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diff --git a/old/55275-0.txt b/old/55275-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 3469489..0000000 --- a/old/55275-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15366 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Indian Fights and Fighters:, by Cyrus Townsend Brady - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Indian Fights and Fighters: - The Soldier and the Sioux - -Author: Cyrus Townsend Brady - -Release Date: August 6, 2017 [EBook #55275] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INDIAN FIGHTS AND FIGHTERS: *** - - - - -Produced by Richard Tonsing and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - - - - - - - - - Indian Fights & Fighters - - -[Illustration: - - THE LAST OF CUSTER - - _Drawing by E. L. Blumenschein_ -] - - AMERICAN FIGHTS AND FIGHTERS SERIES - - - - - Indian Fights and Fighters - THE SOLDIER AND THE SIOUX - - - BY - - CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY, LL.D. - - Author of “Colonial,” “Border,” and “Revolutionary” Fights and Fighters - -[Illustration] - - Illustrated with Original Drawings by Remington, Schreyvogel, - Blumenschein, Crawford, Elwell, Deming, and Zogbaum - - With Maps, Photographs, and Sketches from Life from Original Sources, - many of which are now published for the first time - - NEW YORK - THE McCLURE COMPANY - MCMVIII - - - - - _Copyright, 1904, by_ - McCLURE, PHILLIPS & CO. - _Published, December, 1904, N_ - - Second Impression. - - - Copyright, 1904, by The Pearson Publishing Company - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - To that most eminent and useful - - CHURCHMAN AND CITIZEN - - OZI WILLIAM WHITAKER, D.D., LL.D. - - Bishop of Pennsylvania - - Whom I admire as a _CLERIC_, respect as a _MAN_, and love as a _FRIEND_ - - I dedicate - - _This Story of the West_ - - He served so well - - - - - PREFACE - - -The writing of history requires three operations: (I) The collection of -facts; (II) The classification and arrangement of facts; (III) The -presentation and discussion of facts. I have collected the facts related -in this book from every source open to me. These sources may be divided -into two groups: (1) Published and (2) unpublished, matter. The -published matter includes (a) official records; (b) books, and (c) -magazine or other ephemeral articles. The unpublished matter includes -(a) letters and (b) verbal communications. - -I have made use of all these sources of information in gathering the -facts. A list of some of the printed authorities consulted follows this -preface. In addition thereto, I beg to acknowledge written -communications from the following American Army officers, all now on the -retired list except Colonels Godfrey and Brainard and Captain -Livermore:—Lieutenant-General Nelson A. Miles; Major-General Robert P. -Hughes; Brigadier-Generals Henry B. Carrington, George A. Forsyth, Louis -H. Carpenter, Anson Mills, Charles A. Woodruff and Theo. F. Rodenbough; -Colonel Edward E. S. Godfrey, commanding the Ninth Cavalry; Colonel -David L. Brainard, Commissary of Subsistence; Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel -M. Horton; Captains Henry R. Lemly, Francis M. Gibson, Nathan S. Jarvis, -George E. Albee and R. L. Livermore, Tenth Cavalry; and the following -civilians: President E. Benjamin Andrews; Doctors T. E. Oertel and D. D. -Thompson; Messrs. W. Kent Thomas, Sigmund Schlesinger, Edward Esmonde, -Phineas Towne, W. R. E. Collins, Hugh M. Johnson, Herbert Myrick, R. J. -Smyth, William E. Morris, Nicholas E. Boyd, Theo. W. Goldin and Arthur -Chapman; Mrs. Guy V. Henry and Mrs. James Powell. - -In addition to these letters I have gathered much information in -conversation with officers and others, not only recently but during many -years spent in the West, where I was a frequent guest at army posts, in -frontier towns, and at some of the Indian reservations. I knew many of -the participants in the stirring incidents and heard the fascinating -stories from their own lips. - -The chapters of the Fort Phil Kearney series have been read and -corrected as to matters of fact by General Carrington and Colonel -Horton; those referring to the defense of Beecher’s Island, by General -Forsyth; those describing the relief of Forsyth and the fight on the -Beaver, by General Carpenter; those relating to the Little Big Horn -campaign, by General Woodruff and Colonel Godfrey, and the account of -the affair at Slim Buttes and the death of American Horse, by General -Mills. All of these gentlemen gave me interesting details, anecdotes, -etc., besides answering all my inquiries. Several of them put their -private papers at my disposal. To Colonel Godfrey I am especially -indebted for much interesting matter on the Little Big Horn campaign, -and to Captain Gibson for the use of his unprinted account of the Battle -of the Washita. The Office of the Secretary of War has been most kind in -answering questions and furnishing information not otherwise procurable. -Mr. W. H. Holmes, Chief of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian -Institution, has decided all questions as to the proper spelling of -Indian names,[1] and has given me the Indian equivalents of the names of -prominent chiefs, as Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull, etc. - -Several of the papers following are original contributions especially -prepared for this book. The authors of these papers are indicated -hereafter. For all expressions of opinion, for all comments, notes and -inferences, not specifically attributed to somebody else, I alone am -responsible. - -To all who have aided me to make this series authoritative and -definitive, my most grateful thanks are hereby heartily expressed. - -I trust that in thus striving to preserve the records of those stirring -times I have done history and posterity a service. The majority of those -who fought on the plains have passed away. Many of the surviving -participants in the adventures described are growing old. In a short -time it would have been impossible to have secured the information here -presented unless some one else had gone about it as I have. - -With intervals devoted to other duties, I have been over a year and a -half engaged in this congenial task. I have written literally hundreds -of letters, to learn, or to verify, a fact, an incident, or a -conclusion. It is interesting to call attention to the fact that -information has been freely and generously given to me from every source -whence I have asked it save three, one of which is noted in the -appendix. - -The series of historical books of which this forms the fourth seems to -have won a permanent place for itself. The number of copies which found -a welcome last year was greater than the number of the year before, -although there was no new volume issued last fall to call renewed -attention to the series. These books are generally spoken of by the -title of the first published, “American Fights and Fighters.” It has -been deemed proper, therefore, to adopt that name, which is sufficiently -explicit and descriptive, as the generic name of the series. Hereafter -all the books that have appeared, and those that are yet to appear in -this series, will bear that general name, with the addition of a -distinctive subtitle in each instance. The covers of the earlier books, -accordingly, have been changed to read as follows: - - 1. American Fights and Fighters, Colonial. - 2. American Fights and Fighters, Revolutionary—1812. - 3. American Fights and Fighters, Border. - -As I have stated, it is my hope to continue this series of books until I -have covered all the wars that have been fought upon the American -Continent since Columbus’s day. - -So far as the American people are concerned—save in the case of the -Mexican War—their struggles have generally been to establish a broader, -nobler conception of human freedom. I would not have any one gather from -this that our dealings with the Indian invariably have been -characterized by that honesty and honor which should be at the base of -every national undertaking—far from it! In this book, without growing -sentimental, I have endeavored to be fair to the Indians; as in previous -books, I have tried to deal justly by any and every enemy.[2] To be -honest and to be fair—these things are of prime importance in writing -history and in living life. - -I am now at work on two other volumes, a book on “South American Fights -and Fighters” and a second volume of “Indian Fights and Fighters.” In -this proposed Indian book I shall take up the further struggles of the -United States with the Indians of the Northwest, notably Chief Joseph’s -splendid migration with his Nez-Percés, the dash of the Cheyennes for -freedom, Captain Jack and the Modoc War, the Ute War, the last outbreak -of the Sioux, and various other affairs in the Northwest. Thereafter I -contemplate a third book dealing with Arizona and the Apache. - -I take this opportunity of asking every individual, soldier or civilian, -who participated in any of these campaigns or battles, who has any -material bearing upon them, and who is willing to allow me to look over -it, kindly to send it to me in care of the publishers of this book, as -soon as possible, as I expect to issue the next volume of the series -next fall. Any such material will be carefully preserved and returned by -express in good order, and due credit—also a copy of the book!—will be -given for any which may be of use to me in the next book, as in this -one. - -It is getting late, as I said, to write the history of some of these -things, and I am actuated by an earnest desire to preserve the records -before it is too late. Who will help me? Since I began writing history I -have learned to disregard no authority, however humble, and to neglect -no source of information, however obscure it may appear to a casual -inspection. Therefore send me what you have or can prepare, and allow me -to judge of its value. - -American people are usually more familiar with the story of other -peoples than with their own history. How often have I heard the charge -made that there is nothing romantic or interesting in American history. -I do not see how any one could read even the chapter headings of a book -like this and say a thing like that. Where are there more splendid -stories of dauntless heroism, of subtle strategy, of brilliant tactics, -of fierce fighting, than are contained in these pages? I may have told -them indifferently and may be the subject of just criticism therefor, -but the stories at least are there. They speak for themselves. I could -not spoil them if I tried. The facts ring like a trumpet-call to -American manhood, be it white, or red, or black. - - CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY. - - Brooklyn, N. Y., - August 1, 1904. - ------ - -Footnote 1: - - Almost every author has a different way of spelling the names of the - sub-tribes of the Siouan family. - -Footnote 2: - - For instance:—Every time a body of troops engages in a fight with - Indians and the troops are outnumbered, or caught at a disadvantage, - and the battle is continued until the troops are slaughtered, such an - affair is popularly called a “massacre”; as “The Fetterman Massacre,” - “The Custer Massacre.” I believe this to be an unwarranted use of the - term. Fetterman and Custer attacked the Indians and fought desperately - until they and their men were all killed. I call that a “battle” not a - “massacre.” When an Indian war party raided a settlement or - overwhelmed a train, or murdered children and women, that, I think, - was a “massacre”; but these two instances were not. Consequently, I - have carefully refrained from making use of that term in this book, - except where it is justifiable. The reader may not agree with me in - this position, but I would like to ask if any one ever heard of the - “Massacre of Thermopylæ”? The Greeks fought there until all, save one, - were killed. The results there were exactly those of the Fetterman - affair and the battle of the Little Big Horn, but I have yet to read - in history that the Persians “massacred” the Greeks in that famous - pass. What is sauce for the Persians is sauce for the Red Men as well. - - - - - PREFACE - - -It will be noticed that this book differs from others of the AMERICAN -FIGHTS AND FIGHTERS SERIES, and especially its immediate predecessor, -“Indian Fights and Fighters,” in that I am not the author of all or most -of it. In response to a request for contributions from participants in -the Modoc and Nez Percé wars, numerous papers were submitted, all of -such high value, not only from an historic but from a literary point of -view as well, that I had not the presumption to rewrite them myself—not -even the proverbial assurance of the historian would warrant that. - -Therefore, I have contented myself with writing a general and -comprehensive account of each of the two wars considered, leaving to the -actors themselves the telling in full of the detailed story of the -splendid achievements in which they were making history. I can affirm, -therefore, that never before has there been included in a single volume -such a remarkable and interesting collection of personal experiences in -our Indian Wars as in this book. - -And as I admire the doers of the deeds so, also, do I admire the tellers -of the tales. Their modesty, their restraint, their habit of relating -adventures which stir the blood and thrill the soul as a mere matter of -course,—“all in the day’s work”—enkindles my enthusiasm. And how -graphically these old soldiers wield their pens! What good story tellers -they are! - -And what different sorts and conditions of men are here represented! -Major-generals and scouts, captains and sergeants, frontiersmen and -troopers, soldiers and civilians, to say nothing of an Indian chief and -a bishop, have all said their say in their own way. The reader will be -glad, I know, that I have permitted these men, like Paul, to speak for -themselves. - -The whole book constitutes a trumpet call to American manhood, and -honor, and courage, and that I believe to be true of the whole series. - -The Army of the United States is sometimes slandered. A case in point is -now in mind. The chief official of a city of no little prominence, who -is also an author and a publicist of national repute, has recently put -forth a bitter diatribe against our soldiers. Such a book as this -refutes these unfounded accusations. The Army is not perfect—neither is -the Church!—but not only man for man, but also as an organization it is -the equal of any, and the superior of most, of the armies of the world! -And I am sure that no one can get a much better training for the battle -of life that he gets in the peace loving, hard working, honor seeking, -duty following, never failing, hard fighting service of the United -States—on sea or shore. I have been in both, worn the Army and also the -Navy blue, and I know. We all deprecate the necessity for armies, but if -we must have them, let us thank God for an army like that of our beloved -country. I am glad to express this my deliberate and matured conviction, -begot of much study, wide observation, and ripe experience. - - CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY. - - LAKE WINNIPESAUKEE, CENTRE HARBOR, - NEW HAMPSHIRE, _July, 1907_. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - ❦ - - PART I - - PROTECTING THE FRONTIER - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I. THE POWDER RIVER EXPEDITION 3 - - II. THE TRAGEDY OF FORT PHIL KEARNEY 19 - - III. THE THIRTY-TWO AGAINST THE THREE THOUSAND 40 - - IV. PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF FORT PHIL KEARNEY AND THE - WAGON-BOX FIGHT 59 - - V. FORSYTH AND THE ROUGH RIDERS OF ’68 72 - - VI. THE JOURNEY OF THE SCOUTS AND THE RESCUE OF FORSYTH 97 - - VII. A SCOUT’S STORY OF THE DEFENSE OF BEECHER’S ISLAND 113 - - VIII. CARPENTER AND HIS BRUNETTES. THE FIGHT ON BEAVER CREEK 123 - - IX. A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE BEAVER CREEK AFFAIR 136 - - X. THE BATTLE OF THE WASHITA 146 - - XI. CARR AND TALL BULL AT SUMMIT SPRINGS 170 - - - PART II - - THE WAR WITH THE SIOUX - - I. WITH CROOK’S ADVANCE 183 - - II. EX-TROOPER TOWNE ON THE ROSEBUD FIGHT 203 - - III. THE GRIEVANCE OF RAIN-IN-THE-FACE 209 - - IV. THE LITTLE BIG HORN CAMPAIGN 216 - - V. THE LAST OF CUSTER 237 - - VI. ONE OF THE LAST MEN TO SEE CUSTER ALIVE 263 - - VII. THE PERSONAL STORY OF RAIN-IN-THE-FACE 279 - - VIII. TWO INTERESTING AFFAIRS 293 - - IX. THE FIRST SUCCESS 304 - - X. A DECISIVE BLOW 312 - - XI. MILES’ GREAT CAMPAIGNING 319 - - XII. WHAT THEY ARE THERE FOR—A SKETCH OF GENERAL GUY V. HENRY, - A TYPICAL AMERICAN SOLDIER 339 - - ❦ - - - APPENDICES - - APPENDIX A—BEING A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF GENERAL CUSTER’S COURSE - IN THE LITTLE BIG HORN CAMPAIGN 359 - - APPENDIX B—FURTHER LIGHT ON THE CONDUCT OF MAJOR RENO 398 - - INDEX 407 - - - - - LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - - ❦ - - - DRAWINGS - - FACING PAGE - - THE LAST OF CUSTER _Frontispiece_ - - LIEUTENANT GRUMMOND SACRIFICING HIMSELF TO COVER THE - RETREAT 36 - - CHARGE OF RED CLOUD ON THE CORRAL AT PINEY ISLAND 50 - - “BOOTS AND SADDLES:” A START IN THE EARLY MORNING 60 - - ROMAN NOSE LEADING THE CHARGE AGAINST FORSYTH’S DEVOTED - BAND 86 - - “SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THEIR ARRIVAL A RATTLESNAKE MADE - HIS APPEARANCE” 98 - - THE CRUCIAL MOMENT ON BEECHER’S ISLAND 116 - - THE CHIEF MEDICINE MAN AT BEAVER CREEK 132 - - THE DIFFICULT TASK OF THE HORSE-HOLDERS IN ACTION 194 - - THE CAPTURE OF RAIN-IN-THE-FACE 214 - - RAIN-IN-THE-FACE 280 - - CHIEF TWO MOON OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNES 300 - - MACKENZIE’S MEN IN DULL KNIFE’S VILLAGE 316 - - - PHOTOGRAPHS - - FACING - PAGE - - GROUP OF FAMOUS WAR CHIEFS 10 - - CROW KING, RED CLOUD, AMERICAN HORSE, GALL - - THE FORT PHIL KEARNEY FIGHTERS 20 - - CAPT. W. J. FETTERMAN, LIEUT. G. W. GRUMMOND, CAPT. FREDK. H. BROWN - CAPT. JAMES POWELL - - BEECHER’S ISLAND FIGHTERS 72 - - CAPT. LOUIS H. CARPENTER, MAJ. GEORGE A. FORSYTH, LIEUT. FREDK. H. - BEECHER, SCOUT JACK STILLWELL - - BEECHER’S ISLAND FIELD 80 - - SOME OFFICERS OF THE SEVENTH CAVALRY IN THE WASHITA EXPEDITION 156 - - MAJ. JOEL H. ELLIOTT, CAPT. JAMES M. BELL, CAPT. LOUIS McL. HAMILTON, - CAPT. J. W. BENTEEN - - GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED GENERAL OFFICERS 174 - - GEN. GEORGE CROOK, GEN. ELWELL S. OTIS, GEN. EUGENE A. CARR, GEN. HENRY - B. CARRINGTON - - GEN. GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER 220 - - SOME OF CUSTER’S OFFICERS 238 - - CAPT. MYLES MOYLAN, LIEUT. E. A. SMITH, MAJ. MARCUS A. RENO, CAPT. - EDWARD S. GODFREY - - SOME OF CUSTER’S TROOP COMMANDERS 248 - - CAPT. THOMAS W. CUSTER, CAPT. GEORGE W. YATES, LIEUT. JAMES CALHOUN, - CAPT. MILES W. KEOGH - - OFFICERS OF THE SEVENTH CAVALRY 258 - - LIEUT. H. M. HARRINGTON, LIEUT. J. E. PORTER, LIEUT. W. VAN W. RILEY, - ADJ. W. W. COOK, LIEUT. J. STURGIS, LIEUT. J. J. CRITTENDEN, LIEUT. - DONALD McINTOSH, LIEUT. BENJ. HODGSON - - SITTING BULL 268 - - SOME FAMOUS INDIAN FIGHTERS 326 - - GEN. JOHN GIBBON, GEN. WESLEY MERRITT, GEN. NELSON A. MILES, GEN. - ALFRED H. TERRY - - GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED INDIAN FIGHTERS 340 - - COL. RANALD S. MACKENZIE, CAPT. ANSON MILLS, GEN. GUY V. HENRY, F. CODY - (BUFFALO BILL) - - - - - MAPS AND PLANS - - - ❦ - - PAGE - - FORT PHIL KEARNEY 16 - - THE FETTERMAN MASSACRE 27 - - STOCKADE AT FORT PHIL KEARNEY 33 - - THE WAGON-BOX CORRAL ON PINEY ISLAND 45 - - PLAN OF MAGAZINE AT FORT PHIL KEARNEY 63 - - MAP OF FORSYTH’S DEFENSE OF BEECHER’S ISLAND 79 - - MAP OF MARCHES TO RELIEVE COLONEL FORSYTH AND TO ESCORT GENERAL - CARR 103 - - POSITIONS OF WAGONS AND SOLDIERS IN BEAVER CREEK FIGHT 130 - - BATTLE OF THE ROSEBUD 197 - - MAP OF CUSTER’S DEFEAT ON THE LITTLE BIG HORN 230 - - MAP ILLUSTRATING THE ROUTE OF THE THREE BATTALIONS AT THE LITTLE - BIG HORN 234 - - PLAN OF RENO’S DEFENSE ON THE BLUFF 247 - - KEY TO MAP OF CUSTER BATTLE-FIELD 287 - - - - - BIBLIOGRAPHY - - - I. The official reports of the Secretary of War, with accompanying - documents, very kindly lent to me by the United States - Government. - - II. Different numbers of the following magazines and journals: - Harper’s Weekly; The Century; Scribner’s Monthly; The - Chatauquan; McClure’s Magazine; Outdoor Life; Journal of the - United States Cavalry Association; Journal of the Military - Service Institution. - - III. Files of various contemporary newspapers, notably the Chicago - Times and the New York Herald. - - IV. Various General Histories. - - V. AB-SA-RA-KA, by General and Mrs. Henry B. Carrington, U. S. A. - J. B. Lippincott Co. Philadelphia. 1890. - - VI. ADVENTURES OF BUFFALO BILL, By Col. William F. Cody. Harper & - Brothers. New York. 1904. - - VII. ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE, by Gen. Theo. F. Rodenbough, U. - S. A., and Maj. Wm. L. Haskin, U. S. A. Maynard, Merrill & Co. - New York. 1896. - - VIII. ARMY SACRIFICES, by Col. James B. Fry, U. S. A. D. Van Nostrand. - New York. 1879. - - IX. BOOTS AND SADDLES, by Elizabeth B. Custer. Harper & Brothers. - New York. 1902. - - X. CAMPAIGNING WITH CROOK, by Captain Charles King, U. S. A. Harper - & Brothers. New York. 1902. - - XI. CAMPAIGNS OF GENERAL CUSTER IN THE NORTHWEST, by Judson Eliott - Walker. Jenkins & Thomas. New York. 1881. - - XII. DEEDS OF VALOR, Compiled by W. F. Beyer and O. F. Keydel. - Perrien-Keydel Co. Detroit, Mich. 1901. - - XIII. FOLLOWING THE GUIDON, by Elizabeth B. Custer. Harper & Brothers. - New York. 1901. - - XIV. LIFE OF GENERAL G. A. CUSTER, by Captain Frederick Whittaker. - Sheldon & Co. New York. 1876. - - XV. MY LIFE ON THE PLAINS, OR PERSONAL EXPERIENCES WITH INDIANS, by - General G. A. Custer, U. S. A. Sheldon & Co. New York. 1876. - - XVI. ON THE BORDER WITH CROOK, by Captain John G. Bourke, U. S. A. - Charles Scribner’s Sons. New York. 1892. - - XVII. OUR WILD INDIANS, by Col. Richard I. Dodge, U. S. A. A. D. - Worthington & Co. Hartford. 1890. - - XVIII. PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF GENERAL NELSON A. MILES. The Werner - Co. Chicago. 1897. - - XIX. SABRE AND BAYONET, by Gen. Theo. F. Rodenbough, U. S. A. G. W. - Dillingham Co. New York. 1897. - - XX. STORY OF THE SOLDIER, THE, by General George A. Forsyth, U. S. - A. D. Appleton & Co. New York. 1900. - - XXI. STORY OF THE WILD WEST AND CAMP FIRE CHATS, by W. F. Cody. - (Buffalo Bill.) Historical Publishing Co. Philadelphia. 1888. - - XXII. TENTING ON THE PLAINS, by Elizabeth B. Custer. Harper & - Brothers. New York. 1895. - - XXIII. THRILLING DAYS IN ARMY LIFE, by Gen. George A. Forsyth, U. S. A. - Harper & Brothers. New York. 1902. - - XXIV. TWENTY YEARS AMONG OUR HOSTILE INDIANS, by J. Lee Humfreville - (late Captain of United States Cavalry). Hunter & Co. New - York. 1903. - - XXV. UNITED STATES IN OUR OWN TIME, THE, by E. Benjamin Andrews. - Charles Scribner’s Sons. New York. 1903. - - XXVI. WAR PATH AND BIVOUAC, by John F. Finerty. M. A. Donohue & Co. - Chicago. 1890. - - - - - PART I - Protecting the Frontier - - - - - CHAPTER ONE - The Powder River Expedition - - - I. The Field and the Fighters - -Since the United States began to be there never was such a post as Fort -Philip Kearney, commonly called Fort Phil Kearney.[3] From its -establishment, in 1866, to its abandonment, some two years later, it was -practically in a state of siege. I do not mean that it was beleaguered -by the Indians in any formal, persistent investment, but it was so -constantly and so closely observed by war parties, hidden in the -adjacent woods and the mountain passes, that there was little safety -outside its stockade for anything less than a company of infantry or a -troop of cavalry; and not always, as we shall see, for those. - -Rarely in the history of the Indian wars of the United States have the -Indians, no matter how preponderant in force, conducted a regular siege, -Pontiac’s investment of Detroit being almost unique in that particular. -But they literally surrounded Fort Phil Kearney at all times. Nothing -escaped their observation, and no opportunity to harass and to cut off -detached parties of the garrison, to stampede the herds, or to attack -the wagon trains, was allowed to pass by. Not a stick of timber could be -cut, not an acre of grass mowed, except under heavy guard. Herds of beef -cattle, the horses for the cavalry and mounted infantry, the mules for -the supply wagons, could not graze, even under the walls of the fort, -without protection. The country teemed with game. Hunting parties were -absolutely forbidden. To take a stroll outside the stockade on a summer -evening was to invite death, or worse if the stroller happened to be a -woman. There was no certainty about the attacks, except an assurance -that one was always due at any given moment. As old James Bridger, a -veteran plainsman and fur trader, a scout whose fame is scarcely less -than that of Kit Carson, and the confidential companion adviser of -Carrington in 1866, was wont to say to him: “Whar you don’t see no -Injuns thar they’re sartin to be thickest.” - -Taking at random two average months in the two different years during -which the post was maintained, one in the summer, another in the fall, I -find that there were fifteen separate and distinct attacks in one and -twenty in the other. In many of these, in most, in fact, one or more men -were killed and a greater number wounded. Not a wagon train bound for -Montana could pass up the Bozeman trail, which ran under the walls of -the fort, and for the protection of which it had been established, -without being attacked again and again. Only the most watchful prudence, -the most skilful management, and the most determined valor, prevented -the annihilation of successive parties of emigrants seeking the new and -inviting land. - -The war with the Indians was about the ownership of territory, as most -of our Indian wars have been. Indeed, that statement is true of most of -the wars of the world. The strong have ever sought to take from the -weak. The westward-moving tide of civilization had at last pressed back -from the Missouri and the Mississippi the Sioux and their allies, the -Cheyennes, the largest and most famous of the several great groups of -Indians who have disputed the advance of the white man since the days of -Columbus, saving perhaps the Creeks and the Iroquois. - -The vast expanse of territory west of the hundredth meridian, extending -from the Red River to the British Columbia boundary line, was at the -time practically devoid of white settlements, except at Denver and Salt -Lake, until the Montana towns were reached in the northwest.[4] It is a -great sweep of land which comprises every variety of climate and soil. -The huge Big Horn Mountains severed that immense domain. The Sweet Water -Country and all east of the Wind River Range, including South Pass and -the region west of the great bend of the North Platte, had its prairies -and fertile valleys. Just north of the Big Horn Mountain Range, which -took in the territory which formed the most direct route to Central -Montana, and the occupation of which was the real objective of -Carrington’s expedition in the spring of 1866, was the most precious -section, controlled by tribes jealous of any intrusion by the whites. - -All along the Yellowstone and its tributaries, in spite of the frequent -“_Mauvaises Terres_,” or “bad lands,” of apparent volcanic origin, the -whole country was threaded with clear streams from the Big Horn Range. -The valleys of these were luxuriant in their natural products and their -promise. Enormous herds of buffalo roamed the plains, affording the -Indian nearly everything required for his support. The mountains -abounded with bear, deer and other game in great variety. The many -rivers which traversed the territory teemed with fish, the valleys which -they watered were abundantly fertile for the growing of the few crops -which the Indian found necessary for his support. The land was desirable -naturally and attracted the attention of the settlers. - -It cannot be gainsaid that the Indians enjoyed a quasi-legal title to -this land. But if a comparatively small group of nomadic and savage -tribes insists upon reserving a great body of land for a mere hunting -ground, using as a game preserve that which, in a civilized region, -would easily support a great agricultural and urban population of -industrious citizens seeking relief from the crowded and confined -conditions of older communities, what are you going to do about it? -Experience has shown that in spite of treaties, purchases and other -peaceful means of obtaining it, there is always bound to be a contest -about that land. The rights of savagery have been compelled to yield to -the demands of civilization, ethics to the contrary notwithstanding. And -it will always be so, sad though it may seem to many. - -The close of the Civil War threw many soldiers out of employment. After -four years of active campaigning they could not settle down to the -humdrum life of village and country again. With a natural spirit of -restlessness they gathered their families, loaded their few household -belongings into wagons, and in parties of varying sizes made their way -westward. Railroads began to push iron feelers across the territory. -Engineers and road builders, as well as emigrants, demanded the -protection of the government. At first most of the settlers merely -wished to pass through the country and settle in the fair lands upon the -other side, but the fertility and beauty that met their eyes on every -hand irresistibly invited settlement on the journey. - -At that time there were four great routes of transcontinental travel in -use: southward over the famous Santa Fé trail; westward over the Kansas -trail to Denver; westward on the Oregon trail through Nebraska and Salt -Lake City to California and Oregon; northwestward on the Bozeman trail -through Wyoming to Montana. The Union Pacific road was building along -the Oregon trail, the Kansas Pacific along the Kansas trail to Denver, -while the great Santa Fé system was not yet dreamed of. - -The railroads being in operation for short distances, the only method of -transportation was in the huge Conestoga wagon, or prairie schooner -which, with its canvas top raking upward fore and aft over a capacious -wagon box, looked not unlike the hull of the boat from which it took its -name. These wagons were drawn by four or six mules—sometimes by oxen, -known as “bull teams”—and, stores there being none, carried everything -that a settler was apt to need in the new land, including the -indispensable wife and children. - -I am concerned in this article only with the Bozeman or Montana trail. - -Early in 1866 Government Commissioners at Fort Laramie, Nebraska, were -negotiating a treaty with the Sioux and Northern Cheyennes to secure the -right of way for emigrants through that territory which, by the -Harney-Sanborne treaty, had been conceded to them in 1865. Red Cloud, an -Oglala Sioux, the foremost of the young warriors, led the objectors to -the treaty, even to the point of fighting, and opposed the more -conservative chiefs who deprecated war as eventually fatal to all their -territorial claims. During this council, to anticipate later events, -Carrington, then approaching with troops, arrived in advance, -dismounted, and was introduced to the members of the council. Red Cloud, -noticing his shoulder straps, hotly denounced him as the “White Eagle” -who had come to steal the road before the Indian said yes or no. In full -view of the mass of Indians who occupied the parade ground he sprang -from the platform under the shelter of pine boughs, struck his tepees -and went on the war-path. A telegram by Carrington advising suspension -of his march until the council came to some agreement was negatived, and -although Sunday he pushed forward nine miles beyond the fort before -sunset. - -One stipulation upon which the United States insisted was the -establishment of military posts to guard the trail, without which it was -felt the treaty would amount to nothing. The Brulé Sioux, under the lead -of Spotted Tail, Standing Elk and others, favored the concession, and -ever after remained faithful to the whites. The older chiefs of other -Sioux bands, in spite of Red Cloud’s defection and departure, remained -in council for some days and, although sullen in manner and noisy in -protests, finally accepted valuable gifts and indemnities and so far -satisfied the Commission that they despatched special messengers to -notify the District Commander that “satisfactory treaties had been made -with the tribes represented at Laramie and that its route was safe.” -Emigrant trains were also pushed forward with their assurance that an -ample force of regulars had gone up the country to ensure their safety. -The sequel will appear later. - - - II. General Carrington’s Romantic Expedition - -Pursuant to the plan, Brigadier-General Henry B. Carrington, Colonel of -the Eighteenth Regular Infantry, was ordered with the second battalion -of his regiment, about to become the Twenty-seventh Regular Infantry, to -establish, organize and take command of what was known as the Mountain -District. The Mountain District at that time had but one post in it, -Fort Reno, one hundred and sixty miles from Fort Laramie. Carrington was -directed to march to Fort Reno, move it forty miles westward, garrison -it, and then, with the balance of his command, establish another post on -the Bozeman trail, between the Big Horn Mountains and the Powder River, -so as to command that valley much frequented by Indians; and, lastly, to -establish two other posts, one on the Big Horn, the other on the -Yellowstone, for the further protection of the trail. - -General Carrington was a graduate of Yale College. He had been a -teacher, an engineer and scientist, a lawyer and man of affairs, a -student of military matters as well as Adjutant-General of Ohio for -several years prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. At the beginning -of that struggle he promptly moved one battery and several regiments of -Ohio Militia into West Virginia to take part in the Battle of Phillipi -before the State Volunteers could be mustered into the United States -service. Without his solicitation, on May 14th, 1861, he had been -appointed Colonel of the Eighteenth United States Infantry, promoted -Brigadier-General November 29th, 1863, and had rendered valuable and -important services during the war. He was a high-minded Christian -gentleman, a soldier of large experience and proven courage, an -administrator of vigor and capacity, and, as his subsequent career has -shown, a man of fine literary talents.[5] No better choice could have -been made for the expedition. - -After many delays, due principally to difficulties in securing -transportation, a little army of seven hundred men, accompanied by four -pieces of artillery, two hundred and twenty-six wagons, and a few -ambulances containing the wives and children of several of the officers, -set forth from old Fort Kearney, Nebraska, on the 19th of May, 1866. -About two hundred of the men were veterans, the rest raw recruits. They -were armed with old-fashioned Springfield, muzzle-loading muskets, save -a few who had the new Spencer breech-loading carbine, a weapon of rather -short trajectory, but a great improvement on the old army musket from -the rapidity of fire which it permitted. A portion of the command was -mounted from the discarded horses of a cavalry regiment going east to be -mustered out. They were not trained horsemen, however, and at first were -rather indifferent mounted infantrymen. - -Among the soldiers were artificers and mechanics of every description. -The government had provided appliances needed for building forts, -including tools, doors, sash, glass, nails, stoves, steel, iron, mowers, -reapers, scythes, and two steam sawmills. The officers were in the main -a fine body of men, most of whom had learned their soldiering in the -Civil War. - -[Illustration: - - _Copyright by D. F. Barry_ -] - - CROW KING AMERICAN HORSE[6] - RED CLOUD GALL - - GROUP OF FAMOUS WAR CHIEFS - -It seems incredible to think that women should accompany such an -expedition, but no grave anticipations of trouble with the Indians were -felt by any persons in authority at that time. The Sioux and Cheyennes -had consented to the opening of the road, and though they demurred to -the forts, they had not absolutely refused the treaty when the -government insisted upon it. The expedition was not conceived or planned -for war. It was supposed to be a peaceable expedition. In fact, General -Sherman, who visited Fort Kearney before the troops began to march, -personally advised the ladies to accompany the expedition as very -attractive in its object and wholly peaceful. Had the authorities known -what was to happen, a force three times as great would scarcely have -been thought adequate for the purpose. But even had there been a full -knowledge of the dangers incurred, the army women would have gone with -their husbands. - -History records no greater instances of romantic devotion than those -exhibited by the army wife. She stands peculiar among American women -to-day in that particular. The army woman in a hostile country risked -much more than the men. Her fate when captured was terrible beyond -description—one long agony of horror and shame until death put an end to -it. I have talked with army officers of large experience and have read -what others have said, and the universal testimony is that no woman who -was ever captured by the plains Indians west of the Missouri was spared. -It was commonly agreed among the officers and men of regiments -accompanied by women—and fully understood by the women as well—that in -the last extremity the women were to be shot by their own friends, -rather than to be allowed to fall into the hands of the savages; but no -such apprehension attended this march. - -The army woman’s knowledge of the peril in the usual border warfare was -not an imaginary one, either. As we may read in letters and books -written by army wives, it was brought home to them directly again and -again. After every campaign poor, wretched women of stranded and robbed -emigrant trains or devastated settlements were brought into the various -camps, to whom these army women ministered with loving care, and from -whom they heard frightful and sickening details that froze the blood; -yet the army wife herself never faltered in her devotion, never failed -in her willingness to follow wherever her husband was sent. And, save -for the actual campaigning in the field, the army wife was -everywhere—sometimes there, too. - -In this particular expedition there were several little children, from -some of whom I have gleaned details and happenings. One of these lads, -while at Fort Kearney before the march, became so expert with the bow -and arrow in target shooting with young Pawnee Indians near the fort, -that he challenged General Sherman to shoot over the flagstaff. The -youngster accomplished it by lying upon his back with feet braced -against the bow, and the general squarely withdrew from the contest, -declining to follow the boy’s ingenious artifice. - -The march was necessarily a slow one and the distance great—some six -hundred miles—so that it was not until the twenty-eighth of June they -reached Fort Reno. There they were menaced by the Indians for the first -time and every endeavor was made to stampede their herds. The officers -and men were fast becoming undeceived as to the character of their -expedition. To abandon Fort Reno, or to remove it, was not practicable. -Carrington ordered it re-stockaded and put in thorough repair, -garrisoned it from his command, and with the balance, something over -five hundred, advanced farther into the unknown land on the 9th of July. -On the 13th of July, 1866, he established his camp on the banks of the -Big Piney Creek, an affluent of the Powder River, about four miles from -the superb Big Horn Range, with snow-capped Cloud Peak towering nine -thousand feet into the heavens, close at hand. A few days later, on a -little, flower-decked, grass-covered plateau, bare of trees, which -fortunately happened to be just the size to contain the fort he proposed -to erect, and which sloped abruptly away in every direction, forming a -natural glacis, he began building the stockade. - - - III. The Outpost of Civilization - -The plateau lay between two branches of the Piney. To the eastward of -the smaller branch rose a high hill called Pilot Hill. West of it was -another ridge which they named Sullivant Hills. Southwest of Sullivant -Hills was a high ridge called Lodge Trail Ridge, the main branch of the -Piney Creek flowing between them, so that the water supply was at the -eastern or “Water Gate” of the fort. The Bozeman trail passed westward, -under Pilot Hill in front of the fort, crossing the Big Piney as it -neared Sullivant Hills, and then, circling around Lodge Trail Ridge for -easier ascent, advanced northward, twice crossing Peno Creek and its -branches, before that stream joined Goose Creek, a tributary to Tongue -River, one of the chief forks of the Yellowstone. The first branch of -the Peno was five miles from the fort, and the second twelve miles -farther, where the garrison had to cut hay, but the branch nearer the -fort was especially associated with the events of December 21st, as well -as with the fight of the sixth of the same month. - -The spot was delightful. Adjacent to the fort were broad stretches of -fertile, brilliantly flowered, grassy, river and mountain creek valleys. -The mountains and hills were covered with pines. Game there was in -plenty; water was clear and abundant. Wood, while not immediately at -hand, else the place would not have been practicable of defense without -tremendous labor in clearing it, was conveniently adjacent. - -General Carrington marked out the walls of the fort, after a survey of -the surrounding country as far as Tongue River, set up his sawmills, one -of them of forty horse-power, capable of cutting logs thirty inches in -diameter, established a logging camp on Piney Island, seven miles -distant, with no intervening hills to surmount, which made -transportation easy, and began the erection of the fort. Picket posts -were established upon Pilot and Sullivant Hills, which overlooked -approaches both from the east and the road to the mountains. Three times -Indians attempted to dislodge these pickets, once at night; but -case-shot exploding over them, and each time causing loss of men or -ponies, ended similar visitations. - -The most careful watchfulness was necessary at all hours of the day and -night. The wood trains to fetch logs to the sawmills went out heavily -guarded. There was fighting all the time. Casualties among the men were -by no means rare. At first it was difficult to keep men within the -limits of the camp; but stragglers who failed to return, and some who -had been cut off, scalped and left for dead, but who had crawled back to -die, convinced every one of the wisdom of the commanding officer’s -repeated orders and cautions.[7] - -To chronicle the constant succession of petty skirmishes would be -wearisome; yet they often resulted in torture and loss of life on the -part of the soldiers, although the Indians in most instances suffered -the more severely. One single incident may be taken as illustrative of -the life of the garrison. - -One afternoon, early in October, the picket reported that the wood train -was attacked to the west, and shortly after signalled the approach of a -small party of soldiers from the east. Detachments were sent from the -post in both directions. It proved to be not a reinforcement of troops -or ammunition supplies, but two ambulances with two contract surgeons -and an escort of eight men, besides Bailey, the guide, and Lieutenant -Grummond, who had just been appointed to the Eighteenth Infantry, and -his young bride. As they approached the main gate, accompanied by the -mounted men who had been sent out to meet them, they were halted to give -passage to an army wagon from the opposite direction. It was escorted by -a guard from a wood train, and brought in the scalped, naked, dead body -of one of their comrades, a strange welcome, indeed, to the young wife, -who, upon leaving Laramie, had been assured of a beautiful ride through -fertile valleys without danger, and sadder yet in its sequel two months -later. - -[Illustration: FORT PHILIP KEARNEY] - -Meanwhile the work of erecting the fort was continued. It was a -rectangle, six hundred by eight hundred feet, inclosed by a formidable -stockade of heavy pine logs standing eight feet high, with a continuous -banquette, and flaring loopholes at every fourth log. There were -enfilading blockhouses on the diagonal corners, with portholes for the -cannon, and quarters for officers and men, with other necessary -buildings. The commanding officer’s quarters was a two-story building of -framed lumber, surmounted by a watch-tower. The officers’ and men’s -quarters were built of logs. The warehouses, four in number, eighty feet -by twenty-four, were framed. - -East of the fort proper was a corral of slightly less area, surrounded -by a rough palisade of cottonwood logs, which inclosed the wood train, -hay, and miscellaneous supplies. Everything—stockade, houses, stables, -in all their details, blacksmith shops, teamsters’ quarters, and so -on—was planned by Carrington himself.[8] - -The main fort inclosed a handsome parade ground, in the center of which -arose the tall flagstaff planned and erected by a ship carpenter in the -regiment. From it, on the 31st of October, with great ceremony and much -rejoicing, the first garrison flag that ever floated over the land was -unfurled. The work was by no means completed as it appears on the map, -but it was inclosed, and there were enough buildings ready to house the -actual garrison present, although the fort was planned for a thousand -men, repeatedly promised but not furnished, while all the time both -cavalry and the First Battalion of the Eighteenth were held within the -peaceful limits of Fort Laramie’s control. - -Early in August Captain Kinney, with two companions, had been sent -ninety miles to the northward to establish the second post on the Big -Horn, which was called Fort C. F. Smith, and was very much smaller and -less important than Fort Phil Kearney. The third projected post was not -established. There were not enough men to garrison the three already in -the field, much less to build a fourth. - ------ - -Footnote 3: - - Although the general for whom this fort was named spelled his name - Kearny, the name of the fort is written as above in all official - documents I have examined. - -Footnote 4: - - The country is roughly comprehended by the boundary lines between - which Mountain Standard, or 105th meridian, Time, prevails. - -Footnote 5: - - Among his literary works he is best known for his “Washington, the - Soldier,” and his “Battles of the American Revolution,” which is the - standard work of the kind. In a personal interview he told me he read - some portion of the Bible in the original Greek and Hebrew every day - for years. Not many army officers can say that, and very few - civilians, either. - -Footnote 6: - - Killed at Slim Buttes - -Footnote 7: - - Just when the alarms were most frequent a messenger came to the - headquarters, announcing that a train en route from Fort Laramie, with - special messengers from that post, was corralled by Indians, and - demanded immediate help. An entire company of infantry in wagons, with - a mountain howitzer and several rounds of grape-shot, was hastened to - their relief. It proved to be a train with mail from the Laramie - Commission announcing the consummation of a “satisfactory treaty of - peace with all the Indians of the Northwest,” and assuring the - District Commander of the fact. The messenger was brought in in - safety, and peace lasted until his message was delivered. So much was - gained—that the messenger did not lose his scalp en route. - -Footnote 8: - - General W. B. Hazen, upon inspection of this post’s stockade, - pronounced it “the best he had ever seen, except one built by the - Hudson Bay Company, in British America.” - - - - - CHAPTER TWO - The Tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney - - - I. How the Fighting Began - -To summarize the first six months of fighting, from the first of August -to the close of the year, the Indians killed one hundred and fifty-four -persons, including soldiers and citizens, wounded twenty more, and -captured nearly seven hundred animals—cattle, mules, and horses. There -were fifty-one demonstrations in force in front of the fort, and they -attacked every train that passed over the trail. - -As the fort was still far from completion, the logging operations were -continued until mid-winter. On every day the weather permitted, a -heavily guarded train of wood-cutters was sent down to Piney Island, or -to the heavier timber beyond, where a blockhouse protected the choppers. -This train was frequently attacked. Eternal vigilance was the price of -life. Scarcely a day passed without the lookout on Pilot Hill signalling -Indians approaching, or the lookout on Sullivant Hills reporting that -the wood train was corralled and attacked. On such occasions a strong -detachment would be mounted and sent out to drive away the Indians and -bring in the wood train—an operation which was invariably successful, -although sometimes attended with loss. - -Hostile demonstrations were met by prompt forays or pursuits, as -circumstances permitted; and on one occasion the general pursued a band -that ran off a herd nearly to Tongue River; but flashing mirrors -betrayed Indian attempts to gain his rear, and a return was ordered, -abandoning the stolen stock. - -One expedition is characteristic of many. On the afternoon of December -6th the lookout on Sullivant Hills signalled that the wood train was -attacked, and Captain (Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel) Fetterman, the senior -captain present, was detailed with a squad of forty mounted men, -including fifteen cavalrymen under Lieutenants Bingham and Grummond, -with Sergeant Bowers of the infantry, a veteran of the Civil War, to -relieve the wood train and drive the Indians toward the Peno Valley, -while Carrington himself, with about a score of mounted infantrymen, -would sweep around the north side of Lodge Trail Ridge and intercept -them. - -The Indians gave way before Fetterman’s advance, hoping to lure the -troops into an ambush, but at a favorable spot they made a stand. The -fighting there was so fierce that the cavalry, which by a singular -circumstance was without its officers, gave way and retreated headlong -across the valley toward the ridge. The mounted infantry stood its -ground, and under Fetterman’s intrepid leadership was making a brave -fight against overwhelming odds, the number of Indians present being -estimated at more than three hundred. It would have gone hard with them, -however, had not Carrington and the first six of his detachment suddenly -swept around a small hill or divide and taken the Indians in reverse. -The general had been forced to advance under fire, and meeting the -fugitive cavalry, ordered them to fall in behind his own detachment. He -was filled with anxiety as to the course of the fight on the other side -of the ridge. - -[Illustration] - - CAPT. W. J. FETTERMAN[9] CAPT. FREDK. H. BROWN[9] - LIEUT. G. W. GRUMMOND[9] CAPT. JAMES POWELL - - THE FORT PHIL KEARNEY FIGHTERS - - _For portrait of General Carrington, see illustration opposite page 174_ - - Carrington, in his official report,[10] says: “But six men turned - the point with me, one a young bugler of the Second Cavalry, who - told me that Lieutenant Bingham had gone down the road around the - hill to my right. This seemed impossible, as he belonged to - Fetterman’s command. I sounded the recall on his report, but in - vain. One of my men fell and his horse on him. The principal chief - operating during the day attempted to secure his scalp, but - dismounting, with one man to hold the horses and reserving fire, I - succeeded in saving the man and holding the position until joined by - Fetterman twenty minutes later. The cavalry that had abandoned him - had not followed me, though the distance was short; but the Indians, - circling round and yelling, nearly one hundred in number, with one - saddle emptied by a single shot fired by myself, did not venture to - close in.” - -The rear detachment and Fetterman soon joined, and by the efforts of the -combined parties the Indians were compelled to flight. It was a close -call for all, but Lieutenants Grummond and Bingham were yet unaccounted -for. Search was instantly made for these two officers and the infantry -sergeant, who had become separated from their command while chasing some -scattered Indians. One of the officers, Lieutenant Bingham, was dead. -Lieutenant Grummond, after a hand-to-hand fight, was closely pressed by -mounted Indians and was barely rescued. Sergeant Bowers had been -fearfully wounded and scalped, although he was still alive, but died -immediately.[11] He had killed three Indians before he had been -overborne. The cavalrymen, mostly recruits, were deeply ashamed of their -defection, which was partly due to the incaution of their officers in -leaving them to pursue a few Indians, and they were burning with a -desire to retrieve their reputation, which they bravely did with their -lives some two weeks later. - -The casualties in the little command were two killed, five wounded. A -messenger was sent to the fort for an ambulance, and the command retired -in good order without further sight of the Indians. Lieutenant Bingham -was not the first officer killed; for, five months before, Lieutenant -Daniels, riding ahead of a small party of soldiers escorting several -officers and the wife of Lieutenant Wands from Fort Laramie, had been -killed in full view of the party. He had been horribly tortured with a -stake before he died, and the savages put on his clothing and danced on -the prairie just out of range, in front of the party, which was too -small to do more than stand on the defensive. Lieutenant Grummond’s wife -was in the fort during the fighting on the sixth of December, and her -joy at her husband’s safe return can be imagined. - -On the eighth of December President Andrew Johnson congratulated -Congress that treaties had been made at Fort Laramie, and that _all was -peace in the Northwest_! - -On the 19th of December, in this peaceful territory, the wood train was -again attacked in force. Carrington promptly sent out a detachment under -Captain Powell with instructions to relieve the wood train, give it his -support, and return with it, but not to pursue threatening Indians, for -experience had shown that the Indians were constantly increasing in -numbers and growing bolder with every attack. Powell efficiently -performed his task. The Indians were driven off, and, although he was -tempted to pursue them, he was too good a soldier to disobey orders, so -he led his men back in safety to the fort. - -By this time all warehouses were finished, and it was estimated that one -large wood train would supply logs enough for the completion of the -hospital, which alone needed attention. - -Impressed by Powell’s report, Carrington himself accompanied the -augmented train on the 20th, built a bridge across to Piney Island to -facilitate quick hauling, and returned to the fort to make ready for one -more trip only. No Indians appeared in sight on that date. Already -several hundred large logs had been collected for winter’s firewood, -besides the slabs saved at the sawmill. - -It cannot be denied that there was much dissatisfaction among some of -the officers at Carrington’s prudent policy. They had the popular idea -that one white man, especially if he were a soldier, was good for a -dozen Indians; and although fifteen hundred lodges of Indians were known -to be encamped on the Powder River, and there were probably between five -and six thousand braves in the vicinity, they were constantly suggesting -expeditions of all sorts with their scanty force. Some of them, -including Fetterman and Brown, “offered with eighty men to ride through -the whole Sioux Nation!” While the mettle of the Sioux Nation had not -yet been fairly tried by these men, Carrington was wise enough to -perceive that such folly meant inevitable destruction, and his consent -was sternly refused. - -The total force available at the fort, including prisoners, teamsters, -citizens and employees, was about three hundred and fifty—barely enough -to hold the fort, should the Indians make an attack upon it. Besides -which, details were constantly needed to carry despatches, to deliver -the mail, to get supplies, to succor emigrant trains, and so on. The -force was woefully inadequate, and the number of officers had been -depleted by detachment and other causes until there were but six left. - -Ammunition was running low. There were at one time only forty rounds per -man available. Repeated requests and appeals, both by letter and -telegram, for reinforcements and supplies, and especially for modern and -serviceable weapons, had met with little consideration. The officials in -the far East hugged their treaty, and refused to believe that a state of -war existed; and, if it did exist, were disposed to censure the -commanding officer for provoking it. In several instances presents given -in the treaty at Fort Laramie were found on the persons of visiting -Indians, and one captured Indian pony was heavily loaded with original -packages of those presents. - -Carrington had done nothing to provoke war, but had simply carried out -General Sherman’s written instructions, sent him as late as August, to -“avoid a general war, until the army could be reorganized and -increased;” but he defended himself and command stoutly when attacked. -Some of the officers, therefore, covertly sneering at the caution of the -commander, were burning for an opportunity to distinguish themselves on -this account, and had practically determined to make or take one at the -first chance. Fetterman and Brown, unfortunately, were the chief of -these malcontents. - - - II. The Annihilation of Fetterman’s Command - -On the 21st of December, the ground being free from snow, the air clear -and cold, the lookout on Sullivant Hills signalled about eleven o’clock -in the morning that the wood train had been corralled, and was again -attacked in force about a mile and a half from the fort. A relief party -of forty-nine men from the Eighteenth Infantry, with twenty-seven -troopers from the Second Cavalry, a detachment from which, nearly all -recruits and chiefly armed with muskets as their carbines had not -reached Laramie, had joined the post some months before, was at once -ordered out. - -The command was first given to Captain Powell, with Lieutenant Grummond -in charge of the cavalry. Grummond had a wife in delicate health at the -post, and he was cautioned by the officers to take care not to be led -into a trap, although his experience on the 6th, when he had so narrowly -escaped death, was, it would seem, the best warning he could have had. -This body of men was the best armed party at the post, a few of those -designated carrying the Spencer repeating carbines. Each company had -been directed to keep forty rounds per man on hand for immediate use in -any emergency, besides extra boxes always kept in company quarters. The -men had been exercised in firing recently and some of the ammunition had -been expended, although they still had an abundant supply for the -purposes of the expedition. Carrington personally inspected the men -before they left, and rejected those who were not amply provided. - -The situation of the wood train was critical, and the party was -assembled with the greatest despatch. Just as they were about to start, -Captain Fetterman, who had had less experience in the country and in -Indian fighting than the other officers, for he had joined the regiment -some time after the fort had been built and expected assignment to -command Fort C. F. Smith, begged for the command of the expedition, -pleading his senior captaincy as justification for his request. -Carrington reluctantly acceded to his plea, which indeed he could -scarcely have refused, and placed him in charge, giving him strict and -positive instructions to “relieve the wood train, drive back the -Indians, _but on no account to pursue the Indians beyond Lodge Trail -Ridge_,” and that so soon as he had performed this duty he was to return -immediately to the fort. - -Captain Fetterman, as has been said, had frequently expressed his -contempt for the Indians, although his fight on December 6th had -slightly modified his opinions. Carrington, knowing his views, was -particular and specific in his orders. So necessary did he think the -caution that he repeated it to Lieutenant Grummond, who, with the -cavalry, followed the infantry out of the gate, the infantry, having -less preparation to make, getting away first. These orders were -delivered in a loud voice and were audible to many persons—women, -officers, and men in the fort. The general went so far as to hasten to -the gate after the cavalry had left the fort, and from the sentry -platform or banquette overlooking it, called out after them again, -emphatically directing them “on no account to pursue the Indians across -Lodge Trail Ridge.” - -The duty devolved upon Captain Fetterman was exactly that which Captain -Powell had performed so satisfactorily a few days before. With Captain -Fetterman went Captain Brown, with two citizens, frontiersmen and -hunters, as volunteers. These two civilians, Wheatley and Fisher, were -both armed with the new breech-loading rapid-fire Henry rifle, with -which they were anxious to experiment on the hostiles. Wheatley left a -wife and children in the fort. - -[Illustration: THE FETTERMAN MASSACRE Dec. 21, 1866.] - -Captain Frederick Brown, a veteran of the Civil War, had just been -promoted, had received orders detaching him from the command, and was -simply waiting a favorable opportunity to leave. He was a man of the -most undaunted courage. His position as quartermaster had kept him on -the watch for Indians all the time, and he announced on the day before -the battle that he “must have one chance at the Indians before he left.” -It is believed, however, that his impetuous counsel, due to his good -luck in many a brush with assailing parties, which he had several times -pursued almost alone, largely precipitated the final disaster. - -The total force, therefore, including officers and citizens, under -Fetterman’s command, was eighty-one—just the number with which he had -agreed to ride through the whole Sioux Nation. No one in the command -seems to have had the least idea that any force of Indians, however -great, could overcome it. - -Captain Fetterman, instead of leading his men direct to the wood train -on the south side of Sullivant Hills, double-quicked toward the Peno -Valley on to the north side. Perhaps he hoped that he could take the -Indians in reverse and exterminate them between his own troops and the -guard of the wood train—which all told comprised some ninety men—when he -rounded the western end of the hills. This movement was noticed from the -fort; but, as it involved no disobedience of orders, and as it might be -considered a good tactical manœuver, no apprehension was felt on account -of it. - -The Indians surrounding the wood train were well served by their scouts, -and when they found that Fetterman’s force was advancing on the other -side of the hill, they immediately withdrew from the wood train, which -presently broke corral and made its way to the Piney, some seven miles -northwest of the fort, unmolested. As Fetterman’s troops disappeared -down the valley, a number of Indians were observed along the Piney in -front of the fort. A spherical case-shot from a howitzer in the fort -exploded in their midst, and they vanished. The Indians were much afraid -of the “gun that shoots twice,” as they called it. - -At that time it was discovered that no doctor had gone with the -relieving party, so Acting-Assistant Surgeon Hines, with an escort of -four men, was sent out with orders to join Fetterman. The doctor -hastened away, but returned soon after with the information that the -wood train had gone on, and that when he attempted to cross the valley -of the Peno to join Fetterman’s men he found it full of Indians, who -were swarming about Lodge Trail Ridge, and that no sign of Fetterman was -observed. Despite his orders, he must have gone over the ridge. - -The alarm caused in the fort by this news was deepened by the sound of -firing at twelve o’clock. Six shots in rapid succession were counted, -and immediately after heavy firing was heard from over Lodge Trail -Ridge, five miles away, which continued with such fierceness as to -indicate a pitched battle. Carrington instantly despatched Captain Ten -Eyck with the rest of the infantry, in all about fifty-four men, -directing him to join Fetterman’s command, then return with them to the -fort. The men went forward on the run. A little later forty additional -men were sent after Ten Eyck. Carrington at once surmised that Fetterman -had disobeyed orders, either wittingly or carried away by the ardor of -the pursuit, and was now heavily engaged with the Indians on the far -side of the ridge. - -Counting Fetterman’s detachment, the guards of the wood train, and Ten -Eyck’s detachments, the garrison of the fort was now reduced to a very -small number. The place, with its considerable extent, might now be -attacked at any time. Carrington at once released all prisoners from the -guard-house, armed the quartermaster’s employees, the citizens, and -mustered altogether a force of only one hundred and nineteen men to -defend the post.[12] Although every preparation for a desperate defense -had been made, there were not enough men to man the walls. - -The general and his remaining officers then repaired to the observatory -tower, field glasses in hand, and in apprehension of what fearful -catastrophe they scarcely allowed themselves to imagine. The women and -children, especially those who had husbands and fathers with the first -detachment, were almost crazed with terror. - -Presently Sample, the general’s own orderly, who had been sent with Ten -Eyck, was seen galloping furiously down the opposite hill. He had the -best horse in the command (one of the general’s), and he covered the -distance between Lodge Trail Ridge and the fort with amazing swiftness. -He dashed up to headquarters with a message from Ten Eyck, stating that -“the valley on the other side of the ridge is filled with Indians, who -are threatening him. The firing has stopped. He sees no sign of Captain -Fetterman’s command. He wants a howitzer sent out to him.” - -The following note was sent to Captain Ten Eyck: - -“Forty well-armed men, with three thousand rounds, ambulances, stores, -etc., left before your courier came in. You must unite with Fetterman. -Fire slowly, and keep men in hand. You would have saved two miles toward -the scene of action if you had taken Lodge Trail Ridge. I order the wood -train in, which will give fifty men to spare.” - -No gun could be sent him. Since all the horses were already in the -field, it would have required men to haul it. No more could be spared, -and not a man with him could cut a fuse or handle the piece anyway. The -guns were especially needed at the fort to protect women and children. - -Late in the afternoon Ten Eyck’s party returned to the fort with -terrible tidings of appalling disaster. In the wagons with his command -were the bodies of forty-nine of Fetterman’s men; the remaining -thirty-two were not at that time accounted for. Ten Eyck very properly -stood upon the defensive on the hill and refused to go down into the -valley in spite of the insults and shouts of the Indians, who numbered -upward of two thousand warriors, until they finally withdrew. After -waiting a sufficient time, he marched carefully and cautiously toward -Peno Valley and to the bare lower ridge over which the road ran. - -There he came across evidences of a great battle. On the end of the -ridge, nearest the fort, in a space about six feet square, inclosed by -some huge rocks, making a sort of a rough shelter, he found the bodies -of the forty-nine men whom he had brought back. After their ammunition -had been spent, they had been stripped, shot full of arrows, hacked to -pieces, scalped, and mutilated in a horrible manner. There were no -evidences of a very severe struggle right there. Few cartridge shells -lay on the ground. Of these men, only four besides the two officers had -been killed by bullets. The rest had been killed by arrows, hatchets, or -spears. They had evidently been tortured to death. - -Brown and Fetterman were found lying side by side, each with a bullet -wound in the left temple. Their heads were burned and filled with powder -around the wounds. Seeing that all was lost, they had evidently -stood-face to face, and each had shot the other dead with his revolver. -They had both sworn to die rather than be taken alive by the Indians, -and in the last extremity they had carried out their vows. Lieutenant -Grummond, who had so narrowly escaped on the 6th of December, was not -yet accounted for, but there was little hope that he had escaped again. - - - III. Carrington’s Stern Resolution - -The night was one of wild anxiety. Nearly one-fourth of the efficient -force of the fort had been wiped out. Mirror signals were flashed from -the hills during the day, and fires here and there in the night -indicated that the savages had not left the vicinity. The guards were -doubled, every man slept with his clothing on, his weapons close at -hand. In every barrack a noncommissioned officer and two men kept watch -throughout the night. Carrington and the remaining officers did not -sleep at all. They fully expected the fort to be attacked. The state of -the women and children can be imagined, although all gossip and rumor -were expressly prohibited by the commander. - -[Illustration: STOCKADE] - -The next day was bitterly cold. The sky was overcast and lowering, with -indications of a tremendous storm. The Indians were not accustomed to -active operations under such conditions, and there was no sign of them -about. Carrington determined to go out to ascertain the fate of his -missing men. Although all the remaining officers assembled at his -quarters advised him not to undertake it, lest the savages, flushed with -victory, should attempt another attack, Carrington quietly excused his -officers, told the adjutant to remain with him, and the bugle instantly -disclosed his purpose in spite of dissenting protests. He rightly judged -that the moral effect of the battle would be greatly enhanced, in the -eyes of the Indians, if the bodies were not recovered. Besides, to set -at rest all doubts it was necessary to determine the fate of the balance -of his command. His own wife, as appears from her narrative,[13] -approved his action and nerved herself to meet the possible fate -involved, while Mrs. Grummond was the chief protestant that, as her -husband was undoubtedly dead, there should be no similar disaster -invited by another expedition. - -In the afternoon, with a heavily armed force of eighty men, Carrington -went in person to the scene of battle. The following order was left with -the officer of the day: “Fire the usual sunset gun, running a white lamp -to masthead. If the Indians appear fire three guns from the -twelve-pounder at minute intervals, and, later, substitute a red lantern -for the white.” Pickets were left on two commanding ridges, as signal -observers, as the command moved forward. The women and children were -placed in the magazine, a building well adapted for defense, which had -been stocked with water, crackers, etc., for an emergency, with an -officer pledged not to allow the women to be taken alive, if the General -did not return and the Indians overcame the stockade. - -Passing the place where the greatest slaughter had occurred, the men -marched cautiously along the trail. Bodies were strung along the road -clear to the western end farthest from the fort. Here they found -Lieutenant Grummond. There were evidences of a desperate struggle about -his body. Behind a little pile of rock, making a natural fortification, -were the two civilians who had been armed with the modern Henry rifle. -By the side of one fifty shells were counted, and nearly as many by the -side of the other brave frontiersman. Behind such cover as they could -obtain nearby lay the bodies of the oldest and most experienced soldiers -in Fetterman’s command. - -In front of them they found no less than sixty great gouts of blood on -the ground and grass, and a number of dead ponies, showing where the -bullets of the defenders had reached their marks,[14] and in every -direction were signs of the fiercest kind of hand-to-hand fighting. -Ghastly and mutilated remains, stripped naked, shot full of -arrows—Wheatley with no less than one hundred and five in him, scalped, -lay before them. - -Brown rode to the death of both a little Indian “calico” pony which he -had given to the general’s boys when they started from Fort Leavenworth, -in November, 1865, and the body of the horse was found in the low ground -at the west slope of the ridge, showing that the fight began there, -before they could reach high ground.[15] At ten o’clock at night, on the -return, the white lamp at masthead told its welcome story of a garrison -still intact. - -Fetterman had disobeyed orders. Whether deliberately or not, cannot be -told. He had relieved the wood train, and instead of returning to the -post, had pursued the Indians over the ridge into Peno Valley, then -along the trail, and into a cunningly contrived ambush. His men had -evidently fought on the road until their ammunition gave out, and then -had either been ordered to retreat to the fort, or had retreated of -their own motion—probably the latter. All the dead cavalry horses’ heads -were turned toward the fort, by the way. Fetterman and Brown, men of -unquestioned courage, must have been swept along with their flying men. -There may have been a little reserve on the rocks on which they hoped to -rally their disorganized, panic-stricken troops, fleeing before a horde -of yelling, blood-intoxicated warriors. I imagine them vainly -protesting, imploring, begging their men to make a stand. I feel sure -they fought until the last. But these are only surmises; what really -happened, God alone knows. - -The judgment of the veteran soldiers and the frontiersmen, who knew that -to retreat was to be annihilated, had caused a few to hold their ground -and fight until they were without ammunition; then with gun-stocks, -swords, bayonets, whatever came to hand, they battled until they were -cut down. Grummond had stayed with them, perhaps honorably sacrificing -himself in a vain endeavor to cover the retreat of the rest of his -command. The Indian loss was very heavy, but could not exactly be -determined. - -[Illustration: - - _Copyright, 1902, by Charles Schreyvogel_ - - LIEUTENANT GRUMMOND SACRIFICING HIMSELF TO COVER THE RETREAT - - _Drawing by Charles Schreyvogel_ -] - - - IV. The Reward of a Brave Soldier - -Such was the melancholy fate of Fetterman and his men. The post was -isolated, the weather frightful. A courier was at once despatched to -Fort Laramie, but such means of communication was necessarily slow, and -it was not until Christmas morning that the world was apprised of the -fatal story. In spite of the reports that had been made and fatuously -believed, that peace had obtained in that land, it was now known that -war was everywhere prevalent. The shock of horror with which the -terrible news was received was greater even than that attendant upon the -story of the disastrous battle of the Little Big Horn, ten years later. -People had got used to such things then; this news came like a bolt from -the blue. - -Although Carrington had conducted himself in every way as a brave, -prudent, skilful, capable soldier, although his services merited reward, -not censure, and demanded praise, not blame, the people and the -authorities required a scapegoat. He was instantly relieved from command -by General Cooke, upon a private telegram from Laramie, never published, -before the receipt of his own official report, and was ordered to change -his regimental headquarters to the little frontier post at Fort Caspar, -where two companies of his first battalion, just become the new -Eighteenth, were stationed, while four companies of the same battalion, -under his lieutenant-colonel, were ordered to the relief of Fort Phil -Kearney. - -The weather had become severe and the snow was banked to the top of the -stockade. The mercury was in the bulb. Guards were changed half-hourly. -Men and women dressed in furs made from wolfskins taken from the -hundreds of wolves which infested the outside butcher-field at night, -and which were poisoned by the men for their fur. Upon the day fixed -precisely for the march, as the new arrivals needed every roof during a -snow-storm which soon became a blizzard, Carrington, his wife and -children, his staff and their families, including Mrs. Grummond, -escorting the remains of her husband to Tennessee, and the regimental -band, with its women and children, began that February “change of -headquarters.” They narrowly escaped freezing to death. More than -one-half of the sixty-five in the party were frosted, and three -amputations, with one death, were the immediate result of the foolish -and cruel order. - -It was not until some time after that a mixed commission of soldiers and -civilians, which thoroughly investigated Carrington’s conduct, having -before them all his books and records from the inception of the -expedition until its tragic close, acquitted him of all blame of any -sort, and awarded him due praise for his successful conduct of the whole -campaign. His course was also the subject of inquiry before a purely -military court, all of them his juniors in rank, which also reported -favorably. General Sherman expressly stated that “Colonel Carrington’s -report, to his personal knowledge, was fully sustained,” but by some -unaccountable oversight or intent, the report was suppressed and never -published, thereby doing lasting injustice to a brave and faithful -soldier. - -At the same time the government established the sub-post between Laramie -and Fort Reno, so earnestly recommended by Carrington, in October, -calling it Fort Fetterman, in honor of the unfortunate officer who fell -in battle on the 21st of December. - -Perhaps it ill becomes us to censure the dead, but the whole unfortunate -affair arose from a direct disobedience of orders on the part of -Fetterman and his men. They paid the penalty for their lapse with their -lives; and so far, at least, they made what atonement they could. A year -later opportunity was given the soldiers at Phil Kearney to exact a -dreadful revenge from Red Cloud and his Sioux for the slaughter of their -brave comrades. - ------ - -Footnote 9: - - Killed on Lodge Trail Ridge - -Footnote 10: - - Published by the United States Senate in 1887. - -Footnote 11: - - At the burial of Sergeant Bowers, Captain Brown, who had known him - during the Civil War, pinned his Army of the Cumberland badge upon his - breast, and this was found when the remains were reinterred in 1878. - -Footnote 12: - - PHIL KEARNEY GARRISON, at date of massacre, from “Post Returns”:— - - Wood Party, besides teamsters 55 men - Fetterman’s Party (two citizens) 81 men - Ten Eyck’s Party (relieving) 94 men - Helpless in hospital 7 men - Roll-call, of present, all told 119 men - Total officers and men 356 men - - Ninety rifles worn out by use on horseback. Citizen employees used - their private arms. - - Information furnished by General H. B. Carrington. - -Footnote 13: - - “AB-SA-RA-KA, Land of Massacre,” by Mrs. Carrington, of which Oliver - Wendell Holmes wrote to General Carrington as follows: “What an - interesting record is that of Mrs. Carrington! I cannot read such a - story of devotion and endurance in the midst of privations and danger, - without feeling how little most of us know of what life can be when - all the human energies are called out by great enterprises and - emergencies.” - -Footnote 14: - - The Indians, where possible, remove the bodies of their slain. They - did during this campaign, as few dead Indians ever came into - possession of the troops. - -Footnote 15: - - Once, while loading the bodies in the wagons, a nervous sergeant - mistook one of the pickets for Indians in the rear, and gave the - alarm. His detail was sharply ordered by the general to “leave their - ammunition and get back to the fort as best they could, if they were - afraid; for no armed man would be allowed to leave until the last body - was rescued.” - - - - - CHAPTER THREE - The Thirty-two Against the Three Thousand - - - I. The Improvised Corral on Piney Island - -Red cloud, who had been one of the subchiefs of the Sioux, gained so -much prestige by the defeat and slaughter of Fetterman’s men that he -became at once the leading war chief of the nation.[16] The angry -braves, flushed with conquest and eager for blood, hastened to enroll -themselves by thousands in his band. - -Fort Phil Kearney had been in a state of siege before: it was more -closely invested now than ever. Contrary to their usual avoidance of the -war-path in cold weather, throughout the long and bitter winter there -was no intermittence to the watchfulness of the Indians. The garrison -was constantly in arms. Attacks of all sorts were made with increasing -frequency. The letters from the soldiers which got through to the East -adequately describe their sense of the dire peril which menaced them. -“_This may be my last letter_” is a frequent phrase. Travel on the trail -was abandoned. As soon as possible in the spring, reinforcements were -hurried up and the fort was completed, but the same state of affairs -continued right along without intermission. - -With the advance of summer Red Cloud gathered his warriors and -determined upon a direct attack upon the fort itself. He was tired of -skirmishing, stampeding stock, cutting off stragglers, etc. He wanted -war, real war, and he got it! If, or when, he captured the fort, he -would advance upon the other two forts in succession and so clear the -country, once and for all, of the detested invaders, whose soldierly -qualities he seems to have held in contempt. For the campaign he -proposed he assembled no fewer than three thousand warriors, the flower -of the Sioux Nation. Probably half of them were armed with firearms, -Winchester rifles, Spencer repeating carbines, or old army muskets, -including those that had been captured from Fetterman’s party. Under -cover of frequent skirmishes, which prevented much scouting on the part -of the troops, Red Cloud gathered his warriors undiscovered and -unmolested, and prepared to attack about the first of August, 1867. - -The limits of the military reservation had been fixed at -Washington—without adequate knowledge of the ground and in disregard of -General Carrington’s request and protests—so as to exclude the timber -land of Piney Island, from which the post had been built, and from which -the nearest and most available wood supply must be obtained. The post -had been completed, but immense supplies of wood would be required for -fuel during the long and severe winter. This was to be cut and delivered -at the fort by a civilian outfit which had entered upon a contract with -the government for the purpose. One of the stipulations of the contract -was that the woodmen should be guarded and protected by the soldiers. - -Wood-cutting began on the 31st of July, 1867, and Captain and -Brevet-Major James Powell, commanding “C” Company, of the twenty-seventh -Infantry, which was formerly a battalion of the Eighteenth a part of the -command which had built the fort, and to which Fetterman and his men had -belonged, was detailed with his company to guard the contractor’s party. -Captain Powell had enlisted in the army in 1848 as a private soldier. -The Civil War had given him a commission in the regular service, and in -its course he had been twice brevetted for conspicuous gallantry, once -at Chickamauga and the second time during the Atlanta campaign, in which -he had been desperately wounded. He had had some experience in Indian -fighting before and since he came to the post, and had distinguished -himself in several skirmishes, notably in the relief of the wood train, -a few days before Fetterman’s rashness and disobedience precipitated the -awful disaster. - -Arriving at Piney Island, some seven miles from the post, Powell found -that the contractor had divided his men into two parties. One had its -headquarters on a bare, treeless, and comparatively level plain, perhaps -one thousand yards across, which was surrounded by low hills backed by -mountains farther away. This was an admirable place to graze the herds -of mules required to haul the wagons. As will be seen, it could also be -turned into a highly defensive position. The other camp was in the thick -of the pine wood, about a mile away across the creek, at the foot of the -mountain. This division of labor necessitated a division of force, which -was a misfortune, but which could not be avoided. - -Powell sent twelve men under a noncommissioned officer to guard the camp -in the wood, and detailed thirteen men with another noncommissioned -officer to escort the wood trains to and from the fort. With the -remaining twenty-six men and his lieutenant, John C. Jenness, he -established headquarters on the plain in the open. - -The wagons used by the wood-cutters were furnished by the -quartermaster’s department. In transporting the cordwood, the woodmen -made use of the running gears only, the wagon bodies having been -deposited in the clearing. In order to preserve their contents and to -afford as much protection as possible to their occupants in case of -Indian attacks, the quartermaster’s department was in the habit of -lining the wagon beds with boiler iron; and, to give their occupants an -opportunity to fight from concealment, loopholes were cut in the sides. -Almost every authority who has written of the fight has concluded that -the particular wagon beds in question were so lined. This is a mistaken -though natural conclusion. In a letter to an old comrade who wrote an -account of the subsequent action,[17] Powell makes no mention of any -iron lining, and it is certain that the wagons were not lined, but were -just the ordinary wooden wagon beds.[18] - -There were fourteen of these wagon bodies. Powell arranged them in the -form of a wide oval. At the highest point of the plain, which happened -to be in the center, this corral was made. The wagon beds were deep, and -afforded ample concealment for any one lying in them. I sometimes wonder -why Powell did not stand these beds on their sides instead of their -bottoms, making a higher and stouter inclosure, the bottoms being -heavier than the sides; but it is clear that he did not. There were -plenty of tools, including a number of augers, in the camp, and with -these Powell’s men made a number of loopholes about a foot from the -ground, in the outward sides of the wagons. - -At the ends of the oval, where the configuration of the ground made it -most vulnerable for attack, especially by mounted men, two wagons -complete—that is, with bodies and running gears—were placed a short -distance from the little corral. This would break the force of a charge, -and the defenders could fire at the attacking party underneath the -bodies and through the wheels. The spaces between the wagon bodies were -filled with logs and sacks of grain, backed by everything available that -would turn a bullet. The supplies for the soldiers and wood party were -contained in this corral. - -[Illustration: - - The Wagon-Box Corral on Piney Island -] - -Instead of the old Springfield muzzle-loading musket, with which the -troops mainly had been armed up to this time, Powell’s men were provided -with the new Allen modification of the Springfield breech-loading rifle. -He had enough rifles for his men and for all the civilian employees, and -a large number of new Colt revolvers, with plenty of ammunition for all. -The new rifle had never been used by the troops in combat with the -Indians, and the latter were entirely ignorant of its tremendous range -and power and the wonderful rapidity of fire which it permitted. They -learned much about it in the next day or two, however. A quantity of -clothing and blankets was issued to the troops at the fort on the first -of August, and supplies for Powell’s men were sent down to him. - - - II. The Wild Charge of the Sioux - -Having matured his plans, Red Cloud determined to begin his attack on -Fort Phil Kearney by annihilating the little detachment guarding the -train.[19] Parties of Indians had been observed in the vicinity for -several days, but no attack had been made since Powell’s arrival until -the second of August, when, about nine o’clock in the morning,[20] a -party of some two hundred Indians endeavored to stampede the herd of -mules. The herders, who were all armed, stood their ground and succeeded -for the time being in beating back the attack. While they were hotly -engaged with the dismounted force, sixty mounted Indians succeeded in -getting into the herd and running it off. At the same time five hundred -other Indians attacked the wood train at the other camp. - -The affair was not quite a surprise, for the approach of the Indians had -been detected and signalled from the corral on the island a few moments -before. In the face of so overwhelming a force the soldiers and -civilians at the wood train immediately retreated, abandoning the train -and the camp. Here four of the lumbermen were killed. The retreat, -however, was an orderly one, and they kept back the Indians by a -well-directed fire. - -Meanwhile the herders, seeing the stampede of the mules, made an effort -to join the party retreating from the wood train. The Indians endeavored -to intercept them and cut them off. Powell, however, with a portion of -his force, leaving the post in command of Lieutenant Jenness, -immediately dashed across the prairie and attacked the savages in the -rear. They turned at once, abandoning the pursuit of the herders, and -fell upon Powell, who in his turn retreated without loss to the corral. -His prompt and bold sortie had saved the herders, for they were enabled -to effect a junction with the retreating train men and their guards and -the soldiers and civilians, and eventually gained the fort, although not -without hard fighting and some loss. One thing that helped them to get -away from the Indians was that the savages stopped to pillage the camp -and burn it and the train. Another thing was the presence of Powell’s -command, which they could not leave in the rear. After driving away the -others and completing the destruction of the camp, they turned their -attention to Powell’s corral. - -Some of the clothing that had been received the day before had not been -unpacked or distributed, so it was used to strengthen the weak places in -the corral. Powell’s men lay down in the wagon beds before the -loopholes; blankets were thrown over the tops of the beds to screen the -defenders from observation and in the hope of perhaps saving them from -the ill effects of the plunging arrow fire, and everything was got -ready. Everybody had plenty of ammunition. - -Some of the men who were not good shots were told off to do nothing but -load rifles, of which there were so many that each man had two or three -beside him, one man making use of no less than eight. Four civilians -succeeded in joining the party in the corral—a welcome addition, indeed, -bringing the total number up to thirty-two officers and men. Among this -quartet was an old frontiersman who had spent most of his life hunting -in the Indian country, and who had been in innumerable fights, renowned -for his expertness in the use of the rifle—a dead-shot. This was the man -to whom the eight guns were allotted. Powell, rifle in hand, stationed -himself at one end of the corral; Jenness, similarly armed, was posted -at the other, each officer watching one of the openings covered by the -complete wagons, which were loaded with supplies so they could not be -run off easily by hand. - -While all these preparations were being rapidly made, although without -confusion or alarm, the surrounding country was filling with a countless -multitude of Indians. It was impossible at the time to estimate the -number of them, although it was ascertained that more than three -thousand warriors were present and engaged. Red Cloud himself was in -command, and with him were the great chiefs of the great tribes of the -Sioux, who were all represented—Unkpapas, Miniconjous, Oglalas, Brulés, -and Sans Arcs, besides hundreds of Cheyennes. - -So confident of success were they that, contrary to their ordinary -practices, they had brought with them their women and children to assist -in carrying back the plunder. These, massed out of range on the farthest -hills, constituted an audience for the terrible drama about to be played -in the amphitheater beneath them. - -We can well imagine the thoughts of that little band of thirty-two, -surrounded by a force that outnumbered them one hundred to one. Their -minds must have gone back to that winter day, some seven months before, -when twice their number had gone down to defeat and destruction under -the attack of two-thirds of their present foemen. It is probable that -not one of them ever expected to escape alive. The chances that they -could successfully withstand an attack from so overwhelming a number of -foes of such extraordinary bravery were of the smallest. But not a man -flinched, not a man faltered. They looked to their weapons, settled -themselves comfortably in the wagon beds, thought of Fetterman and their -comrades, and prayed that the attack might begin and begin at once. -There were no heroics, no speeches made. Powell quietly remarked that -they had to fight for their lives now, which was patent to all; and he -directed that no man, for any reason, should open fire until he gave the -order. - -Some little time was spent by the Indians in making preparations, and -then a force of about five hundred Indians, magnificently mounted on the -best war ponies and armed with rifles, carbines, or muskets, detached -themselves from the main body and started toward the little corral lying -like a black dot on the open plain. They intended to ride over the -soldiers and end the battle with one swift blow. Slowly at first, but -gradually increasing their pace until their ponies were on a dead run, -they dashed gallantly toward the corral, while the main body of the -savages, at some distance in their rear, prepared to take advantage of -any opening that might be made in the defenses. It was a brilliant -charge, splendidly delivered. - -Such was the discipline of Powell’s men that not a shot was fired as the -Indians, yelling and whooping madly, came rushing on. There was -something terribly ominous about the absolute silence of that little -fortification. The galloping men were within one hundred yards now, now -fifty. At that instant Powell spoke to his men. The inclosure was -sheeted with flame. Out of the smoke and fire a rain of bullets was -poured upon the astonished savages. The firing was not as usual—one -volley, then another, and then silence; but it was a steady, persistent, -continued stream, which mowed them down in scores. The advance was -thrown into confusion, checked but not halted, its impetus being too -great; and then the force divided and swept around the corral, looking -for a weak spot for a possible entrance. At the same moment a furious -fire was poured into it by the warriors, whose position on their horses’ -backs gave them sufficient elevation to enable them to fire over the -wagon beds upon the garrison. Then they circled about the corral in a -mad gallop, seeking some undefended point upon which to concentrate and -break through, but in vain. The little inclosure was literally ringed in -fire. Nothing could stand against it. So close were they that one bullet -sometimes pierced two Indians.[21] - -[Illustration: - - CHARGE OF RED CLOUD ON THE CORRAL AT PINEY ISLAND - - _Drawing by R. Farrington Elwell_ -] - -Having lost terribly, and having failed to make any impression whatever, -the Indians broke and gave way. They rushed pell-mell from the spot in -frantic confusion till they got out of range of the deadly storm that -swept the plain. All around the corral lay dead and dying Indians, -mingled with killed and wounded horses kicking and screaming with pain, -the Indians stoically enduring all their sufferings and making no -outcry. In front of the corral, where the first force of the charge had -been spent, horses and men were stretched out as if they had been cut -down by a gigantic mowing-machine. The defenders of the corral had -suffered in their turn. Lieutenant Jenness, brave and earnest in -defense, had exposed himself to give a necessary command and had -received a bullet in his brain. One of the private soldiers had been -killed and two severely wounded. The thirty-two had been reduced to -twenty-eight. At that rate, since there were so few to suffer, the end -appeared inevitable. The spirit of the little band, however, remained -undaunted. Fortunately for them, the Indians had met with so terrible a -repulse that all they thought of for the time being was to get out of -range. The vicinity of the corral was thus at once abandoned. - - - III. Red Cloud’s Baptism of Fire - -Red Cloud determined, after consultation with the other chiefs, upon -another plan which gave greater promise of success. Seven hundred -Indians, armed with rifles or muskets and followed by a number carrying -bows and arrows, were told off to prepare themselves as a skirmishing -party. Their preparations were simple, and consisted of denuding -themselves of every vestige of clothing, including their war shirts and -war bonnets. These men were directed to creep forward, taking advantage -of every depression, ravine, or other cover, until they were within -range of the corral, which they were to overwhelm by gun and arrow fire. -Supporting them, and intended to constitute the main attack, were the -whole remaining body of the Indians, numbering upward of two thousand -warriors. - -With the wonderful skill of which they were masters, the skirmishing -party approached near to the corral and began to fire upon it. Here and -there, when a savage incautiously exposed himself, he was shot by one of -the defenders; but in the main the people of the corral kept silent -under this terrible fusillade of bullets and arrows. The tops of the -wagon sides were literally torn to pieces; the heavy blankets were -filled with arrows which, falling from a distance, did no damage. The -fire of the Indians was rapid and continuous. The bullets crashed into -the wood just over the heads of the prostrate men, sounding like -cracking thunder; yet not one man in the wagon beds was hurt. Arguing, -perhaps from the silence in the corral, that the defenders had been -overwhelmed and that the time for the grand attack had arrived, signal -was given for the main body of the Indians to charge. - -They were led by the nephew of Red Cloud, a superb young chieftain, who -was ambitious of succeeding in due course to the leadership now held by -his uncle. Chanting their fierce war songs, they came, on arranged in a -great semicircle. Splendid, stalwart braves, the flower of the nation, -they were magnificently arrayed in all the varied and highly-colored -fighting panoply of the Sioux. Great war bonnets streamed from the heads -of the chiefs, many of whom wore gorgeous war shirts; the painted bodies -of others made dashes of rich color against the green grass of the -clearing and the dark pines of the hills and mountains behind. Most of -them carried on their left arms painted targets or shields of buffalo -hide, stout enough to turn a musket shot unless fairly hit. - -Under a fire of redoubled intensity from their skirmishers they broke -into a charge. Again they advanced in the face of a terrible silence. -Again at the appointed moment the order rang out. Again the fearful -discharge swept them away in scores. Powell’s own rifle brought down the -dauntless young chief in the lead. Others sprang to the fore when he -fell and gallantly led on their men. Undaunted, they came on and on, in -spite of a slaughter such as no living Indian had experienced or heard -of. The Indians could account for the continuous fire only by supposing -that the corral contained a greater number of defenders than its area -would indicate it capable of receiving. So, in the hope that the -infernal fire would slacken, they pressed home the attack until they -were almost at the wagon beds. Back on the hills Red Cloud and the -veteran chiefs, with the women and children, watched the progress of the -battle with eager intensity and marked with painful apprehension the -slaughter of their bold warriors. - -The situation was terribly critical. If they came on a few feet farther -the rifles would be useless, and the little party of twenty-eight would -have to fight hand-to-hand without reloading. In that event the end -would be certain; but just before the Indians reached the corral, they -broke and gave way. So close had they come that some of the troopers in -their excitement actually rose to their knees and threw the augers with -which the loopholes had been made, and other missiles, in the faces of -the Indians. Others, however, kept up the fire, which was indeed more -than mortal humanity could stand. - -What relief filled the minds of the defenders, when they saw the great -force which had come on so gallantly reeling back over the plains in -frantic desire to get to cover, can easily be imagined. Yet such was the -courage, the desperation of these Indians, in spite of repulse after -repulse and a slaughter awful to contemplate, that they made no less -than six several and distinct charges in three hours upon that devoted -band. After the first attack made by the men on horseback, not a single -casualty occurred among the defenders of the corral. It was afternoon -before the Sioux got enough. - -The Indians could not account for this sustained and frightful fire -which came from the little fort, except by attributing it to magic. “The -white man must have made bad medicine,” they said afterwards, before -they learned the secret of the long-range, breech-loading firearm, “to -make the guns fire themselves without stopping.” Indeed, such had been -the rapidity of the fire that many of the gun-barrels became so hot that -they were rendered useless. To this day the Indians refer to that battle -as “the bad medicine fight of the white man.” - -The ground around the corral was ringed with Indian slain. They were -piled up in heaps closer by, and scattered all over the grass farther -away. Nothing is more disgraceful in the eyes of an Indian chieftain or -his men than to permit the dead bodies of those killed in action to fall -into the hands of the enemy. Red Cloud recognizing the complete -frustration of his hopes of overwhelming Fort Phil Kearney and sweeping -the invaders out of the land at that time, now only wished to get his -dead away and retreat. In order to do so he threw forward his -skirmishers again, who once more poured a heavy fire on the corral. - -This seemed to Powell and his exhausted men the precursor of a final -attack, which they feared would be the end of them. Indeed Powell, in -his report, says that another attack would have been successful. From -the heat and the frightful strain of the long period of steady fighting, -the men were in a critical condition. The ammunition, inexhaustible as -it had seemed, was running low; many of the rifles were useless. They -still preserved, however, their calm, unbroken front to the foe, and -made a slow, deliberate, careful reply to the firing that was poured -upon them. - -Red Cloud, however, had no thought of again attacking. He only wanted to -get away. Under cover of his skirmishers he succeeded in carrying off -most of the dead, the wounded who were able to crawl getting away -themselves. A warrior, protecting himself as well as he could with the -stout buffalo-hide shield he carried, would creep forward, attach the -end of a long lariat to the foot of a dead man, and then rapidly -retreating he would pull the body away. All the while the hills and -mountains resounded with the death chants of the old men and women. - -At the close of these operations a shell burst in the midst of the -Indian skirmishers, and through the trees off to the left the weary -defenders saw the blue uniforms of approaching soldiers, who a moment -afterwards debouched in the open. - -An astonishing sight met the eyes of the relief party. Clouds of Indians -covered the plain. The little corral was still spitting fire and smoke -into the encircling mass. They had got there in time then. Without -hesitation the troops deployed and came forward on the run. Their cheers -were met by welcoming shouts from Powell and his heroic comrades. - -The herders, woodsmen, and guards who had escaped from their camp in the -morning, had reached the fort at last with the news of Powell’s imminent -danger. Major Smith, with one hundred men and a howitzer, was at once -despatched to his support. No one dreamed that the force of Indians was -so great, or perhaps more men would have been sent, although the number -at the fort was still insufficient to permit of the detachment of a very -large party. It was now three o’clock in the afternoon. The Indians, -disheartened and dismayed by their fearful repulse, sullenly retreated -before the advance of the charging soldiers. There was a splendid -opportunity presented to them to wipe out Smith’s command with their -overwhelming force, for they could have attacked him in the open; but -they had had enough for that day, and the opportunity was not embraced. - -Major Smith realized instantly that the proper thing for him to do, in -the face of such great odds, was to get Powell’s men and return with all -speed. Carrying the bodies of the dead and wounded, the little band of -defenders joined the rescuers and returned to the fort, leaving the -barren honors of the field to the Indians, Awho occupied it on the heels -of the retiring soldiers.[22] - - - IV. After the Battle. The Scout’s Story - -Powell modestly estimated he had killed sixty-seven Indians and wounded -one hundred and twenty. Most of his men declared the Indian loss to have -been between three and four hundred, but it was not until a year after -the battle that the real facts were ascertained from the Indians -themselves. The loss in killed and wounded in the engagement, on the -part of the Indians, was _one thousand one hundred and thirty-seven_. In -other words, each of the defenders had accounted for at least thirty-six -of the Indians. Amply, indeed, had the little band avenged the death of -their comrades under Fetterman. - -As Colonel Dodge justly says, the account reads like a story of -Cortes.[23] At first sight it appears to be incredible. In explanation -of it, the following account, which Colonel Dodge has preserved of a -subsequent conversation between the frontiersman to whom the eight guns -were allotted and the department commander is of deep interest:— - - “How many Indians were in the attack?” asked the General. - - “Wall, Gin’r’ll, I can’t say fer sartin, but I think thar wur nigh - onto three thousand uv ’em.” - - “How many were killed and wounded?” - - “Wall, Gin’r’ll, I can’t say fer sartin, but I think thar wur nigh - onto a thousand uv ’em hit.” - - “How many did you kill?” - - “Wall, Gin’r’ll, I can’t say; but gi’me a dead rest, I kin hit a - dollar at fifty yards every time, and I fired with a dead rest at - more’n fifty of them varmints inside of fifty yards.” - - “For Heaven’s sake, how many times did you fire?” exclaimed the - astonished General. - - “Wall, Gin’r’ll, I can’t say, but I kept eight guns pretty well het - up for more’n three hours.” - -On this occasion Powell received his third brevet for heroism and -distinguished conduct on the field. - -The next fall a new treaty was made with the Indians, and the post which -had been the scene alike of heartbreaking disaster and defeat and of -triumph unprecedented, was abandoned to them. The troops were withdrawn. -The Indians at once burned it to the ground. It was never reoccupied, -and to-day is remembered simply because of its association with the -first and, with one exception, the most notable of our Indian defeats in -the west, and with the most remarkable and overwhelming victory that was -ever won by soldiers over their gallant red foemen on the same ground. - -At this writing (September, 1903) the once mighty Red Cloud, now in his -eighty-ninth year, is nearing his end, and already various claimants for -the now practically empty honor of the Head-Chieftainship of the Sioux -have arisen, the two most prominent candidates being young Red Cloud and -the son of old Sitting Bull. - - - NOTE - -Since the first publication of this article I have received the -following letter, which, as it tends to confirm what seems incredible, -the terrible Indian loss, I quote in full: - - DEAR MR. BRADY: - - Although I am much nearer three score than fifty, I still enjoy - historical romance and facts, and I have, I think, read most of your - writings. I have just read your last article and it recalls a - conversation with Red Cloud twenty years ago. - - He was with my dear old friend, “Adirondack Murray” and, I think, J. - Amory Knox and myself. He, Murray and Knox had been photographed in - a group. In reminiscing in regard to the Piney Island battle, he - said he went in with over three thousand braves and lost over half. - Murray asked him if he meant over fifteen hundred had been killed - then, and he said: - - “I lost them. They never fought again.” - - He knew Murray, Knox and myself wielded the pen sometimes but that - we never used private talks. I tell you the above for your personal - satisfaction. Sincerely, - - W. R. E. COLLINS, - 1438 Broad—Exchange, New York. - - 3–22-’04. - ------ - -Footnote 16: - - Mahapiya-luta, Red Cloud, was one of the most famous of the great - Sioux Nation. He was a fierce and ruthless warrior, but withal a man - of his word. After the abandonment of Fort Phil Kearney he - participated in no important actions with the soldiers, although he - was elected head chief of the Sioux. In the war of 1876 his camp was - surprised by General Mackenzie before he had an opportunity to go on - the war-path. His men were disarmed, and with him were detained in the - reservation. It was a fortunate thing for the army. - - Recently the old chief was asked to tell the story of his most - thrilling adventure. It was a tale of one man against seven, and the - old man’s dim eyes grew bright and his wrinkled face lighted up with a - strange light as he told it. A well-known warrior was jealous of Red - Cloud, and, together with six of his followers, waylaid the young - brave in a lonely spot. - - Two of them were armed with rifles, the rest carried only bows and - arrows, while Red Cloud had a Winchester. At the first fire Red Cloud - fell with a bullet in his thigh, but from where he lay he contrived to - kill every one of his assailants. - - The skill and courage he displayed on that occasion won for him many - admiring followers, and as war after war with the whites broke out and - he won fresh laurels his followers increased in numbers. He joined the - various secret societies, passed through the terrible agony of the sun - dance, and when, in 1866, the chiefs of the tribe signed a “peace - paper,” he stood out for and declared war. The fighting men flocked to - his standard, and when the awful massacre in which he played so - conspicuous a part occurred, he was proclaimed Chief of all the Sioux. - - All the prestige he lost at Piney Island he regained upon the - abandonment of the forts by the government, a most impolitic and - unfortunate move. - -Footnote 17: - - General Rodenbough, in “Sabre and Bayonet.” - -Footnote 18: - - This statement is corroborated by private letter from a veteran - soldier in the United States Army, who is one of the few survivors of - the battle. Surgeon Horton, who was at the post from its establishment - until it was abandoned, also says that the wagon beds were of ordinary - boards, without lining or other protection. - -Footnote 19: - - On the same day an attack was made in force on Fort C. F. Smith, on - the Big Horn. - -Footnote 20: - - Powell’s official report says nine, although a private letter written - some time later makes the hour seven. It isn’t material, anyway: there - was ample time for all the fighting both sides cared for before the - day was ended. - -Footnote 21: - - “I know that my husband never expected to come out of that fight - alive. He has told me that during the fight the Indians came up so - close to the corral, that one shot would pass through the Indian in - advance and kill or wound the one behind. My husband claimed the honor - of killing Red Cloud’s nephew.”—Letter from Mrs. Annie Powell to me. - Surgeon Horton states that the men told him on their return to the - fort that the Indians were crowded so closely together that the - conical bullets from their muskets killed four or five Indians in line - behind one another. The Indians came up in solid masses on every side. - -Footnote 22: - - Dr. Horton writes me that when Powell’s men reached the post they were - literally crazed with excitement and the nervous strain of the fight. - The health of many of them was completely broken. Powell himself never - fully recovered from the strain of that awful day, his wife informs - me. - -Footnote 23: - - “Our Wild Indians,” by Colonel R. I. Dodge, U. S. A. Mrs. Powell, in a - letter to me, also vouches for the anecdote quoted. - - - - - CHAPTER FOUR - Personal Reminiscences of Fort Phil Kearney and the Wagon-Box Fight - - By Mr. R. J. Smyth.[24] - - - “Cherokee, Ia., 6–27–1904. - -As I was a member of the Carrington Powder River Expedition of 1866, I -take the liberty of sending you a short sketch of happenings about Fort -Phil Kearney. Being actively engaged with others for some two years in -making the history of that place, I think that the account may be of -interest. - -I left Fort Leavenworth early in the spring of 1866. At Fort Kearney, -Nebraska, we found Col. Carrington and a part of his command, consisting -of several companies of the Eighteenth Regular Infantry. Early in April -we received some recruits for said command, and in a short time started -on what at that time was called the Carrington Powder River Expedition. -We followed the overland trail (sometimes called the Salt Lake trail) up -the south side of the South Platte River to Julesberg, crossed the river -there, then crossed the divide to the North Platte. From here we went to -Fort Laramie. From this point we marched west to Mussa ranch, crossed -Horse Creek, and followed the Bozeman trail. This was a new road, and a -short cut to Montana. After following this trail fifteen miles we struck -the North Platte at Bridger’s Ferry. We crossed here in a ferryboat—a -large flat boat attached to a large cable rope stretched across the -river. - -We followed the North Platte River up on the right side to a point -opposite to the present site of Fort Fetterman. At this point we left -the river and struck across the country, crossing Sand Creek and several -other small creeks, among which I now remember the North, South, and -Middle Cheyennes. They were then merely the dry beds of what would be -quite large rivers at the time of the melting of the snow in the -mountains. At a point twenty-two miles east of the Powder River we -struck the head of the Dry Fork of the Powder River and followed it down -to the river. - -There on the west side we found Fort Reno, established by General Conner -in ’65 and garrisoned by a few “galvanized soldiers.” The garrison had -been greatly reduced by desertions during the winter, the soldiers -making for Montana. “Galvanized soldiers” was a name given to captured -Rebel soldiers who enlisted in the Union Army to do frontier duty in -order to get out of prison, and incidentally to draw pay from Uncle Sam. -We laid over here for a few days, and on the fourth of July the Indians -stampeded the stock of Al. Leighton, the sutler. The colonel made a -detail of soldiers and citizens to go out after the Indians and recover -the stock if possible. - -[Illustration: - - _Courtesy of The Century Co._ - - “BOOTS AND SADDLES:” A START IN THE EARLY MORNING - - _Drawing by Frederic Remington_ -] - -It was indeed a laughable sight to see the soldiers trying to ride mules -that were not broken to ride—and the soldiers knew about as much about -riding as the mules did. We followed the Indians to the Pumpkin Buttes -and I am free to say for myself that I was very glad that we did not -find them. Had we got in touch with them we would have had the smallest -kind of a show to save our hair. The soldiers being mounted on green -mules, and being armed with the old Springfield musket, and that -strapped on their backs, a very few Indians could have stampeded the -mules and, in fact, the soldiers as well. - -We, the citizens, had made arrangements that if the Indians attacked us -we would stick together and fight it out the best that we could. Jim -Bridger, our guide, was with this party. He was an old timer in the -mountains. I had two years experience in the mountains and plains prior -to this time; the rest of the citizens were good men. We returned to the -fort safely but did not recover any of the stock. - -A day or two later we left the fort. The first day’s march was a very -hard one, thirty-six miles to Crazy Woman’s Fork. This creek was a very -fine one, clear, cool, and very rapid. The command was badly demoralized -by this long, hot, and dry march, no water between that point and Fort -Reno. The soldiers had been paid off a day or two before, many had been -drunk, many more thoughtless, and did not provide for water in spite of -orders. I saw five dollars paid for a canteen of water on this march. On -our arrival at Crazy Woman’s Fort, the commanding officer detailed a -guard to keep the soldiers from jumping into the creek and drinking too -much water. - -We laid over here two days, to repair wagons and bring in the -stragglers. Had the Indians been on hand, they could have cleaned up -many of the soldiers at this time. From this creek west to the Big Horn -the country is very fine; plenty of wood, water, and grass; in fact, a -paradise. We traveled west to the forks of the Pineys. The big and -little Pineys fork near where we made our camp, sixty-five miles west of -the Powder River. - -On the twenty-fourth day of July we moved to the place where we -established Fort Phil Kearney. The grasshoppers were so thick in the air -that day that they nearly obscured the sun from sight.[25] In fact, it -did not look bigger than a silver dollar. The fort was built about as -you have described it, and from the day that we established it until I -left there, in November, ’67, the Indians were very much in evidence and -plenty of fighting nearly all that time. - -I was a teamster on this expedition, driving an ambulance team. Made -several trips to Fort Laramie and to Fort C. F. Smith on the Big Horn. -This latter Fort was established by Carrington a short time after the -establishment of Fort Phil Kearney, and was a two-company post. - -I was with the hay-making party down the Big Piney during a part of the -summer of ’66. During one of our trips to the hay field, we were -accompanied by a man who represented _Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Weekly_ -as an artist. This man rode with me a part of the way. He intended to do -some sketching near there but I advised him to stay with our outfit. -However, he insisted on stopping by the way. On our return we found him -dead, a cross cut on his breast, which indicated that they thought him a -coward who would not fight. He wore long, black hair and his head had -been completely skinned. Probably it was the work of a band of young -Cheyenne bucks; they could cut the scalps into many pieces and thereby -make a big show in camp. Was very sorry for this man; he appeared to be -a perfect gentleman. His thought was, that if the Indians found him they -would not hurt him, as he intended to show them his drawings, and also -explain to them that he was not armed. - -[Illustration: Plan of Magazine at Fort Phil Kearney (now Wyoming)] - -Later on the Indians got so thick that we had to abandon this hay-making -business. The day that we broke camp we had a great deal of fighting -with the Indians. I remember a soldier named Pate Smith who borrowed a -revolver from me that day. This man was mounted. He rode too far ahead -of the outfit, the Indians cut him off. Later we heard from the Crows -that the Sioux caught him, skinned him alive. This man was an old -volunteer soldier, but what show has a man with the old-fashioned -Springfield musket? One shot and you are done. - -I was at the Fort at the time of the Phil Kearney massacre and went down -with the reinforcements to that sad scene. Our men were all down when we -got there, and cut up in the most brutal manner, such as only a red -brute would do. We buried them a little east of the fort. They fought a -good fight, but were surprised and overpowered. As we approached the -scene of action the country was black with Indians to the west. - -The officers were clearly to blame for this slaughter; they disobeyed -the colonel’s orders, which were to guard the wood train to the fort, -and not to engage the Indians unless attacked by them. At a point about -two miles west of the fort they left the wood train; crossed the Big -Piney Creek; got nearly to the Peno Creek, and were ambushed by about -three thousand Indians, and the entire command killed. This band of -Indians included all of the different tribes of the Sioux, also -Cheyennes, Blackfeet, Arapahoes, and some young renegade Crow bucks. I -knew this latter statement to be true, from the fact that one member of -Company C, Second Cavalry, had stolen a revolver from me some time -before and it was with him in this fight. It was taken from his body by -the Indians. Next spring a young Crow came to the fort. I saw the gun -under his blanket and took it away from him. If he was in camp on the -Big Horn with his people, he could not have got this gun on this field -of slaughter. I had been wounded about six weeks prior to this fight and -had not reported for duty, but on call for volunteers to reinforce the -Fetterman party, reported for duty and went with the command to the -scene of the massacre. - -You are in error in stating that there was no communication with the -outside world during this winter. I made one trip with my ambulance to -Fort Laramie. We had an escort of ten cavalry soldiers. We made, I -think, three trips after this without an escort, using pack mules, the -party consisting of two packers and the mail-carrier, Van Volsey, a very -fine man and a brave one, too. Last trip up I saw Indian signs in the -dry forks of the Powder River, consisting of the remains of a camp fire, -not entirely burned out, and some Indian traps lying around it. I -refused to make another trip without an escort. On our arrival at the -fort we reported the facts, and demanded an escort for the next trip. -But owing to the fact that the stock was in such poor condition on -account of the scarcity of food, they could not furnish one mounted. - -They persuaded me to take one more trip with Van Volsey, which I -foolishly consented to do. On the first day out I got snow blind and on -our arrival at Fort Reno requested him to get a substitute in my place. -He refused to do so and insisted that I accompany him to Fort Laramie, -but after being on the road a short time, my eyes played out entirely. I -had to return to the fort and there secured another man to take my -place. They made the trip down all right and returning were accompanied -by two or three soldiers, who were going to join their commands. They -had got nearly to the head of the dry fork of the Powder River when the -Indians killed the entire party. We found the bones of the men and mules -and some of the mail sacks. We buried the men’s remains there. - -During the summer of ’67 life was one continual round of fighting. We -lost a great many men, but damaged the Sioux much more than during the -previous year. The soldiers had better guns, and were far better Indian -fighters. They had learned that it was safer to keep their faces to the -Indians, than, as during the previous year, their backs. When you run -from an Indian you are his meat. - -On the day of the wagon-box fight, accompanied by my partner, I left the -fort before daylight. We went to the foot-hills to get some deer. A -short time after daylight we discovered a lot of Indian smoke signals on -the hills, and decided that we had better get back to the fort. In -making our way back we followed the Little Piney down for some distance, -and found that the country was full of Indians. We then struck out for -the wood train. The Indians had got between us and it. We then went to -the wagon-box corral, and got there none too soon. - -Your description of the corral is correct as I remember it to be. Its -location is about right, except that it was not on an island. I never -heard of Little Piney Island, and I do not believe such an island -existed there at that time.[26] The wagon boxes were of the ordinary -government boxes. They were set off from the wagons, as the wagons were -in corral. The intervals between were packed with logs, bales of -blankets, clothing, sacks of corn, etc. As to the wagon boxes being -lined with iron, you are right. They were not. Up to that time, and -during my time on the plains, I never saw wagon boxes so lined. The -wagon box that I was detailed to fight in had no such protection, but we -had gunny sacks of corn placed on edge two deep on the inside of the -box, with a two inch auger hole at the point where the four sacks came -together. This made good protection for the body when lying down. As -stated in your article, the tops of the wagon boxes were literally torn -to pieces with the bullets fired at us by the Indians. Without this -protection the fight would not have lasted very long. - -There was a surplus of ammunition and guns. I had two Spencer carbines, -and two revolvers (six-shot army Colt’s). During the first charge I -emptied the carbines and the revolvers less two shots (reserved for -myself in case of a show down). The balance of our men must have fired -as many shots as I did. The soldier that was in the box with me had a -needle gun and a Spencer; also one or two revolvers. And he kept them -busy while he lived. This man was an infantry soldier—do not remember -his company. He was shot through the head, dying in about two hours -after being shot. - -Lieutenant Jenness had just cautioned me not to expose my person, and to -hold my fire until I was sure of getting an Indian at each shot. He had -moved a few feet from my box when he was shot through the head. I think -he died instantly. He was a grand, good man, and a fearless officer. I -told him to keep under cover. He stated he was compelled to expose -himself in order to look after his men. - -I got a slight wound in my left hand; a bullet came in through my -porthole, which I thought was close shooting for a Sioux. - -This fight lasted about four hours, and was very hot from the start. I -had been in several Indian fights prior to this time, but never saw the -Indians make such a determined effort to clean us up before. They should -have killed the entire party. They certainly had force enough to ride -over us, but our fire was so steady and severe that they could not stand -the punishment. - -Our men stood the strain well, held their fire until the bullets would -count. In fact, shooting into such a mass of Indians as charged on us -the first time, it would be nearly impossible for many bullets to go -astray. In all my experience in fighting Indians prior to this time, I -never saw them stand punishment so well as they did at this time; they -certainly brought all their sand with them. In charging on our little -corral they rode up very close to the wagon boxes, and here is where -they failed. Had they pushed home on the first charge, the fight would -not have lasted ten minutes after they got over the corral. - -Many dead and wounded Indians lay within a few feet of the wagon boxes. -The wounded Indians did not live long after the charge was over. They -would watch and try to get a bullet in on some of our men. We had to -kill them for self-protection. Anyway, it was evening up the Fetterman -deal. They never showed mercy to a wounded white man, and should not -expect any different treatment. I had a canteen of water when the fight -commenced, and used most of it to cool my guns. - -You state that all of our loss occurred at time of the first charge. -This is an error, as the man in my box was shot after he had been -fighting nearly an hour. I think that his name was Boyle. Up to the time -that he was shot he certainly filled the bill and did his duty, dying -with his face to the foe as a soldier should. - -I do not try to estimate the number of the Indians, but, as my partner -said, “The woods were full of them.” This was the largest gathering of -Indians that I ever saw, and the hardest fighting lot that I ever -encountered. - -When the reinforcements came in sight we took on a new lease of life, -and when they dropped a shell over the Indians we knew that the fight -was won. Indians will not stand artillery fire. They call it the “wagon -gun.” The reinforcements came just in time. One hour more of such -fighting would have exhausted our men and ammunition. - -As to the Indians carrying off all their dead and wounded, here you are -again mistaken, as many of our men carried away with them scalps, etc., -taken from the bodies of the dead Indians near the corral.[27] The -Indians certainly hauled off all their dead and wounded that they could, -but did not expose themselves very much in order to get the dead ones -near the corral. - -On arrival of reinforcements we immediately retreated to the fort. -Captain Powell was the right man to command under such trying -circumstances. No better or braver man ever held a lieutenant’s -commission than Jenness. As to the Indian loss, I think you have -overestimated it. We thought that we had killed and wounded some more -than four hundred. However, you may be right in your estimates. We had -the opportunity to clean up that number, and we certainly did our best -to do so. - -After the massacre of ’66 (Dec.) we received reinforcements, as I now -remember, four companies of infantry and two companies, L and M, of the -2d Cav. This large additional force, stationed at a four-company fort, -and only provisioned for four companies, caused a great deal of -suffering during the winter, resulting in much sickness and many deaths -from scurvy. Nearly all of us were suffering from this disease. I have -never fully recovered from the effect of it. - -Colonel Carrington was severely censured by the War Department and many -others for the Fort Phil Kearney massacre, and, I think, unjustly. Had -Col. Fetterman and Capt. Brown and the other officers in command obeyed -his orders, the massacre would not have occurred, not, at least, at this -time. - -Fetterman and Brown were dare-devil fighters, always anxious for a -fight, and took this opportunity to get into one. Capt. Brown, on his -“calico” pony, was a familiar figure around this fort—the boys called -him “Baldy.” The Indians were very anxious to kill Brown; he was a thorn -in their sides. While we to some extent lay the blame of the massacre on -Brown and Fetterman, to be honest, we were nearly all partly to blame. -We were always harping at the colonel to send a large force out and -fight the Indians, but he always insisted on a conservative course. We -all thought up to that time that one hundred good men could walk through -the entire Sioux Nation. This massacre demonstrated that in a fight in -the open the Sioux should not have over five to one of us. - -I was well posted in regard to the Carrington Powder River Expedition of -1866 and the history of Fort Phil Kearney from the date of establishment -to Nov., 1867, and acquainted with all of the officers and many of the -soldiers and citizens. I probably would not have written this little -statement of actual history were it not for the fact that in your -article you stated that you got some of the record from the only living -member of the celebrated wagon-box fight. I am still in the flesh and -will pull down the scale at two hundred pounds. In all probability there -are others alive, as we all were young men at that time. - -The history of the three forts established in 1865 and 1866, well -written, would make interesting history, as almost every day was full of -stirring events. Quite a number of the citizens in that country at this -time were discharged volunteer soldiers and some rebel soldiers also. As -a rule, they were hard nuts for the Indians to crack. It was noticeable -that they would not take chances fighting citizens that they would take -with the soldiers. - -After leaving Fort Phil Kearney I went to Cheyenne and followed the -Union Pacific R. R. to the finish. Was at Promontory Point in Utah when -the Union Pacific and Central Pacific R. Rs. connected; this was one of -the mile-stones in the history of the West, and practically solved the -Indian problem. The Indians fought hard for this territory. It was the -best hunting ground that they had left. There were many half-breeds -among them, and they were daring and shifty fighters. - - Respectfully yours, - R. J. SMYTH” - ------ - -Footnote 24: - - The serial publication of these articles brought me many letters - filled with corrections, suggestions, and other material, written by - participants in the events described. Among them all none is more - graphic and more interesting than this from Mr. Smyth, formerly - Teamster with Carrington, which I count it a privilege to insert in - this book in his own words.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 25: - - I have observed similar visitations in other parts of the West years - ago.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 26: - - General Carrington’s map on page 27 shows the island. Mr. Smyth’s - recollection is in error here.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 27: - - Surgeon Horton writes me that the “soldiers brought back to the fort - the head of an Indian for a scientific study of Indian skulls!” He - afterwards sent it to Washington. He also states that there were a - number of dead bodies too near the corral for the Indians to get them - during the action. When he and other officers visited the place the - next day, after the withdrawal of the Indians, there were no dead - bodies to be found, not even the headless one.—C. T. B. - - - - - CHAPTER FIVE - Forsyth and the Rough Riders of ’68 - - - I. The Original “Rough Riders.” - -No one will question the sweeping assertion that the grittiest band of -American fighters that history tells us of was that which defended the -Alamo. They surpassed by one Leonidas and his Spartans; for the Greeks -had a messenger of defeat, the men of the Alamo had none. But close on -the heels of the gallant Travis and his dauntless comrades came “Sandy” -Forsyth’s original “Rough Riders,” who immortalized themselves by their -terrific fight on Beecher’s Island on the Arickaree Fork of the -Republican River, in Eastern Colorado, in the fall of 1868. - -The contagion of the successful Indian attacks on Fort Phil Kearney had -spread all over the Central West. The Kansas Pacific was then building -to Denver, and its advance was furiously resisted by the Indians. As -early as 1866, at a council held at Fort Ellsworth, Roman Nose, head -chief of the Cheyennes, made a speech full of insolent defiance. - -[Illustration] - - CAPT. LOUIS H. CARPENTER LIEUT. FREDK. H. BEECHER[29] - MAJ. GEORGE A. FORSYTH SCOUT JACK STILLWELL - - BEECHER’S ISLAND FIGHTERS - - _All contemporary portraits except Stillwell’s_ - -“This is the first time,” said the gigantic warrior, who was six feet -three and magnificently proportioned,[28] “that I have ever shaken the -white man’s hand in friendship. If the railway is continued I shall be -his enemy forever.” - -There was no stopping the railway. Its progress was as irresistible as -the movement of civilization itself. The Indians went on the war-path. -The Cheyennes were led by their two principal chiefs, Black Kettle being -the second. We shall see subsequently how Custer accounted for Black -Kettle. This story deals with the adventures of Roman Nose. - -As fighters these Indians are entitled to every admiration. As marauders -they merit nothing but censure. The Indians of the early days of the -nation, when Pennsylvania and New York were border states, and across -the Alleghenies lay the frontier, were cruel enough, as the chronicle of -the times abundantly testify; but they were angels of light compared -with the Sioux and Cheyennes, the Kiowas, Arapahoes and Comanches, and -these in turn were almost admirable beside the Apache. The first-named -group were as cruel as they knew how to be, and they did not lack -knowledge, either. The Apaches were more ingenious and devilish in their -practices than the others. The Sioux and the Cheyennes were brutal with -the brutality of a wild bull or a grizzly bear. To that same kind of -brutality the Apaches added the malignity of a wildcat and the subtlety -of a snake. The men of the first group would stand out and fight in the -open to gain their ends, although they did not prefer to. They were -soldiers and warriors as well as torturers. The Apache was a lurking -skulker, but, when cornered, a magnificent fighter also.[30] General -Crook calls him “the tiger of the human species.” However, from the -point of detestableness there wasn’t much to choose between them. - -Perhaps we ought not to blame the Indians for acting just as our -ancestors of, say the Stone Age, acted in all probability. And when you -put modern weapons and modern whisky in the hands of the Stone Age men -you need not be surprised at the consequences. The Indian question is a -terrible one any way you take it. It cannot be denied they have been -treated abominably by the United States, and that they have good cause -for resentment; but the situation has been so peculiar that strife has -been inevitable. - -As patriots defending their country, they are not without certain -definite claims to our respect. Recognizing the right of the aborigines -to the soil, the government has yet arbitrarily abrogated that right at -pleasure. At times the Indians have been regarded as independent -nations, with which all differences were to be settled by treaty as -between equals; and again, as a body of subjects whose affairs could be -and would be administered willy-nilly by the United States. Such -vacillations are certain to result in trouble, especially as, needless -to say, the Indians invariably considered themselves as much independent -nations as England and France might consider themselves, in dealing with -the United States or with one another. And the Indians naturally claimed -and insisted that the territory where their fathers had roamed for -centuries belonged solely and wholly to them. They admitted no -suzerainty of any sort, either. And they held the petty force the -government put in the field in supreme contempt until they learned by -bitter experience the illimitable power of the United States. - -To settle such a growing question in a word, offhand, as it were, is, of -course, impossible, nor does the settlement lie within the province of -these articles; but it may be said that if the United States had -definitely decided upon one policy or the other, and had then -concentrated all its strength upon the problem; if it had realized the -character of the people with whom it was dealing, and had made such -display of its force as would have rendered it apparent, to the keenest -as well as to the most stupid and besotted of the Indians, that -resistance was entirely futile, things might have been different. But it -is the solemn truth that never, in any of the Indian wars west of the -Missouri, has there been a force of soldiers in the field adequate to -deal with the question. The blood of thousands of soldiers and -settlers—men, women, and children—might have been spared had this fact -been realized and acted upon. - -The Cheyennes swept through western Kansas like a devastating storm. In -one month they cut off, killed, or captured eighty-four different -settlers, including their wives and children. They swept the country -bare. Again and again the different gangs of builders were wiped out, -but the railroad went on. General Sheridan finally took the field in -person, as usual with an inadequate force at his disposal. One of his -aides-de-camp was a young cavalry officer named George Alexander -Forsyth, commonly known to his friends as “Sandy” Forsyth. He had -entered the volunteer army in 1861 as a private of dragoons in a Chicago -company. A mere boy, he had come out a brigadier-general. In the -permanent establishment he was a major in the Ninth Cavalry. Sheridan -knew him. He was one of the two officers who made that magnificent ride -with the great commander that saved the day at Winchester, and it was -due to his suggestion that Sheridan rode down the readjusted lines -before they made the return advance which decided the fate of the -battle. During all that mad gallop and hard fighting young Forsyth rode -with the General. To-day he is the only survivor of that ride. - -Forsyth was a fighter all through, and he wanted to get into the field -in command of some of the troops operating directly on the Indians in -the campaign under consideration. No officer was willing to surrender -his command to Forsyth on the eve of active operations, and there was no -way, apparently, by which he could do anything until Sheridan acceded to -his importunities by authorizing him to raise a company of scouts for -the campaign. He was directed, if he could do so, to enlist fifty men, -who, as there was no provision for the employment of scouts or civilian -auxiliaries, were of necessity carried on the payrolls as -quartermasters’ employees for the magnificent sum of one dollar per day. -They were to provide their own horses, but were allowed thirty cents a -day for the use of them, and the horses were to be paid for by the -government if they were “expended” during the campaign. They were -equipped with saddle, bridle, haversack, canteen, blanket, knife, tin -cup, Spencer repeating rifle, good for seven shots without reloading, -six in the magazine, one in the barrel, and a heavy Colt’s army -revolver. There were no tents or other similar conveniences, and four -mules constituted the baggage train. The force was intended to be -strictly mobile, and it was. Each man carried on his person one hundred -and forty rounds of ammunition for his rifle and thirty rounds for his -revolver. The four mules carried the medical supplies and four thousand -rounds of extra ammunition. Each officer and man took seven days’ -rations. What he could not carry on his person was loaded on the pack -mules; scanty rations they were, too. - -As soon as it was known that the troop was to be organized, Forsyth was -overwhelmed with applications from men who wished to join it. He had the -pick of the frontier to select from. He chose thirty men at Fort Harker -and the remaining twenty from Fort Hayes. Undoubtedly they were the best -men in the West for the purpose. To assist him, Lieutenant Frederick H. -Beecher, of the Third Infantry, was detailed as second in command. -Beecher was a young officer with a record. He had displayed peculiar -heroism at the great battle of Gettysburg, where he had been so badly -wounded that he was lame for the balance of his life. He was a nephew of -the great Henry Ward Beecher and a worthy representative of the -distinguished family whose name he bore. The surgeon of the party was -Dr. John H. Mooers, a highly-trained physician, who had come to the West -in a spirit of restless adventure. He had settled at Hayes City and was -familiar with the frontier. The guide of the party was Sharp Grover, one -of the remarkable plainsmen of the time, regarded as the best scout in -the government service. The first-sergeant was W. H. H. McCall, formerly -brigadier-general, United States Volunteers. McCall, in command of a -Pennsylvania regiment, had been promoted for conspicuous gallantry on -the field, when John B. Gordon made his magnificent dash out of -Petersburg and attacked Fort Steadman. - -The personnel of the troop was about equally divided between hunters and -trappers and veterans of the Civil War, nearly all of whom had held -commissions in either the Union or Confederate Army, for the command -included men from both sides of Mason and Dixon’s line. It was a -hard-bitten, unruly group of fighters. Forsyth was just the man for -them. While he did not attempt to enforce the discipline of the Regular -Army, he kept them regularly in hand. He took just five days to get his -men and start on the march. They left Fort Wallace, the temporary -terminus of the Kansas Pacific Railroad, in response to a telegram from -Sheridan that the Indians were in force in the vicinity, and scouted the -country for some six days, finally striking the Indian trail, which grew -larger and better defined as they pursued it. Although it was evident -that the Indians they were chasing greatly outnumbered them, they had -come out for a fight and wanted one, so they pressed on. They got one, -too.[31] - - - II. The Island of Death - -On the evening of the fifteenth of September, hot on the trail, now like -a well-beaten road, they rode through a depression or a ravine, which -gave entrance into a valley some two miles wide and about the same -length. Through this valley ran a little river, the Arickaree. They -encamped on the south bank of the river about four o’clock in the -afternoon. The horses and men were weary with hard riding. Grazing was -good. They were within striking distance of the Indians now. Forsyth -believed there were too many of them to run away from such a small body -as his troop of scouts. He was right. The Indians had retreated as far -as they intended to. - -[Illustration: - - MAP OF FORSYTH’S DEFENSE OF BEECHER’S ISLAND, ARIKAREE RIVER, COLORADO - - (_Drawn by the author from rough sketches and maps furnished by - General Forsyth_) - - Explanation of Map: A. Forsyth’s camp before attack. B. Rifle-pits on - island. C. Low, unoccupied land on island with solitary cottonwood - at end. D. Indian charge led by Roman Nose and Medicine Man. EE. Low - banks fringed with trees. FF. Dry sandy bed of the river. HH. Indian - riflemen on the banks. KK. Indian women and children on bluffs, half - a mile from river. L. Ground sloping gently to river. M. Level - grassy plain to bluffs. -] - -The river bed, which was bordered by wild plums, willows and alders, ran -through the middle of the valley. The bed of the river was about one -hundred and forty yards wide. In the middle of it was an island about -twenty yards wide and sixty yards long. The gravelly upper end of the -island, which rose about two feet above the water level, was covered -with a thick growth of stunted bushes, principally alders and willows; -at the lower end, which sloped to the water’s edge, there rose a -solitary cottonwood tree. There had been little rain for some time, and -this river bed for the greater part of its width was dry and hard.[32] -For a space of four or five yards on either side of the island there was -water, not over a foot deep, languidly washing the gravelled shores. -When the river bed was full the island probably was overflowed. Such -islands form from time to time, and are washed away as quickly as they -develop. The banks of the river bed on either side commanded the island. - -The simple preparations for the camp of that body of men were soon made. -As night fell they rolled themselves in their blankets, with the -exception of the sentries, and went to sleep with the careless -indifference of veterans under such circumstances. - -[Illustration: - - BEECHER’S ISLAND FIELD - - The battle took place just about where the cattle are standing in the - river. The shifting current has obliterated the Island. -] - -Forsyth, however, as became a captain, was not so careless or so -reckless as his men. They were alone in the heart of the Indian country, -in close proximity to an overwhelming force, and liable to attack at any -moment. He knew that their movements had been observed by the Indians -during the past few days. Therefore the young commander was on the alert -throughout the night, visiting the outposts from time to time to see -that careful watch was kept. - -Just as the first streaks of dawn began to “lace the severing clouds,” -he happened to be standing by the sentry farthest from the camp. -Silhouetted against the sky-line they saw the feathered head of an -Indian. For Forsyth to fire at him was the work of an instant. At the -same time a party which had crept nearer to the picket line unobserved -dashed boldly at the horses, and resorting to the usual devices with -bells, horns, hideous yells, and waving buffalo robes, attempted to -stampede the herd. - -Men like those scouts under such circumstances slept with their boots -on. The first shot called them into instant action. They ran -instinctively to the picket line. A sharp fire, and the Indians were -driven off at once. Only the pack mules got away. No pursuit was -attempted, of course. Orders were given for the men to saddle their -horses and stand by them. In a few moments the command was drawn up in -line, each man standing by his horse’s head, bridle reins through his -left arm, his rifle grasped in his right hand—ready! Scarcely had the -company been thus assembled when Grover caught Forsyth’s arm and pointed -down the valley. - -“My God!” he cried, “look at the Injuns!” - -In front of them, on the right of them, in the rear of them, the hills -and valleys on both sides of the river seemed suddenly to be alive with -Indians. It was as quick a transformation from a scene of peaceful quiet -to a valley filled with an armed force as the whistle of Roderick Dhu -had effected in the Scottish glen. - -The way to the left, by which they had entered the valley, was still -open. Forsyth could have made a running fight for it and dashed for the -gorge through which he had entered the valley. There were, apparently, -no Indians barring the way in that direction. But Forsyth realized -instantly that for him to retreat would mean the destruction of his -command, that the Indians had in all probability purposely left him that -way of escape, and if he tried it he would be ambushed in the defile and -slain. That was just what they wanted him to do, it was evident. That -was why he did not attempt it. He was cornered, but he was not beaten, -and he did not think he could be. Besides, he had come for that fight, -and that fight he was bound to have. - -Whatever he was to do he must do quickly. There was no place to which he -could go save the island. That was not much of a place at best, but it -was the one strategic point presented by the situation. Pouring a heavy -fire into the Indians, Forsyth directed his men to take possession of -the island under cover of the smoke. In the movement everything had to -be abandoned, including the medical stores and rations, but the precious -ammunition—that must be secured at all hazards. Protected by a squad of -expert riflemen on the river bank, who presently joined them, the scouts -reached the island in safety, tied their horses to the bushes around the -edge of it, and in the intervals of fighting set to work digging -rifle-pits covering an ellipse twenty by forty yards, one pit for each -man, with which to defend the upper and higher part of the island They -had nothing to dig with except tin cups, tin plates, and their bowie -knives, but they dug like men. There was no lingering or hesitation -about it. - -The chief of the Indian force, which was made up of Northern Cheyennes, -Oglala and Brulé Sioux, with a few Arapahoes and a number of Dog -Soldiers, was the famous Roman Nose, an enemy to be feared indeed. He -was filled with disgust and indignation at the failure of his men to -occupy the island, the strategic importance of which he at once -detected. It is believed that orders to seize the island had been given, -but for some reason they had not been obeyed; and to this oversight or -failure was due the ultimate safety of Forsyth’s men. It was not safe to -neglect the smallest point in fighting with a soldier like Forsyth. - -With more military skill than they had ever displayed before, the -Indians deliberately made preparations for battle. The force at the -disposal of Roman Nose was something less than one thousand warriors. -They were accompanied by their squaws and children. The latter took -position on the bluffs on the east bank of the river, just out of range, -where they could see the whole affair. Like the ladies of the ancient -tournaments, they were eager to witness the fighting and welcome the -victors, who, for they never doubted the outcome, were certain to be -their own. - -Roman Nose next lined the banks of the river on both sides with -dismounted riflemen, skilfully using such concealment as the ground -afforded. The banks were slightly higher than the island, and the -Indians had a plunging fire upon the little party. The riflemen on the -banks opened fire at once. A storm of bullets was poured upon the -devoted band on the island. The scouts, husbanding their ammunition, -slowly and deliberately replied, endeavoring, with signal success, to -make every shot tell. As one man said, they reckoned “every ca’tridge -was wuth at least one Injun.” The horses of the troop, having no -protection, received the brunt of the first fire. They fell rapidly, and -their carcasses rising in front of the rifle-pits afforded added -protection to the soldiers. There must have been a renegade white man -among the savages, for in a lull of the firing the men on the island -heard a voice announce in perfect English, “There goes the last of their -horses, anyway.” Besides this, from time to time, the notes of an -artillery bugle were heard from the shore. The casualties had not been -serious while the horses stood, but as soon as they were all down the -men began to suffer.[33] - -During this time Forsyth had been walking about in the little circle of -defenders encouraging his men. He was met on all sides with insistent -demands that he lie down and take cover, and, the firing becoming -hotter, he at last complied. The rifle-pit which Surgeon Mooers had made -was a little wider than that of the other men, and as it was a good -place from which to direct the fighting, at the doctor’s suggestion some -of the scouts scooped it out to make it a little larger, and Forsyth lay -down by him. - -The fire of the Indians had been increasing. Several scouts were killed, -more mortally wounded, and some slightly wounded. Doctor Mooers was hit -in the forehead and mortally wounded. He lingered for three days, saying -but one intelligent word during the whole period. Although he was blind -and speechless, his motions sometimes indicated that he knew where he -was. He would frequently reach out his foot and touch Forsyth. A bullet -struck Forsyth in the right thigh, and glancing upwards bedded itself in -the flesh, causing excruciating pain. He suffered exquisite anguish, but -his present sufferings were just beginning, for a second bullet struck -him in the leg, between the knee and ankle, and smashed the bone, and a -third glanced across his forehead, slightly fracturing his skull and -giving him a splitting headache, although he had no time to attend to it -then. - - - III. The Charge of the Five Hundred - -During all this time Roman Nose and his horsemen had withdrawn around -the bend up the river, which screened them from the island. At this -juncture they appeared in full force, trotting up the bed of the river -in open order in eight ranks of about sixty front. Ahead of them, on a -magnificent chestnut horse, trotted Roman Nose. The warriors were -hideously painted, and all were naked except for moccasins and cartridge -belts. Eagle feathers were stuck in their long hair, and many of them -wore gorgeous feather war bonnets. They sat their horses without saddles -or stirrups, some of them having lariats twisted around the horses’ -bellies like a surcingle. Roman Nose wore a magnificent war bonnet of -feathers streaming behind him in the wind and surmounted by two -buffalo-horns; around his waist he had tied an officer’s brilliant -scarlet silk sash, which had been presented to him at the Fort Ellsworth -conference. The sunlight illumined the bronze body of the savage -Hercules, exhibiting the magnificent proportions of the man. Those who -followed him were in every way worthy of their leader. - -As the Indian cavalry appeared around the bend to the music of that -bugle, the fire upon the island from the banks redoubled in intensity. -Forsyth instantly divined that Roman Nose was about to attempt to ride -him down. He also realized that, so soon as the horses were upon him, -the rifle fire from the bank would of necessity be stopped. His order to -his men was to cease firing, therefore; to load the magazines of their -rifles, charge their revolvers, and wait until he gave the order to -fire. The rifles of the dead and those of the party too severely wounded -to use them were distributed among those scouts yet unharmed. Some of -the wounded insisted upon fighting. Forsyth propped himself up in his -rifle-pit, his back and shoulders resting against the pile of earth, his -rifle and revolver in hand. He could see his own men, and also the -Indians coming up the river. - -Presently, shouting their war songs, at a wild pealed whoop from their -chief, the Indian horsemen broke into a gallop, Roman Nose leading the -advance, shaking his heavy Spencer rifle—captured, possibly, from -Fetterman’s men—in the air as if it had been a reed. There was a last -burst of rifle fire from the banks, and the rattle of musketry was -displaced by the war songs of the Indians and the yells of the squaws -and children on the slopes of the hills. As the smoke drifted away on -that sunny September morning, they saw the Indians almost upon them. In -spite of his terrible wounds the heroic Forsyth was thoroughly in -command. Waiting until the tactical moment when the Indians were but -fifty yards away and coming at a terrific speed, he raised himself on -his hands to a sitting position and cried, “Now!” - -[Illustration: - - _Copyright, 1900, by Charles Schreyvogel_ - - ROMAN NOSE LEADING THE CHARGE AGAINST FORSYTH’S DEVOTED BAND - - _Drawing by Charles Schreyvogel_ -] - -The men rose to their knees, brought their guns to their shoulders, and -poured a volley right into the face of the furious advance. An instant -later, with another cartridge in the barrel they delivered a second -volley. Horses and men went down in every direction; but, like the -magnificent warriors they were, the Indians closed up and came sweeping -down. The third volley was poured into them. Still they came. The war -songs had ceased by this time, but in undaunted spirit, still pealing -his war cry above the crashing of the bullets, at the head of his band, -with his magnificent determination unshaken, Roman Nose led such a ride -as no Indian ever attempted before or since. And still those quiet, cool -men continued to pump bullets into the horde. At the fourth volley the -medicine man on the left of the line and the second in command went -down. The Indians hesitated at this reverse, but swinging his rifle high -in the air in battle frenzy, the great war chief rallied them, and they -once more advanced. The fifth volley staggered them still more. Great -gaps were opened in their ranks. Horses and men fell dead, but the -impetus was so great, and the courage and example of their leader so -splendid, that the survivors came on unchecked. The sixth volley did the -work. Just as he was about to leap on the island, Roman Nose and his -horse were both shot to pieces. The force of the charge, however, was so -great that the line was not yet entirely broken. The horsemen were -within a few feet of the scouts, when the seventh volley was poured into -their very faces. As a gigantic wave meets a sharply jutting rock and is -parted, falling harmlessly on either side of it, so was that charge -divided, the Indians swinging themselves to the sides of their horses as -they swept down the length of the island. - -The scouts sprang to their feet at this juncture, and almost at contact -range jammed their revolver shots at the disorganized masses. The -Indians fled precipitately to the banks on either side, and the yelling -of the war chants of the squaws and children changed into wails of -anguish and despair, as they marked the death of Roman Nose and the -horrible slaughter of his followers. - -It was a most magnificent charge, and one which for splendid daring and -reckless heroism would have done credit to the best troops of any nation -in the world. And magnificently had it been met. Powell’s defense of the -corral on Piney Island was a remarkable achievement, but it was not to -be compared to the fighting of these scouts on the little open, -unprotected heap of sand and gravel in the Arickaree. - -As soon as the Indian horsemen withdrew, baffled and furious, a rifle -fire opened once more from the banks. Lieutenant Beecher, who had -heroically performed his part in the defense, crawled over to Forsyth -and said: - -“I have my death wound, General. I am shot in the side and dying.” - -He said the words quietly and simply, as if his communication was -utterly commonplace, then stretched himself out by his wounded -commander, lying, like Steerforth, with his face upon his arm. - -“No, Beecher, no,” said Forsyth, out of his own anguish; “it can not be -as bad as that.” - -“Yes,” said the young officer, “good-night.” - -There was nothing to be done for him. Forsyth heard him whisper a word -or two of his mother, and then delirium supervened. By evening he was -dead. In memory of the brave young officer, they called the place where -he had died Beecher’s Island. - -At two o’clock in the afternoon a second charge of horse was assayed in -much the same way as the first had been delivered; but there was no -longer a great war chief in command, and this time the Indians broke at -one hundred yards from the island. At six o’clock at night they made a -final attempt. The whole party, horse and foot, in a solid mass rushed -from all sides upon the island. They came forward, yelling and firing, -but they were met with so severe a fire from the rifle-pits that, -although some of them actually reached the foot of the island, they -could not maintain their position, and were driven back with frightful -loss. The men on the island deliberately picked off Indian after Indian -as they came, so that the dry river bed ran with blood. The place was a -very hell to the Indians. They withdrew at last, baffled, crushed, -beaten. - -With nightfall the men on the island could take account of the -situation. Two officers and four men were dead or dying, one officer and -eight men were so severely wounded that their condition was critical. -Eight men were less severely wounded, making twenty-three casualties out -of fifty-one officers and men.[34] There were no rations, but thank God -there was an abundance of water. They could get it easily by digging in -the sandy surface of the island. They could subsist, if necessary, on -strips of meat cut from the bodies of the horses. The most serious lack -was of medical attention. The doctor lying unconscious, the wounded were -forced to get along with the unskilled care of their comrades, and with -water, and rags torn from clothing for dressings. Little could be done -for them. The day had been frightfully hot, but, fortunately, a heavy -rain fell in the night, which somewhat refreshed them. The rifle-pits -were deepened and made continuous by piling saddles and equipments, and -by further digging in the interspaces. - -One of the curious Indian superstitions, which has often served the -white man against whom he has fought to good purpose, is that when a man -is killed in the dark he must pass all eternity in darkness. -Consequently, he rarely ever attacks at night. Forsyth’s party felt -reasonably secure from any further attack, therefore, notwithstanding -which they kept watch. - - - IV. The Siege of the Island - -As soon as darkness settled down volunteers were called for to carry the -news of their predicament to Fort Wallace, one hundred miles away. Every -man able to travel offered himself for the perilous journey. Forsyth -selected Trudeau and Stillwell. Trudeau was a veteran hunter, Stillwell -a youngster only nineteen years of age, although he already gave promise -of the fame as a scout which he afterwards acquired. To them he gave the -only map he possessed. They were to ask the commander of Fort Wallace to -come to his assistance. As soon as the two brave scouts had left, every -one realized that a long wait would be entailed upon the little band, -if, indeed, it was not overwhelmed meanwhile, before any relieving force -could reach the island. And there were grave doubts as to whether, in -any event, Trudeau and Stillwell could get through the Indians. It was -not a pleasant night they spent, therefore, although they were busy -strengthening the defenses, and nobody got any sleep. - -Early the next morning the Indians again made their appearance. They had -hoped that Forsyth and his men would have endeavored to retreat during -the night, in which event they would have followed the trail and -speedily annihilated the whole command. But Forsyth was too good a -soldier to leave the position he had chosen. During the fighting of the -day before he had asked Grover his opinion as to whether the Indians -could deliver any more formidable attack than the one which had resulted -in the death of Roman Nose, and Grover, who had had large experience, -assured him that they had done the best they could, and indeed better -than he or any other scout had ever seen or heard of in any Indian -warfare. Forsyth was satisfied, therefore, that they could maintain the -position, at least until they starved. - -The Indians were quickly apprised, by a volley which killed at least one -man, that the defenders of the island were still there. The place was -closely invested, and although the Indians made several attempts to -approach it under a white flag, they were forced back by the accurate -fire of the scouts, and compelled to keep their distance. It was very -hot. The sufferings of the wounded were something frightful. The Indians -were having troubles of their own, too. All night and all day the -defenders could hear the beating of the tom-toms or drums and the -mournful death songs and wails of the women over the bodies of the -slain, all but three of whom had been removed during the night.[35] -These three were lying so near the rifle-pits that the Indians did not -dare to approach near enough to get them. The three dead men had -actually gained the shore of the island before they had been killed. - -The command on the island had plenty to eat, such as it was. There was -horse and mule meat in abundance. They ate it raw, when they got hungry -enough. Water was plentiful. All they had to do was to dig the -rifle-pits a little deeper, and it came forth in great quantities. It -was weary waiting, but there was nothing else to do. They dared not -relax their vigilance a moment. The next night, the second, Forsyth -despatched two more scouts, fearing the first two might not have got -through, thus seeking to “make assurance double sure.” This pair was not -so successful as the first. They came back about three o’clock in the -morning, having been unable to pass the Indians, for every outlet was -heavily guarded. - -The third day the Indian women and children were observed withdrawing -from the vicinity. This cheered the men greatly, as it was a sign that -the Indians intended to abandon the siege. The warriors still remained, -however, and any incautious exposure was a signal for a volley. That -night two more men were despatched with an urgent appeal, and these two -succeeded in getting through. They bore this message: - - “Sept. 19, 1868. - - To COLONEL BANKHEAD, or Commanding Officer, - Fort Wallace: - - I sent you two messengers on the night of the 17th inst., informing - you of my critical condition. I tried to send two more last night, - but they did not succeed in passing the Indian pickets, and - returned. If the others have not arrived, then hasten at once to my - assistance. I have eight badly wounded and ten slightly wounded men - to take in.... Lieutenant Beecher is dead, and Acting Assistant - Surgeon Mooers probably cannot live the night out. He was hit in the - head Thursday, and has spoken but one rational word since. I am - wounded in two places—in the right thigh, and my left leg is broken - below the knee.... - - I am on a little island, and have still plenty of ammunition left. - We are living on mule and horse meat, and are entirely out of - rations. If it was not for so many wounded, I would come in, and - take the chances of whipping them if attacked. They are evidently - sick of their bargain.... I can hold out for six days longer if - absolutely necessary, but please lose no time. - - P.S.—My surgeon having been mortally wounded, none of my wounded - have had their wounds dressed yet, so please bring out a surgeon - with you.” - -The fourth day passed like the preceding, the squaws all gone, the -Indians still watchful. The wound in Forsyth’s leg had become -excruciatingly painful, and he begged some of the men to cut out the -bullet. But they discovered that it had lodged near the femoral artery, -and fearful lest they should cut the artery and the young commander -should bleed to death, they positively refused. In desperation, Forsyth -cut it out himself. He had his razor in his saddle bags and, while two -men pressed the flesh back, he performed the operation successfully, to -his immediate relief. - -The fifth day the mule and horse meat became putrid and therefore unfit -to eat. An unlucky coyote wandered over to the island, however, and one -of the men was fortunate enough to shoot him. Small though he was, he -was a welcome addition to their larder, for he was fresh. There was but -little skirmishing on the fifth day, and the place appeared to be -deserted. Forsyth had half a dozen of his men raise him on a blanket -above the level of the rifle beds so that he might survey the scene -himself. Not all the Indians were gone, for a sudden fusillade burst out -from the bank. One of the men let go the corner of the blanket which he -held while the others were easing Forsyth down, and he fell upon his -wounded leg with so much force that the bone protruded through the -flesh. He records that he used some severe language to that scout. - -On the sixth day Forsyth assembled his men about him, and told them that -those who were well enough to leave the island would better do so and -make for Fort Wallace; that it was more than possible that none of the -messengers had succeeded in getting through; that the men had stood by -him heroically, and that they would all starve to death where they were -unless relief should come; and that they were entitled to a chance for -their lives. He believed the Indians, who had at last disappeared, had -received such a severe lesson that they would not attack again, and that -if the men were circumspect they could get through to Fort Wallace in -safety. The wounded, including himself, must be left to take care of -themselves and take the chances of escape from the island. - -The proposition was received in surprised silence for a few moments, and -then there was a simultaneous shout of refusal from every man: “Never! -We’ll stand by you.” McCall, the first sergeant and Forsyth’s right-hand -man since Beecher had been killed, shouted out emphatically: “We’ve -fought together, and, by Heaven, if need be, we’ll die together.” - -They could not carry the wounded; they would not abandon them. Remember -these men were not regular soldiers. They were simply a company of -scouts, more or less loosely bound together, but, as McCall had pointed -out, they were tied to one another by something stronger than -discipline. Not a man left the island, although it would have been easy -for the unwounded to do so, and possibly they might have escaped in -safety. - -For two more days they stood it out. There was no fighting during this -time, but the presence of an Indian vedette indicated that they were -under observation. They gathered some wild plums and made some jelly for -the wounded; but no game came their way, and there was little for them -to do but draw in their belts a little tighter and go hungry, or, -better, go hungrier. On the morning of the ninth day, one of the men on -watch suddenly sprang to his feet, shouting: - -“There are moving men on the hills.” Everybody who could stand was up in -an instant, and Grover, the keen-eyed scout, shouted triumphantly: - -“By the God above us, there’s an ambulance!” They were rescued at last. - - * * * * * - -NOTE.—The serial publication of this article called forth another -version of this affair, differing from it in some non-essential -features, which was written by Mr. Herbert Myrick, and published -serially. Mr. Myrick accounts for the “mysterious voice” which the -scouts heard saying in English, “There goes the last of their horses -anyway,” by disclosing the interesting fact that there were two renegade -white men among the Indians. One of them was called “Nibsi” or “Black -Jack,” a notorious desperado, who was afterwards hung for murder. The -other was Jack Clybor, once a trooper of the Seventh Cavalry. Having -been shot and left for dead in an engagement, the Indians captured him, -nursed him back to life, adopted him, and named him “Comanche.” He was a -singular compound of good and evil, and became as notorious for his good -deeds as for his bad acts. Mr. Myrick has been collecting a mass of -unknown and unpublished Western material for many years, which when -published will undoubtedly clear up many mysteries, throw light upon -many disputed questions, and prove of the deepest interest as well. - ------ - -Footnote 28: - - General Fry, in his valuable book, “Army Sacrifices,” now - unfortunately out of print and scarce, thus graphically describes him: - “A veritable man of war, the shock of battle and scenes of carnage and - cruelty were as of the breath of his nostrils; about thirty years of - age, standing six feet three inches high, he towered giant-like above - his companions. A grand head with strongly marked features, lighted by - a pair of fierce black eyes; a large mouth with thin lips, through - which gleamed rows of strong, white teeth; a Roman nose with dilated - nostrils like those of a thoroughbred horse, first attracted - attention, while a broad chest, with symmetrical limbs on which the - muscles under the bronze of his skin stood out like twisted wire, were - some of the points of this splendid animal. Clad in buckskin leggings - and moccasins elaborately embroidered with beads and feathers, with a - single eagle feather in his scalp-lock, and with that rarest of robes, - a white buffalo, beautifully tanned and soft as cashmere, thrown over - his naked shoulders, he stood forth, the war chief of the Cheyennes.” - -Footnote 29: - - Killed on the Island - -Footnote 30: - - Charles F. Lummis refers to the Apaches as among the most ferocious - and most successful warriors in history. - -Footnote 31: - - The reason a large body of men had not been detailed for the pursuit - was that the greater the number the slower the movement would have - been, and the Indians could and would have kept out of the way with - ease. If the Indians were laying a trap for Forsyth, he was tempting - them to stop and fight. - -Footnote 32: - - In dry seasons I have often seen Western river beds half a mile wide - absolutely devoid of water. In the wet season these same beds would be - roaring torrents from bank to bank. - -Footnote 33: - - As the Indians surrounded the island and the fire came in from all - quarters, the men had to dig the earth for protection in rear as well - as in front, and the rifle-pits were, in fact, hollows scooped out of - the ground just long enough for a man to lie in. - -Footnote 34: - - Two of the scouts had been left behind, at Fort Wallace, because of - illness. - -Footnote 35: - - The reason why an Indian will sacrifice everything to remove the body - of one of his tribe or kin who has been killed, is to prevent the - taking of his scalp. The religious belief of the Indians is that a man - who is scalped cannot enter the happy hunting grounds, but is doomed - to wander in outer darkness forever. For that reason he always scalps - his enemy, so that when he himself reaches the happy hunting grounds - he will not be bothered by a lot of enemies whom he has met and - overcome during his lifetime. Naturally, it was a point of honor for - him to get the bodies of his friends away, so that they might not be - debarred from the Indian Heaven in the hereafter. Sometimes, however, - the Indian did not scalp the body of a particularly brave man, for - this reason: It is his belief that if he kills a man in battle and - does not scalp him, that man will be his slave or servant in the happy - hunting grounds, and although the victim still possesses capacities - for mischief, the Indian sometimes risks all in the future glory that - will come to him from holding in slavery a brave man, or a noted - warrior, as a spiritual witness to his prowess. It is stated that the - Indians never scalp the bodies of negroes and suicides. “Buffalo - soldier heap bad medicine,” is their universal testimony when asked - why they do not scalp negro troopers whom they have killed or - captured. Perhaps they cannot scalp a woolly, kinky-haired black - soldier, and that is the reason it is “bad medicine.” Suicide is “bad - medicine,” too, for some unexplained reason. - - - - - CHAPTER SIX - The Journey of the Scouts and the Rescue of Forsyth - - - I. The Adventures of the Scouts - -Trudeau and Stillwell, the first pair of scouts despatched by Forsyth -with the story of his desperate situation on Beecher’s Island, left -their commander about midnight on the evening of the first day of the -attack. The Indians had withdrawn from the immediate vicinity of the -river and were resting quietly in the camps on either side, although -there were a number of warriors watching the island. The men bade a -hasty good-by to their comrades, received their captain’s final -instructions, and with beating hearts stole away on their desperate -errand. - -They neglected no precaution that experience could dictate. They even -took off their boots, tied them together by the straps, slung them -around their necks, and walked backward down the bed of the river in -their stocking feet, so that, if the Indians by any chance stumbled upon -their trail the next morning, it would appear to have been made by -moccasined feet and perhaps escape attention, especially as the tracks -would point toward the island instead of away from it. Further to -disguise themselves, they wrapped themselves in blankets, which they -endeavored to wear as the Indians did. - -They proceeded with the most fearsome caution. Such was the -circumspection with which they moved and the care necessary because of -the watchfulness of the foe, who might be heard from time to time moving -about on the banks, that by daylight they had progressed but two miles. -During most of the time after leaving the river bed they had crawled on -their hands and knees. Before sunrise they were forced to seek such -concealment as they could find in a washout, a dry ravine, within sight -and sound of the Indian camps. Providence certainly protected them, for -if any of the Indians had happened to wander in their direction there -was nothing to prevent their discovery; and if the savages had stumbled -upon their hiding-place it would have been all up with them. Death by -torture would have been inevitable if they were taken alive, and the -only way to prevent that would be suicide. They had determined upon -that. They had pledged each other to fight until the last cartridge, and -to save that for themselves. They had nothing to eat and nothing to -drink. The sun beat down upon them fiercely all the long day. After -their experience of the one before, it was a day calculated to break -down the strongest of men. They bore up under the strain, however, as -best they could, and when darkness came they started out once more. - -[Illustration: - - “SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THEIR ARRIVAL A RATTLESNAKE MADE HIS APPEARANCE” - - _Drawing by Will Crawford_ -] - -This night there was no necessity for so much caution and they made -better progress, although they saw and successfully avoided several -parties of Indians. When the day broke they were forced to conceal -themselves again. The country was covered with wandering war parties, -and it was not yet safe to travel by daylight. This day they hid -themselves under the high banks of a river. Again they were fortunate in -remaining unobserved, although several times bands of warriors passed -near them. They traveled all the third night, making great progress. -Morning found them on an open plain with no place to hide in but a -buffalo wallow—a dry alkali mud-hole which had been much frequented in -the wet season by buffalo—which afforded scanty cover at best. - -During this day a large party of scouting Indians halted within one -hundred feet of the wallow. Simultaneously with their arrival a -wandering rattlesnake made his appearance in front of the two scouts, -who were hugging the earth and expecting every minute to be discovered. -The rattlesnake in his way was as deadly as the Indians. The scouts -could have killed him easily had it not been for the proximity of the -Cheyennes. To make the slightest movement would call attention to their -hiding-place. Indeed, the sinister rattle of the venomous snake before -he struck would probably attract the notice of the alert Indians. -Between the savage reptile and the savage men the scouts were in a -frightful predicament, which young Stillwell, a lad of amazing -resourcefulness, instantly and effectually solved. He was chewing -tobacco at the time, and as the snake drew near him and made ready to -strike, he completely routed him by spitting tobacco juice in his mouth -and eyes and all over his head. The rattlesnake fled; he could not stand -such a dose. The Indians presently moved on, having noticed nothing, and -so ended perhaps the most terrible half hour the two men had ever -experienced. - -They started early on the evening of the fourth night, and this time -made remarkable progress. Toward morning, however, Trudeau all but broke -down. The brunt of the whole adventure thereupon fell on Stillwell. He -encouraged his older companion, helped him along as best he could, and -finally, late at night, they reached Fort Wallace and told their tale. -Instantly all was excitement in the post. Captain and Brevet -Lieutenant-Colonel Louis H. Carpenter, with seventy men of Troop H, of -the Tenth Cavalry (a negro regiment), with Lieutenants Banzhaf and -Orleman, Doctor Fitzgerald and seventeen scouts, with thirteen wagons -and an ambulance, had been sent out from the post the day before with -orders to make a camp on the Denver road, about sixty miles from the -fort. From there he was to scout in every direction, keep off the -Indians, and protect trains. - -At eleven o’clock at night a courier was despatched to Carpenter with -the following order: - - “Headquarters, Fort Wallace, Kansas, - September 22, 1868, 11:00 P.M. - - Brevet Lieut.-Colonel L. H. CARPENTER, 10th U. S. Cavalry. On Scout. - - Colonel: - - The Commanding Officer directs you to proceed at once to a point on - the “Dry Fork of the Republican,” about seventy-five or eighty miles - north, northwest from this point, thirty or forty miles west by a - little south from the forks of the Republic, with all possible - despatch. - - Two scouts from Colonel Forsyth’s command arrived here this evening - and bring word that he (Forsyth) was attacked on the morning of - Thursday last by an overwhelming force of Indians (700), who killed - all the animals, broke Colonel Forsyth’s left leg with a rifle ball, - severely wounding him in the groin, wounded Doctor Mooers in the - head, and wounded Lieutenant Beecher in several places. His back is - supposed to be broken. Two men of the command were killed and - eighteen or twenty wounded. - - The men bringing the word crawled on hands and knees two miles, and - then traveled only by night on account of the Indians, whom they saw - daily. - - Forsyth’s men were intrenched in the dry bed of the creek with a - well in the trench, but had only horse-flesh to eat and only sixty - rounds of ammunition. - - General Sheridan orders that the greatest despatch be used and every - means employed to succor Forsyth at once. Colonel Bradley with six - companies is now supposed by General Sheridan to be at the forks of - the Republic. - - Colonel Bankhead will leave here in one hour with one hundred men - and two mountain howitzers. - - Bring all your scouts with you. - - Order Doctor Fitzgerald at once to this post, to replace Doctor - Turner, who accompanies Colonel Bankhead for the purpose of dressing - the wounded of Forsyth’s party. - - I am, Colonel, very respectfully your obedient servant, - - HUGH JOHNSON, - Acting Post Adjutant. - - 1st Lieutenant 5th Infantry.” - -One hour afterward Bankhead himself, with one hundred men and two -howitzers and the surgeon, started for the relief of Forsyth. With -Bankhead went the undaunted Stillwell as guide. Trudeau had suffered so -much during the perilous journey that he was unable to accompany the -relief party, and he soon afterward died from the hardships and -excitement of the horrible days he had passed through. - - - II. The Rescue of Forsyth - -Carpenter had bivouacked on the evening of the 22d of September at -Cheyenne Wells, about thirty-five miles from Fort Wallace. He had broken -camp early in the morning and had marched some ten miles, when, from a -high point on a divide he had reached, which permitted a full view of -the Rocky Mountains from Pike’s to Long’s Peaks, he observed a horseman -galloping frantically toward them. He was the courier despatched by -Colonel Bankhead. Carpenter was a splendid soldier. He had received no -less than four brevets for gallantry during the Civil War. He had been -on Sheridan’s staff with Forsyth, and the two were bosom friends. No -task could have been more congenial to him than this attempt at rescue. - -He communicated the situation of their white comrades to his black -troopers, and their officers crowded close about him. The orders were -received with exultant cheers. The regiment had been raised since the -war, and had not yet had a chance to prove its mettle. There were no -veterans among them, and Carpenter and the other officers had been -obliged to build the regiment from the ground up. Now was an opportunity -to show what they could do. Carpenter had been trained to obey orders to -the letter. In this instance he determined to disobey the command -regarding Doctor Fitzgerald. It appeared to him that Bankhead had little -hope that he (Carpenter) would find Forsyth, for he had sent him no -guide; but Carpenter perceived that if he did find Forsyth—and he -intended to find him—the conditions would be such that the services of a -physician would be vitally necessary. He therefore retained the doctor. -He also retained the wagon train, having no other way of carrying -necessary supplies. For one reason, if he had detached a guard for the -train, it would have weakened his force so greatly as to have made it -inadequate to the enterprise. The mules were strong and fresh, and he -decided to keep the wagons with him. The pace was to be a fast one, and -he instructed the wagon masters that, if any of the mule teams gave out, -they should be shot and, if necessary, the wagon should be abandoned. - -[Illustration: - - Map of Marches to Relieve Colonel Forsyth and to Escort General Carr, - Drawn by General Carpenter -] - -There was no one in his command, he found, who had ever been in that -territory. Indeed, it is probable that, save Forsyth’s men, no white men -had ever penetrated that section of the country before. The map that -Carpenter had was very defective. He studied over the matter a few -moments, and then led his command toward the place where he supposed -Forsyth to be. They advanced at a fast trot, with intervals of walking, -and when they camped at night near some water holes they had covered -nearly forty-five miles. The mules, under the indefatigable and profane -stimulus of their drivers, had kept up with the rest. As soon as it was -dawn the next day they started once more, and, after a twenty-mile ride, -arrived at the dry bed of a river. - -Whether this was the fork of the Republican, on which Forsyth was -besieged, no one could tell. It happens that the Republican has three -forks—a north fork, the Arickaree, and the south or dry fork. Carpenter -was afraid to leave the fork he had found without satisfying himself -that Forsyth was not there, so he concluded to scout up the river for -some fifteen or eighteen miles. Finding nothing, he then turned -northward again until he came to a stream flowing through a wide, -grass-covered valley surrounded by high hills. As they entered the -valley they came across a very large, fresh Indian trail. The scouts -estimated that at least two thousand ponies had passed along the trail -within a few hours. Various other signs showed a large village had moved -down the trail. - -They had traveled over forty miles this second day, and were -apprehensive that the Indians, being so close to them, might attack -them. It was nearly evening. A spot well adapted for defense was chosen -near the water, the wagons were corralled, and preparations made for a -stout resistance in case of an attack. While the men were making camp, -Carpenter with a small escort rode to the top of one of the high hills -bordering the valley. He could see for miles, but discovered no Indians -nor any other living object in any direction. In front of them, however, -on the top of another hill, were a number of scaffolds, each one bearing -a human body. The Cheyenne method of burial was instantly recognized. A -nearer look developed that the scaffolds had been recently erected. Five -of them were examined, and in each case the body contained was that of a -Cheyenne warrior, who had been killed by a gunshot wound. This was proof -positive that they were some of the Indians who had been fighting -against Forsyth. - -While this was going on, one of the troopers noticed something white in -a ravine on the opposite side of the valley. They galloped over to it, -and found it to be an elaborate and beautiful tepee or wigwam, made out -of freshly tanned white buffalo skins. The colonel dismounted, opened -the tepee, and entered. There, upon a brush heap, lay a human figure -wrapped in buffalo robes. When the robes were taken away the body of a -splendid specimen of Indian manhood was disclosed. “He lay like a -warrior taking his rest, with his martial cloak around him.” His stern -and royal look, the iron majesty of his features, even though composed -in death, revealed at once a native chieftain. In his breast was a -great, gaping wound, which had pierced his heart. He lay in his -war-gear, with his weapons and other personal property close at hand. - -After the examination they recovered him and left him undisturbed. Then -they went back to the camp. The corral was watchfully guarded during the -night, but no one appeared to molest them. It was decided to follow the -Indian trail at daylight, as it would probably lead to the site of -Forsyth’s fight. Early the next morning, while they were packing up, -they saw some horsemen coming over the hills to the south of them. They -were white men, led by a scout named Donovan. Two more men had been -despatched by Forsyth from the island on the third night of the siege, -and being unobserved by the Indians, they had made their way to Fort -Wallace. When they arrived there they found that Colonel Bankhead had -already gone; whereupon Donovan had assembled five bold spirits and had -immediately started out on the return journey. Fortunately for -Carpenter, Donovan had struck the latter’s trail, and had followed it to -the camp. - -Carpenter thereupon took thirty of his best mounted troopers and the -ambulance loaded with hardtack, coffee, and bacon, and set out on a -gallop in the direction in which they supposed the island lay. Banzhaf -was left in command of the rest, with orders to come on as fast as he -could. - -Carpenter went forward at a rapid gallop, and after traveling eighteen -miles, while it was yet early in the morning, came to a spur of land -from which he had a view of the surrounding country for miles. As he -checked his horse on the brink, he saw to the right of him a valley -through which meandered a narrow silver stream. - -In the center of the valley there was an island. From it rose a solitary -cottonwood. Men could be seen moving about the place. Donovan recognized -it instantly. The horses of the detachment were put to a run, and the -whole party galloped down the valley toward the island. The scouts -swarmed across the river with cries of joy, and welcomed the soldiers. -The faithful mules dragged the ambulance close behind. There was food -for everybody. Carpenter was struck with the wolfish look on the faces -of the hungry men as they crowded around the ambulance. Later one of -them brought him a piece of mule or horse meat which was to have been -served for dinner that day, if the rescuers had not appeared. Carpenter -could not endure even the odor of it. - -Galloping across the river bed, the first to enter the rifle-pits on the -island was Carpenter. There, on the ground before him, lay Forsyth. And -what do you suppose he was doing? He was reading a novel! Some one had -found, in an empty saddle-bag, an old copy of _Oliver Twist_. Forsyth -was afraid to trust himself. He was fearful that he would break down. He -did not dare look at Carpenter or express his feelings. Therefore he -made a pretense of being absorbed in his book. - -The black cavalry had arrived in the very nick of time. Forsyth was in a -burning fever. Blood-poisoning had set in, and his wounds were in a -frightful condition. Another day and it would have been too late. -Everything was gone from him but his indomitable resolution. Many others -were in like circumstances. It was well that Carpenter had brought his -surgeon with him, for his services were sadly needed. The men were taken -off the island, moved half a mile away from the terrible stench arising -from the dead animals; the wagon train came up, camps were made, the -dead were buried on the island they had immortalized with their valor, -and everything possible done for the comfort of the living by their -negro comrades. - -The doctor wanted to amputate Forsyth’s leg, but he protested, so that -the amputation was not performed, and the leg was finally saved to its -owner. One of the scouts, named Farley, however, was so desperately -wounded that amputation had to be resorted to. The doctor performed the -operation, assisted by Carpenter. A military commander in the field has -to do a great many things. - -The next day Bankhead made his appearance with his detachment. He had -marched to the forks of the river and followed the Arickaree fork to the -place. He was accompanied by two troops of the Second Cavalry, picked up -on the way. He did not find fault with Carpenter for his disobedience in -retaining Doctor Fitzgerald. On the contrary, such was his delight at -the rescue that he fairly hugged his gallant subordinate. - -As soon as it was possible, the survivors were taken back to Fort -Wallace. Forsyth and the more severely wounded were carried in the -ambulance. It took four days to reach the fort. Their progress was one -long torture, in spite of every care that could be bestowed upon them. -There was no road, and while the drivers chose the best spots on the -prairie, there was, nevertheless, an awful amount of jolting and -bumping. - -Forsyth was brevetted a brigadier-general in the Regular Army for his -conduct in this action. This was some compensation for two years of -subsequent suffering until his wounds finally healed. - - - III. The End of Roman Nose - -On the way back the men stopped at the white tepee in the lonely valley. -Grover and McCall rode over to the spot with the officers and examined -the body of the chieftain. They instantly identified him as Roman Nose. -With a touch of sentiment unusual in frontiersmen they respected his -grave, and for the sake of his valor allowed him to sleep on -undisturbed. His arms and equipments, however, were considered -legitimate spoils of war, and were taken from him. It was a sad end, -indeed, to all his splendid courage and glorious defiance of his white -foemen. - -The loss of the Indians in the several attacks was never definitely -ascertained. They admitted to seventy-five killed outright and over two -hundred seriously wounded, but it is certain that their total losses -were much greater. The fighting was of the closest and fiercest -description, and the Indians were under the fire of one of the most -expert bodies of marksmen on the plains at half pistol-shot distance in -the unique and celebrated battle. The whole action is almost -unparalleled in the history of our Indian wars, both for the thrilling -and gallant cavalry charge of the Indians and the desperate valor of -Forsyth and his scouts. - - - IV. A Few Words About Forsyth’s Men - -The heroism and pluck of the men in the fight had been quite up to the -mark set by their captain. A man named Farley had fought through the -action with a severe bullet wound in the shoulder, which he never -mentioned until nightfall; his father was mortally wounded, but he lay -on his side and fought through the whole of the long first day until he -died. Another man named Harrington was struck in the forehead by an -arrow. He pulled out the shaft, but the head remained imbedded in the -bone. An Indian bullet struck him a glancing blow in the forehead and -neatly extricated the arrow—rough surgery, to be sure, but it served. -Harrington tied a rag around his head, and kept his place during the -whole three days of fighting. - -When they first reached the island one of the men cried out, “Don’t -let’s stay here and be shot down like dogs! Will any man try for the -opposite bank with me?” Forsyth, revolver in hand, stopped that effort -by threatening to shoot any man who attempted to leave the island. In -all the party there was but one coward. In looks and demeanor he was the -most promising of the company—a splendid specimen of manhood apparently. -To everybody’s surprise, after one shot he hugged the earth in his -rifle-pit and positively refused to do anything, in spite of orders, -pleadings, jeers, and curses. He left the troop immediately on its -arrival at Fort Wallace. - -_Per contra_, one of the bravest, where all but one were heroes, was a -little, eighteen-year old Jewish boy, who had begged to be enlisted and -allowed to go along. He had been the butt of the command, yet he proved -himself a very paladin of courage and efficiency when the fighting -began.[36] - -One of the last acts of the recent Congress was the setting apart of one -hundred and twenty acres of land in Yuma County, Colorado, as a national -park. This reservation forever preserves Forsyth’s battlefield and the -vicinity from settlement. On the edge of the river bank, on what was -once Beecher’s Island, which the shifting river has now joined to the -bank, is a wooden monument to Beecher and the other scouts who were -buried somewhere in those shifting sands.[37] - -The few survivors of the battle have formed themselves into an -association which holds an annual reunion on the battlefield. Soon there -will be none of them left. Would it not be a graceful act for some one -who honors courage, manliness, and devotion to duty to erect a more -enduring monument to the memory of Beecher and his comrades than the -perishable wooden shaft which now inadequately serves to call attention -to their sacrifice and their valor? - - * * * * * - -NOTE.—The following interesting communication slightly modifies one of -the statements in the above article. It certainly shows prompt decision -upon the part of Lieutenant Johnson, who was left in command of the post -after Bankhead’s departure. - - Great Barrington, Mass., August 5th, 1904. - - Dr. Brady says “Donovan had assembled five _bold spirits_, and had - immediately started out on the return journey.” As a matter of fact, - Donovan did no such thing. The departure of General Bankhead’s - relief column stripped the garrison of Fort Wallace to seven - enlisted men, took away the last horse, and placed me in command. - Forsyth’s second note, brought by Donovan, fell into my hands. It - was telegraphed in full to General Sheridan, who ordered me to spare - no expense of men, money, and horses to hasten relief to Forsyth. By - the promise of $100 each, four citizens of the neighboring town of - Pond Creek were induced to seek the Carpenter command. Donovan I - persuaded to guide them, promising him $100 in addition to his pay - as a scout. This party started at daylight, on government mules, - rode all day, all night, and found Carpenter’s command on the south - fork of the Republican River, about ten miles southeast of the scene - of the fight. Guided by these men, Carpenter pushed out, and Forsyth - and his men were relieved some hours in advance of the arrival of - the other relief commands. - - The country from Fort Wallace to Arickaree Fork I passed over the - following December, in an unsuccessful endeavor to secure the bodies - of those killed in the fight. We surprised a village of Indians at - the scene of the fight, fought them off, and found the body of one - of the scouts, but Lieutenant Beecher’s and Dr. Mooers’ graves were - empty. Yours very truly, - - HUGH M. JOHNSON, - Late Lieutenant 5th U. S. Infantry. - ------ - -Footnote 36: - - In General Fry’s entertaining story of “Army Sacrifices,” the - following little poem about him appears: - - “When the foe charged on the breastworks - With the madness of despair, - And the bravest souls were tested, - The little Jew was there. - - “When the weary dozed on duty, - Or the wounded needed care, - When another shot was called for, - The little Jew was there. - - With the festering dead around them, - Shedding poison in the air, - When the crippled chieftain ordered, - The little Jew was there.” - -Footnote 37: - - “To-day cattle stand knee-deep in the Arickaree. The water no longer - ripples around the island, as the shifting sands have filled the - channel to the south. But if one digs under the cottonwoods he can - find bullets, cartridges, and knives. And near at hand is the simple - white shaft that tells where Beecher and Roman Nose, typifying all - that is brave in white man and red, forgot all enmity in the last - sleep that knows no dreams of racial hatred.” I cut this from a - newspaper the other day. How well written, frequently, are the - modestly unsigned articles in the daily press! - - - - - CHAPTER SEVEN - A Scout’s Story of the Defense of Beecher’s Island - - -By great good fortune I am permitted to insert here a private letter to -me from Mr. Sigmund Schlesinger, the Jewish boy referred to in Chapter -Six, which, as it contains an original account of the defense of -Beecher’s Island from the standpoint of one of the participants, is an -unique document in our Western historical records:—C.T.B. - - * * * * * - -For several days we had been following an Indian trail so broad that it -looked like a wagon-road. Those in our command experienced in Indian -warfare told us that we must be on the track of an Indian village on the -move, with a large herd of horses. Evidently they knew that we were -behind them, and seemed to be in a hurry to get away, for we found camp -utensils, tent-poles, etc., which had been dropped and no time taken to -pick them up. Among other things we saw fresh antelope meat, quarters, -etc., and although our rations were nearly, if not all, gone, except -some coffee and very little “sow-belly,” we did not dare eat the -Indians’ remnants. - -The night of Sept. 16th, before the attack next morning, Scout Culver, -who was killed next day, pointed out to a few of us some torch-lights -upon the hills that were being swung like signals. I knew that something -“would be doing” soon, but, like a novice, I was as if on an anxious -seat, under a strain of anticipation, expecting something strange and -dangerous. The next thing that I now recall was that I was awakened just -before daylight by a single cry, “Indians!” so loud and menacing that -when I jumped up from the ground I was bewildered and felt as if I -wanted to ward off a blow, coming from I knew not where, for it was -still quite dark. That cry I will never forget. Soon I perceived a -commotion among our horses and mules. The Indians, about a dozen, tried -to stampede them. I could see in the dawning light the outlines of a -white horse in the distance, and from the noise I realized that they -were driving some of our stock before them. Later, in the daylight we -could recognize some of our ponies on a neighboring hill in the -possession of the Indians. - -As soon as we crossed from the north bank of the river to the island, -just before the attack, we tied our horses and pack mules to shrubs as -best we could. During the day a mule with a partial pack on his back got -loose and wandered around the vicinity of my pit. He had several arrows -sticking in his body and seemed wounded otherwise, which caused him to -rear and pitch to such an extent that Jim Lane, my neighbor, and I, -decided to kill him. After shooting him he fell and lay between us, and -served us the double purpose of food and barricade. - -My horse was securely tethered to the underbrush on the island, and -later that day I saw the poor beast rearing and plunging in a death -struggle, having been shot and killed like the rest of our horses and -mules. He also furnished me with several meals during the siege, even -after he began to putrefy. There was little to choose between horse and -mule meat under such circumstances—both were abominable. - -When day broke that Tuesday, the seventeenth of September, 1868, we saw -our pickets riding toward camp as fast as their horses could carry them, -excitedly yelling: “Indians! Indians!” As I looked up the valley toward -the west I beheld the grandest, wildest sight—such as few mortals are -permitted to see and live to tell about. Many hundreds of Indians in -full war paraphernalia, riding their splendid war ponies, rushed toward -us _en masse_. Some were galloping in one direction, others cantering in -another, their lances topped with many-colored streamers, the fantastic -Indian costumes lending an awful charm to the whole. About this time -those among us who had any had boiled some coffee and were preparing to -cross over to the island. - -I will frankly admit that I was awed and scared. I felt as if I wanted -to run somewhere, but every avenue of escape was blocked. Look where I -might I perceived nothing but danger, which increased my agitation; so I -naturally turned to Colonel Forsyth as a protector, as a young chick -espying the hawk in the air flutters toward the mother wing. Under such -conditions of strain some things engrave themselves vividly upon your -mind, while others are entirely forgotten. I remember that distinctly as -in my trepidation I instinctively kept close to the colonel. I was -reassured by his remarkable self-possession and coolness. While stirring -every one to activity round us, he consulted with Lieutenant Beecher and -the guide, Sharp Grover, giving directions here, advice there, until -most of the command had crossed; then he crossed himself and posted the -men, telling them where to take up their different positions. Meantime -the Indians were coming closer. I was just behind the colonel when the -first shot from the enemy came flying seemingly over our heads. I heard -him say, smilingly, “Thank you,” but immediately afterward he ordered -every one of us to lie flat upon the ground, while he, still directing, -kept on his feet, walking around among us, leading his horse. The shots -began coming thicker, and many of us yelled to him to lie down also. How -long after this I do not know, but I heard the colonel cry out that he -was shot, and I saw him clutch his leg and get down in a sitting -position. - -I was lying alongside of Lou McLaughlin; some tall weeds obscured my -vision, so I asked Lou to crouch lower and I rolled over him to the -other side and was there kept busy with my carbine, for the Indians were -onto us. They were circling around while others were shooting. Very soon -I heard Lou growl and mutter. I looked at him and saw that he was hit, a -bullet coming from the direction where I was lying struck his gun-sight -and glanced into his breast. He told me what had happened, but I could -give him no attention, for there seemed lots of work to do before us. -But later, after the repulse of the attack, I looked at Lou and was -surprised to see him lying in a wallow. In his pain he had torn up the -grass and dug his hands into the sand. In answer to my question whether -he was hurt bad, he told me not bad, and advised me to dig into the sand -and make a hole, as it would be a protection. - -[Illustration: - - _Courtesy of Chas. Scribner’s Sons_ - - THE CRUCIAL MOMENT ON BEECHER’S ISLAND - - _Drawing by R. F. Zogbaum_ -] - -I am not sure at this time, but I am now under the impression that I -told Colonel Forsyth of this; and from that time on we began to dig with -our hands or whatever we could use, and kick with our heels and toes in -the sand, and some of us soon had holes dug deep enough to protect the -chest, at least. - -Time seemed out of our calculations. I heard some one call, “What time -is it?” An answer came, “Three o’clock.” I had thought it was about ten -A.M. We had nothing to eat or drink all day and, strange to say, I was -not hungry, which may have been the reason why I thought it was still -early. Word was passed that Lieutenant Beecher and Scouts Wilson and -Culver were killed, Colonel Forsyth wounded again, also Doctor Mooers -shot in the head and others hurt whose names I do not now remember. - -We fought steadily all day. After dark the Indians withdrew; then nature -began to assert itself. I got hungry; there was nothing to eat in the -camp that I knew of, except some wild plums that I had gathered the day -before, which were in my saddle-bags, still on the body of my horse. I -got out of my hole, creeping on hands and knees toward where I knew the -poor animal lay. As I felt my way in the darkness I touched something -cold, and upon examination found that it was Wilson’s dead hand. He lay -where he fell; it was a most horrible feeling. The shivers ran up and -down my back, but I got to my horse at last, and tugging, I finally -secured the bag and my plums. I also found in it a piece of bacon, the -size of two fingers, which I reserved for a last emergency, and was -still in possession of that rusty piece of fat when relief came. - -On my way back to my hole I passed one where Doctor Mooers lay wounded, -moaning piteously. I put a plum in his mouth, and I saw it between his -teeth next morning. He died on the night of the 19th. All our wounded -were very cheerful, and to look at Colonel Forsyth and talk to him as he -lay there helpless, no outsider would have suspected that he was -crippled. We used to gather round him in his pit and hold conversation, -not like men in a desperate situation, but like neighbors talking over a -common cause. - -Colonel Forsyth was the right man in command of such a heterogeneous -company. Like the least among us, he attended to his own horse when in -camp, and many times have I seen him gather buffalo chips to supply the -mess fuel. While he was our commander in practice he was our friend, and -as such we respected him, followed and obeyed him. - -On about the fifth day, as the Indians began leaving us, we began to -walk about and look around. About fifteen or twenty feet from my pit I -noticed a few of our men calling to the rest of us. I ran to the place, -and there, against the edge of the island, I saw three dead Indians. -Their friends evidently could not reach them to carry them off, which -explained to us the persistent fighting in this direction. When I got -there the Indians were being stripped of their equipments, scalps, etc. -One of them was shot in the head and his hair was clotted with blood. I -took hold of one of his braids and applied my knife to the skin above -the ear to secure the scalp, but my hand coming in contact with the -blood, I dropped the hair in disgust. - -Old Jim Lane saw my hesitation, and taking up the braid, said to me: “My -boy, does it make you sick?” Then inserting the point of the knife under -the skin, he cut around, took up the other braid, and jerked the scalp -from the head. I had been about three years in that country and four -years in America, and life on the plains under such hardships as I had -undergone hardens the sensibility, yet I was not quite ripe for such a -cutting affray, even with a dead Indian. - -After this we were not molested, but devoted our time to looking around -for something to eat besides the rotten horse and mule meat, which we -boiled several times in water and powder, not to get it soft, but to -boil out the stench as much as possible. We found some cactus fruit, and -killed a coyote, of which the brains and a rib were my portion. Aside -from this we had nothing but horse and mule during the siege, which soon -told on our bowels; but in spite of all this, I do not remember a -despondent man in our crowd. - -One morning, being the ninth since we were attacked, I was lying outside -of my pit, having done some guard duty during the night; I was half -dozing and dreaming of home and a good meal. I felt so homesick and so -hungry when I heard some one call attention to something moving on the -hill. - -I was all attention at once. Soon I heard again “I think that’s Doctor -Fitzgerald’s greyhound.” Whoever it might be, we would welcome. We would -even have been pleased to have the Indians attack us again, in hopes of -killing one of their horses for fresh meat; but it was soon evident that -help was coming, and when I fully realized this fact, enfeebled as I -was, I jumped up and joined in a lunatics’ dance that was in progress -all around us. Those on the hill must have seen us, for there was a rush -of horsemen down the hill toward us, followed by one or two ambulance -wagons. - -They were as eager to reach us as we were to greet them, and as I ran -uphill I noticed a soldier on a white horse coming full tilt. The -momentum carried him past me, but in passing I grabbed his saddle-bag -and was taken off my feet, but it would have taken more than one horse -to drag me from my hold. I suspected some eatables in there, and as soon -as he could stop, without dismounting he assisted me to open that bag. -With both hands I dived in, and with each hand I clutched some hardtack, -but only one hand could reach my mouth; my other was in the grip of one -of our men, who ravenously snatched the “tacks.” We ate, cried, laughed, -and ate, all in a breath. - -As soon as possible we put our dead in the ground. Those that died at -one end of the island were cared for by those in that vicinity, and -others in their vicinity, so that one part of the island was not aware -of the location of the corpses of the other part; at least I did not -know where the bodies lay of those killed on the eastern end of the -island. So one time, as I walked around among the pits, I noticed -something red and round sticking out of the sand, like a half-buried red -berry. I kicked it, but by so doing it was not dislodged; I kicked -again, but to no result. I then looked closer and discovered that it was -the nose of a dead man. I called others to my assistance, and we fixed -matters so that no desecration was possible again. - -Our mortally wounded were made as comfortable as possible before they -died. I assisted at such ministrations given to Lieutenant Beecher. We -removed his boots, coat, etc., and, of course, these things were not -replaced on the body after he was dead, but lay around unnoticed. My -shoes were quite badly worn, especially after being used for digging in -the sand, so when relief came and we were preparing to leave the island, -I put on his shoes, which were just about my size, and wore them even -after I got back to New York City, leaving my old shoes in their stead -on the island. - -At one of our “sittings” around Colonel Forsyth in his pit, the incident -of killing the coyote was discussed, and plans were suggested for the -killing of more of them. Along with others, I also suggested a scheme, -but it was ridiculed, and I soon retired to my pit, which was near -enough to the colonel’s, so that I could hear what was said there. One -of the men remaining was saying uncomplimentary things about me, when -the colonel silenced him, telling him that I was but a boy unused to -such things and that, under the circumstances, I was doing better than -some of the older men. Colonel Forsyth is unconscious of the fact that I -am very grateful to him for his kindness to that strange “boy” among -those strangers, and that I still hope some day that I may have the -opportunity to show my appreciation. - -Jack Stillwell and I were the only boys in the company, and naturally -gravitated toward each other. We were friends as soon as we met and -chums before we knew each other’s names. When the colonel asked for -volunteers to go to Fort Wallace for help, Jack was among the first to -announce himself. I wanted to go with him, but the colonel gave no heed -to my request; even Jack discouraged me, for he knew I was too -inexperienced. After Colonel Carpenter came to our relief Jack was not -with him, which made me and others feel very uneasy. The day after -Colonel Carpenter’s arrival we saw the mounted sentinel that had been -posted by Colonel Carpenter on a high eminence in the hills about three -miles from the island, signaling that a body of men was approaching, -which created a flutter of excitement, but there was a strong sensation -of security, mingled with a sense of dependence upon our black rescuers -permeating our emaciated party, after being cooped up, so to say, for so -long a period in dread and suspense. At least that was my sensation. I -remember watching that vedette, horse and rider turning around and -around, being the only moving object in that dim distance, indicating to -the anxious watchers that either friend or foe was in the vicinity. As -he showed no inclination to leave his post, it was soon evident he had -no fear of the approaching column, and that friends were coming. Not -long after a few horsemen were seen coming around the bend of the river -bed, and among them was my friend Jack Stillwell. Nearly all of us ran -to meet the party. Soon Jack jumped from his horse, and in his joy to -see so many of us alive again, he permitted his tears free flow down his -good honest cheeks. I kept up correspondence with him all these years -past. Last year he died.[38] He was a big-hearted, jovial fellow, brave -to a fault. - ------ - -Footnote 38: - - Stillwell studied law, and ultimately became a judge in Texas. He was - a friend of Generals Miles and Custer—also of “Wild Bill” Hickok, - “Texas Jack” Omohundro, and other famous figures on the frontier; and - when he died, a couple of years ago, he was the subject of glowing - tributes from high and low alike.—C. T. B. - - - - - CHAPTER EIGHT - Carpenter and His “Brunettes.”[39]<br>The Fight on Beaver Creek - - -Carpenter had performed a very commendable thing in his march of over -one hundred miles in two days for the relief of Forsyth. And it is -marvelous that he had been able to find him in that vast expanse of -country. He received high praise for it, which he fully deserved; but -the battle which, with his black comrades, he fought three weeks later, -elicited still more praise. The fight was one of the prettiest and most -typical of any in our Indian campaigns; and I am fortunate in being able -to give it in General Carpenter’s own words, written especially for this -book, the notes appended being my own contribution.—C. T. B. - - * * * * * - -While on the forced march to relieve the party of scouts with Colonel -George A. Forsyth, surrounded by Indians on the Arickaree fork of the -Republican River, the troops under my command discovered a large trail -of the Indians who had been engaged in that fight on the south fork of -the Republican. - -The scouts discovered that this trail left the valley of the stream a -short distance below and struck across country in the direction of the -Beaver Creek. After the relief of Forsyth, on my return to Fort Wallace -with the survivors and wounded, a report was made to General Sheridan, -then to the east of Fort Hayes, Kansas, of the probable whereabouts of -the Indians; and the Fifth Cavalry, which had just arrived from the East -by rail, was disembarked between Hayes and Wallace and ordered to move -north under Major Royall, and strike the savages, if possible, on the -Beaver. A day or two after the Fifth had left, Brevet-Major-General -Eugene A. Carr reported for duty to General Sheridan. Carr had been a -general officer of volunteers during the Civil War with an excellent -record, and now reverted to his rank in the regulars of Major in the -Fifth Cavalry. - -Sheridan was anxious to have Carr join his regiment because of his -experience with Indians and his general reputation, and therefore sent -him to Fort Wallace with orders to have the two troops of cavalry there -go under my command and escort Carr and overtake the Fifth, if possible, -to enable him to join his regiment. The troops consisting of Troops H -and I, Tenth Cavalry, were officered by myself and Captain Graham, -Lieutenants Banzhaf, Amick, and Orleman, and were soon in readiness for -the duty required. We had returned from the relief of Forsyth Oct. 1st, -and we started with Carr at ten A.M. Oct. 14th. - -I concluded to march north so as to strike the Beaver as soon as -possible, and then to follow down that creek with the expectation of -finding the Fifth Cavalry or of striking its trail. On the 15th I -reached the Beaver at about one P.M., and after proceeding some miles -down, went into bivouac. As we expected, we found a very large Indian -trail about two weeks old, over which over two thousand head of ponies -had been ridden or driven, going in the same direction. - -The next day we continued our journey down the stream, finding plenty of -water, a fine bottom covered with grass and timber, and still observing -the Indian trail, which ran to a point about twenty miles east from the -place where we first struck the Beaver. At this locality the signs -showed that the Indians had encamped for the night. The ground was -covered for acres with old fire-places, pieces of wood, and the manure -of ponies; and a little distance off we found a dead Cheyenne, wrapped -in his robes, lying upon a scaffolding in a tree, a protection against -ravenous wolves. The trail then struck south toward Short Nose Creek, -the Indian name for a stream about twenty miles south of the Beaver. We -continued our course, however, on the Beaver, until we made about thirty -miles, and then stopped for the night. - -As there was no pack outfit at Wallace, I was compelled to take wagons -to carry our supplies, and had eleven with me. The mules, dragging heavy -loads over rough country, were made to trot in order to keep up with the -cavalry column. We had now moved down the Beaver about forty-five miles -without finding anything about the Fifth, and it began to look as if -something had taken the regiment in another direction. - -The next morning I sent Lieutenant Amick and ten men well mounted with -Sharp Grover, the famous scout, with orders to proceed as quickly as -possible across country to the Short Nose to look for signs of the Fifth -Cavalry and to keep a sharp lookout for Indians. - -Grover, who, it will be remembered, had been with Forsyth, afterward -joined my command. He had married a Sioux woman and had lived for years -with the Indians before the outbreak of hostilities. He could speak -their language and knew their ways and customs, and was perfectly -trained in reading signs. It was interesting to see how he could read -what the tracks meant, as if they had been books. He could tell how long -since the tracks were made, whether they were made by horses or ponies, -shod or unshod, how many were ridden, how many were driven, whether it -was a war party or a party changing camp. If Indians stopped for the -night he could tell how many men or squaws were in the party, to what -tribe they belonged, from the shape of their moccasins, and many more -details. Like most of his ilk, Grover drank heavily on occasion. When -the Indians went on the war-path Grover could not stay longer with the -Sioux, as his life was not safe, and he entered the government employ, -where he rendered heroic and invaluable services. Later he was killed in -a row at Pond City, near Fort Wallace. - -Amick and his party soon disappeared over the hills to our right and we -kept on down the stream, the general course of which was to the -northeast. I began to feel certain that the Fifth Cavalry had never -reached the Beaver, and that we would probably be attacked by the -Indians if this was the case. Under these circumstances I felt that it -would be wise to be cautious and on the lookout against surprise. The -road we passed over was very rough and the stream in most places ran -through deep-cut banks several feet high, with very few places suitable -for crossing. - -As night came on a place was selected for a camp in a bend of the creek -where the wagons could be placed across, giving room inside to graze the -animals without fear of a stampede from howling savages. Amick returned -just before night, having scouted some miles beyond the Short Nose -without discovering any trace of the Fifth Cavalry. Grover told me that -as they passed across the divide between the Beaver and the Short Nose -he came across a single Indian pony track. This track was coming from a -direction to our rear, and showed that the pony was going at a rapid -gallop. Grover inferred from this that it was probably an Indian hunter -returning homeward who had most likely crossed our trail behind us, -discovered our presence in the country, and was riding as fast as -possible to carry the news to the Indian camps somewhere to our front -and not far off. - -After a council over the situation General Carr came to the conclusion, -after having traveled some sixty miles down the Beaver without finding -the Fifth, that the regiment had never reached that stream and that -therefore he would give it up and start on our return in the morning. -About seven A.M. on the next day, Oct. 15th, Captain Graham expressed a -wish to make a scout for a short distance to the front, and rode forward -with two men. The command was ordered saddled up and everything made in -readiness to move. In view of the fact that the south side of the creek -was hilly and difficult and offered opportunities for ambuscades, I -determined to go back by the north side, which was comparatively open. -The afternoon before I had sent Lieutenant Orleman with a detachment to -dig down the sides of the creek and prepare a practicable passage for -the wagons and troops. - -Graham had hardly ridden a thousand yards when twenty-five Indians -suddenly dashed over the hill to his rear, with the evident intention of -cutting him off. They were almost upon Graham before he discerned them, -but he instantly struck spurs into his horse and dashed for the creek, -the Indians firing a volley at short range upon the party. One of the -bullets passed through Graham’s hat, another through his coat, and a -third through his leggings without wounding him. One of the horses was -shot through the shoulder and fell. His rider succeeded in getting into -the creek and behind the bank along with the other soldiers, and they -commenced firing upon the Indians. Graham’s girth burst as his horse -sprang away at the first fire, but as his saddle gave way he seized his -horse’s mane and dragged himself forward on the animal. He then dashed -the horse over the bank of the creek, about ten feet to the bottom. He -fell from his horse in this jump, but the horse, fortunately, ran in our -direction.[40] - -By this time I started out thirty men under Lieutenants Amick and -Orleman to cover the retreat of Graham’s men. As they charged toward the -hill the savages rushed from the creek to avoid being cut off, and were -hotly pursued by our men. Judging that the presence of these Indians -indicated that a large party could not be far off, I thought it best to -be prudent and sent a trumpeter to overtake Amick and tell him to -discontinue the pursuit and fall back slowly to camp. Without further -delay I now broke up the camp, crossed the creek with wagons and troops, -and, having dismounted the men, deployed them as riflemen to cover the -retreat of Amick. - -In a few minutes the absent party made its appearance on the hills, with -bodies of Indians, numbering at least a hundred, skirmishing on our -flank and rear. They slowly fell back toward the creek, and when within -range the dismounted men on the banks opened fire on the advancing -savages, and under cover of this Amick crossed and joined the command, -while the Indians kept at a respectful distance. - -The wagons were now placed in double column so as to make everything as -compact as possible.[41] H Troop was assigned on the flanks and advance, -deployed in open order. Troop I covered the rear in the same manner, -with one platoon under Graham as a reserve. These arrangements being -completed, we moved steadily up the creek bottom. As soon as this -movement commenced, a large body of Indians made their appearance and -charged toward us, taking advantage of ravines, trees, and bluffs to -fire from the south side of the creek. Some of the balls were well aimed -and came close. - -I soon saw that if we continued down the creek bottom the enemy would -harass us immensely under cover of the timber and banks, and therefore -changed our course so as to leave the valley and take the higher ground -or divide. The Indians followed, showing about two hundred strong, and -acted boldly in their attacks on the rear and flanks. The men and -officers behaved very coolly, facing toward the enemy and driving them -back without stopping the progress of the column. - -[Illustration: - - Position of Wagons and Soldiers in Beaver Creek Fight - - _T_, _Troopers Surrounding Wagons_; _H_, _Horses Inside the Inclosure_ - - Drawn by General Carpenter -] - -At one point we passed near a deep ravine, and the enemy, quick to -observe cover of any kind, occupied it with quite a number of warriors -and opened up a serious fire. The reserve platoon under Graham charged -at the place as we were passing and, arriving at the edge of the ravine, -poured in a volley at close range on the savages. A number must have -been hurt and the Indians certainly lost no time in getting out of their -position. Afterward they were more cautious in occupying ground too -close to us. The flankers, under Banzhaf and Orleman, also repulsed the -Indians on several occasions. - -One Indian carried a red flag with some white device upon it, and by his -movements the whole force seemed more or less governed. They were all -stripped to the waists, and were decorated by various ornaments hanging -from their heads and their shields, quivers, and bridles, so as to -glisten and shine in the sun at every turn of the ponies. Up to this -time five Indians were known to be killed at various points and quite a -number wounded. - -At one P.M. the enemy seemed to stop the fight and apparently withdrew, -and I supposed that I had seen the last of them; but half an hour -afterward, hearing an exclamation, I looked back and saw the Indians -appearing again on the hills to our rear. On they came, one body after -another coming in sight until it was estimated by all present that at -least six hundred warriors were in view. Emboldened by their number they -rushed forward, directing themselves toward our front, flanks and rear, -making things look rather serious. I soon saw that we could not continue -the march and meet this force, but that we must select a position and -make a stand. - -In the first attack in the morning I had offered the command to General -Carr, as the senior officer present, but he declined it, stating that he -considered himself simply as a passenger to be escorted, and I therefore -continued to direct the operations.[42] - -I looked around and saw a small knoll or rise a short distance to the -front, from which the ground fell in every direction, and this point was -immediately selected. The teamsters were directed to take the trot, aim -for this place, and on arrival at the knoll immediately to form a -circular corral, half a circle on either side, with the mules facing -inward, affording a shelter within and something of a fortification. As -soon as we increased our pace the Indians evidently thought we were -running from them, and sent up a yell which made shivers run down the -backs of some of our recruits. We kept on, however, at a fast gait, and -the moment we struck the highest ground, the wagons were corralled with -six wagons one side, five wagons on the other, and the troops were -rushed inside at a gallop and dismounted. The horses were tied together -inside the corral with some men to watch them, and the rest were formed -outside the corral in open order.[43] This was done in about two minutes -and then the advance of the Indians was upon us. - -[Illustration: - - THE CHIEF MEDICINE MAN AT BEAVER CREEK - - _Drawing by Will Crawford_ -] - -A fire commenced from our seven-shooter Spencers which sounded like the -fire of a line of infantry. The Indians charged up around the wagons, -firing rapidly and seriously wounded some of the men, but in a very -short time they were driven back in wild disorder, leaving the ground -covered with ponies, arms, and some bodies. Three dead warriors lay -within fifty feet of the wagons. One man who was killed here was carried -off by his comrades. - -The chief Medicine Man, on a fine looking horse, rode out in front of -our line about two hundred yards off, after the retreat of the Indians, -to try to show that his medicine was good and the white man’s bullets -could not hurt him. I directed several men near me to aim carefully at -him. They fired and the Medicine Man went down, accompanied by a howl -from the more distant Indians. After the repulse the men rushed forward -from the wagons, seized and hauled in ten bodies of the Indians. The -savages, disheartened and surprised at this reception, withdrew out of -gunshot and assembled, apparently for council.[44] - -The men carried corn sacks and made breastworks near the wagons and we -waited, expecting a renewal of the attack, for about an hour, when it -became evident that some of the Indians were withdrawing. The day was -very warm, we had been engaged about eight hours, and in the hot sun men -and animals were suffering very much from thirst. I made up my mind to -move for water, and keeping the wagons in double column, the horses -inside and the men dismounted on the outside, we marched for the Beaver. -A large party of Indians followed up to where their dead comrades lay -and set up a mournful howl over their remains. Their loss in this fight, -added to what they had suffered the month before in the conflict with -Forsyth, must have had a sobering effect. - -We now proceeded to the creek without further interference, and -selecting a wide bottom encamped for the night, preparing some -rifle-pits to cover our outlying pickets and to enable them to receive -the enemy if an attack were made in the morning. We heard them around us -all night imitating coyotes, but they did not find a weak place and -refrained from molesting us. The next morning the Indians were gone and -we marched by the shortest route to Fort Wallace, arriving there on the -21st. - -On our return journey we passed through Sheridan City, a frontier town -located at the then terminus of the Kansas Division of the Union Pacific -R. R. It was full of taverns, saloons, gambling houses and dens, and of -a rather tough lot of citizens and desperadoes. These people and others -crowded into the streets when we passed through, and when they saw the -troopers and their horses decorated with the spoils from the Indians -whose dead bodies we had captured, they knew that we had been in a -successful fight and they gave us a perfect ovation. - -The savages suffered a considerable loss, but we escaped with a few men -wounded (some of them seriously) and none killed. General Carr found the -Fifth Cavalry had returned to the railroad, and through mistake they -never reached the Beaver. He took command of the regiment, marched again -and pursued the Indians over the Platte River, and followed them on a -long campaign. - - * * * * * - -This was one of the smartest and most successful Indian fights on -record. Carpenter’s tactics throughout had been admirable. General Carr -was much surprised and pleased at the conduct of these black troopers, -and on his return to Fort Wallace telegraphed to General Sheridan that -“the officers and troops behaved admirably.” General Sheridan published -a general order highly commending the commander, the officers and the -men for this brilliant and gallant affair. Carpenter was brevetted -colonel in the Regular Army (his fifth brevet), and afterward received a -medal of honor for this fight and the relief of Forsyth. Well did he -deserve them both.—C. T. B. - ------ - -Footnote 39: - - Negro troops were often so styled by their white comrades in the - service.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 40: - - Luckily for Graham, just as he fell from his horse Amick’s men charged - the Indians, who thereupon retreated. One of the troopers caught the - horse and held him until the captain came running up. Carpenter’s - prompt action in instantly throwing Amick’s detachment on the savages - undoubtedly saved the lives of Graham and his men. As it was, it was a - fearfully narrow escape for them.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 41: - - Six wagons on one side, five on the other.—L.H.C. - -Footnote 42: - - General Carr, while he used a rifle efficiently during the whole of - the action, did not interfere with Carpenter’s arrangements; with rare - self-restraint he refrained even from offering suggestions. Although - he showed plenty of nerve and was entirely calm and collected - throughout the hot affair, he is reported to have said after the fight - that he thought he was in the tightest box in which he was ever caught - in his life, and that there was nothing left for them all to do but to - sell their lives as dearly as possible. He had never served on the - plains with negro troopers before, and had no knowledge as to how they - would behave against Indians—nobody had, for that matter.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 43: - - When there are many wagons, the corral is formed with the wagons close - together, axles touching, tongues and mules inward; but in this case - they had to form an open corral with about twenty feet between the - wagons. The horses, to the number of one hundred—the troops being - reduced to that number by illness, hard work, and other causes—were - forced inside the wagons in columns of four, each set of fours being - tied together, with horse-holders detailed to look after them. The - duty of the horse-holders was most important. They had always to be on - watch to prevent a stampede. If the troops had been deprived of their - horses on that open knoll their position would have been hopeless - indeed. The dismounted men were formed in front and rear and on both - sides of the corral, as Indian attacks must be expected from every - direction. The plan made by General Carpenter explains the situation - perfectly.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 44: - - Just after the first repulse of the Indians, Graham went to General - Carr very improperly (he had no business to communicate with him - except through Carpenter, his immediate commanding officer), and - suggested that he order the wagons abandoned, the teamsters mounted on - the mules, and the whole party to retreat in that fashion as fast as - possible. Carr, of course, referred the matter to Carpenter, who - promptly refused to sanction any such manœuver. To leave the wagons, - which afforded some protection on the hill, would be to enable six or - seven hundred Indians to surround the hundred troopers in his command - and invite annihilation. Carpenter assured Carr that as he had - defeated the Indians once, he was certain that he could do it again. - Carr wisely persisted in his determination not to interfere, and - Graham had his suggestion decisively negatived by Carpenter. Graham - deserved reprobation for his unmilitary action, _as well as for his - foolish suggestion_.—C.T.B. - - - - - CHAPTER NINE - A Further Discussion of the Beaver Creek Affair - - -When General Carpenter’s account of the fight on the Beaver Creek was -published serially, General Carr took exception to it in a public letter -to the editor of the periodical in which it appeared. I am permitted by -the editor to make extracts from this letter, which, with my own comment -and General Carpenter’s rejoinder, appear as follows: - - - I. General Carr’s Account - -I do not think that General Sheridan sent orders for my escort to go -under command of Colonel Carpenter. I know that, after waiting with -General Sheridan at Fort Hayes for several days, he ordered me to go to -Fort Wallace, take an escort and go to find Royall, who had not been -heard from as expected. - -While we were going over the “rough hills” Colonel Carpenter, and -perhaps some of the others, came up and remonstrated with me for -marching the command so hard; said they could not be responsible for its -effect on the horses, and when I insisted, asked me to take command and -be responsible. I said, “All right, I will take command; but you must -attend to the details. I will not appoint an adjutant and take the -office work” (detailing guards, stable duties, etc., etc.). - -I had with me an officer of my regiment, Captain Kane, Fifth Cavalry, -and now wish I had appointed him adjutant and taken formal command. - -Finding that the stream (Beaver Creek) was persistently hugging the -south side of the valley, on which we were traveling, creating bluffs -and ravines over which it was difficult to move the wagons, I determined -to cross to the north side, where the valley consisted of a gentle and -smooth slope. - -I selected the camp in an “ox bow” bend of the creek, putting the tents -and wagons across the entrance, the guard at the bow and the animals -inside, selected a place for crossing, and ordered the banks to be cut -down to the bed of the creek, so that the wagons and animals could -cross. - -In the Indian country I always had my commands up and under arms before -daylight, which is the most dangerous time; and next morning we were up, -had breakfast, the tents struck and the wagons packed, and were standing -’round the camp fire when Amick called out “Indians!” - -I had intended to move camp across the creek and get fresh grass. Graham -had started on his trip, following a narrow path between the bluff and -the river bank. He was riding a fine horse called “Red Eye,” which had a -very deep chest and thin barrel. As he told me afterward, his saddle -began to slip back, but he waited to get down to fix it till he should -reach a more open place ahead at the mouth of a ravine, when _bang, -bang!_ came some shots. His horse dodged and jumped down the bank into -the creek, slipping the saddle farther back and kicking it clear, while -Graham landed on the shoulders of the horse and from there on the bed of -the creek. He turned back with his gun toward the bank, which protected -him while he fired, till I sent Lieutenant Amick with some skirmishers, -who covered his retreat. His two men jumped their horses down into and -up out of the creek and fell back, and when we got the men all in I -moved the command up to and over the crossing I had prepared and out to -the open slope on the north side of the valley. As we had not found -Royall but had found the Indians, or, rather, they had found us, it was -of no use to go farther down the Beaver, and I determined to move toward -home. - -The Indians kept coming out from those bluffs, crossing the creek and -following us, and I arranged the wagons in two columns, with Carpenter’s -company in front and on the flanks, and Graham’s company in rear, where -I was also. - -Some of the Indians got on our flanks as skirmishers, a few in front and -more in rear, while the main body got into two columns, about like the -two halves of a regiment in columns of four, marching steadily and -gradually, closing on us by increasing their gait. I estimated them at -seven hundred warriors; we had about one hundred colored soldiers. Their -chiefs were marching between the heads of their columns; they had a flag -and a bugle. I sent word to Carpenter to turn more toward the higher -ground, away from the timber along the creek, which Indians were using -for cover. Pretty soon he began to trot, and I had to send Captain Kane -to him with orders to go slower, for fear of a stampede. I was in the -rear near Graham’s troop. He was one of the bravest men I ever saw. He -would amuse himself with the Indians by concealing men in hollows, -taking away their horses till Indians came up for them to shoot at, then -charging up with their horses, mounting and bringing them off. Most of -the men were cool, but I saw one man loading and firing when the Indians -were a mile away. I called to him to stop, but he paid no attention, -seemed to be dazed, and I had to go up and lay my hand on him before he -obeyed my order. As the Indians got closer, one of the men dismounted to -shoot. When he tried to remount, his horse got scared and edged away -from him, and I rode up on the off-side, got hold of the rein, and let -his horse come against mine. Then he put his foot in the stirrup, made a -leap and got his leg over, when we both cantered off—just in time. He -lost his cap, and we lost a dog which was playing about between us and -the Indians, interested in the shooting till he got near enough to them -to be killed. These were our only losses. - -As the main body of the Indians got closer and increased their gait to -the charge, the leading wagons turned toward each other and stopped. The -others turned their mules inside of those in front of them, lapping onto -and tying to the wagons, forming a corral in shape of a flat-iron, and -the horsemen rode inside, dismounted, tied their horses, and began to -fire at the Indians who were thronging around us. One Indian, on a -clay-bank pony and wearing a red blanket, with no arms, rode ’round and -’round us within fifty or one hundred yards, and seemed to bear a -charmed life. I shot at him several times, and Grover said he also shot -at him till he began to think the Indian had strong medicine which -protected him—Grover was a squaw man and had imbibed some of their -superstitions. He was shooting a Sharp’s carbine, and, taking it down to -reload, happened to notice that he had the sight set for five hundred -yards and had been shooting over the Indian’s head. - -I had a Spencer carbine which had been sent me by the company for trial. -With it I shot down an Indian, who fell and lay within thirty yards of -the corral. He was not dead, and I afterward talked with him through -Grover. He said his name was Little Crow, and mentioned the name of his -father, whom Grover said he knew. He was young—about eighteen. I asked -him why they attacked us. He said because we came on their creek. He -told where their camp was, so that one week from that day, which was -Sunday, October 18th, 1868, I found them with my own regiment, the -Fifth, had a fight lasting two days and two nights, and drove them out -of Kansas. - -While the fight was going on our soldiers showed great bravery. While -inside the wagon corral they would rush from one side to the other, -wherever the Indians appeared, so as to fire at them. Their officers did -not seem to keep them in their places, and, after it was over, I -reprimanded them for not commanding their men. After the Indians were -repulsed we went around and rearranged the wagons, got out sacks, -cracker-boxes, etc., fixed breastworks in anticipation of another -attack, and then sat down and ate our lunch. - -It was two o’clock. Our soldiers wanted to scalp the dead Indians, of -whom about ten were lying too near the corral for their friends to carry -off. We prevented this till, while we were going around the corral -rearranging, the soldiers got the chance to scalp them. Two were lying -wounded when two soldiers approached them; one drew his bow and sent an -arrow through the thighs of one of the men. The arrow passed through the -fleshy part of one thigh and entered the other and stopped against the -bone. It had to be cut in two to extract it. Years after, at Fort -Leavenworth, a first sergeant showed me an arrow-head with the point -marred, and said he was that man. - -The other wounded Indian had a pistol, and shot the other soldier in the -calf of his leg. These were the only men we had hurt. It was then that -there was some talk of abandoning the wagons and going direct for the -railroad. With the wagons, we had, of course, to go by routes over which -wheeled vehicles could travel. I do not recall whether Captain Graham -advocated this, but there would have been no impropriety in his stating -his views to me. Any officer can talk to his commander, and I had been -giving orders from time to time directly to him and his men. We sat -there eating our lunch and talking with each other and the wounded -Indian who lay in front of us, when he made a motion with his hand back -toward me. I asked Grover what he meant. He said, “He wants you to go -away; says his heart is bad.” This pleased me very much. I had been -watching the Indians, who had fallen back to some rising ground nearly a -mile off. They were moving about, pow-wowing, and, I supposed, preparing -for a new attack. They seemed to be diminishing in numbers, but I -thought they were trying to get around to some place where they would -have a better chance at us. I really did not expect to get out of that -fix. If those Indians had had sufficient resolution, being seven to one, -they ought to have used us up. When the wounded Indian made this motion, -I took it to mean that he knew they were giving up. He could see them as -well as we could, and knew better what they were doing. I suppose that -those who remained were the friends of the dead, waiting for us to go. - -I gave orders to reload the wagons and move out. Some of the Indians -followed us for several miles, but did not again attack. - -Colonel Carpenter did not offer the command to me at the first attack in -the morning, nor did I decline it. I was exercising the command all the -time. One of the articles of war provides that “when troops join and do -duty together the highest in rank of the line of the army shall command -the whole, and give the orders needful for the service,” and I could not -have avoided the responsibility. - -The foregoing narrative shows that I was not a “passive spectator,” nor -did I “refrain from advice or suggestion,” nor from giving orders as -required. - -I, no doubt, said that I was a guest, and did not interfere -unnecessarily; but my long experience on the plains and with Indians -rendered it incumbent on me to exercise my judgment. - - EUGENE A. CARR, - Brevet Major-General and Congressional Medallist. - - * * * * * - -With reference to this letter from General Carr I beg to point out: - -That General Carr in his letter practically admits in two places that he -was not in command. First, when he writes of Captain Kane, “I wish I had -appointed him adjutant and taken formal command.” Second, when he -writes: “I, no doubt, said that I was a guest, and did not interfere -unnecessarily.” - -I do not see, therefore, that there is really any serious discrepancy -between the account of General Carpenter and that of General Carr. I -presume, if there is, I am more to blame than any one for the note to -which General Carr takes exception. The original wording of that note -was, possibly, not happy, and probably conveyed more than I intended. I -did not suppose that any one thought that General Carr sat around and -twiddled his thumbs while the fighting was going on. I have made changes -in the note, which appears in this book in its amended form. - -It must not be forgotten that General Carpenter received his medal of -honor in part for this fight, and he certainly would not have received -it had he not been in command. - -Here follows a communication from General Carpenter on the subject. This -discussion, I think, settles the matter in a way which I trust will be -satisfactory to the friends of both of these distinguished officers. - - - II. General Carpenter’s Reply - -I was very much surprised in reading General Carr’s contention that he -was in command of the troops who constituted his escort to enable him to -join the Fifth Cavalry, and who were in the action on the Beaver in -October, 1868. The account I wrote is from my recollection, and from -letters written home at the time, and I repeated what I thought there -was no question about, and had no desire to ignore General Carr or any -one concerned. - -The two troops of the Tenth Cavalry, a portion of the garrison at Fort -Wallace, under my command as the senior officer, were ordered to act as -escort for General Carr, then Major, Fifth Cavalry. - -I am quite positive that General Carr was offered the command by me, -knowing him to be senior, and that he declined it. Many officers have -been escorted by troops without taking command of the escort although of -senior rank. As the troops were to escort this officer, of course he was -consulted about the direction of the march, the time for camping, and -concerning many other details of greater or less importance, but he -never took formal command. If he did not, then, it would be manifestly -improper for him to issue orders directly to subordinate officers or -men. The officers and men were mentioned in General Orders by General -Sheridan in 1868 for their gallantry and bravery in this action, and it -is stated that they were escorting General Carr. - -Thirty-five years have passed since the affair, and I never heard of any -question about who commanded the troops engaged. This length of time -naturally accounts for some difference of memory, and no two narratives -may be expected altogether to agree. As mentioned before, Carr was -consulted frequently during the expedition and his wishes were carried -out, as was proper under the circumstances. - -Some of the details mentioned by General Carr I do not remember, but I -certainly regarded myself as being in command of the troops during the -fight and gave directions as I have stated in accordance with my -recollection, and selected the ground on which the wagons were corralled -and the Indians repulsed. - -I do not know of any officers being reprimanded, but when we returned to -Fort Wallace we were informed that General Carr had reported to General -Sheridan that “the officers and men had behaved admirably,” - -I inclose a copy of General Field Orders, No. 4, Headquarters Department -of the Missouri, dated October 27, 1868, issued by order of General -Sheridan to commend the conduct of the troops engaged in the combat on -the Beaver, October 18, 1868: - - Headquarters Department of the Missouri. - In the Field, Fort Hays, Kansas, October 27, 1868. - - General Field Orders, No. 4. - - The attention of the officers and soldiers of this department is - called to the engagement with hostile Indians on Beaver Creek, - Kansas, October 18, 1868, in which a detachment of cavalry - (escorting Brevet Major-Gen’l E. A. Carr, Major, Fifth Cavalry to - his Regiment) under the command of Brevet Lieut.-Col. Louis H. - Carpenter, Captain, Tenth Cavalry, consisting of Companies I, Tenth - Cavalry, under Capt. George W. Graham and 1st Lieut.-Major J. Amick, - and H, Tenth Cavalry, under 1st Lieut. Charles Banzhaf and 2d Lieut. - Louis H. Orleman, engaged about five hundred (500) Indians for - several hours, inflicting a loss on the savages of ten (10) killed - and many wounded, losing three (3) enlisted men wounded. - - The major-general commanding desires to tender his thanks for the - gallantry and bravery displayed by this small command against so - large a body of Indians. - - By command of Major-General Sheridan. - - J. SCHUYLER CROSBY, - Brevet Lieut.-Col. A. D. C. - A. A. A. General. - -It is expressly stated that the detachment of cavalry (escorting Brevet -Major-General Eugene A. Carr, Major, Fifth Cavalry, to his regiment) was -“_under the command of Brevet Lieut.-Col. Louis H. Carpenter, Captain, -Tenth Cavalry_.” - -The records show, further, that Brevet Lieut.-Col. Louis H. Carpenter -was brevetted colonel for gallant and meritorious conduct in the -engagement with Indians on Beaver Creek, Kansas, October 18, 1868. This -appointment was made on the recommendation of General Sheridan, and was -undoubtedly conferred on this officer as being in command of the troops -during the fight. Others behaved gallantly and their conduct deserved -recognition, but this was the only brevet given at the time. - - LOUIS H. CARPENTER. - - - - - CHAPTER TEN - The Battle of the Washita - - - I. Custer and the Famous Seventh Cavalry - -A fighter of fighters and a soldier of soldiers was that _beau sabreur_ -of the American Army, George Armstrong Custer, “Old Curly” to his men, -“The White Chief with the Yellow Hair,” or, more briefly, “Long Hair” to -the Indians. From Bull Run to Appomattox his career was fairly meteoric. -Second lieutenant in the Army of the Potomac at twenty-one, fresh from -West Point, a brigadier-general at twenty-three, a major-general at -twenty-four, and commander of the third cavalry division, which, in the -six months preceding the downfall of the Confederacy, had taken one -hundred and eleven guns, sixty-five battle-flags, and over ten thousand -prisoners of war, without losing a flag or gun, and without a failure to -capture whatever it went for—such was his record.[45] - -I have heard my father tell of the impression made by the dashing young -soldier whose spirited horse ran away on Pennsylvania Avenue at the -Grand Review in Washington, in spite of the efforts of his rider—a -peerless horseman—to restrain him. Custer’s hat fell off, his long, -yellow curls floated back in the wind, making a dashing and romantic -picture. He was a man of superb physique and magnificent strength. I saw -him when I was a boy, and I have never forgotten him. His devoted wife, -in one of the three charming books in which she has told the deathless -romance of their married life on the frontier, relates how, on one -occasion, riding by her side, with his left arm he lifted her out of the -saddle high in the air, held her there for a moment or two, then gently -replaced her on her horse. No fatigue was too great for him to surmount, -no duty, however arduous, ever caused him to give back.[46] - -Reams have been written about his unfortunate campaign upon the Little -Big Horn, in which he went down to such awful destruction, but little is -known of some of the exploits of his early career on the plains. After -the war, more fortunate than most of the younger general officers who -were forced to content themselves with captaincies or less, General -Custer was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the new Seventh Regular -Cavalry, a regiment which was born with him, lived with him, and a large -part of which died with him. - -The officers of the regiment were a set of unusual men. Custer himself -was allowed considerable voice in the selection of them, and such a body -of officers had been rarely assembled in one command. Most of the -troopers were not at first of the high grade to which they afterward -attained. The best men, in the ranks at least, at the close of the Civil -War, had had enough of fighting. They wanted to get back to civil life -once more. Not frequently it was only the inferior soldiers who could be -induced to re-enlist from the volunteer into the regular regiments which -were being organized or reorganized. - -There were in the ranks, however, a leaven of veterans who were soldiers -from love as well as from habit. With these as a nucleus, Custer and his -officers, by a judicious weeding out and a rigorous course of -discipline, soon gathered a body of troopers than which there were none -finer in the service of the United States, nor, in fact, in any other -service. Owing to the fact that the colonel, a distinguished general -officer in the war, was on detached service commanding a department, the -regiment was practically continuously under the command of Custer until -his death in 1876. - -The duty that devolved upon it was the protection of the settlers in -Kansas. The job was no sinecure. In the last half of the year 1868 -statistics, which do not pretend to be comprehensive, for they are only -facts reported officially to the headquarters of the Department of the -Missouri, show one hundred and fifty-seven people killed, fifty-seven -wounded, including forty-one scalped, fourteen women outraged and -murdered, one man, four women and twenty-four children taken into -captivity, one thousand six hundred and twenty-seven horses, mules and -cattle stolen, twenty-four ranches or settlements destroyed, eleven -stage coaches attacked, and four wagon trains annihilated. This with a -total loss to the Indians of eleven killed and one wounded. Truly there -was a reign of blood upon that frontier. Every man murdered was also -frightfully and disgustingly mutilated. This record takes no account of -soldiers who were killed. - -In one instance ten troopers under Lieutenant Kidder, of the Second -Cavalry, with a message for Custer’s command, then in the field, were -overtaken and slaughtered to a man after a desperate defense. When -Custer came upon the scene of battle the bodies were so mutilated that -it was impossible to tell one from the other. The only distinguishing -mark upon any one of them was a shirt neckband made of a material of a -peculiar marking, which was yet a common article of wearing apparel at -that time. It was by this shirt collar that the body of Lieutenant -Kidder was subsequently identified by his mother and taken East for -burial. - -As usual, there was strife between the Indian agents and the army. There -always has been, there always will be. The agents invariably declared -that there was peace in the land and sought to embarrass the army in its -efforts to protect the frontier. Popular indignation, however, at last -forced the government to act, and the campaign was long and arduous -during the latter part of the summer of 1868. - -The success of the soldiers was not pronounced at first. The extent of -territory was great, the force available small, the Indians exceedingly -mobile, and the troopers had as yet scarcely learned the rules of the -game, so that it was a matter of extreme difficulty to get at any -considerable body of Indians and inflict a crushing blow. As we have -seen, General Forsyth’s command barely escaped annihilation in the great -battle of the Arickaree. Matters dragged on, however, with nothing -decisive happening until the summer and fall had slipped away and winter -was at hand. The Indians rarely did any fighting in the winter. It was -difficult and dangerous for horsemen to move on the exposed prairies in -the winter season, and hitherto fighting had been abandoned with the -advent of the cold. The Indians, during the winter, naturally tended -southward, seeking a less severe climate if it might be had, and from -November to April had been considered a closed season. - - - II. The March in the Blizzard - -General Sheridan, however, who had command of the department, determined -to inaugurate a winter campaign in the hope that the Indians, who would -naturally congregate in large villages in secluded spots sheltered by -trees along the river banks, might be rounded up and defeated -decisively. The force at his disposal for these projected operations -consisted of eleven troops of the Seventh Cavalry, four companies of -infantry, and the Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, a regiment of -settlers and old soldiers which had been organized for the campaign. - -The expedition was under command of Sheridan himself. The rendezvous was -at Camp Supply, in the Indian Territory, about one hundred miles south -of Fort Dodge, Kansas. No Indians—in any considerable body, that is—had -been seen by any of the scouts sent out, and no outrages were reported. -It was evident that the hostiles were lying snugly concealed somewhere -for the winter season. Sheridan determined to detach Custer and his -regiment from the command and send them scouting farther southward, -while with the rest of the force, so soon as it should be in condition -to march, he himself would explore the country in other directions. - -Custer received his orders on the 22d of November, late at night. -Reveillé was sounded at four o’clock on the twenty-third. The -thermometer was below zero. There was a foot of snow upon the ground, -and it was still coming down furiously when Custer reported to Sheridan -that he was ready to move. - -“What do you think of this?” asked Sheridan, alluding to the weather. - -“It’s all right,” answered Custer, cheerfully; “we can move. The Indians -can’t.” - -There was a hasty breakfast, coffee and hardtack, each trooper standing -by the head of his horse, and the column moved off. The undaunted band -of the regiment, surely made up of the most heroic and hardy musicians -that ever tooted horn or thumped sheepskin, in gallant style played them -out and into the terrible blizzard then raging, with the old marching -tune “The Girl I Left Behind Me,” which was more fancy than truth, for -there were no “girls” with that expedition, save one hard-featured old -campaigner, red-headed at that, who went along as the commanding -officer’s cook at her own earnest request. - -No one can realize the force of a blizzard on the plains who has not, as -I have, experienced it. The guides almost immediately declared -themselves unable to lead the regiment. Every cavalry officer in the -field carries a pocket compass. Custer knew where he wanted to go. With -his own compass to show the way he led the regiment forward. The men -stumbled on through the awful snow and hurricane until two o’clock, when -they were stopped on the bank of Wolf Creek, fifteen miles from the -starting point. First caring for the exhausted horses, they made camp, -and as the wagons came up fires were soon burning, meals were prepared, -and some of the effects of the deadly cold were dissipated. - -The next morning, November 24th, they marched down Wolf Creek. The snow -had stopped falling, but the temperature stood at seven degrees below -zero. The 25th they continued the march. Many another commander would -have been stopped by the fearful weather; but Custer was known as a man -who would press on as long as the mules could draw the wagons, and when -they could not he would abandon the wagons and live off the mules. He -kept on. On the twenty-sixth, Thanksgiving Day, arriving at the north -bank of the Canadian River, he despatched Major Elliott, the second in -command of the regiment, with three troops on a scouting expedition up -the river, which he proposed to cross with the balance of his men. There -was no Thanksgiving dinner awaiting them, and the remembrance of the -holiday spent under happier circumstances but aggravated their present -condition. - -The river was frozen, but not sufficiently so to bear the regiment. They -had to break through the ice and find a ford in the icy water, and it -was after eleven o’clock in the morning before the whole command -succeeded in passing to the south side. Scarcely had they done so when -they noticed a horseman galloping at full speed toward them on the other -side. As soon as he came near they recognized him as Scout Corbin, one -of Elliott’s guides. He brought the startling news that Elliott had come -upon the trail of an Indian war party, at least one hundred and fifty -strong, and not twenty-four hours old, which led to the south side of -the river. The scout was given a fresh horse and ordered to return to -Elliott, who was directed to follow the trail cautiously until eight -o’clock at night, at which time he was to halt and wait for Custer, who -would leave the wagon train and follow him immediately. - -Calling the officers to him, Custer briefly gave his orders for the -advance. The wagon train was to be left under the care of an officer and -eighty men. Each trooper was to take one day’s rations of coffee and -hardtack and one hundred rounds of ammunition upon his person, together -with a little forage for his horse, and the regiment was to push on at -the highest possible speed to join Elliott. - -When it came to designate an officer to remain with the train, the -detail fell upon Captain Louis McLane Hamilton, whose turn it was to act -as officer of the day in camp. This young man bore two historic names. -McLane was the second in command of Light Horse Harry Lee’s famous -cavalry in the Revolution, and he was the grandson of the great -Alexander Hamilton. He demurred bitterly to being left in the rear in -command of the train under such circumstances. There was no help for it, -however, until Custer finally informed him that if he could get any one -to take his detail he could go. - -It was discovered upon inquiry that one of the officers of the regiment -had become almost helpless from snow blindness, the glare of the ice and -snow being something terrible, especially upon an open prairie such as -they were then traversing. This officer was entirely unfit for active -campaigning, but such was his zeal to go forward that he concealed his -ailment until Hamilton’s scrutiny brought it forth. To him, therefore, -was committed the charge of the wagon train, much against his wish, and -Hamilton was allowed to go at the head of his troop. - - - III. The Trail in the Snow - -It had grown somewhat warmer during the day. The top crust of the snow -became soft, and the horses sank through it to their knees. There was no -road or trail, of course, but the command advanced straight across the -open prairie toward the point where Corbin had indicated that Elliott -had picked up the trail. The several troops were successively placed in -the advance for the fatiguing and arduous labor of breaking up the road. -There was every desire to spare the horses, but they were nevertheless -urged to the last limit to overtake Elliott. Under such circumstances it -was problematical whether they would find him alive; for the Indians, -who were believed to be in great force, might discover him, ambush him, -attack him, and wipe him out as Fetterman had been annihilated, or as -Forsyth had been overwhelmed. - -During the afternoon Custer and his command struck Elliott’s trail, but -it was not until nine o’clock at night that they overtook him. They -found him encamped on the banks of a little stream and thoroughly -concealed in the timber. With relief the regiment halted, and taking -advantage of the deep ravine through which the creek ran, they managed -to build a few fires, which, being well screened, were invisible a short -distance away. Over the fires the men made coffee, which, with the -hardtack, constituted their only meal since morning—a Thanksgiving -dinner indeed. - -Elliott had followed the trail, which was still well defined, until -eight o’clock, and then had halted in accordance with the orders of -Custer, and had waited for his commander. A hasty council was held and -some were for taking up the advance at once. But it was pointed out that -the moon would rise in one hour and by waiting they would have the -benefit of the moonlight in following the Indian trail. Besides, the -short rest would do the command good. Saddles were taken off, the horses -rubbed down and sparingly fed from the scanty supply of forage. At ten -the march was once more resumed in this order: - -First of all, riding some distance ahead of the main body, were two -Osage Indian scouts. One of these was Little Beaver, who was chief of a -small band of Indian auxiliaries which had volunteered for the campaign. -Next to them came other Indians, several famous frontiersmen, California -Joe and Scout Corbin, and a hideous half Negro, half Indian interpreter -whose name was Romero, but whom the soldiers facetiously dubbed Romeo, -because he was so ugly; then General Custer and his staff, and then, -some distance in rear, the successive troops of the regiment in a column -of fours. About three miles from their camping place Little Beaver came -back to Custer in considerable agitation and declared that he smelled -fire. Nobody else smelled anything, but at his insistence the command -was halted, and he and one of his men went forward with Custer and one -or two of the scouts until they had gone a mile from the halting place. - -Sure enough, after surmounting a little hill, they saw ahead of them and -some distance away the embers of a fire. The advance party halted. -Little Beaver and the other Indians snaked their course over the ground, -taking advantage of every cover to learn what they could. With beating -hearts the general and the others watched them. Would they stumble upon -the foemen then and there? They waited, concealed beneath the hillock, -until Little Beaver returned to tell them that the fire had evidently -been kindled by the boys guarding the herds of ponies during the day. At -any rate it had almost gone out, no one was there, and the way was safe -for the present, although the main camp was probably not far distant. - -Orders were sent back to the regiment to advance but to keep its present -distance behind Custer and the scouts. The command proceeded with the -utmost caution, with an excitement in their veins at the stealthy -approach with its possible consequences which made them almost -insensible to the frightful cold. About half after twelve o’clock on the -morning of the twenty-seventh, Custer saw the leading Indian suddenly -sink down behind a hill and wave his hand quickly backward. The whole -party dismounted, and the commanding officer with one of his scouts -crawled to the hill where the Indian lay. Whispering a word or two, -Little Beaver pointed straight in front of him. - -Half a mile away a huge black blotch was tremulously moving on the snow -in the moonlight. Experienced eyes recognized a herd of ponies. Where -the ponies were there were the Indians also. Custer watched the scene -for a moment, and upon the still air—the wind had died and the night -though bitter cold was intensely quiet—he heard the sound of a bell, -evidently tied to the neck of the leader of the herd. Dogs barked, and -as they waited they marked the thin, shrill cry of a little child. It -was an Indian camp beyond peradventure. Beyond it, among the bare and -leafless trees, gleamed in the moonlight the ice-bound shores of a -half-frozen river—the Washita. - -The general, as tender-hearted a man as ever lived, and as kindly for -all his fights, tells us how strangely that infant’s cry heard on that -bitter winter night moved him, appealed to him. It filled his mind with -natural regret that war had to be waged and an attack delivered upon a -camp in which there were women and children; but the stern necessities -of the case permitted no other course. - -[Illustration: - - _Copyright by D. F. Barry_ -] - - MAJ. JOEL H. ELLIOTT[47] CAPT. LOUIS McL. HAMILTON[47] - CAPT. JAMES M. BELL CAPT. J. W. BENTEEN - - SOME OFFICERS OF THE SEVENTH CAVALRY IN THE WASHITA EXPEDITION - -The band of Indians under his gaze was that of Black Kettle,[48] Head -Chief of the Cheyennes since the death of Roman Nose, one of the most -ferocious and brutal of the Plains Indians. The blood of scores was upon -his hands and upon the hands of his followers as well. Torture, infamy, -treachery, shame beyond estimation, had stained that band. Even then in -the camp there were helpless captives, poor women whose fate cannot be -described or dwelt upon. - -When Custer had satisfied himself at last that he had found the camp for -which he had been searching—which appeared to be a very large one from -the number of lodges which they thought they could make out in the -distance—leaving the scouts to observe the Indians, he tramped back -through the snow to the command, and by messengers summoned the officers -about him. Taking off their sabers for the moment, so that their -clanking would not betray them, the officers crept to the crest of the -hill and made themselves as familiar with the situation as they could by -such inspection. - -There Custer gave them their final orders. The regiment was divided into -four squadrons; Major Elliott, with three troops, G, H, and M, was -ordered to circle cautiously to the left and get in the rear of the -Indian camp. Captain Thompson, with troops B and F, was directed to make -a long detour to the right and join Elliott. Captain Myers, with troops -E and I, was commanded to move a shorter distance to the right and take -position on the left of Thompson, while Custer himself, with the four -remaining troops—Captain Hamilton commanding one squadron, comprising -troops A and C, Captain West, another, of troops D and K, with the -Osages and scouts and forty sharp-shooters under Adjutant Cook—was to -approach the village from the point where they then stood. - -Not a sound was to be made, not a shot fired, not a signal given. The -attack would be delivered at dawn. When they heard the bugler sounding -the charge in the still air of the morning they were to rush in -immediately. In order not to impede their movements the men were -directed to remove their overcoats and leave them in care of the guard -in the rear before the attack was delivered. Then, after hearty -handshakes and whispered salutations, the officers assembled their -several squadrons and silently started out upon the long detours -necessary to enable them to reach their designated positions. - -The Indian village was located in the valley of a small river in the -Indian Territory, an affluent of the Canadian called the Washita. It was -in a deep depression, below the surrounding country, and was well -sheltered by trees on the banks of the stream, here easily fordable. By -the time all preparations had been made in Custer’s own detachment it -still wanted some four hours to dawn. The troops with Custer had nothing -to do but wait where they were, and a weary, freezing wait it was. So -insistent was the general that there should be no noise that he refused -to allow the men even to beat their breasts to keep up circulation, or -to stamp their feet to ward off the numbing cold. Conversation was -forbidden. They were dealing with a warrior who was the most watchful of -foemen, with men who could detect an enemy, as the Osage had the fire a -mile away, seemingly by instinct. They must take every precaution. The -men dismounted and stood uncomplainingly by the side of their horses. -Some of them wrapped themselves in their overcoats, and attaching their -bridle reins to their wrists, lay down on the ground and actually went -to sleep. - -About an hour before dawn Custer despatched the last squadron under -Captain Myers, who had but a short distance to go, and then, as the -first pale grayness of the morning began to steal over the eastern hills -and mingle with the moonlight, he gave orders to call the troops to -attention. The first sergeants went through the ranks and by a touch of -the hand woke the sleeping men. Stiff and numb with the cold, they -staggered to their feet, took off their overcoats, left them under the -care of a small guard, and mounted their horses. Their sabers had been -left behind and they were armed with revolvers and Spencer carbines. The -officers quickly formed up their troops and with whispered words placed -themselves at the head. - -The troops were deployed in line, Hamilton’s squadron to the right, -West’s to the left. Cook’s sharp-shooters were about forty yards in -advance of the left, dismounted, their horses being left with the guard. -Some distance in front of all the rest rode Custer. Following him was -his bugler. Next to the bugler was the indomitable regimental band. The -orders were, in Hamilton’s last words, “Now men, keep cool; fire low, -and not too rapidly.” - -The Osages had been somewhat doubtful as to the issue of the attack. -They had made medicine, war-painted themselves and arrayed themselves -for battle, but with a great deal of trepidation. They expected the -white soldiers would be beaten, and they reasoned that in that case -their allies would endeavor to purchase their own salvation by -surrendering the Osages to the vengeance of their enemies. They -determined to take such a position as would enable them to be governed -by circumstances in their movements—so they could either fight or fly. -They knew the reverence with which the soldiers regarded their flag. -Never having been in action with the white man, they concluded that the -flag would be kept in a place of safety and if they stood religiously -close to the banner they would be in a good position to attack or -retreat as circumstances required. Consequently, they rallied on the -flag. For once the red man’s reasoning led him into trouble, for, as it -happened, and as it was to be expected, the flag was in the thick of the -fight, and, to give them credit, after they saw their mistake and saw no -means of rectifying it, the Osages fought as bravely and as efficiently -as the rest. - -The command went silently down the hill, making for the center of the -valley and the trees where lay the Indian camp. The excitement of the -situation was intense. Nobody knew just what he was about to encounter. -No one could tell whether the other troops had succeeded in getting -within supporting distance or not. But Custer knew his officers, and he, -rightly in this instance—alas, that it might not have been so in other -cases!—depended upon them. Nearer and nearer the line approached the -village. Clearer and clearer came the light from the pale sky. Little, -hazy clouds of smoke floated above the tepees under the trees, but aside -from that there was yet no evidence of life among them. - -However cautiously it was conducted the advance of such a body of men -over the snow made a great deal of noise. They had come so near the camp -that they could not hope to remain undiscovered another moment. At the -instant Custer was about to give the signal a rifle shot was heard on -the other side of the camp. At first it was thought to be an accidental -discharge from one of the other attacking parties. It was afterward -learned that shot was fired by Black Kettle himself, who had heard the -noise of the advancing troops, for every squadron had reached its -appointed place, and practically at the same time they commenced their -advance upon the devoted town. So soon as the crack of the rifle broke -upon the still air the bugle sounded the charge. - -With the first notes Custer turned to the band. Each trumpeter had his -trumpet to his lips, each drummer his drum-sticks in the air. - -“Play!” he shouted, and for the first time in action the stirring notes -of the tune now peculiar to the Seventh Cavalry as its battle -music—“Garry Owen”—broke on the air. Three answering bugle calls rang -out from the different squadrons on all sides of the village. The -cavalry charged, the dismounted soldiers advanced on the run. They all -cheered. - - - IV. The Attack in the Morning - -The village was strung along the banks of the creek and the troopers -fell upon it like a storm. The Indians, completely surprised, -nevertheless did not lose a moment. They poured out of the lodges, and -seeking the shelter of the trees or standing knee-deep in the icy water -of the river, with the banks acting as rifle-pits, returned the fire of -the white men. A few of them succeeded in breaking away, but most of -them had to fight where they were, and right well they fought. - -Brave Captain Hamilton, who had sought the detail with such zeal, was -shot from his horse and instantly killed. Captain Barnitz received a -wound through the breast under his heart. Here and there others fell. - -Strict orders had been given to spare the women and children. Most of -the squaws and children remained hidden in the tepees. Others took part -in the defense. The various troops scattered throughout the village and -the fighting was hand-to-hand of a most vigorous character. Captain -Benteen, galloping forward, was approached by an Indian boy about -fourteen years of age on horseback. The boy was armed with a revolver. -As the captain drew near he called out to the lad that his life would be -safe if he would throw away his weapon. Fearing he could not understand -him he made peace signs to him. For reply the boy leveled his weapon and -shot at the captain. The bullet missed him. The Indian fired a second -time and the bullet cut through the sleeve of Benteen’s coat. The -captain was still making signs of amity and friendship when the boy -fired a third time and hit his horse. As he raised the pistol to fire a -fourth time the officer was forced to shoot him dead. - -One squaw seized a little white boy, a captive, and broke for the river. -She got into hiding in some underbrush where she might have remained -unmolested, but such was her malignity that she busied herself by taking -pot-shots at the galloping troops with her revolver. They captured her -when her revolver was empty and then discovered that she had been -fighting them in spite of a broken leg. - -The Indians rallied in certain places favorable for defense. In their -desperation seventeen braves threw themselves into a little depression -in the ground and refused to surrender, fighting until all were killed. -In a ravine running from the river thirty-eight made a heroic defense -until they were all shot. In all, one hundred and three were killed, -including Black Kettle, the chief. - -The furious fighting had lasted one hour. The village was now in -possession of the troops. A number of officers and men had been wounded -and a temporary hospital was established in the middle of the village. -Details were sent through the lodges to rout out the squaws and -children, and a roll-call was ordered. - -Custer was dismayed to find that Major Elliott and fourteen men, -including Sergeant-Major Kennedy and three corporals, were missing. -Where they had gone to no one at first could imagine. Finally a trooper -stated that a number of Indians had escaped in the gap between Elliott -and Thompson, and that he had seen Elliott with a few troopers break -away in pursuit of them. An order was given for a troop to search for -them, but before it could get away Indians were perceived in a heavy -force on the bluffs directly in front of the command. Custer had -succeeded in killing practically the whole of Black Kettle’s band, and -as the Indians who had escaped had been forced to run for their lives, -naked as they came from the lodges, he could not understand the -appearance, just out of range of his men, of this portentous and -constantly increasing force arrayed in full war panoply. - -Inquiry among the captives disclosed the fact that the valley had been -chosen as the winter headquarters for the principal bands of the Kiowas, -Arapahoes, Cheyennes, “Dog Soldiers,”[49] Comanches, and even a -wandering band of Apaches. There were at least two thousand warriors in -this assemblage. At that moment the men who had been guarding the -overcoats and the lead horses came running in saying that they had been -driven off by a heavy force of Indians. The situation was indeed -critical. - -Something had to be done at once. Custer dismounted his men, threw them -out in a half circle about the camp, and prepared for battle. The -Indians did not delay in delivering it. Led by Little Raven, an -Arapahoe, and Satanta,[50] a famous Kiowa, and Black Kettle’s successor, -Little Rock, they at once attacked. A fierce battle was on and Custer’s -ammunition was running low. The troops were now fighting for their -lives. They had not expected anything of this kind. Fortunately, at this -critical juncture a four-mule wagon came dashing through the Indian -line. The Indians, being occupied in fighting, did not observe it until -it was right upon them. Driving the wagon was Major Bell, the -quartermaster, from the train. With him was a small escort. He had -loaded the wagon with ammunition and galloped toward the sound of the -fighting. With the fresh supplies, therefore, the troops at last made a -bold charge which drove the Indians headlong down the valley, during -which Little Rock, striving to rally his braves, was killed. - -Custer now set fire to the lodges, totally destroying them and their -contents. What to do with the ponies of the herd which had been captured -in spite of the efforts of the squaws to run off with them, was a -problem. It was impossible, under the circumstances, to drive them back -to the camp. To turn them loose would have allowed them to fall into the -hands of other Indians for use in future warfare. They had to be shot. -It was a most unpleasant and repulsive duty for the soldiers, but there -was no alternative. The whole herd was slaughtered. It took an hour and -a half to kill them, and those engaged in the work said they had never -done anything so harrowing and distressing. - -By this time it was late in the afternoon. The Indians from the other -villages, finding they were pursued but a short distance, had -reassembled and once more prepared for attack. It was necessary for -Custer to retreat at once. He put every available man on horseback, -threw out skirmishing parties, the colors were brought up, the -indefatigable band started playing, and the party advanced gaily up the -valley toward the Indians. As he hoped and planned, they immediately -reasoned that he would not advance with such confidence against such an -overwhelming force, unless he was supported by heavy reinforcements to -his command. After a short resistance they broke and fled. - -It was night by this time, and Custer lost no time in getting out of the -valley. The weather was still frightfully cold, and his men were without -their overcoats, for they had, of course, not recovered them, and were -almost perishing. They got back in safety, however, to Camp Supply, -having accomplished the object of their expedition in dealing a decisive -blow to the Indians. More than that, they had shown the Indians, who -trusted for immunity to the season, that winter and summer were alike to -the American soldier. - -The Indian loss was one hundred and three killed in the village, -including Black Kettle; an unknown number, believed to be large, killed -and wounded during the all-day fighting, including Little Rock; the -capture of fifty-three squaws and children; eight hundred and -seventy-five ponies, eleven hundred and twenty-three buffalo robes and -skins; the destruction of over five hundred pounds of powder and one -thousand pounds of lead; four thousand arrows, seven hundred pounds of -tobacco, besides rifles, pistols, saddle-bows, lariats, immense -quantities of dried beef, and other winter provisions; in short, the -complete destruction of the village and the annihilation of the band. - -The losses of the regiment in the engagements were one officer and -fourteen men missing (Elliott and his party), one officer and five men -killed, three officers and eleven men wounded. General Sheridan called -the affair the most complete and satisfactory battle ever waged against -the Indians to that time. - -Custer had marched through that blizzard and over the snow-clad plains -to victory. His stealthy approach, the skill with which he had -surrounded the village, the strength with which the attack had been -delivered, and the battle which he had fought with the unexpected Indian -force, the ruse by which he had extricated himself, and, last but not -least, Bell’s gallant dash with the ammunition wagon, were all given the -highest praise. And well they merited it. - -One or two incidents of the battle are worthy of especial mention. When -the troops obtained possession of the village, they found the dead body -of a white woman. The fact that she still had some vestige of civilized -clothing upon her, quite new, proved that she had been but recently -captured. She had been shot dead by the Indians at the moment of attack -to prevent her rescue; and there was also the body of a little white -child, who had been killed by those who had him in charge, lest he -should be returned to his family again. - -The squaws, of course, were in great terror. They thought they would be -instantly put to death when they were routed from their tepees. Black -Kettle’s sister, Mah-wis-sa, who seemed to be the leading woman of the -village, made a long oration to Custer, telling him that she was a good -Indian, and that she had tried to restrain Black Kettle in his nefarious -career—which was all a lie, of course. She wound up by bringing the -comeliest of the young Indian maidens to Custer, and, after solemnly -placing the hand of the girl in that of the General, mumbled some kind -of a gibberish over the two. The General observed Romeo standing near -with a broad grin upon his face, and asked him what Mah-wis-sa was -doing. He was told that she was marrying him to the beauty of the tribe -to propitiate him. That marriage did not stand. - - - V. The Fate of Elliott and his Men - -The fate of Elliott’s detachment remained a mystery. His comrades hoped -that he had escaped, but as the days passed and he did not return to the -regiment, and as nothing was heard from him, they abandoned hope in -despair. This was not, by any means, the end of the winter campaigning; -and some time after, Custer and his men, this time heavily reinforced, -again marched up the valley of the Washita. A short distance from the -place where Black Kettle’s band had been annihilated they found the -remains of Elliott and his men. The evidence of the field and what was -afterward learned from Indian captives told the sad story. - -Pursuing the fleeing Indians, Elliott and his party suddenly ran into -the midst of a horde of braves coming down the valley to help Black -Kettle and the men who had been engaged with Custer. To fly was -impossible. They dismounted from their horses, formed themselves in a -semicircle a few feet in diameter, stood back to back, as it were, and -fought until they died. There were evidences of a terrible conflict all -around them. Right dearly had they sold their lives. - -The last survivor of that gallant little band had been Sergeant-Major -Kennedy, the finest soldier in the regiment. He was not wounded, it -appeared, but had expended all his ammunition for both rifle and -revolver. Being an officer, he wore a sword. Seeing him, as they -supposed, helpless, the Indians resolved to take him alive for the -purpose of torturing him. There was not a soldier who knew of the habits -of the Indians who would not chose death to captivity any time. The -brave Kennedy stood alone in the midst of the bodies of his comrades, -fronting death, sword in hand. I like to think of the courage of that -heroic man in the midst of that savage, ravening assemblage. - -With wily treachery the Indians made peace signs, and walked toward him -with hands outstretched, saying: “How, How!” Kennedy, who knew the true -value of such proceedings, waited until the chief of the band approached -him nearly, then thrust his sword up to the hilt into the Indian’s -breast. When they found Kennedy’s body he had been pierced by no less -than twenty bullets. The other troopers had received one or two bullet -wounds each. They were all stripped, scalped, and mutilated.[51] - -There was a great outcry when this battle became known, and Custer was -accused of slaughtering helpless, inoffensive, gentle Indians! Unmerited -obloquy was heaped upon him, but those who lived near enough to feel the -effects of the Red Scourge realized that he had done for the settlers -the best thing that could be done. People who knew, and his superior -officers, not only sustained but commended him. - -Custer again, in command of a much larger force, surprised a more -populous village later in this same winter. It was completely in his -power. He could have wiped it from the face of the earth, although it -contained a force of Indians nearly equal to his own; but he stayed his -hand, and said he would spare the savages if they would deliver to him -two wretched women, one a young bride, the other a young girl, whom they -held in captivity and for whose deliverance the campaign had been -undertaken. By masterly skill Custer captured Satanta the Infamous, and -held him until the captives were given up. With the expedition was the -brother of one of the captives. Custer tells, in his simple, terse -manner, with what feelings that whole army watched the poor women -brought into camp, and how the boy, the last of his family, stood -trembling by the general’s side until he recognized, in one of the -wrecks of humanity which the Indians handed over, the sister whom he was -seeking.[52] The red-headed cook, referred to above, was with the army -again, and proved herself, in her rude way, an angel of mercy and -tenderness to these, her wretched sisters. - ------ - -Footnote 45: - - This statement has been called in question. The facts are taken from - Custer’s farewell order to his division, April 19, 1865, as published - in Captain Frederick Whittaker’s “Complete Life of General George A. - Custer,” Sheldon & Co., New York, 1876. There is no possible doubt as - to the correctness of the statement. - -Footnote 46: - - It is interesting, in view of his great services to his country, to - learn that the first American ancestor of the Custer family was a - Hessian officer who was captured at Saratoga in 1777. - -Footnote 47: - - Killed in the Battle - -Footnote 48: - - Mo-ke-ta-va-ta.—Letter from Mr. W. H. Holmes, Chief of the Bureau of - American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution. - -Footnote 49: - - Dog Soldiers were bands of especially ruthless Indians who could not - brook even tribal restraint. They included members of different tribes - and were unusually formidable. Possibly they got their name from a - perversion of Cheyennes, _i.e._ Chiens-dogs. Another account describes - them as a sort of mercenary police at the service of a chief of a - tribe, with which he enforced his commands upon the recalcitrant and - generally kept order. In any case they were men of exceptional courage - and bravery. - -Footnote 50: - - A corruption of Set-t’á-iñt-e, “White Bear.”—Letter from Mr. W. H. - Holmes, Chief of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian - Institution. - -Footnote 51: - - “Our Wild Indians,” Colonel Richard I. Dodge, U.S.A. - -Footnote 52: - - “... and at the last the brief reference to that episode when he - (Custer) let glory of battle go, to save two white women! - - “Has any one told you that the long line of soldiers and officers - drawn up to witness the return of the two captives wept like women, - and were not ashamed when the poor creatures came into the lines? Will - you not write that story up some day, Dr. Brady? I will give you some - addresses of officers who were eye-witnesses. They cannot seem to put - such a picture before the public, but they do talk well.”—Private - letter to me from the wife of an officer present on the occasion - noted. - - - - - CHAPTER ELEVEN - Carr and Tall Bull at Summit Springs - - - I. A Brilliant Little Fight - -General Eugene A. Carr, in command of the Fifth Cavalry, did some -brilliant skirmishing and fighting in 1868–9 western Kansas and -Colorado. His most notable exploit was the surprise of Tall Bull’s camp. -Next to Black Kettle, Tall Bull was probably the most vicious and -diabolical of the Indian raiders in these two states. - -Carr, with five troops of the Fifth Cavalry and with W. F. Cody (Buffalo -Bill) as chief guide, learning where Tall Bull’s camp was, marched one -hundred and fifty miles in four days in pursuit of him. Halting when he -believed he had reached the vicinity of the camp, he sent Buffalo Bill -with some of his Pawnee Indian auxiliaries to find out exactly where the -Indians were located. - -Cody, having discovered the location of the village, returned to General -Carr and advised him to take a wider detour, keeping his forces -concealed among the hills, so that he could approach the Indians from -the north, a direction from which they would not be expecting attack, -and whence they might be the more easily surprised. The advice was -followed, the command made its encircling march without detection, and -formed up in line of troops, each troop two abreast, in the ravines -about twelve hundred yards from the village. - -They were between the Indians and the Platte River. The camp was located -at Summit Springs, Colorado. Every preparation having been made, Carr -ordered the bugler to sound the charge. The man was so excited that he -was unable to produce a note. Twice Carr gave the command. Finally, -Quartermaster Hayes snatched the bugle from the agitated musician and -sounded the charge himself, and the whole regiment rushed out into the -open. - -The Indians made for their ponies and advanced to meet the charge. The -rush of the soldiers was too threatening, however. After a hasty fire -they broke and fled on their horses, the whole party, soldiers and -Indian scouts, following after at full speed through the village. The -attack was a complete success. Fifty-two Indians were killed, two -hundred and seventy-four horses and one hundred and forty-five mules -were captured. The soldiers had one man wounded, with no other -casualties. - -In the camp were found the bodies of two unfortunate white women, who -had been captured. Swift as had been the dash of the soldiers, the -Indians had taken time to brain one of the women with a war-club, while -the second was shot in the breast and left for dead. She was given every -possible attention by the soldiers, who took her back to Fort Sedgwick, -and her life was eventually spared. Her sufferings and treatment had -been beyond description. Fifteen hundred dollars in money—in gold, -silver, and greenbacks—strange to say, had been found in the camp. This -sum the soldiers, by permission of the general, donated to the poor -woman, as an expression of their sympathy for her. - -According to some accounts, Tall Bull, who was chief of the camp, and -one of the head chiefs of the Sioux, was killed in this attack. Buffalo -Bill tells another story.[53] The day after the fight the various -companies of the Fifth Cavalry—which had remained in the camp all the -ensuing day and night, at the insistence of the plucky commander, in -spite of the pleas of some of the officers, who, fearing an attack in -force, suggested retiring immediately—separated in order the more -effectively to pursue the flying Indians. Several days after the -surprise the detachment for which Cody was guide was attacked by several -hundred Indians. The soldiers fought them off, killing a number. The -chief of this party was believed by Cody to be Tall Bull. - -Buffalo Bill crept through a ravine for several hundred feet, unobserved -by the Indians, until he reached an opening whence he had the savages in -range. Watching his opportunity as the Indians were careering wildly -over the prairie, he drew a bead on the chief and shot him dead. Whether -that was Tall Bull or not, one fact is clear—that he was killed either -then or before, for he was certainly dead thereafter. - -When the troops were following the Indian trails on the march to Summit -Springs, at every place where the Indians had camped they found marks of -white women’s shoes. It was this knowledge that gave additional -determination and fire to their magnificent attack. - -General Carr deservedly gained great reputation for his dash and daring. - - * * * * * - -Here I include a letter describing this battle from the standpoint of a -soldier, which is a most interesting contribution to the story of the -affair: - - - II. Account of the Battle of Summit Springs - - Written by J. E. Welch to his comrade, Colonel Henry O. Clark, of - Vermont.[54] - -The next spring, 1869, I heard that General Eugene A. Carr, commanding a -detachment of the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, was organizing an expedition to -go after a large band of Indians (Sioux and Cheyennes) who had been -raiding and murdering through Colorado, New Mexico, and Kansas. Some -other fellows and myself went to Fort McPherson and offered our services -as volunteers to serve without pay. The general could not accept our -services, but he said we could go along and act with the scouts—so along -we went. - -The expedition consisted of about four hundred cavalry, one hundred and -fifty Pawnee scouts, under Colonel Frank North, and about twenty -civilians. Buffalo Bill was the guide. He struck out for the Republican -River, and the first night after we got there the hostiles tried to -stampede our horses; they came near accomplishing their object, too, but -they only succeeded in wounding a teamster and killing a mule. Next day -we found the trail of their main body and followed it, but soon found -that we could not gain an inch on them; we kept on, however, until we -came to a place where the trail divided. The trail to the right was very -plain, while the one to the left was scattered and so dim it was evident -to the most inexperienced man in the command that the trail they -intended us to follow was the one to the right. So General Carr detached -two troops of cavalry and some Indians, under Major Royall, caused them -to make as big a show as possible and take the decoy trail, while the -main body was kept back in a low place for a day in order that any -hostile scouts who might be watching us would think the whole command -had gone on the decoy trail. Next day we started on the dim trail, and -before night we became satisfied that we were on the trail of the main -body of the hostiles. Major Royall followed the decoy trail until it -scattered, then turning the head of his column to the left he -intercepted and rejoined the command. We now found that we were gaining -on the game we were after. They evidently thought they had fooled us, -and were taking their time. - -On the tenth of July we marched sixty-five miles, passing three of their -camps. On the eleventh we were on the march before daylight. The trail -was hot, the Indians making for the Platte. Every one knew that if they -succeeded in crossing the river the game was up. By noon we had marched -thirty-five miles, at which time Buffalo Bill, who had been far in -advance of the command all day, was seen approaching as fast as his -tired horse could come. As soon as he reached the column he called for a -fresh horse, and while transferring his saddle told General Carr that he -had encountered two bucks who were hunting and that the Indian camp was -about twelve miles ahead. - -[Illustration] - - GEN. GEORGE CROOK GEN. EUGENE A. CARR - GEN. ELWELL S. OTIS GEN. HENRY B. CARRINGTON - - GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED GENERAL OFFICERS - -The general, knowing the bucks who had been run off by Cody would make -every effort to reach their camp ahead of us in order to give the alarm, -gave the command “Trot.” Both horses and men seemed to brighten up, and -we put real estate behind us at a rapid rate. When within a mile of the -hostile camp a halt was called to let the Pawnees unsaddle, as they -flatly refused to go into action with saddles on their horses. They -began daubing their faces with paint and throwing off their clothing. -They were made to retain enough of the latter to enable us to -distinguish them from the hostiles. After this short delay we moved -forward at a sharp trot, and in a few moments we were looking down at -“Tall Bull’s” camp in a small valley below us. In a moment the camp was -alive with Indians running in every direction. - -General Carr, taking in the situation at a glance, gave utterance to a -few words of command, winding up his remarks with the order, given loud -and clear and sharp: - -“Charge!” - -Every horse leaped forward at the word, and in a twinkling we were among -them and the fight was on. It did not last long. There was rapid firing -for about five minutes, when all was over except an occasional shot as -some fellow would find an Indian who had failed to secure a horse and -escape. - -The result of the fight was about as following: no white men killed, -four or five horses killed, about one hundred and eighty-eight dead -Indians, forty of whom were squaws and children;[55] one hundred and -five lodges captured, many rifles, five tons of dried buffalo meat baled -for winter use, a very ample supply of ammunition, consisting of powder, -lead, etc., and a greater number and variety of brass kettles than I -ever saw before. - -Of their live stock we captured five hundred and sixty head of ponies -and mules. - -To pursue those who had fled was out of the question, our horses being -too badly done up. As we charged the camp, we saw a white woman run from -among the Indians, one of whom fired at her as she ran. We shouted to -her to lie down, which she did, our horses leaping over her without a -hoof touching her. She was wounded in her side, but not fatally. Almost -at the same moment we saw an Indian seize another white woman by the -hair and brain her with a tomahawk. Some of us rode straight for that -Indian, and there was not a bone left in his dead carcass that was not -broken by a bullet. I dismounted in the midst of the hubbub to see if I -could help the woman, but the poor creature was dead. (She had the -appearance of being far gone in pregnancy.) I mounted my horse again -with a very good stomach for a fight. - -After firing a few shots, I happened to see a Red mounted on a large -paint pony making off by himself, and driving four fine mules ahead of -him. I gave chase and gained on him rapidly, which he soon perceived, -dropping his mules and doing the best he could to get away. But it was -no use. “Sam,” my horse, was Kentucky bred, and walked right up on him. -When I was within seventy-five or one hundred yards of him he wheeled -his horse and fired, the bullet passing through the calf of my leg and -into my horse. The Indian threw his gun away and rode at me like a man, -discharging arrows as he came. The third arrow split my left ear right -up to my head. It was then my turn, and I shot him through the head. -This Indian’s name was “Pretty Bear.” He was chief of a band of -Cheyennes. The Pawnees knew him and were anxious to secure his scalp, -which I was glad to give them as I soon became disgusted with the -ghastly trophy. “Pretty Bear” had on his person the badge of a Royal -Arch Mason, with West Springfield, Ill., engraved on it. I sent the -badge to the postmaster at Springfield with a statement as to how it -came into my possession. “Pretty Bear” had five or six scalps on the -trail of his shield, one of which was that of a woman. The hair was -brown, very long, and silken. - -“Tall Bull,” the Sioux chief, was killed by Lieutenant Mason, who rode -up to him and shot him through the heart with a derringer. After I had -taken the scalp of “Pretty Bear” I found that Sam was shot through the -bowels. I unsaddled him and turned him loose to die, but he followed me -like a dog and would put his head against me and push, groaning like a -person. I was forced to shoot him to end his misery. I had to try two or -three times before I could do it. At first to save my life I could not -do it. He kept looking at me with his great brown eyes. When I did fire -he never knew what hurt him. He was a splendid horse, and could do his -mile in 1.57. - -My wounds being slight, I rustled around and soon managed to catch a -small mule, which I mounted bareback, intending to scout around a -little. I did not carry out my intention, however. The brevet horse ran -into the middle of the Indian camp, threw me into a big black mud-hole, -my boot was full of blood, my ear had bled all over one side of me, so -that when I crawled out of that mud-hole I was just too sweet for -anything. By this time the fight was over. A friend of mine, Bill -Steele, went with me to the spring that ran into the mud-hole, where he -washed me as well as he could, bandaged my leg, sewed my ear together -with an awl and some linen thread. He made a good job of it, and I was -all right except that my leg was a little sore and stiff. - -After the fight we found we had one hundred and seventeen prisoners, -four squaws, and fifteen children. They were turned over to the Pawnees. -The Pawnees did not fight well. They skulked and killed the women and -children. I have never seen Indians face the music like white men. We -camped where we were that night. Men were coming into camp all night. In -fact, they did not reach the scene of action until about ten o’clock -next day. They were fellows who had been left along the trail by reason -of their horses giving out. - -Our first duty next day was to bury the poor woman they had so foully -murdered the day before. Not having a coffin, we wrapped her in a -buffalo robe. General Carr read the funeral service and the cavalry -sounded the funeral dirge, and as the soft, mournful notes died away -many a cheek was wet that had long been a stranger to tears. The other -woman was found to be all right with the exception of a wound in the -side. She was a German, unable to speak English. Both of the women had -been beaten and outraged in every conceivable manner. Their condition -was pitiful beyond any power of mine to portray. - -The Indian camp and everything pertaining thereto was destroyed, after -which we took up our line of march for Fort Sedgwick, where we arrived -in due time without any mishap. - -I think it just as impossible to make a civilized man of the Indian as -it would be to make a shepherd dog of a wolf, or a manly man of a dude. -They do not in my opinion possess a single trait that elevates a man -above a brute. They are treacherous, cowardly, and ungrateful, Cooper to -the contrary notwithstanding. I knew a Greek in Arizona who came to the -country with camels for the government. After the camels died he married -an Apache squaw, learned the language, and was employed by the United -States government as an interpreter. This man told me that in the Apache -dialect there was no word, or combination of words, whereby they could -convey the idea that we do by using the word _Gratitude_. What do you -think of that? - -Well, old man, I have been writing half the night, and have only got as -far as the 11th of July ’69. I am discouraged, and right here I quit you -like a steer in the road. How long am I to wait for that picture? I am -curious to see how much of a change old dad Time has wrought in you. He -has played h—l with me. - - As ever, - J. E. WELCH. - -P. S. The photo has come. I could have known you anywhere. You have -changed a little—for the better, I think. - - J. E. W. - ------ - -Footnote 53: - - I have written several times to General Carr, asking information as to - this and other points, but have not received any.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 54: - - This letter, which is dated Edith, Coke County, Texas; June 16, 1891, - was furnished me for publication by Dr. T. E. Oertel. I am informed - that the writer has since died.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 55: - - These figures, which are evidently from memory, are certainly in - error.—C. T. B. - - - - - Part II - The War With the Sioux - - - - - CHAPTER ONE - With Crook’s Advance - - - I. The Cause of the Fighting - -Late in 1876 the government determined that thereafter all Indians in -the Northwest must live on the reservations. For a long time the -Interior Department, to which the management of Indian affairs was -committed, had been trying in vain by peaceable means to induce them to -do this. The Indians were at last definitely informed that if they did -not come into the reservation by the first of January, 1876, and stay -there, the task of compelling them to do so would be turned over to the -War Department. They did not come in; on the contrary, many of those on -the reservations left them for the field; and thus the war began. - -The principal adviser and most influential head man among the Sioux -Nation and its allied tribe, the Cheyennes, was Sitting Bull,[56] an -Unkpapa chief and a great medicine man. He does not seem to have been -much of a fighter. The Indians said he had a big head but a little -heart, and they esteemed him something of a coward; in spite of this, -his influence over the chiefs and the Indians was paramount, and -remained so until his death. - -Perhaps he lacked the physical courage which is necessary in fighting, -but he must have had abundant moral courage, for he was the most -implacable enemy and the most dangerous—because of his ability, which -was so great as to overcome the Indians’ contempt for his lack of -personal courage—that the United States had ever had among the Indians. -He was a strategist, a tactician—everything but a fighter. However, his -lack of fighting qualities was not serious, for he gathered around him a -dauntless array of war chiefs, the first among them being Crazy Horse, -an Oglala, a skilful and indomitable, as well as a brave and ferocious, -leader. - -The Sioux country was encircled by forts and agencies. The Missouri -River inclosed it on the east and north. On the south were the military -posts along the line of the Union Pacific Railroad. To the west were the -mountains. Sitting Bull and his followers took position in the valleys -of the Big Horn near the sources of the Powder River, right at the -center of the encircling forts and agencies. It was a situation whence -they could move directly upon the enemy in any direction as necessity -required. - -For years unscrupulous and mercenary traders had supplied the savages -with high-grade firearms in spite of government protests. The Indians -were better armed than the soldiers, and possessed ammunition in plenty. -Their numbers in the field have been estimated at from twelve hundred to -six thousand warriors, with their wives and children. Those who have -studied the war from the Indian point of view have put the number at the -lower figure; nearly every one else at from three thousand up. Whatever -the facts, there were enough of them to give the United States Army the -busiest time that it had enjoyed since the Civil War. - -Three expeditions were planned for the winter, which were to be launched -upon the Indians simultaneously. One, under General Gibbon, was to come -eastward from western Montana; another, under General Crook, was to -advance northward from southern Nebraska; and the third, under Custer, -was to strike westward from Fort Lincoln. It was believed that any one -of the three, each of which comprised more than a thousand men, would be -strong enough to defeat the Indians, the only problem being to catch -them or corner them. - -The well-known disinclination of Indians to fight pitched battles is a -factor which enters largely into every campaign. Somehow or other, the -Indians in this campaign did not seem to be so disinclined that way. One -cannot but admire the skill with which they manœuvered and the courage -with which they fought. Putting aside all questions of their cruelty and -brutality—and what else could be expected from them?—they were patriots -fighting for the possession of their native land. Bravely they fought, -and well. They were fully apprised of the movements of the troops, and -resolved to attack them in severalty and beat them in detail. We shall -see how completely they did so, and with what brilliant success they -battled, until they were run down, worn out, scattered, killed, or -captured. - - - II. Reynolds’ Abortive Attempt - -The weather was something frightful. Indeed, all through the ensuing -spring it was unprecedentedly inclement. Neither Custer’s expedition nor -Gibbon’s got away in winter. Crook did advance, and first came in touch -with the enemy with results not altogether satisfactory. General Joseph -J. Reynolds, with ten troops from the Second and Third Cavalry, -surprised and took possession of Crazy Horse’s village, on the Powder -River, on the morning of March 17, 1876. The troops had partially -destroyed the village while under a severe fire from the Indians who had -rallied on bluffs and hills round about it, when Reynolds abandoned the -position and retreated. He was, of course, pursued by the Indians, grown -bolder than before, if possible, as they saw the reluctant soldiers -giving up their hard-won prize. - -So precipitate was Reynolds’ withdrawal, in fact, that the bodies of -several troopers who had been shot in the action were abandoned to the -malignity of the savages, and there was a persistent whisper, which will -not down, to the effect that one wounded man was also left behind. - -As to this, an army officer of high rank personally stated to me that -Reynolds was in such a state of excitement, as the afternoon wore away -and Crook did not join him in the village, that he finally peremptorily -ordered the troops to mount and go away, in spite of the fact that the -work of destruction was not complete. This was bad enough, but my -informant solemnly asserted that Reynolds, in spite of plea and even -remonstrance, compelled him to leave behind a wounded trooper, who must -necessarily have been tortured by the Indians so soon as they reoccupied -the village. Captain Bourke has gone on record in his “On the Border -with Crook,” expressing his belief in the truth of this charge, which -forever stains the name of the commander of the expedition. The whole -affair was a disgrace to the army, and many of the officers of the -command, capable and brave men, felt it keenly. They chafed for a chance -to show their qualities, which they had later on. - -The cold was intense, the temperature dropping to thirty degrees below -zero. The soldiers suffered greatly in the retreat. The Indians, who -seemed impervious to cold, pursued them and succeeded in recapturing -their pony herd of some seven hundred head, which Reynolds was -endeavoring to bring away with him. Crook, bringing up the infantry and -wagons, was furious when he met the retreating cavalry and heard its -story. - -There were a number of courts-martial subsequently, but little came of -them, and the matter was finally allowed to drop upon the retirement or -resignation of some of the officers chiefly concerned. It was a -disgraceful affair, and all the honors rested with Crazy Horse. The -Indians were greatly encouraged. The loss of the troops was four men -killed and six wounded, and sixty-six men badly frozen or otherwise -incapacitated by the cold. - - - III. The March to the Tongue River - -After the ignominious outcome of Reynolds’ attack upon the village of -Crazy Horse, the various expeditions noted spent the greater part of the -spring in preparing for the grand advance of the converging columns -which were to inclose the recalcitrant Indians in a cordon of soldiers, -force them back on the reservations, and thus, it was sincerely hoped, -end the war. It will be necessary to follow the movements of the several -columns separately. As that of Crook first came in contact with the -Indians, its history will be first discussed. - -The reorganized command for the campaign, which assembled at Fort -Fetterman, Wyoming, included fifteen troops of cavalry—about nine -hundred men—ten of the Third, under command of Colonel Evans, and five -of the Second, under Major Noyes, the whole being under the command of -Colonel William B. Royall, of the Third.[57] There were also three -companies of the Ninth Infantry and two of the Fourth, a total of three -hundred men, under the command of Colonel Chambers. - -There was an abundance of transportation, a long wagon train, and an -invaluable pack train. The troops were generously provided with -everything necessary for the hard work before them. It was the largest, -and it was believed to be the most efficient, force which had ever been -sent against the Indians in the West. - -Crook, an officer of large experience, especially in Indian fighting, -assumed personal command of the expedition on the 28th of May, 1876. On -the 29th the march began. The objects of the campaign were the villages -of Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull, which were believed to be somewhere on -the Rosebud River. The topography of that country is well known now, but -then it was more or less of a terra incognita—rather more than less, by -the way. Certainly, this was true after the Tongue River was reached. -The advance was made at first up the Bozeman trail, past Fort Reno, and -over the battle-fields around the ruins of abandoned and destroyed Fort -Phil Kearney, which were objects of much interest to the soldiers. - -On the 9th of June the army encamped on the south side of the Tongue -River, near the point where that stream intersects the Montana boundary -line. Crazy Horse[58] had been fully advised by disaffected Indians at -the agencies and military posts, as well as by his own daring scouts, of -all these preparations that were being made to overwhelm him. He had -sent to Crook a specific warning not to cross the Tongue River, and -declared his intent to attack him immediately he reached that stream. To -prove that his threat was no idle boast, he mustered his warriors, and -at half after six o’clock on the evening of the 9th, from the high -bluffs on the other side, opened fire upon the camp. - -Through a fortunate mistake the Indians directed their fire to the tents -of the camp, imagining that they would be full of men. They happened to -be empty. The Sioux soon got the range, and the camp was swept with -bullets. They ripped open mess chests, shattered the sides of the -wagons, destroyed the baggage, killed a few horses, but did little -damage to the men.[59] - -The Third Cavalry was divided into three battalions, one of four, and -two of three troops each. Captain Mills commanded the first battalion, -Captain Henry the second, Captain Van Vliet the third. Crook acted -promptly. He sent forward three companies of his infantry, deploying -them as skirmishers, to line the river bank and open fire on the Indians -in plain view on the bluff on the other side. At the same time he -ordered Captain Mills to take his battalion across the river and charge -the enemy. The Sioux were already unsettled by the accurate fire of the -infantry with their long-range rifles, and as Mills’ battalion deployed, -dashed through the water and at the steep bluffs on the other side, they -broke and fled, having suffered little or no loss, and not having -inflicted much more. - - - IV. The Flying Column - -The skirmish was simply a grim earnest of the determined purpose of the -Indian chief. No pursuit was attempted at that time. Negotiations had -been entered into between the Crows, who were the hereditary enemies of -the Sioux, and the Shoshones, with a view to securing a body of Indian -auxiliaries to the troops, whose services would be invaluable for -scouting. Persuaded thereto by Frank Gruard,[60] a celebrated scout, -something less than two hundred Crows, with eighty odd Shoshones, joined -the army on the 15th of June. - -To pursue Indians while incumbered with infantry and a wagon train was -well nigh a hopeless task. Crook determined to park the wagons and -baggage, leave them under the command of Major Furey, the quartermaster, -strip his command to the lightest marching order, and make a dash for -the Rosebud River and the Indian country. One hundred infantrymen, -protesting most vehemently against their orders, to their credit, be it -said, were detailed to remain with the train. Two hundred others, who -professed to have some skill in riding, were mounted on the mules of the -wagon train to accompany the cavalry. - -The morning of the 15th was spent in accustoming the infantrymen to the -mules and the mules to the infantrymen. The cavalrymen and the Indian -allies enjoyed the circus which ensued when the mules were bridled and -saddled for the first time, and mounted by men who had never before -straddled anything more formidable than a fence rail. It took the whole -morning before the infantrymen and the mules learned to get along with -each other, even in a half-hearted way. - -At five A.M., on the 16th, the force, numbering a little less than -eleven hundred men, with two hundred and fifty Indian auxiliaries, -crossed the Tongue River and marched to the Rosebud.[61] They bivouacked -that night on the banks of the Rosebud, on a level depression surrounded -by low bluffs on all sides, forming a sort of natural amphitheater, on -the top of which the pickets were stationed. Each man carried four days’ -rations of hardtack, coffee, and bacon in his saddle-bags and one -hundred rounds of ammunition upon his person. The pack train was limited -to two mules carrying the medical supplies. There being little to do at -the wagon camp on Goose Creek, a number of mule packers, led by a -veteran, Tom Moore, accompanied the expedition to help the foot soldiers -to manage their mules, and incidentally to take part in the fighting. -There were no tents, of course, and but one blanket (a single blanket at -that) for each man. This blanket barely kept off the heavy dew, and the -night was a thoroughly uncomfortable one. - -At three A.M. on the 17th of June reveillé was sounded. After breakfast -and the care of the horses and mules, six o’clock found the troops on -the march down the Rosebud. At eight o’clock they halted and unsaddled -their animals to give them a nibble of grass and a little rest, -preparatory to a farther advance later on, while the Crows and Shoshones -were sent on ahead to scout. The place in which they had stopped was an -amphitheater, like their camp ground of the night before, a rolling bit -of boggy prairie, inclosed on all sides by bluffs, every point being -within rifle shot of the center. Through this amphitheater ran the -Rosebud River, here a mere creek, its general direction being from west -to east. Toward the east side of the amphitheater the creek was diverted -to the left, the northeastward, and plunged into a gloomy and forbidding -cañon, called the Dead Cañon of the Rosebud. The course of the river was -marked by a rank undergrowth of grass, small trees, etc. - -Mills’ battalion of the Third Cavalry halted on the south bank of the -creek. In rear of Mills was Noyes’ battalion of the Second Cavalry. -Across the creek were Henry’s and Van Vliet’s battalions of the Third -Cavalry, the mounted infantrymen, and the small pack train with the -packers. Crook desired to keep his movements secret, but it had been -impossible to restrain the impetuosity of the Indian auxiliaries the day -before. They had come across a herd of buffalo and had made great -slaughter of the helpless animals, killing one hundred and fifty of -them, for which they had no use at all. It is certain that so able a -general as Crazy Horse had scouts watching Crook all the time, and would -have discovered his advance in any event; but with all the noise made by -the Indians in the buffalo hunt, there was no possibility of a surprise. -As a matter of fact, it was Crazy Horse who began the game. Crook was -ready for him. - - - V. The Battle of the Rosebud - -About half after eight o’clock in the morning, the resting soldiers were -called to attention by the sound of shots from the bluffs in front of -them, over which their allies had disappeared. It was at first supposed -that these friendly Indians had run across another herd of buffalo, but -a few moments told the practised troopers that the firing was the -beginning of a battle rather than that of a hunt. At the same time the -Indian auxiliaries came galloping back to the main body at full speed, -yelling: - -“Sioux, Sioux! Heap Sioux!” - -Without waiting for orders, the troopers saddled their horses and fell -in. They got ready none too soon, for right on the heels of the fleeing -Crows and Shoshones came the Sioux. In front of them to the right, the -left, the low bluffs inclosing the plain, were ringed with Indians in -full war-gear. As one observer described it to me, they looked like -swarms of blackbirds, there were so many of them and in such rapid -motion. They kept coming and coming into view, and as they dashed up to -the brink of the hills upon their war ponies they opened a long-range -fire upon the soldiers, which from the distance did little damage. There -were at least a thousand of them in plain sight. How many others there -might be, no one could tell. It was a safe guess that those in sight -constituted but a small part of the force. - -It is said that there were at least six thousand warriors that day under -the command of Crazy Horse, but that most of them were not engaged. -Crazy Horse had planned an ambush for General Crook, and he had hoped to -defeat him by luring the soldiers into it, or by separating the army -into small detachments and overwhelming them in detail. His plans were -well devised, and came very near being successful. That they did not -succeed is probably due more to the acts of the Indians themselves than -because of the wariness of the soldiers. - -[Illustration: - - _Courtesy of The Century Co._ - - THE DIFFICULT TASK OF THE HORSE-HOLDERS IN ACTION - - _Drawing by Frederic Remington_ -] - -Crook acted at once. Sending his staff officers to rally the Crows and -Shoshones, he directed them to circle to the right and left, and make -ready to fall on the flanks of the Indians. Mills, who had behaved so -gallantly at the Tongue River, was ordered to charge the Indians -straight up the valley to the bluff to the northward, the front. Two -troops of Van Vliet’s squadron were rushed off to the southward, the -rear, to seize a commanding position to prevent the Indians from -circling around in that direction and getting in Crook’s rear. The -infantry and part of the Second Cavalry were dismounted, and thrown -forward as skirmishers around the foot of the bluffs. Royall took -Henry’s battalion, with Van Vliet’s remaining troop, one of Mills’ -troops which he detached while the battalion was on the gallop, and -another of Noyes’ troops, and charged the Indians on the left. - -Mills’ charge was most gallantly delivered. The soldiers struggled -through the bog, raced across the bottom land for about eight hundred -yards, and scrambled up the bluffs in twenty minutes, finding -themselves, when they reached the top, within fifty paces of the Sioux. -There was no time to use carbines. Firing revolvers, the battalion -rushed at the Indians. The savages fired ineffectively, gave way, and -fled instantly to higher ground six hundred yards further on, where they -opened fire. In their excitement they shot badly. Mills dismounted his -battalion, deployed them as skirmishers, rushed the second ridge and -cleared it, the Indians sullenly retiring before him, and again opened -fire on the troops, to which the cavalrymen made effective reply. The -Sioux galloped rapidly to and fro, yelling and firing from their horses, -kicking up clouds of dust, but doing little harm. - -Royall, Henry, and Van Vliet had a similar success on the left, where -the ground was much more open and unfavorable for defense, although the -Indians were massed more heavily in that quarter than before Mills. - -Meanwhile the Crows and Shoshones had fallen upon the flanks of the -Sioux, but not very effectively. Every one in the field except a small -reserve was now hotly engaged. The pressure on Mills became stronger, -but he drove the Indians from him by another gallant attack. Thereafter -he was reinforced by Noyes’ battalion. The front of his line was finally -partially cleared by this last dash. The Indians who had been attacking -him thereupon left him, and joined the others before Royall and Henry. - -Crook now withdrew Mills’ command from the battlefield, and Mills was -ordered to take his three troops down the Dead Cañon of the Rosebud and -attack the villages which it was believed the Indians were defending. -Mills’ movements were supported by the five troops of the Second Cavalry -under Noyes. Crook promised to follow up the movement, and support it -with the remaining cavalry and infantry. We will follow this movement -later. - -Mills’ place in the line was occupied by Tom Moore and his packers and -some other auxiliaries from the camp, and a smart fire was kept up in -that direction. On the left the firing was fast and furious. The Indians -from the front cleared by Mills joined their associates on the left, and -again and again attacked Royall, Henry, and Van Vliet, who had joined -the other two, with the most determined courage. Charge and counter -charge were made over that portion of the field. Now the troops gave way -before the Indian advance, now the soldiers were rallied and hurled back -the Indians, now the Indians retreated before some desperate -countercharge. So went the varying fortunes of the hour. The number of -savages increased with every passing moment. To the eyes of the -astonished soldiers they seemed to spring from the ground. If one fell -in the line, a dozen were ready to take his place. - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE ROSEBUD] - -In one of the charges Captain Henry was shot through the face and -frightfully wounded. The troopers had dismounted, but the officers -remained mounted. Henry reeled in his saddle as the bullet pierced both -his cheek bones and tore out the whole front of his face below the eyes. -Although, as an eye-witness has it, he was spitting blood by the -handful, he continued on the battle line. The situation of Royall’s wing -of Crook’s army was precarious. Henry’s battalion held the extreme left -flank. It was his duty to remain there. Vroom’s troop L, of the Third -Cavalry, had become separated from the main body during the battle, and -was caught ahead of the line and surrounded by Indians, in imminent -danger of annihilation. Crook had ordered Royall to bring his men back -to their horses, in order to mount them and prepare for a general -charge. The Indians took this movement for a retreat, and came dashing -after the retrograding troopers. Only the cool courage of Royall and -Henry, and the magnificent way in which they handled their forces when -they went forward to the rescue, prevented the annihilation of Vroom’s -troops. - -It was in the midst of this operation that Henry received his fearful -wound and stayed on the line.[62] Presently he fell from his horse. As -he did so, the soldiers, dismayed by his fall, began to give back before -the Sioux. The impetuous Indians charged over the place where Henry lay. -Fortunately, he was not struck by the hoofs of the galloping horses. His -men rallied and rushed to his rescue. Old Chief Washakie and his -Shoshones at this period of the fighting displayed splendid courage. The -fight actually raged over the body of Captain Henry until the Indians -were driven off, and Henry was rescued from what would otherwise have -been certain death. After this fierce struggle, part breaking through -the line and part turning the flank, the Indians galloped down the -valley between the river and the troops, and finally disappeared on the -other side of the Dead Cañon, their retreat accelerated by the movement -of Mills toward the village. The fighting had lasted a little more than -two hours. - - - VI. Mills’ Advance down the Cañon - -Meanwhile Mills and his men, in a column of twos, trotted down the -gloomy depths of the Dead Cañon, the rocky walls of which, towering on -either side, would have afforded abundant cover for Indian riflemen. -Before entering the cañon, they had cleared the mouth of it of a body of -Sioux by a smart charge, and they were thereafter unmolested. They -advanced rapidly but with caution, although what they could have done if -attacked it is hard to see, and how caution would have saved them it is -difficult to tell. They had their orders to go through the cañon and -attack the village. There was nothing to do but obey. Sending them -forward was a mistake which might have resulted in a terrible disaster, -although nobody believed that then. The soldiers had not yet realized -what fighters these Indians were. The Custer disaster was still to come, -and no one imagined that so large a body as that commanded by Mills and -Noyes could be defeated. If Crook had followed with his whole force, the -troops under his command would have been annihilated; it is probable -that not one of them would have come out of that cañon. - -When Crook began to prepare to follow Mills with the rest of his force, -he discovered that he had a much larger number of wounded than he had -thought possible, and the doctors protested against their being left -with a feeble guard while Crook with the best of the force went up the -cañon. The protest was justified by the situation. Besides, the attack -on Royall and Henry had not yet ceased. Crook reflected, concluded that -he could not leave the field, and that Mills’ force was too weak for the -work assigned it. The general thereupon despatched Captain Nickerson, of -his staff, attended by a single orderly, at the imminent peril of their -lives, with orders to ride after Mills and tell him to leave the cañon, -defile to the left, and rejoin him at once. Crook hoped that Mills, on -his return to the field, might succeed in getting in the rear of any -Indians who might be lurking in the hills before Royall’s shattered -line. - -So rapid had been Mills’ movements, that Nickerson, although going at -the full speed of his horse, did not overtake him until he had -penetrated some seven miles down the cañon. Fortunately for all -concerned, the command had halted where a cross cañon made an opening -toward the west, and on that side the cañon was so broken and so sloping -that it could be scaled by the troopers. Firing was heard to the front, -and the Indians were detected massing to attack Mills’ detachment. A -halt had been ordered for the purpose of making final preparations for -the attack. - -“Mills,” said Nickerson, as he came galloping up, “Royall has been badly -handled—there are many wounded. Henry is severely hurt, and Vroom’s -troop is all cut up. The General orders that you and Noyes defile by -your left flank out of this cañon and return to the field at once. He -cannot move out to support you and the rest on account of the wounded.” - -Never was order more unwelcome. The officers at the head of the column -urged Mills to go on. The Indian village was in sight. Crook could not -have known how near they were, or he would not have recalled them. -Mills, however, was a thorough soldier. In his mind orders were to be -obeyed, and he silenced the objectors and advisers, and did as he was -directed, although with great disappointment and reluctance. Never was -obedience better justified. General Mills admits now that, had he -disobeyed Crook, his command would have been annihilated. - -The cañon was the mouth of Crazy Horse’s trap. A short distance farther -on, it ended in a great dam covered with broken logs, making a dangerous -abattis. Here the main body of the Indians had been massed. Here they -expected, seeing the confident advance of the eight troops of cavalry up -the cañon, to fall upon them and kill them all, which they might easily -have done. Nickerson got there just in time. - -Mills instantly turned to the left and led his troops up the broken wall -of the cañon to the high ground on the farther side; fortunately, he had -been overtaken at about the very point where the ascent was practicable -for troops. Presently the detachment rejoined the main body, their -progress being unmolested. - -There were ten soldiers killed and twenty-seven seriously wounded, -besides a great number of slightly wounded. Most of the casualties were -in Royall’s command, Vroom’s troop having lost heavily while it was in -such peril. - -Crook camped for the night on the battle-field. The dead were buried, -the wounded looked after temporarily, and the next morning the soldiers -withdrew. They went back to their camp at Goose Creek and stayed there. -The battle was in one sense a victory for the white soldiers, in that -they drove the Indians from the field, forcing them back at least five -miles. In another, and a larger and more definite sense, it was a -decided victory for Crazy Horse. He had fought Crook to a standstill. He -had forced him back to his base of supplies. He had stopped the farther -progress of that expedition. He had protected his villages and had -withdrawn his army in good order. - -If Mills’ command had not been recalled, it is certain that it would -have been annihilated. As it was, the Indians had done remarkably well. -Crazy Horse, free from further apprehension of pursuit by Crook for the -present, had leisure to turn his attention to the other two expeditions, -which there is no doubt he was well aware had been launched against him. - -While technically it was perhaps a drawn battle, as a feat of arms the -battle of the Rosebud must go down to the credit of the Indians. It was -more like a pitched battle than any that had been fought west of the -Missouri heretofore. The individual officers and soldiers of the army -did splendidly; so did the Indians. Mills had displayed commendable dash -and daring in all his charges. Royall, Henry and Van Vliet, and Chambers -with the infantry, had fought skilfully and bravely against an -overwhelming force. Crook’s dispositions were good on the field, and -were well carried out by his subordinates. The same may be said of Crazy -Horse, his subchiefs, and their warriors. - -Crook had nearly exhausted his ammunition in the hard fighting, the -larger part of his supplies had been expended, and he had a number of -very seriously wounded on his hands. There was not one chance in a -thousand that he could catch the Indians now. There was nothing left for -him to do but go back to the main camp, send his wounded back to Fort -Fetterman for treatment, order up more supplies and more troops, and -await a favorable opportunity to attack again. - -To anticipate events, it may be noted that, owing to the disaster to -Terry’s column, Crook did not advance until August. - ------ - -Footnote 56: - - Tatá ^nka I yotá ^nka, according to a letter from Mr. W. H. Holmes, - Chief of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution. - -Footnote 57: - - General King, in his fascinating book, “Campaigning with Crook,” has - preserved a characteristic anecdote of Royall, which I venture to - quote as illustrating the way they have in the army, and as throwing - some light on the temperament of the peppery old fighter: - - “A story is going the rounds about Royall that does us all good, even - in that dismal weather. A day or two before, so it was told, Royall - ordered one of his battalion commanders to ‘put that battalion in camp - on the other side of the river, facing east.’ A prominent and - well-known characteristic of the subordinate officer referred to was a - tendency to split hairs, discuss orders, and, in fine, to make trouble - where there was a ghost of a chance of so doing unpunished. Presently - the colonel saw that his instructions were not being carried out, and, - not being in a mood for indirect action, he put spurs to his horse, - dashed through the stream, and reined up alongside the victim with: - - “’Didn’t I order you, sir, to put your battalion in camp along the - river, facing east?’ - - “’Yes, sir; but this ain’t a river. It’s only a creek.’ - - “’Creek be d—d, sir! It’s a river—a river from this time forth, _by - order_, sir. Now do as I tell you!’ - - “There was no further delay.” - -Footnote 58: - - “Crazy Horse was the personification of savage ferocity; though - comparatively a young man, he was of a most restless and adventurous - disposition, and had arrived at great renown among the warriors, even - before he was twenty-six years of age. In fact, he had become the war - chief of the southern Sioux and the recognized leader of the hostile - Oglalas.”—“Personal Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles, U. S. - A.” - -Footnote 59: - - One bullet smashed the pipe of a small camp stove in Captain Mills’ - tent. When the Eastern papers learned the interesting fact that Mills’ - stovepipe had been smashed, that gallant officer was severely - censured, and much ridicule was heaped upon him, under the impression - that he wore a “stovepipe” hat in action. By the way, when Captain - Broke, of the British frigate _Shannon_, boarded the American frigate - _Chesapeake_, Captain Lawrence, in the War of 1812, he wore just such - a hat! - -Footnote 60: - - “Frank Gruard, a native of the Sandwich Islands, was for some years a - mail rider in northern Montana, and was there captured by the forces - of ‘Crazy Horse’; his dark skin and general appearance gave his - captors the impression that Frank was a native Indian, whom they had - recaptured from the whites; consequently, they did not kill him, but - kept him a prisoner until he could recover what they believed to be - his native tongue—the Sioux. Frank remained several years in the - household of the great chief ‘Crazy Horse,’ whom he knew very well, as - well as his medicine man, the since renowned ‘Sitting Bull.’ Gruard - was one of the most remarkable woodsmen I have ever met; no Indian - could surpass him in his intimate acquaintance with all that pertained - to the topography, animal life, and other particulars of the great - region between the head of the Piney, the first affluent of the Powder - on the west, up to and beyond the Yellowstone on the north; no - question could be asked him that he could not answer at once and - correctly. His bravery and fidelity were never questioned; he never - flinched under fire, and never growled at privation.”—“On the Border - with Crook,” Captain John G. Bourke. - -Footnote 61: - - So called from the quantity of wild roses which grew along its banks - in season. - -Footnote 62: - - For a sketch of General Henry and an account of his experiences in - this battle and elsewhere, see the last chapter of this book. - - - - - CHAPTER TWO - Ex-Trooper Towne on the Rosebud Fight - - -I am afraid that any attempt on my part to comply with your request will -be a very feeble attempt to describe to you the Battle of the Rosebud, -which took place on June 17th, 1876. There are many men living who -participated in that battle who can describe more fully and more -comprehensively than I the details of that day. However, I will do my -best. - -On the 16th day of June, 1876, General Crook with his command was camped -on the Tongue River awaiting the arrival of three hundred Crow and -Shoshone Indians to be used as scouts, under Frank Gruard, a noted scout -of the Indian country, it being Crook’s intention thoroughly to scout -the whole country from the Powder and Tongue Rivers north to the -Yellowstone, and to co-operate with the other columns in the field under -Custer, Terry, and Gibbon. - -At about five P.M. on the afternoon of June 16th the three hundred -scouts came into our camp, and shortly afterward General Crook gave -orders to the command to prepare for a night march. Extra ammunition and -extra rations were issued, and at about eight P.M. we broke camp and -mounted into the saddle to commence our march into the Indian country, -which was overrun by the Oglalas, Brulés, Unkpapas, and Miniconjous, the -four most powerful tribes of Sioux Indians on the plains, for it is to -be remembered that the whole Sioux Nation had left their reservations -and was then on the war-path. - -General Crook had, on the morning of the 16th, sent out scouts to find -and report any Indian signs that might be found. Numerous signs were -found which indicated that a large party of Indians had recently passed -that way going in a northerly direction, with the evident intention of -joining those from the Brulé agency on the Yellowstone. It was General -Crook’s purpose to cut them off. Thus the forced march of the night of -the 16th.[63] - -After a long and tiresome journey of all night, about seven A.M. of the -17th Indians were seen on the hills to our front and left who were -evidently watching our movements. It was reported to General Crook by -the scouts that we had gotten into a country that was completely alive -with hostile Indians and that we were near an immense Indian camp. - -General Crook at about 7.30 A.M. went into camp with the intention of -making another night march and, if possible, overtake their camp the -next day. As we had been in the saddle all night, men and horses needed -a few hours rest. - -After going into camp we unsaddled and put our horses to graze, but -first hobbling them to prevent any stampede that might be attempted. -While we were putting our horses to graze the whole range of hills in -our front became literally alive with Indians, and at the same time the -Crow and Shoshone Indians with us commenced their warlike preparations -by daubing themselves with war paint and riding their ponies in a circle -one behind the other, and at the same time singing their war songs. - -After riding in this manner a short while, the circle broke and the -whole group of Indian scouts charged up the hill toward their enemies. -It is a well known fact that the Sioux and Crow Indians were enemies -toward each other at that time. I have seen the Crow Indians shoot -buffalo and let them lie where they fell, not even undertaking to remove -the hide, because, they would say, “Sioux Buffalo no good,” which -indicated that as the Sioux Indians were their enemies, so were the -buffalo found in the Sioux country their enemies also. Everything in the -Sioux country was an enemy to the Crow Indian. - -While our Indians were making their charge upon the Sioux, General Crook -gave orders to saddle up, for well he knew that a battle was on hand. -After we had saddled and formed in line, my troop, F, Third Cavalry,[64] -was placed on the left flank of the command, and it with two other -troops were detailed as skirmishers and were ordered to make a flank -movement to our left and gain the hills, where we dismounted, leaving -each fourth trooper to hold the horses. We then formed the skirmish line -on foot, which was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Royall. - -At this time I witnessed a most daring act by a bugler by the name of -Snow, who was carrying a despatch from General Crook to Colonel Royall. -General Crook was stationed on one of the hills to our right, near the -center of the line,[65] where he could view all that was taking place. -Wishing to send an order to Colonel Royall, he directed his orderly, -Bugler Snow, to carry it with all haste. The most direct route was down -a steep hill and across a level plain and then up another hill, where -Colonel Royall was. All chances of reaching there alive were against -him. - -When I saw him he was coming as fast as his horse could carry him, while -two Indians were after him with the intention of capturing him. Seeing -that they could not capture him, they finished the game by shooting at -him, and proved their good marksmanship as poor Snow fell from his -horse, shot through both arms, but he delivered his orders all right. - -After remaining on the skirmish line for perhaps two hours, we were -ordered to fall back and remount our horses to take a new position (our -horses were held in check in a ravine), as it was impossible to hold our -present position against such overwhelming odds. I must say that I never -saw so great a body of Indians in one place as I saw at that time, and I -have seen a great many Indians in my time. It seemed that if one Indian -was shot five were there to take his place. If we had remained in our -first position we would all have been killed, and I consider that we -retreated in the right time. - -I had not gone more than one third of the distance from our position to -where the horses were when I overtook three other soldiers of my own -troop carrying a sergeant by the name of Marshall, who had been shot -through the face. I knew that time was precious and none to lose. I -could not give them the cold shoulder by passing them without giving a -helping hand. Glancing back, I saw the hostiles coming over the hill. I -said to the others, “Quick, here they come!” - -At that instant my comrades, to save themselves, dropped the wounded -sergeant and hastened to their horses. The sergeant, seeing that I was -the only one left, said: - -“Save yourself if you can, because I am dying. Don’t stay with me.” I -replied: - -“Dave, old boy, I am going to stay right here with you and will not -desert you.” - -Grasping him with all my strength, I carried my comrade until it was -useless to carry him any farther, for he was dead. I then laid him down -and left him and hurried to get away. - -I don’t think that I had gone more than ten yards when I was surrounded -by about twenty or more of the most murderous looking Indians I ever -saw. You can talk of seeing devils; here they were in full form, painted -in the most terrifying manner, some with their war bonnets adorned with -horns of steers and buffalo. It was enough to strike terror to anyone’s -heart. - -I knew that my time had come, I knew that I would be taken prisoner. I -fought, but it was fighting against terrible odds. There I was down in -that ravine, alone and in the midst of a lot of murderous savages. - -Taking my carbine from me and throwing a lariat over my head and -tightening it about my feet, I was helpless. This was all done in an -instant, while I struggled and fought in vain, until I was struck on the -head with something which rendered me unconscious and caused me to fall. -As I went down a bullet struck me in the body. - -I think that when the bullet struck me I regained my consciousness, -because I realized I was being dragged at a lively pace over the ground -by a pony at the other end of the lariat. It was, I think, the intention -of the Indians either to drag me to death at the heels of the pony or -after getting me away to torture me in some other manner. - -They captured one other comrade of mine by the name of Bennett, of L -Troop, Third Cavalry, and completely cut him in pieces. His remains were -buried in a grain sack. - -After I was dragged in this manner for some distance, my captors were -charged by one of the troops of cavalry, and to save themselves from -capture abandoned me and made their escape. Thus was I enabled to regain -my liberty. - -I was immediately sent to the field hospital, and three days later I, -with eighteen other wounded men, was sent to the post hospital at Fort -Fetterman. You ask in your letter did I get a medal of honor for trying -to get my sergeant away. I am very sorry to say that I did not, although -I do think that even at this late day had I some one who would speak a -good word in my behalf I think that my case would be taken up and that I -might get one.[66] - -I receive a very small pension for the wound received in this Indian -battle, and that is all my recompense. - -Hoping that this narrative of my experience in the Battle of the Rosebud -may be of interest, I have the honor to remain, - - Yours sincerely, - PHINEAS TOWNE. - - St. Louis, Mo. - ------ - -Footnote 63: - - Trooper Towne is in error here; there was no night march, according to - Captain Bourke. See his “On the Border with Crook.” See also “War Path - and Bivouac,” by Finerty.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 64: - - This troop was commanded by Lieutenant Reynolds, and was in Henry’s - battalion.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 65: - - Crook was right in the fighting; his horse was shot under him.—C. T. - B. - -Footnote 66: - - The official records show that Marshall was killed and Towne wounded - in the battle. If this account falls under the eye of any one in - authority, I trust an investigation may be made, and that the medal - may be awarded, if it has been earned.—C. T. B. - - - - - CHAPTER THREE - The Grievance of Rain-in-the-Face - - - I. The Yellowstone Expedition of 1873 - -Having thus disposed of the most formidable column, Crook’s, in so -summary and so effective a manner, the Indians under their able -leadership turned their attention to Custer and Gibbon. - -Before the Little Big Horn campaign is discussed, however, in order the -better to understand the most terribly dramatic episode in the most -disastrous of our Indian battles, it will be necessary to go back a -little and take up the thread of the discourse later. - -The country watered by the Yellowstone and its affluents, traversed by -the Black Hills and other ranges of mountains, and protected by the -almost impassable Bad Lands in Dakota, had been up to 1873 practically a -terra incognita. However, the Northern Pacific Railroad was even then -surveying a route across it. Gold had been discovered, and miners and -settlers were crowding in. The Indians, since the treaty of 1868, which -had resulted in the abandonment of Fort Phil Kearney and the other -posts, had been ugly in mood and troublesome in action. They welcomed -neither railroad nor men. - -An expedition of some seventeen hundred men under General Stanley was -sent into the country in 1873. Custer and the Seventh Cavalry formed a -large part of the command. There were no guides. The country, especially -in the Bad Lands, was a terrible one to cross, and Custer volunteered to -take two troops of cavalry and ride some miles ahead of the main body -every day to mark a road. Custer possessed a faculty for this sort of -work which was simply marvelous. He was a born pathfinder, better even -than Frémont. - -On the 4th of August he left camp at five o’clock in the morning with -the troops of Moylan and Tom Custer, eighty-six men, five officers, and -a favorite Arikara scout, called Bloody Knife. At ten A.M., reaching the -crest of some bluffs along the river bank, they saw spread before them a -beautiful village, through which the river gently meandered between the -tree-clad banks. They advanced two miles up the valley, and made camp -under the trees for a noonday rest. They had come at a smart pace and -were far ahead of the main column, which was out of sight in the rear. -The passage through the valley was easy, and there was no necessity for -them to press on. The weather was hot. After picketing the horses, -partaking of their noonday meal and posting sentries, officers and men -threw themselves on the grass and fell asleep. - -At one o’clock the sentry on the edge of the timber gave the alarm. A -small party of Indians was approaching, in the hope of stampeding the -horses. All Indian attacks begin that way. After the horses are -stampeded the soldiers have to fight where they are, and, as the Indians -are mounted, the dismounted troopers are at a disadvantage. Custer was -on his feet in an instant, shouting: - -“Run to your horses, men!” - -The troopers were no less alert. Before the Indians could stampede the -horses, each man had reached his animal and led him back into the -timber. A few shots drove off the little party of savages, the horses -were saddled, and the men moved out. As they did so, six mounted Indians -appeared on the crest of a little hill. Custer led the way toward them. -They retreated slowly, keeping just out of range. In this manner they -drew the soldiers some two miles up the valley. - -Finally, in the hope of getting near to them, Custer took twenty men, -with his brother and Lieutenant Varnum in command, and rode out some two -hundred yards ahead of the remainder under Captain Moylan, who were -directed to keep that distance in rear of the advance. Custer, -accompanied only by an orderly, rode about the same distance ahead of -the advance, making peace signs to the six Indians whom they had -pursued. As he approached nearer to them, their pace slackened and they -suddenly stopped. - -To the left of the soldiers was a thick wood. It occurred to Custer that -Indians might be concealed therein, and he sent his orderly back to the -advance to caution them to be on their guard. Scarcely had the orderly -reached the advance when the Indians they had been pursuing turned and -came at full gallop toward Custer, now alone in the valley. At the same -instant, with a terrific war whoop, three or four hundred splendidly -mounted Sioux burst out from the trees on the left. - -Custer was riding a magnificent thoroughbred. In a second he was racing -for his life toward the advance-guard. The Indians had two objects in -view. They wanted to intercept Custer and also cut off the advance party -from Moylan’s men, who were coming up at a gallop. Only the speed of -Custer’s horse saved his life. As he galloped toward them, he shouted to -Tom Custer to dismount his men. He was not heard in the confusion, but -young Custer knew exactly what to do. While five men held the horses, -the other fifteen threw themselves on the ground. On came the Indians -after Custer. As soon as they were within easy range, the dismounted men -blazed away right in their faces. The troopers were armed with -breech-loaders, and the first volley was succeeded by a second. Several -of the savages were hit and many of their horses. They reeled, swerved, -and Custer rejoined his men. A few moments after, Moylan came up with -the main body. - -Custer now dismounted most of his men, and keeping a bold front to the -Indians, retreated in the timber, fighting hard all the way. Reaching -the river, they made good their defense. The Indians tried all their -devices to get them out. They set fire to the grass, but it was green -and did not burn readily. All their efforts to dislodge the troopers -failed, and late in the afternoon a heavy squadron came up on the gallop -from the main body under Stanley and put them to flight. It was a sharp -affair, and the Indians suffered severely. - -The only losses to the expedition on that day were two civilians: Doctor -Honzinger, a fat old German, who was the veterinarian of the regiment, -and Mr. Baliran, the sutler. They were both quiet, inoffensive, -peaceable men, very much liked, especially the doctor. They were amateur -naturalists, and frequently wandered away from the main body on -botanizing excursions. They had done so that morning, following Custer’s -advance, and the Indians had fallen upon them and murdered them. It was -the discovery of the remains of these two men which had caused General -Stanley to despatch the cavalry to the relief of the advance. - -Bitter was the anger of the officers and men over this murder of unarmed -non-combatants, and deep and abiding was their thirst for vengeance on -the Indians who perpetrated it. - - - II. The Capture of Rain-in-the-Face - -The next year, 1874, the Seventh Cavalry being stationed at Fort Abraham -Lincoln, near Bismarck, on the upper Missouri, word was brought to -Custer by a scout that a famous Sioux, called by the picturesque name of -Rain-in-the-Face, was at Standing Rock Agency, some twenty miles away, -boasting that he had killed Doctor Honzinger and Mr. Baliran. -Rain-in-the-Face was already a renowned warrior, of more than ordinary -courage. That he should have left the hostiles under Sitting Bull to -come to the agency was a thing implying peculiar bravery; and that he -should there openly boast of the murder was even more extraordinary. -Custer immediately determined upon his capture, although to effect it -would be a matter of difficulty and danger. - -The agency was filled with Indians waiting for the issue of rations; -and, though they were on a peaceable errand, they were always unruly, -insubordinate, and on the alert. Captain Yates and Captain Tom Custer, -with one hundred troopers, were detailed to make the arrest. The arrival -of one hundred men at the agency instantly excited the suspicion of the -Indians. To divert it from the real object, Captain Yates ostentatiously -detached a lieutenant with fifty men to ride to some villages ten miles -away in quest of certain Indians who had some time before raided a -settlement and run off some stock, killing the herders. With the -remainder he purposed to wait for the return of the detachment. -Meanwhile it was learned from a scout that Rain-in-the-Face was in the -sutler’s store. - -Tom Custer, with five picked men, was ordered to enter the store and -make the arrest. The store was full of Indians. The weather was very -cold, and the Indians kept their blankets well around their faces. It -was impossible to tell one from another. Tom Custer had received a good -description of Rain-in-the-Face, however, but it availed him nothing -under the circumstances. He and his men, therefore, mingled freely with -the Indians from time to time, making small purchases of the sutler to -divert suspicion as they lounged about the store. They deceived the -savages entirely, in spite of their watchful scrutiny and suspicion. At -last one Indian dropped his blanket and stepped to the counter, either -to speak to the trader or to make a purchase. - -It was Rain-in-the-Face. Custer recognized him immediately. Stepping -behind him, he threw his arms about him and seized him in an iron grasp. -The Indian, who had observed the movement too late, attempted to fire -his Winchester; but Custer was too quick for him. The five troopers -sprang to the side of their captain, disarmed Rain-in-the-Face, and -presented their guns to the astonished and infuriated Indians. The room -was filled with seething excitement in a moment. The Indians surged -toward the troopers, and perhaps would have made short work of them, had -not Captain Yates at this juncture entered the room with a detail of his -men. - -[Illustration: - - THE CAPTURE OF RAIN-IN-THE-FACE - - _Drawing by E. W. Demian_ -] - -Rain-in-the-Face, a magnificent specimen of Indian manhood, had ceased -to struggle the moment he was convinced that it was unavailing. He was -led outside, securely bound and mounted on a horse. The troopers were -assembled, and in spite of threats and menaces by the Indians, who did -not venture to attack, they started back to Fort Lincoln with their -prisoner. - -Messengers were sped in every direction to the different bands of -Indians to mass a force to release Rain-in-the-Face, who was a man of -such importance, being the brother of Iron Horse, one of the principal -chiefs of the Unkpapas, that no price was counted too great to secure -his liberty; indeed, before starting, they had offered Yates two -warriors in exchange for him. The rapidity with which the troops moved -was such that the prisoner was safely imprisoned at Fort Lincoln before -anything could be done. - -Rain-in-the-Face stubbornly refused to say anything for a day or two, -but finally made full confession that he had shot Mr. Baliran and -wounded Doctor Honzinger, who had fallen from his horse, whereupon he -had crushed his head with stones. He was put in the guard-house -preparatory to being tried for murder, and kept there in spite of the -efforts to release him that were made by many prominent Indians. In the -same guard-house were some civilians who had been caught stealing grain. -One bitterly cold night, during a raging blizzard, the civilians, with -some outside assistance, succeeded in making their escape. -Rain-in-the-Face took advantage of the opportunity and left also. He -joined the hostiles under Sitting Bull, and sent back word that he -intended to have his revenge on the Custers for the treatment he had -received. - - - - - CHAPTER FOUR - The Little Big Horn Campaign - - - I. Custer Loses His Command - -To return to the spring of 1876. When the column which Custer was to -have commanded moved out, Custer led his own regiment, while -Major-General Alfred H. Terry was in personal command of the column. I -give the reason in the words of General George A. Forsyth in a recent -letter to me: - -“For some reason Custer, one of the most splendid soldiers that ever -lived, hated General Belknap, the Secretary of War. He was a good hater, -too. When General Belknap was imprisoned and undergoing trial Custer -wrote that he knew of certain things regarding the appointment of -post-traders on the upper Missouri River, which things the prosecution -thought were what they needed to insure conviction. As a matter of fact, -Custer did not know anything. He had heard disappointed men who had -failed to get said post-traderships curse Belknap and say that they knew -Belknap had sold the traderships to the appointees. It was not so. -Belknap had given these appointments to certain able Iowa politicians -for their friends, in order to secure their influence in the next -campaign for United States Senator from Iowa, as he had determined to -try for a senatorship from his state, viz., Iowa. - -“It was entirely within his own right to make these appointments and -there was really nothing wrong in doing so. Of course the disappointed -applicants were furious, and especially certain men who had served with -Belknap during the Civil War and who thought they had a claim on him. -They could not tell lies fast enough about Belknap and especially to -Custer, who was thoroughly honest and believed what they said. This was -what Custer thought he knew. - -“Custer was summoned to Washington of course. When he was questioned by -the House Committee of prosecution it was apparent that he did not know -anything. His evidence was all hearsay and not worth a tinker’s dam. The -President—General Grant—was indignant at Custer’s statements regarding -Belknap, which turned out to be all hearsay.... The President directed -General Sherman not to permit Custer to take the field against Sitting -Bull—undoubtedly to punish him. - -“You will recall that Belknap was—in a sort of Scotch verdict way, ‘Not -proven, my lord’—acquitted. It was only upon the strong, insistent and -urgent request of General Sheridan to General Sherman—the then -Commanding General of the Army—that the President finally said that if -General Sheridan regarded Custer’s services of great importance in the -campaign, Sherman might authorize Sheridan to permit him to join his -regiment and serve under General Terry, who was appointed to command the -expedition. Sherman wired Sheridan what the President said, and Sheridan -at once applied for Custer as in his opinion ‘necessary.’[67] - -“I was in Europe at the time of the Custer disaster, and on my return to -General Sheridan’s headquarters I saw all the correspondence in the -case.” - - * * * * * - -Therefore, instead of commanding the column, Custer was placed under -Terry, who was to command Gibbon’s column as well, when the junction had -been made between the two. On the 17th of May the command left Fort -Lincoln. The seriousness of the situation was felt as never before in an -Indian campaign. It was realized that no child’s play was before the -troops, and it was with unusual gravity that the regiment marched away. -Mrs. Custer tells how General Terry ordered the force to parade through -Fort Lincoln to reassure the women and children left behind by the sight -of its formidable appearance. - -The best part of the expedition was the Seventh Cavalry, six hundred -strong, with Custer at its head. The band played “Garry Owen,” the -famous battle tune of the Washita, as they marched away. They halted on -the prairie afterward, and an opportunity was given to the officers and -men to say good-by to the dear ones to be left behind; then, to the -music of “The Girl I Left Behind Me,” they started on that campaign from -which half of them never came back. - -They reached the Powder River without mishap, and were there joined by -General Gibbon, who reported his command encamped along the Yellowstone, -near the mouth of the Big Horn. Major Reno, of the Seventh Cavalry, with -six troops had been sent on a scouting expedition to the southward, and -had discovered a big Indian trail leading westward toward the Big Horn -country. On the 17th of June Reno’s men had been within forty miles of -the place where Crook was fighting his fierce battle, although, of -course, they knew nothing of it at this time. On the 22d Custer was -ordered to take his regiment with fifteen days’ rations and march down -the Rosebud, thoroughly examining the country en route until he struck -the Indian trail reported by Reno. - - - II. Did Custer Obey His Orders? - -And now we come to the most important question of this remarkable -campaign. On the one hand, General Terry has been severely censured for -its dire failure; the death of Custer and the escape of the Indians have -been laid at his door. On the other hand, it has been urged that Custer -disobeyed his orders, broke up Terry’s plan of campaign, and by his -insubordination brought about a terrible disaster and let slip the -opportunity for administering a crushing defeat to the Indians, which -probably would have ended the war and prevented a deplorable loss of -life, to say nothing of prestige and treasure. Both officers had, and -still have, their partizans, and the matter has been thoroughly threshed -out. - -As between Custer and Terry, I profess absolute impartiality, although, -if I have any natural bias, it is toward Custer, whose previous career, -as I have investigated it, appeals to me more than Terry’s, -distinguished as were the latter’s services. I have studied the -situation carefully, examining all the evidence published by both sides, -and very reluctantly, in spite of my liking for poor Custer, I am -compelled to admit that he did disobey his orders; that his action did -break up a most promising plan, which, it is highly probable, would have -resulted in a decisive battle with the Indians and the termination of -the war; and that he, and he alone, must be held responsible for the -subsequent disaster. - -General Terry’s order to Custer, which follows, is entirely clear and -explicit: - - Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, M. T., - June 22d, 1876. - - Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, 7th Cavalry. Colonel: - - The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your - regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the - Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by - Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give - you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were - it not impossible to do so, the Department Commander places too much - confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon - you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in - contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own - views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should - conform to them, unless you should see sufficient reasons for - departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the - Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the - trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears - almost certain that it will be found) to turn toward the Little - Horn,[68] he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps - as far as the head-waters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the - Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to - preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south - or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of - Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As - soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move - up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of - course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances, as - they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little - Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape - will be impossible. - -[Illustration: - - _Courtesy of The Century Co._ - - GEN. GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER - - Killed with half his regiment at the Little Big Horn -] - - The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you - should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock’s Creek, and - that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon’s - column, with information of the result of your examination. The - lower part of this Creek will be examined by a detachment from - Colonel Gibbon’s command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the - Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable - for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany - the command of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there - not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are - rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders. - - Very respectfully your obedient servant, - - E. W. SMITH, - Captain 18th Infantry, - - Acting Assistant Adjutant General. - -Custer was directed to march southward until he struck the trail Reno -had discovered. If, as Terry supposed, it led across the Rosebud, he was -not to follow it westward to the Little Big Horn, or until he met the -Indians, but he was to turn to the southward until he struck the -head-waters of the Tongue River. If he found no Indians there, he was to -swing northward down the valley of the Little Big Horn, toward the spot -where Terry supposed the Indians to be, and where, in reality, they -were. Meanwhile Gibbon was to come up the Little Big Horn from the north -toward the same spot. In the general plan of the campaign, Crook and his -force were supposed to prevent the Indians from moving south—which they -did, by the way. Custer was to keep them from going east, and, as he -advanced, was “to feel to his left” to preclude all possibility of their -slipping between him and Crook, while Gibbon was to keep them from going -off to the north. The Indians would have no direction open to them for -flight except westward, and in that case the troops hoped to overtake -them in a difficult country, inclosed by mountains and rivers. - -Terry, although he was not an experienced Indian fighter, had divined -the position of the Indians with remarkable accuracy, and he fully -expected to find them on the Little Big Horn. If Custer had followed -Terry’s orders, he would have reached the Indians on the day that -Gibbon’s men, as we shall see, rescued Reno. After the disaster Terry -magnanimously strove at first to conceal from the public the fact that -Custer had disobeyed his orders. Custer had paid the penalty for his -disobedience with his life, and Terry was willing to bear the odium of -the defeat and failure. His self-sacrifice was noble and characteristic; -but a mistake, caused by the carelessness of General Sherman, coupled -with the enterprise of a brilliant newspaper reporter, who posed as a -regularly accredited government messenger, defeated Terry’s intent, and -instead of the first report, which made no allusion to the disobedience -of orders, being made public,[69] a second report, which told the whole -story, and which was intended for the authorities alone, was given to -the press and immediately spread broadcast. The first report soon turned -up, and Terry thereafter was made the victim of unmerited obloquy by -Custer’s partizans, who said that the absence of any mention in the -original report of any disobedience on the part of Custer, and the -alleged failure to allude to the plan of campaign which Custer had -frustrated, was evidence that no importance was attached to the plan by -Terry or any one until after the failure and consequent popular -indignation. Terry’s answer to this was a noble silence, to save -Custer’s reputation. The living assumed the responsibility to protect -the fame of the dead—honor to him! - -General Gibbon also has gone on record in a letter to Terry regarding -the situation: - - “So great was my fear that Custer’s zeal would carry him forward too - rapidly, that the last thing I said to him when bidding him good-by - after his regiment had filed past you when starting on his march - was, ‘Now, Custer, don’t be greedy, but wait for us.’ He replied - gaily as, with a wave of his hand, he dashed off to follow his - regiment, ‘No, I will not.’ Poor fellow! Knowing what we do now, and - what an effect a fresh Indian trail seemed to have had upon him, - _perhaps we were expecting too much to anticipate a forbearance on - his part which would have rendered coöperation of the two columns - practicable_.[70] - - “Except so far as to draw profit from past experience, it is perhaps - useless to speculate as to what would have been the result had your - plan, as originally agreed upon, been carried out. But I cannot help - reflecting that in that case my column, supposing the Indian camp to - have remained where it was when Custer struck it, would have been - the first to reach it; that with our infantry and Gatling guns we - should have been able to take care of ourselves, even though - numbering only about two-thirds of Custer’s force; and that with six - hundred cavalry in the neighborhood, led as only Custer could lead - it, the result to the Indians would have been very different from - what it was.” - -With regard to Gibbon’s generous suggestion that Custer was suddenly -carried away by the opportunity presented, the testimony of the late -General Ludlow is interesting. According to him, Custer stated on the -8th of May, in St. Paul, Minnesota, that he intended, at the first -chance he got in the campaign, to “cut loose from (and make his -operations independent of) General Terry during the summer;” that he had -“got away from Stanley and would be able to swung clear of Terry.”[71] - -It is difficult, nay, it is impossible, therefore, to acquit Custer of a -deliberate purpose to campaign on his own account so soon as he could -get away from General Terry. The sentence of Terry’s orders commencing: -“It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions,” -etc., and expressing confidence in his zeal and energy, and Terry’s -unwillingness to hamper him with precise directions, when nearly in -contact with the enemy, did not warrant Custer in disobeying his orders. -_It was only to govern his conduct when he should be in contact with the -enemy_, in which case, of course, he would have to be the sole judge of -what was best to be done. His conduct in that case will be considered -later. In any event it has no bearing on the question of disobedience, -for the crux is here: had Custer obeyed orders, he would not have come -in contact with the enemy when and where he did. The conditions would -have differed greatly. - -Every student of military matters knows that the words used, “He desires -that you should conform to them (his own views) unless,” etc., convey a -direct, positive command.[72] - -The abstract question of disobedience of orders is one that has often -been discussed. It is impossible to maintain the position that an -officer should never, under any circumstances, disobey his orders. -Circumstances sometimes compel him to do so. But when an officer -commanding troops which are supposed to act in coöperation with other -troops receives orders to carry out a certain specified detail of a -stated general plan, and in the exercise of his own discretion concludes -to disobey his orders and do something other than what he was directed -to do, he takes upon himself the onus of success or failure, not merely -of his own immediate manœuver, but of the whole general plan. If the -plan miscarries through his disobedience, whatever may have been his -motives, woe be unto him! If by his disobedience he brings about the end -at which the original plan aimed, the defeat of the enemy, that is -another proposition. The event has then justified his disobedience. - -Every soldier understands that reasons for disobedience must be so -clear, so convincing, and so unexpected, that he is warranted in taking -so prodigious a risk. Disregarding for the moment, for the sake of -argument, General Ludlow’s testimony as to preconceived and deliberate -intent on Custer’s part to disobey, supposing Custer’s disobedience to -have been caused by some exigency or crisis, we may ask ourselves what -were the reasons that caused him entirely to disregard Terry’s plan and -so to manœuver as to bring himself directly in touch with the Indians in -the shortest possible time, without attempting either to examine -Tullock’s Creek[73] or to incline to the southward—“feel with his left”? -These reasons—if any there were—can never be known, owing to Custer’s -death. It can only be said that no satisfactory reasons appear which -justify Custer’s action. - -The best that can be urged in defense of Custer is contained in the -following paragraph taken from Colonel Godfrey’s _Century_ article.[74] - -“Had Custer continued his march southward—that is, left the Indian -trail—the Indians would have known of our movements on the 25th and a -battle would have been fought very near the same field on which Crook -had been attacked and forced back only a week before; the Indians would -never have remained in camp and allowed a concentration of the several -columns to attack them. If they escaped without punishment or battle, -Custer would undoubtedly have been blamed.” - -It may be pointed out with due reverence to Colonel Godfrey—whom I -consider one of the ablest officers in the United States Army, by the -way—that it is hard to see how Custer could have been blamed for obeying -his orders, and that it is by no means certain that the Indians would -have discovered Custer’s column. Indeed, his previous success in -concealing his movements and surprising the Indians (witness the Washita -campaign) leads me to believe that he could have carried out his orders -without observation. If Gibbon had struck the Indians first and had held -them in play Custer could have annihilated them. General Fry’s comments -in the _Century_ (appended to Colonel Godfrey’s article) on Custer’s -action are entirely wrong. - -As to what would have happened if Custer had been successful, it is more -or less idle to speculate. Certainly, if he had overwhelmingly defeated -the Indians, I do not think he would have been court-martialed; but if -he had been in Reno’s place and had been besieged with heavy loss, then -I feel certain that Terry would have been in duty bound to prefer -charges against him. All this is beside the main question, however, and -it is now time to return to the history of the expedition. - -Terry offered Custer four troops of the Second Cavalry and two Gatling -guns, which were refused. Custer said that any force that was too big -for the Seventh Cavalry alone to deal with would be too big for the -Seventh Cavalry plus the four troops, and urged that the guns would -hamper and harass his movements. Terry, who elected to go with Gibbon’s -infantry column, agreed with him. - -Neither Terry nor Custer nor any one expected to meet more than one -thousand warriors. They had no knowledge whatever of the large numbers -of the so-called peaceable Indians, for whom rations had been regularly -issued, who had broken away from the agencies and joined the hostiles. -They did not know of Crook’s defeat, and the great effect it had in -inducing wavering bucks to give their allegiance to the brave men on the -war-path. It will, perhaps, be fair to estimate the number of Indian -warriors in the field at a mean between the white and Indian accounts, -which range from twelve hundred on the one hand to three thousand on the -other. To be on the safe side, I shall call it at least two -thousand.[75] Whatever their number, there were enough of them. - -In their way they were two thousand of the fiercest and most desperate -fighters on the face of the globe. While they were undisciplined, -untrained, and not entirely amenable to one will, as were the soldiers, -they were, nevertheless, a fearfully formidable force. Their common -hatred of the white man gave them sufficient coherence to form a rude -but effective organization. They were led by experienced chiefs and were -used to fighting. From 1868, after the close of the treaty by which the -frontier posts were abandoned and the country restored to the Sioux and -the Cheyennes, to 1876, no less than two hundred distinct fights, like -that described in the account of the Yellowstone expedition, had -occurred between the soldiers and the Indians. They were now to be tried -in a real battle, and, as we shall see, they were not found wanting; -for, in the end, all the honors of the campaign rested with them. - - - III. Custer’s Expedition - -The Seventh Cavalry left the camp at the mouth of the Powder River at -twelve o’clock noon, on the 22d of June, 1876. Generals Terry, Gibbon, -and Custer reviewed it as it marched away. With the column were fifty -Arikara (“Rees”) Indian auxiliaries, a few Crows, and a number of white -scouts and newspaper correspondents. At four o’clock, after they had -progressed twelve miles, the march was halted, and that evening the -officers were summoned to Custer’s headquarters, and marching -instructions were given them. No bugle-calls were to be sounded. The -march was to be made with the greatest possible rapidity; every officer -was to look carefully to his men and horses. Squadron and battalion -formations were abandoned; each troop commander was to report to Custer -in person. - -Custer was usually very uncommunicative. Ordinarily, he kept his plans -to himself until the time to strike arrived. On this occasion, however, -he announced his purpose, which was to follow the trail until they found -the Indians, and then “go for them.” He was not “carried away” by -anything, and this declaration is further evidence of his deliberate -purpose. His manner, at all times blunt and peremptory, not to say -brusque, was now entirely changed. He was usually full of cheerfulness -and confidence. There appeared to be a marked absence of both qualities -in this instance. Officers have recorded that he seemed worried and -depressed. It may be that he was feeling the displeasure of Grant, which -his imprudent conduct had brought about. Perhaps the serious character -of the risk he was taking by his independent move weighed upon him. If -he succeeded, he would regain all he had lost in the censure. If he -failed—well, he would not anticipate that. It was enough to give a man -serious thoughts. His letters to his wife seem as cheerful and confident -as ever, but, perhaps, he may have affected that for her sake. At any -rate, the testimony as to his mental condition is unequivocal. - -However he may have felt, he acted with his usual energy. Starting at -five on the morning of the 23d, the regiment went into camp at five in -the afternoon, having covered thirty-three miles over an execrable -marching country—the “Bad Lands.” On the 24th they marched twenty-eight -miles over an even worse territory. Indian signs were abundant. Hundreds -of Indians evidently had passed. As no one could tell how near they were -to the hostiles, after supper on the 24th fires were put out and the men -were allowed to sleep until half after eleven, while the officers and -scouts examined the trail. It was reported to Custer that it led -straight across the divide separating the Rosebud and the Little Big -Horn. At half after eleven the men were routed out and marched ten miles -toward the crest of the Little Big Horn Mountains, which they reached at -two o’clock in the morning of Sunday, the 25th. A further halt was made, -and at eight o’clock the advance was taken up once more. - -[Illustration: - - _Courtesy of the Century Co._ - - MAP OF CUSTER’S DEFEAT ON THE LITTLE BIG HORN - - _Movements of Battalions plotted from data furnished by Col. Edward S. - Godfrey_ -] - -They marched ten miles farther, and concealed themselves in a large -ravine near the divide and about sixteen miles from the little Big Horn, -about half after ten in the morning. Smoke was seen trembling in the air -by the scouts in the crow’s nest on the top of the divide, and there -were other evidences of Indians down the valley of the Little Big Horn. -It is believed that Custer intended to remain in hiding during the day, -and deliver his attack on the next morning. Unfortunately, however, his -trail had been crossed by the Indians. A box of hard bread had fallen -from one of the pack-mules during the night march. When its loss was -discovered, a squad of men had been sent back for it. They found an -Indian trying to open it. He made his escape, and would undoubtedly -alarm the villages they were approaching. - -And now we come to another problem. As the result of his disobedience he -was now practically in contact with the enemy, although he should not -have been. Being in contact, however, what was he to do? There were no -orders to govern him now. He was thrown on his own resources—just what -he wanted, and what he had schemed and planned for. How was he to deal -with his self-created opportunity? - -Believing, as he and every one else did, that the Indian force did not -greatly outnumber his own, an attack was entirely feasible. Should he -deliver that attack, or should he wait to be attacked? The advantage is -usually with the attacking party in Indian warfare. Should he seize or -yield that? Suppose he decided not to attack the Indians, and they moved -away and escaped? Would he not be censured for allowing them to get -away, since he had got in touch with them? - -Suppose—remote contingency—he were not entirely successful in his attack -on the Indians? Gibbon must be somewhere in the vicinity. A day or two -would probably bring him to the rescue. Could he not fight a waiting -battle, if necessary, until the other column arrived on the field? Was -it not absolutely incumbent upon him to embrace the opportunity -presented to him? He had what he believed to be the finest regiment of -cavalry in the service. He had tried it, tested it, on many fields; he -knew, or thought he knew, the temper of his officers and men. He decided -to attack. Indeed, there was nothing else for him to do. Fight he must. -In the opinion of distinguished military critics who have expressed -themselves upon the point, from General Sheridan down, he was justified -in his decision. In that opinion I concur. And there is no evidence that -he ever contemplated doing anything else. He had arranged matters to -bring about the opportunity, and he had no hesitation in embracing it. -Evidently, he had absolutely no premonition of defeat or disaster. - -A little before noon he communicated his intention to his officers and -men. He divided his regiment into three battalions. To Major Marcus A. -Reno,[76] an officer with no experience in Indian fighting, he gave -Troops A, G, and M; to Captain Benteen, a veteran and successful Indian -fighter, Troops D, H, and K; Captain McDougall, with Troop B, was -ordered to bring up the mule train and take it in charge; Custer himself -took the five remaining troops, C, E, F, I, and L. - -They left the ravine, and about noon crossed the divide which separated -them from Little Big Horn Valley. Benteen was ordered to swing over to -the left and search the country thoroughly in that direction, driving -any hostiles he might come across into the village and preventing any -escape of the Indians to the southward and westward. Reno was to follow -a small creek, sometimes called Reno’s Creek, to its junction with the -Little Big Horn and strike the head of the village, supposed to be -there. Custer’s movements would be determined subsequently, although for -the present he followed Reno. McDougall came last, following their trail -with the slow-moving train, which dropped rapidly to the rear as the -others proceeded at a smart pace. Benteen at once moved off to the -westward, while Reno, followed by Custer, started down toward the valley -of the Little Big Horn. - -This river is a rapid mountain stream of clear, cold water, with a -pebbly bottom, from twenty to forty yards wide. The depth of the water -varies from two to five feet. While it is very tortuous, the general -direction of the stream is northward to the Big Horn, which flows into -the Yellowstone. The valley, from half a mile to a mile in width, is -bordered by the bare bluffs. Along the river in places are thick clumps -of trees. The Indian camp, the end of which they could see as they -crossed the divide, was strung along the valley for several miles. - -[Illustration: Map to illustrate the route of the three battalions at -the Little Big Horn] - -Reno’s advance down the creek took him near to the east bank of river. -Custer had followed him, slightly on his right flank. When Reno -discovered the head of the village in the valley, he crossed the creek -to Custer and reported what he had seen. Custer directed him to cross -the river, move down the valley, and attack in force, informing him that -he would be “supported” by Custer’s battalion. Reno accordingly put his -battalion to a fast trot in columns of four, crossed the Little Big Horn -River beyond the mouth of the creek, and proceeded onward for perhaps -half a mile. Then he threw his troops in line, reaching from the river -to the bluffs on the left, with the Arikara scouts on the left flank, -and galloped down the valley for a mile farther.[77] - -Reno stated subsequently that he believed that Custer intended to keep -behind him all the time; and he fully expected, should he come in -contact with Indians, that Custer would be on hand to join in the -attack. Custer, however, had not continued down the creek or crossed the -river with Reno, but had swung off to the high bluffs on the right bank -of the creek, east of the river. Reno mistook the purport of Custer’s -statement. In order to support an attack, it is not necessary to get -behind it. A flank attack or a demonstration in force, from some other -direction, frequently may be the best method of supporting an attack. -Custer’s plan was entirely simple. Reno was to attack the end of the -village. Benteen was to sweep around and fall on the left of it, Custer -on the right. The tactics in the main were those which had been used so -successfully in the Battle of the Washita (q.v.), and were much in vogue -among our Indian fighters during the Indian wars. - -Dividing forces in the face of an enemy to make several simultaneous -attacks is dangerous, because it is almost impossible to secure a proper -coöperation between the attacking units. A skilful general will -concentrate his force upon the separately approaching and more or less -isolated units and beat them in detail. Washington’s tactics at -Germantown were similar to those of Custer; and his force, which would -have swept the British from the field if his plans had been carried out, -was beaten in detail for lack of coördination in the separate attacks. -Some of Napoleon’s most brilliant battles were fought when he occupied -interior lines and by successive attacks broke up converging columns. - -Still, the Indians were not believed to be veteran tacticians, although -everybody underestimated their qualities. They were extremely liable to -panic. A sudden attack or a surprise almost always disorganized them and -threw them into confusion. Under the peculiar circumstances, I think -there is little question that Custer’s tactics were entirely sound and -well considered, although this conclusion is often disputed. Where -Custer made a mistake appears to be in his failure to take greater -precautions that the attacks should be delivered simultaneously. He had -a much longer distance to go than Reno and over a much worse country -before he could attack, and he was not at all sure as to where Benteen -was or when he could join. Nevertheless, the chances of success were -many, the chances of failure few, and I have no doubt that Custer would -have been successful had there not been a woeful lack of conduct on the -part of his principal subordinate. - ------ - -Footnote 67: - - It was General Terry’s urgent representations which were the - main-springs of Sheridan’s action.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 68: - - At the time this was written, it was not generally understood that the - full Indian appellation of this stream was Little Big Horn.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 69: - - It was delayed in transmission, owing to the cutting of the telegraph - wires by the Indians. - -Footnote 70: - - Italics mine.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 71: - - Journal of the Military Service Institution in the United States, Vol. - XVIII., No. LXXIX.: “The Campaign Against the Sioux in 1876,” by - Major-General Robert P. Hughes, U. S. A. - -Footnote 72: - - In Terry’s report to the Secretary of War, under date of November 21, - 1876, he gives his own understanding of his orders, which is fully - warranted, in the following paragraph: - - “At a conference which took place on the 21st between Colonel Gibbon, - Lieutenant-Colonel Custer, and myself, I communicated to them the plan - of operations which I had decided to adopt. It was that Colonel - Gibbon’s column should cross the Yellowstone near the mouth of the - Little Big Horn, and thence up that stream, with the expectation that - it would arrive at that point by the 26th; that Lieutenant-Colonel - Custer with the whole of the Seventh Cavalry should proceed up the - Rosebud until he should ascertain the direction in which the trail - discovered by Major Reno led; that if it led to the Little Big Horn it - should not be followed, but that Lieutenant-Colonel Custer should keep - still further to the south before turning toward that river, in order - to intercept the Indians should they attempt to pass around to his - left, and in order, by a longer march, to give time for Colonel - Gibbon’s column to come up.” - -Footnote 73: - - I have not discussed the Tullock’s Creek matter. It is not material, - except that the failure to examine it and to send a scout to - Gibbon—some of Gibbon’s men had been detailed with Custer for the - purpose—with a report, was simply a further disobedience, and is, - perhaps, a confirmation of Custer’s deliberate purpose. - -Footnote 74: - - _Century Magazine_, Vol. XLIII., No. 3: “Custer’s Last Battle,” by - Colonel E. S. Godfrey, U. S. A. - -Footnote 75: - - Personally, I believe there were many more. - -Footnote 76: - - As the conduct of Major Reno was so decisive in the subsequent - fighting, and since, upon his conduct as a pivot, the fortunes of the - day turned, it is well to say something of his record, which I have - compiled from official sources. - - He was graduated from West Point in 1857, and was immediately - appointed to the First Dragoons, and had risen to a captaincy in the - First Cavalry at the outbreak of the Civil War. His career during the - war was one of distinction. He was brevetted major, March 17, 1863, - for gallant and meritorious services at Kelly’s Ford, and - lieutenant-colonel for gallant and meritorious services at the Battle - of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864. On January 1, 1865, he was appointed - colonel of the Twelfth Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry, and was - brevetted brigadier-general of Volunteers at the close of the war. - Here is a brave and honorable record. Would that it might never have - been tarnished! - - He joined the Seventh Cavalry December 19, 1869, as major. He had had - no Indian service prior to that time, and his services up to the - present campaign comprised a three months’ scouting expedition in - Colorado in the summer of 1870. In 1879, upon his own application, a - court of inquiry was convened for the purpose of investigating his - conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. It was the opinion of - the court that no further proceedings were necessary in the case. One - sentence of the record is significant: “The conduct of the officers - throughout was excellent, and while subordinates in some instances did - more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage - than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires - animadversion from this court.” - - His relations with General Custer had not been friendly; so inimical - were they, in fact, that Custer was begged, before starting on the - fatal campaign, not to intrust the command of any supporting movement - to Reno. Custer refused to allow any such personal considerations to - prevent Reno receiving the command to which his rank entitled him. - - In 1880 Major Reno was found guilty, by a general court-martial, of - conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. While in an intoxicated - condition he had engaged in a brawl in a public billiard saloon, in - which he assaulted another officer, destroyed property, and otherwise - conducted himself disgracefully. The court sentenced him to be - dismissed from the military service of the United States. The sentence - was approved by President Hayes, and Major Reno ceased to be an - officer of the Army in April, 1880. - - It is painful to call attention to these facts, especially as Major - Reno has since died; but the name and fame of a greater than he have - been assailed for his misconduct, and in defense of Custer it is - absolutely necessary that Reno’s character and services should be - thoroughly understood. For a further discussion of Major Reno’s - conduct, see Appendix B. - -Footnote 77: - - Sure proof that the horses were not, as is sometimes urged, utterly - worn out by the hard marching. - - - - - CHAPTER FIVE - The Last of Custer - - - I. Reno’s Failure at the Little Big Horn - -It will be necessary, in order clearly to comprehend the complicated -little battle, to treat each of the three operations separately, and -then see how they were related to one another. - -As Reno’s men trotted down the valley, they saw, some distance ahead of -them and to the right across the river on a line of high bluffs, Custer -attended by his staff. The general waved his hat at them encouragingly, -and disappeared over the brow of the hill. That glimpse of Custer, -standing on that hill with outstretched arm gallantly waving his -troopers on to battle, was the last any one of his comrades in the -valley had of him in life; and it is certain that Reno must have -realized then that Custer was not following him, and that he was -expected to attack in his front alone. - -However, Reno, having drawn near to the village, deployed his -skirmishers, and slowly advanced down the valley. In a few moments they -were hotly engaged with a constantly growing force of Indians. - -Now, one thing about the battle that followed is the utter unreliability -of the Indian reports of their movements. It is alleged that fear of -punishment made them and keeps them reticent and uncommunicative. -Different Indians tell different stories. Most of these stories disagree -in their essential details, and it is impossible to reconcile them. It -may be that the faculties of the Indians are not sufficiently alert to -enable them to recall the general plan of the battle, or at least to -relate it, although they knew well enough how to fight it at the time. -Their accounts are haphazard to the last degree. Some say that they knew -nothing of the advent of the troops until Reno’s men deployed in the -valley. At any rate, they had sufficient time, on account of his -dilatory and hesitating advance, to assemble in heavy force. Reno had -less than one hundred and fifty men with him. Even if Dr. Eastman’s -estimate,[78] that the Indians numbered but twelve hundred warriors, be -true, they still outnumbered Reno, although, owing to the fact that the -villages were strung along the river for several miles, only a portion -of them were at first engaged with the troops. Flushed with their -previous victory over Crook a short time before, these Indians now fell -upon Reno like a storm. - -[Illustration] - - CAPT. MYLES MOYLAN MAJ. MARCUS A. RENO - LIEUT. A. E. SMITH[79] CAPT. EDWARD S. GODFREY - - SOME OF CUSTER’S OFFICERS - -Reno’s line extended clear across the valley, which was quite narrow -where the battle was joined, the right flank protected by the river, the -left by the bluffs. Recovering from their alleged panic, possibly -because of the feeble advance of the soldiers, the Indians rallied, and -with wonderful generalship massed their attack on the left flank, which -was most unfortunately held by the Arikara scouts. No Arikara that ever -lived was a match for the Sioux or the Cheyennes. The Rees, as these -Indian auxiliaries were called, broke and fled incontinently. They never -stopped until they reached the supply camp on the Powder River, miles -away. At the same time the horses of two troopers in the command ran -away with them, and plunged straight into the Indian lines with their -riders. Their fate was plain. - -As the Ree scouts broke, the Indians turned Reno’s left flank. The -troopers gave way at once. There was no reserve which could be thrown -upon the Indians until the line was restored. The whole force was -slammed back, like a door, into the timber on the bank of the river. - -Here Reno made a serious mistake. After rallying his men, he ordered -them to dismount. Cavalry may be dismounted for defense, but sound -judgment and military usage demand that for an attack, especially upon -an Indian village of that kind, they should charge upon horseback. As -one veteran cavalryman has written me, “I never could understand why -Reno did not charge desperately on the Indians in front of him. His -dismounting his men was against all sound military judgment. ‘Audacity, -always audacity,’ is the motto for a cavalryman.”[80] Had Reno been -governed by this principle and charged, as he should have done, the -result would have been different.[81] - -The position was instantly surrounded by yelling Indians galloping madly -to and fro, firing upon the troops. So far, Reno had lost but one -wounded and the two who had galloped into the Indian line. His second -position was admirable for defense. Sheltered by the trees, with his -flanks and rear protected by the river, he could have held the place -indefinitely. However, he had not been detailed to defend or hold any -position, but to make a swift, dashing attack. Yet, after a few moments -of the feeblest kind of advance, he found himself thrown on the -defensive. Such a result would break up the most promising plan. It -certainly broke up Custer’s. In spite of the defection of the Rees, a -vigorous countercharge down the valley would have extricated Reno and -might have saved Custer. - -It is a painful thing to accuse an army officer of misconduct; yet I -have taken the opinion of a number of army officers on the subject, and -every one of them considers Reno culpable in a high degree. One at least -has not hesitated to make known his opinion in the most public way. I am -loath to believe that Major Reno was a coward, but he certainly lost his -head; and when he lost his head, he lost Custer. His indecision was -pitiful. Although he had suffered practically no loss and had no reason -to be unduly alarmed, he was in a state of painful uncertainty as to -what he should do next. The soldier, like the woman, who hesitates in an -emergency which demands instant decision, is lost. - -How long the troops stayed under the trees by the river bank cannot be -determined accurately. Some have testified that it was a few moments, -others an hour. Personally I think it was a few moments, which fear and -apprehension lengthened to an impossible period. There had as yet been -no panic, and under a different officer there would have been none; but -it is on record that Reno at last gave an order for the men to mount and -retreat to the bluffs. Before he could be obeyed, he countermanded this -order. Then the order was repeated, but in such a way that nobody save -those immediately around him heard it, because of the din of the battle -then raging in a sort of aimless way all along the line, and no attempt -was made to obey it. It was then repeated for the third time. Finally, -as those farther away saw those nearest the flurried commander mounting -and evidently preparing to leave, the orders were gradually communicated -throughout the battalion, and nearly the whole mass got ready to leave. -Eventually they broke out of the timber in a disorderly column of fours, -striving to return to the ford which they had crossed when they had -entered the valley. - -Reno calls this a charge, and he led it. He was so excited that, after -firing his pistols at the Indians who came valiantly after the fleeing -soldiers, he threw them away.[82] The pressure of the Indians upon the -right of the men inclined them to the left, away from the ford. In fact, -they were swept into a confused mass and driven toward the river. All -semblance of organization was lost in the mad rush for safety. The -troops had degenerated into a mob. - -The Indians pressed closely upon them, firing into the huddle almost -without resistance. Evidently in their excitement the Indians fired -high, or the troops would have been annihilated. The Indians supposed, -of course, that they now had the troops corralled between them and the -river, and that all they needed to do was to drive them into it. Chief -Gall, who with Crazy Horse and Crow King was principally responsible for -the Indian manœuvers, seeing the retreat of Reno to the river, summoned -a large body of warriors, left the field and crossed the river farther -down, intending to sweep down upon the other side and attack Reno’s men -as they struggled up the steep bank in case any of them succeeded in -crossing. This was, as it turned out, a fortunate move for the Indians. - -Meanwhile, Reno’s men providentially found a pony trail which indicated -a ford of the river. On the other side the trail led into a -funnel-shaped amphitheater, surrounded by high, slippery bluffs. Into -this _cul-de-sac_ the whole fleeing body plunged, the Indians pressing -the rear hard. The men jumped their horses from the bank into the water, -and finding that the trail stopped at the bluff on the other side, -actually urged them up the steep slopes of the hill. - -There is no denying that they were panic-stricken. Although some of the -veterans opened fire upon the savages, the bulk of the troopers did -nothing but run. Dr. DeWolf was one of the coolest among those present. -He stopped his horse deliberately, and fired at the Indians until he was -shot dead. Lieutenant MacIntosh, striving to rally his men, was shot -just as they left the timber. Lieutenant Hodgson, reaching the river -bank, had his horse shot. In his agony the animal stumbled into the -river and fell dead. The same bullet which killed the horse broke -Hodgson’s leg. He cried for help, and Sergeant Criswell rode over to -where he lay. Hodgson took hold of the sergeant’s stirrup, and under a -heavy fire was dragged out on the bank, which he had scarcely reached -before a second bullet struck him in the head, killing him instantly. -Criswell was swept on by his men, but so soon as he could he rode back -under a furious fire and brought off the body, as well as all the -ammunition in the saddle-bags on several dead horses. He received a -medal of honor for his courage. - -If Gall had completed his projected movements, Reno’s men would have -been annihilated then and there. As it was, they reached the top of the -bluffs without further molestation. They had lost three officers and -twenty-nine men and scouts killed; seven men were badly wounded, and one -officer, Lieutenant DeRudio, and fifteen men were missing.[83] These had -been left behind in the confusion of Reno’s “charge.” - -It was now somewhere between half after one and two o’clock in the -afternoon, and during the fighting Reno was joined by Benteen’s -battalion. The Indians kept up a desultory fire on the position, but -they seemed to have diminished in numbers. Reno occupied the next hour -in reorganizing his force, getting the men into their accustomed troops, -and taking account of casualties. - - - II. With Benteen’s Battalion - -In accordance with his orders, Benteen had moved off to the westward. He -speedily became involved in almost impassable country, full of deep -ravines, in which progress was slow and difficult. Water was very scarce -in the country over which the regiment had marched until it reached the -valley of the Big Horn. What water they had found that morning was so -alkaline that the horses and mules, although they had been nearly a day -without water, would not drink it. The horses were naturally tired, -having marched over fifty miles since the morning of the day before, and -the terrible up-and-down hill work exhausted them still more, although -they were by no means played out. No Indians were seen by Benteen, and -the condition of the country was such that it was evident there were -none before him. - -He turned to the right, therefore, and struck into the valley of the Big -Horn, just ahead of McDougall and the pack train, intending to cross the -river and attack the village or join Reno, as the case might be. He had -just watered his horses at a little brook following out a morass, when a -sergeant from Custer’s battalion passed by on a gallop, with a message -for the supply train to come at once. As the trooper raced along the -line he shouted exultantly, “We’ve got ’em, boys!” Benteen’s men took -this to mean that Custer had captured the village. A few moments after, -Trumpeter Martini galloped up with a message from Custer to Benteen, -signed by Cook, the adjutant, which read as follows: - -“Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs. - -“P. S. Bring packs.” - -The need for the spare ammunition with the pack-train was apparently so -urgent that in his hurry Cook repeated the last two words. At the same -time the sound of distant firing was heard in the valley. Making ready -for instant action, Benteen led his troopers forward at a gallop down -the valley. Tired though the animals were, they responded nobly to the -demands of their riders, and the whole party swept across the hills in -the direction whence the trumpeter had come until they overlooked the -valley. Every one supposed that Custer had entered the valley and was -driving the Indians before him. That he expected to have a big fight on -his hands was indicated by the reiteration of his request that the -pack-train should be rushed forward, evidently to bring the reserve -ammunition. - -The valley was filled with dust and smoke; the day was frightfully hot -and dry. Bodies of men could be distinguished galloping up and down. -Benteen would, perhaps, have crossed the river and charged down the -valley had his attention not been called to a body of men in blue on the -bluff on the same side of the river to the right. They were, assuredly, -hotly engaged, but there were also evidences of fierce fighting far down -the valley. What was happening? What should he do? At this junction one -of the Crow scouts—these Indians had not fled with the cowardly Rees, -but remained with the command, fighting bravely—came up driving a small -bunch of captured ponies, and he indicated that the principal battle was -on the bluff. Benteen accordingly galloped around the bend of the river, -and joined the demoralized Reno without opposition. - -It is interesting to speculate what might have happened if Benteen had -crossed the river and had charged down the valley. In that case, if Reno -had recrossed the river and again attacked, the day might still have -been won, but in all probability Reno would not have recrossed and -Benteen would have been annihilated. At any rate, Benteen did the only -thing possible when Reno’s whereabouts and need were made known to him -by the scout. - -Reno had lost his hat in his famous “charge,” and had his head tied up -in a handkerchief. He was much excited, and apparently had no idea as to -what he should do next. The officers of his battalion made no bones -about admitting to the newcomers that they had been badly beaten and -were in a critical condition. None of them could tell anything about -Custer. - - - III. The Battle on the Bluffs - -Benteen’s men were ordered to divide their ammunition with Reno’s. A -line of skirmishers was thrown out around the bluffs, and an effort to -get water from the river was made, the supply in the canteens having -been long ago exhausted. The Indian fire prevented this. There was, of -course, not a drop of water on the bluffs, and the wounded suffered -greatly, to say nothing of the thirsty men. The officers collected in -groups on the edge of the bluffs overlooking the field, and discussed -the question. They were not molested by the Indians at this time. - -The general impression was that Custer had made the mistake of his life -in not taking the whole regiment in together. Possibly Reno’s men took -that view because they had been so badly mauled themselves. The valley -had been filled with Indians, but, about three o’clock or a little -after, most of them galloped down the river and were soon out of sight. -The river banks were still lined with Indians under cover, who kept up a -smart fire on Reno’s men if they attempted to descend the bluffs and -approach the water; but the main force had evidently withdrawn. - -Firing was heard far away to the northward. It was heavy and continuous. -There could be but one explanation of it. Custer’s detachment had at -last met the Indians and was engaged. This should surely have been a -stimulus to Reno. Custer was fighting; Reno was not menaced—what should -he do? Later in the afternoon two heavy volleys in rapid succession were -remarked. This was so unusual under the circumstances that it was -finally felt to be a signal from Custer. He must surely be in grave -peril, then, and calling for help. How, in the name of all that was -soldierly, could such an appeal be neglected? Many and anxious were the -questions the officers and men put among themselves as to why Reno did -not do something. It was felt by everybody that Custer was in grave -jeopardy, and that Reno should move at once. He had about three hundred -men under his command, one-half of whom had not been engaged. - -[Illustration: PLAN OF RENO’S DEFENCE ON THE BLUFF.] - -Captain Weir, of D Troop, on the right of Reno’s command, having cleared -away the Indians in front of him, at last boldly took matters in his own -hands. After pleading again and again for permission,[84] he started -alone without it toward the sound of the firing to see what he could. -Lieutenant Edgerly, his second, supposed that he had received orders to -advance, and he accordingly put the troop in motion. Weir was on the -bluff, Edgerly lower down in a small ravine. The Indians moved to attack -Edgerly, when Weir signaled him to lead his men up the bluff, which he -did without loss. The troop, unsupported and in defiance of Reno’s -orders, advanced to the point where Custer had been last seen to wave -his hat, and there stopped. The men could overlook the ridges and -valleys beyond them for a great distance. - -A mile and a half or two miles away they could see, through the defiles -in the ridges, great clouds of mounted Indians. Reports of rifles -indicated that the battle, whatever it was, was still being waged. It -was impossible for Weir and Edgerly to do anything with their single -troop. Although they were not seriously attacked in their bold advance, -Reno at first made no movement to support them. - -[Illustration] - - CAPT. THOS. W. CUSTER LIEUT. JAMES CALHOUN - CAPT. GEORGE W. YATES CAPT. MILES W. KEOGH - - SOME OF CUSTER’S TROOP COMMANDERS - - All killed with him at the Little Big Horn - -At half after four Captain McDougall and the pack train joined Reno. -They had not been molested in any way. At last, about five o’clock, Reno -yielded to the urgent and repeated representations of the angry -officers, and marched along the ridge to the position Weir and Edgerly -had reached. He came up to this point at half after five. The firing on -the bluffs far ahead was practically over. The Indians could still be -seen and some shooting was going on, but there did not appear to be a -battle raging. They learned afterward that it was the Indians shooting -into the bodies of the dead. - -It was evident to every one that whatever might have been done earlier -in the afternoon, there was no use in advancing now. Indeed, the Indians -came sweeping back in great force in front of Reno, and at once attacked -him. There was nothing for him to do but retreat to the most defensible -position he could find, and endeavor to hold his ground. Custer and his -men, if they still survived, must be left to face as best they could -whatever fate had in store for them. Reno accordingly retreated to the -place on the bluff whence he had just come. Lieutenant Godfrey, of K -Troop, the rear guard, without orders deployed and dismounted his men, -and, ably seconded by his junior, Lieutenant Luther R. Hare, by hard -fighting kept off the Indians till the retreat was safely made by the -rest, whom he and his troopers succeeded in joining. It was well that he -did this, for his coolness and courage saved the command. - -There was a little depression back of a ridge, which afforded some cover -for the horses and pack train. During the retreat an incident occurred -worthy of mention. One of the pack mules, loaded with precious -ammunition, broke away and galloped toward the Indian line. Sergeant -Hanley, of C Troop, sprang to his horse and raced after it. Officers and -men called to him to come back, but knowing how priceless was the -ammunition, he persisted in his course. He succeeded in heading off the -animal, which turned and ran parallel to the Indian line, along which he -galloped under a perfect shower of bullets, none of which, fortunately, -touched him. He captured the mule, and brought it back with the -ammunition intact. For this exploit he received a medal of honor. - -The men took position around the ridge, across the depression and on a -hill to the right, so as to protect the packs and the field hospital -from all sides except on the river side, where the height of the bluffs -and the distance prevented any Indian attack from that direction. -Benteen’s Troop H was placed on the right. They were on top of the break -of the ridge and were without cover, the ridges being entirely bare of -trees. Farther off, to the right, Benteen’s position was commanded by -higher ridges. At first the brunt of the fighting fell on the left, but -the Indians soon surrounded the position and the engagement became -general. The men threw themselves on the ground, and dug rifle-pits with -their knives, tin pans—anything they could get. The fighting soon became -severe, but gradually slackened as darkness approached, and stopped at -about nine o’clock at night. The village in the valley was the scene of -triumphant revel that night, and the shouting of the Indians could -plainly be heard on the bluffs. - -The early part of the night was full of wild confusion, but before long -the soldiers recovered their equanimity and set to work strengthening -their position. They were now completely surrounded; but most of them -were under cover except Benteen’s men, whose position, as has been -stated, was overlooked by higher ridges within easy range. At two A.M., -contrary to their usual habit, the Indians opened fire, but no attack -was made. The next morning the battle began again in grim earnest. - -The Indians pressed the party closer and closer. Benteen’s exposed line -suffered more than any other position. That experienced fighter saw that -the Indians were massing in front of him, evidently intending to deliver -a charge. If it fell upon his single troop it would not be possible to -withstand it, and the whole force on the hill would be taken in reverse -and annihilated. His men had nearly exhausted their ammunition, several -had been killed, and there were a number of wounded to be attended to. - -Ordering Lieutenant Gibson to hold the line at all hazards, Benteen ran -to Reno, explained the situation, and begged for a reinforcement. After -much urging he succeeded in getting Troop M, Captain French, sent over -to the hill. Then he entreated Reno to allow the two troops to charge. -Reno hesitated. Benteen urged him again and again, pointing out that if -something were not done immediately, the position would be rushed and -the command wiped out. At last he wrung a reluctant permission from -Reno. He ran back to his position on the hill, and not a moment too soon -formed his men up for the charge, putting himself at their head. - -“All ready now, men!” he cried gallantly. “Now’s your time! Give ’em -hell! Hip! Hip! Here we go!” - -The Indians had also given the word to charge, but Benteen was too quick -for them. Leading his men with splendid bravery, revolver in hand, he -rushed at the Indians. There was a brief hand-to-hand mêlée and the -Indians broke and fled. Reno, seeing the effect of Benteen’s gallant -dash, actually led out a portion of his command on the other side of the -hill and drove back the Indians in that direction. Benteen’s magnificent -courage had saved the day for the present. - -The fire having slackened somewhat about eleven o’clock in the morning, -volunteers were called to get water for the command, especially for the -wounded. The Indians swept the banks of the river with their fire, and -the attempt was hazardous to a degree. Nineteen men offered their -services. Four of the best marksmen—Geiger, Windolph, Voit, and -Mechling, of Troop H—were detailed to cover the others by taking an -exposed position on the brink of the bluffs overlooking the river, as -near as they could get to it. The other fifteen, one of whom has told me -about the attempt, carrying canteens and camp-kettles, but without arms, -crawled down through the bushes and ravines to the open space on the -bank of the river, and then, covered by the rapid fire of the four men -stationed above them, dashed for the stream. The Indians, who were -execrable shots, opened a heavy fire upon them, but the men succeeded in -filling the vessels they had brought, and though many of these vessels -were hit and some of the men wounded, none of them was killed. A scanty -supply of water it was, but it was a godsend. These nineteen also -received medals of honor. - -At three o’clock in the afternoon the firing, which had been maintained -intermittently since noon, finally stopped, and later the men on the -hill saw the Indians withdrawing from the valley. They set fire to the -grass to screen their movements, but about seven o’clock in the evening -they were distinctly seen moving out with all their possessions toward -the mountains of the Big Horn. Eighteen troopers had been killed on the -hill, and fifty-two wounded. - - - IV. The Last of Custer - -Now let us turn to Custer. - -Nobody knows exactly what he did. The testimony of the field is not -clear, and the statements of the Indians are contradictory. Dr. Eastman, -an educated Sioux, has investigated the subject among many of his -people, and arrives at one conclusion; Colonel Godfrey, one of the troop -commanders who was with Benteen, and who has subsequently examined the -field in company with Benteen and other officers, taking the testimony -of Chief Gall, holds another. According to Eastman, whose account agrees -with the popular understanding, Custer attempted to ford the river at a -place now called Reno’s Creek,[85] and fall on what he supposed to be -the rear of the village, but which was really the middle of the upper -half, and was driven back to the hills, where the final tragedy took -place. - -Godfrey, on the contrary, says that Custer, from the point where he was -last seen by Reno’s men, had a view of the village for several miles, -although not for its whole length; that he must have been confident that -he had it below him then, and that he made a wide detour in order to -fall on the rear of the village. It was from this point that he sent the -hurry-up message to Benteen. When at last, having gone far enough, as he -thought, to take the village in the rear, or what he supposed was the -rear, he turned toward the river, and was at once met by the Indians in -great force. - -It was probably about half after two in the afternoon. Reno had been -forced back and driven across the river. Chief Gall, it will be -recalled, had taken a large body of men across the river to intercept -Reno on the other side. Before he could move down to the right for this -purpose, Custer’s men suddenly appeared on the hills. Custer’s -manœuvering had been fine, and his appearance was a complete surprise, -which at first greatly alarmed the Indians. Gall, however, did not lose -his head. Rightly judging that Reno was temporarily eliminated from the -game, he at once determined to attack Custer. He sent word of the -situation to Crazy Horse, who was pressing Reno. Leaving just enough -warriors to make a demonstration before the demoralized Reno, Crazy -Horse galloped headlong down the valley, followed by his men and joined -by others from the far end of the village, who had as yet taken no part -in the fighting. They too crossed the river at the point where a deep -ravine concealed their movements and enabled them to obtain a position -on Custer’s right flank. A similar ravine enabled Gall to menace the -left flank. The Indians were in sufficient force completely to surround -Custer. In the twinkling of an eye he found himself attacked in front -and on both sides. Instead of advancing, he was forced to defend himself -against an overwhelming attack. The troops were dismounted, horses moved -to the rear, and Custer’s men occupied the ridges. - -Calhoun’s troop was posted on the left, followed by those of Keogh, -Smith, and Yates, with Tom Custer’s on the extreme right. The last three -troops happened to have the best defensive position upon the highest -hill. With them was Custer. The Indians attacked at once. Riding at full -gallop along the front of the line on their ponies, they poured a heavy -fire from their long-range rifles upon the soldiers, to which the latter -made a brave, steady, but not very effective reply with their inferior -carbines. Keogh’s and Calhoun’s horses were stampeded at the first fire. - -The force menacing them was so great that Custer dared not leave his -position on the hills. To retreat was hopeless, to advance impossible. -They must stand on the defensive and pray that the advance of Reno’s -command up the valley, which they probably hoped that Benteen would -reinforce, would compel the withdrawal of the Indians from their front. -They fought on, therefore, coolly and resolutely, husbanding their -ammunition and endeavoring to make every shot tell on their galloping, -yelling foemen. They were, I imagine, by no means without ultimate hope -of victory. The Indians in their accounts speak of the cool, deliberate -courage of numbers of the officers and men, whom they singled out for -their bravery. - -Yet the troopers suffered great loss as the afternoon wore on. Their -ammunition began to run low, and the contracting, whirling circle of -Indians drove them closer and closer together. The remaining horses of -the other three troops were at last stampeded, and with them went all of -the reserve ammunition. The situation had evidently become so serious -that Custer, in the vain hope that Reno would understand his peril at -last, fired the two volleys which have been referred to. It appears at -this time that he must have endeavored to send a message to Reno, for -the body of a solitary soldier, Sergeant Butler, was found after the -battle at a point half way between Custer’s and Reno’s commands. A -little heap of cartridges lay near his body, evidencing that he had sold -his life dearly. The Indians were acute enough—so they say, and probably -with truth—to pick out the officers with Custer, and the mortality among -them was fearful. It was evident to all on the hill, as the afternoon -drew toward its close, that they were doomed. It was hardly possible -that a counterattack by Reno would save them now, and there were no -evidences whatever that he was anywhere in the vicinity. - -“Where, in God’s name,” they must have asked themselves in their -despair, “can Reno be?” - -One of the Crow scouts has said—although his account is generally -disbelieved—that he went at last to Custer, as yet unharmed, and told -him that he thought he could get him away, and that Custer, of course, -refused to leave the field. The Crow altered his appearance by draping a -blanket about him so as to look as much like a Sioux as possible, and in -the confusion of the fight got away safely.[86] He was the only human -survivor of the field.[87] What occurred after is a matter of -conjecture, based upon the contradictory and inadequate testimony of the -Indians themselves. - -Gall and Crazy Horse now determined to end the affair. Massing their -warriors in the ravine, they fell on both flanks at the same time that -Crow King and Rain-in-the-Face led a direct charge against the front of -the thinned and weakened line. They swept over the little band of men, -probably now out of ammunition, in a red wave of destruction. There was -a fierce hand-to-hand struggle with clubbed guns, war-clubs, and -tomahawks, and all was over. Some twenty or thirty men, without their -officers, who had probably all been killed where they stood, for their -bodies were found grouped around that of Custer on the highest hill, -endeavored to break through on the right. They were slaughtered to a man -before they reached the river. A few scattered bodies, here and there in -different parts of the field, indicated that separate men had made -futile dashes for freedom. But the bulk of the command was found just -where it had fought, with _the troopers in line, their officers in -position_! They had been beaten and killed. Not an officer or man lived -to tell the story, but they had not been disgraced. - -There, the second day afterward, Terry, with Gibbon, having relieved -Reno’s men, found them on the hills which they had immortalized by their -desperate valor. They had been stripped and most of them mutilated. -Custer’s body was shot in two places, in the side and in the temple. It -was not scalped or mutilated. Colonel Dodge, an authority on Indian -customs, declares that if Custer’s body was neither scalped nor -mutilated, he is convinced that the general committed suicide. None of -the officers with whom I have communicated who inspected the body is -willing to indorse this statement; on the contrary. Therefore, I am sure -Colonel Dodge must be in error. The Indians give no particular -information as to Custer’s death. All that is known is that his body was -there with those of his brave men. - -With Custer in that fight perished many gallant souls. His brother, -Captain Tom Custer, was the only man in the United States Army who held -two medals for capturing two flags with his own hands in the Civil War. -Rain-in-the-Face had accomplished his terrible revenge, for after the -battle he had cut open the breast of the brave young soldier and had -eaten his heart. Calhoun, of L Troop, was Custer’s brother-in-law. With -him was young Crittenden, a lieutenant of infantry, who had sought an -assignment with Custer for this campaign. Smith was the captain of E, -the Gray Horse Troop. At the storming of Fort Fisher, after two -color-bearers had been killed, he had led his regiment to the attack, -colors in hand. His shoulder had been smashed by a musket ball in that -attack. He could never afterward put on his coat without assistance. -With him was young Sturgis. Yates, a veteran of the Civil War, was -captain of F, the Bandbox Troop; and with him was Riley, the youngest -lieutenant there. Keogh, of I Troop, the oldest soldier of them all, and -not the least brave, had been an officer of the Papal Zouaves in early -life. He had a gallant record in the Civil War, too. With him was -Porter, and with the others who had done their parts were Cook, the -adjutant, and Lord, the doctor. - -Others worthy of note fell on that fatal field: Mark Kellogg, a -newspaper correspondent; Charlie Reynolds, the famous scout; Boston -Custer, the General’s brother, who was civilian forage-master of the -regiment, and Autie Reed, the General’s nephew—a mere boy, who wanted to -see something of life in the West and who had welcomed with joy his -opportunity to make the campaign. Well, he saw it, poor fellow! Indeed, -the Custer family was almost wiped out on that fatal Sunday. - -Premonitions of disaster, such as loving women may feel, were in the air -that afternoon. Back at Fort Abraham Lincoln, the devoted wife tells how -the women of the garrison assembled in her quarters in an agony of -apprehension. There were words of prayer. Some one at the piano started -“Nearer My God to Thee,” and the women tried to sing it, but they could -not finish it. It was not until the 5th of July that they received the -news that at that very hour their loved ones were dying on the hill. - -[Illustration: - - _Courtesy of The Century Co._ -] - - LIEUT. H. M. ADJ. W. W. COOK[88] LIEUT. J. J. - HARRINGTON[88] CRITTENDEN[89] - - LIEUT. J. E. PORTER[88] LIEUT. J. STURGIS[88] LIEUT. DONALD - McINTOSH[90] - - LIEUT. W. VAN W. LIEUT. BENJ. HODGSON[90] - RILEY[88] - - OFFICERS OF THE SEVENTH CAVALRY - - All killed at the Little Big Horn - - - V. After the Battle - -On the morning of the 27th of June Terry and Gibbon rescued Reno. The -next day the surviving troops of the regiment, with some individuals -from the other command, marched to the scene of Custer’s defeat to -identify and bury the dead. The bodies upon the dry grass had all been -stripped and left, white and ghastly save for the red stains of wounds. -The bodies of Doctor Lord, Lieutenants Porter, Harrington, and Sturgis, -with those of a number of men, were not recovered. What became of them -is not known to this day. They may have been captured alive and taken by -the Indians to the village, and there tortured to death and their bodies -disposed of. This, however, is unlikely. The Indians positively deny -that they took any prisoners, and it is probable that they did not. -There are quicksands near the bed of the Little Big Horn, and possibly -those bodies were engulfed in them. But all this is only surmise. No one -can tell anything about it, except that they were undeniably killed. And -we may be certain they died as brave men should. - -They buried two hundred and twelve bodies on the hill, and the total -losses of the regiment in the two days of fighting were two hundred and -sixty-five killed and fifty-two wounded—over fifty per cent. The losses -of the Indians were never ascertained. They did not, however, begin to -equal those of the soldiers. It is grossly unfair to speak of the battle -as the “Custer Massacre,” as is often done. Custer attacked the Indians, -and they fought him until all the white men were killed. There was no -massacre about it. - -The cause of the disaster must, first of all, be laid to Custer’s -disobedience of orders. In spite of that, however, I think it is -probable that he might have won the battle, or at least made good his -defense until relieved by Terry and Gibbon, although sustaining heavy -loss, had it not been for three happenings. The first was the vastly -greater number of Indians in the field than any one expected to -encounter. The next, and to me this is absolutely decisive, was Reno’s -failure to press his attack. If he had gone in with the dashing -gallantry which was expected of him, while it is certain that he could -not alone have whipped the Indians, yet he could have so disorganized -them as to have maintained his position in the valley in the midst of -the village without the greatest difficulty, until Custer could fall -upon the rear of those attacking him, and Benteen, with the pack train, -could reinforce them both. The Indians say that they were demoralized -for the time being by Reno’s sudden appearance, and that the squaws were -packing up getting ready for flight when the weakness of Reno’s advance -encouraged them to try to overwhelm him. Custer had a right to expect -that Reno would do his duty as a soldier and take a bold course—which -was, as usual, the only safe course. - -Colonel Godfrey, in his account, suggests still a third cause. The -carbines of the troopers did not work well. When they became clogged and -dirty from rapid firing, the ejectors would not throw out the shells, -and the men frequently had to stop and pick out the shells with a knife. -The chambers of the carbines at that time were cylindrical, and the -easily accumulated dirt on the cartridges clogged them so that the -ejectors would not work properly. The chambers were afterward made -conical, with good results. The Indians had no such trouble. Their -weapons were newer and better than those of the soldiers. If the -indifferent weapons of the troopers failed them, their annihilation in -any event would have been certain.[91] - -I have censured Custer somewhat severely in this article, and it is a -pleasure to me to close it with a quotation from Captain Whittaker’s -life of his old commander. In this quotation Lawrence Barrett, the -eminent actor, who was an old and intimate friend of Custer, has -summarized the character of the brave captain in exquisitely apposite -language; and, in his words, I say good-by to the gallant soldier whose -errors were atoned for by an heroic death in the high places of the -field: - -“His career may be thus briefly given: He was born in obscurity; he rose -to eminence; denied social advantages in his youth, his untiring -industry supplied them; the obstacles to his advancement became the -steppingstones to his fortunes; free to choose for good or evil, he -chose rightly; truth was his striking characteristic ... his acts found -his severest critic in his own breast; he was a good son, a good -brother, a good and affectionate husband, a Christian soldier, a -steadfast friend. Entering the army a cadet in early youth, he became a -general while still on the threshold of manhood; with ability undenied, -with valor proved on many a hard-fought field, he acquired the affection -of the nation; and he died in action at the age of thirty-seven, died as -he would have wished to die, no lingering disease preying upon that iron -frame. At the head of his command, the messenger of death awaited him; -from the field of battle where he had so often ‘directed the storm,’ his -gallant spirit took its flight. Cut off from aid, abandoned in the midst -of incredible odds ... the noble Custer fell, bequeathing to the nation -his sword; to his comrades an example; to his friends a memory, and to -his beloved a Hero’s name.” - - * * * * * - -NOTE.—The question concerning Custer’s conduct is so important a one -that I have included in Appendix A the opinions, pro and con, of several -officers with whom I have corresponded; and in which I have indicated -some other sources of information by which the reader may settle the -debatable question for himself. - ------ - -Footnote 78: - - Charles A. Eastman, M. D., a full-blooded Sioux, a graduate of - Dartmouth and the Boston University School of Medicine, who has - published an interesting account of the battle from his investigations - among the Sioux. See _The Chautauquan_, Vol. XXXI., No. 4, July, 1900. - -Footnote 79: - - Killed with Custer at the Little Big Horn - -Footnote 80: - - General G. A. Forsyth. - -Footnote 81: - - The unanimous testimony of the Indians who have discussed the battle - subsequently is that they were panic-stricken by Reno’s approach, and - would have fled if his attack had been pressed home. This is about the - only statement upon which the Indians all agree. - -Footnote 82: - - This statement is elsewhere denied. - -Footnote 83: - - DeRudio and one other man joined the command on the night of June - 26th; the others succeeded in crossing the river to Reno’s position - late in the afternoon. - -Footnote 84: - - “The splendid officers of the Seventh, who had followed Custer so - faithfully, begged Major Reno to let them try to join the general. - They cried like women, they swore, they showed their contempt of that - coward, but the discipline of their lives as soldiers prevented them - disobeying until it was too late. You know Colonel Weir and Lieutenant - Edgerly tried.”—Private letter to me from the wife of an officer who - was killed in the battle. - -Footnote 85: - - Not the Reno’s Creek referred to above, down which Reno marched to the - Little Big Horn. This Reno’s Creek may be seen in the largest map - between Reno’s final position and the Custer Hill, where the general’s - battalion was overwhelmed. - -Footnote 86: - - It is believed that this man, who was named Curley, secreted himself - in a ravine, before the fighting began, and stole away at nightfall. - -Footnote 87: - - Captain Keogh’s horse “Comanche,” badly wounded, was found on the - field the second day after the battle. His life was saved, and for - many years he was the particular pet of the regiment. - -Footnote 88: - - Killed with Custer. - -Footnote 89: - - 20th Infantry, attached to Custer’s command. Killed. - -Footnote 90: - - Killed with Reno. - -Footnote 91: - - It is possible that if Custer had kept the regiment together, he would - have won the battle; but this is by no means certain, and authorities - differ. I think he would have been forced eventually on the defensive. - - - - - CHAPTER SIX - One of the Last Men to See Custer Alive - - -Mr. Theodore W. Goldin, of Janesville, Wisconsin, formerly a trooper of -the Seventh Cavalry, now Chairman of the Republican State Central -Committee of Wisconsin, was the last, or perhaps the next to the last, -man to see Custer alive. He has prepared an account of his personal -experiences in the battle, which is one of the most interesting of the -contributions that have been made to this volume. His description of the -death of Hodgson is splendidly dramatic, as is his story of the brief -conversations between Custer and Keogh, Reno and Weir, and Benteen and -Wallace. - -What a magnificent picture is that presented by Hodgson, determined to -retreat no longer, facing about, drawing his revolver, and dying at -last, face to the foe, weapon in hand! Mr. Goldin contradicts the -popular impression, as repeated by Colonel Godfrey and others, that Reno -threw away his pistols in his “charge.” - - Milwaukee, Wis., August 11, 1904. - - My Dear Sir:— - - I am in receipt of your letters of July 28th and August 2d, asking - me for a few reminiscences of personal experiences and touching on - my acquaintance and knowledge of Gen. Custer and his last fight. - - The years that have elapsed since that stirring event may have - somewhat dimmed my recollections, and the time at my disposal at - this time is so very limited, that what I may say must, of - necessity, be somewhat fragmentary. Your articles on this subject, - as well as the entire series, have been read with great interest, - and I am very much pleased to know they are to be published in book - form. - - In reply to your request, I will say that I had known Gen. Custer - from the time I joined the regiment in 1873 up to the time of his - tragic death, and had campaigned with him and with the regiment with - the exception of the year 1875, when the troop to which I was - attached was stationed in the South. - - Early in the spring of ’76, we received word that an expedition was - being organized against the Sioux, and that three large columns were - to take the field, and a few weeks later our marching orders came, - and our battalion changed station from near Shreveport, La., to Fort - Lincoln, D. T. - - At the time of our arrival Gen. Custer was in Washington before some - investigating committee, and only joined the regiment a few days - before our column took the field, he having been ordered under - arrest at Chicago while en-route from Washington. - - I will not take the time or space to touch on our march from Fort - Lincoln to the Yellowstone, which we struck near the mouth of the - Powder River. Here we remained a few days while outfitting our pack - train, as it had been determined that we would abandon our wagons - here and establish a supply camp. Maj. Reno had left us a few days - before on a scout, expecting to rejoin us near the mouth of the - Tongue River on June 17th. - - After arranging to leave our wagon train and some dismounted - recruits and the regimental band at the Powder River, we moved camp - to the mouth of the Tongue, where we lay on the 17th of June, the - day on which Gen. Crook had his big fight with the Indians on the - Rosebud. During the day we watched every distant dust cloud that - whirled across the river bottom, hoping that it meant the approach - of Maj. Reno’s command, but as nothing was heard from him, we broke - camp on the morning of the 18th and moved up the valley, where we - effected a junction with Reno soon after noon. During the previous - days we could not help but note the fact that Gen. Custer seemed - moody and discontented, and, entirely different from his usual - habit, appeared nervous and excited to some extent. - - When Reno came in with his report he became a changed man. His - old-time energy and snap were made apparent by the manner in which - he hustled the command into marching order and took the trail for - the Rosebud, where Gen. Terry on our supply steamer the “Far West” - had already preceded us in the hope of striking the command of Gen. - Gibbon, who was known to be somewhere in that vicinity. Our march - was prolonged far into the night, but we finally struck the - Yellowstone and went into camp, assured that if the steamer was - below us we were bound to intercept it. - - The following morning we were in the saddle early, and soon after - noon we sighted the wagon train of Gen. Gibbon’s command moving - slowly up the river and a few moments later the “Far West” steamed - into sight. Couriers were sent out to advise them of the fact that - Reno had discovered the trail of a considerable body of Indians, and - in a short time we were in camp near the mouth of the Rosebud and a - council of war was held at which we understood that Reno’s report - was discussed in detail. - - The following day arrangements were made for a vigorous campaign. A - final council was held on the steamer on the night of the 21st, as I - now recollect it, at which time Gen. Custer received his final - orders, substantially as you have stated them. At this council, and - just about the time it was breaking up, the question was asked Gen. - Gibbon as to what time he could reach the mouth of the Little Big - Horn River, and he replied, - - “Not before noon of the 26th.” - - At this conference it was reported that Custer had been offered the - battalion of the Second Cavalry and the artillery which had been - brought up on the steamer, but declined both, claiming that he knew - his command so well that he preferred to trust himself with them - alone, and that he feared the artillery might delay his march when - nearly in presence of the enemy. Many of the officers and men felt - that it was but a part of a preconceived scheme to secure an - independent command, such as he had been used to having for years, - but be that as it may his request was granted. - - On the afternoon of June 22d we passed in review before Gen. Terry - and Gen. Gibbon, and soon struck the trail described by Maj. Reno. - From that time until Reno struck the Indian village we did not - deviate from it except when it became necessary to find a - satisfactory camping ground. No attempt was made to scout the - country as we had been directed to do, nor was any attempt made to - send a courier across to Gen. Gibbon, although a man named Herndon, - a scout, had been attached to our command for that purpose. - - Our marches were long and our movements very rapid until the night - of the 24th, when we moved off the trail some distance and - apparently settled down for the night. But this was only a ruse to - mislead the Indians, as we had received orders not to unpack our - saddles and to be prepared for a night march. - - From the hour we left the Rosebud Gen. Custer acted in many respects - like another man, his old-time restless energy had returned, and he - seemed to think of nothing but to reach and strike the Indians. In - this connection it might be well to say that the trail we were - following led from the direction of the Missouri River and - indicated, according to the estimate of Bloody Knife and some of our - Crow scouts, a band of from a thousand to twelve hundred Indians, - whom we afterward learned came from the Missouri River agencies and - consisted almost entirely of warriors. - - About eleven o’clock we received word to saddle up and lead into - line. In the meantime a scouting party of Crows and Rees, with some - of our officers, Lieut. Varnum and, I think, Lieut. Hare, had pushed - on ahead of us to scout the trail across the divide and seek to - locate the Indians if possible. Leaving our bivouac, we again struck - the trail and pushed forward, seeking to cross the divide and get - into the shelter of the foot-hills along the Little Big Horn before - daybreak the following morning. Owing to the roughness of the - country and the difficulty in scouting the trail, we were unable to - do this, and daybreak found us in a ravine at the foot of a range of - high bluffs, just how far from the river we did not know. - - Some time during the night it was said Gen. Custer had pushed ahead - and joined the scouts, and that just after daybreak they told him - they had located the village in the valley of the Little Big Horn, - but Gen. Custer replied that he did not believe them. In the - meantime it became apparent that our presence in the country was - known, as, during the night a box of ammunition[92] had been lost - and a detachment sent back to recover it came across some Indians - trying to open the box. On this being reported to Gen. Custer, he - seemed to decide on an immediate advance. - - In the talk, just about the time the division was made in the - command, Mitch Bowyer, a half-breed Crow interpreter, said to Gen. - Custer that he would find more Indians in that valley than he could - handle with his command. Custer replied that if he (Bowyer) was - afraid to go he could stay behind. Bowyer replied that he was not - afraid to go wherever Custer did, or something to that effect, but - that if they went in there neither of them would come out alive. - - Just before the advance was made I was detailed by Lieut. McIntosh - to report to Gen. Custer for duty as orderly, and at once did so. - The general directed me to ride with Lieut. Cook, our regimental - adjutant, and perform any duties he might assign to me. - -[Illustration: - - _Copyright by D. F. Barry_ - - SITTING BULL - - Chief Medicine Man of the Sioux Nation -] - - During our brief halt the men had thrown themselves on the ground - and were most of them asleep, while the horses were grazing among - the sage brush. Gen. Custer ordered the advance, saying that the - company in each battalion first ready should have the right of the - line, and in a few minutes we were all in the saddle. During the - halt it had been ordered that Benteen with his battalion should move - off to the left, scouting the country in that direction, driving - before him any Indians he might discover, and sending word to the - command of anything he might find. Reno was to follow the trail, - while Gen. Custer with the five troops under him struck off to the - right, leaving McDougall with the pack train to follow as best he - could. - - We immediately took up the line of march in accordance with these - orders, and after probably a half hour’s hard ride the impassibility - of some of the hills and ravines forced the column under Gen. Custer - to veer off to the left and we soon came up with the command of Maj. - Reno, which was pushing ahead on the trail as fast as the roughness - of the ascent would permit. After a hard climb we reached the top of - the ridge, where we saw before us a rolling plateau sloping off - toward the foot-hills of the river, which was perhaps some five or - six miles away. - - As our command dashed over the divide we could see Reno some - distance in front of us, moving rapidly down the trail, while - several miles to our left was the command of Col. Benteen, scouting - the bluffs as he had been ordered. For some distance we followed the - general course of Reno’s advance, but were some distance in his rear - and to his right. - - To those of us who were near him it seemed that Custer was chafing - at the apparent slowness of our advance, as he would at times dash - ahead of the column and then rein in and await our approach and - again off he would go. Just about this time we discovered a huge - dust cloud moving down the river valley, but could not determine the - nature of it. As soon as this was discovered Custer rode over toward - the river accompanied only by his orderly trumpeter, and stopped for - a moment on the top of a high pinnacle, where we saw him wave his - hat, apparently in salutation to some one in the distance, and then - come dashing back toward the head of the column which was headed by - Capt. Keogh and “I” Troop, veterans of a dozen fights. With his eyes - snapping in his excitement, Custer rode up to Keogh and said, - somewhat excitedly: - - “Keogh, those Indians are running. If we can keep them at it we can - afford to sacrifice half the horses in the command.” - - Calmly as though on dress parade, Keogh turned in his saddle and - looked back at the long line of eager, bronzed, bearded faces, and - turned to Custer with the remark: - - “General, we will do all that man and horse can do.” - - A moment later the bugles blared out the charge, the first bugle - note we had heard since leaving the Rosebud, and away we thundered - northward down the river, two or three times seeking to find a place - where we could work down into the valley below us, but without - success. - - After perhaps the third unsuccessful trial, Gen. Custer talked - hurriedly with Capt. Cook for a moment, and Cook pulled out his pad - and dashed off a line or two, which he folded up, at the same time - calling for an orderly. I happened to be the first one to reach him, - and he handed me the paper with the order. - - “Deliver that to Maj. Reno, remain with him until we effect a - junction, then report to me at once,” and he was gone. - - An instant later the rear of the column dashed past me and was lost - to sight in the ravines. For an instant I looked after them, and - then realizing that I was in a dangerous country and alone, I lost - no time in heading in the direction of Reno’s command, which I was - able to locate by the dust cloud that hovered over them. - Fortunately, I was not molested to any great extent. A few - long-range shots were fired at me, which only served to accelerate - my speed and materially added to my desire to be among friends. - - A ride of some five or six miles and I overtook Reno just as he was - dismounting to fight on foot. I delivered my dispatch, the contents - of which I did not know. Reno glanced at it somewhat hurriedly and - stuck it in his pocket. About this time the Ree scouts stampeded - and, as we afterward learned, did not recover their sand until they - reached the Powder River and the shelter of the wagon train. It soon - became apparent that the Indians were passing our flank and coming - in behind us, and we were forced to face about and endeavor to repel - their advances until we could get our horses into the timber, in - which attempt several horses were shot and two or three stampeded. - Soon after this we retired into the timber, where we had better - protection and resumed the fight. Sheltered by the timber and the - river bank, we were able to make a much better defense for a short - time. - - Soon after this we noticed that Capt. Moylan was mounting his troop - and Lieut. Wallace, who stood near me on the skirmish line, called - to Capt. French, who was commanding the center company, and asked - what the orders were. French replied that he hadn’t received any but - would try and find out, and in a few minutes he called to us saying - he understood they were going to charge, that he had not received - any orders, but we might as well mount and support them. - - We were ordered to get to our horses, and while doing this we found - that some fifteen of our men were dismounted either because of the - shooting or stampeding of their horses. Lieut. McIntosh had lost his - horse and took one belonging to a trooper named McCormick, who gave - him up with the remark that we were all dead anyway, and he might as - well die dismounted as mounted. Swinging into the saddle, we moved - out of the timber and to our surprise discovered that instead of - “charging the Indians” Reno was executing a masterly charge on the - bluffs on the opposite side of the river. - - As soon as the Indians discovered this, they massed on our flanks - and opened a heavy fire on the retreating column. Fortunately, they - were poor marksmen mounted, and our loss was comparatively small at - this stage of the stampede, for that is what it was. - - It is reported that Reno became so excited that he emptied his - revolver at the Indians and then threw the weapon from him. I happen - to know this was not so, as the revolver is now in the possession of - Gen. Benteen or his family, or was a few years ago. - - During the progress of this retreat I was riding on the left of our - column and near the timber, and when almost in sight of the river my - horse fell, throwing me into a bunch of sage brush, but without - doing me serious injury save to exterior cuticle. As I scrambled to - my feet Lieut. Wallace passed me, shouting for me to run for the - timber as my horse was killed. I did not stop to verify his report, - but took his advice, striking only one or two high places between - where the horse fell and the timber, which I presently reached. - - From where I was concealed I could see our men force their horses - into the river and urge them across the boulder-strewn stream. I saw - Lieut. Hodgson’s horse leap into the stream and saw him struggling - as though wounded, I saw the lieutenant disengage himself from the - stirrups and grab the stirrup strap of a passing trooper and with - that aid make his way across the stream. No sooner had he reached - the bank than it became apparent he had been wounded, but he - pluckily held on, and the trooper seemed to be trying to help him up - behind him on the saddle, but without daring to stop his horse. An - instant later Hodgson seemed to be hit again, for he lost his hold, - fell to the ground, staggered to his feet and sought to reach - another comrade who reined in to aid him, and just as it seemed that - he was saved I saw the second trooper throw up his arms, reel in the - saddle and fall heavily to the ground. Hodgson started to make his - way toward the ravine up which the command was disappearing, he - staggered forward a few steps, stumbled, struggled to his feet - again, only to fall once more. He apparently decided that further - effort to retreat was useless, as I saw him turn and face the - Indians, draw his revolver and open fire. An instant later three or - four shots rang out from my side of the river, and I saw Hodgson - reel and fall and I knew it was all over. - - In the meantime our men had succeeded in crossing the river and made - their way up a neighboring ravine, all save those who had met their - fate at the ford, which was one of the worst along the river for - many rods. Left alone, I began to wonder what my own fate was likely - to be, but I was not observed and therefore not molested, the - Indians being busy stripping and mutilating the bodies of our dead - along the banks of the stream. - - About this time I could hear sounds of heavy firing down the river, - and made up my mind that Custer was engaging the Indians, and from - the momentary glimpses I had of the village I felt that he was as - badly outnumbered as we were. Most of the Indians in our front - melted away and I could see them lashing their ponies as they - hurried to join their friends at the lower end of the village. - - About this time I saw the scout, Herndon, some little distance from - me, making his way toward the river, and called to him, and we were - soon together. He told me that the fifteen dismounted men of our - outfit had made their way to a point in the timber about a couple of - hundred yards from where we were, but that in order to get nearer - the river they had to cross an open space and every time they tried - it the Indians fired on them. Before leaving us the Indians had set - the river bottom on fire, evidently with a design of concealing - their movements, or of smoking or roasting out our wounded. This - smoke proved to be our salvation, as under its cover we made our way - to the river, forded it with some difficulty, and stumbled on to one - of our Crow scouts, who pointed out to us the location of the - command, which we soon joined. - - We found that Benteen and his battalion had reached it and that - nothing was known of the location of Custer and his command. We - reported what we had heard and seen, and just about this time some - one discovered a white flag waving from a point in the river bottom - near where Herndon and myself had been concealed. Lieut. Hare, at - the risk of his life, crept down to a point of bluffs overlooking - the valley, and after considerable signaling satisfied the party we - were friends and they made their way across the river and soon - joined us, proving to be the dismounted men who had been left to - their fate when Reno made his retreat. - - I omitted to state that when we started on our retreat Lieut. - McIntosh, mounted on McCormick’s horse, was several rods in front of - me and I noticed that in some way his lariat had become loosened and - was dragging on the ground, the picket pin striking sage brush and - other obstacles, and rendering his immediate vicinity very - dangerous. Several of the men sought to call his attention to it, - but evidently he did not hear them. A moment after this I saw his - horse go down, but whether he was shot or not I do not know. All I - could see as I passed was that the lieutenant was lying where he - fell, and was either dead or stunned, probably dead, as we found him - in the same place the day after the Indians left us. - - As we were standing on the bluffs looking down into the valley I - heard some loud talk near me, and turning in that direction, I heard - Capt. Weir say: - - “Well, by G—d, if you won’t go, I will, and if we ever live to get - out of here some one will suffer for this.” - - He strode away, and a few moments later I saw “D” Troop mount up and - move down the valley in the direction of the distant firing. - Apparently without orders, the entire command followed them in no - sort of military order with the exception of the two troops under - Benteen and Godfrey. In this way we pushed down the valley some - distance, when we discovered Weir and his troop falling back before - a largely superior body of Indians. - - Hastily forming a line, we held back the advancing horde until Weir - and his command had passed our lines and formed some distance in our - rear, where, with the support of some of our men who were near them, - they formed a line and opened fire, permitting us to fall back and - re-form again in their rear. In this way we fell back some little - distance, when Col. Benteen, who seemed to be the leader in our - section of the field, spoke to Lieut. Wallace, saying: - - “Wallace, there is no use falling back any further. Form your troop, - your right resting here, and we will make a stand.” - - Wallace grinned and said, - - “I haven’t any troop, only two men.” - - Benteen laughed grimly and answered, - - “Form yourself and your two there, and I will tell you more about it - when I find out myself.” - - That was the nucleus of our line of defense. Others soon joined us - and we sheltered ourselves behind sage brush and hurriedly heaped - piles of dirt and opened fire, keeping the Indians at a respectable - distance until darkness came to our relief. During the night we - changed our position a trifle, located our corral and hospital, and - put in the night intrenching ourselves as best we could. At daybreak - the fight opened again and continued without intermission until - about three in the afternoon, when to our surprise the Indians began - to take down their tepees, pack their travois, and in a few hours - were moving up the river valley, a great mass of ponies, travois and - Indians, unfortunately just out of rifle range. - - Twice during the afternoon volunteer parties had gone for water, - each time being fired upon by the Indians, but it was only on the - second trip that any one was hit. Poor Madden, of “K” Troop, was the - unfortunate, his leg being shattered three times between the ankle - and the knee. We carried him back to the hospital, where his leg was - amputated that night. - - On the following day Gen. Terry and Gen. Gibbon came to our relief, - and through them we received the first authentic information as to - the fate of our comrades of the other battalion. On the 28th, after - having transported our wounded across the river, we visited the - scene of the battle and buried such of Custer’s men as we found. - Aside from General Custer, we found hardly a body on the field that - had not been mutilated in some manner or another, but as I recollect - now, we found no marks of mutilation on our dead leader. - - In the space at my disposal it is not possible to deal in incidents - of the fight or go into detailed descriptions. In fact, those have - been well covered in your article already. - - Since the fight I have discussed it with many officers of the army, - and others who have had experience on the frontier, and the general - opinion seemed to be that there were two, possibly three, main - causes for this disaster. - - First: A division of the command into practically four separate - columns while still some fifteen miles from the battle-field, and - without accurate knowledge as to the exact location or approximate - strength of the enemy, and the separation of those columns so that - at a critical period of the fight no two of them were in supporting - distance of one another. - - Second: The fact that Custer came into the presence of the enemy - practically twenty-four hours ahead of time. - - Third: The loss of the horses and with them much of the surplus - ammunition of Custer’s command. - - This subject has been so often discussed by men much abler than - myself that I will not attempt it here. - - My experiences with Gen. Custer always led me to look upon him as - somewhat recklessly brave, disposed to take chances without fully - considering the odds against him. - - I have always felt that one possible reason for the course he - followed, in the face of the orders he received, might be attributed - to the fact that he was feeling keenly the apparent disgrace of the - treatment accorded him by the President, and that he thought that by - a brilliant dash and a decided victory, similar to his Washita - fight, he might redeem himself and once more stand before the people - as a leader and an Indian fighter second to none. Whatever may have - been his motive, we must all admit that he made a most gallant fight - and gave his life at the side of the comrades who had ridden with - him to victory in many a previous battle. - - Very truly yours, - THEO. W. GOLDIN. - ------ - -Footnote 92: - - Mr. Goldin’s recollection is in error, according to Colonel Godfrey, - who is positive that the box contained hard bread. However, the - difference is not material—it was a box, anyway!—C. T. B. - - - - - CHAPTER SEVEN - The Personal Story of Rain-in-the-Face - - BY - W. Kent Thomas - -NOTE.—It is rare, indeed, to get the Indian side of a story in so clear, -so connected, and so dramatic a form as is the following account of the -Battle of the Little Big Horn from one who played a great part in it and -in the events that led up to it. This is a unique document in our -records, and is inserted here by kind permission of Mr. Thomas. It -originally appeared in _Outdoor Life_, Vol. XI., No. 3, for March, 1903. -Its accuracy and fidelity to fact are so attested as to be beyond -question.—C. T. B. - - -The writer saw much of the “Custer Indians” at the World’s Fair and -afterward at Coney Island, and had a good chance to know some of them -well. The following leaves from a diary kept at that time show how the -Indians regarded the Custer fight; they considered that the white men -were simply outgeneraled by Sitting Bull: - - Coney Island, N. Y., Aug. 12, 1894. - - Rain-in-the-Face (Itiomagaju) hobbled into the tent to-night, as - McFadden and I were discussing the events of the day, and seating - himself, unbidden, with true Indian stoicism, he grunted out that - one word of all words so dear to a Lakota, “Minnewaukan!” which, - literally translated, means “Water of God,” but which by usage has - been interpreted as “fire-water.” Since the other Indians were all - away from camp on a visit to their friends, the Oglalas at Buffalo - Bill’s camp, I decided to yield for once to Rain’s oft-repeated - demand, which had been hitherto as regularly denied. - - He took my flask, and with a guttural “How!” drained it at one gulp, - without straining a muscle of his face. “Ugh! good! like Rain’s - heart,” he remarked, as he handed the empty bottle to “Mac” with a - self-satisfied look. Then, after a long pause, he joined in our - hearty laughter, and added: “Wechasa Chischina (Little Man, as he - always calls me) good! Potoshasha (Red Beard, his name for McFadden) - good! Minnewaukan good! All heap good!” - - “Something’s come over the old man,” laughed Mac. “His heart’s good - to-night. Suppose we take advantage of it, as the boys are all over - at the Oglala tepees, and get Rain to turn his heart inside out. - Here, give me my hat and I’ll get the flask refilled and bring back - Harry with me to interpret.” Off he went like a shot, leaving me to - entertain Rain as best I could with my small knowledge of the Sioux - lingo and signs. - - McFadden soon returned, bringing Harry McLaughlin, our interpreter. - It didn’t take long to get Rain started; after he had had another - pull at the flask, he said: - -[Illustration: - - RAIN-IN-THE-FACE - - _From a sketch from life made in 1894 by Edward Esmonde_ -] - - “If you want a story, I will tell a true one. It’s about myself. I - was a bad man and dangerous to fool with before I had to walk with - crutches. My heart’s good now, but it was all the time bad when I - was a fighter and a hunter. The maidens admired me, but the bucks - were afraid of me. I would rather fight than eat. The long swords - (soldiers) trembled when they knew I was near, and the Rees and - Crows always felt of their hair every morning to see if their scalps - were still on when Rain was near by.” - - Here Harry headed him off, for it’s natural for an Indian to boast, - and if any one will listen he will sing his own praises for hours at - a stretch. - - “Yes, we know you were a bad man and a fighter from ’way back,” said - Harry, “but we want to hear about the time Tom Custer made you take - water. If you were such a brave man, how did it happen that a little - man like Tom Custer got the best of you?” - - This had the desired effect, and Rain winced under such a reflection - on his bravery, for he measured forty-six inches around his chest, - stood five feet nine inches, and weighed about 195 pounds at that - time, while Captain Tom Custer was under the average weight and - height. - - With great deliberation and much gesticulation, Rain told his - version of the incident in question, and much to our surprise he - continued on and related his version of the “Custer Massacre.” - - Now, since nearly all the officers in the Regular Army, as well as - all the agents of the Interior Department, have failed to get him - even to speak of this fight (their trying, coaxing, and threatening - for years has been in vain), and since Rain gets the credit of being - the slayer of Custer, and has been immortalized in verse by - Longfellow, it was a pleasant surprise to have this unexpected - revelation. I am writing it down as nearly like McLaughlin - interpreted it as I can. - - “Two years before the big fight,” he said, “Gall and Sitting Bull - had their camp at Standing Rock. All were hostiles. They were - Unkpapa Sioux and fighters who never feared an enemy any more than a - buffalo calf. The Yanktonais (friendly Indians) were coffee coolers - (cowards) and hung around the agency which was at Lincoln then (Fort - Abraham Lincoln on the upper Missouri now). We used to have great - times in the hostile camp, dancing, running races, shooting and - playing games. Buffalo and deer were plenty, and we had many ponies. - I was a great fellow with the girls. They used to tease me to get me - mad—when I got mad I knew no reason, I wanted to fight. One night a - girl dared me to go up to Fort Lincoln and kill a white man. I told - her it was too risky, as the long swords always kept watch. Besides, - the Rees (another tribe of Indians, employed by the government as - scouts) had their lodges on the hill back of the fort. The - wood-choppers were camped between the fort and the river. She said: - - “’A brave man fears nothing. If you are a coward, don’t go. I’ll ask - some other young man who isn’t afraid, if he hasn’t danced in the - Sun Dance.’ (This was a torture dance in which Rain-in-the-Face - subsequently underwent the most horrible self-torture ever - inflicted.[93]) - - “The other girls laughed, but the young men who heard it didn’t. - They feared me. I would have killed them for laughing. I went to my - lodge and painted sapa (black, the color used when they go on the - war-path), took my gun, my bow, my pony. Sitting Bull had forbidden - any one to leave camp without his permission. I skipped off under - cover of darkness and went up to Lincoln (forty-five miles north, - opposite the present site of Bismarck, North Dakota). I hung around - for two days, watching for a chance to shoot a long sword. I had - plenty of chances to kill a Ree squaw, plenty to kill a - wood-chopper, but I wanted to carry back the brass buttons of a long - sword to the girl who laughed at me. I did so, and she sewed them on - her shawl. One morning I saw the sutler (store keeper) and a horse - medicine man (U. S. Veterinary Surgeon Hontzinger) go out to a - spring; Long Yellow Hair (General Custer) and his men were riding - back about 100 yards. I rushed up and shot the sutler and brained - the horse medicine man with my war club; then I shot them full of - arrows and cut off some buttons. Long Yellow Hair heard the shot and - his troop charged back. I didn’t have time to scalp the men I got. I - jumped on my pony and yelled at them to catch me. They chased me to - the Cannon Ball (a small river twenty-five miles south). Charlie - Reynolds (a scout) knew me and told Long Yellow Hair who did this - brave deed. - - “Next winter I went to the agency store at Standing Rock. I drew no - rations—I hadn’t signed the paper. (All the Indians who signed a - peace treaty and consented to live on the reservation, under - military orders, were furnished with rations by the government twice - a month. The hostiles had to live by hunting.) Istokscha (One Arm, - the Hon. H. S. Parkin) was running the store then. I wasn’t afraid - of any of them. Little Hair (Capt. Tom Custer) had thirty long - swords there. He slipped up behind me like a squaw, when my back was - turned. They all piled on me at once; they threw me in a sick wagon - (ambulance) and held me down till they got me to the guard-room at - Lincoln. - - “I was treated like a squaw, not a chief. They put me in a room, - chained me, gave me only one blanket. The snow blew through the - cracks and on to me all winter. It was cold. Once Little Hair let me - out and the long swords told me to run. I knew they wanted to shoot - me in the back. I told Little Hair that I would get away some time; - I wasn’t ready then; when I did, I would cut his heart out and eat - it. I was chained to a white man. One night we got away. They fired - at us, but we ran and hid on the bank of Hart river in the brush. - The white man cut the chains with a knife (a file). They caught him - next day. - - “I rejoined Sitting Bull and Gall. They were afraid to come and get - me there. I sent Little Hair a picture, on a piece of buffalo skin, - of a bloody heart. He knew I didn’t forget my vow. The next time I - saw Little Hair, ugh! I got his heart. I have said all.” - -And, Indian-like, he stopped. - -We all knew that the greater part of this was true, since it tallied -with the government account of the death of the sutler and Surgeon -Hontzinger. But we wanted to hear how he took Tom Custer’s heart. -McFadden, who is quite an artist as well as an actor of note, had made -an imaginary sketch of “Custer’s Last Charge.” He got it and handed it -to Rain, saying: - -“Does that look anything like the fight?” - -Rain studied it a long time, and then burst out laughing. - -“No,” he said, “this picture is a lie. These long swords have -swords—they never fought us with swords, but with guns and revolvers. -These men are on ponies—they fought us on foot, and every fourth man -held the others’ horses. That’s always their way of fighting. We tie -ourselves onto our ponies and fight in a circle. These people are not -dressed as we dress in a fight. They look like agency Indians—we strip -naked and have ourselves and our ponies painted. This picture gives us -bows and arrows. We were better armed than the long swords. Their guns -wouldn’t shoot but once—the thing wouldn’t throw out the empty cartridge -shells. (In this he was historically correct, as dozens of guns were -picked up on the battle-field by General Gibbon’s command two days after -with the shells still sticking in them, showing that the ejector -wouldn’t work.) When we found they could not shoot we saved our bullets -by knocking the long swords over with our war clubs—it was just like -killing sheep. Some of them got on their knees and begged; we spared -none—ugh! This picture is like all the white man’s pictures of Indians, -a lie. I will show you how it looked.” - -Then turning it over, he pulled out a stump of a lead pencil from his -pouch and drew a large shape of a letter S, turned sideways.[94] “Here,” -said he, “is the Little Big Horn river; we had our lodges along the -banks in the shape of a bent bow.” - -“How many lodges did you have?” asked Harry. - -“Oh, many, many times ten. We were like blades of grass. (It is -estimated that there were between four and six thousand Indians, hence -there must have been at least a thousand lodges.) - -“Sitting Bull had made big medicine way off on a hill. He came in with -it; he had it in a bag on a coup-stick. He made a big speech and said -that Waukontonka (the Great Spirit) has come to him riding on an eagle. -Waukontonka had told him that the long swords were coming, but the -Indians would wipe them off the face of the earth. His speech made our -hearts glad. Next day our runners came in and told us the long swords -were coming. Sitting Bull had the squaws put up empty death lodges along -the bend of the river to fool the Ree scouts when they came up and -looked down over the bluffs. The brush and the bend hid our lodges. Then -Sitting Bull went away to make more medicine and didn’t come back till -the fight was over. - -“Gall was head chief; Crazy Horse led the Cheyennes; Goose the Bannocks. -I was not a head chief—my brother Iron Horn was—but I had a band of the -worst Unkpapas; all of them had killed more enemies than they had -fingers and toes. When the long swords came, we knew their ponies were -tired out; we knew they were fooled by the death lodges. They thought we -were but a handful. - -[Illustration: - - Key to map of Custer battle-field. Drawn on back of buckskin coat by - Rain-in-the-Face for Edward Esmonde. Said to be the only map of the - battle-field ever made by an Indian. - - _A_, _Camp of the Indians_; _B_, _Reno’s Skirmish Line_; _C_, _Timber - Where Reno’s Horses Were_; _D_, _Reno’s Retreat_; _E_, _Reno Joined - Benteen_; _F_, _Custer’s Trail_; _G_, _Custer’s First Stand_; _H_, - _Squaws and Children Crossed River_; _I_, _Where Squaws Went Into - Camp After Re-crossing River_; _J_, _Where Last Stand Was Made and - Custer Was Killed_. -] - -“We knew they made a mistake when they separated. Gall took most of the -Indians up the river to come in between them and cut them off. When we -saw the Ree scouts had stayed back with Long Yellow Hair, we were glad. -We saw them trotting along, and let them come in over the bluffs. Some -of our young men went up the gully which they had crossed and cut them -off from behind. - -“Then we showed our line in front, and the long swords charged. They -reeled under our fire and started to fall back. Our young men behind -them opened fire. Then we saw some officers talking and pointing. Don’t -know who they were, for they all looked alike. I didn’t see Long Yellow -Hair then or afterward. We heard the Rees singing their death song—they -knew we had them. All dismounted, and every fourth man held the others’ -ponies. Then we closed all around them. We rushed like a wave does at -the sand out there (the ocean beach) and shot the pony holders and -stampeded the ponies by waving our blankets in their faces. Our squaws -caught them, for they were tired out. - -“I had sung the war song, I had smelt the powder smoke. My heart was -bad—I was like one that has no mind. I rushed in and took their flag; my -pony fell dead as I took it. I cut the thong that bound me. I jumped up -and brained the long sword flag-man with my war club, and ran back to -our line with the flag. - -“The long sword’s blood and brains splashed in my face. It felt hot, and -blood ran in my mouth. I could taste it. I was mad. I got a fresh pony -and rushed back, shooting, cutting, and slashing. This pony was shot, -and I got another. - -“This time I saw Little Hair. I remembered my vow. I was crazy; I feared -nothing. I knew nothing would hurt me, for I had my white weasel-tail -charm on.[95] (He wears the charm to this day.) I don’t know how many I -killed trying to get at him. He knew me. I laughed at him and yelled at -him. I saw his mouth move, but there was so much noise I couldn’t hear -his voice. He was afraid. When I got near enough I shot him with my -revolver. My gun was gone, I don’t know where. I leaped from my pony and -cut out his heart and bit a piece out of it and spit it in his face. I -got back on my pony and rode off shaking it. I was satisfied and sick of -fighting; I didn’t scalp him. - -“I didn’t go back on the field after that. The squaws came up afterward -and killed the wounded, cut their boot legs off for moccasin soles, and -took their money, watches, and rings. They cut their fingers off to get -them quicker. They hunted for Long Yellow Hair to scalp him, but could -not find him. He didn’t wear his fort clothes (uniform), his hair had -been cut off, and the Indians didn’t know him. (This corroborates what -Mrs. Custer says about her husband’s having his long yellow curls cut at -St. Paul some weeks before he was killed.) - -“That night we had a big feast and the scalp dance. Then Sitting Bull -came up and made another speech. He said: ‘I told you how it would be. I -made great medicine. My medicine warmed your hearts and made you brave.’ - -“He talked a long time. All the Indians gave him the credit of winning -the fight because his medicine won it. But he wasn’t in the fight. Gall -got mad at Sitting Bull that night. Gall said: ‘We did the fighting, you -only made medicine.’ It would have been the same anyway. Their hearts -were bad toward each other after that, always. - -“After that fight we could have killed all the others on the hill -(Reno’s command) but for the quarrel between Gall and Sitting Bull. Both -wanted to be head chief. Some of the Indians said Gall was right and -went with him. Some said Sitting Bull was. I didn’t care, I was my own -chief and had my bad young men; we would not obey either of them unless -we wanted to, and they feared us. - -“I was sick of fighting—I had had enough. I wanted to dance. We heard -more long swords were coming with wheel guns (artillery, Gatlings). We -moved camp north. They followed many days till we crossed the line. I -stayed over there till Sitting Bull came back, and I came back with him. -That’s all there is to tell. I never told it to white men before.” - -When he had finished, I said to him: “Rain, if you didn’t kill Long -Yellow Hair, who did?” - -“I don’t know. No one knows. It was like running in the dark.” - -“Well,” asked Mac, “why was it Long Yellow Hair wasn’t scalped, when -every one else was? Did you consider him too brave to be scalped?” - -“No, no one is too brave to be scalped; that wouldn’t make any -difference. The squaws wondered afterward why they couldn’t find him. He -must have laid under some other dead bodies. I didn’t know, till I heard -it long afterward from the whites, that he wasn’t scalped.” - -“How many Indians were killed in the fight?” - -“I don’t remember, but about ten and four or ten and six.” - -“How about Curley, the Crow scout, who claims to have escaped?” asked -Mac. - -“Ugh! I know Curley. He is a liar. He never was in the fight. His pony -stumbled and broke something. He stayed behind to fix it. When he heard -the firing, he ran off like a whipped dog. One long sword escaped, -though; his pony ran off with him and went past our lodges. They told me -about it at Chicago. I saw the man there, and I remembered hearing the -squaws tell about it after the fight.” - -Rain-in-the-Face (Itiomagaju) is about sixty years of age now, and is -the only chief that survives to tell the tale of the Custer fight. Gall -and Sitting Bull have both gone to hunt the white buffalo long since. -Rain can write his name in English. I taught him to do it at the World’s -Fair in order to sell Longfellow’s poem, entitled “The Revenge of -Rain-in-the-Face.” He doesn’t know the significance of it after he -writes it. His knowledge of English is confined to about thirty words, -but he can’t say them so any one can understand him, though he can -understand almost anything that is said in English. Like all other -Indians, his gratitude is for favors to come and not for favors already -shown. He is utterly heartless and unprincipled, physically brave but -morally a coward. His redeeming feature lies in the fact that you can -depend upon any promise he makes, but it takes a world of patience to -get him to promise anything. Even at the age of sixty he is still a -Hercules. In form and face he is the most pronounced type of the ideal -Fenimore Cooper, dime novel Indian in America. - ------ - -Footnote 93: - - The Sun Dance is that ceremonial performance in which the young Sioux - aspirant gives that final proof of endurance and courage which - entitles him to the _toga virilis_ of a full-fledged warrior. One - feature of it is the suspension in air of the candidate by a rawhide - rope passed through slits cut in the breast, or elsewhere, until the - flesh tears and he falls to the ground. If he faints, falters, or - fails, or even gives way momentarily to his anguish during the period - of suspension, he is damned forever after, and is called and treated - as a squaw for the rest of his miserable life. - - Rain-in-the-Face was lucky when he was so tied up. The tendons gave - way easily, and he was released after so short a suspension that it - was felt he had not fairly won his spurs. Sitting Bull, the chief - medicine man, decided that the test was unsatisfactory. - Rain-in-the-Face thereupon defied Sitting Bull to do his worst, - declaring there was no test which could wring a murmur of pain from - his lips. - - Sitting Bull was equal to the occasion. He cut deep slits in the back - over the kidneys—the hollows remaining were big enough almost to take - in a closed fist years after—and passed the rawhide rope through them. - For two days the young Indian hung suspended, taunting his torturers, - jeering at them, defying them to do their worst, while singing his war - songs and boasting of his deeds. The tough flesh muscles and tendons - would not tear loose, although he kicked and struggled violently to - get free. Finally, Sitting Bull, satisfied that Rain-in-the-Face’s - courage and endurance were above proof, ordered buffalo skulls to be - tied to his legs, and the added weight with some more vigorous kicking - enabled the Indian stoic to break free. It was one of the most - wonderful exhibitions of stoicism, endurance, and courage ever - witnessed among the Sioux, where these qualities were not infrequent. - Rain-in-the-Face had passed the test. No one thereafter questioned his - courage. He was an approved warrior, indeed. It was while suspended - thus that he boasted of the murder of Dr. Hontzinger, and was - overheard by Charlie Reynolds, the scout, who told Custer and the - regiment. - - Mr. Edward Esmonde, a companion of Mr. Thomas during the season he had - Rain-in-the-Face and his fellows at the World’s Fair in Chicago and - afterward at Coney Island in his charge, gave me the information in - this note.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 94: - - Rain-in-the-Face afterward drew a picture or map of the battle of the - Little Big Horn, on the back of a handsome buckskin hunting-shirt. A - cut of this picture appears on the following page. It is believed to - be the only map of the battle drawn by one of the Indian participants - therein.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 95: - - Notwithstanding his “white weasel-tail charm,” Rain-in-the-Face was - wounded in this battle. A bullet pierced his right leg above the knee. - Among the plunder which fell to him after the action was over was a - razor taken from the person of some dead soldier. With this razor the - wounded man essayed some home-made surgery. First he cut deeply into - the front of his leg, but failed to reach the bullet. Then he reached - around to the back of his leg and chopped recklessly into the flesh - from that quarter. He got the bullet, also several tendons, and - narrowly missed cutting the artery and bleeding to death. He was lame - and had to walk on crutches all his life thereafter. - - —Statement of Mr. Esmonde. - - Colonel Godfrey, in his _Century_ article, relates a similar instance - of courage and endurance on the part of one of his troopers: - - “Among the wounded was Saddler ‘Mike Madden,’ of my troop, whom I - promoted to be sergeant on the field for gallantry. Madden was very - fond of his grog. His long abstinence had given him a famous thirst. - It was necessary to amputate his leg, which was done without - administering any anæsthetic; but after the amputation, the surgeon - gave him a good stiff drink of brandy. Madden eagerly gulped it down, - and his eyes fairly danced as he smacked his lips and said: - - “’M-eh, doctor, cut off my other leg.’”—C. T. B. - - - - - CHAPTER EIGHT - Two Interesting Affairs - - - I. The Fight on the War Bonnet - -Before entering upon a detailed description of the larger events of the -campaign after the Battle of the Rosebud and Little Big Horn, two -smaller affairs are worthy of mention. One, though nothing but a -skirmish, was of great importance in determining the final result. The -other well illustrates something of the adventurous life and perilous -duty of a soldier in Indian warfare. - -On Saturday, July 15, 1876, the Fifth Cavalry, under General Wesley -Merritt, was marching toward Fort Laramie, under orders to join Crook. -At noon word was received from the agency that a body of Cheyennes, -numbering, perhaps, one thousand warriors, who had heretofore remained -quiet on the reservation at the Red Cloud Agency, on the White River, -South Dakota—the Pine Ridge Agency—was about to break away and join the -Indians in the field. Their minds had been inflamed by the story of -Crook’s defeat and the account of the disaster to the Seventh Cavalry. -They thought they saw unlimited opportunities for plunder, scalp-taking, -and successful fighting—therefore they decided to go on the war-path -without delay. There were not troops enough near the agency to prevent -this action, which was entirely unsuspected anyway. - -The orders for Merritt to join Crook were imperative; but, in view of -this news, the general decided to disregard them for the present. He -realized that he could perform no better service than heading off this -body of Cheyennes, and either defeating and scattering them or, better -still, forcing them back to the agency. - -The trail they would have to take would cross a creek in the extreme -southeast corner of South Dakota, called the War Bonnet,[96] some -eighty-five miles, by the only practicable route, from where the Fifth -Cavalry then was. The Indians were a much shorter distance from it. -Merritt would have had to march around, practically, three sides of a -square, owing to the configuration of the country, to reach that point, -which was the best place for miles around, within the knowledge of W. F. -Cody (Buffalo Bill), his chief scout, to intercept the flying Cheyennes. - -Merritt did not hesitate an instant after learning the news. He put his -command in motion immediately, and by a forced march of thirty-one -hours, got to the crossing in good time. There was no evidence that the -Cheyennes had passed. The troopers concealed themselves in ravines under -the bluff’s, and waited for the Indians. - -Early on the morning of July 17th, the pickets, commanded by Lieutenant -Charles King,[97] observed the approach of the Indians. At about the -same time Merritt’s wagon train, under Lieutenant Hall, with two hundred -infantrymen spoiling for a fight, concealed in the wagons as a guard, -was observed toiling along, some four miles to the southwest, in an -endeavor to reach the rendezvous on the War Bonnet. The regiment -remained carefully concealed, and the Indians, in high glee, thought -they had the train at their mercy. - -So soon as he sighted the Cheyennes, Lieutenant Hall despatched two -troopers of his small cavalry escort ahead to the crossing to apprise -Merritt that the Indians were at hand. An advance party of Cheyennes, -superbly mounted and led by a gorgeous young chief, determined to -intercept these troopers, who were ignorant of their peril. The two -soldiers came down one trail which led through a ravine, the Indians -came up another which led through another ravine. The troopers and the -Cheyennes were hidden from each other, but both were in plain view of -the picket on the hill. The two trails joined at the foot of the hill. -The plain back of the wagon-train was black—or red, rather—with Indians -coming up rapidly, although they were not yet near enough to attack. - -Merritt and one or two other officers, with Buffalo Bill and a few of -his scouts and several troopers, joined King on the hill. The main body -of the Indians was too far away to attack, so the little advance party -determined to wait until the Cheyennes, who were endeavoring to cut off -the two soldiers, were close at hand and then fall upon them. Everybody -withdrew from the crest of the hill except Lieutenant King, who was to -give the signal, when the party below should sally around it and fall on -the Cheyennes. - -King, who has described the situation with masterly skill in his -“Campaigning with Crook,” flattened himself out on the brow of the hill, -with nothing showing but the top of his hatless head and his field -glass, and watched the soldiers rapidly galloping up one trail and the -Indians more rapidly rushing down the other. He waited until the Indians -had almost reached the junction. Then he gave the signal. Merritt’s -escort and Cody’s scouts raced around the base of the hill, and dashed -slap into the faces of the astonished Cheyennes. Two Indian saddles were -emptied in the twinkling of an eye. Such was the impetus of their charge -that the Indians scarcely had time to rein in their steeds before the -white men were upon them. - -Buffalo Bill shot the leader of the war party, a famous young chief -named Yellow Hand, through the leg. The bullet also pierced the heart of -the pony Yellow Hand was riding. Both crashed to the earth. In spite of -his pain, Yellow Hand dragged himself to his feet and fired at the -scout, killing his horse. The two, not twenty paces apart, exchanged -shots the next instant. The Indian missed, but Buffalo Bill sent a -bullet through Yellow Hand’s breast. The Indian reeled, but before he -fell Cody leaped upon him and drove his knife into his gallant enemy’s -heart. Yellow Hand was a dead Indian when he struck the ground. “Jerking -the war bonnet off,” he says, “I scientifically scalped him in about -five seconds.”[98] - -Yellow Hand had recognized Buffalo Bill, and had virtually challenged -him to this duel. “The first scalp for Custer!” shouted Cody, waving his -trophy in the air. - -Some of the other Indians had now come within range. They opened fire -upon the little party; the bullets zipped around them in every -direction, one narrowly grazing General Merritt. They nicked a horse -here and there, but, as usual, their marksmanship was execrable. - -As the little party charged the Indians, Merritt had directed King to -order the rest of the regiment to advance. In the midst of the firing, -the splendid troops of the dandy Fifth came bursting through the ravines -and over the hills, making for the Cheyennes on the gallop. At the same -time Lieutenant Hall’s infantrymen scrambled out of their wagons and -sent a few volleys at the Cheyennes at long range. A more astonished -body of Indians the United States has probably never contained. They -hadn’t the slightest idea that there was a soldier within five hundred -miles, except those in the wagon train which they had expected to -capture. They had anticipated no trouble whatever in joining Sitting -Bull, and now they found themselves suddenly face to face with one of -the finest cavalry regiments in the service. What were they to do? They -hadn’t much time to decide, for the cavalry were after them at full -gallop. They turned and fled incontinently. They stood not on the order -of their going, but went at once. - -If they could get back to the reservation, they would be free from -attack. They fled at the highest possible speed of their horses, -throwing aside everything they possessed, save their guns and -ammunition, in their frantic desire to get away. For thirty miles -Merritt and his men pursued them with the best will in the world to come -up with them; but the horses of the soldiers were more or less tired -from their long march of the day before, and the Indians, lightly -equipped and on fresh horses, finally succeeded in escaping. By -nightfall the whole party was back on the reservation. Thereafter care -was taken that they found no further opportunity to go on the war-path. - -The coöperation of this splendid body of Indians with that under the -command of Crazy Horse might possibly have turned the scale in some of -the hotly contested battles, and Merritt’s promptness was greatly -commended by the authorities. Buffalo Bill received the chief glory of -the little adventure from his dramatic duel with Yellow Hand, in full -view of soldiers and Indians. - - - II. The Sibley Scout - -The other event is known in army records as The Sibley Scout. While -General Crook was waiting for reinforcements and additional supplies at -his camp on Goose Creek, near the Tongue River, he decided to send out a -scouting party to see what had become of his friend, Crazy Horse, who -had handled him so severely at the Rosebud a few weeks before. - -Lieutenant Frederick W. Sibley, of E Troop, of the Third Cavalry, an -enterprising but cool-headed young officer, was given command of -twenty-five picked men from the regiment. With him went scouts Frank -Gruard and Baptiste Pourier, commonly known as “Big Bat,” to distinguish -him from another scout, Baptiste, a smaller man. To the party also were -attached John Becker, mule packer, and the indefatigable Finerty, the -war correspondent of the Chicago _Times_, making a total of thirty men. - -Each man carried one hundred rounds of ammunition on his person, and a -few days’ rations in his saddle-bags. They started on the 6th of July. -On the 7th they had reached the Rosebud, some fifty miles away from -Crook’s camp. There they came across the Indians. Gruard and Pourier -observed them from the top of a hill, behind which the rest of the -expedition halted. There were hundreds of them, apparently, and the -scouts rejoined the command immediately. To take the back track was -impossible. Therefore, they struck westward over the mountains, leading -their horses. The Indians, marching slowly southward, soon came upon the -trail of the party, and followed it at some distance. Urged by the -imminence of their peril, the men, led by the unerring Gruard, who was -familiar with all the ramifications of the Big Horn Range, since he had -often hunted there during his captivity with the Sioux, did some rapid -mountain climbing, and finally thought they had escaped pursuit, -especially as no one could ride up the trail up which they had climbed, -and these Indians were poor trailers when on foot. Having progressed -some five miles over terrific trails, they halted in a little glade -under the shade of some trees, unsaddled their horses, made coffee, and -ate dinner. Feeling themselves safe from pursuit, they rested for -several hours, and it was not until late in the afternoon that they took -up their march again. - -The going here was easier than before, and they could mount their horses -once more. Presently they trotted into a level, thickly wooded valley. -The trail led along the right side of the mountain, which was broken and -rugged. There were woods to the left and in front of them, and high -rocks and open timber on the right. John Becker, who brought up the -rear, suddenly alarmed everybody by the shout of “Indians, Indians!” - -The next instant the timber and boulders to the right were alive with a -war party of Sioux and Cheyennes, not two hundred yards away—not the -same party they had seen in the valley, by the way. So soon as the -Indians appeared they opened fire. Again their shooting was bad. Not a -trooper was hurt, although a number of horses were hit, some seriously. -Sibley acted with prompt decision. A word with Gruard determined him in -his course. Under a spattering fire from the Indians, the party turned -to the left and raced for the thick timber as fast as they could go. -They threw themselves to the ground in a semi-circular line so soon as -they reached the woods, tied their horses to the trees back of them, and -taking advantage of fallen logs and boulders as a breastwork, opened -fire upon the Indians, who, on their part, sought concealment and -commenced firing in earnest. The soldiers were well protected in the -forest, however, and although the Indians killed many of the horses, -they did not hit any of the troopers. - -The party was now overwhelmingly outnumbered. There were already several -hundred Indians engaged. Their leader was a magnificent young Cheyenne -chief, dressed in a suit of white buckskin. It was afterward learned -that his name was White Antelope. Gruard was recognized by the Indians, -who were desirous of taking him alive. After firing for perhaps half an -hour, White Antelope led the Indians on foot in a direct charge on the -woods. - -Sibley ordered his men to hold their fire until they could make every -shot tell. They mowed the advancing Indians down in scores. White -Antelope was seen to leap into the air and fall. He had been pierced, it -was afterward learned, by several bullets, and started for the happy -hunting grounds then and there. The charge was handsomely repulsed, and -the Indians retired in confusion, although still keeping up a severe -fire. - -[Illustration: - - CHIEF TWO MOON OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNES - - Allies of the Sioux at Little Big Horn - - _Painted from life by F. A. Burbank_ -] - -It was evident to every one that the Indians would hold the soldiers in -play until they were joined by other war parties—indeed, their numbers -were increased already—when Sibley’s detachment would be surrounded and -exterminated. Gruard, therefore, proposed abandoning the horses—most of -them had been killed anyway—and that the whole party should steal away -through the timber and endeavor to escape over the mountains on foot. -Firing two or three volleys and then keeping up a scattering fire for a -short time to make the Indians think they were on the alert, the -troopers, exercising the greatest caution, one by one crawled through -the underbrush until they were hidden by the forest trees. Then -everybody got up on his feet and ran like mad. - -Gruard, whose instincts as a guide were of the highest order, led them -over magnificent mountains, through gloomy cañons, past overhanging -cliffs, along impossible trails on the sides of tremendous precipices, -one of which stretched for several hundred feet below them and three -hundred feet above them, almost sheer. Not being mountaineers, they -would have been utterly unable to have followed the scout had it not -been for the Red Terror that lurked behind. They had succeeded in -getting, perhaps, a mile away from and some distance above the valley, -when they heard several heavy volleys, followed by a series of wild -yells, which apprised them that the Indians had at last rushed their -camp. They were so confident of escape now that they actually burst into -roars of laughter at the thought of the Indian disappointment when the -attackers found their victims had decamped. Those Indians were not -accustomed to hunt on foot. An Indian off a horse is about as awkward as -a sailor on one. The pursuit was soon abandoned, and the soldiers left -to follow their course unmolested. Theirs had been a lucky escape. -Without Gruard, they had all been killed. - -The day was frightfully hot. The fast going caused by the exigencies of -the occasion and the desperate nature of the climbing increased their -discomfort. The men threw away everything in the way of superfluous -clothing which would impede their progress or tire them in their hurry, -save their weapons and ammunition. They camped that night, or halted, -rather, for there was nothing with which to camp, on the crest of the -range. It turned very cold, a terrible storm arose, and they suffered -severely. They had nothing to eat; their provisions had been in their -saddle-bags, and they had not dared to take them in their attempt to -escape, lest the suspicions of the Indians should be excited by their -efforts. - -The next day, the 9th of July, they started down the mountain. Gruard’s -instincts were not at fault. He led them to the foot-hills overlooking -Crook’s main camp far away. In order to reach the plain they had to -cross a rapid mountain brook, the water of which came almost up to their -necks. Two men who could not swim and who were in a very nervous -condition from their exciting adventures, stubbornly refused to try to -cross the stream, even with the assistance of their comrades. They chose -rather to hide themselves where they were, and begged that help might be -sent back to them. The rest of the party managed to cross and started -for the camp, still about fifteen miles distant. They were met in the -evening by a scouting party of soldiers, who brought them back to camp. - -Their clothing and shoes were torn to ribbons, and they were greatly -exhausted from the terrible strains and hardships to which they had been -subjected. That they escaped at all was a miracle, due to the coolness -of young Sibley and the marvelous skill of Gruard. A detachment went -back for the two men who had remained behind and brought them back to -the camp. - -Lieutenant Sibley reported to General Crook that he had found the -Indians, but whether that statement is accurate is a question. It would, -perhaps, be more truthful to say that the Indians had found him. Sibley -and Gruard were highly complimented by Crook; and Mr. Finerty, who had -displayed great courage, wrote a graphic account of it, from which this -brief sketch has been abridged. - ------ - -Footnote 96: - - The frontiersmen translate this to “Hat Creek”; and that is the name - it bears to-day—more’s the pity! - -Footnote 97: - - Afterward brigadier-general of volunteers in the Spanish-American War, - and the author of many fascinating romances of army life. - -Footnote 98: - - “The Adventures of Buffalo Bill.” By Colonel William F. Cody. Harper & - Brothers, 1904. - - - - - CHAPTER NINE - The First Success - - - I. Crook and Mills at Slim Buttes - -After the defeat of General Custer, and the successful retreat of the -Sioux and Cheyennes from the Little Big Horn, the government hurried -reinforcements into the field, and ordered Crook and Terry to press the -pursuit of the Indians with the greatest vigor. It was not, however, -until nearly a year after the disaster on the Little Big Horn that the -Sioux war was concluded, and it was not until after the Indians had met -with several crushing defeats and had been pursued until they were -utterly exhausted that peace was declared. - -The greatest individual factor in bringing about this much desired -result was General George Crook, a celebrated cavalryman during the -Civil War, and a more celebrated Indian fighter after its close. With -unwearied tenacity and vigor he pursued the savages, striking them -through his subordinates whenever and wherever they could be found. The -terrible persistence with which he urged his faint, starving, foot-sore, -tattered soldiers along the trail, to which he clung with a resolution -and determination that nothing could shake, entitles him to the respect -and admiration of his countrymen—a respect and admiration, by the way, -which was fully accorded him by his gallant and equally desperate foes. - -After Crook, the men who brought about the result were, first and -foremost, Nelson A. Miles—singularly enough not a cavalryman, but the -Colonel of the Fifth Infantry; and, next to him, Colonel Ranald S. -Mackenzie, of the Fourth Cavalry, and Captain Anson Mills, of the Third, -whom we have already noted doing gallant service at the Battle of the -Rosebud. Miles had been ordered into the field to reinforce Terry’s -shattered and depleted column. - -After much marching and scouting, the columns of Terry and Crook -combined; but Terry’s forces were in bad condition, and his command was -soon withdrawn from the field. What was left of the Seventh Cavalry was -sent back to Fort Lincoln, whence they had started out with such bright -hopes a few months before. Gibbon’s command was returned to Montana, -where it had been made up, on account of the threatening aspect of -things in that quarter, and Terry retired from active campaigning to -resume command of his department. Miles, as we shall see, was sent to -the Yellowstone. - -Crook was left alone in the active pursuit. Space and time are lacking -to describe the details of the wonderful marches he made on the trails -of the Indians—now under burning suns, which parched the ground until it -was as bare as the palm of a hand; again through torrents of drenching -rains, which succeeded the fierce heat; and, finally, through the snows -and cold of a winter of unexampled severity. During the summer there was -no forage for the horses of the cavalry nor for the very small pack -train, and rations for the men became shorter and shorter. Finally, -early in September, the supply of provisions was reduced to two and a -half days’ rations. Crook calculated that they could march two weeks on -that amount. - -They supplemented the rations by living on horse and mule meat and a few -wild onions which they could gather from time to time in spots which had -escaped the universal baking of the summer. At last the command -literally reached the end of its resources. The Indians were in bad -condition, too, but their situation was not nearly so desperate as was -that of Crook and his men. The Indians were worn out and exhausted by -the energetic and relentless pursuit which had been hurled after them by -the indomitable commander, but they still had plenty to eat, and they -had managed to keep ahead of him, and to avoid various scouting columns. - -On the 7th of September, 1876, Crook realized that his men had reached -the limit of their endurance, and that forage and food must be procured -or they would all die in the wilderness. The Indians had swept the -country bare of game, and the sun had swept it clean of fodder. One -hundred and fifty of the best men—that is, those who showed the fewest -signs of the hardships they had undergone—with the best horses and the -last of the mules, were formed into an advance party under Captain Anson -Mills, of the Third Cavalry. Mills had instructions to push on to -Deadwood City, one of the new towns in the Black Hills, to get -provisions, “Any kind of provisions, for God’s sake!” which he could -bring back to the rest of the army, now in a destitute condition. - -Mills was not expected to hunt for, or to fight, Indians—primarily, that -is. He was to go for food in order to keep the army from starving; but -as he marched southward, his scouts discovered a large village of forty -or fifty lodges at a place called Slim Buttes, in the northwest corner -of South Dakota. The tepees had been pitched on a little rising from the -banks of a small stream called Rabbit Creek. The place was inclosed on -three sides by a series of tall cliffs, whose broken sides seemed here -and there to have been cut in half-formed terraces, making the ascent -easy. Little ravines and small cañons ran through the buttes, gradually -ascending until they met the plateau on top. - -Mills instantly determined to attack the camp—a wise and soldierly -action on his part. He made his dispositions with care. Reaching the -vicinity of the camp, he halted in a deep gorge on the night of -September 8, and prepared for battle early the next morning. The night -was dark, cold, and very rainy, and the tired men suffered greatly. -Marching out at dawn, Mills succeeded at daybreak in surprising the -camp, which proved to be that of a band of Sioux led by American Horse, -one of the most prominent chiefs. Leaving Lieutenant Bubb with the pack -train and the lead horses, Mills directed Lieutenant Schwatka, afterward -so well known from his Arctic explorations, to charge directly into the -village with twenty-five mounted men. The remainder of his force he -dismounted and divided into two parties, under Lieutenants Von Luettwitz -and Crawford, respectively, with orders to move on the camp from -different sides. - -The attack was a complete success. The village was taken with but little -loss. Some of the Sioux were killed and others captured, but most -escaped through the ravines to the plateau surrounding the valley. One -heroic but unfortunate little band, consisting of American Horse and -four warriors, with fifteen women and children, was driven into one of -the cañons which ended in a cave. One or two of the soldiers had been -wounded in the attack. Lieutenant Von Luettwitz, who had fought all -through the Franco-Austrian War in Italy, and who was a veteran of the -Civil War, was shot in the knee and so badly wounded that his leg had to -be amputated on the field. - -Being now in complete command of the village, the pack train was ordered -up and the captured village was examined. To the joy of Mills and his -soldiers, an immense quantity of provisions, in the shape of meat, -forage, and other stores, was discovered. - -There still remained the little band of savages in the ravine to be -dealt with. A detachment was ordered to drive them out. The Indians had -been busy making rifle-pits, and as the soldiers advanced to storm the -cave, they were met with a rapid and well-directed fire. Two of them -were shot dead and others wounded.[99] The Indian position appeared to -be impregnable. An interpreter crept near enough under cover to make -himself heard, and asked their surrender. They replied to his command -with taunts and jeers. They incautiously informed him, however, that -Crazy Horse with his warriors was in the vicinity, and on being apprised -of their situation by some of the fugitives, he would undoubtedly come -to their rescue. Crazy Horse could have made short work of Mills and his -hundred and fifty. Meanwhile the survivors of the village, which had -contained a hundred warriors, formed an extended line on the buttes and -opened fire on the soldiers. - -Mills acted promptly. He despatched a courier to Crook on the best horse -in the command, to report the situation and ask him for reinforcements -at once. Incidentally, he mentioned that a great quantity of provisions -had been found. Then he made preparations to hold the place, and at the -same time to prosecute his attack against the cave, all the time keeping -up a smart fight with the men on the buttes. So soon as Crook received -the message, he started forward, intending to take with him a select -body of men; but the whole army, spoiling for a fight and hungry for a -square meal, insisted on going along. They made a forced march, and -reached Mills about half after eleven in the morning. - -Crook immediately proceeded to dislodge the Indians in the cave. The men -were led forward under a galling fire, to which the general, in spite of -the entreaties of his staff, exposed himself with indifference. When -they got in a position to command the cave, Crook, willing to spare his -brave foemen, again asked them to surrender. His request was met by a -decided negative. The men opened fire, and searched every cranny and -recess of the cave with a storm of bullets. Gruard, one of the scouts, -taking advantage of cover, crept to the very mouth of the cave, remained -there unobserved, watched his opportunity, seized a squaw who -incautiously exposed herself, and with her as a shield dashed forward -and shot one of the warriors, escaping in safety himself. - - - II. The Death of American Horse - -After two hours of firing, the death-chants of the squaws induced Crook -to order a cessation for another parley. This time his request that the -Indians surrender met with some response; for the squaws and children, -to the number of thirteen, came reluctantly forth on his positive -assurance that they would be protected. The braves refused to give up. -They were confident that Crazy Horse would succor them. The engagement -at once began again, but after it had lasted some little time the fire -of the Indians ceased. - -The offer of mercy was made a fourth time. A young Indian stepped out -and received additional assurance that no harm should come if they -surrendered. He went back into the cave and presently reappeared with -another young warrior, supporting between them the tall, splendid figure -of brave old American Horse. He had been shot through the bowels, and -his intestines protruded from the wound. He was suffering frightful -agony, and was biting hard upon a piece of wood to control himself. He -handed his gun to Crook and gave up the contest. The surgeons with the -command did everything they possibly could for him, but his wound was -beyond human skill. That night, surrounded by his wives and children, he -died, as stoically and as bravely as he had lived. - -Inside the cave the rocky walls were cut and scored by the rain of -bullets which had been poured into it, and lying on the floor were the -bodies of the two Indian warriors, together with a woman and a child, -who had been killed. The soldiers had not known, until the squaws came -out, that there were any women or children there. The little band had -sold their lives dearly. Even the women had used guns, and had displayed -all the bravery and courage of the Sioux. - -Too late Crazy Horse, with some six hundred warriors, appeared on the -scene. Imagining he had only to deal with Mills’ small force, he -galloped gallantly forward to the attack at about five o’clock. He was -greatly astonished at the number of antagonists developed thereby. He -retired to the top of the buttes, and the soldiers in gallant style -dashed after him. They scaled the cliffs, finally gaining the level -plateau. Crazy Horse made one or two attempts to break through the line, -but it was impossible, and seeing himself greatly outnumbered, he wisely -retired, having sustained some loss. - -The battle was one of the most picturesque ever fought in the West. -Crook and his officers stood in the camp, the center of a vast -amphitheater ringed with fire, up the sides of which the soldiers -steadily climbed to get at the Indians, silhouetted in all their war -finery against the sky. The loss of life on either side was not great, -but the capture of the village and the provisions which had been -accumulated for the winter was a serious one. - -In the camp were discovered many articles that had belonged to the -Seventh Cavalry—a guidon, money, one of Captain Keogh’s gauntlets, -marked with his name, orderly books, saddles, etc. Among other things, -were letters written by officers and soldiers to friends in the East, -some of them still sealed and ready for mailing. They must have come -like voices from the dead when they reached those to whom they had been -written. - ------ - -Footnote 99: - - One of the scouts killed in this battle was a great admirer of Buffalo - Bill, whose manners, methods, and appearance he aped as well as he - could. He rejoiced in an unfortunate sobriquet, which was received in - this wise: General Sheridan, seeking Buffalo Bill to lead a hunting - expedition on one occasion, was met by this swaggerer, with the remark - that Buffalo Bill was gone away, and when Buffalo Bill was gone he was - Buffalo Bill himself. “The h—l you are!” said Sheridan contemptuously. - “Buffalo Chip, you mean!” The poor braggart never got away from the - name of “Buffalo Chip Charlie.” He was a brave man for all his vanity, - and the soldiers were sorry enough for their mockery when they buried - him that night at the foot of the buttes, where he had fallen in the - attack on the cave. - - - - - CHAPTER TEN - A Decisive Blow - - - I. Mackenzie’s Winter Battle - -Crook now gave over the pursuit, and returned to Fort Fetterman to -organize a winter campaign. This expedition was one of the best equipped -that ever started on an Indian campaign. It contained all arms of the -service, with an abundance of everything necessary to success. To follow -its marches to the Big Horn Range would reveal little of interest; but -late in November it was learned, from a captured Cheyenne, that the -principal Cheyenne village was located in a cañon through which flowed -one of the main sources of Crazy Woman’s Fork of the Powder River. -Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie was ordered, with the Indian scouts and ten -troops of cavalry from the Second, Fourth, and Fifth regiments, to find -and destroy the village. - -The Cheyennes were not so numerous as the Sioux, and the greater number -of their allies has sometimes caused people to minimize the quality of -the Cheyennes; but no braver, more magnificent fighters ever lived than -this same tribe. They had some of the Homeric qualities of the ancient -Greeks. I believe it will generally be admitted that they were the -finest of the Plains Indians. They were foemen worthy Mackenzie’s or -anybody else’s steel. The battle which ensued was in some respects one -of the most terrible in Western history, and in its results exemplified, -as few others have done, the horrible character of the war. It was, -perhaps, as great a contribution to the downfall of the Sioux as any -single incident that occurred. - -Mackenzie’s men left the main encampment on the 23d of November. The -ground was covered with snow. The weather was arctic in its severity. -The scouts and friendly Indians—Pawnees, Crows, Shoshones, the -hereditary enemies of the Cheyennes, including certain Cheyennes also -who had entered the service of the United States[100]—had located the -camp in Willow Creek Cañon. Some of the Indians had kept the camp under -observation while Mackenzie brought up his troops. He had seven hundred -and fifty cavalrymen and three hundred and fifty Indians. Halting at the -mouth of the cañon, which he reached on the night of the 24th, he -resolved to await the still hours before the break of day the next -morning before delivering his attack. - -The cañon was a gloomy gorge in the Big Horn Mountains. A swift, -ice-bound river rushed over the rocks between precipitous walls, which -soared into the sky for perhaps a thousand feet on either side. -Numberless icy brooks poured their contents into the main stream through -lateral cañons scarcely less forbidding in their appearance than the -main one, and which made the trail of the creek almost impossible. Here -and there the cañon widened, and in one of these open places the -Cheyennes, under the leadership of Dull Knife, had pitched their camp. -They fondly believed the place impregnable—as, indeed, with careful -guarding it would have been. The greatest precaution was taken by -Mackenzie to prevent his men from making any noise. They stood in ranks -by their horses in the snow in that polar cold, waiting for the order -for the advance. Presently the moon rose, flooding the recesses of the -ravine with silvery light, which sparkled with dazzling brilliancy upon -patches of snow here and there on the dark walls. - -Mackenzie, calculating that day would be breaking just about the time he -would reach the camp from his present position, at last gave order to -take up the march. With what relief the benumbed troopers sprang to -their saddles and urged their shivering horses forward, can scarcely be -imagined by dwellers in peaceful lands around warm firesides. As they -struggled up the cañon they could hear the sound of dancing and revelry -in the Indian camp, faintly blown back to them by the night wind. They -learned afterward that the Cheyennes had just returned from a successful -raid on the Shoshones, and that the dance was in celebration of an -important victory they had gained. They halted again, therefore, until -all was silence, before they once more advanced. Day was beginning to -break as they reached the village. - -The sleeping Indians in the camp had not the slightest suspicion that -the enemy was within a hundred miles. The troops, cheering and shouting, -burst upon them like a winter storm. Indians, when not apprehensive of -attack, invariably sleep naked. The Cheyennes had just time to seize -rifles and cartridge belts, while the women caught hasty blankets about -the children, when the soldiers were upon them. Indeed, so quick and -sudden was the attack that some of the warriors could not get out of the -tepees. With their knives they slashed the wigwams, and from these -openings fired upon the soldiers as they galloped through the village. -Many were shot dead where a few moments before they had slept in peace. - -Most of the pony herd was captured, and the village in a short time was -in possession of Mackenzie. The Cheyennes, though overwhelmed, were -undismayed. They had retreated headlong up the cañon, but were soon -rallied by their subchiefs. Dull Knife, their leader, was found in the -village with half a dozen bullets in him. He had fought gallantly in the -open until he died. - -Presently the Indians came swarming back along the side of the cañon. -They occupied points of vantage, and, naked though they were in the -frightful weather, with the thermometer ranging from ten to twenty -degrees below zero during this campaign, they opened fire upon their -opponents. Unless they could be dislodged, Mackenzie’s position was -untenable. He sent his Shoshone and other Indian scouts, who, animated -with bitter hatred of the Cheyennes, were eager to obey his commands, to -the summits of the cliffs to clear the Indians from them. - -Meanwhile he directed Lieutenant John A. McKinney, with his troop, to -charge and drive the Indians from a rocky eminence where they were -concentrating and from which they were pouring a hot fire upon the -soldiers. McKinney’s charge was entirely successful, for he drove the -Cheyennes back until he was stopped by a ravine. Wheeling his men, he -attempted to find a crossing, when he was fired upon by a flanking party -of Indians and instantly killed, being hit no less than six times. Six -of his troopers were wounded, and a number of horses were shot. The -troop was thrown into confusion, and some of the men started to retreat. -Mackenzie, observing the situation, immediately ordered Captain John M. -Hamilton and Major G. A. Gordon to charge to the rescue. The charge was -gallantly made and stubbornly resisted. - -The fighting was hand to hand, of the fiercest description; and the -Cheyennes, while keeping the rest of Mackenzie’s forces engaged, began -concentrating on these two troops, which had been joined by Captain -Davis, with his men. There was no reserve; the cavalry were all in, and -this detachment might have been wiped out had it not been for the -success of the Shoshones and other Indians, who cleared the key to the -position on the summit of the plateau above the cañon, and then came to -the assistance of the sorely beset soldiers. Twenty Cheyennes were -killed here and several of the soldiers. - -Relieved in a measure by these two movements, although not altogether, -for the Cheyennes with their superior knowledge of the topography of the -country could not be entirely dislodged from their position, and kept up -a fierce fire upon the soldiers all day long, to which he could make -little reply, Mackenzie sent back word to Crook of his success, and -meanwhile began the destruction of the village. All the winter supplies -for over a thousand Indians were there. The Cheyennes were a forehanded, -prosperous tribe of Indians, as Indians go, and the property destroyed -was enormous. - - - II. The Sufferings of the Cheyennes - -What must have been the despair of the surprised warriors, with their -women and children, naked, shivering in the hills, as they saw their -belongings consumed by the flames! It was simply impossible for them to -maintain their position during the night. They had to move away or die -of cold. As it was, twelve little Indian babies froze to death that -awful night. Many of the older men and women were kept alive only by -having their hands and feet, and in the case of the children, their -whole bodies, thrust into the warm bodies of the few ponies not captured -by the soldiers, which had been disemboweled for the purpose. - -[Illustration: - - _Courtesy of The Century Co._ - - MACKENZIE’S MEN IN DULL KNIFE’S VILLAGE - - _Drawing by Frederic Remington_ -] - -There was no fighting on the 26th. The Cheyennes took up a strong -position six miles farther up the cañon, from which Mackenzie could not -dislodge them, and on the 27th he started on his return to the camp. -Crook, who made a forced march night and day, with Colonel Dodge and the -infantry, who came forward with astonishing speed in spite of storm and -cold, met Mackenzie retiring just after he left the cañon, and the whole -army returned to the encampment. - -The subsequent sufferings of the Indians were frightful. Naturally, they -repaired to Crazy Horse, expecting that he would succor them, feed them, -and clothe them. The Sioux and the Cheyennes had been warm friends and -allies, and had fought together on many a field. Had they come in their -prosperity, Crazy Horse would have given them a warm welcome. As it was, -he had little with which to support his own band during the winter, -owing to Crook’s pursuit of him, and with short-sighted, yet -natural—from an Indian point of view—policy, he refused to receive these -Cheyennes, or to share anything with them. - -Exasperated beyond measure by their treatment by the Sioux, and swearing -eternal vengeance upon Crazy Horse, the wretched band struggled into the -nearest agency and surrendered, and in the following spring moved out -with the soldiers against Crazy Horse and his men. - -It is appalling to think of that night attack in that awful weather upon -that sleeping camp—to read of those wretched women and children, -wandering naked in that bitter cold; to learn of those little ones -frozen to death; of the old men and women abandoned by the road to -die—yet there is another side to the picture, scarcely less horrible. - -In this Indian camp also were found many relics of the Custer battle. So -far as that is in question, I may say that I consider that action to -have been a fair and square stand-up fight, in which one side was -defeated and its members all died fighting.[101] Naturally, the Indians -despoiled the slain for trophies. White soldiers have done the same when -conditions have been reversed, as has been noted in the preceding -chapters of this book. Of course, the Indians mutilated the dead and -tortured the living, but some instances of both practices are found -among white men, and we cannot judge the Indian by our standards, -anyway. - -But in the camp there were other evidences of savage ferocity, from -which the soul shrinks in horror, and which showed that these Indians -were among the most cruel and ruthless on the continent, and that they -were only getting what they had given. Two instances will suffice. The -troops took from the body of a dead warrior an unique necklace of human -forefingers, which had been displayed with pride upon his barbaric -breast;[102] and a bag was found which contained the right hands of -twelve little Shoshone babies and children, which had been recently cut -from little arms to give some ruthless warrior a ghastly trophy. - ------ - -Footnote 100: - - It is a singular thing to note the looseness of the tie with which the - members of the various tribes were bound. Frequently we find bands of - the same tribe fighting for and against the United States on the same - field. One of the most fruitful causes of the success of our arms has - been this willingness on the part of the Indians to fight against - their own people, of which the government has been quick to avail - itself. - -Footnote 101: - - See Preface for discussion of the term “Massacre.” - -Footnote 102: - - A picture of a similar necklace may be seen in Captain J. Lee - Humfreville’s interesting book, “Twenty Years Among Our Hostile - Indians.” - - - - - CHAPTER ELEVEN - Miles’ Great Campaigning - - - I. Miles and His Foot Cavalry Defeat Sitting Bull - -Now let us turn to Miles and his men. - -General Miles was ordered to march his command up the Yellowstone to the -mouth of the Tongue River, and establish a temporary post or cantonment -there for the winter. He was an officer in whom great confidence was -reposed, and from whom much was to be expected. He had as brilliant a -record in the Civil War as Custer, and had practically fought one -decisive battle in the closing campaign on his own responsibility, with -splendidly successful results. He was a natural-born soldier, and he -never showed his talents to better advantage than in the operations -which followed. His career before and after this period is still fresh -in the minds of a grateful people. - -While Crook and his men were hammering away in one portion of the field, -Miles was doing splendid service in the other. The original intention -had been to place under his command some fifteen hundred men, but the -force he really received amounted only to about five hundred. With these -he was not expected to do more than maintain his position, and acquire -such information as he could in preparing for the spring and summer -campaign of the following year. That was not, from his point of view, a -satisfactory program. - -Veteran Indian fighters in the Northwest informed him that it would be -useless to try to reach the Indians in the winter; but Miles was not -that kind of a soldier. If the Indians could live in tepees in that -season, he saw no reason why white soldiers should not move against them -in spite of the weather. He had one of the finest regiments of infantry -in the service—the Fifth. Based upon the report of courts-martial, -discipline, etc., no regiment surpassed or even equaled its record. -Miles himself proved to be the most successful commander against Indians -that the war produced, and his success was not due to what envious -people called good luck. It was well merited and thoroughly earned. - -The government, upon the representations of Sheridan and Sherman, which -were based upon Miles’ previous successful fighting with the -Southwestern Indians, allowed the young colonel everything he asked for. -If his troops were not completely equipped for the work in which their -commander designed to employ them, it would be his fault. With wise -forethought, he provided the soldiers as if for an arctic expedition. -They cut up blankets for underwear. They were furnished with fur boots -and the heaviest kind of leggings and overshoes. Every man had a buffalo -overcoat and a woolen or fur mask to go over his face under his fur cap. -Their hands were protected by fur gloves. It was well for them that they -were thus provided, for the winter of 1876–7 was one of the most severe -that had ever visited that section of the country. The mercury -frequently froze in the thermometer, and on one occasion a temperature -of sixty degrees below zero was recorded by the spirit thermometer. - -Busying themselves during the late fall, which was, in effect, winter, -in the erection of the cantonment on the Tongue and Yellowstone, the -first important touch they got with the Indians was on the 18th of -October, when Lieutenant-Colonel Elwell S. Otis, commanding a battalion -of four companies of the Twenty-third Infantry, escorting a wagon-load -of supplies from Glendive, Montana, to the cantonment, was attacked by a -large force of hostiles. The attack was not delivered with any great -degree of force at first, but it grew in power until the troops had to -corral the train. The soldiers had a hard fight to keep the animals from -being stampeded and the train captured. Having beaten off the Indians, -the train advanced, fighting, until Clear Creek was reached. During a -temporary cessation of the attacks a messenger rode out from the Indian -lines, waving a paper, which he left upon a hill in line with the -advance of the train. When it was picked up, Colonel Otis found it to be -an imperious message—probably written by some half-breed—from the chief -whom he had been fighting. It ran as follows: - - “Yellowstone. - - “I want to know what you are doing traveling on this road. You scare - all the buffalo away. I want to hunt in this place. I want you to - turn back from here. If you don’t, I’ll fight you again. I want you - to leave what you have got here, and turn back from here. - - I am your friend, - SITTING BULL. - - “I mean all the rations you have got and some powder. Wish you would - write me as soon as you can.” - -I consider this document unique in the history of Indian warfare, and it -well illustrates not only the spirit, but the naïveté of the great -chief. Otis despatched a scout to Sitting Bull with the information that -he intended to take the train through to the cantonment in spite of all -the Indians on earth, and if Sitting Bull wanted to have a fight, he -(Otis) would be glad to accommodate him at any time and on any terms. -The train thereupon moved out, and the Indians promptly recommenced the -fight. But the engagement was soon terminated by a flag of truce. A -messenger appeared, who stated that the Indians were tired and hungry -and wanted to treat for peace. Otis asked Sitting Bull to come into his -lines, but that wily old chief refused, although he sent three chiefs to -represent him. - -Otis had no authority to treat for peace or anything else, but he gave -the Indians a small quantity of hardtack and a couple of sides of bacon, -and advised them to go to the Tongue River and communicate with General -Miles. The train then moved on, and after following a short distance, -with threatening movements, the Indians withdrew. - -On the same night Otis fell in with Miles and his whole force. Miles, -being alarmed for Otis’ safety, had marched out to meet him. The train -was sent down to the cantonment, and the troops, numbering three hundred -and ninety-eight, with one gun, started out in pursuit of Sitting Bull. -They overtook him on the 21st of October at Cedar Creek. With Sitting -Bull were Gall and other celebrated chiefs, and one thousand warriors of -the Miniconjous, San Arcs, Brulés, and Unkpapas, together with their -wives and children, in all over three thousand Indians. Crazy Horse, -with the Oglalas and Two Moon’s band of the Northern Cheyennes, were not -with Sitting Bull, while Dull Knife’s band, as we have seen, had gone to -Wyoming for the winter. - -The reason for this separation is obvious. They could better support the -hardships of the winter, more easily find shelter, and with less -difficulty escape from the pursuing soldiers, if they were broken up in -smaller parties. - -Sitting Bull asked Miles for an interview, which was arranged. He was -attended by a subchief and six warriors, Miles by an aide and six -troopers. The meeting took place between the lines, all parties being on -horseback. - -Sitting Bull wanted peace on the old basis. The Indians demanded -permission to retain their arms, with liberty to hunt and roam at will -over the plains and through the mountains, with no responsibility to any -one, while the government required them to surrender their arms and come -into the agencies. The demands were irreconcilable therefore. The -interview was an interesting one, and although it began calmly enough, -it grew exciting toward the end. - -Sitting Bull, whom Miles describes as a fine, powerful, intelligent, -determined looking man, was evidently full of bitter and persistent -animosity toward the white race. He said no Indian that ever lived loved -the white man, and that no white man that ever lived loved the Indian; -that God Almighty had made him an Indian, but He didn’t make him an -Agency Indian, and he didn’t intend to be one. - -The manner of the famous chief had been cold, but dignified and -courteous. As the conversation progressed, he became angry—so enraged, -in fact, that in Miles’ words “he finally gave an exhibition of wild -frenzy. His whole manner seemed more like that of a wild beast than a -human being. His face assumed a furious expression. His jaws were -tightly closed, his lips were compressed, and you could see his eyes -glisten with the fire of savage hatred.”[103] - -One cannot help admiring the picture presented by the splendid, if -ferocious, savage. I have no doubt that General Miles himself admired -him. - -At the height of the conference a young warrior stole out from the -Indian lines and slipped a carbine under Sitting Bull’s blanket. He was -followed by several other Indians to the number of a dozen, who joined -the band, evidently meditating treachery. Miles, who, with his aide, was -armed with revolver only, promptly required these new auxiliaries to -retire, else the conference would be terminated immediately. His demand -was reluctantly obeyed. After some further talk, a second meeting was -appointed for the morrow, and the conference broke up. - -During the night Miles moved his command in position to be able to -intercept the movement of the Indians the next day. There was another -interview with the picturesque and imperious savage, whose conditions of -peace were found to be absolutely impossible, since they involved the -abandonment of all the military posts, the withdrawal of all settlers, -garrisons, etc., from the country. He wanted everything and would give -nothing. He spoke like a conqueror, and he looked like one, although his -subsequent actions were not in keeping with the part. Miles, seeing the -futility of further discussion, peremptorily broke up the conference. He -told Sitting Bull that he would take no advantage of the flag of truce, -but that he would give him just fifteen minutes to get back to his -people to prepare for fighting. Shouting defiance, the chiefs rode back -to the Indian lines. - -There was “mounting in hot haste” surely, and hurried preparations were -made for immediate battle on both sides. Watch in hand, Miles checked -off the minutes, and exactly at the time appointed he ordered an -advance. The Indians set fire to the dry grass, which was not yet -covered with snow, and the battle was joined amid clouds of flame and -smoke. Although outnumbered nearly three to one, the attack of the -soldiers was pressed home so relentlessly that the Indians were driven -back from their camp, which fell into the possession of Miles. - -The Sioux were not beaten, however, for the discomfited warriors rallied -a force to protect their flying women and children, under the leadership -of Gall and others, Sitting Bull not being as much of a fighter as a -talker. They were led to the attack again and again by their intrepid -chiefs. On one occasion, so impetuous was their gallantry that the -troops were forced to form square to repel their wild charges. Before -the battle was over—and it continued into the next day—the Indians had -been driven headlong for over forty miles. - -They had suffered a serious loss in warriors, but a greater in the -destruction of their camp equipage, winter supplies, and other property. -Two thousand of them came in on the third day and surrendered, under -promises of good treatment. Several hundred broke into small parties and -scattered. Miles’ little force was too small to be divided to form a -guard for the Indians who had been captured; and besides, he had other -things to do, so he detained a number of the principal chiefs as -hostages, and exacted promises from the rest that they would surrender -at the Spotted Tail or Red Cloud Agency—a promise which, by the way, the -great majority of them kept. Sitting Bull, Gall, and about four hundred -others refused to surrender, and made for the boundary line, escaping -pursuit for the time being. - -This was the first and most serious defection from the Indian -Confederacy. It was followed by others. In a subsequent campaign, in the -depth of winter, a battalion under Lieutenant Baldwin struck Sitting -Bull’s depleted and starving camp on two separate occasions, inflicting -further loss upon that implacable chieftain.[104] - - - II. Miles’ Crushing Defeat of Crazy Horse at Wolf Mountain - -Late in December Miles, having practically eliminated Sitting Bull from -the game, moved out against Crazy Horse. He had with him five companies -of the Fifth Infantry and two of the Twenty-second, in all four hundred -and thirty-six officers and men and two Napoleon guns. These guns were -fitted with canvas wagon-tops, and were so disguised as exactly to -resemble the supply wagons of the train. The men left the cantonment on -the 29th of December, 1876. It had been learned that Crazy Horse was in -the valley of the Tongue River, south of the Yellowstone. There were -sharp skirmishes on the first and third of January between the advance -and war parties of Indians, who were moving gradually up the Tongue -toward the mountains. On the evening of the 7th of January, 1877, a -young warrior and a woman were captured, belonging to those Cheyennes -who were still with Crazy Horse and the Unkpapas, and were related to -some of the principal members of the band. From them much was learned of -the situation of the Indian position. - -[Illustration: - - _From the collection of J. Robert Coster_ -] - - GEN. JOHN GIBBON GEN. NELSON A. MILES - GEN. WESLEY MERRITT GEN. ALFRED H. TERRY - - SOME FAMOUS INDIAN FIGHTERS - -The next morning, the weather being bitterly cold, the men moved out to -attack the Indian camp. Crazy Horse’s warriors numbered between eight -and nine hundred. He had posted his men on the cliffs surmounting a -valley in the Wolf Mountains, a spur of the Big Horn Range, not far from -Crook’s battle-ground on the Rosebud. The troops entered the valley in -full view of the Indians occupying the heights. The position was well -chosen; for in order to make the attack, the soldiers would have to -climb straight up the walls to get at the Indians, who were enabled, by -the configuration of the ground and by their numbers, almost to surround -the soldiers. One reason why Crazy Horse was willing to fight was -because of his great desire to get possession of the Indians recently -captured. - -Seeing that Crazy Horse was willing to accept battle, Miles made his -preparations deliberately. The troops, out of range of the Indians, -calmly had breakfast and made their camp secure. Having done everything -at his leisure, Miles moved out to the attack. - -The Sioux were plainly visible on the cliffs. They could be seen shaking -their fists and brandishing their rifles as the soldiers slowly advanced -through the deep snow which covered the ground. The Indians seemed -absolutely confident that Miles was marching into a trap, that when he -got into the cañon he would be unable to scale the slopes, and they -would have him at their mercy. There was no ambush about it. The whole -thing was open and plain. They had chosen their position and had invited -the soldiers to make at them. There was, indeed, no other way for Miles -to get to them, so cunningly had they taken advantage of the ground, -except the way which lay open before them. As the troops drew nearer, -the gestures of defiance and contempt were accompanied by yells and -jeers. Among the things they shouted in their confident assurance of -success were these significant words: - -“You have had your last breakfast!” - -Indeed, the grim prophecy did not seem unlikely of fulfilment. - -It might have been supposed that men, encumbered as were the soldiers -with their heavy, winter clothing, could never have scaled those -heights, especially in the face of such opposition as the redoubtable -warriors of Crazy Horse would offer. If they did not succeed in clearing -the cliffs of the Indians, they would probably be shot down in scores in -the valley. They would then be forced to retreat to their train, if any -of them were left alive to do so, and stand a siege; and as they were -three or four hundred miles from any possible relieving force, and in -the depth of a Dakota winter, that would mean a speedy annihilation. It -was a serious risk to take, but no battle was ever won without taking -risks, and the nice art of the soldier consists in knowing what risks to -take and when to take them. Not the least of Miles’ claims to admiration -as a commander was his determination, under all circumstances, to fight -then and there. - -Undaunted by the threatening prospect and unmoved by the savage shouts -and jeers, although some of the scouts who knew the Sioux language -retorted in kind, the troops deployed, and at as rapid a pace as they -could manage, started for the hills. The artillery was exposed and -unlimbered, and the shells thrown into the Indian position caused great -surprise and consternation. The key to the position was a high elevation -upon the left. The Indians who held it were led by Big Crow, the chief -medicine man. As the battle began he exposed himself freely between the -lines, dressed in a magnificent Indian war shirt and bonnet, running up -and down and yelling like a fiend. - -Miles massed a little column against Big Crow and the warriors defending -the eminence. At the same time he ordered a general escalade of the -cliff along the whole line. Under a heavy fire, which, however, like -most plunging fires down the sides of mountains or slopes, did but -little damage, the troops slowly toiled up the icy, snow-covered -bluffs.[105] Led by Major Casey and Captains McDonald and Baldwin, the -charge was delivered with the utmost resolution. It was not a dash. No -men, encumbered as were those soldiers, could move rapidly up icy -cliffs, covered, wherever the sharpness of the acclivity permitted, with -from one to three feet of snow. It was rather a slow, dogged, determined -crawl, with a stop every few moments to fire at some Indian silhouetted -above them on the gray sky-line of that winter morning. - -The fighting for the high cliff on the left of the line was spirited and -desperate. Finally, the men came to a hand-to-hand struggle. The Indians -clung tenaciously to the post until Big Crow was shot, when the soldiers -succeeded in dislodging them. This bluff commanded the lines. It was -occupied by the troops, who poured an enfilading fire upon the army of -Crazy Horse. The Indian position, therefore, became untenable, and -fighting sullenly and stubbornly, they withdrew in good order, though -closely pursued by the troops. In the latter part of the advance snow -began to fall, and before the battle was closed the combatants were -fighting in the midst of a blinding storm. Miles says that the moment at -which the Indians turned their backs and began the retreat was one in -which he felt relief scarcely to be expressed, so desperate had been the -fighting, so difficult the ascent, and so doubtful the result. - -The Indians were pursued for some distance, and a large portion of their -camp equipage, with supplies, was captured. On the whole, they had -suffered a most disheartening and disorganizing defeat. Their ammunition -was about gone, their confederates in other tribes had been captured, -the main body of the redoubtable Cheyennes had been crushed and were -starving, the Unkpapas, the Miniconjous, the Sans Arcs, and the Brulés -had surrendered. The game was up. There was nothing for Crazy Horse and -the exhausted remnant which remained faithful to him to do but to -surrender, which they accordingly did in the early spring. - - - III. The Capture of Lame Deer’s Village - -There remained, then, in the field practically but one band of sixty -lodges,[106] under Lame Deer and Iron Star, who refused positively to -surrender. The indefatigable and brilliantly successful Miles pursued -this band, overtook it, surprised it one morning in May, captured the -village, dispersed the greater portion of the Indians, and succeeded in -isolating and surrounding Lame Deer and Iron Star, with half a dozen -principal warriors. Miles was very desirous of taking them alive. He -advanced with some of his officers toward the desperate little body of -Indians who had been cut off from the fleeing mass of savages, making -peace signs and crying peace words. - -The Indians were tremendously excited and remained on guard, but -committed no act of hostility. Miles rode up, and leaning over the -saddle, extended his hand to Lame Deer. The intrepid chieftain, who was -quivering with emotion under his Indian stoicism, grasped the general’s -hand and clung to it tightly. Iron Star took Baldwin’s hand. The other -Indians came forward, reluctantly, with hands extended, and all was -going well. - -At this juncture one of the white scouts, not knowing what was going on, -dashed up to the group, and possibly under a misapprehension that the -life of the commanding officer was threatened, covered Lame Deer with -his rifle. The Indian, probably thinking that he was to be killed in any -event, resolved to die fighting. Miles strove to hold him and to -reassure him, but by a powerful wrench he freed himself, lifting his -rifle as he did so, and pointing it straight at the general. - -Miles had been in many battles, but he was never nearer death than at -that moment. His quickness and resource did not desert him. Just as the -Indian’s finger pressed the trigger he dug his spurs into his horse and -swung the animal aside in a powerful swerve. Lame Deer’s bullet, which -missed him by a hair’s breadth, struck one of the escort and instantly -killed him. Iron Star also drew away from Baldwin and raised his rifle, -as the other Indian had done. None of them were so quick, however, as -Lame Deer had been. The soldiers closing in had seen Lame Deer’s motion, -and before any further damage was done by the Indians they were -overwhelmed by a rapid fire, which stretched them all dead upon the -ground. The fighting had been short, but exceedingly sharp. The troops -lost four killed and seven wounded, the Sioux fourteen killed and a -large number wounded. The band was completely broken up, and most of the -Indians surrendered soon after.[107] - -Of all the Indians who had borne prominent parts in this greatest of our -Indian wars with the savage tribes, there remained at large only the -indomitable Sitting Bull, and he had escaped capture because, with a -wretched band of starving but resolute followers, he succeeded in -crossing the British Columbia boundary line. - -Crook’s persistence, Mills’ bold stroke, Mackenzie’s desperate dash up -Willow Creek Cañon, Miles’ splendid campaigning, his hard fighting at -Cedar Creek and Wolf Mountain, his pursuit of Lame Deer, his policy and -skill in dealing with the critical situations which had arisen, at last -brought peace to the blood-drenched land. The most important work ever -done by the United States Army outside of the greater wars of the nation -had been successfully and brilliantly accomplished. - - - IV. Farewell to a Great Chief and His Hopes - -A note of the fate of the two chief antagonists of the United States may -fittingly close this chapter. Sitting Bull returned to the United -States, and surrendered to the army a few years later. Ever a -malcontent, he was one of the moving spirits in the Ghost Dance -uprising, which culminated in the battle of Wounded Knee in 1890, and he -was killed by the Indian police while resisting arrest.[108] - -The end of Crazy Horse came sooner, in a mêlée in a guard-house on the -7th of September, 1877. He was stabbed in the abdomen, and died from the -effects of the wound. He was dissatisfied always, in spite of his -surrender, and had been conspiring to take the war-path again. Believing -that his intentions had become known and that he would be rigorously -dealt with on account of the discovery, he started to run amuck, with a -knife of which he had become possessed by some means, in the -guard-house. When the fracas was over, he was found on the ground, with -a desperate wound in the abdomen. Whether the wound was given by the -bayonet of the sentry at the door, whether the blow was delivered by -some of the Indians who threw themselves upon him, and with whom he -struggled, is a matter which cannot be determined. However it was come -by, it was enough, for from the effects he died in a short time. - -So that was the melancholy end of Crazy Horse, the protagonist of these -tales, and one of the most famous Indians that ever lived. Captain -Bourke[109] thus describes him: - -“I saw before me a man who looked quite young, not over thirty years -old, five feet eight inches high, lithe and sinewy, with a scar in the -face. The expression of his countenance was one of quiet dignity, but -morose, dogged, tenacious, and melancholy. He behaved with stolidity, -like a man who realized that he had to give in to Fate, but would do so -as sullenly as possible.... All Indians gave him a high reputation for -courage and generosity. In advancing upon an enemy, none of his warriors -were allowed to pass him. He had made himself hundreds of friends by his -charity toward the poor, as it was a point of honor with him never to -keep anything for himself, excepting weapons of war. I never heard an -Indian mention his name save in terms of respect. In the Custer -Massacre, the attack by Reno had first caused a panic among the women -and children and some of the warriors, who started to flee; but Crazy -Horse, throwing away his rifle, brained one of the incoming soldiers -with his stone war-club, and jumped upon his horse.” - -Crazy Horse was a born soldier, whose talents for warfare and leadership -were of the highest order. He had repulsed Reynolds on the Powder River, -wresting a victory from apparent defeat. He had thrown himself in -succession upon the columns of Crook on the Rosebud and of Custer on the -Little Big Horn; and it must be admitted that he had not only checked, -but had driven back, Crook by a crushing attack upon him, while he had -annihilated half of Custer’s command. He had fought a desperate, and, -from a military point of view, highly creditable, action with Crook’s -vastly superior forces at Slim Buttes. The only man who had fairly and -squarely defeated him was Miles at Wolf Mountain, and even there Crazy -Horse managed to keep his force well in hand as he withdrew from the -field. - -He would probably never have surrendered, had it not been for the -defections around him, and for the disastrous defeat of the Cheyennes by -Mackenzie, and the destruction of so much of his camp equipage at Wolf -Mountain. As it was, he might have continued the fighting, had not his -warriors been freezing and starving, and almost entirely out of -ammunition. There was nothing left for the Indians but surrender. As one -of them said to Miles: - -“We are poor compared with you and your force. We cannot make a rifle, a -round of ammunition, or a knife. In fact, we are at the mercy of those -who are taking possession of our country. Your terms are harsh and -cruel, but we are going to accept them, and place ourselves at your -mercy.” - -That summed up the situation, although the terms granted the Indians -were very far from being harsh or cruel. - -So passed out of history the great war chief of the Sioux, one of the -bravest of the brave, and one of the most capable and sagacious of -captains in spite of his absurd name. He had many of the vices, perhaps -all the vices, of his race; but he had all their rude virtues, too, and -great abilities, which most of them lacked. Sitting Bull, wise, crafty, -indomitable as he was, was not to be compared with him for a moment. - -It was a tragedy any way you look at it. You cannot but feel much -admiration for those Sioux and Cheyennes—cruel, ruthless though they -were. I bid good-by to them with a certain regret. - -Some one has said, as the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn marked the -high-water of Indian supremacy in the Northwest, so the forgotten grave -of Crazy Horse marks an ebb from which no tide has ever risen. - -As he passes to the happy hunting-ground in the land of the Great -Spirit, I stand and salute him with a feeling of respect which I have -gathered not only from a study of his career, but from the statements -and writings of men who could best judge of his qualities—for they were -the soldiers who fought him. - - - NOTES ON THE LAME DEER FIGHT - - By Colonel D. L. Brainard, U. S. A.[110] - - The command, consisting of four troops of the Second Cavalry, “F,” - “G,” “H,” and “L,” two companies of the Fifth Infantry, two of the - Twenty-second Infantry, and a company of mounted scouts, all under - command of Colonel Nelson A. Miles, left the cantonment on Tongue - River May 1, 1877, and marched up Tongue River, with a view of - intercepting a band of hostile Indians, under Lame Deer, known to be - at or near the head-waters of the Rosebud River. The transportation - consisted of bull teams, mule teams, and a few pack animals. The - command marched up Tongue River four days, when the train was left - in charge of a small guard, the main command pushing on with pack - trains, the cavalry leading and the infantry following more slowly, - striking across country toward the Rosebud River, marching day and - night, stopping only long enough to make coffee for the men, and to - rest and graze the animals. - - We bivouacked on the evening of the 6th in a deep valley near Little - Muddy Creek, and about two o’clock the following morning were again - in the saddle, moving silently and swiftly down the valley toward - the Indian camp, which had been located the previous evening by - White Bull, Brave Wolf, Bob Jackson, and the other scouts. The - scouts had reported that the camp was only about six miles distant, - but it was soon discovered that it was much farther than this, and - at early dawn we were still some distance away. The command had been - moving at a trot, but the gallop was immediately taken up, and just - as the sun appeared above the horizon, we rounded a bend in the - valley and came in sight of the Indian camp, which was located on - the right side, close to the hills. - - At first we saw no Indians except a few boys guarding the ponies, - which were grazing a little distance beyond the camp, but they came - out immediately, and dropping in the grass, began to fire in our - direction, though without effect. As we charged down on the camp, - these Indians, together with squaws and children, ran for the hills, - driving with them the few horses that were near the tepees. “H” - Company, under command of Lieutenant Lovell H. Jerome, charged - through the camp and beyond, capturing the pony herd. The other - companies, all under command of Captain Ball, charged to the - village, formed line to the right, deployed as skirmishers, and - pursued the Indians up the hill. - - The hills were so steep at this point that it was necessary to - dismount the command and advance on foot, the horses being sent - around by an easier route to join us later near the summit of the - hill. The line as formed was “F” troop (Tyler) on the right, “L” - troop (Norwood) center, and “G” troop (Wheelan) on the left. The - Indians were driven up over the hills, where they scattered like - quail. Our horses were brought up, and mounting, we charged across - the country for two or three miles, and later returned to the - village. - - As my recollections serve me, four soldiers and fourteen Indians - were killed, ten soldiers being wounded, myself being one of the - number. About four hundred ponies were captured, which were - afterward used for mounting a battalion of Infantry, which later - performed much effective work in the field. There were over sixty - tepees, in which we found tons of dried buffalo meat, a few arms, - some ammunition, and a great many buffalo robes, saddles, and an - assortment of camp property, all of which were burned that - afternoon, thus so effectually crippling the band that the remnant - came in and surrendered a few weeks later. - - We camped on the battle-ground that night, the following day moving - back in the direction of our wagon train. - - One of the most interesting incidents of the fight occurred just as - the troop to which I belonged (“L”) charged on the village. I saw - General Miles riding toward the first tepee, near which were two - Indians, followed by his orderly. He called out something to these - Indians which I did not understand, but I later understood he had - called on them to surrender. One of these was evidently the Chief, - Lame Deer, for he wore a long head-dress of eagle feathers, the - head-dress reaching to the ground. As Miles approached on horseback, - the Chief walked rapidly toward him, with his hand extended, as - though to shake hands, but when within ten or twelve feet of him, - the Indian in the rear, who was said to be Iron Star, a son of Lame - Deer, and also a medicine man of the tribe, called sharply to Lame - Deer, presumably warning him of the approaching troops, and urging - him to follow the other Indians to the hills. - - Lame Deer stopped, turned, hesitated, then ran back a few steps, and - picking up a loaded carbine from the ground, fired point blank at - General Miles, who, seeing the movement, wheeled his horse sharply - and bent forward. The bullet passed over him, striking his orderly - in the breast, killing him instantly. The Chief then ran up the - steep hill, accompanied by the other Indian. The head-dress made a - very conspicuous mark, and many shots were immediately fired in that - direction. From his tottering steps we saw that the Chief was badly - wounded, and at this point his companion, instead of escaping as he - could have done, placed his arm around the Chief’s waist, and - supported him up the hill. About this time the Chief drew a - revolver, and without turning about, held it in rear of him and - fired in our direction, the bullets striking the ground only a few - feet in his rear. This act, we assumed, was one of defiance of a man - who knew he could not escape, but who was game to the last. Iron - Star supported the Chief until the latter fell, when he escaped over - the hill, only to be killed by “G” troop, which had been pushing up - on that side. After the devotion and bravery he had displayed in - supporting Lame Deer up the hill, we were almost sorry he had not - escaped alive. - - A few days later Bob Jackson told me that, on examining Lame Deer’s - body after the fight, he had found that he had been hit seventeen - times. - - Another incident which illustrates the valor of the United States - soldier was that of Private Leonard, Troop “L,” Second Cavalry, who - had dropped behind to readjust his saddle, a couple of miles from - the Indian camp. The command was moving rapidly, and the Indians - slipped in between the rear of the column and this lone soldier. - However, when he saw them he rode to the top of a hill, and lying - down behind some rocks, held these Indians at bay for several hours - until relief came to him. It was fortunate that relief came as it - did, for he had nearly exhausted his ammunition in firing at these - Indians, who had several times charged his position. - ------ - -Footnote 103: - - Personal Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles, U. S. A. - -Footnote 104: - - As an instance of Miles’ capacity in handling men, this is what - Baldwin says in a private letter, afterward made public, of the orders - he received: “When I was given command of this battalion opposite the - mouth of Squaw Creek, and the General took command of a less number of - men, it was a question as to which would find the hostile Indians, and - with the only order or suggestion given by him in that earnest manner - characteristic of him, he said, ‘Now, Baldwin, do the best you can. I - am responsible for disaster, success will be to your credit; you know - what my plans are, and what we are here for.’” There is a dashing, - manly ring about such words which I rejoice to recognize. It is a - great soldier who can first choose and then trust his subordinates. - -Footnote 105: - - At the battle of King’s Mountain, in the American Revolution, the - small loss of life among the Americans was due to the fact that the - English, trained marksmen though they were, firing down the slopes of - the mountain, overshot their opponents, although they had them in full - view all the way up the slope; and it is the tendency of troops always - to do the same thing. Troops on a level usually fire too low, and the - ground between the advancing lines of soldiers is often plowed up by - bullets from the depressed muzzles, which should have gone into the - breasts of the approaching enemy. - -Footnote 106: - - Each lodge accounted for from five to ten persons. - -Footnote 107: - - See close of this chapter for another account of the Lame Deer Fight. - -Footnote 108: - - These affairs are to be discussed at length in a forthcoming volume. - -Footnote 109: - - “On the Border With Crook,” Captain John G. Bourke, U. S. A. - -Footnote 110: - - Colonel Brainard won his commission by his heroic conduct in the - Greely Arctic Expedition, 1881–4.—C. T. B. - - - - - CHAPTER TWELVE - What They Are There For A Sketch of General Guy V. Henry, a Typical - American Soldier - - - I. Savage Warfare - -The most thankless task that can be undertaken by a nation is warfare -against savage or semi-civilized peoples. In it there is usually little -glory; nor is there any reward, save the consciousness of disagreeable -duty well performed. The risk to the soldier is greater than in ordinary -war, since the savages usually torture the wounded and the captured. -Success can only be achieved by an arduous, persistent, wearing down -process, which affords little opportunity for scientific fighting, yet -which demands military talents of the highest order. - -Almost anybody can understand the strategy or the tactics of a pitched -battle where the number engaged is large, the casualties heavy, and the -results decisive; but very few non-professional critics appreciate a -campaign of relentless pursuit by a small army of a smaller body of -mobile hostiles, here and there capturing a little band, now and then -killing or disabling a few, until in the final round-up the enemy, -reduced to perhaps less than a score, surrenders. There is nothing -spectacular about the performance, and everybody wonders why it took so -long. - -And as injustice and wrong have not been infrequent in the preliminary -dealings between the government and the savages, the soldier, who has -only to obey his orders, comes in for much unmerited censure from those -who think darkly though they speak bitterly. Especially is he criticized -if, when maddened by the suffering, the torture, of some comrade, the -soldier sinks to the savage level in his treatment of his ruthless -foeman. No one justifies such a lapse, of course, but few there be who -even try to understand it. The incessant campaigning in the Philippines, -with its resulting scandals, is an instance in point. - -Long before the Spanish-American War and its Philippine corollary, -however, our little army had shown itself capable of the hardest and -most desperate campaigning against the Indians of the West—as difficult -and dangerous a work as any army ever undertook. There was so much of -it, and it abounded with so many thrilling incidents, that volumes could -be written upon it without exhausting its tragedy, its romance. There -were few soldiers who served beyond the Mississippi from 1865 to 1890 -who did not participate in a score of engagements, whose lives were not -in peril more than once in many a hard, but now forgotten, campaign. - -[Illustration: - - _From the collection of J. Robert Coster_ -] - - COL. RANALD S. MACKENZIE GEN. GUY V. HENRY - CAPT. ANSON MILLS W. F. CODY (BUFFALO BILL) - - GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED INDIAN FIGHTERS - - _All except General Henry from contemporary photographs_ - -One of the bravest of our Indian fighters was Guy V. Henry. Personally, -he was a typical representative of the knightly American soldier. -Officially, it was his fortune to perform conspicuous services in at -least three expeditions subsequent to the Civil War. He was a West -Pointer, and the son of another, born in the service at Fort Smith in -the Indian Territory. Graduating in 1861, a mere boy, he participated in -four years of the hardest fighting in the Civil War, from Bull Run to -Cold Harbor. At the age of twenty-three, his merit won him the -appointment of Colonel of the Fortieth Massachusetts Volunteers, “a -regiment that was never whipped.” The tall, brawny Yankees fairly -laughed at the beardless stripling who was appointed to command them. -“They laugh best who laugh last,” and Henry had the last laugh. He -mastered them, and to this day they love his memory. - -He was thrice mentioned in despatches, and brevetted five times for -conspicuous gallantry in action during the war, out of which he came -with the rank of brigadier-general. For heroic and successful fighting -at Old Cold Harbor, he received the highest distinction that can come to -a soldier, the medal of honor. Having two horses shot from under him in -the attack upon the Confederate lines, he seized a third from a trooper, -mounted him under a withering fire, and led his soldiers forward in a -final assault, which captured the enemy’s intrenchments; this third -horse was shot under him just as he leaped the breastworks. - -“Thin as a shoestring and as brave as a lion,” he was a past-master of -military tactics and a severe disciplinarian. “I tell you he is a -martinet,” cried one young officer angrily, smarting under a -well-deserved reproof. “You are wrong,” replied a wiser officer, who -knew Henry better; “he is trying to make your own record better than you -could ever make it yourself.” Sudden as a thunderbolt and swift as a -hawk when he struck the red Sioux, in his family and social relations he -was a kindly, considerate, Christian gentleman. He could kill -Indians—but never cruelly, mercilessly, only in open warfare—and teach a -class in Sunday-school. I’ve seen him do the latter, and no man did it -better; the boys of his class simply idolized him. And his men in the -army did the same. Cool and tactful, a statesman, for all his fiery -energy, he was perhaps the best of our colonial governors. When he died -the people of Porto Rico mourned him as a friend, where the little -children had loved him as a father. - - - II. A March in a Blizzard - -At the close of the Civil War he was transferred to the Third Cavalry, a -regiment with which he was destined to win lasting renown. It must have -been hard for men who had exercised high command, and who had proved -their fitness for it, to come down from general officers to subalterns; -but Henry accepted the situation cheerfully. He was as proud of his -troop of cavalry as he had been of his regiment and brigade of -volunteers. His new detail took him to Arizona, where for two years he -commanded a battalion engaged in hard scouting among the Apaches. The -winter of 1874 found him at Fort Robinson in the Black Hills. While -there he was ordered to go into the Bad Lands to remove certain miners -who were supposed to be there in defiance of treaty stipulations. - -The day after Christmas, with his own troop and fifteen men of the Ninth -Infantry under Lieutenant Carpenter, with wagons, rations, and forage -for thirty days, the men set forth. The expedition involved a march of -three hundred miles, over the worst marching country on the face of the -globe, and in weather of unimaginable severity, the cold continually -ranging from twenty to forty degrees below zero. The miners were not -found, and on the return journey the command, which had suffered -terrible hardships, was overtaken by a blizzard. - -When, in an Eastern city, the thermometer gets down to the zero mark, -and it blows hard, with a heavy snow for twenty-four hours, people who -are not familiar with the real article call such insignificant weather -manifestations a blizzard. Imagine a fierce gale sweeping down from the -north, filled with icy needles which draw blood ere they freeze the -naked skin, the thermometer forty degrees below zero, a rolling, -treeless country without shelter of any sort from the blinding snow and -the biting wind, and you have the situation in which that expedition -found itself. The storm came up an hour after breaking camp on what was -hoped to be the last day on the return journey. To return to the place -of the camp was impossible. To keep moving was the only thing to be -done. The cold was so intense that it was at first deemed safer to walk -than ride. The troops dismounted and struggled on. Many of the men gave -out and sank exhausted, but were lifted to their saddles and strapped -there, Henry himself doing this with his own hands. Finally, the whole -party got so weak that it was impossible for them to proceed. In -desperation, they mounted the exhausted horses and urged them forward. -Henry had no knowledge of direction, but trusted to the instincts of his -horse. He led the way. Many of the men had to be beaten to keep them -awake and alive—to sleep was death. - -Finally, when hope and everything else was abandoned, they came to a -solitary ranch under the curve of a hill, occupied by a white man and -his Indian wife. They were saved; that is, they had escaped with their -lives. The horses were put in shelter in the corral, the men crowded -into the house, and the painful process of thawing out was begun. The -ranch was fifteen miles from Fort Robinson, and when the blizzard abated -the next day wagons and ambulances were sent out, and the helpless -soldiers were carried back to the post. - -Most of them were in a terrible condition, and few had escaped. They -were broken from the hardships they had undergone, especially from the -freezing, which those who have suffered from declare causes a -prostration from which it is difficult to recover. When Henry entered -his quarters his wife did not recognize him. His face was black and -swollen. His men cut the bridle reins to free his hands, and then slit -his gloves into strips, each strip bringing a piece of flesh as it was -pulled off. All his fingers were frozen to the second joint; the flesh -sloughed off, exposing the bones. One finger had to be amputated, and to -the day of his death his left hand was so stiff that he was unable to -close his fingers again. As he was a thin, spare man, with no -superfluous flesh, he had suffered more than the rest. Yet he made no -complaint, and it was only due to his indomitable persistence that the -men were not frozen to death that awful day. Henry’s winter march is -still remembered, by those in the old service, as one of the heroic -achievements of the period. - - - III. A Ghastly Experience - -The heroism and sufferings of the young soldier were nothing, however, -to what he manifested and underwent two years later. Just before the -Custer Massacre, General Crook, with some eleven hundred men, moved out -from Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, on the expedition that culminated in the -battle of the Rosebud. Colonel W. B. Royall had command of the cavalry -of Crook’s little army. One morning in June the Sioux and the Cheyennes, -under Crazy Horse, who as a fighter and general was probably second to -few Indians that ever lived, attacked Crook’s men. The left wing, under -Royall, was isolated in a ravine and practically surrounded by a foe who -outnumbered them five to one. The rest of the army, heavily engaged, -could give them no succor. The Indians made charge after charge upon the -troops, who had all dismounted except the field officers. Henry had -command of the left battalion of Royall’s force. Cool as an iceberg, he -rode up and down the thin line, steadying and holding his men. At one -time, by a daring charge, he rescued an imperiled company under a -brother officer. - -At last, in one of the furious attacks of the Sioux, he was shot in the -face. A rifle bullet struck him under the left eye, passed through the -upper part of his mouth under the nose, and came out below the right -eye. The shock was terrific. His face was instantly covered with blood, -his mouth filled with it. He remained in the saddle, however, and strove -to urge the troops on. In the very act of spurring his horse forward to -lead a charge, he lost consciousness, and fell to the ground. - -At that instant the war-bonneted Indians, superbly mounted, delivered an -overwhelming onslaught on the left flank of the line. The men, deprived -of their leader, for a time gave back. The Indians actually galloped -over the prostrate figure of the brave soldier. Fortunately, he was not -struck by the hoofs of any of the horses. A determined stand by Chief -Washakie, of the friendly Shoshones, our Indian allies in that battle, -who with two or three of his braves fought desperately over Henry’s -body, prevented him from being scalped and killed. - -The officers of the Third speedily rallied their men, drove back the -Indians, and reoccupied the ground where Henry lay. He was assisted to -his horse and taken to the rear where the surgeons were. Such was the -nature of his wound that he could not speak above a whisper; he could -not see at all, he could scarcely hear, and he had great difficulty in -breathing. As the doctor bent over him he heard the wounded man mumble -out, “Fix me up so that I can go back!” - -There was no going back for him that day. Through the long day he lay on -the ground while the battle raged about him. There was little water and -no shelter; there wasn’t a tent in the army. Although it was bitter cold -during the nights in that country at that season, at midday it was -fearfully hot. He was consumed with thirst. His orderly managed to give -him a little shade by holding his horse so that the shadow of the -animal’s body fell upon the wounded man. His wound was dressed -temporarily as well as possible, and then he was practically left to -die. - -One of the colonel’s comrades came back to him during a lull in the -fight. There he lay helpless on the bare ground, in the shadow of the -restive horse, which the orderly had all he could do to manage. No one -else could be spared from the battle line to attend to Henry’s wants, -although, as a matter of fact, he expressed no wants. The flies had -settled thickly upon his bandaged face. The officer bent over him with -an expression of commiseration. - -“It’s all right, Jack,” gurgled out from the bleeding lips; “it’s what -we’re here for.”[111] - -Royall’s forces were finally able to effect a junction with the main -body by withdrawing fighting, and Henry was carried along any way in the -hurried movement. The Indians at last withdrew from the field (the -battle must be considered a drawn one), and then there was time to -consider what was to be done with the wounded. The facilities for -treatment were the slenderest. The column had been stripped of its -baggage, in order to increase its mobility, to enable it to cope with -the Indians. All they had they carried on their persons, and that -included little but the barest necessities. - -Nobody expected Henry to survive the night. He didn’t expect to live -himself, as he lay there through the long hours, listening to the men -digging graves for those who had fallen, and wondering whether or not he -was to be one of the occupants thereof. The next day they sent him to -the rear. He was transported in what is called a travois. Two saplings -were cut from the river bank; two army mules, one at each end, were -placed between the saplings, which were slung over the backs of the -animals. An army blanket, or piece of canvas, was then lashed to the -poles, and on them the sufferer was placed. There were a number of -wounded—none of them, however, so seriously as Henry. It was some two -hundred miles to Fort Fetterman, and they carried him all that distance -that way. - -The weather at night was bitterly cold. In the daytime it was burning -hot. The travois was so short—they had to take what poles they could -get, of course—that several times the head of the rear mule hit the -wounded officer’s head, so that finally they turned him about, putting -his head behind the heels of the foremost animal, where he was liable to -be kicked to death at any moment. - -On one occasion one of the mules stumbled and fell and pitched Henry out -upon his head. The officers of the little escort stood aghast as they -saw him fall out; but it is a matter of record, solemnly attested, that -such was Henry’s iron self-control that he made no sound, although the -agony was excruciating. In fact, on the whole journey he made no -complaint of any sort. His only food was broth, which was made from -birds shot by the soldiers as they came upon them, and he got this very -infrequently. - -Finally, the little cortège reached Fort Fetterman. The last mishap -awaited them there. The river was crossed by a ferryboat, which was -pulled from shore to shore by ropes and tackles. The river was very high -and the current running swiftly, and as they prepared to take the -wounded officer across, the ropes broke, and the whole thing went to -pieces, leaving him within sight, but not within reach, of clean beds, -comforts, and medical attention he hoped to secure. Some of the escort, -rough soldiers though they were, broke into tears as they saw the -predicament of their beloved officer. He himself, however, true to his -colors, said nothing. Finally, they offered to take him across the -raging torrent in a small skiff—the only boat available—if he were -willing to take the risk. Of course, if the skiff were overturned, he -would have been drowned. He took the risk, and with two men to paddle -and an officer to hold him in his arms, the passage was made. - - - IV. An Army Wife - -Three hundred miles away, at Fort D. A. Russell, his wife was waiting -for him. Long before he reached Fort Fetterman, she heard through -couriers the news of his wound, which was reported to her as fatal, -although he had taken care to cause a reassuring message to be sent her -with the first messenger. With the heroism of the army wife, although -she was in delicate health at the time, she immediately made -preparations to join him. The railroad at that time ran as far as -Medicine Bow. Beyond that there was a hundred-mile ride to Fort -Fetterman. All the troops were in the field; none could be spared from -the nominal garrisons for an escort. Again and again Mrs. Henry made -preparations to go forward, several times actually starting, and again -and again she was forbidden to do so by the officers in command at the -various posts. It was not safe to send a woman across the country with a -few soldiers; the Indians were up and out in all directions. There was -no safety anywhere outside the forts or larger towns; she had to stay at -home and wait. Sometimes the devoted wife got word from her husband, -sometimes she did not. The savages were constantly cutting the wires. -Her suspense was agonizing. - -Finally, the arrival of troops at Fort Fetterman enabled a stronger -escort to be made up, and Henry was sent down to Fort D. A. Russell. The -troops arrived at Medicine Bow on the third of July. The train did not -leave until the next day. They were forced to go into camp. The cowboys -and citizens celebrated the Fourth in the usual manner. That night the -pain-racked man narrowly escaped being killed by the reckless shooting -of the celebrators. Two bullets passed through the tent in which he lay, -just above his head. The next morning found him on the train. His heart -action had been so weakened by chloral and other medicines which they -had given him, that at Sherman, the highest point on the journey, he -came within an inch of dying. - -His thoughts all along had been of his wife. When he got to the station -he refused to get in an ambulance, in order to spare her the sight of -his being brought home in that way. A carriage was procured, and -supported in the arms of the physician and his comrades, he was driven -back to the fort. With superhuman resolution, in order to convince his -wife that he was not seriously hurt, he determined to walk from the -carriage to the door. Mrs. Henry had received instructions from the -doctor to control herself, and stood waiting quietly in the entrance. - -“Well,” whispered the shattered man, as she took him tenderly by the -hand, alluding to the fact that it was the Fourth of July, “this is a -fine way to celebrate, isn’t it?” - -After the quietest of greetings—think of that woman, what her feelings -must have been!—he was taken into the house and laid on the sofa. The -doctor had said that he might have one look at his wife. The bandages -were lifted carefully from his face, so that he might have that single -glance; then they were replaced, and the wife, unable to bear it longer, -fled from the room. The chaplain’s wife was waiting for her outside the -door, and when she got into the shelter of that good woman’s arms she -gave way and broke down completely. - -“You know,” said the chaplain’s wife, alluding to many conversations -which they had had, “that you asked of God only that He should bring him -back to you, and God has heard that prayer.” - -Everybody expected that Henry would die, but die he did not; perhaps it -would be better to say die he would not. And he had no physique to back -his efforts, only an indomitable will. He never completely recovered -from that experience. He lost the sight of one eye permanently, and to -the day of his death was liable to a hemorrhage at any moment, in which -there was grave danger of his bleeding to death. - -He took a year’s leave of absence, and then came back to duty. In 1877, -when his troop was ordered to the front in another campaign under Crook -against the redoubtable Sioux, he insisted upon accompanying them. He -had been out an hour or so when he fell fainting from the saddle. Did -they bring him back? Oh, no! He bade them lay him under a tree, leave -two or three men with him to look after him, and go ahead. He would -rejoin them that night, when it became cooler and he could travel with -more ease! What he said he would do he did. A trooper rode back to the -post on his own account and told of his condition. An order was sent him -by the post commander to return. Henry quietly said he would obey the -first order and go on. He remained with the troop for six weeks, until -finally he was picked up bodily and carried home, vainly protesting, the -doctor refusing to answer either for his eyesight or for his life if he -stayed in the field any longer. - - - V. The Buffalos and Their Famous Ride - -Thirteen years after that Henry was commanding the Ninth Cavalry, with -headquarters at Fort McKinney. The Ninth Cavalry was a regiment of -negroes. From the overcoats which they wore in Wyoming in the winter -they were called the “Buffalos,” and sometimes they were facetiously -referred to as “Henry’s Brunettes.” Whatever they were called, they were -a regiment of which to be proud. - -In 1890 occurred the last outbreak of the Sioux under the inspiration of -the Ghost Dancers, which culminated in the battle of Wounded Knee. -Troops from all over the United States were hurried to the Pine Ridge -Agency as the trouble began. On the 24th of December Henry and the -“Brunettes” were ordered out to the former’s old stamping ground in the -Black Hills on a scouting expedition. It was bitter cold that Christmas -Eve, but, thank God! there was no blizzard. Fifty miles on the back of a -trotting horse was the dose before them. They rested at four A.M. on the -morning of Christmas Day. Some of the garments the men wore were frozen -stiff. They had broken through the ice of the White River in crossing -it. How the men felt inside the frozen clothing may be imagined. Eight -miles farther they made their camp. They did not have much of a -Christmas celebration, for as soon as possible after establishing their -base at Harney Springs they went on the scout. They hunted assiduously -for several days, but found no Indians. These had gone south to join -their brethren concentrated about the agency. One day they rode -forty-two miles in a vain search. They got back to camp about seven -o’clock. At nine a courier from the agency fifty miles away informed -them of the battle of Wounded Knee, and that five thousand Oglala Sioux -were mustering to attack the agency. - -“Boots and Saddles!” instantly rang out, and the tired troopers mounted -their jaded horses again. This time the camp was broken for keeps, and -tents were struck, wagons packed to abandon it. It was a bitter cold -night. There was a fierce gale sweeping through the valley, blowing a -light snow in the faces of the men wrapped to the eyes in their buffalo -coats and fur caps. They pushed steadily on in spite of it, for it was -Henry’s intention to reach the agency in the dark in order to avoid -attack by the Indians. - -It was thought advisable, therefore, to leave the wagon train under an -escort of one company and press forward with the rest. The men arrived -at the agency at daybreak, completing a ride of over ninety miles in -less than twenty hours. Fires were kindled, horses picketed, and the -exhausted men literally threw themselves on the ground for rest. They -had been there but a short time when one of the men from the escort came -galloping madly in with the news that the wagon-train was heavily -attacked, and that succor must be sent at once. Without waiting for -orders, without even stopping to saddle the horses, Henry and his men -galloped back over the road two miles away, where the escort was -gallantly covering the train. A short, sharp skirmish, in which one man -was killed and several wounded, drove back the Indians, and the regiment -brought in the train. - -It was ten o’clock now, and as the negro troops came into the agency, -word was brought that the Drexel Mission, seven miles up the valley, was -being attacked, and help must be sent immediately. There were two -regiments of cavalry available, the Seventh and the Ninth. For some -unexplained reason, the Ninth was ordered out. In behalf of his men, -Henry made protest. They must have a little rest, and so the Seventh was -despatched, and was soon hotly engaged. Two hours later a messenger -reported that the Seventh, in the valley where the mission was situated, -was heavily attacked by the Indians, who had secured commanding -positions on the surrounding ridges. Unless they could be relieved, they -would probably be overwhelmed. Again the trumpet call rang out, and the -tired black troopers once more climbed into their saddles and struck -spurs into their more tired horses, galloping away to the rescue of -their hard-pushed white comrades. The ridges were carried in most -gallant style, and after some sharp fighting the Indians were driven -back. The Seventh was extricated and the day was saved. - -In thirty-four hours of elapsed time, the Ninth Cavalry had ridden one -hundred and eight miles—the actual time in the saddle being twenty-two -hours. They had fought two engagements and had rested only two hours. -Marvelous to relate, there wasn’t a sore-backed horse in the whole -regiment. One horse died under the pressure, but aside from that and -their fatigue, horses and men were in excellent condition. - -That was probably the most famous ride ever performed by troops in the -United States. For it Henry was recommended for a further brevet, as -major-general—the sixth he had received. - -The Spanish-American War was too short to afford Henry an opportunity to -distinguish himself in the field, but in Porto Rico he showed that his -talents were not merely of the military order. In the brief period his -health permitted him to remain there, he accomplished wonders, and did -it all in such a way as to gain the respect—nay, the affection—of the -people over whom, with single-hearted devotion and signal capacity, he -ruled. He stayed there until he broke down. I, sick with typhoid fever -on a transport at Ponce, saw him just before he collapsed. We were old -friends, and he came off to the ship to visit me. I was not too ill then -to realize that his own time was coming. He would not ask to be -relieved. - -“Here I was sent”, he said; “here I will stay until my duty is done.” - -He was the knightliest soldier I ever met, and I have met many. He was -one of the humblest Christians I ever knew, and I have known not a few. -It was his experience at Porto Rico which finally brought about his -death; for it is literally true that he died, as a soldier should, in -his harness. In those trying times at Ponce, when life and health were -at a low ebb, he wrote, in the sacred confidence of his last letter to -his faithful wife, words which it was not his custom to speak, but which -those of us who knew him felt expressed his constant thought: - -“I am here alone. One by one my staff officers have fallen ill and gone -home. Home!—let us not speak of it. Jesus is here with me, and makes -even this desolation home until a brighter one is possible.” - -So, his memory enshrined in the hearts that loved him, his heroic deeds -the inspiration of his fellow-soldiers, passed to his brighter home Guy -V. Henry, a Captain of the Strong. - ------ - -Footnote 111: - - John F. Finerty, who was present as the correspondent of the Chicago - _Times_, and who relates the incident, says that Henry, immediately - after this remark, advised Finerty to join the army. Encouraging - circumstances to back up such a recommendation! - - - - - APPENDICES - - - - - APPENDIX A. -Being a Further Discussion of General Custer’s Course in the Little Big - Horn Campaign.[112] - - - I. - -Whether General Custer did, or did not, obey General Terry’s orders; -whether these orders were, or were not, well considered, and such as -could be carried out; whether, if General Custer did disobey General -Terry’s orders he was warranted in so doing by the circumstances in -which he found himself, are questions of the deepest interest to the -student of military matters and the historian thereof. I presume the -problem they present will never be authoritatively settled, and that men -will continue to differ upon these questions until the end of time. - -The matter has been discussed, pro and con, at great length on many -occasions. A number of books and magazine articles have been written -upon different phases of the situation. I have come to the conclusion -indicated in my own article, as I said, against my wish. In view of his -heroic death in the high places of the field, I would fain hold General -Custer, for whom I have long cherished an admiration which I still -retain, entirely innocent. I have only come to this conclusion after a -rigid investigation including the careful weighing of such evidence as I -could secure upon every point in question. - -This evidence consists, first, of a great variety of printed matter; -second, of personal conversations with soldiers and military critics, -which, as any record of it would necessarily be hearsay and secondhand, -I have not set down hereafter save in one instance; third, of letters -which have been written me by officers who, from their participation in -the campaign, or from unusual opportunities to acquire knowledge -concerning it which they have enjoyed, have become possessed of -information which they were willing to give to me. - -The object of this appendix is to set down, so that it may be here -preserved in permanent and available form for future reference, such -evidence in these letters as may be pertinent and useful; also to refer -the student, who desires to go deeper into the subject, to some of the -more valuable printed accounts which are easily accessible. - -I am glad that some of the communications I have received, notably those -from Colonel Godfrey, make a stout defense of General Custer. Perhaps -upon consideration of Colonel Godfrey’s points and arguments, which are -not only strong and well taken, but also admirably put, the critic may -be inclined to differ from my conclusion. For the sake of General -Custer’s fame, I sincerely hope so. I should be glad to be proved to be -mistaken. - -Without specifically noting the various descriptions of the campaign and -battle, which are interesting, but irrelevant to my purpose,[113] -Custer’s conduct has been critically considered at some length—by -persons whose standing requires that their opinions should be -respectfully received—in several publications which I note in such order -as best serves the purpose of this discussion without regard to the -order in which they appeared. - -Colonel Edward S. Godfrey,[114] U. S. A., now commanding the Ninth -Cavalry, who, as a lieutenant, commanded K Troop, in Benteen’s -battalion, which joined that of Reno in the battle of the 26th of June, -1876, wrote a most interesting account of the battle, containing some -valuable reflections upon some disputed points, which was published in -the _Century Magazine_, Vol. XLIII., No. 3, January, 1892. To this -article, in the same number, were appended certain comments by -Major-General James B. Fry, U. S. A., since deceased. - -This article and these comments came to the notice of Major-General -Robert P. Hughes, U. S. A. (retired), then Colonel and -Inspector-General. General Hughes was General Terry’s aide-de-camp -during the Little Big Horn Campaign. He wrote an exhaustive criticism on -Fry’s comments to Godfrey’s article, which was in effect a discussion of -the main proposition that Custer disobeyed his orders and thereby -precipitated the disaster, for which he was therefore responsible. This -campaign was also considered in an article by Dr. E. Benjamin Andrews, -president of the University of Nebraska, who was then president of Brown -University, Providence, Rhode Island, which appeared in _Scribner’s -Magazine_ for June, 1895. A fuller reference to Dr. Andrews’ position -will be made later. - -General Hughes’ article was offered to the _Century_, but was not -accepted, and was finally published in the _Journal of the Military -Service Institution_, Vol. XVIII., No. 79, January, 1896. - -Among the many books in which the matter has been discussed, three only -call for attention. - -In “THE STORY OF THE SOLDIER,” by Brigadier-General George A. Forsyth, -U. S. A. (retired), the following comment appears: - - “Under the peculiar condition of affairs, bearing in mind the only - information he could possibly have had concerning Sitting Bull’s - forces, was Custer justified, in a military sense and within the - scope of his orders, in making the attack? - - “In the opinion of the writer he was within his orders, and fully - justified from a military standpoint in so doing.” - -General Forsyth gives no reason for his decision, but it is to be -presumed that he did not arrive at that decision hastily and carelessly, -and as he is a very able and distinguished officer and military critic, -due weight should be accorded his views. - -In “THE UNITED STATES IN OUR OWN TIME,” by Dr. E. Benjamin Andrews, -published by Chas. Scribner’s Sons, edition of 1903, pages 190–1–2–3, -there is a concise discussion of the question, based on the article in -_Scribner’s Magazine_, referred to above, with some additional -reflections on General Hughes’ paper. - -In “PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF GENERAL NELSON A. MILES, U. S. A.,” -chapter xv., pages 198–210, there is a further discussion by the -Lieutenant-General, lately in command of the United States Army. - -In order clearly to understand what follows the student should refer to -each of the sources mentioned and examine carefully into what is therein -set forth. It is not practicable to quote all these authors at length. I -have corresponded with every one of the authors mentioned except General -Fry. I print their letters to me, having made no change except once in a -while breaking a page into paragraphs and supplying a missing word here -and there which had no especial bearing upon the point at issue. Some of -the letters were written in pencil amid press of duties. Most of these -documents I print without comment. It is necessary, however, that I -should call attention to some features brought out by the -correspondence. - -President Andrews says, in the book referred to: - - “Much turns on the force of Custer’s written orders, which, judged - by usual military documents of the kind, certainly gave Custer a - much larger liberty than Colonel Hughes supposed. There is an - affidavit of a witness who heard Terry’s and Custer’s last - conversation together at the mouth of the Rosebud, just before - Custer began his fatal ride. Terry said: ‘Use your own judgment and - do what you think best if you strike the trail; and whatever you do, - Custer, hold on to your wounded.’” - -General Miles says, in his book: - - “But we have positive evidence in the form of an affidavit of the - last witness who heard the two officers in conversation together on - the night before their commands separated, and it is conclusive on - the point at issue. This evidence is that General Terry returned to - General Custer’s tent,[115] after giving him the final order, to say - to him that on coming up to the Indians he would have to use his own - discretion and do what he thought best. This conversation occurred - at the mouth of the Rosebud, and the exact words of General Terry, - as quoted by the witness, are: - - “’Custer, I do not know what to say for the last.’ - - “Custer replied: ‘Say what you want to say.’ - - “Terry then said: ‘Use your own judgment, and do what you think best - if you strike the trail; and, whatever you do, Custer, hold on to - your wounded.’ - - “This was a most reasonable conversation for the two officers under - the circumstances. One had won great distinction as a general in the - Civil War; was an able lawyer and department commander, yet entirely - without experience in Indian campaigns. The other had won great - distinction as one of the most gallant and skilful division - commanders of cavalry during the war, commanding one of the most - successful divisions of mounted troops; he had years of experience - on the plains and in handling troops in that remote country, and he - had fought several sharp engagements with hostile Indians.” - -If General Terry spoke such words to General Custer the last thing -before Custer’s departure, those remarks have a very important, almost a -decisive, bearing on the matter at issue. The only question then -existing would be, how far the verbal order ought to be considered as -superseding the written one. _It is my opinion that the charge that -Custer disobeyed orders would fall to the ground if the truth of the -alleged remarks could be established._ By giving him this verbal order, -Terry would make Custer an absolutely free agent. The vital importance -of establishing this affidavit is therefore obvious. - -I call attention to the fact that Terry nowhere refers to this -conversation, which it would be incumbent upon a gentleman to declare -immediately Custer was charged with disobeying Terry’s written order, -and that Terry, in that portion of his report which is quoted by me on -page 225, virtually not only fails to exculpate but actually charges -that Custer did disobey his order, by saying he did the very thing that -he was not expected to do. - -To establish this affidavit, I wrote to President Andrews, asking his -authority for stating that such an affidavit existed and requesting a -copy of it. Here is his reply. I insert it without comment. - - The University of Nebraska, Chancellor’s Office, - Lincoln, November 22d, ’03. - - My Dear Sir: - - Replying to your esteemed favor of the eleventh inst. I regret to - say that I have no means of recalling with certainty the source of - my information touching the Custer affidavit. My impression is, - however, that my informant was Gen. Miles, with whom I communicated - on the subject while I was writing my account. I also conversed - personally with Hughes and with a very intimate friend, now - deceased, of Gen. Terry’s. - - I shall be extremely pleased to read your views upon this subject. - - Very truly yours, - E. BENJ. ANDREWS. - -I also wrote to General Miles and received the following reply from him: - - 1736 N Street, N. W., - Washington, D. C., November 20, 1903. - - My Dear Sir: - - In reply to your two letters, you will find in my book, “Personal - Recollections, or from New England to the Golden Gate,” published by - Werner & Co., Akron, Ohio, perhaps all the information you will - require. I can not give the time now to going over the campaign in - detail. I presume you will find the book in most libraries.[116] You - will notice in it a chapter on the Custer campaign. General Custer - did not disobey orders. When General Terry divided his command, - taking one portion of it with him up the Yellowstone, and sending - General Custer with the other portion far out in the Indian country, - it necessarily put from seventy-five to one hundred miles between - the two commands, and therefore placed upon General Custer the - responsibility of acting on the offensive or defensive, for he could - have been attacked by the whole body of the combined tribes, and, on - the other hand, if he allowed them to escape without attacking them, - he would have been severely censured. It would be silly to suppose - that Indian chiefs like Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse would permit - two columns to march around over the country with infantry, cavalry, - wagon trains, etc.,[117] and wait for them to come up on both sides - simultaneously, and one must believe the American people very - gullible if they thought such a proposition had military merit. - - Yours very truly, - NELSON A. MILES. - -I immediately wrote General Miles a second letter asking him for the -name of the affiant and any statement he might be willing to make about -the affidavit. I pointed out to him what he very well knew—the -prominence given to the story in his own book indicates that—the -importance of the affidavit in establishing General Custer’s position -and defending him against the charge of disobedience. I received no -answer to this letter. - -Meanwhile the question of the affidavit was taken up by General Hughes -in his several communications to me which appear below. - -In order not to break the thread of the discourse I will anticipate -events and here insert a third letter which I wrote to General Miles, -after carefully considering General Hughes’ remarks. The letter was sent -to General Miles by registered mail. I hold the registry receipt showing -that he received it. To this inquiry I have as yet received no reply. - - 455 East 17th Street, Flatbush, - Brooklyn, N. Y., March 30th, 1904. - - Lieutenant-General NELSON A. MILES, U. S. A., - 1736 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. - - My Dear General Miles: - - A few months since I addressed to you a letter asking you for the - name of the person, alluded to in your book, who made the affidavit - as to the last remark of General Terry to General Custer. This - letter has probably never reached you since I have never received - any answer to it. - - The statement is questioned by a number of officers, and in the - interest of historical accuracy and for the sake of bringing forward - every particle of evidence tending to clear General Custer of the - charges which are made against him in that campaign, I most - respectfully ask you to give me the name of the affiant together - with such other statements concerning the affidavit as may be - conclusive. How did you become possessed of the affidavit, for - instance? Did you see it? Did you know the affiant? Was he a person - whose testimony was to be implicitly relied upon? Is he alive now? - In short, any information concerning it will be most acceptable as - well as most useful. - - Very sincerely yours, - CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY. - -I do not desire to comment on General Miles’ refusal further than to say -that if he has in his possession the affidavit he should either submit -it to the inspection of impartial observers, give it to historians, -state who made it, where it was made, furnish a certified copy of it to -the public, or otherwise establish it. If he is not willing to do this -he should at least say why he is not willing. I submit that no man, -whatever his rank or station, ought to make statements which affect the -fame and reputation of another man _without giving the fullest publicity -to his sources of information, or stating why the public must be content -with a simple reference thereto_. - -While I am on the subject of the affidavit, I call the student’s -attention to a possible suggestion in Colonel Godfrey’s second -communication below. - -It is twenty-eight years since the Battle of the Little Big Horn. If the -alleged affiant is now alive, what reason can exist to prevent him -coming out and acknowledging his affidavit? If he is dead, why should -secrecy about it longer exist? Why does not General Miles break his -silence? _The whole matter turns on the production of this affidavit, -with satisfactory evidence as to the character of the affiant._ - -The other position taken in General Miles’ letter above, which of course -is a summary of his views as set forth in his book, is discussed later -on by General Woodruff. - - - II. - -I now refer the student to the following letter in answer to one from me -asking information and calling General Hughes’ attention to President -Andrews’ book, which has just been reissued in a new and amplified -edition: - - New Haven, Conn., - 18th Nov., 1903. - - Dear Sir: - - Your letter of the 13th was duly received. I had not heard of Dr. E. - Benjamin Andrews’ book prior to receipt of your letter, but have - looked it up since. - - After a careful examination of what he says about the Sioux campaign - of 1876, I cannot find any good and sufficient reason for changing - aught that was stated in the article published in the _Journal of - the Military Service Institution_, in January, 1896. I do find, - however, that something could be added to the statement of the case - in reply to new matter which he has injected into it in his book. - These items are three in number, to wit: - - 1st. General Miles does not agree with the views therein expressed. - - 2d. New evidence in the form of an affidavit made by some - individual, name not given. - - 3rd. The writer of the book dissents from my view of the case. - - We will take these items up severally: - - First: “General Miles is strongly of the opinion that Custer was not - guilty of disobeying any orders.” - - It is not a new experience to learn that the views of General Miles - and myself are at variance. Indeed, it seems that they are seldom in - accord. But, in this instance, my views are supported by the late - General P. H. Sheridan, who states as follows: - - “General Terry, now pretty well informed of the locality of the - Indians, directed Lieutenant-Colonel George A. Custer to move with - the Seventh Cavalry up the Rosebud, until he struck the trail - discovered by Major Reno, with instructions _that he should not - follow it directly to the Little Big Horn, but that he should send - scouts over it and keep his main force farther south_.”[118] - - General Gibbon, in a letter to General Terry, written after having - reached his post, Fort Shaw, Montana, and bearing date November 5th, - 1876, writes as follows, speaking of the “Conference”: - - “We both impressed upon him (Custer) that he should keep - constantly feeling to his left, and even should the trail turn - toward the Little Big Horn that he should continue his march - southward along the headwaters of the Tongue, and strike west - toward the Little Big Horn. So strong was the impression upon my - mind and great my fear that Custer’s zeal would carry him - forward too rapidly, that the last thing I said to him when - bidding him good-by, after his regiment had filed past you when - starting on the march, was, ‘Now, Custer, don’t be greedy, but - wait for us.’ Poor fellow! Knowing what we do now, and what an - effect a fresh Indian trail seemed to have on him, perhaps we - were expecting too much to anticipate a forbearance on his part - which would have rendered coöperation between the two columns - practicable.” - - The foregoing clearly shows that no doubt existed in the minds of - the Division Commanders and the third party present at the - conference as to what the instructions required and that those - instructions were not complied with. - - Second: Dr. Andrews states that there was a listener at the last - conversation between Terry and Custer at the mouth of the Rosebud, - just before Custer began his fatal ride, and that his affidavit sets - up that: - - “Terry said: ‘Use your own judgment and do what you think best if - you strike the trail and, whatever you do, Custer, hold on to your - wounded.’” - - It is quite evident that this is the same affidavit which General - Miles refers to in his book. My attention was called to that - reference in the winter of 1896, and in behalf of the family and - friends of General Terry I asked to see the affidavit, saying that I - might wish to make a copy of it. My request was refused by General - Miles, with the further information that it had been in his - possession for nineteen years, which carried the date back to a time - when Colonel Miles was commanding a post in General Terry’s - Department. The value of the document could have been very readily - determined at that time by General Terry himself, and I am thankful - to say its worthlessness is still capable of proof. - - The quotations given by Dr. Andrews would alone be sufficient to - condemn the paper with any one familiar with General Terry and the - situation. - - It will be noticed that he is represented as saying, “If you strike - the trail.” Terry was sending, with Custer, Reno and six troops of - cavalry, who had followed the trail for many weary miles only three - days before, and there was no “if” in the case. - - The other quotation is equally incredible. General Terry had an - enviable reputation throughout the army for his exceptional courtesy - on all occasions and under all circumstances, to all those serving - in his command. To have made the remarks quoted, “Whatever you do, - hold on to your wounded,” would have been tantamount to saying to - one of his Lieutenant-Colonels, to whom he was confiding the finest - command in his department, that he considered it necessary to - caution him on the elementary principle of the position assigned - him. To an officer of General Custer’s experience and gallantry such - a caution would have been far from agreeable, and such action would - have been entirely foreign to the life-long conduct of General - Terry. - - But, fortunately, we are not dependent upon deductive evidence in - this instance. There are still living a good many people who were - witnesses of that “march past” and parting of Generals Terry and - Custer. By personal observation I positively know that any one, - General Gibbon excepted, who makes affidavit to the effect that, at - the said parting at the Rosebud, there was a conversation between - Terry and Custer to which he was the only listener, is guilty of - perjury. - - When the notice came that the command was ready to take up its march - I was sitting with Terry and Gibbon. General Terry invited General - Gibbon to go with him and see it. They walked off a few yards from - the bank of the stream and stood together when Custer joined them. - The three remained together until the command had filed past and the - final good-by was said. Custer mounted his horse and rode off, and - Terry and Gibbon came back to where I had remained. The last remark - made to Custer was by Gibbon. If any change was made at that time in - Custer’s orders it was perforce known to Gibbon, who was alongside - of Terry, and the only one who was with him and Custer. Now let us - see what Gibbon said in a letter written to General Terry - twenty-seven years ago, when he could not foresee for what purpose - his words would be quoted: - - “Except so far as to draw profit from past experience it is, - perhaps, useless to speculate as to what would have been the - result had _your plan_ been carried out. But I cannot help - reflecting that, in that case, my column, supposing the Indian - camp to have remained where it was when Custer struck it, would - have been the first to reach it; that with our infantry and - Gatling guns we should have been able to take care of ourselves, - even though numbering only two-thirds of Custer’s force.” - - The only person actually in the presence of Terry and Custer at that - final parting, happened to be the third member of the conference, - who knew the “plan,” and on the fifth of the November following he - writes as above, of what would have been the result had “your plan” - (Terry’s conference plan) been carried out. - - It so happened that I went over this whole subject with General - Gibbon personally only a short time before his death. He certainly - knew nothing of any change in the “conference plan” at that time. - Any historian who makes use of the affidavit General Miles had some - years ago, would do well to look carefully into the facts. - - Third: Andrews states: “He (Hughes) adduced many interesting - considerations, but seemed to the writer not at all to justify his - views.” - - I am, by no means, sure that this dissent would have disturbed me if - I had depended on my own judgment alone in submitting the - article[119] for publication, but it so happened that I did not do - so. The tragedy discussed being of an exceedingly grave character, - and both the responsible heads having passed away, rendered it - unusually important that every possible precaution should be taken - against mistakes. For this reason, after the “many interesting - considerations” were prepared for publication, I submitted the - article to different _competent military men_ with the simple - question, “Is it conclusive?” - - The final review was made by General Henry L. Abbott, U. S. Army, - who enjoys a world-wide reputation for military ability and - scholarly attainments. The gentlemen who revised the article were - unanimously of the opinion that the statement was _absolutely - conclusive_, and with the support of such men I have felt little - anxiety about the criticisms that have been made. - - Very truly yours, - R. P. HUGHES. - -Thereafter I wrote again to General Hughes about some matters repeated -to me in conversation by General Carrington, who told me that Custer -actually got down on his knees to Terry and begged him, for the sake of -Custer’s honor and fame as a soldier, to get the orders detaining him at -Fort Lincoln revoked, so that he might be spared the disgrace of seeing -his regiment march to the front leaving him behind. Carrington’s -recollection was that the scene took place in Terry’s bedroom. - -Here is General Hughes’ letter on that point: - - New Haven, Conn., - 27th Nov., 1903. - - My Dear Sir: - - Yours of the 27th at hand. Carrington is all right except as to - location—the incident occurred in General Terry’s office in St. - Paul, corner Fourth and Wabashaw Streets. It drew from Terry a - request to the President to permit Custer to go with him, the answer - being through Sherman, “If Terry wishes Custer let him take him - along.” Just after notifying Custer of the reply and telling him he - would take him along, Custer met Ludlow on the street and made the - “swing clear” remark which is spoken of in Andrews’ history and is - referred to in my article in the journal. I shall have to apply for - a copy of the Secretary of War’s report for 1876, which has the - reports of Sheridan, Crook, Terry, Gibbon, Reno, etc., pages - 439–487.[120] - - Yours very truly, - R. P. HUGHES. - - - III. - -Meanwhile I had communicated with Colonel Godfrey, who had already -furnished me with much data in addition to that contained in his -valuable and interesting paper, calling particular attention to some of -the statements made by General Hughes in his article in the _Journal_ -_of the Military Service Institution_. From Colonel Godfrey I received -the following paper: - - MEMORANDA FOR REV. C. T. BRADY - - A semi-official account entitled “Record of Engagements with Hostile - Indians in the Division of the Missouri, from 1868 to 1882,” was - published by the Division of the Missouri. This paper is now being - reprinted in the _United States Cavalry Journal_, Fort Leavenworth, - Kansas. The part relating to the Little Big Horn, is in the October, - 1903, number. This account reads: - - “About two o’clock in the morning of July 25th, the column halted - for about three hours, made coffee, and then resumed the march, - crossed the divide, and by _eight o’clock_ were in the valley of one - of the branches of the Little Big Horn.” - - This is misleading and not altogether true. We halted about two - A.M., till eight A.M., then marched till ten A.M., halted, and it - was not until nearly noon that we crossed the divide. We were in a - narrow valley. The march is correctly described in my article. The - inference is that Custer was so very eager that he crossed the - divide into the valley of the Little Big Horn and put himself where - he could be discovered. General Hughes’ article is a _special plea_ - to clear General Terry from the odium that he and his family seemed - to think was heaped upon him for failure to push forward with the - information they had on June 25th and 26th, and that General - Custer’s family and friends were supposed to hold him (Terry) - responsible for the disaster in a measure. I do not remember a - charge of disobedience as having been made at any time during this - campaign; nor, on the other hand, do I recall that much was said - that Terry and Gibbon did not do as they thought best on June 25th - and 26th. - - The marching distance from the Yellowstone, where Gibbon’s command - was crossed, to the Little Big Horn, was about forty-six miles. East - of the Big Horn, the country over which Gibbon’s forces marched, was - rough—bad lands. The Second Cavalry on its march June 25th, saw the - “big smoke” (from the fire in the bottom at the time of Reno’s - attack) and at once sent word to General Gibbon (and Terry) that - they thought a fight was going on, or something to that effect. I - don’t know when they saw this “big smoke,” but my recollection is - that it corresponded or tallied very well with the time of Reno’s - attack. The Second Cavalry got to the Little Big Horn, four or five - miles above the mouth, about nine-thirty, June 26th. They were then - distant from the battlefield about eight or ten miles—an infantry - officer says six miles. They arrived in the vicinity of our position - about eleven A.M., June 27th, nearly two days after the “signs,” the - “big smoke” of the fight, had been communicated. - - That the country between the Yellowstone and the Little Big Horn was - rough; that the 25th of June was hot; that the water was scarce, we - all know; but we thought it strange that, after they learned from - the Crow scouts—say at ten-thirty, June 26th, on the Little Big - Horn—that a disaster had occurred, it took them so long to get a - move. Yet none of us blamed them for being cautious at that time. - - General Terry was not an Indian fighter and would never have made a - success of getting Indians on the plains. The idea is - preposterous[121] that a force can march through the open country (a - great big country like we had) pass by the Indians fifty or sixty - miles south, then turn round and find them in the same place, and - crush them between that force and another from the opposite - direction. They don’t linger that way. Our march from eleven P.M., - June 24th, was in a close country and not exposed—was in a close - valley, a branch of the Rosebud. The Indians who discovered us and - sent word to the village would have discovered our trail and - consequently informed them of our movements. - - General Custer did not intend to attack until June 26th, the date - Terry was to be at the Little Big Horn.[122] Herandeen was the scout - that was to take the information through to Terry, but developments - made it necessary, in General Custer’s opinion, if we were to strike - the Indians at all, that we should do it at once. Even then he - expected only a running fight. Their stand and concentration were - unexpected, because the chance of “surprise” was gone, and he - probably did not send Herandeen, as was intended, to communicate - with Terry for the reason that he did not think he could get - through. - - Now, suppose the Indians had been located on the headwaters of the - Rosebud or Tongue, or Powder, and not on the Little Big Horn, and we - had bumped up behind them on the north, should Custer have backed - away, sent a scout through to Terry, made a detour so as to get to - the south side? Terry’s instructions had fairly located the Indians, - but it was a mere _guess_.[123] On the 17th they had fought Crook to - a retreat, then they concentrated upon the Little Big Horn. - - In my opinion, if our attack had been delayed even a few hours we - would not have found the Indians all in the village. When we got to - the divide their pony herds were still out grazing; when the attack - was made all herds had been driven into the village; they did not - have time to strike their tepees and steal away. I don’t believe - they had a long warning of our advance. The Indian runners had the - same, or a greater, distance to get back than we had to advance. It - was their evident purpose to drop out of sight of our scouts who - were in position for observation before daylight, and did not see - them returning down the valley on the trail. Therefore, they must - have made a wide detour. - - Again, when they discovered us we were probably in bivouac and, at - all events, an ordinary day’s march distant from the village. The - time of warning, I think, could be safely conjectured as the time of - arrival of the few warriors that came out to meet the advance and - attack Reno. All those warriors that had their ponies handy, I - believe, were assembled at once to come out and meet the troops. The - rapid advance didn’t give the Indians a chance to collect their - belongings and mature any plans to escape; otherwise I believe the - expected “scattering” would have taken place. And in just so much - was the attack a “surprise.” - - That General Custer deliberately disobeyed Terry’s orders I do not - believe. Custer was intensely in earnest and fully determined to - find the Indians and, when found, to attack them, even if it took - him back to the agencies. Suppose Custer had asked Terry “If I find - these Indians shall I attack, or wait for you?” Undoubtedly Terry - would have replied “Attack!” He was too good a soldier not to - appreciate opportunity, but he was not enough of a cavalryman or - Indian fighter to appreciate the flash-like opportunities for - hitting the Indians on the broad prairies. - - Custer was what in these modern days is styled a “strenuous” man. - Terry was not. He was the personification of gentleness and - deliberateness. And besides, Terry’s instructions _gave the - necessary latitude_. He told Custer what he thought should be done - but, after all, left it to Custer’s judgment and discretion when so - nearly in contact with the enemy.[124] If Custer had passed on south - and the Indians had escaped, or had gone forth and attacked him, as - they had Crook, and defeated him, would these instructions have - shielded him? Not much. He would have been damned as cordially for - the failure of the expedition as he is now, by those same men, for - courting disaster. I have no doubt in my mind, that if Custer had - passed south even one more day, the Indians would have attacked us - as they had General Crook, and upon almost the same ground, just one - week before.[125] - - Terry says, in his instructions, “He will indicate to you his own - views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should - conform to them unless _you should see sufficient reason for - departing from them_.”[126] Custer was an experienced war soldier, a - thorough cavalryman, and an experienced Indian campaigner. So why - not give him the benefit of “sufficient reason”? Were Terry’s - instructions “definite and explicit”? Terry himself says in his - order that “definite instructions” were “impossible.” - - There was not an officer or soldier of the Seventh Cavalry but that - expected a fight when we were preparing to leave the mouth of the - Rosebud. Where the fight would take place we knew not, but I venture - to say that never was there a thought that the Indians would take a - position and wait there for us to go through a lot of manœuvers. - Reno’s scout had not brought any _definite_ information. I find my - notes (June 20th) say that it was generally thought the trail, when - they left it, was about _three weeks old_ and the indications showed - perhaps three hundred and fifty lodges. I don’t think General Terry - had any later information than Reno’s scout on which to guess the - location of the Indians on the Little Big Horn. General Custer’s - statement that he would follow the trail until he found the Indians, - even if it took us to the agencies on the Missouri or in Nebraska, - does not indicate that he expected them to wait in position on the - Little Big Horn or elsewhere. This statement was made after it had - been decided that we should go over the trail, June 21st, but - probably before the general instructions had been made out. - - As it turned out I think Custer did make a mistake in going in with - a divided force, not that the division of itself would have been - fatal, but because Reno failed to hold a leg even if he couldn’t - skin. - - If Custer had followed Reno the latter, in my opinion, would never - have dared to halt, or even hesitate, in his attack. If Reno had - even held to the bottom, the overwhelming forces would have been - divided. There was nothing in Reno’s past career that would indicate - confidence should not be placed in his courage. Custer could not - have anticipated a faint-hearted attack or that Reno would get - stampeded. - - I believe that Reno was dismayed when he saw the showing in front of - him, and when he failed to see the “support” promised, I think he - lost his nerve, and then when his Ree scouts stampeded and he found - his force being surrounded in the bottom, I believe he abandoned - himself to his fears, then stampeded to the hills and lost his - reason, throwing away his ivory handled pistols. If Reno had held to - the bottom, Custer’s left flank (Keogh and Calhoun) would not have - been so quickly overwhelmed (for the Indians leaving Reno made that - envelopment), and it is reasonable to suppose Custer would have had - a better show to withdraw and rejoin other forces. - - If Custer had followed up Reno he would have taken matters in his - own hands, held and concentrated his men in such manner as to - control the situation until Benteen and the packs came up. The - Indians, as a rule, will not stand punishment unless cornered. I - went over the ground in the bottom where Reno was when he concluded - to go to the hills, and I believe he could have held the position. I - talked the matter over with General Gibbon and he practically agreed - with me. I know many others think otherwise, including some who were - in that part of the fight. - - I have doubts about the saving of Custer if Reno had advanced after - the packs joined us, for I think the fight was practically over - then. To have advanced before then might possibly have done - something in favor of Custer, but probably not. I am of the opinion - that part of the fight was settled quickly. Custer’s battalion had - practically no shelter and no time to make any. While a good many - horses were killed, I fear that most of those getting away carried - their reserve ammunition, and it didn’t take long to get away with - fifty rounds in a fight. With a different commander than Reno we - might have created a diversion by advancing as soon as the - ammunition packs came up, which was some little time before - McDougall arrived with all the packs. Reno was apparently too busy - waiting for further orders from Custer to take any initiative. Weir - asked permission to take his troop to reconnoiter in the direction - of the firing on Custer, and Reno would not give it. Weir started on - his own hook, and Edgerly (Weir’s Lieutenant) supposing permission - had been given for the troop, followed Weir with the troop. I think - Reno subsequently tried to make it appear that this advance of Weir - was by authority. I don’t think Reno was drunk, for I don’t believe - there was enough whiskey in the command to make a “drunk.”[127] - - At the Reno Court of Inquiry I was asked if I thought Reno had done - all he could as a commanding officer, and I replied “No.” That was - about the effect of the question and answer. The testimony and - proceedings were reported in full in the Chicago _Times_. The New - York _Herald_ had an able correspondent, Mr. Kelly, that joined our - forces on the Yellowstone in July or August, and wrote, giving all - the information he could gather from all sources that pervaded the - command, that he could _get at_. There were a “whole lot” of - correspondents in the field after the fight, but Mr. Kelly was - considered one of the ablest. Being in the field till September - 26th, we saw but few newspapers from the east. - - E. S. GODFREY. - -On the receipt of this memoranda I sent Colonel Godfrey all the papers -printed above, and asked him further to discuss these papers. They were -returned to me with the following letter, accompanied by these -additional notes: - - Headquarters, Ninth United States Cavalry, - Fort Walla Walla, Washington, - February 12th, 1904. - - My Dear Doctor: - - I return to-day the letters sent to me by registered mail. I am very - sorry to have kept them so long from you, but I have been suffering - from a sprained knee which has laid me up, and have been otherwise - under the weather. - - I feel that I have not in my memoranda done justice to the subject. - It is largely one of sentiment, and the best rule is to put yourself - in his place and act under the lights then exposed to view. That - Custer may have been actuated by other motives I do not doubt. The - main question to me was whether he was justified from a military - point, in a campaign against Indians, in his conduct of the march - and battle. - - If we could have foreseen as we now look back and see! - - Sincerely yours, - E. S. GODFREY. - - - ADDITIONAL NOTES BY COLONEL GODFREY. - -The statement of General Sheridan, quoted by Hughes, was made in his -annual report for 1876, and of course from data furnished by General -Terry. It is but natural that he should reflect more or less the views -of Terry. He could have had only the newspaper and other unofficial -accounts. Of course I recognize that “unofficial accounts” very often -give more _inside_ information than the official report. - -A word as to that affidavit. I don’t know anything about it and am ready -to take Hughes’ say-so as to what _officers_ were present, but I suggest -a possible solution: When Custer dismounted he had his orderly and -generally his flags with him; naturally the orderly would be somewhat -retired, and when Custer went to mount his horse, Terry may have gone -aside to accompany him and spoken the caution to him in a subdued voice -so that Gibbon would not have heard him, but the orderly might have -heard.[128] - -In going over a lot of letters relating to the campaign, etc., I find -one from General J. S. Brisbin (now dead), then Major, commanding Second -Cavalry Battalion. It is dated January 1st, 1892, just two weeks before -his death. In it he is very bitter against Custer. He says that Custer -disobeyed: - -“If not in letter, then in spirit, and I think and have ever thought, in -letter as well as spirit. Terry intended, if he intended anything, that -we should be in the battle with you. I was on the boat, steamer Far -West, Captain Grant Marsh, the night of the 21st, when the conference -took place between Gibbon, Custer and Terry, to which you refer, and I -heard what passed. Terry had a map and Custer’s line of march up the -Rosebud was blocked out on it by pins stuck in the table through the -paper. Terry showed Custer his line of march and, being somewhat -near-sighted as you know, Terry asked me to mark the line, and I did so -with a blue pencil. Custer turned off that line of march from the -Rosebud, just twenty miles _short_ of the end of the pins and blue -line.” - -Just how much dependence can be placed on Brisbin’s statements I don’t -know. He may have been present at this conference, but Hughes makes no -mention of him; in fact, entirely ignores him and may have forgotten -him. I will make another quotation from Brisbin: - -“I read the order you print as being the one given by Terry to Custer -for this march. If that is the order Custer got it is not the order -copied in Terry’s books at Department Headquarters. You will remember -that after Custer fell Terry appointed me chief of cavalry. I looked -over all the papers affecting the march and battle of Little Big Horn -and took a copy of the order sending you up the Rosebud. The order now -lies before me and it says ‘you should proceed up the Rosebud until you -ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of -leads (Terry had already referred to the trail Reno followed). Should it -be found, as it appears almost certain that it should be found, to turn -toward the Little Big Horn, he thinks (that is, the Department Commander -thinks) that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the -headwaters of the Tongue River, and _then_ (‘then’ underscored in order) -turn _toward Little_ Big Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your -left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to -the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. It is desired -that you conform as nearly as possible to those instructions and that -you do not depart from them unless you shall see absolute necessity for -doing so.’” - -That part of the quotation from “It is desired” to “necessity for doing -so,” is omitted in the order as printed in the report of General Terry. -Not having seen the original order I cannot vouch for either being the -true copy, but the omission looks peculiar to say the least, if omission -there was.[129] - -I do not know that I can add very much to what I have already sent to -you on the question of disobedience. Here is a commander who has had -experience in war, civilized and Indian, sent in command of his regiment -against an unnumbered foe, located we know not where (although well -conjectured in the instructions, as it turned out); given instructions -to _preclude their_ escape; to coöperate with another column separated -from fifty to one hundred miles, having infantry and artillery, marching -over a rough, untried country. Now if that commander thought that to go -on farther south before he had located the foe (when he was on the -trail) was to leave an opening and an almost certainty of their escape, -if they wanted to do so, is it reasonable to expect him to leave the -trail and go on “in the air”? The commander who gives him his -instructions cannot be communicated with. Is this isolated commander not -allowed to act on his own responsibility, if he thinks he cannot -_preclude_ the escape by leaving the very trail that will locate the -enemy? - -Hughes in his article, and the official reports, make it appear that we -were at or near the “Crow’s Nest” at daylight and crossed the divide at -eight A.M. The scouts were at the “Crow’s Nest,” but at eight A.M. we -took up the march to near the divide and “Crow’s Nest,” arriving at ten -o’clock, A.M.; that is, we were in the Rosebud Valley, one mile from the -divide. We did not cross the divide till nearly noon. Hughes seems to -pooh-pooh the idea that we were not to attack till the morning of the -26th. We had Custer’s own statement as to that. He said so himself when -he called the officers together on the night of June 24th and again -reiterated the statement before crossing the divide. - -During the second or third day (23rd or 24th) up the Rosebud, several -times we thought we (I mean some of us) saw smoke in the direction of -the Tullock, and finally we spoke of it to the General (Custer) at one -of the halts. He said it could not be, that he had scouts over on that -side and they most certainly would have seen any such “signs” and report -to him, and he reiterated that there were scouts out looking toward -Tullock’s Valley. After this assurance we made it a point to watch this -“smoke business” and we discovered the illusion was due to fleecy clouds -on the horizon and the mirage, or heated air, rising from the hills on -that side. The air was full of dust from our marching columns, which -helped the illusion. - -With reference to my slip that “about eighteen hundred had gone _from -one agency_ alone.” I took that from my diary, as I had been informed by -some one who got the information from Department Headquarters. I had -never seen the despatch and put down the item as it came to me. It was a -matter of common report in the camp. - -Another point occurs to me: “For Custer to be in coöperating distance on -the only line of retreat if the Indians should run away.” (Hughes’ -magazine article, page 36.) Hughes intimates that there was only one -line of retreat, presumably up the valley of the Little Big Horn. The -Indians certainly could have retreated over their traveled route, or -could have cut across the headwaters of the Tullock for the Yellowstone -had Custer gone south. Hughes seems to forget that an almost impassably -rough country—the Wolf Mountains—would lie between Custer and those -lines of retreat. Yet he would insist that it was good generalship to -leave these routes open to close up one other. The Indians were in light -marching order and could travel faster than Gibbon over the Tullock -Divide, and there would have been a long-distance, “tail-end” pursuit -for Custer when he descended the Little Big Horn (by following the -“plan”) and found the enemy had escaped over the very trail he had left -behind him, or had struck for the Yellowstone, passing Gibbon’s left. - -It has been the criticism almost ever since Indian fighting began that -commanders were too prone to follow some strategic theory and fail to -bring the Indians to battle—give them a chance to escape. It was -Custer’s practice to take the trail and follow it, locate the enemy and -then strike home by a surprise attack. Custer knew the ridicule and -contempt heaped on commanders who had failed to strike when near the -enemy; or who had given the enemy opportunity to escape when nearly in -contact with them. Whatever may be the academic discussions as to his -disobedience, I hold that he was justified by sound military judgment in -making his line of march on the trail.[130] - - - IV. - -General Hughes and Colonel Godfrey may be considered fairly enough as -representatives of the opposing views on the question. I thought it -would be well to have the papers discussed by an officer who might be -considered as taking an impartial view of the matter. I therefore sent -them to Brigadier-General Charles A. Woodruff, U. S. A. (retired), and -his review of the whole question is as follows: - - 103 Market Street, - San Francisco, May 3, 1904. - - My Dear Dr. Brady: - - I have read with a great deal of pleasure, your three articles on - “War with the Sioux,” and I have taken the liberty of making various - marginal notes and corrections on the manuscript. I have also read - the letters from General Miles, Professor Andrews, General Hughes, - and Colonel Godfrey. - - General Miles, in his letter of November 20, 1903, dismisses the - matter very curtly. He says “Custer did not disobey orders,” and he - states as military dictum that, in sending General Custer - seventy-five or one hundred miles away, Terry could not indicate - what Custer should do, and that, practically, Custer was not under - any obligations to execute Terry’s orders, even when he found - conditions as Terry had expected and indicated.[131] - - The order states explicitly “Should it—the trail up the Rosebud—be - found (as it appears almost certain it will be found) to turn toward - the Little Big Horn, then you should still proceed southward.” Now, - when he found that it turned toward the Little Big Horn, instead of - going south or stopping where he was and scouting south or southwest - and west and try to locate the village, or examining Tullock Creek, - or sending scouts to Gibbon, he made that fatal night march with the - deliberate intention of trying to locate and strike the village - before Gibbon could possibly get up. - - Gibbon says (page 473, Vol. I., Report of the Secretary of War for - 1876), “The Department Commander (Terry) strongly impressed upon him - (Custer) the propriety of not pressing his march too rapidly.” - Whether Custer’s written instructions were based upon a “guess” of - the actual condition, as Colonel Godfrey suggests, or had no - “military merit,” as General Miles states, the facts remain: First: - That they were based upon a “foresight” as good as the present - “hindsight,” which is often not the case. Second: That Custer - accepted them without demur. Third: No further information was - gained to suggest a modification, or, to use the words of the - letter: “unless you see sufficient reason for departing from them.” - On the contrary, the supposed turn of the trail was found to be an - actual fact. - - Therefore, Custer did not obey his written instructions, in letter - or spirit, and had no proper military justification for not doing - so, unless General Terry afterwards told him, “Use your own judgment - and do what you think best,” which, in my opinion, would have made - the instructions advisory rather than positive orders. If these - facts (I ignore the unproduced affidavit) do not constitute - disobedience of orders, I do not see how it is possible for the - charge of disobedience of orders to hold against any man, under any - circumstances, when away from his superior. - - Here is a trifling sidelight on the matter. On the night of June - 23d, General Gibbon, in reply to an optimistic remark of mine, told - me in effect, “I am satisfied that if Custer can prevent it we will - not get into the fight.” The meaning I gathered was that Gibbon - thought that Custer was so eager to retrieve the good opinion that - he might have lost owing to his controversy over post traderships, - that he would strike when and where he could. - - While Terry, with Gibbon’s command, was camped at Tullock’s Creek, - Saturday night and Sunday morning, June 24th and 25th, he was - looking for a message from Custer very anxiously, so I was told at - the time. - - Colonel Godfrey speaks of the odium Terry’s family seemed to think - was “heaped upon him for the failure to push forward on the - information they had on June 25th and 26th.” Now let me say a few - words with reference to that. - - The smoke that is spoken of as having been seen by Terry’s - command—and I saw it myself—was on the afternoon of June 25th. It - was occasioned, I understood, by attempts to drive some of Reno’s - stragglers out of the brush, and must have been somewhere from two - to four o’clock in the afternoon. Now let me quote from a telegram - of General Terry, dated June 27, and found on page 463, Vol. I., - Report of the Secretary of War of 1876, to show that Gibbon’s - command did not linger by the wayside: - - “Starting soon after five o’clock in the morning of the 25th, the - infantry made a march of twenty-two miles over the most difficult - country which I have ever seen. In order that the scouts might be - sent into the valley of the Little Big Horn, the cavalry, with the - battery, was then pushed on thirteen or fourteen miles farther, - reaching camp at midnight. The scouts were sent out at half-past - four in the morning of the 26th. They soon discovered three Indians, - who were at first supposed to be Sioux; but, when overtaken, they - proved to be Crows, who had been with General Custer. They brought - the first intelligence of the battle. Their story was not credited. - It was supposed that some fighting, perhaps severe fighting, had - taken place; but it was not believed that disaster could have - overtaken so large a force as twelve companies of cavalry. The - infantry, which had broken camp very early, soon came up, and the - whole column entered and moved up the valley of the Little Big - Horn.” - - I want to say that the infantry broke camp about four o’clock on the - morning of the 26th. It had rained that preceding night and the lash - ropes of the packs were soaked with water and, as we moved, they - stretched continuously and we were stopping constantly to replace - the packs, and besides that, mind you, traveling in adobe mud was - very trying. I continue the quotation as follows: - - “During the afternoon efforts were made to send scouts through to - what was supposed to be General Custer’s position, to obtain - information of the condition of affairs; but those who were sent out - were driven back by parties of Indians, who, in increasing numbers, - were seen hovering in General Gibbon’s front. At twenty minutes - before nine o’clock in the evening, the infantry had marched between - twenty-nine and thirty miles. The men were very weary and daylight - was fading. The column was therefore halted for the night, at a - point about eleven miles in a straight line from the mouth of the - stream. This morning the movement was resumed, and, after a march of - nine miles, Major Reno’s intrenched position was reached.” - - It was the general opinion from indications found next day just - beyond where we halted for the night, that had we proceeded five - hundred yards more, we would have been in the midst of a night - attack from the Sioux Indians, who came to meet us as a means of - guarding their fleeing village. - - In reference to the number of Indians, the same telegram of General - Terry’s says: “Major Reno and Captain Benteen, both of whom are - officers of great experience, accustomed to seeing large masses of - mounted men, estimate the number of Indians engaged at not less than - twenty-four hundred. Other officers think that the number was - greater than this. The village in the valley was about three miles - in length and about a mile in width. Besides the lodges proper, a - great number of temporary brushwood shelters were found in it, - indicating that many men, besides its proper inhabitants, had - gathered together there.” - - I am under the impression now that we counted positions occupied by - twelve hundred lodges. - - I coincide with your view that had Reno proceeded in his attack, - with the audacity that should characterize, and usually does - characterize, a cavalry charge, there would have been a different - story to tell; perhaps as many men would have been killed, but they - would have been divided among at least eight, if not eleven, troops - of cavalry rather than concentrated in five, which meant - annihilation for those. - - I have been told, or was told at the time, that it was thought that - about sixty lodges were a few miles up the Little Big Horn above the - main village, and that, in the early morning, when Custer’s - proximity was discovered, that this small village, knowing that they - were but a mouthful for Custer’s command, hurriedly packed up and - dashed down the valley. It can readily be understood that sixty - lodges, with the horses and paraphernalia, moving rapidly down the - valley, might well create the impression that a very large force was - in retreat. - - Now, if the Indian village was in retreat, Custer’s division of his - forces was not altogether bad. One command to hurry them up and - continue the stampede, his main force to attack them in the right - flank if they turned that way, which was most probable, Benteen’s to - attack them if they turned to the left, which was possible but not - as probable. - - Unfortunately for Custer they were not fleeing. Colonel Godfrey - rather dwells upon the fact that Custer had to attack these Indians - or they would have gotten away from him. The fact is, as I have - stated above, when he left the Rosebud he did not know where they - were, had not located them, was not in visual contact even with - them, and a glance at the map will show that, standing on the - Rosebud, where the trail left it to go over to the Little Big Horn, - Custer was in the best possible position for intercepting these - Indians on three of their four lines of retreat. For having passed - into the Little Big Horn Valley, there were only four practicable - routes of flight for the Indians, north, toward Gibbon, or east, - northeast, or southeast. From the point where he left the Rosebud, - Custer was in a position to strike either one of the three last - lines of flight, whereas, if, after making the forced night march - with his fatigued animals, he had struck the Little Big Horn, and a - reconnaissance had shown that the village had left the Little Big - Horn, going northeast, on the 24th of June, he would have been two - days’ march behind them. - - Had he sent a scout, on the night of the 24th, to Gibbon, whose - exact whereabouts was almost known to him, that scout would have - reached Terry or Gibbon, on Tullock’s Fork, a few miles from the - Yellowstone, on the morning of Sunday, and by Sunday night Gibbon’s - command would have been within less than ten miles of what is - designated as Custer Peak, the hill on which Custer perished. Then, - with Custer moving on the morning of the 26th, Gibbon’s infantry and - Gatling guns could have forced those Sioux out of the village on to - the open ground, extending from the Little Big Horn to the Big Horn, - and Custer’s twelve troops of cavalry and Gibbon’s four, sixteen - troops in all, between them would have made the biggest killing of - Indians who needed killing ever made on the American continent since - Cortez invaded Mexico. While this is a speculation, and an idle one, - it is to my mind a rather interesting one. - - I think myself that General Hughes makes out his case in reference - to that affidavit that General Miles has so carefully treasured for - so many years. It would be a very interesting historical document, - but it would have been more satisfactory if it had been produced - while Terry or General Gibbon or both were alive. I doubt very much - whether Major Brisbin’s supposed copy of the order book at Terry’s - headquarters was compared with the original after Brisbin had made - it. - - I regret to say that my paper upon this campaign was lost, and I - have not even the notes from which it was written. I found one brief - page, which I quote merely as indication of my reasons for believing - that there were more than two thousand Indian warriors in the battle - of June 25th: “Before May 10th of ’77 more than one thousand - warriors came in and surrendered, not including the warriors killed - in that battle or the half dozen other engagements, nor the - individual warriors by the hundreds that sneaked back to the - agencies and those who went to British America under Sitting Bull, - numbering, it was understood, over two thousand warriors.” - - I do not think you are too severe upon Major Reno. I conversed with - most of the officers of that command at one time or another, while - in the field, and nearly all were very pronounced in their severe - criticism of Reno. The testimony at the Reno court of inquiry was - less severe than the sentiments expressed within a few days, weeks, - and months after the occurrence. That was perhaps natural. It is - barely possible that some of it was due to the fact that Captain - Weir, one of General Custer’s most pronounced friends and one of - Major Reno’s most bitter critics, died before the court of inquiry - met. - - I do not think that Sturgis, Porter, etc., were captured and - tortured. I found most of the lining of Porter’s coat in the camp, - which showed that the bullet that struck him must have broken the - back and passed in or out at the navel. My theory has been, with - reference to those whose bodies could not be found, that most of - them made a dash into the Bad Lands in the direction of the mouth of - the Rosebud, where they had last seen General Gibbon’s command. It - would have been easy for them to have perished from thirst in the - condition they were in, and if they reached the Yellowstone and - undertook to swim it, the chances were decidedly against their - succeeding. - - Very sincerely, - C. A. WOODRUFF, - Brigadier-General, United States Army, Retired. - - - V. - -So soon as this appendix as above was in type, I sent printed proofs of -it to Generals Hughes, Woodruff, and Carrington, and to Colonel Godfrey -for final revision and correction before the matter was plated. In -returning the proof, General Carrington and Colonel Godfrey both add -further communications, which I insert below. - -I also sent the same proof to Mrs. Elizabeth B. Custer, widow of General -Custer, and to Mrs. John H. Maugham, his sister, with an expression of -my willingness—nay, my earnest desire—to print any comment they or -either of them might wish to make upon the question under discussion. - -At Mrs. Custer’s request I sent the appendix to Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob -L. Greene, U. S. V., now president of the Connecticut Mutual Life -Insurance Company, who was Custer’s adjutant-general during the war and -his life-long friend thereafter. His able defense of his old commander -is printed as the last of this interesting series of historic documents. - -Desiring that Custer, through his friends, may have the final word, I -print it without comment, save to say that I fully join Colonel Greene -in his admiration for the many brilliant qualities and achievements of -his old commander. - - - GENERAL CARRINGTON’S LETTER - - Hyde Park, Mass., Sept. 25, 1904. - - Dear Dr. Brady: - - I appreciate the favor of reading the proof-sheets of the appendix - to your papers upon the Custer massacre. When it occurred I was - greatly shocked by an event so similar in its horrors to that of the - Phil Kearney massacre, in 1866. A previous interview with General - Custer came to mind, and I attended the sessions of the court of - inquiry at Chicago, taking with me, for reference, a map which I had - carefully prepared of that country, with the assistance of James - Bridger, my chief guide, and his associates. - - The evidence indicated that when Custer reached the “Little Big - Horn” (so known upon that map) and sent Benteen up stream, with - orders that, “if he saw any Indians, to give them hell,” ordering - Reno to follow the trail across the river and move down toward the - Indian camps, while he moved down the right bank, detaching himself - from the other commands, he practically cut the Indians off from - retreat to the mountains, which was part of his special mission; - but, in the flush of immediate battle, lost thought of the combined - movement from the Big Horn, which had for its purpose the - destruction of the entire Indian force by overwhelming and - concentrated numbers. - - Indeed, the court of inquiry did not so much discredit the conduct - of Reno as reveal the fact that he faced a vastly superior force - with no assurance that he could have immediate support from the - other battalions, so vital in a sudden collision with desperate and - hard-pressed enemies. The succeeding fight, on the defensive, - protracted as it was, with no information of Custer’s position, or - possible support from him, was a grave commentary upon the whole - affair. - - The interview with General Custer referred to was in 1876, when, - upon leaving the lecture platform of the Historical Society in New - York, he made the remark, on our way to his hotel, “It will take - another Phil Kearney massacre to bring Congress up to a generous - support of the army.” We spent several hours together, while he - discussed his troubles with the authorities at Washington. He - recalled the events of 1867, and felt that General Sherman had - severely judged his operations on the Republican, but that the time - was near when he might have an opportunity to vindicate himself, and - that, “if he again had a chance he would accomplish it or die in the - attempt.” He was practically on a leave of absence, and its - extension was not his choice. Colonel Smith was sick, and he claimed - the right to command his regiment, since it had been ordered to - report as part of General Terry’s command. - - The famous sutlership scandal was fully discussed, and here there - has been confusion as to Custer’s position. He had nothing to do - with the popular complaint that Belknap was farming out sutlerships - for personal emolument. Neither is it technically correct that the - Secretary of War could make original appointments of the kind - complained of. Post commanders, with their councils of officers, had - both the selection of their sutler, and fixed the prices of articles - to be sold. The Secretary simply issued the appointment thus - designated, unless for good reasons declined, thereby requiring - another selection by the officers. In cases of troops in campaign, - or detached, or on distant service, the commanding General confirmed - the officer’s choice. Custer’s position was manly, legal, and just; - but his assertion of this right, so far as made, offended Belknap, - at the expense of officers whose rights were overruled by - non-military influence. - - Custer was _not under charges_ that would militate against his - assignment to the rightful command of his regiment when ordered into - field service. I did not hesitate to urge him to press his claim, - but could not entertain the idea that he would go to Bismarck, or - otherwise to make his claim in person, except through Washington - Headquarters. - - If ever a man had an incentive to dare odds with his regiment, this - fearless fighter and rider, whose spirit reached the verge of frenzy - in battle, was the man for the occasion. - - Through all the papers cited by you, there runs the same subtle - suggestion that he who, as an independent commander of aggressive - cavalry in the Civil War, was almost expected to take into the field - a large discretion as to his actions (whereby he had formerly - achieved success) when confronted by the enemy, within striking - distance in the Little Big Horn Valley, lost all sense of danger and - all thought of prescribed details of action in the confidence that, - somehow, the old Seventh could not be whipped by any savage force - whatsoever! - - I have always regarded Terry’s general plan as well conceived, for - Reno’s prior scouting had almost assured the inevitable course of - the Indian trail westward, and events confirmed Terry’s judgment. - General Hughes had served upon Terry’s staff during the Civil War - with credit, as well as captain in the 18th Infantry on the - frontier, and his assurances that General Terry fully explained to - Custer the reasons why Washington authorities distrusted his - discretion and was more precise in giving him this detached command, - cannot be impeached by an asserted affidavit that whispered hints, - unheard by officers by his side, allowed him to be his own master in - a matter where a combined movement of three commands was the prime - factor in complete success. - - Neither is there any doubt whatever that Custer’s earnest plea, that - he be trusted to fulfil the exact duties assigned to his command, - secured not only the sympathy and confidence of Terry in his behalf, - but that on that condition only did the Washington authorities - authorize General Terry to vacate the order for his arrest because - of going to his command without orders. - - As already stated, Custer’s confidence in the Seventh Cavalry was - well deserved. It, with him, was a veritable thunderbolt in action; - but it was not omnipotent. That over-confidence which dissolved its - unity at the supreme crisis was fatal. Even then, a realized success - of which Custer had no doubt, would have minimized the rashness of - his dash and have largely condoned his fault. - - Yours sincerely, - HENRY B. CARRINGTON. - - - COLONEL GODFREY’S FINAL REMARKS - -I have no desire to pose as the special champion of General Custer, and -it is still further from my desire to pose as inimical to General Terry. -My only purpose is to demonstrate the truth, not only for this -discussion, but for history. - -This subject surely has gotten to the stage of academic discussion. I am -not willing to admit that the phrase “he desires that you should conform -to them (his views) unless,” etc., conveys a direct, positive command -which could not be more explicit. Nor do I admit that orders given by a -commander, in which he uses the words “desires,” “wishes,” and -equivalents, convey _positive_ commands under all circumstances. In -personal or social matters, such words convey the idea of what is wanted -and what is expected; and in such matters the expressed wishes and -desires are usually conveyed to personal friends, who loyally conform -thereto, if not in letter, in spirit and in results. In such relations a -commander does not want to use language that would appear dogmatic. I -further admit that in personally giving orders a commander may -accentuate the expression of his desires, wishes, etc., so as to leave -no doubt about his intentions, and to convey positiveness thus expressed -to his commands. When a commander gives written orders through official -channels, the words “commands,” “orders,” and “directs,” or the use of -the imperative, leave little ambiguity or doubt as to what is ordered or -intended. - -Developments subsequent to the campaign or battle leave little doubt -that General Terry had about him men or influences that were suspicious, -inimical, or hostile to General Custer. I sincerely believe General -Terry was too high minded knowingly to allow himself to be influenced by -any sinister motive. - -That the “instructions” give rise to this discussion shows they were -vague. Was this vagueness intentional? General Terry was a lawyer. He -was a soldier. As lawyer and soldier his trained mind should have -weighed the words embodied in these instructions. Now read them: “It is -of course _impossible_[132] to give you any _definite instructions_ in -regard to this movement, and were it not _impossible_ to do so, the -Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, -and ability _to wish to impose upon you precise orders_ which might -hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy,” and then goes -on to indicate what he thinks should be done; or, in other words, -indicates what he (Terry) himself would do if he found conditions as -expressed. Custer evidently saw “sufficient reasons for departing from -them” and did what a reasonable interpretation of the instructions -contemplated, _made his own plans_.[132] I interpret the phrase “when so -nearly in contact with the enemy” to refer to the immediate time or -place (June 21, mouth of Rosebud) of writing it.[133] - -As to the location of the Indians. Terry believed they were on the -Little Big Horn;—we found them on that river about 15 miles above its -forks with the Big Horn. Had the village been at the forks, the attack -would have been delivered on the 25th of June, as the village would not -have been located by Custer from the divide. It is possible the two -columns might have joined in the attack. Now, suppose the village had -been located 50 or 60 miles farther south, it would have still been -within Terry’s guess, but it would have been a far cry to Gibbons’ -column which, under the instructions, would have remained at the forks. -It must be remembered that Custer would have had the Wolf Mountains -(Rosebud Mountains on later maps) between him and the Little Big Horn -had he ignored the trail and gone on southward up the Rosebud, as -Custer’s critics would have us believe were the intentions of the -instructions. - -General Woodruff would have him stop at the camp of June 24 and scout to -locate the village, etc. Would that have complied with Woodruff’s -interpretation of the instructions? And from that position he says: -“Custer was in a position to strike either one of the three last lines -of flight (east, northeast or southeast), whereas if, after making the -_forced_[134] night march with his fatigued animals, he had struck the -Little Big Horn, and a reconnaissance had shown that the village had -left the Little Big Horn going northeast, on June 24 he would have been -two days’ march behind them.” That “forced” night march was about eight -miles, and every mile made was in the direction to place us in the best -position to intercept any flight to the northeast and east. Instead of -being two days behind them, we would have met them almost “head on.” - -Of what practical use to send scouts through to Gibbon June 24? - -There was no fresh or new positive information to send to him; Terry had -“guessed” it all. - -Now let us repeat the marches made: June 22, twelve miles; June 23, -thirty-three miles; June 24, twenty-eight miles; June 25, eight miles to -the bivouac; and ten miles to the divide, and then say fifteen miles to -the village. That is to say, ninety-one miles up to noon June 25, when -it was decided to attack, and one hundred and six miles in all four -days. That doesn’t indicate that we made _forced_ marches. - -Woodruff further states that “he made that fatal night march with the -_deliberate_(?) intention of trying to locate and strike the village -before Gibbon could possibly get up.” I say that statement is -deliberately unfair, and contradicts the twice-told statement by Custer, -that he did not intend to attack the village until the 26th, once before -he knew the location of the village, the night of the 24th, and again -when he called the officers together after the discovery at the divide. - -Reno’s position in the bottom, in the old river bed, was sheltered from -fire from the hills by heavy timber, and was nearly a mile from the -hills. I have never before heard that he was fired upon from those -hills; but he was fired upon from the woods on the opposite side of the -river. General Gibbon and I both thought the hills were too far away to -give any effective fire. It must be remembered that the river bottom was -heavily timbered for some distance above and below this position. This -timber subsequently was cut for the construction of Fort Custer. - - - LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GREENE’S DEFENSE OF CUSTER - - Hartford, Conn., September 1, 1904. - - My Dear Sir: - - I have read with great interest your discussion of the question of - General Custer’s alleged disobedience of orders, both in the - narrative of the Battle on the Little Big Horn and in the appendix - to the volume, and upon which you have asked my comment. - - For whatever bearing it may have upon the propriety of any comment - of mine, let me say that General Custer was my intimate friend, and - that his first act after receiving his appointment in the Civil War - as a brigadier-general was to secure my appointment and detail to - him as adjutant-general, which relation I held until his muster out - of the volunteer service in 1866. I think no one knows better his - quality as a soldier and as a man. I know his virtues and his - defects, which were the defects of his virtues. He was a born - soldier, and specifically a born cavalry man. The true end of - warfare was to him not only a professional theory—it was an - instinct. When he was set to destroy an enemy, he laid his hand on - him as soon as possible, and never took it off. He knew the whole - art of war. But its arts and its instruments and their correct - professional handling were not in his eyes the end all of a - soldier’s career, to be satisfied with a technical performance. They - were the means and the tools in the terms of which and by the use of - which his distinct military genius apprehended and solved its - practical and fateful problems. When he grappled his task it was to - do it, not to go correctly through the proper motions to their - technical limit, and then hold himself excused. - - He was remarkable for his keenness and accuracy in observation, for - his swift divination of the military significance of every element - of a situation, for his ability to make an instant and sound - decision, and then, for the instant, exhaustless energy with which - he everlastingly drove home his attack. And the swiftness and - relentless power of his stroke were great elements in the - correctness of his decisions as well as in the success of his - operations. He was wise and safe in undertaking that in which a man - slower in observation, insight and decision, and slower and less - insistent in action, would have judged wrongly and failed. - - I knew Custer as a soldier when he was a brigade and division - commander under Pleasanton and Sheridan, the successive commanders - of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Those who knew the - estimate in which those great commanders held him—the tasks they - committed to his soldierly intelligence and comprehension, his - fidelity and skill—need no reminder that in nothing of all their - dependence upon and confidence in him did he ever fail in letter or - spirit. I know how absolutely loyal he was under the conflicting - conditions which sometimes confront every subordinate charged with - grave responsibilities, and which test the sense of duty to the - utmost. He was true as steel. He was depended upon for great things - because he was dependable. - - In temperament he was sanguine and ardent. He loved his friends; he - was impatient of every form of inefficiency and of pretense; he did - not highly esteem mere professionalism; he was impulsive and - sometimes abrupt in manner, but kind of heart; he was sensitive only - to unjust criticism; he despised intrigue, chicane and all meanness; - he was independent in opinion and judgment, and frank in their - expression; he was open in opposition, and fair to an enemy. - - And it goes without saying that such a man had enemies—men who were - envious of his abilities, his achievements and his fame; men whom he - never sought to placate, and who sought envy’s balm in detraction - and hatred; men who could not measure him or be fair to him, but men - who in a pinch would have turned to him with unhesitating trust, - whether in his ability or his soldierly faith. - - Did this man, this soldier, whose service throughout the Civil War - and a long career of frontier warfare was for eighteen years - unequaled for efficiency and brilliancy within the range of its - opportunities and responsibilities, who never failed his commanders, - who never disobeyed an order, nor disappointed an expectation, nor - deceived a friend—did this man, at the last, deny his whole life - history, his whole mental and moral habit, his whole character, and - wilfully disobey an understood order, or fail of its right execution - according to his best judgment, within the limits of his ability - under the conditions of the event; and, what is worse—and this is - what his detractors charge—did he not only disobey, but did he from - the inception of the enterprise plan to disobey—to deceive his - commander who trusted him, in order that he might get the - opportunity to disobey? - - To any man who knew Custer, except those who for any reason hold a - brief against him, not only is the charge of premeditated, - deliberate disobedience absurd, but it is a foul outrage on one of - the memories that will never fail of inspiration while an American - army carries and defends an American flag. - - In one of Mrs. Custer’s letters to me, narrating what took place - during the days of preparation for the General’s departure, she - wrote: - - “A day before the expedition started, General Terry was in our house - alone with Autie (the General’s pet name). A.’s thoughts were calm, - deliberate, and solemn. He had been terribly hurt in Washington. - General Terry had applied for him to command the expedition. He was - returned to his regiment because General Terry had applied for him. - I know that he (Custer) felt tenderly and affectionately toward him. - On that day he hunted me out in the house and brought me into the - living-room, not telling me why. He shut the door, and very - seriously and impressively said: ‘General Terry, a man usually means - what he says when he brings his wife to listen to his statements. I - want to say that reports are circulating that I do not want to go - out to the campaign under you.’ (I supposed that he meant, having - been given the command before, he was unwilling to be a - subordinate.) ‘But I want you to know that I do want to go and serve - under you, not only that I value you as a soldier, but as a friend - and a man.’ The exact words were the strongest kind of a declaration - that he wished him to know he wanted to serve under him.” - - That was Custer all over. And to any one who knew him—to any one who - can form a reasonable conception of the kind of a man he must needs - have been to have done for eighteen years what he had done and as he - had done it, and won the place and fame he had won—that statement - ends debate. Whatever of chagrin, disappointment, or irritation he - may have felt before, however unadvisedly the sore-hearted, - high-spirited man may have spoken with his lips when all was - undetermined, and his part and responsibility had not been assigned, - this true soldier, knowing the gossip of the camp, conscious - possibly it was not wholly without cause, however exaggerated, but - facing now his known duty and touched by the confidence of his - superior as Custer never failed to be touched, could not part from - his commander with a possible shadow resting between them. He knew - the speech of men might have carried to Terry’s mind the suggestion - of a doubt. And yet Terry had trusted him. He could not bear to part - without letting General Terry know that he was right to trust him. - That statement to Terry was a recognition of whatever folly of words - he might before have committed in his grief and anger; it was an - open purging of an upright soldier’s soul as an act honorably due - alike to superior and subordinate; it was, under the circumstances, - the instinctive response of a true man to the confidence of one who - had committed to him a trust involving the honor and fame of both. - Disobedience, whether basely premeditated, or with equal baseness - undertaken upon after-deliberation, is inconceivable, unless one - imputes to Custer a character void of every soldierly and manly - quality. With such an one discussion would be useless. - - Upon the discussion itself, which is presented in the narrative and - in the appendix, I have little to say. In the opening paragraph of - the appendix, you say: “I presume the problem ... will never be - authoritatively settled, and that men will continue to differ upon - these questions until the end of time.” - - In other words, the charge of disobedience can never be proved. The - proof does not exist. The evidence in the case forever lacks the - principal witness whose one and only definite order was to take his - regiment and go “in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was - discovered by Major Reno a few days since.” They were the objective; - they were to be located and their escape prevented. That was - Custer’s task. All the details were left, and necessarily left, to - his discretion. All else in the order of June 22d conveys merely the - “views” of the commander to be followed “unless you should see - sufficient reasons for departing from them.” The argument that - Custer disobeyed this order seems to resolve itself into two main - forms. One is trying to read into the order a precision and a - peremptory character which are not there and which no ingenuity can - put there, and to empty it of a discretion which is there and is - absolute; the other is in assuming or asserting that Custer departed - from General Terry’s views without “sufficient reasons.” And this - line of argument rests in part upon the imputation to Custer of a - motive and intent which was evil throughout, and in part upon what - his critic, in the light of later knowledge and the vain regrets of - hindsight, thinks he ought to have done, and all in utter ignorance - of Custer’s own views of the conditions in which, when he met them, - he was to find his own reasons for whatever he did or did not do. - Under that order, it was Custer’s views of the conditions when they - confronted him that were to govern his actions, whether they - contravened General Terry’s views or not. If in the presence of the - actual conditions, in the light of his great experience and - knowledge in handling Indians, he deemed it wise to follow the - trail, knowing it would reach them, and deeming that so to locate - them would be the best way to prevent their escape, then he obeyed - that order just as exactly as if, thinking otherwise, he had gone - scouting southward where they were not, and neither Terry nor he - expected them to be. - - To charge disobedience is to say that he wilfully and with a wrong - motive and intent did that which his own military judgment forbade; - for it was his own military judgment, right or wrong, that was to - govern his own actions under the terms of that order. The quality of - his judgment does not touch the question of obedience. If he - disobeyed that order, it was by going contrary to his own judgment. - That was the only way he could disobey it. If men differ as to - whether he did that, they will differ. - - Respectfully yours, - JACOB L. GREENE. - - - VI. - -To sum up, I suggest this as a possible line of investigations by which -the student may determine the question for himself: - -First. Were Terry’s written orders definite and explicit? - -Second. Were they intelligent orders capable of execution? - -Third. Did these orders admit of more than one meaning? - -Fourth. What are the various meanings, if more than one? - -Fifth. Did Custer carry them out in any of their meanings? - -Sixth. Did Custer depart from them? - -Seventh. If so, how far? - -Eighth. Such being the case, was he justified in so departing by the -exigencies of the situation? - -Ninth. Were the consequences of such a departure serious? - -Tenth. Did Custer receive verbal orders from Terry at the last moment? - -Eleventh. If so, when? - -Twelfth. Did these verbal orders supersede the written orders? - -In closing, I repeat that I should be glad to be convinced that I have -erred in my conclusions; and that if any one can convince me that Custer -did not disobey, or that in doing so he was justified in his -disobedience, I shall make the fullest public amends for my expression -of opinion that he did and that he was not.[135] If this Appendix shall -cause any light to be thrown on the affidavit so often referred to, it -will serve an excellent purpose; for, I say again, I shall consider the -establishment of that affidavit as settling the question. - -The subject is now left with the student. Perhaps I cannot more fitly -close the discussion than by this quotation from the confidential report -of General Terry by General Sheridan, dated July 2, 1875: - - “I do not tell you this to cast any reflection on Custer, for - whatever errors he may have committed he has paid the penalty, and - you cannot regret his loss more than I do; but I felt that our plan - must have been successful had it been carried out, and I desire you - to know the facts.” - ------ - -Footnote 112: - - All notes in this appendix are signed by the initials of their writers - to identify them.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 113: - - Such as Congressman Finerty’s graphic account in his book, “War-path - and Bivouac;” Dr. Charles S. Eastman’s paper in the _Chautauqua - Magazine_, Vol. XXXI., No. 4, 1900; and Mr. Hamlin Garland’s report of - Two Moon’s account of the battle in _McClure’s Magazine_, Vol. XI., - No. 5, September, 1898.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 114: - - General G. A. Forsyth writes me that he considers Colonel Godfrey one - of the ablest officers in the United States Army—in which opinion I - concur.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 115: - - These two authorities seem to differ as to just when the conversation - took place. Andrews, apparently quoting Miles, says: “Just before - Custer began his fatal ride.” Miles, quoting the mysterious and - unknown affiant, says the conversation took place the night before, - and at Custer’s tent. The difference is radical and, in view of - Colonel Godfrey’s suggestion below, is material. Besides, the regiment - marched away at noon on the 22d, and that is the date of the order; - hence, Custer had no orders the night before. The regiment passed - Generals Terry, Gibbon, and Custer in review as it marched away. When, - then, was the precise hour at which this alleged conversation took - place?—C. T. B. - -Footnote 116: - - I have it in my own library, of course, and have consulted it - frequently.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 117: - - This is overdrawn. Custer had neither infantry, artillery nor wagons - with him; Gibbon had cavalry, infantry and artillery, but no wagons, - be it remembered.—C.T.B. - -Footnote 118: - - Report of Secretary of War, Vol. I., 1876, page 443. Italics in - quotation above are mine.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 119: - - The reference is to the article in the _Journal of the Military - Service Institution_ mentioned above.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 120: - - I have had them before me constantly for the past six months, and have - examined them most carefully again and again, verifying quotations, - etc.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 121: - - If the orders were preposterous, or involved movements that were - profitless and absurd, why did not Custer point out these patent - absurdities to Terry and Gibbon _before he started_? There had been no - change in conditions; the trail, the Indian position, and everything - else were just as the orders predicted.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 122: - - The time of the arrival of Terry at the Little Big Horn is assumed to - be June 26th. What authority there is for that assumption I do not now - recall. It is not embodied in the “instructions.” We of the command - knew nothing of it till after the battle; after Terry’s arrival, that - is.—E. S. GODFREY. - -Footnote 123: - - Having located them, guess or not, the conditions were exactly those - contemplated in the orders.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 124: - - But if Custer had followed his orders, he would not have been nearly - in contact with the enemy—there’s the rub!—C. T. B. - -Footnote 125: - - This I consider a good point in Custer’s favor.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 126: - - Italics mine.—E. S. GODFREY. - -Footnote 127: - - Colonel Godfrey made this statement in answer to a question from me. - On this point see Appendix B.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 128: - - Again I ask General Miles if this is the explanation of the affidavit? - If so, how does it accord with the statement that the conversation - occurred the night before the command separated? Or, has General Miles - written carelessly “the night before,” and does he mean just before - the final march past?—C. T. B. - -Footnote 129: - - Personally I do not believe that the sentence in question was in the - order given to Custer. For if it was, why should Terry suppress it, - since it only confirms his own claims? Besides I should be loath to - believe that Terry would suppress anything. The sentence may have been - in a rough draft of the orders, and not in the final copy.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 130: - - This also is very interesting and seems to point to the order as a - “preposterous” one under the circumstances. It may be so; but if so, I - wish Custer had pointed it out to Terry before he started.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 131: - - Would General Miles excuse subordinates for such obedience (?) of his - orders for a combined movement?—C. A. WOODRUFF. - -Footnote 132: - - No italics in original.—E. S. GODFREY. - -Footnote 133: - - This is interesting, and is the first suggestion I have met with that - the phrase refers to the position of Terry and Custer when the orders - were prepared or delivered, and not to the time anticipated when - Custer should meet the Sioux. I regret that I cannot agree with this - interpretation. Still, it is possible that such an interpretation is - certainly a point for Custer.—C. T. B. - -Footnote 134: - - Italics mine.—E. S. GODFREY. - -Footnote 135: - - At the risk of tiring the reader, but because I am sensitive in the - matter and anxious not to be misunderstood, I append here a letter - written by me to a sister of General Custer, who had expressed the - hope that I would not take the position that he disobeyed his orders - - July 13th, 1904. - - My Dear Madam: - - I have received and read and reread your letter of the 12th inst. - That letter and the thought of Mrs. Custer, whose character, in - common with all Americans, I respect and admire, taken in - connection with the position which my conscience, much against my - will, has compelled me to assume, has filled me with deep regret. - - Having read thus far, you will undoubtedly divine that I am - compelled to say that I believe General Custer did disobey his - orders. I have nowhere stated that I consider him guilty of - rashness. I have also made it plain, I think, that even though he - did disobey his orders, the ultimate annihilation of his battalion - was due to the cowardice or incapacity of Major Reno. - - I remember to have seen General Custer when I was a boy in Kansas. - My father, who was a veteran of the Civil War, had a great - admiration for him. I was present when the bodies of the officers - of the Seventh Cavalry were brought back for reinterment at Fort - Leavenworth. My wife, a Southern woman, is a cousin of the late - General Dod Ramseur, who was General Custer’s intimate friend. The - family have never forgotten General Custer’s kindness when Ramseur - was killed. - - I did, and still have, a warm admiration for the brilliant and - soldierly qualities of General Custer. He was, and is, my beau - ideal of a cavalry soldier. When I began to write these articles, - I would not hear the charge that he had disobeyed orders. But I - have been compelled by my investigations to take that position. I - cannot tell you how painful it has been to me, and it is, to come - to this conclusion. I have thought long and deeply over the - matter. - - Of course I read General Hughes’ now famous article. I did not, - however, allow that article alone to determine me; but I carefully - considered every account. I examined every discussion which I - could find. Not only that, I corresponded with a number of - officers, among them being Lieutenant-General Miles, Major-General - Hughes, Brigadier-General C. A. Woodruff, Brigadier-General - Carrington, and Colonel Godfrey. The remarks of these officers - were submitted to one another. Their statements were weighed and - digested with the utmost care by me. I could come to no other - conclusion than that I have arrived at. - - As an Appendix I have inserted in full my correspondence with - different officers concerning the matter. I have been glad to - print all that Colonel Godfrey, who has indeed been a powerful - advocate in opposition to my views, has written. I have called - attention to one significant fact which, in my opinion, would - fully clear General Custer from the charge of disobedience. That - is the affidavit of an alleged witness to the last conversation - between Terry and General Custer. - - General Miles refers to this affidavit in his book, “Personal - Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles.” President E. Benjamin - Andrews also refers to it in his book, “The United States in our - Own Time.” I wrote to President Andrews, who gave Miles as his - authority. I wrote to General Miles _three times_, registering the - last letter, asking him to substantiate the affidavit, the - existence of which was doubted by many army officers. General - Miles has made no reply. I take it for granted, therefore, that - _he cannot substantiate the affidavit_. - - I have said frankly that if he can prove this affidavit and - establish the credibility of the affiant, I will make public - amends in the most ample manner for having said General Custer - disobeyed his orders. I have said that if _anybody_ can convince - me that I have been wrong in my conclusion; if any evidence can be - produced which will establish the contrary, I shall be most happy - to retract what I have said in any possible way that may be - suggested to me. - - I beg you to believe that I have written in no spirit of animosity - to General Custer. My real feelings for General Custer can easily - be seen from my article on the Battle of the Washita, to which you - have referred. It would be most agreeable to me if you would - forward this letter to Mrs. Custer. - - Again deploring the unfortunate conclusion I am conscientiously - compelled to arrive at, and regretting more than I can express - that I must give pain to Mrs. Custer, to you, and to the friends - of General Custer, I am, - - Yours sincerely, - CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY. - - - - - APPENDIX B - Further Light on the Conduct of Major Reno - - -After the publication of the Custer article censuring Reno, my attention -was called to the following editorial, which appeared in the -_Northwestern Christian Advocate_, of September 7, 1904: - - - WHY GENERAL CUSTER PERISHED - -General George A. Custer was and will always be regarded as one of the -most brilliant officers of the United States Army. His career abounds in -romantic interest; and his death, together with that of every officer -and soldier fighting with him, was one of the most tragic and memorable -incidents in Indian warfare. The story of Custer’s last fight with the -Indians, which took place on the Little Big Horn River in the summer of -1876, is graphically described by Cyrus Townsend Brady. It is not our -purpose to relate the story of the battle, but to call attention to the -real cause of Major Reno’s conduct, which resulted in Custer’s defeat -and death. - -After describing the movements by which Custer distributed his force, -and the task assigned to Major Reno, who displayed remarkable indecision -and errors of judgment, which would have been inexcusable even in an -inexperienced young officer, and caused Reno to retreat instead of -vigorously attacking the Indians, Mr. Brady says: - - “His [Reno’s] second position was admirable for defense. Sheltered - by the trees, with his flanks and rear protected by the river, he - could have held the place indefinitely. He had not, however, been - detailed to defend or hold any position, but to make a swift, - dashing attack; and after a few moments of the feeblest kind of - advance, he found himself thrown upon the defensive. Such a result - would break up the most promising plan. It certainly broke up - Custer’s. - - “It is a painful thing to accuse an army officer of misconduct, but - I have taken the opinion of a number of army officers on the - subject, and every one of them considers Reno culpable in a high - degree. One, at least, has not hesitated to make known his opinion - in the most public way. I am loath to believe that Major Reno was a - coward; _but he certainly lost his head, and when he lost his head - he lost Custer_. His indecision was pitiful. Although he had - suffered practically no loss and had no reason to be alarmed, he was - in a state of painful uncertainty as to what he should do next. The - soldier—like the woman—who hesitates in an emergency which demands - instant decision is lost.... - - “There had, as yet, been no panic, and under a different officer - there would have been none; but it is on record that Reno gave an - order for the men to mount and retreat to the bluffs. Before he - could be obeyed he countermanded this order. Then the order was - given again, but in such a way that nobody, save those immediately - around him, heard it because of the din of the battle then raging in - a sort of aimless way all along the line, and no attempt was made to - obey it. It was then repeated for the third time. Finally, as those - farthest away saw those nearest the flurried commander mounting and - evidently preparing to leave, the orders were gradually communicated - throughout the battalion and nearly the whole mass got ready to - leave. Eventually they broke out of the timber in a disorderly - column of fours, striving to return to the ford they had crossed - when they had entered the valley. - - “Reno calls this a charge, and he led it! He was so excited that, - after firing his pistols at the Indians, who came valiantly after - the fleeing soldiers, he threw them away. The pressure of the - Indians upon the right of the men inclined them to the left, away - from the ford. In fact, they were swept into a confused mass and - driven toward the river. All semblance of organization was lost in - the mad rush for safety. The troops had degenerated into a mob.” - -Major Reno was not a coward, as many believe. His career in the army -during the Civil War and his promotion for gallant and meritorious -services at Kelley’s Ford, March 17, 1863, and at the battle of Cedar -Creek, October 19, 1864, are evidence of his courage. What, then, was -the explanation of his conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn? Dr. -Brady does not give it. Perhaps he does not know. But Major Reno himself -told the late Rev. Dr. Arthur Edwards, then editor of the -_Northwestern_, that his strange actions were due to the fact that HE -WAS DRUNK. Reno’s conduct in that battle lost him many of his military -friends. To Arthur Edwards, who knew him well, and continued his -faithful friend, Major Reno often unburdened his heart, and on one -occasion in deep sorrow said that his strange actions were due to drink, -and drink ultimately caused his downfall. His action at the Battle of -the Little Big Horn was cited as one instance of the result of his use -of intoxicating liquor. Liquor finally caused his expulsion from the -army in disgrace. In 1880 he was found guilty, by a general -court-martial, of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. While -in an intoxicated condition he engaged in a brawl in a public billiard -saloon, in which he assaulted another officer, destroying property and -otherwise conducted himself disgracefully. For this offense the court -sentenced him to be dismissed from the army. - - * * * * * - -It had occurred to me that probably the explanation of Reno’s conduct -lay in the fact that he might have been intoxicated. I asked Colonel -Godfrey if he thought so, and his reply has been noted above in Appendix -A. - -After reading the article in the _Advocate_, I wrote to the editor, Dr. -David D. Thompson, asking for further evidence of the statement quoted. -Here follows his letter: - - Chicago, September 30, 1904. - - My Dear Sir: - - Doctor Arthur Edwards, the former editor of the _Northwestern - Christian Advocate_, was chaplain in the army during the Civil War. - He was a soldier by instinct, and kept up his interest in military - and naval affairs and his acquaintance with army and naval officers - during all his life. In the army he won the confidence of his - fellow-officers by his character and moral courage. - - He was requested, by a number of officers, to wait upon General - Hooker, then in command of the army, and express to him the great - anxiety felt by the officers over his intemperate habits. Doctor - Edwards waited upon General Hooker, and told him what the officers - had requested him to say. He did it in so manly and delicate a way - that General Hooker thanked him, and told him the army would not - again have occasion to fear ill results because of his habits. - - The story of this incident came to the knowledge of Mr. H. I. - Cleveland, an editorial writer on the Chicago _Herald_, who - published it several years ago over his own name in that paper. I - had never before heard the story from Doctor Edwards, and when I saw - Mr. Cleveland’s article I asked Doctor Edwards about it. He related - the story to me, and, after doing so, told the story of Reno as I - give it briefly in the _Northwestern_. - - From all that I can learn of Reno, the feeling in the army against - him was not due to his drinking habits, but to his conduct in his - relations with others. Doctor Edwards told me that Reno told him - that all of his trouble in his contact with his fellow-officers was - due, primarily, to his drinking habits, which had undermined his - moral character. Doctor Edwards knew Reno very well, and told me he - believed that drinking was, as Reno himself stated, the cause of all - his trouble. He had known him in the army during the Civil War, and - spoke highly of his character as a soldier at that time. - - Yours sincerely, - D. D. THOMPSON. - - P. S.—Doctor Edwards intended at some time to publish this story, - but died in April, 1901, before doing so. - - - II. - -As I have always been most willing and anxious to give the accused a -hearing in every case, it gives me great pleasure to insert here a -letter recently received from Mr. William E. Morris, an attorney, who is -also an alderman of Greater New York. In this letter will be found a -spirited defense of Major Reno, with interesting details of his fight. -Although Mr. Morris dissents from many of my conclusions, and differs -radically from the printed accounts of Colonel Godfrey and others, I am -glad to place the other side before my readers. I only regret that this -paper was received too late to be included in the body of the book. - - Haven, Maine, - September 21, 1904. - - Dear Sir: - - I have read your article entitled “War with the Sioux,” and as a - survivor of Reno’s Battalion desire to enter an earnest protest - against the many incorrect statements of alleged facts. - - Col. Reno was cruelly libeled while he was alive, and took his - medicine manfully, knowing that he had the respect of every officer - and enlisted man who served under him on the 25th and 26th days of - June, 1876. - - The 7th Cavalry had no use for cowards, and had Reno showed the - white feather, he would have been damned by every member of his - command. - - As a matter of fact, we revere his memory as that of a brave and - gallant officer, who, through circumstances over which he had no - control, was blamed by the public, who had no personal knowledge of - the facts for the result of the Battle of the Little Horn. - - It is quite evident to me that you have never interviewed a single - member of Reno’s Battalion, to wit: Troops “A,” “G,” and “M,” for if - you had you would not misstate the facts, as I assume that you - intend to be fair, and would not intentionally mislead the public - mind.[136] - - I was a member of Capt. Thomas H. French’s Troop “M,” 7th U. S. - Cavalry, and I submit the following as a concise statement of the - facts: - - We lost sight of Custer, whose command was on our right, at least - thirty minutes before we crossed the Little Horn River. - - We saw a party of about one hundred Indians before we reached the - river; we pursued them across the Little Horn and down the valley. - As soon as we forded, Reno gave the command, “Left into line, - gallop—forward, guide, center,” and away we went faster than I had - ever ridden before. The Indians rode as fast as they could, and the - battalion in line of battle after them. A body of at least two - thousand came up the valley to meet the one hundred or more we were - pursuing. They immediately made a flank movement to our left and a - stand, opened a galling fire, causing some of our horses to become - unmanageable. John R. Meyer’s horse carried him down the valley - through the Indians, some of whom chased him two or three miles over - the hills and back to ford. He escaped with a gun-shot wound in the - neck. Rutten’s horse also ran away, but he succeeded in making a - circle before reaching the Indians, and received only a gun-shot - wound in the shoulder. We were then abreast the timber; to continue - the charge down the valley meant (to the mind of every one) - immediate destruction of the battalion, which consisted of about one - hundred and twenty men (the old guard, of ten men from each troop, - being with the packs). - - Reno, very properly, gave the command “Battalion halt—prepare to - fight on foot—dismount!” He directed French to send ten men from the - right of his troop to skirmish the woods, before the “numbers four” - proceeded there with the horses. We immediately deployed as - skirmishers and opened fire. The odds were at least thirty to one, - as our line with the fours out did not exceed seven officers and - ninety men. We had, however, a few Indian scouts and civilians. We - had entire confidence in our officers and in ourselves, and went to - work smiling and as cool as if we were at target practice. In less - time than it takes to relate it, the Indians were on three sides of - us. We were ordered to lie down, and every man that I could see, - except Reno and French, were fighting lying down. Reno walked along - the line giving instructions to the men, while French was calling - his men’s attention to his own marksmanship with an infantry - long-tom that he carried. - - While in this position, the man next on my right, Sergeant O’Hara, - was killed. The smoke obscured the line, but bullets were taking - effect all along it. We were perfectly cool, determined, and doing - good execution and expected to hear Custer attack. We had been - fighting lying down about fifteen minutes when one of our men came - from the timber and reported that they were killing our horses in - the rear. Every troop had, at this time, suffered loss and the enemy - was closing in, despite our steady and deadly fire. Reno then made - his only error; he gave the command, “Retreat to your horses, men!” - French immediately corrected the mistake with the command, “Steady, - men—fall back, slowly; face the enemy, and continue your fire.” “M” - troop fell back slowly and in perfect order, held the Indians in - check until “A” and “G” had mounted. Several of their horses had - been shot, and their riders, consequently, very much disturbed. - - “M” Troop left Sergeant O’Hara and Private Smith on the skirmish - line. Isaiah, the colored interpreter of Fort Rice, Bloody Knife, - the Chief of the Rees Scouts, and a civilian also remained. Lawrence - was hit in the stomach when about to mount. I went to his relief, - which caused me to be the last man to leave the timber, with the - command, with the exception of Lieutenant Hare, who passed me in the - bottom. Sergeant Charles White was wounded in the arm and his horse - killed. He was left in the woods, as was also “Big Fritz,” a - Norwegian, whose surname I do not remember, but whose horse was - killed. “A” and “G” had men left in the timber also, and they all - reached the command on the hill during the night with De Rudio, or - about the same time. - - I give more details in regard to “M” than the other troops, because - of a personal acquaintance with each member. Corporal Scollen and - Private Sommers fell in the charge from the timber to the ford. It - was a charge and not a retreat, and it was led by Reno. Every man - that I saw used his revolver at close range. I was at least twenty - yards behind the rear of the command. The Indians closed in, so I - was compelled to jump my horse off the bank, at least fifty yards - below the ford, and while in the river had an excellent view of the - struggle. It was hand to hand, and McIntosh was certainly there at - the ford and sold his life as dearly as he possibly could. When I - reached the cut in bank, I found Turley and Rye mounted and - Lieutenant Hodgson wounded and dismounted. He was waist-deep in the - water. He grasped my off stirrup strap with both hands. Rye let - Turley go ahead through the cut, and he was killed as he reached the - top; Rye followed without receiving a scratch. The lieutenant held - onto my stirrup for two or three seconds, and was dragged out of the - water. He was hit again, and let go as my horse plunged up the cut. - Sergeant Criswell may have assisted him out of the water, but if he - did he went back into it again. To say that any man could or did - ride back down that cut is to suggest, to my mind, the impossible. - Upon reaching the level above the cut I dismounted and led my horse - as fast as possible up the bluff, and overtook Tinker, Bill Meyer - and Gordon about half way up the bluff. We stopped a moment to rest. - The bodies of the fallen soldiers were plainly visible. They marked - the skirmish line and the line of the charge from the timber to the - ford, and were in the river and at the top of the cut. At this - instant a shower of lead sent Meyer and Gordon to the happy - hunting-ground, and a fifty caliber passed through the left breast - of your humble servant. Our horses were also hit. I continued up the - hill alone and joined the command; was then assisted to the - improvised hospital. - - Reno at this time had lost, in killed, wounded, and left dismounted - in the woods, over 30 per cent. of his battalion (there were over - ten left in the woods). Lieutenant Hare was particularly - conspicuous, and distinguished himself by his cool and determined - manner when he ordered the men to fall in at the top of the hill, - and whatever demoralization there was, was immediately dispelled by - that courageous young Texan. Benteen, arriving about an hour later, - came up as slow as though he were going to a funeral. By this - statement I do not desire to reflect in any way upon him; he was - simply in no hurry; and Müller, of his troop, who occupied an - adjoining cot to mine in the hospital at Fort Abraham Lincoln, told - me that they walked all the way, and that they heard the heavy - firing while they were watering their horses. - - Benteen was, unquestionably, the bravest man I ever met. He held the - Indians in absolute contempt, and was a walking target from the time - he became engaged until the end of the fight at sundown on the 26th. - He took absolute charge of one side of the hill, and you may rest - assured that he did not bother Reno for permission of any kind. He - was in supreme command of that side of the hill, and seemed to enjoy - walking along the line where the bullets were the thickest. His - troop, “H,” did not dig rifle-pits during the night of the 25th, as - the other troops did, and in the morning their casualties were - increased on that account. He ordered “M” out of their pits to - reinforce his troop. There was some dissatisfaction at the order, as - the men believed that the necessity was due solely to the neglect of - “H,” in digging pits. They obeyed, however, and assisted Benteen in - his famous charge. - - It was rumored, subsequently, that French recommended his First - Sergeant, John Ryan, a sharpshooter, and some other men for medals, - and that Benteen refused to indorse the recommendation as to Ryan, - because he failed immediately to order the men out of their pits at - his end of the line at his (Benteen’s) order. It was claimed that - French thereupon withdrew his list. Ryan was in charge of the ten - men that Reno sent to skirmish the woods. - - I was very much amused to learn, from your article, that Windolph - received a medal. I remember him as the tailor of “H” troop, and - have a distinct recollection of his coming into the field-hospital, - bent almost double and asking for treatment for a wound which, his - appearance would suggest, was a mortal one, but which the surgeon - found, on removing his trousers, to be only a burn. The surgeon - ordered him back to the line amid a shout of laughter from the - wounded men. Mike Madden of “K” lost his leg, and Tanner of “M” his - life, in the dash for the water for the wounded. I hope Madden - received a medal. - - In view of the conflict between the foregoing and the statements - contained in your article, I ask you to investigate the matter - further, with a view to correcting the false impression that your - readers must have concerning Reno and his command. In conclusion, I - ask you “how, in God’s name,” you could expect Reno, with one - hundred and twenty men, to ride through upwards of three thousand - armed Sioux, and then be of assistance to Custer or any one else? I - say we were sent into that valley and caught in an ambush like rats - in a trap. That if we had remained ten minutes longer, there would - not have been one left to tell the tale. That the much abused Reno - did charge out of the timber, and that we who survive owe our lives - to that identical charge which he led. We, at least, give him credit - for saving what he did of his command. I am, sir, - - Very respectfully, - WM. E. MORRIS, - Late private Troop “M,” Seventh U. S. Cavalry. - ------ - -Footnote 136: - - I have been in communication with a number of persons who belonged to - this battalion.—C. T. B. - - - - - INDEX - - - _A_ - - “Ab-sa-ra-ka, Land of Massacre,” book written by Mrs. Carrington, 34 - note - - Allen breech-loading rifle, 45, 46 - - American Horse, Sioux chief, surprised by Capt. Mills, 307; - killed, 310 - - Amick, Lieut., 124, 137; - sent in search of Fifth Cavalry, 125–127; - covers Graham’s retreat, 128, 138 - - Andrews, Dr. E. B., on Custer’s Little Big Horn campaign, 361 - - Apache Indians, cruelties of, 73 - - Arapahoe Indians, 64 - - Arikara scouts in Reno’s command flee from the Sioux, 238 - - Arickaree Fork, Republican River, 72; - Gen. Bankhead’s march to, 108, 111 note, 112 - - Army woman’s devotion in Indian warfare, 11, 12 - - - _B_ - - “Bad Lands” of Dakota, of volcanic origin, 5, 209, 230 - - Bailey, Indian guide, 15 - - Baliran, M., naturalist, killed by Rain-in-the-Face, 212, 213, 215 - - Ball, Capt., 336 - - Bankhead, Col., Forsyth’s letter to, from Beecher’s Island, 93 - - Banzhaf, Lieut., assists in Col. Forsyth’s rescue, 100, 106, 124; - repulses Indians, 131 - - Barnitz, Capt., Seventh Cavalry, killed, 161 - - Barrett, Lawrence, actor, his eulogy on Gen. Custer, 261 - - Battle of Beaver Creek, 131–140; - of Big Horn, 243–250; - of Little Big Horn, 216–236; - Battle of Little Big Horn, the personal story of, by - Rain-in-the-Face, 279–292; - Rosebud River, 191–198, 203–208; - Summit Springs, 170–179; - Washita, 146–169; - of Wounded Knee, 352 - - Beaver Creek, Captain Carpenter’s fight on, 123–135; - map of position of wagons and soldiers, 130, 132 note; - further discussion of fight on, 136–145 - - Becker, John, mule packer, in the Sibley scout, 298, 299 - - Beecher, Lieut. Frederick H., second in command to Capt. Forsyth, 77; - killed, 88; - monument to, 111; - attention to, before dying, 120 - - Beecher’s Island, fight of Rough Riders at, 72; - named, 88; - siege of, 90–96; - a scout’s story of the defense of, 113–122 - - Belknap, Gen., Secretary of War, his relations with Gen. Custer, - 216–218 - - Bell, Major, Seventh Cavalry, 164, 166 - - Benteen, Col., in battle of Washita, 162; - in battle of Big Horn, 233, 235, 236, 243–246, 250; - his magnificent courage, 251, 253, 274–276; - Gen. Terry comes to his relief, 276 - - Big Crow, Indian chief, defeated by Gen. Miles, 329, 330 - - Big Horn Mountains, controlled by jealous Indian tribes, 5 - - Big Horn Range, streams from, 5 - - Big Piney Creek, Gen. Carrington establishes camp on banks of, 13, 64 - - Bingham, Lieut., under Gen. Carrington, 20; - killed, 21 - - Black Hills, 209; - gold discovered in, 209 - - Black Kettle (Mo-ke-ta-va-ta), 73; - head chief of the Cheyennes, brutality of, 157; - killed, 162 - - Blackfeet Indians, 64 - - Blizzard, Gen. Custer’s march in a, 150–161 - - Bloody Knife, Arikara scout with Custer, 210, 267 - - Bourke, Capt John G., his books, “Campaigning with Crook,” quoted, 186; - “On the Border with Crook,” 191, 204, 333 - - Bowers, Sergeant, in fight with Indians, 20; - scalped, 21; - badge found when reinterred, 21 note - - Bowyer, Mitch, Crow interpreter, warns Gen. Custer, 268 - - Bozeman trail, 4, 7, 9, 13, 60; - army post on, 9, 189 - - Brainard, Col. D. L., notes on the Lame Deer fight, 335–338 - - Brave Wolf, scout, 336 - - Bridger, James, fur trader and scout, adviser of Gen. Carrington, 4, 61 - - Bridger’s Ferry, 60 - - Brown, Capt. Frederick, rashness of, 23; - malcontent conduct of, 24; - joins Capt. Fetterman, 26; - promotion of, 26; - death of, 32 - - Brulé, Sioux Indians, faithful to whites, 8; - attack Capt. Powell’s corral, 48 - - “Brunette” regiment, see Tenth Cavalry - - Brunettes, Gen. Henry’s, 351–355 - - Buffalo Bill, see Cody, Wm. F. - - Buffalo Chip, scout, killed, 308 note - - Buffalo, herds of, in Montana valleys, 5 - - “Buffaloes,” Gen. Henry’s, and their rides, 351–353 - - “Bull teams,” for prairie schooners, 7 - - - _C_ - - California Joe, scout, 155 - - Camp Supply, Indian Territory, 150 - - Canadian River, Gen. Custer’s march on, 152 - - Carpenter, Captain Louis H., Tenth Cavalry, sent to rescue Gen. - Forsyth, 100; - the story of his “brunettes,” 123–135; - promotion of, 135 - - Carr, Major-Gen. Eugene A., ordered to Fort Wallace, 124; - in fight on Beaver Creek, 131, 132; - pursues Indians over the Platte River, 135; - his account of the fight on Beaver Creek, 136–140; - Carr and Tall Bull at Summit Springs, 170–179 - - Carrington, Gen. Henry B., in Central Montana, 5; - effects treaty with Indians at Fort Laramie, 8; - romantic expedition of, 9–13; - sketch of, 9; - repairs and garrisons Fort Reno, 12; - establishes camp on Big Piney Creek, 13; - in desperate fight at Lodge Trail Ridge, 20, 21; - inadequate force of, 23, 24; - carries out Gen. Sherman’s instructions, 24; - specific instructions to Capt. Fetterman, 26; - his stern resolution, 32–37; - used as a scapegoat, 37; - acquitted of all blame by a mixed commission, 38; - also by a military court and by Gen. Sherman, 38; - his views on Custer’s Little Big Horn campaign, 386–388 - - Carrington Powder River expedition, reminiscences of, 59–71 - - Central Montana, objective of Gen. Carrington’s expedition, 5 - - Chambers, Col., 188 - - Cheyenne Indians dispute advance of the white man, 5; - Harney-Sanborne treaty with, 7; - attack Capt. Powell’s corral, 48; - cruelty of, 73; - break away from Red Cloud Agency, 293; - Gen. Merritt heads them off, 294; - bravery of, 312, 313; - their winter stores destroyed, 316; - sufferings of, 316–318; - surrender and turn against Crazy Horse, 318; - savage ferocity of, 318 - - Civil War, soldiers of the, emigrate to the West, 6 - - Civilization, the demands of, 6; - the outpost of, 13–18 - - Clear Creek, Montana, 321 - - Cloud Peak, 13 - - Clybor, Jack, adopted by Indians and named “Comanche,” 96 - - Cody, William F. (Buffalo Bill), Gen. Carr’s guide at Summit Springs, - 170, 173, 174; - scout for Gen. Merritt, 294, 295; - duel with Yellow Hair, 296, 297 - - Coffee Coolers, 282 - - Collins, W. R. E., letter of, in reference to Red Cloud’s losses in - wagon-corral attack, 58 - - “Comanche,” Capt. Keogh’s horse, in Custer’s last fight, 256 note - - Conestoga wagons, only method of transportation before railroad, 7 - - Conner, Gen., establishes Fort Reno, 60 - - Contest for Indian lands, 6 - - Cook, Adjutant, Seventh Cavalry, 158, 159; - killed with Custer, 258 - - Cook, Capt., 268, 270 - - Cooke, Gen., relieves Gen. Carrington of his command, 37 - - Corbin, scout, in Gen. Custer’s command, 152, 154, 155 - - Crawford, Lieut., 307 - - Crazy Horse, an Oglala chief, 184; - his village surprised and taken, 186, 187; - warns Gen. Crook, 189; - sketch of, 189 note; - begins attack, 193; - plans ambush for Crook, 194; - successful stand against Crook, 201, 202; - opposed to Maj. Reno, 241, 254; - attacks Custer, 256; - defeated by Gen. Crook at Slim Buttes, 310, 311; - refuses to succor Cheyennes, 317; - meets crushing defeat by Gen. Miles, 326–330; - surrenders, 330; - stabbed in guard-house, 333; - Captain Bourke’s description of, 333; - a born soldier, 334 - - Crazy Woman’s Fork, 61, 312 - - Criswell, Sergeant, bravery of, in fight with Indians, 242 - - Crittenden, Lieut., Custer’s brother-in-law, killed, 257 - - Crook, Gen. George, opinion of Apache Indians, 74; - his advance against Indians in the Northwest, 183–202; - assumes command of expedition, 188; - Ex-Trooper Towne’s account of his fight on the Rosebud, 203–208; - joined by Gen. Merritt at Fort Laramie, 293; - at Slim Buttes, 304–309; - his deplorable condition for want of supplies, 305, 306; - defeats - Crazy Horse at Slim Buttes, 310, 311 - - Crow Indians, auxiliaries in Gen. Crook’s expedition, 190, 205 - - Crow King, Indian chief, opposed to Major Reno, 241, 256 - - Curley, Crow scout, only survivor of Custer’s command, 256 - - Custer, Boston, civilian forage-master, killed with Gen. Custer, 258 - - Custer, Gen. George Armstrong, in command of Seventh Cavalry, 146–150; - record of, 146, 147; - selects his own officers, 147; - protects Kansas settlers, 148; - his march in a blizzard, 150–153; - has command under Gen. Stanley, 210; - his faculty for scouting, 210; - loses his command, 216–219; - his relations with Gen. Belknap, 216; - question as to whether he obeyed Gen. Terry’s orders, 219–228; - Gen. Terry’s letter of instructions, 220, 221; - various opinions about Terry’s instructions to Custer, 224–228; - account of his last expedition, 229–236; - his officers under Reno tried to join him, 248 note; - his fine manœuvering, 254; - signals to Reno, 255; - killed, 256, 257; - Mr. Theodore W. Goldin’s reminiscences of, 263–278; - a further discussion of his course in the Little Big Horn campaign, - 359–397; - various opinions on Custer’s campaign—Col. Edward S. Godfrey, 360, - 371–380, 388–390; - Major-Gen. James B. Fry, 360; - Major-Gen. Robert P. Hodges, 360, 366–370; - Brig.-Gen. George A. Forsyth, 361; - Dr. C. B. Andrews, 361; - Gen. Nelson A. Miles, 361–365; - Gen. Gibbon, 367; - Brig.-Gen. Charles A. Woodruff, 380–385; - Gen. Henry B. Carrington, 386–388; - Lieut.-Col. Jacob L. Greene, 391–395 - - Custer, Capt. Tom, brother of Gen. Custer, 210, 212, 213; - captures Rain-in-the-Face, 214; - in the Big Horn Fight, 254; - killed, 257; - called Little Hair by Rain-in-the-Face, 284; - story of his killing, 289 - - Custer family, disaster to, 258 - - “Custer Massacre,” 259, 281 - - - _D_ - - Daniels, Lieut., killed, 22 - - Davis, Capt., 316 - - Dead Cañon of the Rosebud, 193, 196, 198 - - Denver, Col., white settlements at, 5 - - DeRudio, Lieut., 243 - - DeWolf, Dr., killed by Indians, 242 - - Dodge, Col. R. I., his book, “Our Wild Indians,” quoted, 168; - claims Gen. Custer committed suicide, 257 - - Dog Soldiers, 163 note - - Donovan, scout, assists in Col. Forsyth’s rescue, 106 - - Drexel Mission attacked by Indians, 353 - - Dry Fork, 60 - - Dull Knife, Cheyenne chief, attacked by Mackenzie, 313–315; - killed, 315 - - - _E_ - - Eastman, Charles A., M. D., a full-blooded Sioux, his account of Reno’s - fight at Little Big Horn, 238; - with Gen. Custer, 253 - - Edgerly, Lieut., 248 - - Eighteenth Regular Infantry in the Mountain District, 9, 25; - at Fort Kearney, 59 - - Elliott, Major, Custer’s second in command, 152; - in battle of the Washita, 157; - fate of, 166–169 - - Emigrants, protected by Fort Phil Kearney, 4 - - Evans, Col., Third Cavalry, 188 - - - _F_ - - “Far West,” Gen. Terry’s supply steamer on the Rosebud, 265 - - Farley, scout, wounded, 108; - bravery of, 109 - - Fetterman, Capt., fight with Indians at Lodge Trail Ridge, 20; - rashness of, 23; - annihilation of his command, 24–32; - begs command of expedition from Gen. Carrington, 25; - map of massacre of his command, 27; - death of, 32; - result of his disobeying orders, 36, 39 - - Fifth Cavalry, in battle of Summit Springs, 172; - other engagements, 293, 294, 312 - - Fifth Infantry, 326, 335 - - Finerty, John F., Chicago _Times_ correspondent, joins the Sibley - scout, 298, 303; - account of Gen. Henry’s ghastly experience, 346 - - Fisher, civilian volunteer, 26; - killed, 35 - - Fitzgerald, Dr., 100 - - Forsyth, George Alexander (“Sandy”), and the Rough Riders of ’68, - description of, 72–96; - aide to Gen. Sheridan, 75; - sketch of, 76; - desperate situation of, on Beecher’s Island, 97; - adventures of Scouts Trudeau and Stillwell to rescue, 97–112; - map of march to relieve Forsyth and escort Gen. Carr, 103; - a few words about Forsyth’s men, 109–112; - his battlefield preserved, 111; - letter of, on the relations between Gen. Custer and Gen. Belknap, - 216–218; - on Custer’s Little Big Horn campaign, 361 - - Forsyth Association, 111 - - Fort Abraham Lincoln, Seventh Cavalry stationed at, 213, 214; - Rain-in-the-Face imprisoned at, 215; - Gen. Terry at, 218; - Mrs. Custer at, 258 - - Fort Caspar, Gen. Crook’s headquarters, 37 - - Fort C. F. Smith established, 17, 25, 62; - attacked, 46 note - - Fort D. A. Russell, Gen. Henry at, 349 - - Fort Ellsworth, Indian council held at, 72 - - Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, established, 39; - actions at, 188, 202, 208, 312, 344, 348, 349 - - Fort Laramie, Nebraska, government commissioners negotiate treaty with - Indians at, 7, 293 - - Fort Phil Kearney, establishment and abandonment of, 3, 209; - constantly surrounded by Indians, 3; - Montana emigrants protected by, 4; - plan of, 16; - the tragedy of, 19–39; - working plan of, 33; - troops ordered to relief of, 37; - closely invested, 40, 41; - fort completed, 41; - Red Cloud’s attack on, 46; - burned by Indians, 58; - Mr. R. J. Smyth’s personal reminiscences of, and the wagon-box fight, - 59–71; - Gen. Crook at, 189; - - Fort Reno, removal of ordered, 9; - repaired and garrisoned, 12; - construction of, 15–17; - plan of, 16; - established by Gen. Conner, 60; - Gen. Crook at, 189 - - Fort Wallace, Kansas, temporary terminus of Kansas Pacific Railroad, - 78; - orders issued from, to rescue Col. Forsyth, 100; - Capt. Carpenter arrives at, 134 - - Fourth Cavalry, 312 - - Fourth Infantry, 188 - - French, Capt., 251, 271 - - Frontier, protecting the, 3–179 - - Fry, Gen. James B., his book, “Army Sacrifices,” quoted, 72; - on Custer’s Little Big Horn campaign, 360 - - Furey, Major, with Gen. Crook, 191 - - - _G_ - - Gall, Indian chief, opposed to Reno, 241, 253, 254; - attacks Custer, 256, 286; - at big feast after the Custer battle, 290; - attacks Gen. Miles, 325 - - “Galvanized soldiers,” 60 - - “Garry Owen,” played in battle of the Washita, 161; - at Fort Lincoln, 218 - - Ghost Dancers, Sioux, 352 - - Gibbon, Gen. encamps on the Yellowstone, 218; - letter to Gen. Terry regarding Gen. Custer’s situation, 223, 224; - relieves Reno and finds Custer’s body, 257; - his conference with Custer, 266; - goes to relief of Col. Benteen, 276; - his command returned to Montana, 305 - - Gibson, Lieut., 251 - - Godfrey, Col. Edward S., 249; - his article in _Century Magazine_ “Custer’s Last Battle,” quoted, - 226, 227, 253; - his account of Custer’s defeat, 260; - on Custer’s Little Big Horn Campaign, 360, 371–380, 388–390 - - Gold discovered in the Black Hills, 209 - - Goldin, Mr. Theodore W., one of the last to see Custer alive, his - reminiscences of the general, 263–278 - - Goose Creek, 13, 192, 201, 209 - - Gordon, Major G. A., 316 - - Graham, Capt., Tenth Cavalry, 124; - scouts on the Beaver, 127; - retreat of, 128; - unmilitary action of, 133 note - - Grant, President U. S., indignant at Gen. Custer’s statements regarding - Gen. Belknap, 217 - - Greene, Lieut.-Col. Jacob L., his views on Custer’s Little Big Horn - campaign, 391–395 - - Grover, Sharp, guide, 77; - his acquaintance with Indian signs and customs, 125–127, 139 - - Gruard, Frank, celebrated scout, with Gen. Crook, 191, 203; - sketch of, 191 note; - his clever scouting, 298, 301, 302, 309 - - Grummond, Lieut., Eighteenth Infantry, 15, 20, 22; - in charge of cavalry at Fort Phil. Kearney, 25, 26; - killed, 35, 36 - - - _H_ - - Hall, Lieut., 294, 295 - - Hamilton, Capt. John M., 316 - - Hamilton, Capt. Louis McLane, in Gen. Custer’s winter expedition, 153, - 157, 159; - killed, 161 - - Hanley, Sergeant, 249 - - Hare, Lieut. Luther R., 249, 267, 274 - - Harney-Sanborne treaty with Indians, 7 - - Harrington, Lieut., killed with Custer, 259 - - Hat Creek, see War Bonnet - - Hazen, Gen. W. B., inspects Fort Reno, 17 note - - Henry, Gen. Guy V., Third Cavalry, 190, 193, 195, 196, 198; - wounded, 197; - in Dead Cañon, 200, 201; - sketch of, 339–355; - his march in a blizzard, 342–344; - a ghastly experience, 344–348; - bravery of his wife, 348–351; - his “Buffaloes” and their famous rides, 351–355; - in the Spanish-American War, 354; - in Porto Rico, 354; - dies there, 355 - - Henry rifle, breech-loading rapid fire, use of, 26, 35 - - Herndon, scout, 266, 267, 274 - - Hines, Acting-Assistant Surgeon, sent to join Capt. Fetterman, 29 - - Hodgson, Lieut., killed by Indians, 242; - account of his death, 263, 272, 273 - - Honzinger, Dr., veterinarian, killed by Rain-in-the-Face, 12, 213, 215, - 283 note, 285 - - Horse Creek, 60 - - Horton, Surgeon, on wagon-beds, 44 note, 50, 56, 69 - - Howitzers, Indian fear of, 29 - - Hughes, Major-Gen. Robert P., his book, “The Campaign Against the - Sioux,” quoted, 224; - Little Big Horn campaign, 360, 366–370 - - Humfreville, Capt. J. Lee, his book “Twenty Years Among Our Hostile - Indians” quoted, 318 - - Hunting ground, Indian title to, 6 - - Hunting parties forbidden at Fort Phil Kearney, 4 - - - _I_ - - Indian attacks on Fort Phil Kearney, 4, 37–71 - - Indian fights at Beaver Creek, 123–140; - on Beecher’s Island, 97; - at Fort C. F. Smith, 46 note; - at Fort Phil Kearney, 40–56; - at Glendive, Mont., 321; - at Lodge Trail Ridge, 20, 21; - on the Rosebud River, 191–198, 203–208; - at Slim Buttes, 304–309; - at Summit Springs, 170–179 - - Indian fighters and their field, 3–8 - - Indian police kill Sitting Bull, 332 - - Indian skulls, scientific study of, 69 - - Indian traders, their mercenary policy, 184 - - Indian wars, cause of, 4; - sieges in, 3 - - Indian’s dread of scalping, 91–92 note - - Indians, annihilate Capt. Fetterman’s command outside Fort Phil - Kearney, 30–32 - - Indians as patriots, 74, 185; - looseness of tie binding tribes, 313 note - - Indians, Montana, jealous of intrusion by whites, 5 - - Iron Star, Indian chief, attacked by Gen. Miles and killed, 330–332 - - Island of Death, the, 78–85 - - Itiomagaju, see Rain-in-the-Face. - - - _J_ - - Jackson, Bob, scout, 336, 338 - - Jenness, Lieut. John C., detailed under Capt. Powell to protect - wood-cutters, 43; - killed, 51, 67 - - Jerome, Lieut. Lovell H., 336 - - Jewish boy’s bravery in Gen. Forsyth’s fight, 110; - Gen. Fry’s poem on, 110 note - - Johnson, Hugh, Adjutant, sends Captain Carpenter to succor Col. - Forsyth, 100, 101; - prompt action of, 111, 112 - - Johnson, President Andrew, congratulates Congress on peace with - Indians, 22 - - Julesberg, 59 - - - _K_ - - Kane, Capt., Fifth Cavalry, in Beaver Creek fight, 137, 138 - - Kansas Pacific Railroad, building of, resisted by Indians, 7–72 - - Kansas trail, 7 - - Kansas, Western, swept and devastated by Cheyennes, 75 - - Kellogg, Mark, newspaper correspondent, killed with Custer, 258 - - Kennedy, Sergeant-Major, 7th Cavalry, brave death of, 168 - - Keogh, Capt., killed with Custer, 258, 259 - - Kidder, Lieut., Second Cavalry, slaughtered, 149 - - King, Gen., his book, “Campaigning with Crook,” quoted, 188 - - King, Lieut. Charles, fighter and author, 294 - - Kinney, Capt., sent to establish Fort C. F. Smith, 17 - - - _L_ - - Lame Deer, Indian chief, attacked by Gen. Miles and killed, 330–332; - notes on the fight, 335–338 - - Laramie Commission, announcement of, 15 note - - Leighton, Al., sutler, Indians stampede stock of, 60 - - Little Beaver, Indian scout, 155 - - Little Big Horn, battle of, the story of by Rain-in-the-Face, 279–292 - - Little Big Horn Campaign, the, 216–236; - map of, 234 - - Little Big Horn Valley, 233 - - Little Crow, Indian, wounded, 140 - - Little Hair (Tom Custer), 284 - - Little Muddy Creek, 336 - - Little Raven, Arapahoe Indian chief, 164 - - Little Rock, Indian chief, killed, 164 - - Lodge Trail Ridge, 13, 20, 26, 29–31 - - Longfellow’s poem, “The Revenge of Rain-in-the-Face,” sold by the - Indian himself at the World’s Fair, 291 - - Long Hair, Gen. Custer’s Indian name, 146 - - Lord, Dr., killed with Custer, 258, 259 - - Luettwitz, Lieut. Von, 307; - wounded, 308 - - Lummis, Charles F., on the Apache Indians, 74 note - - - _M_ - - Mackenzie, Ranald S., Col. Fourth Cavalry, 305; - his winter battle, 312–316; - attacks Indians at Willow Creek Cañon, 313–316 - - MacIntosh, Lieut., killed by Indians, 242, 268, 272, 274 - - Mahapiya-luta, see Red Cloud - - Mah-wis-sa, Black Kettle’s sister, endeavors to marry Gen. Custer to an - Indian girl, 167 - - “Mauvaises Terres,” or “bad lands,” 5 - - McCall, Sergeant W. H. H., 77, 78 - - McDougall, Capt., joins Maj. Reno with pack train, 248; - serves under Custer at the Little Big Horn, 233 - - McKinney, Lieut. John A., charges Cheyennes at Willow Creek Cañon, 315; - shot, 315 - - Medicine Man, daring of a, 133 - - Merritt, Gen. Wesley, ordered to join Gen. Crook at Fort Laramie, 293; - his fight with Cheyennes, 295–297 - - Miles, Gen. Nelson A., his “Personal Recollections” quoted, 189; - his Indian campaigning, 305; - his great campaigning, 319–338; - his foot cavalry defeat Sitting Bull, 319–326; - interview with Sitting Bull, 323, 324; - his crushing defeat of Crazy Horse, 326–330; - his capacity for handling men, 326; - attacks and captures Lame Deer’s village, 330–332; - his views on Custer’s Little Big Horn campaign, 361–365 - - Mills, Capt. Anson, Third Cavalry, 190, 193, 195, 196; - his advance down Dead Cañon, 199–202; - sent on foraging expedition, 305, 306 - - Miniconjou Indians attack Capt. Powell, 48 - - Montana, emigrants and wagon-trains to, annihilated by Indians, 4; - white settlements at, 5 - - Mooers, Dr. John H., 77; - killed, 84 - - Moore, Tom, veteran, 192, 196 - - Morris, William E., on the conduct of Major Reno, 401–405 - - Mountain District, army posts in, 9 - - Mountain game in Montana ranges, 6 - - Mountain standard time, 5 - - Mo-ke-ta-va-ta, see Black Kettle - - Moylan, Capt., with Custer, 211, 212, 271 - - Mussa ranch, 60 - - Myers, Capt., Seventh Cavalry, 157, 159 - - - _N_ - - Napoleon guns, 326 - - Nickerson, Capt., in Crook’s command, 200 - - Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, in Sheridan’s winter campaign - against Indians, 150 - - Ninth Cavalry, 351–355 - - Ninth Infantry, 188, 342 - - North, Col. Francis, in Summit Springs battle, 173 - - North Platte, 5, 59, 60 - - Northern Pacific Railroad, survey of, 209 - - _Northwestern Christian Advocate_ on the conduct of Major Reno, 398–400 - - Noyes, Major, Second Cavalry, 188, 193, 196 - - - _O_ - - Oglala Indians attack Capt. Powell’s corral, 48 - - Oregon trail, 7 - - Orleman, Lieut., assists in Col. Forsyth’s rescue, 100, 124; - in expedition to Beaver Creek, 127; - covers Graham’s retreat, 128; - repulses Indians, 131 - - Osage Indians, with Custer in battle of the Washita, 159, 160 - - Otis, Lieut.-Col. Elwell S., attacked by Indians at Glendive, Mont., - 321; - Sitting Bull’s letter to, 321 - - - _P_ - - Pawnee scouts at battle of Summit Springs, 173–177 - - Peno Creek, 13, 20, 64 - - Peno Valley, 28, 31, 36 - - Phil Kearney Garrison, post return of, 30 note - - Pilot Hill, 13, 14, 19 - - Pine Ridge Agency, 293 - - Piney Island, logging camp on, 14; - the improvised corral on, 40–46; - wood-cutting on, 43; - wagon-box corral illustrated, 45 - - Porter, Lieut., killed with Custer, 258, 259 - - Pourier, Baptiste (Big Bat) scout with Gen. Crook, 298 - - Powder River, Indians encamped on, 23; - Sitting Bull at, 184; - Gen. Reynolds captures Crazy Horse’s village on the, 186; - Gen. Terry at, 218, 265, 312 - - Powder River Expedition, the, 3–18; - reminiscences of, 59–71 - - Powell, Capt. James, 22; - report of, to Gen. Carrington, 23; - command of relief party given to, 25; - detailed to guard wood-cutting party, 42; - sketch of, 42; - his gallant fight in the wagon-corral against Red Cloud, 48–55; - promotion of, 57 - - Prairie schooners, early use of, 7 - - Pretty Bear, Cheyenne chief, killed, 176, 177 - - Pumpkin Buttes, 61 - - - _R_ - - Rabbit Creek, 307 - - Rain-in-the-Face (Itiomagaju), Indian chief, his grievance, 209–215; - capture of, 213–215; - escapes, 215; - attacks Custer, 256; - his revenge, 257; - his personal story of the fight, 279–292; - boasts of murdering Dr. Honzinger, 283; - his map of Custer’s battlefield, 287; - wounded, 289 note - - Red Cloud (Mahapiya-luta), Sioux chief, opposes treaty with Gen. - Carrington, 7, 8; - revenge on, for massacre at Fort Phil Kearney, 39; - becomes leading war chief, 40; - surprised and disarmed by Gen. Mackenzie, 40 note; - his most thrilling adventure, 40, 41, note; - determines to capture Fort Phil Kearney, 41; - his attack, 46; - his baptism of fire, 51–56; - his losses in the attack on Capt. Powell’s wagon-corral, 58 - - Red Cloud Agency, 293 - - Rees, Indian auxiliaries, 238, 240, 267 - - Religious belief of Indians in regard to scalping, 91–92 note - - Reno, Major Marcus A., in the Big Horn country, 218; - Custer gives command to, 232; - record of, 232 note; - his advance, 234–236; - his failure at the Little Big Horn, 237–243; - plan of his defence on the bluff, 247; - his failure to press his attack, 260; - his report to Custer, 265; - further light on the conduct of Major Reno, 398–405 - - Reno’s Creek, 233, 253 - - Reynolds, Charlie, famous scout, killed with Custer, 258 - - Reynolds, Gen. Joseph J., surprises and takes Crazy Horse’s village, - 186 - - Riley, Lieut., killed, 258 - - Rodenbough, Gen., his “Sabre and Bayonet” quoted, 43, 44 - - Roman Nose, Indian chief, insolent speech of, 72, 73; - attacks Capt. Forsyth, 83–85; - charge of his five hundred warriors, 85–88; - killed, 87; - his tepee discovered by Capt. Carpenter, 105, 108, 109 - - Romero, Indian interpreter, 155, 167 - - Rosebud River, Crook’s advance against Indians on the, 189, 191–193; - battle of the, 193–198; - map of battle, 197; - Ex-Trooper Towne’s account of the battle on, 203–208 - - Rough Riders of ’68, the, 72–96 - - Royall, Col. William B., Fifth Cavalry, ordered to attack Indians on - Beaver Creek, 124; - given command under Gen. Crook, 188; - anecdote of, 188 note; - charges Indians at the Rosebud, 195, 196, 198 - - - _S_ - - Salt Lake, white settlements at, 5 - - Salt Lake trail, 59 - - Sample, Gen. Carrington’s orderly, reports on Fetterman’s command, 30 - - Sand Creek, 60 - - Sans Arc Indians attack Capt. Powell’s corral, 48 - - Santa Fé trail, 7 - - Satanta, Kiowa Indian chief, 164; - captured by Custer, 169 - - Savage warfare, 339–344 - - Savagery, the rights of, 6 - - Scalping, Indian belief in, 91–92 note - - Schlesinger, Sigmund, his bravery in Gen. Forsyth’s fight, 110; - Gen. Fry’s poem on, 110 note; - his story of the defense of Beecher’s Island, 113–122 - - Schwatka, Lieut., Arctic explorer, successful attack on Sioux by, 307 - - Second Cavalry, in tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney, 25, 60; - other engagements, 188, 195, 196, 312, 335 - - Settlers on Indian lands, 6–7 - - Seventh Cavalry, Gen. Custer in command of, 146; - formation of regiment, 147; - protects Kansas settlers, 148; - in Sheridan’s winter campaign, 150; - other engagements, 213, 218, 229, 293, 305, 355 - - Sheridan, Gen. Philip, attacks the Cheyenne Indians, 75; - inaugurates winter campaign against Indians, 150 - - Sheridan City, terminus of Union Pacific Railroad, 134 - - Sherman, Gen., advises ladies to join Gen. Carrington’s expedition, 11; - boy’s challenge to, 12; - acquits Gen. Carrington of all blame for disaster at Fort Phil - Kearney, 38 - - Short Nose Creek, 125, 127 - - Shoshone Indians, auxiliaries in Gen. Crook’s expedition, 190, 205 - - Sibley, Lieut. Frederick W., Third Cavalry, his scouting after Crazy - Horse, 298–303 - - Sioux Indians dispute the advance of the white man, 5; - Harney-Sanborne treaty with, 7; - accept valuable gifts from Gen. Carrington, 8; - invest Fort Phil Kearney under Red Cloud, 40–42; - wild charge of 46–51 - - Slim Buttes, South Dakota, Gen. Crook and Capt. Mills at, 304–309 - - Sitting Bull, Unkpapa Indian chief, his character, 183, 184; - out-generals Custer, 279; - in the sun dance, 282 note; - strategy of, 286; - at big feast after the Custer fight, 290; - sends letter to Col. Otis, 321; - interview with Gen. Miles, 323, 324; - attacked by Lieut. Baldwin, 326; - escapes to British Columbia, 332; - surrenders to United States army, 332; - a moving spirit in ghost dance uprising, 332; - killed by Indian police, 332 - - Smith, Capt. Gray Horse Troop, killed with Custer, 257 - - Smith, Captain E. W., Eighteenth Infantry, sends Gen. Terry’s - instructions to Gen. Custer, 220, 221 - - Smith, Major rescues Capt. Powell in wagon-corral fight, 56 - - Smyth, R. J., reminiscences of the Carrington Powder River Expedition, - 59–71 - - Snow, Bugler, shot, 206 - - South Pass, 5 - - South Platte River, 59 - - Spencer breech-loading carbine, 10, 25, 41, 67, 76 - - Spencer rifle, 132, 140, 159 - - Spotted Tail, Brulé Sioux chief, 8 - - Springfield muzzle-loading muskets, 10, 61, 64; - breech-loading rifles, modification of, 45 - - Standing Elk, Brulé Sioux chief, 8 - - Standing Rock, 282 - - Standing Rock Agency, Rain-in-the-Face captured at, 213 - - Stanley, Gen., sent on expedition to the Black Hills, 210 - - Stillwell, John, scout, 90; - adventures of, to rescue Gen. Forsyth, 97–112; - volunteers to go to Fort Wallace, 121; - studied law and became a judge, 122 note; - death of, 122 - - Sturgis, Lieut., killed, 258, 259 - - Sullivant Hills, 13, 14, 19, 24, 25 - - Summit Springs, Col., Gen. Carr’s fight with Tall Bull at, 170–179; - account of battle of, 173–179 - - Sun Dance, the, description of, 282 note - - - _T_ - - Tall Bull, Indian chief, Gen. Carr’s fight with at Summit Springs, - 170–179; - killed, 172, 177 - - Ten Eyck, Capt., sent to Capt. Fetterman’s relief, 29; - returns with tidings of disaster, 31 - - Tenth Cavalry (negro regiment), sent to the rescue of Gen. Forsyth, 100 - - Terry, Major-Gen. Alfred H., takes command of Custer’s column, 216; - did Custer obey orders? 219–228; - text of his letter to Custer, 220, 221; - his report to the Secretary of War on his orders to Custer, 225 note; - relieves Maj. Reno, 257; - finds Custer’s body, 257; - goes to relief of Col. Benteen, 276; - a discussion on his orders to Gen. Custer, 359–397 - - Third Cavalry, 188, 190, 193, 198, 205, 342 - - Thomas, W. Kent, the personal story of Rain-in-the Face by, 279–292 - - Thompson, Capt., Seventh Cavalry, 157 - - Thompson, David D., editor _Northwestern Christian Advocate_, on the - conduct of Major Reno, 398–400 - - Tongue River, a fork of the Yellowstone, 13, 20, 221, 265, 298, 319, - 326, 336; - Gen. Crook’s march to, 187–190, 192 - - Towne, Phineas, Ex-Trooper, on the Rosebud fight, 203–208 - - Trudeau, scout, 90; - adventures of, to rescue Gen. Forsyth, 97–112 - - Tullock’s Creek, 221, 226 - - Twenty-second Infantry, 326, 336 - - Twenty-seventh Regular Infantry in the Mountain District, 9; - detailed to protect wood-cutting party, 42 - - Twenty-third Infantry, attacked at Glendive, Montana, 321 - - - _U_ - - Union Pacific Rail-Road, building of, 7; - military posts along, 184 - - Unkpapa Indians attack Capt. Powell’s corral, 48 - - - _V_ - - Van Vliet, Capt., Third Cavalry, 190, 193, 195, 196 - - Varnum, Lieut., with Custer, 211, 267 - - Vroom, ——, Third Cavalry, 198, 201 - - - _W_ - - “Wagon Guns,” 69 - - Wagons made for defence in Indian wars, 43 - - Wallace, Lieut., 271, 272, 276 - - War Bonnet, (creek in South Dakota), the fight on the, 293–298 - - War Department censures Gen. Carrington unjustly, 70 - - Warfare against savages, 339–344 - - Washakie, Shoshone Indian chief, 198 - - Washita, battle of the, 146–169 - - Weir, Capt. of D troop, under Major Reno, 248, 275 - - Welch, J. E., letter of, to Col. H. O. Clark on battle of Summit - Springs, 173–179 - - West, Capt., Seventh Cavalry, 157, 159 - - Wheatley, civilian volunteer, 26; - killed, 35 - - White Antelope, Cheyenne chief, killed by Lieut. Sibley, 300 - - White Bull, scout, 336 - - “White Eagle,” name given to Gen. Carrington by Indians, 8 - - Whittaker, Capt. Frederick, his “Complete Life of General George A. - Custer,” quoted, 146; - extract from, 261 - - Willow Creek Cañon, Big Horn Mountains, Mackenzie attacks Cheyennes at, - 313 - - Winchester rifles, Sioux armed with, 41 - - Wolf Creek, Custer’s march down, 151 - - Wolf Mountains, Big Horn Range, 327 - - Women, in Gen. Carrington’s expedition, 11; - fate of, in Indian warfare, 11 - - Woodruff, Brig.-Gen. Charles A., on Custer’s Little Big Horn campaign, - 380–385 - - Wounded Knee, battle of, 352 - - - _Y_ - - Yanktonais, 282 - - Yates, Capt., assists in capture of Rain-in-the-Face, 214; - killed, 258 - - Yellow Hand, Indian chief, shot by Buffalo Bill, 296 - - Yellowstone expedition of 1873, 209–213 - - Yellowstone River, threaded with streams from the Big Horn Range, 5; - army post established on, 9 - - Yuma County, Col., Gen. Forsyth’s battlefield preserved in national - park there, 111 - - - THE McCLURE PRESS. NEW YORK - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES - - - 1. Changed “Gillore” to “Greene” on p. 413 per text. - 2. Silently corrected typographical errors. - 3. Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed. - 4. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. - 5. 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