - │ │ │ - *3063-PS │Letters of transmission enclosing report│ │ - │about events and judicial proceedings in│ │ - │connection with anti-semitic │ │ - │demonstrations of 9 November 1938. (USA │ │ - │332) │ V │ 868 - │ │ │ - 3253-PS │Affidavit, 26 November 1945, of Dr. │ │ - │Benno F. T. Martin. │ V │ 959 - │ │ │ - *3257-PS │Letter from Armament Inspector in the │ │ - │Ukraine to General Thomas, Chief of the │ │ - │Industrial Armament Department, 2 │ │ - │December 1941, enclosing report by Prof.│ │ - │Seraphim on Jewish Problem in Ukraine. │ │ - │(USA 290) │ V │ 994 - │ │ │ - *3311-PS │Charge No. 6 against Hans Frank, │ │ - │submitted by Polish Government to │ │ - │International Military Tribunal. (USA │ │ - │293) │ V │ 1104 - │ │ │ - *3319-PS │Foreign Office Correspondence and │ │ - │reports on anti-Jewish action in foreign│ │ - │countries. (GB 287) │ VI │ 4 - │ │ │ - *3358-PS │German Foreign Office circular, 31 │ │ - │January 1939, “The Jewish Question as a │ │ - │factor in German Foreign Policy in the │ │ - │year 1938”. (GB 158) │ VI │ 87 - │ │ │ - *3428-PS │Letter from Kube, 31 July 1942, │ │ - │concerning combatting of Partisans and │ │ - │action against Jews in White Ruthenia. │ │ - │(USA 827) │ VI │ 131 - │ │ │ - *3663-PS │Letter, 31 October 1941, and reply 15 │ │ - │November 1941, concerning execution of │ │ - │Jews. (USA 825) │ VI │ 401 - │ │ │ - *3666-PS │Letter from Braeutiger to Reich │ │ - │Commissioner for East, 18 December 1941,│ │ - │concerning Jewish question. (USA 826) │ VI │ 402 - │ │ │ - 3688-PS │Notice from the Foreign Office, 24 │ │ - │September 1942, concerning evacuation of│ │ - │Jews from Occupied Territories. │ VI │ 403 - │ │ │ - *3762-PS │Affidavit of SS Colonel Kurt Becher, 8 │ │ - │March 1946, concerning the │ │ - │responsibility of Kaltenbrunner for │ │ - │concentration camp executions. (USA 798)│ VI │ 645 - │ │ │ - *3803-PS │Covering letter enclosing a letter from │ │ - │Kaltenbrunner dated 30 June 1944, │ │ - │concerning forced labor of Jews in │ │ - │Vienna. (USA 802) │ VI │ 737 - │ │ │ - *3840-PS │Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February │ │ - │1946, concerning the elimination of the │ │ - │Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803) │ VI │ 775 - │ │ │ - *3841-PS │Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer │ │ - │Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, │ │ - │concerning elimination of the Warsaw │ │ - │Ghetto. (USA 804) │ VI │ 776 - │ │ │ - *3846-PS │Interrogation of Johann Kanduth, 30 │ │ - │November 1945, concerning crematorium at│ │ - │Mauthausen and the activities of │ │ - │Kaltenbrunner there. (USA 796) │ VI │ 783 - │ │ │ - *3868-PS │Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand │ │ - │Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning │ │ - │execution of 3,000,000 people at │ │ - │Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA │ │ - │819) │ VI │ 787 - │ │ │ - *3870-PS │Affidavit of Hans Marsalek, 8 April │ │ - │1946, concerning Mauthausen │ │ - │Concentration Camp and dying statement │ │ - │of Franz Ziereis, the Commandant. (USA │ │ - │797) │ VI │ 790 - │ │ │ - D-229 │Extract from pamphlet “Judges Letters” │ │ - │concerning judgment of Lower Court, 24 │ │ - │April 1942, on concealment of Jewish │ │ - │identification. │ VI │ 1091 - │ │ │ - D-251 │Lieberman memorandum, 27 September 1945,│ │ - │describing method of transport, gassing,│ │ - │and cremation. │ VI │ 1100 - │ │ │ - D-734 │Note of conversation between Reich │ │ - │Foreign Minister and Duce in presence of│ │ - │von Mackenson, Alfieri and Bastianini, │ │ - │25 February 1943. │ VII │ 188 - │ │ │ - *D-736 │Notes on discussion between Fuehrer and │ │ - │Horthy on 17 April 1943. (GB 283) │ VII │ 190 - │ │ │ - EC-265 │German Foreign Office telegram, 1 │ │ - │October 1940, concerning the Jews in │ │ - │Occupied French Territory. │ VII │ 375 - │ │ │ - *L-18 │Official report, Katzmann to General of │ │ - │Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, concerning│ │ - │“Solution of Jewish Question in │ │ - │Galicia”. (USA 277) │ VII │ 755 - │ │ │ - *L-22 │Public reports of War Refugee Board, │ │ - │Washington, on German Extermination │ │ - │Camps Auschwitz and Birkenau, April │ │ - │1944. (USA 294) │ VII │ 771 - │ │ │ - *L-53 │Order from Commandant of the SIPO and SD│ │ - │for the Radom District to Branch Office │ │ - │in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on clearance│ │ - │of prisons. (USA 291) │ VII │ 814 - │ │ │ - *L-161 │British War Office Report “Poland │ │ - │(Auschwitz) Concentration Camp”, 31 May │ │ - │1945. (USA 292) │ VII │ 908 - │ │ │ - *L-165 │Polish Ministry of Information, Press │ │ - │Bulletin, published in Polish │ │ - │Fortnightly Review, 15 December 1942, │ │ - │concerning Jewish Food Situation. (USA │ │ - │287) │ VII │ 908 - │ │ │ - *L-180 │Report by SS Brigade Commander │ │ - │Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group A”,│ │ - │15 October 1941. (USA 276) │ VII │ 978 - │ │ │ - *R-135 │Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret │ │ - │reports from Kube on German atrocities │ │ - │in the East, 18 June 1943, found in │ │ - │Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289) │ VIII │ 205 - │ │ │ -Statement XI │Farewell Message of Robert Ley Found in │ │ - │Nurnberg prison, 25 October 1945, after │ │ - │discovery of his suicide. │ VIII │ 740 - │ │ │ -Statement XII │Political Testament of Robert Ley │ │ - │written in Nurnberg Prison, October │ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 742 - │ │ │ -Statement XIII │Outline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley, │ │ - │written in Nurnberg Prison, 24 October │ │ - │1945. │ VIII │ 749 - │ │ │ -Statement XIV │Hungarian Relations with Germany Before │ │ - │and During the War by Nicholas Horthy, │ │ - │Jr., Nurnberg, 22 February 1946. │ VIII │ 756 - - - - - Chapter XIII - GERMANIZATION AND SPOLIATION - - -The Nazi conspirators had made plans for the Germanization and -spoliation of their conquered territories. Plans to Germanize meant -plans to assimilate conquered territories politically, culturally, -socially, and economically into the German Reich. Germanization meant -the obliteration of the former national character of the conquered -territories and the extermination of all elements which could not be -reconciled with the Nazi ideology. Plans for spoliation meant plans to -plunder public and private property and, in general, to exploit the -people and natural resources of occupied countries. - - 1. POLAND - -Poland was, in a sense, the testing ground for the conspirators’ -theories of “lebensraum.” The four western provinces of Poland were -purportedly incorporated into Germany by an order of 8 October 1939. -This order, which was signed by Hitler, Lammers, Goering, Frick, and -Hess, is set forth in 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, p. 2042. These -areas of Poland are frequently referred to in correspondence between the -conspirators as the “incorporated Eastern territories”. The remainder of -Poland which was seized by the Nazi invaders was established as the -Government-General of Poland by an order of Hitler, dated 12 October -1939. By that same order, Hans Frank was named Governor-General of the -newly-created Government-General, and Seyss-Inquart was named Deputy -Governor-General. This order is set forth in 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, -Part I, p. 2077. - -The plans with respect to Poland, which will appear gradually from the -individual documents hereafter discussed, followed a broad pattern, as -follows: - -_First_: The conspirators specifically planned to exploit the people and -material resources of the Government-General of Poland in order to -strengthen the Nazi war machine, to impoverish the Government-General, -and to reduce it to a vassal state. At a later stage, plans were -formulated for creating islands of German settlements in the more -fertile regions of the Government-General in order to engulf the native -Polish population and accelerate the process of Germanization. - -_Second_: The incorporated area of Poland, which was deemed to be a part -of the German Reich, was to be ruthlessly Germanized. To that end, the -conspirators planned: - -(_a_) To permit the retention of the productive facilities in the -incorporated area, all of which were to be dedicated to the Nazi war -machine. - -(_b_) They planned to deport to the Government-General many hundreds of -thousands of Jews, members of the Polish intelligentsia, and other -noncompliant elements. The Jews deported to the Government-General were -doomed to speedy annihilation. Moreover, since the conspirators felt -that members of the Polish intelligentsia could not be Germanized and -might serve as a center of resistance against their “new order”, they -too were to be eliminated. - -(_c_) They planned to deport all able-bodied Polish workers to Germany -for work in the Nazi war machine. This was to serve the twofold purpose -of helping to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine and -preventing the propagation of a new generation of Poles. - -(_d_) They planned to mold all persons in the incorporated area who were -deemed to possess German blood, into German subjects who would -religiously adhere to the principles of National Socialism. To that end, -the conspirators set up an elaborate racial register. Those who resisted -or refused to cooperate in this program were sent to concentration -camps. - -(_e_) They planned to bring thousands of German subjects into the -incorporated area for purposes of settlement. - -(_f_) They planned to confiscate the property—particularly the -farms—of the Poles, the Jews, and all dissident elements. The -confiscation of the property of Jews was part of the conspirators’ -larger program of extermination of the Jews. Confiscation likewise -served three additional purposes: (1) it provided land for the new -German settlers and enabled the conspirators to reward their adherents; -(2) dispossessed Polish property owners could be shipped to Germany for -work in the production of implements of war; and (3) the separation of -Polish farmers from their wives furthered the plan to prevent the growth -of a new generation of Poles. - -These plans are developed in the specific documents which follow. - -A. _The Program in the Incorporated Area._ - -(1) _Economic Spoliation._ A report of an interview with Frank on 3 -October 1939, which was included in a large report prepared in the OKW -by one Captain Varain at the direction of General Thomas, then Chief of -the Military Economic Staff of the OKW, states: - - “In the first interview which the chief of the Central Division - and the liaison officer between the Armament Department Upper - East and the Chief Administrative Officer (subsequently called - Governor-General) had with Minister Frank on October 3, 1939 in - Posen, Frank explained the directive, and the economic and - political responsibilities which had been conferred upon him by - the Fuehrer and according to which he intended to administer - Poland. According to these directives, Poland can only be - administered by utilizing the country through means of ruthless - exploitation, deportation of all supplies, raw materials, - machines, factory installations, etc., which are important for - the German war economy, availability of all workers for work - within Germany, reduction of the entire Polish economy to - absolute minimum necessary for bare existence of the population, - closing of all educational institutions, especially technical - schools and colleges in order to prevent the growth of the new - Polish intelligentsia. ‘Poland shall be treated as a colony; the - Poles shall be the slaves of the Greater German World Empire’. * - * * - - * * * * * * - - “By destroying Polish industry, its subsequent reconstruction - after the war would become more difficult, if not impossible, so - that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an - agrarian country which would have to depend upon Germany for - importation of industrial products.” (_EC-344-16 & 17_) - -The conspirators planned a difference in treatment for the incorporated -area of Poland, and for the Government-General. A directive issued and -signed by Goering on 19 October 1939, which was found among captured -files of the OKW, stated, _inter alia_: - - “In the meeting of October 13th, I have given detailed - instructions for the economical administration of the occupied - territories. I will repeat them here in short: 1. The task for - the economic treatment of the various administrative regions is - different depending on whether a country is involved which will - be incorporated politically into the German Reich or whether we - deal with the Government-General, which, in all probability, - will not be made a part of Germany. - - “In the first mentioned territories the reconstruction and - expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their - production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as - a complete incorporation into the Greater German economic system - at the earliest possible time. On the other hand, there must be - removed from the territories of the Government-General all raw - materials, scrap materials, machines etc., which are of use for - the German war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely - necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked existence of - the population must be transferred to Germany, unless such - transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time and - would make it more practical to exploit these enterprises by - giving them German orders to be executed at their present - location.” (_EC-410_) - -Once the Government-General had been stripped of its industrial -potential, the conspirators planned to leave the country desolate. Not -even the war damage was to be repaired. This is the clear import of an -order dated 20 November 1939, issued by Hess in his capacity as Deputy -Fuehrer, and found in captured OKW files. Hess stated: - - “I hear from Party members who came from the Government-General - that various agencies, as, for instance, the Military Economic - Staff, the Reich Ministry for Labor, etc., intend to reconstruct - certain industrial enterprises in Warsaw. However, in accordance - with a decision by Minister Dr. Frank, as approved by the - Fuehrer, Warsaw shall not be rebuilt nor is it the intention of - the Fuehrer to rebuild or reconstruct any industry in the - Government-General.” (_EC-411_) - -(2) _Deportation and Resettlement._ The Academy of German Law in January -1940 prepared a secret report on plans for the mass migration of Poles -and Jews from incorporated areas of Poland to the Government-General, -and for the forcible deportation of able-bodied Poles to Germany. (The -date of the report does not appear in the English translation, but it is -clearly set forth on the cover page of the original document, as January -1940.) It should be recalled that the decree of 11 July 1934 -(_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, p. 605, 11 July 1934) provided that the -Academy of German Law would be a public corporation of the Reich under -the supervision of the Reich Ministers of Justice and the Interior, and -that its task would be: - - “To promote the reconstruction of German legal life, and to - realize, in constant close collaboration with the competent - legislative organizations, the National Socialist program in the - entire sphere of the law.” - -It should also be stated that Frank was the president of the Academy of -German Law during the period when this secret report was made -(_2749-PS_). The report stated: - - “For the carrying out of costly and long term measures for the - increase of agricultural production, the Government-General can - at the most absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers, as it is already - over-populated. * * * By further absorption of 1.6 million - resettlers, the 1925 Reich census figure of 133 inhabitants per - square kilometer would be reached, which practically because of - already existing rural over-population and lack of industry - would result in a double over-population. - - “This figure of 1.6 million will barely suffice to transfer from - the Reich: - - “The Jews from the liberated East (over 600,000), parts of the - remaining Jews, preferably the younger age groups from Germany - proper, Austria, Sudetengau and the Protectorate (altogether - over 1 million). * * *” (_661-PS_) - -The report then goes on to say that the following groups of people -should be deported: - - “The Polish intelligentsia who have been politically active in - the past, and potential political leaders; the leading economic - personalities, comprising owners of large estates, - industrialists and businessmen, etc.; the peasant population, so - far as it has to be removed in order to carry out by strips of - German settlements the encirclement of Polish territories in the - East * * *.” - - * * * * * * - - “In order to relieve the living space of the Poles in the - Government-General as well as in the liberated East, one should - remove cheap labor temporarily by the hundreds of thousands, - employ them for a few years in the old Reich, and thereby hamper - their native biological propagation. (Their assimilation into - the old Reich must be prevented.) * * *” (_661-PS_) - -Finally, the report stated: - - “Strictest care is to be taken that secret circulars, memoranda - and official correspondence which contain instructions - detrimental to the Poles are kept steadily under lock and key so - that they will not some day fill the White Books printed in - Paris or the U.S.A.” (_661-PS_) - -Frank made the following entry in his diary: - - “The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) wishes that all Jews be - evacuated from the newly gained Reich territories. Up to - February approximately 1,000,000 people are to be brought in - this way into the Government-General. The families of good - racial extraction present in the occupied Polish territory - (approximately 4,000,000 people) should be transferred into the - Reich and individually housed and thereby be uprooted as a - people.” (_2233-G-PS_) - -The top secret minutes of a meeting held on 12 February 1940 on -“questions concerning the East,” at which Goering was chairman and -Himmler and Frank were present, stated, among other things: - - “By way of introduction, the General Field Marshal (_Goering_) - explained that the strengthening of the war potential of the - Reich must be the chief aim of all measures to be taken in the - East. * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “_Agriculture_: - - “The task consists of obtaining the greatest possible - agriculture production from the new Eastern Gaus disregarding - questions of ownership. * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “_Special questions concerning the Government-General_: - - “The Government-General will have to receive the Jews who are - ordered to emigrate from Germany, and the New Eastern Gaus.” - - * * * * * * - - “The following reported on the situation in the Eastern - territories: * * * - - “2. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Forster: The population of the - Danzig/West Prussia Gau (newly acquired territories) is 1.5 - million, of whom 240,000 are Germans, 850,000 well-established - Poles and 300,000 immigrant Poles, Jews and asocials (1,800 - Jews). 87,000 persons have been evacuated, 40,000 of these from - Gotenhafen. From there, also the numerous shirkers, who are now - looked after by welfare, will have to be deported to the - Government-General. Therefore, an evacuation of 20,000 further - persons can be counted on for the current year. * * *” - (_EC-305_) - -Comparable reports were made by other Gauleiters at this meeting. These -figures, it may be noted, were only as of February 1940. - -These forcible deportations did not involve merely ordering the victims -to leave their homes, and to take up new residences elsewhere. These -deportations were accomplished, according to plan, in a brutal and -inhuman manner. This is shown in a speech delivered by Himmler to -officers of the SS on a day commemorating the presentation of the Nazi -flag. The exact date of the speech does not appear in the document, but -its contents plainly show that it was delivered sometime after Poland -had been overrun. In this speech Himmler said: - - “Very frequently the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about the - deportation of this people here. These thoughts came to me today - when watching the very difficult work out there performed by the - Security Police, supported by your men, who help them a great - deal. Exactly the same thing happened in Poland in weather 40 - degrees below zero, where we had to haul away thousands, ten - thousands, hundred thousands; where we had to have the toughness - * * * you should hear this but also forget it again—to shoot - thousands of leading Poles.” (_1918-PS_) - -Such Poles from the incorporated area as managed to survive the journey -to the Government-General could look forward at best to extreme -hardship, and exposure to degradation and brutality. For the Jews who -were forcibly deported to the Government-General there was no hope. -Frank, by his own admissions, had dedicated himself to their complete -annihilation. In his diary Frank wrote: - - “We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them, and - wherever it is possible.” (_2233-D-PS_) - -(3) _Forcible Return of Racial Germans to the Reich._ The conspirators -had planned the forcible Germanization of persons in the incorporated -area who were deemed to possess German blood. Such persons were given -the choice of the concentration camp, or submission to Germanization. -Himmler was the chief executioner of this program. In a secret decree -signed by Hitler, Goering, and Keitel, dated 7 October 1939, Himmler was -entrusted with the task of executing the conspirators’ Germanization -program. The decree provided, among other things: - - “The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) has the obligation in accordance - with my directives: - - “1. To bring back for final return into the Reich all German - nationals, and racial Germans in the foreign countries. - - “2. To eliminate the harmful influence of such alien-parts of - the population, which represent a danger to the Reich, and the - German folk community. - - “3. The forming of new German settlements by re-settling, and in - particular by settling of the returning German citizens and - racial Germans from abroad. - - “The Reichsfuehrer SS is authorized to take all necessary - general and administrative measures for the execution of this - obligation.” (_686-PS_) - -Himmler’s conception of his tasks under this decree were plainly stated -in the foreword which he wrote for the “_Deutsche Arbeit_” issue of -June/July 1942. He wrote: - - “It is not our task to Germanize the East in the old sense, that - is, to teach the people there the German language and German - law, but to see to it that only people of purely German, - Germanic blood live in the East.” (_2915-PS_) - -The 1940 Edition of “_Der Menscheneinsatz_,” a confidential publication -issued by Himmler’s Office for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, -contained the following statements: - - “The removal of foreign races from the incorporated Eastern - Territories is one of the most essential goals to be - accomplished in the German East. This is the chief national - political task, which has to be executed in the incorporated - Eastern Territories by the Reichsfuehrer SS, Reich Commissioner - for the strengthening of the national character of the German - people.” - - * * * * * * - - “* * * there are the following two primary reasons, which make - the regaining of lost German blood an urgent necessity. - - “1. Prevention of a further increase of the Polish - intelligentsia, through families of German descent even if they - are Polonized. - - “2. Increase of the population by racial elements desirable for - the German nation, and the acquisition of ethno-biologically - unobjectionable forces for the German reconstruction of - agriculture and industry.” (_2916-PS_) - -Further light upon the goals which the conspirators had set for their -Germanization program in conquered Eastern areas, is contained in a -speech delivered by Himmler on 14 October 1943. This speech was -published by the National Socialist Leadership staff of the OKW. The -following are excerpts from this speech: - - “I consider that in dealing with members of a foreign country, - especially some Slav nationality, we must not start from German - points of view, and we must not endow these people with decent - German thoughts, and logical conclusions of which they are not - capable, but we must take them as they really are * * *.” - - “Obviously in such a mixture of peoples, there will always be - some racially good types. Therefore, I think that it is our duty - to take their children with us, to remove them from their - environment, if necessary by robbing, or stealing them. Either - we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves and - give it a place in our people, or * * * we destroy that blood.” - - * * * * * * - - “For us the end of this war will mean an open road to the East, - the creation of the Germanic Reich in this way or that * * * the - fetching home of 30 million human beings of our blood, so that - still during our lifetime we shall be a people of 120 million - Germanic souls. That means that we shall be the sole decisive - power in Europe. That means that we shall then be able to tackle - the peace, during which we shall be willing for the first twenty - years to rebuild and spread out our villages and towns, and that - we shall push the borders of our German race 500 kilometers - further out to the East.” (_L-70_) - -(4) _The Racial Register._ In furtherance of these plans, the -conspirators established a Racial Register in the incorporated area of -Poland. The Racial Register was, in effect, an elaborate classification -of persons deemed to be of German blood, and contained provisions -setting forth some of the rights, privileges, and duties of the persons -in each classification. Persons were classified into four groups: - -(1) Germans who had actively promoted the Nazi cause. - -(2) Germans who had been more or less passive in the Nazi struggle, but -had retained their German nationality. - -(3) Persons of German extraction who, although previously connected with -the Polish nation, were willing to submit to Germanization. - -(4) Persons of German descent, who had been “politically absorbed by the -Polish nation”, and who would be resistant to Germanization. - -The Racial Register was inaugurated under a decree of 12 September 1940, -issued by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German -Nationhood. The following are pertinent extracts: - - “The list of ‘ethnic Germans’ will be divided into four parts - (limited to interoffice use). - - “1. Ethnic Germans who fought actively in the ethnic struggle. - Besides the membership of a German organization, every other - activity in favor of the German against a foreign nationality - will be considered an active manifestation. - - “2. Ethnic Germans, who did not actively intervene in favor of - the German nationality, but who preserved their traceable German - nationality. - - “3. Persons of German descent, who became connected with the - Polish nation in the course of the years, but have on account of - their attitude, the prerequisites to become full-fledged members - of the German national community. To this group belong also - persons of non-German descent who live in a people’s mixed - marriage with an ethnic German in which the influence of the - German spouse has prevailed. Persons of Masurian, Slonzak, or - upper Silesian descent who are to be recognized as ethnic - Germans, usually belong to this group 3. - - “4. Persons of German descent, politically absorbed by the - Polish nation (renegades). - - “Persons not included on the list of ethnic Germans are Poles, - or foreign nationals. Their treatment is regulated by BII. - - “Members of groups 1 and 2 are ethnic Germans who will be used - for the reconstruction in the East. The differentiation between - the groups 1 and 2 is important for the National Socialist - Party; primarily only members of group 1 should be accepted in - the Party according to the instructions of the deputy of the - Fuehrer. - - “Members of groups 3 and 4 have to be educated as full Germans, - that is, have to be re-Germanized in the course of time through - an intensive educational training in old Germany. - - “The establishment of members of group 4 has to be based on the - doctrine, that German blood must not be utilized in the interest - of a foreign nation. Against those who refuse re-Germanization, - Security Police measures are to be taken.” (_2916-PS_) - -The basic idea of creating a racial register for persons of German -extraction was later incorporated into a decree of 3 March 1941, signed -by Himmler, Frick, and Hess. This decree is set forth in the 1941 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_ Part 1, page 118. - -The entire apparatus of the SS was thrown behind the vigorous execution -of these decrees. Proof of this fact is contained in the following -extracts from directives issued by Himmler as the Reich Commissioner for -the Consolidation of German Nationhood: - - “I. Where Racial Germans have not applied for entry in the - ‘German Ethnical List,’ you will instruct the subordinate - agencies to turn over their names to the State Police (Superior) - Office. Subsequently, you will report to me (Himmler). - - “II. The Local State Police (Superior) Office, will charge the - persons whose names are turned over to them to prove within - eight days that they have applied for entry in the ‘German - Ethnical List.’ - - “If such proof is not submitted, the person in question is to be - taken into protective custody for transfer into a concentration - camp.” (_R-112_) - -The measures taken against persons in the fourth category, “Polonized -Germans,” were particularly harsh. These persons were resistant to -Germanization, and ruthless measures calculated to break their -resistance were prescribed. Where the individual’s past history -indicated that he could not be effectively Germanized, he was thrown -into a concentration camp. In the words of Himmler’s decree of 16 -February 1942: - - “II. The Re-Germanization of the Polonized Germans presupposes - their complete separation from Polish surroundings. For that - reason the persons entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical - List are to be dealt with in the following manner: - - “A. They are to be re-settled in Old Reich territory. - - “1. The Superior SS and Police Leaders are charged with - evacuating and resettling them according to instructions which - will follow later. - - “2. Asocial persons and others who are of inferior hereditary - quality will not be included in the resettlement. Their names - will be turned over at once by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer - (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the - competent State Police (Superior) Office. The latter will - arrange for their transfer into a concentration camp. - - “3. Persons with a particularly bad political record will not be - included in the resettlement action. Their names will also be - given by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer (Inspectors of - Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State - Police (Superior) Office for transfer into a concentration camp. - The wives and children of such persons are to be resettled in - old Reich territory and to be included in the Germanization - measures. Where the wife also has a particularly bad political - record, and cannot be included in the resettlement action, her - name, too, is to be turned over to the competent State Police - (Superior) Office with a view to imprisoning her in a - concentration camp. In such cases the children are to be - separated from their parents and to be dealt with according to - III, paragraph 2 of this decree. Persons are to be considered as - having a particularly bad political record who have offended the - German nation to a very great degree (e.g., who participated in - persecutions of Germans, or boycotts of Germans, etc.).” - (_R-112_) - -(5) _Nazi Colonization._ Coincident with the program of Germanizing -persons of German extraction in the incorporated areas, the -conspirators, as previously indicated, undertook to settle large numbers -of Germans of proven Nazi convictions in that area. This aspect of their -program is clearly shown by an article by SS Obergruppenfuehrer and -General of the Police, Wilhelm Koppe, who was one of Himmler’s trusted -agents. The following is an excerpt from this article: - - “The victory of the German weapons in the East must therefore be - followed by the victory of the German race over the Polish race, - if the regained Eastern sphere—according to the Fuehrer’s - will—henceforth shall for all time remain an essential - constituent part of the Greater German Reich. It is therefore of - decisive importance to penetrate the regained German region with - German farmers, laborers, civil servants, merchants, and - artisans so that a living and deep-rooted bastion of German - people can be formed as a protective wall against foreign - infiltration, and possibly as a starting point for the racial - penetration of the territories further East.” (_2915-PS_) - -B. _The Program in the Government-General_ - -(1) _Germanization._ In the Government-General there were relatively few -persons, at the outset, who qualified as Germans by the conspirators’ -standards. Hence, little would be served by the introduction of a Racial -Register, categorizing persons of German extraction on the model of the -one instituted in the incorporated area; and it is not known that any -such Racial Register was prescribed in the Government-General. Rather, -the plan seems to have been (_a_) to make the Government-General a -colony of Germany, which was an objective announced by Frank (_EC-344-16 -& 17_), and (_b_) to create so-called “German island settlements” in the -productive farming areas. These island settlements were to be created by -an influx of German persons who faithfully adhered to the principles of -National Socialism. - -In this connection, secret notes bearing the date line, “Department of -the Interior, Krakow, 30th March, 1942,” reveal some of Himmler’s ideas -on the “planned Germanization” of the Government-General. The following -extracts are pertinent: - - “The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) developed further trains of - ideas to the effect that in the first five-year plan for - re-settlement after the war the new German Eastern territories - should first be filled; afterwards it is intended to provide at - this time the Crimea and the Baltic countries with a German - upper-class at least. Into the Government-General perhaps - further German Island Settlements should be newly transplanted - from European nations. An exact decision in this respect, - however, has not been issued. In any case, it is wished that at - first a heavy colonization along the San and the Brig be - achieved so that the parts of Poland are encircled with alien - populations. Hitherto, it has been always proved that this kind - of encirclement leads most quickly to the desired - nationalization.” (_910-PS_) - -An entry in Frank’s Diary (1941, volume II, page 317) bears on the same -point: - - “Thanks to the heroic courage of our soldiers, this territory - has become German, and the time will come when the valley of the - Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will be as - German as the Valley of the Rhine.” (_2233-H-PS_) - -(2) _Confiscation of Property._ The conspirators had made plans to -confiscate the property of Poles, Jews, and dissident elements. These -plans were designed to accomplish a number of objectives. Insofar as the -Jews were concerned, they were part of the conspirators’ over-all -program of extermination. Confiscation was also a means of providing -property for German settlers and of rewarding those who had rendered -faithful service to the Nazi State. This phase of their program likewise -made dispossessed Polish farmers available for slave labor in Germany, -and operated to further the conspirators’ objective of preventing the -growth of another generation of Poles. - -Proof of these matters appears in a number of reports by Kusche, who -appears to have been one of Himmler’s chief deputies in Poland. In one -of these reports Kusche pointed out that it was possible, without -difficulty, to confiscate small farms and that - - “The former owners of Polish farms together with their families - will be transferred to the old Reich by the employment agencies - for employment as farm workers.” (_1352-PS_) - -In another secret report by Kusche dated 22 May 1940, and entitled -“Details of the Confiscation in the Bielitz Country”, the following -appears: - - “Some days ago the commandant of the concentration camp being - built at Auschwitz spoke at Staff Leader Muller’s and requested - support for the carrying out of his assignments. He said that it - was absolutely necessary to confiscate the agricultural - enterprises within a certain area around the concentration camp, - since not only the fields but also the farm houses of these - border directly on the concentration camp. A local inspection - held on the 21st of this month revealed the following: there is - no room for doubt that agricultural enterprises bordering on the - concentration camp must be confiscated at once. Further than - this, the camp commandant requests that further plots of - farmland be placed at his disposal, so that he can keep the - prisoners busy. This too can be done without further delay since - enough land can be made available for the purpose. The owners of - the plots are all Poles.” - - * * * * * * - - “I had the following discussion with the head of the labor - office in Bielitz: - - “The lack of agricultural laborers still exists in the old - Reich. The transfer of the previous owners of the confiscated - enterprises, together with their entire families, to the Reich - is possible without any further consideration. It is only - necessary for the labor office to receive the lists of the - persons in time, in order to enable it to take the necessary - steps (collection of transportation, distribution over the - various regions in need of such labor)”. - - * * * * * * - - “The confiscation of these Polish enterprises in Alzen will also - be carried out within the next few days. The commandant of the - concentration camp will furnish SS men and a truck for the - execution of the action. Should it not yet be possible to take - the Poles from Alzen to Auschwitz, they should be transferred to - the empty castle at Zator. The liberated Polish property is to - be given to the needy racial German farmers for their use.” - (_1352-PS_) - -On 17 September 1940, Goering issued a decree which was designed to -regularize the program of confiscation (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1940, Part -I, page 1270). Under Section 2 of this decree, sequestration of movable -and immovable property, stores, and other intangible property interests -of Jews and “persons who have fled or are not merely temporarily absent” -was made mandatory. In addition, sequestration was authorized under -Section 2, sub-section 2, if the property were required “for the public -welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the -strengthening of Germanism.” By section 9 of the decree, confiscation of -sequestrated property was authorized “if the public welfare, -particularly the defense of the Reich, or the strengthening of -Germanism, so requires.” However, Section 1, sub-section 2, provided -that property of German nationals was not subject to sequestration and -confiscation; and section 13 provided that sequestration would be -suspended if the owner of the property asserted that he was a German. -The decree, on its face, clearly indicates a purpose to strip Poles, -Jews, and dissident elements of their property. It was, moreover, -avowedly designed to promote Germanism. - -Apparently some question arose at one point as to whether the decree -required that a determination be made in each case involving the -property of a Pole that the property was required “for the public -welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the -strengthening of Germanism.” The answer supplied by the conspirators was -firm and clear: In _any_ case in which the property of a Pole was -involved, the “strengthening of Germanism” required its seizure. On 15 -April 1941, on paper bearing the letterhead of the Reich Leader SS, -Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, instructions -were given “for internal use on the application of the law concerning -property of the Poles of 17 September 1940.” The following is an -excerpt: - - “The conditions permitting seizure according to section II, - sub-section 2, are always present if the property belongs to a - Pole. For the Polish real estate will be needed without - exception for the consolidation of the German nationhood.” - (_R-92_) - -In the Government-General, Frank promulgated a decree on 24 January -1940, authorizing sequestration “in connection with the performance of -tasks serving the public interest”, and liquidation of “anti-social or -financially unremunerative concerns.” The decree is embodied in the -_Verordnungsblatt_ of the Government-General, No. 6, 27 January 1940, -page 23. The undefined criteria in this decree clearly empowered Nazi -officials in the Government-General to engage in wholesale seizure of -property. - -The magnitude of the conspirators’ confiscation program in Poland was -staggering. The Nazis’ own statistics show that as of 31 May 1943, a -total of 693,252 estates, comprising 6,097,525 hectares, had been -seized, and 9,508 estates, comprising 270,446 hectares had been -confiscated by the Estate Offices Danzig-West Prussia, Poznan, Zichenau, -and Silesia (_R-92_). This, it will be noted, represented the seizures -and confiscations which were effected by only four offices. Figures are -not available at this time for other offices maintained by the -conspirators for these purposes. - - 2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - -The conspirators had given much thought to their plans to Germanize -Bohemia and Moravia. Three plans, each characterized by severity, were -discussed, and finally the Fuehrer decided on plan (_c_), which involved -the assimilation of about one-half the Czech population by the Germans -and the extermination of the other half. Moreover, this plan envisaged a -large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans whose loyalty to the Fuehrer -was unquestioned. - -These matters appear from a top secret report dated 15 October 1940, -written by General Friderici, Deputy General of the Wehrmacht in Bohemia -and Moravia. On the face of the document, it appears that only four -copies were made. The original document bears the handwritten letters -“K” and “J” on the first page on the left side, and the handwriting is -unquestionably that of Keitel and Jodl. The report states: - - “On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector - held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt. - General K. H. Frank spoke about the following: [SS - Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank was Secretary of State under Von - Neurath, who at the date of this report was the Protector of - Bohemia and Moravia]. - - “Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, - Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the - central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the - solution of the Czech problem. - - “After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his - views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this way, - three ways of solution were indicated: - - “_a._ German infiltration of Moravia and reduction of the Czech - nationality to a residual Bohemia. This solution is considered - unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a - diminished form, will continue to exist. - - “_b._ Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical - solution, namely, the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore, - the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried - out within a reasonable period of time. - - “_c._ Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e., absorption of about half - of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of - importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint. - This will take place, among other things, also by increasing the - _Arbeitseinsatz_ of the Czechs in the Reich territory (with the - exception of the Sudeten-German border district), in other - words, by dispersing the closed Czech nationality. - - “The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its - power, eliminated and shipped out of the country by all sorts of - methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid - part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter - can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a - burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the - other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid - assimilation. - - “Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought to be - handled roughly and should be eliminated. - - “The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx - of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate. - - “After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution (_c_) - (Assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech - problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the - Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be - carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich - Protector for years to come. - - “From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed - forces. This is the direction which has always been represented - from here. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which - was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed - Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret, - entitled: “The Czech Problem.” (Attached as annex.) - - “The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector - in Bohemia and Moravia.” - - “(Signed) FRIDERICI - Infantry Lt. General.” (_862-PS_) - -Solution (_a_), as outlined in the foregoing report, would have called -for German infiltration into Moravia and the forcible removal of the -Czechs from that area to Bohemia. Moravia lies between Bohemia and -Slovakia. Thus, solution (_a_) would have involved the erection of a -German state between Bohemia and Slovakia, and would have prevented -effective inter-communications between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In -this manner, the historic desire for unity of these two groups of people -and the continued existence of their Czechoslovakian State would have -been frustrated. Solution (_a_) was rejected because the surviving -Czechs, even though compressed into a “residual Bohemia,” would have -remained to plague the conspirators. - -Solution (_b_), which involved the forcible deportation of all Czechs, -was rejected, not because its terms were deemed too drastic but rather -because a more speedy resolution of the problem was desired. - -Solution (_c_) was regarded as the most desirable, and was adopted. This -solution first provided for the assimilation of about one-half of the -Czechs. This meant two things: (_a_) enforced Germanization for those -who were deemed racially qualified, and (_b_) deportation to slave labor -in Germany for others. “Increasing the _Arbeitseinsatz_ of the Czechs in -the Reich territory”, as stated in the report, meant, in reality, slave -labor in Germany. - -Solution (_c_) further provided for the elimination and deportation “by -all sorts of methods” of the other half of the Czech population, -particularly intellectuals and those who did not meet Nazi racial -standards. Czech intellectuals, as the conspirators well know, had a -conspicuous record of resistance to the Nazi ideology. They were, -therefore, to be exterminated. That section of the report which stated, -“elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled -roughly and should be eliminated,” meant that intellectuals and other -dissident elements were either to be thrown in concentration camps or -immediately exterminated. - -In short, the provisions of solution (_c_) were simply a practical -application of the conspirators’ philosophy as expressed in Himmler’s -speech referred to above: - - “Either we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves - * * * or we destroy this blood.” (_L-70_) - - 3. THE U. S. S. R. - -(The Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet Union has assumed the task of -introducing detailed evidence showing the results of the execution of -this program. The American prosecution confined itself to showing the -plan.) - -The evidence, individual items of which will be discussed hereafter, -shows the following: - -A. The conspirators planned to remove to Germany all foodstuffs and raw -materials from the south and southeast of the Soviet Union, over and -above the needs of the Nazi invading forces and the absolute minimum -necessary to supply the bare needs of the people in these particular -regions who produced the materials which were to be removed to Germany. -This region had previously supplied the northern area of the Soviet -Union, which the conspirators called the “Forest Zone”. The latter zone -embraced some of the leading industrial areas of the Soviet Union, -including Moscow and Leningrad. - -B. They deliberately and systematically planned to starve millions of -Russians. Starvation was to be accomplished by the following means: - -(1) As indicated under A above, products from the south and southeast of -the Soviet Union which ordinarily were sent to the industrial regions of -the north were to be forcibly diverted to Germany. Moreover, all -livestock in the industrial regions was to be seized for use by the -_Wehrmacht_ and the German civilian population. The necessary -consequence was that the population of the northern regions would be -reduced to starvation. - -(2) They established the following order of priority in which food -produced by the Russians would be allocated: - - First, the combat troops. - - Second, the remainder of troops in enemy territory. - - Third, troops stationed in Germany. - - Fourth, the German civilian population, and - - Lastly, the population of the occupied countries. - -Thus, even Russians in the food-surplus area of the Ukraine, who were -not essential to the production of products for the German war machine, -were systematically to be starved. - -C. They planned the permanent destruction of all industry in the -northern area of the Soviet Union in order that the remnants of the -Russian population would be completely dependent upon Germany for -consumer goods. - -D. They planned to incorporate a part of Galicia and all of the Baltic -countries into Germany and to convert the Crimea, an area north of the -Crimea, the Volga territory, and the district around Baku, into German -colonies. - -By a directive issued by Goering’s office for “The Operation of the -Economy in the newly-occupied Eastern Territories,” there was -established the Economic Executive Staff, East, which was directly -responsible to Goering, under which was created the Economic Staff, -East. The Economic Staff, East, in turn was subdivided into four groups: -the Chief of the Economic Staff, Group LA, Group W, and Group M. The -functions of Group LA were stated to be as follows: - - “Group LA. (Functions: nutrition and agriculture, the economy of - all agricultural products, provision of supplies for the Army, - in cooperation with the Army groups concerned.)” (_EC-472_) - -A report was made on 23 May 1941 (which was before the invasion of the -Soviet Union) on the subject, “Economic Policy Directives for Economic -Organization, East, Agricultural Group.” (_EC-126_). It was prepared by -the Economic Staff, East, Group LA, the Agricultural Group, which (as -shown by _EC-472_) was an important part of the organization which -Goering had established to formulate plans for the economic -administration of Russia. The report begins by a recitation of figures -pertaining to the production of agricultural products in the Soviet -Union. It states that the grain surplus of Russia is determined by the -level of domestic consumption and that this fact affords the basis upon -which the planners must predicate their actions and economic policy. The -report continues: - - “The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district - (that is in the south and southeast) and in the Caucasus. The - deficit areas are principally located in the forest zone of the - north. Therefore, an isolation of the black soil areas must, in - any case, place greater or lesser surpluses in these regions at - our disposal. The consequences will be cessation of supplies to - the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial - centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.” - - * * * * * * - - “This (the cessation of supplies) means: - - “1. All industry in the deficit area, particularly the - manufacturing industries in the Moscow and Petersburg regions as - well as the Ural industrial regions will be abandoned. It may be - assumed that these regions today absorb an annual five to ten - million tons from the food production zone. - - “2. The Trans-Caucasian oil district will have to be excepted, - although it is a deficit area. This source of oil, cotton, - manganese, copper, silk, and tea must continue to be supplied - with food in any case, for special political and economic - reasons. - - “3. No further exceptions with a view to preserving one or the - other industrial region or industrial enterprise must be - permitted. - - “4. Industry can only be preserved so far as it is located in - the surplus region. This applies, apart from the above-mentioned - oil field regions in the Caucasus, particularly to the heavy - industries in the Donets district (Ukraine). Only the future - will show to what extent it will prove possible to maintain in - full these industries, and in particular the Ukrainian - manufacturing industries, after the withdrawal of the food - surpluses required by Germany. - - “The following consequences result from this situation, which - has received the approval of the highest authorities, since it - is in accord with the political tendencies (preservation of the - small Russians, preservation of the Caucasus, of the Baltic - provinces, of White Russia, to the prejudice of the Great - Russians). - - “I. _For the forest belt_: - - “_a._ Production in the forest belt (the food-deficit area) will - become ‘naturalized,’ similar to the events during the World War - and the Communistic tendencies of the war, etc., namely: - agriculture in that territory will begin to become a mere ‘home - production.’ The result will be that the planting of products - destined for the market such as, in particular, flax and hemp, - will be discontinued, and the area used therefor will be taken - over for products for the producer (grain, potatoes, etc.) - Moreover, discontinuance of fodder for that area will lead to - the collapse of the dairy production and pig producing in that - territory. - - “_b._ Germany is not interested in the maintenance of the - productive power of these territories, except for supplying the - troops stationed there. The population, as in the old days, will - utilize arable land for growing its own food. It is useless to - expect grain or other surpluses to be produced. Only after many - years can these extensive regions be intensified to an extent - that they might produce genuine surpluses. The population of - these areas, in particular the urban population, will have to - face most serious distress from famine. It will be necessary to - divert the population into the Siberian spaces. Since rail - transport is out of the question, this too, will be an extremely - difficult problem. - - “_c._ In this situation, Germany will only draw substantial - advantages by quick, nonrecurrent seizure, that is, it will be - vitally necessary to make the entire flax harvest available for - German needs, not only the fibers but also the oleaginous seeds. - - “It will also be necessary to utilize for German purposes the - livestock which has no fodder base of its own, that is, it will - be necessary _to seize livestock holdings_ immediately, and to - make them available to the troops not only for the moment, but - in the long run, and also for exportation to Germany. Since - fodder supplies will be cut off, pig and cattle holdings in - these areas will of necessity drastically decline in the near - future. If they are not seized by the Germans at an early date, - they will be slaughtered by the population for its own use, - without Germany getting anything out of it.” - - * * * * * * - - “It has been demanded by the Fuehrer that the reduction in the - meat ration should be made good by the fall. This can only be - achieved by the most drastic seizures of Russian livestock - holdings, particularly in areas which are in a favorable - transport situation in relation to Germany.” - - * * * * * * - - “In future, southern Russia must turn its face toward Europe. - Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it - purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany, or Europe. - Russian competition from the forest zone must, therefore, be - abolished. - - “It follows from all that has been said that the German - administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate - the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take - place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural - conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in - these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other - important food crops giving a high yield. However, these - measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people - in this area will become redundant and will either die or have - to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there - from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black - soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It - would reduce Germany’s staying power in the war, and would - undermine Germany’s and Europe’s power to resist the blockade. - This must be clearly and absolutely understood.” - - * * * * * * - - “I. Supplies for the Army - - “Germany’s food situation in the third year of war demands it - imperatively that the _Wehrmacht_, in all its provisioning, must - not live off Greater German territory or that of incorporated or - friendly areas from which this territory receives imports. This - minimum aim, the provisioning of the _Wehrmacht_ from enemy - territory in the third year, and if necessary in later years, - must be attained at any price. This means that one-third of the - _Wehrmacht_ must be fully provisioned by French deliveries to - the army of occupation. The remaining two-thirds (and even - slightly more in view of the present size of the Wehrmacht) must - without exception be provisioned from the Eastern _space_.” - - * * * * * * - - “Thus it is not important, under any circumstances, to preserve - what has existed, but what matters is a deliberate turning away - from the existing situation and introducing Russian food - resources into the European framework. This will inevitably - result in an extinction of industry as well as a large part of - the people in what so far have been the food-deficit areas. - - “It is impossible to state an alternative in sufficiently hard - and severe terms.” - - * * * * * * - - “Our problem is not to replace intensive food production in - Europe through the incorporation of new space in the East, but - to replace imports from overseas by imports from the East. The - task is twofold: - - “1. We must use the eastern spaces for overcoming the food - shortages during and after the war. This means that we must not - be afraid of drawing upon the capital substance of the East. - Such an intervention is much more acceptable from the European - standpoint than drawing upon the capital substance of Europe’s - agriculture.” - - * * * * * * - - “2. For the future new order, the food-producing areas in the - East must be turned into a permanent and substantial - complementary source of food for Europe, through intensified - cultivation and resulting higher yields. - - “The first-named task must be accomplished at any price, even - through the most ruthless cutting down of Russian domestic - consumption, which will require discrimination between the - consuming and producing zones.” (_EC-126_) - -It is submitted that this document discloses, on its face, a studied -plan to murder millions of people through starvation. It reveals a -program of premeditated murder on a scale so vast as to stagger human -imagination. This plan was the logical culmination of general objectives -clearly announced by Adolf Hitler in _Mein Kampf_. (See Section 6 of -Chapter IX.) - -A top secret memorandum, dated 16 July, 1941, of a conference at the -Fuehrer’s headquarters concerning the war in the East, seems to have -been prepared by Bormann, because his initials appear at the top of page -one (_L-221_). The text of the memorandum indicates that the conference -was attended by Hitler, Lammers, Goering, Keitel, Rosenberg, and -Bormann. This memorandum throws light upon the conspirators’ plans to -Germanize conquered areas of the Soviet Union. It also discloses the -fraudulent character of the Nazi propaganda program; and shows how the -conspirators sought to deceive the entire world; how they pretended to -pursue one course of action when their aims and purposes were to follow -precisely the opposite course. The following portions are particularly -relevant. - - “Now it was essential that we did not publicize our aims before - the world; also there was no need for that, but the main thing - was that we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we - render our task more difficult by making superfluous - declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we - could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was - beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway. - - “What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought - to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to - act here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of - Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we did - not publish our aims, and it was only sensible to continue in - the same way. - - “Therefore, we shall emphasize again that we were forced to - occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the - interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food, - traffic, etc., hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to - recognize that it initiates final settlement. This need not - prevent our taking all necessary measures—shooting, - de-settling, etc.—and we shall take them. - - “But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely - and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to - exercise a mandate only. At the same time we must know clearly - that we shall never leave those countries. - - “Our conduct therefore ought to be: - - “1. To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but - to prepare for it only in secret. * * *” - - “2. To emphasize that we are liberators. - - “In particular: The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners - and to be settled by Germans only. In the same way the former - Austrian part of Galicia will become Reich territory. - - “Our present relations with Roumania are good, but nobody knows - what they will be at any future time. This we have to consider, - and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to - be dependent on the good will of other people. We have to plan - our relations with Roumania in accordance with this principle. - - “On principle, we have now to face the task of cutting up the - giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able— - - “first, to dominate it; - - “second, to administer it, and; - - “third, to exploit it. - - “The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our - front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it - enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us. - - “Principles: Never again must it be possible to create a - military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war - for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every - successor of the Fuehrer should know: security for the Reich - exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the - Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of this area - against all possible danger. Our iron principle is and has to - remain: We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry - arms.” - - * * * * * * - - “The Fuehrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will have - to be incorporated into Germany. - - “At the same time the Crimea, including a considerable - hinterland, (situated north of the Crimea) should become Reich - territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible. - - “Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living - there. - - “Incidental question: It occurred to me several times that - Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to - aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.” - - “The Fuehrer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga Colony, too, - will have to become Reich territory, also the district around - Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession - (military colony).” - - “The Finns wanted East Carelia, but the Kola Peninsula will be - taken by Germany because of the large nickel mines there. - - “The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be - prepared with caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by - the Finns; the Fuehrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and - then hand it over to the Finns.” (_L-221_) - -Thus, the program, as outlined by the conspirators at this meeting of 16 -July, 1941, called for the unlawful incorporation of a part of Galicia -and all the Baltic countries into Germany; and for the unlawful -conversion of the Crimea and areas north of it, the Volga territory and -the district around Baku, into German colonies. - -This point is reinforced by a directive entitled, “Instruction for a -Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia,” which states: - - “The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, - and White Russia [last two words added in pencil] must be to - strive to achieve the form of a German protectorate, and then - transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by - Germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic - races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must - become a Germanic inland sea, under the guardianship of Greater - Germany.” (_1029-PS_) - -Even in the food-surplus areas of the occupied regions of the Ukraine, -the conspirators planned to allocate food on a basis which left -virtually nothing for those persons who were not engaged in the -compulsory production of commodities for the German war machine. This -was in violation of the explicit provision in Article 52 of the Hague -Regulations of 1907, that requisitions in kind and services shall not be -demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the -army of occupation. This program was disclosed in a top secret -memorandum, dated 18 September, 1941, concerning a meeting of German -military officials presided over by Goering (_EC-3_). The memorandum was -signed by General Nagl, liaison officer between Goering’s Four Year Plan -Office and the OKW. The memorandum states: - - “At this conference which was concerned with the better - exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food - economy, the Reich Marshal (Goering) called attention to the - following:” - - * * * * * * - - “It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is - needed. - - “First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of - troops in enemy territory, and then those troops stationed at - home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the - German nonmilitary population follows and only then comes the - population of the occupied territories.” (_EC-3_) - -Another memorandum, dated 25 November 1941, relating to the general -principles of economic policy in the newly-occupied eastern territories, -as prescribed in a conference held in Berlin on 8 November 1941, also -bears out this point. This memorandum was also written by General Nagl. -It is on the stationery of the Supreme Headquarters Armament Procurement -Office. The following portions are pertinent: - - “I. For the duration of the war the requirements of the war - economy will be the all-dominant factor of any economic measures - in the newly-occupied Eastern territories. - - “II. Seen from a long range point of view the newly-occupied - eastern areas will be exploited economically from the point of - view of colonial administration and by colonial methods. - - “Exceptions will be made only for those parts of the Eastland - which are to be Germanized by order of the Fuehrer, but even - they are subject to the principle expressed in paragraph I. - - “III. The main emphasis of all economic work rests with the - production of food and raw materials. - - “The highest possible production surplus for the supply of the - Reich and of other European countries is to be attained by cheap - production based on the maintenance of the low living standard - of the native population. Besides covering thereby the European - needs for food supplies and raw materials as far as possible, - this measure is intended to create a source of income for the - Reich which will make it possible to liquidate in a few decades, - with utmost consideration for the German taxpayer, an essential - part of the debts incurred in the financing of the war.” - (_EC-3_) - -On 17 July, 1941, Hitler and Keitel issued a decree appointing Rosenberg -as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. This was the day -following the meeting at the Fuehrer’s headquarters, which is reported -in the document previously quoted from (_L-221_). This decree states, -_inter alia_: - - “The Civil Administration in the newly-occupied Eastern - territories where these territories are not included in the - administration of the territories bordering on the Reich or the - Government-General, is subject to the Reich Minister for the - Occupied Eastern Territories. - - * * * * * * - - “I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for - the occupied Eastern territories. He will hold office in - Berlin.” (_1997-PS_) - -Rosenberg’s views well fitted him for his task as one of the chief -executioners of the conspirators’ plans in the Soviet Union. His views -were plainly expressed in a speech delivered on 20 June 1941: - - “The job of feeding the German people, stands, this year, - without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims on - the East; and here the southern territories and the northern - Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the - German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on - our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of - that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, - bare of any feelings.” (_1058-PS_) - -These views were implemented in the directives issued by Rosenberg in -his capacity as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. -Among his directives were these: - - “The principal task of the civilian administration in the - occupied Eastern territories is to represent the interest of the - Reich. This basic principle is to be given precedence in all - measures and considerations. Therefore, the occupied - territories, in the future, may be permitted to have a life of - their own in a form not as yet to be determined. However, they - remain parts of the Greater German living space and are always - to be governed according to this guiding principle. - - “The regulations of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which - concern the administration of a country occupied by a foreign - belligerent power, are not applicable, since the USSR is to be - considered dissolved, and therefore the Reich has the obligation - of exercising all governmental and other sovereign functions in - the interests of the country’s inhabitants. Therefore, any - measures are permitted which the German administration deems - necessary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive - task.” (_EC-347_) - -Implicit in Rosenberg’s statement that the Hague Regulations are not -applicable to the Soviet Union is the recognition by him that the -conspirators’ action in the Soviet Union flagrantly violated the Hague -Regulations and applicable principles of International Law. - -A top secret memorandum, dated 5 October 1942, written by Braeutigam, -who was a high official in Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern -Territories, made the following statements: - - “In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for - the destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the - greater Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of - colonial territory for colonizing purposes and economic - exploitation. - - * * * * * * - - “With the inherent instinct of the Eastern peoples the primitive - man soon found out also that for Germany the slogan: ‘Liberation - from Bolshevism’ was only a pretext to enslave the Eastern - peoples according to her own methods.” (_294-PS_) - -Certain German industrialists and financiers aided and abetted Himmler -in his relentless program of Germanization, exploitation, oppression, -and destruction. A letter from the banker, Baron Kurt von Schroeder to -Himmler, dated 27 August 1943, stated: - - “My very honorable Reichsfuehrer: - - “With great joy I learn of your appointment as Reichsminister of - the Interior and take the liberty to extend my heartiest - congratulations to you on assuming your new post. - - “A strong hand is now very necessary in the operation of this - Department and it is universally welcomed but especially by your - friends that it was you who were chosen for this by the Fuehrer. - Please be assured that we will always do everything in our power - at all times to assist you in every possible way. - - “I am pleased to inform you at this opportunity that your circle - of friends has again placed at your disposal this year a sum - slightly in excess of RM 1 million for ‘special purposes.’ An - exact list showing the name of the contributors will be sent to - you shortly. - - “Again all my very best wishes—as well as those of my family—I - remain yours, in old loyalty and esteem. - -“Heil Hitler! Yours truly.” (_EC-454_) - -A later letter from von Schroeder to Himmler, dated 21 September 1943, -enclosed the list of contributors. The letter stated: - - “Dear Reichsleader: - - “I thank you very much for your kind letter of the 14th of this - month with which you made me very happy. At the same time, I am - enclosing a list with the total amount of funds made available - to you by your circle of friends and totalling RM 1,000,000. We - are very glad indeed to render some assistance to you in your - special tasks and to be able to provide some small relief for - you in your still further extended sphere of duties. - - “Wishing you, dear Reichsleader, the best of luck, I remain in - old loyalty and esteem. - -“Heil Hitler! Yours very truly.” (_EC-453_) - -The Himmler “circle of friends,” it may be noted, was a relatively -small, select group. It did not include all, or even a majority of the -industrialists and financiers in Germany. These contributions were not -like the “_Hitler Spende_” or the Winter Relief contributions which were -exacted from all industrialists by the Nazi state. These were -contributions by a small group of very influential industrialists and -financiers who, for selfish reasons, were anxious to “do everything in -our power at all times to assist you “(Himmler)” in every possible way.” -By a rather strange coincidence, firms like I. G. Farben, the Flick -Combine, and the Herman Goering Werke, which are on the list of -contributors to Himmler, were among the chief beneficiaries of the -conspirators’ program of plunder of public and private property in the -occupied countries. (_EC-453_) - - 4. THE WESTERN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES - -(This section is based on a brief originally prepared for submission by -the United States Prosecution in support of the allegation, in Count One -of the Indictment, of a plan or conspiracy to commit war crimes. The -evidence relating to the plan or conspiracy, however, proved to be -inseparable from that on the execution thereof, a subject assigned to -the French Prosecution. The materials contained herein were accordingly -made available to the French for such use as they might deem appropriate -in connection with the proof of their case.) - -A. _The Nazi Conspirators Obtained Enormous Quantities of Foodstuffs, -Raw Materials and Equipment From the Occupied Western Countries._ - -(1) _The Nazis planned in advance of the invasion to secure from the -conquered territories the strategic materials which Germany lacked and -without which Germany could not prevail in a war of long duration._ In -this war, as in the last, German resources were sufficient only for a -conflict of short duration. As early as the winter of 1939-40, following -the swift and crushing defeat of Poland, Germany suffered from a -critical shortage of essential raw materials (_EC-615_). The Nazi -leaders were thus faced with the question whether to conserve their -supplies for a long war or to commit their limited reserves in the hope -of obtaining an early decision. Hitler decided on the latter course. As -Goering told General Thomas: - - “The Fuehrer is firmly convinced that he will succeed in - reaching a decision * * * in the year 1940 by a big attack in - the West. He reckons that Belgium, Holland, and Northern France - will get into our possession and * * * had figured out that the - industrial areas of Douai and Lens and those of Luxembourg, - Longwy, and Briey could, from the point of view of raw material, - replace the supplies from Sweden. Therefore, the Fuehrer had - decided now to make use of our reserve of raw materials without - regard to future times. * * *” (_EC-606_) - -Careful plans were made in advance of the invasion in 1940 to secure for -Germany the raw material resources of the to-be-occupied countries. A -manual of directives and decrees issued by the Quartermaster, OKH, for -the economic administration of the military government set forth an -exhaustive list of important raw materials to be seized wherever found -(_EC-155_). Directives were issued to the so-called economic squads -(_Wirtschafts Truppe_) attached to the tactical units on the procedures -to be followed in locating, seizing, and preparing such materials for -shipment to Germany (_EC-618_). Also included in the manual mentioned -were drafts of decrees to be promulgated by the German occupation -authorities, for the establishment in the occupied countries of Goods -Offices, modeled after the German rationing boards, to control -production and distribution in the occupied countries in the German -interest. (_EC-155_) - -(2) _The occupied Western countries were ruthlessly exploited according -to plan._ The occupied areas were systematically stripped of their -economic resources to feed the German war machine. The extent of German -exploitation is partially indicated by the staggering totals of the -occupation levies and the “credit” balances of the local central banks -under clearing arrangements imposed by the Nazis, the principal sources -of the funds with which Germany financed the spoliation of Western -Europe. (For a brief explanation of the clearing system, see _infra_ -under D, 2.) - -The total occupation charges exacted from France alone were -31,600,000,000 RM from 25 June, 1940, to 5 September, 1944 (_3615-PS_). -They averaged more than 7,000,000,000 RM annually, a sum more than four -times the German annual payments under the Dawes and Young Plans. This -sum is in addition to a “credit” of the Bank of France under the -Franco-German clearing, which, as of September, 1943, amounted to -4,400,000,000 RM (_3615-PS_). For the period May 1942-43, the tribute -exacted from Belgium (mainly from occupation charges and clearing -credits) amounted to more than two-thirds of the Belgium national income -(_ECR-149_). These figures, large as they are, take no account of the -substantial quantities of materials seized and removed to the Reich -without compensation (see _infra_ under B, (1)) nor do they reflect the -windfall to the Reich resulting from the substantial over-valuation of -the Reichsmark, particularly in the case of France and Belgium. -(_EC-86_) - -A few illustrative examples of specific items, taken from the report of -the German Military Commander for France of 10 September, 1942 -(_EC-267_), will serve to show even more concretely than monetary -figures, the extent to which materials and equipment were taken from the -occupied countries for the benefit of the Reich. Since the Armistice, -according to this report, the French contributed to the Germans 73 -percent of the normal annual French consumption of iron, amounting to -nearly 5 million tons. From the Armistice to July, 1942, 225,000 tons of -copper and 5,700 tons of nickel were delivered by France to Germany, -amounting to 80 percent and 86 percent of French supplies respectively; -also 55 percent of the French aluminum and 80 percent of the magnesium -production. For her own needs France retained only 30 percent of the -normal production of the wool industry, 16 percent of the cotton -production, and 13 percent of the linen production. The total French -production of locomotives and the major part of the machine tool -industry were put at the disposal of the Germans. (_EC-267_) - -B. _The Foodstuffs, Raw Materials and Equipment Delivered to Germany -were Obtained by Compelling the Nationals of the Conquered Countries to -Produce and Distribute in Accordance with German War Requirements, by -Seizure and Requisition, and by Purchases Financed with Funds Exacted -from the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals._ - -(1) _Much of the material and equipment removed to Germany was obtained -by seizure, requisition, and confiscation of private property._ During -the first phase of the occupation, the Nazis systematically removed to -the Reich almost all available supplies to satisfy the immediate German -requirements. This phase, according to the German Military Commander’s -description of the practice in France, was one of “stripping” occupied -areas of “foodstuffs, raw materials and machinery”, leaving only enough -to secure the “bare subsistence” of the population (_EC-614_). In the -words of the report of the Wi-Rue Staff in France: - - “In this period the legal concepts of the Hague Regulations - regarding Land Warfare are not yet strictly observed. The main - purpose is to get out of France through seizure _Beschlagnahme_ - or purchase at infinitesimal prices the materials of use for the - German armament.” (_EC-422_) - -By order of the German High Command, booty was defined to include not -merely public property but “beyond the Hague Regulations on Land -Warfare,” also “privately owned finished and semi-finished products if -they were manufactured in fulfillment of an order of the French armed -forces” (_EC-422_). At the same time, payments made by the French armed -forces on account of war material orders were likewise treated as war -booty. Even goods in transit were arbitrarily placed in this category -(_EC-422_). Machinery and equipment affixed to the realty were seized -and shipped to Germany in wilful disregard of the limitations of the -Hague Regulations authorizing seizure only of chattels. (_EC-84_) - -The “stripping phase” of Nazi spoliation was relatively short-lived. -Decision was soon reached to utilize at least part of the industrial -capacity of the occupied areas to relieve the burden on the armament -plants in Germany (_EC-620_). Throughout the period of occupation, -however, the Nazis continued the seizure and requisition of machinery -and certain raw materials in short supply in the Reich. From December, -1942, to the end of the occupation, for example, 242 German demands for -Belgian machinery were met, of which 110 were fulfilled by requisitions -(_ECH-10_). In 79 instances the requisitioned equipment was shipped to -Germany. (_ECH-10_) - -Support for such requisitions was found in an order of the Military -Commander of Belgium of 6 August 1942. This order was explained as -embodying the “modern” German view that, as “total war is no longer -limited in space but has become a struggle of peoples and nations -against each other,” requisitions under Article 52 of the Hague -Regulations should no longer be limited to the “needs of the occupying -forces” but may also be used in the “general interest of the German war -effort”; and that requisitioned articles may be used not only in the -territory in which they were obtained but also “in other territories in -the sphere of the occupying power.” (_ECH-10_) - -In April 1941, Goering ordered the removal of church bells in France -“which represent the most important and last reserve of copper and tin,” -stressing that “no church bells would be removed in Germany before all -bells had been removed in France” (_EC-323_). In 1943, after the removal -of church bells from the other occupied countries and even from the -Reich, Hitler ordered their removal from Belgium (_ECH-11_). The -Belgians protested, invoking the Hague Regulations, and refused an offer -to buy; thereupon the Germans requisitioned the bells against receipt. -(_ECH-11_) - -By circular letter, dated 23 June 1943, Speer ordered that scientific -instruments and apparatus be taken out of the laboratories and research -institutes in the occupied Western countries, directing that -applications for instruments be made through channels and that the -requisitions be made by the Military Government. (_ECH-14_) - -In many cases, representatives of German scientific institutions sought -to acquire scientific instruments in order to modernize their own -installations, appearing in Army uniforms to give the impression that -the requisition was a military measure (_ECH-15_). The Military -Government of Belgium decided that Articles 52 and 56 of the Hague -Regulations were inapplicable because the Allies had destroyed a number -of German scientific installations in the Reich through bombing, which -therefore had to be replaced from the occupied territories, and that “in -a total war, no consideration could be given to the cited articles of -the Hague Regulations”. (_ECH-16_) - -As part of the design to supply the armament industry in Germany with -material from the occupied Western territories, a program for the -removal of copper and lead from transmission installations of power -distribution plants in the occupied Western countries was instituted by -a decree of Speer dated 31 May, 1943 (_EC-101_). The plan contemplated -from the outset that the transmission of facilities would not be -restored (as required by the second paragraph of Article 53 of the Hague -Regulations) but that an equivalent amount of metal would be returned -after the war. (_EC-101_) - -(2) _The Nazis purchased war materials and consumer goods_ _in the -regular and black markets for shipment to the Reich, all with funds -exacted from the occupied countries._ Following the initial “stripping” -phase of the occupation, the Nazis promptly instituted an extensive -“buying-out” program (_061-PS_) with the object of procuring not merely -materials required for the German war effort, but to obtain also -consumer goods, including luxury items, for the civilian population of -Germany (_EC-485_). - -No limitations, legal or moral, were observed in the execution of this -program. Supplies which could not be obtained through normal channels -were purchased on the black market. The disastrous effects of -competition among various German agents led the central occupational -authorities in Belgium, France, and Holland to take over black market -operation directly (_1765-PS_). On 13 June 1942, by order of Goering, -Col. Veltjens was appointed to direct black market purchases in all -occupied territories and a new agency, the so-called UEWA, was placed at -his disposal. (_ECH-7_) - -The actual purchases were made by several corporations, including -Pimetex, an agency of the Speer Ministry of Armament and Munitions. The -goods were distributed through Roges according to directives of the -Central Planning Board (Speer, Koerner, Milch) and in appropriate cases -by the German Ministry of Economics and the _Reichsstellen_ (_ECH-7_). -Black market operations were finally abolished by order of Goering dated -2 April, 1943, confirmed in Belgium by circular of the Military -Commander of 19 June, 1943. (_ECH-9_) - -Certain of the purchases made through the black market while under the -direction of Col. Veltjens are of special interest: - - _Christmas Drive._ On 22 September 1942, Goering ordered a - special drive in the Western occupied countries to purchase - presents for the civil population in Germany for the coming - Christmas. The Roges Company effected the distribution of the - articles in Germany. - - _Special Drive WABO._ This drive was pursuant to Hitler’s order - to Speer to procure Christmas packages for the soldiers. The O. - Todt Cantine accepted offers of sale on the black market and - Pimetex did the buying. - - _Special Drive LOWA_ (Degenkolb locomotive program). The - purchase were made by Pimetex. (_ECH-7_) - -As of 15 January 1943, black market purchases totaled approximately -1,100,000,000 RM, including: - - RM 929,100,000 in France. - - RM 103,881,929 in Belgium, and - - RM 73,685,162.64 in Holland. (_1765-PS_) - -Payment in France was made out of occupation funds, in Belgium out of -such funds and through the clearing, and in Holland through “normal bank -transactions” (_1765-PS_; _ECR-132_). As appears very clearly from the -report of Col. Veltjens of 15 January, 1943, substantially all the goods -so purchased were shipped to the Reich. (_1765-PS_) - -(3) _The Nazi conspirators compelled the nationals of the occupied -countries to produce and distribute materials and equipment in -accordance with the German general war requirements._ The “stripping” -and “buying-out” phases of the Nazi spoliation were both gradually -superseded by a regulated program for the utilization of the industrial -plant of the occupied areas and the transfer of orders (subcontracting) -to local concerns. The Nazi conspirators established comprehensive -rationing controls under which essential raw materials were made -available only to those who produced in the German interest; those -reluctant to produce on German order were placed under compulsory -administration. “This,” Keitel noted in commenting on the controls -established in France, “is * * * booty of the victor”. (_EC-613_) - - _Belgium_ - -The means employed in Belgium were typical. Production quotas for coal, -iron and steel, textiles and leather, and other products were fixed by -the Ministry of Economics and its _Reichsstellen_, in some cases after -consultation with the Reich Minister (Funk). (_ECH-2_) - -Comprehensive production controls were established in Belgium to assure -the fulfillment of these quotas. Pursuant to plans developed in advance -of the invasion (_EC-155_), a decree was issued by the Military -Commander on 27 May, 1940, creating so-called “Goods Offices,” endowed -with authority to issue general and special orders to Belgian firms -requiring production of designated products, and the sale thereof to -designated buyers, and with the further power to prohibit production or -sale without license (_3604-PS_). By decree of the Military Commander of -29 April, 1941, the appointment of a commissar to direct operations of -private plants was authorized. (_3610-PS_) - -The German Goods Offices (_ECH-3_) were transferred to similar units -established by Belgian decree of 3 September, 1940. (Whether this decree -was issued on German order or suggestion does not appear.) The Germans -supervised the Belgian Goods Offices and adopted as German orders both -the Belgian decree establishing the Offices and the orders issued -thereunder, and prescribed punishment by fine and imprisonment for -violations. (_3609-PS_) - -For the first two years of the occupation, German control was exercised -mainly through prohibitions and restrictions, that is, by a priority -system (_ECH-4_), although even then important sectors of the Belgian -economy, notably textiles and leather products, were controlled by -“positive” orders directing the amount in kind to be produced and the -persons to whom distribution must be made (_ECH-4_; _ECH-2_). During -this period the Military Commander issued instructions to the Goods -Offices through “command channels,” that is, through the Belgian -Minister of Economics. (_ECH-3_) - -On 6 August, 1942, the Military Commander, however, published a decree -reaffirming explicitly the power to compel production of designated -articles (_3612-PS_), a signal for the introduction of “positive” -controls. In 1943, on instructions from the Reich Ministry of Economics, -German representatives selected from the _Reichsstellen_ were attached -directly to the Belgian Goods Offices (_ECH-3_). At the end of 1943, the -office of the “Ruestungsobmann” of the Speer Ministry for Armaments and -War Production began issuing “positive orders” for production to -individual concerns directly, without clearing with the Goods Offices, -pursuant to decree of the Minister for Armaments and War Production -(Speer). (_ECH-3_) - -Production facilities in Belgium which were not deemed to serve the -German interest were shut down. By order of 30 March 1942, the Military -Commander prohibited the enlargement of existing plants and the -construction of new ones without German authorization, and provided for -the closing down of factories at his discretion (_3616-PS_). In the iron -and metal industry alone at least 400 plants “not important for the war -effort” had been closed down by 15 April 1943 (_EC-335_). By the end of -the occupation, 1360 put of a total of 2164 plants in the textile -industry had been closed down. (_ECH-19_) - - _France and Holland_ - -Substantially the same system was put into effect in France and Holland. -German Goods Offices were established in Occupied France at the same -time as in Belgium (_3604-PS_). These were subsequently abolished in -November, 1940, however, when the Vichy Government, at the “suggestion” -of the Nazis, created raw material rationing boards, on which delegates -of the German Military Administration served as technical advisers -(_EC-613_; _EC-616_). In the Netherlands, controls were exercised by the -local German Armament Inspectorate (_EC-471_; _EC-472-A_), who, it is -believed, made use of the rationing boards set up in Holland before the -outbreak of war. - -C. _The Nazi Conspirators Acquired Ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and -French Participations in European Industries by Means of Governmental -Pressure and Through the Use of Funds Unlawfully Exacted from the -Occupied Countries and Their Nationals._ - -The Nazi conspirators were not content with securing for Germany the -supplies necessary for the period of the war. They aimed at obtaining -permanent ownership and domination of European industry to the fullest -extent possible, and embarked on a program to that end even during the -progress of the war. - -(1) _The Nazi conspirators established a program to acquire for German -interests ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French participations during -the war._ On 23 May 1940, recommendation was made that it would be -opportune to secure all Dutch and Belgian stocks “in order, especially -in the case of holding companies, to win influence * * * over the -controlled companies” (_EC-41_). The memorandum recommended the taking -possession of stocks of the dominated companies located in foreign -countries and influencing the decisions of members of holding companies -located in Holland and Belgium or of other owners of such stock. Because -of the provisions of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations prohibiting -confiscation of private property, it was deemed more advisable to -influence members of holding companies through careful guiding than -through plain force. (_EC-41_) - -At a meeting held in the Reich Ministry of Economics on 3 June 1940 on -the subject of “Belgian and Dutch capital shares in southeastern -European countries,” it was decided that regulations should be issued -immediately by the Military Commander for Belgium prohibiting the -destruction, transfer, or disposition of any bonds or stocks of these -countries, and that registration should be required of owners and -trustees. (_1445-PS_) - -In a memorandum of 2 August 1940 Goering declared that the goal of the -Germans’ economic policy was the “increase of German influence with -foreign enterprises,” that it was “necessary already now that any -opportunity is used to make it possible for the German economy to start -the penetration even during the war of the interesting objects of the -economy of the occupied countries,” and directed that the transfer of -capital from Germany to the occupied countries be facilitated to make -possible the immediate purchase of enterprises in the occupied -countries. (_EC-137_) - -At a meeting at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 8 August 1940 on the -subject of “Acquisition of shares of important foreign enterprises in -southeastern Europe,” Dr. Schlotterer of the Reich Ministry of Economics -commented that “private economical penetration of the Southeast area by -German influence is desirable, likewise the supplanting of British and -French interests in that territory” (_EC-43_). The group present, -including representatives of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the -Reichsbank, agreed that “attempts should be made immediately to acquire -shares” and that “in doing so the tendency should be preserved to -present a bill for the shares at the peace conference.” It was further -agreed that “it should be attempted if possible to transfer the shares -into private hands” but that “in order to make the right selection it -appears necessary to introduce an intermediary stage” in which “first of -all, enterprises should be taken over through banks, thereupon the -plants should be managed as a matter of trusteeship for the Reich with -the aim that the Reich (Reich Marshal Goering)” undertake handing them -over to private industry. (_EC-43_) - -(2) _The Nazi conspirators carried out this program by compulsory sale -where necessary and by purchases financed out of occupation charges and -under clearing agreements with the occupied countries._ - - _Belgium_ - -Immediate steps were taken to implement these measures in Belgium. The -annual report of the Commissar at the National Bank from May 1940-41 -states: - - “According to the directions of the Reichsmarshal Goering as - early as September 1940 the first measures for a closer - formation of capital ties between the Belgian and German economy - were taken. Two different procedures were concerned here: - - “1. Direct negotiations between German industrialists and - Belgian industrialists, for the purpose of obtaining - constructive participations in important Belgian enterprises - which offer the basis for collaboration between the two - economies even after the war. Furthermore, it is desired to - transfer to German hands important Belgian participations in - foreign enterprises whose administration is located in Belgium, - particularly so far as enterprises are concerned which are - located in the Balkans and in which a general German interest - exists. - - “2. Ties which result from purchases of stock by German parties - on the Belgian stock markets. For this purpose the Reich - Economic Minister has given general permission to 32 German - banks to obtain participation rights, particularly stocks, in a - limited quantity in Belgium. Till now use has been made of this - permission in the amount of about 25 million RM, to which can be - added an additional 10 million RM for the procurement of Belgian - participations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and the former Poland.” - (_ECR-24_) - -In his report for November 1940 the Military Commander for Belgium -stated: - - “A certain readiness exists on the part of the Belgians to give - up investments in stocks in such countries which, at the present - time, are being ruled militarily or economically by Germany. - Among the important business deals of this kind which have been - concluded should be mentioned the taking over by the - _Kreditanstalt, Wien_ (Credit Institute, Vienna) of an essential - interest in the _Allgemeiner Jugoslawischer Bankverein_ (General - Yugoslav Bank Association) from the _Societé Generale_ (capital - approximately 1 million RM) and the taking over by the _Deutsche - Bank_ of the overwhelming majority [translator’s note: of - shares] of the _Banca Commerciala Romana_ from the _Societé - Generale_ (capital approximately 2 million RM). The _Deutsche - Bank_ also succeeded in acquiring shares of the _Kreditanstalt, - Wien_, of approximately 800,000 RM nominally from the _Societé - Generale_ and from one of its subsidiaries. Negotiations between - the _Deutsche Bank_ and the _Societé Generale_ on the transfer - of approximately 25% of the capital of the _Banque Generale du - Luxembourg_ are about to be concluded. Through this deal the - _Deutsche Bank_ together with the other German groups obtains - the absolute majority of the Luxembourger Bank (approximately - 70% of the shares). The _Deutsche Bank_ gets the right to - acquire another 25% of the shares which for the time being, - remained with the _Societé Generale_.” (_EC-34_) - -While the Military Commander of Belgium may have given some assurance -that the owners would not be compelled to sell (_ECH-22_), in at least -one instance, purchase could be effected only by military order -(_EC-335_). In this instance the procurement for the Main Branch of -Trustees East of shares of the Belgian “Trust Metallurgique” in -electricity and road enterprises of East Silesia and the General -Government, as well as purchase of shares in the iron works Ostrovica -for the Reichswerk Hermann Goering had “to be done, at the request of -the Reich Ministry for Economics, forcibly, as an agreement on a -financial basis could not be obtained.” (_EC-335_) - -The German acquisition of Belgian stock participations was financed -through the Belgium-German clearing. The Belgian clearing balances of 20 -March 1940 included an item of 296 millions bfrs., which “is explained -by out-payment of large clearing transfers to purchase Belgian capital -participations in Balkan enterprises” (_ECR-14_). Increasing transfers -resulting from the German capital penetration program precipitated a -controversy with the Emission Bank, which was resolved by the -Commissar’s issuance of an order requiring the bank to make payment -(_ECR-24_). As a sequel, “capital” payments were separated from those -for “goods and services” and financed by a separate “capital” clearing -agreement covering purchases of securities and other “capital” -transactions (_ECR-24_). The Belgian clearing “credit” under the capital -clearing, as of 31 July 1943, amounted to 1,071,000,000 bfrs -(_ECR-173_). As shown below, (see _infra_, D, 2) the Belgian credit -under the capital clearing traffic represents a forced loan, exacted for -a purpose not even remotely related to the needs of the occupation army. - - _France and Holland_ - -The limited evidence, in the presently available German documents -indicates that similar methods were employed in French and Dutch -participations. The procedure followed in the Netherlands is indicated -below in the discussion of the removal of restrictions on the free -transfer of Reichsmarks in that country. (See _infra_, D, 5.) In France, -participations of a value of 121,000,000 RM were purchased for German -interests, paid for in part out of occupation funds and in part through -the clearing. (_1991-PS_) - -D. _The Nazi Conspirators Compelled the Occupied Countries and Their -Nationals to Furnish the Monetary Requirements for the German -Exploitation, by Means of Occupation Levies, Forced Loans, and the -Requisition of Gold and Foreign Exchange in Amounts Far in Excess of the -Needs of the Occupation Armies._ - -Except for the early period of the occupation, during which -_Reichskreditkassen_ certificates were issued to finance the needs of -the occupation troops (Lemkin, _Axis Rule In Occupied Europe_, p. 329), -the Nazis obtained the necessary local currency through the levy of -excessive occupation charges, the imposition of clearing arrangements -under which the local central banks were compelled to finance exports to -the Reich, and by requisition of gold and foreign exchange. - -(1) _The Nazi conspirators exacted excessive occupation charges from the -conquered countries._ - - _Belgium_ - -The Nazi conspirators demanded from Belgium both “internal occupation -costs” and “external occupation costs” (_ECR-32_). The former was -defined as “those sums which are gotten out of the country to finance -the needs of the German military formations located in the country” -(_ECR-32_). The term “external occupation costs” was used -interchangeably with the title “antibolshevistic contribution” -(_EC-401_). Under whatever theory, the exaction of occupation charges -was made “to the limit of capacity”. (_ECR-59_) - -Throughout the period of German occupation, a substantial part of the -contribution charges obtained from Belgium was used as a matter of -regular practice “not for occupation cost purposes” (_ECR-166_; -_ECR-155-A_; _ECR-35_), including: - -(_a_) Exports to Germany, Holland, and France (_ECR-89_; _ECR-104_). - -(_b_) Exchange for Belgian francs of RKK certificates, a “not -inconsiderable part” of which did “not have the least thing to do with -occupation costs” (_ECR-39_; _ECR-142_). - -(_c_) “Political purposes (that is, SS, Propaganda, Hitler Youth)” -(_ECR-106_). - -(_d_) Purchases in the “black market” (_ECR-106_), many of them destined -for export. (See _supra_, B, (2).) - -(_e_) General war expenses, including the supply of troops based in -Belgium for military operations against England (_ECH-5_); the -Commander-in-Chief of the Army rejected a recommendation of the Military -Commander that a distinction be drawn between occupation troops and -those for military operations (_ECH-5_). - -Notwithstanding the extensive use of occupation levies for -non-occupation purposes, the contributions exacted from Belgium - - “were not only sufficient to cover the needs of the _Wehrmacht_ - * * * but also made it possible * * * to fund a cash reserve - which reached at certain times about 2,500,000,000 bfrs”. - (_ECH-5_) - - _France_ - -The occupation cost accounts of the _Reichskreditkasse_ in Paris -disclose on their face that a large part of the occupation funds was -obtained and used for nonoccupational purposes. Two sets of occupation -cost accounts, were maintained: Account A, into which payments were made -on behalf of various Reichs ministeries and agencies, and for specified -purposes; and Account B, into which payments were made for disposal for -the _Wehrmacht_ (_3615-PS_). The funds in Account A were used for -obviously nonoccupational purposes, as follows: - - _June 1940 to end - 1943_ - A I. Reich Minister for Economic Affairs - (primarily for the buying agency, - “Roges,” also for the purchase of - securities and devisen) RM 1,518,000,000 - A II. Foreign Office (for propaganda - purposes in France) 27,000,000 - A III. Payment of support to dependents of - laborers recruited in France for - work in Germany 1,500,000 - A IV. Reich Minister for Transportation - (purchase of securities) 2,500,000 - A V. Paris Agency of the - _Reichstierstelle_ (Reich Agency - for Animals)—imports of meat and - meat products 19,000,000 - A VI. Exchange by the Bank of France of - RM notes for persons evacuated - from Alsace-Lorraine 900,000 - A VII. Financing purchases of raw sugar in - North France by sugar refinery in - South Germany 1,285,000 - A VIII. Compensation for war damage to - _Reichsdeutsche_ and - _Volkdeutsche_ in France 8,500,000 - A IX. Sale of French francs to the Reich - (Commodity imports into - Alsace-Lorraine) 66,000,000 - A X. Reich Minister of Education - (Purchases for libraries in the - Reich of books destroyed in air - raids) 1,000,000 - (_3615-PS_) - -The available records do not disclose the full extent to which the -_Wehrmacht_ used the funds at its disposal in Account B for -nonoccupational purposes. It is certain, however, that large sums were -expended for such purposes. Thus, a communication of the OKW to the -Foreign Office of 6 November 1942, explaining the decrease in reserve -for Account B, states: - - “In addition, payments to a considerable extent had to be made - from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted to meet - the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed in - France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was - approximately 3 bill. RM. The reason for the decrease appears - from the following compilation: - - _Million - RM._ - _a._ For procurement of goods exported from France during - the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct. 1942 an estimated 10 × 90 mill. - RM 900 - _b._ To Roges Raw Material Trading Company Ltd. for - purchases on black market 700 - _c._ For procurement of foreign bills by the Navy (the - purchase of foreign bills with French francs was necessary - to buy and repair merchant ships in Spanish harbors. These - merchant ships are to serve for supplying Rommel’s Panzer - army in Africa) 40 - _d._ Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account Syria) 4 - _e._ Allotments in favor of families of French workersw - orking in Germany 1.5 - _f._ Special commissioner Rumania 1.3 - _g._ Costs of building completions for directors of French - powder factories 0.2 - ——— - 1,647 - - Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation - cost funds amounting to 3,000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is - primarily due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the - occupation.” (_1741-PS_) - - _Holland_ - -Occupation charges were fixed at about 100,000,000 gulden a month -(_ECR-174_; _EC-86_). (100 RM = 75 gulden, approximately (_EC-468_)). - -Expenditures were divided between “occupation” purposes and -“nonoccupation” purposes, according to whether “the products purchased -or produced on orders of the armed forces of the Netherlands remain in -the Netherlands (occupation cost) or leave the Netherlands -(nonoccupation cost)” (_ECR-174_). During the 20-month period from March -1941 to October 1942, inclusive (the only period for which figures are -available), out of the total occupation charges of 1,545,500,000 gulden, -433,800,000 gulden were expended for “nonoccupation” purposes -(_ECR-175-193_). A large part of the “pure” occupation expenditure, -moreover, was for general war expenses, including the construction of -fortifications and airfields, and the letting of shipbuilding contracts. -(_ECR-180, 181, 183, 187, 191_) - -In theory, only the “occupation” costs were supposed to be charged to -the Netherlands (_ECR-174_); until April 1941, the “nonoccupation” -expenditures were returned to the Military Commander in the Netherlands -(_ECR-175_). The claim of the Netherlands to the sums “returned,” -however, was rejected. Moreover, as appears from the above cited reports -(_ECR-175-193_), nonoccupation expenditure continued even after April -1941, when reimbursements ceased. (_ECR-176_) - -During the first year of the occupation Germany exacted an additional -levy from the Netherlands under the heading of “external occupation -costs,” amounting to 500,000,000 RM (_ECR-194_). Of this sum, -100,000,000 RM was paid in gold; the remainder was paid by a transfer of -the clearing balance of the Netherlands Bank at the _Verrechnungskasse_ -to the German Ministry of Finance, that is, was used to reduce a credit -which arose by reason of exports to the Reich. (_ECR-194_) - -In April 1942, “at the instigation of the Reich Commissioner -Seyss-Inquart,” the Netherlands began to pay a “voluntary contribution -to the war against Bolshevism” of 50,000,000 guilders per month, -retroactive to 1 July 1941, of which 10,000,000 per month was paid in -gold (_ECR-195_). By 31 March 1944, this “contribution” amounted to -2,150,000,000 RM. (_EC-86_) - -It is immaterial whether this “contribution” was made at the direction -of Seyss-Inquart or was in fact the “voluntary” act of the then -President of the Netherlands Bank and Treasurer in the Ministry of -Finance, Van Tonningen. Van Tonningen was appointed by Seyss-Inquart and -acted in the German interest. His acts, like that of civilian -administrators in occupied territories generally, must be charged to the -occupant. (See _infra_, _Conclusion_.) The spirit in which he discharged -his duties is sympathetically described by the German Commissar at the -Netherlands Bank as follows: - - “The new President of the Netherlands Bank, Mr. Rost Van - Tonningen, is, in contrast to a large part of the leadership, - penetrated in his movements and his official acts by the greater - German thought, and convinced of the necessity of the creation - of a greater European economic space. This ideological attitude - in itself gives him the correct position on financial and - monetary policy questions for his country in relation to the - greater German economic space. Furthermore, it makes easier - cooperation with my office, a fact which deserves special - mention in consideration of the frequently observed passive - conduct of the Netherlands agencies before the entrance into - office of the new President. I consider as a fortunate solution - the fact that the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Dutch Areas - has also entrusted Mr. Rost Van Tonningen with the Treasury of - the Ministry of Finance (_Schatzamt des Finanzministeriums_). - Mr. Rost Van Tonningen took over this office at the end of the - month of April. Thus there is a guarantee that the financial and - monetary policy of the country will be conducted according to - unified points of view.” (_ECR-196_) - -(2) _The Nazi conspirators financed exports from the occupied countries -to Germany by means of forced loans under the guise of clearing -agreements._ - - _Belgium_ - -The principle of the clearing system is as follows: - -The importer makes a deposit of the purchase price in his own currency -at the national clearing agency of his country, which places the same -amount to the credit of the clearing agency of the exporting country. -The latter institution then pays the exporter in his own currency. Thus -if trade between two countries is unequal the clearing agency of one -acquires a claim against the agency of the other which, however, is -satisfied only when a shift in the balance of trade gives rise to an -offsetting claim. - -In the order establishing the German-Belgium clearing, the Belgium -clearing agency was the National Bank of Belgium (_3608-PS_). The -administration of the clearing was shortly thereafter transferred to -Emission Bank, an organization originally incorporated by Belgian -interests pursuant to order of the Military Commander of 27 June 1940 -(_ECR-24_). The change was one in name only, however, since at this time -the management of the two banks was substantially identical and the -Emission Bank obtained its currency by loan from the National Bank. The -Emission Bank was, by its charter terms, subject to orders of the -Commissar at the National Bank; the Commissar obtained the same powers -over the National Bank by German order of 16 December 1940. (_ECR-24_) - -The Belgian total “credit” under the clearing, as of 31 July 1944, -amounted to 60,837,000,000 bfrs = 4,867,000,000 RM, of which -54,993,000,000 bfrs = 4,399,000,000 RM arose from the Belgian-German -clearing for goods and services. (_ECR-173_) - -The continued increase in the Belgian “credit” was due mainly to “the -increasing Belgian export to Germany for which there are only small -imports from Germany on the other side of the account.” (_ECR-149_) - -The entire Belgian credit under the clearing constitutes a forced loan, -largely for nonoccupation purposes: - -(_a_) The Belgian-German clearing was established by circular of the -Reichs Minister of Economics, 4 July 1940 (_ECH-6_), which was published -to the Belgians by proclamation of the Military Commander of 10 July -1940 (_EC-604_; _3608-PS_). - -(_b_) “Since it was to be foreseen that as the result of the increased -deliveries from Belgium to the Reich, which were not matched by opposite -accounts, particularly in the early period, the clearing status would -develop to the favor of the Emission Bank” (_ECR-24_), an agreement was -signed by the Emission Bank and the German Reichsbank on 16/17 August -1940 under which each undertook to pay out clearing transfers -immediately (_ECR-24_; _ECH-5_). - -(_c_) This agreement did not prescribe what must be financed through the -clearing; it merely provided for immediate payment of claim arising -thereunder without waiting until the account should be balanced by -equalizing of imports and exports. As the Military Commander stated, the -German-Belgian clearing was “not regulated by an agreement, but has been -regulated unilaterally by my proclamation of 10 July 1940” (_EC-604_). -The Military Commander made clear the absolute power asserted by the -German authorities over the Belgian Note Banks (as the Germans described -the Emission and National Banks). He stated: - - “* * * The claim made to the Commissar that the Emission Bank is - entitled to ask in every case for detailed explanation of - compensation payments coming from Germany is incorrect. The - clearing activities between Germany and Belgium are not - regulated by an agreement but have been regulated unilaterally - by my proclamation on July 10, 1940 and are not subject to any - Belgian control. Inter-alia the transfer of all payments which - have been specially authorized by the Reich Ministry of Economy - has been expressly permitted * * *.” (_EC-604_) - -(_d_) The Commissar freely invoked his directive power over the Note -Banks. - - 1. When, in April 1941, the clearing balance of the Emission - Bank exceeded 1,500,000 bfrs the Emission Bank refused to pay - out several large sums arising by virtue of German-Belgian - “capital” transactions. Thereupon, the Commissar issued an order - directing the bank to make the payment. (_ECR-24_) - - 2. In December 1941, the Emission Bank refused to pay out a sum - of 43,256,000 RM transferred from Paris. The Commissar thereupon - issued an order directing the bank to do so. (_ECR-172_) - - 3. In October 1942, the Emission Bank refused to pay out certain - amounts expended for purchases on the Belgian black market. The - military administrator, however, “held down the increasing - resistance of the Note Banks which culminated at the end of - October of this year in a public threat of resignation by the - Governor of the National Bank, by the heaviest pressure, and - forced the Note Banks, while emphasizing his willingness to - negotiate on certain Belgian proposals, again to take up the - global clearing transfers for German procurement agencies which - were cut off for a period” (_ECR-132_). The nature of this - pressure is explicitly shown in the following communication from - the Commissar to the President of the Emission Bank dated 29 - October 1942: - - “The Military Commander has ordered me to inform you of the - following: - - “The requested extension of time for the resumption of business - relations with the Armed Forces Clearing Institute - (_Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse_) and for the payment of the - arrears of RM 60 million have been denied. An official will - determine tomorrow at 10 a. m. whether payment has been made. - - “Severest measures against you and all responsible parties must - be expected in case of failure to pay. - - “If acts of sabotage occur on the equipment and the values of - the National Bank or the Emission Bank, you and the gentlemen - designated on the enclosed list will be held responsible - personally and your property will be seized. Your liability is a - joint one.” (_EC-605_) - - _France_ - -The “credit” balance of the Bank of France under the Franco-German -clearing established on 14 November 1940 amounted to 4,400,000,000 RM as -of September 1943 (_3615-PS_). The clearing arrangement was designed, of -course, principally for the financing of exports, that is, for purposes -not related to the needs of the occupation army. (_EC-619_) - -Coercion in the establishment of the Franco-German clearing is readily -demonstrable. Extreme pressure was brought to bear, particularly in -regard to the rate of exchange established in the agreement, by -threatening to cut off communications between “occupied” and -“nonoccupied” zones in France (_3602-PS_; _3603-PS_), a step which would -have destroyed the last vestige of economic order in France. The harsh -terms of the agreement, which required the Bank of France to make -immediate payment for exports to Germany regardless of the balance of -trade, fixed the rate of exchange at 20 francs to the mark (as compared -to 10 to 1 before the war), and gave Germany a unilateral option to -cancel at any time, forcibly suggest that the agreement would not -voluntarily have been accepted. (_EC-619_) - - _Holland_ - -The clearing system between Holland and Germany was of short duration, -being cancelled effective 1 April 1941, when free transfer of -Reichsmarks to Holland was introduced. (See _infra_, D, (5).) It is -therefore not deemed of sufficient importance to warrant discussion at -this point. - -(3) _The Nazi conspirators unlawfully took over the gold reserve of the -National Bank of Belgium and the Netherlands Bank in the interest of the -German general war effort._ - - _Belgium_ - -The gold of the National Bank, deposited with the Bank of France and -transferred to Dakar, was brought to Berlin pursuant to German-French -“agreement” in the amount of 545,700,000 RM (_ECR-149_), and there -deposited with the Reichsbank in Berlin (_ECR-24_). Because of the “high -demands on gold and foreign exchange” which led to a “considerable -straining of the reserves” (_EC-401_), the “Reich Government felt itself -required to lay claim to the gold of the National Bank for the Reich” -(_ECR-149_). A decision to proceed by requisitioning under paragraph 52 -of the Hague Regulations (_EC-401_) was not executed, apparently because -of fears on the part of the Reichsbank that title thus acquired would -not be recognized (_ECR-115_). On order of Goering (_ECH-5, part 9, -Annex XIII_), the gold was then “requisitioned on 19 September 1942 by -the Oberpraesident of the Province of Mark Brandenburg for the Deputy of -the Four-Year Plan, on the basis of the Reich Contribution Law -(_Reichsleistungsgesetz_) of 1.IX.1939 (Sec. 15, paragraph 1, No. 5, and -Sec. 2a)” (_ECR-149_). - - _Holland_ - -As shown above, part of the Dutch “voluntary” contribution to the “war -against Bolshevism” was paid in gold. The gold was, in fact, taken from -the Netherlands Bank. (_EC-401_) - -(4) _The Nazi conspirators unlawfully compelled the nationals of the -occupied countries to surrender and offer for sale all precious metals -and foreign exchange to the local central banks, which delivered them to -the German Reichsbank._ - - _Belgium_ - -By German decree of 17 June 1940 and administrative orders issued -pursuant thereto the Belgians were required to surrender gold and -foreign exchange notes to the Emission Bank, which in turn, delivered -the loot to the Reichsbank (_ECR-24_). - -By May 1943, the Reichsbank had acquired in this fashion gold and -foreign exchange of the value of 23,400,000 RM. (_ECR-149_) - - _Holland_ - -Gold and foreign exchange delivered by the Netherlands Bank to the -Reichsbank “on the basis of the direction of the Reichsmarshal” -(Goering) amounted to 74,000,000 RM through November 1940. (_EC-465_) - - _France_ - -It is believed that the same practice was followed in France, but -evidence as to details has not been found in the German documents -presently available. - -(5) _The Nazi conspirators used German Reichsmarks as currency in the -Netherlands, for purposes unrelated to the needs of the occupational -troops, which currency they caused to be freely exchanged for gulden by -the Netherlands Bank._ The Nazi conspirators, animated in part by the -view that the Netherlands were “akin in blood to the German nation” -(_3613-PS_), sought to promote a “mutual interpenetration of the German -and Netherlands economies” through the acquisition by Germans of Dutch -participations (_EC-468_) and Dutch investment in German securities. -(_ECR-174_) - -To this end, restrictions on the free transfer of Reichsmark and gulden -across the German-Dutch border were removed. Conversations between the -Reich Economics and Finance Ministers in October 1940 led to the first -step in this direction, the issuance by the Economics Minister of a -Circular (_Runderlass_)—No. 89/40—which produced substantial changes -in the foreign exchange control along the German-Dutch borders -(_EC-468_). This provided, _inter-alia_, that RM 1,000 or its equivalent -in gulden could be taken across the German-Dutch border by travelers or -in border trade without permit, and permitted Germans to transfer to -Holland up to 5,000 RM per person per month for any purpose except -purchase of goods without any permission (_EC-468_). - -These relaxations were made effective in Holland by free exchange of -Reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank, introduced “on the -initiative” of the Commissar, and by enforced acceptance of Reichsmark -currency by the Dutch business population. (_EC-468_) - -The Reichsmarks thus made available in the Netherlands were mainly used -to purchase Dutch securities on the stock exchange (_EC-468_). -Permission to make such purchases was extended to a large number of -German banks by the German Ministry of Economics. The transfers were -made with “reluctance” by the Dutch, in connection with which the Reich -Commissar at the Netherlands Bank observed, “it may be pointed out with -some justification that an out-payment of gulden made against a -Reichsmark credit, which can only result through the burdening of the -Netherlands State credit, represents no genuine transfer” (_EC-468_). - -Notwithstanding the objections of the then Commissar at the Netherlands -Bank (_EC-468_), circular 87/40 was soon followed by No. 29/41 of 31 -March 1941, which abolished almost completely all restrictions on the -free use of the Reichsmark in Holland (_ECR-197_). Circular 29/41 -provided that all foreign exchange transactions between Germany and the -Netherlands were freed of control, the only important exception being -that German investments of more than 100,000 gulden in Holland required -permission of the Reichskommissar in the Netherlands. The clearing -agreement was abolished, and payments between Germany and the -Netherlands were permitted by simple bank checks, drafts, or postal -money orders. A simultaneous order by the Reich Commissar for the -Occupied Netherlands Areas lifted all restrictions set by Netherlands -foreign exchange law on such transactions (_ECR-197_). - -After this “introduction of free payments traffic” or “removal of the -foreign exchange frontiers,” payments for exports from Holland were made -in Germany “through the accounts of the banks, mainly through the -account of the Netherlands Bank, which takes on the exchange into gulden -means of payment without further formalities.” (_ECR-174_) - -This exchange presumably merely continued the practice introduced -earlier at the “instigation” of Seyss-Inquart. At all events, the -President of the Bank, Van Tonningen, was a Nazi agent, and his acts may -be charged to the Nazi conspirators. - -The result of this radical step was this: - - “Ever since the introduction of free payments traffic the status - of the Netherlands Bank is mainly influenced by the taking up of - Reichsmarks. On 31 March 1941, the day before the introduction - of free payments traffic, the Netherlands Bank had a total stock - of about 83 million RM of Reichsmark credits, on 30 April 1941 - of about 213 million RM, and on 31 May 1941 of about 366 million - RM. Thus, in the two months after the removal of the foreign - exchange frontier, it has taken up about 283 million RM, the - gulden equivalent, at the rate of RM 132.7 equals florin 100, on - the basis of the transfer agreement with the Reichsbank.” - (_ECR-174_) - -Thus the Netherlands Bank was caused to pledge its credit (in the form -of Dutch currency) in exchange for a Reichsmark credit. In this manner -the Nazi conspirators were enabled to exact from the bank a loan -unlimited in quantity and beyond the bank’s control, by the simple -expedient of writing out a check in Germany. - -E. _Argument and Conclusion._ - -The acts of the Nazi conspirators as revealed by the evidence constitute -war crimes within the meaning of Article 6 (B) of the charter of the -International Military Tribunal. Two general observations should be made -at the outset. In the first place, the pertinent provisions of the Hague -Regulations (_3737-PS_) are controlling. The Germans entered into an -Armistice Agreement with only one of the countries under discussion -(France), and the Franco-German Armistice Agreement of 22 June 1940 -contains nothing which purports to confer on the occupant powers broader -than those which may be exercised under the Hague Regulations. Article 3 -of the Armistice reserves to Germany in the occupied zone “all the -rights of the occupying power.” No other provision is material here. The -language of Article 3 plainly does not purport to qualify in any way the -otherwise binding terms of the Hague Regulations. The German position -(_EC-113_) that “the rights of Article 3 are more extensive than the -rights of the occupation power in the Hague Regulations” and permitted -Germany to base thereon “all measures which are, according to her own -judgment, necessary for the continuation of the war against England,” is -therefore plainly untenable. - -Secondly, the collaboration of certain French, Dutch, and Belgian -officials is legally immaterial and does not serve to shield the Nazi -conspirators from responsibility for the acts done in the territory -under German control. Belgium, Holland, and a large part of France were -under German occupation throughout the period in question and, after 10 -November 1942, so-called Vichy France was overrun and occupied as well. -It is accepted doctrine that governmental authority is completely, -albeit temporarily, vested in the occupant during the period of its -control. Whether the occupant elects to employ the existing -administrative machinery and personnel or substitute its own, is solely -a question of political and administrative convenience; the choice is -without legal significance. The civil administration of an occupied -country, it may be confidently asserted, has no independent legal status -whatever. - -(1) _The acts of the Nazi conspirators as revealed by the evidence are -prohibited by the Hague Regulations._ - -(_a_) _The forcible removal of machinery, foodstuffs, and raw -materials._ It has been shown above that the Nazis forcibly removed -large quantities of machinery, foodstuffs, and raw materials to Germany, -including even church bells and the strategic metals contained in the -transmission systems of the occupied countries. Articles 52 and 53 of -the Hague Regulations (the only pertinent provisions) provide no basis -for such action. - -Article 52 of the Hague Regulations declares that requisitions in kind -and services shall not be demanded except for “the needs of the -occupation army,” a limitation deliberately substituted for the less -restrictive one of “military necessity” which had previously been -contained in the Brussels Declaration of 1874 (_Conference -Internationale de la Paix, La Haye_, 1899, Part I, p. 60; Part III, pp. -45, 181). It is settled that requisitions for export to the country of -the occupying power is violative of Article 52 (see Feilchenfeld, _The -International Law of Belligerent Occupation_, Washington, 1942, pars. -148-149, and cases cited). - -The argument, advanced by the Germans in defense of such requisitions -during the first World War (see Garner, _International Law and World -War_, Vol. II, p. 126, n.) and frequently again during the recent -conflict (_EC-344-7_; _ECH-16_), that the limitations of Article 52 may -be disregarded in case of military necessity, is not well founded. -Article 23g, which permits the destruction of private property when -“imperatively demanded by the necessities of war,” is included among the -provisions relating to the rights of belligerents in the conduct of -military operations, and has no relation to the powers of a belligerent -in an occupied area in which conflict has ceased (see Garner, _loc. cit. -supra_). The latter are governed, so far as material here, by Articles -42-56. - -Apart from Article 23g, there is no basis whatever for the German -position. The Hague Regulations are limitations on the powers which may -be exercised under the plea of military necessity (II, Oppenheim, -_International Law_, 6th Edition Revised, edited by Lauterpacht, p. 185, -n.1). An exception for cases of alleged military necessity, therefore, -cannot be implied. The deliberate substitution of the present -terminology in lieu of the vague limitations of “military necessity” as -contained in the Brussels Declaration of 1874, moreover, would seem to -remove all basis for a contrary construction. - -Article 53 provides no better support for the Nazis’ action. The second -paragraph, relating to private property, states: - - “All appliances, whether on land, on sea, or in the air, adapted - for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or - things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms - and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized - even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored - and compensation fixed when peace is made.” - -This Article, it may be conceded, authorizes not only the sequestration -but the use of all matters within its reach. The term “munitions of -war,” however, clearly refers only to chattels (Feilchenfeld, _supra_, -par. 351). It does not, therefore, include machinery affixed to the -realty. The German legal advisors uniformly so conceded during this war -(_EC-560_; _EC-84_; _EC-263_; _EC-344-7_). The suggestion that Article -53 is subject to an implied exception in the case of military necessity -(_EC-344-7_) is, for reasons noted above, untenable. It is equally clear -that the deliberate removal of the metal content of the transmission -systems in the occupied areas is without legal basis. Article 53 in -terms requires restoration when peace is made and, whatever exceptions -may be implied in case of munitions which are necessarily consumed by -use, no basis can be found for the deliberate destruction of -transmission facilities. - -The question as to the class of chattels included within the -deliberately general term “munitions of war” is not free from doubt. The -right of seizure is based on military necessity, namely, the danger of -leaving at large things which are peculiarly adapted to warlike purposes -(Spaight, _War Rights on Land_, p. 512). It should accordingly be -limited to those things which are “susceptible of direct military use” -(see British Manual of Military Law, 1929, Amendment No. 12, par. 415; -U. S. Army Basic Field Manual on Rules of Land Warfare, FM 27-10, 1940, -par. 332). Article 53, which contains no limitation restricting seizures -to the needs of the occupation army, would otherwise completely nullify -the deliberate limitations on the right of requisition imposed in -Article 52. In this view, raw materials and even semi-finished goods, -save perhaps such goods as are normally part of military equipment, -would seem outside the reach of Article 53. - -(_b_) _The control and direction of production and distribution in the -German interest._ The planned control and direction of the economy of -the occupied countries in the interest of the German war effort -constitute a violation of Article 52. This seems clearly true to the -extent that production and sale for export to Germany were ordered by -the _Ruestungsobmann_ pursuant to Speer’s directive late in 1943. It -would seem equally true of the earlier method of control by prohibitions -and restrictions. For the net effect of the priority system was to leave -no alternative to producing in the German interest save to cease -operations. And even this alternative was not available, since the power -to appoint a commissar in case of recalcitrant plants was expressly -reserved. - -Article 53, which is limited to chattels and has no relation to the -demanding of personal services in any event, provides not even a remote -basis for the imposition of the controls in question. - -In what has been said, it is not meant to be suggested that an occupant -is without power to institute a system of rationing for articles in -short supply with the aim of securing an equitable distribution among -the population of the occupied area. Such a measure is plainly related -to the promotion of economic order and there is nothing in the Hague -Regulations which restricts even requisition for the needs of the local -population. The Nazi controls, however, were exercised, not in the -interest of the local population, but to fulfill the general war -requirements of Germany, in the Reich as well as in the occupied area. - -(_c_) _Levy of occupation charges for purposes not related to the needs -of the occupation army._ Article 49 of the Hague Regulations limits the -levy of occupation charges to the “needs of the army or of the -administration of the territory in question.” The only purpose for which -such contributions may be levied (other than for the financing of the -costs of administration, a matter not material here), is to supply the -needs of the army of occupation (_Conference Internationale de la Paix, -La Haye_, 1899, Pt. I, p. 60; Feilchenfeld, _supra_, par. 167; Spaight, -_supra_, pp. 384-392). The power to levy contributions is reserved in -order to permit an equitable distribution among the entire community of -costs which, if supplies were requisitioned, would fall directly and -solely on the owners of the requisitioned property (Spaight, _supra_, -pp. 387-389). Accordingly, the levy of contributions to finance exports -or for other purposes unrelated to the needs of the army in the -territory in question would seem plainly forbidden (Feilchenfeld, -_supra_, par. 167; Spaight, _supra_, pp. 384-392). - -Moreover, as Article 49 refers to the occupation army only, the levy of -contributions to support the troops engaged in military operations -against an enemy located outside the boundaries of the occupied country -or to finance other general war expenses would seem prohibited. - -(_d_) _Forced loans._ Forced loans can be justified only as -contributions and are therefore subject to the same limitations -(Feilchenfeld, _supra_, par. 185). The forced loans under the -Belgian-German and Franco-German clearing arrangements, were executed -largely to finance exports to Germany, that is, for nonoccupation -purposes. - -(_e_) _The exchange of reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank._ -These transactions, whether viewed as resulting in a loan or merely in -an exchange, constitute a contribution of money for nonoccupation -purposes. It may be assumed that they were carried out “voluntarily” -while the Netherlands Bank was under the immediate direction of Rost Van -Tonningen. This circumstance is immaterial, however, since Van Tonningen -was a civil official appointed by Seyss-Inquart, and his authority, like -that of civilian officials in occupied areas generally, was derived -solely from that of the occupant. - -(_f_) _The taking over of gold of the National Bank of Belgium and the -Netherlands Bank._ That the gold of the National Bank of Belgium was -private property is not disputed; the Nazi conspirators proceeded on -this view in the original decision to requisition under Article 52 -(_EC-401, second enclosure_). Confiscation under Article 53, first -paragraph, therefore, was not open to the Nazi conspirators; so far as -appears they never considered such a step. - -It may be assumed for purposes of argument that gold is subject to -requisition under the Hague Regulations. Requisition may be made, -however, only for the needs of the occupation army. It cannot be -resorted to to relieve the “considerable straining of the reserves” of -Germany. - -The gold reserve of the Netherlands Bank, it is believed, is private -property, no less than that of the National Bank of Belgium. In this -view, the taking over of the gold of the Netherlands Bank was likewise -illegal. There is, of course, no basis in law for exacting a -contribution for the so-called “war against Bolshevism,” to use the -Nazis’ phrase. And, for the reasons indicated above, it is immaterial -whether these “contributions” were “voluntarily” made by Van Tonningen. - -(_g_) _The compulsory surrender of gold and foreign exchange._ The -requirement of surrender of gold and foreign exchange for ultimate -delivery to the Reichsbank amounts in substance to a requisition and -cannot be supported because obviously done solely to maintain the -reserves of foreign exchange for the total war effort, not for the needs -of the occupation army alone. - -(_h_) _The acquisition of business interests._ The Nazis’ acquisition of -Belgian, Dutch, and French participations was unlawful. That this is so -in the case of the sales ordered by the Ministry of Economics is clear -(_EC-43_). The conclusion should be the same even when sale was not -expressly ordered. These purchases were financed through the clearing -system (which, as shown above, constituted a forced loan) and out of -occupation cost funds. Since such expenditures bore no relation to the -needs of the occupation army or, indeed, served any purpose other than -to enrich the Nazi conspirators and their nominees, the Nazi program for -acquisition of participations was in plain violation of Article 49 of -the Hague Regulations. - -(2) _Such acts constitute “plunder of public or private property” within -the meaning of Article 6 (B) of the Charter of the International -Military Tribunal._ Save as they may be authorized by International Law -(and hence “consented” to by the occupied countries), the acts -complained of are of a character condemned by the criminal code of the -occupied countries and, indeed, of all civilized nations. Absent such -authority, the forcible permanent taking of money or other property -whether from Government agencies or private persons, constitutes larceny -or, as known in the international law of belligerent occupation, -“pillage” (Garner, _supra_, pp. 472-473). The question of which court or -courts may try and punish for the offense is one of jurisdiction only -(see Garner, _supra_, pp. 475-480) and has been resolved by the -Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal. - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GERMANIZATION AND - SPOLIATION - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6, especially 6 (b, │ │ - │ c). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, │ │ - │ Indictment Number 1, Sections III; │ │ 15, 43, - │ VIII (E, J). │ I │ 51 - │ │ │ - 3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the │ │ - │ Laws and Customs of War on Land, │ │ - │ Annex, Articles 49, 52, 53, 55. │ VI │598, 599 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was│ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg │ │ - │trial. A double asterisk (**) before a │ │ - │document number indicates that the │ │ - │document was referred to during the │ │ - │trial but was not formally received in │ │ - │evidence, for the reason given in │ │ - │parentheses following the description of│ │ - │the document. The USA series number, │ │ - │given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *061-PS │Secret Bormann letter, 11 January 1944, │ │ - │concerning large-scale organization for │ │ - │withdrawal of commodities from occupied │ │ - │territories for use of bombed-out │ │ - │population in Germany. (USA 692) │ III │ 105 - │ │ │ - *294-PS │Top secret memorandum signed by │ │ - │Brautigam, 25 October 1942, concerning │ │ - │conditions in Russia. (USA 185) │ III │ 242 - │ │ │ - *661-PS │Secret thesis from the Academy of German│ │ - │Law, January 1940, on Resettlement. (USA│ │ - │300) │ III │ 472 - │ │ │ - *686-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich │ │ - │Chancellor to strengthen German Folkdom,│ │ - │7 October 1939, signed by Hitler, │ │ - │Goering, Lammers and Keitel. (USA 305) │ III │ 496 - │ │ │ - *862-PS │Memorandum by General Friderici, │ │ - │Plenipotentiary of the Wehrmacht to the │ │ - │Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, │ │ - │initialled by Keitel, Jodl and │ │ - │Warlimont, 15 October 1940, concerning │ │ - │plan to Germanize Czechoslovakia. (USA │ │ - │313) │ III │ 618 - │ │ │ - *910-PS │Notes on Himmler’s plan for │ │ - │Germanization of Poland, 27 and 30 March│ │ - │1942, from the Main Office, Interior │ │ - │Administration, initialled “Dr. S. H.”. │ │ - │(USA 310) │ III │ 639 - │ │ │ - 997-PS │Top secret report by Seyss-Inquart │ │ - │concerning the situation in the │ │ - │Netherlands—Exploitation and │ │ - │Nazification in period 29 May to 19 July│ │ - │1940. │ III │ 641 - │ │ │ -*1029-PS │Paper entitled “Instructions for a Reich│ │ - │Commissar in the Baltic States”, 8 May │ │ - │1941, found in Rosenberg’s “Russia │ │ - │File”. (USA 145) │ III │ 690 - │ │ │ -*1058-PS │Excerpt from a speech, 20 June 1941, by │ │ - │Rosenberg before people most intimately │ │ - │concerned with Eastern Problem, found in│ │ - │his “Russia File”. (USA 147) │ III │ 716 - │ │ │ -*1352-PS │Reports concerning the confiscation of │ │ - │Polish agricultural properties, 16 and │ │ - │29 May 1940, signed Kusche. (USA 176) │ III │ 916 - │ │ │ - 1445-PS │Report on conference at Ministry of │ │ - │Economics regarding use of Belgian and │ │ - │Dutch capital investments in │ │ - │southeastern European enterprises, 15 │ │ - │June 1940. │ IV │ 20 - │ │ │ -*1456-PS │Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel │ │ - │consulted about resources of USSR. (USA │ │ - │148) │ IV │ 21 - │ │ │ - 1741-PS │Collection of documents relating to the │ │ - │French Armistice. │ IV │ 228 - │ │ │ - 1765-PS │Report of the Commissioner for the Four │ │ - │Year Plan Plenipotentiary for Special │ │ - │Missions on Black Market Activities, 15 │ │ - │January 1943. │ IV │ 325 - │ │ │ -*1918-PS │Speech by Himmler to SS officers on day │ │ - │of Metz. (USA 304) │ IV │ 553 - │ │ │ - 1991-PS │Sixth report on activity and final │ │ - │report of the German Armistice │ │ - │Delegation for Economy, and of Delegate │ │ - │of Reich Government for Economic and │ │ - │Financial Questions with French │ │ - │Government, 1 July 1943 to 17 August │ │ - │1944. │ IV │ 605 - │ │ │ -*1997-PS │Decree of the Fuehrer, 17 July 1941, │ │ - │concerning administration of Newly │ │ - │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA 319) │ IV │ 634 - │ │ │ - 2149-PS │Letter, 11 December 1942, to Foreign │ │ - │Office, enclosing statement of German │ │ - │Reichsbank concerning question of an │ │ - │increase of French contributions to │ │ - │Occupation expenses. │ IV │ 758 - │ │ │ -*2233-D-PS │Frank Diary. Regierungsitzungen. 1941. │ │ - │October-December. Entry of 16 December │ │ - │1941 at pp. 76-77. (USA 281) │ IV │ 891 - │ │ │ -*2233-G-PS │Frank Diary. 1939. 25 October to 15 │ │ - │December. (USA 302) │ IV │ 903 - │ │ │ -*2233-H-PS │Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1941. Part II. │ │ - │Entry of 19 April 1941. (USA 311) │ IV │ 904 - │ │ │ -*2749-PS │Title page of publication of Academy for│ │ - │German Law, 7th year, 1940. (USA 301) │ V │ 390 - │ │ │ -*2915-PS │Extracts from German Labor, June-July │ │ - │1942. (USA 306) │ V │ 580 - │ │ │ -*2916-PS │Commitment of Manpower │ │ - │Doctrines-Orders-Directives, published │ │ - │by Office of Reich Commissioner for │ │ - │strengthening of National Character of │ │ - │German People, December 1940. (USA 307) │ V │ 581 - │ │ │ - 3602-PS │Report on conversation (interview) │ │ - │between Mr. Hemmen and Mr. de Boisanger,│ │ - │4 October. │ VI │ 314 - │ │ │ - 3603-PS │Report on conversation between Mr. │ │ - │Hemmen and Mr. de Boisanger, 10 October.│ VI │ 314 - │ │ │ - 3604-PS │Decree concerning rationing of │ │ - │industrial goods from Official Gazette │ │ - │of Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ - │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 37, Sec. 1.│ VI │ 315 - │ │ │ - 3605-PS │Rationing decree, 27 May 1940, from │ │ - │Official Gazette of Military Commander │ │ - │in Belgium and Northern France, 1940-41,│ │ - │p. 37, Sec. 4. │ VI │ 315 - │ │ │ - 3606-PS │Rationing decree, 27 May 1940, from │ │ - │Official Gazette of Military Commanders │ │ - │in Belgium and Northern France, 1940-41,│ │ - │p. 38, Sec. 10. │ VI │ 316 - │ │ │ - 3607-PS │Public Notice on Board of Directors of │ │ - │Reichskreditkasse, from Official Gazette│ │ - │of Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ - │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 65. │ VI │ 316 - │ │ │ - 3608-PS │Public Notice of Establishment of a │ │ - │Clearing system between Belgium and │ │ - │German Reich, 10 July 1940, from │ │ - │Official Gazette of Military Commander │ │ - │in Belgium and Northern France. │ VI │ 317 - │ │ │ - 3609-PS │Decree for execution of rationing decree│ │ - │in Belgium, 5 November 1940, from │ │ - │Official Gazette of Military Commander │ │ - │in Belgium and Northern France. │ VI │ 318 - │ │ │ - 3610-PS │Decree regarding Plant Commissars, 29 │ │ - │April 1941, from Official Gazette of │ │ - │Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ - │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 599. │ VI │ 319 - │ │ │ - 3611-PS │Decree on economic measures against │ │ - │Jews, 31 May 1941, from Official Gazette│ │ - │of Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ - │Northern France, 1940-41, p. 620, Sec. │ │ - │17. │ VI │ 320 - │ │ │ - 3612-PS │Decree regarding prohibition of │ │ - │manufacturing of certain products, 6 │ │ - │August 1942, from Official Gazette of │ │ - │Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ - │Northern France, 1942, p. 986, Sec. 1. │ VI │ 321 - │ │ │ - 3613-PS │Proclamation to Netherlands population, │ │ - │25 May 1940, from Official Gazette for │ │ - │Occupied Dutch Territory, No. 1, 5 June │ │ - │1940. │ VI │ 321 - │ │ │ - 3615-PS │Report by Ostrow on examination of │ │ - │records of Reichskreditkasse, 29 │ │ - │September 1945. │ VI │ 322 - │ │ │ - 3616-PS │Decree on prohibition to establish and │ │ - │enlarge enterprises and on shutting down│ │ - │enterprises, 30 March 1942, from │ │ - │Official Gazette of Military Commander │ │ - │in Belgium and Northern France, 1942, p.│ │ - │865. │ VI │ 388 - │ │ │ -*EC-3 │Letter of Liaison Staff at Supreme │ │ - │Headquarters, Armament Procurement │ │ - │Office directed to General Thomas, Chief│ │ - │of Wi Rue Amt, Berlin, 25 November 1941.│ │ - │(USA 318) │ VII │ 242 - │ │ │ - EC-21 │Memorandum of Posse, 8 January 1940. │ VII │ 249 - │ │ │ - EC-34 │Report No. 1 on activities of Military │ │ - │Administration for month of November │ │ - │1940. │ VII │ 254 - │ │ │ - EC-41 │Notice concerning seizure of security │ │ - │properties of Dutch and Belgian │ │ - │holdings, 23 May 1940. │ VII │ 255 - │ │ │ - EC-43 │Report on conferences at Ministry of │ │ - │Economics, 20 August 1940, regarding │ │ - │acquisition of shares in important │ │ - │foreign enterprises in Southeast Europe.│ VII │ 258 - │ │ │ - EC-69 │Memorandum of General Holder, 13 │ │ - │December 1939, regarding treatment of │ │ - │economical questions at the OKH. │ VII │ 262 - │ │ │ - EC-84 │Report of Lt. Colonel Helder on │ │ - │reconversion of the economy, 7 December │ │ - │1940. │ VII │ 263 - │ │ │ - EC-86 │Report on financial contributions of the│ │ - │Occupied Areas. │ VII │ 264 - │ │ │ - EC-87 │Report on contribution of Netherlands │ │ - │for German War economy. │ VII │ 278 - │ │ │ - EC-101 │Affidavit by Schmid-Lossberg, 21 │ │ - │September 1945, concerning Holland, │ │ - │Belgium and France. │ VII │ 280 - │ │ │ - EC-113 │Covering letter, 8 July 1940, to letter │ │ - │from Supreme Command of Armed Forces, │ │ - │concerning decision of Fuehrer in │ │ - │Armistice questions, and memorandum of │ │ - │Goering, 5 July 1940. │ VII │ 291 - │ │ │ -*EC-126 │Economic Policy Directive for Economic │ │ - │Organization, East, Agricultural Group, │ │ - │23 May 1941. (USA 316) │ VII │ 295 - │ │ │ - EC-137 │Memorandum of Goering, 2 August 1940, │ │ - │regarding extension of German interests │ │ - │in foreign enterprise, and covering │ │ - │letter. │ VII │ 309 - │ │ │ - EC-155 │Collection of planned decrees on │ │ - │economic matters, from Military │ │ - │Administration-Economy, pp. 50-74. │ VII │ 312 - │ │ │ - EC-256 │Letter from Dr. Lammers to Goering and │ │ - │Funk, 12 October 1937. │ VII │ 346 - │ │ │ - EC-261 │Letter from Funk to all Ministries, 14 │ │ - │March 1938, regarding appointment of │ │ - │Sarnow, deputy of Plenipotentiary for │ │ - │War Economy. │ VII │ 371 - │ │ │ - EC-263 │Note on draft of decree on confiscation │ │ - │of private Polish property. │ VII │ 373 - │ │ │ - EC-267 │Development and Position of French │ │ - │Industry in area of Military Commander, │ │ - │France, in 1941, from Report on Economy │ │ - │by Military Commander, France. │ VII │ 376 - │ │ │ -*EC-305 │Minutes of meeting on 12 February 1940, │ │ - │under Chairmanship of Goering concerning│ │ - │labor supply in the East. (USA 303) │ VII │ 402 - │ │ │ - EC-323 │Telegram signed Schleier, dated Paris 26│ │ - │April 1941. │ VII │ 406 - │ │ │ - EC-335 │Report of the Military Administration in│ │ - │Belgium and Northern France, │ │ - │January-March 1943. │ VII │ 407 - │ │ │ - EC-336 │Report of the Reich Minister for │ │ - │Occupied Eastern Territories, 26 │ │ - │November 1942, concerning treatment of │ │ - │Poles under his jurisdiction. │ VII │ 408 - │ │ │ - EC-344-7 │Report on Armament Economy in │ │ - │Poland, 1939-1940. │ VII │ 416 - │ │ │ -*EC-344 16 and │Thomas report, 20 August 1940, │ │ -17 │summarizing experience with German │ │ - │Armament Industry in Poland 1939-40 and │ │ - │extract from report by Captain Dr. │ │ - │Varain on same subject. (USA 297) │ VII │ 419 - │ │ │ -*EC-347 │Directives for operation of the Economy │ │ - │in Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │ - │320) │ VII │ 421 - │ │ │ - EC-401 │Letter from Office Four Year Plan, 8 │ │ - │July 1942, on seizure of Belgian gold. │ VII │ 439 - │ │ │ -*EC-410 │Appendix to Goering’s directive of 19 │ │ - │October 1939 concerning the economic │ │ - │administration of Occupied Territories. │ │ - │(USA 298) │ VII │ 466 - │ │ │ -*EC-411 │Order by Hess concerning the │ │ - │reconstruction of certain industrial │ │ - │enterprises in Poland, 20 November 1939.│ │ - │(USA 299) │ VII │ 469 - │ │ │ - EC-422 │Extracts from History of the War │ │ - │Economy—and Armament Staff in France. │ VII │ 481 - │ │ │ - EC-427 │Letter from Lammers to Reichsbank │ │ - │Directorate, 20 January 1939, on │ │ - │appointment of Funk as President of │ │ - │Reichsbank. │ VII │ 484 - │ │ │ -*EC-453 │Letter to Himmler, 21 September 1943, │ │ - │and list of contributions by his │ │ - │friends. (USA 322) │ VII │ 510 - │ │ │ -*EC-454 │Letter to Himmler, 27 August 1943, │ │ - │regarding contributions by his friends. │ │ - │(USA 321) │ VII │ 512 - │ │ │ - EC-465 │Letter from Commissar with the │ │ - │Netherlands Bank, 9 December 1940, with │ │ - │November report to Fuehrer. │ VII │ 518 - │ │ │ - EC-468 │Letter from Commissar at the Netherlands│ │ - │Bank, 10 February 1941, with report for │ │ - │January 1941 to Fuehrer. │ VII │ 524 - │ │ │ - EC-469 │Memorandum on meeting in Duesseldorf, 25│ │ - │May 1940. │ VII │ 536 - │ │ │ - EC-470 │Special Events in the field of │ │ - │procurement of means of production, raw │ │ - │material, semi-finished products. │ VII │ 538 - │ │ │ - EC-471 │Armament Inspectorate Netherlands—War │ │ - │Diary for time from 1 January-31 March │ │ - │1943. │ VII │ 538 - │ │ │ -*EC-472 │Directives of Reich Marshal Goering │ │ - │concerning economic organization of │ │ - │Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA 315) │ VII │ 539 - │ │ │ - EC-472-A │War Diary of Armament Inspectorate from │ │ - │10 April 1940-30 September 1942. │ VII │ 540 - │ │ │ - EC-473 │Extract from History of Armament │ │ - │Inspectorate—Netherlands. │ VII │ 542 - │ │ │ - EC-474 │Letter, 1 June 1940, enclosing report of│ │ - │Armament Inspectorate Netherlands. │ VII │ 542 - │ │ │ - EC-485 │Minutes on Goering Meeting, 1 October │ │ - │1940, on the economic exploitation of │ │ - │Occupied Territories. │ VII │ 543 - │ │ │ - EC-560 │Extract from War Diary of Armament │ │ - │Inspectorate—Belgium 21 January 1941, │ │ - │regarding right to remove machinery. │ VII │ 584 - │ │ │ - EC-604 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France, 1 May 1942.│ VII │ 584 - │ │ │ - EC-605 │Letter of the Commissar with the │ │ - │Emission Bank in Brussels, 29 October │ │ - │1942, with enclosure. │ VII │ 585 - │ │ │ - EC-606 │Minutes concerning conference with Field│ │ - │Marshal Goering at Karinhall, 30 January│ │ - │1940. │ VII │ 588 - │ │ │ - EC-613 │Memorandum on contributions of French │ │ - │economy in favor of France performed at │ │ - │instigation of Military Commander in │ │ - │France. │ VII │ 602 - │ │ │ - EC-614 │Memorandum of the Military Commander in │ │ - │France. │ VII │ 602 - │ │ │ - EC-615 │Notes by General Thomas on Meeting with │ │ - │Colonel General Keitel, 1 December 1939.│ VII │ 603 - │ │ │ - EC-616 │Interference of War Economy and Armament│ │ - │Staff with raw material rationing boards│ │ - │from Situation Report of War Economy and│ │ - │Armament Staff of France. │ VII │ 603 - │ │ │ - EC-617 │Extracts from Situation Report of War │ │ - │Economy and Armament Staff of France. │ VII │ 604 - │ │ │ - EC-618 │Service instructions for Economic │ │ - │Squads. │ VII │ 604 - │ │ │ - EC-619 │Clearing agreement of 14 November 1940, │ │ - │for French-German payments. │ VII │ 608 - │ │ │ - EC-620 │Directive of Goering on exploitation of │ │ - │the Occupied Western Territories, 26 │ │ - │August 1940. │ VII │ 608 - │ │ │ - ECH-1 │Final report of Military Commander │ │ - │Belgium, Part 10, Section I, concerning │ │ - │German-Belgian trade. │ VII │ 609 - │ │ │ - ECH-2 │Report on Economic Planning of Military │ │ - │Commander Belgium and Northern France, │ │ - │13 September 1940. │ VII │ 610 - │ │ │ - ECH-3 │Final Report of Chief of Military │ │ - │Administration in Belgium and Northern │ │ - │France. │ VII │ 611 - │ │ │ - ECH-4 │Annual report of Military Commander of │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France, 15 July │ │ - │1941. │ VII │ 613 - │ │ │ - ECH-5 │Final Report of Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France. │ VII │ 615 - │ │ │ - ECH-6 │Final report of Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France. │ VII │ 620 - │ │ │ - ECH-7 │Final Report of Supervisory Office with │ │ - │Military Commander in Belgium and │ │ - │Northern France on legalized │ │ - │exploitation of black market in Belgium │ │ - │and Northern France. │ VII │ 622 - │ │ │ - ECH-9 │Circular of Military Commander, 19 June │ │ - │1943, concerning prohibition of black │ │ - │market purchase. │ VII │ 629 - │ │ │ - ECH-10 │Final Report of Military Commander on │ │ - │machinery clearing. │ VII │ 629 - │ │ │ - ECH-11 │Final Report of Military Commander on │ │ - │Church Bell drive in Belgium. │ VII │ 631 - │ │ │ - ECH-12 │Report of Activity Department for │ │ - │“Protection of Art” of Military │ │ - │Commander Belgium and Northern France. │ VII │ 632 - │ │ │ - ECH-14 │Letter from Speer, 23 June 1943, with │ │ - │covering letter. │ VII │ 632 - │ │ │ - ECH-15 │Draft of letter to Falkenhausen, 22 May │ │ - │1944. │ VII │ 634 - │ │ │ - ECH-16 │Memorandum from Military Administration │ │ - │Department for Culture, 17 May 1944, │ │ - │concerning requisition of scientific │ │ - │instruments. │ VII │ 635 - │ │ │ - ECH-19 │Final Report of Military Commander │ │ - │showing total picture of consolidation │ │ - │of Belgian Textile Industry. │ VII │ 636 - │ │ │ - ECH-21 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France to General │ │ - │Falkenhausen, 12 October 1940, and │ │ - │annexes. │ VII │ 637 - │ │ │ - ECH-22 │Final Report of Military Commander, │ │ - │concerning foreign exchange and gold. │ VII │ 639 - │ │ │ - ECH-23 │Report of Military Commander on supplies│ │ - │in the German interest in Belgium and │ │ - │Northern France in 1941. │ VII │ 641 - │ │ │ - ECH-24 │Introduction to Final Report of Military│ │ - │Commander by Dr. Beyer. │ VII │ 642 - │ │ │ - ECR-14 │Memorandum from Commissar at the Belgian│ │ - │National Bank on Clearing Transfers, 24 │ │ - │March 1941. │ VII │ 642 - │ │ │ - ECR-24 │Annual report of the Commissar at the │ │ - │National Bank of Belgium, covering │ │ - │period May 1940-May 1941. │ VII │ 642 - │ │ │ - ECR-32 │Memorandum from Reich Marshal of the │ │ - │Greater German Reich Commissioner for │ │ - │the Four Year Plan, 11 June 1941, on │ │ - │occupation costs in Belgium and covering│ │ - │letters. │ VII │ 667 - │ │ │ - ECR-35 │Memorandum from Special Commissioner │ │ - │West of the Reichskreditkassen, 2 August│ │ - │1941. │ VII │ 670 - │ │ │ - ECR-39 │Memorandum from Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France, 2 August │ │ - │1941, concerning procurement of │ │ - │Occupation Costs in Belgium, and │ │ - │covering letter. │ VII │ 671 - │ │ │ - ECR-59 │Memorandum from Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France, 2 October │ │ - │1941, on contributions from Belgium to │ │ - │the limit of its capacity, and covering │ │ - │letter. │ VII │ 676 - │ │ │ - ECR-72 │Memorandum from Special Commissioner │ │ - │West of RKK, 22 December 1941, ordering │ │ - │Emission Bank to pay out clearing │ │ - │transfer. │ VII │ 681 - │ │ │ - ECR-89 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France, 2 March │ │ - │1942, concerning payment for German │ │ - │Military Expenditures in Belgium through│ │ - │clearing; and letter of transmittal. │ VII │ 682 - │ │ │ - ECR-104 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France, 24 April │ │ - │1942, concerning payment of expenses of │ │ - │German Armed Forces in Belgium in │ │ - │clearing. │ VII │ 685 - │ │ │ - ECR-106 │Memorandum from Commissar at the │ │ - │National Bank of Belgium, 1 May 1942, on│ │ - │use of occupation funds for black market│ │ - │purchases and political purposes. │ VII │ 686 - │ │ │ - ECR-115 │Teletype, 27 July 1942, on position of │ │ - │Reichsbank regarding requisition of │ │ - │Belgian gold. │ VII │ 689 - │ │ │ - ECR-132 │Report of the Commissar at the National │ │ - │Bank of Belgium, 1 December 1942, │ │ - │covering period August-October 1942. │ VII │ 690 - │ │ │ - ECR-142 │Letter from Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France, 22 February│ │ - │1943, on exchange of RKK notes in │ │ - │Belgium. │ VII │ 695 - │ │ │ - ECR-149 │Third Annual Report of the Commissar at │ │ - │the National Bank of Belgium, 5 June │ │ - │1943. │ VII │ 700 - │ │ │ - ECR-155-A │Memorandum from Special Commissioner │ │ - │West of Reichskreditkassen, 7 December │ │ - │1943, on occupation costs. │ VII │ 716 - │ │ │ - ECR-166 │Memorandum from Special Commissioner │ │ - │West of Reichskreditkassen, 10 May 1944,│ │ - │concerning cash situation of Chief │ │ - │Paymaster at Military Commander in │ │ - │Belgium and Northern France. │ VII │ 718 - │ │ │ - ECR-172 │Letter from Reichskommissar for Occupied│ │ - │Territories of Belgium and Northern │ │ - │France, 21 July 1944, concerning │ │ - │equalization of monthly balance in giro │ │ - │traffic of Reichskreditkassen. │ VII │ 720 - │ │ │ - ECR-173 │Report of Commissar at the National Bank│ │ - │of Belgium, 15 August 1944, on total │ │ - │occupation charges and Belgium clearing │ │ - │balance. │ VII │ 721 - │ │ │ - ECR-174 │Report of the Commissar of the │ │ - │Netherlands Bank for the month May 1941,│ │ - │dated 12 June 1941. │ VII │ 726 - │ │ │ - ECR-175 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Brussels, 18 May │ │ - │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 732 - │ │ │ - ECR-176 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Brussels, 27 May │ │ - │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 733 - │ │ │ - ECR-177 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 June │ │ - │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 735 - │ │ │ - ECR-178 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 25 July │ │ - │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 735 - │ │ │ - ECR-179 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 28 August │ │ - │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 735 - │ │ │ - ECR-180 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 │ │ - │September 1941, concerning occupation │ │ - │costs. │ VII │ 736 - │ │ │ - ECR-181 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 28 October│ │ - │1941, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 737 - │ │ │ - ECR-182 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 29 │ │ - │November 1941, concerning occupation │ │ - │costs. │ VII │ 737 - │ │ │ - ECR-183 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 6 January │ │ - │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 738 - │ │ │ - ECR-184 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 January│ │ - │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 739 - │ │ │ - ECR-185 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 27 │ │ - │February 1942, concerning occupation │ │ - │costs. │ VII │ 740 - │ │ │ - ECR-186 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 28 March │ │ - │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 740 - │ │ │ - ECR-187 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 April │ │ - │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 741 - │ │ │ - ECR-188 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 13 July │ │ - │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 742 - │ │ │ - ECR-189 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 13 August │ │ - │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 743 - │ │ │ - ECR-190 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 31 August │ │ - │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 743 - │ │ │ - ECR-191 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 30 │ │ - │September 1942, concerning occupation │ │ - │costs. │ VII │ 744 - │ │ │ - ECR-192 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 6 November│ │ - │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 744 - │ │ │ - ECR-193 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 7 December│ │ - │1942, concerning occupation costs. │ VII │ 745 - │ │ │ - ECR-194 │Letter of Commissar at the Netherlands │ │ - │Bank Amsterdam, enclosing report on │ │ - │contributions of Holland for Germany │ │ - │during the first year of occupation, 28 │ │ - │May 1941. │ VII │ 745 - │ │ │ - ECR-195 │Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central │ │ - │Administration of RKK Berlin, 21 April │ │ - │1942, concerning Dutch East Help. │ VII │ 747 - │ │ │ - ECR-196 │Report of the Commissar of the │ │ - │Netherlands Bank, 9 May 1941. │ VII │ 748 - │ │ │ - ECR-197 │Circular of the Reichsminister of │ │ - │Economics in foreign exchange matters, │ │ - │31 March 1941. │ VII │ 749 - │ │ │ -*L-70 │Speech by Himmler at Bad Schachen, 14 │ │ - │October 1943, on the Question of │ │ - │Security. (USA 308) │ VII │ 818 - │ │ │ -*L-221 │Bormann report on conference of 16 July │ │ - │1941, concerning treatment of Eastern │ │ - │populations and territories. (USA 317) │ VII │ 1086 - │ │ │ -*R-92 │Instruction for internal use on │ │ - │application of law concerning property │ │ - │of Poles of 17 September 1940; copy of │ │ - │monthly report 31 May 1942 with │ │ - │statistics on farms and estates seized │ │ - │and confiscated in the Incorporated │ │ - │Eastern Territories; copy of letter from│ │ - │SS officer to Himmler, 20 November 1940.│ │ - │(USA 312) │ VIII │ 61 - │ │ │ -*R-112 │Orders issued by Reich Commissioner for │ │ - │the Consolidation of German nationhood, │ │ - │16 February 1942, 1 July 1942, 28 July │ │ - │1942. (USA 309) │ VIII │ 108 - │ │ │ -*R-114 │Memoranda of conferences, 4 and 18 │ │ - │August 1942, concerning directions for │ │ - │treatment of deported Alsatians. (USA │ │ - │314) │ VIII │ 122 - - - - - Chapter XIV - THE PLUNDER OF ART TREASURES - - - 1. THE EINSATZSTAB ROSENBERG - -A. _Formation, Purpose, Powers._ - -On 29 January 1940 Hitler issued a decree in the following terms: - - “The ‘Hohe Schule’ is supposed to become the center for national - socialistic ideological and educational research. It will be - established after the conclusion of the war. I order that the - already initiated preparations be continued by Reichsleiter - Alfred Rosenberg, especially in the way of research and the - setting up of the library. - - “All sections of Party and State are requested to cooperate with - him in this task.” (_136-PS_) - -What began as a project for the establishment of a research library -developed into a project for the seizure of cultural treasures. -(_141-PS_) - -On 1 March 1942 Hitler issued a decree in which he asserted that Jews, -Freemasons, and affiliated opponents of National Socialism are the -authors of the War against the Reich, and that a systematic spiritual -battle against them is a military necessity. The decree thereupon -authorized Rosenberg to search libraries, archives, lodges, and cultural -establishments, to seize relevant material from these establishments as -well as cultural treasures which were the property or in the possession -of Jews, which were ownerless, or the origin of which could not be -clearly established. The decree directed the cooperation of the -_Wehrmacht_ High Command and indicated that Rosenberg’s activities in -the West were to be conducted in his capacity as Reichsleiter and in the -East in his capacity as Reichsminister. (_149-PS_) - -This decree was implemented by a letter from Dr. Lammers, Reichsminister -and Chief of Chancellory, directed to the “Highest Reich Authorities and -the Services directly subordinate to the Fuehrer.” The letter reiterated -the terms of the Hitler decree and requested support of the Reich -authorities in Rosenberg’s fulfillment of his task. (_154-PS_) - -B. _Scope of Activities._ - -Rosenberg’s activities in fulfillment of the above decrees were -extended, in the West, to France (_138-PS_), Belgium (_139-PS_), the -Netherlands (_140-PS_), Luxembourg (_137-PS_), and Norway and Denmark. -(_159-PS_) - -In the East activities were carried out throughout the Occupied Eastern -Territories (_153-PS_), including the Baltic states and the Ukraine -(_151-PS_), as well as in Hungary (_158-PS_), Greece (_171-PS_), and -Yugoslavia. (_071-PS_) - -The function of the Rosenberg Organization included not only the seizure -of books and scientific materials specified in the original Hitler Order -(_171-PS_), but the seizure of private art treasures (_1015-B-PS_), -public art treasures (_055-PS_), and household furnishings. (_L-188_) - -C. _Cooperating Agencies._ - -On 5 July 1940 Keitel (Chief of the OKW) informed the Chief of the Army -High Command (OKH) and the Chief of the Armed Forces in The Netherlands -that the Fuehrer had ordered that Rosenberg’s suggestion be followed, to -the effect that certain libraries and archives, chancelleries of high -church authorities, and lodges be searched for documents valuable to -Germany or indicating political maneuvers directed against Germany, and -that such material be seized. The letter further stated that Hitler had -ordered the support of the Gestapo and that the Chief of the Sipo -(Security Police), SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich, had been informed and -would communicate with the competent military commanders. (_137-PS_) - -Keitel issued a further order to the Chief of the OKH, France, on 17 -September 1940, providing: - - “The ownership status before the war in France, prior to the - declaration of war on 1 September 1939, shall be the criterion. - - “Ownership transfers to the French state or similar transfers - completed after this date are irrelevant and legally invalid - (for example, Polish and Slovak libraries in Paris, possessions - of the Palais Rothschild or other ownerless Jewish possessions). - Reservations regarding search, seizure and transportation to - Germany on the basis of the above reasons will not be - recognized. - - “Reichsleiter Rosenberg and/or his deputy - Reichshauptstellenleiter Ebert has received clear instructions - from the Fuehrer personally governing the right of seizure; he - is entitled to transport to Germany cultural goods which appear - valuable to him and to safeguard them there. The Fuehrer has - reserved for himself the decision as to their use. - - “It is requested that the services in question be informed - correspondingly.” (_138-PS_) - -The above order was extended to Belgium on 10 October 1940 (_139-PS_), -and an identical order was issued by the Chief of the OKH to the Armed -Forces Commander in The Netherlands on 17 September 1940. (_140-PS_) - -Hitler’s order of 1 March 1942 stated: - - “Directions for carrying out this order in cooperation with the - Wehrmacht will be issued by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High - Command in agreement with Reichsleiter Rosenberg.” (_149-PS_) - -Dr. Lammers’ order of 5 July 1942 declared that the Chief of the OKH, in -agreement with Keitel, would issue regulations governing the cooperation -with the Wehrmacht and the Police Services for assistance in making -seizures. (_154-PS_) - -An official of the Rosenberg Ministry for the Occupied East declared the -Wehrmacht to be one of the primary agencies engaged in removing art -treasures from Russia. (_1107-PS_) - -Cooperation of the SS and the SD was indicated by Rosenberg in a letter -to Bormann on 23 April 1941: - - “* * * It is understood that the confiscations are not executed - by the regional authorities but that this is conducted by the - Security Service as well as by the police. * * * it has been - communicated to me in writing by a Gauleiter, that the chief - office of the Reich Security (RSHA) of the SS has claimed the - following from the library of a monastery: * * *.” (_071-PS_) - -The above letter also points out that there has been - - “* * * close cooperation on the widest scale with the Security - Service and the military commanders. * * * - - “This affair (Operations in Salonika) has already been executed - on our side with the Security Service (SD) in the most loyal - fashion.” (_071-PS_) - -The National Socialist Party financed the operations of the _Einsatzstab -Rosenberg_. (_090-PS_; _145-PS_) - -In a letter to Goering, 18 June 1942, Rosenberg voiced the opinion that -all art objects and other confiscated items should belong to the -National Socialist Party because the Party has been bearing the brunt of -the battle against the persons and forces from whom this property was -taken. (_1118-PS_) - -D. _Cooperation of Hermann Goering._ - -On 5 November 1940, Goering issued an order specifying the distribution -to be made of art objects brought to the Louvre. The order lists as -second in priority of disposition, “Those art objects which serve to the -completion of the Reichsmarshal’s collection” and states that the -objects will “be packed and shipped to Germany with the assistance of -the Luftwaffe.” (_141-PS_) - -On 1 May 1941 Goering issued an order to all Party, State, and Wehrmacht -Services requesting them: - - “* * * to give all possible support and assistance to the Chief - of Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s Staff, - Reichshauptstellenleiter Party Comrade Utikal, and his deputy - DRK-Feldfuehrer Party Comrade von Behr, in the discharge of - their duties. The above-mentioned persons are requested to - report to me on their work, particularly on any difficulties - that might arise.” (_1117-PS_) - -On 30 May 1942, Goering claimed credit for the success of the -_Einsatzstab_: - - “* * * On the other hand I also support personally the work of - your _Einsatzstab_ wherever I can do so, and a great part of the - seized cultural goods can be accounted for because I was able to - assist the _Einsatzstab_ by my organizations.” (_1015-I-PS_) - -E. _Method of Operation._ - -The staff of the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_ seized not only “abandoned” art -treasures but also treasures which had been hidden, or were left in the -custody of depots or warehouses, including art treasures that were -already packed for shipment to America. (_1015-B-PS_) - -Robert Scholz, Chief of the Special Staff for Pictorial Art, described -the thoroughness with which the _Einsatzstab_ conducted investigations -and seizures: - - “* * * These seizures were carried out on the basis of - preliminary exhaustive investigations into the address lists of - the French Police authorities, on the basis of Jewish handbooks, - warehouse inventories and order books of French shipping firms - as well as on the basis of French art and collection catalogs. - - “* * * The seizure of ownerless Jewish works of art has - gradually extended over the whole French territory.” - (_1015-B-PS_) - -In the East, members of Rosenberg’s staff operated directly behind the -front in close cooperation with the infantry. (_035-PS_) - -Von Behr, in a progress report dated 8 August 1944, described the method -of seizing household furnishings: - - “The confiscation of Jewish homes was effected in most cases in - such a way that the so-called confiscation officials went from - house to house when no records were available of the addresses - of Jews who had departed or fled, as was the case for example, - in Paris * * * They drew up inventories of these homes and - subsequently sealed them . . . . . . . . . - - “The goods are dispatched first, to large collecting camps from - where they are turned over, sorted out and loaded for Germany. - - “* * * work shops were established for cabinet-makers, - watchmakers, shoemakers, electricians, radio experts, furriers, - etc. All incoming goods were diligently sorted out and those not - ready for use were repaired. Moreover special boxes were - dispatched for the use of special trades * * * - - “For the sorting out of the confiscated furniture and goods on - the invisible assembly line and for the packing and loading, - exclusive use was made of interned Jews. Because of its - experience as to confiscation, as to working systems within the - camps, and as to transportation, the Office West was able to - reorganize their entire working system and thus to succeed in - providing for the use in Germany of even things which appeared - to be valueless such as scrap paper, rags, salvage, etc. * * *” - (_L-188_). - -F. _Nature, Extent, and Value of Property Seized._ - -(1) _Books, manuscripts, documents, and incunabula._ A report on the -library of the “_Hohe Schule_,” prepared by Dr. Wunder, lists the most -significant book collections belonging to the library and confiscated by -the _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_ in accordance with the orders of the -Fuehrer, as follows (_171-PS_): - - (approx.) - Alliance Israelite Universelle 40,000 Vols. - Ecole Rabbinique 10,000 Vols. - Federation de Societé des Juifs de France 4,000 Vols. - Lipschuetz Bookstore, Paris 20,000 Vols. - Rothschild Family, Paris 28,000 Vols. - Rosenthaliana, Amsterdam 20,000 Vols. - Sefardischen Jewish Community, Amsterdam 25,000 Vols. - Occupied Eastern Territories 280,000 Vols. - Jewish Community, Greece 10,000 Vols. - “Special Action”, Rhineland 5,000 Vols. - Other sources 100,000 Vols. - ——— - 552,000 - -An undated report on the activities of the _Einsatzstab_ Working Group, -Netherlands, lists Masonic Lodges and other organizations whose -libraries and archives have been seized. The report states that 470 -cases of books had already been packed and reports materials seized from -92 separate lodges of the “_Droit Humain_”, the “_Groot Oosten_”, the -“IOOF” and the “Rotary Club”. An additional 776 cases containing -approximately 160,000 volumes were seized from the International -Institute for Social History at Amsterdam. An additional 170 cases were -seized from the “Theosophischen Society” and other organizations. -(_176-PS_) - -The report further states that the value of the above works is between -30 million and 40 million Reichsmarks. Additional materials to be -derived from other sources, including 100,000 volumes from the -“Rosenthaliana” collection, are estimated to have a value of three times -that of the above, or an additional 90 million to 120 million -Reichsmarks. The estimated over-all value is thus between 120 and 160 -million Reichsmarks. (_176-PS_) - -(2) _Household furnishings._ The entire furniture seizure action, known -as “Action M”, is summarized in a report of Von Behr, Chief of the -Office West, dated 8 August 1944. The report furnishes the following -statistics on results up to 1 July 1944: - - Jewish homes confiscated 71,619 - Loading capacity required cu. ms. 1,079,373 - Railroad cars required 26,984 - Foreign currency and securities - confiscated RM 11,695,516 - Scrap metal, scrap paper, and textiles - dispatched kgms. 3,191,352 - (_L-188_) - -The report goes on to list in detail the number of boxes of -miscellaneous items seized, including china (199 boxes), curtains (72 -boxes), coat hangers (120 boxes), toys (99 boxes), bottles (730 boxes), -etc. The report concludes with an itemized statement of the number of -wagons dispatched to various cities throughout Germany, to German camps, -to SS Divisions, the German State Railways, the Postal Service, and the -Police. (_L-188_) - -(3) _Works of Art (East)._ With reference to the work of the -_Einsatzstab_ in the Eastern Territories, Robert Scholz reported as -follows: - - “In the course of the evacuation of the territory several - hundred most valuable Russian ikons, several hundred Russian - paintings of the 18th and 19th centuries, individual articles of - furniture and furniture from castles were saved in cooperation - with the individual Army Groups, and brought to a shelter in the - Reich.” (_1015-B-PS_) - -In August 1943, just prior to the loss of Charcow by the Germans, 300 -paintings of West European masters and Ukrainian painters, and 25 -valuable Ukrainian carpets, mostly from the Charcow museum, were packed -and shipped by the _Einsatzstab_. (_707-PS_) - -Reporting on the withdrawal from the Ukraine, Staff Director Utikal -accounted for the removal of the following materials: - - From the Museum of Art at Charcow: - Ukrainian paintings 96 - Western European paintings 185 - Wood carvings and etchings 12 - Carpets and tapestries 25 - - From the Ukrainian museum in Kiev: - Textiles of all sorts. - Collection of valuable embroidery patterns. - Collection of brocades. - Numerous items of wood, etc. (_035-PS_) - -In addition Utikal reported shipment of a total of 131 cases containing: -10,186 books, the catalog of the “East” library, art folios, samples of -magazines, Bolshevist pictures, and Bolshevist films. Utikal also -stated: - - “Moreover an essential part of the prehistoric museum was - transported away.” (_035-PS_) - -Another report on the shipment of works of art from the Ukraine, 12 -September 1944, indicated the value of the contents of 85 chests of art -objects: - - “There are a great many of the oldest ikons, works of famous - masters of the German, Dutch and Italian schools of the 16th, - 17th and 18th centuries, as well as works of the best Russian - artists of the 18th and 19th centuries. On the whole, the - contents include the most valuable works of the known Ukrainian - art possession, which in themselves represent a value of many - millions after a cursory appraisal.” (_055-PS_) - -Attached to the above report is a detailed inventory listing hundreds of -individual objects. - -Additional evidence as to the extent of material seized in Kiev is found -in a secret note, 17 June 1944, dealing with measures taken prior to the -Russian Occupation. The note reported the taking of materials from -museums, archives, institutions, etc., during the autumn of 1943 on the -order of the _Einsatzstab_ and of the Reichs-commissar. During October -there were sent to the Reich 40 railway trucks, carrying mostly goods -belonging to the Central Research Institute of the Ukraine. The report -concluded with the statement that when the Soviets entered the town -nothing of value was left. (_1109-PS_) - -On 28 September 1941, the General Commissar for White Ruthenia reported -the seizure of art treasures in the area of Minsk, destined for -Konigsberg and Linz. The value of these confiscations was stated to -amount to millions of marks. (_1099-PS_) - -(4) _Works of Art (West)._ The Robert Scholz report declared that: - - “During the period from March 1941 to July 1944, the Special - Staff for Pictorial Art brought into the Reich: - _29 large shipments_ including _137 freight cars_ with _4,174 - cases of art works_.” (_1015-B-PS_) - -The report stated that a total of 21,903 art objects of all types had -been counted and inventoried, and stated: - - “With this scientific inventory of a material unique in its - scope and importance and of a value hitherto unknown to art - research, the Special Staff for Pictorial Art has conducted a - work important to the entire field of art. _This inventory work - will form the basis of an all-inclusive scientific catalog in - which should be recorded history, scope and scientific and - political significance of this historically unique art - seizure._” (_1015-B-PS_) - -The following is a summary of the inventory attached to the report: - - Paintings 10,890 - Plastics 583 - Furniture 2,477 - Textiles 583 - Hand-made art objects 5,825 - East Asiatic objects 1,286 - Antiquities 259 - ——— - Total 21,903 - (_1015-B-PS_) - -The report stated that the above figures would be increased since -seizures in the West were not yet completed and it had not been possible -to make a scientific inventory of part of the seized objects because of -the lack of experts. (_1015-B-PS_) - -As early as 28 January 1941, Rosenberg stated, with reference to -properties seized in France alone: - - “* * * the value involved will come close to a billion - Reichsmarks.” (_090-PS_) - -Scholz, in his report on activities from March 1941 to July 1944, -expressed the value of the seizures as follows: - - “The extraordinary artistic and material value of the seized art - works cannot be expressed in figures. The paintings, period - furniture of the 17th and 18th Centuries, the Gobelins, the - antiques and renaissance jewelry of the Rothschild’s are objects - of such a unique character that their evaluation is impossible, - since no comparable values have so far appeared on the art - market. - - “A short report, moreover, can only hint at the artistic worth - of the collections. Among the seized paintings, pastels and - drawings there are several hundred works of the first quality, - masterpieces of European art, which could take first place in - any museum. Included therein are absolutely authenticated signed - works of Rembrandt Van Rijn, Rubens, Frans Hals, Vermeer van - Delft, Valasquez, Murillo, Goya, Sebastiano del Piombo, Palma - Vecchio, etc. - - “Of first importance among the seized paintings are the works of - the famous French painters of the 18th Century, with - masterpieces of Boucher, Watteau, Rigaud, Largielliere, Rattler, - Fragonard, Pater, Danloux and de Troy. - - “This collection can compare with those of the best European - museums. It includes many works of the foremost French masters, - who up to now have been only inadequately represented in the - best German museums. Very important also is the representation - of masterpieces of the Dutch Painters of the 17th and 18th - Centuries. First of all should be mentioned the works of Van - Dyck, Saloman and Jacob Ruisdal, Wouvermann, Terborch, Jan - Weenix, Gabriel Metsu, Adrian van Ostade, David Teniers, Pieter - de Hooch, Willem van der Velde, etc. - - “Of foremost importance also are the represented works of - English painting of the 18th and early 19th centuries, with - masterpieces of Reynolds, Romney, and Gainsborough. Cranach and - Amberger, among the German masters, should be mentioned. - - “The collection of French furniture of the 17th and 18th - centuries is perhaps even more highly to be evaluated. This - contains hundreds of the best preserved and, for the most part, - signed works of the best known cabinet-makers from the period - between Louis XIV to Louis XVI. Since German cabinetmakers - played an important part in this golden age of French cabinetry, - now recognized for the first time in the field of art, this - collection is of paramount importance. - - “The collection of Gobelins and Persian tapestries contains - numerous world-famous objects. The collection of handicraft - works and the Rothschild collection of renaissance jewelry is - valuable beyond comparison.” (_1015-B-PS_) - -The report refers to 25 portfolios of pictures of the most valuable -works of the art collections seized in the West, which portfolios were -presented to the Fuehrer. Ten additional portfolios are stated to be -attached to the report and additional portfolios are said to be in -preparation. Thirty-nine leatherbound volumes prepared by the -_Einsatzstab_ contain photographs of paintings, textiles, furniture, -candelabra, and numerous other objects of art and illustrate the -magnitude and value of the collection made by _Einsatzstab Rosenberg_. - - 2. THE GENERAL-GOUVERNEMENT - -A. _Confiscatory Laws and Decrees_ - -In October 1939 Goering issued a verbal order to Dr. Muehlmann asking -him to undertake the immediate securing of all Polish art treasures. -(_1709-PS_) - -On 15 November 1939, Hans Frank, Governor-General for the Occupied -Polish Territories, issued a decree providing in part: - - “Article 1. 1. All movable and stationary property of the Former - Polish State * * * will be sequestered for the purpose of - securing all manner of public valuables.” (_1773-PS_). - -On 16 December 1939, Frank issued a decree providing in part: - - “Article 1. All art objects in public possession in the General - Gouvernement will be confiscated for the fulfillment of public - tasks of common interest insofar as it has not already been - seized under the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the - former Polish State in the General Gouvernement of 15 November - 1939 (_Verordnungsblatt GGP_, p. 37). - - “Article 2. With the exception of art collections and art - objects which were the property of the former Polish State, art - objects will be considered as owned by the public: - - “1. Private art collections which have been taken under - protection by the special commissioner for the seizure and - safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures. - - “2. All ecclesiastical art property with the exception of those - objects required for the daily performance of liturgic actions. - - “Article 3. 1. In order to determine whether art objects are - public property in the sense of this regulation, every private - and ecclesiastical art possession has to be registered with - exact data on the kind, nature and number of pieces. - - “2. Everyone who possessed or at the present time is in - possession of or else is entitled to dispose of such objects of - art since 15 March 1939, is obliged to register the same.” - (_1773-PS_) - -In order to implement the above decree, the following registration -decree was issued in the name of the Governor-General by Dr. Muehlmann, -Special Deputy for the Securing of Art Treasures: - - “Article 2. 1. Objects of artistic, cultural-historical and - historical value which originate from the time before 1850, have - to be registered. - - “2. The registration includes the following: - - “_a._ Paintings. - - “_b._ Sculpture. - - “_c._ Products of handicraft (for instance antique - furniture, chinaware, glass, golden and silver objects, - Gobelins, rugs, embroideries, lacework, paramente, - etc.). - - “_d._ Drawings, engravings, woodcuts, etc. - - “_e._ Rare manuscripts, musical manuscripts, autographs, - book-paintings, miniatures, prints, covers, etc. - - “_f._ Weapons, armors, etc. - - “_g._ Coins, medals, seals, etc. - - “3. Regarding the art objects mentioned in section 2, detailed - information has to be given if possible, on the master, the time - of production, the contents of the representation, measurements - and material (for instance, wood, canvas, bronze, etc.).” - (_1773-PS_) - -The seizures authorized by the above decrees ripened into confiscation -and assumption of ownership by the General Gouvernement, with the -issuance of the following decree by Frank on 24 September 1940: - - “Article 1. The property sequestered on the basis of Article 1, - section 1 of the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the - former Polish State within the General Gouvernement of 15 - November 1939 (_Verordnungsblatt GGP_, page 37) will be - transferred to the ownership of the General Gouvernement.” - (_1773-PS_) - -Heinrich Himmler, as Reichscommissioner for the Strengthening of -Germanism, issued an “urgent decree” to the regional officers of the -Secret Police in the Annexed Eastern Territories and the Commanders of -Security Service in Krakau (Charkow), Radom, Warsaw, and Lublin. The -decree, 1 December 1939, was circulated on 16 December 1939, the same -date as the promulgation of the decree of Dr. Muehlmann, above referred -to (_1773-PS_). The Himmler decree contained administrative directions -for execution of the Art Seizure program. (_R-143_) - -B. _Purpose of Art Seizures._ - -The purpose of the Seizure Program is indicated in the aforementioned -Himmler decree: - - “I - - “1. To strengthen Germanism in the defense of the Reich all - articles mentioned in Section II of this decree are hereby - confiscated. This applies to all articles located in the - territories annexed by the Fuehrer’s and Reich Chancellor’s - decree of 12/10/39, and the General Government for the Occupied - Polish Territories. They are confiscated for the benefit of the - German Reich and are at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner - for the Strengthening of Germanism.” - - * * * * * * - - IV - - “All confiscations made before this decree by authorities of the - Reich Fuehrer SS and the Chief of German Police and the Reich - Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism are hereby - confirmed. They are to be regarded as made for the benefit of - the German Reich and are at the disposal of the Reich - Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism.” (_R-143_) - -The methodical nature of the Art Seizure Program, and the existence of a -general policy of confiscation of art treasures, is indicated in section -V of Himmler’s decree: - - “In due course the usual questionnaires for cataloguing - confiscated articles are to be sent to the Chief Custodian - East.” (_R-143_) - -The intention to enrich Germany by the seizures rather than merely to -protect the seized objects is indicated in a report by Dr. Hans Posse, -Director of the Dresden State Picture Gallery: - - “I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private - collections as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. - It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from - the acquisition of great Art works, of paintings and sculptures, - with the exception of the Veit-Stoss Altar and the plates of - Hans Von Kulmbach in the Church of Maria in Cracow . . . . . . - and several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw. * * - *” (_1600-PS_) - -The avowed purpose of the art treasure seizures was the promulgation of -German Culture throughout the Occupied East: - - “* * * the result is put down in the catalogue together with - reproductions, and this is a definite proof of the penetration - of the East by the German Cultural urge.” (_1233-PS_) - -C. _Nature, Extent, and Value of Property Seized._ - -Virtually the entire art possession of Poland, private as well as -public, was seized by the General Gouvernement (_1233-PS_). In a -catalogue of the more important works of art seized by the General -Gouvernement, paragraph 1 of the Foreword contains the following -admission: - - “On the basis of the decree of the General Governor for the - Occupied Polish Territories of December 16, 1939, the Special - Delegate for the Safeguarding of Treasures of Art and Culture - was able in the course of six months to secure almost the entire - art treasure of the country, with one single exception: the - Flemish Gobelin series from the castle in Cracow. According to - the latest information, these are kept in France, so that it - will be possible to secure them eventually.” (_1233-PS_) - -The nature and extent of materials seized by the General Gouvernement is -indicated in Document _1709-PS_. The document inventories the objects -seized, and divides them into two classifications: those of primary -importance (“Reich-important”), and those of secondary importance. -Articles of primary importance, totaling 521 separate objects, are also -set forth in a descriptive catalogue. (_1233-PS_) - -The articles catalogued include paintings by German, Italian, Dutch, -French, and Spanish masters, rare illustrated books, Indian and Persian -miniatures, woodcuts, the famous Veit-Stoss hand-carved altar, -handicraft articles of gold and silver, antique furniture, articles of -crystal, glass and porcelain, tapestries, antique weapons, rare coins, -and medals. The objects were seized from both public and private -sources, including the National Museum in Cracow and the National Museum -in Warsaw, the cathedrals of Warsaw and Lublin, a number of churches and -monasteries, the Chateau of the Kings in Warsaw, university and other -libraries, and a large number of private collections of the Polish -nobility. (_1709-PS_) - -Items placed in the second category are of the same nature as those -placed in category I. Approximately 500 separate items are catalogued, -many of the items including a large number of separate objects treated -under a single catalogue heading. (_1709-PS_) - -The value of the objects seized from 22 collections is stated to be -9,437,000 Zloty. The materials referred to are only a portion of those -selected as being of secondary importance. No valuation is given as to -the balance of the items of secondary importance or as to the 521 -objects selected as being of primary importance. (_1709-PS_) - -D. _Evidence That Seizures Were Not Merely for Protective Purposes._ - -In Dr. Posse’s report (_1600-PS_), a number of items are referred to -which may be found in the catalogue of art objects “made secure” -(_1233-PS_): - - “I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private - collections as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. - It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from - the acquisition of great Art works, of paintings and sculptures, - with the exception of the Veit-Stoss altar and the plates of - Hans von Kulmbach in the Church of Maria in Cracow, the Raphael, - Leonardo and Rembrandt from the collection Czartoryski, and - several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw, * * * - works of a rather high value of whose existence we in Germany - had already known. Richer and more extensive is the Polish stock - of ‘objects d’art’, such as handicraft in gold and silver, of - German origin to a large part, particularly from the Church of - Maria and the Cathedral of Wawel, tapestries, arms, porcelains, - furniture, bronzes, coins, valuable parchment scrips, books, - etc. * * *” - - * * * * * * - - “As I said before, I shall not be able to make proposals - regarding the distribution as long as an inventory of the entire - material does not exist. However, I should like to reserve for - the museum at Linz the three most important paintings of the - Czartoryski collection, namely the Raphael, Leonardo and - Rembrandt which are at present in the Kaiser-Frederick Museum in - Berlin. We in Dresden are particularly interested in the - interior decorations of the castle of the Kings in Warsaw since - Saxonian architects and artists have created them; therefore, - the suggestion is made that the salvaged parts of it - (panellings, doors, inlaid floors, sculptures, mirrors, - glass-chandeliers, porcelains, etc.) be used for the interior - decoration of the Pavillion of the ‘Zivinges’ in Dresden.” - (_1600-PS_) - -The following items listed in the above report are also listed in the -catalogue: - - _Item_ _Catalog No._ - Veit-Stoss Altar 241 - Hans Vol Kulmbach Works 22 - Raphael 141 - Leonardo 134 - Rembrandt 81 - Church of Maria Handicraft 262-265, 279, 280 - From Jagellonic Library 166, 167, 186, 199-203, 206, - 209, 212, 215-224 - (_See 1233-PS_; _1600-PS_.) - -Appendix 8 of Document _1709-PS_ lists a large number of objects which -were turned over to Architect Koettgen. The items listed include, in -addition to paintings, tapestries, etc., plates, dishes, cups and -saucers, vases, cream pitchers, glasses, a bread basket, a service tray, -and other items of table service. These objects were turned over to the -architect for the purpose of furnishing the Castle at Cracow and Schloss -Kressendorf for the Governor. (_1709-PS_) - -A number of objects were transported out of Poland and placed in Berlin -in the Depot of the Special Deputy or in the safe of the Deutsche Bank -(_1709-PS_). Items at this location are also listed in the catalog -(_1233-PS_) as numbers 4, 17, 27, 35, 42, 45, 47, 51, 138, 141, 145, and -148. - -Thirty-one sketches by Durer were taken from the collection Lubomierski -in Lemberg: - - “The Special Deputy has personally handed over these sketches in - July 1941 to the Reichsmarshal who took them to the Fuehrer at - headquarters where they remain at the present time. On express - direction of the Fuehrer they will stay in his possession for - the time being.” (_1709-PS_) - -All art objects seized were screened for those which were important from -the German point of view: - - “The Reich-important pieces were collected in a catalogue of the - so called ‘First Choice’. One copy of this catalogue has been - submitted to the Fuehrer who reserved to himself the first - decision as to location and use of the art objects of the ‘First - Choice’”. (_1709-PS_) - -Dr. Muehlmann, the “Special Deputy for the Safeguarding of Art -Treasures” in the General Government, has confirmed that it was the -policy and purpose of the art seizure program to confiscate the art -treasures and to retain them for the benefit of Germany: - -“I confirm, that it was the official policy of the Governor General, -Hans Frank, to take into custody all important art treasures, which -belonged to Polish public institutions, private collections and the -Church. I confirm, that the art treasures, mentioned, were actually -confiscated, and it is clear to me, that they would not have remained in -Poland in case of a German victory, but that they would have been used -to complement German artistic property.” (_3042-PS_) - - * * * * * - - LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PLUNDER OF ART - TREASURES - - Document │ Description │ Vol. │ Page - │ │ │ - │Charter of the International Military │ │ - │ Tribunal, Article 6 (b). │ I │ 5 - │ │ │ - │International Military Tribunal, Indictment│ │ - │ Number 1, Sections III; VIII (E). │ I │15, 43 - │ │ │ - 3737-PS │Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the │ │ - │ Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, │ │ 597, - │ Articles 46, 47, 56. │ VI │ 599 - │ ————— │ │ - │Note: A single asterisk (*) before a │ │ - │document indicates that the document was │ │ - │received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial.│ │ - │A double asterisk (**) before a document │ │ - │number indicates that the document was │ │ - │referred to during the trial but was not │ │ - │formally received in evidence, for the │ │ - │reason given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document. The USA series│ │ - │number, given in parentheses following the │ │ - │description of the document, is the │ │ - │official exhibit number assigned by the │ │ - │court. │ │ - │ ————— │ │ - *015-PS │Letter and report of Rosenberg to Hitler, │ │ - │16 April 1943, concerning seizure of │ │ - │ownerless Jewish art possessions. (USA 387)│ III │ 41 - │ │ │ - 035-PS │Report, 26 October 1943, regarding security│ │ - │measures by Main Division Ukraine during │ │ - │withdrawal of Armed Forces. │ III │ 75 - │ │ │ - 055-PS │Report, 12 September 1944, concerning works│ │ - │of art shipped from the Ukraine. │ III │ 99 - │ │ │ - *071-PS │Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April 1941,│ │ - │replying to Bormann’s letter of 19 April │ │ - │1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA 371) │ III │ 119 - │ │ │ - *090-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Schwarz, 28 │ │ - │January 1941, concerning registration and │ │ - │collection of art treasures. (USA 372) │ III │ 148 - │ │ │ - *136-PS │Certified copy of Hitler Order, 29 January │ │ - │1940, concerning establishment of “Hohe │ │ - │Schule”. (USA 367) │ III │ 184 - │ │ │ - *137-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to Commanding │ │ - │General of Netherlands, 5 July 1940, to │ │ - │cooperate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. │ │ - │(USA 379) │ III │ 185 - │ │ │ - 138-PS │Copy of Order from Keitel to Commanding │ │ - │General of France, 17 September 1940, to │ │ - │cooperate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. │ III │ 186 - │ │ │ - 139-PS │Reineke order, 10 October 1940, concerning │ │ - │instructions to be given to Military │ │ - │Administration in Belgium to cooperate with│ │ - │Einsatzstab Rosenberg. │ III │ 187 - │ │ │ - 140-PS │Reineke order, 30 October 1940, │ │ - │supplementing order of 17 September 1940 │ │ - │(Document 138-PS). │ III │ 187 - │ │ │ - *141-PS │Goering Order, 5 November 1940, concerning │ │ - │seizure of Jewish art treasures. (USA 368) │ III │ 188 - │ │ │ - *145-PS │Order signed by Rosenberg, 20 August 1941, │ │ - │concerning safeguarding the cultural goods │ │ - │in the Occupied Eastern Territories. (USA │ │ - │373) │ III │ 189 - │ │ │ - *149-PS │Hitler Order, 1 March 1942, establishing │ │ - │authority of Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (USA │ │ - │369) │ III │ 190 - │ │ │ - 151-PS │Rosenberg Order, 7 April 1942, concerning │ │ - │safeguarding of cultural goods, research │ │ - │material and Scientific Institutions in │ │ - │Occupied Eastern Territories. │ III │ 191 - │ │ │ - *153-PS │Rosenberg Order, 27 April 1942, for │ │ - │formation of central unit for seizure of │ │ - │art treasures in occupied Eastern │ │ - │Territories. (USA 381) │ III │ 192 - │ │ │ - *154-PS │Letter from Lammers to high State and Party│ │ - │authorities, 5 July 1942, confirming │ │ - │Rosenberg’s powers. (USA 370) │ III │ 193 - │ │ │ - *158-PS │Message, 1 June 1944, initialled Utikal, │ │ - │Chief of Einsatzstab, concerning missions │ │ - │in Hungary. (USA 382) │ III │ 199 - │ │ │ - *159-PS │Message, 6 June 1944, initialled Utikal, │ │ - │Chief of Einsatzstab, concerning missions │ │ - │in Denmark and Norway. (USA 380) │ III │ 199 - │ │ │ - *171-PS │Undated report on “Library for Exploration │ │ - │of the Jewish Question” by the Hohe Schule │ │ - │District Office. (USA 383) │ III │ 200 - │ │ │ - *176-PS │Report on Einsatzstab Rosenberg, Working │ │ - │Group Netherlands, signed Schimmer. (USA │ │ - │707) │ III │ 203 - │ │ │ - 707-PS │Letters, June-October 1943 concerning │ │ - │evacuation of the museum of Charkow. │ III │ 516 - │ │ │ - 1015-B-PS │Report on activities of Special Staff for │ │ - │Pictorial Art, October 1940 to July 1944. │ III │ 666 - │ │ │ -*1015-I-PS │Letter from Goering to Rosenberg, 30 May │ │ - │1942. (USA 385) │ III │ 670 - │ │ │ - 1015-GG-PS │Inventory of art objects—attached to a │ │ - │report (Document 1015-B-PS). │ III │ 671 - │ │ │ - 1099-PS │Letter from Kube, General Commissar White │ │ - │Ruthenia, to Rosenberg, 28 September 1941. │ III │ 781 - │ │ │ - 1107-PS │Office memorandum, 17 May 1944, in │ │ - │Rosenberg Ministry concerning the │ │ - │Wehrmacht’s function in removing treasures │ │ - │from the USSR. │ III │ 789 - │ │ │ - 1109-PS │Note signed by Dr. Ullman, 17 June 1944, │ │ - │concerning Bolshevic Atrocity Propaganda. │ III │ 791 - │ │ │ -*1117-PS │Goering Order, 1 May 1941 concerning │ │ - │establishment of Einsatzstab Rosenberg in │ │ - │all Occupied Territories. (USA 384) │ III │ 793 - │ │ │ - 1118-PS │Letter from Rosenberg to Goering, 18 June │ │ - │1942, and related correspondence. │ III │ 793 - │ │ │ -*1233-PS │Printed catalog undated, concerning secured│ │ - │objects of art in the Government General │ │ - │(Poland). (USA 377) │ III │ 850 - │ │ │ -*1600-PS │Bormann correspondence, 1940-1941, │ │ - │concerning confiscation of religious art │ │ - │treasures. (USA 690) │ IV │ 128 - │ │ │ -*1709-PS │Report of Special Delegate for art │ │ - │seizures, July 1943. (USA 378) │ IV │ 211 - │ │ │ -*1773-PS │Decree on sequestration of property of │ │ - │former Polish State in the General │ │ - │Government, 15 November 1939, published in │ │ - │The Law of the General Government, pp. │ │ - │E810, E845, E846. (USA 376) │ IV │ 346 - │ │ │ -*2523-PS │Account of conversation between Goering and│ │ - │Bunjes. (USA 783) │ V │ 258 - │ │ │ -*3042-PS │Affidavit of Dr. Kajetan Muehlmann, 19 │ │ - │November 1945. (USA 375) │ V │ 754 - │ │ │ - 3766-PS │Report prepared by the German Army in │ │ - │France 1942 concerning removal of French │ │ - │art objects through the German Embassy and │ │ - │the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in France. │ VI │ 646 - │ │ │ - 3814-PS │Correspondence between Hans Frank, Lammers │ │ - │and various witnesses to the conduct of │ │ - │Frank, February 1945. │ VI │ 739 - │ │ │ -*L-188 │Report of 8 August 1944, on confiscation up│ │ - │to 31 July 1944. (USA 386) │ VII │ 1022 - │ │ │ - R-143 │Himmler decree, 1 December 1939, concerning│ │ - │procedure for confiscation of works of art,│ │ - │archives, and documents. │ VIII │ 246 - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred including missing periods or commas for -periods. American spelling occurs throughout the document. There are -differences in spellings of cities depending on whether the source is -the prosecutor or part of a quoted statement. Multiple occurrences of -the following spellings which differ and are found throughout this -volume are as follows: - - Luxemburg Luxembourg - Esthonia Estonia - Kiew Kiev - Roumania Rumania - Czecho-Slovakia Checkoslovakia - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as presented read into the -record and reflects the actual translations of the various national -documents presented as material for the trial(s). This volume had no -German, Polish, Czech, Russian or other eastern European diacritics, -only French diacritics. As a result, Goering and Fuehrer are spelled -without umlauts throughout. - -A correction of fact has been made on page 778 regarding “. . . the -Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November 1940. . . .” It should be “28 -October 1940”. 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