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diff --git a/old/55278-0.txt b/old/55278-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 317ac31..0000000 --- a/old/55278-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6621 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Chess Generalship, Vol. I. Grand -Reconnaissance, by Franklin K. Young - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Chess Generalship, Vol. I. Grand Reconnaissance - -Author: Franklin K. Young - -Release Date: August 6, 2017 [EBook #55278] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CHESS GENERALSHIP, VOL. I. *** - - - - -Produced by Donald Cummings, Adrian Mastronardi and the -Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net -(This file was produced from images generously made -available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - - - - - - - - - - CHESS - GENERALSHIP - - BY - FRANKLIN K. YOUNG - - _Vol. I._ - GRAND RECONNAISSANCE. - - “_He who first devised chessplay, made a model of the Art - Militarie, representing therein all the concurrents and - contemplations of War, without omitting any._” - - “_Examen de Ingenios._” - - _Juan Huarte, 1616._ - - “_Chess is the deepest of all games; it is constructed to carry - out the principal of a battle, and the whole theory of Chess lies - in that form of action._” - - _Emanuel Lasker._ - - BOSTON - INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING CO. - 1910 - - _Copyright, 1910_, - BY FRANKLIN K. YOUNG. - - _Entered at Stationers’ Hall._ - - _All rights reserved._ - - “_Chess is the gymnasium for the mind--it does for the brain what - athletics does for the body._” - - _Henry Thomas Buckle._ - - GEORGE E. CROSBY CO., PRINTERS, BOSTON, MASS. - - - - -YOUNG’S CHESS WORKS - - - MINOR TACTICS OF CHESS $1.00 - An eminently attractive treatment of the game of - Chess.--_Scientific American._ - - MAJOR TACTICS OF CHESS 2.50 - In this book one finds the principles of strategy - and logistics applied to Chess in a unique and - scientific way.--_Army and Navy Register._ - - GRAND TACTICS OF CHESS 3.50 - For the student who desires to enter the broader - channels of Chess, the best books are by FRANKLIN - K. YOUNG: his “Minor Tactics” and his more elaborate - “Grand Tactics” are the most important productions - of modern Chess literature.--_American Chess Magazine._ - - CHESS STRATEGETICS ILLUSTRATED 2.50 - We know no work outside of the masterpieces of Newton, - Hamilton and Darwin, which so organizes and systematizes - human thought.--_Chicago Evening Post._ - - - * * * * * - - _“There are secrets that the children_ - _Are not taught in public school;_ - _If these secrets were broadcasted,_ - _How could we the masses rule?_ - _If they understood Religion,_ - _Jurisprudence, Trade and War,_ - _Would they groan and sweat and labor--_ - _Make our bricks and furnish straw?”_ - - _Anon._ - - * * * * * - - TO - The Memory - OF - EPAMINONDAS - THE INVENTOR - OF - SCIENTIFIC WARFARE - - * * * * * - - _“I leave no sons_ - _To perpetuate my name;_ - _But I leave two daughters--_ - _LEUCTRA and MANTINEA_ - _Who will transmit my fame_ - _To remotest posterity.”_ - - * * * * * - - _“For empire and greatness it importeth most that a people - do profess arms as their principal honor, study and - occupation.”--Sir Francis Bacon._ - - * * * * * - - _“There is nothing truly imposing but Military Glory.”--Napoleon._ - - * * * * * - - _“The conquered in war, sinking beneath the tribute exacted - by the victor and not daring to utter their impotent hatred, - bequeath to their children miseries so extreme that the aged have - not further evil to fear in death, nor the youthful any good to - hope in life.”--Xenocles._ - - * * * * * - - _“War is an element established by the Deity in the order of - the World; perpetual peace upon this Earth we inhabit is a - dream.”--Von Moltke._ - - - - -PREFACE - - _“To become a good General one well may begin by playing at - Chess.”--Prince de Condé._ - - -_Except the theatre of actual Warfare, no spot known to man furnishes -such facilities for the practice of combined strategy, tactics and -logistics as does the surface of the Chess-board._ - -To those familiar with the Science of Strategetics, it needs no proof -that ability to play a good game at Chess, indicates the possession of -faculties common to all great military commanders. - -At a certain point, the talent of Morphy for Chess-play and the talent of -Napoleon for Warfare become merged; and beyond this point, their methods -of thought and of action are identical. - -Opportunity to display, and in most spectacular fashion, their singular -and superlative genius, was not wanting to either. - -But unlike the ferocious Corsican, whose “only desire is to find myself -on the battlefield,” the greatest of all Masters at Chess, found in the -slaughter of his fellow-creatures no incentive sufficient to call forth -those unsurpassed strategetical powers, which recorded Chess-play shows -he possessed. - -From this sameness of talent, common to the great Chess-player and the -great military commander, arises the practical utility of the Royal Game. - -For by means of Chess-play, one may learn and practice in their highest -interpretation, mental and physical processes of paramount importance to -the community in time of extreme peril. - -From such considerations and for the further reason that in a true -Republic all avenues to greatness are open to merit, scientific -Chess-play should be intelligently and systematically taught in the -public schools. “A people desirous of liberty will entrust its defense to -none but themselves,” says the Roman maxim, and in crises, woe to that -land where the ruler is but a child in arms, and where the disinclination -of the people towards its exercise is equalled by their unfamiliarity -with the military habit. - -Despite the ethics of civilization, the optimism of the “unco guid” and -the unction even of our own heart’s deep desire, there seems no doubt but -that each generation will have its wars. - -“_Pax perpetua_,” writes Leibnitz, “exists only in God’s acre.” Here on -earth, if seems that men forever will continue to murder one another for -various reasons; all of which, in the future as in the past, will be good -and sufficient to the fellow who wins; and this by processes differing -only in neatness and despatch. - -Whether this condition is commendable or not, depends upon the point -of view. Being irremediable, such phase of the subject hardly is worth -discussing. However, the following by a well-qualified observer, is -interesting and undeniably an intelligent opinion, viz.: - - -From the essay on “WAR,” read by Prof. John Ruskin at Woolwich, (Eng.) -Military Academy. - -“All the pure and noble arts of Peace are founded on War; no great Art -ever rose on Earth, but among a nation of soldiers. - -“As Peace is established or extended the Arts decline. They reach an -unparalleled pitch of costliness, but lose their life, enlist themselves -at last on the side of luxury and corruption and among wholly tranquil -nations, wither utterly away. - -“So when I tell you that War is the foundation of all the Arts, I mean -also that it is the foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of -men. - -“It was very strange for me to discover this and very dreadful--but I saw -it to be quite an undeniable fact. - -“We talk of Peace and Learning, of Peace and Plenty, of Peace and -Civilization; but I found that those were not the words which the Muse of -History coupled together; but that on her lips the words were--Peace and -Selfishness, Peace and Sensuality, Peace and Corruption, Peace and Death. - -“I found in brief, that all great nations learned their truth of word and -strength of thought in War; that they were nourished in War and wasted in -Peace; taught by War and deceived by Peace; trained by War and betrayed -by Peace; that they were born in War and expired in Peace. - -“Creative, or foundational War, is that in which the natural -restlessness and love of contest among men, is disciplined into modes of -beautiful--though it may be fatal--play; in which the natural ambition -and love of Power is chastened into aggressive conquest of surrounding -evil; and in which the natural instincts of self-defence are sanctified -by the nobleness of the institutions which they are appointed to defend. - -“For such War as this all men are born; in such War as this any man may -happily die; and forth from such War as this have arisen throughout the -Ages, all the highest sanctities and virtues of Humanity.” - - * * * * * - -That our own country may escape the common lot of nations, is something -not even to be hoped. - -Defended by four almost bottomless ditches, nevertheless it is a -certainty that coming generations of Americans must stand in arms, not -only to repel foreign aggression, but to uphold even the integrity of the -Great Republic; and with the hand-writing of coming events flaming on the -wall, posterity well may heed the solemn warning of by-gone centuries: - -“_As man is superior to the brute, so is a trained and educated soldier -superior to the merely brave, numerous and enthusiastic._” - - * * * * * - -_“The evils to be apprehended from a standing army are remote and in -my judgment, not to be dreaded; but the consequence of lacking one is -inevitable ruin.”--Washington._ - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - PREFACE VII - - INTRODUCTORY XIII - - CHESS GENERALSHIP 3 - - GRAND RECONNAISSANCE 23 - Military Examples 28 - - ORGANIZATION 45 - Military Examples 59 - - TOPOGRAPHY 73 - Military Examples 85 - - MOBILITY 97 - Military Examples 116 - - NUMBERS 123 - Military Examples 127 - - TIME 139 - Military Examples 142 - - POSITION 147 - Military Examples 158 - - PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS 169 - - PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION 185 - - _“The progress of Science universally is retarded, because - sufficient attention is not paid to explaining essentials in - particular and exactly to define the terms employed.”--Euclid._ - - * * * * * - - _“The first care of the sage should be to discover the true - character of his pupils. By his questions he should assist them - to explain their own ideas and by his answers he should compel - them to perceive their falsities. By accurate definitions he - should gradually dispel the incongruities in their earlier - education and by his subtlety in arousing their doubts, he should - redouble their curiosity and eagerness for information; for the - art of the instructor consists in inciting his pupils to that - point at which they cannot endure their manifest ignorance._ - - _“Many, unable to undergo this trial and confounded by offended - self-conceit and lacking the fortitude to sustain correction, - forsake their master, who should not be eager to recall them. - Others who learn from humiliation to distrust themselves should - no longer have snares spread for their vanity. The master should - speak to them neither with the severity of a censor nor with - the haughtiness of a sophist, nor deal in harsh reproaches nor - importunate complaints; his discourse should be the language of - reason and friendship in the mouth of experience.”--Socrates._ - - - - -INTRODUCTORY - - _“The test is as true of cerebral power, as if a hundred thousand - men lay dead upon the field; or a score of hulks were swinging - blackened wrecks, after a game between two mighty admirals.”--Dr. - Oliver Wendell Holmes._ - - (Opening Address at Morphy Banquet, Boston, 1859.) - - -_Men whose business it is to understand war and warfare often are amused -by senseless comparisons made by writers who, as their writings show, are -ignorant even of the rudiments of military art and science. Of course a -certain license in expression of thought is not to be denied the layman; -he cannot be expected to talk with the exactness of the man who knows. At -the same time there is a limit beyond which the non-technical man passes -at his peril, and this limit is reached when he poses as a critic and -presumes to dogmatize on matters in regard to which he is uninformed._ - -The fanciful conjectures of such people, well are illustrated by the -following editorial _faux pas_, perpetrated by a leading metropolitan -daily, viz.: - - “_Everyone knows now that a future war between states having - similar and substantially equal equipments will be a different - affair from any war of the past; characterized by a different - order of generalship and a radically novel application of the - principles of strategy and tactics._” - -Many in the struggle to obtain their daily bread, are tempted to essay -the unfamiliar, and for a stipulated wage to pose as teachers to the -public. - -Such always will do well to write modestly in regard to sciences which -they have not studied and of arts which they never practiced, and -especially in future comments on Military matters, such people may profit -by the appended modicum of that ancient history, which newspaper men as a -class so affect to despise, and in regard to which, as a rule, they are -universally and lamentably, ignorant. - -What orders of Generalship can exist in the future, different from those -which always have existed since war was made, viz.: good generalship and -bad generalship? - -Ability properly to conduct an army is a concrete thing; it does not -admit of comparison. Says Frederic the Great: - -“There are only two kinds of Generals--those who know their trade and -those who do not.” - -Hence, “a different order of Generalship,” suggested by the editorial -quoted, implies either a higher or a lesser degree of ability in the -“general of the future”; and as obviously, it is impossible that he can -do worse than many already have done, it is necessary to assume that the -commander of tomorrow will be an improvement over his predecessors. - -Consequently, to the military mind it becomes of paramount interest to -inquire as to the form and manner in which such superiority will be -tangibly and visibly manifested, viz.: - -Will the general of the future be a better general than Epaminondas, -Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, -Frederic, Washington, Napoleon, Von Moltke? - -Will he improve upon that application of the principles of strategy and -tactics to actual warfare which comes down to us of today, stamped with -the approval of these superlative military geniuses? - -Will the general of the future know a better way for making war than -acting against the enemy’s communications? - -Will he devise a better method of warfare than that whose motive is the -concentration of a superior force upon the strategetic objective? - -Will the processes of his prime logistic operations be preferable to -those of men who won their victories before their battles were fought, by -combining with their troops the topography of the country, and causing -rivers and mountains to take the place of corps d’armee? - -Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that -military organization founded centuries before the Christian Era, by the -great Theban, Epaminondas, the father of scientific warfare; that system -adopted by every captain of renown and which may be seen in its purity in -the greater military establishments from the days of Rome to the present -Imperial North German Confederation? - -Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that -system of Minor Tactics utilized by every man who has made it his -business to conquer the World? Will he propose to us something more -perfect than the primary formation of forces depicted in Plate XIII of -the Secret Strategical Instructions of Frederic II? - -Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless those -intricate, but mathematically exact, evolutions of the combined arms, -which appertain to the Major Tactics of men who are remembered to this -day for the battles that they won? - -Will he invent processes more destructive than those whereby Epaminondas -crushed at Leuctra and Mantinea the power of Sparta, and the women of -Lacedaemon saw the smoke of an enemy’s camp fire for the first time in -six hundred years? - -Than those whereby Alexander, a youth of eighteen, won Greece for his -father at Chaeronea and the World for himself at Issus and Arbela? Than -those whereby Hannibal destroyed seriatim four Roman armies at Trebia, -Thrasymenus, Cannae and Herdonea? - -Will he find out processes more sudden and decisive than those whereby -Caesar conquered Gaul and Pompey and the son of Mithridates, and which -are fitly described only in his own language; “Veni, vidi, vici”? - -What will the general of the future substitute for the three contiguous -sides of the octagon whereby Tamerlane the Great with his 1,400,000 -veterans at the Plains of Angora, enveloped the Emperor Bajazet and -900,000 Turks in the most gigantic battle of record? - -Will he eclipse the pursuit of these latter by Mizra, the son of -Tamerlane, who with the Hunnish light cavalry rode two hundred and thirty -miles in five days and captured the Turkish capital, the Emperor Bajazet, -his harem and the royal treasure? - -Will he excel Gustavus Adolphus, who dominated Europe for twenty years, -and Turenne, the military Atlas who upheld that magnificent civilization -which embellishes the reign of Louis XIV? - -Will he do better than Prince Eugene, who victoriously concluded eighteen -campaigns and drove the Turks out of Christendom? - -Will he discover processes superior to those whereby Frederic the Great -with 22,000 troops destroyed at Rosbach a French army of 60,000 regulars -in an hour and a half, at the cost of three hundred men; and at Leuthern -with 33,000 troops, killed, wounded or captured 54,000 out of 93,000 -Austrians, at a cost of 3,900 men? - -Will he improve on those processes whereby Napoleon with 40,000 men, -destroyed in a single year five Austrian armies and captured 150,000 -prisoners? Will he improve on Rivoli, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, -Wagram, Dresden, and Ligny? - -Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that -system of Grand Tactics, by means of which the mighty ones of Earth have -swept before them all created things? - -Will his system surpass in grandeur of conception and exactness of -execution the march of Alexander to the Indus? Will he reply to his -rival’s prayers for peace and amity as did the great Macedonian; “There -can be but one Master of the World”; and to the dissuasions of his -friend; “So would I do, were I Parmenio”? - -Will he do things more gigantic than Hannibal’s march across the Alps? - -Than the operation of Alesia by Caesar; where the Romans besieging one -Gallic army in a fortified city, and themselves surrounded by a second -Gallic army, single handed destroyed both? Than the circuit of the -Caspian Sea by the 200,000 light cavalry of Tamerlane, a feat of mountain -climbing which never has been duplicated? Than that marvelous combination -of the principles of tactics and of field fortification, whereby in the -position of Bunzelwitz, Frederic the Great, with 55,000 men, successfully -upheld the last remaining prop of the Prussian nation, against 250,000 -Russian and Austrian regular troops, commanded by the best generals of -the age? - -Will he conceive anything more scientific and artistic than the manoeuvre -of Trenton and Princeton by Washington? Than the capture of Burgoyne at -Saratoga and Cornwallis at Yorktown? Than the manoeuvres of Ulm, of Jena, -of Landshut? Than the manoeuvres of Napoleon in 1814? Than the manoeuvre -of Charleroi in 1815, declared by Jomini to be Napoleon’s masterpiece? -Will he excel the manoeuvres of Kutosof and Wittsengen in 1812-13 and -of Blucher on Paris in 1814 and on Waterloo in 1815; each of which -annihilated for the time being the military power of France? - -Will he devise military conceptions superior to those whereby Von Moltke -overthrew Denmark in six hours, Austria in six days, and France in six -weeks? - - * * * * * - -The sapient race of quill-drivers ever has hugged to its breast -many delusions; some of which border upon the outer intellectual -darkness. One of these delusions is that most persistently advertised, -least substantial, but forever darling first favorite of timid and -inexperienced minds: “_The pen is mightier than the sword._” - -Explanation of the invincible ignorance of the penny-a-liner is simple, -viz.: - -Of the myriad self-appointed educators to the public, few are familiar -even with the rudimentary principles of Military Science and almost none -are acquainted even with the simplest processes of Strategetic Art. -Hence, like all who discourse on matters which they do not understand, -such writers continually confound together things which have no -connection. - -Ignorant of war and the use of weapons; bewildered by the prodigious -improvements in mechanical details, they immoderately magnify the -importance of such improvements, oblivious to the fact that these latter -relate exclusively to elementary tactics and in no way affect the system -of Strategy, Logistics, and the higher branches of Tactics. - -Of such people, the least that can be said and that in all charity, is, -that before essaying the role of the pedagogue, they should endeavor to -grasp that most obvious of all truths: - - “_A man cannot teach what he never has learned._” - -Says Frederic the Great: “Improvements and new discoveries in implements -of warfare will be made continually; and generals then alive must modify -tactics to comply with these novelties. But the Grand Art of taking -advantage of topographical conditions and of the faulty disposition of -the opposing forces, ETERNALLY WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED in the military -system.” - - * * * * * - -Naturally, the student now is led to inquire: - -What then is this immutable military system? What are its text books, -where is it taught and from whom is it to be learned? - -In answer it may be stated: - -At the present day, private military schools make no attempt to teach -more than elementary tactics. Even the Governmental academy curriculum -aims little higher than the school of the battalion. - -Scientific Chess-play begins where these institutions leave off, and ends -at that goal which none of these institutions even attempt to reach. - -Chess teaches to conduct campaigns, to win battles, and to move troops -securely and effectively in the presence of and despite the opposition of -an equal or superior enemy. - -Military schools graduate boys as second-lieutenants commanding a -platoon. Chess graduates Generals, able to mobilize Corps d’armee, -whatever their number or location; to develop these into properly posted -integers of a grand Strategic Front and to manoeuvre and operate the army -as a Strategetic Unit, in accordance to the laws of the Strategetic art -and the principles of the Strategetic science. - -By precept and by actual practice, Chess teaches what is _NOT_ taught in -any military school--that least understood and most misunderstood; that -best guarded and most invaluable of all State Secrets-- - -The profession of - -GENERALSHIP. - - * * * * * - - _“Books will speak plain when counsellors blanch. Therefore it - is good to be conversant with them; especially the books of such - as themselves have been actors upon the stage.”--Sir Francis - Bacon._ - - * * * * * - - _“At this moment, Europe, which fears neither God nor devil, - grovels in terror before a little man hardly five feet in height; - who, clad in a cocked hat and grey great-coat and mounted upon a - white horse, plods along through mud and darkness; followed by - the most enthusiastic, most devoted and most efficient band of - cut-throats and robbers, the world has ever seen.”_ - - * * * * * - - _“Many good soldiers are but poor generals.”--Hannibal._ - - * * * * * - - _“No soldier serving under a victorious commander, ever has - enough of war.”--Caesar._ - - * * * * * - - _“Officers always should be chosen from the nobility and never - from the lower orders of society; for the former, no matter how - dissolute, always retain a sense of honor, while the latter, - though guilty of atrocious actions, return to their homes - without compunction and are received by their families without - disapprobation.”--Frederic the Great._ - - * * * * * - - At the terrible disaster of Cannae, the Patrician Consul Aemilius - Paulus and 80,000 Romans died fighting sword in hand; while - the Plebian Consul, Varro, fled early in the battle. Upon the - return of the latter to Rome, the Senate, instead of ordering his - execution, with withering sarcasm formally voted him its thanks - and the thanks of the Roman people, “that he did not despair of - the Republic.” - - * * * * * - - _“Among us we have a man of singular character--one Phocion. - He seems not to know that he lives in our modern age and at - incomparable Athens. He is poor, yet is not humiliated by his - poverty; he does good, yet never boasts of it; and gives advice, - though he is certain it will not be followed. He possesses talent - without ambition and serves the state without regard to his own - interest. At the head of the army, he contents himself with - restoring discipline and beating the enemy. When addressing the - assembly, he is equally unmoved by the disapprobation or the - applause of the multitude._ - - _“We laugh at his singularities and we have discovered an - admirable secret for revenging ourselves for his contempt. He - is the only general we have left--but we do not employ him; he - is the most upright and perhaps the most intelligent of our - counsellors--but we do not listen to him. It is true, we cannot - make him change his principles, but, by Heaven, neither shall he - induce us to change ours; and it never shall be said that by the - example of his superannuated virtues and the influence of his - antique teachings, Phocion was able to correct the most polished - and amiable people in the world.”--Callimedon._ - - - - -GENERALSHIP - - - - -CHESS GENERALSHIP - - _“In Chess the soldiers are the men and the General is the mind - of the player.”--Emanuel Lasker._ - - * * * * * - - _“It is neither riches nor armies that make a nation formidable; - but the courage and genius of the Commander-in-Chief.”--Frederic - the Great._ - - * * * * * - - _“Ho! Ye Macedonians! Because together we have conquered the - World, think ye to give law to the blood of Achilles and to - withstand the dictates of the Son of Jupiter?_ - - _“Choose ye a new commander, draw yourselves up for battle; I - will lead against you those Persians whom ye so despise, and if - you are victorious, by Mehercule, I will do everything that you - desire.”--Alexander the Great._ - - * * * * * - - _“It is I and I alone, who give you your glory and your - success.”--Napoleon._ - - * * * * * - - _“My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways, My - ways, saith the Lord.”--Holy Bible._ - - -_By authority indisputable, the ex-cathedra dictum of the greatest of the -Great Captains, we have been informed that the higher processes of the -military system, eternally will remain unchanged._ - -_As a necessary corollary, it follows that these processes always have -been and always will be comprehended and employed by every great Captain._ - -_Equally, it is self-evident, that capability to comprehend these higher -processes, united with ability properly to utilize them to win battles -and campaigns, constitutes genius for Warfare._ - -Moreover, we are further informed by the same unimpeachable authority, -that so irresistible is genius for warfare, that united to courage, it -is formidable beyond the united financial and military resources of the -State. In corroboration of this, we have the testimony of well-qualified -judges. Says the Count de Saxe: - -“Unless a man is born with talent for war and this talent is brought -to perfection, it is impossible for him to be more than an indifferent -general.” - - * * * * * - -In these days, more or less degenerate from the soldierly standpoint, the -fantastic sophistries of Helvetius have vogue, and most people believe -book-learning to be all-in-all. - -Many are so weak-minded, as really to believe, that because born in -the Twentieth Century, they necessarily are the repository of all -the virtues, and particularly of all the knowledge acquired by their -ancestors from remotest generations. Few seem to understand that the -child, even of ultra-modern conditions, is born just as ignorant and -often invincibly so, as were the sons of Ham, Shem and Japhet, and most -appear to be unaware, that: - -_Only by intelligent reflection upon their own experience and upon the -experiences of others, can one acquire knowledge._ - -The triviality of crowding the memory with things that may or may not be -true, is the merest mimicry of education. - -Real education is nothing more than the fruit of experience; and he who -acts in conformity to such knowledge, alone is wise. Thus to act, implies -ability to comprehend. But there are those in whom capability is limited; -hence, all may not be wise who wish to be so, and these necessarily -remain through life very much as they are born. - -The use of knowledge would be infinitely more certain, if our -understanding of its accurate application were as extensive as our needs -require. We have only a few ideas of the attributes of matter and of the -laws of mechanics, out of an infinite number of secrets which mankind -never can hope to discover. This renders our feeble adaptations in -practice of the knowledge we possess, oftimes inadequate for the result -we desire; and it seems obvious that if Nature had intended man to attain -to the superlative, she would have endowed him with intelligence and have -communicated to him information, infinitely superior to that we possess. - -The universal blunder of mankind arises from an hallucination that all -minds are created equal; and that by mere book-learning, _i.e._, simply -by memorizing what somebody says are facts it is possible for any man to -attain to superior and even to superlative ability. - - * * * * * - -Such profoundly, but utterly mis-educated people, not unnaturally may -inquire, by what right speaks the eminent warrior previously quoted. -These properly may be informed in the words of Frederic the Great: - - “_The Count de Saxe is the hero of the bravest action ever done - by man._” viz., - -A great battle was raging. - -Within a magnificent Pavilion in the centre of the French camp, the King, -the nobility and the high Ecclesiastics of the realm were grouped about a -plain iron cot. - -Prone upon this cot, wasted by disease, lay the Count de Saxe, in that -stupor which often precedes and usually presages dissolution. - -The last rites of the Church had been administered, and the assemblage in -silence and apprehension, awaited the approach of a victorious enemy and -the final gasp of a general who had never lost a battle. - -The din of strife drawing nearer, penetrated the coma which enshrouded -the soul of the great Field-Marshal. - -Saxe opened his eyes. His experienced ear told him that his army, routed -and disordered, was flying before an exultant enemy. - -The giant whose pastime it was to tear horseshoes in twain with his bare -hands and to twist nails into corkscrews with his fingers, staggered to -his feet, hoarsely articulating fierce and mandatory ejaculations. - -Hastily clothed, the Count de Saxe was placed in a litter and borne out -of his pavilion into that chaos of ruin and carnage which invariably -accompanies a lost battle. Around him, behind and in front, swarmed his -broken battalions and disorganized squadrons; while in pursuit advanced -majestically in solid column, the triumphant English. - -Saxe demanded his horse and armor. - -Clad in iron and supported in the saddle on either hand, this modern -Achilles galloped to the front of his army; then, at the head of the -Scotch Guards, the Irish Brigade, and French Household troops, Saxe in -person, led that series of terrific hand-to-hand onslaughts which drove -the English army from the field of battle, and gained the famous victory -of Fontenoy. - - * * * * * - -“Furthermore,” declares this illustrious Generalissimo of Louis XIV; - - “_It is possible to make war without trusting anything to - accident; this is the highest point of skill and perfection - within the province of a general._” - -“Most men,” writes Vergetius, “imagine that strength and courage are -sufficient to secure victory. Such are ignorant that when they exist, -stratagem vanquishes strength and skill overcomes courage.” - -In his celebrated work, _Institutorum Rei Militaris_, that source from -whence all writers derive their best knowledge of the military methods -of the ancients; and by means of which, he strove to revive in his -degenerate countrymen that intelligent valor which distinguishes their -great ancestors--the famous Roman reiterates this solemn warning: - - “Victory in war depends not on numbers, nor on courage; skill and - discipline only, can ensure it.” - -The emphasis thus laid by these great warriors on genius for warfare is -still further accentuated by men whose dicta few will dispute, viz., - - “The understanding of the Commander,” says Frederic the Great, - “has more influence on the outcome of the battle or campaign, - than has the prowess of his troops.” - -Says Napoleon: - - “The general is the head, the whole of an army. It was not the - Roman army that subjugated Gaul, it was Caesar; nor was it the - Carthagenian army that made the Republic tremble to the gates - of Rome, it was Hannibal; it was not the Macedonian army which - reached the Indus, it was Alexander; it was not the French army - which carried war to the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne; it - was not the Prussian army which for seven years defended Prussia - against the three strongest powers of Europe, it was Frederic the - Great.” - -From such opinions by men whose careers evince superlative knowledge of -the subject, it is clear, that: - - I. _There exists a system of Strategetics common to all great - commanders_; - - II. _That understanding of this system is shown by the skillful - use of it_; - - III. _That such skill is derived from innate capability_; - - IV. _That those endowed by Nature with this talent, must bring - their gifts to perfection, by intelligent study_. - -So abstruse are the processes of this greatest of all professions, that -comprehension of it has been evidenced by eleven men only, viz.: - -Epaminondas, Alexander, Caesar, Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, -Eugene, Frederic, Washington, Napoleon, Von Moltke. - -Comprehension of this system can be attained, only by innate capability -brought to perfection by intelligent study of the words and achievements -of these great Captains. - -For life is so short and our memories in general so defective, that we -ought to seek instruction only from the purest sources. - -None but men endowed by Nature with the military mind and trained in the -school of the great Captains, are able to write intelligently on the acts -and motives of generals of the first order. All the writings of mere -literati relative to these uncommon men, no matter how excellent such -authors may be, never can rise to anything more than elegant phraseology. - -It is of enlightened critics, such as the former, that the youthful -student always is first in need. Such will guide him along a road, in -which he who has no conductor may easily lose himself. They will correct -his blunders considerately, recollecting that should these be ridiculed -or treated with severity, talent might be stifled which might hereafter -bloom to perfection. - -It is a difficult matter to form the average student, and to impart to -him that degree of intelligent audacity and confident prudence which is -requisite for the proper practice of the Art of Strategetics. - -To secure proficiency, the student from the beginning must cheerfully -submit himself to a mental discipline, which properly may be termed -severe; in order to make his faculties obedient to his will. - -Secondly, he must regularly exercise these faculties, in order to make -them active and to acquire the habit of implicitly conforming to the laws -of the Art; to make himself familiar with its processes, and to establish -in his mind that confidence in its practice which can come only through -experience. - -The student daily should exercise his mind in the routine of deployments, -developments, evolutions, manoeuvres, and operations, both on the -offensive and on the defensive. These exercises should be imprinted on -the memory by closely reviewing the lesson of the previous day. - -Even with all this severe and constant effort, time is necessary for -practical tactics to become habitual; for the student must become so -familiar with these movements and formations that he can execute them -instantly and with precision. - -To acquire this degree of perfection, much study is necessary; it is a -mistake to think otherwise. But this study is its own sufficient reward, -for the student soon will find that it has extended his ideas, and _that -he is beginning to think in the GREAT_. - -At the same time the student should thoroughly instruct himself in -military history, topography, logic, mathematics, and the science of -fortification. With all of these the strategist must be familiar. - -But his chief aim must be to perfect his judgment and to bring it to the -highest degree of broadness and exactness. - -This is best done by contemplation of the works of the Great Masters. - -The past history of Chess-play, is the true school for those who aspire -to precedence in the Royal Game. It is their first duty to inform -themselves of the processes of the great in every age, in order to shun -their errors and to avail of their methods. - -It is essential to grasp that system of play common to the Masters; to -pursue it step by step. Particularly is it necessary to learn that he who -can best deduce consequences in situations whose outcome is in doubt, -is the competitor who will carry off the prize from others who act less -rationally than himself. - -Especially, should the student be wary in regard to what is termed chess -analysis, as applied to the so-called “openings” and to the mid-game. -Most chess analysts are compilers of falsities occasionally interspersed -with truth. Among the prodigious number of variations which they pretend -to establish or refute, none may be implicitly relied on in actual play; -few are of value except for merely elementary purposes, and many are -fallacies fatal to the user. - -The reason for this is: whenever men invited by curiosity, seek to -examine circumstantially even the less intricate situations on the -Chess-board, they at once become lost in a labyrinth abounding in -obscurities and contradictions. Those, who ignorant of the synthetic -method of calculation, are compelled to depend upon their analytic -powers, quickly find that these, on account of the number of unknown -quantities, are utterly inadequate. - -Any attempt to calculate the true move in Chess-play by analysis, other -than in situations devoid of unknown quantities, is futile. - -Yet it is of such folly that the mediocre mind is most enamoured. -Content with seeing much, it is oblivious to what it cannot see; and the -analytical system consists merely in claiming that there is nothing to -see, other than what it does see. - -This is that slender reed upon which the so-called “chess-analyst” hangs -his claims, oblivious to the basic truth that in analysis, unless all is -known, nothing is known. - -Many delude themselves to the contrary and strive to arrive at correct -conclusions without first having arranged clearly before their minds all -the facts. - -Hence, their opinions and judgments, being founded in ignorance of -all the facts, are to that extent defective; and their conclusions -necessarily wrong. - -Through action taken upon incomplete knowledge, men are beguiled into -error; and it is to such unreason that most human catastrophes are to be -attributed. - - * * * * * - -Most of those who attempt to write on Strategetics, and whether applied -to Chess-play or to Warfare, very quickly are compelled to seek refuge in -vague phrases; in order to conceal their uncertain grasp on the subject -discussed. The uninformed believe in them, because of their reputation, -and are satisfied that the thing is so, without understanding _WHY_. - -Words intended to convey instruction, should not be used except in their -proper meaning. Each word should be defined for the student and its use -regulated. The true use of words being established, there is no longer -danger from a play upon them; or, from different and confused ideas -annexed to them, either by the persons who read, or who employ them. - -By means of this warning, the student easily may detect the empty -mouthings of enthusiastic inexperience, and equally so, the casuistries -of the subtle expert; who often uses language merely to conceal from -youthful talent, knowledge which if imparted, might be fatal to his -domination. - -As the student progresses toward proficiency, he, sooner or later, will -come to realize, that of all disgusting things, to a mind which revolts -at nonsense, reasoning ill is the worst. - -It is distressing, to be afflicted with the absurdities of men, who, -victims of the fancy, confound enthusiasm with capability and mistake -mania for talent. The world is full of such people, who, in all honesty -thinking themselves philosophers, are only visionaries enamoured of their -own lunatic illusions. - -The true discipline for the student who aspires to proficiency at -Chess-play, is, in every succeeding game, to imitate more closely the -play of the Great Masters; and to endeavor to take his measures with more -attention and judgment than in any preceding. - -Every player at Chess has defects; many have very great ones. In -searching for these one should not treat himself tenderly, and when -examining his faults, he should grant himself no quarter. - -Particularly should the student cultivate confidence in and rigidly -adhere to the standard of skill, as interpreted by that immutable System -of Chess-play, of which Morphy is the unapproachable and all-sufficient -exponent. - -Observing the lack of method displayed by the incompetent -Chess-commander, the student of this system will remark with -astonishment, the want of plan and the entire absence of co-operation -between the various Chessic corps d’armee, which under such leadership -are incapable of a general effort. - -How dense is such a leader in the selection of a project, how slow and -slovenly in its execution; how many opportunities does he suffer to -escape him and how many enormous faults does he not commit? To such -things, the numerically weaker but more skillful opponent, often is -indebted for safety and ultimately for success. - -One who is opposed by such blockheads, necessarily must gain advantages -continually; for conduct so opposite to all the laws of the Art, is, in -itself, sufficient to incur ruin. It is for such negligence on his own -part that one often has cause bitterly to reproach himself. But such -errors, especially on the part of great players, are exemplary lessons -for the student, who from them may learn to be more prudent, circumspect, -and wise. - - * * * * * - -Those who make a mere pastime of Chess, who have no desire for the true -benefit of the game, do not deserve information. - -Such people are more numerous than may be supposed. They have few -coherent ideas and are usually influenced by mere chatter and by writers -whose sole excuse is enthusiasm. - -These players at the game cannot benefit by example. The follies -of others afford them no useful lesson. Each generation of such -“wood-shifters,” has blindly followed in the footsteps of those preceding -and daily is guilty of errors which times innumerable have been fully -exposed. - -It is the darling habit of such folk to treat the great things in Chess -with levity and to dignify those insignificant matters which appertain to -the game when used as a plaything. - -Such people are merely enthusiastic; usually they are equally frivolous. -They do everything from fancy, nothing from design. Their zeal is strong, -but they can neither regulate nor control it. - -Such bear about their Chessic disabilities in their character. Inflated -in good fortune, groveling in adversity, these players never attain to -that sage contemplation, which renders the scientific practice of Chess -so indescribably beautiful. - -There is another class of Chess-players who from mere levity of mind are -incapable of steadily pursuing any fixed plan; but who overturn, move by -move, even such advantages as their good fortune may have procured. There -are others, who, although possessed of great vivacity of mind and eager -for information, yet lack that patience necessary to receive instruction. - -Lastly, there are not a few whose way of thinking and the validity of -whose calculations, depend upon their good or ill digestion. - -It is in vain that such people endeavor to divine things beyond their -understanding. Hence it is, that among those incapable of thought, or -too indolent for mental effort, the game proceeds in easy fashion until -routine is over. Afterward, at each move, the most probable conjecture -passes for the best reason and victory ultimately rests with him whose -blunders are least immediately consequential. - - * * * * * - -Understanding of high art is dispensed only to the few; the great mass -neither can comprehend nor enjoy it. In spite of the good natured -Helvetius, all are not wise who wish to be so and men ever will remain -what Nature made them. It is impossible for the stream to rise higher -than its source. - -“The progress of human reason,” writes the great Frederic, “is more slow -than is imagined; the true cause of which is that most men are satisfied -with vague notions of things and but few take time for examination and -deep inquiry. - -“Some, fettered by prejudice from their infancy, wish not, or are unable -to break their chains; others, delighting in frivolity know not a word -of mathematics and enjoy life without allowing their pleasures to be -interrupted by a moment of reflection. Should one thinking man in a -thousand be discovered it will be much; and it is for him that men of -talent write. - -“The rest naturally are offended, for nothing so enrages the mediocre -mind as to be compelled to admit to itself its own inferiority. -Consequently, they consign book, author, and reader conjointly to Satan. -So much easier is it to condemn than to refute, or to learn.” - - * * * * * - -The early success of many young students does not permit them to observe -that they often have departed from the rules of the Art. As they have -escaped punishment for their errors, they remain unacquainted with the -dangers to which they were exposed. Constant good fortune finally makes -them over-confident and they do not suspect it necessary to change their -measures, even when in the presence of an able foe. - -Thus, the youthful tyro, inconsiderate, inconsistent, and turbulent, and -oblivious to the innumerable dangers by which he is surrounded, plays -his pieces hither and thither, as fancy and inclination dictate, culling -bouquets of the most gorgeous flowers of the imagination; thoughtless of -the future and perfectly happy because he cannot reflect. - -To reason exactly, the student first must rid his mind of all -preconceived notions; he must regard the matter under consideration -as a blank sheet of paper, upon which nothing is to be written save -those things which by the processes of logic and demonstration, are -established as facts. - -There is much difference between the Art of Logic and mere conjecture. - -The calculations of arithmeticians, though rigorous and exact, are never -difficult; because they relate to known quantities and to the palpable -objects of nature. But when it is required to argue from combining -circumstances, the least ignorance of uncertain and obscure facts breaks -the chain and we are deceived every moment. - -This is no defect of the understanding, but error arising from plausible -ideas, which wear the face of and are too quickly accepted for truth. -A long chapter can be written on the different ways in which men lose -themselves in their conjectures. Innumerable examples of this are not -wanting, and all because they have suffered themselves to be hurried away -and thus to be precipitate in drawing their conclusions. - -The part that the General, whether in Chess-play or in Warfare, has -to act, always is more difficult because he must not permit himself -the least mistake, but is bound to behave with prudence and sagacity -throughout a long series of intricate processes. A single false -deduction, or a movement of the enemy unintelligible to a commander, -may lead him to commit an irremediable error; and in cases wherein the -situation is beyond comprehension, his ignorance is invincible. - -For however extensive the human mind may be, it never is sufficiently so -to penetrate those minute combinations necessary to be developed in order -to foresee and regulate events, the sequence, utility and even existence -of which, depend upon future contingencies. - -Incidents which are past, can be explained clearly, because the reasons -therefor are manifest. But men easily deceive themselves concerning the -future, which, by a veil of innumerable and impenetrable secondary -causes, is concealed from the most prying inspection. - -In such situations, how puerile are the projects even of the greatest -Strategist. To him, as much as to the tyro, is the future hidden; he -knows not what shall happen, even on the next move. How then may he -foresee those situations which secondary causes later may produce? - -Circumstances most often oblige him to act contrary to his wishes; and -in the flux and reflux of fortune, it is the part of prudence to conform -to system and to act with consistency. It is impossible to foresee all -events. - - * * * * * - -“It is not possible,” writes the Count de Saxe, “to establish a -system without first being acquainted with the _principles_ that must -necessarily support it.” - -In corroboration of this is the opinion of Frederic the Great: - -“Condemned by my unfortunate stars to philosophies on contingencies and -on probabilities I employ my whole attention to examine the _principle_ -on which my argument must rest and to procure all possible information on -that point. Deprived of such precaution, the edifice I erect, wanting a -base, would fall like a house of cards.” - -Everyone who does not proceed on principle, is inconsistent in his -conduct. Equally so, whenever the principle on which one acts is false, -_i.e._, does not apply to the existing situation; all deductions based -thereon, if applied to the existing situation, necessarily are false. - -“Those principles which the Art of Warfare prescribes, never should be -departed from,” writes Frederic the Great, “and generals rigidly should -adhere to those circumspections and never swerve from implicit obedience -to laws, upon whose exact observance depends the safety of their armies -and the success of their projects.” - -Thus the student will clearly see that all other calculations, though -never so ingeniously imagined, are of small worth in comparison with -comprehension of the use of Strategetic principles. By means of these -latter, we are taught to control the raging forces which dominate in the -competitive arts and to compel obedience from friend and foe alike. - -“To the shame of humanity it must be confessed,” writes Frederic the -Great, “that what often passes for authority and consequence is mere -assumption, used as a cloak to conceal from the layman the extreme of -official indolence and stupidity. - -“To follow the routine of service, to be busied concerning food and -clothing, and to eat when others eat, to fight when others fight, are the -whole warlike deeds of the majority and constitute what is called having -seen service and grown grey in arms. - -“The reason why so many officers remain in a state of mediocrity, is -because they neither know, nor trouble themselves to inquire into the -causes either of their victories or defeats, although such causes are -exceedingly real.” - -In this connection, writes Polybius, the friend and biographer of -Hannibal: - -“Having made ourselves masters of the subject of Warfare, we shall no -longer ascribe success to Fortune and blindly applaud mere conquerors, -as the ignorant do; but we shall approve and condemn from Principle and -Reason.” - -To the Chess-student nothing can be more conclusive than the following: - -“My success at Chess-play,” writes Paul Morphy, “is due to rigid -adherence to fixed rules and Principles.” - - * * * * * - -_“Chess is best fought on Principles, free from all deception and -trickery.”--Wilhelm Steinitz._ - - - - -GRAND RECONNAISSANCE - - _“Man can sway the future, only by foreseeing through a clear - understanding of the present, to what far off end matters are - tending.”--Caesar._ - - * * * * * - - _“From the erroneous ideas they form in regard to good and evil, - the ignorant, the mis-educated and the inexperienced always act - without precisely knowing what they ought to desire, or what they - ought to fear; and it is not in the end they propose, but in the - choice of means, that most deceive themselves.”--Aristotle._ - - - - -GRAND RECONNAISSANCE - - _“In every situation the principal strategical requirements must - clearly be defined and all other things must be subordinated to - these considerations.”--Frederic the Great._ - - * * * * * - - _“One should seek to obtain a knowledge of causes, rather than - of effects; and should endeavor to reason from the known, to the - unknown.”--Euclid._ - - -_The province of Grand Reconnaissance is exactly to determine the -relative advantages and disadvantages in time, numbers, organization, -topography, mobility and position, which appertain to hostile armies -contained in the same strategetic plane; and to designate those Corps -d’armee by which such advantages are materially expressed._ - -Those processes which appertain to the making of Grand Reconnaissance, -necessarily are argumentative; inasmuch as all the facts never are -determinate. - -Consequently, talent of the highest order is required for the deducing -of conclusions which never can be based upon exact knowledge, and which -always must contemplate the presence of numerous unknown quantities. - -The responsibilities inherent to Grand Reconnaissance never are to be -delegated to, nor thrust upon subordinates. Scouts, spies, and informers -of every kind, have their manifold and proper uses, but such uses never -rise above furnishing necessary information in regard to topographical, -tactical, and logistic details. - -The Commander-in-chief alone is presumed to possess knowledge and skill -requisite to discern what strategetically is fact and what is not fact; -and to ascribe to each fact its proper place and sequence. - -Lack of military talent and of Strategetic knowledge, never is more -strikingly shown than by negligence or inability in this regard. - -Incompetents, ignorant of this truth, and oblivious to its importance, -devolve such vital responsibility upon subordinates; and later, these -legalized murderers palliate the slaughter of their troops and the -national shame by publicly reprimanding men serving at shillings per -month, for failing in a service, which were the latter able to perform, -would entitle them to the gold epaulets and general’s pay, of which their -commander is the unfit recipient. - - * * * * * - -Knowledge of the number, organization, position and movements of the -enemy’s troops is the basic element for correct calculation in campaign -and battle. - -Such things to be accurately estimated must be closely inspected. -All speculation and all conjecture in regard to these matters is but -frivolity. - -It is by being precipitate and hasty in making such conclusions, that men -are deceived, for to judge rightly of things before they become clearly -shown is most difficult. - -_To act on uncertainty is WRONG._ - -We do not know all the facts and a single iota of light later on may -oblige us to condemn that which we previously have approved. - - * * * * * - -In the making of Grand Reconnaissance, one always must be wary of placing -too much confidence in appearances and in first impressions. Especially -must care be taken not to magnify the weaknesses of the hostile army, nor -the efficacy of the kindred position. - -Also, one never should underrate: - - 1. The talents of the opposing commander; nor - - 2. The advantages possessed by the opposing army: - - (a) In numbers, - - (b) In organization, - - (c) In position, - - (d) In topography, - - (e) In time, - - (f) In mobility. - -It is a first essential, constantly to note the movements of the enemy, -in order to detect his plans and the exact location of his corps. - -These things are the only reliable guides for determining the true course -of procedure. It must be left to the enemy to show by his movements and -the posts which he occupies, the measures he projects for the future, and -until these are known, it is not proper to _ACT_. Hence: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_All movements of Corps Offensive should be governed by the POSITION of -the hostile army, and all movements of Corps Defensive should be governed -by the MOVEMENTS of the hostile army._ - -As soon as the enemy begins a movement, his intentions become clear. It -is then possible to make precise calculations. - -But be not hasty to build conclusions upon uncertain information and -do not take any resolutions until certain what are the numbers, the -position, the objectives, and the projects of the enemy. - -However interesting an undertaking may appear, one should not be seduced -by it while ill-informed of the obstacles to be met and the possibility -of not having sufficient force in the theatre of action. - -Chimerical schemes should be abandoned at their inception. Reason, -instead of extravagancies of the fancy, always must be the guide. Men, -most courageous, often undertake fearful difficulties, but impracticable -things they leave to lunatics. - -In all situations, one must beware of venturing beyond his depth. It is -wiser to keep within the limits which the knowledge we possess shall -prescribe. - -Especially in crises, one must proceed most cautiously until sure -information is acquired; for over-haste is exceedingly dangerous, -when exact knowledge is lacking of the enemy’s numbers, position, and -movements. - - -PRINCIPLE - -_Situations always should be contemplated as they EXIST, never as they -OUGHT to be, or, perhaps, MAY be._ - -In every important juncture, each step must be profoundly considered; as -little as possible should be left to chance. - -Particularly, must one never be inflated and rendered careless and -negligent by success; nor made spiritless and fearful by reverses. At all -times the General should see things only as they are and attempt what -is dictated by that Strategetic Principle which dominates the given -situation. Fortune often does the rest. - - * * * * * - -_“Napoleon bending over and sometimes lying at full length upon his -map, with a pair of dividers opened to a distance on the scale of from -17 to 20 miles, equal to 22 to 25 miles over country, and marking the -positions of his own and of the hostile armies by sticking into the map -pins surmounted by little balls made of diverse colored sealing wax; in -the twinkling of an eye calculated those wonderful concentrations of his -Corps d’armee upon decisive points and dictated those instructions to his -Marshals which in themselves are a title to glory.”--Baron de Jomini._ - - -MILITARY EXAMPLES - - _“Phillip, King of Macedonia, is the single confidant of his - own secrets, the sole dispenser of his treasure, the most able - general of all Greece, the bravest soldier in his army. He - foresees and executes everything himself; anticipates events, - derives all possible advantages from them and yields to them when - to yield is necessary._ - - _His troops are extremely well disciplined, he exercises them - incessantly. Always himself at their head, they perform with - arms and baggage marches of three hundred stadia with alarming - expedition and making no difference between summer or winter, - between fatigue and rest._ - - _He takes no step without mature reflection, nor proceeds to a - second until he is assured of the success of the first and his - operations are always dominated by considerations of time and - place.”--Apollodorus._ - -The facility with which one familiar with the Strategetic Art may make -Grand Reconnaissance, even of an invisible theatre of action, and may -evolve accurate deductions from a mass of inexact and contradictory -reports is illustrated by the following practical examples, viz.: - - -FIRST EXAMPLE. - -(From the _New York Journal_, Dec. 26, 1899 By =Franklin K. Young=.) - -“The position of the British armies is deplorable. - -“With the single exception of Gen. Buller’s force, the situation of these -bodies of British troops, thus unfortunately circumstanced, is cause for -the greatest anxiety. - -“Strong indications point to a grand offensive movement on the part of -the Boers, with the object of terminating the war in one campaign and by -a single blow. - -“True, this movement may be but a feint, but if it be a true movement, it -is difficult to over-estimate the gravity of the situation of the British -in South Africa. - -“For if this movement is a true military movement, it shows as clearly -as the sun in the sky to those who know the Strategetic Art, that the -Boer armies are in transition from the defensive to an offensive plan of -campaign, with the purpose of capturing DeArr and from thence advancing -in force against the chief British depot, Capetown.” - - * * * * * - -The United States War Department, _Report on the British-Boer War_, -published June 14, 1901, contains the following: - -(By =Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, December 25, 1899. U. S. Military Attache -with the British Army.) - -“I consider the present situation to be the most critical for the English -forces, since hostilities began. Should the Boers assume offensive -operations, the English armies with their long and thinly guarded lines -of communication, would be placed in great jeopardy.” - - * * * * * - -(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, war correspondent with Gen. Buller and Lord -Roberts in the South African Campaign. MacMillan & Co., 1902.) - -“Had the defence (of Cape Colony) been entrusted to less capable hands -than those of Gen. French, who, with a mere handful of troops succeeded -not only in checking the Boer advance, but in driving them back on -Colesberg, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the enemy would have -been able to push on south and west to Craddock and Hex River range and -thus bring about a state of affairs which might have shaken British rule -in South Africa to its foundation.” - - -SECOND EXAMPLE. - -(_Boston Globe_, Jan. 12, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.) - -“Lord Roberts’ first object will be the rescue of Lord Methuen’s army now -blockaded near Magersfontein by Gen. Conje. - -“As the first step to effect this, the British commander-in-chief at once -and with all his force, will occupy the line from Naauwpoort to De Arr. -There, he will await the arrival of twenty-two transports now en route -from England. - -“With these reinforcements, he will advance directly to the Modder River -by the route previously taken by Lord Methuen.” - - * * * * * - -(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, Sp. Cor. British Army.) - -“Slow to recognize their opportunities, the enemy were still in the midst -of preparation, when Gen. French reached De Arr. Meanwhile a detachment -under Major McCracken occupied Naauwpoort, to which place thirty days’ -supplies for 3000 men and 1100 animals had been ordered. - -“In the ten weeks of fighting which ensued, prior to the arrival of the -British main army, Gen. French by his skillful tactics held a powerful -force of Boers at bay, checked their descent into the southern part of -the colony, defeated their attempt to display the Vierkleur across the -cape peninsular, and materially influenced, if not absolutely determined, -the entire future of the campaign.” - - * * * * * - -(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, Sp. Cor. with British Army.) - -“Arriving at Capetown on Jan. 10, Lord Roberts decided that the line of -march should lead by way of Bloemfontein to Pretoria, initiating the -operation by the concentration of large forces on the Modder River, -forming there an advanced base.” - - -THIRD EXAMPLE. - -(_Boston Globe_, Jan. 21, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.) - -“It is plain that when the Boers took position at Colenso they prepared -their plan for the protection of their flanks; to deny this would be to -assume that men who had displayed superb military sagacity were ignorant -of the simplest processes of warfare. - -“What that plan is will be unfolded very rapidly should Gen. Buller -attempt to pierce the line of Boer vedettes posted upon the Spion Kop and -concealing as near as can be determined from the present meagre facts, -either the Second, or the Fourth Ambuscade. - -“In either case it signifies that the Boers are confident of annihilating -Gen. Buller’s army if it should cross the Tugela. - -“About this time the Boers are watching Gen. Warren and his command and -watching him intently. Something may happen to him.” - - * * * * * - -(_London Times_, Jan. 22, 1900.) - -“On Friday, Jan. 19, Gen. Warren began a long, circuitous march to the -westward for the purpose of turning the right of the Boer position. - -“This attempt was abandoned on account of the long ridge running from -Spion Kop being occupied by the Boers in such strength as to command the -entire route. - -“Saturday, Jan. 20, Gen. Warren, having crossed the Tugela River with the -bulk of his troops, ordered a frontal attack. Our men behaved splendidly -under a heavy cross-fire for seven hours. Our casualties were slight. -Three lines of rifle fire[1] were visible along the Boer main position.” - -[1] The Second Ambuscade. Vide “Secret Instructions” of Frederic the -Great. - - * * * * * - -(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 22, 1900.) - -“Gen. Warren has been engaged all day chiefly on his left, which he has -swung forward a couple of miles.” - - (Signed) _Buller._ - - * * * * * - -(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 24, 1900.) - -“Gen. Warren holds the position he gained two days ago. The Boer position -is on higher ground than ours and can be approached only over bare and -open slopes. An attempt will be made tonight to seize Spion Kop.” - - (Signed) _Buller._ - - * * * * * - -(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 25, 1900.) - -“Gen. Warren’s troops last night occupied Spion Kop, surprising the -small[2] garrison which fled.” - - (Signed) _Buller._ - -[2] Merely the outposts and vedettes of the Second Ambuscade. - - * * * * * - -(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 26, 1900.) - -“Gen. Warren’s garrison, I am sorry to say, I find this morning had in -the night abandoned Spion Kop.” - - (Signed) _Buller._ - - * * * * * - -(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 28, 1900.) - -“I decided that a second attack on Spion Kop was useless[3] and that the -enemy’s right was too strong to allow me to force it. Accordingly I -decided to withdraw the troops to the south side of the Tugela River.” - - (Signed) _Buller._ - -[3] The proffer of an untenable post always is the bait of the Second -Ambuscade. - - * * * * * - -(_London Daily Mail_, Jan. 29, 1900.) - -“The richest and what was hitherto considered the most powerful nation -in the world is today in the humiliating position of seeing its armies -beaten back with heavy losses by two small states.” - - -FOURTH EXAMPLE. - -(_Boston Globe_, Feb. 16, 1900, by =Franklin K. Young=.) - -“Lord Roberts’ communications for nearly two hundred miles are exposed -to the attack of an enemy, who at any moment is liable to capture and -destroy his supply and ammunition trains and to reduce the British army -to a condition wherein it will be obliged to fight a battle under most -disadvantageous circumstances.” - - * * * * * - -(From United States War Department _Report on the British Boer War_. By -=Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, U. S. Attache with British Army.) - -“Feb. 15, 1900. The main supply park of the army was attacked by the -enemy near Watervale Drift. - -“This park consisted of one hundred ox-wagons containing rations and one -hundred more wagons filled with ammunition. One hundred and fifty of -these wagons and three thousand oxen were captured by the Boers. - -“The loss of these rations and munitions was a most serious blow. Lord -Roberts was here confronted by a crisis which would have staggered and -been the undoing of many commanders-in-chief placed as he was. - -“He was in the enemy’s country, cut off from his base of supplies on the -railroad and with an unknown number of the enemy in his rear and upon his -line of communication. His transport was nearly all captured and his army -was suddenly reduced to three days full rations on the eve of a great -movement and the country afforded no food whatever. The crisis still -further developed when a courier brought the report that the Boers were -in position at Watervale Drift and commanding the ford with artillery.” - - -FIFTH EXAMPLE. - -(_Boston Globe_, Feb. 25, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.) - -“There is reason to believe that should worse come to worse, the Boer -Army, should it be compelled to abandon its position, will be able to -save its personnel by a rapid flight across the Modder. Of course, in -this case, the Boers would lose their supplies and cannon.” - - * * * * * - -(From United States War Department, _Report on the British Boer War_. By -=Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, U. S. Attache, with British Army.) - -“The enemy, under Cronje, with all his transport was in all practical -effect surrounded, although by abandoning his wagons and supplies, a -large number of the Boers undoubtedly could have escaped.” - - * * * * * - -(_Boston Sunday Times_, March, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.) - -“Cronje’s conduct was heroic and imbecile in the extreme. As the -commander on the ground he is entitled to all the glory and must assume -all the blame. One of the ablest of the Boer generals, he is the only one -in the whole war to make a mistake. - -“Cronje’s first duty was to decide whether he should stand or run; he -decided to run, which was proper, but having so decided he should have -run at once and not have stopped running until safe on the north bank of -the Vaal River. - -“Properly he sent his siege guns and trains off to the north across the -Vaal and improperly held his position in force on the British front, -instead of withdrawing his personnel after his material. - -“This blunder, like all blunders of a commander-in-chief, quickly -produced blunders by his subordinates. Commander Ferrera permitted French -to get around Cronje’s left flank without a battle. The presence of this -force on his rear cut Cronje off from his natural line of retreat across -the Vaal and compelled him to flee toward Bloemfontein. - -“Even now Cronje was all right; he easily and brilliantly out-manoeuvred -the British and gained the protection of the Modder River. But a second -time he blundered. Instead of first executing Ferrera and then abandoning -everything and devoting all his efforts to saving his men, he neglected -an obvious and imperative military duty and clung to his slow-moving -cannon and wagons. - -“Finally he took position on the Modder and resolved to fight the whole -British army. This was fatal. - -“Then for the fourth time he blundered. Having made his decision to -fight he should not have surrendered to the British on the anniversary -of Majuba Hill. On the contrary, surrounded by the mightiest army the -British empire ever put in the field and enveloped in the smoke of a -hundred cannon, Cronje, upon a rampart formed by his dead army and with -his last cartridge withstanding the destroyers of his country, would have -presented to posterity a more spectacular and seemingly a more fitting -termination of the career of the Lion of South Africa.” - - * * * * * - -_“Mere hope of attaining their desires, coupled with ignorance of the -processes necessary to their accomplishment, is the common delusion and -the certain destruction of the inexperienced.”--Plato._ - - - - -ORGANIZATION - - _“To employ in warfare an uninstructed people is to destroy the - nation.”--Chinese Saying._ - - * * * * * - - Antiochus, King of Syria, reviewing his immense but untrained and - undisciplined army at Ephesus, asked of Hannibal, “if they were - not enough for the Romans.” - - “Yes,” replied the great Carthagenian, “enough to glut the - bloodthirstiness, even of the Romans.” - - * * * * * - - _“A man in the vigor of life and capable of sustaining the - heaviest fatigues, but untrained in warfare, is fitted not to - bear arms, but to bear baggage.”--Timoleon._ - - - - -ORGANIZATION - - _“The chief distinction between an army and a mob is the good - order and discipline of the former and the disorderly behavior of - the latter.”--Washington._ - - * * * * * - - “It is the duty of the commander-in-chief frequently to assemble - the most prudent and experienced of his generals and to consult - with them as to the state of his own and of the enemies’ troops. - - “He must examine which army has the better weapons, which is the - better trained and disciplined; superior in condition and most - resolute in emergencies. - - “He must note whether himself or the adversary has the superior - infantry, cavalry or artillery, and particularly must he discern - any marked lack in quantity and quality of men or horses, and any - difference in equipment of those corps which necessarily will be - or because of such reason, advantageously may be opposed to each - other. - - “Advantages in Organization determine the field of battle to - be preferred, which latter should be selected with the view of - profiting to the uttermost by the use of specially equipped - corps, to whom the enemy is not able to oppose similar troops. - - “If a general finds himself superior to his enemy he must use all - means to bring on an engagement, but if he sees himself inferior, - he must avoid battle and endeavor to succeed by surprises, - stratagems and ambuscades; which last skillfully managed often - have gained the victory over foemen superior in numbers and in - strength.”--_Vergetius._ - - -_Advantage in Organization consists in having one or more Corps d’armee -which in equipment or in composition are so superior to the hostile -corps to which they may become opposed, as entails to them exceptional -facilities for the execution of those major tactical evolutions that -appertain to any tactical area made up of corresponding geometric or -sub-geometric symbols._ - - -PRINCIPLE - -_Advantage in Organization determines the choice of a prospective -battlefield; and the latter always should be composed of those tactical -areas which permit of the fullest exercise of the powers peculiar to -kindred corps d’armee._ - -Every corps d’armee thus especially equipped should be constantly and -energetically employed in the prospective battle; and usually it will -eventuate as the Prime Tactical Factor in the decisive Major Tactical -evolution. - - * * * * * - -Notions most mistaken prevail in regard to the Pawns and Pieces of the -Chessboard. - -To suppose that the Chessmen _per se_ may be utilized to typify the -different arms of the military service is a fallacy. - -Many unfamiliar with the technicalities of Strategetic Science delude -themselves that the Pawns, on account of their slow and limited -movements properly are to be regarded as Infantry; that the Knights -because topped by horses’ heads thereby qualify as light Cavalry; the -Bishops, for reasons unknown, often are held to represent Artillery; the -Rooks, because of their swift, direct and far-reaching movements are -thought to duplicate heavy Cavalry; while the Queen, in most of these -unsophisticated philosophies, is supposed to constitute a Reserve. - -Nothing can be further from the truth than such assumptions. - -As a fundamental of military organization applied to Chessplay, each -Chesspiece typifies in itself a complete Corps d’armee. Each of these -Chessic corps d’armee is equal to every other in strength, but all -differ, more or less, in construction and in facilities, essential to the -performance of diverse and particular duties. - -Thus it is that while every Chesspiece represents a perfectly appointed -and equally powerful body of troops, these corps d’armee in Chessplay as -in scientific warfare are not duplicates, except to others of their own -class. Each of these corps d’armee is made up of Infantry, Cavalry and -Artillery in correct proportion to the service they are to perform and -such proportions are determined not by simple arithmetic, but by those -deployments, developments, evolutions, and manoeuvres, which such corps -d’armee is constructed promptly and efficiently to execute. - -The Chessmen, therefore, do not as individuals represent either infantry, -cavalry or artillery. - -But in the same manner as the movements of troops over the surface of -the earth, exemplify the attributes of the three kindred grand columns -in the greater logistics of a campaign; so do those peculiarities which -appertain to the moves of the different Chesspieces exemplify the action -of the three chief arms of the military service; either singly or in -combination against given points in given times, in the evolutions of the -battlefield, viz.: - - -CORPS D’ARMEE EN MARCH. - -The march of: - - (_a_) Infantry, alone, or of - - (_b_) Cavalry, alone, or of - - (_c_) Artillery, alone, or of - - (_d_) Infantry and Cavalry, or of - - (_e_) Infantry and Artillery, or of - - (_f_) Cavalry and Artillery, or of - - (_g_) Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery, - -is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an -unoccupied adjacent point. - -The march of: - - (_a_) Cavalry, alone, or of - - (_b_) Artillery, alone, or of - - (_c_) Cavalry and Artillery, - -is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an -unoccupied point, _not_ an adjacent point. - - -CORPS D’ARMEE EN ASSAULT. - -The _Charge of Infantry_ is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece -from a given point to an occupied adjacent point; posting itself thereon -and capturing the adverse piece there located. - -The _Charge of Cavalry_ is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece -from a given point to an occupied point _not_ an adjacent point; posting -itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located. - - -CORPS D’ARMEE FIRE EFFECT. - -_Infantry:_ - -_Offensive Fire Effect._ Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its -post upon an adjacent occupied point. - -_Defensive Fire Effect._ Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an -adjacent unoccupied point. - -_Artillery:_ - -_Offensive Fire Effect._ Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its -post upon an occupied point not an adjacent point. - -_Defensive Fire Effect._ Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an -unoccupied point not an adjacent point. - - -CHESSIC CORPS D’ARMEE. - -The _Corps d’armee of the Chessboard_ are divided into two classes: viz.: - - I. Corps of Position. - - II. Corps of Evolution. - - -CORPS D’ARMEE OF POSITION. - - _“The Pawns are the soul of Chess; upon their good or bad - arrangement depends the gain or loss of the game.”--Philidor._ - -_The eight Pawns_, by reason of their limited movements, their inability -to move backward and the peculiarity of their offensive and defensive -powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to perform those functions -which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of Position. - -Each Corps of Position has its particular and designated Point of -Mobilization and of Development, which differ with the various Strategic -Fronts. - -Upon each Corps of Position devolves the duties of maintaining itself -as a consistent integer of the established, or projected kindred Pawn -Integral; as a possible kindred Promotable Factor and as a Point of -Impenetrability upon the altitude of an opposing Pawn. - -Corps of Position take their individual appelation from their posts in a -given formation, viz.: - - 1. Base Corps. - - 2. Pivotal Corps. - - 3. Minor Vertex Corps. - - 4. Minor Corps Aligned. - - 5. Major Vertex Corps. - - 6. Major Corps Aligned. - - 7. Corps Enpotence. - - 8. Minor Corps Enceinte. - - 9. Major Corps Enceinte. - - 10. Corps Echeloned. - - 11. Corps En Appui. - - 12. Base Corps Refused. - - 13. Pivotal Corps Refused. - - 14. Minor Vertex Corps Refused. - - 15. Minor Corps Aligned Refused. - - 16. Major Vertex Corps Refused. - - 17. Major Corps Aligned Refused. - - 18. Major Corps Refused Enpotence. - - 19. Corps en Major Crochet. - - 20. Corps en Minor Crochet. - - 21. Corps en Crochet Aligned. - - 22. Corps Doubly Aligned. - - 23. Grand Vertex Corps. - -The above formations by Corps of Position are described and illustrated -in detail in preceding text-books by the author, entitled: - - The Minor Tactics of Chess. - - The Grand Tactics of Chess. - -The normal use of Corps of Position is limited to Lines of Mobilization, -of Development and to the Simple Line of Manoeuvre. - - -CORPS D’ARMEE OF EVOLUTION. - - _“Every man in Alexander’s army is so well trained and obedient - that at a single word of command, officers and soldiers make any - movement and execute any evolution in the art of warfare._ - - _“Only such troops as themselves can check their career and - oppose their bravery and expertness.”--Caridemus._ - -_The eight Pieces_, by reason of their ability to move in all directions, -the scope of their movements and the peculiar exercises of their -offensive and defensive powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to -perform those functions which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of -Evolution. - -_Corps of Evolution_ acting offensively, take their individual -appelations from the points which constitute their objective in the true -Strategetic Horizon, viz.: - - 1. Corps of the Right. - - 2. Corps of the Centre. - - 3. Corps of the Left. - -_Corps of Evolution_ acting defensively, take their individual -appelations from the particular duties they are required to perform, viz.: - - 1. Supporting Corps. - - 2. Covering Corps. - - 3. Sustaining Corps. - - 4. Corps of Impenetrability. - - 5. Corps of Resistance. - -The normal use of Corps of Evolution is limited to Lines of Manoeuvre. -When acting on a Simple Line of Manoeuvre, a Corps of Evolution may -deploy on the corresponding Line of Mobilization; but it has nothing in -common with the Line of Development, which latter appertains exclusively -to Corps of Position. - -Any corps d’armee, whether of Position or of Evolution may be utilized -upon a Line of Operations. - - -THE KING. - -Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the King marches as infantry, -cavalry and artillery; but it attacks as infantry exclusively and never -as cavalry or artillery. - -Although every situation upon the Chessboard contemplates the presence of -both Kings, either, or neither, or both, may, or may not be present in -any given Strategetic Horizon. - -Whenever the King is present in a given Strategetic Horizon the effect of -his co-operation is mathematically outlined, thus: - -I. At his maximum of efficiency, the King occupies the centre of a circle -of one point radius. His offensive power is equally valid against all -eight points contained in his circumference, but his defensive power is -valid for the support from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five -points. - -II. At his medium of efficiency the King occupies the centre of a -semi-circle of one point radius. - -His offensive power is valid against all five points contained in his -semi-circumference, and his defensive power is valid for the support from -a minimum of one, to a maximum of five points. - -III. At his minimum of efficiency, the King occupies the centre of a -quadrant of one point radius. Both his offensive and his defensive powers -are valid against all three points contained in his segment. - - -THE QUEEN. - -Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Queen marches and attacks as -infantry, cavalry and artillery. - -Either, neither, or both Queens may be present in any given Strategetic -Horizon; and whenever present the effect of her co-operation -mathematically is outlined, viz.: - -At her maximum of efficiency the Queen occupies the common vertex of one -or more unequal triangles, whose aggregate area is from a minimum of 21 -to a maximum of 27 points. Her offensive power is equally valid against -all of these points; but her defensive power is valid for the support -from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five points. - - -THE ROOK. - -Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Rook marches and attacks as -infantry, cavalry and artillery. - -From one to four Rooks may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; -and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is -outlined, viz.: - -At her maximum of efficiency, the Rook occupies the common angle of four -quadrilaterals, whose aggregate area always is 14 points. The Offensive -Power of the Rook is equally valid against all these points, but his -defensive power is valid for the support of only two points. - - -THE BISHOP. - -Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Bishop marches and attacks as -infantry, cavalry and artillery. - -From one to four Bishops may be present in any Strategetic Horizon; -and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is -outlined, viz.: - -At its maximum of efficiency, the Bishop occupies the common vertex -of four unequal triangles, having a maximum of 13 and a minimum of 9 -points. His offensive power is valid against all of these points but his -defensive power is valid only for the support of two points. - - -KNIGHT. - -Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Knight marches and attacks as -cavalry and artillery. - -From one to four Knights may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; -and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is -outlined, viz.: - -At its maximum of efficiency, the Knight occupies the centre of an -octagon of two points radius, having a minimum of two points and a -maximum of eight points area. His offensive power is equally valid -against all of these eight points, but his defensive power is valid for -the support of only one point. - - -THE PAWN. - -Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Pawn at its normal post marches -as infantry and cavalry. Should an adverse corps, however, take post -within the kindred side of the Chessboard; that Pawn upon whose altitude -the adverse Piece appears, at once loses its equestrian attributes and -marches and attacks exclusively as infantry. - -Located at any other point than at its normal post, the Pawn is composed -exclusively of infantry and never acts either as cavalry or artillery. - -From one to eight Pawns may be present in any Strategetic Horizon; -and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is -outlined as follows: - -At its maximum of efficiency the Pawn occupies the vertex of a triangle -of two points. Its offensive power is equally valid against both of these -points; but its defensive power is valid for the support of only one -point. - - -POTENTIAL COMPLEMENTS. - -Subjoined is a table of the potential complements of the Chesspieces. - - The King 6⁹⁄₁₆ units. - The Queen 22¼ ” - The Rook 14 ” - The Bishop 8¾ ” - The Knight 5¼ ” - The Pawn 1½ ” - -The student clearly should understand that this table does not indicate -prowess, but relates exclusively to normal facilities for bringing force -into action. - - * * * * * - -The relative advantage in Organization possessed by one army over an -opposing army always can be determined by the following, viz.: - - -_RULE._ - -1. Above a line, set down in order those abbreviations which properly -designate the White corps d’armee present in a given Strategetic -Situation; and below the line, set down those abbreviations which in like -manner designate the Black corps d’armee, viz.: - - K+Q+R+R+P+P+P+P - ---------------- - K+Q+R+B+P+P+P+P+P - -2. Cancel all like symbols and resolve the unlike symbols remaining, into -their respective Potential complements, viz.: - - R 14 - --- = ------- = --- - B+P 8¾ + 1½ 10¼ - -3. Subtract the lesser Potential total from the greater and the -difference will be the relative advantage in Organization. - -4. To utilize the relative advantage in Organization select a battlefield -in which the Strategic Key, the Tactical Keys and the Points of Command -of the True Strategetic Horizon are situated upon the perimeters of those -geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the corps d’armee -whose superior potentiality is established by Section 2. - -5. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Organization, occupy the -necessary posts upon the battlefield selected in such a manner that the -kindred decisive points are situated _not_ upon the perimeters of the -geometric and sub-geometric symbols appertaining to the adverse corps -d’armee of superior potentiality; while the adverse decisive points _are_ -situated upon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols -which appertain to the kindred corps d’armee of inferior potentiality. - - -MILITARY EXAMPLES - - _“Men habituated to luxury cannot contend with an army accustomed - to fatigue and inured to want.”--Caesar._ - - * * * * * - - _“That wing with which you propose to engage the enemy should be - composed of your best troops.”--Epaminondas._ - -The _Sacred Band_ of the Thebans was composed of men selected for valor -and character. Epaminondas called them _Comrades_ and by honorable -rewards and distinctions induced them to bear without murmur the hardest -fatigues and to confront with intrepidity the greatest dangers. - -At Leuctra (371 B.C.) and again at Mantinea (362 B.C.) the right wing -of the Lacedaemonian Army, composed exclusively of Spartans and for six -hundred years invincible, was overthrown and destroyed by the Sacred Band -led by Epaminondas. - -This formidable body of Theban warriors was massacred by Alexander the -Great at the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.) - - * * * * * - -The _Macedonian Phalanx_ was devised by Philip, King of Macedon. It was -made up of heavy infantry accoutred with cuirass, helmet, greaves, and -shield. The principal weapon was a pike twenty-four feet long. - -The Phalanx had a front of two hundred and fifty-six files and a depth of -sixteen ranks. A file of sixteen men was termed Lochos; two files were -called Dilochie; four files made a Tetrarchie; eight files a Taxiarchie -and thirty-two of the last constituted a simple Phalanx of 4096 men. -A grand Phalanx had a front of one thousand and twenty-four files and -a depth of sixteen ranks. It was made up of four simple Phalanxes and -contained 16,384 men. - -With this formation of his infantry, Alexander the Great, when eighteen -years of age, destroyed the Allied Athenian--Theban--Boeotian army at -Chaeronea, the hosts of Persia at the river Grancius (334 B.C.) at Issus -(333 B.C.) and Arbela (331 B.C.) and conquered Porus, King of India at -the Hydaspes (326 B.C.). - - * * * * * - -The _Spanish Heavy Cavalry_ and _Nubian Infantry_ of Hannibal was a -reproduction of that Macedonian organization whereby Alexander the Great -had conquered the world. - -With this formation Hannibal maintained himself for fifteen years in -the richest provinces of Italy and destroyed seven Roman armies, at the -Trebia (218 B.C.) at Lake Trasymenus (217 B.C.) at Cannae (216 B.C.) and -at Herdonea (212 B.C.) at Herdonea (210 B.C.) at Locri (208 B.C.) and at -Apulia (208 B.C.). - -At Zama (202 B.C.) Hannibal’s effacement as a military factor was -directly due to his lack of that organization which had been the -instrument of his previous successes; a circumstance thus commented on by -the victorious Roman commander, Scipio Africanus; - - “Hitherto I have been opposed by an army without a general; now - they send against me a General without an army.” - - * * * * * - -The _Tenth Legion_ of Caesar was the quintessence of that perfection -in elementary tactics devised by the Romans to accord with the use of -artillery. - -The fundamentals of minor tactics as elucidated by Epaminondas and -exploited by Alexander the Great and Hannibal are unchanged in the -Legion, but by subdivision of the simple Phalanx into ten Cohorts, a -necessary and maximum gain in mobility was effected. - -The Roman Legion consisted of 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry, divided -into the Militarain Cohort of 1105 heavy foot, 132 Cuirassiers and nine -ordinary Cohorts, each containing 555 heavy foot and 66 Cuirassiers. -The Legion was drawn up in three lines; the first of which was termed -Principes, the second Hastati, and the third Triarii. The infantry were -protected by helmet, cuirass, greaves and shield; their arms were a long -sword, a short sword, five javelins and two large spears. - -With this formation Caesar over-run Spain, Gaul, Germany, Britain, -Africa, Greece, and Italy. The Scots alone withstood him and the ruins -of a triple line of Roman entrenchments extending from the North to -the Irish Seas to this day mark the southern boundary of the Scottish -Highlands and the northern limit of Roman dominion. - -At Pharseleus, Pompey made the inexplicable blunder of placing his best -troops in his right wing, which was covered by the river Enipeus and -inferior troops on his left wing which was in the air. By its first -charge, the Tenth Legion destroyed the latter, outflanked the entire -Pompeian army, drove it backward into the river and single handed won for -Caesar undisputed dominion of the Earth. - - * * * * * - -The _Scots Volunteers_ of Gustavus Adolphus consisted of two brigades -aggregating about 12,000 foot, made up of Scottish gentlemen who for -various reasons were attracted to the Continental Wars. - -At Leipsic, (Sept. 7, 1631) 20,000 Saxons, constituting one-half of the -allied Protestant army, were routed at the first charge, put to flight -and never seen again. Tilly’s victorious right wing then turned upon the -flank of the King’s army. Three regiments of the Scots Volunteers on foot -held in check in open field 12,000 of the best infantry and cavalry in -Europe, until Gustavus had destroyed the Austrian main body and hastened -to their aid with the Swedish heavy cavalry. - -The Castle of Oppenheim was garrisoned by 800 Spanish infantry. Gustavus -drew up 2,000 Swedes to escalade the place. Thirty Scots Volunteers, -looking on observed that the Spaniards, intently watching the King had -neglected to guard the opposite side of the fortress. Beckoning to their -aid about a hundred of their comrades, they scaled the wall, captured the -garrison and opened the gates to the king. Gustavus entered on foot, hat -in hand. “My brave Scots,” said he, “you carry in your scabbards, the key -to every castle in Europe.” - - * * * * * - -The _Van-Guard_ of Frederic the Great is the perfect adaptation of the -minor tactics of Epaminondas to gunpowder. This choice body was made -up of the best troops in the army divided into infantry, cuirassiers, -dragoons and light artillery. - -The Van-Guard, a miniature army in itself, always marched between the -main body and the enemy; it always led in the attack, followed by that -wing containing the best soldiers, in two lines; and supported by the -heavy cavalry on that flank. - -At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) the Prussian Van-Guard, composed of 4,800 -infantry, 2,500 cavalry and 30 guns, annihilated 70,000 French regular -troops, by evolutions so rapidly executed that the Prussian main army -was unable to overtake either pursuers or pursued and had no part in the -battle, other than as highly interested spectators. - -The _Continentals_ of the Revolutionary army under Washington were made -up of troops enlisted for the war and trained by Baron von Steuben, a -Major-General in the Prussian service, who had served throughout the -Seven Years War under Frederic the Great. - -The Continentals, without firing a shot, carried by assault, Stony -Point (July 16, 1779), Paulus Hook (July 20, 1779) and the British -intrenchments at Yorktown (Oct. 19, 1781). Of these troops, the Baron von -Steuben writes: - - “I am satisfied with having shown to those who understand the - Art of Warfare, an American army worthy of their approbation; - officers who know their profession and who would do honor to any - army in Europe; an infantry such as England has never brought - into the field, soldiers temperate, well-drilled and obedient and - the equal of any in the world.” - - * * * * * - -The _Consular Guard_ was the reproduction of the Van Guard of Frederic -the Great, but its sphere of action was strangely restricted by -Bonaparte, who, instead of placing his best troops in the front of his -army, as is the practice of all other of the Great Captains; subordinated -their functions to that of a reserve and to personal attendance upon -himself. - -This Corps d’elite was but once notably in action; at Marengo (June 14, -1800) it undoubtedly saved the day for France, by maintaining the battle -until the arrival of Gen. Desaix and his division. - - * * * * * - -The _Imperial Guard_ of Napoleon was the development of the Consular -Guard of Bonaparte. Under the Empire the Guard became an independent -army, consisting of light and heavy infantry, horse and field artillery, -cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars and chasseurs, and composed of the best -troops in the French service. - -The functions of this fine body, like that of its prototype, was limited -to the duties of a reserve and to attendance upon the person of the -Emperor; and perhaps next to announcement of victory, Napoleon’s favorite -bulletin always read, “The Imperial Guard was not engaged.” - -Many were the unavailing remonstrances made by his advisors against this -policy, which judged by the practice of the great masters of warfare, is -putting the cart before the horse; and seemingly is that speck of cloud -in Napoleon’s political sky, which properly may be deemed a precursor of -St. Helena. - -At Austerlitz (Dec. 2, 1805), the cuirassiers of the French Imperial -Guard routed a like body of Russian cavalry. At Eylau (Nov. 7, 1807) the -Guard, as at Marengo again saved the day, after the corps d’armee of -Soult and Angereau had been destroyed, by maintaining the battle until -the arrival of Ney and Davoust. In the retreat from Russia (1812) the -Guard then numbering 64,000 men was nearly destroyed. What was left of -it won at Ligny (June 16, 1815), Napoleon’s last victory and at Waterloo -(June 18, 1815), one of its two surviving divisions covered the flight of -the French army, while the other escorted Napoleon in safety to Paris. - - * * * * * - -The _Royal Prussian Guard_, under Von Moltke, was organized and utilized -in accord with the teachings of Frederic the Great. - -Its most notable achievement occurred in the campaign of 1870. The right -flank of the French having been turned by the battle of Woerth (Aug. -4, 1870) and Marshal MacMahon’s army being driven to the westward, it -became the paramount object of Von Moltke to seize the country in rear of -Metz and thus prevent the retreat of Marshall Bazine across the Moselle -River. - -The Royal Prussian Guard out-marching both friends and enemies first -reached the Nancy road (Aug. 18, 1870) and until the German corps reached -the battlefield this body of picked troops successfully withstood the -assault of nearly the entire French army. In the first half-hour the -Guard lost 8,000 men. - -As the result of all this, Marshal Bazine with 150,000 men was forced -back into and taken in the intrenched camp at Metz; and the Emperor -Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon and a second French army of 140,000 men -was captured at Sedan (Sept. 1, 1870), in an attempt to rescue Marshal -Bazine. - -_“I must tell you beforehand this will be a bloody touch. Tilly has a -great army of old lads with iron faces that dare look an enemy in the -eye; they are confident of victory, have never been beaten and do not -know what it means to fly. Tilly tells his men he will beat me and the -old man is as likely to do it as to say it.”--Gustavus Adolphus._ - -“Tilly’s men were rugged, surly fellows; their faces mangled by wounds -and scars had an air of hardy courage. I observed of them that their -clothes were always dirty, their armor rusty from winter storms and -bruised by musket-balls, their weapons sharp and bright. They were -used to camp in the open fields and to sleep in the frosts and rain. -The horses like the men were strong and hardy and knew by rote their -exercises. Both men and animals so well understood the trade of arms that -a general command was sufficient; every man was fit to command the whole, -and all evolutions were performed in order and with readiness, at a note -of the trumpet or a motion of their banners. - -“The 7th of Sept. (1631) before sunrise, the Swedish army marched from -Dieben to a large field about a mile from Leipsic, where we found old -Tilly’s army in full battalia in admirable order, which made a show both -glorious and terrible. - -“Tilly, like a fair gamester, had taken up but one side of the plain, -and left the other side clear and all the avenues open to the King’s -approach, nor did he stir to the charge until the Swedish army was -fully drawn up and was advancing toward him. He had with him 44,000 old -soldiers and a better army I believe never was so soundly beaten.… - -“Then was made a most dreadful slaughter, and yet there was no flying. -Tilly’s men might be killed or knocked down, but no man turned his back, -nor would give an inch of ground, save as they were marched, wheeled, or -retreated by their officers.… About six o’clock the field was cleared of -the enemy except at one place on the King’s front, where some of them -rallied; and though they knew that all was lost, they would take no -quarter, but fought it out to the last man, being found dead the next day -in rank and file as they were drawn up.” - - * * * * * - -Perfection in Organization is attained when troops instantly and -intelligently act according to order and execute with exactness and -precision any and every prescribed evolution. - - - - -TOPOGRAPHY - - _“Let us not consider where we shall give battle, but where we - may gain the victory.”--Phocion._ - - * * * * * - - _“There can be no discretion in a movement which forsakes the - advantage in ground.”--Gustavus Adolphus._ - - * * * * * - - _“That battlefield is best which is adapted to the full use of - the chief constituents of your army and unfavorable to the mass - of the enemy.”--Napoleon._ - - - - -TOPOGRAPHY - - _“The ground is the CHESSBOARD of we cannibals; and it is the - selection and use made of it, that decides the knowledge or the - ignorance of those by whom it is occupied.”--Frederic the Great._ - - -_The highest use of Topography consists in reducing a superior adverse -force to the inferior force, by minimizing the radius of action of the -hostile Corps d’armee._ - -_This is effected by so posting the kindred corps that in the resulting -Strategetic Horizons, impassable natural barriers are presented to the -march of hostile corps toward their respective objectives._ - -On the surface of the earth such natural barriers are formed by -mountains, rivers, lakes, swamps, forests, deserts, the ocean, and the -boundaries of neutral States. - -On the Chess-board these topographical conditions are typified by -peculiarities and limitations in the movements of the Chess-pieces, viz.: - -I. The sides of the Chess-board which terminate all movements of the -chess pieces. - -II. That limitation of the movements of the Chesspieces which makes it -impossible for them to move other than in straight lines. - -III. The inability of the Queen to move on obliques. - -IV. The inability of the Rook to move either on obliques or on diagonals. - -V. The inability of the Bishop to move either on obliques, verticals, or -horizontals. - -VI. The inability of the Knight to move either on diagonals, verticals, -or horizontals, and the limitation of its move to two squares distance. - -VII. The inability of the Pawn to move either on obliques or horizontals, -and the limitation of its first move to two squares and of its subsequent -moves to one square. - -VIII. The limitation of the King’s move to one square. - -These limitations and impediments to the movements of the Chess-pieces, -are equivalent in Chess-play to obstacles interposed by Nature to the -march of troops over the surface of the earth. - -Prefect Generalship, in its calculations, so combines these -insurmountable barriers with the relative positions of the contending -armies, that the kindred army becomes at every vital point the superior -force. - -This effect is produced by merely causing rivers and mountains to take -the place of kindred Corps d’armee. - -It is only by the study of Chessic topography that the tremendous -problems solved by the chess player become manifest: - -_Instead of calculations limited to one visible and unchangeable -Chess-board of sixty-four squares, the divinations of the Chess-master -comprehend and harmonize as many invisible Chess-boards as there are -Chess-pieces contained in the Topographical Zone._ - -Furthermore, all these surfaces differ to the extent and in conformity to -that particular sensible horizon, appertaining to the Chess-piece from -which it emanates. - -The enormous difficulties of Chess-play, like those of warfare, arise -from the necessity of combining in a single composite topographical -horizon, all those differing, sensible horizons which appertain, not -merely to the kindred, but also to the hostile corps; and to do this in -such a manner, as to minimize the hostile powers for offence and defence, -by debarring one or more of the hostile pieces from the true Strategetic -Horizon. - -_To divide up the enemy’s force, by making natural barriers take the -place of troops, is the basis of those processes which dominate Grand -Manoeuvres._ - -Of all the deductions of Chess-play and of warfare, such combinations of -Strategy and Topography are the most subtle and intangible. The highest -talent is required in its interpretation, and mastery of it, more than of -any other branch of Strategetics, proclaims the great Captain at war, or -at chess. - - -TOPOGRAPHY OF THE KING - -From the view-point of the _King_, the surface of the Chess-board takes -on the topographical aspect of a vast expanse of open, level country. - -This vista is void of insurmountable natural obstacles, other than the -sides and extremities. The latter collectively may be regarded, for -strategical purposes, either as the Ocean, or the boundaries of neutral -States. - -To the King, this vast territory is accessible in all directions. At his -pleasure he may move to and occupy either of the sixty-four squares of -the Chess-board, in a minimum of one and in a maximum of seven moves. The -only obstacles to his march are distance and the opposition of an enemy. - -The Strategical weakness of the Topographical Horizon peculiar to the -King arises from its always taking on and maintaining the physical form -of a plain. Consequently it is vulnerable to attack from all sides -and what is far worse, it readily is commanded and from a superior -topographical post, by every adverse piece, except the King and Pawn. - -Thus, the hostile Queen, without being attacked in return, may enfilade -the King along all verticals, horizontals and diagonals; the Rooks, along -all verticals and horizontals; the Bishops, along all diagonals of like -color; and the Knights along all obliques. - - -TOPOGRAPHY OF THE QUEEN - -From the view-point of the _Queen_, the surface of the Chess-board -takes on the topographical aspect of a series of wide, straight valleys -separated by high, impassable mountain ranges, unfordable rivers, and -impenetrable forests and morasses. These valleys, which number never less -than three, nor more than eight, in the same group, are of varying length -and always converge upon and unite with each other at the point occupied -by the Queen. - -These valleys contained in the Queen’s topographical horizon may be -classified, viz.: - -Class I, consists of those groups made up of three valleys. - -Class II, of those groups made up of five valleys. - -Class III, of those groups made up of eight valleys of lesser area; and - -Class IV, of those groups made up of eight valleys of greater area. - -Groups of the first class always have an area of twenty points; those of -the second have an area of twenty-three points; those of the third have -an area of twenty-five points, and those of the fourth have an area of -twenty-seven points. Such areas always are exclusive of that point upon -which the Queen is posted. - -Although impassable natural barriers restrict the movement of the Queen -to less than one-half of the Topographical Zone, these obstacles always -are intersected by long stretches of open country formed by intervening -valleys. - -Hence, the march of this most mobile of the Chesspieces always is open -either in three, five, or eight directions, and it always is possible for -her, unless impeded by the interference of kindred or hostile corps, to -reach any desired point on the Chess-board in two moves. - -The weakness peculiar to the Topographical Horizon which appertains to -the Queen, originates in the fact that it never commands the origins of -obliques. Consequently, every post of the Queen, is open to unopposed -attack by the hostile Knights. - - -TOPOGRAPHY OF THE ROOK - -From the view-point of the _Rook_, the surface of the Chess-board takes -on a topographical aspect which varies with the post occupied. - -Placed at either R1 or R8 the Rook occupies the central point of a great -valley, 15 points in length, which winds around the slope of an immense -and inaccessible mountain range. This latter, in extent, includes the -remainder of the Topographical Zone. - -With the Rook placed at R2 or R7, this great mountain wall becomes -pierced by a long valley running at right angles to the first, but the -area open to the movement of the Rook is not increased. - -Placed at Kt2, B3, K4, or Q4, the Rook becomes enclosed amid impassable -natural barriers. But although in such cases it always occupies the -point of union of four easily traversed although unequal valleys, its -area of movement is neither increased nor diminished, remaining always at -fourteen points open to occupation. - -Unless impeded by the presence of kindred or adverse corps on its -logistic radii, the Rook always may move either in two, three, or four -directions, and it may reach any desired point on the Chess-board in two -moves. - -The weakness peculiar to the Topographical Horizon of the Rook lies in -the fact that it never commands the origins of diagonals or obliques. -Hence it is open to unopposed attack along the first from adverse Queen, -King, Bishops and Pawns, and along the second from adverse Knights. - - -TOPOGRAPHY OF THE BISHOP - -From the view-point of the _Bishop_, the surface of the Chess-board takes -on a topographical aspect most forbidding. - -To this Chess-piece at least one-half of the Topographical Zone is -inaccessible, and under any circumstances his movements are limited to -the thirty-two squares of his own color. - -Thus, the Topographical Horizon of the Bishop takes the form of a broken -country, dotted with high hills, deep lakes, impenetrable swamps, and -thick woodlands. But between these obstacles thus set about by Nature, -run level valleys, varied in extent and easy of access. This fact so -modifies this harshest of all sensible horizons as to make the Bishop -next in activity to the Rook. - -Within its limited sphere of action, the Bishop may move in either one or -four directions with a minimum of nine and a maximum of fourteen points -open to his occupation. Unimpeded by other corps blocking his route of -march, the Bishop may reach any desired point of his own color on the -chess board in two moves. - -The weakness peculiar to the topographical horizon of the Bishop is its -liability to unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals by the -hostile King, Queen and Rooks; and along obliques by the hostile Knights. - - -TOPOGRAPHY OF THE KNIGHT - -From the view-point of the _Knight_, the surface of the Chess-board takes -on the aspect of a densely wooded and entirely undeveloped country; made -up of a profusion of ponds, rivulets, swamps, etc., none of which are -impassable although sufficient to impede progress. - -Unless interfered with by kindred or hostile corps, or the limitations -of the Chess-board, the Knight always may move either in two, four, six, -or eight directions. It may reach any desired point in a minimum of one -and a maximum of six moves, and may occupy the sixty-four squares of the -Chess-board in the same number of marches. - -The weakness of the topographical horizon of the Knight lies in the fact -that it never commands adjacent points, nor any of those distant, other -than the termini of its own obliques. Hence it is open to unopposed -attack along verticals and horizontals from the adverse King, Queen and -Rooks, and along diagonals from the adverse King, Queen, Bishop and Pawns. - - -TOPOGRAPHY OF THE PAWN - -From the point of view of the _Pawn_, the surface of the Chess-board -takes on the topographical aspect of a country which as it is entered, -constantly becomes wilder and more rugged. - -The march of the Pawn always is along a valley situated between -impracticable natural barriers, and the possible movements of the Pawn -always decrease as the distance traveled increases. - -Unhindered by either kindred or hostile corps, the Pawn may reach any -point of junction in the kindred Logistic Horizon, which is contained -within its altitude, in a minimum of five and in a maximum of six moves. -It may march only in one direction, except in capturing, when it may -acquire the option of acting in three directions. - -The weakness of the topographical horizon of the Pawn originates in its -inability to command the adjacent country. Therefore, it is exposed to -unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals by the hostile King, -Queen and Rooks; along diagonals by the adverse King, Queen and Bishops, -and along obliques by the adverse Knights. - - -TOPOGRAPHY OF THE TOPOGRAPHICAL ZONE - -That normal and visible surface of the _Chess-board_ termed the -Topographical Zone is bounded by four great natural barriers, impassable -to any Chess-piece. - -The two sides of the zone may be held to typify either the Ocean or the -boundaries of neutral States. The two extremities of the Chess-board -while holding the previously announced relation to Chess-pieces contained -in the Topographical Zone, also holds another and radically different -relation to those Chess-pieces _not_ contained in the Topographical Zone, -viz.: - -In the latter case, the two extremities of the chessboard are to be -regarded as two great mountain ranges, each of which is pierced by eight -defiles, the latter being the sixteen points of junction contained in the -kindred and adverse logistic horizons. - -In the arena thus formed by these four great natural barriers, two -hostile armies composed of the thirty-two Chess-pieces, are contending -for the mastery. - -Meanwhile, beyond these great mountain ranges, are advancing to the -aid of the combatants, two other armies, represented by the power of -promotion possessed by the Pawns. Each of these two hypothetical armies -is assailing the outer slope of that range of mountains which lies in the -rear of the hostile force. Its effort is to pass one of the eight defiles -and by occupying a Point of Junction in the kindred Logistic Horizon, -to gain entrance into the Topographical Zone. Then in the array of a -Queen, or some other kindred piece, it purposes to attack decisively, the -adverse Strategetic Rear. - -To oppose the attack of this hypothetical hostile army, whose movements -always are typified by the advance of the adverse Pawns, is the duty of -the kindred column of manoeuvre. - -Primarily this labor falls upon the kindred Pawns. Upon each Pawn -devolves the duty of guarding that defile situated directly on its -front, by maintaining itself as a Point of Impenetrability between the -corresponding hostile pawn and the kindred Strategic Rear. - -Conversely, a second duty devolves upon each Pawn; and as an integer -of the Column of Support, it continually must threaten and whenever -opportunity is presented it decisively must assault the defile on its -front, for the purpose of penetrating to the kindred logistic horizon -and becoming promoted to such kindred piece, as by attacking the adverse -Determinate Force in flank, in rear, or in both, may decide the victory -in favor of the kindred army. - -Every variety of topography has peculiar requirements for its attack and -its defence; and situations even though but little different from each -other, nevertheless must be treated according to their particular nature. - -In order to acquire the habit of selecting at a glance the correct posts -for an army and of making proper dispositions of the kindred corps -with rapidity and precision, topography should be studied with great -attention, for most frequently it happens that circumstances do not allow -time to do these things with deliberation. - - -PRINCIPLE - -_Acting either offensively or defensively, one never should proceed in -such a way as to allow the enemy the advantage of ground;_ - -That is to say: Kindred corps never should be exposed to unopposed -adverse radii of offence, when the effect of such exposure is the loss of -kindred material, or of time much better to be employed, than in making a -necessary and servile retreat from an untenable post. - -On the contrary, every kindred topographical advantage should -unhesitatingly be availed of; and particular attention continually should -be paid to advancing the kindred corps to points offensive where they -cannot be successfully attacked. - -Pains always must be taken to select advantageous ground. Indifferent -posts must never be occupied from sheer indolence or from over-confidence -in the strength of the kindred, or the weakness of the adverse army. - -Particularly must one beware of permitting the enemy to retain advantages -in topography; always and at once he should be dislodged from posts whose -continued occupation may facilitate his giving an unforeseen and often a -fatal blow. - -The full importance of topography perhaps is best expressed in the -following dictum by the great Frederic: - - -PRINCIPLE - -“_Whenever a general and decisive topographical advantage is presented, -one has merely to avail of this, without troubling about anything -further._” - -The relative advantage in Topography possessed by one army over an -opposing army, always can be determined by the following, viz.: - - -RULE - -1. If the principal adverse Corps of Position are situated upon points -of a given color, and if the principal Kindred Corps of Position are -situated upon points _not_ of the given color, then: - -That army which has the _more_ Corps of Evolution able to act against -points of the given color, and the _equality_ in Corps of Evolution able -to act against points of the opposite color, has the relative advantage -in Topography. - -2. To utilize the relative advantage in Topography, construct a position -in which the kindred Corps of Position necessary to be defended shall -occupy a point upon the sub-geometric symbol of a kindred Corps of -Evolution; which point shall be a Tactical Key of a True Strategetic -Horizon of which the kindred Corps of Evolution is the Corps of the -Centre and of which either the adverse King or an undefendable adverse -piece is the second Tactical Key. - -3. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Topography, eliminate -that adverse Corps d’armee which is able to act simultaneously by its -geometric symbol against the principal Kindred Corps of Position upon a -given color; and by its sub-geometric symbol against points of opposite -color. - - * * * * * - -Perfection in Defensive Topography is attained whenever the ground -occupied nullifies hostile advantages in Time, Organization, Mobility, -Numbers and Position. - -Perfection in Offensive Topography is attained whenever the ground -occupied accentuates the kindred advantages in Time, Organization, -Mobility, Numbers and Position. - - -MILITARY EXAMPLES - - _“When you intend to engage in battle endeavor that your - CHIEF advantage shall arise from the ground occupied by your - army.”--Vegetius._ - -To cross the Granicus, Alexander the Great selected a fordable spot -where the river made a long, narrow bend, and attacked the salient and -both sides simultaneously. The Persians thus outflanked were easily and -quickly routed; whereupon the Grecian army in line of Phalanxes, both -flanks covered by the river and its retreat assured by the fords in rear, -advanced to battle in harmony with all requirements of Strategetic Art. - - * * * * * - -At Issus, Alexander the Great so manoeuvred that the Persian army of more -than a million men was confined in a long valley not over three miles in -width, having the sea on the left hand and the Amanus Mountains on the -right, thus the Grecians had a battlefield fitted to the size of their -army, and fought in Phalanxes in line, both wings covered by impassable -natural barriers and retreat assured, by open ground in rear. - - * * * * * - -At the Trebia, Hannibal by stratagems now undiscernible, induced the -consul Sempronius to pass the river and following along the easterly bank -to take position with his army upon the lowlands between an unfordable -part of the stream and the Carthagenians. - -Upon this, Hannibal detached his youngest brother Margo to cut off the -retreat of the Romans from the ford by which they had crossed the Trebia; -advanced his infantry by Phalanxes in line and overthrowing the few -Roman horse, assailed the hostile left wing with 10,000 heavy cavalry. -The destruction of the Roman army was completed by the simultaneous -attack of their right wing by Margo and the impossibility of repassing -the river in their rear. - - * * * * * - -By one of the most notable marches in surprise recorded in military -annals, Hannibal crossed the seemingly impassible marshes of the river -Po, and turned the left flank of the Roman army, commanded by the Consul -C. Flaminius. Then the great Carthagenian advanced swiftly toward the -city of Rome, devasting the country on either hand. - -In headlong pursuit the Consul entered a long narrow valley, having Lake -Trasymenus on the one hand and the mountains on the other. - -Suddenly while entombed in this vast ravine, the Roman army was attacked -by infantry from the high ground along its right flank; and in front and -rear by the Carthagenian heavy cavalry, while the lake extending along -its left flank made futile all attempts to escape. - - * * * * * - -At Cannae, Hannibal reproduced the evolutions of Alexander the Great -at the passage of the Granicus. Selecting a long bend in the Aufidus, -Hannibal forded the river and took position by Phalanxes in line, his -flanks covered by unfordable parts of the stream and his retreat assured -by the fords by which he had crossed, while as at Issus, the ground on -his front though fitting his own army, was so confined as to prevent the -Romans engaging a force greater than his own. Beyond Hannibal’s front, -the hostile army was posted in a wide level plain, suited to the best -use of the vastly superior Carthagenian heavy cavalry, both for the -evolutions of the battle and the subsequent pursuit and massacre of the -Romans. - - * * * * * - -At the River Arar (58 B.C.) Caesar achieved his first victory. Following -leisurely but closely the marauding Helvetii, he permitted three-fourths -of their army to cross to the westerly side of the river; then he fell -upon the remainder with his whole army. - - * * * * * - -An eye-witness thus describes the famous passage of the Lech by Gustavus -Adolphus: - - “Resolved to view the situation of the enemy, his majesty went - out the 2nd of April (1632) with a strong body of horse, which - I had the honor to command. We marched as near as we could to - the bank of the river, not to be too much exposed to the enemy’s - cannon; and having gained a height where the whole course of - the river might be seen, we drew up and the king alighted and - examined every reach and turning of the river with his glass. - Toward the north, he found the river fetching a long reach and - doubling short upon itself. ‘There is the point will do our - business,’ says the king, ‘and if the ground be good, we will - pass there, though Tilly do his worst’.” - -He immediately ordered a small party of horse to bring him word how high -the bank was on each side and at the point, “and he shall have fifty -dollars” says the king, “who will tell me how deep the water is.” - -… The depth and breadths of the stream having been ascertained, and the -bank on our side being ten to twelve feet higher than the other and -of a hard gravel, the king resolved to cross there; and himself gave -directions for such a bridge as I believe never army passed before nor -since. - -The bridge was loose plank placed upon large tressels as bricklayers -raise a scaffold to build a wall. The tressels were made some higher and -some lower to answer to the river as it grew deeper or shallower; and all -was framed and fitted before any attempt was made to cross. - -At night, April 4th the king posted about 2,000 men near the point and -ordered them to throw up trenches on either side and quite around it; -within which at each end the king placed a battery of six pieces and six -cannon at the point, two guns in front and two at each side. By daylight, -all the batteries were finished, the trenches filled with musketeers and -all the bridge equipment at hand in readiness for use. To conceal this -work the king had fired all night at other places along the river. - -At daylight, the Imperialists discovered the king’s design, when it -was too late to prevent it. The musketeers and the batteries made such -continual fire that the other bank twelve feet below was too hot for the -Imperialists; whereupon old Tilly to be ready for the king on his coming -over on his bridge, fell to work and raised a twenty-gun battery right -against the point and a breast-work as near the river as he could to -cover his men; thinking that when the King should build his bridge, he -might easily beat it down with his cannon. - -But the King had doubly prevented him; first by laying his bridge so low -that none of Tilly’s shot could hurt it, for the bridge lay not above -half a foot above the water’s edge; and the angle of the river secured it -against the batteries on the other side, while the continual fire beat -the Imperialists from those places where they had no works to cover them. - -Now, in the second place, the King sent over four hundred men who cast -up a large ravelin on the other bank just where he planned to land; and -while this was doing the King laid over his bridge. - -Both sides wrought hard all the day and all the night as if the spade, -not the sword, was to decide the controversy; meanwhile the musketry -and cannon-balls flew like hail and both sides had enough to do to make -the men stand to their work. The carnage was great; many officers were -killed. Both the King and Tilly animated the troops by their presence. - -About one o’clock about the time when the King had his bridge finished -and in heading a charge of 3000 foot against our ravelin was brave old -Tilly slain by a musket bullet in the thigh. - -We knew nothing of this disaster befallen them, and the King, who looked -for blows, the bridge and ravelin being finished, ordered to run a line -of palisades to take in more ground and to cover the first troops he -should send over. This work being finished the same night, the King sent -over his Guards and six hundred Scots to man the new line. - -Early in the morning a party of Scots under Capt. Forbes of Lord Rae’s -regiment was sent abroad to learn something of the enemy and Sir John -Hepburn with the Scots Brigade was ordered to pass the bridge, draw up -outside the ravelin, and to advance in search of the enemy as soon as the -horse were come over. - -The King was by this time at the head of his army in full battle array, -ready to follow his van-guard and expecting a hot day’s work of it. Sir -John sent messenger after messenger entreating for permission to advance, -but the King would not suffer it; for he was ever on his guard and would -not risk a surprise. So the army continued on this side of the Lech all -day and the next night. - -In the morning the King ordered 300 horse, 600 horse and 800 dragoons -to enter the wood by three ways, but sustaining each other; the Scots -Brigade to follow to the edge of the wood in support of all, and a -brigade of Swedish infantry to cover Sir John’s troops. So warily did -this famous warrior proceed. - -The next day the cavalry came up with us led by Gustavus Horn; and the -King and the whole army followed, and we marched on through the heart of -Bavaria. His Majesty when he saw the judgment with which old Tilly had -prepared his works and the dangers we had run, would often say, “That -day’s work is every way equal to the victory of Leipsic.” - - * * * * * - -With but 55,000 troops in hand and surrounded by the united Austrian -and Russian armies aggregating a quarter of a million men; Frederic the -Great availing of a swamp, a few hills, a rivulet and a fortified town, -constructed a battlefield upon which his opponents dared not engage him. - -This famous camp of Bunzlewitz is one of the wonders of the military -art. It also is an illustration of the inability of the Anglo-Saxon to -reason; for to this day many who wear epaulets, accepting the dictum of -a skillfully hoodwinked French diplomat at the siege of Neisse, (Dec., -1740) commonly assert that “the great Frederic was a bad engineer.” - - * * * * * - -Washington compelled the British to evacuate Boston, merely by occupying -with artillery Dorchester Heights, the tactical key of the theatre of -action and thus preventing either ingress or egress from the harbor. - - * * * * * - -At Trenton the Hessian column was unable to escape from Washington’s -accurate evolutions, on account of being imprisoned in an angle formed by -the unfordable Delaware river. - - * * * * * - -At Yorktown, the British army under Lord Cornwallis was captured entire, -being cut off from all retreat by the ocean on the right flank and the -James river in rear. - - * * * * * - -Bonaparte made his reputation at Toulon (1793) merely by following the -method employed by Washington in the siege of Boston. - - * * * * * - -Bonaparte gained his first success in Italy because the allied -Piedmontese and Austrian armies, although thrice his numbers, were -separated by the Apennine mountains. - - * * * * * - -Bonaparte’s success at Castiglione was due to the separation of the -Austrian army into two great isolated columns by the Lake of Garda. - - * * * * * - -At Arcola, Bonaparte occupied a great swamp upon the hostile strategic -center and the Austrian army was destroyed by its efforts to dislodge him. - - * * * * * - -At Rivoli, the Austrian army purposed to unite its five detached wings -upon a plateau of which Bonaparte was already in possession. All were -ruined in the effort to dislodge the French from this Tactical Center. - - * * * * * - -The Austrian army was unable to escape after Marengo on account of the Po -river in its rear. - - * * * * * - -At Austerlitz the left wing of the Austro-Russian army was caught between -the French army and a chain of lakes and rivulets and totally destroyed. - - * * * * * - -At Friedland the Russian army was caught between the French in front and -the Vistula river in rear and totally destroyed. - - * * * * * - -At Krasnoe, the Russians under Kutosof, occupied the strategic center -and were covered by the Dnieper. To force the passage of the river cost -Napoleon 30,000 men. - - * * * * * - -At the Beresina, the Russians under Benningsen, occupied the Strategic -Center and were covered by the unfordable river. To force the passage -cost Napoleon 20,000 men. - - * * * * * - -At Leipsic, Napoleon was caught between the allied army and the Elbe. The -retreat across the river cost the French 50,000 men. - - * * * * * - -At Waterloo, the high plateau sloping gradually to a plain, various -hamlets on front and flank and the forest in rear, made a perfect -topography for a defensive battle. - - * * * * * - -At Sedan, the Emperor, Napoleon III, and his army were enclosed between -the Prussian army and the frontier of Belgium and captured. - - * * * * * - -_“Where the real general incessantly sees prepared by Nature means -admirably adapted for his needs, the commander lacking such talents sees -nothing.”--Hannibal._ - - - - -MOBILITY - - _“Success in an operation depends upon the secrecy and celerity - with which the movements are made.”--Napoleon._ - - * * * * * - - _“An eye unskilled and a mind untutored can see but little where - a trained observer detects important movements.”--Von Moltke._ - - * * * * * - - _“Caesar is a marvel of vigilance and rapidity, he finishes a war - in a march.”--Cicero._ - - - - -MOBILITY - - _“Victory lies in the legs of the soldier.”--Frederic the Great._ - - * * * * * - - _“The principal part of the soldier’s efficiency depends upon his - legs._ - - _“The personal abilities required in all manoeuvres and in - battles are totally confined to them._ - - _“Whoever is of a different opinion is a dupe to ignorance and a - novice in the profession of arms.”--Count de Saxe._ - - -_“It is easier to beat an enemy than commonly is supposed,” says -Napoleon, “the great Art lies in making nothing but decisive movements.”_ - -To the proficient in Strategetics the truth of the foregoing dictum is -self-evident. Nevertheless, it remains to instruct the student how to -select from a multitude of possible movements, that particular movement -or series of movements, which in a given situation are best calculated to -achieve victory. - -Whatever may be such series of movements, obviously, it must have an -object, _i.e._, a specific and clearly defined purpose. Equally so, all -movements made on such line of movement must each have an objective, -_i.e._, a terminus. These objectives, like cogs in a gear, intimately are -connected with other objectives or termini, so that the project thus -formed constitutes always an exact and often a vast scheme. - -Frequently it happens that the occupation of an objective, valid in a -given situation, is not valid in an ensuing situation for the reasons: - - 1. That the object of the given line of movement is become - unattainable, or, - - 2. Because it has become no longer worth attaining, or, - - 3. Because such belated attainment may be direct cause of - disaster. - - -PRINCIPLE - -_In order to select the decisive movement in a given situation it is -necessary first to determine both the object and the objective, not -merely of the required movement, but also of that series of movements, -which collectively constitute the projected line of movement; together -with the object and the objective of every movement contained therein._ - -The mathematician readily will perceive, and the student doubtless will -permit himself to be informed, that: - -Before the true object and the true objective of any movement can be -determined it first is necessary to deduce the common object of all -movement. - - * * * * * - -As is well known, the combined movements of the Chess-pieces over the -surface of the Chess-board during a game at Chess are infinite. - -These calculations are so complex that human perception accurately can -forecast ultimate and even immediate results only in comparatively few -and simple situations. Such calculable outcomes are limited to the -earlier stages of the opening, to the concluding phases of a game; and -to situations in the mid-game wherein the presence of but few adverse -pieces minimizes the volume of effort possible to the opponent. - -Consequently, it is self-evident, that: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_Situations on the Chess-board require for their demonstration a degree -of skill which decreases as the hostile power of resistance decreases._ - -All power for resistance possessed by an army emanates from its ability -to move. This faculty of Mobility is that inestimable quality without -which nothing and by means of which everything, can be done. - -From this truth it is easy to deduce the common object of all movement, -which obviously is: - - _To minimize the mobility of the opposing force._ - -The hostile army having the ability to move and consequently a power for -resistance equal to that possessed by the kindred army; it becomes of the -first importance to discover in what way the kindred army is superior to -that adverse force, which in the Normal Situation on the Chess-board is -its exact counterpart in material, position and formation. - -Such normal superiority of the White army over the Black army is found in -the fact that: - - 1. _The former has the privilege of making the initial move of - the game._ - - 2. _This privilege of first move is the absolute advantage in - Time._ - -While no mathematical demonstration of the outcome of a game at Chess is -possible, nevertheless there are rational grounds for assuming that with -exact play, White should win. - -This decided and probably decisive advantage possessed by White can be -minimized only by correcting a mathematical blemish in the game of Chess -as at present constructed; which blemish, there is reason to believe, did -not originally exist. - -This imperfection seemingly is the result of unscientific modifications -of the Italian method of Castling; which latter, from the standpoint -of mathematics and of Strategetics, embodies the true spirit of that -delicate and vital evolution. - -To the mathematician and to the Strategist, it is clear that Chess as -first devised was geometrically perfect. The abortions played during -successive ages and in various parts of the Earth, merely are crude and -unscientific deviations from the perfect original. - -Thus, strategetically, the correct post of deployment for the Chess-King -is at the extremity of a straight line drawn from the center of that -Grand Strategic Front which appertains to the existing formation. - -Hence, in the grand front by the right, the King in Castling K R, -properly goes in one move to KKt1, his proper post. Conversely, in -Castling Q R, he also should go in one move to QKt1, his proper post -corresponding to the grand front by the left. - -Again, whenever the formation logically points to the grand front by the -right refused, the King should go in one move from K1 to KR1. When the -formations indicate the grand front by the left refused, the King should -go in one move from K1 to QR1. - -In each and every case the co-operating Rook should be posted at the -corresponding Bishop’s square, in order to support the alignment by P-B4, -of the front adopted. - -The faulty mode of castling today in vogue clearly is not the product -either of the mathematic nor of the strategetic mind. - -The infantile definition of “the books,” viz., “The King in Castling -moves two squares either to the right or to the left,” displays all that -mania for the commonplace, which characterizes the dilettante. - -All that can be done is to call attention to this baleful excrescence on -the great Game. Of course, it is useless to combat it. In the words of -the Count de Saxe: - - “The power of custom is absolute. To depart from it is a - crime, and the most inexcusable of all crimes is to introduce - innovations. For most people, it is sufficient that a thing is - so, to forever allow it to remain so.” - -Says the great Frederic; - - “Man hardly may eradicate in his short lifetime all the - prejudices that are imbibed with his mother’s milk; and it is - well nigh impossible to successfully wrestle with custom, that - chief argument of fools.” - -Also bearing in mind the irony of Cicero, who regarded himself fortunate -in that he had not fallen victim to services rendered his countrymen, it -suffices to say: - -The true Chessic dictum in regard to the double evolution of the King and -Rook should read: - - “_The King of Castling should deploy in one move to that - point where, as the Base of Operations, it mathematically - harmonizes with that Strategic Front, which is, or must become, - established._” - -The change in the present form of Castling, herein suggested, should be -made in the true interests of the Royal Game. - -The instant effect of such change will be: - - 1. Largely to increase the defensive resources both of White and - Black; - - 2. To minimize the handicap on the second player, due to White’s - advantage of first move; - - 3. To permit open play on the Queen’s side of the board and thus - provide a broader and more resplendent field for Strategetic - genius. - - * * * * * - -In all our modern-day mis-interpretations of the ethics of Chess and -our characteristic Twentieth Century looseness of practice as applied -to Chess-play, perhaps there exists no greater absurdity, than that -subversion of ordinary intelligence, daily evinced by permitting a piece -which cannot move, to give check. - -It is a well known and in many ways a deserved reproach, cast by the -German erudite, that the mind of the Anglo-Saxon is not properly -developed, that it is able to act correctly only when dealing with known -quantities, and is inadequate for the elucidation of indeterminate things. - -In consequence, they say, the argumentative attempts of the Anglo-Saxon -are puerile; the natural result of a mental limitation which differs from -that of monkeys and parrots, merely in ability to count beyond two. - -Surely it would seem that a very young child readily would sense that: - -A Chess-piece, which by law is debarred from movement, is, by the same -law, necessarily debarred from capturing adverse material; inasmuch as in -order to capture, a piece must move. - -Nevertheless consensus of opinion today among children of every growth -and whether Anglo-Saxon or German, universally countenance the paradox -that: - -A piece which is pinned on its own King, can give check _i.e._, threaten -to move and capture the adverse King. - -To argue this question correctly and to deduce the logical solution, it -is necessary to revert to first principles and to note that: - -It is a fundamental of Chess mathematics that the King cannot be exposed -to capture. - -Furthermore, it is to be noted as equally fundamental, that: - - 1. A piece exerts no force against that point upon which it is - posted; - - 2. That whatever power a piece exerts, always is exerted against - some other point than the point upon which it stands; and that; - - 3. In order to exert such power, it is an all-essential that the - piece move from the point which it occupies to the point at which - its power is to be exerted. - -Hence, it is obvious and may be mathematically demonstrated, that, - - 1. A piece which cannot move, cannot capture. - - 2. A piece which cannot capture, does not exercise any threat of - capture; and - - 3. Consequently, a piece deprived of its right to move; which - cannot capture nor exercise any threat to capture, obviously and - by mathematical demonstration, cannot give check, inasmuch, as - “check” merely is the threat by a piece to move and capture the - adverse King. - -Therefore, whatever may be the normal area of movement belonging to a -piece, whenever from any cause such piece loses its power of movement, -then, - -It no longer can capture, nor exercise any threat of capture, upon the -points contained within said area; and consequently such points so far -as said immovable piece is concerned, may be occupied in safety by any -adverse piece including the adverse King, for the reason that: - -An immovable piece cannot move; and not being able to move it cannot -capture, and not being able to capture, it does not exercise any threat -of capture, and consequently it cannot give check. - -This incongruity of permitting an immovable piece to give check -constitutes the second mathematical blemish in the game of Chess, as at -present constructed. - -This fallacy, the correction of which any schoolboy may mathematically -demonstrate, is defended, even by many who would know better, if they -merely would take time for reflection; by the inane assumption, that: - -A piece which admittedly is disqualified and rendered dormant by all -the fundamentals of the science of Chess, and which therefore cannot -legally move and consequently cannot legally capture anything; by some -hocus-pocus may be made to move and to capture that _most_ valuable -of _all_ prizes, the adverse King; and this at a time and under -circumstances when, as is universally allowed, it cannot legally move -against, nor legally capture _any other_ adverse piece. - -The basis of this illogical, illegal, and untenable assumption is: - -The pinned piece, belonging to that force which has the privilege of -moving, can abandon its post, and capture the adverse King; this stroke -ends the game and the game being ended, the pinning piece never can avail -of the abandonment of the covering post by the pinned piece to capture -the King thus exposed. - -The insufficiency of this subterfuge is clear to the mathematical -mind. Its subtlety lies in confounding together things which have no -connection, viz.: - -Admittedly the given body of Chess-pieces has the right to move, but it -is of the utmost importance to note that this privilege of moving extends -only to a single piece and from this privilege of moving the pinned piece -is debarred by a specific and fundamental law of the game, which declares -that: - - “A piece shall not by removing itself uncover the kindred King to - the attack of a hostile piece.” - -Thus, it is clear, that a pinned piece is a disqualified piece; its -powers are dormant and by the laws of the game it is temporarily reduced -to an inert mass, and deprived of every faculty normally appertaining -to it as a Chess-piece. On the other hand, as is equally obvious, the -pinning piece is in full possession of its normal powers and is qualified -to perform every function. - -To hold that a piece disqualified by the laws of the game can nullify the -activities of a piece in full possession of its powers, is to assert that -black is white, that the moon is made of green cheese, that the tail can -wag the dog, or any other of those things which have led the German to -promulgate his caustic formula on the Anglo-Saxon. - -Hence, artificially to nullify the normal powers of an active and -potential piece which is operating in conformity to the laws of the game, -and artificially to revivify the dormant powers of a piece disqualified -by the same laws; to debar the former from exercising its legitimate -functions and to permit the latter to exercise functions from which by -law, it specifically is debarred, is a self-evident incongruity and any -argument whereby such procedure is upheld, necessarily and obviously, is -sophistry. - - * * * * * - -No less interesting than instructive and conclusive, is reference of this -question to those intellectual principles which give birth to the game of -Chess, _per se_, viz.: - -As a primary fundamental, with the power to give check, is associated -concurrently the obligation upon the King thus checked, not to remain in -check. - -Secondly: The totality of powers assigned to the Chess-pieces is the -ability to move, provided the King be free from check. This totality of -powers may be denoted by the indefinite symbol, X. - -The play thus has for its object: - -The reduction to zero of the adverse X, by the operation of the kindred X. - -This result is checkmate in its generalized form. In effect, it is the -destruction of the power of the adverse pieces to move, by means of check -made permanent. - -By the law of continuity it is self-evident that: - -The power to move appertaining either to White or to Black, runs from -full power to move any piece (a power due to freedom from check), down -to total inability to move any piece, due to his King being permanently -checked, _i.e._, checkmated. - -This series cannot be interrupted without obvious violation of the ethics -of the game; because, so long as any part of X remains, the principle -from which the series emanated still operates, and this without regard to -quantity of X remaining unexpended. - -Thus, a game of Chess is a procedure from total ability to total -disability; _i.e._, from one logical whole to another; otherwise, from X -to zero. - -Checkmate, furnishes the limit to the series; the game and X vanish -together. - -This is in perfect keeping with the law of continuity, which acts and -dominates from beginning to end of the series, and so long as any part of -X remains. - -Hence to permit either White or Black to move any piece, leaving his King -in check, is an anomaly. - - * * * * * - -Denial to the Pawn of ability to move to the rear is an accurate -interpretation of military ethics. - -Of those puerile hypotheses common to the man who does not know, one of -the most entrancing to the popular mind, is the notion that Corps d’armee -properly are of equal numbers and of the same composition. - -This supposition is due to ignorance of the fact that the multifarious -duties of applied Strategetics, require for their execution like variety -of instruments, which diversity of means is strikingly illustrated by the -differing movements of the Chess-pieces. - -The inability of the Pawn to move backward strategically harmonizes with -its functions as a Corps of Position, in contradiction to the movements -of the pieces, which latter are Corps of Evolution. - -This restriction in the move of the Pawn is in exact harmony with the -inability of the Queen to move on obliques, of the Rook to move on -obliques or on diagonals, of the Bishop to move on obliques, verticals -and horizontals, of the Knight to move on diagonals, verticals, and -horizontals, and of the King to move like any other piece. - - * * * * * - -Possessed of the invaluable privilege of making the first move in -the game, knowing that no move should be made without an object, -understanding that the true object of every move is to minimize the -adverse power for resistance and comprehending that all power for -resistance is derived from facility of movement, the student easily -deduces the true object of White’s initial move in every game of Chess, -viz.: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_To make the first of a series of movements, each of which shall increase -the mobility of the kindred pieces and correspondingly decrease the -mobility of the adverse pieces._ - -As the effect of such policy, the power for resistance appertaining to -Black, ultimately must become so insufficient that he no longer will be -able adequately to defend: - - 1. His base of operations. - - 2. The communications of his army with its base. - - 3. The communications of his corps d’armee with each other, or, - - 4. To prevent the White hypothetical force penetrating to its - Logistic Horizon. - -To produce this fatal weakness in the Black position by the advantage of -the first move is much easier for White than commonly is supposed. - -The process consists in making only those movements by means of which the -kindred corps d’armee, progressively occupying specified objectives, are -advanced, viz.: - - I. _To the Strategetic Objective, when acting against the - communications of the adverse Determinate Force and its Base of - Operations._ - - II. _To the Logistic Horizon, when acting against the - communications between the adverse Determinate and the adverse - Hypothetical Forces._ - - III. _To the Strategic Vertices, when acting against the - communications of the hostile corps d’armee with each other._ - -To bring about either of these results against an opponent equally -equipped and capable, of course is a much more difficult task than to -checkmate an enemy incapable of movement. - -Yet such achievement is possible to White and with exact play it -seemingly is a certainty that he succeeds in one or the other, owing to -his inestimable privilege of first move. - -For the normal advantage that attaches to the first move in a game of -Chess is vastly enhanced by a peculiarity in the mathematical make-up of -the surface of the Chess-board, whereby, he who makes the first move may -secure to himself the advantage in mobility, and conversely may inflict -upon the second player a corresponding disadvantage in mobility. - -This peculiar property emanates from this fact: - - _The sixty-four points, i.e., the sixty-four centres of the - squares into which the surface of the Chess-board is divided, - constitute, when taken collectively, the quadrant of a circle, - whose radius is eight points in length._ - -Hence, in Chessic mathematics, the sides of the Chessboard do not form a -square, but the segment of a circumference. - -To prove the truth of this, one has but to count the points contained -in the verticals and horizontals and in the hypothenuse of each -corresponding angle, and in every instance it will be found that the -number of points contained in the base, perpendicular, and hypothenuse, -is the same. - -For example: - -Let the eight points of the King’s Rook’s file form the perpendicular of -a right angle triangle, of which the kindred first horizontal forms the -base; then, the hypothenuse of the given angle, will be that diagonal -which extends from QR1 to KR8. Now, merely by the processes of simple -arithmetic, it may be shown that there are, - - 1. Eight points in the base. - - 2. Eight points in the perpendicular. - - 3. Eight points in the hypothenuse. - -Consequently the _three_ sides of this given right angled triangle are -_equal_ to each other, which is a geometric _impossibility_. - -Therefore, it is self-evident that there exists a mathematical -incongruity in the surface of the Chess-board. - -That is, what to the eye _seems_ a right angled triangle, is in its -relations to the _movements_ of the Chess-pieces, an equilateral -triangle. Hence, the Chess-board, in its relations to the pieces when -the latter are at _rest_, properly may be regarded as a great _square_ -sub-divided into sixty-four smaller squares; but on the contrary, -in those calculations relating to the Chess-pieces in _motion_, the -Chess-board must be regarded as the _quadrant_ of a circle of eight -points radius. The demonstration follows, viz.: - -Connect by a straight line the points KR8 and QR8. Connect by another -straight line the points QR8 and QR1. Connect each of the fifteen points -through which these lines pass with the point KR1, by means of lines -passing through the least number of points intervening. - -Then the line KR8 and QR8 will represent the segment of a circle of -which latter the point KR1 is the center. The lines KR1-KR8 and KR1-QR1 -will represent the sides of a quadrant contained in the given circle and -bounded by the given segment, and the lines drawn from KR1 to the fifteen -points contained in the given segment of the given circumference, will be -found to be fifteen equal radii each eight points in length. - - * * * * * - -Having noted the form of the Static or positional surface of the -Chess-board and its relations to the pieces at rest, and having -established the configuration of the Dynamic surface upon which the -pieces move, it is next in sequence to deduce that fundamental fact and -to give it that geometric expression which shall mathematically harmonize -these conflicting geometric figures in their relations to Chess-play. - -As the basic fact of applied Chessic forces, it is to be noted, that: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_The King is the SOURCE from whence the Chess-pieces derive all power of -movement; and from his ability to move, emanates ALL power for attack and -for defence possessed by a Chessic army._ - -This faculty of mobility, derived from the existence of the kindred King, -is the all essential element in Chess-play, and to increase the mobility -of the kindred pieces and to reduce that of the adverse pieces is the -simple, sure and only scientific road to victory; and by comparison of -the Static with the Dynamic surface of the Chess-board, the desired -principle readily is discovered, viz., - - The Static surface of the Chess-board being a square, its least - division is into two great right angled triangles having a common - hypothenuse. - - The Dynamic surface being the quadrant of a circle, its least - division also is into two great sections, one of which is a right - angled triangle and the other a semi-circle. - -Comparing the two surfaces of the Chess-board thus divided, it will -be seen that these three great right angled triangles are equal, each -containing thirty-six points; and having for their common vertices, the -points KR1, QR1 and R8. - -Furthermore, it will be seen that the hypothenuse common to these -triangles, also is the chord of that semi-circle which appertains to the -Dynamic surface. - -Again, it will be perceived that this semi-circle, like the three right -angled triangles, is composed of thirty-six points, and consequently that -all of the four sub-divisions of the Static and Dynamic surfaces of the -Chess-board are equal. - -Thus it obviously follows, that: - - 1. The great central diagonal, always is one side of each of - the four chief geometric figures into which the Chess board is - divided; that: - - 2. It mathematically perfects each of these figures and - harmonizes each to all, and that: - - 3. By means of it each figure becomes possessed of eight more - points than it otherwise would contain. - -Hence, the following is self-evident: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_That Chessic army which can possess itself of the great central -diagonal, thereby acquires the larger number of points upon which to act -and consequently greater facilities for movement; and conversely:_ - -_By the loss of the great central diagonal, the mobility of the opposing -army is correspondingly decreased._ - -It therefore is clear that the object of any series of movements by a -Chessic army acting otherwise than on Line of Operations, should be: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_Form the kindred army upon the hypothenuse of the right angled triangle -which is contained within the Dynamic surface of the Chess-board; and -conversely,_ - -_Compel the adverse army to act exclusively within that semi-circle which -appertains to the same surface._ - -Under these circumstances, the kindred corps will be possessed of -facilities for movement represented by thirty-six squares; while the -logistic area of the opposing army will be restricted to twenty-eight -squares. - -There are, of course, two great central diagonals of the Chess-board; but -as the student is fully informed that great central diagonal always is to -be selected, which extends towards the Objective Plane. - - * * * * * - -Mobility, _per se_, increases or decreases with the number of squares -open to occupation. - -But in all situations there will be points of no value, while other -points are of value inestimable; for the reason that the occupation of -the former will not favorably affect the play, or may even lose the game; -while by the occupation of the latter, victory is at once secured. - -But it is not the province of Mobility to pass on the values of points; -this latter is the duty of Strategy. It is sufficient for Mobility that -it provide superior facilities for movement; it is for Strategy to define -the Line of Movement; for Logistics, by means of this Line of Movement, -to bring into action in proper times and sequence, the required force, -and for Tactics, with this force, to execute the proper evolutions. - -Mobility derives its importance from three things which may occur -severally or in combination, viz.: - - 1. All power for offense or for defense is eliminated from a - Chess-piece the instant it loses its ability to move. - - 2. The superiority possessed by corps acting offensively over - adverse corps acting defensively, resides in that the attack of - a piece is valid at every point which it menaces; while the - defensive effort of a piece, as a rule, is valid only at a single - point. Consequently: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_Increased facilities for movement enhance the power of attacking pieces -in a much greater degree than like facilities enhance the power of -defending pieces._ - -Such increasing facilities for movement ultimately render an attacking -force irresistible, for the reason that it finally becomes a physical -impossibility for the opposing equal force to provide valid defences for -the numerous tactical keys, which at a given time become simultaneously -assailed. Hence: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_Superior facilities for occupying any point at any time and with any -force, always ensure the superior force at a given point, at a given -time._ - -The relative advantage in mobility possessed by one army over an opposing -army always can be determined by the following, viz.: - - -RULE - -1. That army whose strategic front of operations is established upon the -Strategetic Center has the relative advantage in Mobility. - -2. To utilize the advantage in Mobility extend the Strategic Front in the -direction of the objective plane. - -3. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Mobility eliminate that -adverse Corps d’armee which tactically expresses such adverse advantage; -or so post the Prime Strategetic Point as to vitiate the adverse -Strategic front. - -Advantage in Mobility is divided into two classes, viz.: - - I. General Advantage in Mobility. - - II. Special Advantage in Mobility. - -A General Advantage in Mobility consists in the ability to act -simultaneously against two or more vital points by means of interior -logistic radii due to position between:-- - - 1. The adverse army and its Base of Operations. - - 2. Two or more adverse Grand Columns. - - 3. The wings of a hostile Grand Column. - - 4. Two or more isolated adverse Corps d’armee. - -Such position upon interior lines of movement is secured by occupying -either of the Prime Offensive Origins, _i.e._: - - 1. Strategic Center _vs._ Adverse Formation in Mass. - - 2. Logistic Center _vs._ Adverse Formation by Grand Columns. - - 3. Tactical Center _vs._ Adverse Formation by Wings. - - 4. Logistic Triune _vs._ Adverse Formation by Corps. - -Special Advantage in Mobility consists in the ability of a corps d’armee -to traverse greater or equal distances in lesser times than opposing -corps. - - -MILITARY EXAMPLES - - _“Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a false - movement.”--Napoleon._ - -In the year (366 B.C.) the King of Sparta, with an army of 30,000 men -marched to the aid of the Mantineans against Thebes. Epaminondas took -up a post with his army from whence he equally threatened Mantinea and -Sparta. Agesilaus incautiously moved too far towards the coast, whereupon -Epaminondas, with 70,000 men precipitated himself upon Lacedaemonia, -laying waste the country with fire and sword, all but taking by storm the -city of Sparta and showing the women of Lacedaemonia the campfire of an -enemy for the first time in six hundred years. - - * * * * * - -Flaminius advancing incautiously to oppose Hannibal, the latter took up a -post with his army from whence he equally threatened the city of Rome and -the army of the Consul. In the endeavor to rectify his error, the Roman -general committed a worse and was destroyed with his entire army. - - * * * * * - -At Thapsus, April 6, 46 B.C., Caesar took up a post with his army from -whence he equally threatened the Roman army under Scipio and the African -army under Juba. Scipio having marched off with his troops to a better -camp some miles distant, Caesar attacked and annihilated Juba’s army. - - * * * * * - -At Pirna, Frederic the Great, captured the Saxon army entire, and at -Rossbach, Leuthern and Zorndorf destroyed successively a French, an -Austrian and a Russian army merely by occupying a post from whence he -equally threatened two or more vital points, awaiting the time when one -would become inadequately defended. - - * * * * * - -Washington won the Revolutionary War merely by occupying a post from -whence he equally threatened the British armies at New York and -Philadelphia; refusing battle and building up an army of Continental -regular troops enlisted for the war and trained by the Baron von Steuben -in the system of Frederic the Great. - - * * * * * - -Bonaparte won at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcola, Rivoli and Austerlitz -his most perfect exhibitions of generalship, merely by passively -threatening two vital points and in his own words: “By never interrupting -an enemy when he is making a false movement.” - - * * * * * - -Perfection in Mobility is attained whenever the kindred army is able to -act unrestrainedly in any and all directions, while the movements of the -hostile army are restricted. - - - - -NUMBERS - - _“In warfare the advantage in numbers never is to be - despised.”--Von Moltke._ - - * * * * * - - _“Arguments avail but little against him whose opinion is voiced - by thirty legions.”--Roman Proverb._ - - * * * * * - - _“That king who has the most iron is master of those who merely - have the more gold.”--Solon._ - - * * * * * - - _“It never troubles the wolf how many sheep there - are.”--Agesilaus._ - - - - -NUMBERS - - _“A handful of troops inured to Warfare proceed to certain - victory; while on the contrary, numerous hordes of raw and - undisciplined men are but a multitude of victims dragged to - slaughter.”--Vegetius._ - - * * * * * - - _“Turenne always was victorious with armies infinitely inferior - in numbers to those of his enemies; because he moved with - expedition, knew how to secure himself from being attacked in - every situation and always kept near his enemy.”--Count de Saxe._ - - * * * * * - - _“Numbers are of no significance when troops are once thrown into - confusion.”--Prince Eugene._ - - -Humanity is divisible into two groups, one of which relatively is small -and the other, by comparison, very large. - -The first of these groups is made up comparatively of but a few persons, -who, by virtue of circumstances are possessed of everything except -adequate physical strength; and the second group consists of those vast -multitudes of mankind, which are destitute of everything except of -incalculable prowess, due to their overwhelming numbers. - -Hence, at every moment of its existence, organized Society is face to -face with the possibility of collision into the Under World; and because -of the knowledge that such encounter is inevitable, unforeseeable and -perhaps immediately impending, Civilization, so-called, ever is beset by -an unspeakable and all-corroding fear. - - _To deter a multitude, destitute of everything except the power - to take, from despoiling by means of its irresistible physique, - those few who are possessed of everything except ability to - defend themselves, in all Ages has been the chiefest problem of - mankind; and to the solution of this problem has been devoted - every resource known to Education, Legislation, Ecclesiasticism - and Jurisprudence._ - -This condition further is complicated by a peculiar outgrowth of -necessary expedients, always more or less unstable, due to that falsity -of premise in which words do not agree with acts. - -Of these expedients the most incongruous is the arming and training of -the children of the mob for the protection of the upper stratum; and that -peculiar mental insufficiency of hoi polloi, whereby it ever is induced -to accept as its leaders the sons of the Patrician class. - -That a social structure founded upon such anomalies should endure, -constitutes in itself the real Nine Wonders of the World; and is proof -of that marvellous ingenuity with which the House of Have profits by -the chronic predeliction of the House of Want to fritter away time and -opportunity, feeding on vain hope. - - * * * * * - -_The advantage in Numbers consists in having in the aggregate more Corps -d’armee than has the adversary._ - -All benefit to be derived from the advantage in Numbers is limited to -the active and scientific use of every corp d’armee; otherwise excess of -Numbers, not only is of no avail, but easily may degenerate into fatal -disadvantage by impeding the decisive action of other kindred corps. Says -Napoleon: “It is only the troops brought into action, that avails in -battles and campaigns--the rest does not count.” - -A loss in Numbers at chess-play occurs only when two pieces are lost -for one, or three for two, or one for none, and the like. No diminution -in aggregate of force can take place on the Chess-board, so long as the -number of the opposing pieces are equal. - -This is true although all the pieces on one side are Queens and those of -the other side all Pawns. - -The reason for this is: - -All the Chess-pieces are equal in strength, one to the other. The Pawn -can overthrow and capture any piece--the Queen can do no more. - -That is to say, at its turn to move, any piece can capture any adverse -piece; and this is all that any piece can do. - -It is true that the Queen, on its turn to move, has a maximum option -of twenty-seven squares, while the Pawn’s maximum never is more than -three. But as the power of the Queen can be exerted only upon one point, -obviously, her observation of the remaining twenty-six points is merely -a manifestation of mobility, and her display of force is limited to a -single square. Hence, the result in each case is identical, and the -display of force equal. - -The relative advantage in Numbers possessed by one army over an opposing -army always can be determined by the following, viz.: - - -RULE - -_That army which contains more Corps d’armee than an opposing army has -the relative advantage in Numbers._ - - _“With the inferiority in Numbers, one must depend more upon - conduct and contrivance than upon strength.”--Caesar._ - - -MILITARY EXAMPLES - - _“He who has the advantage in Numbers, if he be not a blockhead, - incessantly will distract his enemy by detachments, against all - of which it is impossible to provide a remedy.”--Frederic the - Great._ - - * * * * * - - _“He that hath the advantage in Numbers usually should exchange - pieces freely, because the fewer that remain the more readily are - they oppressed by a superior force.”--Dal Rio._ - -At Thymbra, Cyrus the Great, king of the Medes and Persians, with 10,000 -horse cuirassiers, 20,000 heavy infantry, 300 chariots and 166,000 light -troops, conquered Croesus, King of Assyria whose army consisted of -360,000 infantry and 60,000 cavalry. This victory made Persia dominant in -Asia. - - * * * * * - -At Marathon, 10,000 Athenian and 1,000 Plataean heavy infantry, routed -110,000 Medes and Persians. This victory averted the overthrow of Grecian -civilization by Asiatic barbarism. - - * * * * * - -At Leuctra, Epaminondas, general of the Thebans, with 6000 heavy -infantry and 400 heavy horse, routed the Lacedaemonean army, composed -of 22,000 of the bravest and most skillful soldiers of the known world, -and extinguished the military ascendency which for centuries Sparta had -exercised over the Grecian commonwealths. - -At Issus, Alexander the Great with 40,000 heavy infantry and 7,000 heavy -cavalry destroyed the army of Darius Codomannus, King of Persia, which -consisted of 1,000,000 infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 chariots and 15 -elephants. This battle, in which white men encountered elephants for the -first time, established the military supremacy of Europe over Asia. - - * * * * * - -Alexander the Great invaded Asia (May, 334 B.C.) whose armies aggregated -3,000,000 men trained to war; with 30,000 heavy infantry, 4000 heavy -cavalry, $225,000 dollars in money and thirty days’ provisions. - -At Arbela, Alexander the Great with 45,000 heavy infantry and 8,000 heavy -horse, annihilated the last resources of Darius and reduced Persia to a -Greek province. The Persian army consisted of about 600,000 infantry and -cavalry, of whom 300,000 were killed. - - * * * * * - -Hannibal began his march from Spain (218 B.C.) to invade the Roman -commonwealth, with 90,000 heavy infantry and 12,000 heavy cavalry. He -arrived at Aosta in October (218 B.C.) with only 20,000 infantry and -6,000 cavalry to encounter a State that could put into the field 700,000 -of the bravest and most skillful soldiers then alive. - - * * * * * - -At Cannae, Hannibal destroyed the finest army Rome ever put in the field. -Out of 90,000 of the flower of the commonwealth only about 3,000 escaped. -The Carthagenian army consisted of 40,000 heavy infantry and 10,000 heavy -cavalry. - - * * * * * - -At Alesia, (51 B.C.) Caesar completed the subjugation of Gaul, by -destroying in detail two hostile armies aggregating 470,000 men. The -Roman army consisted of 43,000 heavy infantry, 10,000 heavy cavalry and -10,000 light cavalry. - - * * * * * - -At Pharsaleus, (48 B.C.) Caesar with 22,000 Roman veterans routed 45,000 -soldiers under Pompey and acquired the chief place in the Roman state. - - * * * * * - -At Angora, (1402) Tamerlane, with 1,400,000 Asiatics, destroyed the -Turkish army of 900,000 men, commanded by the Ottoman Sultan Bajazet, in -the most stupendous battle of authentic record. - -After giving his final instructions to his officers, Tamerlane, it is -recorded, betook himself to his tent and played at Chess until the crisis -of the battle arrived, whereupon he proceeded to the decisive point and -in person directed those evolutions which resulted in the destruction of -the Ottoman army. - -The assumption that the great Asiatic warrior was playing at Chess during -the earlier part of the battle of Angora, undoubtedly is erroneous. Most -probably he followed the progress of the conflict by posting chess-pieces -upon the Chessboard and moving these according to reports sent him -momentarily by his lieutenants. - -Obviously, in the days when the field telegraphy and telephone were -unknown, such method was entirely feasible and satisfactory to the Master -of Strategetics and far superior to any attempt to overlook such a -confused and complicated concourse. - - * * * * * - -At Bannockburne (June 24, 1314), Robert Bruce, King of Scotland, with -30,000 Scots annihilated the largest army that England ever put upon a -battlefield. - -This army was led by Edward II and consisted of over 100,000 of -the flower of England’s nobility, gentry and yeomanry. The victory -established the independence of Scotland and cost England 30,000 troops, -which could not be replaced in that generation. - - * * * * * - -Gustavus Adolphus invaded Germany with an army of 27,000 men, over -one-half of whom were Scots and English. At that time the Catholic armies -in the field aggregated several hundred thousand trained and hardened -soldiers, led by brave and able generals. - -At Leipsic, after 20,000 Saxon allies had fled from the battlefield, -Gustavus Adolphus with 22,000 Swedes, Scots and English routed 44,000 -of the best troops of the day, commanded by Gen. Tilly. This victory -delivered the Protestant princes of Continental Europe from Catholic -domination. - - * * * * * - -At Zentha (Sept. 11, 1697), Prince Eugene with 60,000 Austrians routed -150,000 Turks, commanded by the Sultan Kara-Mustapha, with the loss of -38,000 killed, 4,000 prisoners and 160 cannon. This victory established -the military reputation of this celebrated French General. - - * * * * * - -At Turin (Sept. 7, 1706) Prince Eugene with 30,000 Austrians routed -80,000 French under the Duke of Orleans. Gen. Daun, whose brilliant -evolutions decided the battle, afterward, as Field-Marshal of the -Austrian armies, was routed by Frederic the Great at Leuthern. - - * * * * * - -At Peterwaradin (Aug. 5, 1716) Prince Eugene with 60,000 Austrians -destroyed 150,000 Turks. This victory delivered Europe for all time from -the menace of Mahometan dominion. - - * * * * * - -At Belgrade (Aug. 26, 1717) Prince Eugene with 55,000 Austrians destroyed -a Turkish army of 200,000 men. - - * * * * * - -At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) Frederic the Great with 22,000 Prussians, in -open field, destroyed a French army of 70,000 regulars commanded by the -Prince de Soubisse. - - * * * * * - -At Leuthern (Dec. 5, 1757) Frederic the Great with 33,000 Prussians -destroyed in open field, an Austrian army of 93,000 regulars, commanded -by Field-Marshal Daun. The Austrians lost 54,000 men and 200 cannon. - - * * * * * - -At Zorndorf (Aug. 25, 1758) Frederic the Great with 45,000 Prussians -destroyed a Russian army of 60,000 men commanded by Field-Marshal Fermor. -The Russians left 18,000 men dead on the field. - - * * * * * - -At Leignitz (Aug. 15, 1760) Frederic the Great with 30,000 men -out-manoeuvred, defeated with the loss of 10,000 men and escaped from the -combined Austrian and Russian armies aggregating 130,000 men. - - * * * * * - -At Torgau (Nov. 5, 1760) Frederic the Great with 45,000 Prussians -destroyed an Austrian army of 90,000 men, commanded by Field-Marshal Daun. - - * * * * * - -Washington, with 7,000 Americans, while pursued by 20,000 British and -Hessians under Lord Cornwallis, captured a Hessian advance column at -Trenton (Dec. 25, 1776) and destroyed a British detachment at Princeton, -(Jan. 3, 1777). - - * * * * * - -Bonaparte, with 30,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 40 cannon, invaded -Italy, (March 26, 1796) which was defended by 100,000 Piedmontese and -Austrian regulars under Generals Colli and Beaulieu. In fifteen days -he had captured the former, driven the latter to his own country and -compelled Piedmont to sign a treaty of peace and alliance with France. - -At Castiglione, Arcole, Bassano and Rivoli, with an army not exceeding -40,000 men Bonaparte destroyed four Austrian armies, each aggregating -about 100,000 men. - - * * * * * - -At Wagram, Napoleon, with less than 100,000 men, overthrew the main -Austrian army of 150,000 men, foiled the attempts at succor of the -secondary Austrian army of 40,000 men, and compelled Austria to accept -peace with France. - -In the campaign of 1814, Napoleon, with never more than 70,000 men, twice -repulsed from the walls of Paris and drove backward nearly to the Rhine -River an allied army of nearly 300,000 Austrians, Prussians and Russians. - - * * * * * - -In the year 480 B.C., Xerxes, King of Persia, invaded Greece with an -army, which by Herodotus, Plutarch and Isocrates, is estimated at -2,641,610 men at arms and exclusive of servants, butlers, women and camp -followers. - -Arriving at the Pass of Thermopolae, the march of the invaders was -arrested by Leonidas, King of Sparta, with an army made up of 300 -Spartans, 400 Thebans, 700 Thespians, 1,000 Phocians and 3,000 from -various Grecian States, posted behind a barricade built across the -entrance. - -This celebrated defile is about a mile in length. It runs between Mount -Oeta and an impassible morass, which forms the edge of the Gulf of Malia -and at each end is so narrow that a wagon can barely pass. - -Xerxes at once sent a herald who demanded of the Grecians the surrender -of their arms, to which Leonidas replied: - - “_Come and take them._” - -On the fifth day the Persian army attacked, but was unable to force an -entrance into the pass. On the sixth day the Persian Immortals likewise -were repulsed, and on the seventh day these troops again failed. - -That night Ephialtes, a Malian, informed Xerxes of a foot path around -the mountains to the westward, and a Persian detachment was sent by a -night march en surprise against the Grecian rear. On the approach of this -hostile body, the Phocians, who had been detailed by Leonidas to guard -this path, abandoned their post without fighting and fled to the summit -of the mountains, leaving the way open to the enemy, who, wasting no time -in pursuit, at once marched against the rear of the Grecian position. - -At the command of Leonidas, all his allies, with the exception of the 700 -Thespians, who refused to leave him, abandoned Thermopolae in haste and -returned safely to their own countries. - -Xerxes waited until day was well advanced and his detachment had -taken post upon the Grecian rear. Then both Persian columns attacked -simultaneously. The first part of this final conflict was fought outside -and to the north of the barricade. Leonidas being slain and their -numbers reduced over half, the remaining Greeks retired behind the -barricade and took post upon a slight elevation, where one after another -they were killed by arrows and javelins. The four days of fighting cost -the Persians over 20,000 of their best troops. - -Upon the summit of the hill where the Spartans perished a marble lion was -erected, bearing the inscription: - - “Go tell the Lacedymonians, O, Stranger, - That we died here in obedience to the law.” - -A second inscription engraved upon a stone column erected upon the scene -of conflict read: - - “Upon this spot four thousand Pelleponesians contended against - three hundred myriads.” - - * * * * * - -The largest army commanded by Epaminondas was about 70,000 men. Alexander -the Great, after Arbela, had 135,000 trained troops. Hannibal never led -more than 60,000 men in action, nor Caesar more than 80,000. Gustavus -Adolphus, just before Lutzen, marshalled 75,000 of the best soldiers in -the world under the banners of Protestantism. Turenne never fought with -more than 40,000 troops; Prince Eugene often had 150,000 in hand, and -Frederic the Great several times commanded 200,000 men. At Yorktown, -Washington had 16,000 Continentals, 6,000 French regulars and 18,000 -Provincial volunteers: Napoleon’s largest army, that of the Austerlitz -campaign, consisted of 180,000 men, while von Moltke personally directed -at Sadowa, 250,000 men; at Gravelotte, 211,000 men and at Sedan, 200,000 -men. - - * * * * * - -_Perfection in Numbers is attained whenever the kindred army has the most -troops in the theatre of decisive action._ - - - - -TIME - - _“You lose the time for action in frivolous deliberations. Your - generals instead of appearing at the head of your armies, parade - in processions and add splendor to public ceremonies. Your armies - are composed of mercenaries, the dregs of foreign nations, vile - robbers, a terror only to yourselves and your allies. Indecision - and confusion prevail in your counsels; your projects have - neither plan nor foresight. You are the slaves of circumstance - and opportunities continually escape you. You hurry aimlessly - hither and thither and arrive only in time to witness the success - of your enemy.”--Demosthenes._ - - - - -TIME - - _“That greatest of all advantages--TIME!”--Frederic the Great._ - - * * * * * - - _“Ask me for anything except--TIME.”--Napoleon._ - - * * * * * - - _“Time is the cradle of hope, the grave of ambition, the solitary - counsel of the wise and the stern corrector of fools. Wisdom - walks before it, opportunities with it and repentance behind it. - He that hath made it his friend hath nothing to fear from his - enemies, but he that hath made it his enemy hath little to hope - even from his friends.”--Anon._ - - -_The absolute advantage of Time consists in being able to move while the -adversary must remain stationary._ - -_The conditioned advantage in Time i.e., the Initiative, consists in -artificially restricting the adverse ability to move._ - -Advantage in Time is divided into two classes: - - I. The Initiative. - - II. Absolute. - -The Initiative treats of restrictions to the movements of an army, due -to the necessity of supporting, covering or sustaining Points or corps -d’armee, menaced with capture by adverse corps offensive. - -The absolute advantage in Time is the ability to move, while the adverse -army must remain immovable. - -Whenever the right to move is unrestricted, any desired Piece may be -moved to any desired Point. - -But whenever the right to move is restricted it follows that the Piece -desired cannot be moved; or, that if moved it cannot be moved to the -desired Point; or, that a piece not desired, must be moved and usually to -a Point not desired. - -Such restrictions of the right to move, quickly produce fatal defects -in the kindred Formation; and from the fact that such fatal defects in -Formation can be produced by restricting the right to move, arises the -inestimable value of the advantage in Time. - -Perfection in Time is attained whenever the kindred army is able to move -while the hostile army must remain stationary. - -The object of the active or absolute advantage in Time always is to -remain with the Initiative, or Passive Advantage in Time; which consists -in operating by the movement made, such menaces, as compel the enemy: - -1. To move corps d’armee which he otherwise would not move and - -2. Prevents him from moving corps d’armee which he otherwise would move. - - -PRINCIPLE - -_Given superior brute strength and no matter how blunderingly and -clumsily it be directed, it always will end by accomplishing its purpose, -unless it is opposed by Skill._ - -Skill is best manifested by the proper use of Time. Such ability is -acquired only through study and experience, guided by reflection, and it -can be retained only by systematic and unremitting practice. - -Most people imagine that Skill is to be attained merely from study; many -believe it but the natural and necessary offshoot of long experience; and -there are some of the opinion that dilettante dabbling in book lore is -an all-sufficient substitute for that sustained and laborious mental and -physical effort, which alone can make perfect in the competitive arts. - -Only by employing his leisure in reflection upon the events of the Past -can one get to understand those things which make for success in Warfare -and in Chessplay, and develop that all-essential ability to detect -equivalents in any situation. - -For in action there is no time for such reflection, much less for -development. - -Then, moments of value inestimable for the achieving of results are not -to be wasted in the weighing and comparison of things, whose relative -importance should be discerned in the twinkling of an eye, by reason of -prior familiarity with similar conditions. - -The relative advantage in time possessed by one army over an opposing -army always can be determined by the following, viz.: - - -RULE - -1. _That army which is in motion while the opposing army must remain -stationary has the absolute advantage in Time._ - -2. _That army which although at rest can dictate the movement of an -opposing army in motion has the conditioned advantage in Time, i.e., the -Initiative._ - - * * * * * - -_“One may lose more by letting slip a decisive opportunity than -afterwards can be gained by ten battles.”--Gustavus Adolphus._ - -_“It is the exact moment that must be seized; one minute too soon or too -late and the movement is utterly futile.”--Napoleon._ - - -MILITARY EXAMPLES - - _“The movements of an army should be characterized by decision - and rapidity.”--Hannibal._ - - * * * * * - - _“In order to escape from a dilemma it first of all is necessary - to gain Time.”--Napoleon._ - -Thebes having revolted, Alexander the Great marched 400 miles in fourteen -days; attacked and captured the city and razed it to the ground (335 -B.C.) sparing only the house and family of Pindar, the poet; massacred -all males capable of bearing arms and sold 30,000 women and children into -slavery. - - * * * * * - -To gain time to occupy the Strategic center and to cut the communications -with Rome of the army of the Consul Flaminius, Hannibal marched his army -for three days and nights through the marshes of the Po. - - * * * * * - -Caesar marched from Rome to Sierra-Modena in Spain, a distance of 1350 -miles in twenty-three days. - - * * * * * - -Frederic the Great in order to gain time usually marched at midnight. - - * * * * * - -Bonaparte finished his first Italian campaign by winning the battles of -St. Michaels, Rivoli and Mantua, marching 200 miles and taking 20,000 -prisoners, all in less than four days. In 1805, the French infantry in -the manoeuvres which captured 60,000 Austrians, marched from 25 to 30 -miles a day. In 1806 the French infantry pursued the Prussians at the -same speed. In 1814, Napoleon’s army marched at the rate of 30 miles -per day, besides fighting a battle every 24 hours. Retrograding for the -succor of Paris, Napoleon marched 75 miles in thirty-six hours. On the -return from Elba, 1815, the Imperial Guard marched 50 miles the first -day, 200 miles in six days and reached Paris, a distance of 600 miles, in -twenty days. - - * * * * * - -_“The fate of a battle always is decided by the lack of the -few minutes required to bring separated bodies of troops into -co-operation.”--Napoleon._ - - - - -POSITION - - - - -POSITION - - _“War is a business of position.”--Napoleon._ - - -By the term Position is signified those relative advantages and -disadvantages in location, which appertain to the aggregate posts -occupied by the kindred army, as compared with the aggregate posts -occupied by the adverse army. - -Advantages and disadvantages in Position are of three classes, viz.: - - (a) Those which appertain to the Column of Attack - - (b) Those which appertain to the Column of Support. - - (c) Those which appertain to the Column of Manoeuvre. - - -STRATEGETIC SITUATIONS - -A Strategic Situation, and whether in warfare or in Chess-play, is -produced by the presence, in any Strategetic Plane, _i.e._, theatre -of conflict, of two or more opposing Strategetic Entireties, _i.e._, -contending armies. - -These latter are of four classifications and are denominated as follows: - - (a) The Kindred Determinate Force. - - (b) The Adverse Determinate Force. - - (c) The Kindred Hypothetical Force. - - (d) The Adverse Hypothetical Force. - - -RULE I - -_Given the Strategetic Entireties present in a given Strategetic -Situation, designate the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors and express -the relative values of each in the terms of the Strategic Syllogism._ - - -THE STRATEGIC SYLLOGISM - -Having classified the existing Strategetic Situation, it is necessary -next to designate the opposing Columns of Attack, of Support, and of -Manoeuvre. - -Then, by comparing these Prime Strategetic Factors, to determine the -net advantage, disadvantage, or equality that exist between them and to -express this condition in the terms of the resulting Strategic Syllogism. - -In the construction of a Strategic Syllogism, the Strategic, _i.e._, -the positional value of each of the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors -contained in a given Strategetic Situation, is expressed in terms made up -of letters and symbols, viz., - - A Signifies Column of Attack. - S ” Column of Support. - M ” Column of Manoeuvre. - + ” Advantage in Position. - - ” Disadvantage in Position. - = ” Equality in Position. - -The positional values of the several Prime Strategetic Factors are -obtained as follows: - - -COLUMN OF ATTACK - -That Column of Attack which is posted upon the superior Strategic front -as compared to the front occupied by the immediately opposing formation -(cf, Grand Tactics, pp. 117 to 275), has the advantage in position. - -This relative advantage and disadvantage in position of the Column of -Attack is expressed by the first term of the Strategic Syllogism, viz.: - - (I.) - +A - ---- - -A - -or - - (II.) - -A - ----- - +A - -In the first instance (I), the White Column of Attack has the advantage -and the Black formation has the disadvantage; in the second case (II), -this condition is reversed. - - -COLUMN OF SUPPORT - -A Column of Support has the superiority in position, as compared with the -adverse Column of Support, whenever it contains more than the latter of -the following advantages, viz.: - - I. One, or more, Passed Pawns. - - II. Two united Pawns, overlapping an adverse Pawn. - - III. Two isolated Pawns adjacent to a single adverse Pawn. - - IV. Three, or more, united Pawns at their fifth squares, opposed - by a like number of adverse Pawns posted on their Normal Base - Line. - - V. A majority of kindred Pawns on that side of the Board farthest - from the adverse King. - -The relative advantage and disadvantage of one Column of Support, over -the opposing Column of Support, is expressed by the second term of the -Strategic Syllogism, thus: - - (I.) - +S - ---- - -S - -or - - (II.) - -S - ----- - +S - -In the first case (I), White has the advantage and Black has the -disadvantage. In the second case (II), this condition is reversed. - - -COLUMN OF MANOEUVRE - -Columns of Manoeuvre are not compared with each other. The advantage of -one over another is determined by comparing their respective powers of -resistance to the attack of the corresponding adverse Columns of Support. - -That Column of Manoeuvre which longest can debar the adverse promotable -Factors from occupying a point of junction on the kindred Strategetic -Rear, has the advantage. - -The relative advantage and disadvantage of the column of Manoeuvre is -expressed by the third term of the Strategic Syllogism, viz.: - - (I.) - +M - ---- - -M - -or - - (II.) - -M - ----- - +M - -In the first case (I), White, has the advantage and Black the -disadvantage. In the second case (II), this condition is reversed. - -In recording the values of the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors, the -terms relating to White are written above and those relating to Black, -below the line. - -The terms expressing the relative values of the Columns of Attack always -are placed at the left; those for the Columns of Support in the center, -and those for the Columns of Manoeuvre at the right. - -The Strategic Syllogisms are twenty-seven in number and are formulated, -viz.: - - -TABLE OF STRATEGIC SYLLOGISMS - - No. 1. +A+S+M - ------ - -A-S-M - - No. 2. +A+S=M - ------ - -A-S=M - - No. 3. +A+S-M - ------ - -A-S+M - - No. 4. +A=S+M - ------ - -A=S-M - - No. 5. +A=S=M - ------ - -A=S=M - - No. 6. +A=S-M - ------ - -A=S+M - - No. 7. +A-S+M - ------ - -A+S-M - - No. 8. +A-S=M - ------ - -A+S=M - - No. 9. +A-S-M - ------ - -A+S+M - - No. 10. =A+S+M - ------ - =A-S-M - - No. 11. =A+S=M - ------ - =A-S=M - - No. 12. =A+S-M - ------ - =A-S+M - - No. 13. =A=S+M - ------ - =A=S-M - - No. 14. =A=S=M - ------ - =A=S=M - - No. 15. =A=S-M - ------ - =A=S+M - - No. 16. =A-S+M - ------ - =A+S-M - - No. 17. =A-S=M - ------ - =A+S=M - - No. 18. =A-S-M - ------ - =A+S+M - - No. 19. -A+S+M - ------ - +A-S-M - - No. 20. -A+S=M - ------ - +A-S=M - - No. 21. -A+S-M - ------ - +A-S+M - - No. 22. -A=S+M - ------ - +A=S-M - - No. 23. -A=S=M - ------ - +A=S=M - - No. 24. -A=S-M - ------ - +A=S+M - - No. 25. -A-S+M - ------ - +A+S-M - - No. 26. -A-S=M - ------ - +A+S=M - - No. 27. -A-S-M - ------ - +A+S+M - - -_STRATEGIC ELEMENTALS._ - -_Each of the terms contained in the Strategic Syllogism should have its -counterpart in a tangible and competent mass of troops._ - -This principle of Strategetics, when applied to warfare, is absolute, -and admits of no exception. The catastrophies sustained by the French -armies in the campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 are each and every -one directly due to the persistent violation by Napoleon of this basic -truth, in devolving the duties of a column of support and a column of -manoeuvre upon a single Strategic Elemental. - -In solemn contrast to that fatal and indefensible rashness which cost -Napoleon five great armies and ultimately his crown, is the dictum by one -whose transcendent success in warfare, is the antithesis of the utter -ruination which terminated the career of the famous Corsican. - -Says Frederic the Great: - - “_I adhere to those universal laws which all the elements obey; - these, for me are sufficient._” - -Singularly enough, it seemingly has escaped the notice of the great -in warfare, owing to the subtle mathematical construction of the -Chess-board, its peculiar relations to the moves of the Chess-pieces, and -of the latter to each other, that: - - -PRINCIPLE - -I. _The functions of all three terms contained in a Strategic Syllogism -may be combined in a single chess Pawn, and, that:_ - -II. _All three functions are contemplated in and should be expressed by -every movement of every Chess-piece; and every move upon the Chess-board -is weak and unscientific, to the extent that it disregards either of -these obligations._ - - * * * * * - -Those advantages in position, which are denoted by the plus signs of the -Strategic Syllogism, have their material manifestation upon the surface -of the earth by Corps d’armee, and by Pieces which are equivalents of -these latter, upon the Chess-board. - -The _sign +A in the Strategic Syllogism_ denotes the superior Strategic -Front. That point whose occupation by a kindred piece demonstrates such -superiority in position is termed the _Key of Position_. The kindred -Corps occupying such point constitutes a _Corps en Line_, and is termed -the _First Strategic Elemental_. - -The _sign +S in the Strategic Syllogism_ denotes the _larger number_ -of pawn altitudes open to the kindred promotable factors. Those points -occupied by such kindred promotable factors are termed _Logistic -Origins_. The kindred Corps which occupy such points constitute _Corps en -Route_ and collectively are termed the _Second Strategic Elemental_. The -objective of Corps en Route always is the Kindred Logistic Horizon. - -The _sign +M in the Strategic Syllogism_ denotes that the _shortest_ open -pawn altitude is occupied by a kindred promotable factor. Such kindred -promotable factor is termed the _Corps en Touch_, and the point occupied -by such Corps is termed the _Point of Proximity_. The Objective of such -Corps always is a designated Point of Junction in the Kindred Logistic -Horizon, and such Corps constitutes the _Third Strategic Elemental_. - -In Warfare it is imperative that each of these Strategic Elementals be -represented by one or more Corps d’armee. But it is a second peculiarity -of the Chessic mechanism that a single Chessic Corps d’armee may -represent in itself, one, two or three Strategic Elementals and thus -constitute even the entire _Strategic Ensemble_. - -Hence, in Chess play, the Strategic Ensemble may be either single, -double, or triple, viz.: - -A Single Strategic Ensemble consists either of: - - (a) 1. Major Vertex. - - 2. Grand Vertex. - - (b) Logistic Origin. - - (c) Point of Proximity. - -A _Double Strategic Ensemble_ consists of either: - - (a) 1. Major Vertex, plus a Kindred Logistic Origin. - - 2. Grand Vertex, plus a Kindred Logistic Origin. - - (b) 1. Major Vertex, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity. - - 2. Grand Vertex, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity. - - (c) Logistic Origin, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity. - -A _Triple Strategic Ensemble_ consists of: - - 1. Major Vertex, plus a Kindred Logistic Origin, plus a Kindred - Point of Proximity. - - 2. Grand Vertex, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity, plus a - Kindred Logistic Origin. - - -PRINCIPLE - -_The relative positional advantage expressed by the plus signs of -the Strategic Syllogism decreases as the number of plus signs in the -Strategic Syllogism exceeds the number of corresponding Strategic -Elementals._ - -Failure to observe the amalgamation of the duties of the three Grand -Columns in each and every move upon the Chess-board, and to note that -the tangible and material expression of these powers and advantages may -be expressed either by three, by two, or even by a single Chessic Corps -d’armee, has caused doubt of the exact analogy between Chess and War; -and hence a like doubt of the utility of Chess-play. - -Recognizing the truth of the foregoing, the Asiatic conqueror, Tamerlane, -sought to rectify this discrepancy between the mechanism of Chess and -that of War, by increasing the size of the Chess-board to one hundred and -forty-four squares, and the number of pieces to forty-eight. - -By this innovation the geometric harmony existing between the Dynamic and -the Static surfaces of the Chess-board was destroyed; and this without -substituting therefor another like condition of mathematic perfection. -Ultimately, this remedy was abandoned, a fate which sooner or later, has -overtaken all attempts to improve that superlative intellectual exercise -of which says Voltaire: - - “Of all games, Chess does most honor to the human mind.” - -The reason why the scheme devised by Tamerlane did not satisfy even -himself, and why all attempted alterations in the machinery of Chess -prove unacceptable in practice, is due to the present perfect adaptation -of the Board and the Pieces for exemplifying the processes of Strategetic -Art. - -Any change in the construction of the Chess-board and the Chess-pieces, -to be effective, must largely increase the number of Chessmen, -correspondingly increase the number of squares, and equally so, increase -the number of moves permitted to each player at his turn to play. - -That is to say: Such innovation to be correct must permit each player -at his turn to play to move one of the Corps d’armee contained in the -Column of Attack, a second in the Column of Support, and a third in the -Column of Manoeuvre. Necessarily, the number of pieces must be increased -in order to provide Corps d’armee for the make-up of each Grand Column, -and obviously, the Board must be sufficiently enlarged to accommodate -not merely this increased mass, but also to permit full scope for the -increased number of possible movements. - - _The student thus readily will perceive, that it is only one step - from such an elaboration of Chess, to an army and the theatre of - actual campaigning._ - - * * * * * - -Perfection in Position is attained whenever the kindred army is acting or -is posted as a unit, while the hostile army is not so posted nor able so -to act. - - -MILITARY EXAMPLES - - -COLUMN OF ATTACK - - _“Frontal attacks are to be avoided, and the preference always is - to be given to the assault of a single wing, with your center and - remaining wing held back; because if your attack is successful - you equally destroy the enemy without the risk of being routed if - you fail.”--Frederic the Great._ - -At Leuctra and Mantinea, Epaminondas won by the oblique or Strategic -order of battle. Alexander the Great won by the same order at Issus -and the Haspades. Cyrus won at Thymbra and Hannibal won at Trebia, -Thrasymene, Cannae and Herdonea, by the three sides of an octagon or -enveloping formation. Caesar won by the oblique order at Pharsaleus. - - * * * * * - -Gustavus Adolphus won at Leipsic by acting from the Tactical Center and -Turenne and Prince Eugene gained their victories by the same means. - - * * * * * - -Frederic the Great won at Hohenfriedberg, Sohr, Rosbach, Leuthern, -Zorndorf and Leignitz by the oblique order and at Torgau by acting from -the tactical center. - - * * * * * - -Washington won at Trenton and Princeton acting by three contiguous sides -of an octagon. - -Bonaparte won at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcola, Rivoli, Ulm, -Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram and Ligny, by acting from the -tactical center. Never did he attack by the oblique order of battle. - - * * * * * - -Von Moltke’s victories all were won by acting in strict accord with the -system laid down for the use of the Prussian army by Frederic the Great. - - -COLUMN OF SUPPORT - -The most magnificent illustration both of the proper and of the improper -use of the Column of Support is found in that Grand Operation executed -by the Roman consuls, Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius, whereby the -Carthagenian Army under Hasdrubal was destroyed at the river Metaurus 207 -B.C. - -Hannibal, with the main Carthagenian army, posted in the south of Italy -near Canusium, was observed by Nero and his troops; while in the west, -Hasdrubal, observed by Livius was slowly advancing southward to form a -junction with his brother, a most unscientific procedure. - -Livius permitted Hasdrubal to penetrate into Italy to a point a few -miles south of the Metaurus River; whereupon Nero, taking 7,000 of his -best troops, by a rapid march of 200 miles united with Livius; and the -two consuls at once falling upon Hasdrubal utterly annihilated the -Carthagenian army. Nero returned at all speed and the first news of his -march and of the death blow to the Carthagenian projects against Rome -was furnished by the sight of his brother’s head, which Nero cast into -Hannibal’s camp from a military machine. - -The true method for uniting the Columns of Support to a Column of Attack -is thus shown by Gustavus Adolphus: - - “We encamped about Nuremberg the middle of June, the army after - so many detachments was not above 11,000 infantry and 8,000 horse - and dragoons. The King posted his army in the suburbs and drew - intrenchments around the circumference so that he begirt the - whole city with his army. His works were large, the ditch deep, - planked by innumerable bastions, ravelins, horn-works, forts, - redoubts, batteries and palisades, the incessant labor of 8000 - men for fourteen days. - - “On the 30th of June the Imperialists, joined to the Bavarian - army arrived and sat down 60,000 strong, between the city and the - friendly states; in order to intercept the King’s provisions and - to starve him out. - - “The King had three great detachments and several smaller ones, - acting abroad, reducing to his power the castles and towns of the - adjacent countries and these he did not hasten to join him until - their work was done. - - “The two chief armies had now lain for five or six weeks in - sight of each other and the King thinking all was ready, ordered - his generals to join him. Gustavus Horn was on the Moselle, - Chancellor Oxenstern about Mentz and Cologne and Dukes William - and Bernard and Gen. Bannia in Bavaria. - - “Our friends were not backward in obeying the King’s command, and - having drawn together their forces from various parts and _ALL_ - joined the chancellor Oxenstern, they set out in full march for - Nuremburg, where they arrived Aug. 21, being 30,000 old soldiers - commanded by officers of the greatest conduct and experience in - the world.” - - * * * * * - -Only once, at the battle of Torgau, (Nov. 5, 1760) did Frederick the -Great rely upon the co-operation of his Columns of Support for victory. - -As the result, his Column of Attack of 25,000 men fought the entire -battle and was so ruined by the fire and sabres of 90,000 enemies and 400 -pieces of artillery that, as the sun went down the King charged at the -head of two battalions, his sole remaining troops. At this moment Gen. -Zeithen, with the Column of Support, of 22,000 men occupied Siptka Hill, -the tactical key of the battlefield, and fired a salvo of artillery to -inform the King of their presence. The astonished Austrians turned and -fled; the King’s charge broke their line of battle and Frederic grasped a -victory, “for which” says Napoleon, “he was indebted to Fortune and the -only one in which he displayed no talent.” - -This comment of course is not true. Frederic displayed magnificent -talent that day, by holding in check a force of thrice his numbers and -so shattering it by his incessant attacks that it crumbled to pieces -before the mere presence and at sight of his fresh and vigorous Column -of Support. Had Napoleon displayed such talent in the personal conduct -of battles during 1813, 1814 and 1815 it is possible that he would have -terminated his career at some other place than at St. Helena. - -The experience, however, was enough to fully satisfy Frederic, and never -again did he attempt a Logistic battle. - - * * * * * - -The capture of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown is perhaps the nearest -approach to the achievement of Nero and Livius in the annals of the -military art. Decoyed by the retrograde movements of Gen. Greene, the -British army was deluded into taking up a position at Yorktown, having -the unfordable James River in rear, and within striking distance of the -main American army under Washington about New York City. - -Lafayette was ordered to reinforce Greene; Count d’Esting was induced to -bring the French fleet from the West Indies to Chesapeake Bay to prevent -the rescue of Cornwallis by British coming by the ocean, and Count -Rochambeau was requested to join Washington with the French army then in -Rhode Island. - -All this took time, but everything was executed like clockwork. The -French fleet arrived in the Chesapeake; the next day came a British -fleet to rescue the Earl’s army. In the naval fight which ensued, the -British were driven to sea and so damaged as to compel their return to -New York. By a swift march, Washington, with his Continentals and the -French, joined Greene and Lafayette, and two of his redoubts being taken -by storm, Lord Cornwallis surrendered. This victory established the -independence of the American Colonies. - - * * * * * - -The Logistic Battle, _i.e._, the combination of the Columns of Attack -and of Support was first favorite with Napoleon and to his partiality -for this particular form of the tactical offensive was due both the -spectacular successes and the annihilating catastrophes which mark his -astonishing career. - -The retrieving of his lost battle of Marengo, by the fortuitous arrival -of Dessaix column, seems to have impressed Napoleon to the extent that he -ever after preferred to win by such process, rather than by any other. - -The first attempt to put his new hypothesis into practice was at Jena. -Single handed his column of attack destroyed the Prussian main body, -while Davoust with the column of manoeuvre held in check over three times -his numbers. - -The French Column of Support under Bernadotte did not arrive in season to -fire a shot. - - * * * * * - -At Eylau, the French Column of Support under Davoust was four hours -in advancing six miles against the opposition of the Russian general -Doctoroff. The second French Column of Support under Ney did not reach -the field until the battle was over. - - * * * * * - -In the retreat from Russia, the French Column of Support under the Duke -of Belluno was driven from its position at Smolensko, thus permitting the -Russians under Kutosof to occupy the Strategic center, which disaster -cost Napoleon 30,000 men in clearing his communications. - - * * * * * - -In 1813, the Column of Support under Ney at Bautzen was misdirected and -the battle rendered indecisive by its lack of co-operation with the -French Column of Attack. - - * * * * * - -In 1814, Napoleon conformed to the Art by acting in three columns, but -yielding to his besetting military sin, he joined his Column of Support -to his Column of Attack and through the open space thus created in the -French Strategetic Front, Blucher advanced triumphantly to Paris. - - * * * * * - -In the Waterloo campaign, Napoleon properly began with three Grand -Columns. At the battle of Ligny, his Column of Support arrived upon -Blucher’s left flank and then without firing a shot, wheeled about and -marched away. - -At Waterloo, by uniting his Columns of Attack and of Support prematurely, -Napoleon permitted Blucher to penetrate the French Strategetic Front and -to win in the same manner and as decisively as he did at Paris. - - * * * * * - -Von Moltke won the battle of Sadowa by the arrival of the Prussian Column -of Support, commanded by Prince Frederic William. But in the interim, the -German main army was driven in several miles by the Austrians, and Prince -Bismark’s first white hairs date from that day. - - -COLUMN OF MANOEUVRE - - _“A small body of brave and expert men, skillfully handled and - favored by the ground, easily may render difficult the advance of - a large army.”--Frederic the Great._ - -At the river Metaurus, the Roman Consul Livius gave a fine example of the -duties of a Column of Manoeuvre which are slowly and securely to retreat -before an advancing enemy and never to be induced into a pitched battle -until the arrival of the kindred main body. - - * * * * * - -Frederic the Great made great use of Columns of Manoeuvre. In the Seven -Years War he constantly maintained such a column against the armies of -each State with whom Prussia was at war; while himself and his brother -Henry operated as Columns of Attack. - - * * * * * - -In the Revolutionary War, Washington maintained a Column of Manoeuvre -against the British in Rhode Island, another against the British in the -south and a third against the hostile Indian tribes of the southwest. - - * * * * * - -Napoleon constantly used Columns of Manoeuvre in all his campaigns; -notably at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcole, Rivoli, Ulm, Austerlitz, -Jena, in 1812, 1813, 1814 and at Ligny and Waterloo in 1815. - - - - -PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS - - - - -PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS - - _“It is necessary exactly to weigh the means we possess in - opposition to the enemy in order to determine beforehand which - must ultimately predominated.”--Frederic the Great._ - - -_Those elemental quantities whose comparative values are determined by -Grand Reconnaissance and which are termed: Organization, Topography, -Mobility, Numbers, Time, and Position, collectively constitute Prime -Strategetic Means whose proper employment is the basis of every true -Prime Strategetic Process._ - - -POLICY OF CAMPAIGN - -That relative advantage in Numbers expressed by the larger aggregate of -Chess-pieces is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by additional -geometric and sub-geometric symbols. - -Excess or deficiency in Numbers determines the policy of Campaign. The -policy of the inferior force is: - - 1. To preserve intact its Corps d’armee, and - - 2. To engage in battle only when victory can be assured by other - advantages in Strategetic means, which nullify the adverse - advantage in Numbers; and even then only when such victory is - decisive of the Campaign. - -Hence, the policy of Campaign of that army superior in Numbers, is: - -Incessantly to proffer battles which: - - (a) Accepted, constantly reduces the inferior army and increases - its disproportion in numbers, or, - - (b) Evaded, compels the inferior army to abandon important posts, - for whose defence it cannot afford the resulting loss of troops; - thus permitting to the numerically superior army a continually - increasing advantage in Position. - - -PRINCIPLE - -_All else being equal the advantage of Numbers is decisive of victory in -battle and Campaign._ - -_Things being unequal, the advantage in Numbers may be nullified by -adverse advantages in Organization, Topography, Mobility, Time and -Position._ - -_Victory resulting from advantage in Numbers is achieved by -simultaneously attacking two or more Tactical Keys from a Kindred -Strategic Key and two or more Kindred Points of Command._ - - -TO LOCATE THE AREA OF CONCENTRATION - -That _relative advantage in Mobility_ expressed by the situation of the -Strategic Front upon the Strategetic Center is materially manifested -upon the Chess-board by Kindred Chess-pieces posted upon that great -central diagonal which extends towards the Objective Plane. Such -advantage determines those points which should be occupied in the proper -development of the front so posted; and consequently designates the -direction and location of that battlefield upon which the kindred army -may concentrate in overwhelming force, despite all possible resistance by -the enemy. - - -MOST FAVORABLE BATTLEFIELD - -That _relative advantage in Organization_ expressed by superior potential -totality, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the geometric -and sub-geometric symbols of those Chess-pieces possessed of the superior -potential complement. Such symbols taken in combination, describe that -field of battle most favorable for the execution of those Major Tactical -evolutions which appertain to the Chess-pieces of superior organization. - - -POSTS OF MAXIMUM SECURITY - -That _relative defensive advantage in Topography_ expressed by -inaccessibility to hostile attack is materially manifested upon the -Chess-board by Corps of Position, posted upon points of different color -to that occupied by the adverse Bishop; and this advantage designates -those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be occupied -with the maximum of security. - -That _relative offensive advantage in Topography_ expressed by -accessibility to kindred attack is materially manifested upon the -Chess-board by Corps of Position posted upon points of the same color as -that occupied by the kindred Bishop; and this advantage designates those -posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be attacked with -the maximum facility. - - -CHARACTER OF THE MOST FAVORABLE BATTLE - -That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Attack_, -expressed: - - 1. By superior location, direction and development of the Kindred - Strategic Front of Operations; and - - 2. By the occupation of Points of Departure, of Manoeuvre, of - Command and of the Strategic Key of a True Strategic Horizon, - indicates that a Strategic Grand Battle in the first instance; - and in the second case that a Tactical Grand Battle is most - favorable in the existing situation. - -That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Support_, -expressed by superior facilities for occupying with the Kindred -Promotable Factors their corresponding Points of Junction in the Kindred -Logistic Horizon, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by -the larger number of Pawn Altitudes which either are open, or may be -opened, despite all possible resistance by the enemy; and such advantage -designates those adverse Points of Impenetrability and Points of -Resistance to the march of the Kindred Promotable Factors, which it is -necessary to nullify. - -That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvre_, -expressed by the security of the Kindred and the exposure of the -adverse Strategetic Rear to attack by the Kindred Column of Support, is -materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the occupation by a Kindred -Promotable Factor of the Point of Proximity; and such advantage indicates -that the advance with all possible celerity of such Promotable Factor -and Point of Proximity toward the corresponding Point of Junction is a -dominating influence in the existing situation. - - -PROJECTED GRAND BATTLE - -From the advantage in Position appertaining to the three Grand Columns is -deduced the character of the Grand Battle properly in sequence. - -_Advantage in Position with the Column of Attack_ indicates the -opportunity, all else being equal, to engage in a victorious Strategic -Grand Battle against the hostile Formation in Mass, or in a Tactical -Grand Battle against the hostile Formation by Wings. - -_Advantage in Position with the Column of Support_ indicates the -opportunity to engage effectively in a series of minor battles, as though -having the advantage in Numbers. - -_Advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvre_ indicates the -opportunity to engage in a victorious Logistic Grand Battle against the -adverse Formation by Grand Columns. - - -LEAST FAVORABLE ADVERSE CONDITION - -That _relative advantage in Time_ expressed by restrictions of the -adversary’s choice of movements at his turn to play, is materially -manifested upon the Chess-board by Feints operated by Kindred -Chess-pieces against adverse vital points; and such advantage of the -Initiative dictates the next move of the opposing army. - -The _advantage of the Initiative_ determines which of the adverse corps -d’armee may and may not move. - -The material expression of this advantage always is a Feint by a Kindred -Corps against a vital point either occupied or unoccupied, which -necessitates that upon his next move, the enemy either evacuate, support, -cover or sustain the post so menaced. - -Such feint, therefore, restricts the move of the enemy to those of his -corps as are able to obviate the threatened loss and proportionately -reduces the immediate activity of his army. - - -RELATIVE ADVANTAGES IN LOCATION - - _“It is only the force brought into action that avails in battles - and campaigns--the rest does not count.”--Napoleon._ - -_The distance which separates opposing Corps d’armee always modifies the -values of the Prime Strategetic Means._ - -Hence in the making of Grand Reconnaissance, it is next in sequence to -determine whether the Chess-pieces are: - - I. In Contact. - - II. In Presence. - - III. At Distance. - -Corps d’armee are _in Contact_ with each other whenever their logistic -radii intersect; or, their radii offensive and the corresponding adverse -radii defensive are opposed to each other. - -Corps d’armee are _in Presence_ whenever the posts which they occupy are -contained within the same Strategic front, the same Strategetic Horizon, -or are in communication with their corresponding posts of mobilization, -development, or manoeuvre. - -Corps d’armee are _at Distance_ when the posts which they occupy are not -in communication with Kindred Corps d’armee posted upon the strategic -front adopted, or with posts of mobilization or development contained -within the corresponding Primary Base of Operations, or, within the True -Strategetic Horizon. - - -REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNING - -Every Campaign, whether upon the surface of the Earth or upon the -Chess-board is decided and usually is terminated by a Grand Battle. - -Those movements of opposing Grand Columns, whereby such decisive -conflict is brought about under circumstances which ensure victory, by -reason of superior advantages in Strategetic Means, are termed Grand -Manoeuvres; and a proper series of Grand Manoeuvres, combined with their -corresponding feints, strategems, ambuscades and minor battles, the whole -terminated by a resulting Grand Battle, is termed a Grand Operation. - -Those processes of Grand Manoeuvre, which produce an opportunity to -victoriously engage in battle, are the most subtle and difficult known to -the Strategetic Art. - -_Successful application of these processes in practice depends wholly -upon proper use of the MEANS at hand and the doing of the utmost that can -be done in the TIME available._ - -Nothing can be more repugnant to high art in Strategetics than those -crudities termed in the specious mouthings of pretentious mediocrity -“waiting moves,” “delayed strokes,” “defensive-offensives,” “masterly -inactivities,” and the like. - -“Time past is gone and cannot be regained; time future is not and may -never be; time present is” and with it Opportunity, which an instant -later may be gone. - -The gain of but “a foot of ground and a minute of time” would have saved -the French army at Rosbach and have cost Frederic the Great one of his -most lustrous victories and perhaps his army and his crown. - - -PRINCIPLE - -_In Strategetics there is but a single method whereby Opportunity may -be availed of, and that is by so augmenting kindred advantages and so -depreciating adverse advantages as to acquire for the kindred army that -particular advantage of Strategetic means which in the given situation is -the proper basis of the Strategetic movement next in sequence._ - - * * * * * - -_At Distance._ - -_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse army at -Distance, is the advantage in MOBILITY._ - -The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army -acting in the formation by Grand Columns, and the object of such Grand -Manoeuvre always is, by superior celerity of movement, to occupy: - -1. The Strategic Center by the Kindred Column of Attack, thus -intersecting the Route of Communication between the adverse main body and -its Base of Operation; or to occupy: - -2. The Logistic Center with the Kindred Columns of Support and of -Manoeuvre, thus intersecting the Route of Communication between the -adverse main body and its Chief Supporting Column and clearing the way -for the advance of the Kindred Column of Support against the flank and -rear of the adverse Main Body. - -Obviously, the united Kindred Columns of Attack and of Support always -will constitute an overwhelming superiority in Numbers as compared with -the adverse main body. - -_In Presence._ - -_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse Grand -Column in Presence, is the advantage in POSITION._ - -The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army -acting in the Formation by Wings, and the object of such Grand Manoeuvre -always is, by availing to the uttermost of its situation upon the -Tactical Center, _i.e._, upon the area midway between the adverse Wings -thus isolated from each other; to act in overwhelming Numbers, first -against one and then against the other hostile bodies. - -_In Contact._ - -_The chief requisite for success when acting offensively against an -adverse Grand Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee, in Contact, is the -advantage in NUMBERS._ - -The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army -has an overwhelming superiority in Numbers in contact, and at least the -equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means. - -In this circumstance, the object of such Grand Battle always is: - -1. To attack the hostile Formation in Mass frontally at the center, and -upon both wings obliquely; all three attacks being made simultaneously -and the evolutions so executed that the hostile army never is able to -penetrate between either kindred wing and the kindred center, nor to -outflank that kindred wing which may be in the air. - -2. In case the kindred army has the equality or inferiority in all -other Prime Strategetic Means, then the object of a Grand Battle on the -Offensive is to attack the hostile Formation in Mass obliquely with the -whole kindred army, and preferably upon that wing which covers the -route of communication of the adverse army with its Base of Operations, -but always upon that wing which contains the Tactical Key of the actual -Battlefield. - -Obviously, the concentration of the entire kindred army against a single -adverse wing always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in -Numbers. - -In making such attack obliquely against a single adverse wing, the center -and remaining wing of the kindred army must not engage until the kindred -Van and Corps of Position of the attacking wing first have formed the -_center_ of three sides of an octagon; of which the Kindred Corps of -Evolution will form the _farthest_ side and the Kindred Center and left -wing Corps d’armee will form the _nearest_ and latest constructed side. - - * * * * * - -_The chief requisite for success when acting defensively against a Grand -Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee is the advantage in TOPOGRAPHY._ - -The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army, -decidedly inferior in Numbers in the aggregate, has the advantage in -Topography and equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means. - -In this case the object is to support both flanks of the inferior army -upon impassable natural barriers, strengthening both wings at the expense -of the center, both in quantity and in quality of troops. - -If the Tactical Defensive be selected, the center should retire before -the oncoming of the hostile army in order to enclose it between the -Kindred Wings, which will then overwhelm it by superior Numbers, while -the natural barriers on the flanks being impassable will prevent the -remaining hostile corps from participating in the battle otherwise than -as spectators. - -Should the Tactical Offensive be selected, that kindred wing best adapted -for attack should engage supported by all kindred Corps of Evolution, -while advancing the Kindred Center in reserve and holding the remaining -wing refused and in observation. - -All else being equal, relative advantage in either branch of Prime -Strategetic Means is sufficient to ensure victory in battle, and the -proper use of such advantage for securing victory is outlined thus: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_Utilize advantage in Prime Strategetic Means to obtain the superiority -in Numbers at the Point of Contact in an Offensive Battle; and to nullify -the adverse superiority in Numbers at the point of contact in a Defensive -Battle._ - - * * * * * - -Between War and Chess there is a seeming incongruity, which is the basis -of that doubt of the utility of Chess-play, so commonly held by laymen, -and which fallacy few, even among proficients, are competent to combat. - -This doubt most frequently is voiced by the query: - - If Chess and War are analagous, why was not Napoleon a Master - Chess-player and Morphy a great military Commander? - -This query readily is answered in the words of Frederic the Great, viz.: - - “To be possessed of talent is not sufficient. Opportunity to - display such talent and to its full extent is necessary. All - depends on the time in which we live.” - -The Strategetic talent possessed in common by Morphy and Napoleon, in -both was brought to perfection by long and expert training. - -But circumstances placed the twelve year old Napoleon in the midst of -soldiers and in an era of war, while circumstances placed the twelve year -old Morphy in the midst of Chess-players and in an era of Peace. - -Napoleon was educated a General; Morphy was educated a lawyer. - -To develop his self-evident and superlative Strategetic talent, -Napoleon’s education was of the best; to develop his self-evident and -superlative Strategetic talent, Morphy’s education was of the worst. - -Napoleon succeeded as a General; Morphy failed as a lawyer. - -The innate capability of Napoleon for Strategetics was developed in the -direction of Warfare; the innate capability of Morphy for Strategetics -was developed in the direction of Chess-play. - -In War, Napoleon is superlative; in Chess, Morphy is superlative. - -Educated in the law, Napoleon might have proved like Morphy a non-entity; -educated in Chess, Napoleon might have proved like Morphy a phenomenon. - -Educated in War, Morphy might have rivalled Napoleon. - -For the Chess-play of Morphy displays that perfect comprehension of -Strategetics, to which none but the great Captains in warfare have -attained. - -Perfection in Strategetics consists in exactly interpreting in battle and -campaign, the System of Warfare invented by Epaminondas. - -Those able to do this in War have achieved greatness, and the great at -Chess-play are those who best have imitated that exactness with which -Morphy employed this system on the Chess-board. - -To those who imagine that Strategetic talent, as exemplified in Warfare, -is different from Strategetic talent as exemplified in Chess-play, the -following may afford matter for reflection. - - * * * * * - -_“Frederic the Great was one of the finest Chess-players that Germany -ever produced.”--Wilhelm Steinitz._ - - - - -PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION - -SECTION ONE - - - - -PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION - -SECTION ONE - - -(FIRST PHASE.) - -In the consideration of every Strategetic Situation possible in Warfare, -or in Chess-play, the initial process always is a Grand Reconnaissance. - -Grand Reconnaissance is that exact scrutiny of existing conditions, -whereby is determined the relative advantages and disadvantages possessed -by the opposing armies in: - - 1. Time. - - 2. Numbers. - - 3. Position. - - 4. Organization. - - 5. Mobility. - - 6. Topography. - -The _First Phase_ in the demonstration of every Prime Strategetic -Proposition consists: - - 1. _In determining by comparison of the relative advantages and - disadvantages in Time, which of the opposing armies has the - ability to MOVE, while the other must remain stationary._ - - 2. _In deducing the MOTIF of such movement._ - - 3. _In designating the DIRECTION of such movement._ - -The making of Grand Reconnaissance is a special privilege which -exclusively appertains to the advantage in _Time_. It always should be -made by the Commander-in-chief of that army which is able to put itself -in motion, while the opposing army must remain stationary, and it never -should be confounded with the advance of the Cavalry Corps, nor confused -with the work of scouts and spies; all of which are matters entirely -separate and distinct from Grand Reconnaissance. - -In the Grand Reconnaissance of any given Strategetic Situation the -element of Numbers _primarily_ is to be considered, for the reason that -the basic fact of the Science of Strategetics is: - - _“THE GREATER FORCE ALWAYS OVERCOMES THE LESSER.”--Napoleon._ - -Hence, unless more immediately vital considerations prevent, superiority -in Numbers, of itself, is _decisive_ of victory; and thus it readily -is to be deduced that all else being equal, the advantage in Time plus -the advantage in Numbers constitutes the easiest and simplest winning -combination known to Strategetic Art. - -But it so happens that the advantage in Time may be combined not only -with the greater force, but also with an equal, or even with the lesser -force, and from this it is self-evident that Strategetic Situations are -divided into three classes, viz.: - - I. Numerical superiority, plus right to move. - - II. Numerical equality, plus right to move. - - III. Numerical inferiority, plus right to move. - -There are _two primary methods_ for availing of superiority in Numbers to -destroy the opposing lesser force, viz.: - - 1. _By the Process of Attrition, i.e., by maintaining an - incessant tactical offensive and thus wearing down the opposing - army by exchanging pieces at every opportunity._ - - 2. _By Acting in Detachments, i.e., by means of the extra corps, - simultaneously to attack more points of vital importance than the - hostile army is able simultaneously to defend._ - -From the foregoing it is obvious that conversely there are two principal -considerations, which all else being equal, must dominate the procedure -of the Numerically inferior force, viz.: - - I. To avoid further diminution of its aggregate. - - II. To avoid creating indefensible vital points. - - * * * * * - -The _second consideration_ in the making of a Grand Reconnaissance by -the commander-in-chief of an army having the advantage in Time, is the -element of _Position_; for the reason that by unscientific posting of -Corps d’armee, relative advantages in Time, or in Numbers or in both, may -be rendered nugatory, on account of inability of the kindred Columns of -Attack, of Support and of Manoeuvre to perform their functions. - -In case the Corps are scientifically posted and are in positions to -avail of advantage in Time and Numbers, those adverse vital points -whose occupation may be effected by superior force, always will be the -objectives of the movements of the latter. - -Hence, the following: - - -PRINCIPLE - -_As the advantage in Time gives the right to MOVE and the advantage -in Numbers indicates the MOTIF of movement; so does the advantage in -Position, as expressed by the Strategic Syllogism, specify the DIRECTION -of that movement which normally appertains to the army having the -advantage in Time._ - -The proper _direction_ of that movement which normally appertains to the -advantage in Time always is indicated by the plus signs in the Strategic -Syllogism, viz.: - - +A. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army - having the advantage in Time is along the Strategetic Center - towards the Objective Plane. - - +S. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army - having the advantage in Time is along one or more pawn - altitudes towards the Kindred Logistic Horizon. - - +M. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army - having the advantage in Time is along the shortest open pawn - altitude towards the Kindred Point of Junction. - - ------- - +A+S. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army - having the advantage in Time is double, _i.e._, - - +A. towards the Objective Plane. - - +S. along one or more open Pawn altitudes toward the - Kindred Logistic Horizon. - - ------- - +A+M. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army - having the advantage in Time, is double, _i.e._, - - +A. towards the Objective Plane. - - +M. Along the shortest open pawn altitude toward the - Kindred Point of Junction. - - ------- - +S+M. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army - having the advantage in Time is double, _i.e._, - - +S. Along one or more open Pawn altitudes toward the - Kindred Logistic Horizon. - - +M. Along the shortest open Pawn Altitude toward the - Kindred Point of Junction. - - ------- - +A+S+M. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement is triple, - _i.e._, - - +A. Toward the Objective Plane. - - +S. Along one or more open Pawn altitudes, toward the - Kindred Logistic Horizon. - - +M. Along the shortest open Pawn altitude, toward the - Kindred Point of Junction. - -The First Phase in the demonstration of every Strategetic Proposition is -determined by the following: - - -THEOREM - -_Given the Normal ability to move, to determine the Normal motif and -direction of movement._ - -1. Designate that army having the advantage in Time and express such -advantage by the symbol +T, express the corresponding disadvantage -in Time which appertains to the opposing army, by the symbol -T, and -such symbols will constitute the First Term of the First Phase of the -demonstration of any Prime Strategetic Proposition. - -2. Express that superiority, equality, or inferiority in Numbers, which -appertains to each of the opposing armies by the symbols +N, =N,-N, -respectively; and such symbols will constitute the Second Term of the -First Phase of the demonstration of any Prime Strategetic Proposition. - -3. Express the objectives designated by the plus terms of the Strategic -Syllogism, viz.: - - (a) Objective of +A = Objective Plane, _i.e._, O. P. - - (b) ” +S = Logistic Horizon, _i.e._, L. H. - - (c) ” +M = Point of Junction, _i.e._, P. J. - -and the symbols denoting such objectives will constitute the Third -Term in the First Phase of the demonstration of any Prime Strategetic -Proposition. - -4. Combine those three terms which appertain to the advantage in Time, -then combine those three terms which appertain to the disadvantage in -Time, and the resulting equation when expanded will depict: - - (a) The normal ability to move. - - (b) The normal motif of movement. - - (c) The normal directions of movement which appertain to each of - the opposing armies. - - -EXAMPLE - - White. (+T+N) + (+A+S+M) - ----------------- - Black. (-T-N) + (-A-S-M) - - -EXPANDED - - First Term. +T = Normal ability to move. - - Second Term. +N = Normal motif of movement, - (a) Detachments, (b) Exchanges. - - Third Term +O. P. = Normal objective of +A. - +L. H. = ” ” ” +S. - +P. J. = ” ” ” +M. - -Hence, in the foregoing example the normal direction of movement for -White may be either toward the Objective Plane with the Column of Attack, -or toward the Logistic Horizon, or the Point of Junction with the Column -of Support, or toward both objectives, with both columns simultaneously. - -Meanwhile, the Black army having the disadvantage in Time is unable to -move, and consequently is stationary. - -Furthermore, White having the superiority in Numbers may move with an -equal force against either objective designated by the Third Term of the -equation, and with his excess force against one or more adverse vital -points, simultaneously, against which latter movement, Black obviously -has no adequate defence. - - -TACTICO-LOGISTIC INEQUALITY - -The Tactico-Logistic Inequality is the algebraic expression of the -relative advantages and disadvantages in Time and in Numbers appertaining -to opposing Strategetic Entireties. - -Such advantages and disadvantages are denoted by the terms, viz.: - -+T. Signifies the absolute advantage in Time, _i.e._, the ability of -an army, a grand column, a wing or a corps d’armee to move, while the -opposing force must remain stationary. - --T. Signifies the absolute disadvantage in Time, _i.e._, the obligation -of an army, a grand column, a wing, or a corps d’armee to remain -stationary, while the opposing force is in motion. - -+N. Signifies the absolute advantage in Numbers, _i.e._, the larger -number of corps d’armee. - --N. Signifies the absolute disadvantage in Numbers, _i.e._, the smaller -number of corps d’armee. - -=N. Signifies the equality in Numbers, _i.e._, the same number of corps -d’armee. - -There are six forms of the Tactico-Logistic Inequality, viz.: - - 1. +T+N - ------ - -T-N - - 2. +T=N - ------ - -T=N - - 3. +T-N - ------ - -T+N - - 4. -T+N - ------ - +T-N - - 5. -T=N - ------ - +T=N - - 6. -T-N - ------ - +T+N - - -INITIAL STRATEGETIC EQUATION - -The Initial Strategetic Equation is made up of those terms which compose -the Strategic Syllogism and the Tactico-Logistic Inequality, viz.: - - ----------------- ----------------- - (+A+S+M) + (+T+N) - (-A-S-M) + (-T-N) = - the Normal Motif and Direction of Effort. - - -RULE - -1. _Set down in parenthesis those terms of the Strategic Syllogism which -appertain to White._ - -_Set down in parenthesis those terms of the Tactico-Logistic Inequality -which appertain to White._ - -_Connect the two kindred terms thus constructed, by the sign of addition, -to show that each is to augment the other, and superscore all by the same -vincula to show that all are to be taken together to form one side of the -resulting equation._ - - * * * * * - -2. _Repeat this process for the Black terms to construct the second side -of the Initial Strategetic Equation, and separate the White from the -Black terms by a minus sign._ - - -STRATEGETIC VALUES - -The Strategetic Values of the terms contained in the Strategic Syllogism -and in the Tactico-Logistic Inequality are shown by the appended tables, -viz.: - - -TABLE OF STRATEGIC VALUES. - - _Term._ _Post._ _Direction._ _Motif._ - - 1. +A Grand Vertex Tactical Key of To give checkmate - Objective Plane - - 2. +M Point Proximity Point of Junction To queen a Pawn - en command - - 3. +A Major Vertex 1. Grand Vertex To gain winning Position - 2. Point Aligned with Column of Attack - 3. Point en Potence - - 4. +M Point Proximity Point en Command To gain winning Position - en Menace with Column of Support - - 5. +M Point Proximity Point en Menace To gain winning Position - en Presence with Column of Support - - 6. +A Minor Vertex 1. Major Vertex To gain Superior Position - 2. Point Aligned with Column of Attack - - 7. +S Point Proximity Point en Presence To gain Superior Position - en Observation with Column of Support - - 8. +S Point Proximity Point en Observation To gain superior Position - en Route with Column of Support - - 9. +S Point Proximity Point en Route To gain advantage with - Remote Column of Support - - -TABLE OF LOGISTIC VALUES - - _Term._ - - 1. +T Unrestricted privilege to move any Piece. - - 2. +T Restricted to moving a Sustaining Piece en counter attack. - - 3. +T Restricted to moving an aggressive Covering Piece. - - 4. +T Restricted to moving a Passive Covering Piece. - - 5. +T Restricted to moving a Supporting Piece. - - 6. +T Restricted to moving the King out of check. - - 7. +T Restricted to moving the King from an untenable Objective Plane. - - 8. +T Restricted to moving a Piece to reduce the value of the Kindred - King’s Logistic Radii. - - -TABLE OF TACTICAL VALUES - - _Term._ - - 1. +N Larger numbers of Grand Corps d’armee of Evolution. - - 2. +N Larger numbers of Major Corps d’armee of Evolution. - - 3. +N Larger numbers of Minor Corps d’armee of Evolution. - - 4. +N Larger numbers of Corps d’armee of Position. - - - - -PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION - -SECTION TWO - - - - -PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION - -SECTION TWO - - -THEOREM. - -_Given any Strategetic Situation to determine the True Tactical Sequence._ - - -DEMONSTRATION. - -(_First Phase._) - -Let the term +A in its degree represent the relative advantage in -Position of the Column of Attack; +S in its degree the relative advantage -in Position of the Column of Support, and +M in its degree the relative -advantage in Position of the Column of Manoeuvre; let equality in -Position of the several Columns be represented by the terms =A, =S, =M, -and let inferiority in Positions of the several Columns be represented -by the terms -A, -S, -M, and let those terms appertaining to the White -Columns be written above a line and those terms appertaining to the Black -Columns be written below the line, and let that collection of terms -containing the plus and equal signs of greater Strategetic value be the -Major Premise and that collection of terms containing the signs of lesser -strategetic value be the Minor Premise of the _Strategic Syllogism_ thus -constructed. - -Let the ability to move while the opposing force must remain stationary -be represented by the term +T, and let the converse be represented by -the term -T, and let superiority in Numbers be represented by the term -+N; the equality in Numbers by the term =N, and inferiority in Numbers -by the term -N, and let the combining of any form of the terms T and N -constitute a _Tactico-Logistic Inequality_. - -Let any combination of that Strategic Syllogism which appertains to a -given Strategetic Situation with the corresponding Tactico-Logistic -Inequality, form the _Initial Strategetic Equation_. - -Let the plus terms and the equality terms, which are contained in the -Initial Strategetic Equation, be expanded into their highest forms -according to the table of Strategetic Values, and annex to each of such -terms that numeral which expresses the relative rank of such term in -those calculations which appertain to the pending Prime Strategetic -Proposition. - -Compare the values so obtained and let the highest _Strategetically_ be -regarded as the menace most immediately decisive, then: - -If the term +T appertain to the Piece operating such menace, let such -Piece be regarded as the Corps d’armee en Menace, and the Objective of -such menace as the Prime Decisive Point; the occupation of such Point -by such Piece as the Normal Motif of Offensive Effort, and the Logistic -Radius connecting the Point of Departure occupied by such Piece and the -Prime Decisive Point as the Normal Direction of Offensive Effort. - -If the term +T does NOT apply to that menace which combined with the term -+T would be most immediately decisive, then: - -By further comparison of the terms of the Initial Strategetic Equation, -select that Decisive Menace strategetically next in sequence to which -the term +T does appertain; and let the Piece operating such Decisive -Menace be regarded as the Corps d’armee en Menace; the Objective of such -menace as the Prime Decisive Point; the occupation of such Point by such -Piece as the Normal Motif of Offensive Effort, and the Logistic Radius -connecting the Point of Departure occupied by such Piece and the Prime -Decisive Points as the Normal direction of Offensive Effort. - -Provided: - -Whenever the term +T appertains to a Menace not so immediately decisive -as another menace operated by an adverse army, column, wing or corps -d’armee, but to which the term +T does _not_ appertain, then: the Normal -motif of Effort is _defensive_, and the Normal direction of Defensive -Effort is along the Logistic Radius between the Point of Departure of -that Kindred Piece, which by the advantage of the term +A, is able to -nullify the adverse most immediately Decisive Menace and that Point of -Command which is the Objective of such Effort en Defence and from whence -such adverse most immediately Decisive Menace may be nullified. - - * * * * * - -The second or Intermediate Phase of the Prime Strategetic Proposition -appertains to Grand Manoeuvres; and the third, or Final Phase, appertains -to Grand Operations. - -_However vast one’s capabilities may be, there is no mind so -comprehensive but that it has much to learn from other minds which have -preceded it, and no talent is so potential but that its development is -proportional to its exercise._ - -_For no matter how broad and exact one’s knowledge, the application of -such knowledge alone constitutes Art, and the value of such knowledge -always is commensurate to the degree of skill attained in the use of it._ - -_Hence, there is a training of the physical senses which gives quickness -and strength to the eye, the ear and the hand; a training of the nervous -organism which gives courage to the heart, clearness to the brain, and -steadiness to the body; a training of the intellect which fructifies in -originality, ingenuity, profundity and exactness of calculation._ - -_Such training is to be acquired only from systematic study of the best -productions by Masters of the Art, and by incessant practice with the -best proficients._ - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Chess Generalship, Vol. I. 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