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diff --git a/old/55144-0.txt b/old/55144-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index f5fbbc3..0000000 --- a/old/55144-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,28507 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the -International Military Tribunal, Volume VI, by Various - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Volume VI - Nuremburg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 - -Author: Various - -Release Date: July 18, 2017 [EBook #55144] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS--VOL VI *** - - - - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer, and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by TIA-US. - - - - - - - [Cover Illustration] - - - - - TRIAL - OF - THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS - - BEFORE - - THE INTERNATIONAL - MILITARY TRIBUNAL - - N U R E M B E R G - 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 - -[Illustration] - - P U B L I S H E D A T N U R E M B E R G , G E R M A N Y - 1 9 4 7 - - - - - This volume is published in accordance with the - direction of the International Military Tribunal by - the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction - of the Allied Control Authority for Germany. - - - - - VOLUME VI - - - - O F F I C I A L T E X T - - I N T H E - - ENGLISH LANGUAGE - - - - P R O C E E D I N G S - - 22 January 1946 — 4 February 1946 - - - - - CONTENTS - - Fortieth Day, Tuesday, 22 January 1946, - Morning Session 1 - Afternoon Session 26 - - Forty-first Day, Wednesday, 23 January 1946, - Morning Session 53 - Afternoon Session 84 - - Forty-second Day, Thursday, 24 January 1946, - Morning Session 111 - Afternoon Session 134 - - Forty-third Day, Friday, 25 January 1946, - Morning Session 158 - Afternoon Session 177 - - Forty-fourth Day, Monday, 28 January 1946, - Morning Session 203 - Afternoon Session 236 - - Forty-fifth Day, Tuesday, 29 January 1946, - Morning Session 268 - Afternoon Session 295 - - Forty-sixth Day, Wednesday, 30 January 1946, - Morning Session 329 - Afternoon Session 344 - - Forty-seventh Day, Thursday, 31 January 1946, - Morning Session 369 - Afternoon Session 393 - - Forty-eighth Day, Friday, 1 February 1946, - Morning Session 418 - Afternoon Session 447 - - Forty-ninth Day, Saturday, 2 February 1946, - Morning Session 476 - - Fiftieth Day, Monday, 4 February 1946, - Morning Session 505 - Afternoon Session 534 - - - - - FORTIETH DAY - Tuesday, 22 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -M. HENRY DELPECH (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. -President, Your Honors, I had the honor yesterday of beginning to -explain before the Tribunal the methods of economic spoliation of -Belgium by the Germans in the course of their occupation of the country. - -Coming back to what was said in the course of the general considerations -on economic pillage and on the behavior of the Germans in Norway and -Denmark and in Holland, I have been able to show that in all places the -determination to economic domination of National Socialism had -manifested itself. The methods were the same everywhere, at least in -their broad outlines. Therefore in immediate response to the wish -expressed yesterday by the Tribunal and to fulfill the mission entrusted -to the French Prosecution by the Belgian Government to plead its case -before your high jurisdiction, I shall confine myself to the main -outlines of the development, and I shall take the liberty of referring -to the details of the German seizure of Belgian production, to the text -of the report submitted to the Tribunal, and to the numerous documents -which are quoted in our document book. - -I have had the honor of calling your attention to the existence of the -black market in Belgium, its organization by the occupation troops, and -their final decision to suppress this black market. One may, with -respect to this, conclude, as has already been indicated in the course -of the general observations, that in spite of their claims it was not in -order to avoid inflation in Belgium that the German authorities led a -campaign against the black market. - -The day the Germans decided to suppress the black market, they loudly -proclaimed their anxiety to spare the Belgian economy and the Belgian -population the very serious consequences of the threatening inflation. -In reality, the German authorities intervened against the black market -in order to prevent its ever-growing extension from reaching the point -where it would absorb all the available merchandise and completely -strangle the official market. In a word, the survival of the official -market with its lower prices was finally much more profitable for the -army of occupation. - -I now come, gentlemen, to Page 46 of my presentation, to the third -Chapter—purchases which were regular in appearance; which had only one -aim, namely the subjugation of Belgian productive power. - -Carrying out their program of domination of the countries of Western -Europe as it had been established since before 1939, the Germans, from -the moment they entered Belgium in May 1940, took all the measures which -seemed to them appropriate to assure the subjugation of Belgian -production. - -No sector of Belgian economy was to be spared. If the pillage seems more -noticeable in the economic sphere, that is only because of the very -marked industrial character of Belgian economy. Agriculture and -transport were not to escape the German hold, and I propose to discuss -first the levies in kind in industry. - -Belgian industry was the first to be attacked. Thus, the military -commander in Belgium, in agreement with the various offices of the Reich -for raw materials and with the Office of the Four Year Plan and the -Ministry of Economics, drew up a program the purpose of which was to -convert almost the whole of Belgian production to the bellicose ends of -the Reich. Already on the 13th of September 1940 he was able to make -known to the higher authorities a series of plans for iron, coal, -textiles, and copper. I submit Exhibit Number RF-162 (Document Number -ECH-2) in support of this statement. - -Also a report by Lieutenant Colonel, Dr. Hedler, entitled “Change in -Economic Direction,” states that from 14 September 1940 the Army -Ordnance Branch sent to its subordinate formations the following -instructions, to be found in the document book under Exhibit Number -RF-163 (Document Number ECH-84). I read the last paragraph of Page 41 of -the German text: - - “I attach the greatest importance to the proposition that the - factories in the occupied western territories, Holland, Belgium, - and France, be utilized as much as possible to ease the strain - on the German armament production and to increase the war - potential. Enterprises located in Denmark are also to be - employed to an increasing extent for subcontracts. In doing so - the operational directives of the regulation of the Reich - Marshal as well as the regulations concerning the economy of raw - materials in the occupied territories are to be strictly - observed.” - -All these arrangements quickly enabled the Germans to control and to -direct Belgium’s whole production and distribution for the German war -effort. - -The decree of 27 May 1940, VOBEL Number 2, submitted as Document Number -RF-164, established commodity control offices whose task was—and I -quote from the third paragraph: - - “. . . to issue, in compliance with Army Group directives, - general regulations or individual orders to enterprises which - are producing, dealing with, or using controlled commodities, in - order to regulate production and ensure just distribution and - rational utilization while keeping to the place of work, as far - as possible.” - -Article 4 of the same text indicated in detail the powers of these -commodity control offices, and in particular they were given the right: - - “To force enterprises to sell their products to specified - purchasers; to forbid or require the utilization of certain raw - materials; to subject to their approval every sale or purchase - of commodities.” - -To conceal more effectively their real objective, the Germans gave these -commodity control offices independence and the status of a corporation. -Thus, there were set up 11 commodity control offices which embraced the -whole economy except coal, the direction of which was left under the -Belgian Office of Coal. Exhibit Number RF-165 (Document Number ECH-3), -gives proof of this. - -The execution of the regulations was ensured by a series of texts -promulgated by the Belgian authorities in Brussels. They issued in -particular a decree dated 3 September 1940, by virtue of which Belgian -organizations took over again the offices which the Germans gave up. - -These offices were to experience various vicissitudes. Although -originating from the Belgian Ministry of Economics, they were closely -controlled by the German military command. In this way, the seizure of -Belgian production was completed by the appointment of “Commissioners of -Enterprises,” under the ordinance of 29 April 1941, submitted as -Document Number RF-166. Article 2 of this text defines the powers of the -commissioners: - - “The duty of the Commissioner is to set or keep in motion the - enterprise under his charge, to ensure the systematic - fulfillment of orders, and to take all measures which increase - the output.” - -The decline of the commodity control offices began with an ordinance -dated 6 August 1942, establishing the principle providing for the -prohibition of manufacturing certain products or for ordering the use of -certain raw materials. This ordinance is to be found in the document -book under Document Number RF-167. Supervision of the commodity control -offices was soon organized by the appointment to each of them of a -German Commissioner, selected by the competent Reichsstelle. - -From the last months of 1943 on, the “Rüstungsobmann” Office of the -Armament and War Production Ministry (Speer), acquired the habit of -passing its orders direct, without having recourse to the channel of the -commodity control offices. - -Even before this date measures had been taken to prevent any initiative -that was not in accord with the German war aims. Further and even before -the above ordinance of 6 August 1942, the ordinance of 30 March 1942 -should be mentioned, which made the establishment or extension of -commercial enterprises subject to previous authorization by the military -commissioner. - -In the report of the military administration in Belgium that has already -been cited, the chief of the administrative staff, Reeder, specifies in -Exhibit Number RF-169 (Document Number ECH-335) that for the period of -January to March 1943 alone, out of 2,000 iron works, 400 were closed -down for working irrationally or being useless to the war aims. The -closing of these factories seems to have been caused less by the concern -for a rational production than by the cunning desire to obtain cheaply -valuable tools and machines. - -In this connection, it is appropriate to point to the establishment of a -Machine Pool Office. The above quoted report of the military -administration in Belgium, in the 11th section, Pages 56 and following, -is particularly significant in this respect. Here is an extract from the -German text, the last lines of the last paragraph of Page 56, in the -French translation, the last lines . . . - -THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): That passage you -read about the Defendant Raeder, was that from Document 169 or 170? - -M. DELPECH: Mr. President, I spoke yesterday of the chief of the -administration section, Reeder. He was section chief in Brussels. He has -no connection with the defendant here. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see, very well. - -M. DELPECH: Exhibit Number RF-171 (Document Number ECH-10), second -paragraph of the French text. The paragraph concerns the Machine Pool -transactions: - - “Proof may be seen by a brief glance at the pool operations - dealt with and actually carried out. Altogether 567 demands have - been dealt with, to a total value of 4.6 million Reichsmark.” - -Reeder then gave a number of figures. I shall pass over these and I come -to the end of the first paragraph, Page 57 in the German text: - - “The legal basis for the requisition of these machines was the - Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 52 and 53. The formulation of - the Hague Convention which provides for requisitions only for - the benefit and the needs of the occupying power, applied to the - circumstances of the year 1907, that is, to a time when war - actions were confined within narrowly restricted areas and - practically the military front alone was involved in war - operations. In view of such space restrictions for war, it was - evident that the provisions of the Hague Convention, stipulating - that requisitions be made solely for the needs of the occupying - power, were sufficient for the conduct of operations. Modern - war, however, which by its expansion to total war is no longer - bound by space but has developed into a general struggle of - peoples and economies, requires that while the regulations of - the Hague Convention should be maintained, there should be a - sensible interpretation of its principles adapted to the demands - of modern warfare.” - -I pass to the end of this quotation: - - “Whenever, in requisitioning, reference was made to the - ordinance of the military commander of 6 August 1942, this was - done in order to give the Belgian population the necessary - interpretation of the meaning of the principle of the - requisition regulations of the Hague Convention.” - -Such an interpretation may leave jurists wondering, who have not been -trained in the school of National Socialism. It cannot in any case -justify the pillage of industry and the subjugation of Belgian -production. - -These few considerations show how subtle and varied were the methods -employed by the Germans to attain their aims in the economic sphere. In -the same way as the preceding statements on clearing operations and the -utilization of occupation costs, they make it possible to specify the -methods employed for exacting heavy levies from the Belgian economy. - -Whereas in certain spheres, as in agriculture and transport, it has been -possible to assess the extent of economic pillage with a certain -exactitude, there are, however, numerous industrial sectors where -assessments cannot yet be made. It is true that a considerable part of -the industrial losses correspond to the clearing operations, -particularly through requisition of stocks. It will therefore be -necessary to confine ourselves to the directives of the policy practiced -by the Germans. - -We may examine briefly the way in which economic spoliation took place -in three sectors: industry, agriculture, and transport. - -First the industrial sector: The clearing statistics, in the first -place, give particulars of the total burdens imposed upon the various -industrial branches. - -The report of the military administration in Belgium, to which I shall -refer constantly, gives the following details, briefly summarized: - -From the very beginning of the occupation the Germans demanded an -inventory of supplies on which they were to impose considerable levies, -notably textiles and non-ferrous metals. - -I shall confine myself to some brief remarks on textiles and non-ferrous -metals. The example of the textiles industry is particularly revealing: -On the eve of the invasion, the Belgian textile industry, with its -165,000 workers, was the second largest industry in Belgium after the -metal industry. Under the pretext of avoiding the exhaustion of the very -important supplies then still available, an ordinance of 27 July 1940 -prohibited the textile industry to work at more than 30 percent of its -1938 capacity. For the period from May to December 1940 alone -requisitions were not less than 1,000 million Belgian francs. They -particularly affected nearly half of the wool stock available in the -country on May 10, 1940, and nearly one-third of the stock of raw -cotton. - -On the other hand, the forced closing down of factories constituted for -the Germans an excellent excuse for taking away, on the pretext of -hiring, unused equipment, unless it was requisitioned at a cheap price. -The ordinance of 7 September 1942, which is to be found in the document -book under Document Number RF-174, laid down the manner in which -factories were to be closed in execution of the right accorded to the -occupation authorities; and it also gave the right to dissolve certain -business and industrial groups and to order their liquidation. -Consolidation of enterprises was the pretext given. In the month of -January 1944, 65 percent of the textile factories had been stopped. - -I shall not go into the details of these operations and I shall pass on -to Page 58. The report of the German military administration quoted -above gives particularly significant figures as to production. Of a -total output of the wool industry of 72,000 tons for the entire period -May 1940 to the end of June 1944, representing a value of about 397 -million Reichsmark, the distribution of the deliveries between the -German and Belgian markets is the following: The German market, 64,700 -tons, 314 million Reichsmark; the Belgian market, 7,700 tons, 83 million -Reichsmark. The whole spoliation of the textile industry is contained in -these figures. - -Belgian consumption obviously had to suffer a great deal from the German -policy of direction of the textile market. The same report of the -military administration furnishes details, stating that in 1938 the -needs in textile products amounted in Belgium to a monthly average of -twelve kilos. The respective figures for the occupation years are the -following: 1940 to 1941—2.1 kilos per head, 1941 to 1942—1.4, 1942 to -1943—1.4, 1943 to 1944—0.7. The diminution of Belgian consumption -under the Germans is contained in these two figures; twelve kilos per -head in 1938; 0.7 kilo at the end of the occupation. - -On the other side, the Belgian Government gives the following details on -the pillage of this produce. Compulsory deliveries to Germany during the -occupation amounted to: - -Cotton yarn, about 40 percent of the production; linen, 75 percent; -rayon, 15 percent. - -Finally, out of the textile stocks remaining in Belgium a great -percentage was still taken away by the Germans through purchases on the -Belgian markets, purchases of finished or manufactured products. The -equivalent of these forced deliveries can generally be found in the -clearing statistics, unless it is placed under misrepresented occupation -costs. - -I have finished with textiles. As to the non-ferrous metal industry, -Belgium was in 1939 the largest producer in Europe of non-ferrous -metals, of copper, lead, zinc, and tin. The statistics included in the -report of the military command, which are to be found in Exhibit Number -RF-173 (Document Number ECH-11), will furnish the evidence for the -Tribunal. - -On the 18th of February 1941, in connection with the Four Year Plan, the -Reich Office for Metals and the Supreme Command of the Army worked out a -“metal” plan which provided for Belgian consumption; the carrying out of -German orders; exports to the Reich. - -These various measures did not satisfy the occupying authorities so they -ran a certain number of salvage campaigns which were called “special -actions” (Sonderaktionen) in accordance with the method they applied in -all the countries of Western Europe. I shall not go into the details of -these actions which are described on Page 63 and following of the -report; the salvage campaigns for bells, for printing lead, for lead and -copper—from information given by the Belgian Government, Document -Number RF-146, Page 65 of the report. - -In other fields, but without admitting it, the Germans pursued a policy -intended to eliminate or to restrict Belgian competition, so that in -case of a German victory the economic branches concerned would have had -to restrict themselves to the Belgian market, which would then have -remained wide open to German business. - -These attempts at immediate or future suppression of competition were -clearly evident in the case of foundries, glass works, textile -industries, construction works, car assembling, construction of material -for narrow-gauge railroads, the leather industry, and especially -shoe-manufacturing, for which reconstruction of destroyed factories was -systematically prohibited. - -But in addition, in the textile industry as well as in numerous sectors, -especially in the iron-smelting industry, the weakening of the economy -cannot be measured only by the scale of the compulsory deliveries but in -relation to the policy practiced by the occupying power. Belgian -industry, especially coal and iron, suffered considerable losses as a -result of directives imposed to finance the war needs at a cheaper rate. - -I shall pass over the question of prices of coal. The control of the -coal industry was assured by the appointment of a plenipotentiary for -coal and by centralization of all sales in the hands of a single -organism, the “single seller,” under Belgian direction but with a German -commissioner. I am referring to the Belgian coal office, one seller to a -single purchaser, “Rheinisch Westfälisches Kohlensyndikat,” which -ordered deliveries to be made to the Reich, to Alsace-Lorraine and -Luxembourg. - -According to the same German report, Page 67, in spite of the rise in -the price of coal agreed to on 20 August 1940, 1 January 1941, and 1 -January 1943, the coal industry showed considerable losses in the course -of the occupation years. In February 1943, the coal office having agreed -to an increase of the sales price, the price per ton for the Belgian -coal was higher than on the German home market. The German commissioner -for the mining industry forced the Belgian industry to pay the -difference in rate when exporting to the Reich by means of premiums. - -From the figures indicated in Exhibits Numbers RF-176 (Document Number -ECH-35) and 178 (Document Numbers ECH-26 and 27), the Tribunal may -gather information as to the financial losses caused by exploitation. -The report of the military administration gives in its eleventh section -details regarding the iron-smelting industry: It suffered as greatly as -had the coal industry during the occupation. In the Thomas smelting -works in particular, the losses resulted from the increase in the cost -price and from price fluctuations in respect to certain elements -pertaining to the manufacture. - -In this one sector, according to the memorandum of the Belgian -Government, the respective losses may be assessed at 3,000 million -Belgian francs. Still, according to the same report, out of a total -production of 1,400,000 tons, 1,300,000 tons of various products were -exported to Germany not including the metal delivered to Belgian -factories working exclusively for Germany. - -According to information furnished by the Belgian Government, the -Germans removed in bulk and transported to Germany material of very -great value. The total industrial spoliation is estimated by the Belgian -Government at a sum of 2,000 million Belgian francs, at the 1940 rate, -of course. - -These removals constitute a real material loss; and from the fragmentary -indications given to the Tribunal, this sum of 2,000 million Belgian -francs is the figure which I ask the Tribunal to note. - -In view of the information available at present it is not easy to -estimate the extent of the levies made on industry; it is even more -difficult to evaluate it in the agricultural sphere, which I shall -briefly present. - -Apart from the admissible needs of the occupation troops, the German -authorities made an effort to obtain a supplement to the food levies in -Belgium for the purpose of increasing the food of the Reich and other -territories occupied by its troops. After having employed direct methods -of levying, the Germans used the services of unscrupulous agents whose -job it was to purchase at any price on the illicit markets; and the -black market in this field assumed such proportions that the occupying -authorities were frequently alarmed and in 1943 had to suppress it. - -Apart from the damage to livestock and to the woods and forests, which -play an important part in Belgium, the damage resulting from abnormal -cutting in the forests brought about an excess in deforestation reaching -a figure of 2 million tons; the damage to capital caused by this -premature cutting can be estimated at about 200 million Belgian francs. - -The military operations proper caused damage to an extent of 100 million -Belgian francs; and according to the memorandum of the Belgian -Government, the total damage caused to forestry reaches a figure of 460 -million Belgian francs. Taking into account the damage caused by -abnormal cutting in the forests and by the establishment of airfields, -the Belgian Government estimates at approximately 1,000 million Belgian -francs the losses suffered by its agriculture during the occupation. - -It must be noted, without going further into this subject, that these -are net losses in capital, constituting a veritable exhaustion of -substance and a consequent reduction and real consumption of the -nation’s resources. With this I have concluded my presentation -concerning agriculture, and I pass on to transport. - -The conduct of war led the Germans to utilize to the utmost the railroad -network and the canal and river system of Belgium. The result was that -the railroads and river fleet are included in those branches of Belgian -economy which suffered most from the occupation and the hostilities -which took place on Belgian soil. German traffic was simultaneously a -traffic of personnel as demanded by military operations and a traffic of -merchandise, coal, minerals, pit-props, foodstuffs, not to speak of the -considerable quantities of construction material required for the -fortification of the coast of the North Sea. - -Railroads: The report of the Belgian Government shows that the damages -suffered by the railroads consisted of losses in capital as well as of -losses in revenue. Losses in capital resulted first and principally from -requisitions and removals, to which the Germans proceeded in a wholesale -fashion from the moment of their entry into Belgium. Thus in particular -they immediately drained the stock of locomotives under the pretext of -recovering German locomotives surrendered to Belgium after the war of -1914-1918 as a means of reparation. - -In addition to seizures of locomotives, the Belgian National Railroad -Company was subjected to numerous requisitions of material, sometimes -under the form of rental; these requisitions are estimated at 4,500 -million francs at the 1940 value. - -Against the losses in capital, losses in revenue (Page 77) resulted -principally from the free transportation service required by the -Wehrmacht, also from the price policy pursued by the occupying power. -These levies and these exceptional costs could be borne by the -organizations concerned only by making large drains on the treasury. - -Regarding automobiles, I shall say hardly anything (Page 79). The losses -amount to about 3,000 million Belgian francs, out of which individuals -received as compensation for requisition approximately 1,000 million (at -the 1938 value). - -We come now to river transport: The carrying out of the plan for the -economic spoliation of Belgium presented the occupying power with -serious transportation problems, to which I have already called -attention. - -In this sphere the German military administration imposed upon Belgian -river shipping very heavy burdens. According to the report of the -Belgian Government, the losses suffered by the Belgian river fleet took -three forms: Requisitions and removals by the Germans; partial or total -damage through military operations; excessive deterioration of material. -These three forms of damage amount to 500 million francs, of which only -100 million are represented in clearing. Damage to waterways (Page 81), -rivers, streams, and canals, can be evaluated at between 1,500 million -to 2,000 million francs, at the 1940 value, especially with respect to -requisitions and removals of public or private harbor installations. - -Fishing boats were requisitioned for marking the river Scheldt and then -disappeared without leaving any trace. Others suffered damage through -requisitions or hire for military maneuvers. - -Before closing this chapter concerned with levies in kind, the question -of removal of industrial material may be briefly mentioned (Page 82). - -It has already been pointed out that the policy of production and -reorganization as pursued by the military administration had as a result -the closing of numerous enterprises, thus enabling the Germans to seize -a great number of machines under the pretext that they were out of use. - -There are no branches of industry which were not despoiled in this way. -The metal industry seems now to be one of those that suffered most. -Though we do not wish to try the patience of the Tribunal, it seems -particularly pertinent to draw its attention briefly to the actual -technique used in the organization of the levies, details which were -decided upon even before the entry of German troops into the territories -of Western Europe, organization putting into play military formations, -organization emanating from the economy bureau of the General Staff of -the Army and hence from the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW. - -The existence of these military detachments, veritable pillaging -detachments, is proved by various German documents. Under the name of -economic detachments, “Wirtschaftstrupps,” or special commandos, these -pillaging crews carried out nefarious and illegal activities in all the -countries of Western Europe. - -The secret instructions for the “economic detachment J,” stationed at -Antwerp, are found in the file under Document Number RF-183. They -constitute a very important, irrefutable document on the German -intention to pillage and an additional proof of the contempt of the -National Socialist leaders for the rules of international law. - -These instructions date from the last days of May 1940. I should like to -read a few excerpts of these instructions to the Tribunal (Document -Number RF-183, Page 1). - - “The economic detachments are formed by the office for economic - armament of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. They are placed - at the disposal of the High Command of the Army for employment - in the countries to be occupied.” - -I shall skip to the bottom of Page 1 of the German document. - - “It is their task to gain information quickly and completely in - their districts of the scarce and rationed goods (raw materials, - semi-finished products, mineral oil, _et cetera_) and machines - of most vital importance for the purposes of national defense - and to make a correct return of these stocks. - - “In the case of machines, the requisition will be effected by - means of a label, in the case of scarce and rationed goods, both - by labelling and by guarding. - - “Furthermore, the economic detachments have the duty of - preparing and, upon order of the Army Group, of carrying out the - removal of scarce and rationed goods, mineral oils, and the most - important machines. These tasks are the exclusive responsibility - of the economic detachments. - - “The economic detachments are to commence their activities in - newly occupied territories as early as the battle situation - permits.” - -Machines and raw materials having thus been found and identified, the -new organizations went into action to dismantle and put to use these -machines and raw materials in Germany. - -The above quoted document RF-183 gives precise and very curious -information on the formation and the strength of detachment “J” at -Antwerp. The eight officers are all reserve officers, engineers, -wholesale dealers, directors of mines, importers of raw materials, -engineering consultants. Their names and their professions are mentioned -in the document. These men are therefore all specialists in commerce and -industry. The choice of these technicians cannot be attributed to mere -chance. - -According to the above instructions and more especially the instructions -found under date of 10 May 1940, coming from General Hannecken (Exhibit -Number RF-184), Document Number ECH-33, once the machines and the stocks -have been identified, the offices set to work, the Roges on one hand, -and the compensation bureaus on the other hand, to whose activities -attention has already been called in connection with the pillage of -Holland and of the Belgian non-ferrous metal industry. - -Another document, which is likewise presented as Exhibit Number RF-184 -(Document Number ECH-33), shows that the very composition of the -economic detachments emanates from the High Command. Quoting from Page -6: - - “The economic detachments already mentioned in Section I, which - are composed of experts for the branches of industry found in - the respective areas, shall gain information and secure stocks - of raw materials and special machinery for the production of - ammunition and war equipment which are at present important.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that quotation set out in your dossier? - -M. DELPECH: The quotation is on Page 84, bis. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. DELPECH: Besides the economic detachments to which I have just drawn -the attention of the Tribunal, detailed to remove and redistribute -machinery either to factories working in the country on behalf of the -occupying power or to factories in Germany, these operations were -directed by the Machine Pool Office. - -Such offices were set up in all the occupied territories of Western -Europe during the last months of 1942, upon the order of the Minister -for Armaments and War Production, for example, the Defendant Speer, and -the Office of the Four Year Plan, for example, the Defendant Göring. - -The Machine Pool Office for Belgium and Northern France was set up upon -the decision of the Chief of the Military Economic Section in Brussels -under date of 18 February 1943. Its activity has already been outlined -to the Tribunal in connection with the spoliation of non-ferrous metal -industries. Its activity did not stop there; it is found in all branches -of industry. The Exhibit Number RF-185 (Document ECH-29) can give us -figures on its activity. This activity continued to the very last days -of the occupation. Requisitions of machinery and instruments were not -limited to industry; Documents Numbers ECH-16 and ECH-15 (Exhibits -Numbers RF-193 and 194) show the extent of the requisitioning of -scientific instruments. - -I have finished with the levies on industrial material. - -I shall present briefly in the fourth chapter the question of services, -first of all: - -1. The billeting of troops. By an ordinance dated 17 December 1940, Page -88, the Germans imposed the costs of billeting their troops upon -Belgium. Having done this, the occupation authorities justified -themselves by a rather liberal interpretation of Article 52 of the Hague -Convention, according to the provisions of which the occupying power may -require levies in kind and in services. - -The Wetter report (Document Number RF-186) wrongly contends that the -Convention does not specify by whom the settlement should be made; -Article 49 gives the right to make the occupied country defray the -expenses. - -Therefore Belgium had to meet expenses to the amount of 5,900 million -francs for billeting costs, equipment, and furniture. The payments of -the Belgian treasury for billeting is estimated in the report of the -Belgian Military Administration at 5,423 million francs. - -It is evident that under the pretext of billeting costs, other expenses -were entered to the detriment of the Belgian economy, as in other -occupied countries—the purchases of furniture which was to be sent to -Germany. - -2. Transport and Communications. - -To assure transport and communications, the Belgian treasury had to -advance a total of 8,000 million francs. As already pointed out to the -Tribunal, the seizure by the occupation authorities covered even the -river fleet to the extent that the transport plan restricted the use of -rail to the operation troops. - -According to Article 53 of the Hague Convention, the occupying army has -the right to seize means of transport and communications provided that -it returns them and pays indemnity. That army, however, does not possess -the right to make the occupied country pay the costs of transport put at -the army’s disposal. That is, however, what Germany did in Belgium. - -3. Labor. - -The deportation of labor to Germany and forced labor in Belgium have -already been explained to the Tribunal. It therefore seems unnecessary -to stress this point (Page 91). At the most, we should recall certain -consequences unfavorable to the Belgian economy. The measures concerning -the deportation of labor caused an economic disorganization and -weakening without precedent. - -Secondly, the departure of workers and particularly of skilled workers -inadequately replaced by unskilled labor—women, adolescents and -pensioners—brought about a decrease in production at the same time as -an increase in the cost price, which contributed to complicating the -problem of the financial equilibrium of industrial enterprises. - -Third observation: The requisition of labor was the cause of political -and social discontent owing to the dispersion of families and the -inequalities which appeared in the requisition of workers. - -Fourth and last observation: The workers were required for spheres of -work which were not necessarily their own, which resulted in a loss of -their professional skill. Personnel were divided and unclassed. The -closing of artisan workshops brought about changes more or less felt in -certain branches of production. The losses thus suffered cannot be -measured in terms of money, but they are none the less important to be -submitted to your jurisdiction. - -I have finished with this subject and will turn to a last chapter, -Chapter V, the acquisition of Belgian investments in foreign industrial -enterprises. - -Since 1940 according to their general policy in all occupied countries -of Western Europe, the Germans concerned themselves with acquiring -shares in Belgian financial enterprises abroad. The official German -point of view emerges clearly from a letter dated 29 July 1941, from the -Minister of Finance to the Military Commander in Belgium. I have -submitted it under Number 187, in the document book (Document Number -RF-187). - -This conception of the right to acquire shares is certainly very far -from the idea as laid down by the Hague Convention in respect to the -right of requisition. It clearly shows the German leaders’ determination -for enrichment at the expense of Belgium. - -Thus, the Germans, since May 1940, sought to obtain influence in Belgian -holding companies. Not being able to violate directly international -laws, particularly Article 46 of the Hague Convention, they strove to -influence the members of the executive boards through persuasion rather -than by force. - -In the course of a conference held on 3 May 1940 at the Reich Ministry -of Economics, dealing with Belgian and Dutch capital which it would -still be possible to acquire, it was decided that the Military Commander -in Belgium should take all necessary measures to prevent, on the one -hand, the destruction, transfer, sale, and illegal holding of all bonds -and stocks of these countries and, on the other hand, to induce Belgian -capitalists to hand over their foreign securities to the Germans. The -minutes of this conference are found in the document book under Number -RF-187 above. - -To prevent the flight of any capital, an ordinance of 17 June 1940 was -promulgated, subjecting to authorization the sending abroad of any -securities and any acquisitions or disposal of foreign securities. - -From 2 August 1940 the German leaders and the Defendant Göring himself -took a definite stand on this point. In the course of the general -remarks on economic plundering secret directives issued in this respect -by the Defendant Göring were read to you. It is the document submitted -under Number RF-105 (Page 97). - -In spite of the German assurances and in spite of the wish of the -occupying power to preserve the appearance of regularity, the German -desire to absorb certain shares met with serious resistance. The -occupation authorities several times had to resort to compulsion to -conclude sales, in spite of the rights which they had reserved for -themselves in the above cited decree of 27 August 1940. This was -particularly the case with regard to the shares held by the Belgian -Metal Trust in the electrical enterprises of Eastern Silesia and, still -more clearly, the case regarding the shares of the Austrian Metal -Company, which at that time were wanted by the Hermann Göring Works. - -The Belgian ill-will increased as the German determination to pillage -became more evident. In this report of 1 December 1942, Exhibit Number -RF-191 (Document Number ECR-132), the German Commissioner with the -National Bank very clearly denounces this resistance on the part of the -Belgian market. Almost all acquisitions which could be realized by the -Germans were settled by means of clearing (Page 98). - -The balance of clearing capital credited to Belgium, to the amount of -1,000 million Belgian francs on 31 August 1944, represents a forced loan -imposed upon Belgium without any legal or logical relation to occupation -costs, unless it is the Germans’ will to hegemony. - -Such a practice, contrary to the principles of international law and to -the rules of criminal law of civilized nations, falls under Article 6(b) -of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and constitutes an -act of pillage of public or private property such as is envisaged in the -above-mentioned text. - -Closely allied to the acquisition of shares and always within the -framework of legality, the levies made by the German authorities on -foreign, enemy, and Jewish property, should be pointed out to the -Tribunal. - -As to foreign property seized by the Germans, it must be mentioned that -this measure was applied to French capital in Belgium in spite of -numerous protests by the French Government. As to Jewish property, for -the years 1943 and 1944, the figures are presented in Document Number -ECH-35 (Exhibit Number RF-192). - -With this I conclude the presentation of the economic spoliation of -Belgium (Page 100). - -The damage caused to Belgian economy in its principal branches have just -been submitted to the Tribunal. The statistical data have been taken -either from German reports or from official reports of the Belgian -Government. The available estimates and figures are not yet sufficiently -exact to fix the costs of war, the occupation and economic spoliation of -Belgium; some losses and damages cannot be expressed in money. Among -them, first of all, we must mention the privations resulting from the -German commandeering of a large part of food supplies and from the -particular situation of billeting and clothing. This purely material -aspect of the question should not cause us to overlook the consequences -of the occupation upon the public health (Page 103). For lack of -statistical data, it is difficult to show precisely the final state of -public health resulting from the particular circumstances. - -One fact, however, must be remembered: The considerable increase in the -number of persons who were eligible for special invalid diets. This -number rose from 2,000 a month in 1941 to more than 25,000 a month in -1944. It had, therefore, increased more than tenfold, in spite of the -rationing measures which became more and more severe. - -This increase in nutritional aid given to sick persons deserves the -attention of the Tribunal, less for itself and for its statistical -interest, than because it is the indication of the increase of disease -in Belgium. This increase is itself the result of the undernourishment -of the population during the four years of occupation. - -This deplorable state of affairs, however, had not escaped the attention -of the occupation authorities, as appears from the letter of the -Military Commander in Belgium already quoted which is found in the -document book under Document Number RF-187: - - “Regarding the food situation in Belgium, neither the minimum - for existence for the civilian population is secured nor the - minimum amount necessary for feeding heavy laborers who are - employed solely in the interest of the German war economy.” - -I shall not dwell on this. This undernourishment of the Belgian -population has been the inevitable and the most serious result of the -huge levies made by the occupation authorities who willfully disregarded -the elementary requirements of an occupied country in order to pursue -only the war aims of the Reich. - -The lowering of the average standard of health and the rise in the death -rate in Belgium from 1940 to 1945 may therefore be rightly considered -the direct result of the spoliations committed by the Germans in Belgium -in transgression of international law. - -I have concluded the presentation on Belgium. - -I would like to make a few brief remarks on the economic pillaging of -Luxembourg (Page 106). - -Supplementing the presentation on Belgium it is fitting to present to -the Tribunal some details on the conduct of the Germans in Luxembourg. -The Government of the Grand Duchy has submitted a general summary of its -accusations which has been lodged with the Tribunal as Document Number -UK-77 and in which an extract covering the crimes against property, the -economic section, is in the document book under the Number RF-194. - -The Germans, shortly after their entry into the Grand Duchy, proceeded -to annex it in fact. This attitude, similar enough to that adopted -towards the inhabitants of the Departments of Moselle, Bas-Rhin, and -Haut-Rhin, calls for some remarks. - -As was their wont, one of the first measures they put into effect was -the exchange of the Luxembourg money at the rate of 10 Luxembourg francs -to 1 mark. This was the subject of the ordinance of 26 August 1940, to -be found in the document book under Number 195 (Document Number RF-195). -This rate of exchange did not correspond to the respective purchasing -power of the two currencies. It constituted a considerable levy on the -wealth of the inhabitants and especially assured the Germans of a -complete seizure of the monies. It thus procured for them the means for -seizing a considerable part of the reserves of raw materials and -manufactured goods of the country. The purchases were paid for in -depreciated marks on the basis of controlled prices imposed by the -Germans. - -Finally, by the Ordinance of 29 January 1941, the Reichsmark was -introduced as the only legal tender (ordinance submitted as Document -Number RF-196). The Luxembourg francs and the Reichskreditkasse notes -were taken out of circulation, as well as Belgian francs, up to then -considered as currency of the Franco-Luxembourg monetary union. All of -these became foreign currency, as from 5 February 1941. - -I should like to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that of -all the countries occupied by Germany, Luxembourg is, like Alsace and -Lorraine, one of the few countries which was totally deprived of its -national currency. - -Moreover, to procure for the Reich the financial means necessary for the -prosecution of the war, the ordinance of 27 August 1940 (Document Number -RF-197) prescribed compulsory delivery of gold and foreign currency. -Moreover, the same ordinance stipulated that foreign shares and bonds -had to be offered for sale to the Reichsbank at rates and under -conditions fixed by the occupying power. - -As has already been pointed out, the Germans seized industrial stocks. -In this respect, the report dated 21 May 1940, on the economic situation -in Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, contains information on the stocks -found in the country: - -1,600 million tons of iron ore; 125,000 tons of manganese; 10,000 tons -of crude iron; 10,000 tons of ferro-manganese; 36,000 tons of plated -products and finished products, and I could continue this enumeration. -The German seizure spread from stocks to the management of the -industrial production. - -According to the memorandum presented by the Reparations Commission of -the Luxembourg Government, Document Number RF-198, the total economic -damages amount to 5,800 million Luxembourg francs at the 1933 value. -This figure can be analyzed as follows: - -Industry and commerce, 1,900 million; Railroads, 200 million; Roads and -Highways, 100 million; Agriculture, 1,600 million; Damage to property in -general, 1,900 million. - -From the same official source, the total loss in capital represents -about 33 percent of the national wealth of Luxembourg, before the war -estimated at approximately 5,000 million Luxembourg francs. - -The effect on the financial and monetary situation of the country was a -loss exceeding 6,000 million Luxembourg francs. In these damages the -increase in circulation of money and the amount of forced investments in -Germany—more than 4,800 million Luxembourg francs—as well as an -additional charge imposed upon the taxpayers of the Grand Duchy -following the introduction of the German fiscal system figure -particularly. To these burdens must be added the skimming of profits, -fines, and the allegedly voluntary gifts of every kind imposed upon -Luxembourg. - -Similar to what was done in other countries, the Ordinance of 21 -February 1941 (Document Number RF-199, Exhibit Number RF-199 of the -document book concerning Luxembourg) provided that no German managers -could be appointed in large enterprises, particularly in smelting works, -who—and this is the text of the ordinance—“would not be prepared to -favor the interests of Germanism in every circumstance.” - -The task of these commissioners was to insure for the Reich, within the -scope of the Four Year Plan, the direction and control of exploitation -in the exclusive interest of the German war effort. Thus, on 2 August -1940, the “Reichskommissar” for the administration of enemy property -appointed to the largest metal company in Luxembourg, the United Steel -Works of Burbach-Eich-Dudelange (Arbed), three German commissioners who -ensured the complete control of the company. Neither did other large -companies escape this domination as can be seen from the documents -submitted to the Tribunal under Number 200 (Document Number RF-200). - -The spoliation of Luxembourg and foreign interests in the insurance -field, one of the most important branches of Luxembourg’s activities, -was complete. With the exception of three Swiss companies and a German -company, all transactions were prohibited to the Luxembourg companies, -whose assets were transferred to German insurance companies—in an -official way as regards the national companies, and secretly as regards -the foreign companies. - -The insurance companies of Luxembourg were deprived of the premiums from -fire insurance by the introduction of compulsory fire insurance, for -which the German companies were given the monopoly. - -Introducing in Luxembourg their racial policy, the National Socialists -seized and confiscated all Jewish property in the Grand Duchy to the -profit of the “Verwaltung für die Judenvermögen” (Administration of -Jewish Property). - -Also in regard to the Umsiedlungspolitik (resettlement policy), 1,500 -families (that is 7,000 Luxembourg persons) were deported. The Germans -took possession of their property. A German trust company, set up in the -German Office for Colonization and Germanization, was charged with the -administration of this property, and, in fact, set about to liquidate -it. Important assets were thus confiscated and transferred to the Reich. - -Germans from the Tyrol were, as has already been pointed out, installed -in the buildings, and industrial, commercial, and artisan enterprises of -the deportees. - -That is to say, Your Honors, that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was the -victim of economic pillage as systematically organized as that in -Belgium. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Delpech, the Tribunal is grateful to you for the way -in which you have performed the task which they asked you to perform -last night, a task which is not altogether easy, of shortening the -address which you had intended to make. As far as they are able to -judge, no essential parts of your address have been omitted. It is of -great importance that the Trial should be conducted, as the Charter -indicates, in an expeditious way, and it was for this reason that the -Tribunal asked you, if you could, to shorten your address. - -M. DELPECH: I thank you, Your Honor, for your kindness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Gerthoffer. - -M. CHARLES GERTHOFFER (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): -Mr. President, Your Honors, I come to the sixth section of this -presentation, which deals with the economic pillage of France. - -When the Germans invaded France, they found there considerable wealth. -They set about with ingenuity to seize it and also to subjugate the -national production. - -When they failed to attain their ends by mere requisitions, they -resorted to devious methods, using simultaneously ruse and violence, -striving to cloak their criminal actions with legality. - -To accomplish this, they misused the conventions of the armistice. -These, in fact, did not contain any economic clauses and did not include -any secret provisions but consisted only of regulations, which were -published. Nevertheless, the Germans utilized two clauses to promote -their undertakings. I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-203 a -copy of the Armistice Conventions, and I cite Article 18, which reads as -follows: - - “The maintenance costs of German occupation troops in French - territory will be charged to the French Government.” - -This clause was not contrary to the regulations of the Hague -Conventions, but Germany imposed payment of enormous sums, far exceeding -those necessary for the requirements of an occupation army. Thus she was -enabled to dispose, without furnishing any compensation, of nearly all -the money which, in fact, was cleverly transformed into an instrument of -pillage. - -Article 17 of the Armistice Convention reads as follows: - - “The French Government undertakes to prevent any transfer of - economic securities or stocks from the territory to be occupied - by the German troops into the non-occupied area or into a - foreign country. Those securities and stocks in the occupied - territory can be disposed of only in agreement with the Reich - Government, it being understood that the German Government will - take into account what is vitally necessary for the population - of the non-occupied territories.” - -Apparently the purpose of this clause was to prevent things of any kind -which might be utilized against Germany from being sent to England or to -any of the colonies. But the occupying power took advantage of this to -get control of production and the distribution of raw materials -throughout France, since the non-occupied zone could not live without -the products of the occupied zone and vice versa. - -This intention of the Germans is proved particularly by Document Number -1741-PS which was discovered by the American army, and which I now -submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-204. - -I do not want to trouble the Tribunal by reading this long document, I -shall give only a short summary. - -It is a secret report, dated 5 July 1940 addressed to the President of -the Council . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Gerthoffer, as this is not a document of which we can -take judicial notice, I think you must read anything that you wish to -put in evidence. - -M. GERTHOFFER: I shall read a passage of the document to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - - M. GERTHOFFER: “Article 17 grants Germany the right to seize the - securities and economic reserves in occupied territory, and any - arrangements of the French Government are subject to approval by - Germany. - - “In compliance with the request of the French Government, - Germany has agreed that when considering applications of the - French Government regarding the disposal of securities and - reserves in the occupied zone, she will also take into - consideration the needs of the inhabitants of the non-occupied - zone.” - -I shall cite only this passage in order to shorten my explanatory -remarks, and I now come to the following document, which is in the -nature of a reply to the German official who drew up this report, a -document which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-205 (Document Number -EC-409) and which is a document found by the American army. Here is the -reply to the document from which I just quoted one passage: - - “The elimination of the demarcation line is now out of the - question, and if the revival of the economic life of France is - thereby paralyzed, that is quite immaterial to us. The French - have lost the war and must pay for the damages. Upon my - objection that France would then soon become a center of unrest, - I was answered that either shots would settle that or the - occupation of the still free zone. - - “For all concessions we make, the French must pay dearly in - deliveries from the unoccupied zone or the colonies. We must - strive to stop non-coordination in the economic field in - France.” - -Finally, another document captured by the U. S. Army which I submit as -Exhibit Number RF-206 (Document Number EC-325), signed by Dr. Gramsch, -gives us the following information: - - “In the course of the negotiations regarding relaxation of the - restrictions of the demarcation line, it has been suggested that - the French Government seize the gold and foreign currency in the - whole of France.” - -Further in this document: - - “The foreign currency reserves of occupied France would - strengthen our war potential. This measure could, moreover, be - used in negotiations with the French Government as a means of - pressure in order to make it show a more conciliatory attitude - in other respects.” - -A study of these documents shows the German intent, in disregard of all -legal principles, to get all the wealth and economy of France under -their control. - -Through force the Germans succeeded, after one year of occupation, in -putting all or nearly all the French economy under their domination. -This is evident from an article, published by Dr. Michel, director of -the Economic Office, attached to the Military Government in France which -appeared in the _Berliner Börsen Zeitung_, of 10 April 1942. I submit it -as Document Number RF-207, and shall read one passage from it: - - “The task of the competent offices of the German military - administration should be regarded as directing ‘Economic - Direction,’ that is issuing directives and at the same time - seeing that these directives are really followed.” - -Further, on Page 12 of the statement, Dr. Michel writes: - - “Now that the direction of raw materials and the placing of - orders has been organized and is functioning efficiently, - rigorous restrictions on consumption not important to war - economy are a matter of prime consideration in France. The - restrictions imposed upon the French population in respect of - food, clothing, footwear, and fuel, have been for some time more - severe than in the Reich.” - -After having shown you, Mr. President and members of the Tribunal, in -this brief introduction concerning the economic spoliation of France, -the consequences of German domination upon this country, I give you an -account of the methods employed to arrive at such a result. This will be -the purpose of the four following chapters: German seizure of means of -payment; clandestine purchases of the black market; outwardly legal -acquisitions; finally, impressment of labor. - -I. German seizure of means of payment. - -This seizure was the result of paying occupation costs, the one-way -clearing system, and outright seizures and levies of gold, bank notes, -foreign currency, and the imposition of collective fines (Page 15). - -Indemnity for the maintenance of occupation troops: - -I shall not recapitulate the legal principles of the matter, but shall -merely confine myself to a few explanatory remarks, so that you may -realize the pressure which was brought to bear on the leaders in order -to obtain the payment of considerable sums. - -As I have had the honor of pointing out to you, in the Armistice -Conventions the principle of the maintenance of occupation troops is -succinctly worded, with no stipulation as to the amount and the method -of collection. The Germans took advantage of this to distort and amplify -this commitment of France, which became nothing more than a pretext for -the imposition of exorbitant tribute. - -At the first sessions of the Armistice Commission, the discussions bore -on this point, while the French pointed out that they could only be -forced to pay a contractual indemnity representing the cost of -maintaining an army strictly necessary for the occupation of the -territory. The German General Mieth had to recognize the just foundation -of this claim and declared that troops which were to fight against -England would not be maintained at expense to France. - -This is evident from an extract of the minutes of the Armistice -Commission, which I submit as Document Number RF-208. But later this -General Mieth apparently was overruled by his superiors, since in the -course of a subsequent session, 16 July 1940, without expressly going -back on his word, he declared in this respect that he could not give any -reply, that this question would no longer be discussed, and that, in -short, everything necessary would be done to enable the French -Government to draw up its budget. This appears from an extract of the -minutes of the Armistice Commission which I submit as Exhibit Number -RF-209. - -On 8 August 1940 Hemmen, Chief of the German Economic Delegation, at -Wiesbaden, forwarded a memorandum to General Huntziger, President of the -French Delegation, in which he stated: - - “As at present it is impossible to assess the exact costs of - occupation, daily installments of at least 20 million Reichsmark - are required until further notice, at a rate of exchange of 1 - mark to 20 French francs. - - “That is to say, 400 million French francs daily. In this amount - the costs for billeting troops were not included, but were to be - paid separately.” - -This is found in Document 210 (Document Number RF-210), which I submit -to the Tribunal and which bears the signature of Hemmen. - -These exorbitant requirements provoked the reply of 12 August 1940, in -which it was emphasized that the amount of the daily payment did not -permit the supposition that it had been fixed in consideration of the -normal forces of an occupation army and the normal cost of the -maintenance of this army, that, moreover, such forces as corresponded to -the notified figure would be out of proportion to anything that military -precedent and the necessity of the moment might reasonably justify. This -is the content of a note of 12 August, submitted as Document Number -RF-211. - -On 15 August 1940 the German delegation took notice of the fact that the -French Government was ready to pay some accounts, but in a categorical -manner refused to discuss either the amount of payment or the -distinction between occupation and operation troops. This is found in -Document Number RF-212, which I submit to the Tribunal. - -On 18 August the French delegation took note of the memorandum of 15 -August and made the following reply (Document Number RF-213): - - “. . . that France is to pay the costs for the maintenance of - operation troops is a demand incontestably beyond the spirit and - the provisions of the Armistice Convention. - - “. . . that the required costs are converted into francs at a - rate considerably in excess of the purchasing power of the mark - and franc respectively; furthermore, that the purchases of the - German Army in France are a means of control over the life in - this country and that they will, moreover, as the German - Government admits, partly be replaced by deliveries in kind.” - -The memorandum terminates as follows: - - “In these circumstances the onerous tribute required of the - French Government appears arbitrary and exceeds to a - considerable extent what might legitimately be expected to be - demanded. - - “The French Government, always anxious to fulfill the clauses of - the Armistice Convention, can only appeal to the Reich - Government in the hope that it will take into account the - arguments presented above.” - -THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -M. GERTHOFFER: This morning I had the honor of presenting to the -Tribunal the fact that the Germans demanded of France an indemnity of -400 million francs a day for the maintenance of their army of -occupation. I indicated that the French leaders of that time, without -failing to recognize the principle of their obligations, protested -against the sum demanded. - -At the moment of their arrival in France the Germans had issued, as in -the other occupied countries, Reichskreditkasse notes and requisition -vouchers over which the bank of issue had no control and which was legal -tender only in France. This issue represented a danger, for the -circulation of this currency was liable to increase at the mere will of -the occupying power. - -At the same time, by a decree of 17 May 1940, published in the VOBIF of -17 May 1940, Number 7, which appears as Document Number 214 in the -document book (Exhibit Number RF-214), the occupying power fixed the -rate of the Reichsmark at 20 French francs per mark, whereas the real -parity was approximately 1 mark for 10 French francs. - -The French delegation, having become concerned over the increasing -circulation of the Reichskreditkasse notes and over the increased volume -of German purchases, as well as over the rate of exchange of the mark, -was informed by the German delegation, on 14 August 1940, of its refusal -to withdraw these notes from circulation in France. This is to be found -in a letter of 14 August, which I submit as Document Number RF-215. - -The occupying power thus unjustifiably created a means of pressure upon -the French Government of that time to make it yield to its demands -concerning the amount of the occupation costs, as well as concerning the -forced rate of the mark and the clearing agreements, which will be the -subject of a later chapter. - -General Huntziger, President of the French delegation, addressed several -dramatic appeals to the German delegation in which he asked that France -should not be hurled over the precipice, as shown by a teletype report -addressed by Hemmen on 18 August 1940, to his Minister of Foreign -Affairs, a report discovered by the United States Army, bearing the -Document Number 1741-PS(5), which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit -Number RF-216. Here is the interesting passage of this report: - - “These large payments would enable Germany to buy up the whole - of France, including its industries and foreign investments, - which would mean the ruin of France.” - -In a letter and a note of 20 August, the German delegation summoned the -French delegation to make partial payments, specifying that no -distinction would be made between the German troops in France, that the -strength of the German occupation would have to be determined by the -necessities of the conduct of war. In addition, the fixing of the rate -of the mark would be inoperative as far as the payments were concerned, -since they would constitute only payments on account. I submit the note -of the 20th of August of the German Government as Document Number -RF-217. - -The next day, 21 August 1940, General Huntziger, in the course of an -interview with Hemmen, made a last vain attempt to obtain a reduction in -the German demands. According to the minutes of this interview (Document -Number RF-218), Germany was already considering close economic -collaboration between herself and France through the creation of -commissioners of exchange control and of foreign trade. At the same time -Hemmen pledged elimination of the demarcation line between the two -zones. But he refused to discuss the question of the amount of the -occupation costs. - -In a note of 26 August 1940, the French Government indicated that it -considered itself obliged to yield under pressure and protested against -the German demands; this note ended with the following passage: - - “The French nation fears neither work nor suffering, but it must - be allowed to live. This is why the French Government would be - unable in the future to continue along the road to which it is - committed if experience showed that the extent of the demands of - the government of the Reich is incompatible with this right to - live.” (Document Number RF-219.) - -The Germans had the incontestable intention of utilizing the sums -demanded as occupation costs, not only for the maintenance, the -equipment, and the armament of their troops in France, or for operations -based in France, but also for other purposes. This is shown in -particular in a teletype from the Supreme Command of the Army, dated 2 -September 1940, discovered by the United States Army, which I submit as -Exhibit Number RF-220 (Document Number EC-204). There is a passage from -this teletype message which I shall read to the Tribunal (Page 22): - - “To the extent to which the incoming amounts in francs are not - required for the troops in France, the Supreme Command of the - Armed Forces reserves for itself the right to make further use - of the money. In particular, the allocation of the money to any - offices not belonging to the Armed Forces must be authorized by - the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, in order to insure - definitely that, first, the entire amount of francs required by - the Armed Forces shall be covered and that thereafter any - possible surplus shall remain at the disposal of the Supreme - Command of the Armed Forces for purposes important to the Four - Year Plan.” - -From another teletype message, which was seized in the same manner and -which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-221 (Document Number EC-201), I read -the following: - - “It is clear that there was no agreement at all with the French - as to what should be understood by ‘costs for maintenance of - occupation troops’ in France. If we are in agreement among - ourselves that at the present moment we must, for practical - reasons, avoid interminable discussions with the French, on the - other hand there must be no doubt that we have the right to - interpret the term ‘maintenance’ in the broadest possible - sense.” - -Further on in the same teletype, Page 24, Paragraph 2, there is the -following: - - “In any case, the concessions demanded by the French on the - question of specifying the amount of occupation costs and of the - utilization of the francs thus delivered must be rejected.” - -And finally the following paragraph: - - “The utilization of sums paid in francs. - - “Concerning the use of the francs paid which are not really - required for the costs of the maintenance of the occupation - troops in France, there can, of course, be no discussion with - French authorities.” - -The French then attempted, in vain, to obtain a reduction in the -occupation costs and also a modification in the rate of the mark, but -the Germans refused all discussion. - -At the beginning of the year 1941, negotiations were resumed. In view of -the intransigence of the Germans, the French Government suspended -payments in the month of May 1941. Then, at the insistence of the -occupying powers, they resumed it, but paid only 300 million francs a -day. This is found in the document submitted as Document Number RF-222. - -On the 15 December 1942, after the invasion of the entire French -territory, Germany demanded that the daily payment of 300 million francs -be raised to 500 million a day. - -The sums paid for the occupation troops increased to a total of 631,866 -million francs, or at the imposed rate, 31,593,300,000 marks. This -amount is not only to be gathered from the information given by the -French administration, but can also be verified by German documents, in -particular by the report of Hemmen. - -Hemmen, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, had been -designated President of the German economic delegation of the Armistice -Commission, and he was acting, in fact, under the direct orders of his -Minister, Von Ribbentrop, as a veritable dictator in economic questions. -His chief assistant in Paris was Dr. Michel, of whom we have already -spoken. - -While maintaining his functions as chief of the economic delegation of -the Armistice Commission of Wiesbaden, the same Hemmen was to be -appointed by a decision of Hitler, under date of 19 December 1942, Reich -Government delegate for economic questions, attached to the French -Government. This is verified in the document submitted as Exhibit Number -RF-223 (Document Number 1763-PS). - -Hemmen periodically sent secret economic reports to his minister. These -documents were discovered by the United States Army. They are of a -fundamental importance in this part of the Trial, since, as you will -see, they contain Germany’s admission of economic pillage. - -These voluminous reports are submitted as Exhibits Numbers RF-224, 225, -226, 227, 228, and 229 (Documents Numbers 1986-PS, 1987-PS, 1988-PS, -1989-PS, 1990-PS, 1991-PS) of the French documentation. It is not -possible for me, in view of their length, to read them in their entirety -to the Tribunal. I shall confine myself to giving a few brief extracts -therefrom in the course of my presentation. To show their importance, -here is the translation of the last volume of the Hemmen reports. In -this last report, printed in Salzburg on 15 December 1944, on Page 26, -Hemmen recognizes that France has paid by way of indemnity for the -maintenance of occupation troops 31,593,300,000 marks, that is . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Gerthoffer, these documents are in German, are they -not? - -M. GERTHOFFER: Yes, Mr. President, they are in German. I have only been -able to have the last one translated into French. Because of their -length it has not been possible for me to have all the translations -made, but it is from the last volume, which is translated into French, -that I will make certain very brief quotations by way of proof. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well then are you confining yourself to the last -document, and to certain passages in the last document? - -M. GERTHOFFER: I shall limit myself to this. - -THE PRESIDENT: And then, as these are not documents of which we can take -judicial notice, only the parts which you read will be regarded as part -of the Record, and be treated as in evidence. - -M. GERTHOFFER: This enormous sum imposed was much greater than Germany -was entitled to demand. In spite of the enormous sums which the Germans -may have spent in France during the first two years, they were not able -to use a sum less than half of that for which they were credited. - -This is shown in the Hemmen report, where on Page 27 (Page 59 of the -French translation) he gives a summary of the French payments made as -occupational indemnity, and the German expenses in millions of marks -corresponding to these expenses. This summary is very short. I shall -read it to the Tribunal. It will constitute a German proof in support of -my presentation. - - _French payment_ _German expenditure_ - _in millions of marks_ _in millions of marks_ - 1940 4,000 1,569 - 1941 6,075 5,205 - 1942 5,475 8,271 - 1943 9,698.3 9,524 - 1944 6,345 6,748 - -This makes from 1940 to 1944 a total amount of 31,593,300,000 marks paid -by the French and 31,317 million marks of German expenditure. - -The figures contained in this table unquestionably constitute the German -admission of the exorbitance of the indemnity for the maintenance of -occupation troops, for Germany was not able to utilize the credit at its -disposal. Most of it served to finance expenses relative to armament, -operation troops, and feeding of Germany. This is shown by Document -Number EC-232, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-230. - -According to the calculation of the “Institut de Conjoncture,” the -maximum sum of the indemnity which could be exacted was 74,531,800,000 -francs, taking as a basis the average daily costs of upkeep per troop -unit during the Allied occupation of the Rhineland in 1919, namely the -sum of seventeen francs or twenty-one francs with billeting, which was -at that time provided by the German Government. According to the report -on the average cost of living (coefficient -3.14) the sum of 21 francs -should correspond to 66 francs at the 1939 value when applying the -coefficient of depreciation of the franc during the occupation, that is -2.10 percent, or a daily average cost of 139 francs per day. - -Granting that the real costs of the occupation army were half of those -calculated by Hemmen, that is to say, 27,032,279,120 marks, this sum is -still lower than the 74,531,800,000 calculated by the Institut de -Conjoncture. - -Even accepting the calculation most favorable to the accused, one can -estimate that the indemnity imposed without justification amounted to -631,866 million less 74,531,800,000, that is, 557,334,200,000 francs. - -In his final report, Page 10, and Page 22 of the French translation, -Hemmen writes: - - “. . . during the 4 years which have elapsed since conclusion of - the Armistice, there has been paid for occupation costs and - billeting 34,000 million Reichsmark, or 680,000 million francs. - France thus contributed approximately 40 percent of the total - cost of occupation and war contributions raised in all the - occupied and Allied countries. This represents a charge of 830 - Reichsmark, or 16,600 francs, per head of the population.” - -In the second part of this chapter we shall examine briefly the question -of clearing. The Tribunal is acquainted with the functioning of -clearing, and I shall not revert to this. I shall indicate under what -conditions the French Government at the time was made to sign agreements -which were imposed upon it. - -Parallel to the discussions relative to the indemnity for the -maintenance of occupation troops, discussions were entered into -concerning a Clearing Agreement. - -On the 24 July 1940 the German Delegation announced that it would -shortly submit a project. On 8 August 1940 Hemmen submitted to the -French Delegation a project of a Franco-German arrangement for payment -by compensation. This project, which I submit as Document Number -RF-231(bis) of the French documentation, shows arbitrary provisions, -which could not be voluntarily accepted. - -It provided for financial transfers from France to Germany without any -equivalent in financial transfers from Germany to France. It fixed the -rate of exchange at 20 francs for 1 Reichsmark by a unilateral and -purely arbitrary decision, whereas the rate on the Berlin Exchange was -approximately 17.65 and the real parity of the two currencies, taking -into account their respective purchasing power on both markets, was -approximately ten francs for one Reichsmark. - -I pass to Page 34. The French Delegation of the Armistice Commission -submitted unsuccessfully a counter project, on 20 August 1940, and -attempted to obtain a modification of the most unfavorable clauses. I -submit this project as Document Number RF-232. - -On 29 August 1940, the French delegation at the Armistice Commission -brought up in detail the question of the parity of the franc and the -Reichsmark. It called attention to the fact that the prohibition of the -financial transfers from Germany to France would create gross -inequality, whereas the transfers in the other direction were organized, -and this meant the French Government giving its agreement to a veritable -expropriation of French creditors. An extract from this report is -submitted as Document Number RF-233. - -In a letter of 31 August, General Huntziger again took up in vain the -argument concerning the Franc-Reichsmark rate of exchange. I submit this -letter as Document Number RF-234. - -On 6 September 1940 the French delegation made a new attempt to obtain a -modification of the most unfavorable clauses in the draft of the -Clearing Agreement, but it encountered an absolute refusal. The German -delegation meant to impose under the cloak of a bilateral agreement a -project elaborated by it alone. - -I quote a passage from the minutes of the Armistice Delegation (Document -Number RF-235). Herr Schone, the German delegate, stated: “I cannot -reopen the discussion on this question. I can make no concession.” - -Concerning the Franc-Reichsmark rate of exchange, on 4 October 1940 -Hemmen notified the French delegation that the rate of 20 francs must be -considered as definite and according to his own words “this is no longer -to be discussed.” He added that if the French for their part refused to -conclude the payment agreement, that is to say, the arbitrary contract -imposed by Germany, he would advise the Führer of this and that all -facilities with regard to the demarcation line would be stopped. I -submit as Document Number RF-236 this passage of the minutes. - -Finally, in the course of the negotiations which followed on 10 October -1940, the French delegation attempted for the last time to obtain an -alleviation of the drastic conditions which were imposed upon it, but -the Germans remained intransigent and Hemmen declared in particular -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Gerthoffer, do these negotiations lead up to a -conclusion, because if they do, would it not be sufficient for your -purpose to give us the conclusion without giving all the negotiations -which lead up to it? - -M. GERTHOFFER: Mr. President, I am just finishing the statement with the -last quotation, in which the Tribunal will see what pressure, what -threats, were made upon the French, who were then in contact with the -Germans. I shall have concluded the discussion on clearing with this -quotation, if the Tribunal will allow it, it will be a short one and it -will then be finished: - - “You are attempting to make the rate of the mark fictitious. I - beg you to warn your government that we shall break off - negotiations. I have in fact foreseen that you would be unable - to prevent prices from rising, but export prices are rising - systematically. We shall find other means of achieving our aims. - We shall get the bauxite ourselves.” (Document Number RF-237.) - -This is the end of the quotation. - -Perhaps the Tribunal will allow me a very brief comment. At the -Armistice Commission all kinds of economic questions were discussed; and -the French delegates resisted, for Germany wanted to seize immediately -the bauxite beds which were in the unoccupied zone. This last sentence -is the threat: if you do not accept our Clearing Agreement, we shall -seize the bauxite. That is to say, we shall occupy by force of arms the -free zone. - -The so-called compensation agreement worked only to Germany’s advantage. -The results of the agreement are the following: - -At the moment of liberation the total transfer from France to Germany -amounted to 221,114 million francs, while the total transfer from -Germany to France amounted to 50,474 million francs. The -difference—that is, 170,640 million francs credit balance on the French -account—represents the means of payment which Germany improperly -obtained through the functioning of the clearing which she had imposed. - -I now come to the third part of this chapter, which will be very brief. -This is the seizure of goods and collective fines. - -Besides the transactions which were outwardly legal, the Germans -proceeded to make seizures and impose collective fines in violation of -the principles of international law. - -First, a contribution of 1,000 million francs was imposed upon the -French Jews on 17 December 1941 without any pretext. This is shown in -the documents submitted as Document Number RF-239 and cannot be -contested. - -Secondly, a certain number of collective fines were imposed. The amount -actually known to the Finance Ministry amounts to 412,636,550 francs. - -Thirdly, the Germans proceeded to make immediate seizure of gold. Even -Hemmen admits in his last secret report, on Pages 33 and 34, Page 72 of -the French translation, that on 24 September 1940 the Germans seized 257 -kilograms of gold from the port of Bayonne, which represents at the 1939 -rate 12,336,000 francs; and in July 1940 they seized a certain number of -silver coins amounting to 55 millions. - -Still following the secret report of Hemmen, for the period between 1 -January to 30 June 1942 Germany had seized in France 221,730 kilograms -of gold belonging to the Belgian National Bank, which represents at the -1939 rate the sum of 9,500 million francs. - -It is not possible for me to present in detail the conditions under -which the Belgian gold was delivered to the Germans. This question in -itself would involve me in an explanation which would take up several -sessions. The fact is undeniable since it is admitted by Hemmen. I shall -simply indicate that as early as the month of September 1940, in -violation of international law, Hemmen had insisted on the delivery of -this gold, which had, in May 1940, been entrusted by the National Bank -of Belgium to the Bank of France. Moreover, these facts are part of the -accusations made against the ex-ministers of the Vichy Government before -the High Court of Justice in Paris. - -The results of this procedure were long, and frequent discussions took -place at the Armistice Commission, and an agreement was concluded on 29 -October 1940, but was in fact not carried out because of difficulties -raised by the French and Belgians. - -According to the former Assistant Director of the Bank of France, the -German pressure became stronger and stronger. Laval, who was then -determined to pay any price for the authorization to go to Berlin, where -he boasted that he would be able to achieve a large scale liberation of -prisoners, the reduction of the occupation costs, as well as the -elimination of the demarcation line, yielded to the German demands. - -Thus, this gold was delivered to the Reichsbank and was requisitioned by -order of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. The documents -relative to this question are submitted as Document Number RF-240. - -I shall simply add that after the liberation the Provisional Government -of the French Republic transferred to the National Bank of Belgium a -quantity of gold equal to that which the Belgian Bank had entrusted to -the Bank of France in the month of May 1940. - -To conclude the gold question I shall indicate to the Tribunal that -Germany was unable to obtain the gold reserve of the Bank of France, for -it had been put in safekeeping in good time. Finally, still according to -the last secret report of Hemmen, Pages 29 and 49 of the French -translation, at the moment of their retreat the Germans seized without -any right the sum of 6,899 million francs from branches of the Bank of -France in Nancy, Belfort, and Epinal. Document 1741-PS (24). (Exhibit -Number RF-241.) - -I note for the Record that during the occupation the Germans seized -great quantities of gold which they arranged to be bought from private -citizens by intermediaries. I cannot give figures for this. I simply -touch on the question for the Record. - -If we summarize the question of the means of payment which Germany -unduly requisitioned in France, we shall reach—still taking the -calculation most favorable to the defendants and taking the maximum -amount for the cost of maintaining occupation troops—a minimum total of -745,833,392,550 francs, in round figures 750,000 million francs. - -I now come to Page 50, that is to say the use which the Germans made of -these considerable sums; and first of all, the black market organized by -the occupying power. Here again I don’t want to take advantage of your -kind attention. I have had the honor of presenting to you the mechanism -of the black market in all the occupied countries. I have indicated how -it arose, how the Germans utilized it, how, under the orders of the -Defendant Göring, it was organized and exploited. I do not wish to -revert to this, and I shall pass over the whole section of my written -exposé which was devoted to the black market in France. - -I come to Page 69 of my written exposé. Chapter 3: Ostensibly legal -acquisitions. - -Under the pressure of the Germans, the Vichy Government had to consent -to reserve for them a very high quota of products of all kinds. In -exchange the Germans undertook to furnish raw materials, the quantities -of which were determined by them alone. But these raw materials, when -they were delivered, which was not always the case, were for the most -part absorbed by the industry which was forced to supply them with -finished products. In fact, there was no compensation, since the -occupiers got back in the form of finished products the raw materials -delivered and did not in reality give anything in return. - -In the report of the Economic Control which has already been quoted, -submitted as Document Number RF-107, the following example may be noted -which I shall read to the Tribunal: - - “An agreement permitted the purchase in the free zone of 5,000 - trucks destined for the German G.B.K., whereby the Reich - furnished five tons of steel per vehicle or a total of 25,000 - tons of steel destined for French industry. In view of the usual - destination of the products of our metal industry at that time, - this was obviously a one-sided bargain, indeed if our - information is exact, the deliveries of steel to be made in - return were not even fulfilled, and they were partly used for - the defense of the Mediterranean coast, rails, antitank - defenses, _et cetera_.” - -It is appropriate to call attention to the fact that a considerable part -of the levies in kind were the object of no regulation whatever, either -because the Germans remained debtors in these transactions, or that they -considered without justification that these levies constituted war -booty. - -In regard to this there are no documents available; however, the United -States Army has discovered a secret report of one called Kraney, the -representative of Roges, an organization which was charged with -collecting both war booty and purchases on the black market. It appears -from this report that in September 1944, the Roges had resold to Germany -for 10,858,499 marks, or 217,169,980 francs, objects seized in the -southern zone as war booty. I submit this document as Exhibit Number -RF-244. - -As a result of the means of payment exacted by Germany and of -requisitions regulated by her, or not, France was literally despoiled. -Enormous quantities of articles of all kinds were removed by the -occupiers. According to information given by the French statistical -services, preliminary estimates of the minimum of these levies have been -made. These estimates do not include damages resulting from military -operations, but solely the German spoliations, computed in cases of -doubt at a minimum figure. They will be summarized in the eight -following sections. - -1. Levies of agricultural produce. - -I submit as Document Number RF-245, the report of the Ministry of -Agriculture and a statistical table drawn up by the Institut de -Conjoncture, summarizing the official German levies which included -neither individual purchases nor black market purchases which were both -considerable. It is not possible for me to read to the Tribunal a table -as long as this; I shall confine myself to giving a brief résumé of this -statistical table. - -Here are some of the chief agricultural products which were seized and -their estimate in thousands of francs (I am indicating the totals in -round figures): Cereals, 8,900,000 tons, estimate 22 million francs; -meat, 900,000 tons, estimate 30 million; fish, 51,000 tons, estimate 1 -million; wines, liquors, 13,413,000 hectoliters, estimate 18,500,000; -colonial products, 47,000 tons, estimate 805,900; horses and mules, -690,000 head; wood, 36 million cubic meters; sugar, 11,600,000 tons. - -I shall pass over the details. The Germans settled through clearing and -by means of occupation costs 113,620,376,000 francs; the balance, that -is 13,000 million, was not settled in any way. - -Naturally, these estimates do not include considerable damage caused to -forests as a result of abnormal cutting and the reduction of areas under -cultivation. There is no mention, either, of the reduction in livestock -and damage caused by soil exhaustion. This is a brief summary of the -percentage of official German levies on agriculture in relation to the -total French production: Wheat, 13 percent; oats, 75 percent; hay and -straw, 80 percent; meat, 21 percent; poultry, 35 percent; eggs, 60 -percent; butter, 20 percent; preserved fish, 30 percent; champagne, 56 -percent; wood for industrial uses, 50 percent; forest fuels, 50 percent; -alcohol, 25 percent. These percentages, I repeat, do not include -quantities of produce which the Germans bought up either by individual -purchases or on the black market. - -I have had the privilege of presenting to you the fact that these -operations were of a considerable scope and amounted for France -approximately to several hundred thousand millions of francs. The -quantities of agricultural produce thus taken from French consumers are -incalculable. I shall simply indicate that wines, champagne, liquors, -meat, poultry, eggs, butter were the object of a very considerable -clandestine traffic to the benefit of the Germans and that the French -population, except for certain privileged persons, was almost entirely -deprived of these products. - -In Section 2 of this chapter I shall discuss the important question -concerning levies of raw materials. - -THE PRESIDENT: That would be a good time for us to adjourn for ten -minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. GERTHOFFER: The summary of the levies in raw materials from the -statistical point of view is contained in charts which I shall not take -the time to read to the Tribunal. I shall submit them as Document Number -RF-246 and point out that the total amount of these supplies reaches the -sum of 83,804,145,000 francs. - -On Pages 77 to 80 of my written statement I had thought it necessary to -make a summary of these charts, but I consider it is not possible to -read even the summary because the figures are too numerous. - -According to information provided by the French administration, of that -sum the Germans settled, by way of occupation costs and clearing, only -59,254,639,000 francs, leaving the difference of 19,506,109,000 francs -charged to the French Treasury. - -The percentage of the German levies in relation to the whole French -production can be summarized in a chart which I have given in my brief -and I ask the Tribunal for permission to read it: - - “The percentage of levies of raw materials in relation to French - production: Coal, 29 percent; electric power, 22 percent; - petroleum and motor fuel, 80 percent; iron ore, 74 percent; - steel products, crude and half finished, 51 percent; copper, 75 - percent; lead, 43 percent; zinc, 38 percent; tin, 67 percent; - nickel, 64 percent; mercury, 50 percent; platinum, 76 percent; - bauxite, 40 percent; aluminum, 75 percent; magnesium, 100 - percent; sulphur carbonate, 80 percent; industrial soap, 67 - percent; vegetable oil, 40 percent; carbosol, 100 percent; - rubber, 38 percent; paper and cardboard, 16 percent; wool, 59 - percent; cotton, 53 percent; flax, 65 percent; leather, 67 - percent; cement, 55 percent; lime, 20 percent; acetone, 21 - percent.” - -This enumeration permits us to consider that officially about -three-quarters of the raw materials were seized by the occupying power, -but these statistics must be qualified in two ways: A large part of the -quota of raw materials theoretically left to the French economy was in -fact reserved for priority industries, that is to say, those industries -whose production was reserved for the occupying power. Secondly, these -requisitions and percentages include only the figures of official -deliveries; but we have seen that the Germans acquired considerable -quantities of raw materials from the black market, especially precious -metals: gold, platinum, silver, radium, or rare metals, such as mercury, -nickel, tin and copper. - -In fact, one can say in general that the raw materials which were left -for the needs of the population were insignificant. - -Now, I come to Section 3: Levies of manufactured goods and products of -the mining industry. - -As I had the honor to point out to you in my general remarks, the -Germans, using divers means of pressure, succeeded in utilizing directly -or indirectly the greater part of the French industrial production. I -shall not go over these facts again and I shall immediately pass to a -summary of the products which were delivered. I submit as Document -Number RF-248 a chart which contains statistical data, according to -industries, of levies by the occupying power of manufactured goods -during the course of the occupation. - -I do not want to tax the patience of the Tribunal by reading this; I -shall simply cite the summary of this chart, which is as follows: Orders -for products finished and invoiced from 25 June 1940 until the -liberation—Mechanical and electrical industries, 59,455 million; -chemical industry, 11,744 million; textiles and leather, 15,802 million; -building and construction material, 56,256 million; mines (coal, -aluminum, and phosphates), 4,160 million; iron industry, 4,474 million; -motor fuel, 568 million; naval construction, 6,104 million; aeronautical -construction, 23,620 million; miscellaneous industries, 2,457 million; -making a total of 184,640 million. - -These statistics should be commented upon as follows: - -1) The information which is contained here does not include the -production of the very industrialized departments of Nord and of Pas de -Calais, attached to the German administration of Brussels, nor does it -include the manufactures of the Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, and Moselle -departments, actually incorporated into the Reich. - -2) Out of the total sum of 184,640 million francs worth of supplies, the -information which we have to date does not as yet permit us to fix the -amount regulated by the Germans by way of either occupation costs or -clearing, or the balance which was not made the subject of any -settlement. - -3) If, on the basis of contracts, one made an estimate of the industrial -production levied by Germany in the departments of Nord and Pas de -Calais, one would obtain a figure for those two departments of 18,500 -million, which would bring the approximate total up to more than 200,000 -million francs. - -The extent of the German levies on manufactured products is summarized -in the following chart which I submit to the Tribunal, and which I have -summarized on Page 87 of my written statement. I shall take the liberty -of reading it once more to the Tribunal. It will show the proportion of -the manufactured goods which the French population was deprived of: -Automobile construction, 70 percent; electrical and radio construction, -45 percent; industrial precision parts, 100 percent; heavy castings, 100 -percent; foundries, 46 percent; chemical industries, 34 percent; rubber -industry, 60 percent; paint and varnish, 60 percent; perfume, 33 -percent; wool industry, 28 percent; cotton weaving, 15 percent; flax and -cotton weaving, 12 percent; industrial hides, 20 percent; buildings and -public works, 75 percent; woodwork and furniture, 50 percent; lime and -cement, 68 percent; naval construction, 79 percent; aeronautic -construction, 90 percent. - -The scrutiny of this chart leads to the following remarks: - -The proportion of entirely finished products is very large, for -instance: automobiles, 70 percent; precision instruments, 100 percent; -heavy castings, 100 percent; whereas, the proportion of the products in -the process of manufacture is not as great, for example: foundry, 46 -percent; chemical industry, 34 percent; _et cetera_. - -This state of affairs results from the fact that the Germans directed -the products in the process of manufacture—in theory reserved for the -French population—into finishing industries which had priority, that is -to say, whose production was reserved for them. - -Finally, through their purchases on the black market, the Germans -procured an enormous quantity of textiles, machine tools, leather, -perfumes, and so forth. The French population was almost completely -deprived of textiles, in particular, during the occupation. That is also -the case as regards leather. - -Now, I reach Section 4: the removal of industrial tools. - -I shall not impose on your time. This question has already been treated -as far as the other occupied countries are concerned. I would merely -point out that in France it was the subject of statistical estimates -which I submit to you as Document Number RF-251. These statistical -estimates show that the value of the material which was removed from the -various French factories, either private or public enterprise, exceeds -the sum of 9,000 million francs. - -It was observed that for many of the machines which were removed, the -Germans merely indicated the inventory values after reduction for -depreciation and not the replacement value of the machines. - -I now come to Section 5: Securities and Foreign Investments. In Document -EC-57, which I submitted as Exhibit Number RF-105 at the beginning of my -presentation, I had indicated that the Defendant Göring himself had -informed you of the aims of the German economic policy and he ventured -to say that the extension of German influence over foreign enterprises -was one of the purposes of German economic policy. - -These directives were to be expressed much more precisely in the -document of the 12th of August 1940, which I submit as Exhibit Number -RF-252 (Document Number EC-40), from which I shall read a short extract: - - “Since”—as the document says—“the principal economic - enterprises are in the form of stock companies, it is first of - all indispensable to secure the ownership of securities in - France.” - -Further on it says: - - “The exerting of influence by way of ordinances. . . .” - -Then the document indicates all the means to be employed to achieve -this, in particular this passage concerning international law: - - “According to Article 46 of the Hague Convention concerning Land - Warfare, private property cannot be confiscated. Therefore the - confiscation of securities is to be avoided in so far as it does - not concern state owned property. According to Article 42 and - following of the Hague Convention concerning Land Warfare, the - authority exercising power in the occupied enemy territory must - restrict itself in principle to utilizing measures which are - necessary to re-establish or maintain public order and public - life. According to international law it is forbidden in - principle to eliminate the still existing boards of companies - and to replace them by ‘commissioners.’ Such a measure would, - from the point of view of international law, probably not be - considered as efficacious. Consequently, we must strive to force - the various functionaries of such companies to work for German - economy, but not to dismiss those persons . . .” - -Further on: - - “If these functionaries refuse to be guided by us, we must - remove them from their posts and replace them by persons we can - use.” - -We will briefly consider the three categories of seizure of financial -investments, which were the purpose of German spoliation during the -occupation, and first of all the seizure of financial investments in -companies whose interests were abroad. - -On the 14th of August 1940 an ordinance was published in VOBIF, Page 67 -(Document Number RF-253), forbidding any negotiations regarding credits -or foreign securities. But mere freezing of securities did not satisfy -the occupying power; it was necessary for them to become outwardly the -owners of the securities in order to be able, if necessary, to negotiate -them in neutral countries. - -They had agents who purchased foreign securities from private citizens -who needed money, but above all, they put pressure on the Vichy -Government in order to obtain the handing over of the principal French -investments in foreign countries. That is why, in particular, after long -discussions in the course of which the German pressure was very great, -considerable surrenders of securities were made to the Germans. - -It is not possible for me to submit to the Tribunal the numerous -documents concerning the surrender of these securities: minutes, -correspondence, valuations. There would be without exaggeration, several -cubic meters of them. I shall merely quote several passages as examples. - -Concerning the Bor Mines Company, the copper mines in Yugoslavia of -which the greater part of the capital was in French hands, the Germans -appointed, on 26 July 1940, an administrative commissioner for the -branches of the company situated in Yugoslavia. This is found in -Document Number RF-254 which I submit to the Tribunal. The -administrative commissioner was Herr Neuhausen, the German Consul -General for Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. - -In the course of the discussions of the Armistice Commission Hemmen -declared (extract from the minutes of 27 September 1940 at 10:30, which -I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-255): - - “Germany wishes to acquire the shares of the company without - consideration for the juridical objections made by the French. - Germany obeys, in fact, the imperative consideration of the - economic order. She suspects that the Bor Mines are still - delivering copper to England and she has definitely decided to - take possession of these mines.” - -Faced with the refusal of the French delegates, Hemmen declared at the -meeting of 4 October 1940 (I submit to the Tribunal an extract from the -minutes of this meeting as Document Number RF-256): - - “I should regret to have to transmit such a reply to my - government. See if the French Government cannot reconsider its - attitude. If not, our relations will become very difficult. My - government is anxious to bring this matter to a close. If you - refuse, the consequences will be extremely grave.” - -M. de Boisanger, the French Delegate, replied: - - “I will therefore put that question once more.” - -And Hemmen replied: - - “I shall expect your reply by tomorrow. If it does not come, I - shall transmit the negative reply which you have just given.” - -Then, in the course of the meeting on 9 January 1941, Hemmen stated—I -submit again an extract from the minutes, Document Number RF-257: - - “At first I was entrusted with this affair at Wiesbaden. Then it - was taken over by Consul General Neuhausen on behalf of a very - high-ranking personage (Marshal Göring), and it was handled - directly in Paris by M. Laval and M. Abetz.” - -As far as French investments in petroleum companies in Romania are -concerned, the pressure was no less. In the course of the meeting of 10 -October 1940, of the Armistice Commission, the same Hemmen stated (I -submit as Document Number RF-258, an extract from the minutes of the -meeting): - - “Moreover we shall be satisfied with the majority of the shares. - We will leave in your hands anything which we do not need for - this purpose. Can you accept on this point in principle? The - matter is urgent, as for the Bor Mines. We want all.” - -On the 22 November 1940, Hemmen stated again (I submit this extract of -the minutes of the Armistice Commission meeting as Document Number -RF-259): - - “We are still at war and we must exert immediate influence over - petroleum production in Romania. Therefore we cannot wait for - the peace treaty.” - -When the French delegates asked that the surrender should at least be -made in exchange for a material compensation, Hemmen replied in the -course of the same meeting: - - “Impossible. The sums which you are to receive from us will be - taken out of the occupation costs. This will save you from using - the printing. This kind of participation will be made general on - the German side when the new collaboration policy has once been - defined.” - -We might present indefinitely quotations of this kind, and many even -much more serious from the point of view of violation of the provisions -of the Hague Convention. - -All these surrenders, apparently agreed to by the French, were accepted -only under German pressure. Scrutiny of the contracts agreed upon shows -great losses to those who handed over their property and enormous -profits for those who acquired it, without the latter having furnished -any real compensation. - -The Germans thus obtained French shares in the Romanian petroleum -companies, in the enterprises of Central Europe, Norway, and the -Balkans, and especially those of the Bor Mines Company which I -mentioned. These surrenders paid by francs coming from occupation costs, -rose to a little more than two thousand million francs. The others were -paid by the floating of French loans abroad, notably in Holland, and -through clearing. - -Having given you a brief summary of the seizure of French business -investments abroad, I shall also examine rapidly the German seizure of -registered capitals of French industrial companies. - -Shortly after the Armistice, in conformity with the directives of the -Defendant Göring, a great number of French industries were the object of -proposals on the part of German groups anxious to acquire all or part of -the assets of these companies. - -This operation was facilitated by the fact that the Germans, as I have -had the honor of pointing out to you, were in reality in control of -industry and had taken over the direction of production, particularly by -the system of “Paten Firmen.” Long discussions took place between the -occupying power and the French Ministry of Finance, whose officials -strove, sometimes without success, to limit to 30 percent the maximum of -German shares. It is not possible for me to enter into details of the -seizure of these shares. I shall point out, however, that the Finance -Minister handed to us a list of the most important ones, which are -reproduced in a chart appended to the French Document Book under -Document RF-260 (Exhibit Number RF-260). - -The result was that the seizure of shares, fictitiously paid through -clearing, reached the sum of 307,436,000 francs; through occupation -costs accounts, 160 millions; through foreign stocks a sum which we have -not been able to determine; and finally, through various or unknown -means, 28,718,000 francs. - -We shall conclude the paragraph of this fifth section by quoting part of -the Hemmen report relative to these questions (Page 63 of the original -and 142 of the French translation). Here is what Hemmen writes, in -Salzburg in January 1944, concerning this subject: - - “The fifth report upon the activity of the delegation is devoted - to the difficulty of future seizures of shares in France, in the - face of the very challenging attitude of the French Government - concerning the surrender of valuable domestic and foreign - securities. This resistance increased during the period covered - by the report to such an extent that the French Government was - no longer disposed to give any approval to the transfer of - shares even if economic compensation were offered.” - -Further on, Page 63 in the third paragraph: - - “During the 4 years of the occupation of France the Armistice - Delegation transferred stocks representing altogether about 121 - million Reichsmark from French to German ownership, among them - shares in enterprises important for the war in other countries, - in Germany, and in France. Details of this are found in the - earlier reports of the activities of the delegation. For about - half of these transfers, economic compensation was given on the - German side by delivery of French holdings of foreign shares - acquired in Holland and in Belgium, while the remaining amount - was paid by way of clearing or occupation costs. The use of - French foreign investments as a means of payment resulted in a - difference, between the German purchasing price and the French - rate, of about 7 million Reichsmark which went to the Reich.” - -There is reason to emphasize that the profit derived by Germany merely -from the financial point of view is not 7 million Reichsmark, or 140 -million francs according to Hemmen, but much greater. In fact, Germany -paid principally for these acquisitions with the occupation indemnity, -clearing, and French loans issued in Holland or in Belgium, the -appropriation of which by Germany amounted to spoliation of these -countries and could not constitute a real compensation for France. - -These surrenders of holdings, carried out under the cloak of legality, -moved the United Nations in their declarations made in London on 5 -January 1943 to lay down the principle that such surrenders should be -declared null and void, even when carried out with the apparent consent -of those who made them. - -I submit as Document Number RF-261, the solemn statement signed in -London on 5 January 1943, which was published in the French _Journal -Officiel_ on 15 August 1944, at the time of the liberation. I might add -that all these surrenders are the subject of indictments before the -French Courts of high treason against Frenchmen who surrendered their -holdings to the Germans, even though undeniable pressure was brought to -bear upon them. - -I shall conclude this chapter with one last observation: The German -seizure of real estate in France. It is still difficult to give at this -time a precise account of this subject, for these operations were made -most often through an intermediary with an assumed name. The most -striking is that of a certain Skolnikoff, who during the occupation was -able to invest nearly 2,000 million francs in the purchase of real -estate. - -This individual of indeterminate nationality, who lived in poverty -before the war, enriched himself in a scandalous fashion, thanks to his -connection with the Gestapo and his operations on the black market with -the occupying power. But whatever may have been the profits he derived -from his dishonest activities, he could not personally have acquired -real estate to the value of almost 2,000 million in France. - -I submit, as Document Number RF-262, a copy of a police report -concerning this individual. It is not possible for me to read this to -the Tribunal in its entirety, but this report contains the list of the -buildings and real estate companies acquired by this individual. These -are without question choice buildings of great value. It is evident that -Skolnikoff, an agent for the Gestapo, was an assumed name for German -personalities whose identity has not been discovered up to the present. - -Now I shall take up Section 6; the requisition of transport and -communication material. - -A report from the French administration gives us statistics which are -reproduced in very complete charts, which I shall not read to the -Tribunal. I shall merely point out that most of the locomotives and -rolling stock in good shape were removed, and that the total sum of the -requisitions of transport material reaches the sum of 198,450 million -francs. - -I shall now deal with requisitions in the departments of Haut-Rhin, -Bas-Rhin, and Moselle. From the beginning of the invasion the Germans -incorporated these departments into the Reich. This question will be -presented by the French Prosecution when they discuss the question of -Germanization. From the point of view of economic spoliation it must be -stressed that the Germans sought to derive a maximum from these three -departments. If they paid in marks for a certain number of products, -they made no settlement whatever for the principal products, especially -coal, iron, crude oil, potash, industrial material, furniture, and -agricultural machinery. - -The information relating to this is given by the French administration -in a chart which I shall summarize briefly and which I submit as -Document Number RF-264. The value of requisitions made in the three -French departments of the east—requisitions not paid for by the -Germans—reaches the sum of 27,315 million francs. - -To conclude the question of the departments in the east, I should like -to point out to the Tribunal that my colleague, who will discuss the -question of Germanization, will show how the firm, Hermann Göring Werke, -in which the Defendant Göring had considerable interests, appropriated -equipment from mines of the large French company called the “Petits-Fils -de François de Wendel et Cie.” (See Document RF-1300.) - -I now come to the Section 8, concerning miscellaneous levies. - -1) Spoliations in Tunisia. The Germans went into Tunisia on 10 November -1942 and were driven out by the Allied Armies in May 1943. During this -period they indulged in numerous acts of spoliation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you think that it is necessary to go into details of -the seizures in this part of the country if they are of the same sort as -those in other parts of the country? - -M. GERTHOFFER: Mr. President, it is similar; there is only one -difference, and that concerns the amount. I believe the principle cannot -be contested by anyone; therefore I shall go on. - -Gentlemen, I shall also pass over the question of compulsory labor. I -shall conclude my summary, however, by pointing out to the Tribunal that -French economy suffered enormous losses from the deportation of workers, -a subject which was discussed by my colleague. We have calculated the -losses in working hours and we estimate—and this will be my only -remark—that French economy lost 12,550 million working hours through -the deportation of workers, a figure which does not include the number -of workers who were more or less forced to work for the Germans in -enterprises in France. - -If you will permit me, gentlemen, I shall conclude this presentation -concerning France by giving you a general review of the situation; and I -shall refer once more to Hemmen, the economic dictator who actually -ruined my country upon the orders of his masters, the defendants. While -in the first five reports submitted, despite their apparently technical -nature, the author shows the assurance of the victor who can allow -himself to do anything, in the last report of 15 December 1944 at -Salzburg, the only one I shall refer to, Hemmen sought visibly, while -giving his work a technical quality, to plead the case of Germany—that -of his Nazi masters and his own case. He only succeeded, however, in -bringing forth unwittingly an implacable accusation against the -nefarious work with which he was entrusted. Here are some short -extracts, gentlemen, of Hemmen’s final report. - -On Page 1 of his report, Page 2 of the French text, he implied the -co-responsibility of the German leaders, and Göring particularly. He -writes as follows: - - “According to the directives formulated on 5 July 1940 by the - Reich Marshal and Delegate of the Four Year Plan, concerning the - existing legal situation, the Armistice Convention does not give - us rights in the economic domain of the unoccupied parts of - France, not even when loosely interpreted.” - -A little farther on he admits blackmail with regard; to the demarcation -line with these words (Page 3 of the translation): - - “The Pétain Government manifested from the beginning a strong - desire to re-establish rapidly the destroyed economy by means of - German support and to find work for the French population in - order to avoid the threat of unemployment, but above all to - reunite the two French zones, separated by the demarcation line, - into a unified economic and administrative territory. They were - at the same time willing to bring this territory into line with - German economic direction, under French management, thoroughly - reorganizing it according to the German model.” - -Then Hemmen adds: - - “In return for considerable relaxations regarding the - demarcation line, the Armistice Delegation has come to an - agreement with the French Government to introduce into French - legislation the German law, relating to foreign currency.” - -Farther on, concerning pressure, on Page 4, and Page 7 of the -translation, Hemmen wrote: - - “Thereby the automatic rise of prices aggravated by the - unchecked development of the black market was felt all the more - strongly, since wages were forcibly fixed.” - -I pass over the passage in which Hemmen speaks of French resistance. -However, I should like to point out to the Tribunal that, on Page -13—Page 29 of the translation—Hemmen tries to show through financial -evaluations and most questionable arguments that the cost of the war per -head was heavier for the Germans than for the French. He himself -destroys with one word the whole system of defense which he had built up -by writing at the end of his bold calculations that from autumn 1940 to -February 1944 the cost of living increased 166 percent in France, while -in Germany it increased only 7 percent. Now, gentlemen, it is, I am -quite sure, through the increase in the cost of living that one measures -the impoverishment of a country. - -Last of all, on Page 4, and this is my last quotation from the Hemmen -report, he admits the German crime in these terms: - - “Through the removal, for years, of considerable quantities of - merchandise of every kind without economic compensation, a - perceptible decrease in substance had resulted with a - corresponding increase in monetary circulation, which had led - ever more noticeably, to the phenomena of inflation and - especially to a devaluation of money and a lowering of the - purchasing power.” - -These material losses, we may say, can be repaired. Through work and -saving we can re-establish, in a more or less distant future, the -economic situation of the country. That is true, but there is one thing -which can never be repaired—the results of privations upon the physical -state of the population. - -If the other German crimes, such as deportations, murders, massacres, -make one shudder with horror, the crime which consisted of deliberately -starving whole populations is no less odious. - -In the occupied countries, in France particularly, many persons died -solely because of undernourishment and because of lack of heat. It was -estimated that people require from 3,000 to 3,500 calories a day and -heavy laborers about 4,000. From the beginning of the rationing in -September 1940 only 1,800 calories per day per person were distributed. -Successively the ration decreased to 1,700 calories in 1942, then to -1,500, and finally fell to 1,220 and 900 calories a day for adults and -to 1,380 and 1,300 for heavy laborers; old persons were given only 850 -calories a day. But the true situation was still worse than the ration -theoretically allotted through ration cards; in fact, frequently a -certain number of coupons were not honored. - -The Germans could not fail to recognize the disastrous situation as far -as public health was concerned, since they themselves estimated in the -course of the war of 1914-1918 that the distribution of 1,700 calories a -day was a “regime of slow starvation, leading to death.” - -What aggravated the situation still more was the quality of the rations -which were distributed. Bread was of the poorest quality; milk, when -there was any, was skimmed to the point where the fat content amounted -to only 3 percent. The small amount of meat given to the population was -of bad quality. Fish had disappeared from the market. If we add to that -an almost total lack of clothing, shoes, and fuel, and the fact that -frequently neither schools nor hospitals were heated, one may easily -understand what the physical condition of the population was. - -Incurable sicknesses such as tuberculosis developed and will continue to -extend their ravages for many years. The growth of children and -adolescents is seriously impaired. The future of the race is a cause for -the greatest concern. The results of economic spoliation will be felt -for an indefinite period. - -THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell me what evidence you have for your figures -of calories? - -M. GERTHOFFER: I am going to show you this at the end of my -presentation. It is a report of a professor at the Medical School of -Paris who has been specially commissioned by the Dean of the University -to make a report on the results of undernourishment. I will quote it at -the end of my statement. I am almost there. - -The results of this economic spoliation will be felt for an indefinite -length of time. The exhaustion is such that, despite the generous aid -brought by the United Nations, the situation of the occupied countries, -taken as a whole, is still alarming. In fact, the complete absence of -stocks, the insufficiency of the means of production and of transport, -the reduction of livestock and the economic disorganization, do not -permit the allotting of sufficient rations at this time. This poverty, -which strikes all occupied countries, can disappear only gradually over -a long period of time, the length of which no one can yet determine. - -If in certain rich agricultural regions the producers were able during -the occupation to have and still do have a privileged situation from the -point of view of food supply, the same is not true in the poorer regions -nor in urban districts. If we consider that in France the urban -population is somewhat more numerous than the rural population, we can -state clearly that the great majority of the French population was -subject to and still remains subject to a food regime definitely -insufficient. - -Professor Guy Laroche, delegated by the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine -of Paris to study the consequences of undernourishment in France as a -result of German requisitions, has just sent a report on this question. - -I do not wish to prolong my explanation by reading the entire report. I -shall ask the Tribunal’s permission to quote the conclusion, which I -submit as Document Number RF-264(bis). I received the whole report only -a few days ago. It is submitted in its entirety, but I have not been -able to have 50 copies made of it. Two copies have been made and are -being submitted. Here are Dr. Laroche’s conclusions: - - “We see how great the crime of rationing was, which was imposed - by the Germans upon the French during the occupation period from - 1940 to 1944. It is difficult to give exact figures for the - number of human lives lost due to excessive rationing. We would - need general statistics and these we have been unable to - establish. - - “Nevertheless, without overestimating, we may well believe that, - including patients in institutions, the loss of human life from - 1940 to 1944 reached at least 150,000 persons. We must add a - great number of cases which were not fatal, of physical and - mental decline often incurable, of retarded development in - children, and so forth. - - “We think that three conclusions can be drawn from this report, - which of course is incomplete: - - “1.) The German occupation authorities deliberately sacrificed - the lives of patients in institutions and hospitals. - - “2.) From the way everything happened it seemed as if they had - wished to organize, in a rational and scientific fashion, the - decline of the health of adolescents and adults. - - “3.) Suckling babies and young children received a normal - ration; it is probable that this privileged position is - explained by the fact that the Nazi leaders hoped to spread - their doctrine more easily among beings who would not have known - any other conditions of life and who would, because of a planned - education, have accepted their doctrine, for they knew they - could not expect to convince adolescents and adults except - through force.” - -The report is signed by Professor Guy Laroche. - -This report, gentlemen, has attached to it a photograph, which you will -find at the end of the document book. I beg to hand it to you. The -unfortunate beings that you see in that picture are not the victims of a -concentration or reprisal camp. They are simply the patients of an -asylum in the outskirts of Paris who fell into this state of physical -weakness as a result of undernourishment. If these men had had the diet -of the asylum prior to rationing, they would have been as strong as -normal people. Unfortunately for them they were reduced to the official -rationing and were unable to obtain the slightest supplement. - -Do not let adversaries say: “But the German people are just as badly -off!” - -I should reply that, in the first place, this is not true. The German -did not suffer cold for four years; he was not undernourished. On the -contrary, he was well-fed, warmly clothed, warmly housed, with products -stolen from the occupied countries, leaving only the minimum necessary -for existence for the peoples of these countries. - -Remember, gentlemen, the words of Göring when he said: “If famine is to -reign, it will not reign in Germany.” - -Secondly I should say to my adversaries if they made such an objection: -The Germans and their Nazi leaders wanted the war which they launched, -but they had no right to starve other peoples in order to carry out -their attempt at world domination. If today they are in a difficult -situation, it is the result of their own behavior; and they seem to me -to have no right to take recourse to the famous sentence: “I did not -want that.” - -I am coming to the end of my statement. If you will permit me, -gentlemen, I will conclude in two minutes the whole of this presentation -by reminding the Tribunal in a few words what the premeditated crime -was, of which the German leaders have been accused, from the economic -point of view. - -The application of racial and living space theories was bound to -engender an economic situation which could not be solved and force the -Nazi leaders to war. - -In a modern society because of the division of labor, of its -concentration, and of its scientific organization, the concept of -national capital takes on more and more a primary importance, whatever -may be the social principles of its distribution between nationals, or -its possession in all or in part by states. - -Now, a national capital, public or private, is constituted by the joint -effort of the labor and the savings of successive generations. - -Saving, or the putting into reserve of the products of labor as a result -of deprivations freely consented to, must exist in proportion to the -needs of the concentration of the industrial enterprises of the country. - -In Germany, a country highly-industrialized, this equilibrium did not -exist. In fact, the expenditures, private or public, of that country -surpassed its means; saving was insufficient. The establishment of a -system of obligatory savings was formulated only through the creation of -new taxes and has never replaced true savings. - -As a result of the war of 1914-1918, after having freed herself of the -burden of reparations (and I must point out that two-thirds of the sum -remained charged to France as far as this country is concerned), -Germany, who had established her gold reserve in 1926, began a policy of -foreign loans and spent without counting the cost. Finding it impossible -to keep her agreements, she found no more creditors. - -After Hitler’s accession to power her policy became more definite. She -isolated herself in a closed economic system, utilizing all her -resources for the preparation of a war which would permit her, or at -least that is what she hoped, to take through force the property of her -western neighbors and then to turn against the Soviet Union in the hope -of exploiting, for her profit, the immense wealth of that great country. -It is the application of the theories formulated in _Mein Kampf_, which -had as a corollary the enslavement and then the extermination of the -populations of conquered countries. - -In the course of the occupation the invaded nations were systematically -pillaged and brutally enslaved; and this would have permitted Germany to -obtain her war aims, that is to say, to take the patrimony of the -invaded countries and to exterminate their populations gradually, if the -valor of the United Nations had not delivered them. Instead of becoming -enriched from the looted property, Germany had to sink it into a war -which she had provoked, right up to the very moment of her collapse. - -Such actions, knowingly perpetrated and executed by the German leaders -contrary to international law and particularly contrary to the Hague -Convention, as well as the general principles of penal law in force in -all civilized nations, constitute War Crimes for which they must answer -before your high jurisdiction. - -Mr. President, I should like to add that the French Prosecution had -intended to present a statement on the pillage of works of art in the -occupied countries of western Europe. But this question has already been -discussed in two briefs of our American colleagues, briefs which seem to -us to establish beyond any question the responsibility of the -defendants. In order not to prolong the hearing, the French Prosecution -feels that it is its duty to refrain from presenting this question -again; but we remain respectfully at the disposal of the Tribunal in -case, in the course of the trial, they feel they need further -information on this question. - -The presentation of the French Prosecution is concluded. I shall give -the floor to Captain Sprecher of the American Delegation, who will make -a statement on the responsibility of the Defendant Fritzsche. - -CAPTAIN DREXEL A. SPRECHER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United -States): May it please the Tribunal, I notice that Dr. Fritz, the -defendant’s attorney, is not here; and in view of the late hour, it -would be agreeable if we hold it over until tomorrow. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock now, so we shall adjourn in any event -now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FORTY-FIRST DAY - Wednesday, 23 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -CAPT. SPRECHER: May it please the Tribunal, it is my responsibility and -my privilege to present today the case on the individual responsibility -of the Defendant Hans Fritzsche for Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, -and Crimes against Humanity as they relate directly to the Common Plan -or Conspiracy. - -With the permission of the Tribunal, it is planned to make this -presentation in three principal divisions: - -First, a short listing of the various positions held by the Defendant -Fritzsche in the Nazi State. - -Second, a discussion of Fritzsche’s conspiratorial activities within the -Propaganda Ministry from 1933 through the attack on the Soviet Union. - -Third, a discussion of Fritzsche’s connection, as a Nazi propagandist, -to the atrocities and the ruthless occupation policy which formed a part -of the Common Plan or Conspiracy. - -In listing Fritzsche’s positions, it is not intended at first to -describe the functions of these positions. Later on, in describing some -of Fritzsche’s conspiratorial acts, I shall take up a discussion of some -of these positions which he held. - -Fritzsche’s Party membership and his various positions in the propaganda -apparatus of the Nazi State are shown by two affidavits by Fritzsche -himself: Document Number 2976-PS, which is already in evidence as -Exhibit USA-20; and Document Number 3469-PS, which I offer in evidence -as Exhibit USA-721. Both of these affidavits have been put into the four -working languages of this Tribunal. - -Fritzsche became a member of the Nazi Party on the 1st of May 1933, and -he continued to be a member until the collapse in 1945. Fritzsche began -his services with the staff of the Reich Ministry for Public -Enlightenment and Propaganda, hereinafter referred to as the Propaganda -Ministry, on the 1st of May 1933; and he remained within the Propaganda -Ministry until the Nazi downfall. - -Before the Nazis seized political power in Germany and beginning in -September 1932, Fritzsche was head of the Wireless News Service -(Drahtloser Dienst), an agency of the Reich Government at that time -under the Defendant Von Papen. After the Wireless News Service was -incorporated into the Propaganda Ministry of Dr. Goebbels in May 1933, -Fritzsche continued as its head until the year 1938. Upon entering the -Propaganda Ministry in May 1933, Fritzsche also became head of the news -section of the Press Division of the Propaganda Ministry. He continued -in this position until 1937. In the summer of 1938, Fritzsche was -appointed deputy to one Alfred Ingemar Berndt, who was then head of the -German Press Division. - -The German Press Division, in the Indictment, is called the Home Press -Division. Since “German Press Division” seems to be a more literal -translation, we have called it the German Press Division throughout this -presentation. It is sometimes otherwise known as the Domestic Press -Division. We shall show later that this division was the major section -of the Press Division of the Reich Cabinet. - -Now in December 1938 Fritzsche succeeded Berndt as the head of the -German Press Division. Between 1938 and November 1942 Fritzsche was -promoted three times. He advanced in title from Superior Government -Counsel to Ministerial Counsel, then to Ministerialdirigent, and finally -to Ministerialdirektor. - -In November 1942 Fritzsche was relieved of his position as head of the -German Press Division by Dr. Goebbels and accepted from Dr. Goebbels a -newly created position in the Propaganda Ministry, that of -Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater German -Radio. At the same time he also became head of the Radio Division of the -Propaganda Ministry. He held both these positions in radio until the -Nazi downfall. - -There are two allegations of the Indictment concerning Fritzsche’s -positions for which we are unable to offer proof. These allegations -appear at Page 34 of the English translation. - -The first unsupported allegation states that Fritzsche was -“Editor-in-Chief of the official German News Agency (Deutsches -Nachrichtenbüro).” The second unsupported allegation states that -Fritzsche was “head of the Radio Division of the Propaganda Department -of the Nazi Party.” Fritzsche denies having held either of these -positions, in his affidavit, and therefore these two allegations must -fall for want of proof. - -Before discussing the documentation of the case I wish, in passing, to -state my appreciation for the assistance of Mr. Norbert Halpern, Mr. -Alfred Booth, and Lieutenant Niebergall, who sits at my right, for their -assistance in research, analysis, and translation. - -The Tribunal will note the relative shortness of this document book. It -has been marked as Document Book MM. It contains only 32 pages, which -have been numbered consecutively in red pencil for your convenience. The -shortness of the documentation on this particular case is possible only -because of a long affidavit made by the Defendant Fritzsche, which was -signed by him on the 7th of January 1946. - -It seems appropriate to comment on this significant document before -proceeding. It is before Your Honors as Document Number 3469-PS, -beginning at document book Page 19. As I said, it has been translated -into the four working languages of this proceeding. - -This affidavit contains materials which have been extracted from -interrogations of Fritzsche and many materials which Fritzsche -volunteered to give himself, upon request made by me, through his -Defense Counsel, Dr. Fritz. Some of the portions of the final affidavit -were originally typed or handwritten by the Defendant Fritzsche himself -during this Trial or during the holiday recess. All these materials were -finally incorporated into one single affidavit. - -This affidavit contains Fritzsche’s account of the events which led to -his entering the Propaganda Ministry and his account of his later -connections with that Ministry. Before Fritzsche made some of the -statements in the affidavit concerning the role of propaganda in -relation to important foreign political events, he was shown -illustrative headlines and articles from the German press at that time, -so that he could refresh his recollection and make more accurate -statements. - -It is believed that the Tribunal will desire to consider many portions -of this affidavit independent of this presentation, along with the proof -on the conspirators’ use of propaganda as a principal weapon in the -conspiracy. Some of this proof, you will recall, was submitted by Major -Wallis in the first days of this Trial in connection with Brief E, -entitled “Propaganda, Censorship, and Supervision of the Cultural -Activities,” and the corresponding document book, to which I call the -Tribunal’s attention. - -In the Fritzsche affidavit there are a number of statements which I -would say were in the nature of self-serving declarations. With respect -to these, the Prosecution requests only that the Tribunal consider them -in the light of the whole conspiracy and the indisputable facts which -appear throughout the Record. The Prosecution did not feel, either as a -matter of expediency or of fairness, that it should request Fritzsche, -through his defense lawyer, Dr. Fritz, to remove some of these -self-serving declarations at this time and submit them later in -connection with his defense. - -Since I shall refer to this affidavit at numerous times throughout the -presentation, perhaps the members of the Tribunal will wish to place a -special marker in their document book. - -By referring to Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit, the Tribunal will -note that Fritzsche first became a successful journalist in the service -of the Hugenberg Press, the most important chain of newspaper -enterprises in pre-Nazi Germany. The Hugenberg concern owned papers of -its own, but primarily it was important because it served newspapers -which principally supported the so-called “national” parties of the -Reich, including the NSDAP. - -In Paragraph 5 of his affidavit Fritzsche relates that in September -1932, when the Defendant Von Papen was Reich Chancellor, he was made -head of the Wireless News Service, replacing someone who was politically -unbearable to the Papen regime. The Wireless News Service, I might say, -was a government agency for spreading news by radio. - -Fritzsche began making radio broadcasts at about this time with very -great success, a success which Goebbels recognized and was later to -exploit very efficiently on behalf of these Nazi conspirators. - -The Nazis seized power on the 30th of January 1933. From Paragraph 10 of -the Fritzsche affidavit we find that that very evening, the 30th of -January 1933, two emissaries from Goebbels visited Fritzsche. One of -them was Dressler-Andress, head of the Radio Division of the NSDAP; the -other was an assistant of Dressler-Andress named Sadila-Mantau. These -two emissaries notified Fritzsche that although Goebbels was angry with -Fritzsche for writing a critical article concerning Hitler, still -Goebbels recognized Fritzsche’s public success on the radio since the -previous fall. They stated further that Goebbels desired to retain -Fritzsche as head of the Wireless News Service on certain conditions: -(1) That Fritzsche discharge all Jews; (2) that he discharge all other -personnel who would not join the NSDAP; and (3) that he employ with the -Wireless News Service the second Goebbels’ emissary, Sadila-Mantau. - -Fritzsche refused all these conditions except the hiring of -Sadila-Mantau. This was one of the first ostensible compromises after -the seizure of power which Fritzsche made on his road to the Nazi camp. - -Fritzsche continued to make radio broadcasts during this period in which -he supported the National Socialist coalition government then still -existing. - -In early 1933 SA troops several times called at the Wireless News -Service and Fritzsche prevented them, with some difficulty, from making -news broadcasts. - -In April 1933 Goebbels called the young Fritzsche to him for a personal -audience. At Paragraph 9 of his affidavit, Document Number 3469-PS, -Fritzsche has volunteered the following concerning his prior -relationships with Dr. Goebbels: - - “I was acquainted with Dr. Goebbels since 1928. Apparently he - had taken a liking to me, besides the fact that in my press - activities I had always treated the National Socialists in a - friendly way until 1931. - - “Already before 1933 Goebbels, who was the editor of _The - Attack_ (_Der Angriff_), Nazi newspaper, had frequently made - flattering remarks about the form and content of my writings, - which I did as contributor of many ‘national’ newspapers and - periodicals, among which were also some of more reactionary - character.” - -At the first Goebbels-Fritzsche discussion in early April 1933, Goebbels -informed Fritzsche of his decision to place the Wireless News Service -within the Propaganda Ministry as of 1 May 1933. He suggested that -Fritzsche make certain rearrangements in the personnel which would -remove Jews and other persons who did not support the NSDAP. Fritzsche -debated with Goebbels concerning some of these steps. It must be said -that during this period Fritzsche made some effort to place Jews in -other jobs. - -In a second conference with Goebbels, shortly thereafter, Fritzsche -informed Goebbels about the steps he had taken in reorganizing the -Wireless News Service. Goebbels thereupon informed Fritzsche that he -would like to have him reorganize and modernize the entire news services -of Germany within the control of the Propaganda Ministry. - -It will be recalled by the Tribunal that on the 17th of March 1933, -approximately two months before this time, the Propaganda Ministry had -been formed by decree, 1933 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 104, our -Document Number 2029-PS. - -Fritzsche was intrigued by the Goebbels offer. He proceeded to conclude -the Goebbels-inspired reorganization of the Wireless News Service; and -on the 1st of May 1933, together with the remaining members of his -staff, he joined the Propaganda Ministry. On this same day he joined the -NSDAP and took the customary oath of unconditional loyalty to the -Führer. From this time on, whatever reservations Fritzsche may have had, -either then or later, to the course of events under the Nazis, Fritzsche -was completely within the Nazi camp. For the next 13 years he assisted -in creating and in using the principal propaganda devices which the -conspirators employed with such telling effect in each of the principal -phases of this conspiracy. - -From 1933 until 1942 Fritzsche held one or more positions within the -German Press Division. For 4 years indeed he headed this Division, -during those crucial years 1938 to 1942. That covers the period when the -Nazis undertook actual military invasions of neighboring countries. It -is, therefore, believed appropriate to spell out in some detail, before -this Tribunal, the functions of this German Press Division. These -functions will show the important and unique position of the German -Press Division as an instrument of the Nazi conspirators not only in -dominating the minds and the psychology of Germans through the German -Press Division and through the radio but also as an instrument of -foreign policy and psychological warfare against other nations. - -The already broad jurisdiction of the Propaganda Ministry was extended -by a Hitler decree of the 30th of June 1933, found in 1933 -_Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 449. From that decree I wish to quote -only one sentence. It is found in Document 2030-PS, your document book -Page 3: - - “The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda is - competent for all problems concerning the mental moulding of the - nation, the propaganda for the State, for culture and economy, - and the enlightenment at home and abroad about these questions. - Furthermore, he is in charge of the administration of all - institutions serving these purposes.” - -It is important to underline the stated propaganda objective of -“enlightenment at home and abroad.” - -For a clear exposition of the general functions of the German Press -Division of the Propaganda Ministry, the Tribunal is referred to -Document Number 2434-PS, document book Page 5. It is offered in evidence -as Exhibit USA-722. This document is an appropriate excerpt from a book -by Georg Wilhelm Müller, a Ministerial Director in the Propaganda -Ministry, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice. - -Fritzsche’s affidavit, Paragraphs 14, 15, and 16, beginning at Page 22 -of your document book, contains an exposition of the functions of the -German Press Division, a description which confirms and adds to the -exposition in Müller’s book. Concerning the German Press Division, -Fritzsche’s affidavit states: - - “During the whole period from 1933 to 1945 it was the task of - the German Press Division to supervise the entire domestic press - and to provide it with directives by which this division became - an efficient instrument in the hands of the German State - leadership. More than 2,300 German daily newspapers were subject - to control. - - “The aim of this supervision and control, in the first years - following 1933, was to change basically the conditions existing - in the press before the seizure of power. That meant the - coordination into the New Order of those newspapers and - periodicals which had been serving capitalistic individual - interests or party politics. While the administrative functions - wherever possible were exercised by the professional - associations and the Reich Press Chamber, the political - direction of the German press was entrusted to the German Press - Division. - - “The head of the German Press Division held daily press - conferences in the Ministry for the representatives of all - German newspapers. Thereby all instructions were given to the - representatives of the press. These instructions were - transmitted daily, almost without exception and mostly by - telephone from headquarters by Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich Press - Chief, in a set text, the so-called ‘Daily Parole of the Reich - Press Chief.’ Before the formulation of this text the head of - the German Press Division submitted to him, Dietrich, the - foremost press wishes expressed by Dr. Goebbels and by other - ministries. This was the case especially with the wishes of the - Foreign Office about which Dr. Dietrich always wanted to make - decisions personally or through his representatives at - headquarters, Helmut Sündermann and chief editor Lorenz. - - “The actual interpretation of the direction in detail was thus - left entirely to the individual work of the various editors. - Therefore, it is by no means true that the newspapers and - periodicals were a monopoly of the German Press Division or that - essays and leading articles had to be submitted by them to the - Ministry. Even in war times this happened in exceptional cases - only. The less important newspapers and periodicals which were - not represented at the daily press conferences received their - information in a different way—by providing them either with - ready-made articles and reports, or by confidential printed - instruction. The publications of all other official agencies - were directed and coordinated likewise by the German Press - Division. - - “To enable the periodicals to get acquainted with the daily - political problems of newspapers and to discuss these problems - in greater detail, the _Informationskorrespondenz_ was issued - especially for periodicals. Later on it was taken over by the - Periodical Press Division. The German Press Division likewise - was in charge of pictorial reporting insofar as it directed the - employment of pictorial reporters at important events. - - “In this way, and conditioned upon the prevailing political - situation, the entire German press was, by the German Press - Division, made a permanent instrument of the Propaganda - Ministry. Thereby, the entire German Press was subordinate to - the political aims of the government. This was exemplified by - the timely limitation and the emphatic presentation of such - press polemics as appeared to be most useful, as shown for - instance in the following themes: The class struggle of the - system era; the Leadership Principle and the authoritarian - state; the party and interest politics of the system era; the - Jewish problem; the conspiracy of world-Jewry; the Bolshevistic - danger; the plutocratic democracy abroad; the race problem - generally; the church; the economic misery abroad; the foreign - policy; the living space (Lebensraum).” - -This description of Fritzsche establishes clearly and in his own words -that the German Press Division was the instrument for subordinating the -entire German press to the political aims of the government. - -We now pass to Fritzsche’s first activities on behalf of the -conspirators within the German Press Division. It is appropriate to read -again from his affidavit, Paragraph 17, your document book Page 23. -Fritzsche begins by describing a conference with Goebbels in late April -or early May 1933: - - “At this time Dr. Goebbels suggested to me, in my capacity as - the expert on news technique, the establishment and direction of - a section ‘News’ within the Press Division of his Ministry, in - order to thoroughly organize and modernize the German news - agencies. In carrying out the task assigned to me by Dr. - Goebbels my field covered the entire news service for the German - press and the radio in accordance with the directions given by - the Propaganda Ministry, excepting at first the DNB”—German - News Agency. - -An obvious reason why the DNB was excepted from Fritzsche’s field at -this time is that the DNB did not come into existence until the year -1934 as we shall later see. Later on, in Paragraph 17 of the Fritzsche -affidavit, the Tribunal will note the tremendous funds put at the -disposal of Fritzsche in building up the Nazi news services. Altogether -the German news agencies received a 10-fold increase in their budget -from the Reich, an increase from 400,000 to 4 million marks. Fritzsche -himself selected and employed the chief editor for the Transocean News -Agency and also for the Europa Press. Fritzsche states that some of the -“directions of the Propaganda Ministry which I had to follow were,” and -then skipping, “. . . increase of German news copy abroad at any cost,” -and then skipping again, “. . . spreading of favorable news on the -internal construction and peaceful intentions of the National Socialist -system.” - -About the summer of 1934 the Defendant Funk, then Reich Press Chief, -achieved the fusion of the two most important domestic news agencies, -the Wolff Telegraph Agency and the Telegraph Union, and thus formed the -official German news agency, ordinarily known as DNB. It has already -been pointed out to the Tribunal that the Indictment is in error in -alleging that Fritzsche himself was Editor-in-Chief of the DNB. -Fritzsche held no position whatsoever with the DNB at any time. However, -as head of the news section of the German Press Division, Fritzsche’s -duties gave him official jurisdiction over the DNB, which was the -official domestic news agency of the German Reich after 1934. In the -last part of Paragraph 17 of this affidavit, Fritzsche states that he -coordinated the work of the various foreign news agencies “at home and -within European and overseas foreign countries with one another and in -relationship to DNB.” - -The Wireless News Service was headed by Fritzsche from 1932 to 1937. -After January 1933, the Wireless News Service was the official -instrument of the Nazi Government in spreading news over the radio. -During the same time that Fritzsche headed the Wireless News Service, he -personally made radio broadcasts to the German people. These broadcasts -were naturally subject to the controls of the Propaganda Ministry and -reflected its purposes. The influence of Fritzsche’s broadcasts upon the -German people, during this period of consolidation of control by the -Nazi conspirators, is all the more important since Fritzsche was -concurrently head of the Wireless News Services, which controlled for -the government the spreading of all news by radio. - -It is by now well known to the world that the Nazi conspirators -attempted to be, and often were, very adept in psychological warfare. -Before each major aggression, with some few exceptions based on the -strategy of expediency, they initiated a press campaign calculated to -weaken their victims and to prepare the German people psychologically -for the impending Nazi madness. They used the press after their earlier -conquests as a means for further influencing foreign politics and in -maneuvering for the next following aggression. - -By the time of the occupation of the Sudetenland on the 1st of October -1938, Fritzsche had become deputy head of the entire German Press -Division. Fritzsche states that the role of German propaganda before the -Munich Agreement on the Sudetenland was directed by his immediate chief, -Berndt, then head of the German Press Division. In Paragraph 27 of the -Fritzsche affidavit, Page 26 of your document book, Fritzsche describes -this propaganda which was directed by Berndt. Speaking of Berndt, -Fritzsche states: - - “He exaggerated minor events very strongly, sometimes used old - episodes as new—and there even came complaints from the - Sudetenland itself that some of the news reported by the German - press was untrustworthy. As a matter of fact, after the great - foreign political success at Munich in September 1938, there - arose a noticeable crisis in the confidence of the German people - in the trustworthiness of its press. This was one reason for the - recalling of Berndt, in December 1938 after the conclusion of - the Sudeten action, and for my appointment as head of the German - Press Division. Beyond this, Berndt, by his admittedly - successful but still primitive military-like orders to the - German press, had lost the confidence of the German editors.” - -Now, what happened at this time? Fritzsche was made head of the German -Press Division in place of Berndt. Between December 1938 and 1942, -Fritzsche, as head of the German Press Division, personally gave to the -representatives of the principal German newspapers the “daily parole of -the Reich Press Chief.” During this history-making period he was the -principal conspirator directly concerned with the manipulations of the -press. The first important foreign aggression after Fritzsche became -head of the German Press Division was the incorporation of Bohemia and -Moravia. In Paragraph 28 of the affidavit, your document book, Page 26, -Fritzsche gives his account of the propaganda action surrounding the -incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia as follows: - - “The action for the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia, which - took place on 15 March 1939, while I was head of the German - Press Division, was not prepared for such a long period as the - Sudeten action. According to my memory it was in February that I - received the order from the Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich, and - repeated requests by the envoy Paul Schmidt of the Foreign - Office, to draw the attention of the press to the aspirations of - Slovakia for independence and to the continued anti-German - coalition politics of the Prague Government. I did this. The - daily paroles of the Reich Press Chief and the press conference - minutes at that time show the wording of the pertinent - instructions. The following were the typical headlines of - leading newspapers and the conspicuous leading articles of the - German daily press at that time: (1) The terrorizing of Germans - within the Czech territory by arrest, shooting at Germans by the - state police, destruction and damaging of German homes by Czech - mobs; (2) the concentration of Czech forces on the Sudeten - frontier; (3) the kidnapping, deportation, and persecution of - Slovakian minorities by the Czechs, (4) the Czechs must get out - of Slovakia; (5) secret meetings of Red functionaries in Prague. - - “Some few days before the visit of Hacha, I received the - instruction to publish in the press very conspicuously the - incoming news on the unrest in Czechoslovakia. Such information - I received only partly from the German News Agency DNB but - mostly from the Press Division of the Foreign Office and some - from big newspapers with their own news services. Among the - newspapers offering information was, above all, the _Völkischer - Beobachter_ which, as I learned later on, received its - information from the SS Standartenführer Gunter D’Alquen, who - was at that time at Bratislava. I had forbidden all news - agencies and newspapers to issue news on unrest in - Czechoslovakia until I had seen it. I wanted to avoid a - repetition of the very annoying accompaniments of the Sudeten - action propaganda, and I did not want to suffer a loss of - prestige caused by untrue news. Thus, all news checked by me was - admittedly full of tendency but not invented. Following the - visit of Hacha in Berlin and after the beginning of the invasion - of the German Army, which took place on 15 March 1939, the - German press had enough material for describing these events. - Historically and politically the event was justified with the - indication that the declaration of independence of Slovakia had - required an interference and that Hacha with his signature had - avoided a war and had reinstated a thousand-year-old union - between Bohemia and the Reich.” - -The propaganda campaign of the press preceding the invasion of Poland on -the 1st of September 1939—and thus the propaganda action just preceding -the precipitation of World War II—bears again the handiwork of -Fritzsche and his German Press Division. In Paragraph 30 of Fritzsche’s -affidavit, document book Page 27, Fritzsche speaks of the conspirators’ -treatment of this episode as follows: - - “Very complicated and varying was the press and propagandists - treatment in the case of Poland. Under the influence of the - German-Polish Agreement, the German press was for many years - forbidden, on principle, to publish anything on the situation of - the German minority in Poland. This was still the case when in - the spring of 1939 the German press was asked to become somewhat - more active as to the problem of Danzig. Also when the first - Polish-English conversations took place and the German press was - advised to use a sharper tone against Poland, the question of - the German minority still remained in the background. At first - during the summer this problem was picked up again and created - immediately a noticeable sharpening of the situation. Each - larger German newspaper had for some time quite an abundance of - material on complaints and grievances of the Germans in Poland - without the editors having had a chance to use this material. - The German papers, from the time of the minority discussions at - Geneva, still had correspondents or free collaborators in - Katowice, Bydgoszcz, Posen, Toruń, _et cetera_. Their material - now came forth with a bound. Concerning this, the leading German - newspapers brought but in accordance with directions given for - the so-called daily paroles the following articles, in - conspicuous setting: (1) Cruelty and terror against racial - Germans and the extermination of racial Germans in Poland; (2) - Construction of field works by thousands of racial German men - and women in Poland; (3) Poland, land of servitude and disorder; - the desertion of Polish soldiers; the increased inflation in - Poland; (4) provocation of frontier clashes upon direction of - the Polish Government; the Polish aspirations for conquest; (5) - persecution of Czechs and Ukrainians by Poland. The Polish press - retorted hotly.” - -The press campaign preceding the invasion of Yugoslavia followed the -conventional pattern. You will find the customary defamations, the lies, -the incitement and the threats, and the usual attempt to divide and to -weaken the victim. Paragraph 32 of the Fritzsche affidavit, your -document book Page 28, outlines this propaganda action as follows: - - “During the period immediately preceding the invasion of - Yugoslavia, on the 6th of April 1941, the German press - emphasized by headlines and leading articles the following - boldly made up announcements: (1) The systematic persecution of - racial Germans in Yugoslavia including the burning down of - German villages by Serbian soldiers and the confining of racial - Germans in concentration camps, as well as the physical - mishandling of German-speaking persons; (2) the arming of - Serbian bandits by the Serbian Government; (3) the indictment of - Yugoslavia by the plutocrats against Germany; (4) growing - anti-Serbian feeling in Croatia; (5) the chaotic situation of - the economic and social conditions in Yugoslavia.” - -Since Germany had a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and -because these conspirators wanted the advantage of surprise, there was -no special propaganda campaign immediately preceding the attack on the -U.S.S.R. Fritzsche in Paragraph 33 of his affidavit discussed the -propaganda line, however, for the justification of this aggressive war -to the German people: - - “During the night from the 21st to the 22d of June 1941, - Ribbentrop called me in at about 5 o’clock in the morning for a - conference in the Foreign Office at which representatives of the - domestic and foreign press were present. Ribbentrop informed us - that the war against the Soviet Union would start that same day - and asked the German press to present the war against the Soviet - Union as a preventive war for the defense of the fatherland, a - war which was forced upon us by the imminent danger of an attack - of the Soviet Union against Germany. The claim that this was a - preventive war was later repeated by the newspapers which - received their instructions from me during the usual daily - parole of the Reich Press Chief. I myself have also given this - presentation of the cause of the war in my regular broadcasts.” - -Fritzsche, throughout his affidavit, constantly refers to his technical -and expert assistance to the colossal apparatus of the Propaganda -Ministry. In 1939 he apparently became dissatisfied with the efficiency -of the existing facilities of the German Press Division in furnishing -grist for the propaganda mill and for its intrigues. He established a -new instrument for improving the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda. In -Paragraph 19 of his affidavit, Page 24 of your document book, Fritzsche -describes this new propaganda instrument as follows: - - “About the summer of 1939 I established within the German Press - Division a section called ‘Speed Service.’” - -And then skipping and quoting again: - - “. . . at the start it had the task of checking the correctness - of news from foreign countries. Later on, about the fall of - 1939, this section also worked on the compilation of material - which was put at the disposal of the entire German press: For - instance, dates from the British Colonial policy, political - statements of the British Prime Minister in former times, - descriptions of social distress in hostile countries, _et - cetera_. Almost all German newspapers used such material as a - basis for their polemics, whereby close concentration in the - fighting front of the German press was gained. The title ‘Speed - Service’ was chosen because materials for current comments were - supplied with particular speed.” - -Throughout this entire period preceding and including the launching of -aggressive war, Fritzsche made regular radio broadcasts to the German -people under the following titles: “Political Newspaper Review,” -“Political and Radio Show,” and later “Hans Fritzsche Speaks.” His -broadcasts naturally reflected the polemics and the control of his -Ministry and thus of the Common Plan or Conspiracy. - -We of the Prosecution contend that Fritzsche, one of the most eminent of -Goebbels’ propaganda team, helped substantially to bathe the world in -the blood bath of aggressive war. - -With the Tribunal’s consent I will now pass to proof bearing on -Fritzsche’s incitement of atrocities and his encouragement of a ruthless -occupation policy. The results of propaganda as a weapon of the Nazi -conspirators reach into every aspect of this conspiracy, including the -abnormal and inhuman conduct involved in the atrocities and the ruthless -exploitation of occupied countries. Most of the ordinary members of the -German nation would never have participated in or tolerated the -atrocities committed throughout Europe if they had not been conditioned -and goaded to barbarous convictions and misconceptions by the constant -grinding of the Nazi propaganda machine. Indeed, the propagandists who -lent themselves to this evil mission of instigation and incitement are -more guilty than the credulous and callous minions who headed the firing -squads or operated the gas chambers, of which we have heard so much in -this proceeding. For the very credulity and callousness of those minions -was in large part due to the constant and evil propaganda of Fritzsche -and his official associates. - -With respect to Jews, the Department of Propaganda within the Propaganda -Ministry had a special branch for the “Enlightenment of the German -people and of the world as to the Jewish question, fighting with -propagandistic weapons against enemies of the State and hostile -ideologies.” This quotation is taken from a book written in 1940 by -Ministerial Director Müller, entitled _The Propaganda Ministry_. It is -found in Document Number 2434(a)-PS, your document book Page 10, offered -in evidence as Exhibit USA-722. It is another excerpt from Ministerial -Director Müller’s book and I merely ask that you take judicial notice of -it for that one sentence that I have read. - -Fritzsche took a particularly active part in this “enlightenment” -concerning the Jewish question in his radio broadcasts. These broadcasts -literally teemed with provocative libels against Jews, the only logical -result of which was to inflame Germany to further atrocities against the -helpless Jews who came within its physical power. Document Number -3064-PS contains a number of complete broadcasts by Fritzsche which were -monitored by the British Broadcasting Corporation and translated by BBC -officials. For the convenience of the Tribunal, I have had those -excerpts upon which the Prosecution relies to show illustrative types of -Fritzsche’s broadcasts mimeographed and made into one document, which I -offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-723. Even the Defendant Streicher, the -master Jew-baiter of all time, could scarcely outdo Fritzsche in some of -his slanders against the Jews. All the excerpts in Document Number -3064-PS are from speeches by Fritzsche given on the radio between 1941 -and 1945, which we have already proven was a period of intensified -anti-Jewish measures. With the permission of the Tribunal, I would like -to read some of these excerpts. - -Page 14 of our document book, Item 1, from a broadcast of 18 December -1941—it is found on Page 2122 of the translations from BBC: - - “The fate of Jewry in Europe has turned out to be as unpleasant - as the Führer predicted it would be in the event of a European - war. After the extension of the war instigated by Jews, this - fate may also spread to the New World, for it can hardly be - assumed that the nations of this New World will pardon the Jews - for the misery of which the nations of the Old World did not - absolve them.” - -From a radio broadcast of 18 March 1941, found at Page 2032 of the BBC -translations: - - “But the crown of all wrongly-applied Rooseveltian logic is the - sentence: ‘There never was a race and there never will be a race - which can serve the rest of mankind as a master.’ Here, too, we - can only applaud Mr. Roosevelt. It is precisely because there - exists no race which can be the master of the rest of mankind, - that we Germans have taken the liberty to break the domination - of Jewry and of its capital in Germany, of Jewry which believed - it had inherited the crown of secret world domination.” - -In passing, I would merely like to note that it seems to us that that is -not only applause for past acts concerning persecution of Jews but an -announcement that more is coming and an encouragement of what was -coming. - -I would like to read another excerpt from the 9th of October 1941 -broadcast, translated at Page 2101 of the BBC translation: - - “We know very well that these German victories, unparalleled in - history, have not yet stopped the source of hatred which for a - long time has fed the warmongers and from which this war - originated. The international Jewish-Democratic-Bolshevistic - campaign of incitement against Germany still finds cover in this - or that fox’s lair or rat hole. We have seen only too frequently - how the defeats suffered by the warmongers only doubled their - senseless and impotent fury.” - -Another broadcast of the 8th January 1944—Your Honors, I have tried to -pick out illustrative broadcasts from different periods here: - - “It is revealed clearly once more that not a new system of - government, not a young nationalism, and not a new and - well-applied socialism brought about this war. The guilty ones - are exclusively the Jews and the plutocrats. If discussion on - the post-war problems brings this to light so clearly, we - welcome it as a contribution for later discussions and also as a - contribution to the fight we are waging now, for we refuse to - believe that world history will entrust its future development - to those powers which have brought about this war. This clique - of Jews and plutocrats have invested their money in armaments - and they had to see to it that they would get their interests - and sinking funds; hence they unleashed this war.” - -Concerning Jews, I had one last quotation from the year 1945. It is from -a broadcast of the 13th of January 1945, found on Pages 2258 and 2259 of -the BBC translations: - - “If Jewry provided a link between such divergent elements as - plutocracy and Bolshevism and if Jewry was first able to work - successfully in the democratic countries in preparing this war - against Germany, it has by now placed itself unreservedly on the - side of Bolshevism which, with its entirely mistaken slogans of - racial freedom against racial hatred, has created the very - conditions the Jewish race requires in its struggle for - domination, over other races.” - -And then skipping a few lines in that quotation: - - “Not the last result of German resistance on all the fronts, so - unexpected to the enemy, is the fruition of a development which - began in the pre-war years, that is, the process of - subordinating British policy to far-reaching Jewish points of - view. This development started long before this when Jewish - emigrants from Germany commenced their warmongering against us - from British and American soil.” - -And then skipping several sentences and going to the last sentence on -that page. - - “This whole attempt, aiming at the establishment of Jewish world - domination, was obviously made at a time when the - national-racial consciousness had been too far awakened to - promise such an aim success.” - -Your Honors, we suggest that that is an invitation to further -persecution of the Jews and, indeed, to their elimination. - -Fritzsche also incited and encouraged ruthless measures against the -peoples of the U.S.S.R. In his regular broadcasts Fritzsche’s -incitements against the peoples of the U.S.S.R. were often linked to, -and were certainly as inflammatory as, his slanders against the Jews. If -these slanders were not so tragic in their relation to the murder of -millions of people, they would be comical, indeed ludicrous. It is -ironic that the propaganda libels against the peoples of the U.S.S.R. -concerning atrocities actually described some of the many atrocities -committed by the German invaders, as we now well know. The following -quotations are again taken from the BBC intercepted broadcasts and their -translations, beginning shortly after the invasion of the U.S.S.R. in -June 1941. The first one is taken again from Page 16 of our document -book. I will read only the last half of Item 7, beginning with the third -paragraph: - - “As can be sufficiently seen by letters reaching us from the - front, from P.K. reporters”—and may I interrupt my quotation - there to say that “P.K.” stands for “Propaganda Kompanie,” - propaganda companies which were attached to the German Army - wherever it went—“P.K. reporters and soldiers on leave, in this - struggle in the East not one political system is pitted against - another, not one philosophy is fighting another, but culture, - civilization, and human dignity have stood up against the - diabolical principle of a subhuman world.” - -And then another quote in the next paragraph: - - “It was only the Führer’s decision to strike in time that saved - our homeland from the fate of being overrun by those subhuman - creatures, and our men, women, and children from the unspeakable - horror of becoming their prey.” - -In the next broadcast I want to quote from, 10th of July 1941, in the -first paragraph Fritzsche speaks of the inhuman deeds committed in areas -controlled by the Soviet Union, and he states that one, upon seeing the -evidence of those deeds committed, comes—and here I quote: - - “. . . finally to make the holy resolve to lend one’s assistance - in the final destruction of those who are capable of such - dastardly acts.” - -And then quoting again, the last paragraph: - - “The Bolshevist agitators made no effort to deny that in towns, - thousands, and in the villages, hundreds of corpses of men, - women, and children have been found, who had been either killed - or tortured to death. In spite of this Bolshevik agitators - assert that this was not done by Soviet commissars but by German - soldiers. But we know our German soldiers. No German women, - fathers, or mothers require proofs that their husbands or their - sons cannot have committed such atrocious acts.” - -Evidence already in the Record, or shortly to be offered in this case by -our Soviet colleagues, will prove that representatives of these Nazi -conspirators did not hesitate to exterminate Soviet soldiers and -civilians by scientific mass methods. These inciting remarks by -Fritzsche made him an accomplice in these crimes because his labeling of -the Soviet peoples as members of a “subhuman world” seeking to -“exterminate” the German people and similar desperate talk helped, by -these propaganda diatribes, to fashion the psychological atmosphere of -utter and complete unreason and the hatred which instigated and made -possible these atrocities in the East. - -Although we cannot say that Fritzsche directed that 10,000 or 100,000 -persons be exterminated, it is enough to pause on this question: Without -these incitements of Fritzsche, how much harder it would have been for -these conspirators to have effected the conditions which made possible -the extermination of millions of people in the East. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -CAPT. SPRECHER: Fritzsche encouraged, affirmed, and glorified the policy -of the Nazi conspirators in ruthlessly exploiting the occupied -countries. Again I read an excerpt from his radio broadcast of the 9th -of October 1941, found at Pages 2102 and 2103 of the BBC translation. I -would like to cut it down, but it is one of those long German sentences -that just cannot be broken down: - - “Today we can only say: Blitzkrieg or not, this German - thunderstorm has cleansed the atmosphere of Europe. Certainly it - is quite true that the dangers threatening us were eliminated - one after the other with lightning speed but in these lightning - blows which shattered England’s allies on the continent, we saw - not a proof of the weakness, but a proof of the strength and - superiority of the Führer’s gift as a statesman and military - leader; a proof of the German peoples’ might; we saw the proof - that no opponent can rival the courage, discipline, and - readiness for sacrifice displayed by the German soldier, and we - are particularly grateful for these lightning, incomparable - victories, because—as the Führer emphasized last Friday—they - give us the possibility of embarking on the organization of - Europe and on the lifting of the treasures”—I would like to - repeat that—“lifting of the treasures of this old continent, - already now in the middle of war, without its being necessary - for millions and millions of German soldiers to be on guard, - fighting day and night along this or that threatened frontier; - and the possibilities of this continent are so rich that they - suffice to supply all needs in peace or war.” - -Concerning the exploitation of foreign countries, Fritzsche states -himself, at Paragraph 39 of his affidavit: - - “The utilization of the productive capacity of the occupied - countries for the strengthening of the German war potential, I - have openly and with praise pointed out, all the more so as the - competent authorities put at my disposal much material, - especially on the voluntary placement of manpower.” - -Fritzsche was a credulous propagandist indeed if he gloriously praised -the exploitation policy of the German Reich, chiefly or especially -because the competent authorities gave him a sales talk on the voluntary -placement of manpower. - -I come now to Fritzsche as the high commander of the entire German radio -system. Fritzsche continued as the head of the German Press Division -until after the conspirators had begun the last of their aggressions. In -November 1942, Goebbels created a new position, that of Plenipotentiary -for the Political Organization of the Greater German Radio, a position -which Fritzsche was the first and the last to hold. In Paragraph 36, -Document Number 3469-PS, the Fritzsche affidavit, Fritzsche narrates how -the entire German radio and television system was organized under his -supervision. That is at Page 29 of your document book. He states: - - “My office practically represented the high command of German - radio.” - -As special Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater -German Radio, Fritzsche issued orders to all the Reich propaganda -offices by teletype. These were used first in conforming the entire -radio apparatus of Germany to the desires of the conspirators. - -Goebbels customarily held an 11 o’clock conference with his closest -collaborators within the Propaganda Ministry. When both Goebbels and his -undersecretary, Dr. Naumann, were absent, Goebbels, after 1943, -entrusted Fritzsche with the holding of this 11 o’clock press -conference. - -In Document Number 3255-PS the Court will find Goebbels’ praise of -Fritzsche’s broadcasts. This praise was given in Goebbels’ introduction -to a book by Fritzsche called, _War to the War Mongers_. I would like to -offer the quotation in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-724, from the -_Rundfunk Archiv_, at Page 18 of Your Honors’ document book. This is -Goebbels speaking: - - “Nobody knows better than I how much work is involved in those - broadcasts, how many times they were dictated within the last - minutes to find some minutes later a willing ear by the whole - nation.” - -So we have it from Goebbels himself that the entire German nation was -prepared to lend willing ears to Fritzsche, after he had made his -reputation on the radio. - -The rumor passed that Fritzsche was “His Master’s Voice” (Die Stimme -seines Herrn). This is certainly borne out by Fritzsche’s functions. -When Fritzsche spoke on the radio it was indeed plain to the German -people that they were listening to the high command of the conspirators -in this field. - -Fritzsche is not being presented by the Prosecution as the type of -conspirator who signed decrees or as the type of conspirator who sat in -the inner councils planning all of the over-all grand strategy of these -conspirators. The function of propaganda is, for the most part, apart -from the field of such planning. The function of a propaganda agency is -somewhat more analogous to an advertising agency or public relations -department, the job of which is to sell the product and to win the -market for the enterprise in question. Here the enterprise, we submit, -was the Nazi conspiracy. In a conspiracy to commit fraud, the gifted -salesman of the conspiratorial group is quite as essential and quite as -culpable as the master planners, even though he may not have contributed -substantially to the formulation of all the basic strategy, but rather -contributed to the artful execution of this strategy. - -In this case the Prosecution most emphatically contends that propaganda -was a weapon of tremendous importance to this conspiracy. We further -contend that the leading propagandists were major accomplices in this -conspiracy, and further, that Fritzsche was a major propagandist. - -When Fritzsche entered the Propaganda Ministry, the most fabulous “lie -factory” of all time, and thus attached himself to this conspiracy, he -did this with a more open mind than most of these conspirators who had -committed themselves at an earlier date, before the seizure of power. He -was in a particularly strategic position to observe the frauds committed -upon the German people and upon the world by these conspirators. - -The Tribunal will recall that in 1933, before Fritzsche took his party -oath of unconditional obedience and subservience to the Führer and thus -abdicated his moral responsibility to these conspirators, he had -observed at first-hand the operations of the storm troopers and the Nazi -race pattern in action. When, notwithstanding this, Fritzsche undertook -to bring the German news agencies in their entirety within fascist -control, he learned from the inside, from Goebbels’ own lips, much of -the cynical intrigue and many of the bold lies against opposition groups -within and without Germany. He observed, for example, the opposition -journalists, a profession to which he had previously been attached, -being forced out of existence, crushed to the ground, either absorbed or -eliminated. He continued to support the conspiracy. He learned from day -to day the art of intrigue and quackery in the process of perverting the -German nation, and he grew in prestige and influence as he practiced -this art. - -The Tribunal will also recall that Fritzsche had said that his -predecessor Berndt fell from the leadership of the German Press Division -partly because he overplayed his hand by the successful but blunt and -overdone manipulation of the Sudetenland propaganda. Fritzsche stepped -into the gap which had been caused by the loss of confidence of both the -editors and the German people, and Fritzsche did his job well. - -No doubt Fritzsche was not as blunt as the man he succeeded; but -Fritzsche’s relative shrewdness and subtlety, his very ability to be -more assuring and “to find,” as Goebbels said, “the willing ears of the -whole nation,” these things made him the more useful accomplice of these -conspirators. - -Nazi Germany and its press went into the actual phase of war operations -with Fritzsche at the head of the particular propaganda instrument -controlling the German press and German news, whether by the press or by -radio. In 1942 when Fritzsche transferred from the field of the press to -the field of radio, he was not removed for bungling but only because -Goebbels then needed him most in the field of radio. Fritzsche is not in -the dock as a free journalist, but as an efficient, controlled Nazi -propagandist, a propagandist who helped substantially to tighten the -Nazi stranglehold over the German people, a propagandist who made the -excesses of these conspirators more palatable to the consciences of the -German people themselves, a propagandist who cynically proclaimed the -barbarous racialism which is at the very heart of this conspiracy, a -propagandist who coldly goaded humble Germans to blind fury against -people they were told by him were subhuman and guilty of all the -suffering of Germany, suffering which indeed these Nazis themselves, had -invited. - -In conclusion, I wish to say only this. Without the propaganda apparatus -of the Nazi State it is clear that the world, including Germany, would -not have suffered the catastrophe of these years; and it is because of -Fritzsche’s able role on behalf of the Nazi conspirators and their -deceitful and barbarous practices in connection with the conspiracy that -he is called to account before this International Tribunal. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): -May it please the Tribunal, it was intended that the next presentation -would be by Colonel Griffith-Jones in the case of the Defendant Hess. I -understand that the Tribunal has in mind that it might be better if that -were left for the moment; if so, Major Harcourt Barrington is prepared -to make the presentation with regard to the Defendant Von Papen. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We understood that the Defendant Hess’s counsel -could not be present today, and therefore it was better to go on with -one of the others. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, then Major Harcourt -Barrington will deal with the presentation against the Defendant Von -Papen. - -MAJOR J. HARCOURT BARRINGTON (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): My -Lord, I understand that the court interpreters have not got the proper -papers and document books up here yet, but they can get them in a very -few minutes. Would your Lordship prefer that I should go on or wait -until they have got them? - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on then. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present -the case against the Defendant Von Papen. Before I begin I would like to -say that the documents in the document books are arranged numerically -and not in the order of presentation, and that the English document -books are paged in red chalk at the bottom of the page. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does that mean that the French and the Soviet are not? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, we did not prepare French and Soviet document -books. - -THE PRESIDENT: Major Barrington, the French members of the Tribunal have -no document books at all. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, there should be a German document book for -the French member. I understand it is now being fetched. Should I wait -until it arrives? - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you can go on. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: The Defendant Papen is charged primarily with the -guilt of conspiracy, and the proof of this charge of conspiracy will -emerge automatically from the proof of the four allegations specified in -Appendix A of the Indictment. These are as follows: - -(1) He promoted the accession of the Nazi conspirators to power. - -(2) He participated in the consolidation of their control over Germany. - -(3) He promoted the preparations for war. - -(4) He participated in the political planning and preparation of the -Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression, _et cetera_. - -Broadly speaking, the case against Von Papen covers the period from the -1st of June 1932 to the conclusion of the Anschluss in March 1938. - -So far in this Trial, almost the only evidence specifically implicating -Von Papen has been evidence in regard to his activities in Austria. This -evidence need only be summarized now. But if the case against Von Papen -rested on Austria alone, the Prosecution would be in the position of -relying on a period during which the essence of his task was studied -plausibility and in which his whole purpose was to clothe his operations -with a cloak of sincerity and innocent respectability. It is therefore -desirable to put the evidence already given in its true perspective by -showing in addition the active and prominent part he played for the -Nazis before he went to Austria. - -Papen himself claims to have rejected many times Hitler’s request that -he should actually join the Nazi Party. Until 1938 this may indeed have -been true, for he was shrewd enough to see the advantage of maintaining, -at least outwardly, his personal independence. It will be my object to -show that, despite his facade of independence, Papen was an ardent -member of this conspiracy and, in spite of warnings and rebuffs, was -unable to resist its fascination. - -In the submission of the Prosecution, the key to Von Papen’s activities -is that, although perhaps not a typical Nazi, he was an unscrupulous -political opportunist and ready to fall in with the Nazis when it suited -him. He was not unpracticed in duplicity and viewed with an apparent -indifference the contradictions and betrayals which his duplicity -inevitably involved. One of his chief weapons was fraudulent assurance. - -Before dealing with the specific charges, I will refer to Document -2902-PS, which is on Page 38 of the English document book, and I put it -in as Exhibit GB-233. This is Von Papen’s own signed statement showing -his appointments. It is not in chronological order, but I will read the -relevant parts as they come. I need not read the whole of it. The -Tribunal will note that this statement is written by Dr. Kubuschok, -Counsel for Von Papen, although it is signed by Von Papen himself. -Paragraph 1: - - “Von Papen many times rejected Hitler’s request to join the - NSDAP. Hitler simply sent him the Golden Party Badge. In my - opinion, legally speaking, he did not thereby become a member of - the Party.” - -Interposing there, My Lord, the fact that he was officially regarded as -having become a member in 1938 will be shown by a document which I shall -refer to later. - -Going on to Paragraph 2: - - “From 1933 to 1945 Von Papen was a member of the Reichstag.” - -Paragraph 3: - - “Von Papen was Reich Chancellor from the 1st of June 1932 to the - 17th of November 1932. He carried on the duties of Reich - Chancellor until his successor took office—until the 2d of - December 1932.” - -Paragraph 4: - - “On the 30th of January 1933 Von Papen was appointed Vice - Chancellor. From the 30th of June 1934”—which was the date of - the Blood Purge—“he ceased to exercise official duties. On that - day he was placed under arrest. Immediately after his release on - the 3rd of July 1934 he went to the Reich Chancellery to hand in - his resignation to Hitler.” - -The rest of that paragraph I need not read. It is an argument which -concerns the authenticity or otherwise of his signature as it appears in -the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ to certain decrees in August 1934. I am prepared -to agree with his contention that his signature on those decrees may not -have been correct and may have been a mistake. He admits holding office -only to the 3rd of July 1934. - -He was, as the Tribunal will also remember, in virtue of being Reich -Chancellor, a member of the Reich Cabinet. - -Going on to Paragraph 5: - - “On the 13th of November 1933, Von Papen became Plenipotentiary - for the Saar. This office was terminated under the same - circumstances described under Paragraph 4.” - -The rest of the document I need not read. It concerns his appointments -to Vienna and Ankara, which are matters of history. He was appointed -Minister to Vienna on the 26th of July 1934, and recalled on the 4th of -February 1938, and he was Ambassador in Ankara from April 1939 until -August 1944. - -The first allegation against the Defendant Von Papen is that he used his -personal influence to promote the accession of the Nazi conspirators to -power. From the outset Von Papen was well aware of the Nazi program and -Nazi methods. There can be no question of his having encouraged the -Nazis through ignorance of these facts. The official NSDAP program was -open and notorious; it had been published in _Mein Kampf_ for many -years; it had been published and republished in the _Yearbook of the -NSDAP_ and elsewhere. The Nazis made no secret of their intention to -make it a fundamental law of the State. This has been dealt with in full -at an earlier stage of the Trial. - -During 1932 Von Papen as Reich Chancellor was in a particularly good -position to understand the Nazi purpose and methods; and in fact, he -publicly acknowledged the Nazi menace. Take, for instance, his Münster -speech on the 28th of August 1932. This is Document 3314-PS, on Page 49 -of the English document book, and I now put it in as Exhibit GB-234, and -I quote two extracts at the top of the page: - - “The licentiousness emanating from the appeal of the leader of - the National Socialist movement does not comply very well with - his claims to governmental power. . . . I do not concede him the - right to regard only the minority following his banner as the - German nation and to treat all other fellow countrymen as free - game.” - -Take also his Munich speech of the 13th of October 1932. That is on Page -50 of the English document book, Document Number 3317-PS, which I now -put in as Exhibit GB-235, and I will simply read the last extract on the -page: - - “In the interest of the entire nation, we decline the claim to - power by parties which want to bind their followers body and - soul and which want to identify their party or movement with the - German nation.” - -I do not rely on these random extracts to show anything more than that -he had, in 1932, clearly addressed his mind to the inherent lawlessness -of the Nazi philosophy. Nevertheless, in his letter to Hitler of the 13 -of November 1932, which I shall quote more fully later, he wrote of the -Nazi movement as, I quote: - - “. . . so great a national movement, the merits of which for - people and country I have always recognized in spite of - necessary criticisms . . . .” - -So variable and so seemingly contradictory were Von Papen’s acts and -utterances regarding the Nazis that it is not possible to present the -picture of Papen’s part in this infamous enterprise unless one first -reviews the steps by which he entered upon it. It then becomes clear -that he threw himself, if not wholeheartedly, yet with cool and -deliberate calculation, into the Nazi conspiracy. - -I shall enumerate some of the principal steps by which Papen fell in -with the Nazi conspiracy. - -As a result of his first personal contact with Hitler, Von Papen as -Chancellor rescinded, on the 14th of June 1932, the decree passed on the -13th of April 1932 for the dissolution of the Nazi para-military -organizations, the SA and the SS. He thereby rendered the greatest -possible service to the Nazi Party, inasmuch as it relied upon its -para-military organizations to beat the German people into submission. -The decree rescinding the dissolution of the SA and the SS is shown in -Document D-631, on Page 64 of the document book; and I now put it in as -Exhibit GB-236. It is an extract from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, which was -an omnibus decree. The relevant passage is in Paragraph 20: - - “This order comes into operation from the day of announcement. - It takes the place of the Decree of the Reich President for the - Safeguarding of the State Authority of . . . .”—the date should - be the 13th of April 1932. - -THE PRESIDENT: Which page of the document book is it? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: I am sorry, My Lord; it is Page 64. And the date shown -there should not be the 3rd of May 1932, it should be the 13th of April -1932. That was the decree which had previously dissolved the Nazi -para-military organizations under the Government of Chancellor Brüning. -At the bottom of the page the Tribunal will see the relevant parts of -the decree of the 13th of April reproduced. At the beginning of -Paragraph 1 of that decree it said: - - “All organizations of a military nature of the German National - Socialist Labor Party will be dissolved with immediate effect, - particularly the SA and the SS.” - -This rescission by Von Papen was done in pursuance of a bargain made -with Hitler which is mentioned in a book called _Dates from the History -of the NSDAP_ by Dr. Hans Volz, a book published with the authority of -the NSDAP. It is already an exhibit, Exhibit USA-592. The extract I want -to quote is on Page 59 of the document book, and it is Document Number -3463-PS. I quote an extract from Page 41 of this little book: - - “28th of May”—that was in 1932, of course—“In view of the - imminent fall of Brüning, at a meeting between the former Deputy - of the Prussian Center Party, Franz Von Papen, and the Führer in - Berlin (first personal contact in spring 1932); the Führer - agrees that a Papen cabinet should be tolerated by the NSDAP, - provided that the prohibitions imposed on the SA, uniforms, and - demonstrations be lifted and the Reichstag dissolved.” - -It is difficult to imagine a less astute opening gambit for a man who -was about to become Chancellor than to reinstate this sinister -organization which had been suppressed by his predecessor. This action -emphasizes the characteristic duplicity and insincerity of his public -condemnations of the Nazis which I quoted a few minutes ago. - -Eighteen months later he publicly boasted that at the time of taking -over the chancellorship he had advocated paving the way to power for -what he called the “young fighting liberation movement.” That will be -shown in Document 3375-PS, which I shall introduce in a few minutes. - -Another important step was when, on the 20th of July 1932, he -accomplished his famous _coup d’état_ in Prussia which removed the -Braun-Severing Prussian Government and united the ruling power of the -Reich and Prussia in his own hands as Reichskommissar for Prussia. This -is now a matter of history. It is mentioned in Document D-632, which I -now introduce as Exhibit GB-237. It is on Page 65 of the document book. -This document is, I think, a semi-official biography in a series of -public men. - -Papen regarded this step, his _coup d’état_ in Prussia, as a first step -in the policy later pursued by Hitler of coordinating the states with -the Reich, which will be shown in Document 3357-PS, which I shall come -to later. - -The next step, if the Tribunal will look at Document D-632, on Page 65 -of the document book, the last four or five lines at the bottom of the -page: - - “The Reichstag elections of the 31st of July, which were the - result of Von Papen’s disbandment of the Reichstag on the 4th of - June”—which was made in pursuance of the bargain that I - mentioned a few minutes ago—“strengthened enormously the NSDAP, - so that Von Papen offered to the leader of the now strongest - party his participation in the government as Vice Chancellor. - Adolf Hitler rejected this offer on the 13th of August. - - “The new Reichstag, which assembled on the 30th of August, was - disbanded by the 12th of September. The new elections brought - about a considerable loss to the NSDAP, but did not strengthen - the Government parties, so that Papen’s Government retired on - the 17th of November 1932 after unsuccessful negotiations with - the Party leaders.” - -My Lord, I shall wish to quote a few more extracts from that biography, -but as it is a mere catalogue of events, perhaps Your Lordship would -allow me to return to it at the appropriate time. - -So far as those negotiations mentioned just now in the biography concern -Hitler, they involved an exchange of letters in which Von Papen wrote to -Hitler on the 13th of November 1932. That letter is Document D-633, on -Page 68 of the English document book, and I now put it in as Exhibit -GB-238. I propose to read a part of this letter, because it shows the -positive efforts made by Papen to ally himself with the Nazis, even in -face of further rebuffs from Hitler. I read the third paragraph. I -should tell the Tribunal that there is some underlining in the English -translation of that paragraph which does not occur in the German text: - - “A new situation has arisen through the elections of November - the 6th, and at the same time a new opportunity for a - consolidation of all nationalist elements. The Reich President - has instructed me to find out by conversations with the leaders - of the individual parties concerned whether and how far they are - ready to support the carrying out of the political and economic - program on which the Reich Government has embarked. Although the - National Socialist press has been writing that it is a naive - attempt for Reich Chancellor Von Papen to try to confer with - personalities representing the nationalist concentration, and - that there can only be one answer, ‘No negotiations with Papen,’ - I would consider it neglecting my duties, and I would be unable - to justify it to my own conscience, if I did not approach you in - the spirit of the order given to me. I am quite aware from the - papers that you are maintaining your demands to be entrusted - with the Chancellor’s Office, and I am equally aware of the - continued existence of the reasons for the decision of August - the 13th. I need not assure you again that I myself do not claim - any personal consideration at all. All the same, I am of the - opinion that the leader of so great a national movement, whose - merits for people and country I have always recognized in spite - of necessary criticism, should not refuse to enter into - discussions on the situation and the decisions required with the - presently leading and responsible German statesman. We must - attempt to forget the bitterness of the elections and to place - the cause of the country which we are mutually serving above all - other considerations.” - -Hitler replied on 16 November 1932 in a long letter, laying down terms -which were evidently unacceptable to Von Papen, since he resigned the -next day and was succeeded by Von Schleicher. That document is D-634, -put in as part of Exhibit GB-238 as it is part of the same -correspondence. I need not read from the letter itself. - -Then came the meetings between Papen and Hitler in January 1933, in the -houses of Von Schröder and of Ribbentrop, culminating in Von Schleicher -being succeeded by Hitler as Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933. -Referring back again to the biography on Page 66 of the document book, -there is an account of the meeting at Schröder’s house, the second -paragraph on the page: - - “The meeting with Hitler, which took place in the beginning of - January 1933, in the house of the banker Baron Von Schröder in - Cologne, is due to his initiative”—that means, of course - Papen’s initiative—“although Von Schröder was the mediator. - Both Von Papen and Hitler later made public statements about - this meeting (press of 6 January 1933). After the rapid downfall - of Von Schleicher on the 28th of January 1933, the Hitler-Von - Papen-Hugenberg-Seldte Cabinet was formed on the 30th of January - 1933 as a government of national solidarity. In this cabinet Von - Papen held the office of Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissioner - for Prussia.” - -The meetings at Ribbentrop’s house, at which Papen was also present, -have been mentioned by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe (Document D-472, which was -Exhibit GB-130). - -I now wish to introduce into evidence an affidavit by Von Schröder, but -I understand that Dr. Kubuschok wishes to take an objection to this. -Perhaps before Dr. Kubuschok takes his objection it might help if I -said, quite openly, that Schröder is now in custody, and according to my -information he is at Frankfurt; so that physically he undoubtedly could -be called. Perhaps I might also say at this moment that there would be -no objection from the Prosecution’s point of view to interrogatories -being administered to Von Schröder on the subject matter of this -affidavit. - -DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): I object to the -reading of the affidavit of Schröder. I know that in individual cases -the Tribunal has permitted the reading of affidavits. This occurred -under Article 19 of the Charter, which is based on the proposition that -the Trial should be conducted as speedily as possible and that for this -reason the Tribunal should order the rules of ordinary court procedure -in that respect. Of decisive importance, therefore, is the speediness of -the Trial. But in our case the reading of the affidavit cannot be -approved for that reason. - -Our case is quite analogous to the case that was decided on the 14th of -December with regard to Kurt Von Schuschnigg’s affidavit. Schröder is in -the vicinity. Schröder was apparently brought to the neighborhood of -Nuremberg for the purposes of this Trial. The affidavit was taken down -on 5 December. He could be brought here at any time. The reading of the -affidavit would have the consequence that I would have to refer not only -to him but also to several other witnesses, because Schröder describes a -series of facts in his affidavit which in their entirety are not needed -for the finding of a decision. However, once introduced into the Trial, -they must also be discussed by the Defense in the pursuance of its duty. - -The affidavit discusses internal political matters, using improper -terms. For this reason misunderstandings would be brought into the Trial -which could be obviated by the hearing of a witness I believe, -therefore, that the oral testimony of a witness should be the only way -in which Schröder’s testimony should be submitted to the Tribunal, since -otherwise a large number of witnesses will have to be called along with -the reading of Schröder’s affidavit and his personal interrogation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished? - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make any observation? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, I do, My Lord. The Tribunal has been asked to -exclude this affidavit, using as a precedent the decision on Von -Schuschnigg’s affidavit. I think I am correct in saying that Von -Schuschnigg’s affidavit was excluded as an exception to the general rule -on affidavits which the Tribunal laid down earlier the same day when Mr. -Messersmith’s affidavit was accepted. Perhaps Your Lordship will allow -me to read from the transcript the Tribunal’s decision on the affidavit -of Messersmith. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Messersmith was in Mexico, was he not? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is so, My Lord; yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: So that the difference between him and Schuschnigg in -that regard was very considerable. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: In that regard, but what I was going to say was this, -My Lord: In ruling on Messersmith’s affidavit Your Lordship said: - - “In view of those provisions”—that is Article 19 of the - Charter—“the Tribunal holds that affidavits can be presented - and that in the present case it is a proper course. The question - of the probative value of the affidavit as compared with the - witness who has been cross-examined would, of course, be - considered by the Tribunal, and if at a later stage the Tribunal - thinks the presence of a witness is of extreme importance, the - matter can be reconsidered.” - -And Your Lordship added: - - “If the Defense wish to put interrogatories to the witness, they - will be at liberty to do so.” - -Now in the afternoon of that day, when Schuschnigg’s affidavit came up -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Which day was this? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: This was the 28th of November, My Lord. It is on Page -473 (Volume II, Page 352) of the transcript, the Messersmith affidavit; -and Page 523 (Volume II, Page 384) is the Schuschnigg affidavit. - -Now, when the objection was taken to the Schuschnigg affidavit, the -objection was put in these words: - - “Today when the resolution was announced in respect of the use - to be made of the written affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, the - Court was of the opinion that in a case of very great importance - possibly it would take a different view of the matter.”—And - then defense counsel went on to say—“As it is a case of such an - important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be - adhered to.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you a reference to a subsequent occasion on which we -heard Mr. Justice Jackson upon this subject, when Mr. Justice Jackson -submitted to us that on the strict interpretation of Article 19 we were -bound to admit any evidence which we deemed to have probative value? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I haven’t got that reference. - -THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you call this witness? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: I say, quite frankly—and I was coming on to -that—this witness is in a position of being an alleged co-conspirator, -and I do not make any secret of the fact that for obvious reasons the -Prosecution would not desire to call him as a witness, and I put this -affidavit forward as an admission by a co-conspirator. I admit that it -is not an admission made in pursuance of the conspiracy, but I submit -that by technical rules of evidence, this affidavit may be accepted in -evidence as an admission by a co-conspirator; and as I said before, -there will be no objection to administering interrogatories on the -subject matter of this affidavit, and indeed, the witness would be -available to be called as a defense witness if required. - -That is all I have to say on that, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: There would be no objection to bringing the witness here -for the purpose of cross-examination upon the affidavit? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: I don’t think there could be any objection if it were -confined to the subject matter of the affidavit. I would not like . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: How could you object, for instance, to the defendant -himself applying to call the witness? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: As I said, I don’t think there could be any objection -to that, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: The result would be the same, wouldn’t it? If the witness -were called for the purpose of cross-examination, then he could be asked -other questions which were not arising out of the matter in the -affidavit. If the defendant can call him as his own witness, there can -be no objection to the cross-examination going outside the matter of the -affidavit. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: Of course he couldn’t be cross-examined by the -Prosecution in that event, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean you would ask his questions in re-examination, -but they would not take the form of cross-examination? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is what I mean, My Lord. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you would prefer that he should be called -for the defendants rather than be cross-examined outside the subject -matter of the affidavit? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything you wish to add or not? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: There is nothing I wish to add. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is time for us to adjourn. We will consider the -matter. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): In the place of -Dr. Von Rohrscheidt, counsel for Defendant Hess, I would like to make -the following declaration. - -Dr. Von Rohrscheidt has been the victim of an accident. He has broken -his ankle. The Defendant Hess has asked me to notify the Tribunal that -from now on until the end of the Trial, he desires to make use of his -right under the Charter to defend himself. The reason that he wants to -do that for the whole length of the Trial is to be found in the fact -that due to his absence his counsel will not be informed of the -proceedings of the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the oral application which has -just been made to it on behalf of the Defendant Hess. - -As to the objection to the affidavit of Von Schröder which was made this -morning by counsel for the Defendant Von Papen, the Tribunal does not -propose to lay down any general rule about the admission of affidavit -evidence. But in the particular circumstances of this case, the Tribunal -will admit the affidavit in question but will direct that if the -affidavit is put in evidence, the man who made the affidavit, Von -Schröder, must be presented, brought here immediately for -cross-examination by the defendant’s counsel. When I say immediately I -mean as soon as possible. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I will not introduce this affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Major Barrington. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, before coming on to that affidavit, I last -read a passage from the biography about the meeting at Von Schröder’s -house, and I ask the Tribunal to deduce from that extract from the -biography that it was at that meeting that a discussion took place -between Von Papen and Hitler, which led up to the government of Hitler -in which Von Papen served as Vice Chancellor. So that now at the point -the Defendant Von Papen was completely committed to going along with the -Nazi Party, and with his eyes open and on his own initiative he had -helped materially to bring them into power. - -The second allegation against the Defendant Von Papen is that he -participated in the consolidation of Nazi control over Germany. - -In the first critical year and a half of the Nazi consolidation Von -Papen, as Vice Chancellor, was second only to Hitler in the Cabinet -which carried out the Nazi program. - -The process of consolidating the Nazi control of Germany by legislation -has been fully dealt with earlier in this Trial. The high position of -Von Papen must have associated him closely with such legislation. In -July 1934 Hitler expressly thanked him for all that he had done for the -co-ordination of the government of the National Revolution. That will -appear in Document 2799-PS. In fact, although I shall read from that -document in a minute, the document has been introduced to the Court by -Mr. Alderman. - -Two important decrees may be mentioned specially, as actually bearing -the signature of Von Papen. First, the decree relating to the formation -of special courts, dated the 21st of March 1933, for the trial of all -cases involving political matters. The Tribunal has already taken -judicial notice of this decree. The reference to the transcript is Page -30 (Volume II, Page 197) of the 22d of November, afternoon session. - -This decree was the first step in the Nazification of the German -judiciary. In all political cases it abolished fundamental rights, -including the right of appeal, which had previously characterized the -administration of German criminal justice. - -On the same date, the 21st of March 1933, Von Papen personally signed -the amnesty decree liberating all persons who had committed murder or -any other crime between the 30th of January and the 21st of March 1933 -in the National Revolution of the German people. That document is -2059-PS, and is on Page 30 of the English document book. I read Section -1. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need read the decrees if you will -summarize them. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: If Your Lordship pleases, I will ask you to take -judicial notice of that decree. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: As a member of the Reich Cabinet, Von Papen was, in my -submission, responsible for the legislation carried through even when -the decrees did not actually bear his signature. But I shall mention as -examples two categories of legislation in particular in order to show by -reference to his own previous and contemporaneous statements that they -were not matters of which he could say that as a respectable politician -he took no interest in them. - -First, the civil service. As a public servant himself, Von Papen must -have had a hard but apparently successful struggle with his conscience -when associating himself with the sweeping series of decrees for -attaining Nazi control of the civil service. This has been dealt with on -Page 30 (Volume II, Page 197) of the transcript of the 22d of November -in the afternoon session, and Page 257 (Volume II, Page 207). In this -connection I refer the Tribunal to Document 351-PS, which is on Page 1 -of the document book. It is Exhibit USA-389, and it is the minutes of -Hitler’s first Cabinet meeting on the 30th of January 1933. I read from -the last paragraph of the minutes, on Page 5 of the document book in the -middle of the paragraph: - - “The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Commissioner - for the State of Prussia suggested that the Reich Chancellor - should refute, in an interview at the earliest opportunity, the - rumors about inflation and the rumors about infringing the - rights of civil servants.” - -Even if this was not meant to suggest to Hitler the giving of a -fraudulent assurance, at the best it emphasizes the indifference with -which Von Papen later saw the civil servants betrayed. - -Secondly, the decrees for the integration of the federal states with the -Reich. These again have been dealt with earlier in the Trial, Page 29 -(Volume II, Page 196) of the transcript of 22 November, afternoon -session. The substantial effect of these decrees was to abolish the -states and to put an end to federalism and any possible retarding -influence which it might have upon the centralization of power in the -Reich Cabinet. The importance of this step, as well as the role played -by Papen, is reflected in the exchange of letters between Hindenburg, -Von Papen—in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for Prussia—and -Hitler, in connection with the recall of the Reich Commissioner and the -appointment of Göring to the post of Prime Minister of Prussia. I refer -to Document 3357-PS, which is on Page 52 of the English document book, -and I now put it in as Exhibit GB-239. - -In tendering his resignation on the 7th of April 1933, Von Papen wrote -to Hitler, and I read from the document: - - “With the draft of the law for the co-ordination of the states - with the Reich, passed today by the Reich Chancellor, - legislative work has begun which will be of historical - significance for the political development of the German State. - The step taken on 20 July 1932 by the Reich Government, which I - headed at the time, with the aim of abolishing the dualism - between the Reich and Prussia is now crowned by this new - interlocking of the interests of the state of Prussia with those - of the Reich. You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now be, as once - was Bismarck, in a position to co-ordinate in all points the - policy of the greatest of German states with that of the Reich. - Now that the new law affords you the possibility of appointing a - Prussian Prime Minister, I beg you to inform the Reich President - that I dutifully return to his hands my post of Reich - Commissioner for Prussia.” - -I would like to read also the letter which Hitler wrote to Hindenburg in -transmitting this resignation. Hitler wrote: - - “Vice Chancellor Von Papen has addressed a letter to me which I - enclose for your information. Herr Von Papen has already - informed me within the last few days that he has come to an - agreement with Minister Göring to resign on his own volition, as - soon as the unified conduct of the governmental affairs in the - Reich and in Prussia would be assured by the new law on the - co-ordination of policy in the Reich and the States. - - “On the eve of the day when the new law on the institution of - Reichsstatthalter was adopted, Herr Von Papen considered this - aim as having been attained, and requested me to undertake the - appointment of the Prussian Prime Minister, at the same time - offering further collaboration in the Reich Government, by now - lending full service. - - “Herr Von Papen, in accepting the post of Commissioner for the - Government of Prussia in these difficult times since 30 January, - has rendered a very meritorious service to the realization of - the idea of coordinating the policy in Reich and states. His - collaboration in the Reich Cabinet, to which he is now lending - all his energy, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to him - is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely rejoice at the - great help I shall thus receive.” - -Yet it was only 5 weeks before this that on the 3rd of March 1933, Von -Papen had warned the electorate at Stuttgart against abolishing -federalism. I will now read from Document 3313-PS, which is on Page 48 -of the English document book, and which I now introduce as Exhibit -GB-240—about the middle of the third paragraph. This is an extract from -Von Papen’s speech at Stuttgart. He said: - - “Federalism will protect us from centralism, that organizational - form which focuses all the living strength of a nation on one - point. No nation is less fitted to be governed centrally than - the German.” - -Earlier, at the time of the elections in the autumn of 1932, Von Papen -as Chancellor had visited Munich. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of the 12th -of October 1932 commented on his policy. I refer to Document 3318-PS on -Page 51 of the English document book, which I introduce as Exhibit -GB-241. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ commented: - - “Von Papen claimed that it had been his great aim from the very - beginning of his tenure in office to build a new Reich for, and - with, the various states. The Reich Government is taking a - definite federalist attitude. Its slogan is not a dreary - centralism or uniformity.” - -That was in October 1932. All that was now thrown overboard in deference -to his new master. - -I now come to the Jews. In March 1933 the entire Cabinet approved a -systematic state policy of persecution of the Jews. This has already -been described to the Tribunal. The reference to the transcript is Pages -1442 (Volume III, Page 525) and 2490 (Volume V, Page 93). - -Only 4 days before the boycott was timed to begin “with all -ferocity”—to borrow the words of Dr. Goebbels—Von Papen wrote a -radiogram of reassurance to the Board of Trade for German-American -Commerce in New York which had expressed its anxiety to the German -Government about the situation. His assurance—which I now put in as -Document D-635, and it will be Exhibit GB-242 on Page 73 of the English -document book—his assurance was published in the _New York Times_ on -the 28th of March 1933, and it contained the following sentence which I -read from about the middle of the page. This document is the last but -one in the German document book: - - “Reports circulated in America and received here with - indignation about alleged tortures of political prisoners and - mistreatment of Jews deserve strongest repudiation. Hundreds of - thousands of Jews, irrespective of nationality, who have not - taken part in political activities, are living here entirely - unmolested.” - -This is a characteristic . . . - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: The article in the _New York Times_ goes back to a -telegram of the Defendant Von Papen, which is contained in the document -book one page ahead. The English translation has a date of the 27th of -March. This date is an error. The German text which I received shows -that it is a question of a weekend letter, which, according to the -figures on the German document, was sent on the 25th of March. This -difference in time is of particular importance for the following reason: - -In effect, on the 25th of March nothing was yet known concerning the -Jewish boycott, which Goebbels then announced for the 1st of April. The -Defendant Von Papen could, therefore, on the 25th of March, point to -these then comparatively few smaller incidents as he does in the -telegram. In any case, the conclusion of the indictment that the -contents of the telegram were a lie thereby falls. - -THE PRESIDENT: Major Barrington, have you the original of that? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: The original is here, My Lord; yes. It is quite -correct that there are some figures at the top, which, though I had not -recognized it, might indicate that it was dispatched on the 25th. - -THE PRESIDENT: And when was the meeting of the Cabinet which approved -the policy of persecution of the Jews? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, My Lord, I can’t say. It was some time within -the last few days of March, but it might have been on the 26th. I can -have that checked up. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I clarify that matter by saying that the Cabinet -meeting in which the Jewish question was discussed took place at a much -later date and that in this Cabinet meeting Cabinet members, among -others the Defendant Von Papen, condemned the Jewish boycott. I shall -submit the minutes of the meeting as soon as my motion has been granted. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know what you mean by your motion being granted. -Does Counsel for the Prosecution say whether he persists in his -allegation or whether he withdraws it? - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: I will say this. Subject to checking the date when the -Cabinet meeting took place . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can do that at the adjournment and let us know -in the morning. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: If Your Lordship pleases. At this point I will just -say this: That it was, as the Tribunal has already heard, common -knowledge at the time that the Nazi policy was anti-Jewish, and Jews -were already in concentration camps, so I will leave it to the Tribunal -to infer that at the time when that radiogram was sent, which I am -prepared to accept as being the 25th of March, that Von Papen did know -of this policy of boycotting. - -I will go further now that I am on this point, and I will say that Von -Papen was indeed himself a supporter of the anti-Jewish policy, and as -evidence of this I will put in Document 2830-PS, which is on Page 37A of -the document book, and which I now introduce as Exhibit GB-243. - -This is a letter, My Lord, written by Von Papen from Vienna on the 12th -of May 1936 to Hitler on the subject of the Freiheitsbund. Paragraph 4 -of the English text is as follows: - - “The following incident is interesting. The Czech Legation - secretary Dohalsky has made to Mr. Staud, (leader of the - Freiheitsbund) the offer to make available to the Freiheitsbund - any desired amount from the Czech Government which he would need - for the strengthening of his struggle against the Heimwehr. Sole - condition is that the Freiheitsbund must guarantee to adopt an - anti-German attitude. Mr. Staud has flatly refused this offer. - This demonstrates how even in the enemy’s camp the new grouping - of forces is already taken into account. From this the further - necessity results for us to support this movement financially as - heretofore, and mostly in reference to the continuation of its - fight against Jewry.” - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: I must point out here a difficulty which has apparently -been caused by the translation. In the original German text the word -“mit Bezug” is used in regard to the transmittal in the following way: -“. . . referring to the continuation of its fight against Jewry.” This -word “mit Bezug” means here that under this heading the money must be -transmitted, although this was not the real purpose, for the Austrian -Freiheitsbund (Freedom Union) was not an anti-Semitic movement but a -legal trade union to which Chancellor Dollfuss also belonged. This -expression “mit Bezug” means only that the transmittal of the money -demanded a covering designation because it was not permissible to -transmit money from abroad to a party recognized by the state for any -party purposes, as is shown by the rejected offer of the Czechoslovaks. -I only wanted to point out here that the words “in reference” perhaps -give a wrong impression and should rather be translated “referring.” In -any case, I should like to point out that this “in reference” was a kind -of camouflage for the transmittal of the money. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know to which word you are referring, but as I -understand it the only purpose of referring to this letter was to prove -that in it Von Papen was suggesting that a certain organization should -be financially assisted in its fight against Jewry. That is the only -purpose of referring to the letter. I don’t know what you mean about -some word being wrongly translated. - -DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is exactly how the error originated. The money was -not transmitted to fight Jewry for that was not at all the purpose of -this Christian Trade Union in Austria, but a certain designation for the -transmittal of the money had to be devised. So this continuation of its -fight against Jewry was used. The purpose therefore was not the fight -against Jewry but the elimination through financial support of another -foreign influence, namely that of Czechoslovakia. - -THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought myself that the point which might -have been taken against the Prosecution was that the letter was dated -nearly 3 years after the time with which you were then dealing. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is so, My Lord; it was not at the time of the -previous one. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the previous one was marked 1933, and this was 1936. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: Oh yes. I put it in, My Lord, only to show what Von -Papen’s position was by then, at any rate. If Your Lordship has any -doubt as to the translation I would suggest that it might now be -translated by the interpreter. We have the German text, a photostat. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you can have it translated again tomorrow; if -necessary, you can have it gone into again then. - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord. - -I come now to the Catholic Church. The Nazi treatment of the Church has -been fully dealt with by the United States Prosecution. In this -particular field Von Papen, a prominent lay Catholic, helped to -consolidate the Nazi position both at home and abroad as perhaps no one -else could have done. - -In dealing with the persecution of the Church, Colonel Wheeler read to -the Tribunal Hitler’s assurance given to the Church on the 23rd of March -1933 in Hitler’s speech on the Enabling Act, an assurance which resulted -in the well-known Fulda Declaration of the German bishops, also quoted -by Colonel Wheeler. That was Document 3387-PS, which was Exhibit -USA-566. This deceitful assurance of Hitler’s appears to have been made -at the suggestion of Von Papen 8 days earlier at the Reich Cabinet -meeting at which the Enabling Act was discussed, on the 15th of March -1933. I refer to Document 2962-PS, which is Exhibit USA-578, and it is -on Page 40 of the English document book. I read from Page 44, that is at -the bottom of Page 6 of the German text. The minutes say: - - “The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor and Reich Commissioner for - Prussia stated that it is of decisive importance to coordinate - into the new state the masses standing behind the parties. The - question of the incorporation of political Catholicism into the - new state is of particular importance.” - -That was a statement made by Von Papen at the meeting at which the -Enabling Act was discussed prior to Hitler’s speech on the Enabling Act -in which he gave his assurance to the Church. - -On the 20th of July 1933 Papen signed the Reich Concordat negotiated by -him with the Vatican. The Tribunal has already taken judicial notice of -this as Document 3280(a)-PS. The signing of the Concordat, like Hitler’s -Papen-inspired speech on the Enabling Act, was only an interlude in the -church policy of the Nazi conspirators. Their policy of assurances was -followed by a long series of violations which eventually resulted in -Papal denunciation in the Encyclical “Mit brennender Sorge,” which is -3476-PS, Exhibit USA-567. - -Papen maintains that his actions regarding the Church were sincere, and -he has asserted during interrogations that it was Hitler who sabotaged -the Concordat. If Von Papen really believed in the very solemn -undertakings given by him on behalf of the Reich to the Vatican, I -submit it is strange that he, himself a Catholic, should have continued -to serve Hitler after all those violations and even after the Papal -Encyclical itself. I will go further. I will say that Papen was himself -involved in what was virtually, if not technically, a violation of the -Concordat. The Tribunal will recollect the allocution of the Pope, dated -the 2d of June 1945, which is Document 3268-PS, Exhibit USA-356, from -which on Page 1647 (Volume IV, Page 64) of the transcript Colonel Storey -read the Pope’s own summary of the Nazis’ bitter struggle against the -Church. The very first item the Pope mentioned is the dissolution of -Catholic organizations and if the Tribunal will look at Document 3376-PS -on Page 56 of the English document book, which I now put in as Exhibit -GB-244 and which is an extract from _Das Archiv_, they will see that in -September 1934 Von Papen ordered—and I say “ordered” advisedly—the -dissolution of the Union of Catholic Germans, of which he was at the -time the leader. The text of _Das Archiv_ reads as follows: - - “The Reich Directorate of the Party announced the - self-dissolution of the Union of Catholic Germans. - - “Since the Reich Directorate of the Party, through its - Department for Cultural Peace, administers directly and to an - increasing extent all cultural problems including those - concerning the relations of State and churches, the tasks at - first delegated to the Union of Catholic Germans are now - included in those of the Reich Directorate of the Party in the - interest of a still closer co-ordination. - - “Former Vice Chancellor Von Papen, up to now the leader of the - Union of Catholic Germans, declared about the dissolution of - this organization that it was done upon his suggestion, since - the attitude of the National Socialist State toward the - Christian and Catholic Church had been explained often and - unequivocally by the Führer and Chancellor himself.” - -I said that Von Papen “ordered” the dissolutions, although the -announcement said it was self-dissolution on his suggestion; but I -submit that such a suggestion from one in Papen’s position was -equivalent to an order, since by that date it was common knowledge that -the Nazis were dropping all pretense that rival organizations might be -permitted to exist. - -After 9 months’ service under Hitler, spent in consolidating the Nazi -control, Von Papen was evidently well content with his choice. I refer -to Document 3375-PS, Page 54 of the English document book, which I put -in as Exhibit GB-245. On the 2d of November 1933, speaking at Essen from -the same platform as Hitler and Gauleiter Terboven, in the course of the -campaign for the Reichstag election and the referendum concerning -Germany’s leaving the League of Nations, Von Papen declared: - - “Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of - national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I have - tried to support with all my strength the work of the National - Socialist movement and its Führer; and just as I at the time of - taking over the Chancellorship”—that was in 1932—“advocated - paving the way to power for the young fighting liberation - movement, just as I on January 30 was destined by a gracious - fate to put the hands of our Chancellor and Führer into the hand - of our beloved Field Marshal, so do I today again feel the - obligation to say to the German people and all those who have - kept confidence in me: - - “The good Lord has blessed Germany by giving her in times of - deep distress a leader who will lead her through all distresses - and weaknesses, through all crises and moments of danger, with - the sure instinct of the statesman into a happy future.” - -And then the last sentence of the whole text on Page 55: - - “Let us, in this hour, say to the Führer of the new Germany that - we believe in him and his work.” - -By this time the Cabinet, of which Von Papen was a member and to which -he had given all his strength, had abolished the civil liberties, had -sanctioned political murder committed in aid of Nazism’s seizure of -power, had destroyed all rival political parties, had enacted the basic -laws for abolition of the political influence of the federal states, had -provided the legislative basis for purging the civil service and -judiciary of anti-Nazi elements, and had embarked upon a State policy of -persecution of the Jews. - -Papen’s words are words of hollow mockery: “The good Lord has blessed -Germany . . . .” - -The third allegation against the Defendant Papen is that he promoted -preparations for war. Knowing as he did the basic program of the Nazi -Party, it is inconceivable that as Vice Chancellor for a year and a half -he could have been dissociated from the conspirators’ warlike -preparations; he, of whom Hitler wrote to Hindenburg on the 10th of -April 1933 that, “His collaboration in the Reich Cabinet, to which he is -now lending all his energy, is infinitely valuable.” - -The fourth allegation against Papen is that he participated in the -political planning and preparations for wars of aggression and wars in -violation of international treaties. In Papen’s case this allegation is -really the story of the Anschluss. His part in that was a preparation -for wars of aggression in two senses: First, that the Anschluss was the -necessary preliminary step to all the subsequent armed aggressions; -second, that, even if it can be contended that the Anschluss was in fact -achieved without aggression, it was planned in such a way that it would -have been achieved by aggression if that had been necessary. - -I need do no more than summarize Papen’s Austrian activities since the -whole story of the Anschluss has been described to the Tribunal already, -though with the Tribunal’s permission I would like to read again two -short passages of a particularly personal nature regarding Papen. But -before I deal with Papen’s activities in Austria there is one matter -that I feel I ought not to omit to mention to the Tribunal. - -On the 18th of June 1934 Papen made his remarkable speech at Marburg -University. I do not propose to put it in evidence, nor is it in the -document book, because it is a matter of history and in what I say I do -not intend to commit myself in regard to the motives and consequences of -his speech which are not free from mystery; but I will say this: That as -far as concerns the subject matter of Papen’s Marburg speech, it was an -outspoken criticism of the Nazis. One must imagine that the Nazis were -furiously angry; and although he escaped death in the Blood Purge 12 -days later, he was put under arrest for 3 days. Whether this arrest was -originally intended to end in execution or whether it was to protect him -from the purge as one too valuable to be lost, I do not now inquire. -After his release from arrest he not unnaturally resigned the Vice -Chancellorship. Now the question that arises—and this is why I mention -the matter at this point—is why, after these barbaric events, did he -ever go back into the service of the Nazis again? What an opportunity -missed! If he had stopped then he might have saved the world much -suffering. Suppose that Hitler’s own Vice Chancellor, just released from -arrest, had defied the Nazis and told the world the truth. There might -never have been a reoccupation of the Rhineland; there might never have -been a war. But I must not speculate. The lamentable fact is that he -slipped back, he succumbed again to the fascination of Hitler. - -After the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss only 3 weeks later, on 25 July -1934, the situation was such as to call for the removal of the German -Minister Rieth and for the prompt substitution of a man who was an -enthusiast for the Anschluss with Germany, who could be tolerant of Nazi -objectives and methods but who could lend an aura of respectability to -official German representation in Vienna. This situation is described in -the transcript at Pages 478 and 479 (Volume II, Pages 355, 356). -Hitler’s reaction to the murder of Dollfuss was immediate. He chose his -man as soon as he heard the news. The very next day, the 26th of July, -he sent Von Papen a letter of appointment. This is on Page 37 of the -English document book; it is document 2799-PS and it has already been -judicially noticed by the Tribunal. Mr. Alderman read the letter, and I -only wish to refer to the personal remarks toward the end. Hitler in -this letter, after reciting his version of the Dollfuss affair and -expressing his desire that Austrian-German relations should be brought -again into normal and friendly channels, says in the third paragraph: - - “For this reason I request you, dear Herr Von Papen, to take - over this important task just because you have possessed and - continue to possess my most complete and unlimited confidence - ever since our collaboration in the Cabinet.” - -And the last paragraph of the letter: - - “Thanking you again today for all that you once have done for - the co-ordination of the Government of the National Revolution - and since then, together with us, for Germany . . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: This might be a good time to break off for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I had just read from the letter of -appointment as Minister in Vienna which Hitler sent to Von Papen on the -26th of July 1934. This letter, which, of course, was made public, -naturally did not disclose the real intention of Von Papen’s -appointment. The actual mission of Von Papen was frankly stated shortly -after his arrival in Vienna in the course of a private conversation he -had with the American Minister, Mr. Messersmith. I quote from Mr. -Messersmith’s affidavit, which is Document 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57, and -it is on Page 22 of the document book, just about half way through the -second paragraph. Mr. Messersmith said: - - “When I did call on Von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted - me with: ‘Now you are in my Legation and I can control the - conversation.’ In the baldest and most cynical manner he then - proceeded to tell me that all of southeastern Europe, to the - borders of Turkey, was Germany’s natural hinterland and that he - had been charged with the mission of facilitating German - economic and political control over all this region for Germany. - He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was - to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in - Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from - Vienna to work towards the weakening of the governments in the - other states to the south and southeast. He said that he - intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain - influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, - towards that end.” - -Throughout the earlier period of his mission to Austria, Von Papen’s -activity was characterized by the assiduous avoidance of any appearance -of intervention. His true mission was re-affirmed with clarity several -months after its commencement when he was instructed by Berlin that -“during the next 2 years nothing can be undertaken which will give -Germany external political difficulties,” and that every appearance of -German intervention in Austrian affairs must be avoided; and Von Papen -himself stated to Berger-Waldenegg, an Austrian Foreign Minister, “Yes, -you have your French and English friends now, and you can have your -independence a little longer.” All of that was told in detail by Mr. -Alderman, again quoting from Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit, which is in -the transcript at Pages 492 (Volume II, Page 354), 506, and 507 (Volume -II, Pages 362-364). - -Throughout this earlier period, the Nazi movement was gaining strength -in Austria without openly admitted German intervention; and Germany -needed more time to consolidate its diplomatic position. These reasons -for German policy were frankly expressed by the German Foreign Minister -Von Neurath in conversation with the American Ambassador to France; this -was read into the transcript at Page 520 (Volume II, Page 381) by Mr. -Alderman from Document L-150, Exhibit USA-65. - -The Defendant Von Papen accordingly restricted his activities to the -normal ambassadorial function of cultivating all respectable elements in -Austria, and ingratiating himself in these circles. Despite his facade -of strict nonintervention, Von Papen remained in contact with subversive -elements in Austria. Thus in his report to Hitler, dated 17 May 1935, he -advised concerning Austrian-Nazi strategy as proposed by Captain -Leopold, leader of the illegal Austrian Nazis, the object of which was -to trick Dr. Schuschnigg into establishing an Austrian coalition -government with the Nazi Party. This is Document 2247-PS, Exhibit -USA-64, and it is in the transcript at Pages 516 to 518 (Volume II, -Pages 379, 380). It is on Page 34 of the English document book. I don’t -want to read this letter again, but I would like to call the attention -of the Tribunal to the first line of what appears as the second -paragraph in the English text, where Von Papen, talking about this -strategy of Captain Leopold, says, “I suggest that we take an active -part in this game.” - -I mention also in connection with the illegal organizations in Austria, -Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, which the Tribunal will remember was a -report from Rainer to Bürckel, and which is dealt with in the transcript -at Pages 498 to 505 (Volume II, Pages 367 to 376). - -Eventually the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany and Austria was -negotiated by Von Papen. This is already in evidence as Document TC-22, -Exhibit GB-20. The public form of this agreement provides that while -Austria in her policy should regard herself as a German state, yet -Germany would recognize the full sovereignty of Austria and would not -exercise direct or indirect influence on the inner political order of -Austria. More interesting was the secret part of the agreement, revealed -by Mr. Messersmith, which ensured the Nazis an influence in the Austrian -Cabinet and participation in the political life of Austria. This has -already been read into the transcript at Page 522 (Volume II, Page 383) -by Mr. Alderman. - -After the agreement the Defendant Von Papen continued to pursue his -policy by maintaining contact with the illegal Nazis, by trying to -influence appointments to strategic Cabinet positions, and by attempting -to secure official recognition of Nazi front organizations. Reporting to -Hitler on 1 September 1936, he summarized his program for normalizing -Austrian-German relations in pursuance of the agreement of 11 July. This -is Document 2246-PS, Exhibit USA-67, on Page 33 of the English document -book. - -The Tribunal will recall that he recommended “as a guiding principle, -continued, patient, psychological manipulations with slowly intensified -pressure directed at changing the regime.” Then he mentions his -discussion with the illegal party and says that he is aiming at -“cooperative representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front, but -nevertheless is refraining from putting National Socialists in important -positions for the time being.” - -There is no need to go over again the events that led up to the meeting -of Schuschnigg with Hitler in February 1938, which Von Papen arranged -and which he attended, and to the final invasion of Austria in March -1938. It is enough if I quote from the biography again on Page 66 of the -document book. It is about two-thirds of the way down the page: - - “Following the events of March 1938, which caused Austria’s - incorporation into the German Reich, Von Papen had the - satisfaction of being present at the Führer’s side when the - entry into Vienna took place, after the Führer, in recognition - of his valuable collaboration, had on 14 February 1938, admitted - him to the Party and had bestowed upon him the Golden Party - Badge.” - -And the biography continues: - - “At first Von Papen retired to his estate Wallerfangen in the - Saar district, but soon the Führer required his services again - and on the 18 April 1939 appointed Von Papen German Ambassador - in Ankara.” - -Thus the fascination of serving Hitler triumphed once again, and this -time it was at a date when the seizure of Czechoslovakia could have left -no shadow of doubt in Papen’s mind that Hitler was determined to pursue -his program of aggression. - -One further quotation from the biography on Page 66, the last sentence -of the last paragraph but one: - - “After his return to the Reich”—that was in 1944—“Von Papen - was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the War Merit Order with - Swords.” - -In conclusion, I draw the Tribunal’s attention again to the fulsome -praises which Hitler publicly bestowed upon Von Papen for his services, -especially in the earlier days. I have given two instances where Hitler -said “His collaboration is infinitely valuable,” and again “You possess -my most complete and unlimited confidence.” - -Papen, the ex-Chancellor, the soldier, the respected Catholic, Papen the -diplomat, Papen the man of breeding and culture—there was the man who -could overcome the hostility and antipathy of those respectable elements -who barred Hitler’s way. Papen was—to repeat the words of Sir Hartley -Shawcross in his opening speech—“one of the men whose co-operation and -support made the Nazi Government of Germany possible.” - -That concludes my case. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe will now follow with the -case of Von Neurath. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, the presentation -against the Defendant Von Neurath falls into five parts, and the first -of these is concerned with the following positions and honors which he -held. - -He was a member of the Nazi Party from 30 January 1937 until 1945, and -he was awarded the Golden Party Badge on 30 January 1937. He was general -in the SS. He was personally appointed Gruppenführer by Hitler in -September 1937 and promoted to Obergruppenführer on 21 June 1943. He was -Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Chancellorship of the -Defendant Von Papen from 2 June 1932 and under the Chancellorship of -Hitler from 30 January 1933 until he was replaced by the Defendant Von -Ribbentrop on 4 February 1938. He was Reich Minister from 4 February -1938 until May 1945. He was President of the Secret Cabinet Council, to -which he was appointed on 4 February 1938, and he was a member of the -Reich Defense Council. He was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and -Moravia from 18 March 1939 until he was replaced by the Defendant Frick -on 25 August 1943. - -He was awarded the Adler Order by Hitler at the time of his appointment -as Reich Protector. The Defendant Ribbentrop was the only other German -to receive this decoration. - -If the Tribunal please, these facts are collected in Document 2973-PS, -which is Exhibit USA-19, and in that document, which is signed by the -defendant and his counsel, the defendant makes comments on certain of -these matters with which I should like to deal. - -He says that the award of the Golden Party Badge was made on 30 January -1937 against his will and without his being asked. - -I point out that this defendant not only refrained from repudiating the -allegedly unwanted honor, but after receiving it, attended meetings at -which wars of aggression were planned, actively participated in the rape -of Austria, and tyrannized Bohemia and Moravia. - -The second point is that his appointment as Gruppenführer was also -against his will and without his being asked. On that point, the -Prosecution submits that the wearing of the uniform, the receipt of the -further promotion to Obergruppenführer and the actions against Bohemia -and Moravia must be considered when the defendant’s submission is -examined. - -He then says that his appointment as Foreign Minister was by Reich -President Von Hindenburg. We submit we need not do more than draw -attention to the personalities of the Defendant Von Papen and Hitler and -to the fact that President Von Hindenburg died in 1934. This defendant -continued as Foreign Minister until 1938. - -He then says that he was an inactive Minister from the 4th of February -1938 until May 1945. At that moment attention is drawn to the activities -which will be mentioned below and to the terrible evidence as to Bohemia -and Moravia which will be forthcoming from our friend the Soviet -prosecutor. - -This defendant’s next point is that the Secret Cabinet Council never sat -nor conferred. - -I point out to the Tribunal that that was described as a select -committee of the Cabinet for the deliberation of foreign affairs; and -the Tribunal will find that description in Document 1774-PS, which I now -put in as Exhibit GB-246. This is an extract from a book by a well-known -author, and on Page 2 of the document book, the first page of that -document, in about the seventh line from the bottom of the page, they -will see that among the bureaus subordinated to the Führer for direct -counsel and assistance, number four is the Secret Cabinet Council; -President: Reich Minister Baron Von Neurath. - -And if the Tribunal will be kind enough to turn over to Page 3, about -ten lines from the top, they will see the paragraph beginning: - - “A Secret Cabinet Council to advise the Führer in the basic - problems of foreign policy has been created by the decree of 4 - February 1938”—and a reference is given. - - “This Secret Cabinet Council is under the direction of Reich - Minister Von Neurath, and includes the Foreign Minister, the Air - Minister, the Deputy of the Führer, the Propaganda Minister, the - Chief of the Reich Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief of the - Army and Navy and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed - Forces. The Secret Cabinet council constitutes a closer staff of - collaborators of the Führer which consists exclusively of - members of the Government of the Reich; strictly speaking it - represents a select committee of the Reich Government for the - deliberation on foreign affairs.” - -In order to have the formal composition of the body, that is shown in -Document 2031-PS, which is Exhibit GB-217. I believe that has been put -in. I need not read it again. - -The next point that the defendant makes as to his offices is that he was -not a member of the Reich Defense Council. - -If I may very shortly take that point by stages, I remind the Tribunal -that the Reich Defense Council was set up soon after Hitler’s accession -to power on 4 April 1933; and the Tribunal will find a note of that -point in Document 2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24; and they will find that on -the top of Page 12 of the document book there is a reference to the date -of the establishment of the Reich Defense Council. - -The Reich Defense Council is also dealt with in Document 2986-PS, -Exhibit USA-409, which is the affidavit of the Defendant Frick, which -the Tribunal will find on Page 14. In the middle of that short -affidavit, Defendant Frick says: - - “We were also members of the Reich Defense Council which was - supposed to plan preparations in case of war which later on were - published by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the - Reich.” - -Now, that the membership of this Council included the Minister for -Foreign Affairs, who was then the Defendant Von Neurath, is shown by -Document EC-177, Exhibit USA-390. If the Tribunal will turn to Page 16 -of the document book, they will find that document and, at the foot of -the page, the composition of the Reich Defense Council, the permanent -members including the Minister for Foreign Affairs. That document is -dated “Berlin, 22 May 1933” which was during this defendant’s tenure of -that office. That is the first stage. - -The functioning of this council, with a representative of this -defendant’s department, Von Bülow, present, is shown by the minutes of -the 12th meeting on 14 May 1936. That is Document EC-407, which I put in -as Exhibit GB-247. The Tribunal will find at Page 21 that the minutes -are for the 14th of May 1936, and the actual reference to an -intervention of Von Bülow is in the middle of Page 22. - -Then, the next period was after the secret law of 4 September 1938. This -defendant was, under the terms of that law, a member of the Reich -Defense Council by virtue of his office as president of the Secret -Cabinet Council. That is shown by the Document 2194-PS, Exhibit USA-36, -which the Tribunal will find at Page 24, and if you will look at Page -24, you will see that the actual copy which was put in evidence was -enclosed in a letter addressed to the Reich Protector in Bohemia and -Moravia on the 4th of September 1939. It is rather curious that the -Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia is now denying his membership in -the council when the letter enclosing the law is addressed to him. - -But if the Tribunal will be good enough to turn on to Page 28, which is -still that document, the last words on that page describe the tasks of -that council and say: - - “The task of the Reich Defense Council consists, during - peacetime, in deciding all measures for the preparation of Reich - defense, and the gathering together of all forces and means of - the nation in compliance with the directions of the Führer and - Reich Chancellor. The tasks of the Reich Defense Council in - wartime will be especially determined by the Führer and Reich - Chancellor.” - -If the Tribunal will turn to the next page, they will see that the -permanent members of the Council are listed, and that the seventh one is -the President of the Secret Cabinet Council, who was, again, this -defendant. - -I submit that that deals, for every relevant period, with this -defendant’s statement that he was not a member of the Reich Defense -Council. - -The second broad point that the Prosecution makes against this defendant -is that in assuming the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in -Hitler’s Cabinet, this defendant assumed charge of a foreign policy -committed to breach of treaties. - -We say first that the Nazi Party had repeatedly and for many years made -known its intention to overthrow Germany’s international commitments, -even at the risk of war. We refer to Sections 1 and 2 of the Party -program, which, as the Tribunal has heard, was published year after -year. That is on Page 32 of the document book. It is Document 1708-PS, -Exhibit USA-255. - -I just remind the Tribunal of these Points 1 and 2: - - “1. We demand the unification of all Germans into Greater - Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination of - peoples. - - “2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in - respect to other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties of - Versailles and St. Germain.” - -But probably clearer than that is the statement contained in Hitler’s -speech at Munich on the 15th of March 1939; and the Tribunal will find -one of the references to that on Page 40 at the middle of the page. It -begins: - - “My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was to abolish - the Treaty of Versailles. It is absolutely nonsense for the rest - of the world to pretend today that I had not announced this - program until 1933 or 1935 or 1937. Instead of listening to the - foolish chatter of emigrees these gentlemen should have read, - merely once, what I have written, that is written a thousand - times.” - -It is futile nonsense for foreigners to raise that point. It would be -still more futile for Hitler’s Foreign Minister to suggest that he was -ignorant of the aggressive designs of the policy. But I remind the -Tribunal that the acceptance of force as a means of solving -international problems and achieving the objectives of Hitler’s foreign -policy must have been known to anyone as closely in touch with Hitler as -the Defendant Von Neurath; and I remind the Tribunal simply by reference -to the passages from _Mein Kampf_, which were quoted by my friend Major -Elwyn Jones, especially those toward the end of the book, Pages 552, -553, and 554. - -So that the Prosecution say that by the acceptance of this foreign -policy the Defendant Von Neurath assisted and promoted the accession to -power of the Nazi Party. - -The third broad point is that in his capacity as Minister of Foreign -Affairs this defendant directed the international aspects of the first -phase of the Nazi conspiracy, the consolidation of control in -preparation for war. - -As I have already indicated, from his close connection with Hitler this -defendant must have known the cardinal points of Hitler’s policy leading -up to the outbreak of the World War, as outlined in retrospect by Hitler -in his speech to his military leaders on the 23rd of November 1939. - -This policy had two facets: internally, the establishment of rigid -control; externally, the program to release Germany from its -international ties. The external program had four points: 1) Secession -from the Disarmament Conference; 2) the order to re-arm Germany; 3) the -introduction of compulsory military services; and 4) the -remilitarization of the Rhineland. - -If the Tribunal will look at Page 35 in the document book, at the end of -the first paragraph they will find these points very briefly set out, -and perhaps I might just read that passage. It is Document 789-PS, -Exhibit USA-23—about 10 lines before the break: - - “I had to reorganize everything, beginning with the mass of the - people and extending it to the Armed Forces. First, - reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of - decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While - reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task: To - release Germany from its international ties. Two particular - characteristics are to be pointed out: Secession from the League - of Nations and denunciation of the Disarmament Conference. It - was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that - it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the - number of believers was very small. I was supported by the - nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my - intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again - there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only - a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed - service. After that, militarization of the Rhineland, again a - process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of - people who put trust in me was very small. Then, beginning of - the fortification of the whole country, especially in the west.” - -Now, these are summarized in four points. The Defendant Von Neurath -participated directly and personally in accomplishing each of these four -aspects of Hitler’s foreign policy, at the same time officially -proclaiming that these measures did not constitute steps toward -aggression. - -The first is a matter of history. When Germany left the Disarmament -Conference this defendant sent telegrams dated the 14th of October 1933, -to the President of the conference—and that will be found in _Dokumente -Der Deutschen Politik_, on Page 94 of the first volume for that year. -Similarly this defendant made the announcement of Germany’s withdrawal -from the League of Nations on the 21st of October 1933. That again will -be found in the official documents. These are referred to in the -transcript of the proceedings of the Trial, and I remind the Tribunal of -the complementary documents of military preparation, which of course -were read and which are Documents C-140, Exhibit USA-51, the 25th of -October 1933, and C-153, Exhibit USA-43, the 12th of May 1934. These -have already been read and I merely collect them for the memory and -assistance of the Tribunal. - -The second point—the rearmament of Germany: When this defendant was -Foreign Minister, on the 9th of March 1935, the German Government -officially announced the establishment of the German Air Force. That is -Document TC-44, Exhibit GB-11, already referred to. On the 21st of May -1935 Hitler announced a purported unilateral repudiation of the Naval, -Military, and Air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which, of course, -involved a similar purported unilateral repudiation of the same clauses -of the Treaty for the Restoration of Friendly Relations with the United -States, and that will be found in Document 2288-PS, Exhibit USA-38, -which again has already been read. On the same day the Reich Cabinet, of -which this defendant was a member, enacted the secret Reich Defense Law -creating the office of Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, -afterwards designated by the Wehrmacht armament expert as “the -cornerstone of German rearmament.” The reference to the law is Document -2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24, a letter of Von Blomberg dated the 24th of June -1935, enclosing this law, which is already before the Tribunal; and the -reference to the comment on the importance of the law is Document -2353-PS, Exhibit USA-35. Some of that has already been read, but if the -Tribunal will be good enough to turn to Page 52 where that appears, they -will find an extract and I might just give the Tribunal the last -sentence: - - “The new regulations were stipulated in the Reich Defense Law of - 21 May 1935, supposed to be promulgated only in case of war but - already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As - this law . . . fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the - other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the - fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war - economy organization.” - -The third point is the introduction of compulsory military service. On -the 16th of March 1935 this defendant signed the law for the -organization of the Armed Forces which provided for universal military -service and anticipated a vastly expanded German army. This was -described by the Defendant Keitel as the real start of the large scale -rearmament program which followed. I will give the official reference in -the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, year 1935, Volume I, Part 1, Page 369; and the -references in the transcript are 411 (Volume II, Page 305), 454, and 455 -(Volume II, Page 340). - -The fourth point was the remilitarization of the Rhineland. The -Rhineland was reoccupied on the 7th of March 1936. I remind the Tribunal -of the two complementary documents: 2289-PS, Exhibit USA-56, the -announcement of this action by Hitler; and C-139, Exhibit USA-53, which -is the “Operation Schulung,” giving the military action which was to be -given if necessary. Again the reference to the transcript is Page 458 to -Page 464 (Volume II, Pages 342 to 347). These were the acts for which -the defendant shared responsibility because of his position and because -of the steps which he took; but a little later he summed up his views on -the actions detailed above in a speech before Germans abroad made on the -29th of August 1937, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice, as it appears in _Das Archiv_, 1937, at Page 650. But I quote a -short portion of it that appears on Page 72 of the document book: - - “The unity of the racial and national will created through - Nazism with unprecedented elan has made possible a foreign - policy by which the fetters of the Versailles Treaty were - forced, the freedom to arm regained, and the sovereignty of the - whole nation re-established. We have really again become master - in our own house and we have created the means of power to - remain henceforth that way for all times. . . . The world should - have seen from . . . Hitler’s deeds and words that his aims are - not aggressive.” - -The world, of course, had not the advantage of seeing these various -complementary documents of military preparation which I have had the -opportunity of putting before the Tribunal. - -The next section—and the next point against this defendant—is that -both as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as one of the inner circle of -the Führer’s advisers on foreign political matters, this defendant -participated in the political planning and preparation for acts of -aggression against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other nations. - -If I might first put the defendant’s policy in a sentence, I would say -that it can be summarized as breaking one treaty only at a time. He -himself put it—if I may say so—slightly more pompously but to the same -effect in a speech before the Academy of German Law on the 30th of -October 1937, which appears in _Das Archiv_, October 1937, Page 921, and -which the Tribunal will find in the document book on Page 73. The -underlining (italics) is mine: - - “In recognition of these elementary facts the Reich Cabinet has - always interceded _in favor of treating every concrete - international problem within the scope of methods especially - suited to it; not to complicate it unnecessarily by involvement - with other problems; and, as long as problems between only two - powers are concerned, to choose the direct way for an immediate - understanding between these two powers. We are in a position to - state that this method has fully proved itself good not only in - the German interest, but also in the general interest._” - -The only country whose interests are not mentioned are the other parties -to the various treaties that were dealt with in that way; and the -working out of that policy can readily be shown by looking at the -tabulated form of the actions of this defendant when he was Foreign -Minister or during the term of his immediate successor when the -defendant still was purported to have influence. - -In 1935 the action was directed against the Western Powers. That action -was the rearmament of Germany. When that was going on another country -had to be reassured. At that time it was Austria, with the support of -Italy—which Austria still had up to 1935. And so you get the fraudulent -assurance, the essence of the technique, in that case given by Hitler, -on the 21st of May 1935. And that is shown clearly to be false, by the -documents which Mr. Alderman put in—I give the general reference to the -transcript on Pages 534 to 545 (Volume II, Pages 388 to 398). Then, in -1936, you still have the action necessary against the Western Powers in -the occupation of the Rhineland. You still have a fraudulent assurance -to Austria in the treaty of the 11th of July of that year; and that is -shown to be fraudulent by the letters from the Defendant Von Papen, -Exhibits USA-64 (Document 2247-PS) and 67 (Document 2246-PS), to one of -which my friend Major Barrington has just referred. - -Then in 1937 and 1938 you move on a step and the action is directed -against Austria. We know what that action was. It was absorption, -planned, at any rate finally, at the meeting on the 5th of November -1937; and action taken on the 11th of March 1938. - -Reassurance had to be given to the Western Powers, so you have the -assurance to Belgium on the 13th of October 1937, which was dealt with -by my friend Mr. Roberts. The Tribunal will find the references in Pages -1100 to 1126 (Volume III, Pages 289 to 307) of the transcript. - -We move forward a year and the object of the aggressive action becomes -Czechoslovakia. Or I should say we move forward 6 months to a year. -There you have the Sudetenland obtained in September; the absorption of -the whole of Bohemia and Moravia on the 15th of March 1939. - -Then it was necessary to reassure Poland; so an assurance to Poland is -given by Hitler on the 20th of February 1938, and repeated up to the -26th of September 1938. The falsity of that assurance was shown over and -over again in Colonel Griffith-Jones’ speech on Poland, which the -Tribunal will find in the transcript at Pages 966 to 1060 (Volume II, -Pages 195 to 261). - -Then finally, when they want the action as directed against Poland in -the next year for its conquest, assurance must be given to Russia, and -so a non-aggression pact is entered into on the 23rd of August 1939, as -shown by Mr. Alderman, at Pages 1160 to 1216 (Volume III, Pages 328 to -366). - -With regard to that tabular presentation, one might say, in the Latin -tag, _res ipsa oquitur_. But quite a frank statement from this defendant -with regard to the earlier part of that can be found in the account of -his conversation with the United States Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt, on the -18th of May 1936, which is on Page 74 of the document book, Document -L-150, Exhibit USA-65; and if I might read the first paragraph after the -introduction which says that he called on this defendant, Mr. Bullitt -remarks: - - “Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German - Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until ‘the - Rhineland had been digested.’ He explained that he meant that, - until the German fortifications had been constructed on the - French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do - everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak - by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with - regard to Czechoslovakia. ‘As soon as our fortifications are - constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that - France cannot enter German territory at will, all those - countries will begin to feel very differently about their - foreign policies and a new constellation will develop,’ he - said.” - -I remind the Tribunal, without citing it, of the conversation referred -to by my friend, Major Barrington, a short time ago, between the -Defendant Von Papen, as Ambassador, and Mr. Messersmith, which is very -much to the same effect. - -Then I come to the actual aggression against Austria, and I remind the -Tribunal that this defendant was Foreign Minister: - -First, during the early Nazi plottings against Austria in 1934. The -Tribunal will find these in the transcript at Pages 475 to 489 (Volume -II, Pages 352-364), and I remind them generally that that was the murder -of Chancellor Dollfuss and the ancillary acts which were afterwards so -strongly approved. - -Secondly, when the false assurance was given to Austria on the 21st of -May 1935, and the fraudulent treaty made on the 11th of July 1936. -References to these are Document TC-26, which is Exhibit GB-19, and -Document TC-22, which is Exhibit GB-20. The reference in the transcript -is at Pages 544 and 545 (Volume II, Page 383). - -Third, when the Defendant Von Papen was carrying on his subterranean -intrigues in the period from 1935 to 1937. I again give the references -so the Tribunal will have it in mind: Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, -letter dated 17 May 1935; and Exhibit USA-67, Document 2246-PS, 1 -September 1936. The references in the transcript are Pages 492 (Volume -II, Pages 363, 364), 516-518 (Volume II, Pages 372-374), 526-545 (Volume -II, Pages 378 to 391), and 553-554 (Volume II, Pages 394, 395). - -This Defendant Von Neurath was present when Hitler declared, at the -Hossbach interview on the 5th of November 1937, that the German question -could only be solved by force and that his plans were to conquer Austria -and Czechoslovakia. That is Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, which the -Tribunal will find at Page 82. If you will look at the sixth line of -Page 82, after the heading, you will see that one of the persons in -attendance at this highly confidential meeting was the Reich Minister -for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr von Neurath. - -Without reading a document which the Tribunal have had referred to them -more than once, may I remind the Tribunal that it is on Page 86 that the -passage about the conquest of Austria occurs, and if the Tribunal will -look after “2:” and “3:” the next sentence is: - - “For the improvement of our military-political position, it must - be our first aim in every case of warlike entanglement to - conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to - remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance - westwards.” - -That is developed on the succeeding page. The important point is that -this defendant was present at that meeting; and it is impossible for him -after that meeting to say that he was not acting except with his eyes -completely open and with complete comprehension as to what was intended. - -Then the next point. During the actual Anschluss he received a note from -the British Ambassador dated the 11th of March 1938. That is Document -3045-PS, Exhibit USA-127. He sent the reply contained in Document -3287-PS, Exhibit USA-128. If I might very briefly remind the Tribunal of -the reply, I think all that is necessary—and of course the Tribunal -have had this document referred to them before—is at the top of Page -93. I wish to call attention to two obvious untruths. - -The Defendant Von Neurath states in the sixth line: - - “It is untrue that the Reich used forceful pressure to bring - about this development, especially the assertion, which was - spread later by the former Federal Chancellor, that the German - Government had presented the Federal President with a - conditional ultimatum. It is a pure invention.” - -According to the ultimatum, he had to appoint a proposed candidate as -Chancellor to form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German -Government. Otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held -in prospect. - - “The truth of the matter is that the question of sending - military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up - when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, - already published by the press, to the German Government, - urgently asking for the dispatch of German troops as soon as - possible, in order to restore peace and order and to avoid - bloodshed. Faced with the imminent danger of a bloody Civil war - in Austria, the German Government then decided to comply with - the appeal addressed to it.” - -Well, as I said, My Lord, these are the two most obvious untruths, and -all one can say is that it must have, at any rate, given this defendant -a certain macabre sort of humor to write that, when the truth was, as -the Tribunal know it from the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Bürckel, -which has been put in before the Tribunal as Document 812-PS, Exhibit -USA-61, and when they have heard, as they have at length, the -transcripts of the Defendant Göring’s telephone conversation with -Austria on that day, which is Document 2949-PS, Exhibit USA-76, and the -entries of the Defendant Jodl’s diary for the 11th, 13th, and 14th of -February, which is Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72. - -In this abundance of proof of the untruthfulness of these statements the -Tribunal may probably think that the most clear and obvious correction -is in the transcription of the Defendant Göring’s telephone -conversations, which are so amply corroborated by the other documents. - -The Prosecution submits that it is inconceivable that this defendant -who, according to the Defendant Jodl’s diary—may I ask the Tribunal -just to look at Page 116 of the document book, the entry in the -Defendant Jodl’s diary for the 10th of March, so that they have this -point quite clear? It is the third paragraph, and it says: - - “At 1300 hours General Keitel informs Chief of Operational - Staff, Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. - Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.” - -I submit that it is inconceivable when this defendant had taken over the -Foreign Office, was dealing with the matter, and as I shall show the -Tribunal in a moment, co-operating with the Defendant Göring to suit the -susceptibilities of the Czechs, that he should have been so ignorant of -the truth of events and what really was happening as to write that -letter in honor and good faith. - -His position can be shown equally clearly by the account which is given -of him in the affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit -USA-68. If the Tribunal will look at Page 107 of the document book, I -remind them of that entry which exactly describes the action and style -of activity of this defendant at this crisis. Two-thirds of the way down -the page the paragraph begins: - - “I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made - these promises were not only the dyed-in-the-wool Nazis, but - more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to - lend themselves to the Nazi program. - - “In an official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna, - dated 10 October 1935, I wrote as follows: - - “‘Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, - and Mackensen are not dangerous people, and that they are - “diplomats of the old school.” They are in fact servile - instruments of the regime, and just because the outside world - looks upon them as harmless they are able to work more - effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they - propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the - regime.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned, until 24 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FORTY-SECOND DAY - Thursday, 24 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): If it please Your Honor, the -Defendant Streicher and the Defendant Kaltenbrunner are absent this -morning due to illness. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, before the Tribunal -adjourned, I was dealing with the share of the Defendant Neurath in the -aggression against Austria. Before I proceed to the next stage, I should -like the Tribunal, if it be so kind, to look at the original exhibit to -which I am referred, Document 3287-PS, Exhibit USA-128, which is the -letter from this defendant to Sir Nevile Henderson, who was then the -British Ambassador. The only point in which I would be grateful is if -the Tribunal would note Page 92 of the document book. When I say -original, that is a certified copy certified by the British Foreign -Office, but the Tribunal will see that the heading is from the President -of the Secret Cabinet Council. That is the point that the Tribunal will -remember. The question was raised as to the existence or activity of -that body and the letterhead is from the defendant in that capacity. - -The next stage in the Austrian aggression is that at the time of the -occupation of Austria, this defendant gave the assurance to M. Mastny, -the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia to Berlin, regarding the continued -independence of Czechoslovakia. That is one document at Page 123, TC-27, -which I have already put in as Exhibit GB-21. It was to Lord Halifax, -who was then Foreign Secretary; and if I may read the second paragraph -just to remind the Tribunal of the circumstances in which it was -written, M. Masaryk says: - - “I have in consequence been instructed by my Government to bring - to the official knowledge of His Majesty’s Government the - following facts: Yesterday evening (the 11th of March) Field - Marshal Göring made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the - Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the - developments in Austria will in no way have any detrimental - influence on the relations between the German Reich and - Czechoslovakia, and emphasizing the continued earnest endeavor - on the part of Germany to improve those mutual relations.” - -And then there are the particulars of the way it was put to Defendant -Göring, which have been brought to the Tribunal’s attention several -times, and I shall not do it again. The 6th paragraph begins: “M. Mastny -was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this -subject”—that is, to give the Defendant Göring on the Czech -mobilization—and then it goes on: - - “. . . and today spoke with Baron Von Neurath, who, among other - things, assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still - considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration - Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.” - -In view of the fact that the Defendant Von Neurath had been present at -the meeting on the 5th of November, 4 months previously, when he had -heard Hitler’s views on Czechoslovakia—and that it was only 6 months -before that really negotiated treaty was disregarded at once—that -paragraph, in my submission, is an excellent example on the technique of -which this defendant was the first professor. - -I now come to the aggression against Czechoslovakia. On 28 May 1938 -Hitler held a conference of important leaders including Beck, Von -Brauchitsch, Raeder, Keitel, Göring, and Ribbentrop at which Hitler -affirmed that preparations should be made for military action against -Czechoslovakia by October; and it is believed, though not—I say -frankly—confirmed, that the Defendant Von Neurath attended. The -reference of that meeting is in the transcript of Pages 742 and 743 -(Volume III, Page 42). - -THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, is there any evidence? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No. Your Lordship will remember the documents, a -long series of them, and it does not state who was present; therefore, I -express that and put it with reserve. - -On the 4th of September 1938 the government of which Von Neurath was a -member enacted a new Secret Reich Defense Law which defined various -official responsibilities in clear anticipation of war. This law -provided, as did the previous Secret Reich Defense Law, for a Reich -Defense Council as a supreme policy board for war preparations. The -Tribunal will remember that I have already referred them to Document -2194-PS, Exhibit USA-36, showing these facts. Then there came the Munich -Agreement of 29 September 1938, but in spite of that, on the 14th of -March 1939 German troops marched into Czechoslovakia; and the -proclamation to the German people and the order to the Wehrmacht is -Document TC-50, Exhibit GB-7, which the Tribunal will find at Page 124, -which has already been referred to and I shall not read it again. - -On the 16th of March 1939 the German Government, of which Von Neurath -was still a member, promulgated the “Decree of the Führer and Reich -Chancellor on the Establishment of the Protectorate ‘Bohemia and -Moravia.’” That date is the 16th of March. That is at Page 126 of the -document book, TC-51, Exhibit GB-8. - -If I may leave that for the moment, I will come back to it in dealing -with the setting up of the Protectorate. I will come back in a moment -and read Article 5. But taking the events in the order of time, the -following week the Defendant Von Ribbentrop signed a treaty with -Slovakia, which is at Page 129 (Document 1439-PS, Exhibit GB-135); and -the Tribunal may remember Article 2 of that treaty, which is: - - “For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken - by the German Reich, the German Armed Forces shall have the - right at all times to construct military installations and to - keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary in an - area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State - of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the - eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians, - and the Javornik Mountains. - - “The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to - assure that the land required for these installations shall be - conveyed to the German Armed Forces. Furthermore, the Government - of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for - imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops - and the supply of military installations.” - -The Tribunal will appreciate that the ultimate objective of Hitler’s -policy disclosed at the meeting at which this defendant was present on -the 5th of November 1937, that is the resumption of the “Drang nach -Osten” and the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East, was obvious from -the terms of this treaty as it has been explicit in Hitler’s statement. - -Then we come to the pith of this criminality. By accepting and occupying -the position of Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the Defendant -Von Neurath personally adhered to the aggression against Czechoslovakia -and the world. He further actively participated in the conspiracy of -world aggression and he assumed a position of leadership in the -execution of policies involving violating the laws of war and the -commission of crimes against humanity. - -The Tribunal will appreciate that I am not going to trespass on the -ground covered by my colleagues and go into the crimes. I want to show -quite clearly to the Tribunal the basis for these crimes which was laid -by the legal position which this defendant assumed. - -The first point. The Defendant Von Neurath assumed the position of -Protector under a sweeping grant of powers. The act creating the -Protectorate provided—if the Tribunal would be good enough to turn back -on Page 126 in the document book (TC-51, Exhibit GB-8) and look at -Article V of the Act, it reads as follows: - - “1. As trustee of Reich interests, the Führer and Chancellor of - the Reich nominates a ‘Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia’ - with Prague as his seat of office. - - “2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Führer and - Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich - Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance - of the political principles laid down by the Führer and - Chancellor of the Reich. - - “3. The members of the Government of the Protectorate shall be - confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be - withdrawn. - - “4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all - measures taken by the Government of the Protectorate and to give - advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich - and, in case of danger in delay, issue ordinances required for - the common interest. - - “5. The promulgation of laws, ordinances, and other legal - provisions and the execution of administrative measures and - legal judgments shall be deferred if the Reich Protector enters - an objection.” - -At the very outset of the Protectorate the Defendant Von Neurath’s -supreme authority was implemented by a series of basic decrees of which -I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. They established the alleged -legal foundation for the policy and program which resulted, all aimed -towards the systematic destruction of the national integrity of the -Czechs: - -1. By granting the “racial Germans” in Czechoslovakia a supreme order of -citizenship—and I give the official reference to the Decree of the -Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Protectorate to which I just -referred—and then; - -2. An act concerning the representation in the Reichstag of Greater -Germany by German nationals resident in the Protectorate, 13 April 1939; - -3. An order concerning the acquisition of German citizenship by former -Czechoslovakian citizens of German stock, 20 April 1939. - -Then there was a series of decrees that granted “racial Germans” in -Czechoslovakia a preferred status at law and in the courts: - -1. An order concerning the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction in the -Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 14 April 1939; - -2. An order concerning the Exercise of Jurisdiction in Civil -Proceedings, 14 April 1939; - -3. An order concerning the Exercise of Military Jurisdiction, on 8 May -1939. - -Then the orders also granted to the Protector broad powers to change by -decree the autonomous law of the Protectorate. That is contained in the -Ordinance on Legislation in the Protectorate, 7 June 1939. - -And finally the Protector was authorized to go with the Reich Leader SS -and the Chief of the German Police to take, if necessary, such police -measures which go beyond the limits usually valid for police measures. - -In view of the form of the order itself the Tribunal, if it cares to -listen and to take judicial notice of this, in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ -we have found inserted that one in the document book at Page 131, which -rather staggers the imagination to know what can be police measures even -beyond the limits usually valid for police measures when one has seen -police measures in Germany between 1933 and 1939. But if such increase -was possible, and presumably it was believed to be possible, then an -increase was given by the Defendant Von Neurath and used by him for -coercion of the Czechs. - -The declared basic policy of the Protectorate was concentrated upon the -central objective of destroying the identity of the Czechs as a nation -and absorbing their territory into the Reich; and if the Tribunal will -be good enough to turn to Page 132, they will find Document Number -862-PS, Exhibit USA-313, and I think that has been read to the Tribunal. -Still, the Tribunal might bear with me so that I might indicate the -nature of the document to them. - -This memorandum is signed by Lieutenant General of Infantry Friderici. -It is headed “The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich -Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.” It is marked “Top Secret,” dated 15 -October 1940. That is practically a year before this Defendant Von -Neurath went on leave, as he puts it, on 27 September 1941; and it is -called the “Basic Political Principles in the Protectorate,” and there -are four copies. It also had gone to the Defendant Keitel and the -Defendant Jodl, and it begins: “On 9 October of this year”—that is -1940: - - “On 9 October of this year the Office of the Reich Protector - held an official conference in which State Secretary SS - Gruppenführer K. H. Frank”—that is not the Defendant Frank, it - is the other K. H. Frank—“spoke about the following: - - “Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, - party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the - central authorities of Berlin have been considering the solution - of the Czech problem. - - “After careful deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his - view about the various plans in a memorandum. In this, three - possibilities of solution were indicated: - - “a. German infiltration of Moravia and withdrawal of the Czech - part of the people to a remainder of Bohemia. This solution is - considered as unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if - in a diminished form, will continue to exist. - - “b. Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical - solution, namely, the deportation of all Czechs. Therefore the - memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out - within a reasonable space of time. - - “c. Assimilation of the Czechs, that is, absorption of about - half of the Czech people by the Germans, to the extent that it - is of importance from a racial or other standpoint. This will be - brought about, among other things, also by increasing the - Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory, with the - exception of the Sudeten German border districts—in other - words, by dispersing the block of Czech people. The other half - of the Czech nationality must by all possible ways be deprived - of its power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country. This - applies particularly to the racially mongoloid parts and to the - major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be - converted ideologically and would represent a burden by - constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech - classes and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation. - - “Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be - handled roughly and should be eliminated. - - “The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx - of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate. - - “After a report, the Führer has chosen solution c (assimilation) - as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided - that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate - outwardly, Germanization will have to be carried out uniformly - by the Office of the Reich Protector for years to come. - - “From the above no specific conclusions are drawn by the Armed - Forces. It is the way that has always been followed. In this - connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to the Chief - of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, - entitled ‘The Czech Problem.’” - -And that is signed, as I said, by the Deputy Lieutenant General of the -Armed Forces. - -That view of the Reich Protector was accepted and formed a basis of his -policy. The result was a program of consolidating German control over -Bohemia and Moravia by the systematic oppression of the Czechs through -the abolition of civil liberties and the systematic undermining of the -native political, economic, and cultural structure by a regime of -terror, which will be dealt with by my Soviet Union colleagues. They -will show clearly, I submit, that the only protection given by this -defendant was a protection to the perpetrators of innumerable crimes. - -I have already drawn the attention of the Tribunal to the many honors -and rewards which this defendant received as his worth, and it might -well be said that Hitler showered more honors on Von Neurath than on -some of the leading Nazis who had been with the Party since the very -beginning. His appointment as President of the newly created Secret -Cabinet Council in 1938 was in itself a new and singular distinction. On -22 September 1940 Hitler awarded him the War Merit Cross 1st Class as -Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. That is in the Deutsches -Nachrichtenbüro, 22 September 1940. - -He was also awarded the Golden Badge of the Party and was promoted by -Hitler, personally, from the rank of Gruppenführer to Obergruppenführer -in the SS on 21 June 1943. And I also inform the Tribunal that he and -Ribbentrop were the only two Germans to be awarded the Adlerorden, a -distinction normally reserved for foreigners. On his seventieth -birthday, 2 February 1943, it was made the occasion for most of the -German newspapers to praise his many years of service to the Nazi -regime. This service, as submitted by the Prosecution, may be summed up -in two ways: - -1) He was an internal Fifth Columnist among the Conservative political -circles in Germany. They had been anti-Nazi but were converted in part -by seeing one of themselves, in the person of this defendant, -wholeheartedly with the Nazis; - -2) His previous reputation as a diplomat made public opinion abroad slow -to believe that he would be a member of a cabinet which did not stand by -its words and assurances. It was most important for Hitler that his own -readiness to break every treaty or commitment should be concealed as -long as possible, and for this purpose he found in the Defendant Von -Neurath his handiest tool. - -That concludes the presentation against the Defendant Von Neurath. - -THE PRESIDENT: In view of the motion which was made yesterday by Counsel -for the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal will postpone the presentation of -the individual case against Hess, and will proceed with the presentation -of the case by counsel for France. - -M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): -When stating the charges which now weigh upon the defendants, my British -and American colleagues showed evidence that these men conceived and -executed a plan and plot for the domination of Europe. They have shown -you of what crimes against peace these men became guilty by launching -unjust wars. They have shown you that, as leaders of Nazi Germany, they -had all premeditated unjust wars, and had participated in the conspiracy -against peace. - -Then my friends and colleagues of the French Delegation, M. Herzog, M. -Faure and M. Gerthoffer, submitted documents establishing that the -defendants, who all in various positions counted among the leaders of -Nazi Germany, are responsible for the repeated violations of the laws -and customs of war committed by men of the Reich in the course of -military operations. However, it still remains for us to expose the -atrocities of which men, women, and children of the occupied countries -of the west were victims. - -We intend at this point to prove that the defendants, in their capacity -as leaders of Hitlerite Germany, systematically pursued a policy of -extermination, the cruelty of which increased from day to day until the -final defeat of Germany; that the defendants planned, conceived, willed, -and prescribed these atrocities as part of a system which was to enable -them to accomplish a political aim. It is this political aim which -closely binds all the facts we intend to present to you. The crimes -perpetrated against people and property, as presented so far by my -colleagues of the French Prosecution, were in close connection with the -war. They had the distinct character of war crimes _stricto sensu_. -Those which I shall present to you surpass them both in meaning and -extent. They form part of the plans of a policy of domination, of -expansion, beyond war itself. - -It is Hitler himself who gave the best definition of this policy in one -of his speeches in Munich on 16 May 1927. He was deceiving his listeners -about the danger that France, an agricultural country of only 40 million -inhabitants, might represent for Germany, which was already a -highly-industrialized country with a population of nearly 70 million. -That day Hitler said: - - “There is only one way for Germany to escape encirclement; and - it is the destruction of the state which, by the natural order - of things, will always be her mortal enemy: that is France. When - a nation is aware that its whole existence is endangered by an - enemy, it must aim at one thing only: the annihilation of that - enemy.” - -During the first months that followed their victory, the Germans seemed -to have abandoned their plan of annihilation; but this was only a -tactical pretense. They hoped to draw into their war against England and -the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics the western nations they had -enslaved. By doses of treachery and violence, they attempted to make -these western nations take the road of collaboration. The latter -resisted; and the defendants then abandoned their tactics and came back -to their big scheme, the annihilation of conquered peoples in order to -secure in Europe the space necessary for the 250 million Germans whom -they hoped to settle there in generations to come. - -This destruction, this annihilation—I repeat the very words used by -Hitler in his speech—was undertaken under various pretenses; the -elimination of inferior, or negroid races; the extermination of -bolshevism; the destruction of Jewish-Masonic influences hostile to the -founding of the pseudo “New European Order.” - -In fact, this destruction, this elimination, conduced to the -assassination of the elite and vital forces opposed to the Nazis; it -also led to the reduction of the means of livelihood of the enslaved -nations. - -All of this was done, as I shall prove to you, in execution of a -deliberate plan, the existence of which is confirmed, among other -things, by the repetition and the immutability of the same facts in all -the occupied countries. - -Faced with this repetition and this immutability, it is no longer -possible to claim that only the one who performed the crime was guilty. -This repetition and this immutability prove that the same criminal will -united all the members of the German Government, all the leaders of the -German Reich. - -It is from this common will that the official policy of terrorism and -extermination, which directed the strokes of the executioners, was born; -and it is for having participated in the creation of this common will -that each of the defendants here present has been placed in the ranks of -major war criminals. - -I shall come back to this point when, having finished my presentation of -the facts, I shall have to qualify the crime, in accordance with the -legal tradition of my country. - -Allow me to give you some indications as to how, with your kind -permission, I intend to make my presentation. - -The facts I am to prove here are the results of many testimonies. We -could have called innumerable witnesses to this stand. Their statements -have been collected by the French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. It -seemed to us that it would simplify and shorten the procedure if we were -to give you extracts only from the testimony that we have received in -writing. - -With your authorization, therefore, I shall limit myself to reading -excerpts from the written testimonies collected in France by official -organizations qualified to investigate War Crimes. However, if in the -course of this presentation it appears necessary to call certain -witnesses, we shall proceed to do so but with constant care not to slow -down the sessions in any way and to bring them with all speed to the -only possible conclusion, the one our peoples expect. - -The whole question of atrocities is dominated by the German terrorist -policy. Under this aspect it is not without precedent in the Germanic -practice of war. We all remember the execution of hostages at Dinant -during the war of 1914, the execution of hostages in the citadel of -Laon, or the hostages of Senlis. But Nazism perfected this terrorist -policy; for Nazism, terror is a means of subjugation. We all remember -the propaganda picture about the war in Poland, shown in Oslo in -particular on the eve of the invasion of Norway. For Nazism, terror is a -means of subjugating all enslaved people in order to submit them to the -aims of its policy. - -The first signs of this terrorist policy during the occupation are fresh -in the memory of all Frenchmen. Only a few months after the signing of -the armistice they saw red posters edged with black appear on the walls -of Paris, as well as in the smallest villages of France, proclaiming the -first execution of hostages. We know mothers who were informed of the -execution of their sons in this way. These executions were carried out -by the occupiers after anti-German incidents. These incidents were the -answer of the French people to the official policy of collaboration. -Resistance to this policy stiffened, became organized, and with it the -repressive measures increased in intensity until 1944—the climax of -German terrorism in France and in the countries of the West. At that -time the Army and the SS Police no longer spoke of the execution of -hostages; they organized real reprisal expeditions during which whole -villages were set on fire, and thousands of civilians killed, or -arrested and deported. But before reaching this stage, the Germans -attempted to justify their criminal exactions in the eyes of a -susceptible public opinion. They promulgated, as we shall prove, a real -code of hostages, and pretended they were merely complying with law -every time they proceeded to carry out reprisal executions. - -The taking of hostages, as you know, is prohibited by Article 50 of the -Hague Convention. I shall read this text to you. It is to be found in -the Fourth Convention, Article 50: - - “No collective penalty, pecuniary or other, can be decreed - against populations for individual acts for which they cannot be - held jointly responsible.” (Document Number RF-265). - -And yet, supreme perfidy! The German General Staff, the German -Government, will endeavor to turn this regulation into a dead letter and -to set up as law the systematic violation of the Hague Convention. - -I shall describe to you how the General Staff formed its pseudo-law on -hostages, a pseudo-law which in France found its final expression in -what Stülpnagel and the German administration called the “hostages -code.” I shall show you, in passing, which of these defendants are the -most guilty of this crime. - -On the 15th of February 1940 in a secret report addressed to the -Defendant Göring, the OKW justifies the taking of hostages, as proved by -the excerpt from Document Number 1585-PS which I propose to read to you. -This document is dated Berlin, 15 February 1940. It bears the heading: -“Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Secret. To the Reich Minister for -Aviation and Supreme Commander of the Air Force.” - - “Subject: Arrest of Hostages. - - “According to the opinion of the OKW, the arrest of hostages is - justified in all cases in which the security of the troops and - the carrying out of their orders demand it. In most cases it - will be necessary to have recourse to it in case of resistance - or an untrustworthy attitude on the part of the population of an - occupied territory, provided that the troops are in combat or - that a situation exists which renders other means of restoring - security insufficient . . . . - - “In selecting hostages it must be borne in mind that their - arrest shall take place only if the refractory sections of the - population are anxious for the hostages to remain alive. The - hostages shall therefore be chosen from sections of the - population from which a hostile attitude may be expected. The - arrest of hostages shall be carried out among persons whose - fate, we may suppose, will influence the insurgents.” - -This document is filed by the French Delegation as Exhibit Number -RF-267. - -To my knowledge, Göring never raised any objection to this thesis. Here -is one more paragraph from an order, Document Number F-508 (Exhibit -Number RF-268), from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in France, -administrative section, signed “Stroccius,” 12 September 1940. Three -months after the beginning of the occupation, the hostages are defined -therein as follows: - - “Hostages are inhabitants of a country who guarantee with their - lives the impeccable attitude of the population. The - responsibility for their fate is thus placed in the hands of - their compatriots. Therefore, the population must be publicly - threatened that the hostages will be held responsible for - hostile acts of individuals. Only French citizens may be taken - as hostages. The hostages can be held responsible only for - actions committed after their arrest and after the public - proclamation.” - -This ordinance cancels 5 directives prior to 12 September 1940. This -question was the subject of numerous texts, and two General Staff -ordinances, dated, as indicated at the head of the Document Number F-510 -(Exhibit Number RF-269), 2 November 1940 and 13 February 1941: - - “If acts of violence are committed by the inhabitants of the - country against members of the occupation forces, if offices and - installations of the Armed Forces are damaged or destroyed, or - if any other attacks are directed against the security of German - units and service establishments, and if, under the - circumstances, the population of the place of the crime or of - the immediate neighborhood can be considered as jointly - responsible for those acts of sabotage, measures of prevention - and expiation may be ordered by which the civil population is to - be deterred in future from committing, encouraging, or - tolerating acts of that kind. The population is to be treated as - jointly responsible for individual acts of sabotage, if by its - attitude in general towards the German Armed Forces, it has - favored hostile or unfriendly acts of individuals, or if by its - passive resistance against the investigation of previous acts of - sabotage, it has encouraged hostile elements to similar acts, or - otherwise created a favorable atmosphere for opposition to the - German occupation. All measures must be taken in a way that it - is possible to carry out. Threats that cannot be realized give - the impression of weakness.” - -I submit these two documents as Exhibit Number RF-268 and 269 (Documents -Number F-508 and F-510). - -Until now we have not found any trace in these German texts of an -affirmation which might lead one to think that the taking of hostages -and their execution constitute a right for the occupying power; but here -is a German text which explicitly formulates this idea. It is quoted in -your book of documents as Document Number F-507 (Exhibit Number RF-270), -dated Brussels, 18 April 1944. It is issued by the Chief Judge to the -military Commander-in-Chief in Belgium and the North of France; and it -is addressed to the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. It reads -in the margin: “Most Secret. Subject: Execution of 8 terrorists in Lille -on 22 December 1943. Reference: Your letter of 16 March 1944 Lille -document.” You will read in the middle of Paragraph 2 of the text: - - “. . . Moreover, I maintain my point of view that the legal - foundations for the measures taken by the Oberfeldkommandantur - of Lille, by virtue of the letter of my police group of the 2d - of March 1944, are, regardless of the opinion of the Armistice - Commission, sufficiently justified and further explanations are - superfluous. The Armistice Commission is in a position to - declare to the French, if it wishes to go into the question in - detail at all, that the executions have been carried out in - conformity with the general principles of the law concerning - hostages.” - -It is, therefore, quite obviously a state doctrine which is involved. -Innocent people become forfeit. They answer with their lives for the -attitude of their fellow-citizens towards the German Army. If an offense -is committed of which they are completely ignorant, they are the object -of a collective penalty possibly entailing death. This is the official -German thesis imposed by the German High Command, in spite of the -protests of the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. I say: A -thesis imposed by the German High Command, and I will produce the -evidence. Keitel, on the 16th of September 1941, signed a general order -which has already been read and filed by my American colleagues under -Document Number 389-PS (Exhibit Number RF-271) and which I shall begin -to explain. This order concerns all the occupied territories of the East -and the West, as established by the list of addresses which includes all -the military commanders of the countries then occupied by Germany: -France, Belgium, Norway, Holland, Denmark, eastern territories, Ukraine, -Serbia, Salonika, southern Greece, Crete. This order was in effect for -the duration of the war. We have a text of 1944 which refers to it. This -order of Keitel, Chief of the OKW, is dictated by a violent spirit of -anti-Communist repression. It aims at all kinds of repression of the -civilian population. - -This order, which concerns even the commanders whose troops are -stationed in the West, points out to them that in all cases in which -attacks are made against the German Army: - - “It is necessary to establish that we are dealing with a mass - movement uniformly directed by Moscow to which may also be - imputed the seemingly unimportant sporadic incidents which have - occurred in regions which have hitherto remained quiet.” - -Consequently Keitel orders, among other things, that 50 to 100 -Communists are to be put to death for each German soldier killed. This -is a political conception which we constantly meet in all manifestations -of German terrorism. As far as Hitlerite propaganda is concerned, all -resistance to Germany is of Communist inspiration, if not in essence -Communist. The Germans thereby hoped to eliminate from among the -resistance the nationalists whom they thought hostile to Communism. But -the Nazis also pursued another aim: They still hoped above all to divide -France and the other conquered countries of the West into two hostile -factions and to put one of these factions at their service under the -pretext of anti-Communism. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off for 10 -minutes? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. DUBOST: Keitel confirmed this order concerning hostages on 24 -September 1941. We submit it as Exhibit Number RF-272, and you will find -it in your document book as F-554. I shall read you the first paragraph: - - “Following instructions by the Führer, the Supreme Command of - the Armed Forces issued on 16 September 1941 an order concerning - the Communist revolutionary movements in the occupied - territories. The order was addressed to the Ministry for Foreign - Affairs for the attention of Ambassador Ritter. It also deals - with the question of capital punishment in court-martial - proceedings. - - “According to the order, in the future, most stringent measures - must be taken in the occupied territories.” - -The choice of hostages is also indicated thus in Document Number 877-PS, -which has already been read to you and which is previous to the -aggression of Germany against Russia. It is necessary to remind the -Tribunal of this document because it shows the premeditation of the -German Command and the Nazi Government to divide the occupied countries, -to take away from the partisan resistance all its patriotic character, -in order to substitute for it a political character which it never had. -We submit this document under Exhibit Number RF-273: - - “In this connection it must be borne in mind that, apart from - other adversaries with whom our troops have to contend, there is - a particularly dangerous element of the civilian population - which is destructive of all order and propagates - Jewish-Bolshevist philosophy. There is no doubt that, wherever - he possibly can, this enemy uses this weapon of disintegration - cunningly and in ambush against the German forces which are - fighting and liberating the country.” - -This document is an official document issued by the headquarters of the -High Command of the Army. It expresses the general doctrine of all the -German Staff. It is Keitel who presides over the formation of this -doctrine. He is therefore not only a soldier under the orders of his -government; but at the same time that he is a general, he is also a Nazi -politician whose acts are those of a war leader and also those of a -politician serving the Hitlerite policy. You have proof of it in the -document which I have just read to you: A general who is also a -politician, in whom both politics and the conduct of war are combined in -one single preoccupation. This is not surprising for those who know the -German line of thought, which had never separated war and politics. Was -it not Clausewitz who said that war was only the continuation of -politics by other means? - -This is doubly important. This constitutes a direct and crushing charge -against Keitel; but Keitel is the German General Staff. Now this -organization is indicted, and we see by this document that this -indictment is justified as the German General Staff dabbled in the -criminal policy of the German Cabinet. - -In the case of France, the general orders of Keitel were adapted by -Stülpnagel in his order of 30 September 1941, better known in France -under the name of “hostages code,” which repeats and specifies in detail -the previous order, namely that of 23 August 1941. This order of 30 -September 1941 is of major importance to anyone who wishes to prove -under what circumstances French hostages were shot. This is why I shall -be obliged to read large extracts. It defines, in Paragraph 3, the -categories of Frenchmen who will be considered as hostages. I shall read -this document 1588-PS, which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number -RF-274. Paragraph I concerns the seizure of hostages. I read: - - “1. On 22 August 1941, I issued the following announcement: - - “‘On the morning of 21 August 1941, a member of the German Armed - Forces was killed in Paris as a result of a murderous attack. I - therefore order that: - - “‘1. All Frenchmen held in custody of whatever kind, by the - German authorities or on behalf of German authorities in France, - are to be considered as hostages as from 23 August. - - “‘2. If any further incident occurs, a number of these hostages - are to be shot, to be determined according to the gravity of the - attempt.’ - - “2. On 19 September 1941 by an announcement to the - Plenipotentiary of the French Government attached to the - Military Commander in France, I ordered that, as from 19 - September 1941, all French males who are under arrest of any - kind by the French authorities or who are taken into custody - because of Communist or anarchistic agitation are to be kept - under arrest by the French authorities also on behalf of the - Military Commander in France. - - “3. On the basis of my notification of the 22d of August 1941 - and of my order of the 19th of September 1941 the following - groups of persons are therefore hostages: - - “(a) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind - whatsoever by the German authorities, such as police custody, - imprisonment on remand, or penal detention. - - “(b) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind - whatsoever by the French authority on behalf of the German - authorities. This group includes: - - “(aa) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind - whatsoever by the French authorities because of Communist or - anarchist activities. - - “(bb) All Frenchmen on whom the French penal authorities impose - prison terms at the request of the German military courts and - which the latter consider justified. - - “(cc) All Frenchmen who are arrested and kept in custody by the - French authorities upon demand of the German authorities or who - are being handed over by the Germans to French authorities with - the order to keep them under arrest. - - “(c) Stateless inhabitants who have already been living for some - time in France are to be considered as Frenchmen within the - meaning of my notification of the 22d of August 1941. . . . - - “III. Release from detention. - - “Persons who were not yet in custody on 22 August 1941 or on 19 - September 1941 but who were arrested later or are still being - arrested are hostages as from the date of detention if the other - conditions apply to them. - - “The release of arrested persons authorized on account of - expiration of sentences, lifting of the order for arrest, or for - other reasons will not be affected by my announcement of 22 - August 1941. Those released are no longer hostages. - - “In as far as persons are in custody of any kind with the French - authorities for Communist or anarchist activity, their release - is possible only with my approval as I have informed the French - Government. . . . - - “VI. Lists of hostages. - - “If an incident occurs which according to my announcement of 22 - August 1941 necessitates the shooting of hostages, the execution - must immediately follow the order. The district commanders, - therefore, must select for their own districts from the total - number of prisoners (hostages) those who, from a practical point - of view, may be considered for execution and enter them on a - list of hostages. These lists of hostages serve as a basis for - the proposals to be submitted to me in the case of an execution. - - “1. According to the observations made so far, the perpetrators - of outrages originate from Communist or anarchist terror gangs. - The district commanders are, therefore, to select from those in - detention (hostages), those persons who, because of their - Communist or anarchist views in the past or their positions in - such organizations or their former attitude in other ways, are - most suitable for execution. In making the selection it should - be borne in mind that the better known the hostages to be shot, - the greater will be the deterrent effect on the perpetrators, - themselves, and on those persons who, in France or abroad, bear - the moral responsibility—as instigators or by their - propaganda—for acts of terror and sabotage. Experience shows - that the instigators and the political circles interested in - these plots are not concerned about the life of obscure - followers, but are more likely to be concerned about the lives - of their own former officials. Consequently, we must place at - the head of these lists: - - “(a) Former deputies and officials of Communist or anarchist - organizations.” - -Allow me to make a comment, gentlemen. There never were any anarchist -organizations represented in parliament, in either of our Chambers; and -this paragraph (a) could only refer to former deputies and officials of -the Communist organizations, of whom we know, moreover, that some were -executed by the Germans as hostages. - - “(b) Persons (intellectuals) who have supported the spreading of - Communist ideas by word of mouth or writing. - - “(c) Persons who have proved by their attitude that they are - particularly dangerous. - - “(d) Persons who have collaborated in the distribution of - leaflets.” - -One idea is dominant in this selection: “We must punish the elite.” In -conformity with paragraph (b) of this article, we shall see that the -Germans shot a great number of intellectuals, including Solomon and -Politzer, in 1941 and 1942, in Paris and in the provincial towns. - -I shall come back to these executions later when I give you examples of -German atrocities committed in relation to the policy of hostages in -France. - - “2. Following the same directives, a list of hostages is to be - prepared from the prisoners with De Gaullist sympathies. - - “3. Racial Germans of French nationality who are imprisoned for - Communist or anarchist activity may be included in the list. - Special attention must be drawn to their German origin on the - attached form. - - “Persons who have been condemned to death but who have been - pardoned, may also be included in the lists. . . . - - “5. The lists have to record for each district about 150 persons - and for the Greater Paris Command about 300 to 400 people. The - district chiefs should always record on their lists those - persons who had their last residence or permanent domicile in - their districts, because the persons to be executed should, as - far as possible, be taken from the district where the act was - committed. . . . - - “The lists are to be kept up to date. Particular attention is to - be paid to new arrests and releases. - - “VII. Proposals for executions: - - “In case of an incident which necessitates the shooting of - hostages, within the meaning of my announcement of 22 August - 1941, the district chief in whose territory the incident - happened is to select from the list of hostages persons whose - execution he wishes to propose to me. In making the selection he - must, from the personal as well as local point of view, draw - from persons belonging to a circle which presumably includes the - guilty.” - -I skip a paragraph. - - “For execution, only those persons who were already under arrest - at the time of the crime may be proposed. - - “The proposal must contain the names and number of the persons - proposed for execution, that is, in the order in which the - choice is recommended.” - -And, at the very end of Paragraph VIII, we read: - - “When the bodies are buried, the burial of a large number in a - common grave in the same cemetery is to be avoided, in order not - to create places of pilgrimage which, now or later, might form - centers for anti-German propaganda. Therefore, if necessary, - burials must be carried out in various places.” - -Parallel to this document, concerning France, there exists in Belgium an -order of Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941, which you will find on Page -6 of the official report on Belgium, Document Number F-683, which I -shall submit as Exhibit Number RF-275. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is the Belgian document worded in substantially the same -terms as the document you have just read? - -M. DUBOST: Exactly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then I do not think you need to read that. - -M. DUBOST: As you wish. Then it will not be necessary either to read in -entirety the warning of Seyss-Inquart concerning Holland. - -I think that by referring to these exhibits in your document book, you -will be able to obtain items of evidence which will only confirm what I -read to you of Stülpnagel’s order. - -For Norway and Denmark there is a teletyped letter from Keitel to the -Supreme Command of the Navy, dated 30 November 1944, which you will find -in the document book, as Document C-48 (Exhibit Number RF-280). I read -the end of Paragraph 1: - - “Every ship-yard worker must know that any act of sabotage - occurring within his sphere of activity entails for him - personally or for his relatives, if he disappears, the most - serious consequences.” - -Page 2 of Document Number 870-PS (Exhibit Number RF-281): - - “4. I have just received a teletype from Field Marshal Keitel - requesting the publication of an order according to which the - personnel or, if need be, their near relatives (liability of - next of kin) will be held collectively responsible for the acts - of sabotage occurring in their factories.” - -And Terboven, who wrote this sentence, added (and it is he who condemns -Marshal Keitel): - - “This request only makes sense and will only be successful if I - am actually allowed to have executions carried out by shooting.” - -All these documents will be submitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, do I understand that in Belgium, Holland, in -Norway, and in Denmark, there were similar orders or decrees with -reference to hostages? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor, I mean to read those concerning Belgium, -Holland, and Norway. For Belgium, for instance, you will find at Page 6, -Document Number F-683, which is the official document of the Belgian -Ministry of Justice: - - “Brussels, 29 November 1945, 1, rue de Turin. Decree of - Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941. - - “In the future, the population must expect that if attacks are - made on members of the German Army or the German Police and the - culprits cannot be arrested, a number of hostages proportionate - to the gravity of the offense, five at a minimum, will be shot - if the attack causes death. All political prisoners in Belgium - are, with immediate effect, to be considered as hostages.” - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, I did not want you to read these documents if -they are substantially in the same form as the document you have already -read. - -M. DUBOST: They are more or less in the same form, Your Honor. I shall -submit them because they constitute the proof of the systematic -repetition of the same methods to obtain the same results, that is, to -cause terror to reign in all the occupied countries of the West. But, if -the Tribunal considers it constant and established that these methods -were systematically used in all the western regions, naturally I shall -spare you the reading of documents which are monotonous and which repeat -in substance what was said in the document relating to France. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better give us references to the -documents which concern Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark. - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor, for Belgium, Document F-683, Page 6, decree -of Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941, submitted as Exhibit Number -RF-275, as constituting the official report of the Kingdom of Belgium -against the principal war criminals. - -The second document is C-46, corresponding to UK-42 (24 November 1942), -submitted as Exhibit Number RF-276. - -For Holland, a warning by Seyss-Inquart, Document Number F-224, which -you may feel it necessary for me to read, since Seyss-Inquart is one of -the defendants. I submit this document under Exhibit Number RF-279, and -I quote: - - “For the destruction or the damaging of railway installations, - telephone cables, and post offices I shall make responsible all - the inhabitants of the community on whose territory the act is - committed. - - “The population of these communities must expect that reprisals - will be taken against private property and that houses or whole - blocks will be destroyed.” - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I don’t know where you are reading. Which -paragraph are you reading? - -M. DUBOST: I am told, Mr. President, that this document has not been -bound with the Dutch report; I shall file it at the end of the hearing, -if I may. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -M. DUBOST: I quote now another document, the warning of Seyss-Inquart to -Holland. - -THE PRESIDENT: And that is what number? - -M. DUBOST: Number 152 in your document book, concerning German justice, -which will be submitted at the hearing tomorrow. - -For Norway and Denmark we have several documents which establish that -the same policy of execution of hostages was followed. We have, in -particular, Document C-48 (Exhibit Number RF-280) from which I read a -short time ago. - -All those special orders for each of the occupied regions of the West -are the result of the general order of Keitel, which my American -colleagues have already read and on which I merely gave a comment this -morning. The responsibility of Keitel in the development of the policy -of execution of hostages is total. He was given warning; German generals -even told him that this policy went beyond the aim pursued and might -become dangerous. - -On 16 September 1942, General Falkenhausen addressed a letter to him, -from which I extract the following passage—it is Document Number -1594-PS, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-283: - - “Enclosed is a list of the shootings of hostages which have - taken place until now in my area and the incidents on account of - which these shootings took place. - - “In a great number of cases, particularly in the most serious, - the perpetrators were later apprehended and sentenced. - - “This result is undoubtedly very unsatisfactory. The effect is - not so much deterrent as destructive of the feeling of the - population for right and security; the cleft between the people - influenced by communism and the remainder of the population is - being bridged; all circles are becoming filled with a feeling of - hatred toward the occupying forces and effective inciting - material is given to enemy propaganda. Thereby military danger - and general political reaction of an entirely unwanted - nature. . . .”—Signed—“Von Falkenhausen.” - -I shall now present Document Number 1587-PS from the same German general -and he seems to be lucid: - - “In addition I wish once more to point out the following: - - “In several cases the authors of aggression or acts of sabotage - were discovered when the hostages had already been shot, shortly - after the criminal acts had been committed, according to the - instructions received. Moreover, the real culprits often did not - belong to the same circles as the executed hostages. Undoubtedly - in such cases the execution of hostages does not inspire terror - in the population but indifference to repressive measures and - even resentment on the part of some sections of the population - who until then had displayed a passive attitude. The result for - the occupying power is therefore negative as planned and - intended by the English agents, who were often the instigators - of these acts. It will therefore be necessary to prolong the - delay in cases where the arrest of the culprits may yet be - expected. I therefore request that you leave to me the - responsibility for fixing such delays, in order that the - greatest possible success in the fight against terrorist acts - may be obtained.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it known what the date of that document was? - -M. DUBOST: It is after the 16th of September 1941. We do not have the -exact date. The document is appended to another document, the date of -which is illegible; but it is after Keitel’s order since it gives an -account of the executions of hostages, carried out in compliance with -that order. It points out that after the execution of the hostages the -culprits were found; that the effect was deplorable and aroused the -resentment of some of the population. - -You will find also in this Document Number 1587-PS—but this time an -extract from the monthly report of the Commander of the Wehrmacht in the -Netherlands—the report for the month of August 1942, a new warning to -Keitel: - - “B. Special events and the political situation: - - “On the occasion of an attempt against a train of soldiers on - furlough due to arrive in Rotterdam, a Dutch railway guard was - seriously wounded by touching a wire connected with an explosive - charge, thus causing an explosion. The following repressive - measures were announced in the Dutch press: - - “The deadline for the arrest of the perpetrators, with - collaboration of the population, is fixed at 14 August, - midnight. A reward of 100,000 florins will be made for a - denunciation, which will be treated confidentially. If the - culprits are not arrested within the time appointed, arrests of - hostages are threatened; railway lines will be guarded by - Dutchmen. - - “Since, despite this summons, the perpetrator did not report and - was not otherwise discovered, the following hostages, among whom - some had already been in custody for several weeks as hostages, - were shot on the order of the Higher SS and Police Führer.” - -I will pass over the enumeration of the names. I omit the next -paragraph. - -THE PRESIDENT: Could you read the names and the titles? - -M. DUBOST: “Ruys, Willem, Director General, Rotterdam; Count E.O.G. Van -Limburg-Stirum, Arnhem; M. Baelde, Robert, Doctor of Law, Rotterdam; -Bennenkers, Christoffel, former Inspector General of the Police at -Rotterdam; Baron Alexander Schimmelpennink Van der Oye, Noordgouwe -(Seeland).” One paragraph further on: - - “Public opinion was particularly affected by the execution of - these hostages. Reports at hand express the opinion that, from - the beginning of the occupation, no stroke inflicted by the - Germans was more deeply felt. Many anonymous letters, and even - some signed ones, sent to the Commander of the Wehrmacht, who - was considered as responsible for this ‘unheard of event,’ show - the varied reactions of the mass of the Dutch people. From the - bitterest insults to apparently pious petitions and prayers not - to resort to extremes, no nuance was lacking which did not in - one way or another indicate, to say the least, complete - disapproval and misunderstanding, first of the threat, and - secondly of the actual execution of the hostages. Reproaches for - this most severe infraction of law (which were based on serious - argument and often gave rise to thought), and also cries of - despair from idealists who, in spite of all that had occurred in - the political sphere, had still believed in German-Dutch - understanding but now saw all was at an end—all this was found - in the correspondence. In addition, the objection was raised - that such methods were only doing the work of the Communists, - who as the real instigators of active sabotage must be very glad - to couple with their achievements the pleasure of the - elimination of ‘such hostages.’ - - “In short, such disapproval even in the ranks of the very few - really pro-German Dutch had never before been noticed, so much - hatred at one time had never been felt.”—signed—“Schneider, - Captain.” - -Despite these warnings proffered by conscientious subordinates, neither -the General Staff nor Keitel ever gave any order to the contrary. The -order of 16 September 1941 always remained in force. When I have shown -you examples of executions of hostages in France, you will see that a -number of facts which I shall utilize are dated 1942, 1943 and even -1944. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MARSHAL: If Your Honor please, the Defendants Kaltenbrunner and -Streicher will continue to be absent during this afternoon’s session. - -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dubost, the Tribunal had some difficulty this morning -in following the documents that you were citing; and also, the Tribunal -understands the interpreters had some difficulty because the document -books, except the one that is before me, have no indications of the “PS” -or other numbers; and the documents themselves are not numbered in -order. Therefore it is extremely difficult for members of the Tribunal -to find documents, and it is also extremely difficult for the -interpreters to find any document which may be before them. - -So, this afternoon, it will be appreciated if you will be so kind as to -indicate what the document is, and then give both the interpreters and -the Tribunal enough time in which they may find the document, and then -indicate exactly which part of the document you are going to read, that -is to say, whether it is the beginning of the document, or the first -paragraph, or the second, and so on. But you must bear with us if we -find some difficulty in following you in the documents. - -M. DUBOST: Very well, Your Honor. - -I had finished this morning presenting the general rules which prevailed -during the five years of occupation in the matter of the execution of -numerous hostages in the occupied countries of the West. I brought you -the evidence, by reading a series of official German documents, that the -highest authorities of the Army, of the Party, and of the Nazi -Government had deliberately chosen to practice a terroristic policy -through the seizure of hostages. - -Before passing to the examination of a few particular cases, it seems to -me to be necessary to say exactly wherein this policy consisted, in the -light of the texts which I have quoted. - -According to the circumstances, people belonging by choice or ethnically -to the vanquished nations were apprehended and held as a guarantee for -the maintenance of order in a given sector; or after a given incident of -which the enemy army had been the victim. They were apprehended and held -with a view to obtaining the execution by the vanquished population of -acts determined by the occupying authority, such as denunciation, -payment of collective fines, the handing over of perpetrators of -assaults committed against the German Army, and the handing over of -political adversaries; and these persons thus arrested were often -massacred subsequently by way of reprisal. - -An idea emerges from methods of this kind, namely, that the hostage, who -is a human being, becomes a special security subjected to seizure as -determined by the enemy. How contrary this is to the rule of individual -liberty and human dignity. All the members of the German Government are -jointly responsible for this iniquitous concept and for its application -in our vanquished countries. No member of the German Government can -throw this responsibility on to subordinates by claiming that they -merely executed clearly stated orders with an excess of zeal. - -I have shown you that upon many occasions, on the contrary, the persons -who carried out the orders reported to the chiefs the moral consequences -resulting from the application of the terroristic policy of hostages. -And we know that in no case were contrary orders given. We know that the -original orders were always maintained. - -I shall not endeavor to enumerate in their totality all the cases of -executions of hostages. For our country, France, alone, there were -29,660 executed. This is proved in Document Number F-420, dated Paris, -21 December 1945, the original of which will be submitted under Exhibit -Number RF-266 to your Tribunal. It is at the beginning of the document -book, the second document. There in detail, region by region, the number -is given of the hostages who were executed. - - “Region of: Lille, 1,143; Laon, 222; Rouen, 658; Angers, 863; - Orléans, 501; Reims, 353; Dijon, 1,691; Poitiers, 82; - Strasbourg, 211; Rennes, 974; Limoges, 2,863; Clermont-Ferrand, - 441; Lyons, 3,674; Marseilles, 1,513; Montpellier, 785; - Toulouse, 765; Bordeaux, 806; Nancy, 571; Metz, 220; Paris, - 11,000; Nice, 324; total, 29,660.” - -I shall limit my presentation to a few typical cases of executions which -unveil the political plan of the General Staff which prescribed these -executions—plans of terror, plans that were intended to create and -accentuate the division between Frenchmen, or, more generally, between -citizens of the occupied countries. You will find in your document book -a file quoted as F-133, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-288. This is -called “Posters Concerning Paris.” At the head of the page you will -read, _Pariser Zeitung_ supplement. This document reproduces a few of -the very numerous posters and bills, some of the numerous notices -inserted in the press from 1940 to 1945 announcing the arrest of -hostages in Paris, in the Paris district, and in France. I shall read -only one of these documents, which you will find on the second page, -entitled Number 6, 19 September 1941. You will see in it an appeal to -informers, an appeal to traitors; you will see in it a means of -corruption, which systematically applied to all the countries of the -West for years; all tended to demoralize them to an equal extent: - - “Appeal to the population of occupied territories. - - “On 21 August a German soldier was fired on and killed by - cowardly murderers. In consequence I ordered on 23 August that - hostages be taken, and threatened to have a certain number of - them shot in case such an assault should be repeated. - - “New crimes have obliged me to put this threat into execution. - In spite of this, new assaults have taken place. - - “I recognize that the great majority of the population is - conscious of its duty, which is to help the authorities in their - unremitting effort to maintain calm and order in the country in - the interest of this population.” - -And here is the appeal to informers: - - “But among you there are agents paid by powers hostile to - Germany, Communist criminal elements who have only one aim, - which is to sow discord between the occupying power and the - French population. These elements are completely indifferent to - the consequences, affecting the entire population, which result - from their activity. - - “I will no longer allow the lives of German soldiers to be - threatened by these murderers. I shall stop at no measure, - however rigorous, in order to fulfill my duty. - - “But it is likewise my duty to make the whole population - responsible for the fact that, up to the present, it has not yet - been possible to lay hands on the cowardly murderers and to - impose upon them the penalty which they deserve. - - “That is why I have found it necessary, first of all for Paris, - to take measures which, unfortunately, will hinder the everyday - life of the entire population. Frenchmen, it depends on you - whether I am obliged to render these measures more severe or - whether they can be suspended again. - - “I appeal to you all, to your administration and to your police, - to co-operate by your extreme vigilance and your active personal - intervention in the arrest of the guilty. It is necessary, by - anticipating and denouncing these criminal activities, to avoid - the creation of a critical situation which would plunge the - country into misfortune. - - “He who fires in ambush on German soldiers, who are doing only - their duty here and who are safeguarding the maintenance of a - normal life, is not a patriot but a cowardly assassin and the - enemy of all decent people. - - “Frenchmen! I count on you to understand these measures which I - am taking in your own interests also.”—Signed—“Von - Stülpnagel.” - -Numerous notices follow which all have to do with executions. - -Under Number 8 on the following page you will find a list of twelve -names among which are three of the best known lawyers of the Paris Bar, -who are characterized as militant Communists, Messrs. Pitard, Hajje and -Rolnikas. - -In file 21 submitted by my colleague, M. Gerthoffer, in the course of -his economic presentation, you will find a few notices which are -similar, published in the German official journal VOBIF. - -You will observe, in connection with this notice of 16 September -announcing the execution or rather, the murder, of M. Pitard and his -companions, that the murderers had neither the courage nor the honesty -to say that they were all Parisian lawyers. Was it by mistake? I think -that it was a calculated lie, for at this time it was necessary to -handle the elite gently. The occupying power still hoped to separate -them from the people of France. - -I shall describe to you in detail two cases which spread grief in the -hearts of the French in the course of the month of October 1941 and -which have remained present in the memory of all my compatriots. They -are known as the “executions of Châteaubriant and of Bordeaux.” They are -related in Document Number F-415 in your document book, which I submit -to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-285. - -After the attack on two German officers at Nantes on 20 October 1941 and -in Bordeaux a few days later, the German Army decided to make an -example. You will find, on Page 22 of Document Number F-415, a copy of -the notice in the newspaper _Le Phare_ of 21 October 1941. - - “Notice. Cowardly criminals in the pay of England and of Moscow - killed, with shots in the back, the Feldkommandant of Nantes on - the morning of 20 October 1941. Up to now the assassins have not - been arrested. - - “As expiation for this crime I have ordered that 50 hostages be - shot to begin with. Because of the gravity of the crime, 50 more - hostages will be shot in case the guilty should not be arrested - between now and 23 October 1941 by midnight.” - -The conditions under which these reprisals were exercised are worth -describing in detail. Stülpnagel, who was commanding the German troops -in France, ordered the Minister of the Interior to designate prisoners. -These prisoners were to be selected among the Communists who were -considered the most dangerous (these are the terms of Stülpnagel’s -order). A list of 60 Frenchmen was furnished by the Minister of the -Interior. This was Pucheu. He has since been tried by my compatriots, -sentenced to death, and executed. - -The Subprefect of Châteaubriant sent a letter to the Kommandantur of -Châteaubriant, in reply to the order which he received from the Minister -of the Interior: - - “Following our conversation of today, I have the honor of - confirming to you that the Minister of the Interior has - communicated today with General Von Stülpnagel in order to - designate to him the most dangerous Communist prisoners among - those who are now held at Châteaubriant. You will find enclosed - herewith the list of 60 individuals who have been handed over - this day.” - -On the following page is the German order: - - “Because of the assassination of the Feldkommandant of Nantes, - Lieutenant Colonel Hotz, on 20 October 1941, the following - Frenchmen, who were already imprisoned as hostages in accordance - with my publication of 22 August 1941 and of my ordinance to the - Plenipotentiary General of the French Government of 19 September - 1941, are to be shot.” - -In the following pages you will find a list of all the men who were shot -on that day. I leave out the reading of the list in order not to -lengthen the proceedings unduly. - -On Page 16 you will find a list of 48 names. On Page 13 you will find -the list of those who were shot in Nantes. On Page 12 you will find the -list of those who were shot in Châteaubriant. Their bodies were -distributed for burial to all the surrounding communes. - -I shall read to you the testimony of eyewitnesses as to how they were -buried after having been shot. On Page 3 of this document you will find -the note of M. Dumenil concerning the executions of 21 October 1941, -which was written the day after these executions. The second paragraph -reads: - - “The priest was called at 11:30 to the prison of La Fayette. An - officer, probably of the GFP, told him that he was to announce - to certain prisoners that they were going to be shot. The priest - was then locked up in a room with the 13 hostages who were at - the prison. The other three, who were at les Rochettes, were - ministered to by Abbé Théon, professor at the College Stanislas. - - “The Abbé Fontaine said to the condemned, ‘Gentlemen, you must - understand, alas, what my presence means.’ He then spoke with - the prisoners collectively and individually for the two hours - which the officers had said would be granted to arrange the - personal affairs of the condemned and to write their last - messages to their families. - - “The execution had been fixed for 2 o’clock in the afternoon, - half an hour having been allowed for the journey. But the two - hours went by, another hour passed, and still another hour - before the condemned were sent for. Certain of them, optimists - by nature, like M. Fourny, already hoped that a countermanding - order would be given, in which the priest himself did not at all - believe. - - “The condemned were all very brave. It was two of the youngest, - Gloux and Grolleau, who were students, who constantly encouraged - the others, saying that it was better to die in this way than to - perish uselessly in an accident. - - “At the moment of leaving, the priest, for reasons which were - not explained to him, was not authorized to accompany the - hostages to the place of execution. He went down the stairs of - the prison with them as far as the car. They were chained - together in twos. The thirteenth had on handcuffs. Once they - were in the truck, Gloux and Grolleau made another gesture of - farewell to him, smiling and waving their hands that were - chained together. - - “Signed: Dumenil, Counsellor attached to the Cabinet.” - -Sixteen were shot in Nantes. Twenty-seven were shot in Châteaubriant. -Five were shot outside the department. For those who were shot in -Châteaubriant, we know what their last moments were like. The Abbé -Moyon, who was present, wrote on 22 October 1941 the account of this -execution. This is the third paragraph, Page 17 of your document: - - “It was on a beautiful autumn day. The temperature was - particularly mild. There had been lovely sunshine since morning. - Everyone in town was going about his usual business. There was - great animation in the town for it was Wednesday, which was - market day. The population knew from the newspapers and from the - information it had received from Nantes that a superior officer - had been killed in a street in Nantes but refused to believe - that such savage and extensive reprisals would be applied. At - Choisel Camp the German authorities had, for some days, put into - special quarters a certain number of men who were to serve as - hostages in case of special difficulties. It was from among - these men that those who were to be shot on this evening of 22 - October 1941 were chosen. - - “The Curé of Béré was finishing his lunch when M. Moreau Chief - of Choisel Camp presented himself. In a few words the latter - explained to him the object of his visit. Having been delegated - by M. Lecornu, the subprefect of Châteaubriant, he had come to - inform him that 27 men selected among the political prisoners of - Choisel were going to be executed that afternoon; and he asked - Monsieur Le Curé to go immediately to attend them. The priest - said he was ready to accomplish this mission, and he went to the - prisoners without delay. - - “When the priest appeared to carry out his mission, the - subprefect was already among the condemned. He came to announce - the horrible fate which was awaiting them, asking them to write - letters of farewell to their families without delay. It was - under these circumstances that the priest presented himself at - the entrance to the quarters.” - -You will find on Page 19 the “departure for the execution,” Paragraph 4: - - “Suddenly there was the sound of automobile engines. The door, - which I had shut at the beginning so that we might be more - private, was abruptly opened and French constables carrying - handcuffs appeared. A German officer arrived. He was actually a - chaplain. He said to me, ‘Monsieur le Curé, your mission has - been accomplished and you must withdraw immediately.’” - -At the bottom of the page, the last paragraph: - - “Access to the quarry where the execution took place was - absolutely forbidden to all Frenchmen. I only know that the - condemned were executed in three groups of nine men, that all - the men who were shot refused to have their eyes bound, that - young Mocquet fainted and fell, and that the last cry which - sprang from the lips of these heroes was an ardent ‘Vive la - France.’” - -On Page 21 of the same document you will find the declaration of Police -Officer Roussel. It is also worth reading: - - “The 22 October 1941 at about 3:30 in the afternoon, I happened - to be in the Rue du 11 Novembre at Châteaubriant, and I saw - coming from Choisel Camp four or five German trucks, I cannot - say exactly how many, preceded by an automobile in which was a - German officer. Several civilians with handcuffs were in the - trucks and were singing patriotic songs, the ‘Marseillaise,’ the - ‘Chant du Depart,’ and so forth. One of the trucks was filled - with armed German soldiers. - - “I learned subsequently that these were hostages who had just - been fetched from Choisel Camp to be taken to the quarry of - Sablière on the Soudan Road to be shot in reprisal for the - murder at Nantes of the German Colonel Hotz. - - “About two hours later these same trucks came back from the - quarry and drove into the court of the Châteaubriant, where the - bodies of the men who had been shot were deposited in a cellar - until coffins could be made. - - “Coming back from the quarry the trucks were covered and no - noise was heard, but a trickle of blood escaped from them and - left a trail on the road from the quarry to the castle. - - “The following day, on the 23rd of October, the bodies of the - men who had been shot were put into coffins without any French - persons being present, the entrances to the château having been - guarded by German sentinels. The dead were then taken to nine - different cemeteries in the surrounding communes, that is, three - coffins to each commune. The Germans were careful to choose - communes where there was no regular transport service, - presumably to avoid the population going _en masse_ to the - graves of these martyrs. - - “I was not present at the departure of the hostages from the - camp nor at the shooting in the quarry of Sablière, as the - approaches to it were guarded by German soldiers armed with - machine guns.” - -Almost at the same time, in addition to these 48 hostages who were shot, -there were others—those of Bordeaux. You will find in your document -book, under Document Number F-400, documents which have been sent to us -by the Prefecture of the Gironde, which we submit to the Tribunal as -Exhibit Number RF-286. - -One of them comes from the Bordeaux Section of Political Affairs, and is -dated 22 October 1941, Document F-400(b). - - “In the course of the conference, which took place last night at - the Feldkommandantur of Bordeaux, the German authorities asked - me to proceed immediately to arrest 100 individuals known for - their sympathy with the Communist Party or the Gaullist - movement, who will be considered as hostages, and to make a - great number of house searches. - - “These operations have been in process since this morning. So - far no interesting result has been called to my attention. In - addition, this morning at 11 o’clock the German authorities - informed me of the reprisal measures which they had decided to - take against the population.” - -These reprisal measures you will find set forth on Page “A” of the same -document in a letter addressed by General Von Faber Du Faur, Chief of -the Regional Administration of Bordeaux, to the Prefect of the Gironde. -I quote: - - “Bordeaux, 23 October 1941. - - “To the Prefect of the Gironde, Bordeaux. - - “As expiation for the cowardly murder of the Councillor of War, - Reimers, the Military Commander in France has ordered 50 - hostages to be executed. The execution will take place tomorrow. - - “In case the murderers should not be arrested in the very near - future, additional measures will be taken, as in the case of - Nantes. - - “I have the honor of making this decision known to you. - - “Chief of the Military Regional Administration,”—signed—“Von - Faber Du Faur.” - -And in execution of this order, 50 men were shot. There is a famous -place in the surburbs of Paris which has become a place of pilgrimage -for the French since our liberation. It is the Fort of Romainville. -During the occupation the Germans converted this fort into a hostage -depot from which they selected victims when they wanted to take revenge -after some patriotic demonstration. It is from Romainville that -Professors Jacques Solomon, Decourtemanche, Georges Politzer, Dr. Boer -and six other Frenchmen departed. They had been arrested in March 1942, -tortured by the Gestapo, then executed without trial in the month of May -1942, because they refused to renounce their faith. - -On 19 August 1942, 96 hostages left this fort, among them M. Le Gall, a -municipal councillor of Paris. They left the fort of Romainville, were -transferred to Mont-Valérien and executed. - -In September 1942 an assault had been made against some German soldiers -at the Rex cinema in Paris. General Von Stülpnagel issued a proclamation -announcing that, because of this assault, he had caused 116 hostages to -be shot and that extensive measures of deportation were to be taken. You -will find an extract from this newspaper in Document Number F-402(b) -(Exhibit Number RF-287). - -The notice was worded as follows: - - “As a result of assaults committed by Communist agents and - terrorists in the pay of England, German soldiers and French - civilians have been killed or wounded. - - “As reprisal for these assaults I have had 116 Communist - terrorists shot, whose participation or implication in - terroristic acts has been proved by confessions. - - “In addition, severe measures of repression have been taken. In - order to prevent incidents on the occasion of demonstrations - planned by the Communists for 20 September 1942, I ordered the - following: - - “1) From Saturday, 19 September 1942, from 3 o’clock in the - afternoon, until Sunday, 20 September 1942, at midnight, all - theaters, cinemas, cabarets, and other places of amusement - reserved for the French population shall be closed in the - Departments of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Seine-et-Marne. All - public demonstrations, including sports, are forbidden. - - “2) On Sunday, 20 September 1942, from 3 o’clock in the - afternoon until midnight, non-German civilians are forbidden to - walk about in the streets and public places in the Departments - of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Seine-et-Marne. The only - exceptions are persons representing official services. . . .” - -In actual fact, it was only on the day of 20 September that 46 of these -hostages were chosen from the list of 116. The Germans handed newspapers -of 20 September to the prisoners of Romainville, announcing the decision -of the Military High Command. It was, therefore, through the newspapers -that the prisoners of Romainville learned that a certain number of them -would be chosen at the end of the afternoon to be led before the firing -squad. - -All lived through that day awaiting the call that would be made that -evening. Those who were called knew their fate beforehand. All died -innocent of the crimes for which they were being executed, for those who -were responsible for the assault in the Rex cinema were arrested a few -days later. - -It was in Bordeaux that the 70 other hostages of the total of 116 -announced by General Von Stülpnagel were executed. In reprisal for the -murder of Ritter, the German official of the Labor Front, 50 other -hostages were shot at the end of September 1943 in Paris. Here is a -reprint of the newspaper article which announced these executions to the -French people—Document Number F-402(c). - - “Reprisals against terroristic acts. Assaults and acts of - sabotage have increased in France recently. For this reason 50 - terrorists, convicted of having participated in acts of sabotage - and of terrorism, were shot on 2 October 1943 by order of the - German authorities.” - -All these facts concerning the hostages of Romainville have been related -to us by one of the rare survivors, M. Rabaté, a mechanic living at 69 -Rue de la Tombe-Issiore, Paris, whose testimony was taken by one of our -collaborators. - -In this testimony—Document Number F-402(a), which has already been -submitted as Exhibit Number RF-287—we read the following: - - “There were 70 of us, including Professor Jacques Solomon, - Decourtemanche and Georges Politzer, Dr. Boer, and Messrs. - Engros, Dudach, Cadras, Dalidet, Golue, Pican who were shot in - the month of May 1942, and an approximately equal number of - women. - - “Some of us were transferred to the German quarter of the Santé - (a prison in Paris), but the majority of us were taken to the - military prison of Cherche-Midi (in Paris). We were questioned - in turn by a Gestapo officer in the offices of the Rue des - Saussaies. Some of us, especially Politzer and Solomon, were - tortured to such an extent that their limbs were broken, - according to the testimony of their wives. - - “Moreover, while questioning me, the Gestapo officer confirmed - this to me: I repeat his words: - - “‘Rabaté, here you will have to speak. Professor Langevin’s - son-in-law, Jacques Solomon, came in here arrogant. He went out - crawling.’ - - “After a short stay of 5 months in the prison of Cherche-Midi, - in the course of which we learned of the execution as hostages - of the 10 prisoners already mentioned, we were transferred on 24 - August 1942 to the Fort of Romainville. - - “It is to be noted that from the day of our arrest we were - forbidden to write, or to receive mail, or inform our families - where we were. On the doors of our cells was written, ‘Alles - verboten’ (‘Everything is forbidden’). We received only the - strict food ration of the prison, namely, three-fourths of a - liter of vegetable soup and 200 grams of black bread per day. - The biscuits sent to the prison for political prisoners by the - Red Cross or by the Quakers’ Association were not given to us - because of this prohibition. - - “In the Fort of Romainville we were interned as ‘isolated - prisoners,’ an expression corresponding to the ‘NN’ (Nacht und - Nebel), which we knew about in Germany.” - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that, unless there is -anything very special that you wish to read in any of these documents, -they have already heard the number of the hostages who were put to death -and they think that it really does not add to it—the actual details of -these documents. - -M. DUBOST: I thought, Mr. President, that I had not spoken to you of the -regime to which men were subjected when they were prisoners of the -German Army. I thought that it was my duty to enlighten the Tribunal on -the condition of these men in the German prisons. - -I thought that it was also my duty to enlighten the Tribunal on the -ill-treatment inflicted by the Gestapo, who left the son-in-law of -Professor Langevin with his limbs broken. Moreover that is found in a -testimony. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, if there are matters of that sort which you -think it right to go into, you must do so; but the actual details of -individual shooting of hostages we think you might, at any rate, -summarize. But if there are particular atrocities which you wish to draw -our attention to, by all means do so. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I have only given two examples of executions -out of the multiple executions which caused 29,660 deaths in my country. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Dubost. - -M. DUBOST: In the region of the North of France, which was -administratively attached to Belgium and subjected to the authority of -General Von Falkenhausen, the same policy of execution was practiced. -You will find in Document Number F-133, submitted as Exhibit Number -RF-289, copies of a great number of posters announcing either arrests, -executions, or deportations. Certain of these posters include, moreover, -an appeal to informers, and they are analogous to those which I read to -you in connection with France. Perhaps it would be well, nevertheless, -to point out the one that you will find on Page 3, which concerns the -execution of 20 Frenchmen, ordered as the result of a theft; that on -Page 4, which concerns the execution of 15 Frenchmen, ordered as a -result of an attack against a railroad installation; and finally, -especially the last, the one that you will find on Pages 8 and 9, which -announces that executions will be carried out, and invites the civilian -population to hand over the guilty ones, if they know them, to the -German Army. - -As concerns especially the countries of the West other than France, we -have a very great number of identical cases. You will find in your -document book, under Document Number F-680, Exhibit Number RF-290, a -copy of a poster by the Military Commander-in-Chief for Belgium and the -North of France, which announces the arrest in Tournai, on 18 September -1941, of 25 inhabitants as hostages, and specifies the condition under -which certain of them will be shot if the guilty are not discovered. But -you will find especially, under the Number F-680(a) a remarkable -document; it comes from the German authorities themselves. It is the -secret report of the German Chief of Police in Belgium dated 13 December -1944, that is to say, when Belgium was totally liberated and this German -official wished to give an account to his chiefs of his services during -the occupation of Belgium. - -From the first page of this document we take the following passage: - - “The increasing incitement of the population, by enemy radio and - enemy press, to acts of terrorism and sabotage”—this is applied - to Belgium—“the passive attitude of the population, - particularly that of the Belgian administration, the complete - failure of the public prosecutors, the examining judges, and of - the police to disclose and prevent terrorist acts, have finally - led to preventive and repressive measures of the most rigorous - kind, that is to say, to the execution of persons closely - related to the culprits. - - “Already on 19 October 1941, on the occasion of the murder of - two police officials in Tournai, the Military Commander-in-Chief - declared through an announcement appearing in the press that all - the political prisoners in Belgium would be considered as - hostages with immediate effect. In the provinces of the north of - France, subject to the jurisdiction of the same Military - Commander-in-Chief, this ordinance was already in force as from - 26 August 1941. Through repeated notices appearing in the press - the civilian population has been informed that political - prisoners taken as hostages will be executed if the murders - continue to be committed. - - “As a result of the assassination of Teughels, Rexist major of - Charleroi, and other attempts at assassination of public - officials, the Military Commander-in-Chief has been obliged to - order, for the first time in Belgium, the execution of eight - terrorists. The date of the execution is 27 November 1942.” - -On the following page of this same document—Number F-680(b)—you will -find another order dated 22 April 1944, secret, and issued by the -Military Commander in Belgium and the North of France, concerning -measures of reprisal for the murder of two Walloon SS, who had fought at -Tcherkassy; five hostages were shot on that day. - -On the following page nine hostages are added to these five, and still a -tenth on the next page. Then five others on the following page. - -You will find, finally, on the next to the last page of the document, a -proposed list of persons to be shot in reprisal for the murder of SS -men. Compare the dates, and judge the ferocity with which the -assassination of these two Walloon traitors, SS volunteers, was -revenged. - -Finally, you will see the names of the 20 Belgian patriots who were thus -murdered. - - “Nouveau Journal, 25 April 1944. - - “Measures of reprisal for the murder of men who fought at - Tcherkassy. - - “Announcement by the German authorities: - - “The perpetrators of the assassination on 6 April of the members - of the SS Sturmbrigade Wallonie, Hubert Stassen and François - Musch, who fought at Tcherkassy, have so far not been - apprehended. Therefore, in accordance with the communication - dated 10 April 1944, the 20 terrorists whose names follow have - been executed: - - “Renatus Dierickx of Louvain; François Boets of Louvain; Antoine - Smets of Louvain; Jacques Van Tilt of Holsbeek; Emiliens Van - Tilt of Holsbeek; Franciskus Aerts of Herent; Jan Van der Elst - of Herent; Gustave Morren of Louvain; Eugene Hupin of - Chapelle-lez-Herlaimont; Pierre Leroy of Boussois; Léon Hermann - of Montignies-sur-Sambre; Felix Trousson of Chaudfontaine; - Joseph Grab of Tirlemont; Octave Wintgens of Baelen-Hontem; - Stanislaw Mrozowski of Grâce-Berleur; Marcel Boeur of Athus; - Marcel Dehon of Ghlin; André Croquelois of Pont des Briques, - near Boulogne; Gustave Hos of Mons; and the stateless Jew, - Walter Kriss of Herent.” - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. DUBOST: As far as the other western countries, Holland and Norway, -are concerned, we have received documents which we submit as Document -Number F-224(b), Exhibits RF-291, 292, and 293. - -In the French text you will find a long list of civilians who were -executed. Also you will find a report of the Chief of the Criminal -Police, Munt, in connection with these executions, and you will observe -that Munt tries to prove his own innocence, in my opinion without -success. This is in Document Number RF-277, already submitted. - -On Page 6 you will find the report of an investigation concerning mass -executions carried out by the Germans in Holland. I do not think it is -necessary to read this report. It brings no new factual element and -simply illustrates the thesis that I have been presenting since this -morning: That in all the western countries the German military -authorities systematically carried out executions of hostages as -reprisals for acts of resistance. You will see that on 7 March 1945 an -order was given to shoot 80 prisoners, and the authority who gave this -order said, “I don’t care where you get your prisoners”—execution -without any designation of age or profession or origin. - -The Tribunal will see that a total of 2,080 executions was reached. It -will be noted that as a reprisal for the murder of an SS soldier, a -house was destroyed and 10 Dutchmen were executed; and in addition, two -other houses were destroyed. In another case 10 Dutchmen were executed. -Altogether, 3,000 Dutchmen were executed under these conditions, -according to the testimony of this document, which was drawn up by the -War Crimes Commission, signed by the Chief of the Dutch Delegation to -the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Colonel Baron Van -Tuyll van Serooskerken. - -This document gives to the Tribunal the approximate number of victims, -region by region. - -I do not wish to conclude the statement as to hostages concerning -Holland without drawing the attention of the Tribunal to Section (b) of -Document Number F-224, which gives a long list of hostages, prisoners or -dead, arrested by the Germans in Holland; for the Tribunal will observe -that most of the hostages were intellectuals or very highly placed -personages in Holland. We note, therein, the names of members of -parliament, lawyers, senators, Protestant clergymen, judges, and amongst -them we find a former Minister of Justice. The arrests were made -systematically among the intellectual elite of the country. - -As far as Norway is concerned, the Tribunal will find in Document Number -F-240, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-292, a short report of the -executions which the Germans carried out in that country: - - “On 26 April 1942 two German policemen who tried to arrest two - Norwegian patriots were killed on an island on the west coast of - Norway. In order to avenge them, 4 days later 18 young men were - shot without trial. All these 18 Norwegians had been in prison - since the 22 February of the same year and therefore had nothing - to do with this affair.” - -In the first paragraph of the French translation in the French document -book, which is Page 22 of the Norwegian original, it states that: - - “On 6 October 1942, 10 Norwegian citizens were executed in - reprisal for attempts at sabotage. - - “On 20 July 1944 an indeterminate number of Norwegians were shot - without trial. They had all been taken from a concentration - camp. The reason for this arrest and execution is unknown. - - “Finally, after the German capitulation, the bodies of 44 - Norwegian citizens were found in graves. All had been shot and - we do not know the reason for their execution. It has never been - published, and we do not believe they were tried. The executions - were effected by a shot through the back of the neck or a - revolver bullet through the ear, the hands of the victims being - tied behind their backs.” - -This information is given by the Norwegian Government for this Tribunal. - -I draw the attention of the Tribunal to a final document, Number R-134 -(Exhibit Number RF-293), signed by Terboven, which concerns the -execution of 18 Norwegians who were taken prisoners for having made an -illegal attempt to reach England. - -It is by thousands and tens of thousands that in all the western -countries citizens were executed without trial in reprisal for acts in -which they never participated. It does not seem necessary to me to -multiply these examples. Each of these examples involves individual -responsibility which is not within the competency of this Tribunal. The -examples are only of interest in so far as they show that the orders of -the defendants were carried out and notably the orders of Keitel. - -I believe that I have amply proved this. It is incontestable that in -every case the German Army was concerned with these executions, which -were not solely carried out by the police or the SS. - -Moreover, they did not achieve the results expected. Far from reducing -the number of attacks, it increased them. Each attempt was followed by -an execution of hostages, and every shooting of hostages occasioned more -attacks in revenge. Generally the announcement of new executions of -hostages plunged the countries into a stupor and forced every citizen to -become conscious of the fate of his land, despite the efforts of German -propaganda. Faced with the failure of this terroristic policy, one might -have thought that the defendants would modify their methods. Far from -modifying them, they intensified them. I shall endeavor to show the -activity of the police and the law from the time when, the policy of -hostages having failed, it was necessary to appeal to the German police -in order to keep the occupied countries in a state of servitude. The -German authorities made arbitrary arrests at all times and from the very -beginning of the occupation; but with the failure of the policy of -executing hostages, which was—as you remember—commented upon by -General Von Falkenhausen in the case of Belgium, arbitrary arrests -increased to the point of becoming a constant practice substituted for -that of killing hostages. - -We submit to the Tribunal Document Number 715-PS, Exhibit Number RF-294. -This document concerns the arrest of high-ranking officers who were to -be transferred to Germany in honorable custody: - - “Subject: Measures to be taken against French Officers. - - “In agreement with the German Embassy in Paris and with the - Chief of the Security Police and the SD, the Supreme Commander - in the West has made the following proposals: - - “1. The senior officers enumerated below will be arrested and - transferred to Germany in honorable custody: “Generals of the - Army: Frère”—who died subsequently in Germany after his - deportation—“Gérodias, Cartier, Revers, De Lattre de Tassigny, - Fornel de la Laurencie, Robert de Saint-Vincent, Laure, Doyen, - Pisquendar, Mittelhauser, Paquin; - - “Generals of the Air Force: Bouscat, Carayon, De Geffrier, - D’Harcourt, Mouchard, Mendigal, Rozoy; - - “Colonels: Loriot and Fonck. - - “It is a question of generals whose names have a propaganda - value in France and abroad or whose attitude and abilities - represent a danger. - - “2. Moreover, we have chosen from the index of officers kept by - the ‘Arbeitsstab’ in France about 120 officers who have - distinguished themselves by their anti-German attitude during - the last two years. The SD has also given a list of about 130 - officers previously accused. After the compilation of these two - lists, the arrest of these officers is to be arranged at a later - date, depending on the situation . . . . - - “6. In the case of all officers of the French Army of the - Armistice, the Chief of the Security Police, in collaboration - with the Supreme Command West, will appoint a special day for - the whole territory for a check to be made by the police of - domiciles and occupations.” - -And here are the most important passages: - - “As a measure of reprisal, families of suspected persons who - have already shown themselves to be resistants or who might - become so in the future, will be transferred as internees to - Germany or to the territory of eastern France. For these the - question of billeting and surveillance must first of all be - solved. Afterwards we contemplate as a later measure the - deprivation of their French nationality and the confiscation of - property, already carried out in other cases by Laval.” - -The police and the army were involved in all of these arrests. A -telegram in cipher shows that the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself -was concerned in the matter. Document Number 723-PS, which becomes -Exhibit Number RF-295, will be read in this connection. It is the third -document of the document book. It is addressed to the Minister of -Foreign Affairs and is dated Paris, 5 June 1943: - - “In the course of the conference which took place yesterday with - the representatives of the High Command West and the SD, the - following was agreed on concerning measures to be taken: - - “The aim of these measures must be to prevent, by precautionary - measures, the escape from France of any more well-known soldiers - and at the same time to prevent these personages from organizing - a resistance movement in the event of an attempted landing in - France by the Anglo-Saxon powers. - - “The circle of officers here concerned comprises all who, by - their rank and experience or by their name, would considerably - strengthen the military command or the political credit of the - resistants, if they should decide to join them. In the event of - military operations in France we must consider them as being of - the same importance. - - “The list has been drawn up in agreement with the High Command - West, the Chief of the Security Police, and the General of the - Air Force in Paris.” - -I shall not read these new names of high-ranking French officers who -were to be arrested but will go on further where the Tribunal will see -that the German authorities contemplated causing officers already -arrested by the French Government and under the surveillance of the -French authorities to undergo the same fate as General De Lattre de -Tassigny, General Laure, and General Fornel de la Laurencie. These -generals were to be literally torn away from the French authorities to -be deported. - - “In view of the present general situation and the contemplated - security measures, all the authorities here consider it - undesirable for these generals to remain in French custody, as - the possibility must be considered that either through - negligence or by intentional acts of the guard personnel, they - might escape and regain their liberty.” - -Finally, Page 7, under Roman numeral IX, concerning reprisals against -families: - - “General Warlimont had asked the Commander-in-Chief of the - Western Front to raise the question of reprisal measures against - the relatives of persons who had joined the resistance and to - submit any proposals. - - “President Laval declared himself ready, not long ago, to take - measures of this kind on behalf of the French Government; but to - limit himself to the families of some particularly distinguished - persons.” - -I refer to the paragraph before the last of the telegraphic report -Number 3,486 of 29 May 1943: - - “We must wait and see whether Laval is really willing to apply - reprisal measures in a practical way. - - “All those present at the meetings were in agreement that such - measures should be taken in any event, as rapidly as possible, - against families of well-known personages who had become - resistants. (For example, members of the families of Generals - Giraud, Juin, Georges, the former Minister of the Interior, - Pucheu, the Inspector of Finance Couve De Murville, - Leroy-Beaulieu, and others.) - - “The measures may also be carried out by the German authorities, - since the persons who have become resistants are to be - considered as foreigners belonging to an enemy power and the - members of their families are also to be considered as such. - - “In the opinion of those present, the members of these families - should be interned; the practical carrying-out of this measure - and its technical possibilities must be carefully examined - . . . . - - “We might also study the question of whether these families - should be interned in regions particularly exposed to air - attacks, for instance, in the vicinity of dams, or in industrial - regions which are often bombed. - - “A list of families who are considered liable for internment - will be compiled in collaboration with the Embassy.” - -In this premeditation of criminal arrests we find the Defendant -Ribbentrop, the Defendant Göring, and the Defendant Keitel involved; for -it is their departments who made these proposals, and we know that these -proposals were agreed to—Document Number 720-PS, submitted as Exhibit -Number RF-296, the second in your document book. - -It is a fact that these arrests were carried out. Members of the family -of General Giraud were deported. General Frère was deported and died in -a concentration camp. The orders were therefore carried out. They were -approved before being carried out, and the approval inculpates the -defendants whose names I have mentioned. The arrests did not only affect -high-ranking officers but were much more extensive, and a great number -of Frenchmen were arrested. We have no exact statistics. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, did you produce any evidence for your last -statement? - -M. DUBOST: I shall bring you the proof of the arrest of General Frère -and his death in the concentration camp when I deal with the -concentration camps. With regard to the arrest and death of several -French generals in the concentration camps in Dachau, the Tribunal still -remembers the testimony of Blaha. So far as the family of General Giraud -is concerned, I shall endeavor to bring proofs, but I did not believe it -was necessary; it is a well-known fact that the daughter of General -Giraud was deported. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we can take judicial notice of all -facts which may be public knowledge in France. - -M. DUBOST: I shall submit to the Tribunal the supplementary proof -concerning the generals who died while deported when I deal with the -question of the camps. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -M. DUBOST: General Frère died in Struthof Camp and we shall explain the -circumstances under which he was assassinated. In addition, there exists -in your document book a document numbered F-417, Exhibit Number RF-297, -which was captured among the archives of the German Armistice -Commission, which establishes that the German authorities refused to -free French generals who were prisoners of war and whose state of health -and advanced age made it imperative that they should be released. I -quote: - - “As far as this question is concerned the Führer has always - adopted an attitude of refusal, not only from the point of view - of their release but also with regard to their hospitalization - in neutral countries. - - “Release or hospitalization today is more out of question than - ever, since the Führer has only recently ordered the transfer to - Germany of all French generals living in France.” - -It is signed by Warlimont, and in handwriting it is noted: “No reply to -be given to the French.” - -Please retain as evidence only this last sentence: “—since the Führer -has only recently ordered the transfer to Germany of all French generals -living in France.” As I explained, however, these arrests infinitely -exceeded the relatively limited number of generals or families of -well-known persons envisaged by the document which I have just read to -the Tribunal: “Very many Frenchmen will be arrested . . . .” We have no -statistics; but we have an idea of the number, which is considerable -according to the figures given for Frenchmen who died in French prisons -alone, prisons which had been placed under German command and were -supervised by German personnel during the occupation. - -We know that 40,000 Frenchmen died in the French prisons, alone, in -France, according to the official figures given by the Ministry of -Prisoners and Deportees. In the prison registry “Schutzhaft” (protective -custody) is written. My American colleagues explained to the Tribunal -what this protective custody meant when they read Document Number -1723-PS, submitted under Number USA-206. It is useless to return to this -document. It is sufficient to remind the Tribunal that imprisonment and -protective custody were considered by the German authorities as the -strongest measure of forceful education for any foreigners who would -deliberately neglect their duty towards the German community or -compromise the security of the German State; they had to act in -accordance with the general interests and adapt themselves to the -discipline of the State. - -This protective custody was, as the Tribunal will remember, a purely -arbitrary detention. Those who were interned in protective custody -enjoyed no rights and could not vindicate themselves. There were no -tribunals at their disposal before which they could plead their cause. -We know now through official documents which were submitted to us, -particularly by Luxembourg, that protective custody was carried out on a -very large scale. - -The Tribunal will read in Document Number F-229, already submitted as -Exhibit Number USA-243, Document L-215, a list of 25 persons arrested -and placed in different concentration camps under protective custody. -The Tribunal will recall that our colleagues drew its attention to the -reason for the arrest of Ludwig, who was merely strongly suspected of -having aided deserters. - -Evidence of the application of protective custody in France is given in -our Document Number F-278, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-300: - - “Copy attached to VAAP-7236 (g)—Secret. Ministry for Foreign - Affairs, Berlin, 18 September 1941. - - “Subject: Report of August 30, of this year. - - “The explanations of the Military Commander in France, of 1 - August of this year, are considered in general to be - satisfactory as a reply to the French note. - - “Here, also, we consider there is every reason to avoid any - further discussion with the French concerning preventive arrest, - as this would only lead to fixing definite limits to the - exercise of these powers by the occupying power, which would not - be desirable in the interests of the liberty of action of the - military authorities. By order, signed (illegible).” - - “To the Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at - the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden. - - “The Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—VAAP - 7236(g), Secret, dated Wiesbaden, 23 September 1941. Copy. - - “. . . the Representative of the Ministry requests that he be - informed at an opportune time of the reply made to the French - note.” - -The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was still involved in this question of -protective custody. - -The grounds for this custody were, as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs -admits and according to the testimony of this document, very weak; -nevertheless, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not forbid it. The -arrests were carried out under multiple pretexts, but all these pretexts -may be summarized under two general ideas: Arrests were made either for -motives of a political nature or for racial reasons. The arrests were -individual or collective in both cases. - -Pretexts of a political nature: - -From 1941 the French observed that there was a synchronism between the -evolution of political events and the rhythm of arrests. The French -Document Number F-274(i) (Exhibit Number RF-301), which is at the end of -your document book, will show this. A description is given by the -Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees of the conditions under which these -arrests took place, beginning in 1941—a critical period in the German -history of the war, since it was from 1941 that Germany was at war with -the Soviet Union: - - “The synchronism between the evolution of political events and - the rhythm of arrests is evident. The suppression of the line of - demarcation, the establishment of resistance groups, the - formation of the Maquis resulting from forced labor, the - landings in North Africa and in Normandy, all had immediate - repercussions on the figures for arrests, of which the maximum - curve is reached for the period of May to August 1944, - especially in the southern zone and particularly in the region - of Lyons. - - “We repeat that these arrests were carried out by the members of - all categories of the German repressive system: the Gestapo in - uniform or in plain clothes, the SD, the Gendarmerie, - particularly at the demarcation line, the Wehrmacht and the - SS. . . . - - “The arrests took on the characteristics of collective - operations. In Paris, as a result of an attempted assassination, - the 18th Arrondissement was surrounded by the Feldgendarmerie. - Its inhabitants, men, women, and children, could not return to - their homes and spent the night where they could find shelter. A - round-up was carried out in the arrondissement.” - -I do not think that it is necessary to read the following paragraph, -which deals with the arrests at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, -which the Tribunal will certainly remember, and also the arrests in -Brittany in 1944, at the time of the landing. - -The last paragraph, at the bottom of Page 11: - - “. . . on the pretext of conspiracy or attempted assassinations, - whole families were made to suffer. The Germans resorted to - round-ups when compulsory labor no longer furnished them - sufficient workers. - - “Round-up in Grenoble, 24 December 1943, Christmas Eve. - - “Round-up in Cluny, Saône-et-Loire, in March 1944. - - “Round-up in Figeac in May 1944.” - -The last paragraph, at the bottom of Page 11: - - “Most Frenchmen who were rounded up in this way were in reality - not used for work in Germany but were deported, to be interned - in concentration camps.” - -We might multiply the examples of these arbitrary arrests by delving -into official documents which have been submitted by Luxembourg, -Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium. These round-ups were never -legally justified, they were never even represented as an action taken -in accordance with the pseudo-law of hostages to which we have already -referred. They were always arbitrary and carried out without any -apparent reason, or at any rate, without its being possible for any act -of a Frenchman having motivated them even as a reprisal. Other -collective arrests were made for racial reasons. They were of the same -odious nature as the arrests made for political reasons. - -On Page 5 of the official document of the Ministry of Prisoners and -Deportees, the Tribunal may read a few odious details connected with -these racial arrests. - - “Certain German policemen were especially entrusted to pick out - Jewish persons, according to their physiognomy. They called this - group ‘The Brigade of Physiognomists.’ This verification - sometimes took place in public as far as men were concerned. (At - the railway station at Nice, some were unclothed at the point of - a revolver.) - - “The Parisians remember these round-ups, quarter by quarter. - Large police buses transported old men, women, and children - pell-mell and crowded them into the Velodrome d’Hiver under - dreadful sanitary conditions before taking them to Drancy, where - deportation awaited them. The round-up of the month of August - 1941 has gained sad renown. All the exits of the subway of the - 11th Arrondissement were closed and all the Jews in that - district were arrested and imprisoned. The round-up of December - 1941 was particularly aimed at intellectual circles. Then there - were the round-ups of July 1942. - - “All the cities in the southern zone, particularly Lyons, - Grenoble, Cannes, and Nice, where many Jews had taken refuge, - experienced these round-ups after the total occupation of - France. - - “The Germans sought out all Jewish children who had found refuge - with private citizens or with institutions. In May 1944 they - proceeded to take into custody the children of the Colony of - Eyzieux, and to arrest children who had sought refuge in the - colonies of the U.G.I.F. in June and July 1944.” - -I do not believe that these children were enemies of the German people, -nor that they represented a danger of any kind to the German Army in -France. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, M. Dubost, we had better break off now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FORTY-THIRD DAY - Friday, 25 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL: Your Honors, Defendants Kaltenbrunner and Streicher will be -absent from this morning’s session. - -M. DUBOST: Your Honors, yesterday I was reading from an official French -document, which appears in your document book under the title “Report of -the Ministry for Prisoners of War and Deportees.” It concerned the -seizure by the Germans of Jewish children in France, who were taken from -private houses or public institutions where they had been placed. - -With your permission I will come back to a statement which I had -previously made concerning the execution of orders, given by the German -General Staff with the approval of the German Minister for Foreign -Affairs, to arrest all French generals and, in reprisal, to arrest, as -well, all the families of these generals who might be resistants, in -other words, who were on the side of our Allies. - -In accordance with Article 21 of the Charter the Tribunal will not -require facts of public knowledge to be proved. In the enormous amount -of facts which we submit to you there are many which are known but are -not of public knowledge. There are a few, but nevertheless certain, -facts which are both known and are also of public knowledge in all -countries. There is the famous case of the deportation of the family of -General Giraud, and I shall allow myself to recall to the Tribunal the -six principal points concerning this affair. First: We all remember -having learned through the Allied radio that Madame Giraud, wife of -General Giraud . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: What is it that you are going to ask us to take judicial -knowledge of with reference to the deportation of General Giraud’s -family? - -M. DUBOST: I have to ask the Tribunal, Mr. President, to apply, as far -as these facts are concerned, Article 21 of the Charter, namely, the -provision specifying that the Tribunal will not require facts to be -proved which are of public knowledge. - -Secondly, I request the Tribunal to hear my statement of these facts -which we consider to be of public knowledge for they are known not only -in France but in America, since the American Army participated in these -events. - -THE PRESIDENT: The words of Article 21 are not “of public knowledge” but -“of common knowledge.” It is not quite the same thing. - -M. DUBOST: Before me now I have the French translation of the Charter. I -am interpreting according to the French translation: “The Tribunal will -not require that facts of public knowledge (“notoriété publique”) be -proved.” We interpret these words thus: it is not necessary to bring -documentary or testifying proof of facts universally known. - -THE PRESIDENT: You say “facts universally known”; but supposing, for -instance, the members of the Tribunal did not know the facts? How could -it then be taken that they were of common knowledge? The members of the -Tribunal may be ignorant of the facts. At the same time it is difficult -for them to take cognizance of the facts if they do not know them. - -M. DUBOST: It is a question of fact which will be decided by the -Tribunal. The Tribunal will say whether it does or does not know that -these six points which I shall recall to it are correct. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will retire. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of opinion that the facts with reference -to General Giraud’s deportation and the deportation of his family, -although they are matters of common knowledge or of public knowledge -within France, cannot be said to be of common knowledge or of public -knowledge within the meaning of Article 21, which applies generally to -the world. - -Of course, if the French Prosecutors have governmental documents or -reports from France which state the facts with reference to the -deportation of General Giraud, the question assumes a different aspect -and if there are such documents the Tribunal will, of course, consider -them. - -M. DUBOST: I must bring proof that the crimes committed individually by -the leaders of the German police in each city and in each region of the -occupied countries of the West, were committed in execution of the will -of a central authority, the will of the German Government, which permits -us to charge all the defendants one by one. I shall not be able to prove -this by submitting German documents. That you may consider it a fact, it -is necessary that you accept as valid the evidence which I am about to -read. This evidence was collected by the American and French armies and -the French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. The Tribunal will excuse -me if I am obliged to read numerous documents. - -This systematic will can only be proved by showing that everywhere and -in every case the German policy used the same methods concerning -patriots whom they interned or detained. Internment or imprisonment in -France was in civilian prisons which the Germans had seized, or in -certain sections of French prisons which the Germans had requisitioned, -which they occupied, and which all French officials were forbidden to -enter. The prisoners in all these prisons were subject to the same -regime. We shall prove this by reading to you depositions of prisoners -from each of these German penal institutions in France or the western -occupied countries. This regime was absolutely inhuman. It just allowed -the prisoners to survive under the most precarious conditions. - -In Lyons, at Fort Montluc, the women received as their only food a cup -of herb tea at 7 o’clock in the morning and a ladle of soup with a small -piece of bread at 5 o’clock in the evening. This is confirmed by -Document Number F-555, which you will find the eleventh in your document -book, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-302. The first page of this -document, second paragraph, is an analysis of the depositions which were -received. It is sufficient to refer to this analysis. I shall take a few -lines from the following deposition. The witness declares: - - “. . . on their arrival at Fort Montluc, the prisoners who were - taken in the round-up by the Gestapo on 20 September 1943 were - stripped of all their belongings. The prisoners were treated in - a brutal fashion. The food rations were quite inadequate. The - women’s sense of decency was not respected.” - -This testimony was received at Saint Gingolph, 9 October 1944. It refers -to the arrests made at Saint Gingolph, which were carried out in the -month of September 1943. The witness relates: - - “The young men returned from the interrogation with their toes - burned by means of cotton-wool pads which had been dipped in - gasoline; others had had their calves burned by the flames of a - blow torch; others were bitten by police dogs . . . .” - -DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for the Gestapo): The French Prosecution -submits here documents which do not represent sworn affidavits. They are -statements which do not show who took them. As a matter of principle I -formally protest against these mere testimonies of persons who were not -on oath. They cannot be admitted as proof at this Trial. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say? - -DR. MERKEL: Yes, sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will hear M. Dubost answer. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, the Charter, which goes so far as to admit -evidence of public knowledge, has not fixed any rules as to the manner -in which this evidence, being submitted to you as proof, shall be -presented. The Charter leaves the Tribunal to decide on this or that -document. The Charter leaves the Tribunal free to decide whether such or -such method of investigation is acceptable. The way in which these -investigations have been carried out is regular according to the customs -and usages of my country. As a matter of fact, it is usual for all -official records of the police and gendarmerie to be accepted without -the witnesses being under oath. Moreover, according to the stipulations -of the Charter, all investigations made to disclose war crimes should be -held as authentic proof. Article 21 says: - - “The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common - knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also - take judicial notice of official governmental documents and - reports of the United Nations, including the acts and documents - of the committees set up in the various Allied countries for the - investigation of war crimes, and the records and findings of - military or other Tribunal of any of the United Nations.” - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, is the document that you are reading to us -either an official government document or a report, or is it an act or -document of a committee set up in France? - -M. DUBOST: This report, Mr. President, comes from the Sûreté Nationale. -You can verify that by examining the second sheet of the copy which you -have in your hand, at the top to the left: Direction Générale de la -Sûreté Nationale. Commissariat Special de Saint Gingolph. Testimony of -witnesses. - -THE PRESIDENT: May we see the original document? - -M. DUBOST: This document was submitted to the Secretary of the Tribunal. -The Secretary has only to bring that document to you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Is this a certified copy? - -M. DUBOST: It is a copy certified by the Director of the Cabinet of the -Ministry of Justice. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, I am told that the French Prosecutors have all -the original documents and are not depositing them in the way it is done -by the other prosecutors. Is that so? - -M. DUBOST: The French Prosecutors submitted the originals of yesterday’s -session, and they were handed over this morning to Mr. Martin. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we wish to see the original document. We understand -it is in the hands of the French Secretary. We should like to see it. - -M. DUBOST: I have sent for it, Mr. President. This document is a -certified copy of the original, which is preserved in the archives of -the French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. This certification was -made, on the one hand, by the French Delegate of the Prosecution—you -will see the signature of M. de Menthon on the document you have—on the -other, by the Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, M. -Zambeaux, with the official seal of the French Ministry of Justice. - -THE PRESIDENT: It does appear to be a governmental document. It is the -document of a committee set up by France for the investigation of war -crimes, is it not? - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, it is a document which comes from the Office -of National Security (Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale), which -was set up in connection with an investigation of War Crimes as -prescribed by our French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. The -original remains in Paris at the War Crimes office, but the certified -copy which you have was signed by the Director of the Cabinet of the -Ministry of Justice in Paris. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Dubost, I was not upon the question of whether it -was a true document or not; the question I was upon was whether or not -it was, within Article 21, either a governmental document or a report of -the United Nations, or a document of a committee set up in France for -the investigation of War Crimes; and I was asking whether it is, and it -appears to be so. It is, is it not? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything to what you have said? - -M. DUBOST: No, I have nothing to add. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Merkel, you may speak. - -DR. MERKEL: I should only like to stress briefly that these statements -which are presented here are not statements of an official government -agency and cannot be considered as governmental records. Rather, they -are only minutes which have been taken in police offices and thus can in -no way be authentic declarations of a government or of an investigating -committee. I emphasize once more that these declarations, which have -certainly been taken—partially at least—in minor police precincts, -have not been made under oath and do not represent sworn statements; and -I have to protest firmly against their being considered as evidence -here. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything? - -DR. MERKEL: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Who is M. Binaud? - -M. DUBOST: He is the Police Inspector of the Special Police, who was -attached to the Special Commissariat of Saint Gingolph. - -I must correct an error made by the Defense Counsel, who said this was a -minor police office. This was a frontier post. The Special Commissariats -at frontier posts are all important offices even though they are located -in very small towns. I think that is the same in all countries. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, M. Dubost, you understand what the problem is? It -is a question of the interpretation of Article 21. - -M. DUBOST: I understand. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal requires your assistance upon that -interpretation, as to whether this document does come under the terms of -Article 21. If you have anything to say upon that subject we will be -glad to hear it. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, it seems to me impossible that the Tribunal -should rule out this and similar documents which I am going to present, -for all these documents bear, for authentication, not only the signature -of the French representative at this Tribunal but that of the Delegate -of the Minister of Justice to the War Crimes Commission as well. Examine -the stamp beside the second signature. It is the seal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do not go too fast; tell us where the signatures are. - -M. DUBOST [_Indicating on the document._]: Here, Your Honors, is a -notation of the release of this document by the Office for Inquiry into -War Crimes to the French Prosecutor as an element of proof and below, -the signature of the Director of the Cabinet of the French Minister of -Justice, the Keeper of the Seals, and in addition, over this signature, -the seal of the Minister of Justice. You may read: “Office for Inquiry -into War Crimes.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this the substance of the matter: That this was an -inquiry by the police into these facts; and that police inquiry was -recorded; and then the Minister of Justice, for the purposes of this -Trial, adopted that police report? Is that the substance of it? - -M. DUBOST: That is correct, Mr. President. I think that we agree. The -Office for Inquiry into War Crimes in France is directly attached to the -Ministry of Justice. It carries out investigations. These investigations -are made by the police authorities, such as M. Binaud, Inspector of -Special Police, attached to the Special Commissariat of Saint Gingolph. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know when the service of -inquiry into War Crimes was established. - -M. DUBOST: I cannot give you the exact date from memory, but this -service was set up in France the day after the liberation. It began to -function in October 1944. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was this service established after the police report was -made? - -M. DUBOST: In the month of September or October. - -THE PRESIDENT: September of what year? - -M. DUBOST: In September 1944 this Office for Inquiry into War Crimes in -France was established, and this service functioned as soon as the -Provisional Government was set up in France. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the police inquiry was held under the service? You -see, the police report is dated the 9th of October, and therefore the -police report appears to have been made after the service had been set -up. Is that right? - -M. DUBOST: You have the evidence, Mr. President. If you look at the top -of the second page at the left, it shows the beginning of the record and -you read: “Purpose: Investigation of atrocities committed by Germans -against the civilian population.” These investigations were prescribed -by the Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That would appear to be so if the service was really -established in September and this police investigation is dated the 9th -of October. - -The Tribunal will adjourn for consideration of this question. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the arguments which have been -addressed to it and is of the opinion that the document offered by -counsel for France is a document of a committee set up for the -investigation of War Crimes within the meaning of Article 21 of the -Charter. The fact that it is not upon oath does not prevent it being -such a document within Article 21, of which the Tribunal is directed to -take judicial notice. The question of its probative value would of -course be considered under Article 19 of the Charter and therefore, in -accordance with Article 19 and Article 21 of the Charter, the document -will be admitted in evidence; and the objection of Counsel for the -Gestapo is denied. - -The Tribunal would wish that all original documents should be filed with -the General Secretary of the Tribunal and that when they are being -discussed in Court, the original documents should be present in Court at -the time. - -HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for the SS and SD): I have been informed that -General Giraud and his family were probably deported to Germany upon the -orders of Himmler, but that they were treated very well and that they -were billeted in a villa; that they were brought back to France in good -health; that things went well with them and that they are still well -today. I do not see . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, forgive me for interrupting you, but the -Tribunal are not now considering the case of General Giraud and his -family. Are you unable to hear? - -What I was saying was that you were making some application in -connection with the deportation of General Giraud and were stating facts -to us—what you allege to be facts—as to that deportation. The Tribunal -is not considering that matter. The Tribunal has already ruled that it -cannot take judicial notice of the facts as to General Giraud’s -deportation. - -HERR BABEL: I was of the opinion that what I had to say might bring -about an explanation by the Prosecution and might expedite the trial in -that respect. That was the purpose of my inquiry. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am merely pointing out to you that we are not now -considering General Giraud’s case. - -M. DUBOST: If the Tribunal will permit me to continue? It seems to me -necessary to come back to the proof which I propose to submit. I have to -show that, through uniformity of methods, the tortures which were -inflicted in each bureau of the German Police . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished the document we have just admitted? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Mr. President; I have completed this and I will now read -from other documents. But first I would like to sum up the proofs which -I have to submit this morning through the reading of these documents. - -I said that I was going to demonstrate how through the uniformity of -ill-treatment inflicted by all branches of the German Police upon -prisoners under interrogation, we are able to trace a common will for -which we cannot give you direct proof—as we did yesterday, regarding -hostages, by bringing you papers signed in particular by Keitel—but we -shall arrive at it by a way just as certain, for this identity of method -implies a uniformity of will, which we can place only at the very head -of the police, that is to say, the German Government, to which the -defendants belonged. - -This document, Number F-555, Exhibit Number RF-302, from which I have -just read, refers to the ill-treatment of prisoners at Fort Montluc in -Lyons. - -I pass to Document Number F-556, which we shall submit as Exhibit Number -RF-303, which relates to the prison regime at Marseilles. - -The Tribunal will note that this is an official record drawn up by the -military security service of Vaucluse concerning the atrocities -committed by Germans upon political prisoners and that this record -includes the written deposition of M. Mousson, chief of an intelligence -service, who was arrested on 16 August 1943 and then transferred on 30 -August 1943 to St. Pierre prison at Marseilles. At the last paragraph of -the first page of this document we read: - - “Transferred to Marseilles, St. Pierre prison, on 30 August - 1943, placed in room P, 25 meters long, 5 meters wide. We are - crammed up 75 and often 80. Two straw mattresses for three. - Repulsive hygienic conditions: lice, fleas, bed-bugs, tainted - food. For no reason at all comrades are beaten and put in cells - for 2 or 3 days without food.” - -Following page, fourth paragraph: - - “Taken into custody again 15 May in a rather brutal way”—this - is the 4th paragraph—“I was imprisoned in the prison of Ste. - Anne and . . .” - -5th paragraph: - - “Living conditions in Ste. Anne: deplorable hygiene; food - supplied by National Relief.” - -Next page, second paragraph: - - “Living conditions in Petites Beaumettes: Food, just enough to - keep one alive; no packages; Red Cross gives many, but we - receive few.” - -This concerns, I repeat, prisons entirely under control of the Germans. -Regarding conditions at the prison of Poitiers, we submit Document -Number F-558, Exhibit Number RF-304. A report is attached from the Press -Section of the American Information Service in Paris, dated 18 October -1944. The Tribunal should know that all these reports were included with -the documents which were presented by the French Office for Inquiry into -War Crimes. We read under number two: - - “M. Claeys was arrested 14 December 1943 by the Gestapo and - imprisoned in the Pierre Levee Prison until 26 August 1944 . . . - - “While in prison he asked for a mattress, as he had been wounded - in the war. He was told that he would get it if he confessed. He - had to sleep on 1 inch of straw on the ground. Seven men in one - room 4 meters long, 2 meters wide, and 2.8 meters in - height. . . . For 20 days did not go out of cell. WC was a great - discomfort to him because of wounds. The Germans refused to do - anything about it.” - -Paragraph 4(b). - - “Another prisoner weighed 120 kilograms and lost 30 kilograms in - a month. Was in isolation cell for a month. Was tortured there - and died of gangrene of legs due to wounds caused by torture. - Died after 10 days of agony alone and without help.” - -Paragraph 5. - - “Methods of torture: - - “(a) Victim was kept bent up by hands attached around right leg. - Was then thrown on the ground and flogged for 20 minutes. If he - fainted, they would throw a pail of water in his face. This was - to make him speak. - - “Mr. Francheteau was flogged like that four days out of six. In - some cases, subject was not tied. If he fell they would pick him - up by his hair, and go on. - - “At other times the victim was put naked in a special punishment - cell; his hands were tied to an iron grill above his head. He - was then beaten until made to talk. - - “(b) Beating as above was not common, but M. Claeys has friends - who have seen electric tortures. One electric wire was attached - to the foot and another wire placed at different points on the - body.” - -Paragraph 6. - - “The tortures were all the more horrible because the Germans in - many cases had no clear idea of what information they wanted and - just tortured haphazard.” - -And at the very end, the five last lines. - - “One torture consisted in hanging up the victims by the hands, - which were tied behind the back, until the shoulders were - completely dislocated. Afterwards, the soles of the feet were - cut with razor blades and then the victims were made to walk on - salt.” - -Concerning the prisons of the north, I submit Document Number F-560, -Exhibit Number RF-305. It also comes from the American War Crimes -Commission. On Page 1, under the letter “A” you will find a general -report of Professor Paucot on the atrocities committed by the Germans in -Northern France and in Belgium. The report covers the activities of the -German police in France, at Arras, Béthune, Lille, Valenciennes, Malo -les Bains, La Madeleine, Quincy, and Loos; in Belgium, at Saint-Gilles, -Fort de Huy, and Camp de Belveroo. This report is accompanied by 73 -depositions of victims. From examination of these testimonies the fact -emerges that the brutality, the barbarity of methods used during the -interrogations was the same in the various places cited. - -This synthesis which I have just mentioned is from the American report. -It seems to me unnecessary to stress this as it is confirmed on the -first page. The Tribunal can read further on Pages 4, 5, 6, and 7 a -detailed description of the atrocities, systematic and all identical, -which the German police inflicted to force confessions. - -On Page 5, the fifth paragraph, I quote: - - “A prisoner captured while trying to escape was delivered in his - cell to the fury of police dogs who tore him to pieces.” - -On Page 17, second paragraph, of the German text (Page 14 of the French -text) there is the report of M. Prouille, which, by exception, I shall -read because of the nature of the facts. I quote: - - “Condemned by the German Tribunal to 18 months of imprisonment - for possessing arms and after having been in the prisons of - Arras, Béthune and Loos, I was sent to Germany. - - “As a result of ill-treatment in eastern Prussia I was obliged - to have my eyes looked after. Having been taken to an infirmary, - a German doctor put drops in my eyes. A few hours later, after - great suffering, I became blind. After spending several days in - the prison of Fresnes, I was sent to the clinic of Quinze-Vingts - in Paris. Professor Guillamat, who examined me, certified that - my eyes had been burned by a corrosive agent.” - -Under the Number F-561 I shall read a document from the American War -Crimes Commission, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-306. The -Tribunal will find on Page 2 the proof that M. Herrera was present at -tortures inflicted on numerous persons, and saw a Pole, by the name of -Riptz, have the soles of his feet burned. Then his head was split open -with a spanner. After the wound had healed he was shot. I quote: - - “Commander Grandier, who had had a leg fractured in the war of - 1914, was threatened by those who conducted the interrogations - with having his other leg broken and this was actually done. - When he had half revived, as a result of a hypodermic injection, - the Germans did away with him.” - -We do not want to use more of your time than is necessary, but the -Tribunal should know these American official documents in entirety, all -of which show in a very exact way the tortures carried out by the -various German police services in numerous regions of France, and give -evidence of the similarity of the methods used. - -The following document is Number F-571, which we submit as Exhibit -Number RF-307, and of which we shall read only one four-line paragraph: - - “M. Robert Vanassche, from Tourcoing, states: ‘I was arrested - the 22 February 1944 at Mouscron in Belgium by men belonging to - the Gestapo who were dressed in civilian clothing. During the - interrogation they were wearing uniforms . . . .’” - -I skip a paragraph. - - “‘I was interrogated for the second time at Cand in the main - German prison, where I remained 31 days. There I was locked up - for 2 or 3 hours in a sort of wooden coffin where one could - breathe only through three holes in the top.’” - -Further, the same, document: - - “M. Rémy, residing at Armentières, states: ‘Arrested 2 May 1944 - at Armentières, I arrived at the Gestapo, 18 Rue François Debatz - at La Madelaine about 3 o’clock the same day. I was subjected to - interrogation on two different occasions. The first lasted for - about an hour. I had to lie on my stomach and was given about - 120 lashes. The second interrogation lasted a little longer. I - was lashed again, lying on my stomach. As I would not talk, they - stripped me and put me in the bath tub. The 5th of May I was - subjected to a new interrogation at Loos. That day they hung me - up by my feet and rained blows all over my body. As I refused to - speak, they untied me and put me again on my stomach. When pain - made me cry out, they kicked me in the face with their boots. As - a result I lost 17 lower teeth . . . .’” - -The names of two of the torturers follow, but are of no concern to us -here. We are merely trying to show that the torturers everywhere used -the same methods. This could have been done only in execution of orders -given by their chiefs. - -I will further quote the testimony of M. Guérin: - - “. . . as I would not admit anything, one of the interrogators - put my scarf around my mouth to stifle my cries. Another German - policeman took my head between his legs and two others, one on - each side of me, beat me with clubs over the loins. Each of them - struck me 25 times . . . . This lasted over two hours. The next - morning they began again and it lasted as long as the day - before. These tortures were inflicted upon me because, on 11 - November, I with my comrades of the resistance had taken part in - a demonstration by placing a wreath on the monument to the dead - of the 1914-18 war . . . .” - -I now quote the report of Mr. Alfred Deudon. Here is the ill-treatment -to which he was subjected: - - “18 August, sensitive parts were struck with a hammer. 19 - August, was held under water; 20 August, my head was squeezed - with an iron band; 21 and 24 August, I was chained day and - night; 26 August, I was chained again day and night; and at one - time hung up by the arms.” - -I will now read an extract from the report of M. Delltombe, arrested by -the Gestapo 14 June 1944: - - “Thursday, 15 June, at 8 o’clock in the morning, I was taken to - the torture cellar. There they demanded that I should confess to - the sabotage which I had carried out with my groups and denounce - my comrades as well as name my hiding places. Because I did not - answer quickly enough, the torture commenced. They made me put - my hands behind my back. They put on special handcuffs and hung - me up by my wrists. Then they flogged me, principally on the - loins, and in the face. That day the torture lasted 3 hours. - - “Friday, 16 June, the same thing took place; but only for an - hour and a half, for I could not stand it any longer; and they - took me back to my cell on a stretcher. - - “Saturday the tortures began again with even more severity. Then - I was obliged to confess my sabotage, for the brutes stuck - needles in my arms. After that they left me alone until 10 - August; then they had me called to the office and told me I was - condemned to death. I was put on a train of deportees going to - Brussels, from which I was freed on 3 September by Brussels - patriots. - - “. . . women were subjected to the same treatment as men. To the - physical pain, the sadism of the torturers added the moral - anguish, especially mortifying for a woman or a young girl, of - being stripped nude by her torturers. Pregnancy did not save - them from lashes. When brutality brought about a miscarriage, - they were left without any care, exposed to all the hazards and - complications of these criminal abortions.” - -This is the text of the summary drawn up by the American officer who -carried out this investigation. - -Here is the report of Madame Sindemans, who was arrested in Paris 24 -February 1944: - - “. . . by four soldiers, each armed with a submachine gun, and - two other Germans in civilian clothes holding revolvers. - - “Having looked into my handbag, they found three identification - cards. Then they searched my room and discovered the pads and - stamp of the Kommandantur and some German passes and employment - cards which I had succeeded in stealing from them the day before - . . . . - - “Immediately, they placed handcuffs upon me and took me to be - interrogated. When I gave no reply, they slapped me in the face - with such force that I fell from my chair. Then they struck me - with a rubber ring across the face. This interrogation began at - 10 o’clock in the morning and ended at 11 o’clock that night. I - must tell you that I had been pregnant for 3 months.” - -We shall submit now Documents F-563 and 564 under the one number Exhibit -Number RF-308. It is a report concerning the atrocities committed by the -Gestapo in Bourges. We shall read a part of this report. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, how do you establish what this document is? It -appears to be the report of M. Marc Toledano. - -M. DUBOST: That is correct, Mr. President. This report, with the rest of -the documents in the same bundle, was incorporated in the document -presented by the French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes, as is -evident from the official signature of M. Zambeaux on the original, -which is in the hands of the Secretary of the Court. I shall read the -first page of the original: - - “I, the undersigned, Madame Bondoux, supervisor at the prison in - Bourges, certify that nine men, mostly youths, were subjected to - abominable treatment. They remained with their hands bound - behind their backs and with chains on their feet for 15 to 20 - days; it was absolutely impossible for them to take their food - in a normal way and they were screaming with hunger. In the face - of this situation several of the ordinary criminal prisoners - showed their willingness to help these martyrs by making small - packets from their own rations which I had passed to them in the - evening. A certain German supervisor, whom I knew under his - first name of Michel, threw their bread in a corner of the cell, - and at night came to beat them. All these young men were shot on - 20 November 1943. - - “Then, too, a woman named Hartwig, who lived at Chevannes, I - believe, told me that she had remained for 4 days bound to a - chair. At all events, I can testify that her body was completely - bruised.” - -We read in the statement of M. Labussiere, who is a captain of the -reserve and a teacher at Marseilles-les-Aubigny: - - “. . . On the 11th I was twice flogged with a lash. I had to - bend over a bench and the muscles of my thighs and calves were - fully stretched. At first I received some 30 lashes with a heavy - whip, then another instrument was used which had a buckle at the - end. I then was struck on the buttocks, on the thighs, and on - the calves. To do this my torturer got up on a bench and made me - spread my legs. Then with a very thin thong he finished off by - giving me some 20 more biting lashes. When I picked myself up I - was dizzy and I fell to the ground. I was always picked up - again. Needless to say, the handcuffs were never taken off my - wrists . . .” - -I recoil from reading the remainder of this testimony. The details which -precede are atrocious. - - “At 10 o’clock on the 12th, after having beaten a woman, Paoli - came to find me and said: ‘Dog, you have no heart. It was your - wife I have just beaten. I’ll go on doing it as long as you - refuse to talk.’ He wanted me to give the place of our meetings - and the names of my comrades.” - -On the following line: - - “. . . on the 14th at 6 o’clock in the evening I was taken once - again to the torture chamber. I could hardly crawl. Before he - let me come in, Paoli said: ‘I give you 5 minutes to tell me all - you know. If after these 5 minutes you’ve said nothing, you’ll - be shot at 3 o’clock; your wife will be shot at six, and your - boy will be sent to Germany.’” - -We read that after signing the record of the interrogation his torturer -said to him: - - “‘Look at yourself! See what we can make of a man in 5 days! You - haven’t seen the finish yet!’ And he added: ‘Now get out of - here. You make us sick!’”—and the witness concluded with—“I - was, in fact, covered with filth from head to foot. They put me - in a cart and took me back to my cell . . . . During those 5 - days I had certainly received more than 700 strokes from a lash - . . . .” - -A large hematosis (blood clot) appeared on both his buttocks. A doctor -had to operate. His comrades in custody would not go near him because of -the foul smell from the abscesses covering his body as a result of the -ill-treatment. On 24 November, the date on which he was interrogated, he -had not yet recovered from his wounds. - -His testimony concludes with a general statement of the methods of -torture which were used: - - “1) The lash. - - “2) The bath: The victim was plunged headfirst into a tub full - of cold water until he was asphyxiated. Then they applied - artificial respiration. If he would not talk they repeated the - process several times consecutively. With his clothes soaking, - he spent the night in a cold cell. - - “3) Electric current: The terminals were placed on the hands, - then on the feet, in the ears, and then one in the anus and - another on the end of the penis. - - “4) Crushing the testicles in a press specially made for the - purpose. Twisting the testicles was frequent. - - “5) Hanging: The patient’s hands were handcuffed together behind - his back. A hook was slipped through his handcuffs and the - victim was lifted by a pulley. At first they jerked him up and - down. Later, they left him suspended for varying, fairly long, - periods. The arms were often dislocated. In the camp I saw - Lieutenant Lefevre, who, having been suspended like that for - more than 4 hours, had lost the use of both arms. - - “6) Burning with a soldering lamp or with matches: - - “On 2 July my comrade Laloue, a teacher from Cher, came to the - camp. He had been subjected to most of these tortures at - Bourges. One arm had been put out of joint and he was unable to - move the fingers of his right hand as a result of the hanging. - He had been subjected to flogging and electricity. Sharp-pointed - matches had been driven under the nails of his hands and feet. - His wrists and ankles had been wrapped with rolls of wadding and - the matches had been set on fire. While they were burning, a - German plunged a pointed knife into the soles of his feet - several times and another lashed him with a whip. Phosphorous - burns had eaten away several fingers as far as the second joint. - Abscesses which had developed had burst and this saved him from - blood poisoning.” - -Under the signature of one of the chiefs of the General Staff of the -French Forces of the Interior, who freed the Department of Cher, M. -Magnon—whose signature is authenticated by the French official -authorities whom you know—we read that since the liberation of Bourges, -6 September 1944, an inspection of the Gestapo cellars disclosed an -instrument of torture, a bracelet composed of several balls of hard wood -with steel spikes. There was a device for tightening the bracelet round -the victim’s wrist. This bracelet was seen by numerous soldiers and -leaders of the Maquis of Manetou-Salon. It was in the hands of Adjutant -Neuilly, now in the 1st Battalion of the 34th Demi-Brigade. A drawing is -attached to this declaration. Commander Magnon certifies having seen the -instrument described above. - -We now submit Document F-565, from the military service of the -department of Vaucluse, which becomes Exhibit Number RF-309. It is a -repetition of the same methods. We do not consider it necessary to dwell -upon them. - -We will now turn to Document F-567, which we submit as Exhibit Number -RF-310. It refers to the tortures practiced by the German police in -Besançon. It is a deposition of M. Dommergues, a professor at Besançon. -This deposition was received by the American War Crimes Commission—the -mission of Captain Miller. We shall read about the statement of M. -Dommergues, professor at Besançon: - - “He was arrested on 11 February 1944; was violently struck with - a lash during the interrogation. When a woman who was being - tortured uttered screams, they made M. Dommergues believe that - it was his own wife. He saw a comrade hung up with a weight of - 50 kilograms on each foot. Another had his eyes pierced with - pins. A child lost its voice completely.” - -This is from the American War Crimes Commission, summing up M. -Dommergues’ deposition. This document includes a second part under the -same Number F-567(b). We shall read some excerpts from this document. - -THE PRESIDENT: One of the members has not got his document marked, and I -want to know whose statement it is you are referring to. Is it Dr. -Gomet? - -M. DUBOST: It is not a statement; it is rather a letter sent by Dr. -Gomet, Secretary of the Council of the Departmental College of Doubs of -the National Order of Physicians. This letter was sent by him to the -chief medical officer of the Feldkommandantur in Besançon on 11 -September 1943. Here is the text of this letter: - - “Dear Doctor and Colleague, - - “I have the Honor to deliver to you the note which I drafted at - your request and sent to our colleagues of the department in a - circular of 1 September. - - “My conscience compels me on the other hand, to take up another - subject with you. - - “Quite recently I had to treat a Frenchman who had wounds and - multiple ecchymosis on his face and body, as a result of the - torture apparatus employed by the German security service. He is - a man of good standing, holding an important appointment under - the French Government; and he was arrested because they thought - he could furnish certain information. They could make no - accusation against him, as is proved by the fact that he was - freed in a few days, when the interrogation to which they wanted - to subject him was finished. - - “He was subjected to torture, not as a legal penalty or in - legitimate defense; but for the sole purpose of forcing him to - speak under stress of violence and pain. - - “As for myself, representing the French medical body here, my - conscience and a strict conception of my duty compel me to - inform you of what I have observed in the exercise of my - profession. I appeal to your conscience as a doctor and ask you - whether by virtue of our mission of protecting the physical - health of our fellow-beings, which is the mission of every - doctor, it is not our duty to intervene.” - -He must have had a reply from the German doctor, for Dr. Gomet writes -him a second letter, and here is the text: - - “Dear Doctor and Colleague, - - “You were good enough to note the facts which I put before you - in my letter of 11 September 1943 regarding the torture - apparatus utilized by the German Security Service during the - interrogation of a French official for whom I had subsequently - to prescribe treatment. You asked me, as was quite natural, if - you could visit the person in question yourself. I replied at - our recent meeting that the person concerned did not know of the - step which I had taken; and I did not know whether he would - authorize me to give his name. I wish to emphasize, in fact, - that I myself am solely responsible for this initiative. The - person through whom I learned, by virtue of my profession, the - facts which I have just related to you, had nothing to do with - this report. The question is strictly professional. My - conscience as a doctor has forced me to bring this matter to - your attention. I advance only what I know from absolutely - certain observation, and I guarantee the truth of my statement - on my honor as a man, a physician, and a Frenchman. - - “My patient was interrogated twice by the German Security - Service about the end of August 1943. I had to examine him on 8 - September 1943, that is to say, about 10 days after he left - prison, where he had in vain asked for medical attention. He had - a palpebral ecchymosis on the left side and abrasions in the - region of his right temple, which he said were made with a sort - of circle which they had placed upon his head and which they - struck with small clubs. He had ecchymosis on the backs of his - hands, these having been placed, according to what he told me, - in a squeezing apparatus. On the front of his legs there were - still scars with scabs and small surface wounds—the result, he - told me, of blows administered with flexible rods studded with - short spikes. - - “Obviously, I cannot swear to the means by which the ecchymosis - and wounds were produced, but I note that their appearance is in - complete agreement with the explanations given me. - - “It will be easy for you, Sir, to learn if apparatus of the kind - to which I allude is really in use in the German Security - Service.” - -I pass over the rest. - -THE PRESIDENT: It may be convenient for counsel and others to know that -the Tribunal will not sit in open session tomorrow, as it has many -administrative matters to consider. We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MARSHAL: If Your Honors please, the Defendants Kaltenbrunner and -Streicher will continue to be absent this afternoon. - -M. DUBOST: We left off this morning at the enumeration of the tortures -that had been practiced habitually by the Gestapo in the various cities -in France where inquiries had been conducted; and I was proving to you, -by reading numerous documents, that everywhere accused persons and -frequently witnesses themselves—as seen in the last letter—were -questioned with brutality and subjected to tortures that were usually -identical. This systematic repetition of the same methods of torture -proves, we believe, that a common plan existed, conceived by the German -Government itself. - -We still have a great many testimonies, all extracts from the report of -the American services, concerning the prisons at Dreux, at Morlaix, and -at Metz. These testimonies are given in Documents F-689, 690, and 691, -which we now submit as Exhibits RF-311, 312, and 313. - -With your permission, Your Honor, I will now refrain from further citing -these documents. The same acts were systematically repeated. This is -also true of the tortures inflicted in Metz, Cahors, Marseilles, and -Quimperlé, dealt with in Documents F-692, 693, 565, and 694, which we -are presenting to you as Exhibits RF-314, 314 (bis), 309, and 315. - -We now come to one of the most odious crimes committed by the Gestapo, -and it is not possible for us to keep silent about it in spite of our -desire to shorten this statement. This is the murder of a French officer -by the Gestapo at Clermont-Ferrand, a murder which was committed under -extremely shameful conditions, in contempt of all the rules of -international law; for it was perpetrated in a region where, according -to the terms of the Armistice, the Gestapo had nothing to do and had no -right to be. - -The name of this French officer was Major Henri Madeline. His case is -given in Document F-575, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-316. He -was arrested on 1 October 1943 at Vichy. His interrogation began in -January 1944; and he was struck in such a savage manner, in the course -of the first interrogation, that when he was brought back to his cell -his hand was already broken. - -On 27 January this officer was questioned again on two occasions, during -which he was struck so violently that when he returned to his cell his -hands were so swollen that it was impossible to see the handcuffs he had -on. The following day the German police came back to fetch him from his -cell, where he had passed the whole night in agony. He was still alive; -they threw him down on a road a kilometer away from a small village in -the Massif Central, Perignant-Les-Sarlièves, to make it look as if he -had been the victim of a road accident. His body was found later. A post -mortem showed that the thorax was completely crushed, with multiple -fractures of the ribs and perforation of the lungs. There was also -dislocation of the spine, fracture of the lower jaw, and most of the -tissues of the head were loose. - -Alas, we all know that a few French traitors did assist in the arrests -and in the misdeeds of the Gestapo in France under the orders of German -officers. One of these traitors, who was arrested when our country was -liberated, has described the ill-treatment that had been inflicted on -Major Madeline. The name of this traitor is Verière and we are going to -read a passage from his statement: - - “He was beaten with a whip and a bludgeon; blows on his - fingernails crushed his fingers. He was forced to walk - barefooted on tacks. He was burned with cigarettes. Finally, he - was beaten unmercifully and taken back to his cell in a dying - condition.” - -Major Madeline was not the only victim of such evil treatment which -several German officers of the Gestapo helped to inflict. This inquiry -has shown: - - “. . . that 12 known persons succumbed to the tortures inflicted - by the Gestapo of Clermont-Ferrand, that some women were - stripped naked and beaten before they were raped.” - -I am anxious not to lengthen these proceedings by useless citations. I -believe the Tribunal will consider as confirmed the facts that I have -presented. They are contained in the document that we are placing before -you, and in it the Tribunal will find, in extenso, the written -testimonies taken on the day which followed the liberation. This -systematic repetition of the same criminal proceedings in order to -achieve the same purpose—to bring about a reign of terror—was not the -isolated act of a subordinate having authority in our country only and -remaining outside the control of his government or of the Army General -Staff. An examination of the methods of the German police in all -countries of the West shows that the same horrors, the same atrocities, -were repeated systematically everywhere. Whether in Denmark, Belgium, -Holland, or Norway, the interrogations were everywhere and at all times -conducted by the Gestapo with the same savagery, the same contempt of -the rights of self defense, the same contempt of human dignity. - -In the case of Denmark, we cite a few lines from a document already -submitted to the Tribunal. It is Document F-666 (Exhibit Number RF-317), -which should be the sixth in your document book. It contains an official -Danish report of October 1945, concerning the German major war criminals -appearing before the International Military Tribunal. On Page 5, under -the title, “Torture”, we read in a brief résumé everything that concerns -the question with regard to Denmark: - - “In numerous cases the German police and their assistants used - torture in order to force the prisoners to confess or to give - information. This fact is supported by irrefutable evidence. In - most cases the torture consisted of beating with a rod or with a - rubber bludgeon. But also far more flagrant forms of torture - were used including some which will leave lasting injuries. - Bovensiepen has stated that the order to use torture in certain - cases emanated from higher authorities, possibly even from - Göring as Chief of the Geheime Staatspolizei but, at any rate, - from Heydrich. The instructions were to the effect that torture - might be used to compel persons to give information that might - serve to disclose subversive organizations directed against the - German Reich, but not for the purpose of making the delinquent - admit his own deeds.” - -A little further on: - - “The means were prescribed, namely, a limited number of strokes - with a rod. Bovensiepen does not remember whether the maximum - limit was 10 or 20 strokes. An officer from the criminal police - (Kriminal Kommissar, Kriminalrat) was there and also, when - circumstances so required, there was a medical officer present.” - -The above-mentioned instructions were modified several times for minor -details, and all members of the criminal police were notified. - -The Danish Government points out, in conclusion, two particularly -repugnant cases of torture inflicted on Danish patriots. They are the -cases of Professor Mogens Fog and the ill-treatment inflicted on Colonel -Ejnar Thiemroth. Finally, the Tribunal can read that Doctor -Hoffmann-Best states that his official prerogatives did not authorize -him to prevent the use of torture. - -In the case of Belgium we should recall first of all the tortures that -were inflicted in the tragically famous camp of Breendonck, where -hundreds, even thousands of Belgian patriots, were shut up. We shall -revert to Breendonck when we deal with the question of concentration -camps. We shall merely quote from the report of the Belgian War Crimes -Commission a few definite facts in support of our original affirmation, -that all acts of ill-treatment imputed to the Gestapo in France were -reproduced in identical manner in all the occupied western countries. -The documents which we shall submit to you are to be found in the small -document book under Numbers F-942(a), 942(b), Exhibits RF-318, 319. - -This report comprises minutes which I will not read, inasmuch as it -contains testimonies which are analogous to, if not identical with, -those that were read concerning France. However, on Pages 1 and 2 you -will find the statement made by M. Auguste Ramasl and a statement made -by M. Paul Desomer, which show that the most extreme cruelties were -inflicted on these men and that, when they emerged from the offices of -the Gestapo, they were completely disfigured and unable to stand. - -And now I submit to you with regard to Belgium, Documents F-641(a) and -F-641(b), which now become Exhibits RF-320 and 321. I shall not read -them. They, too, contain reports describing tortures similar to those I -have already mentioned. If the Court will accept the cruelty of the -methods of torture employed by the Gestapo as having been established, I -will abstain from reading all the testimonies which have been collected. - -In the case of Norway our information is taken from a document submitted -by the Norwegian Government for the punishment of the major war -criminals. In the French translation of this document—Number UK-79, -which we present as Exhibit Number RF-323—on Page 2, the Tribunal will -find the statement of the Norwegian Government according to which -numerous Norwegian citizens died from the cruel treatment inflicted on -them during their interrogations. The number of known cases for the -district of Oslo, only, is 52; but the number in the various regions of -Norway is undoubtedly much higher. The total number of Norwegian -citizens who died during the occupation in consequence of torture or -ill-treatment, execution, or suicide in political prisons or -concentration camps is approximately 2,100. - -In Paragraph B, Page 2 of the document, there is a description of the -methods employed in the services of the Gestapo in Norway which were -identical with those I have already described. - -In the case of Holland, we shall submit Document Number F-224, which -becomes Exhibit Number RF-324 and which, is an extract from the -statement of the Dutch Government for the prosecution and punishment of -the major German war criminals. This document bears the date of 11 -January 1946. It has been distributed and should now be in your hands. -The Tribunal will find in this document a great number of testimonies -which were collected by the Criminal Investigation Department, all of -which describe the same ill-treatment and tortures as those already -known to you and which were committed by the services of the Gestapo in -Holland. - -In Holland, as elsewhere, the accused were struck with sticks. When -their backs were completely raw from beating they were sent back to -their cells. Sometimes icy water was sprayed on them and sometimes they -were exposed to electrical current. At Amersfoort a witness saw with his -own eyes a prisoner, who was a priest, beaten to death with a rubber -truncheon. The systematic character of such tortures seems to me -definitely established. - -The document of the Danish Government is a first proof in support of my -contention that these systematic tortures were deliberately willed by -the higher authorities of the Reich and that the members of the German -Government are responsible for them. In any case these systematic -tortures were certainly known, because there were protests from all -European countries against such methods, which plunged us again into the -darkness of the Middle Ages; and at no time was an order given to forbid -such methods, at no time were those who executed them repudiated by -their superiors. The methods followed were devised to reinforce the -policy of terrorism pursued by Germany in the western occupied -countries—a policy of terrorism which I already described to you when I -dealt with the question of hostages. - -It is now incumbent on me to designate to you by name those among the -accused whom France, as well as other countries in the West, considers -to be especially guilty in having prepared and developed this criminal -policy carried out by the Gestapo. We maintain that they are Bormann and -Kaltenbrunner who, because of their functions, must have known more than -any others, about those deeds. Although we are not in possession of any -document signed by them in respect to the western countries, the -uniformity of the acts we have described to you and the fact that they -were analogous and even identical, in spite of the diversity of places, -enables us to assert that all these orders were dictated by a single -will; and among the accused, Bormann and Kaltenbrunner were the direct -instruments of that single will. - -Everything I described to you here concerned the procedure prior to -judgment. We know with what ferocity this procedure was applied. We know -that this ferocity was intentional. It was known to the populations of -the invaded countries, and its purpose was to create an atmosphere of -real terror around the Gestapo and all the German police services. - -After the examination came the judicial proceedings. These proceedings -were, as we see them, only a parody of justice. The prosecution was -based on a legal concept which we dismiss as being absolutely inhuman. -That part will be dealt with by my colleague, M. Edgar Faure, in the -second part of the statement on the German atrocities in the western -countries: crimes against the spirit. - -It is sufficient for us to know that the German courts which dealt with -crimes committed by the citizens of the occupied western countries, -which did not accept defeat, never applied but one penalty, the death -penalty, and that in execution of an inhuman order by one of these men, -Keitel; an order which appears in Document Number L-90, already -submitted to you by my United States colleagues, under Document Number -USA-503. It is the penultimate in your large document book, Line 5: - - “If these offenses are punished with imprisonment or even with - hard labor for life, it will be interpreted as a sign of - weakness. Effective and lasting intimidation can only be - achieved either by capital punishment or by measures which leave - the relatives and the population in the dark about the fate of - the culprit. Deportation to Germany serves this purpose.” - -Is it necessary to make any comment? Can we be surprised at this war -leader giving orders to justice? What we heard about him yesterday makes -us doubt that he is merely a military leader. We have quoted you his own -words, “Effective and lasting intimidation can only be achieved by -capital punishment.” Are such orders, given to courts of justice, -compatible with military honor? “If in effect”—Keitel goes on to say in -this Document—“the courts are unable to pronounce the death penalty, -then the man must be deported.” I think you will share my opinion that, -when such orders are given to courts, one can no longer speak of -justice. In execution of this order, those of our compatriots who were -not condemned to death and immediately executed were deported to -Germany. - -We now come to the third part of my statement: the question of -deportation. - -It remains for me to explain to you in what circumstances the -deportations were carried out. If prior to that the Tribunal could -suspend the sitting for a few minutes, I should be very grateful. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long would you like us to suspend, M. Dubost? - -M. DUBOST: Perhaps ten minutes, Your Honor. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for the Defendant Keitel): The French Prosecutor -just now read from Document L-90, the so-called “Nacht und Nebel” -decree. He referred to this decree and cited the words: - - “Effective and lasting intimidation can only be achieved by - capital punishment, or by measures which leave the relatives and - the population in the dark about the fate of the culprit.” - -The French Prosecutor mentioned that these were the very words of -Keitel. - -In connection with a previous case the President and the Tribunal have -pointed out that it is not permissible to quote only a part of a -document when by so doing a wrong impression might be created. The -French Prosecutor will agree with me when I say that Decree L-90 makes -it quite clear that these are not the words of the Chief of the OKW, but -of Hitler. In this short extract it says: - - “It is the carefully considered will of the Führer that, when - attacks are made in occupied countries against the Reich or - against the occupying power, the culprits must be dealt with by - other measures than those decreed heretofore. The Führer is of - the opinion that if these offenses are punished with - imprisonment, or even with hard labor for life, this will be - looked upon as a sign of weakness. Effective and lasting - intimidation can only be achieved by capital punishment, _et - cetera_.” - -The decree then goes on to say: - - “The enclosed directives on how to deal with the offences comply - with the Führer’s point of view. They have been examined and - approved by him.” - -I take the liberty to point out this fact, because it was just this -decree, which is known as the notorious “Nacht und Nebel” decree, which -in its formulation and execution was opposed by Keitel. That is why I am -protesting. - -M. DUBOST: I owe you an explanation. I did not read the decree in full -because the Tribunal knows it. In accordance with the customary -procedure of this Tribunal, it has been read. It is not necessary to -read it again. Moreover, I knew that the accused Keitel had signed it, -but that Hitler had conceived it. Therefore, I made allusion to the -military honor of this general, who was not afraid to become the lackey -of Hitler. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal understood from your mentioning of the fact -that the document had already been submitted to the Tribunal and does -not think that there was anything misleading in what you did. - -M. DUBOST: If the Tribunal accepts this, we shall proceed to the hearing -of a witness, a Frenchman. - -[_The witness, Lampe, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: This is your witness, is it not? Is this the witness you -wish to call? - -M. DUBOST: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness_] Will you stand up. What is your name? - -M. MAURICE LAMPE (Witness): Lampe, Maurice. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: Do you swear to speak -without hate or fear, to say the truth, all the truth, only the truth? - -[_The witness repeated the oath in French._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Raise the right hand and say, I swear. - -LAMPE: I swear. - -THE PRESIDENT: Spell your name. - -LAMPE: L-A-M-P-E. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -M. DUBOST: You were born in Roubaix on the 23rd of August 1900. Were you -deported by the Germans? - -LAMPE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -LAMPE: Thank you, Mr. President. - -M. DUBOST: You were interned in Mauthausen? - -LAMPE: That is correct. - -M. DUBOST: Will you testify as to what you know concerning this -internment camp? - -LAMPE: Willingly. - -M. DUBOST: Say what you know. - -LAMPE: I was arrested on 8 November 1941. After two years and a half of -internment in France, I was deported on 22 March 1944 to Mauthausen in -Austria. The journey lasted three days and three nights under -particularly vile conditions—104 deportees in a cattle truck without -air. I do not believe that it is necessary to give all the details of -this journey, but one can well imagine the state in which we arrived at -Mauthausen on the morning of the 25th of March 1944, in weather 12 -degrees below zero. I mention, however, that from the French border we -traveled in the trucks, naked. - -When we arrived at Mauthausen, the SS officer who received this convoy -of about 1,200 Frenchmen informed us in the following words, which I -shall quote from memory almost word for word: - - “Germany needs your arms. You are, therefore, going to work; but - I want to tell you that you will never see your families again. - When one enters this camp, one leaves it by the chimney of the - crematorium.” - -I remained about three weeks in quarantine in an isolated block, and I -was then detailed to work with a squad in a stone quarry. The quarry at -Mauthausen was in a hollow about 800 metres from the camp proper. There -were 186 steps down to it. It was particularly painful torture, because -the steps were so rough-hewn that to climb them even without a load was -extremely tiring. - -One day, 15 April 1944, I was detailed to a team of 12 men—all of them -French—under the orders of a German “Kapo,” a common criminal, and of -an SS man. - -We started work at seven o’clock in the morning. By eight o’clock, one -hour later, two of my comrades had already been murdered. They were an -elderly man, M. Gregoire from Lyons, and a quite young man, Lefevre from -Tours. They were murdered because they had not understood the order, -given in German, detailing them for a task. We were very frequently -beaten because of our inability to understand the German language. - -On the evening of that first day, 15 April 1944, we were told to carry -the two corpses to the top, and the one that I, with three of my -comrades, carried was that of old Gregoire, a very heavy man; we had to -go up 186 steps with a corpse and we all received blows before we -reached the top. - -Life in Mauthausen—and I shall declare before this Tribunal only what I -myself saw and experienced—was a long cycle of torture and of -suffering. However, I would like to recall a few scenes which were -particularly horrible and have remained more firmly fixed in my memory. - -During September, I think it was on the 6th of September 1944, there -came to Mauthausen a small convoy of 47 British, American, and Dutch -officers. They were airmen who had come down by parachute. They had been -arrested after having tried to make their way back to their own lines. -Because of this they were condemned to death by a German tribunal. They -had been in prison about a year and a half and were brought to -Mauthausen for execution. - -On their arrival they were transferred to the bunker, the camp prison. -They were made to undress and had only their pants and a shirt. They -were barefooted. The following morning they were at the roll call at -seven o’clock. The work gangs went to their tasks. The 47 officers were -assembled in front of the office and were told by the commanding officer -of the camp that they were all under sentence of death. - -I must mention that one of the American officers asked the commander -that he should be allowed to meet his death as a soldier. In reply, he -was bashed with a whip. The 47 were led barefoot to the quarry. - -For all the prisoners at Mauthausen the murder of these men has remained -in their minds like a scene from Dante’s Inferno. This is how it was -done: At the bottom of the steps they loaded stone on the backs of these -poor men and they had to carry them to the top. The first journey was -made with stones weighing 25 to 30 kilos and was accompanied by blows. -Then they were made to run down. For the second journey the stones were -still heavier; and whenever the poor wretches sank under their burden, -they were kicked and hit with a bludgeon, even stones were hurled at -them. - -This went on for several days. In the evening when I returned from the -gang with which I was then working, the road which led to the camp was a -bath of blood. I almost stepped on the lower jaw of a man. Twenty-one -bodies were strewn along the road. Twenty-one had died on the first day. -The twenty-six others died the following morning. I have tried to make -my account of this horrible episode as short as possible. We were not -able, at least when we were in camp, to find out the names of these -officers; but I think that by now their names must have been -established. - -In September 1944 Himmler visited us. Nothing was changed in the camp -routine. The work gangs went to their tasks as usual, and I had—we -had—the unhappy opportunity of seeing Himmler close. If I mention -Himmler’s visit to the camp—after all it was not a great event—it is -because that day they presented to Himmler the execution of fifty Soviet -officers. - -I must tell you that I was then working in a Messerschmidt gang, and -that day I was on night shift. The block where I was billeted was just -opposite the crematorium; and in the execution room, we saw—I -saw—these Soviet officers lined up in rows of five in front of my -block. They were called one by one. The way to the execution room was -relatively short. It was reached by a stairway. The execution room was -under the crematorium. - -The execution, which Himmler himself witnessed—at least the beginning -of it, because it lasted throughout the afternoon—was another -particularly horrible spectacle. I repeat, the Soviet Army officers were -called one by one, and there was a sort of human chain between the group -which was awaiting its turn and that which was in the stairway listening -to the shots which killed their predecessors. They were all killed by a -shot in the neck. - -M. DUBOST: You witnessed this personally? - -LAMPE: I repeat that on that afternoon I was in Block 11, which was -situated opposite the crematorium; and although we did not see the -execution itself, we heard every shot; and we saw the condemned men who -were waiting on the stairway opposite us embrace each other before they -parted. - -M. DUBOST: Who were these men who were condemned? - -LAMPE: The majority of them were Soviet officers, political commissars, -or members of the Bolshevik Party. They came from Oflags. - -M. DUBOST: I beg your pardon, but were there officers among them? - -LAMPE: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: Did you know where they came from? - -LAMPE: It was very difficult to know from what camp they came because, -as a general rule, they were isolated when they arrived in camp. They -were taken either direct to the prison or else to Block 20, which was an -annex of the prison, about which I shall have occasion . . . - -M. DUBOST: How did you know they were officers? - -LAMPE: Because we were able to communicate with them. - -M. DUBOST: Did all of them come from prisoner-of-war camps? - -LAMPE: Probably. - -M. DUBOST: You did not really know? - -LAMPE: No, we did not know. We were chiefly interested in finding out of -what nationality they were and did not ask other details. - -M. DUBOST: Do you know where the British, American, and Dutch officers -came from, about whom you have just spoken and who were executed on the -steps leading to the quarry? - -LAMPE: I believe they came from the Netherlands, especially the Air -Force officers. They had probably bailed out after having been shot down -and had hidden themselves while trying to go back to their lines. - -M. DUBOST: Did the Mauthausen prisoners know that prisoners of war, -officers or noncommissioned officers, were executed? - -LAMPE: That was a frequent occurrence. - -M. DUBOST: A frequent occurrence? - -LAMPE: Yes, very frequent. - -M. DUBOST: Do you know about any mass executions of the men kept at -Mauthausen? - -LAMPE: I know of many instances. - -M. DUBOST: Could you cite a few? - -LAMPE: Besides those I have already described, I feel I ought to mention -what happened to part of a convoy coming from Sachsenhausen which was -executed by a special method. This was on 17 February 1945. - -When the Allied armies were advancing, various camps were moved back -toward Austria. Of a convoy of 2,500 internees which had left -Sachsenhausen, only about 1,700 were left when they arrived at -Mauthausen on the morning of the 17th of February. 800 had died or had -been killed in the course of the journey. - -The Mauthausen Camp was at that time, if I may use this expression, -completely choked. So when the 1,700 survivors of this convoy arrived, -Kommandant Dachmeier had selected 400 from among them. He encouraged the -sick, the old, and the weak prisoners to come forward with the idea that -they might be taken to the infirmary. These 400 men, who had either come -forward of their own free will or had been arbitrarily selected, were -stripped entirely naked and left for 18 hours in weather 18 degrees -below zero, between the laundry building and the wall of the camp. The -congestion . . . - -M. DUBOST: You saw that yourself? - -LAMPE: I saw it personally. - -M. DUBOST: You are citing this as an actual witness, seen with your own -eyes? - -LAMPE: Exactly. - -M. DUBOST: In what part of the camp were you at that time? - -LAMPE: This scene lasted, as I said, 18 hours; and when we went in or -came out of the camp we saw these unfortunate men. - -M. DUBOST: Very well. Will you please continue? You have spoken of the -visit of Himmler and of the execution of Soviet officers and commissars. -Did you frequently see German personalities in the camp? - -LAMPE: Yes, but I cannot give you the names. - -M. DUBOST: You did not know them? - -LAMPE: One could hardly mistake Himmler. - -M. DUBOST: But you did know they were eminent personalities? - -LAMPE: We did indeed. First of all, these personages were always -surrounded by a complete staff, who went through the prison itself and -particularly adjoining blocks. - -If you will allow me, I would like to go on with my description of the -murder of these 400 people from Sachsenhausen. I said that after -selecting the sick, the feeble and the older prisoners, Dachmeier, the -camp commander, gave orders that these men should be stripped entirely -naked in weather 18 degrees below zero. Several of them rapidly got -congestion of the lungs, but that did not seem fast enough for the SS. -Three times during the night these men were sent down to the -shower-baths; three times they were drenched for half an hour in -freezing water and then made to come up without being dried. In the -morning when the gangs went to work the corpses were strewn over the -ground. I must add that the last of them were finished off with blows -from an axe. - -I now give the most positive testimony of an occurrence which can easily -be verified. Among those 400 men was a captain in the French cavalry, -Captain Dedionne, who today is a major in the Ministry of War. This -captain was among the 400. He owes his life to the fact that he hid -among the corpses and thus escaped the blows of the axe. When the -corpses were taken to the crematorium he managed to get away across the -camp, but not without having received a blow on the shoulder which has -left a mark for life. - -He was caught again by the SS. What saved him was probably the fact that -the SS considered it very funny that a live man should emerge from a -heap of corpses. We took care of him, we helped him, and we brought him -back to France. - -M. DUBOST: Do you know why this execution was carried out? - -LAMPE: Because there were too many people in the camp; because the -prisoners coming from all the camps that were falling back could not be -drafted into working gangs at a quick enough pace. The blocks were -overcrowded. That is the only explanation that was given. - -M. DUBOST: Do you know who gave the order to exterminate the British, -American, and Dutch officers whom you saw put to death in the quarry? - -LAMPE: I believe I said these officers had been condemned to death by -German tribunals. - -M. DUBOST: Yes. - -LAMPE: Probably a few of them had been condemned many months before and -they were taken to Mauthausen for the sentence to be carried out. It is -probable that the order came from Berlin. - -M. DUBOST: Did you know under what conditions the “Revier” (infirmary) -was built? - -LAMPE: Here I have to state that the infirmary was built before my -arrival at the camp. - -M. DUBOST: So you are giving us indirect testimony? - -LAMPE: Yes, indirect testimony. But I heard it from all the internees, -also the SS themselves. The Revier was built by the first Soviet -prisoners who arrived in Mauthausen. Four thousand Soviet soldiers died; -they were murdered, massacred, during the construction of the 8 blocks -of the Revier. These massacres made such a deep impression that the -Revier was always referred to as the “Russen Lager” (Russian Camp). The -SS themselves called the infirmary the Russian camp. - -M. DUBOST: How many Frenchmen were you at Mauthausen? - -LAMPE: There were in Mauthausen and its dependencies about 10,000 -Frenchmen. - -M. DUBOST: How many of you came back? - -LAMPE: Three thousand of us came back. - -M. DUBOST: There were some Spaniards with you also? - -LAMPE: Eight thousand Spaniards arrived in Mauthausen in 1941, towards -the end of the year. When we left, at the end of April 1945, there were -still about 1,600. All the rest had been exterminated. - -M. DUBOST: Where did these Spaniards come from? - -LAMPE: These Spaniards came mostly from labor companies which had been -formed in 1939 and 1940 in France, or else they had been delivered by -the Vichy Government to the Germans direct. - -M. DUBOST: Is this all you have to tell us? - -LAMPE: With the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to cite another -example of atrocity which remains clearly in my memory. This took place -also during September 1944. I am sorry I cannot remember the exact date, -but I do know it was a Saturday, because on Saturday at Mauthausen all -the outside detachments had to answer evening roll call inside the camp. -That took place only on Saturday nights and on Sunday mornings. - -That evening the roll call took longer than usual. Someone was missing. -After a long wait and searches carried out in the various blocks, they -found a Russian, a Soviet prisoner, who perhaps had fallen asleep and -had forgotten to answer roll call. What the reason was we never knew, -but at any rate he was not present at roll call. Immediately the dogs -and the SS went up to the poor wretch, and before the whole camp—I was -in the front row, not because I wanted to be but because we were -arranged like that—we witnessed the fury of the dogs let loose upon -this unfortunate Russian. He was tom to pieces in the presence of the -whole camp. I must add that this man, in spite of his sufferings, faced -his death in a particularly noble manner. - -M. DUBOST: What were the living conditions of the prisoners like? Were -they all treated the same or were they treated differently according to -their origin and nationality or, perhaps according to their ethnic type, -their particular race, shall we say? - -LAMPE: As a general rule the camp regime was the same for all -nationalities, with the exception of the quarantine blocks and the -annexes of the prison. The kind of work we did, the particular units to -which we were attached, sometimes allowed us to get a little more than -usual; for instance, those who worked in the kitchens and those who -worked in the stores certainly did get a little more. - -M. DUBOST: Were, for instance, Jews permitted to work in the kitchens or -the store rooms? - -LAMPE: At Mauthausen the Jews had the hardest tasks of all. I must point -out that, until December 1943, the Jews did not live more than three -months at Mauthausen. There were very few of them at the end. - -M. DUBOST: What happened in that camp after the murder of Heydrich? - -LAMPE: In that connection there was a particularly dramatic episode. At -Mauthausen there were 3,000 Czechs, 600 of whom were intellectuals. -After the murder of Heydrich, the Czech colony in the camp was -exterminated with the exception of 300 out of the 3,000 and six -intellectuals out of the 600 that were in the camp. - -M. DUBOST: Did anyone speak to you of scientific experiments? - -LAMPE: They were commonplace at Mauthausen, as they were in other camps. -But we had evidence which I think has been found: the two skulls which -were used as paper weights by the chief SS medical officer. These were -the skulls of two young Dutch Jews who had been selected from a convoy -of 800 because they had fine teeth. - -To make this selection the SS doctor had led these two young Dutch Jews -to believe that they would not suffer the fate of their comrades of the -convoy. He had said to them “Jews do not live here. I need two strong, -healthy, young men for surgical experiments. You have your choice; -either you offer yourselves for these experiments, or else you will -suffer the fate of the others.” - -These two Jews were taken down to the Revier; one of them had his kidney -removed, the other his stomach. Then they had benzine injected into the -heart and were decapitated. As I said, these two skulls, with the fine -sets of teeth, were on the desk of the chief SS doctor on the day of -liberation. - -M. DUBOST: At the time of Himmler’s visit—I would like to come back to -that question—are you certain that you recognized Himmler and saw him -presiding over the executions? - -LAMPE: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: Do you think that all members of the German Government were -unaware of what was taking place in Mauthausen? The visits you received, -were they visits by the SS simply, or were they visits of other -personalities? - -LAMPE: As regards your first question, we all knew Himmler; and even if -we had not known him, everyone in the camp knew of his visit. Also the -SS told us a few days before that his visit was expected. Himmler was -present at the beginning of the executions of the Soviet officers; but -as I said a little while ago, these executions lasted throughout the -afternoon; and he did not remain until the end. With regard to . . . - -M. DUBOST: Is it possible that only the SS knew what happened in the -camp? Was the camp visited by other personalities than the SS? Did you -know the SS uniforms? The people you saw, the authorities you saw—did -they all wear uniforms? - -LAMPE: The personalities that we saw at the camp were, generally -speaking, soldiers and officers. Some time afterward, a few weeks before -the liberation, we had a visit from the Gauleiter of the Gau Oberdonau. -We also had frequent visits from members of the Gestapo in plain -clothes. The German population, that is, the Austrian population, were -perfectly aware of what was going on at Mauthausen. The working squads -were nearly all for work outside. I said just now that I was working at -Messerschmidt’s. The foremen were mobilized German civilians who, in the -evening, went home to their families. They knew quite well of our -sufferings and privations. They frequently saw men fetched from the shop -to be executed, and they could bear witness to most of the massacres I -mentioned a little while ago. - -I should add that once we received—I am sorry I put it like that—once -there arrived in Mauthausen 30 firemen from Vienna. They were -imprisoned, I think, for having taken part in some sort of workers’ -activity. The firemen from Vienna told us that, when one wanted to -frighten children in Vienna, one said to them, “If you are not good, I -will send you to Mauthausen.” - -Another detail, a more concrete one: Mauthausen Camp is built on a -plateau and every night the chimneys of the crematorium would light up -the whole district, and everyone knew what the crematorium was for. - -Another detail: The town of Mauthausen was situated 5 kilometers from -the camp. The convoys of deportees were brought to the station of the -town. The whole population could see these convoys pass. The whole -population knew in what state these convoys were brought into the camp. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you very much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the Soviet Prosecutor wish to ask any questions? - -GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I should like -to ask a few questions. Can you tell me, Witness, why was the execution -of the 50 Soviet officers ordered? Why were they executed? - -LAMPE: As regards the specific case of these 50 officers, I do not know -the reasons why they were condemned and executed; but as a general rule, -all Soviet officers, all Soviet commissars, or members of the Bolshevist -Party were executed at Mauthausen. If a few among them succeeded in -slipping through, it is because their records were not known to the SS. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You affirm that Himmler was present at the execution of -those 50 Soviet officers? - -LAMPE: I testify to the fact because I saw him with my own eyes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Can you give us more precise details about the execution -of the 4,000 Soviet prisoners of war which you have just mentioned? - -LAMPE: I cannot add much to what I have said, except that these men were -assassinated on the job probably because the work demanded of them was -beyond their strength and they were too underfed to perform these tasks. -They were murdered on the spot by blows with a cudgel or struck down by -the SS; they were driven by the SS to the wire fence and shot down by -the sentinels in the watch towers. I cannot give more details because, -as I said, I was not a witness, an eyewitness. - -GEN. RUDENKO: That is quite clear. And now one more question: Can you -give me a more detailed statement concerning the destruction of the -Czech colony? - -LAMPE: I speak with the same reservation as before. I was not in the -camp at the time of the extermination of the 3,000 Czechs; but the -survivors with whom I spoke in 1944 were unanimous in confirming the -accuracy of these facts, and probably, as far as their own country is -concerned, have drawn up a list of the murdered men. - -GEN. RUDENKO: This means, if I have understood you correctly, that in -the camp where you were interned executions were carried out without -trial or inquiry. Every member of the SS had the right to kill an -internee. Have I understood your statement correctly? - -LAMPE: Yes, that is so. The life of a man at Mauthausen counted for -absolutely nothing. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask -any questions of this witness? . . . Then the witness can retire. -Witness, a moment. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle): Do you know how many guards there -were at the camp? - -LAMPE: The number of the guard varied, but as a general rule there were -1,200 SS and soldiers of the Volkssturm. However, it should be said that -only 50 to 60 SS were authorized to come inside the camp. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they SS men that were authorized to go -into the camp? - -LAMPE: Yes, they were. - -THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All SS men? - -LAMPE: All of them were SS. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you. With your permission, gentlemen, we shall proceed -with the presentation of our case on German atrocities in the western -countries of Europe from 1939 to 1945 by retaining from these -testimonies the particular facts, which all equally constitute crimes -against common law. The general idea, around which we have grouped all -our work and our statement, is that of German terror intentionally -conceived as an instrument for governing all the enslaved peoples. - -We shall remember the testimony brought by this French witness who said -that in Vienna, when one wished to frighten a child, one told it about -Mauthausen. - -The people who were arrested in the western countries were deported to -Germany where they were put into camps or into prisons. The information -that we have concerning the prisons has been taken from the official -report of the Prisoners of War Ministry, which we have already read; it -is the bound volume which was in your hands this morning. In it you will -find, on Page 35, and Page 36 to Page 42, a detailed statement as to -what the prisons were like in Germany. The prison at Cologne is situated -between the freight station and the main station and the Chief -Prosecutor in Cologne, in a report . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: F-274? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor, F-274, on Page 35. The Document was -submitted under Exhibit Number RF-301. The Tribunal will see that the -prison at Cologne, where many Frenchmen were interned, was situated -between the freight station and the main station so that the Chief -Prosecutor in Cologne wrote, in a report which was used by the Ministry -of Deportees and Prisoners of War when compiling the book which is -before you, that the situation of that prison was so dangerous that no -enterprise engaged in war work would undertake to furnish its precious -materials to a factory in this area. The prisoners could not take -shelter during the air attacks. They remained locked in their cells, -even in case of fire. - -The victims of air attacks in the prisons were numerous. The May 1944 -raid claimed 200 victims in the prison at Alexander Platz in Berlin. At -Aachen the buildings were always dirty, damp, and very small; and the -prisoners numbered three or four times as many as the facilities -permitted. In the Münster prison the women who were there in November -1943 lived underground without any air. In Frankfurt the prisoners had -as cells a sort of iron cage, 2 by 1.5 meters. Hygiene was impossible. -At Aachen, as in many other prisons, the prisoners had only one bucket -in the middle of the room, and it was forbidden to empty it during the -day. - -The food ration was extremely small. As a rule, ersatz coffee in the -morning with a thin slice of bread; soup at noon; a thin slice of bread -at night with a little margarine or sausage or jam. - -The prisoners were forced to do extremely heavy work in war industries, -in food factories, in spinning mills. No matter what kind of work it -was, at least twelve hours of labor were required—at Cologne, in -particular, from 7 o’clock in the morning to 9 or 10 o’clock in the -evening, that is to say, 14 or 15 consecutive hours. I am still quoting -from the file of the Public Prosecutor of Cologne, a document, Number -87, sent to us by the Ministry of Prisoners. A shoe factory gave work to -the inmates of 18 German prisons . . . I quote from the same document: - - “Most of the French flatly refused to work in war industries, - for example, the manufacture of gas masks, filing of cast iron - plates, slides for shells, radio or telephone apparatus intended - for the Army. In such cases Berlin gave orders for the - recalcitrants to be sent to punishment camps. An example of this - was the sending of women from Kottbus to Ravensbrück on 13 - November 1944. The Geneva Convention was, of course, not - applied. - - “The political prisoners frequently had to remove unexploded - bombs.” - -This is the official German text of the Public Prosecutor of Cologne. - -There was no medical supervision. There were no prophylactic measures -taken in these prisons in case of epidemics, or else the SS doctor -intentionally gave the wrong instructions. - -At the prison of Dietz-an-der-Lahn, under the eyes of the director, -Gammradt, a former medical officer in the German Army, the SS or SA -guards struck the prisoners. Dysentery, diphtheria, pulmonary diseases, -and pleurisy were not reasons for stopping work; and those who were -dangerously ill were forced to work to the very limit of their strength -and were only admitted to the hospital in exceptional cases. - -There were many petty persecutions. In Aachen the presence of a Jewish -woman prisoner in a cell caused the other prisoners to lose half of -their ration. At Amrasch they had to go to toilets only when ordered. At -Magdeburg recalcitrants had to make one hundred genuflexions before the -guards. Interrogations were carried out in the same manner as in France, -that is, the victims were brutally treated and were given practically no -food. - -At Asperg the doctor had heart injections given to the prisoners so that -they died. At Cologne those condemned to death were perpetually kept in -chains. At Sonnenburg those who were dying were given a greenish liquor -to drink which hastened their death. In Hamburg sick Jews were forced to -dig their own graves until, exhausted, they fell into them. We are still -speaking of French, Belgians, Dutch, Luxembourgers, Danes, or Norwegians -interned in German prisons. These descriptions apply only to citizens of -those countries. In the Börse prison in Berlin, Jewish babies were -massacred before the eyes of their mothers. The sterilization of men is -confirmed by German documents in the file of the Prosecutor of Cologne, -which contains a ruling to the effect that the victims cannot be -reinstated in their military rights. These files also contain documents -which show the role played by children who were in prison. They had to -work inside the prison. A German functionary belonging to the prison -service inquired as to the decision to be taken with regard to a -4-month-old baby, which was brought to the prison at the same time as -its father and mother. - -What kind of people were the prison staff? They were “recruited amongst -the NSKK (National Socialist Motor Corps) and the SA because of their -political views and because they were above suspicion and accustomed to -harsh discipline.” This is also to be found in the file of the Public -Prosecutor at Cologne, Page 39, last paragraph. - -At Rheinbach those condemned to death and to be executed in Cologne were -beaten to death for breaches of discipline. We can easily imagine the -brutality of the men who were in charge of the prisoners. The German -official text will furnish us with details regarding the executions. The -condemned were guillotined. Nearly all the condemned showed surprise, so -say the German documents of which we are giving you a summary, and -expressed their dissatisfaction at being guillotined instead of being -shot for the patriotic deeds of which they were declared guilty. They -thought they deserved to be treated as soldiers. - -Among those executed in Cologne were some young people of eighteen and -nineteen years of age and one woman. Some French women, who were -political prisoners, were taken from the Lübeck prison in order to be -executed in Hamburg. They were nearly always charged with the same -thing, “helping the enemy.” The flies are incomplete, but we have those -of the chief Prosecutor of Cologne. In every case the offenses committed -were of the same nature. Keitel systematically rejected all appeals for -mercy which were submitted to him. - -Although the lot of those who were held in the prisons was very hard and -sometimes terrible, it was infinitely less cruel than the fate of those -Frenchmen who had the misfortune to be interned in the concentration -camps. The Tribunal is well informed about these camps; my colleagues of -the United Nations have presented a long statement on this matter. The -Tribunal will remember that it has already been shown a map indicating -the exact location of every camp which existed in Germany and in the -occupied countries. We shall not, therefore, revert to the geographical -distribution of the camps. - -With the permission of the Tribunal I should now like to deal with the -conditions under which Frenchmen and nationals of the western occupied -countries were taken to these camps. Before their departure the victims -of arbitrary arrests, such as I described to you this morning, were -brought together in prisons or in assembly camps in France. - -The main assembly camp in France was at Compiègne. It is from there that -most of the deportees left who were to be sent to Germany. There were -two other assembly camps, Beaune-La-Rolande and Pithiviers, reserved -especially for Jews, and Drancy. The conditions under which people were -interned in those camps were somewhat similar to those under which -internees in the German prisons lived. With your permission, I shall not -dwell any longer on this. The Tribunal will have taken judicial notice -of the declarations made by M. Blechmann and Mme. Jacob in Document -Number F-457, which I am now lodging as Exhibit Number RF-328. To avoid -making these discussions too long and too ponderous with long quotations -and testimonies which, after all, are very similar, we shall confine -ourselves to reading to the Tribunal a passage from the testimony of -Mme. Jacob concerning the conduct of the German Red Cross. This passage -is to be found at the bottom of Page 4 of the French document: - - “We received a visit from several German personalities, such as - Stülpnagel, Du Paty de Clam, Commissioner for Jewish Questions, - and Colonel Baron Von Berg, Vice President of the German Red - Cross. This Von Berg was very formal and very pompous. He always - wore the small insignia of the Red Cross, which did not prevent - his being inhuman and a thief.” - -And on Page 6, the penultimate paragraph, Colonel Von Berg was, as we -have already said earlier, very pompous. I skip two lines. - - “In spite of his title of Vice President of the German Red - Cross, of which he dared to wear the insignia, he selected at - random a number of our comrades for deportation.” - -Concerning the assembly center of Compiègne, the Tribunal will find, in -Document F-274, Exhibit Number 301, Pages 14 and 15, some details about -the fate of the internees. I do not think it is necessary to read them. - -In Norway, Holland, and Belgium there were, as in France, assembly -camps. The most typical of these camps, and certainly the best known, is -the Breendonck Camp in Belgium, about which it is necessary to give the -Tribunal a few details because a great many Belgians were interned there -and died of privations, hardships, and tortures of all kinds; or were -executed either by shooting or by hanging. - -This camp was established in the Fortress of Breendonck in 1940, and we -are now extracting from a document which we have already deposited under -Document Number F-231 and which is also known under UK-76 (Exhibit -Number RF-329), a few details about the conditions prevailing in that -camp. It is the fourth document in your document book and is entitled -“Report on the Concentration Camp of Breendonck.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What did you say the name of the camp is? - -M. DUBOST: Breendonck, B-r-e-e-n-d-o-n-c-k. - -We will ask the Tribunal to be good enough to grant us a few minutes. -Our duty is to expose in rather more detail the conditions at this camp, -because a considerable number of Belgians were interned there and their -internment took a rather special form. - -The Germans occupied this fort in August 1940, and they brought the -internees there in September. They were Jews. The Belgian Government has -not been able to find out how many people were interned from September -1940 to August 1944, when the camp was evacuated and Belgium liberated. -Nevertheless, it is thought that about 3,000 to 3,600 internees passed -through the camp of Breendonck. About 250 died of privation, 450 were -shot, and 12 were hanged. - -But we must bear in mind the fact that the majority of the prisoners in -Breendonck were transferred at various times to camps in Germany. Most -of these transferred prisoners did not return. There should, therefore, -be added to those who died in Breendonck, all those who did not survive -their captivity in Germany. Various categories of prisoners were taken -into the camp: Jews—for whom the regime was more severe than for the -others—Communists and Marxists, of which there were a good many, in -spite of the fact that those who interrogated them had nothing definite -against them; persons who belonged to the resistance, people who had -been denounced to the Germans, hostages—among them M. Bouchery, former -minister, and M. Van Kesbeek, who was a liberal deputy, were interned -there for ten weeks as a reprisal for the throwing of a grenade on the -main square of Malines. These two died after their liberation as a -result of the ill-treatment which they endured in that camp. - -There were also in that camp some black market operators, and the -Belgian Government says of them that “they were not ill-treated, and -were even given preferential treatment.” That is in Paragraph (e) of -Page 2. - -The prisoners were compelled to work. The most repugnant collective -punishments were inflicted on the slightest pretext. One of these -punishments consisted in forcing the internees to crawl under the beds -and to stand up at command; this was done to the accompaniment of -whipping. You will find that at the top of Page 10. - -In the same page is a description of the conditions of the prisoners who -were isolated from the others and kept in solitary confinement. They -were forced to wear hoods every time they had to leave their cells or -when they had to come in contact with other prisoners. - -THE PRESIDENT: This is a long report, is it not? - -M. DUBOST: That is why I am summarizing it rather than reading it; and I -do not think I can make it any shorter, as it was given to me by the -Belgian Government, which attaches a great importance to the -brutalities, excesses, and atrocities that were committed by the Germans -in the Camp of Breendonck and suffered by the whole of the population, -especially the Belgian elite. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, I understand. You are summarizing it? - -M. DUBOST: I am now summarizing it, Mr. President. I had reached, in my -summary, the description of the life of these prisoners who had been put -into cells and who sometimes wore handcuffs and had shackles on their -feet attached to an iron ring in the wall. They could not leave their -cells without being forced to wear hoods. - -One of these prisoners, M. Paquet, states that he spent eight months -under such a regime; and when, one day, he tried to lift the hood to see -his way, he received a violent blow with the butt of a gun which broke -three vertebrae in his neck. - -Page 12 concerns the following: discipline, labor, acts of brutality, -murders. We are told that the work of the prisoners consisted in -removing the earth covering the fort and carrying it outside the moat. -This work was done by hand. It was very laborious and dangerous and -caused the loss of a great many human lives. Small trucks were used. The -trucks were hurled along the rails by the SS and often broke the legs of -the prisoners who were not warned of their approach. The SS made a game -of this, and at the slightest stoppage of work they would rush at the -internees and beat them. - -On the same page we are told that frequently, for no reason at all, the -prisoners were thrown into the moat surrounding the fort. According to -the report of the Belgian Government, dozens of prisoners were drowned. -Some prisoners were killed after they had been buried up to their necks, -and the SS finished them off by kicking them or beating them with a -stick. Food, clothing, correspondence, and medical care—all this -information is given in this report as in all the other similar reports -which I have already read to you. - -The conclusion is important and should be read in part—second -paragraph: - - “The former internees of Breendonck, many of whom have had - experience of the concentration camps in Germany—Buchenwald, - Neuengamme, Oranienburg—state that, generally speaking, the - conditions prevailing at Breendonck in regard to discipline and - food were worse. They add that in the camps in Germany, which - were more crowded, they felt less under the domination of their - guards and had the feeling that their lives were less in - danger.” - -The figures given in this report are only minimum figures. To give but -one example (last paragraph of the last page), M. Verheirstraeten -declares that he put 120 people in their coffins during the two months -of December 1942 and January 1943. If one bears in mind the executions -of the 6th and 13th of January, each of which accounted for the lives of -20 persons, we see that at that time, that is to say, over a period of -two months, 80 persons died of disease or ill-treatment. From these -camps the internees were transported to Germany in convoys, and a -description of these should be given to the Tribunal. - -The Tribunal should know, first of all, that from France alone, -excluding the three Departments of the Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, and Moselle, -326 convoys left between 1 January 1944 and 25 August of the same year, -that is to say, an average of ten convoys a week. Now each convoy -transported from 1,000 to 2,000 persons; and we know now, from what our -witness said just now, that each truck carried from 60 to 120 -individuals. It appears that there left from France, excluding the -above-mentioned three northern departments, 3 convoys in 1940, 19 -convoys in 1941, 104 convoys in 1942, and 257 convoys in 1943. These are -the figures given in the documents submitted under Number F-274, Exhibit -Number RF-301, Page 14. These convoys nearly always left from the -Compiègne Camp where more than 50,000 internees were registered and from -there 78 convoys left in 1943 and 95 convoys in 1944. - -The purpose of these deportations was to terrorize the populations. The -Tribunal will remember the text already read; how the families, not -knowing what became of the internees, were seized with terror and -advantage was taken of this to round-up more workers to help German -labor which had become depleted owing to the war with Russia. - -The manner in which these deportations were carried out not only made it -possible more or less to select this labor; but it constituted the first -stage of a new aspect of German policy, that is, purely and simply the -extermination of all racial or intellectual categories whose political -activity appeared as a menace to the Nazi leaders. - -These deportees, who were locked up 80 or 120 in each truck, in any -season, could neither sit nor crouch and were given nothing whatsoever -to eat or drink during their journey. In this connection we would -particularly like to bring Dr. Steinberg’s testimony taken by Lieutenant -Colonel Badin of the Office for Inquiry into War Crimes in Paris, -Document Number F-392, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-330, which -is the 12th in your document book. We will read only a few paragraphs on -Page 2: - - “We were crowded into cattle trucks, about 70 in each. Sanitary - conditions were frightful. Our journey lasted two days. We - reached Auschwitz on 24 June 1942. It should be noted that we - had been given no food at all when we left and that we had to - live during those two days on what little food we had taken with - us from Drancy.” - -The deportees were at times refused water by the German Red Cross. -Evidence was taken by the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees, and this -appears in Document RF-301, Page 18. It is about a convoy of Jewish -women which left Bobigny station on 19 June 1942: - - “They travelled for three days and three nights, dying of - thirst. At Breslau they begged the nurses of the German Red - Cross to give them a little water, but in vain.” - -Moreover, Lieutenant Geneste and Dr. Bloch have testified to the same -facts and other different facts; and in Document Number F-321, Exhibit -Number RF-331, entitled “Concentration Camps,” which we have been able -to submit to you in French, Russian, and German, the English version -having been exhausted, on Page 21, you will find, “In the station of -Bremen water was refused to us by the German Red Cross, who said that -there was no water.” This is the testimony by Lieutenant Geneste of -O.R.C.G. Concerning this conduct of the German Red Cross and to finish -dealing with the subject, there is one more word to be said. Document -RF-331 gives you, on Page 162, the proof that that was an ambulance car -bearing a red cross which carried gas in iron containers destined for -the gas chambers of Auschwitz Camp. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until Monday. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 28 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FORTY-FOURTH DAY - Monday, 28 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -M. DUBOST: With the authorization of the Court, I should like to proceed -with this part of the presentation of the French case by hearing a -witness who, for more than 3 years, lived in German concentration camps. - -[_The witness, Mme. Vaillant-Couturier, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you stand up, please? Do you wish to swear the -French oath? Will you tell me your name? - -MADAME MARIE CLAUDE VAILLANT-COUTURIER (Witness): Claude -Vaillant-Couturier. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear that I will -speak without hate or fear, that I will tell the truth, all the truth, -nothing but the truth. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in French._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Raise your right hand and say, “I swear.” - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I swear. - -THE PRESIDENT: Please, will you sit down and speak slowly. Your name is? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Vaillant-Couturier, Marie, Claude, Vögel. - -M. DUBOST: Is your name Madame Vaillant-Couturier? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: You are the widow of M. Vaillant-Couturier? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: You were born in Paris on 3 November 1912? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: And you are of French nationality, French born, and of -parents who were of French nationality? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: You are a deputy in the Constituent Assembly? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: You are a Knight of the Legion of Honor? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: You have just been decorated by General Legentilhomme at the -Invalides? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: Were you arrested and deported? Will you please give your -testimony? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I was arrested on 9 February 1942 by Petain’s -French police, who handed me over to the German authorities after 6 -weeks. I arrived on 20 March at Santé prison in the German quarter. I -was questioned on 9 June 1942. At the end of my interrogation they -wanted me to sign a statement which was not consistent with what I had -said. I refused to sign it. The officer who had questioned me threatened -me; and when I told him that I was not afraid of death nor of being -shot, he said, “But we have at our disposal means for killing that are -far worse than merely shooting.” And the interpreter said to me, “You do -not know what you have just done. You are going to leave for a -concentration camp in Germany. One never comes back from there.” - -M. DUBOST: You were then taken to prison? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I was taken back to the Santé prison where I -was placed in solitary confinement. However, I was able to communicate -with my neighbors through the piping and the windows. I was in a cell -next to that of Georges Politzer, the philosopher, and Jacques Solomon, -physicist. Mr. Solomon is the son-in-law of Professor Langevin, a pupil -of Curie, one of the first to study atomic disintegration. - -Georges Politzer told me through the piping that during his -interrogation, after having been tortured, he was asked whether he would -write theoretical pamphlets for National Socialism. When he refused, he -was told that he would be in the first train of hostages to be shot. - -As for Jacques Solomon, he also was horribly tortured and then thrown -into a dark cell and came out only on the day of his execution to say -goodbye to his wife, who also was under arrest at the Santé. Hélène -Solomon-Langevin told me in Romainville, where I found her when I left -the Santé, that when she went to her husband he moaned and said, “I -cannot take you in my arms, because I can no longer move them.” - -Every time that the internees came back from their questioning one could -hear moaning through the windows, and they all said that they could not -make any movements. - -Several times during the 5 months I spent at the Santé hostages were -taken to be shot. When I left the Santé on 20 August 1942, I was taken -to the Fortress of Romainville, which was a camp for hostages. There I -was present on two occasions when they took hostages, on 21 August and -22 September. Among the hostages who were taken away were the husbands -of the women who were with me and who left for Auschwitz. Most of them -died there. These women, for the most part, had been arrested only -because of the activity of their husbands. They themselves had done -nothing. - -M. DUBOST: When did you leave for Auschwitz? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I left for Auschwitz on 23 January 1943, and -arrived there on the 27th. - -M. DUBOST: Were you with a convoy? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I was with a convoy of 230 French women; among -us were Danielle Casanova who died in Auschwitz, Maï Politzer who died -in Auschwitz, and Hélène Solomon. There were some elderly women . . . - -M. DUBOST: What was their social position? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: They were intellectuals, school teachers; they -came from all walks of life. Maï Politzer was a doctor, and the wife of -the philosopher Georges Politzer. Hélène Solomon is the wife of the -physicist Solomon; she is the daughter of Professor Langevin. Danielle -Casanova was a dental surgeon and she was very active among the women. -It is she who organized a resistance movement among the wives of -prisoners. - -M. DUBOST: How many of you came back out of 230? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Forty-nine. In the convoy there were some -elderly women. I remember one who was 67 and had been arrested because -she had in her kitchen the shotgun of her husband, which she kept as a -souvenir and had not declared because she did not want it to be taken -from her. She died after a fortnight at Auschwitz. - -THE PRESIDENT: When you said only 49 came back, did you mean only 49 -arrived at Auschwitz. - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No, only 49 came back to France. - -There were also cripples, among them a singer who had only one leg. She -was taken out and gassed at Auschwitz. There was also a young girl of -16, a college girl, Claudine Guérin; she also died at Auschwitz. There -were also two women who had been acquitted by the German military -tribunal, Marie Alonzo and Marie-Thérèse Fleuri; they died at Auschwitz. - -It was a terrible journey. We were 60 in a car and we were given no food -or drink during the journey. At the various stopping places we asked the -Lorraine soldiers of the Wehrmacht who were guarding us whether we would -arrive soon; and they replied, “If you knew where you are going you -would not be in a hurry to get there.” - -We arrived at Auschwitz at dawn. The seals on our cars were broken, and -we were driven out by blows with the butt end of a rifle, and taken to -the Birkenau Camp, a section of the Auschwitz Camp. It is situated in -the middle of a great plain, which was frozen in the month of January. -During this part of the journey we had to drag our luggage. As we passed -through the door we knew only too well how slender our chances were that -we would come out again, for we had already met columns of living -skeletons going to work; and as we entered we sang “The Marseillaise” to -keep up our courage. - -We were led to a large shed, then to the disinfecting station. There our -heads were shaved and our registration numbers were tattooed on the left -forearm. Then we were taken into a large room for a steam bath and a -cold shower. In spite of the fact that we were naked, all this took -place in the presence of SS men and women. We were then given clothing -which was soiled and torn, a cotton dress and jacket of the same -material. - -As all this had taken several hours, we saw from the windows of the -block where we were, the camp of the men; and toward the evening an -orchestra came in. It was snowing and we wondered why they were playing -music. We then saw that the camp foremen were returning to the camp. -Each foreman was followed by men who were carrying the dead. As they -could hardly drag themselves along, every time they stumbled they were -put on their feet again by being kicked or by blows with the butt end of -a rifle. - -After that we were taken to the block where we were to live. There were -no beds but only bunks, measuring 2 by 2 meters, and there nine of us -had to sleep the first night without any mattress or blanket. We -remained in blocks of this kind for several months. We could not sleep -all night, because every time one of the nine moved—this happened -unceasingly because we were all ill—she disturbed the whole row. - -At 3:30 in the morning the shouting of the guards woke us up, and with -cudgel blows we were driven from our bunks to go to roll call. Nothing -in the world could release us from going to the roll call; even those -who were dying had to be dragged there. We had to stand there in rows of -five until dawn, that is, 7 or 8 o’clock in the morning in winter; and -when there was a fog, sometimes until noon. Then the commandos would -start on their way to work. - -M. DUBOST: Excuse me, can you describe the roll call? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: For roll call we were lined up in rows of five; -and we waited until daybreak, until the Aufseherinnen, the German women -guards in uniform, came to count us. They had cudgels and they beat us -more or less at random. - -We had a comrade, Germaine Renaud, a school teacher from Azay-le-Rideau -in France, who had her skull broken before my eyes from a blow with a -cudgel during the roll call. - -The work at Auschwitz consisted of clearing demolished houses, road -building, and especially the draining of marsh land. This was by far the -hardest work, for all day long we had our feet in the water and there -was the danger of being sucked down. It frequently happened that we had -to pull out a comrade who had sunk in up to the waist. - -During the work the SS men and women who stood guard over us would beat -us with cudgels and set their dogs on us. Many of our friends had their -legs torn by the dogs. I even saw a woman torn to pieces and die under -my very eyes when Tauber, a member of the SS, encouraged his dog to -attack her and grinned at the sight. - -The causes of death were extremely numerous. First of all, there was the -complete lack of washing facilities. When we arrived at Auschwitz, for -12,000 internees there was only one tap of water, unfit for drinking, -and it was not always flowing. As this tap was in the German wash house -we could reach it only by passing through the guards, who were German -common-law women prisoners, and they beat us horribly as we went by. It -was therefore almost impossible to wash ourselves or our clothes. For -more than 3 months we remained without changing our clothes. When there -was snow, we melted some to wash in. Later, in the spring, when we went -to work we would drink from a puddle by the road-side and then wash our -underclothes in it. We took turns washing our hands in this dirty water. -Our companions were dying of thirst, because we got only half a cup of -some herbal tea twice a day. - -M. DUBOST: Please describe in detail one of the roll calls at the -beginning of February. - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: On 5 February there was what is called a -general roll call. - -M. DUBOST: In what year was that? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: In 1943. At 3:30 the whole camp . . . - -M. DUBOST: In the morning at 3:30? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: In the morning at 3:30 the whole camp was -awakened and sent out on the plain, whereas normally the roll call was -at 3:30 but inside the camp. We remained out in front of the camp until -5 in the afternoon, in the snow, without any food. Then when the signal -was given we had to go through the door one by one, and we were struck -in the back with a cudgel, each one of us, in order to make us run. -Those who could not run, either because they were too old or too ill -were caught by a hook and taken to Block 25, “waiting block” for the gas -chamber. On that day 10 of the French women of our convoy were thus -caught and taken to Block 25. - -When all the internees were back in the camp, a party to which I -belonged was organized to go and pick up the bodies of the dead which -were scattered over the plain as on a battlefield. We carried to the -yard of Block 25 the dead and the dying without distinction, and they -remained there stacked up in a pile. - -This Block 25, which was the anteroom of the gas chamber, if one may -express it so, is well known to me because at that time we had been -transferred to Block 26 and our windows opened on the yard of Number 25. -One saw stacks of corpses piled up in the courtyard, and from time to -time a hand or a head would stir among the bodies, trying to free -itself. It was a dying woman attempting to get free and live. The rate -of mortality in that block was even more terrible than elsewhere -because, having been condemned to death, they received food or drink -only if there was something left in the cans in the kitchen; which means -that very often they went for several days without a drop of water. - -One of our companions, Annette Épaux, a fine young woman of 30, passing -the block one day, was overcome with pity for those women who moaned -from morning till night in all languages, “Drink. Drink. Water!” She -came back to our block to get a little herbal tea, but as she was -passing it through the bars of the window she was seen by the -Aufseherin, who took her by the neck and threw her into Block 25. All my -life I will remember Annette Épaux. Two days later I saw her on the -truck which was taking the internees to the gas chamber. She had her -arms around another French woman, old Line Porcher, and when the truck -started moving she cried, “Think of my little boy, if you ever get back -to France.” Then they started singing “The Marseillaise.” - -In Block 25, in the courtyard, there were rats as big as cats running -about and gnawing the corpses and even attacking the dying who had not -enough strength left to chase them away. - -Another cause of mortality and epidemics was the fact that we were given -food in large red mess tins, which were merely rinsed in cold water -after each meal. As all the women were ill and had not the strength -during the night to go to the trench which was used as a lavatory, the -access to which was beyond description, they used these containers for a -purpose for which they were not meant. The next day the mess tins were -collected and taken to a refuse heap. During the day another team would -come and collect them, wash them in cold water, and put them in use -again. - -Another cause of death was the problem of shoes. In the snow and mud of -Poland leather shoes were completely destroyed at the end of a week or -two. Therefore our feet were frozen and covered with sores. We had to -sleep with our muddy shoes on, lest they be stolen, and when the time -came to get up for roll call cries of anguish could be heard: “My shoes -have been stolen.” Then one had to wait until the whole block had been -emptied to look under the bunks for odd shoes. Sometimes one found two -shoes for the same foot, or one shoe and one sabot. One could go to roll -call like that but it was an additional torture for work, because sores -formed on our feet which quickly became infected for lack of care. Many -of our companions went to the Revier for sores on their feet and legs -and never came back. - -M. DUBOST: What did they do to the internees who came to roll call -without shoes? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: The Jewish internees who came without shoes -were immediately taken to Block 25. - -M. DUBOST: They were gassed then? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: They were gassed for any reason whatsoever. -Their conditions were moreover absolutely appalling. Although we were -crowded 800 in a block and could scarcely move, they were 1,500 to a -block of similar dimensions, so that many of them could not sleep or -even lie down during the whole night. - -M. DUBOST: Can you talk about the Revier? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: To reach the Revier one had to go first to the -roll call. Whatever the state was . . . - -M. DUBOST: Would you please explain what the Revier was in the camp? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: The Revier was the blocks where the sick were -put. This place could not be given the name of hospital, because it did -not correspond in any way to our idea of a hospital. - -To go there one had first to obtain authorization from the block chief -who seldom gave it. When it was finally granted we were led in columns -to the infirmary where, no matter what weather, whether it snowed or -rained, even if one had a temperature of 40° (centigrade) one had to -wait for several hours standing in a queue to be admitted. It frequently -happened that patients died outside before the door of the infirmary, -before they could get in. Moreover, lining up in front of the infirmary -was dangerous because if the queue was too long the SS came along, -picked up all the women who were waiting, and took them straight to -Block Number 25. - -M. DUBOST: That is to say, to the gas chamber? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: That is to say to the gas chamber. That is why -very often the women preferred not to go to the Revier and they died at -their work or at roll call. Every day, after the evening roll call in -winter time, dead were picked up who had fallen into the ditches. - -The only advantage of the Revier was that as one was in bed, one did not -have to go to roll call; but one lay in appalling conditions, four in a -bed of less than 1 meter in width, each suffering from a different -disease, so that anyone who came for leg sores would catch typhus or -dysentery from neighbors. The straw mattresses were dirty and they were -changed only when absolutely rotten. The bedding was so full of lice -that one could see them swarming like ants. One of my companions, -Marguerite Corringer, told me that when she had typhus, she could not -sleep all night because of the lice. She spent the night shaking her -blanket over a piece of paper and emptying the lice into a receptacle by -the bed, and this went on for hours. - -There were practically no medicines. Consequently the patients were left -in their beds without any attention, without hygiene, and unwashed. The -dead lay in bed with the sick for several hours; and finally, when they -were noticed, they were simply tipped out of the bed and taken outside -the block. There the women porters would come and carry the dead away on -small stretchers, with heads and legs dangling over the sides. From -morning till night the carriers of the dead went from the Revier to the -mortuary. - -During the big epidemics, in the winters of 1943 and 1944, the -stretchers were replaced by carts, as there were too many dead bodies. -During those periods of epidemics there were from 200 to 350 dead daily. - -M. DUBOST: How many people died at that time? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: During the big epidemics of typhus in the -winters of 1943 and 1944, from 200 to 350; it depended on the days. - -M. DUBOST: Was the Revier open to all the internees? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No. When we arrived Jewish women had not the -right to be admitted. They were taken straight to the gas chamber. - -M. DUBOST: Would you please tell us about the disinfection of the -blocks? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: From time to time, owing to the filth which -caused the lice and gave rise to so many epidemics, they disinfected the -blocks with gas; but these disinfections were also the cause of many -deaths because, while the blocks were being disinfected with gas, the -prisoners were taken to the shower-baths. Their clothes were taken away -from them to be steamed. The internees were left naked outside, waiting -for their clothing to come back from the steaming, and then they were -given back to them all wet. Even those who were sick, who could barely -stand on their feet, were sent to the showers. It is quite obvious that -a great many of them died in the course of these proceedings. Those who -could not move were washed all in the same bath during the disinfection. - -M. DUBOST: How were you fed? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: We had 200 grams of bread, three-quarters or -half a liter—it varied—of soup made from swedes, and a few grams of -margarine or a slice of sausage in the evening, this daily. - -M. DUBOST: Regardless of the work that was exacted from the internees? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Regardless of the work that was exacted from -the internee. Some who had to work in the factory of the “Union,” an -ammunition factory where they made grenades and shells, received what -was called a “Zulage,” that is, a supplementary ration, when the amount -of their production was satisfactory. Those internees had to go to roll -call morning and night as we did, and they were at work 12 hours in the -factory. They came back to the camp after the day’s work, making the -journey both ways on foot. - -M. DUBOST: What was this “Union” factory? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: It was an ammunition factory. I do not know to -what company it belonged. It was called, the “Union.” - -M. DUBOST: Was it the only factory? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No, there was also, a large Buna factory, but -as I did not work there I do not know what was made there. The internees -who were taken to the Buna plant never came back to our camp. - -M. DUBOST: Will you tell us about experiments, if you witnessed any? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: As to the experiments, I have seen in the -Revier, because I was employed at the Revier, the queue of young -Jewesses from Salonika who stood waiting in front of the X-ray room for -sterilization. I also know that they performed castration operations in -the men’s camp. Concerning the experiments performed on women I am well -informed, because my friend, Doctor Hadé Hautval of Montbéliard, who has -returned to France, worked for several months in that block nursing the -patients; but she always refused to participate in those experiments. -They sterilized women either by injections or by operation or with rays. -I saw and knew several women who had been sterilized. There was a very -high mortality rate among those operated upon. Fourteen Jewesses from -France who refused to be sterilized were sent to a Strafarbeit kommando, -that is, hard labor. - -M. DUBOST: Did they come back from those kommandos? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Very seldom. Quite exceptionally. - -M. DUBOST: What was the aim of the SS? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Sterilization—they did not conceal it. They -said that they were trying to find the best method for sterilizing so as -to replace the native population in the occupied countries by Germans -after one generation, once they had made use of the inhabitants as -slaves to work for them. - -M. DUBOST: In the Revier did you see any pregnant women? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. The Jewish women, when they arrived in the -first months of pregnancy, were subjected to abortion. When their -pregnancy was near the end, after confinement, the babies were drowned -in a bucket of water. I know that because I worked in the Revier and the -woman who was in charge of that task was a German midwife, who was -imprisoned for having performed illegal operations. After a while -another doctor arrived and for 2 months they did not kill the Jewish -babies. But one day an order came from Berlin saying that again they had -to be done away with. Then the mothers and their babies were called to -the infirmary. They were put in a lorry and taken away to the gas -chamber. - -M. DUBOST: Why did you say that an order came from Berlin? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Because I knew the internees who worked in the -secretariat of the SS and in particular a Slovakian woman by the name of -Hertha Roth, who is now working with UNRRA at Bratislava. - -M. DUBOST: Is it she who told you that? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes, and moreover, I also knew the men who -worked in the gas kommando. - -M. DUBOST: You have told us about the Jewish mothers. Were there other -mothers in your camp? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes, in principle, non-Jewish women were -allowed to have their babies, and the babies were not taken away from -them; but conditions in the camp being so horrible, the babies rarely -lived for more than 4 or 5 weeks. - -There was one block where the Polish and Russian mothers were. One day -the Russian mothers, having been accused of making too much noise, had -to stand for roll call all day long in front of the block, naked, with -their babies in their arms. - -M. DUBOST: What was the disciplinary system of the camp? Who kept order -and discipline? What were the punishments? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Generally speaking, the SS economized on many -of their own personnel by employing internees for watching the camp; SS -only supervised. These internees were chosen from German common-law -criminals and prostitutes, and sometimes those of other nationalities, -but most of them were Germans. By corruption, accusation, and terror -they succeeded in making veritable human beasts of them; and the -internees had as much cause to complain about them as about the SS -themselves. They beat us just as hard as the SS; and as to the SS, the -men behaved like the women and the women were as savage as the men. -There was no difference. - -The system employed by the SS of degrading human beings to the utmost by -terrorizing them and causing them through fear to commit acts which made -them ashamed of themselves, resulted in their being no longer human. -This was what they wanted. It took a great deal of courage to resist -this atmosphere of terror and corruption. - -M. DUBOST: Who meted out punishments? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: The SS leaders, men and women. - -M. DUBOST: What was the nature of the punishments? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Bodily ill-treatment in particular. One of the -most usual punishments, was 50 blows with a stick on the loins. They -were administered with a machine which I saw, a swinging apparatus -manipulated by an SS. There were also endless roll calls day and night, -or gymnastics; flat on the belly, get up, lie down, up, down, for hours, -and anyone who fell was beaten unmercifully and taken to Block 25. - -M. DUBOST: How did the SS behave towards the women? And the women SS? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: At Auschwitz there was a brothel for the SS and -also one for the male internees of the staff, who were called “Kapo.” -Moreover, when the SS needed servants, they came accompanied by the -Oberaufseherin, that is, the woman commandant of the camp, to make a -choice during the process of disinfection. They would point to a young -girl, whom the Oberaufseherin would take out of the ranks. They would -look her over and make jokes about her physique; and if she was pretty -and they liked her, they would hire her as a maid with the consent of -the Oberaufseherin, who would tell her that she was to obey them -absolutely no matter what they asked of her. - -M. DUBOST: Why did they go during disinfection? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Because during the disinfection the women were -naked. - -M. DUBOST: This system of demoralization and corruption—was it -exceptional? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No, the system was identical in all the camps -where I have been, and I have spoken to internees coming from camps -where I myself had never been; it was the same thing everywhere. The -system was identical no matter what the camp was. There were, however, -certain variations. I believe that Auschwitz was one of the harshest; -but later I went to Ravensbrück, where there also was a house of ill -fame and where recruiting was also carried out among the internees. - -M. DUBOST: Then, according to you, everything was done to degrade those -women in their own sight? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: What do you know about the convoy of Jews which arrived from -Romainville about the same time as yourself? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: When we left Romainville the Jewesses who were -there at the same time as ourselves were left behind. They were sent to -Drancy and subsequently arrived at Auschwitz, where we found them again -3 weeks later, 3 weeks after our arrival. Of the original 1,200 only 125 -actually came to the camp; the others were immediately sent to the gas -chambers. Of these 125 not one was left alive at the end of 1 month. - -The transports operated as follows: - -When we first arrived, whenever a convoy of Jews came, a selection was -made; first the old men and women, then the mothers and the children -were put into trucks together with the sick or those whose constitution -appeared to be delicate. They took in only the young women and girls as -well as the young men who were sent to the men’s camp. - -Generally speaking, of a convoy of about 1,000 to 1,500, seldom more -than 250—and this figure really was the maximum—actually reached the -camp. The rest were immediately sent to the gas chamber. - -At this selection also, they picked out women in good health between the -ages of 20 and 30, who were sent to the experimental block; and young -girls and slightly older women, or those who had not been selected for -that purpose, were sent to the camp where, like ourselves, they were -tattooed and shaved. - -There was also, in the spring of 1944, a special block for twins. It was -during the time when large convoys of Hungarian Jews—about -700,000—arrived. Dr. Mengele, who was carrying out the experiments, -kept back from each convoy twin children and twins in general, -regardless of their age, so long as both were present. So we had both -babies and adults on the floor at that block. Apart from blood tests and -measuring I do not know what was done to them. - -M. DUBOST: Were you an eye witness of the selections on the arrival of -the convoys? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes, because when we worked at the sewing block -in 1944, the block where we lived directly faced the stopping place of -the trains. The system had been improved. Instead of making the -selection at the place where they arrived, a side line now took the -train practically right up to the gas chamber; and the stopping place, -about 100 meters from the gas chamber, was right opposite our block -though, of course, separated from us by two rows of barbed wire. -Consequently, we saw the unsealing of the cars and the soldiers letting -men, women, and children out of them. We then witnessed heart-rending -scenes; old couples forced to part from each other, mothers made to -abandon their young daughters, since the latter were sent to the camp, -whereas mothers and children were sent to the gas chambers. All these -people were unaware of the fate awaiting them. They were merely upset at -being separated, but they did not know that they were going to their -death. To render their welcome more pleasant at this time—June-July -1944—an orchestra composed of internees, all young and pretty girls -dressed in little white blouses and navy blue skirts, played during the -selection, at the arrival of the trains, gay tunes such as “The Merry -Widow,” the “Barcarolle” from “The Tales of Hoffman,” and so forth. They -were then informed that this was a labor camp and since they were not -brought into the camp they saw only the small platform surrounded by -flowering plants. Naturally, they could not realize what was in store -for them. Those selected for the gas chamber, that is, the old people, -mothers, and children, were escorted to a red-brick building. - -M. DUBOST: These were not given an identification number? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No. - -M. DUBOST: They were not tattooed? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No. They were not even counted. - -M. DUBOST: You were tattooed? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes, look. [_The witness showed her arm._] They -were taken to a red brick building, which bore the letters “Baden,” that -is to say “Baths.” There, to begin with, they were made to undress and -given a towel before they went into the so-called shower room. Later on, -at the time of the large convoys from Hungary, they had no more time -left to play-actor to pretend; they were brutally undressed, and I know -these details as I knew a little Jewess from France who lived with her -family at the “République” district. - -M. DUBOST: In Paris? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: In Paris. She was called “little Marie” and she -was the only one, the sole survivor of a family of nine. Her mother and -her seven brothers and sisters had been gassed on arrival. When I met -her she was employed to undress the babies before they were taken into -the gas chamber. Once the people were undressed they took them into a -room which was somewhat like a shower room, and gas capsules were thrown -through an opening in the ceiling. An SS man would watch the effect -produced through a porthole. At the end of 5 or 7 minutes, when the gas -had completed its work, he gave the signal to open the doors; and men -with gas masks—they too were internees—went into the room and removed -the corpses. They told us that the internees must have suffered before -dying, because they were closely clinging to one another and it was very -difficult to separate them. - -After that a special squad would come to pull out gold teeth and -dentures; and again, when the bodies had been reduced to ashes, they -would sift them in an attempt to recover the gold. - -At Auschwitz there were eight crematories but, as from 1944, these -proved insufficient. The SS had large pits dug by the internees, where -they put branches, sprinkled with gasoline, which they set on fire. Then -they threw the corpses into the pits. From our block we could see after -about three-quarters of an hour or an hour after the arrival of a -convoy, large flames coming from the crematory, and the sky was lighted -up by the burning pits. - -One night we were awakened by terrifying cries. And we discovered, on -the following day, from the men working in the Sonderkommando—the “Gas -Kommando”—that on the preceding day, the gas supply having run out, -they had thrown the children into the furnaces alive. - -M. DUBOST: Can you tell us about the selections that were made at the -beginning of winter? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Every year, towards the end of the autumn, they -proceeded to make selections on a large scale in the Revier. The system -appeared to work as follows—I say this because I noticed the fact for -myself during the time I spent in Auschwitz. Others, who had stayed -there even longer than I, had observed the same phenomenon. - -In the spring, all through Europe, they rounded up men and women whom -they sent to Auschwitz. They kept only those who were strong enough to -work all through the summer. During that period naturally some died -every day; but the strongest, those who had succeeded in holding out for -6 months, were so exhausted that they too had to go to the Revier. It -was then in autumn that the large scale selections were made, so as not -to feed too many useless mouths during the winter. All the women who -were too thin were sent to the gas chamber, as well as those who had -long, drawn-out illnesses; but the Jewesses were gassed for practically -no reason at all. For instance, they gassed everybody in the “scabies -block,” whereas everybody knows that with a little care, scabies can be -cured in 3 days. I remember the typhus convalescent block from which 450 -out of 500 patients were sent to the gas chamber. - -During Christmas 1944—no, 1943, Christmas 1943—when we were in -quarantine, we saw, since we lived opposite Block 25, women brought to -Block 25 stripped naked. Uncovered trucks were then driven up and on -them the naked women were piled, as many as the trucks could hold. Each -time a truck started, the infamous Hessler—he was one of the criminals -condemned to death at the Lüneburg trials—ran after the truck and with -his bludgeon repeatedly struck the naked women going to their death. -They knew they were going to the gas chamber and tried to escape. They -were massacred. They attempted to jump from the truck and we, from our -own block, watched the trucks pass by and heard the grievous wailing of -all those women who knew they were going to be gassed. Many of them -could very well have lived on, since they were suffering only from -scabies and were, perhaps, a little too undernourished. - -M. DUBOST: You told us, Madame, a little while ago, that the deportees, -from the moment they stepped off the train and without even being -counted, were sent to the gas chamber. What happened to their clothing -and their luggage? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: The non-Jews had to carry their own luggage and -were billeted in separate blocks, but when the Jews arrived they had to -leave all their belongings on the platform. They were stripped before -entering the gas chamber and all their clothes, as well as all their -belongings, were taken over to large barracks and there sorted out by a -Kommando named “Canada.” Then everything was shipped to Germany: -jewelry, fur coats, _et cetera_. - -Since the Jewesses were sent to Auschwitz with their entire families and -since they had been told that this was a sort of ghetto and were advised -to bring all their goods and chattels along, they consequently brought -considerable riches with them. As for the Jewesses from Salonika, I -remember that on their arrival they were given picture postcards, -bearing the post office address of “Waldsee,” a place which did not -exist; and a printed text to be sent to their families, stating, “We are -doing very well here; we have work and we are well treated. We await -your arrival.” I myself saw the cards in question; and the -Schreiberinnen, that is, the secretaries of the block, were instructed -to distribute them among the internees in order to post them to their -families. I know that whole families arrived as a result of these -postcards. - -I myself know that the following affair occurred in Greece. I do not -know whether it happened in any other country, but in any case it did -occur in Greece (as well as in Czechoslovakia) that whole families went -to the recruiting office at Salonika in order to rejoin their families. -I remember one professor of literature from Salonika, who, to his -horror, saw his own father arrive. - -M. DUBOST: Will you tell us about the Gypsy camps? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Right next to our camp, on the other side of -the barbed wires, 3 meters apart, there were two camps; one for Gypsies, -which towards August 1944 was completely gassed. These Gypsies came from -all parts of Europe including Germany. Likewise on the other side there -was the so-called family camp. These were Jews from the Ghetto of -Theresienstadt, who had been brought there and, unlike ourselves, they -had been neither tattooed nor shaved. Their clothes were not taken from -them and they did not have to work. They lived like this for 6 months -and at the end of 6 months the entire family camp, amounting to some -6,000 or 7,000 Jews, was gassed. A few days later other large convoys -again arrived from Theresienstadt with their families and 6 months later -they too were gassed, like the first inmates of the family camp. - -M. DUBOST: Would you, Madame, please give us some details as to what you -saw when you were about to leave the camp, and under what circumstances -you left it? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: We were in quarantine before leaving Auschwitz. - -M. DUBOST: When was that? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: We were in quarantine for 10 months, from the -15th of July 1943, yes, until May 1944. And after that we returned to -the camp for 2 months. Then we went to Ravensbrück. - -M. DUBOST: These were all French women from your convoy, who had -survived? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes, all the surviving French women of our -convoy. We had heard from Jewesses who had arrived from France, in July -1944, that an intensive campaign had been carried out by the British -Broadcasting Corporation in London, in connection with our convoy, -mentioning Maï Politzer, Danielle Casanova, Hélène Solomon-Langevin, and -myself. As a result of this broadcast we knew that orders had been -issued, from Berlin to the effect that French women should be -transported under better conditions. - -So we were placed in quarantine. This was a block situated opposite the -camp and outside the barbed wire. I must say that it is to this -quarantine that the 49 survivors owed their lives, because at the end of -4 months there were only 52 of us. Therefore it is certain that we could -not have survived 18 months of this regime had we not had these 10 -months of quarantine. - -This quarantine was imposed because exanthematic typhus was raging at -Auschwitz. One could leave the camp only to be freed or to be -transferred to another camp or to be summoned before the court after -spending 15 days in quarantine, these 15 days being the incubation -period for exanthematic typhus. Consequently, as soon as the papers -arrived announcing that the internee would probably be liberated, she -was placed in quarantine until the order for her liberation was signed. -This sometimes took several months and 15 days was the minimum. - -Now a policy existed for freeing German women common-law criminals and -asocial elements in order to employ them as workers in the German -factories. It is therefore impossible to imagine that the whole of -Germany was unaware of the existence of the concentration camps and of -what was going on there, since these women had been released from the -camps and it is difficult to believe that they never mentioned them. -Besides, in the factories where the former internees were employed, the -Vorarbeiterinnen (the forewomen) were German civilians in contact with -the internees and able to speak to them. The forewomen from Auschwitz, -who subsequently came to Siemens at Ravensbrück as Aufseherinnen, had -been former workers at Siemens in Berlin. They met forewomen they had -known in Berlin, and, in our presence, they told them what they had seen -at Auschwitz. It is therefore incredible that this was not known in -Germany. - -We could not believe our eyes when we left Auschwitz and our hearts were -sore when we saw the small group of 49 women; all that was left of the -230 who had entered the camp 18 months earlier. But to us it seemed that -we were leaving hell itself, and for the first time hopes of survival, -of seeing the world again, were vouchsafed to us. - -M. DUBOST: Where were you sent then, Madame? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: On leaving Auschwitz we were sent to -Ravensbrück. There we were escorted to the “NN” block—meaning “Nacht -und Nebel”, that is, “The Secret Block.” With us in that block were -Polish women with the identification number “7,000.” Some were called -“rabbits” because they had been used as experimental guinea pigs. They -selected from the convoys girls with very straight legs who were in very -good health, and they submitted them to various operations. Some of the -girls had parts of the bone removed from their legs, others received -injections; but what was injected, I do not know. The mortality rate was -very high among the women operated upon. So when they came to fetch the -others to operate on them they refused to go to the Revier. They were -forcibly dragged to the dark cells where the professor, who had arrived -from Berlin, operated in his uniform, without taking any aseptic -precautions, without wearing a surgical gown, and without washing his -hands. There are some survivors among these “rabbits.” They still endure -much suffering. They suffer periodically from suppurations; and since -nobody knows to what treatment they had been subjected, it is extremely -difficult to cure them. - -M. DUBOST: Were these internees tattooed on their arrival? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No. People were not tattooed at Ravensbrück; -but, on the other hand, we had to go up for a gynecological examination, -and since no precautions were ever taken and the same instruments were -frequently used in all cases, infections spread, partly because -common-law prisoners and political internees were all herded together. - -In Block 32 where we were billeted there were also some Russian women -prisoners of war, who had refused to work voluntarily in the ammunition -factories. For that reason they had been sent to Ravensbrück. Since they -persisted in their refusal, they were subjected to every form of petty -indignity. They were, for instance, forced to stand in front of the -block a whole day long without any food. Some of them were sent in -convoys to Barth. Others were employed to carry lavatory receptacles in -the camp. The Strafblock (penitentiary block) and the Bunker also housed -internees who had refused to work in the war factories. - -M. DUBOST: Are you now speaking about the prisons in the camp? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: About the prisons in the camp. As a matter of -fact I have visited the camp prison. It was a civilian prison, a real -one. - -M. DUBOST: How many French were there in that camp? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: From 8 to 10 thousand. - -M. DUBOST: How many women all told? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: At the time of liberation the identification -numbers amounted to 105,000 and possibly more. - -There were also executions in the camps. The numbers were called at roll -call in the morning, and the victims then left for the Kommandantur and -were never seen again. A few days later the clothes were sent down to -the Effektenkammer, where the clothes of the internees were kept. After -a certain time their cards would vanish from the filing cabinets in the -camp. - -M. DUBOST: The system of detention was the same as at Auschwitz? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No. In Auschwitz, obviously, extermination was -the sole aim and object. Nobody was at all interested in the output. We -were beaten for no reason whatsoever. It was sufficient to stand from -morning till evening but whether we carried one brick or 10 was of no -importance at all. We were quite aware that the human element was -employed as slave labor in order to kill us, that this was the ultimate -purpose, whereas at Ravensbrück the output was of great importance. It -was a clearing camp. When the convoys arrived at Ravensbrück, they were -rapidly dispatched either to the munition or to the powder factories, -either to work at the airfields or, latterly, to dig trenches. - -The following procedure was adopted for going to the factories: The -manufacturers or their foremen or else their representatives were coming -themselves to choose their workers, accompanied by SS men; the effect -was that of a slave market. They felt the muscles, examined the faces to -see if the person looked healthy, and then made their choice. Finally, -they made them walk naked past the doctor and he eventually decided if a -woman was fit or not to leave for work in the factories. Latterly, the -doctor’s visit became a mere formality as they ended by employing -anybody who came along. The work was exhausting, principally because of -lack of food and sleep, since in addition to 12 solid hours of work one -had to attend roll call in the morning and in the evening. In -Ravensbrück there was the Siemens factory, where telephone equipment was -manufactured as well as wireless sets for aircraft. Then there were -workshops in the camp for camouflage material and uniforms and for -various utensils used by soldiers. One of these I know best . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better break off now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. DUBOST: Madame, did you see any SS chiefs and members of the -Wehrmacht visit the camps of Ravensbrück and Auschwitz when you were -there? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: Do you know if any German Government officials came to visit -these camps? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I know it only as far as Himmler is concerned. -Apart from Himmler I do not know. - -M. DUBOST: Who were the guards in these camps? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: At the beginning there were the SS guards, -exclusively. - -M. DUBOST: Will you please speak more slowly so that the interpreters -can follow you? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: At the beginning there were only SS men, but -from the spring of 1944 the young SS men in many companies were replaced -by older men of the Wehrmacht both at Auschwitz and also at Ravensbrück. -We were guarded by soldiers of the Wehrmacht as from 1944. - -M. DUBOST: You can therefore testify that on the order of the German -General Staff the German Army was implicated in the atrocities which you -have described? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Obviously, since we were guarded by the -Wehrmacht as well, and this could not have occurred without orders. - -M. DUBOST: Your testimony is final and involves both the SS and the -Army. - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Absolutely. - -M. DUBOST: Will you tell us about the arrival at Ravensbrück in the -winter of 1944, of Hungarian Jewesses who had been arrested en masse? -You were in Ravensbrück—this is a fact about which you can testify? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes, of course I was there. There was no longer -any room left in the blocks, and the prisoners already slept four in a -bed, so there was raised, in the middle of the camp, a large tent. Straw -was spread in the tent, and the Hungarian women were brought to this -tent. Their condition was frightful. There were a great many cases of -frozen feet because they had been evacuated from Budapest and had walked -a good part of the way in the snow. A great many of them had died en -route. Those who arrived at Auschwitz were led to this tent and there an -enormous number of them died. Every day a squad came to remove the -corpses in the tent. One day, on returning to my block, which was next -to this tent, during the cleaning up . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Madame, are you speaking of Ravensbrück or of Auschwitz? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: [_In English._] Now I am speaking of -Ravensbrück. [_In French._] It was in the winter of 1944, about November -or December, I believe, though I cannot say for certain which month it -was. It is so difficult to give a precise date in the concentration -camps since one day of torture is followed by another day of similar -torment and the prevailing monotony makes it very hard to keep track of -time. - -One day therefore, as I was saying, I passed the tent while it was being -cleaned, and I saw a pile of smoking manure in front of it. I suddenly -realized that this manure was human excrement since the unfortunate -women no longer had the strength to drag themselves to the lavatories. -They were therefore rotting in this filth. - -M. DUBOST: What were the conditions in the workshops where the jackets -were manufactured? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: At the workshops where the uniforms were -manufactured. . . - -M. DUBOST: Was it the camp workshop? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: It was the camp workshop, known as “Schneiderei -I.” Two hundred jackets or pairs of trousers were manufactured per day. -There were two shifts; a day and a night shift, both working 12 hours. -The night shift, when starting work at midnight, after the standard -amount of work had been reached—but only then—received a thin slice of -bread. Later on this practice was discontinued. Work was carried on at a -furious pace; the internees could not even take time off to go the -lavatories. Both day and night they were terribly beaten, both by the SS -women and men, if a needle broke owing to the poor quality of the -thread, if the machine stopped, or if these “ladies” and “gentlemen” did -not like their looks. Towards the end of the night one could see that -the workers were so exhausted, that every movement was an effort to -them. Beads of sweat stood out on their foreheads. They could not see -clearly. When the standard amount of work was not reached the foreman, -Binder, rushed up and beat up, with all his might, one woman after -another all along the line, with the result that the last in the row -waited their turn petrified with terror. If one wished to go to the -Revier one had to receive the authorization of the SS, who granted it -very rarely; and even then, if the doctor did give a woman a permit -authorizing her to stay away from work for a few days, the SS guards -would often come round and fetch her out of bed in order to put her back -at her machine. The atmosphere was frightful since, by reason of the -“black-out,” one could not open the windows at night. Six hundred women -therefore worked for 12 hours without any ventilation. All those who -worked at the Schneiderei became like living skeletons after a few -months. They began to cough, their eyesight failed, they developed a -nervous twitching of the face for fear of beatings to come. - -I knew well the conditions of this workshop since my little friend, -Marie Rubiano, a little French girl who had just passed 3 years in the -prison of Kottbus, was sent, on her arrival at Ravensbrück, to the -Schneiderei; and every evening she would tell me about her martyrdom. -One day, when she was quite exhausted, she obtained permission to go to -the Revier; and as on that day the German Schwester (nursing sister), -Erica, was less evil-tempered than usual, she was X-rayed. Both lungs -were severely infected and she was sent to the horrible Block 10, the -block of the consumptives. This block was particularly terrifying, since -tubercular patients were not considered as “recuperable material”; they -received no treatment; and because of shortage of staff, they were not -even washed. We might even say that there were no medical supplies at -all. - -Little Marie was placed in the ward housing patients with bacillary -infections, in other words, such patients as were considered incurable. -She spent some weeks there and had no courage left to put up a fight for -her life. I must say that the atmosphere of this room was particularly -depressing. There were many patients—several to one bed in three-tier -bunks—in an overheated atmosphere, lying between internees of various -nationalities, so that they could not even speak to one another. Then, -too, the silence in this antechamber of death was only broken by the -yells of the German asocial personnel on duty and, from time to time, by -the muffled sobs of a little French girl thinking of her mother and of -her country which she would never see again. - -And yet, Marie Rubiano did not die fast enough to please the SS. So one -day Dr. Winkelmann, selection specialist at Ravensbrück, entered her -name in the black-list and on 9 February 1945, together with 72 other -consumptive women, 6 of whom were French, she was shoved on the truck -for the gas chamber. - -During this period, in all the Revieren, selections were made and all -patients considered unfit for work were sent to the gas chamber. The -Ravensbrück gas chamber was situated just behind the wall of the camp, -next to the crematory. When the trucks came to fetch the patients we -heard the sound of the motor across the camp, and the noise ceased right -by the crematory whose chimney rose above the high wall of the camp. - -At the time of the liberation I returned to these places. I visited the -gas chamber which was a hermetically sealed building made of boards, and -inside it one could still smell the disagreeable odor of gas. I know -that at Auschwitz the gases were the same as those which were used -against the lice, and the only traces they left were small, pale green -crystals which were swept out when the windows were opened. I know these -details, since the men employed in delousing the blocks were in contact -with the personnel who gassed the victims and they told them that one -and the same gas was used in both cases. - -M. DUBOST: Was this the only way used to exterminate the internees in -Ravensbrück? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: In Block 10 they also experimented with a white -powder. One day the German Schwester, Martha, arrived in the block and -distributed a powder to some 20 patients. The patients subsequently fell -into a deep sleep. Four or five of them were seized with violent fits of -vomiting and this saved their lives. During the night the snores -gradually ceased and the patients died. This I know because I went every -day to visit the French women in the block. Two of the nurses were -French and Dr. Louise Le Porz, a native of Bordeaux who came back, can -likewise testify to this fact. - -M. DUBOST: Was this a frequent occurrence? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: During my stay this was the only case of its -kind within the Revier but the system was also applied at the -Jugendlager, so called because it was a former reform school for German -juvenile delinquents. - -Towards the beginning of 1945 Dr. Winkelmann, no longer satisfied with -selections in the Revier, proceeded to make his selections in the -blocks. All the prisoners had to answer roll call in their bare feet and -expose their breasts and legs. All those who were sick, too old, too -thin, or whose legs were swollen with oedema, were set aside and then -sent to this Jugendlager, a quarter of an hour away from the camp at -Ravensbrück. I visited it at the liberation. - -In the blocks an order had been circulated to the effect that the old -women and the patients who could no longer work should apply in writing -for admission to the Jugendlager, where they would be far better off, -where they would not have to work, and where there would be no roll -call. We learned about this later through some of the people who worked -at the Jugendlager—the chief of the camp was an Austrian woman, Betty -Wenz, whom I knew from Auschwitz—and from a few of the survivors, one -of whom is Irène Ottelard, a French woman living in Drancy, 17 Rue de la -Liberté, who was repatriated at the same time as myself and whom I had -nursed after the liberation. Through her we discovered the details about -the Jugendlager. - -M. DUBOST: Can you tell us, Madame, if you can answer this question? -Were the SS doctors who made the selection acting on their own accord or -were they merely obeying orders? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: They were acting on orders received, since one -of them, Dr. Lukas, refused to participate in the selections and was -withdrawn from the camp, and Dr. Winkelmann was sent from Berlin to -replace him. - -M. DUBOST: Did you personally witness these facts? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: It was he himself who told the Chief of the -Block 10 and Dr. Louise Le Porz, when he left. - -M. DUBOST: Could you give us some information about the conditions in -which the men at the neighboring camp at Ravensbrück lived on the day -after the liberation, when you were able to see them? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I think it advisable to speak of the -Jugendlager first since, chronologically speaking, it comes first. - -M. DUBOST: If you wish it. - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: At the Jugendlager the old women and the -patients who had left our camp were placed in blocks which had no water -and no conveniences; they lay on straw mattresses on the ground, so -closely pressed together that one was quite unable to pass between them. -At night one could not sleep because of the continuous coming and going, -and the internees trod on each other when passing. The straw mattresses -were rotten and teemed with lice; those who were able to stand remained -for hours on end for roll call until they collapsed. In February their -coats were taken away but they continued to stay out for roll call and -mortality was considerably increased. - -By way of nourishment they received only one thin slice of bread and -half a quart of swede soup, and all the drink they got in 24 hours was -half a quart of herbal tea. They had no water to drink, none to wash in, -and none to wash their mess tins. - -In the Jugendlager there was also a Revier for those who could no longer -stand. Periodically, during the roll calls, the Aufseherin would choose -some internees, who would be undressed and left in nothing but their -chemises. Their coats were then returned to them. They were hoisted on -to a truck and were driven off to the gas chamber. A few days later the -coats were returned to the Kammer (the clothing warehouse), and the -labels were marked “Mittwerda.” The internees working on the labels told -us that the word “Mittwerda” did not exist and that it was a special -term for the gases. - -At the Revier white powder was periodically distributed, and the sick -were dying as in Block 10, which I mentioned a short time ago. They made -. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: The details of the witness’ evidence as to Ravensbrück -seem to be very much like, if not the same, as at Auschwitz. Would it -not be possible now, after hearing this amount of detail, to deal with -the matter more generally, unless there is some substantial difference -between Ravensbrück and Auschwitz. - -M. DUBOST: I think there is a difference which the witness has pointed -out to us, namely, that in Auschwitz the prisoners were purely and -simply exterminated. It was merely an extermination camp, whereas at -Ravensbrück they were interned in order to work, and were weakened by -work until they died of it. - -THE PRESIDENT: If there are any other distinctions between the two, no -doubt you will lead the witness, I mean ask the witness about those -other distinctions. - -M. DUBOST: I shall not fail to do so. - -[_To the witness._] Could you tell the Tribunal in what condition the -men’s camp was found at the time of the liberation and how many -survivors remained? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: When the Germans went away they left 2,000 sick -women and a certain number of volunteers, myself included, to take care -of them. They left us without water and without light. Fortunately the -Russians arrived on the following day. We therefore were able to go to -the men’s camp and there we found a perfectly indescribable sight. They -had been for 5 days without water. There were 800 serious cases, and -three doctors and seven nurses, who were unable to separate the dead -from the sick. Thanks to the Red Army, we were able to take these sick -persons over into clean blocks and to give them food and care; but -unfortunately I can give the figures only for the French. There were 400 -of them when we came to the camp and only 150 were able to return to -France; for the others it was too late, in spite of all our care. - -M. DUBOST: Were you present at any of the executions and do you know how -they were carried out in the camp? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I was not present at the executions. I only -know that the last one took place on 22 April, 8 days before the arrival -of the Red army. The prisoners were sent, as I said, to the -Kommandantur; then their clothes were returned and their cards were -removed from the files. - -M. DUBOST: Was the situation in this camp of an exceptional nature or do -you consider it was part of a system? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: It is difficult to convey an exact idea of the -concentration camps to anybody, unless one has been in the camp oneself, -since one can only quote examples of horror; but it is quite impossible -to convey any impression of that deadly monotony. If asked what was the -worst of all, it is impossible to answer, since everything was -atrocious. It is atrocious to die of hunger, to die of thirst, to be -ill, to see all one’s companions dying around one and being unable to -help them. It is atrocious to think of one’s children, of one’s country -which one will never see again, and there were times when we asked -whether our life was not a living nightmare, so unreal did this life -appear in all its horror. - -For months, for years we had one wish only: The wish that some of us -would escape alive, in order to tell the world what the Nazi convict -prisons were like everywhere, at Auschwitz as at Ravensbrück. And the -comrades from the other camps told the same tale; there was the -systematic and implacable urge to use human beings as slaves and to kill -them when they could work no more. - -M. DUBOST: Have you anything further to relate? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No. - -M. DUBOST: I thank you. If the Tribunal wishes to question the witness, -I have finished. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I have no questions to ask. - -DR. HANNS MARX (Acting for Dr. Babel, Counsel for the SS): Attorney -Babel was prevented from coming this morning as he has to attend a -conference with General Mitchell. - -My Lords, I should like to take the liberty of asking the witness a few -questions to elucidate the matter. - -[_Turning to the witness._] Madame Couturier, you declared that you were -arrested by the French police? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Yes. - -DR. MARX: For what reason were you arrested? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Resistance. I belonged to a resistance -movement. - -DR. MARX: Another question: Which position did you occupy? I mean what -kind of post did you ever hold? Have you ever held a post? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Where? - -DR. MARX: For example as a teacher? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Before the war? I don’t quite see what this -question has to do with the matter. I was a journalist. - -DR. MARX: Yes. The fact of the matter is that you, in your statement, -showed great skill in style and expression; and I should like to know -whether you held any position such, for example, as teacher or lecturer. - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: No. I was a newspaper photographer. - -DR. MARX: How do you explain that you yourself came through these -experiences so well and are now in such a good state of health? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: First of all, I was liberated a year ago; and -in a year one has time to recover. Secondly, I was 10 months in -quarantine for typhus and I had the great luck not to die of -exanthematic typhus, although I had it and was ill for 3½ months. Also, -in the last months at Ravensbrück, as I knew German, I worked on the -Revier roll call, which explains why I did not have to work quite so -hard or to suffer from the inclemencies of the weather. On the other -hand, out of 230 of us only 49 from my convoy returned alive; and we -were only 52 at the end of 4 months. I had the great fortune to return. - -DR. MARX: Yes. Does your statement contain what you yourself observed or -is it concerned with information from other sources as well? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Whenever such was the case I mentioned it in my -declaration. I have never quoted anything which has not previously been -verified at the sources and by several persons, but the major part of my -evidence is based on personal experience. - -DR. MARX: How can you explain your very precise statistical knowledge, -for instance, that 700,000 Jews arrived from Hungary? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I told you that I have worked in the offices; -and where Auschwitz was concerned, I was a friend of the secretary (the -Oberaufseherin), whose name and address I gave to the Tribunal. - -DR. MARX: It has been stated that only 350,000 Jews came from Hungary, -according to the testimony of the Chief of the Gestapo, Eichmann. - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I am not going to argue with the Gestapo. I -have good reasons to know that what the Gestapo states is not always -true. - -DR. MARX: How were you treated personally? Were you treated well? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: Like the others. - -DR. MARX: Like the others? You said before that the German people must -have known of the happenings in Auschwitz. What are your grounds for -this statement? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I have already told you: To begin with there -was the fact that, when we left, the Lorraine soldiers of the Wehrmacht -who were taking us to Auschwitz said to us, “If you knew where you were -going, you would not be in such a hurry to get there.” Then there was -the fact that the German women who came out of quarantine to go to work -in German factories knew of these events, and they all said that they -would speak about them outside. - -Further, the fact that in all the factories where the Häftlinge (the -internees) worked they were in contact with the German civilians, as -also were the Aufseherinnen, who were in touch with their friends and -families and often told them what they had seen. - -DR. MARX: One more question. Up to 1942 you were able to observe the -behavior of the German soldiers in Paris. Did not these German soldiers -behave well throughout and did they not pay for what they took? - -MME. VAILLANT-COUTURIER: I have not the least idea whether they paid or -not for what they requisitioned. As for their good behavior, too many of -my friends were shot or massacred for me not to differ with you. - -DR. MARX: I have no further question to put to this witness. - -[_Dr. Marx started to leave the lectern and then returned._] - -THE PRESIDENT: If you have no further question there is nothing more to -be said. [_Laughter._] There is too much laughter in the court; I have -already spoken about that. - -[_To Dr. Marx._] I thought you had said you had no further question. - -DR. MARX: Yes. Please excuse me. I only want to make a proviso for -Attorney Babel that he might cross-examine the witness himself at a -later date, if that is possible. - -THE PRESIDENT: Babel, did you say? - -DR. MARX: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon; yes, certainly. When will Dr. Babel be -back in his place? - -DR. MARX: I presume that he will be back in the afternoon. He is in the -building. However, he must first read the minutes. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will consider the question. If Dr. Babel is here this -afternoon we will consider the matter, if Dr. Babel makes a further -application. - -Does any other of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions of -the witness? - -[_There was no response._] - -M. Dubost, have you any questions you wish to ask on reexamination? - -M. DUBOST: I have no further questions to ask. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -M. DUBOST: If the Tribunal will kindly allow it, we shall now hear -another witness, M. Veith. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you calling this witness on the treatment of -prisoners in concentration camps? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Mr. President, and also because this witness can give us -particulars of the ill-treatment to which certain prisoners of war had -been exposed in the camps of internees. This is no longer a question of -concentration camps and of ill-treatment inflicted upon civilians in -those camps, but of soldiers who had been brought to the concentration -camps and subjected to the same cruelty as the civilian prisoners. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you won’t lose sight of the fact that there has -been practically no cross-examination of the witnesses you have already -called about the treatment in concentration camps? The Tribunal, I -think, feels that you could deal with the treatment in concentration -camps somewhat more generally than the last witness. Do you hear what I -say? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you could deal with the question -of treatment in concentration camps rather more generally now, since we -have heard the details from the witnesses whom you have already called. - -[_The witness, Veith, took the stand._] - -M. DUBOST: Is the Tribunal willing to hear this witness? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -[_To the witness._] What is your name? - -M. JEAN-FRÉDÉRIC VEITH (Witness): Jean-Frédéric Veith. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: I swear that I will speak -without hate or fear, that I will tell the truth, all the truth, nothing -but the truth. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in French._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Raise your right hand and say, “I swear.” - -VEITH: I swear it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you like to sit down and spell your name and -surname? - -M. DUBOST: Will you please spell your name and surname? - -VEITH: J-e-a-n F-r-é-d-é-r-i-c V-e-i-t-h. I was born on 28 April 1903 in -Moscow. - -M. DUBOST: You are of French nationality? - -VEITH: I am of French nationality, born of French parents. - -M. DUBOST: In which camp were you interned? - -VEITH: At Mauthausen; from 22 April 1943 until 22 April 1945. - -M. DUBOST: You knew about the work carried out in the factories -supplying material to the Luftwaffe. Who controlled these factories? - -VEITH: I was in the Arbeitseinsatz at Mauthausen from June 1943, and I -was therefore well acquainted with all questions dealing with the work. - -M. DUBOST: Who controlled the factories working for the Luftwaffe? - -VEITH: There were outside camps at Mauthausen where workers were -employed by Heinkel, Messerschmidt, Alfa-Vienne, and the Saurer-Werke, -and there was, moreover, the construction work on the Leibl Pass tunnel -by the Alpine Montan. - -M. DUBOST: Who controlled this work, supervisors or engineers? - -VEITH: There was only SS supervision. The work itself was controlled by -the engineers and the firms themselves. - -M. DUBOST: Did these engineers belong to the Luftwaffe? - -VEITH: On certain days I saw Luftwaffe officers who came to visit the -Messerschmidt workshops in the quarry. - -M. DUBOST: Were they able to see for themselves the conditions under -which the prisoners lived? - -VEITH: Yes, certainly. - -M. DUBOST: Did you see any high-ranking Nazi officials visiting the -camp? - -VEITH: I saw a great many high-ranking officials, among them Himmler, -Kaltenbrunner, Pohl, Maurer, the Chief of the Labor Office, Amt D II, of -the Reich, and many other visitors whose names I do not know. - -M. DUBOST: Who told you that Kaltenbrunner had come? - -VEITH: Well, our offices faced the parade ground overlooking the -Kommandantur; we therefore saw the high-ranking officials arriving, and -the SS men themselves would tell us, “There goes so and so.” - -M. DUBOST: Could the civilian population know, and did it know of the -plight of the internees? - -VEITH: Yes, the population could know, since at Mauthausen there was a -road near the quarry and those who passed by that road could see all -that was happening. Moreover, the internees worked in the factories. -They were separated from the other workers, but they had certain -contacts with them and it was quite easy for the other workers to -realize their plight. - -M. DUBOST: Can you tell us what you know about a journey, to an unknown -castle, of a bus carrying prisoners who were never seen again? - -VEITH: At one time a method for the elimination of sick persons by -injections was adopted at Mauthausen. It was particularly used by Dr. -Krebsbach, nicknamed “Dr. Spritzbach” by the prisoners since it was he -who had inaugurated the system of injections. There came a time when the -injections were discontinued, and then persons who were too sick or too -weak were sent to a castle which, we learned later, was called Hartheim, -but was officially known as a Genesungslager (convalescent camp). Of all -of those who went there, none ever returned. We received the death -certificates directly from the political section of the camp; these -certificates were secret. Everybody who went to Hartheim died. The -number of dead amounted to about 5,000. - -M. DUBOST: Did you see prisoners of war arrive at Mauthausen Camp? - -VEITH: Certainly I saw prisoners of war. Their arrival at Mauthausen -Camp took place, first of all, in front of the political section. Since -I was working at the Hollerith I could watch the arrivals, for the -offices faced the parade ground in front of the political section where -the convoys arrived. The convoys were immediately sorted out. One part -was sent to the camp for registration, and very often some of the -uniformed prisoners were set aside; these had already been subjected to -special violence in the political section and were handed straight over -to the prison guards. They were then sent to the prisons and never heard -of again. They were not registered in the camp. The only registration -was made in the political section by Müller who was in charge of these -prisoners. - -M. DUBOST: They were prisoners of war? - -VEITH: They were prisoners of war. They were very often in uniform. - -M. DUBOST: Of what nationality? - -VEITH: Mostly Russians and Poles. - -M. DUBOST: They were brought to your camp to be killed there? - -VEITH: They were brought to our camp for “Action K.” - -M. DUBOST: What do you know about Action K and how do you know it? - -VEITH: My knowledge of Action K is due to the fact that I was head of -the Hollerith service in Mauthausen, and consequently received all the -transfer forms from the various camps. And when prisoners were -erroneously transferred to us as ordinary prisoners, we would put it on -the transfer form which we had to send to the central office in Berlin, -or rather, we would not put any number at all, as we were unable to give -one. The “Politische” gave us no indications at all and even destroyed -the list of names if, by chance, it ever reached us. - -In conversations with my comrades of the “Politische” I discovered that -this Action K was originally applied to prisoners of war who had been -captured while attempting to escape. Later this action was extended -further still, but always to soldiers and especially to officers who had -succeeded in escaping but who had been recaptured in countries under -German control. - -Moreover, any person engaged in activities which might be interpreted as -not corresponding to the wishes of the fascist chiefs could also be -subjected to Action K. These prisoners arrived at Mauthausen and -disappeared, that is, they were taken to the prison where one part would -be executed on the spot and another sent to the annex of the prison, -which by this time had become too small to hold them, to the famous -Block 20 of Mauthausen. - -M. DUBOST: You definitely state that these were prisoners of war? - -VEITH: Yes, they were prisoners of war, most of them. - -M. DUBOST: Do you know of an execution of officers, prisoners of war, -who had been brought to the camp at Mauthausen? - -VEITH: I cannot give you any names, but there were some. - -M. DUBOST: Did you witness the execution of Allied officers who were -murdered within 48 hours of their arrival in camp? - -VEITH: I saw the arrival of the convoy of 6 September. I believe that is -the one you are thinking of; I saw the arrival of this convoy and in the -very same afternoon these 47 went down to the quarry dressed in nothing -but their shirts and drawers. Shortly after we heard the sound of -machine gun fire. I then left the office and passed at the back, -pretending I was carrying documents to another office, and with my own -eyes I saw these unfortunate people shot down; 19 were executed on the -very same afternoon and the remainder on the following morning. Later -on, all the death certificates were marked, “Killed while attempting to -escape.” - -M. DUBOST: Do you have the names? - -VEITH: Yes, I have a copy of the names of these prisoners. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MARSHAL: If the Court please, it is desired to announce that the -Defendant Kaltenbrunner will be absent from this afternoon’s session on -account of illness. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may go on, M. Dubost. - -M. DUBOST: We are going to complete the hearing of the witness Veith, to -whom, however, I have only one more question to put. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have him brought in. - -[_The witness, Veith, took the stand._] - -M. DUBOST: You continue to testify under the oath that you already made -this morning. - -Will you give some additional information concerning the execution of -the 47 Allied officers whom you saw shot in 48 hours at Camp Mauthausen -where they had been brought? - -VEITH: Those officers, those parachutists, were shot in accordance with -the usual systems used whenever prisoners had to be done away with. That -is to say, they were forced to work to excess, to carry heavy stones. -Then they were beaten until they took heavier ones; and so on and so -forth until, finally driven to extremity, they turned towards the barbed -wire. If they did not do it of their own accord, they were pushed there; -and they were beaten until they did so; and the moment they approached -it and were perhaps about one meter away from it, they were mown down by -machine guns fired by the SS guards in the watchtowers. This was the -usual system for the “killing for attempted escape” as they afterwards -called it. - -Those 47 men were killed on the afternoon of the 6th and morning of the -7th of September. - -M. DUBOST: How did you know their names? - -VEITH: Their names came to me with the official list, because they had -all been entered in the camp registers and I had to report to Berlin all -the changes in the actual strength of the Hollerith Section. I saw all -the rosters of the dead and of the new arrivals. - -M. DUBOST: Did you communicate this list to an official authority? - -VEITH: This list was taken by the American official authorities when I -was at Mauthausen. I immediately went back to Mauthausen after my -liberation, because I knew where the documents were; and the American -authorities then had all the lists which we were able to find. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask the -witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the British Prosecutor want to ask any questions? - -BRITISH PROSECUTOR: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States Prosecutor? - -UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of the Defense Counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -HERR BABEL: I am the defense counsel for the SS and SD. Mr. President, I -was in the Dachau Camp on Saturday and at the Augsburg-Göggingen Camp -yesterday. I found out various things there which now enable me to -question individual witnesses. I could not do this before, as I was not -acquainted with local conditions. I should like to put one question. I -was unable to attend here this morning on account of a conference to -which I was called by General Mitchell. Consequently I did not have the -cross-examination of the witness this morning. I have only one question -to put to the witness now. I should like to ask whether I may -cross-examine the witness further later, or if it is better to withdraw -the question? - -THE PRESIDENT: You can cross-examine this witness now, but the Tribunal -is informed that you left General Mitchell at 15 minutes past 10. - -HERR BABEL: Yes, but as a consequence of the conference I had to send a -telegram and dispatch some other pressing business so that it was -impossible for me to attend the session. - -THE PRESIDENT: You can certainly cross-examine the witness now. - -HERR BABEL: I have only one more question, namely: The witness stated -that the officers in question were driven toward the wire fence. By whom -were they so driven? - -VEITH: They were driven to the barbed wire by the SS guards who -accompanied them, and the entire Mauthausen staff was present. They were -also beaten by the SS and by one or two “green” prisoners, who were with -them and who were the “Kapo.” In the camps these “green” prisoners were -often worse than the SS themselves. - -HERR BABEL: Thus, in the Dachau Camp, inside the camp itself, within the -wire enclosure, there were almost no SS guards, and that was probably -also the case in Mauthausen? However . . . - -VEITH: Inside the camp there was only a limited number of SS, but they -changed, and none of those who belonged to the troops guarding the camp -could fail to be aware of what went on in it; even if they did not enter -the camp, they watched it from the watchtowers and from outside, and -they saw precisely everything. - -HERR BABEL: Were the guards who shot at the prisoners inside or outside -the wire enclosure? - -VEITH: They were in the watchtowers in the same line as the barbed wire. - -HERR BABEL: Could they see from there that the officers were driven to -the barbed wire by anyone by means of blows? Could they observe that -they were driven there and beaten? - -VEITH: They could see it so well that once or twice some of the guards -refused to shoot, saying that it was not an attempt to escape and they -would not shoot. They were immediately relieved from their posts, and -disappeared. - -HERR BABEL: Did you see that yourself? - -VEITH: I did not see it myself, but I heard about it; it was told by my -Kommandoführer among others, who said to me, “There’s a watchguard who -refused to shoot.” - -HERR BABEL: Who was this Kommandoführer? The chief of the group? - -VEITH: The Kommandoführer was Wielemann. I do not remember his rank. He -was not Unterscharführer, but the rank immediately below -Unterscharführer, and he was in charge of the Hollerith section in -Mauthausen. - -HERR BABEL: I thank you. - -I have no more questions to ask just now. I shall, however, make -application to call the witness again, and I shall then take the -opportunity to ask the rest, to put such further questions to him as I -consider necessary. I request you to retain him for this purpose, here -in Nuremberg. I am not in a position to cross-examine the witness this -afternoon, as I did not hear his statements this morning, and I would -request that the witness . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You ought to have been here. If you were released from an -interview with General Mitchell at 10:15, there seems to the Tribunal, -to me at any rate, to be no reason why you should not have been here -while this witness was being examined. - -HERR BABEL: Mr. President, this morning I discussed with General -Mitchell some questions with which I have been occupied for a long time. -General Mitchell agreed in the course of our conversation that my duties -and activities are so extensive that it will now be necessary to appoint -a second defense counsel for the SS; my presence at the sessions claims -so much of my working time and has become so exhausting and so -burdensome that I am often compelled to be absent from the Court. I am -sorry, but in the prevailing circumstances, I cannot help it. - -Further, I would like to say this: So far, over 40,000 members of the SS -have made applications to the Tribunal; and although many of these are -collective and not individual applications, you can imagine how wide the -field is. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, no doubt your work is extensive, but this morning, -as I have already told you, General Mitchell has informed the Tribunal -that his interview with you finished at 10:15; and it appears to the -Tribunal that you must have known that the witnesses who were giving -evidence this morning were giving evidence about concentration camps. - -In addition to that, you had obtained the assistance of another counsel, -I think, Dr. Marx, to appear on your behalf, and he did appear on your -behalf; and he will have an opportunity of cross-examining this witness -if he wishes to do so now. The Tribunal considers that you must conclude -your cross-examination of this witness now. I mean to say, you may ask -any further questions of the witness that you wish. - -HERR BABEL: It all amounts to whether I can put a question, and this I -cannot do at the moment; therefore, I must renounce the -cross-examination of the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions to put, M. Dubost? There -may be some other German counsel who wish to cross-examine this witness. - -M. Dubost, do you wish to address the Tribunal? - -M. DUBOST: Your Honor, I would like to state to the Tribunal that we -have no reason whatsoever to fear a cross-examination of our witness or -of this morning’s witness, at any time; and we are ready to ask our -witnesses to stay in Nuremberg as long as may be necessary to reply to -any questions from the Defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, in view of the offer of the French Prosecutor -to keep the witness in Nuremberg, the Tribunal will allow you to put any -questions you wish to put to him in the course of the next 2 days. Do -you understand? - -HERR BABEL: Yes. - -DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Before I -question the witness, I allow myself to raise one point which, I -believe, will have an important influence on the good progress of the -proceedings. The point I wish to raise is the following, and I speak in -the name of my colleagues as well: Would it not be well to come to an -agreement that both the Prosecution and the Defense be informed the day -before a witness is brought in, which witness is to be heard? The -material has now become so considerable that circumstances make it -impossible to ask pertinent questions, questions which are urgently -necessary in the interest of all parties. - -As far as the Defense is concerned, we are ready to inform the Tribunal -and the Prosecution of the witnesses we intend to ask for examination, -at least one day before they are to be heard. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already expressed its wish that they -should be informed beforehand of the witnesses who are to be called and -upon what subject. I hope that Counsel for the Prosecution will take -note of this wish. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I thank you. - -A point of special significance emerges from the statements of the -witness we heard this morning, as well as from the statements of this -witness; and this point concerns something which may be of decisive -importance for the Trial as a whole. The Prosecution . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You are not here to make a speech at the moment. You are -to ask the witness questions. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes. It is the question of the responsibility of the -German people. The witness has stated that the civilian population was -in a position to know what was going on. I shall now try to ascertain -the truth by means of a series of questions. - -Did civilians look on when executions took place? Would you answer this? - -VEITH: They could see the corpses scattered along the roads when the -prisoners were shot while returning in convoys, and corpses were even -thrown from the trains. And they could always take note of the emaciated -condition of these prisoners who worked outside, because they saw them. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know that it was forbidden on pain of death to say -anything outside the camp about the atrocities, anything in the way of -cruelties, torture, et cetera, that took place inside? - -VEITH: As I spent 2 years in the camp I saw them. Some of them I saw -myself, and the rest were described to me by eyewitnesses. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Could you please repeat that again? Did you see the -secrecy order? What did you see? - -VEITH: Not the order, I saw the execution and that is worse. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: My question was this: Do you know that the strictest -orders were given to the SS personnel, to the executioners, et cetera, -not to speak even inside the camp, much less outside of it, of the -atrocities that went on and that eyewitnesses who spoke of them rendered -themselves liable to the most rigorous penalties, including the death -penalty? Do you know anything about that, about such a practice inside -the camps? Perhaps you will tell me whether you yourself were allowed to -talk about any observations of the kind. - -VEITH: I know that liberated prisoners had to sign a statement saying -that they would never reveal what had happened in the camp and that they -had to forget what had happened; but those who were in contact with the -population, and there were many of them, did not fail to talk about it. -Furthermore, Mauthausen was situated on a hill. There was a crematorium, -which emitted flames 3 feet high. When you see flames 3 feet high coming -out of a chimney every night, you are bound to wonder what it is; and -everyone must have known that it was a crematorium. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further question. Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other counsel for the defendants wish to ask any -questions? Did you tell us who the “green prisoners” were? You mentioned -“green prisoners.” - -VEITH: Yes, these “green prisoners” were prisoners convicted under the -common law. They were used by the SS to police the camps. As I have -already said, they were often more bestial than the SS themselves and -acted as their executioners. They did the work with which the SS did not -wish to soil their hands; they were doing all the dirty work, but always -by order of the Kommandoführer. - -This contact with the “green” Germans was terrible for the internees, -particularly for the political internees. They could not bear the sight -of them, because they realized that we were not their sort, and they -persecuted us for that alone. It was the same in all the camps. In all -the camps we were bullied by the German criminals serving with the SS. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, do you wish to ask any other question? - -M. DUBOST: Your Honor, I have no more questions to ask. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -M. DUBOST: I shall request the Tribunal to authorize us to hear the -French witness, Dr. Dupont. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well. - -[_The witness, Dupont, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Is your name Dr. Dupont? - -DR. VICTOR DUPONT (Witness): Dupont, Victor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me? I swear that I will -speak without hate or fear, that I will tell the truth, all the truth, -nothing but the truth. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in French._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Raise your right hand and say, “I swear.” - -DUPONT: I swear. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -M. DUBOST: Your name is Victor Dupont? - -DUPONT: Yes, I am called Victor Dupont. - -M. DUBOST: You were born on 12 December 1909? - -DUPONT: That is correct. - -M. DUBOST: At Charmes in the Vosges? - -DUPONT: That is correct. - -M. DUBOST: You are of French nationality, born of French parents? - -DUPONT: That is correct. - -M. DUBOST: You have won honorable distinctions. What are they? - -DUPONT: I have the Legion of Honor, I am a Chevalier of the Legion of -Honor. I have 2 Army citations, and I have the Resistance Medal. - -M. DUBOST: Were you deported to Buchenwald? - -DUPONT: I was deported to Buchenwald on 24 January 1944. - -M. DUBOST: You stayed there? - -DUPONT: I stayed there 15 months. - -M. DUBOST: Until 20 May 1945? - -DUPONT: No, until 20 April 1945. - -M. DUBOST: Will you make your statement on the regime in the -concentration camp where you were interned and the aim of those who -prescribed this regime? - -DUPONT: When I arrived at Buchenwald I soon became aware of the -difficult living conditions. The regime imposed upon the prisoners was -not based on any principle of justice. The principle which formed the -basis of this regime was the principle of the purge. I will explain. - -We—I am speaking of the French—were grouped together at Buchenwald -almost all of us, without having been tried by any Tribunal. In 1942, -1943, 1944, and 1945, it was quite unusual to pass any formal judgment -on the prisoners. Many of us were interrogated and then deported; others -were cleared by the interrogation and deported all the same. Others -again were not interrogated at all. I shall give you three examples. - -On 11 November 1943 elements estimated at several hundred persons were -arrested at Grenoble during a demonstration commemorating the Armistice. -They were brought to Buchenwald, where the greater part died. The same -thing happened in the village of Verchenie (Drôme) in October 1943. I -saw them at Buchenwald too. It happened again in April 1944 at St. -Claude, and I saw these people brought in in August 1944. - -In this way, various elements were assembled at Buchenwald subject to -martial law. But there were also all kinds of people, including some who -were obviously innocent, who had either been cleared by interrogation or -not even interrogated at all. Finally, there were some political -prisoners. They had been deported because they were members of parties -which were to be suppressed. - -That does not mean that the interrogations were not to be taken -seriously. The interrogations which I underwent and which I saw others -undergo were particularly inhuman. I shall enumerate a few of the -methods: - -Every imaginable kind of beating, immersion in bathtubs, squeezing of -testicles, hanging, crushing of the head in iron bands, and the -torturing of entire families in each other’s sight. I have, in -particular, seen a wife tortured before her husband; and children were -tortured before their mothers. For the sake of precision, I will quote -one name: Francis Goret of the Rue de Bourgogne in Paris was tortured -before his mother. Once in the camp, conditions were the same for -everyone. - -M. DUBOST: You spoke of racial purging as a social policy. What was the -criterion? - -DUPONT: At Buchenwald various elements described as “political,” -“national”—mainly Jews and Gypsies—and “asocial”—especially -criminals—were herded together under the same regime. There were -criminals of every nation: Germans, Czechs, Frenchmen, et cetera, all -living together under the same regime. A purge does not necessarily -imply extermination, but this purge was achieved by means of the -extermination already mentioned. It began for us in certain cases; the -decision was taken quite suddenly. I shall give one example. In 1944 a -convoy of several hundred Gypsy children arrived at Buchenwald, by what -administrative mystery we never knew. They were assembled during the -winter of 1944 and were to be sent on to Auschwitz to be gassed. One of -the most tragic memories of my deportation is the way in which these -children, knowing perfectly well what was in store for them, were driven -into the vans, screaming and crying. They went on to Auschwitz the same -day. - -In other cases the extermination was carried out by progressive stages. -It had already begun when the convoy arrived. For instance, in the -French convoy which left Compiègne on 24 January 1944 and arrived on 26 -January, I saw one van containing 100 persons, of which 12 were dead and -8 insane. During the period of my deportation I saw numerous transports -come in. The same thing happened every time; only the numbers varied. In -this way the elimination of a certain proportion had already been -achieved when the convoy arrived. Then they were put in quarantine and -exposed to cold for several hours, while roll call was taken. The weaker -died. Then came extermination through work. Some of them were picked out -and sent to Kommandos such as Dora, S III, and Laura. I noticed that -after those departures, which took place every month, when the -contingent was brought up to strength again, truck-loads of dead were -brought back to Buchenwald. I even attended the post-mortems on them, -and I can tell you the results. The lesions were those of a very -advanced stage of cachexy. Those who had stood up to conditions for one, -two, or three months very often exhibited the lesions characteristic of -acute tuberculosis, mostly of the granular type. In Buchenwald itself -prisoners had to work; and there, as everywhere else, the only hope of -survival lay in work. Extermination in Buchenwald was carried out in -accordance with a principle of selection laid down by the medical -officer in charge, Dr. Shiedlauski. These selections . . . - -M. DUBOST: Excuse me for interrupting. What is the nationality of this -medical officer in charge? - -DUPONT: He was a German SS doctor. - -M. DUBOST: Are you sure of that? - -DUPONT: Yes, I am quite sure. - -M. DUBOST: Are you testifying as an eyewitness? - -DUPONT: I am testifying as an eyewitness. - -M. DUBOST: Go on, please. - -DUPONT: Shiedlauski carried out the selection and picked out the sick -and invalids. Prior to January 1945 they were sent to Auschwitz; later -on they went to Bergen-Belsen. None of them ever returned. - -Another case which I witnessed concerns a Jewish labor squad which was -sent to Auschwitz and stayed there several months. When they came back, -they were unfit for even the lighter work. A similar fate overtook them. -They also were sent to Auschwitz again. I myself personally witnessed -these things. I was present at the selection and I witnessed their -departure. - -Later on, the executions in Buchenwald took place in the camp itself. To -my own knowledge they began in September 1944 in room 7, a little room -in the Revier. The men were done away with by means of inter-cardiac -injections. The output was not great; it did not exceed a few score a -day, at the most. - -Later on more and more convoys came in, and the number of cachexy cases -increased. The executions had to be speeded up. At first they were -carried out as soon as the transports arrived; but from January 1945 -onwards they were taken care of in a special block, Block 61. At that -date all those nicknamed “Mussulmans” on account of their appearance -were collected in this block. We never saw them without their blankets -over their shoulders. They were unfit for even the lightest work. They -all had to go through Block 61. The death toll varied daily from a -minimum of 10 to about 200 in Block 61. The execution was performed by -injecting phenol into the heart in the most brutal manner. The bodies -were then carted to the crematorium mostly during roll calls or at -night. Finally, extermination was also always assured at the end by -convoys. The convoys which left Buchenwald while the Allies were -advancing were used to assure extermination. - -To give an example: At the end of March 1945 elements withdrawn from the -S III detachment arrived at Buchenwald. They were in a state of complete -exhaustion when they arrived and quite unfit for any kind of exertion. -They were the first to be re-expedited, two days after their arrival. It -was only about half a mile from their starting point in the small camp, -that is, at the back of the Buchenwald Camp, to their point of assembly -for roll call; and to give you an idea of the state of weakness in which -these people were, I need only say that between this starting point and -their assembly point, that is, over a distance of half a mile, we saw 60 -of them collapse and die. They could not go on further. Most of them -died very soon, in a few hours or in the course of the next day. So much -for the systematic extermination which I witnessed in Buchenwald, -including . . . - -M. DUBOST: What about those who were left? - -DUPONT: Those who were left when the last convoy went out? That is a -complicated story. We were deeply grieved about them. About the 1st of -April, though I cannot guarantee the exact date, the commander of the -camp, Pister, assembled a large number of prisoners and addressed them -as follows: - - “The Allied advance has already reached the immediate - neighborhood of Buchenwald. I wish to hand over to the Allies - the keys of the camp. I do not want any atrocities. I wish the - camp as a whole to be handed over.” - -As a matter of actual fact, the Allied advance was held up, more than we -wanted at least, and evacuation was begun. A delegation of prisoners -went to see the commander, reminding him of his word, for he had given -his word emphasizing that it was his “word of honor as a soldier.” He -seemed acutely embarrassed and explained that Sauckel, the Governor of -Thuringia, had given orders that no prisoner should remain in -Buchenwald, for that constituted a danger to the province. - -Furthermore, we knew that all who knew the secrets of the administration -of Buchenwald Camp would be put out of the way. A few days before we -were liberated 43 of our comrades belonging to different nationalities -were called out to be done away with, and an unusual phenomenon -occurred. The camp revolted; the men were hidden and never given up. We -also knew that under no circumstances would anyone who had been -employed, either in the experimental block or in the infirmary, be -allowed to leave the camp. That is all I have to say about the last few -days. - -M. DUBOST: This officer in command of the camp, whom you have just said -gave his word of honor as a soldier, was he a soldier? - -DUPONT: His attitude towards the prisoners was ruthless; but he had his -orders. Frankly, he was a particular type of soldier; but he was not -acting on his own initiative in treating the prisoners in this way. - -M. DUBOST: To what branch of the service did he belong? - -DUPONT: He belonged to the SS Totenkopf Division. - -M. DUBOST: Was he an SS man? - -DUPONT: Yes, he was an SS man. - -M. DUBOST: He was acting on orders, you say? - -DUPONT: He was certainly acting on orders. - -M. DUBOST: For what purposes were the prisoners used? - -DUPONT: The prisoners were used in such a way that no attention was paid -to the fact that they were human beings. They were used for experimental -purposes. At Buchenwald the experiments were made in Block 46. The men -who were to be employed there were always selected by means of a medical -examination. On those occasions when I was present it was performed by -Dr. Shiedlauski, of whom I have already spoken. - -M. DUBOST: Was he a doctor? - -DUPONT: Yes, he was a doctor. The internees were used for the hardest -labor; in the Laura mines, working in the salt mines as, for instance, -in the Mansleben-am-See Kommando, clearing up bomb debris. It must be -remembered that the more difficult the labor conditions were, the -harsher was the supervision by the guards. - -The internees were used in Buchenwald for any kind of labor; in earth -works, in quarries, and in factories. To cite a particular case: There -were two factories attached to Buchenwald, the Gustloff works and the -Mühlbach works. They were munition factories under technical and -non-military management. In this particular case there was some sort of -rivalry between the SS and the technical management of the factory. The -technical management, concerned with its output, took the part of the -prisoners to the extent of occasionally obtaining supplementary rations -for them. Internee labor had certain advantages. The cost was -negligible, and from a security point of view the maximum of secrecy was -ensured, as the internees had no contact with the outside world and -therefore no leakage was possible. - -M. DUBOST: You mean leakage of military information? - -DUPONT: I mean leakage of military information. - -M. DUBOST: Could outsiders see that the internees were ill-treated and -wretched? - -DUPONT: That is another question, certainly. - -M. DUBOST: Will you answer it later? - -DUPONT: I shall answer it later. I have omitted one detail. The -internees were also used to a certain extent after death. The ashes -resulting from the cremations were thrown into the excrement pit and -served to fertilize the fields around Buchenwald. I add this detail -because it struck me vividly at the time. - -Finally, as I said, work, whatever it might be, was the internees’ only -chance of survival. As soon as they were no longer of any possible use, -they were done for. - -M. DUBOST: Were not internees used as “blood donors,” involuntary of -course? - -DUPONT: I forgot that point. Prisoners assigned to light work, whose -output was poor, were used as blood donors. Members of the Wehrmacht -came several times. I saw them twice at Buchenwald, taking blood from -these men. The blood was taken in a ward known as CP-2, that is, -Operation Ward 2. - -M. DUBOST: This was done on orders from higher quarters? - -DUPONT: I do not see how it could have been done otherwise. - -M. DUBOST: On their own initiative? - -DUPONT: Not on the initiative of anyone in the camp. These elements had -nothing to do with the camp administration or the guards. I must make it -clear that those whom I saw belonged to the Wehrmacht, whereas we were -guarded by SS, all of them from the Totenkopf Division. Towards the end, -a special use was made of them. - -In the early months of 1945, members of the Gestapo came to Buchenwald -and took away all the papers of those who had died, in order to -re-establish their identity and to make out forged papers. One Jew was -specially employed to touch up photographs and to adapt the papers which -had belonged to the dead for the use of persons whom, of course, we did -not know. The Jew disappeared, and I do not know what became of him. We -never saw him again. - -But this utilization of identification papers was not confined to the -dead. Several hundred French internees were summoned to the -“Fliegerverwaltung” and there subjected to a very precise interrogation -on their person, their connections, their convictions, and their -background. They were then told that they would on no account be allowed -to receive any correspondence, or even parcels—those of them who ever -received any. From an administrative point of view all traces of them -were effaced and contact with the outside world was rendered even more -impossible for them than it had been under ordinary circumstances. We -were deeply concerned about the fate of these comrades. We were -liberated very soon after that, and I can only say that prisoners were -used in this way, that their identification papers were used for -manufacturing forged documents. - -M. DUBOST: What was the effect of this kind of life? - -DUPONT: The effect of this kind of life on the human organism? - -M. DUBOST: On the human organism. - -DUPONT: As to the human organism, there was only one effect: the -degradation of the human being. The living conditions which I have just -described were enough in themselves to produce such degradation. It was -done systematically. An unrelenting will seemed to be at work to reduce -those men to the same level, the lowest possible level of human -degradation. - -To begin with, the first degrading factor was the way in which they were -mixed. It was permissible to mix nationalities, but not to mix -indiscriminately every possible type of prisoner: political, -military—for the members of the French resistance movement were -soldiers—racial elements, and common-law criminals. - -Criminals of all nationalities were herded together with their -compatriots, and every nationality lived side by side, so conditions of -living were distressing. In addition, there was overcrowding, unsanitary -conditions, and compulsory labor. I shall give a few examples to show -that prisoners were mixed quite indiscriminately. - -In March 1944, I saw the French General Duval die. He had been working -on the “terrasse” with me all day. When we came back, he was covered -with mud and completely exhausted. He died a few hours later. - -The French General Vernaud died on a straw mattress, filthy with -excrement, in room Number 6, where those on the verge of death were -taken, surrounded by dying men. - -I saw M. De Tessan die . . . - -M. DUBOST: Will you explain to the Tribunal who M. De Tessan was? - -DUPONT: M. De Tessan was a former French minister, married to an -American. He also died on a straw mattress, covered with pus, from a -disease known as septicopyohemia. - -I also witnessed the death of Count de Lipkowski, who had done brilliant -military service in this war. He had been granted the honors of war by -the German Army and had, for one thing, been invited to Paris by Rommel, -who desired to show the admiration he felt for his military brilliance. -He died miserably in the winter of 1944. - -One further instance: The Belgian Minister Janson was in the camp living -under the conditions which I have already described, and of which you -must have already heard very often. He died miserably, a physical and -mental wreck. His intellect had gone and he had partially lost his -reason. - -I cite only extreme cases and especially those of generals, as they were -said to be granted special conditions. I saw no sign of that. - -The last stage in this process of the degradation of human beings was -the setting of internee against internee. - -M. DUBOST: Before dealing with this point, will you describe the -conditions in which you found your former professor, Léon Kindberg, -professor of medicine? - -DUPONT: I studied medicine under Professor Maurice Léon Kindberg at the -Beaujon Hospital. - -M. DUBOST: In Paris? - -DUPONT: Yes, in Paris. A very highly cultured and brilliantly -intelligent man. In January 1945 I learned that he had just arrived from -Monovitz. I found him in Block 58, a block which in normal circumstances -would hold 300 men, and into which 1,200 had been crowded—Hungarians, -Poles, Russians, Czechs, with a large proportion of Jews in an -extraordinary state of misery. I did not recognize Léon Kindberg because -there was nothing to distinguish him from the usual type to be found in -these blocks. There was no longer any sign of intellect in him and it -was hard to find anything of the man that I had formerly known. We -managed to get him out of that block but his health was unfortunately -too much impaired and he died shortly after his liberation. - -M. DUBOST: Can you tell the Tribunal, as far as you know, the “crimes” -committed by this man? - -DUPONT: After the armistice Léon Kindberg settled in Toulouse to -practice the treatment of pulmonary consumption. I know from an -absolutely reliable source that he had taken no part whatsoever in -activities directed against the German occupation authorities in France. -They found out that he was a Jew and as such he was arrested and -deported. He drifted into Buchenwald by way of Auschwitz and Monovitz. - -M. DUBOST: What crime had General Duval committed that he should be -imprisoned along with pimps, moral degenerates, and murderers? What had -General Vernaud done? - -DUPONT: I know nothing about the activities of General Duval and General -Vernaud during the occupation. All I can say is that they were certainly -not asocial. - -M. DUBOST: What about Count de Lipkowski and M. De Tessan? - -DUPONT: Nor has the Count de Lipkowski or M. De Tessan committed any of -the faults usually attributed to asocial elements or common-law -criminals. - -M. DUBOST: You may proceed. - -DUPONT: The means used to achieve the final degradation of the internees -as a whole was the torture of them by their fellow prisoners. Let me -give a particularly brutal instance. In Kommando A. S. 6, which was -situated at Mansleben-am-See, 70 kilometers from Buchenwald, there were -prisoners of every nationality, including a large portion of Frenchmen. -I had two friends there: Antoine d’Aimery, a son of General d’Aimery, -and Thibaut, who was studying to become a missionary. - -M. DUBOST: Catholic? - -DUPONT: Catholic. At Mansleben-am-See hangings took place in public in -the hall of a factory connected with the salt mine. The SS were present -at these hangings in full dress uniform, wearing their decorations. - -The prisoners were forced to be present at these hangings under threats -of the most cruel beatings. When they hanged the poor wretches, the -prisoners had to give the Hitler salute. Worse still, one prisoner was -chosen to pull away the stool on which the victim stood. He could not -evade the order, as the consequences to himself would have been too -grave. When the execution had been carried out, the prisoners had to -file off in front of the victim between two SS men. They were made to -touch the body and, gruesome detail, look the dead man in the eyes. I -believe that men who had been forced to go through such rites must -inevitably lose the sense of their dignity as human beings. - -In Buchenwald itself all the executive work was entrusted to the -internees, that is, the hangings were carried out by a German prisoner -assisted by other prisoners. The camp was policed by prisoners. When -someone in the camp was sentenced to death, it was their duty to find -him and take him to the place of execution. - -Selection for the labor squads, with which we were well acquainted, -especially for Dora, Laura, and S III—extermination detachments—was -carried out by prisoners, who decided which of us were to go there. In -this way the internees were forced down to the worst possible level of -degradation, inasmuch as every man was forced to become the executioner -of his fellow. - -I have already referred to Block 61, where the extermination of the -physically unfit and those otherwise unsuited for labor was carried out. -These executions were also carried out by prisoners under SS supervision -and control. From the point of view of humanity in general, this was -perhaps the worst crime of all, for these men who were constrained to -torture their fellow-beings have now been restored to life, but -profoundly changed. What is to become of them? What are they going to -do? - -M. DUBOST: Who was responsible for these crimes as far as your personal -knowledge goes? - -DUPONT: One thing which strikes me as being particularly significant is -that the methods which I observed in Buchenwald now appear to have been -the same, or almost the same, as those prevailing in all the other -camps. The degree of uniformity in the way in which the camps were run -is clear evidence of orders from higher quarters. In the case of -Buchenwald, in particular, the personnel, no matter how rough it might -be, would not have done such things on their own initiative. Moreover, -the camp chief and the SS doctor, himself, always pleaded superior -orders, often in a vague manner. The name most frequently invoked was -that of Himmler. Other names also were given. The chief medical officer -for all the camps, Lolling, was mentioned on numerous occasions in -connection with the extermination block, especially by an SS doctor in -the camp, named Bender. In regard to the selection of invalids or Jews -to be sent to Auschwitz or Bergen-Belsen to be gassed, I heard the name -of Pohl mentioned. - -M. DUBOST: What were the functions of Pohl? - -DUPONT: He was chief of the SS administration in Berlin, Division D 2. - -M. DUBOST: Could the German people as a whole have been in ignorance of -these atrocities, or were they bound to know of them? - -DUPONT: As these camps had been in existence for years, it is impossible -for them not to have known. Our transport stopped at Trèves on its way -in. The prisoners in some vans were completely naked while in others -they were clothed. There was a crowd of people around the station and -they all saw the transport. Some of them excited the SS men patrolling -the platform. But there were other channels through which information -could reach the population. To begin with, there were squads working -outside the camps. Labor squads went out from Buchenwald to Weimar, -Erfurt, and Jena. They left in the morning and came back at night, and -during the day they were among the civilian population. In the -factories, too, the technical crew were not members of the armed forces. -The “Meister” were not SS men. They went home every night after -supervising the work of the prisoners all day. Certain factories even -employed civilian labor—the Gustloff works in Weimar, for instance. -During the work, the internees and civilians were together. - -The civil authorities were responsible for victualling the camps and -were allowed to enter them, and I have seen civilian trucks coming into -the camp. - -The railway authorities were necessarily informed on those matters. -Numerous trains carried prisoners daily from one camp to another; or -from France to Germany; and these trains were driven by railway men. -Moreover, there was a regular daily train to Buchenwald as a terminal -station. The railway administrative authorities must, therefore, have -been well informed. - -Orders were also given in the factories, and industrialists could not -fail to be informed regarding the personnel they employed in their -factories. I may add that visits took place; the German prisoners were -sometimes visited. I knew certain German internees, and I know that on -the occasion of those visits they talked to their relatives, which they -could hardly do without informing their home circle of what was going -on. It would appear that it is impossible to deny that the German people -knew of the camps. - -M. DUBOST: The Army? - -DUPONT: The Army knew of the camps. At least, this is what I could -observe. Every week so-called commissions came to Buchenwald, a group of -officers who came to visit the camp. There were SS among these officers; -but I very often saw members of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, who came -on those visits. Sometimes we were able to identify the personalities -who visited the camp, rarely so far as I was concerned. On 22 March 1945 -General Mrugowski came to visit the camp. In particular, he spent a long -time in Block 61. He was accompanied on this visit by an SS general and -the chief medical officer of the camp, Dr. Shiedlauski. - -Another point, during the last few months, the Buchenwald guard, plus SS -men . . . - -M. DUBOST: Excuse me for interrupting you. Could you tell us about Block -61? - -DUPONT: Block 61 was the extermination block for those suffering from -cachexy—in other words, those arrived in such a state of exhaustion -that they were totally unfit for work. - -M. DUBOST: Is it direct testimony you are giving about this visit to -Block 61? - -DUPONT: This is from my own personal observation. - -M. DUBOST: Whom does it concern? - -DUPONT: General Mrugowski. - -M. DUBOST: In the Army? - -DUPONT: A doctor and an SS general whom I cannot identify. - -M. DUBOST: Were university circles unaware of the work done in the -camps? - -DUPONT: At the Pathological Institute in Buchenwald, pathological -preparations were made; and naturally some of them were out of the -ordinary, since—and I am speaking as a doctor—we encountered cases -that can no longer be observed, cases such as have been described in the -books of the last century. Some excellent pieces of work were prepared -and sent to universities, especially the University of Jena. On the -other hand there were also some exhibits which could not properly be -described as anatomical. Some prepared tattoo marks were sent to -universities. - -M. DUBOST: Did you personally see that? - -DUPONT: I saw these tattoo marks prepared. - -M. DUBOST: Then how did they obtain the anatomic exhibits, how did they -get these tattoo marks? They waited for a natural death, of course. - -DUPONT: The cases I observed were natural deaths or executions. Before -our arrival—and I can name witnesses who can testify to this—they -killed a man to get these tattoo marks. It happened, I must emphasize, -when I was not at Buchenwald. I am repeating what was told me by -witnesses whose names I will give. During the period when the camp was -commanded by Koch, people who had particularly artistic tattoo marks -were killed. The witness I can refer to is a Luxembourger called Nicolas -Simon who lives in Luxembourg. He spent 6 years in Buchenwald in -exceptional conditions where he had unprecedented opportunities of -observation. - -M. DUBOST: But I am told that Koch was sentenced to death and executed -because of these excesses. - -DUPONT: As far as I know, Koch was mixed up with some sort of swindling -affair. He quarrelled with the SS administration. He was undoubtedly -arrested and imprisoned. - -THE PRESIDENT: We had better have an adjournment now. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. DUBOST: We stopped at the end of the Koch story and the witness was -telling the Tribunal that Koch had been executed not for the crimes that -he had committed with regard to the internees in his charge, but because -of the numerous dishonest acts of which he had been guilty during his -period of service. - -Did I understand the witness’ explanation correctly? - -DUPONT: I said explicitly that he had been accused of dishonesty. I -cannot give precise details of all the charges. I cannot say that he was -accused exclusively of dishonest acts by his administration; I know that -such charges were made against him, but I have no further information. - -M. DUBOST: Have you nothing to add? - -DUPONT: I can say that this information came from Dr. Owen, who had been -arrested at the same time and released again and who returned to -Buchenwald towards the end, that is, early in 1945. - -M. DUBOST: What was the nationality of this doctor? - -DUPONT: German. He was in detention. He was an SS man and Koch and he -were arrested at the same time. Owen was released and came back to -Buchenwald restored to his rank and his functions at the beginning of -1945. He was quite willing to talk to the prisoners and the information -that I have given comes from him. - -M. DUBOST: I have no further questions to ask the witness, Mr. -President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the Defense Counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -DR. MERKEL: I am the Defense Counsel for the Gestapo. - -Witness, you previously stated that the methods of treatment in -Buchenwald were not peculiar to the Buchenwald Camp but must be ascribed -to a general order. The reasons you gave for this statement were that -you had seen those customs and methods in all the other camps too. How -am I to understand this expression “in all the other camps”? - -DUPONT: I am speaking of concentration camps; to be precise, a certain -number of them, Mauthausen, Dachau, Sachsenhausen; labor squads such as -Dora, Laura, S III, Mansleben, Ebensee, to mention these only. - -DR. MERKEL: Were you yourself in those camps? - -DUPONT: I myself went to Buchenwald. I collected exact testimony about -the other camps from friends who were there. In any case, the number of -friends of mine who died is a sufficiently eloquent proof that -extermination was carried out in the same way in all the camps. - -HERR BABEL: I should like to know to what block you belonged. Perhaps -you can tell the Tribunal—you have already mentioned the point—how the -prisoners were distributed? Did they not also bear certain external -markings, red patches on the clothing of some and green on that of -others? - -DUPONT: There were in fact a number of badges, all of which were found -in the same Kommandos. To give an example, where I was—in the -“terrassekommando” known as “Entwässerung” (drainage)—I worked along -side of German “common-laws” wearing the green badge. Regarding the -nationalities in this Kommando, there were Russians, Czechs, Belgians, -and French. Our badges were different; our treatment was identical, and -in this particular case we were even commanded by “common-laws.” - -HERR BABEL: I did not quite hear the beginning of your answer. I asked -whether the internees were divided into specific categories identifiable -externally by means of stars or some kind of distinguishing mark: green, -blue, _et cetera_? - -DUPONT: I said that there were various badges in the camp, triangular -badges which applied in principle to different categories, but all the -men were mixed up together, and subjected to the same treatment. - -HERR BABEL: I did not ask you about their treatment, but about the -distinctive badges. - -DUPONT: For the French it was a badge in the form of a shield. - -HERR BABEL: For all the prisoners, not only the French. - -DUPONT: I am answering you. In the case of the French, who were those I -knew best, the red, political badge was given to everyone without -discrimination, including the prisoners brought over from Fort Barraut, -who were common-law criminals. I saw the same thing among the Czechs and -the Russians. It is true that the use of different badges had been -intended, but that was never put into practice in any reasonable way. - -To come back to what I have already stated, even if there were different -badges, the people were all mixed up together, nevertheless, and -subjected exactly to the same treatment and the same conditions. - -HERR BABEL: We have already heard several times that prisoners of -various nationalities were mixed up together. That is not what I asked -you. You were in the camp for a sufficiently long period to be able to -answer my question. How were these prisoners divided? As far as I know, -they were divided into criminal, political, and other groups, and each -group distinguished by a special sign worn on the clothing—green, blue, -red, or some other color. - -DUPONT: The use of different badges for different categories had been -planned. These categories were mixed up together. “Criminals” were side -by side with prisoners classed as “political.” There were, however, -blocks in which one or another of those elements predominated; but they -were not divided up into specific groups distinguished by the particular -badge they wore. - -HERR BABEL: I have been told, for instance, that political prisoners -wore blue badges and the criminals wore red ones. We have already had a -witness who confirmed this to a certain extent by stating that criminals -wore a green badge and asocial offenders a different badge and that the -category to which they belonged could be seen at a glance. - -DUPONT: It is true that different badges existed. It is true that the -use of these badges for different categories was foreseen; but if I am -to confine myself to the truth, I must emphasize the fact that the full -use was not made of these badges. For the French, in particular, there -were only political badges; and this increased the confusion still more -since notorious criminals from the ordinary civil prisons were regarded -everywhere as political prisoners. The badges were intended to identify -the different existing categories, but they were not employed -systematically. They were not employed at all for the French prisoners. - -HERR BABEL: If I understand you correctly, you say that all French -prisoners were classified as political prisoners? - -DUPONT: That is correct. - -HERR BABEL: Now, among these French prisoners, as you said yourself, is -it not true to say that there were not only political prisoners but also -a large proportion of criminals? - -DUPONT: There were some among . . . - -HERR BABEL: At least, I took your previous statement to mean that. You -said that quite definitely. - -DUPONT: I did say so. I said that there were criminals from special -prisons who were not given the green badge with an F, which they should -have received, but the political badge. - -HERR BABEL: What was your employment in the camp? You are a doctor, are -you not? - -DUPONT: I arrived in January. For 3 months I was assigned first to the -quarry and then to the “terrasse.” After that I was assigned to the -Revier, that is to say the camp infirmary. - -HERR BABEL: What were your duties there? - -DUPONT: I was assigned to the ambulance service for internal diseases. - -HERR BABEL: Were you able to act on your own initiative? What sort of -instructions did you receive regarding the treatment of patients? - -DUPONT: We acted under the control of an SS doctor. We had a certain -number of beds for certain patients, in the proportion of one bed to 20 -patients. We had practically no medical supplies. I worked in the -infirmary up to the liberation. - -HERR BABEL: Did you receive instructions regarding the treatment of -patients? Were you told to look after them properly or were you given -instructions to administer treatment which would cause death? - -DUPONT: As regards that, I was ordered to select the incurables for -extermination. I never carried out this order. - -HERR BABEL: Were you told to select them for extermination? I did not -quite hear your reply. Will you please repeat it? - -DUPONT: I was ordered to select those who were dangerously ill so that -they might be sent to Block 61 where they were to be exterminated. That -was the only order I received concerning the patients. - -HERR BABEL: “Where were they to be exterminated?” I asked if you were -told that they were to be selected for extermination. Were you -told—“They will be sent to Block 61?” Were you also told what was to -happen to them in Block 61? - -DUPONT: Block 61 was in charge of a noncommissioned officer called -Wilhelm, who personally supervised the executions; and it was he who -ordered what patients should be selected to be sent to that block. I -think the situation is sufficiently clear. - -HERR BABEL: I beg your pardon. You were given no specific details? - -DUPONT: The order to send the incurables . . . - -HERR BABEL: Witness, it strikes me that you are not giving a -straightforward answer of “yes” or “no,” but that you persist in evading -the question. - -DUPONT: It was said that these patients were to be sent to Block 61. -Nothing more was added but every patient sent to Block 61 was executed. - -HERR BABEL: That is not first-hand observation. You found out or you -heard that those who were sent there did not come back. - -DUPONT: That is not correct. I could see for myself, for I was the only -doctor who could enter Block 61, which was under the command of an -internee called Louis Cunish (or Remisch). I was able to get a few of -the patients out; the others died. - -HERR BABEL: If such a thing was said to you, why did you not say that -you would not do it? - -DUPONT: If I understand the question correctly, I am being asked why, -when I was told to send the most serious cases . . . - -HERR BABEL: When you received instructions to select patients for Block -61 why did you not say, “I know what will happen to those people, and -therefore I will not do it.” - -DUPONT: Because it would have meant death. - -HERR BABEL: And what would it have meant if Germans had refused to carry -out such an order? - -DUPONT: What Germans are you talking about? German internees? - -HERR BABEL: A German doctor, if you like, or anyone else employed in the -hospital. What would have happened to him if he had received such an -order and refused to carry it out? - -DUPONT: If an internee refused point-blank to execute such an order, it -meant death. In point of fact, we sometimes could evade such orders. I -emphasize the fact that I never sent anyone to Block 61. - -HERR BABEL: I have one more general question to ask about conditions in -the camp. For those who have never seen a camp it is difficult to -imagine what conditions were actually like. Perhaps you could give the -Tribunal a short description of how the camp was arranged. - -DUPONT: I think I have already spoken at sufficient length on the -organization of the camp. I should like to ask the President whether it -will serve any useful purpose to return to this subject. - -THE PRESIDENT: I believe it is not necessary. [_To Herr Babel_] If you -want to put any particular cross-examination to him to show he is not -telling the truth, you can, but not to ask him for a general -description. - -HERR BABEL: The camp consists of an inner site surrounded and secured by -barbed wire. The barracks in which the prisoners were housed were inside -this camp. How was this inner camp guarded? - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly put one question at a time? The question -you just put involves three or four different matters. - -HERR BABEL: How was the part of the camp in which the living quarters -are situated, separated from the rest? What security measures were -taken? - -DUPONT: The camp was a unified whole, cut off from the rest of the world -by an electrified barbed wire network. - -HERR BABEL: Where were the guards? - -DUPONT: The guards of the camp were in towers situated all around the -camp; they were stationed at the gate and they patrolled inside the camp -itself. - -HERR BABEL: Inside the camp? Inside the barbed wire enclosure? - -DUPONT: Obviously, inside the camp and inside the barracks, of course. -They had the right to go everywhere. - -HERR BABEL: I have been informed that each separate barrack was under -the supervision of only one man, a German SS man or a member of some -other organization, that there were no other guards, that these guards -were not intended to act as guards but only to keep order, and that the -so-called Kapos, who were chosen from the ranks of the prisoners, had -the same authority as the guards and performed the duties of the guards. -It may have been different in Buchenwald. My information comes from -Dachau. - -DUPONT: I have already answered all these questions in my statement by -saying that the camps were run by the SS in a manner which is common -knowledge and that in addition the SS employed the internees as -intermediaries in many instances. This was the case in Buchenwald and, I -suppose, in all the other concentration camps. - -HERR BABEL: The answer to the question has again been highly evasive. I -shall not, however, pursue the matter any further, as in any case I -shall not receive a definite answer. - -But I should like to put one further question: You stated in connection -with the facts you described that a professor, whose name I could not -understand through the earphones and who was, I believe, a professor of -your own, was housed in Block 58. You stated in connection with the -question of degradation that at first 300 people, I think, were housed -there and later on 1,200. Is that correct? - -DUPONT: There were 1,200 men in Block 58 when I found Dr. Kindberg -there. - -HERR BABEL: Yes. And if I understood you correctly, you said that in -this block there were not only Frenchmen, but also Russians, Poles, -Czechs, and Jews and that a state of degradation was caused not only -through the herding together of 1,200 people but also through the -intermingling of so many different nationalities. - -DUPONT: I want to make it clear that the intermingling of elements -speaking a different language, men who are unable to understand each -other, is not a crime; but it was a pre-disposing factor which furthered -all the other measures employed to bring about a state of human -degradation among the prisoners. - -HERR BABEL: So you consider that the intermingling of Frenchmen, -Russians, Poles, Czechs, and Jews is a degradation? - -DUPONT: I do not see the point of this question. The fact of -intermingling . . . - -HERR BABEL: There is no need for you to see the point; I know why I am -asking the question. - -DUPONT: The fact of putting men who speak different languages together -is not degrading. I did not either think or say such a thing; but the -herding together of elements which differ from each other in every -respect and especially in that of language, in itself made living -conditions more difficult, and paved the way for the application of -other measures which I have already described at length and whose final -aim was the degradation of the human being. - -HERR BABEL: I cannot understand why the necessity of associating with -people whose language one does not understand should be degrading. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, he has given his answer, that he considers it -tended to degradation. It does not matter whether you understand it or -not. - -HERR BABEL: Mr. President, the transmission through the earphones is -sometimes so imperfect that I, at least, often cannot hear exactly what -the witness says and for that reason I have unfortunately been compelled -to have an answer repeated from time to time. - -M. DUBOST: I should not like the Tribunal to mistake this interpolation -for an interruption of the cross-examination; but I think I must say -that some confusion was undoubtedly created in the mind of the Defense -Counsel just now in consequence of an interpreter’s error which has been -brought to my notice. - -He asked my witness an insidious question, namely, whether the French -deportees were criminals for the most part, and the question was -interpreted as follows: whether the French deportees were criminals. The -witness answered the question as translated into French and not as asked -in German. I therefore request that the question be put once more by the -Defense Counsel and correctly translated. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you understand what Mr. Dubost said, Dr. Babel? - -HERR BABEL: I think I understand the substance. I think I understand -that there was a mistake in the translation. I am not in a position to -judge; I cannot follow both the French and German text. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think the best course is to continue your -cross-examination, if you have any more questions to ask, and Mr. Dubost -can clear up the difficulty in re-examination. - -HERR BABEL: Mr. President, the Defense Counsel for Kaltenbrunner has -already explained today that it is very difficult for the Defense to -cross-examine a witness without being informed at least one day before -as to the subjects on which the witness is to be heard. The testimony -given by today’s witnesses was so voluminous that it is impossible for -me to follow it without previous preparation and to prepare and conduct -from brief notes the extensive cross-examinations which are necessary. - -To my knowledge, the President has already informed Defense Counsel for -the organizations that we shall have an opportunity of re-examining the -witnesses later or of calling them on our own behalf. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have already said what I have to say on behalf of the -Tribunal on that point, but as Counsel for the Defense must have -anticipated that witnesses would be called as to the conditions in the -concentration camps, I should have thought they could have prepared -their cross-examination during the 40 or more days during which the -Trial has taken place. - -HERR BABEL: Mr. President, I do not think that this is the proper time -for me to argue the matter with the Tribunal, but I may perhaps be given -the opportunity of doing so later in a closed session. I consider this -necessary in the interests of the rapid and unhampered progress of the -Trial. - -I have no desire whatsoever to delay the proceedings. I have the -greatest interest in expediting them as far as possible, but I am -anxious not to do so at the cost of prejudicing the defense of the -organizations. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, I have already pointed out to you that you -must have anticipated that the witnesses might be called to state the -conditions in concentration camps. You must therefore have had full -opportunity during the days the Trial has taken place for making up your -mind on what points you would cross-examine, and I see no reason to -discuss the matter with you. - -HERR BABEL: Thank you for this information. But naturally I cannot know -in advance exactly what the witness is going to say, and I cannot -cross-examine him until I have heard him. I know, of course, that a -witness is going to make a statement about concentration camps but I -cannot know in advance which particular points he will discuss. - -M. DUBOST: I would ask the Tribunal to note that in questioning the -French witness the Defense used certain words the literal translation of -which is “for the most part.” This applied to the character of the -French deportees. The question was, “Were they criminals for the most -part?” The witness understood it to be as I did: “Did you say that they -were criminals?” and not “that the convoys were for the most part -composed of criminals.” His reply was the natural one. The Tribunal will -allow me to ask the witness to give details. What was the proportion of -common-law criminals and patriots respectively among the deportees? Was -he himself a common-law criminal or a patriot? Were the generals and -other personalities whose names he has given us common-law criminals or -patriots, speaking generally? - -DUPONT: The proportion of French common-law criminals was very small. -The common-law criminals came from Fort Barraut in a convoy. I cannot -give the exact figures, but there were only a few hundred out of all the -internees. In other incoming convoys the proportion of common-law -criminals included was only 2 or 3 per thousand. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, are you proposing or asking to call other -witnesses upon concentration camps? Because, as I have already pointed -out to you, the evidence, with the exception of Dr. Babel’s recent -cross-examination, has practically not been cross-examined; and it is -supported by other film evidence. We are instructed by Article 18 of the -Charter to conduct the Trial in as expeditious a way as possible; and I -will point out to you, as ordered under 24e of the Charter, you have the -opportunity of calling rebutting evidence, if it were necessary and, -therefore, if the evidence which has been so fully gone into as to the -condition in concentration camps . . . - -M. DUBOST: The witness whom I propose to ask the Tribunal to hear will -elucidate a point which has been pending for several weeks. The Tribunal -will remember that when my American colleagues were presenting their -evidence, the question of ascertaining whether Kaltenbrunner had been in -Mauthausen arose. In evidence of this, I am going to call M. Boix, who -will prove to the Tribunal that Kaltenbrunner had been in Mauthausen. He -has photographs of that visit and the Tribunal will see them, as the -witness brought them with him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -[_The witness, Boix, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -M. FRANÇOIS BOIX (Witness): François Boix. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you French? - -BOIX: I am a Spanish refugee. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me. I swear to speak -without hate or fear, to say the truth, all the truth, only the truth. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in French._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Raise your right hand and say, “I swear.” - -BOIX: I swear. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -M. Dubost, will you spell the name. - -M. DUBOST: B-O-I-X. [_Turning to the witness._] You were born on 14 -August 1920 in Barcelona? - -BOIX: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: You are a news photographer, and you were interned in the -camp of Mauthausen, since . . . - -BOIX: Since 27 January 1941. - -M. DUBOST: You handed over to the commission of inquiry a certain number -of photographs? - -BOIX: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: They are going to be projected on the screen and you will -state under oath under what circumstances and where these pictures were -taken? - -BOIX: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: How did you obtain these pictures? - -BOIX: Owing to my professional knowledge, I was sent to Mauthausen to -work in the identification branch of the camp. There was a photographic -branch, and pictures of everything happening in the camp could be taken -and sent to the High Command in Berlin. - -[_Pictures were then projected on the screen._] - -M. DUBOST: This is the general view of the quarry. Is this where the -internees worked? - -BOIX: Most of them. - -M. DUBOST: Where is the stairway? - -BOIX: In the rear. - -M. DUBOST: How many steps were there? - -BOIX: 160 steps at first; later on there were 186. - -M. DUBOST: We can proceed to the next picture. - -BOIX: This was taken in the quarry during a visit from Reichsführer -Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, the Governor of Linz, and some other leaders -whose names I do not know. What you see below is the dead body of a man -who had fallen from the top of the quarry (70 meters), as happened every -day. - -M. DUBOST: We can proceed to the next picture. - -BOIX: This was taken in April 1941. My Spanish comrades who had sought -refuge in France are pulling a wagon loaded with earth. That was the -work we had to do. - -M. DUBOST: By whom was this picture taken? - -BOIX: At that time by Paul Ricken, a professor from Essen. - -M. DUBOST: We may proceed to the next one. - -BOIX: This staged the scene of an Austrian who had escaped. He was a -carpenter in the garage and he managed to make a box, a box in which he -could hide and so get out of the camp. But after a while he was -recaptured. They put him on the wheelbarrow in which corpses were -carried to the crematorium. There were some placards saying in German, -“Alle Vögel sind schon da,” meaning “All the birds are back again.” He -was sentenced and then paraded in front of 10,000 deportees to the music -of a gypsy band playing a song “J’attendrai.” When he was hanged, his -body swung to and fro in the wind while they played the very well known -song, “Bill Black Polka.” - -M. DUBOST: The next one. - -BOIX: This is the scene; in this picture we see on the right and left -all the deportees in a row; on the left are the Spaniards, they are -smaller. The man in the front with the beret is a criminal from Berlin -by the name of Schultz, who was employed on these occasions. In the -background you can see the man who is about to be hanged. - -M. DUBOST: Next one. Who took these pictures? - -BOIX: By the SS Oberscharführer Fritz Kornatz. He was killed by American -troops in Holland in 1944. This man, a Russian prisoner of war, got a -bullet in the head. They hanged him to make us think he was a suicide -and had tried to hurl himself against the barbed wire. - -The other picture shows some Dutch Jews. That was taken at Barracks C, -the so-called quarantine barracks. The Jews were driven to hurl -themselves against the barbed wire on the very day of their arrival -because they realized that there was no hope to escape for them. - -M. DUBOST: By whom were these pictures taken? - -BOIX: At this time by the SS Oberscharführer Paul Ricken, a professor -from Essen. - -M. DUBOST: Next one. - -BOIX: These are 2 Dutch Jews. You can see the red star they wore. That -was an alleged attempt to escape (Fluchtversuch). - -M. DUBOST: What was it in reality? - -BOIX: The SS sent them to pick up stones near the barbed wires, and the -SS guards at the second barbed wire fence fired on them, because they -received a reward for every man they shot down. - -The other picture shows a Jew in 1941 during the construction of the -so-called Russian camp, which later became the sanitary camp, hanged -with the cord which he used to keep up his trousers. - -M. DUBOST: Was it suicide? - -BOIX: It was alleged to be. It was a man who no longer had any hope of -escape. He was driven to desperation by forced labor and torture. - -M. DUBOST: What is this picture? - -BOIX: A Jew whose nationality I do not know. He was put in a barrel of -water until he could not stand it any longer. He was beaten to the point -of death and then given 10 minutes in which to hang himself. He used his -own belt to do it, for he knew what would happen to him otherwise. - -M. DUBOST: Who took that picture? - -BOIX: The SS Oberscharführer Paul Ricken. - -M. DUBOST: And what is this picture? - -BOIX: Here you see the Viennese police visiting the quarry. This was in -June or July 1941. The two deportees whom you see here are two of my -Spanish comrades. - -M. DUBOST: What are they doing? - -BOIX: They are showing the police how they had to raise the stones, -because there were no other appliances for doing so. - -M. DUBOST: Did you know any of the policemen who came? - -BOIX: No, because they came only once. We had just time to have a look -at them. - -The date of this picture is September 1943, on the birthday of -Obersturmbannführer Franz Ziereis. He is surrounded by the whole staff -of Mauthausen Camp. I can give you the names of all the people in the -picture. - -M. DUBOST: Pass the next photo. - -BOIX: This is a picture taken on the same day as Obersturmbannführer -Franz Ziereis’s birthday. The other man was his adjutant. I forgot his -name. It must be remembered that this adjutant was a member of the -Wehrmacht and put on an SS uniform as soon as he came to the camp. - -M. DUBOST: Who is that? - -BOIX: That is the same visit to Mauthausen by police officials in June -or July 1941. This is the kitchen door. The prisoners standing there had -been sent to the disciplinary company. They used that little appliance -on their backs for carrying stones up to a weight of 80 kilos, until -they were exhausted. Very few men ever came back from the disciplinary -company. - -This picture shows Himmler’s visit to the Führerheim at Camp Mauthausen -in April 1941. It shows Himmler with the Governor of Linz in the -background and Obersturmbannführer Ziereis, the commanding officer of -Camp Mauthausen, on his left. - -This picture was taken in the quarry. In the rear, to the left, you see -a group of deportees at work. In the foreground are Franz Ziereis, -Himmler, and Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner. He is wearing the gold -Party emblem. - -M. DUBOST: This picture was taken in the quarry? By whom? - -BOIX: By the SS Oberscharführer Paul Ricken. This was between April and -May 1941. This gentleman frequently visited the camp at that period to -see how similar camps could be organized throughout Germany and in the -occupied countries. - -M. DUBOST: I have finished. You give us your assurance that it is really -Kaltenbrunner. - -BOIX: I give you my assurance. - -M. DUBOST: And that this picture was taken in the camp? - -BOIX: I give you my assurance. - -M. DUBOST: Were you taken to Mauthausen as a prisoner of war or as a -political prisoner? - -BOIX: As a prisoner of war. - -M. DUBOST: You had fought as a volunteer in the French Army? - -BOIX: Either in infantry battalions or in the Foreign Legion, or in the -pioneer regiments attached to the Army to which I belonged. I was in the -Vosges with the 5th Army. We were taken prisoners. We retreated as far -as Belfort where I was taken prisoner in the night of 20-21 June 1940. I -was put with some fellow Spaniards and transferred to Mulhouse. Knowing -us to be former Spanish Republicans and anti-fascists, they put us in -among the Jews as members of a lower order of humanity (Untermensch). We -were prisoners of war for 6 months and then we learned that the Minister -for Foreign Affairs had had an interview with Hitler to discuss the -question of foreigners and other matters. We knew that our status had -been among the questions raised. We heard that the Germans had asked -what was to be done with Spanish prisoners of war who had served in the -French Army, those of them who were Republicans and ex-members of the -Republican Army. The answer . . . - -M. DUBOST: Never mind that. So although you were a prisoner of war you -were sent to a camp not under Army control? - -BOIX: Exactly. We were prisoners of war. We were told that we were being -transferred to a subordinate Kommando, like all the other Frenchmen. -Then we were transferred to Mauthausen where, for the first time, we saw -that there were no Wehrmacht soldiers and we realized that we were in an -extermination camp. - -M. DUBOST: How many of you arrived there? - -BOIX: At the end we were 1,500; altogether 8,000 Spaniards at the time -of our arrival. - -M. DUBOST: How many of you were liberated? - -BOIX: Approximately 1,600. - -M. DUBOST: I have no more questions to ask. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask any questions? - -GEN. RUDENKO: I shall have some questions. If the President will permit -me I shall present them in tomorrow’s session. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FORTY-FIFTH DAY - Tuesday, 29 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire now to say that the Defendant -Kaltenbrunner will be absent from this morning’s session on account of -illness. - -M. DUBOST: In my capacity as representative of the French Prosecution, I -wish to ask the Tribunal to consider this request. The witnesses that -were interrogated yesterday are to be cross-examined by the Defense. The -conditions under which they are here are rather precarious, for it takes -30 hours to return to Paris. We would like to know whether we are to -keep them here; and, if the Defense really intends to cross-examine -them, we should like to proceed with that as quickly as possible in -order to ensure their return to France. - -THE PRESIDENT: In view of what you said yesterday, M. Dubost, I said on -behalf of the Tribunal that Herr Babel might have the opportunity of -cross-examining one of your witnesses within the next two days. Is Herr -Babel ready to cross-examine that witness now? - -HERR BABEL: No, Mr. President, I have not yet received a copy of his -interrogation and consequently have not been able to prepare my -cross-examination. The time from yesterday to today is, naturally, also -too short. Therefore, I cannot yet make a definite statement whether or -not I shall want to cross-examine the witness. If I were given an -opportunity during the course of the day to get the Record. . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing_] Well, that witness must stay until -tomorrow afternoon, M. Dubost, but the other witnesses can go. M. -Dubost, will you see, if you can, that a copy of the shorthand notes is -furnished to Herr Babel as soon as possible? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Mr. President. - -[_The witness, Boix, took the stand._] - -I shall have it done, My Lord. We continue. The Tribunal will remember -that yesterday afternoon we projected six photographs of Mauthausen -which were brought to us by the witness who is now before you and on -which he offered his comments. This witness specifically stated under -what conditions the photograph representing Kaltenbrunner in the quarry -of Mauthausen had been taken. We offer these photographs as a French -document, Exhibit Number RF-332. - -Will you allow me to formulate one more question to the witness? Then I -shall be through with him, at least concerning the important part of -this testimony. - -Witness, do you recognize among the defendants anyone who visited the -camp of Mauthausen during your internment there? - -BOIX: Speer. - -M. DUBOST: When did you see him? - -BOIX: He came to the Gusen Camp in 1943 to arrange for some -constructions and also to the quarry at Mauthausen. I did not see him -myself as I was in the identification service of the camp and could not -leave, but during these visits Paul Ricken, head of the identification -department, took a roll of film with his Leica which I developed. On -this film I recognized Speer and some leaders of the SS as well, who -came with him. Speer wore a light-colored suit. - -M. DUBOST: You saw that on the pictures that you developed? - -BOIX: Yes. I recognized him on the photos and afterward we had to write -his name and the date because many SS always wanted to have collections -of all the photos of visits to the camp. - -I recognized Speer on 36 photographs which were taken by SS -Oberscharführer Paul Ricken in 1943, during Speer’s visit to the Gusen -Camp and the quarry of Mauthausen. He always looked extremely pleased in -these pictures. There are even pictures which show him congratulating -Obersturmbannführer Franz Ziereis, then commander of the Mauthausen -Camp, with a cordial handshake. - -M. DUBOST: One last question. Were there any officiating chaplains in -your camp? How did the internees who wanted religious consolation die? - -BOIX: Yes, from what I could observe, there were several. There was an -order of German Catholics, known as “Bibelforscher,” but officially -. . . - -M. DUBOST: But officially did the administration of the camp grant the -internees the right to practice their religion? - -BOIX: No, they could do nothing, they were absolutely forbidden even to -live. - -M. DUBOST: Even to live? - -BOIX: Even to live. - -M. DUBOST: Were there any Catholic chaplains or any Protestant pastors? - -BOIX: That sort of Bibelforscher were almost all Protestants. I do not -know much about this matter. - -M. DUBOST: How were monks, priests, and pastors treated? - -BOIX: There was no difference between them and ourselves. They died in -the same way we did. Sometimes they were sent to the gas chamber, at -times they were shot, or plunged in freezing water; any way was good -enough. The SS had a particularly harsh method of handling these people, -because they knew that they were not able to work as normal laborers. -They treated all intellectuals of all countries in this manner. - -M. DUBOST: They were not allowed to exercise their functions? - -BOIX: No, not at all. - -M. DUBOST: Did the men who died have a chaplain before being executed? - -BOIX: No, not at all. On the contrary, at times, instead of being -consoled, as you say, by anyone of their faith, they received, just -before being shot, 25 or 75 lash with a leather thong even from an SS -Obersturmbannführer personally. I noticed especially the cases of a few -officers, political commissars, and Russian prisoners of war. - -M. DUBOST: I have no further questions to ask of the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko? - -GEN. RUDENKO: Witness, please tell us what you know about the -extermination of Soviet prisoners. - -BOIX: I cannot possibly tell you all I know about it; I know so much -that one month would not suffice to tell you all about it. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Then I would like to ask you, Witness, to tell us -concisely what you know about the extermination of Soviet prisoners in -the camp of Mauthausen. - -BOIX: The arrival of the first prisoners of war took place in 1941. The -arrival of 2,000 Russian prisoners of war was announced. With regard to -Russian prisoners of war, they took the same precautions as in the case -of the Republican Spanish prisoners of war. They put machine guns -everywhere around the barracks and expected the worst. As soon as the -Russian prisoners of war entered the camp one could see that they were -in a very bad state, they could not even understand anything. They were -human scarecrows. They were then put in barracks, 1,600 to a barracks. -You must bear in mind these barracks were 7 meters wide by 50 long. They -were divested of their clothes, of the very little they had with them; -they could keep only one pair of drawers and one shirt. One has to -remember that this was in November and in Mauthausen it was more than 10 -degrees (centigrade) below zero. - -Upon their arrival there were already 20 deaths, from walking only the -distance of 4 kilometers between the station and camp of Mauthausen. At -first the same system was applied to them as to us Republican Spanish -prisoners. They left us with nothing to do, with no work. - -They were left to themselves, but with scarcely anything to eat. At the -end of a few weeks they were already at the end of their endurance. Then -began the process of elimination. They were made to work under the most -horrible conditions, they were beaten, hit, kicked, insulted; and out of -the 7,000 Russian prisoners of war who came from almost everywhere, only -30 survivors were left at the end of three months. Of these 30 survivors -photographs were taken by Paul Ricken’s department as a document. I have -these pictures and I can show them if the Tribunal so wishes. - -GEN. RUDENKO: You do have these pictures? - -BOIX: M. Dubost knows about that, yes. M. Dubost has them. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Thank you. Can you show these pictures? - -BOIX: M. Dubost has them. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Thank you. What do you know about the Yugoslavs and the -Poles? - -BOIX: The first Poles came to the camp in 1939 at the moment of the -defeat of Poland. They received the same treatment as everybody else -did. At that time there were only ordinary German bandits there. Then -the work of extermination was begun. There were tens of thousands of -Poles who died under frightful conditions. - -The position of the Yugoslavs should be emphasized. The Yugoslavs began -to arrive in convoys, wearing civilian clothes; and they were shot in a -legal way, so to speak. The SS wore even their steel helmets for these -executions. They shot them two at a time. The first transport brought -165, the second 180, and after that they came in small groups of 15, 50, -60, 30; and even women came then. - -It should be noted that once, among four women who were shot—and that -was the only time in the camp of deportees—some of them spat in the -face of the camp Führer before dying. The Yugoslavs suffered as few -people have suffered. Their position is comparable only to that of the -Russians. Until the very end they were massacred by every means -imaginable. I would like to say more about the Russians, because they -have gone through so much . . . - -GEN. RUDENKO: Do I understand correctly from your testimony that the -concentration camp was really an extermination camp? - -BOIX: The camp was placed in the last category, category 3; that is, it -was a camp from which no one could come out. - -GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does Counsel for Great Britain desire to cross-examine? - -COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for United Kingdom): No -questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the United States? - -MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): No -questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any counsel for the defendants wish to cross-examine? - -HERR BABEL: Witness, how were you marked in the camp? - -BOIX: The number? What kind of brand? - -HERR BABEL: The prisoners were marked by variously colored stars, red, -green, yellow, and so forth. Was this so in Mauthausen also? What did -you wear? - -BOIX: Everybody wore insignia. They were not stars; they were triangles -and letters to show the nationality. Yellow and red stars were for the -Jews, stars with six red and yellow points, two triangles, one over the -other. - -HERR BABEL: What color did you wear? - -BOIX: A blue triangle with an “S” in it, that is to say “Spanish -political refugee.” - -HERR BABEL: Were you a Kapo? - -BOIX: No, I was an interpreter at first. - -HERR BABEL: What were your tasks and duties there? - -BOIX: I had to translate into Spanish all the barbaric things the -Germans wished to tell the Spanish prisoners. Afterwards my work was -with photography, developing the films which were taken all over the -camp showing the full story of what happened in the camp. - -HERR BABEL: What was the policy with regard to visitors? Did visitors go -only into the inner camp or to places where work was being done? - -BOIX: They visited all the camps. It was impossible for them not to know -what was going on. Exception was made only when high officials or other -important persons from Poland, Austria, or Slovakia, from all these -countries, would come. Then they would show them only the best parts. -Franz Ziereis would say, “See for yourselves.” He searched out cooks, -interned bandits, fat and well-fed criminals. He would select these so -as to be able to say that all internees looked like these. - -HERR BABEL: Were the prisoners forbidden to communicate with each other -concerning conditions in the camp? Communication with the outside was, -of course, scarcely possible. - -BOIX: It was so completely forbidden that, if anyone was caught at it, -it meant not only his death but for all those of his nationality -terrible reprisals. - -HERR BABEL: What observations can you make regarding the Kapos? How did -they behave toward your fellow internees? - -BOIX: At times they were really worthy of being SS themselves. To be a -Kapo, one had to be Aryan, pure Aryan. That means that they had a -martial bearing and, like the SS, full rights over us; they had the -right to treat us like beasts. The SS gave them _carte blanche_ to do -with us what they wished. That is why, at the liberation, the prisoners -and deportees executed all the Kapos on whom they could lay their hands. - -Shortly before the liberation the Kapos asked to enlist voluntarily in -the SS and they left with the SS because they knew what was awaiting -them. In spite of that we looked for them everywhere and executed them -on the spot. - -HERR BABEL: You said “they had to treat you like wild beasts.” From what -facts do you draw the conclusion that they were obliged to? - -BOIX: One would have to be blind in order not to see. One could see the -way they behaved. It was better to die like a man than to live like a -beast; but they preferred to live like beasts, like savages, like -criminals. They were known as such. I lived there four and a half years -and I know very well what they did. There were many among us who could -have become Kapos for their work, because they were specialists in some -field or another in the camp. But they preferred to be beaten and -massacred, if necessary, rather than become a Kapo. - -HERR BABEL: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to -ask questions of the witness? M. Dubost, do you wish to ask any -questions? - -M. DUBOST: I have no further questions, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -GEN. RUDENKO: My Lord, the witness informed us that he had at his -disposal the photographic documents of 30 Soviet prisoners of war, the -sole survivors of several thousand internees in this camp. I would like -to ask your permission, Mr. President, to present this photographic -document to the witness so that he can confirm before the Tribunal that -it is really this group of Soviet prisoners of war. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly you may show the photograph to the witness if -it is available. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Yes. Witness, can you show this picture? - -[_The witness presented the picture to the Tribunal._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Is this the photograph? - -BOIX: Yes, I can assure you that these 30 survivors were still living in -1942. Since then, in view of the conditions of the camp, it is very -difficult to know whether some of them are still alive. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you please give the date when this photograph was -taken? - -BOIX: It was at the end of the winter of 1941-42. At that time, it was -still 10 degrees (centigrade) below zero. You can see from the picture -the appearance of the prisoners because of the cold. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has this book been put in evidence yet? - -M. DUBOST: This book has been submitted as evidence, Your Honor, as -official evidence. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have the defendants got copies of it? - -M. DUBOST: It was submitted as Exhibit Number RF-331 (Document F-321). -The Defense have also received a copy of this book in German, but the -pictures are not in the German version, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well then, let this photograph be marked. It had better -be marked with a French exhibit number, I think. What will it be? - -M. DUBOST: We shall give it Exhibit Number RF-333. - -THE PRESIDENT: Let it be marked in that way, and then hand it to Herr -Babel. - -GEN. RUDENKO: Thank you, Sir. I have no more questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you hand the photo to Dr. Babel. - -[_The photo was handed to Herr Babel._] - -I think it should be handed about to the other defendants’ counsel in -case they wish to ask any question about it. M. Dubost, I think that an -approved copy of this book, including the photographs, has been -deposited in the defendants’ Information Center. - -M. DUBOST: The whole book, except for the pictures. - -THE PRESIDENT: Why not the pictures? - -M. DUBOST: At that moment we did not have them to submit. In our exposé -we have not mentioned the photographs. - -THE PRESIDENT: The German counsel ought to have the same documents as -are submitted to the Tribunal. The photographs have been submitted to -the Tribunal; therefore they should have been deposited in the -Information Center. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, the French text, including the pictures, was -deposited in the Defense Information Center; and, in addition, a certain -number of texts in German, to which the pictures were not added because -we had that translation prepared for the use of the Defense. But there -are French copies of the book that you have before you which include the -pictures. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -M. DUBOST: We have here four copies of the picture which was shown -yesterday afternoon, which we shall place before you. It shows -Kaltenbrunner and Himmler in the quarry of Mauthausen, in accordance -with the testimony given by Boix. One of these pictures will also be -delivered to the Defense, that is, to the lawyer of the Defendant -Kaltenbrunner. - -THE PRESIDENT: Now the photograph has been handed around to the -defendants’ counsel. Do any members of the defendants’ counsel wish to -ask any questions of the witness about this photograph? No question? The -witness can retire. - -BOIX: I would like to say something more. I would like to note that -there were cases when Soviet officers were massacred. It is worth noting -because it concerns prisoners of war. I would like the Tribunal to -listen to me carefully. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is it you wish to say about the massacre of the -Soviet prisoners of war? - -BOIX: In 1943 there was a transport of officers. On the very day of -their arrival in the camp they began to be massacred by every means. But -it seems that from the higher quarters orders had come concerning these -officers saying that something extraordinary had to be done. So they put -them in the best block in the camp. They gave them new prisoner’s -clothing. They gave them even cigarettes; they gave them beds with -sheets; they were given everything they wanted to eat. A medical -officer, Sturmbannführer Bresbach, examined them with a stethoscope. - -They went down into the quarry, but they carried only small stones, and -in fours. At that time Oberscharführer Paul Ricken, chief of the -service, was there with his Leica taking pictures without stopping. He -took about 48 pictures. These I developed and five copies of each, 13 by -18, with the negatives, were sent to Berlin. It is too bad I did not -steal the negatives, as I did the others. - -When that was done, the Russians were made to give up their clothing and -everything else and were sent to the gas chamber. The comedy was ended. -Everybody could see on the pictures that the Russian prisoners of war, -the officers, and especially the political commissars, were treated -well, worked hardly at all, and were in good condition. That is one -thing that should be noted because I think it is necessary. - -And another thing, there was a barrack called Barrack Number 20. That -barrack was inside the camp; and in spite of the electrified barbed wire -around the camp, there was an additional wall with electrified barbed -wire around it. In that barrack there were prisoners of war, Russian -officers and commissars, some Slavs, a few Frenchmen, and, they said, -even a few Englishmen. No one could enter that barrack except the two -Führer who were in the camp prison, the commanding officers of the inner -and outer camps. These internees were dressed just as we were, like -convicts, but without number or identification of their nationality. One -could not tell their nationality. - -The service “Erkennungsdienst” must have taken their pictures. A tag -with a number was placed on their chest. This number began with 3,000 -and something. There were numbers looking like Number 11 (two blue -darts), and the numbers started at 3,000 and went up to 7,000. SS -Unterscharführer Hermann Schinlauer was the photographer then in charge. -He was from the Berlin region, somewhere outside of Berlin, I do not -remember the name. He had orders to develop the films and to do all work -personally; but like all the SS of the interior services of the camp, -they were men who knew nothing. They always needed prisoners to get -their work done. That is why he needed me to develop these films. I made -the enlargements, 5 by 7. These were sent to Obersturmführer Karl -Schulz, of Cologne, the Chief of the Politische Abteilung. He told me -not to tell anything to anybody about these pictures and about the fact -that we developed these films; if we did we would be liquidated at once. -Without any fear of the consequences I told all my comrades about it, so -that, if one of us should succeed in getting out, he could tell the -world about it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we have heard enough of this detail that you are -giving us. But come back for a moment to the case you were speaking of. -I wish you would repeat the case of the Russian prisoners of war in -1943. You said that the officers were taken to the quarry to carry the -heaviest stones. - -BOIX: No, just very small stones, weighing not even 20 kilos, and they -carried them in fours to show on the pictures that the Russian officers -did not do heavy work but on the contrary, light work. That was only for -the pictures, whereas in reality it was entirely different. - -THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said they carried big, heavy stones. - -BOIX: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Were the photographs taken while they were in their -uniforms carrying these light stones? - -BOIX: Yes, Sir; they had to put on clean uniforms, neatly arranged, to -show that the Russian prisoners were well and properly treated. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Is there any other particular incident you -want to refer to? - -BOIX: Yes, about Block 20. Thanks to my knowledge of photography I was -able to see it; I had to be there to handle the lights while my chief -took photographs. In this way I could follow, detail by detail, -everything that took place in this barrack. It was an inner camp. This -barrack, like all the others, was 7 meters wide and 50 meters long. -There were 1,800 internees there, with a food ration less than -one-quarter of what we would get for food. They had neither spoons nor -plates. Large kettles of spoiled food were emptied on the snow and left -there until it began to freeze; then the Russians were ordered to get at -it. The Russians were so hungry, they would fight for this food. The SS -used these fights as a pretext to beat some of them with bludgeons. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that the Russians were put directly into -Block 20? - -BOIX: The Russians did not come to the camp directly. Those who were not -sent to the gas chamber right away were placed in Block 20. Nobody of -the inner camp, not even the Blockführer, was allowed to enter this -barrack. Small convoys of 50 or 60 came several times a week and always -one heard the noise of a fight going on inside. - -In January 1945, when the Russians learned that the Soviet Armies were -approaching Yugoslavia, they took one last chance. They seized fire -extinguishers and killed soldiers posted under the watch tower. They -seized machine guns and everything possible as weapons. They took -blankets with them and everything they could find. They were 700, but -only 62 succeeded in passing into Yugoslavia with the partisans. - -That day, Franz Ziereis, camp commander, issued an order by radio to all -civilians to co-operate, to “liquidate” the Russian criminals who had -escaped from the concentration camp. He stated that everyone who could -produce evidence that he had killed one of these men would receive an -extraordinary sum of marks. This was why all the Nazi followers in -Mauthausen went to work and succeeded in killing more than 600 escaped -prisoners. It was not hard because some of the Russians could not drag -themselves for more than 10 meters. - -After the liberation one of the surviving Russians came to Mauthausen to -see how everything was then. He told us all the details of his painful -march. - -THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think the Tribunal wants to hear more details -which you did not see yourself. Does any member of the Defense Counsel -wish to ask any question of the witness upon the points which he has -dealt with himself. - -HERR BABEL: One question only. In the course of your testimony you gave -certain figures, namely 165, then 180, and just now 700. Were you in a -position to count them yourself? - -BOIX: Nearly always the convoys came into the camp in columns of five. -It was easy to count them. These transports were always sent from the -Wehrmacht, from the Wehrmacht prisons somewhere in Germany. They were -sent from all prisons in Germany, from the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the -SD, or the SS. - -THE PRESIDENT: Just answer the question and do not make a speech. You -have said they were brought in in columns of five and it was easy to -count them. - -BOIX: Very easy to count them, particularly for those who wanted to be -able to tell the story some day. - -HERR BABEL: Did you have so much time that you were able to observe all -these things? - -BOIX: The transports always came in the evening after the deportees had -returned to the camp. At this time we always had two or three hours when -we could wander about in the camp waiting for the bell that was the -signal for us to go to bed. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness may now retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -M. DUBOST: If the Tribunal permits, we shall now hear Mr. Cappelen, who -is a Norwegian witness. The testimony of Mr. Cappelen will be limited to -the conditions that were imposed on Norwegian internees in Norwegian -camps and prisons. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -[_The witness, Hans Cappelen, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: I understand that you speak English. - -M. HANS CAPPELEN (Witness): Yes, I speak English. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you take the English form of oath? - -CAPPELEN: Yes, I prefer to speak in English. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -CAPPELEN: My name is Hans Cappelen. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: - -I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole -truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God. - -[_The witness repeated the oath in English._] - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Raise your right hand and say “I -swear.” - -CAPPELEN: I swear. - -M. DUBOST: M. Cappelen, you were born 18 December 1903? - -CAPPELEN: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: In what town? - -CAPPELEN: I was born in Kvitseid, province of Telemark, Norway. - -M. DUBOST: What is your profession? - -CAPPELEN: I was a lawyer, but now I am a business man. - -M. DUBOST: Will you tell what you know of the atrocities of the Gestapo -in Norway? - -CAPPELEN: My Lord, I was arrested on 29 November 1941 and taken to the -Gestapo prison in Oslo, Moellergata 19. After 10 days I was interrogated -by two Norwegian NS, or Nazi police agents. They started in at once to -beat me with bludgeons. How long this interrogation lasted I cannot -remember, but it led to nothing. So after some days I was brought to 32 -Victoria Terrace. That was the headquarters of the Gestapo in Norway. It -was about 8 o’clock at night. I was brought into a fairly big room and -they asked me to undress. I had to undress until I was absolutely naked. -I was a little bit swollen after the first treatment I had by the -Norwegian police agents, but it was not too bad. - -There were present about six or eight Gestapo agents and their leader -was Femer; Kriminalrat was his title. He was very angry and they started -to bombard me with questions which I could not answer. So Femer ran at -me and tore all the hair off my head, hair and blood were all over the -floor around me. And so, all of a sudden, they all started to run at me -and beat me with rubber bludgeons and iron cable-ends. That hurt me very -badly and I fainted. But I was brought back to life again by their -pouring ice water over me. I vomited, naturally, because I was feeling -very sick. But that only made them angry; and they said, “Clean up, you -dirty dog!” And I had to make an attempt to clean up with my bare hands. - -In this way they carried on for a long, long time, but the interrogation -led to nothing because they bombarded me with questions and asked me of -persons whom I did not know or scarcely knew. - -I suppose it must have been in the morning I was brought back again to -the prison. I was placed in my cell and felt very sick and weak. All -during the day I asked the guard if I could not have a doctor; that was -the 19th. After some days—I suppose it must have been the day before -Christmas Eve 1941—I was again, in the night, brought to the Victoria -Terrace. The same happened as last time, only this time it was very easy -for me to undress because I had only a coat on me. I was swollen up from -the last beating. Just like the last time, six, seven, or eight Gestapo -agents were present. - -THE PRESIDENT: German Gestapo, do you mean? - -CAPPELEN: Yes, German Gestapo, all of them. And then there was Femer -present at that time, too. He had a rank in the SS and was criminal -commissar. Then they started to beat me again, but it was useless to -beat a man like me who was so swollen up and looking so bad. Then they -started in another way, they started to screw and break my arms and -legs. And my right arm was dislocated. I felt that awful pain, and -fainted again. Then the same happened as last time; they poured water on -me and I came back again to life. - -Now all the Germans there were absolutely mad. They roared like animals -and bombarded me with questions again, but I was so tired I could not -answer. - -Then they placed a sort of home-made—it looked to me like a sort of -home-made—wooden thing, with a screw arrangement, on my left leg; and -they started to screw so that all the flesh loosened from the bones. I -felt an awful pain and fainted away again. But I came back to -consciousness again; and I have still big marks here on my leg from the -screw arrangement, now, four years afterwards. - -So that led to nothing and then they placed something on my neck—I -still have marks here [_indicating_]—and loosened the flesh here. But -then I had a collapse and all of a sudden I felt that I was sort of -paralyzed in the right side. It has otherwise been proved that I had a -cerebral hemorrhage. And I got that double vision; I saw two of each -Gestapo agent, and all was going round and round for me. That double -vision I have had 4 years, and when I am tired it comes back again. But -I am better now, so I can move again on the right side; but the right -side is a little bit affected from that. - -Well, I cannot remember much more from that night, but the other -prisoners who had to clean up the corridors in the prison had seen them -bringing me back again in the morning. That must have been about 6 -o’clock in the morning. They thought I was dead because I had no irons -on my hands. If it had been for 1 day or 2 days, I can’t tell, but one -day I moved again and was a little bit clear; and then the guard at once -was in my cell where I was lying on a cot in my own vomiting and blood, -and afterwards there came a doctor. - -He had, I suppose, quite a high rank; which rank I can’t exactly say. He -told me that I most probably would die, especially if I wasn’t—I asked -him, “Couldn’t you bring me to a hospital, because . . .” He said, “No. -Fools are not to be brought to any hospital, before you do just what we -say you shall do. Like all Norwegians, you are a fool.” - -Well, they put my arm into joint again. That was very bad, but two -soldiers held me and they drew it in, and I fainted away again. So the -time passed and I rested a bit. I couldn’t walk, because it all seemed -to be going around for me. So I was lying on the cot. And so one day—it -must have been in the end of February or in the middle of February -1942—they came again. It must have been about ten o’clock in the night, -because the light in my cell had been out for quite a long time. They -asked me to stand up, and I made an attempt, and fell down again because -of the paralysis. Then they kicked me; but I said, “Is not it better to -put me to death, because I can’t move?” - -Well, they dragged me out of the cell, and I was again brought up to -Victoria Terrace; that is the headquarters where they made their -interrogations. This time the interrogation was led by one SS man called -Stehr. I could not stand so, naked as I was, I was lying on the floor. -This Stehr had some assistants, four or five Gestapo agents; and they -started to tramp on me and to kick me. So all of a sudden they brought -me to my feet again and brought me to a table where Stehr was sitting. -He took my left hand like this [_indicating_] and put some pins under my -nails and started to break them up. Well, it hurt me badly; and all -things began going around and around for me—the double vision—but the -pain was so intense that I drew my hand back. I should not have done -that, because that made them absolutely furious. I fainted away, -collapsed, and I do not know for how long a time; but I came back to -life again by the smelling of burned flesh or burned meat. And then one -of the Gestapo agents was standing with a little sort of lamp burning me -under my feet. It did not hurt me too much, because I was so feeble that -I did not care; and I was so paralyzed my tongue could not work, so I -could not speak, only groaned a bit, crying, naturally, always. - -Well, I don’t remember much more of that time, but this was to me one of -the worst things I went through with respect to interrogations. I was -brought back again to the prison and time passed and I attempted to eat -a little bit. I spewed most of it up again, I threw it up again, most of -it. But little by little I recovered. I was still paralyzed in the side, -so I couldn’t stand up. - -But I was also taken into interrogations again, and then I was -confronted with other Norwegians, people I knew and people I did not -know; and the most of them were badly treated. They were swollen up, and -I remember especially two of my friends, two very good persons. I had -been confronted with them, and they were looking very bad from torture, -and when I came back again after my imprisonment I learned that they -both were dead; they had died from the treatment. - -Another incident which I aim to tell—I hope My Lord will permit me to -do it—concerned a person called Sverre Emil Halvorsen. He was one -day—that must have been in the autumn or in August or October 1943—a -little bit swollen up and very unhappy; and he said they had treated him -so bad, but he and some of his friends had been in some sort of a court -where they had been told that they were to be shot the next day. They -placed a sort of sentence upon them, just to set an example. - -Well, Halvorsen had, naturally, a headache and felt very ill, and I -asked the guard to bring—the head guard, that was a person named Herr -Götz. He came and asked what the devil I wanted. I said, “My comrade is -very ill, could not he have some aspirins?” “Oh no,” he said, “it is a -waste to give him aspirin, because he is to be shot in the morning.” - -Next morning he was brought out of the cell, and after the war they -found him up at Trondheim together with other Norwegians in a grave -there with a bullet through his neck. - -Well, the Moellergate 19, in Oslo, the prison where I was for about 25 -months, was a house of horror. I heard every night—nearly every -night—people screaming and groaning. One day, it must have been in -December 1943, about the 8th of December, they came into my cell and -told me to dress. It was in the night. I put on my ragged clothes, what -I had. Now I had recovered, practically. I was naturally lame on the one -side, could not walk so well, but I could walk; and I went down in the -corridor and there they placed me as usual against the wall, and I -waited that they would bring me away and shoot me. But they did not -shoot me; they brought me to Germany together with lots of other -Norwegians. I learned afterwards about some few of my friends—and by -friends, I mean Norwegians. We were so-called “Nacht und Nebel” -prisoners, “Night and Mist” prisoners. We were brought to a camp called -Natzweiler, in Alsace. It was a very bad camp, I must say. - -We had to work to take stones out of the mountains. But I shall not bore -you about my tales from Natzweiler, My Lord, I will only say that people -of all other nations—French, Russians, Dutch, and Belgians—were there -and we are about five hundred Norwegians who have been there. Between 60 -and 70 percent died there or in other camps of concentration. Also, two -Danes were there. - -Well, we saw many cruel things there, so cruel that they need—they are -well known. The camp had to be evacuated in September 1944. We were then -brought to Dachau near Munich, but we did not stay long there; at least, -I didn’t stay long there. I was sent to a Kommando called Aurich in East -Friesland, where we were about—that was an under-Kommando of -Neuengamme, near Hamburg. We were about fifteen hundred prisoners. We -had to dig tank traps. Well, we had to walk every day about 3 or 4 -hours, and go by train for 1 hour to the Panzer Gräben where we worked. -The work was so strong and so hard and the way they treated us so bad, -that most of them died there. I suppose about half of the prisoners died -of dysentery or of ill-treatment in the five or six weeks we were there. -It was too much even for the SS, who had to take care of the camp, so -they gave it up, I suppose; and I was sent from Neuengamme, near -Hamburg, to a camp called Gross-Rosen, in Silesia; it is near Breslau. -That was a very bad camp, too. We were about 40 Norwegians there; and of -those 40 Norwegians we were about 10 left after 4 to 5 weeks. - -THE PRESIDENT: You will be some little time longer, so I think we better -adjourn now for 10 minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. DUBOST: M. Cappelen, will you continue to speak to us of your passage -through those camps, particularly of what you know of the camp of -Natzweiler and the role at Natzweiler of Dr. Hirt, Hirch, or Hirtz of -the German medical faculty of Strasbourg? - -CAPPELEN: Well, in Natzweiler, yes, there were also carried on -experiments. Just beside the camp there was a farm they called Struthof. -That was practically a part of the camp; and some of the prisoners had -to work there to clean up the rooms; and—well not so often, but -sometimes—they were taken out. For instance, one day, I remember, all -the Gypsies were taken out, and then they were brought down to Struthof. -They were very afraid of being brought down there. - -Well, one friend of mine, a Norwegian called Hvidding, who had a job in -the hospital—so-called hospital—in the camp, told me the day after the -Gypsies were taken and brought to Struthof, “I tell you something. They -have, so far as I understand, tried some sort of gas on them.” - -“How do you know that?” I asked. - -“Well, come along with me.” - -And then, through the window of the hospital, I could see four of the -Gypsies lying in beds. They did not look well, and it was not easy to -look through the glass, but they had some mucus, I suppose, around their -mouths. And he told me that they had—Hvidding told me—that the Gypsies -could not tell much because they were so ill, but so far as he -understood, it was gas which they had used upon them. There had been 12 -of them, and 4 were living; the other 8, so far as he understood, died -down there at Struthof. Then he told further on, “You see that man who -sometimes walks through the camp together with some others?” - -“Well, I have seen him,” I said. - -“That is Professor Hirtz from the German University in Strasbourg.” - -I am quite sure Hvidding said that this man is Hirt or Hirtz. He is -coming here now nearly daily with a so-called commission to see those -who are coming back again from Struthof, to see the result. That is all -I know about that so far. - -M. DUBOST: How many Norwegians died at Gross-Rosen? - -CAPPELEN: In Gross-Rosen, it is not possible for me to say here exactly; -but I know about 40 persons who had been there, and I also know about -ten who came back again. Well, Gross-Rosen was a bad camp. But nearly -the worst of it all was the evacuation of Gross-Rosen. I suppose it must -have been in the middle of February of that year. The Russians came -nearer and nearer to Breslau. - -THE PRESIDENT: You mean 1945? - -CAPPELEN: Yes, 1945 I mean. One day we were placed upon a so-called -“Appellplatz” (roll call ground). We were very feeble, all of us. We had -hard work, little food, and all sorts of ill-treatment. Well, we started -to walk in parties of about 2,000 to 3,000. In the party I was with, we -were about 2,500 to 2,800. We heard so and so many when they took up the -numbers. - -Well, we started to walk, and we had SS guards on each side. They were -very nervous and almost like mad persons. Several were drunk. We -couldn’t walk fast enough, and they smashed in the heads of five who -could not keep up. They said in German, “That is what happens to those -who cannot walk.” The others would have been treated in the same way if -they had not been able to follow. We walked the best we could. We -attempted to help one another, but we were all too exhausted. After -walking for 6 to 8 hours we came to a station, a railway station. It was -very cold and we had only striped prison clothes on, and bad boots; but -we said, “Oh, we are glad that we have come to a railway station. It is -better to stand in a cow truck than to walk, in the middle of winter.” -It was very cold, 10 to 12 degrees below zero (centigrade). It was a -long train with open cars. In Norway we call them sand cars, and we were -kicked on to those cars, about 80 on each car. We had to sit together -and on this car we sat for about 5 days without food, cold, and without -water. When it was snowing we made like this [_indicating_] just to get -some water into the mouth and, after a long, long time—it seemed to me -years—we came to a place which I afterwards learned was Dora. That is -in the neighborhood of Buchenwald. - -Well, we arrived there. They kicked us down from the cars, but many were -dead. The man who sat next to me was dead, but I had no right to get -away. I had to sit with a dead man for the last day. I didn’t see the -figures myself, naturally, but about one-third of us or half of us were -dead, getting stiff. And they told us that one-third—I heard the figure -afterwards in Dora—that the dead on our train numbered 1,447. - -Well, from Dora I don’t remember so much, because I was more or less -dead. I have always been a man of good humor and high spirited, to help -myself first and my friends; but I had nearly given up. - -I do not remember so much before, so I had a good chance, because -Bernadotte’s action came and we were rescued and brought to Neuengamme, -near Hamburg; and when we arrived, there were some of my old friends, -the student from Norway who had been deported to Germany, other -prisoners who came from Sachsenhausen and other camps, and the few, -comparatively few, Norwegian “NN” prisoners who were living, all in very -bad condition. Many of my friends are still in the hospital in Norway. -Some died after coming home. - -That’s what happened to me and my comrades in the three and -three-quarter years I was in prison. I am fully aware that it is -impossible for me to give details more than I have done; but I have -taken, so to say, the parts of it which show, I hope, the way they -behaved against Norwegians, and in Norway, the German SS. - -M. DUBOST: For what reason were you arrested? - -CAPPELEN: I was arrested the 29th of November 1941, in a place called -then Hoistly. That is a sort of sanitarium where one goes skiing. - -M. DUBOST: What had you done? What was held against you? - -CAPPELEN: Well, what I had done. Like most of us Norwegians, we regarded -ourselves to be at war with Germany in one way or another; and naturally -we, most of us, were against them by feelings; and also, as the Gestapo -asked me, I remember, “What do you think of Mr. Quisling?” I only -answered, “What would you have done if a German officer—even a -major—when your country was at war and your government had given an -order of mobilization, he came and said, ‘Better forget the Mobilization -Order?’” A man can’t do that with respect. - -M. DUBOST: On the whole, did the German population know of, or were they -unaware of, what went on in the camps? - -CAPPELEN: That is, naturally, very difficult for me to answer. But in -Norway, at least, even at the time when I was arrested, we knew quite a -lot about how the Germans treated their prisoners. - -And there is one thing I remember in Munich where I was working. I was -not working; I was in Dachau for that short period. With some others, I -was once brought to the town of Munich to go into the ruins to seek for -persons and find bombs and things like that. I suppose that was the -idea. They never told us anything, but we knew what was on. We were -about one hundred persons, prisoners. We were looking like dead persons, -all of us looking very bad. We went through the streets and people could -see us; and they also could see what we were going to do, the sort of -work which one should think was very dangerous and which should in some -way help them; but it was no fun for them to see us. Some of them were -hollering to us, “It is your fault that we are bombed.” - -M. DUBOST: Were there any chaplains in your camp? Were you allowed to -pray? - -CAPPELEN: Well, we had among the “NN” prisoners in Natzweiler a priest -from Norway. He was, I suppose, what you call in English a Dean. He was -of quite high rank. In Norwegian we call it “Prost.” From the west coast -of Norway. He was also brought to Natzweiler as an “NN” prisoner, and -some of my comrades asked him if they could not meet sometimes so he -could preach to them. But he said, “No, I don’t dare to do it. I had a -Bible. They have taken it from me and they joked about it and said, ‘You -dirty churchman, if you show the Bible and things like that . . .’” You -know, therefore, we did not do anything in that way. - -M. DUBOST: Those who were dying among you, did they have the consolation -of their religion at the time of their death? - -CAPPELEN: No. - -M. DUBOST: Were the dead treated with decency? - -CAPPELEN: No. - -M. DUBOST: Was there any religious service conducted? - -CAPPELEN: No. - -M. DUBOST: I have no further questions to ask. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does counsel for the U.S.S.R. desire to cross-examine? - -GEN. RUDENKO: I have no question, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Has the United States? - -[_No response._] - -Then does any member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask the witness -any questions? - -DR. MERKEL: Witness, at your first interrogations which as a rule took -place about ten days after arrest, were you interrogated by German or by -Norwegian Gestapo men? - -CAPPELEN: It was made by two Norwegians who belonged to, as I learned -afterward, the so-called State Police. That was not the police in -Norway. They were working together with the Gestapo; in fact, it was the -same. But it was by them I was interrogated after the 10 days. But they, -as I heard afterwards, usually did it in that way, because it was easy -to do it in Norwegian; and some of the Germans could not speak -Norwegian. Most of them could not. I think it was, therefore, that they -took the Norwegian; and you can call them Gestapo, practically. They let -them handle the persons first. - -DR. MERKEL: Then at the Victoria Terrace, which name I believe you used -to designate the Gestapo headquarters in Oslo, were there Norwegian or -German officials present during your interrogation? - -CAPPELEN: I dare say there may have been one Norwegian as a sort of -interpreter; but as I spoke the German language, I cannot, with 100 -percent surety, say if there were one or two Norwegian policemen there. -It is difficult. But as Victoria Terrace was the headquarters of the -Gestapo, naturally they had some Norwegian Nazis to help them there. But -most of them were German. - -DR. MERKEL: Were the persons who interrogated you in uniform or in -civilian clothes? - -CAPPELEN: During my interrogation I have sometimes seen them in uniform, -too. But when they tortured me they were mostly in civilian clothes. So -far as I remember, there was only one person in uniform during one of -the torture interrogations. - -DR. MERKEL: You stated that you were then treated by a physician. Did -this physician come of his own free will or was he asked to come? - -CAPPELEN: The first time I asked for a doctor, but then I did not get -any. But at the time when I came back to consciousness, when I was -supposed perhaps to be dead, the guard possibly had been looking at me -because he was then running away; and afterwards they came with a -doctor. - -DR. MERKEL: Did you know that in the German concentration camps there -was an absolute prohibition against talking about the conditions in the -camp—among the prisoners as well as to outsiders, of course—and that -any violation of the order not to talk was subject to most severe -penalties? - -CAPPELEN: Well, in the camps it was like this: It was naturally more or -less understood that it was more or less forbidden to talk about the -tortures we had gone through; but naturally in the camps, the Nacht und -Nebel Camps where I was, the situation was so bad that even torture -sometimes seemed to be better than dying slowly away like that, so -almost the only thing we spoke about was: “When shall the war end; how -to help our comrades; and are we to get some food tonight or not?” - -DR. MERKEL: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel wish to ask any -questions? Mr. Dubost, have you anything you wish to ask? - -M. DUBOST: I have nothing further to ask, Mr. President. I thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -M. DUBOST: If the Tribunal will permit, we will now hear a witness, -Roser, who will give a few details on the conditions under which they -kept French prisoners of war in reprisal camps. - -[_The witness, Paul Roser, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -M. PAUL ROSER (Witness): Roser, Paul. - -THE PRESIDENT: You swear to speak without hate or fear, to state the -truth, all the truth, only the truth? Raise the right hand and say “I -swear.” - -[_The witness raised his right hand and repeated the oath in French._] - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -M. DUBOST: Your name is Paul Roser, R-o-s-e-r? - -ROSER: R-o-s-e-r. - -M. DUBOST: You were born on the 8th of May 1903? You are of French -nationality? - -ROSER: I am French. - -M. DUBOST: You were born of French parents? - -ROSER: I was born of French parents. - -M. DUBOST: You were a prisoner of war? - -ROSER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: You were taken prisoner in battle? - -ROSER: Yes, I was. - -M. DUBOST: In what year? - -ROSER: 14 June 1940. - -M. DUBOST: You sought to escape? - -ROSER: Yes, several times. - -M. DUBOST: How many times? - -ROSER: Five times. - -M. DUBOST: Five times. You were transferred finally to a disciplinary -camp? - -ROSER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: Will you indicate the regime of such a camp? Will you -indicate your rank, and the treatment which French people of your rank -in those disciplinary camps had to submit to, and for what reasons? - -ROSER: Very well, I was an “aspirant,” a rank which, in France, is -between a first sergeant and a second lieutenant. I was in several -disciplinary camps. The first was a small camp which the Germans called -Strafkommando, in Linzburg in Hanover. It was in 1941. There were about -thirty of us. - -While I was in that camp during the summer of 1941, we attempted to -escape. We were recaptured by our guards at the very moment when we were -leaving the camp. We were naturally unarmed. The Germans, our guards, -having recaptured one of us, attempted to make him reveal the others who -also had sought to escape. The man remained silent. The guards hurled -themselves upon him, beating him with the butts of their pistols in the -face, with bayonets, with the butts of their rifles. At that moment, not -wishing to let our comrade be killed, several of us stepped forward and -revealed that we sought to escape. I then received a beating with -bayonets applied to my head and fell into a swoon. When I recovered -consciousness one of the Germans was kneeling on my leg and was -continuing to strike me. Another one, raising his gun, was seeking to -strike my head. I was saved on that occasion through the intervention of -my comrades, who threw themselves between the Germans and myself. That -night we were beaten for exactly 3 hours with rifle butts, with bayonet -blows, and with pistol butts in the face. I lost consciousness three -times. - -The following day we were taken to work, nevertheless. We dug trenches -for the draining of the marshes. It was a very hard sort of work, which -started at 6:30 in the morning, to be completed at 6 o’clock at night. -We had two stops, each of a half-hour. We had nothing to eat during the -day. Soup was given to us, when we came back at night, with a piece of -bread, a small sausage or 2 cubic centimeters of margarine, and that was -all. - -Following our attempted escape, our guards held back from us all the -parcels which our families sent to us for a month. We could not write -nor could we receive mail. - -At the end of three and a half months, in September 1941, we were -shipped to the regular Kommandos. I, personally, was quite ill at that -time and I came back to Stalag X B at Sandbostel. - -M. DUBOST: Why were you subjected to such a special regime, although you -were an “aspirant”? - -ROSER: Certainly because of my attempted escape. - -M. DUBOST: Had you agreed to work? - -ROSER: No, not at all. Like all my comrades of the same rank and like -most of the noncommissioned officers and like all “aspirants,” I had -refused to work, invoking the provision of the Geneva Convention, which -Germany had signed and which prescribed that noncommissioned officers -who were prisoners cannot be forced to perform any labor without their -consent. The German Army, into whose hands we had fallen, practically -speaking, never respected that agreement undertaken by Germany. - -M. DUBOST: Are you familiar with executions that took place in Oflag XI -B? - -ROSER: I was made familiar with the death of several French or Allied -prisoners, specifically at Oflag XI at Grossborn in Pomerania. A French -prisoner, Lieutenant Robin, who with some of his comrades had prepared -an escape and for that purpose had dug a tunnel, was killed in the -following manner: The Germans having had information that the tunnel had -been prepared, Hauptmann Buchmann, who was a member of the officer staff -of the camp, watched with a few German guards for the exit of the -would-be escapees. Lieutenant Robin, who was first to emerge, was killed -with one shot while obviously he could in no manner attack anyone or -defend himself. - -Other cases of this type occurred. One of my friends, a French -Lieutenant Ledoux, who was sent to Graudenz Fortress where he was -subjected to a hard detention regime, saw his best friend, British -Lieutenant Anthony Thomson, killed by Hauptfeldwebel Ostreich with one -pistol shot in the neck, in their own cell. Lieutenant Thomson had just -sought to escape and had been recaptured by the Germans on the airfield. -Lieutenant Thomson belonged to the RAF. - -I should like to state also that in the camp of Rawa-Ruska in Galicia, -where I spent 5 months, several of our comrades . . . - -M. DUBOST: Would you tell us why you were at Rawa-Ruska? - -ROSER: In the course of the winter, 1941-42, the Germans wanted to -intimidate, first, the noncommissioned officers who were refractory in -labor; second, those who had sought to escape; and third, the men who -were being employed in Kommandos (labor gangs) and who were caught in -the act of performing sabotage. The Germans warned us that from 1 April -1942 onward all these escapees who were recaptured would be sent to a -camp, a special camp called a Straflager, at Rawa-Ruska in Poland. - -It was following another attempt to escape that I was taken to Poland -with about two thousand other Frenchmen. I was at Limburg-an-der-Lahn, -Stalag XII A, where we were regrouped and placed in railway cars. We -were stripped of our clothes, of our shoes, of all the food which some -of us had been able to keep. We were placed in cars, in each of which -the number varied from 53 to 56. The trip lasted 6 days. The cars were -open generally for a few minutes in the course of a stop in the -countryside. In 6 days we were given soup on 2 occasions only, once at -Oppel, and another time at Jaroslan, and the soup was not edible. We -remained for 36 hours without anything to drink in the course of that -trip, as we had no receptacle with us and it was impossible to get a -supply of water. - -When we reached Rawa-Ruska on 1 June 1942, we found other -prisoners—most of them French, who had been there for several -weeks—extremely discouraged, with a ration scale much inferior to -anything that we had experienced until then, and no International Red -Cross or family parcel for anyone. - -At that time there were about twelve to thirteen thousand in that camp. -There was for that number one single faucet which supplied, for several -hours a day, undrinkable water. This situation lasted until the visit of -two Swiss doctors, who came to the camp in September, I think. The -billets consisted of 4 barracks, where rooms contained as many as 600 -men. We were stacked in tiers along the walls, 3 rows of them, 30 to 40 -centimeters for each of us. - -During our stay in Rawa-Ruska there were many attempts at escape, more -than five hundred in 6 months. Several of our comrades were killed. Some -were killed at the time when a guard noticed them. In spite of the -sadness of such occurrences, no one of us contested the rights of our -guards in such cases, but several were murdered. In particular, on 12 -August 1942, in the Tarnopol Kommando, a soldier, Lavesque, was found -bearing evidence of several shots and several large wounds caused by -bayonets. - -On the 14th of August, in the Verciniec Kommando, 93 Frenchmen, having -succeeded in digging a tunnel, escaped. The following morning three of -them, Conan, Van den Boosch, and Poutrelle, were caught by German -soldiers, who were searching for them. Two of them were sleeping; the -third, Poutrelle, was not asleep. The Germans, a corporal and two -enlisted men, verified the identity of the three Frenchmen. Very calmly -they told them: “Now we are obliged to kill you.” The three wretched men -spoke of their families, begged for mercy. The German corporal gave the -following reply, which we heard only too often: “Befehl ist Befehl” (“An -order is an order”); and they shot down immediately two of the French -prisoners, Van den Boosch and Conan. Poutrelle was left like a madman -and by sheer luck was not caught again. But he was captured a few days -later in the region of Kraków. He was then brought back to Rawa-Ruska -proper, where we saw him in a condition close to madness. - -On the 14th of August, once again in the Stryj Kommando, a team of about -twenty prisoners accompanied by several guards, were on their way to -work . . . . - -M. DUBOST: Excuse me, you are talking about French prisoners of war? - -ROSER: Yes, French prisoners of war, so far. - -Going along a wood, the German noncommissioned officer, who for some -time had been annoying two of them, Pierrel and Ondiviella, directed -them into the woods. A few moments later the others heard shots. Pierrel -and Ondiviella had just been killed. - -On 20 September 1942, at Stryj once again, a Kommando was at work under -the supervision of German soldiers and German civilian foremen. One of -the Frenchmen succeeded in escaping. Without waiting, the German -noncommissioned officers selected two men, if my memory is correct, -Saladin and Duboeuf, and shot them on the spot. Incidents of this type -occurred in other circumstances. The list of them would be long indeed. - -M. DUBOST: Can you speak of the conditions under which the refractory -noncommissioned officers who were with you at camp at Rawa-Ruska lived? - -ROSER: The noncommissioned officers who refused to work were grouped -together in one section of the camp, in two of the large stables which -served as billets. They were subjected to a regime of most severe -repression; frequent roll calls for assembly; lying-down and standing-up -exercise which after a while leaves one quite exhausted. - -One day, Sergeant Corbihan, having refused Captain Fournier—a German -captain with a French name—to take a tool to work with, the German -captain made a motion and one of the German soldiers with him ran -Corbihan through with his bayonet; Corbihan by miracle escaped death. - -M. DUBOST: How many of you disappeared? - -ROSER: At Rawa-Ruska, in the 5 months that I spent there, we buried 60 -of our comrades who had died from disease or had been killed in -attempted escapes. But so far, 100 of those who were with us and sought -to escape have not been found. - -M. DUBOST: Is this all that you have witnessed? - -ROSER: No, I should say that our stay at the punishment camp, -Rawa-Ruska, involved one thing more awful than anything else we -prisoners saw and suffered. We were horrified by what we knew was taking -place all about us. The Germans had transformed the area of -Lvov-Rawa-Ruska into a kind of immense ghetto. Into that area, where the -Jews were already quite numerous, had been brought the Jews from all the -countries of Europe. Every day for 5 months, except for an interruption -of about six weeks in August and September 1942, we saw passing about -150 meters from our camp, one, two, and sometimes three convoys, made up -of freight cars in which there were crowded men, women and children. One -day a voice coming from one of these cars shouted: “I am from Paris. We -are on our way to the slaughter.” Quite frequently, comrades who went -outside the camp to go to work found corpses along the railway track. We -knew in a vague sort of way at that time that these trains stopped at -Belcec, which was located about 17 kilometers from our camp; and at that -point they executed these wretched people, by what means I do not know. - -One night in July 1942 we heard shots of submachine guns throughout the -entire night and the moans of women and children. The following morning -bands of German soldiers were going through the fields of rye on the -very edge of our camp, their bayonets pointed downward, seeking people -hiding in the fields. Those of our comrades who went out that day to go -to their work told us that they saw corpses everywhere in the town, in -the gutters, in the barns, in the houses. Later some of our guards, who -had participated in this operation, quite good-humoredly explained to us -that 2,000 Jews had been killed that night under the pretext that two SS -men had been murdered in the region. - -Later on, in 1943, during the first week of June, there occurred a -pogrom which in Lvov caused the death of 30,000 Jews. I was not -personally in Lvov, but several French military doctors, Major Guiguet -and Lieutenant Levin of the French Medical Corps, described this scene -to me. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness appears to be not finishing and therefore I -think we had better adjourn now until 2 o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MARSHAL: I desire to announce that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner will be -absent from this afternoon’s session on account of illness. - -M. DUBOST: With the permission of the Tribunal, we shall continue -examining the witness, M. Roser. - -M. Roser, this morning you finished the description of the conditions -under which you witnessed the pogrom of Rawa-Ruska and you wanted to -give us some details on another pogrom. You told us that a German -soldier, who had taken a part in it, made a statement to you which you -wanted to relate to us. Is that right? - -ROSER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: We are listening to you. - -ROSER: At the end of 1942 I was taken to Germany, and I, together with a -French doctor, had the opportunity of meeting the chauffeur of the -German physician who was head of the infirmary where I was at that time. -This soldier, whose name I have forgotten, said to me as follows: - - “In Poland, in a town the name of which I have forgotten, a - sergeant from our regiment went with a Jewess. A few hours later - he was found dead. Then”—said the German soldier—“my battalion - was called out. Half of it cordoned off the ghetto, and the - other half, two companies, to one of which I belonged, forced - its way into the houses and threw out of the windows, pell-mell, - the furniture and the inhabitants.”—The German soldier finished - his story by saying—“Poor fellow! It was terrible, - horrible!”—We asked him then—“How could you do such a - thing?”—He gave us the fatalistic reply—“Orders are orders.” - -This is the example which I previously mentioned. - -M. DUBOST: If I remember rightly, when speaking of Rawa-Ruska you -started describing the treatment of Russian prisoners who were in this -camp before you. - -ROSER: Yes. That is correct. The first French batch, which arrived in -Rawa-Ruska the 14th or 15th of April 1942, followed a group of 400 -Russian prisoners of war, who were the survivors of a detachment of -6,000 men decimated by typhus. The few medicines found by the French -doctors upon arrival at Rawa-Ruska came from the infirmary of the -Russian prisoners. There were a few aspirin tablets and other drugs; -absolutely nothing against typhus. The camp had not been disinfected -after the sick Russians had left. - -I cannot speak here of these wretched Russian survivors of Rawa-Ruska, -without asking the Tribunal for permission to describe the terrible -picture we all—I mean all the French prisoners who were in the stalags -of Germany in the autumn or winter of 1941—saw when the first batches -of Russian prisoners arrived. It was on a Sunday afternoon that I -watched this spectacle, which was like a nightmare. The Russians arrived -in rows, five by five, holding each other by the arms, as none of them -could walk by themselves—“walking skeletons” was really the only -fitting expression. Since then we have seen photographs of those camps -of deportation and death. Our unfortunate Russian comrades had been in -that condition since 1941. The color of their faces was not even yellow, -it was green. Almost all squinted, as they had not strength enough to -focus their sight. They fell by rows, five men at a time. The Germans -rushed on them and beat them with rifle butts and whips. As it was -Sunday afternoon the prisoners were at liberty, inside the camp, of -course. Seeing that, all the French started shouting and the Germans -made us return to the barracks. Typhus spread immediately in the Russian -camp, where, out of the 10,000 who had arrived in November, only 2,500 -survived by the beginning of February. - -These figures are accurate. I have them from two sources. First, from a -semi-official source, which was the kitchen of the camp. In front of the -kitchen a big chart was posted where the Germans recorded the -ridiculously small rations and the number of men in the camp. This -number decreased daily by 80 to 100, in the Russian camp. On the other -hand, French comrades employed in the camp’s reception office, called -“Aufnahme,” also knew the figures, and from them I got the figure of -2,500 survivors in February. Later, particularly at Rawa-Ruska, I had -the opportunity of seeing French prisoners from all parts of Germany. -All those who were in stalags, that is, in the central camps, at the -time mentioned, saw the same thing. Many of the Russian prisoners were -thrown in a common grave, even before they were dead. The dead and the -dying were piled up between the barracks and thrown into carts. The -first few days we could see the corpses in the carts, but as the German -camp commandant did not like to see French soldiers salute their fallen -Russian comrades, he had them covered with canvas after that. - -M. DUBOST: Were your camps guarded by the German Army or by the SS? - -ROSER: By the Wehrmacht. - -M. DUBOST: Only by the German Army? - -ROSER: I was never guarded by anybody but the German Army and once by -the Schutzpolizei, after I had tried to escape. - -M. DUBOST: And were you recaptured? - -ROSER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: One last question. You were kept in a number of -prisoner-of-war camps in Germany, were you not? - -ROSER: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: In all those camps did you have the opportunity to practice -your religion? - -ROSER: In the camps . . . - -M. DUBOST: What is your religion? - -ROSER: I am a Protestant. In the camps where I was kept, Protestants and -Catholics were generally allowed to practice their religion. But I was -detailed to working squads, particularly to an agricultural group in the -Bremen district, called “Maiburg,” I think, where there was a Catholic -priest. There were about sixty of us in this group. This Catholic priest -could not say Mass—they would not let him. - -M. DUBOST: Who? - -ROSER: The sentries—the “Posten.” - -M. DUBOST: Who were soldiers of the German Army? - -ROSER: Yes, always. - -M. DUBOST: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does the British Prosecutor wish to ask any questions? - -BRITISH PROSECUTOR: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Or the United States? - -AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: No. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions? - -DR. NELTE: Witness, when were you taken prisoner? - -ROSER: I was taken prisoner on 14 June 1940. - -DR. NELTE: In which camp for prisoners of war were you put? - -ROSER: I was immediately sent to the Oflag, XI D, at -Grossborn-Westfalenhof in Pomerania. - -DR. NELTE: Oflag? - -ROSER: Yes. - -DR. NELTE: What regulations were made known to you in the -prisoner-of-war camp regarding a possible attempt at escape? - -ROSER: We were warned that we would be shot at and that we should not -try to escape. - -DR. NELTE: Do you think that this warning was in agreement with the -Geneva Convention? - -ROSER: This one certainly. - -DR. NELTE: You mentioned, if I heard correctly, the case of Robin from -Oflag XI D. You said that there was an officer who dug a tunnel in order -to escape from the camp, and that as he was the first to emerge from the -tunnel, he was shot. Is that right? - -ROSER: Yes; I said so. - -DR. NELTE: Were you with those officers who tried to escape? - -ROSER: I said before that this was related to me by Lieutenant Ledoux -who was still in Oflag XI D when that happened. - -DR. NELTE: I only wanted to ascertain that this officer, Robin, met his -death while trying to escape. - -ROSER: Yes, but here I should like to mention one thing, namely, all the -prisoners of war who escaped knew they risked their lives. Everyone -attempting to escape, knew that he risked a bullet. But it is one thing -to be killed trying to climb the barbed wire, for instance, and it is -another thing to be ambushed and murdered at a moment when one cannot do -anything, when one is unarmed and at the mercy of somebody, as was the -case with Lieutenant Robin. He was in a low tunnel, flat on his stomach, -crawling along, and was killed. That was not in accordance with -international rules. - -DR. NELTE: I see what you mean, and you may rest assured that I respect -every prisoner of war who tried to do his duty as a patriot. In this -case, however, which you did not witness, I wanted to make the point -that this courageous officer who left the tunnel might not have answered -when challenged by the guards and was therefore shot. - -ROSER: No. - -DR. NELTE: Though you have just given a vivid description of the -incident, I think it was a product of your imagination because, -according to your own testimony, you did not see it yourself; is that -correct? - -ROSER: There are not 36 different ways of getting out of an escape -tunnel: You lie flat on your stomach, you crawl, and if you are killed -before you get out of the tunnel, I call that murder. - -DR. NELTE: And then you saw the officer . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, we do not want argument in cross-examination. -The witness has already stated that he was not there and did not see it, -and he has explained the facts. - -DR. NELTE: Thank you. The incident in respect to Lieutenant Thomson is -not quite clear to me. In this case too, I believe you said you had no -direct knowledge, but were informed by a friend. Is that correct? - -ROSER: I cannot but repeat what I said before. I related the story of -the French lieutenant, Ledoux, who told me that he was in the fortress -of Graudenz together with an R.A.F. lieutenant called Anthony Thomson. -This English officer escaped from the fortress. He was recaptured on the -airfield, taken back to the fortress, put into the same cell as -Lieutenant Ledoux, and Ledoux saw him killed by a revolver shot in the -back of the neck. Ledoux gave me the name of the murderer. I think I -mentioned him just now, Hauptfeldwebel Ostereich. This is the story told -me by an eyewitness. - -DR. NELTE: Was that Hauptfeldwebel Ostereich a guard at the camp, or to -what formation did he belong? - -ROSER: I don’t know. - -DR. NELTE: Do you know that you, as prisoner of war, had a right to -complain? - -ROSER: Certainly; I personally knew the Geneva Convention which was -signed by Germany in 1934. - -DR. NELTE: Knowing those regulations you also knew, did you not, that -you could complain to the camp commander? Did you avail yourself of -that? - -ROSER: I tried to do so, but without success. - -DR. NELTE: May I ask you for the name of the camp commander who refused -to hear you? - -ROSER: I do not know the name, but I will tell you when I tried to -complain. It was when I was in the infamous Linzburg Strafkommando -(punishment squad) in the province of Hanover. This squad belonged to -Stalag XC. In the morning following the night I have just described, -when, after an unsuccessful attempt at escape, we were beaten for 3 -hours running, some of us were kept in the barracks. We then saw the -immediate superior of the commander of the squad. It was an -Oberleutnant, whose name I do not know, who saw that we were injured, -particularly about the head, and he considered it quite all right. In -the afternoon we went to work. When we returned at 7 o’clock we had the -visit of a major, a very distinguished-looking man, who also thought -that, as we had tried to escape, it was quite in order that we should be -punished. As to our complaint, it went no further. - -DR. NELTE: Did you know that the German Government had made an agreement -with the Vichy Government regarding prisoners of war? - -ROSER: Yes, I have heard of that, but they did not inspect squads of -this kind. - -DR. NELTE: You mean to say that only the camps were inspected, but not -the labor squads? - -ROSER: There were inspections of the labor squads, but not of the -punishment squads where I was. That is the difference. - -DR. NELTE: You were not always in a disciplinary squad, were you? - -ROSER: No. - -DR. NELTE: When were you put in a disciplinary squad? - -ROSER: In April 1941, for the first time. It was a squad to which only -officer cadets and priests were sent without any obvious reasons. This -was the Linzburg Strafkommando squad which did not receive any visits. -At Rawa-Ruska we received the visit of two Swiss doctors; I think it was -in September 1942. - -DR. NELTE: In September 1942? - -ROSER: Yes, in September 1942. - -DR. NELTE: Did you complain to the Swiss doctors? - -ROSER: Not I personally, but our spokesman was able to talk to them. - -DR. NELTE: And were there any results? - -ROSER: Yes, certainly. - -DR. NELTE: Do you not think that a complaint made through the camp -commander would likewise have been successful, if you had wished to -resort to it? - -ROSER: We were not on very friendly terms with the German staff at -Rawa-Ruska. - -DR. NELTE: I do not quite understand you. - -ROSER: I said we were not on friendly terms with the German commander of -the Rawa-Ruska Camp. - -DR. NELTE: It is not a question of good terms, but of a complaint which -could be made in an official manner. Do you not think so? - -[_The witness shrugged his shoulders._] - -DR. NELTE: When did you leave Rawa-Ruska? - -ROSER: At the end of October 1942. - -DR. NELTE: If I remember rightly, you mentioned the number of victims -counted or observed by you, did you not? - -ROSER: Yes. - -DR. NELTE: How many victims were there? - -ROSER: It was a figure given to me by Dr. Lievin, a French doctor at -Rawa-Ruska. There were, as I said, about sixty deaths in the camp -itself, to which approximately one hundred must be added who -disappeared. - -DR. NELTE: Are you speaking of French victims or victims in general? - -ROSER: When I was at Rawa-Ruska there were only Frenchmen there, with a -few Poles and a few Belgians. - -DR. NELTE: I am putting this question because an official French report -I have before me, dated 14 June 1945, states that the victims up to the -end of July were 14 Frenchmen, and therefore for the period from August -to September the number seems to me very high. Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other German counsel want to put any questions -to this witness? [_There was no response._] M. Dubost? - -M. DUBOST: I have finished with this witness, Mr. President. If the -Tribunal will permit me, I shall now call another witness, the last one. - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment, M. Dubost, the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -M. Dubost, could you tell the Tribunal whether the witness you are about -to call is going to give us any evidence of a different nature from the -evidence which has already been given? Because you will remember that we -have in the French document, of which we shall take judicial notice—a -very large French document; I forget the number, 321 I believe it is, -Document Number RF-321; we have a very large volume of evidence on the -conditions in concentration camps. Is the witness you are going to call -going to prove anything fresh? - -M. DUBOST: Your Honors, the witness whom we are going to call is to -testify to a certain number of experiments which he witnessed. He has -even submitted certain documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are these experiments about which the witness is going to -speak all recorded, in the Document Number RF-321? - -M. DUBOST: They are referred to, but not reported in detail. Moreover, -in view of the importance attached to statements of witnesses in the -French presentation concerning the camps, I shall considerably curtail -my work and will dispense with reading the documentary evidence, a large -amount of which I shall merely submit after these witnesses have been -heard. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may call the witness, but try not to let him be too -long. - -M. DUBOST: I shall do my best, Mr. President. - -[_The witness, Dr. Alfred Balachowsky, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -DR. ALFRED BALACHOWSKY (Witness): Alfred Balachowsky. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you French? - -BALACHOWSKY: French. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath? Do you swear to speak without -hate or fear, to say the truth, all the truth, only the truth? - -[_The witness repeated the oath in French._] - -Raise your right hand and swear. - -BALACHOWSKY: I swear. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit if you wish. - -M. DUBOST: Your name is Balachowsky, Alfred B-a-l-a-c-h-o-w-s-k-y? - -BALACHOWSKY: That is correct. - -M. DUBOST: You are head of a laboratory at the Pasteur Institute in -Paris? - -BALACHOWSKY: That is correct. - -M. DUBOST: Your residence is at Viroflay? You were born 15 August 1909 -at Korotcha in Russia? - -BALACHOWSKY: That is correct. - -M. DUBOST: You are French? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes. - -M. DUBOST: By birth? - -BALACHOWSKY: Russian by birth, French by naturalization. - -M. DUBOST: When were you naturalized? - -BALACHOWSKY: 1932. - -M. DUBOST: Were you deported on 16 January 1944 after being arrested on -2 July 1943, and were you 6 months in prison first at Fresnes, then at -Compiègne? Were you then transferred to the Dora Camp? - -BALACHOWSKY: That is correct. - -M. DUBOST: Can you tell us rapidly what you know about the Dora Camp? - -BALACHOWSKY: The Dora Camp is situated 5 kilometers north of the town of -Nordhausen, in southern Germany. This camp was considered by the Germans -as a secret detachment, a Geheimkommando, which prisoners who were kept -there could never leave. - -This secret detachment had as its task the manufacture of V-1’s and -V-2’s—the “Vergeltungswaffen” (reprisal weapons)—the aerial torpedoes -which the Germans launched on England. That is why Dora was a secret -detachment. The camp was divided into two parts: one outer part -contained one-third of the total number of persons in the camp, and the -remaining two-thirds were concentrated in the underground factory. Dora, -consequently, was an underground factory for the manufacture of V-1’s -and V-2’s. I arrived at Dora on 10 February 1944, coming from -Buchenwald. - -M. DUBOST: Please speak more slowly. You arrived at Dora from Buchenwald -on . . .? - -BALACHOWSKY: On 10 February 1944, that is at a time when life in the -Dora Camp was particularly hard. - -On 10 February we were loaded, 76 men, onto a large German lorry. We -were forced to crouch down, four SS guards occupying the seats at the -front of the lorry. As we could not all crouch down, being too many, -whenever a man raised his head he got a blow with a rifle butt, so that -in the course of our 4-hour journey several of us were injured. - -After our arrival at Dora, we spent a whole day and night without food, -in the cold, in the snow, waiting for all the formalities of -registration in the camp—completing forms, with names and surnames, and -so on. - -In comparison with Buchenwald, we found a considerable change at Dora, -as the general management of the Dora Camp was entrusted to a special -category of prisoners who were criminals. These criminals were our block -leaders, served our soup, and looked after us. In contrast to the -political prisoners who wore a red triangular badge, these criminals -were distinguished by a green triangular badge on which was a black S. -We called them the “S” men (Sicherheitsverband). They were people -convicted of crimes by German courts long before the war, but who, -instead of being sent home after having served their terms, were kept -for life in concentration camps to supervise the other prisoners. -Needless to say prisoners of that kind, these criminals with the green -triangles, were asocial elements. Sometimes they had been 5, 10, even 20 -years in prison, and afterwards, 5 or 10 years in concentration camps. -These asocial outcasts no longer had any hope of ever getting out of the -concentration camps. These criminals, however, thanks to the support and -co-operation they were offered by the SS management of the camp, now had -the chance of a career. This career consisted in stealing from and -robbing the other prisoners, and obtaining from them the maximum output -demanded by the SS. They beat us from morning till night. We got up at 4 -o’clock in the morning and had to be ready within 5 minutes in the -underground dormitories where we were crammed, without ventilation in -foul air, in blocks about as large as this room, into which 3,000 to -3,500 internees were crowded. There were five tiers of bunks with -rotting straw mattresses. Fresh ones were never issued. We were given 5 -minutes in which to get up, for we went to bed completely dressed. We -were hardly able to get any sleep, for there was a continuous coming and -going, and all sorts of thefts took place among the prisoners. -Furthermore, it was impossible to sleep because we were covered with -lice; the whole Dora Camp swarmed with vermin. It was virtually -impossible to get rid of the lice. In 5 minutes we had to be in line in -the tunnel and march to a given place. - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness_] Just a minute, please. M. Dubost, you -said you were going to call this witness upon experiments. He is now -giving us all the details of camp life which we have already heard on -several occasions. - -M. DUBOST: So far nobody has spoken about the Dora Camp, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but every camp we have heard of has got the same -sort of brutalities, hasn’t it, according to the witnesses who have been -called? - -You were going to call this witness because he was going to deal with -experiments. - -M. DUBOST: If the Tribunal is convinced that all the camps had the same -regime, then my point has been proved and the witness will now testify -to the experiments at the Buchenwald Camp. However, I wanted to show -that all German camps were the same. I think this has now been proved. - -THE PRESIDENT: If you were going to prove that, you would have to call a -witness from every camp, and there are hundreds of them. - -M. DUBOST: This question has to be proved because it is the uniformity -of the system which establishes the culpability of these defendants. In -every camp there was one responsible person who was the camp commander. -But we are not trying the camp commander, but the defendants here in the -dock and we are trying them for having conceived . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: I have already pointed out to you that there has been -practically no cross-examination, and I have asked you to confine this -witness, as far as possible, to the question of experiments. - -M. DUBOST: The witness will then confine himself to experiments at -Buchenwald as this is the Tribunal’s wish. The Tribunal will consider -the uniformity of treatment in all German internment camps as proved. - -[_Turning to the witness_] Will you now testify to the criminal -practices of the SS Medical Corps in the camps, criminal practices in -the form of scientific experiments? - -BALACHOWSKY: I was recalled to Buchenwald the 1st of May 1944, and -assigned to Block 50, which was actually a factory for the manufacture -of vaccines against exanthematous typhus. I was recalled from Dora to -Buchenwald, because, in the meantime, the management of the camp had -learned that I was a specialist in this sort of research, and -consequently they wished to utilize my services in Block 50 for the -manufacture of vaccines. However, I was unaware of it until the very -last moment. - -I came to Block 50 on the 1st of May 1944, and I stayed there until the -liberation of the camp on the 11th of April 1945. - -Block 50, which was the block where vaccines were manufactured, was -under Sturmbannführer Schuler, who was a doctor with the rank of a -Sturmbannführer, equal to SS major. He was in charge of the block and -was responsible for the manufacture of the vaccines. This same -Sturmbannführer Schuler was also in charge of another block in the -Buchenwald Camp. This other block was Block 46, the infamous block for -experiments, where the internees were utilized as guinea pigs. - -Blocks 46 and 50 were both run by one office; it was the -“Geschäftszimmer.” All archives, index cards pertaining to the -experiments—as well as Block 50, were sent to the Geschäftszimmer, that -is, to the office of Block 50. - -The secretary of Block 50 was an Austrian political prisoner, my friend, -Eugene Kogon. He and a few other comrades had, consequently, -opportunities of looking through all the archives of which they had -charge. Therefore they were able to know, day by day, exactly what went -on either in Block 50, our block, or in Block 46. I myself was able to -get hold of most of the archives of Block 46, and even the book in which -the experiments were recorded has been saved. It is in our possession, -and has been forwarded to the Psychological Service of the American -Forces. - -In this book all experiments are entered which were made in Block 46. -Block 46 was established in October 1941 by a high commission -subordinate to the medical service of the Waffen SS; and we see as -members of its administrative council, a certain number of names, for -this Block 46 came under the Research Section Number 5 -(Versuchsabteilung Number 5 of Leipzig) of the Supreme Command of the -Waffen SS. Inspector Mrugowski, Obergruppenführer of the Waffen SS, was -in charge of this section. The administrative council which set up Block -46 was composed of the following members: - -Dr. Genzken, Obergruppenführer (the highest rank in the Waffen SS); Dr. -Poppendiek, Gruppenführer of the Waffen SS; and finally we see among -these names also that of Dr. Handloser of the Wehrmacht and of the -Military Academy of Berlin, who was also associated with the initiation -of experiments on human beings. - -Thus, in this administrative council there were members of the SS, and -also Dr. Handloser. The experiments proper were carried out by -Sturmbannführer Schuler, but all the orders and directives concerning -the different types of experiments, which I shall speak about to you, -were issued by Leipzig, that is, by the Research Section -(Versuchsabteilung) of the Waffen SS. So there was no personal -initiative on the part of Schuler or the management of the camp. - -As to the experiments, all orders came directly from the Supreme Command -in Berlin. Among these experiments, which we could follow step by step -(at least some of them) through the cards, the results, the registration -number of people admitted to and discharged from Block 46, were, first -of all, numerous exanthematous typhus experiments; second, experiments -on phosphorus burns; third, experiments on sexual hormones; fourth, -experiments on starvation edema or avitaminosis; finally, fifth, I can -tell you of experiments in the field of forensic medicine. So we have -five different types of experiments. - -M. DUBOST: Were the men who were subjected to these experiments -volunteers or not? - -BALACHOWSKY: The human beings subjected to experiments were recruited, -not only in the Buchenwald Camp, but also outside the camp. They were -not volunteers; in most cases they did not know that they would be used -for experiments until they entered Block 46. The recruitment took place -among criminals, perhaps in order to reduce their large numbers in that -way. But the recruitment was also carried out among political prisoners -and I have to point out that recruits for Block 46 came also from -Russian prisoners of war. Among the political prisoners and prisoners of -war who were used for experimental purposes at Block 46, the Russians -were always in the majority, for the following reasons: - -Of all the prisoners who could exist in concentration camps it was the -Russians who had the greatest physical resistance, which was obviously -superior to that of the French or other people of western Europe. They -could withstand hunger and ill-treatment, and, generally speaking, -showed physical resistance in every respect. For this particular reason, -Russian political prisoners were recruited for experiments in greater -numbers than others. However, there were people of other nationalities -among them, particularly French. I should now like to deal with details -of the experiments themselves. - -M. DUBOST: Do not go too much into details, because we are not -specialists. It will suffice us to know that these experiments were -carried out without any regard to humanity and on nonvoluntary subjects. -Will you please describe to us the atrocious character of these -experiments and their results. - -BALACHOWSKY: The experiments carried out in Block 46 did without doubt -serve a medical purpose, but for the greater part they were of no -service to science. Therefore, they can hardly be called experiments. -The men were used for observing the effects of drugs, poisons, bacterial -cultures, _et cetera_. I take, as an example, the use of vaccine against -exanthematous typhus. To manufacture this vaccine it is necessary to -have bacterial cultures of typhus. For experiments such as are carried -out at the Pasteur Institute and the other similar institutes of the -world, cultures are not necessary as typhus patients can always be found -for samples of infected blood. Here it was quite different. From the -records and the chart you have in hand, we could ascertain in Block 46 -12 different cultures of typhus germs, designated by the letter BU, -(meaning Buchenwald) and numbered Buchenwald 1 to Buchenwald 12. A -constant supply of these cultures was kept in Block 46 by means of the -contamination of healthy individuals through sick ones; this was -achieved by artificial inoculation of typhus germs by means of -intravenous injections of 0.5 to 1 cubic centimeter of infected blood -drawn from a patient at the height of the crisis. Now, it is well-known -that artificial inoculation of typhus by intravenous injection is -invariably fatal. Therefore all these men who were used for bacterial -culture during the whole time such cultures were required (from October -1942 to the liberation of the camp) died, and we counted 600 victims -sacrificed for the sole purpose of supplying typhus germs. - -M. DUBOST: They were literally murdered to keep typhus germs alive? - -BALACHOWSKY: They were literally murdered to keep typhus germs alive. -Apart from these, other experiments were made as to the efficacy of -vaccines. - -M. DUBOST: What is this document? - -BALACHOWSKY: This document contains a record of the typhus cultures. - -M. DUBOST: This document was taken by you from the camp? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes, I took this document from the camp, and its contents -were summarized by me in the experiment book of Block 46. - -M. DUBOST: Is this the document you handed to us? - -BALACHOWSKY: We have actually made a more complete document—which is in -the possession of the American Psychological Service—as we have the -entire record, and this represents only one page of it. - -M. DUBOST: I ask the Tribunal to take note that the French Prosecution -submits this document, Document Number RF-334, as appendix to the -testimony of Dr. Balachowsky. - -BALACHOWSKY: [_Continuing_] In 1944, experiments were also made on the -effects of vaccines. One hundred and fifty men lost their lives in these -experiments. The vaccines used by the German Army were not only those -manufactured in our Block 46, but also ones which came from Italy, -Denmark, Poland, and the Germans wanted to ascertain the value of these -different vaccines. Consequently, in August 1944 they began experiments -on 150 men who were locked up in Block 46. - -Here, I should like to tell you how this Block 46 was run. It was -entirely isolated and surrounded by barbed wire. The internees had no -roll call and no permission to go out. All the windows were kept closed, -the panes were of frosted glass. No unauthorized person could enter the -block. A German political prisoner was in charge of the Block. This -German political prisoner was Kapo Dietzsch, an asocial individual who -had been in prisons and in camps for 20 years and who worked for the SS. -It was he who gave the injections and the inoculations and who executed -people upon order. Strangely enough, there were weapons in the block, -automatic pistols, and hand grenades, to quell any possible revolt, -either outside or inside the block. - -I can also tell you that an order slip for Block 46, sent to the office -(Geschäftszimmer) at Block 50 in January 1945, mentioned three strait -jackets to be used for those who refused to be inoculated. - -Now I come back to the typhus and vaccine experiments. You will see how -they were carried out. - -The 150 prisoners were divided into 2 groups: those who were to be used -as tests and those who were to be the subjects. The latter only received -(ordinary) injections of the different types of vaccines to be tested. -Those used for testing were not given any injections. Then, after the -vaccination of the subjects, inoculations were given (always by means of -intravenous injections) to everybody selected for this experiment, those -for testing as well as the subjects. Those used for tests died about two -weeks after the inoculation—as such is approximately the period -required before the disease develops to its fatal issue. As for the -others, who received different kinds of vaccines, their deaths were in -proportion to the efficacy of the vaccines administered to them. Some -vaccines had excellent results, with a very low death rate—such was the -case with the Polish vaccines. Others, on the contrary, had a much -higher death rate. After the conclusion of the experiments, no survivors -were allowed to live, according to the custom prevailing in Block 46. -All the survivors of the experiments were “liquidated” and murdered in -Block 46, by the customary methods which some of my comrades have -already described to you, that is by means of intracardiac injections of -phenol. Intracardiac injections of 10 cubic centimeters of pure phenol -was the usual method of extermination in Buchenwald. - -THE PRESIDENT: We are not really concerned here with the proportion of -the particular injections. - -BALACHOWSKY: Will you repeat that please? - -THE PRESIDENT: As I have said, we are not really concerned here with the -proportions in which these injections were given, and will you kindly -not deal with these details? - -M. DUBOST: You might try and confine the witness. - -BALACHOWSKY: [_Continuing_] Then I will speak of other details which may -interest you. They are experiments of a psychotherapeutic nature, -utilization of chemical products to cure typhus, in Block 46, under the -same conditions as before. German industries co-operated in these -experiments, notably the I. G. Farben Industrie which supplied a certain -number of drugs to be used for experiments in Block 46. Among the -professors who supplied the drugs, knowing that they would be used in -Block 46 for experimental purposes, was Professor Lautenschläger of -Frankfurt. So much for the question of typhus. - -I now come to experiments with phosphorus, particularly made on -prisoners of Russian origin. Phosphorus burns were inflicted in Block 46 -on Russian prisoners for the following reason. Certain bombs dropped in -Germany by the Allied aviators caused burns on the civilians and -soldiers which were difficult to heal. Consequently, the Germans tried -to find a whole series of drugs which would hasten the healing of the -wounds caused by these burns. Thus, experiments were carried out in -Block 46 on Russian prisoners who were artificially burned with -phosphorus products and then treated with different drugs supplied by -the German chemical industry. - -Now as to experiments on sexual hormones . . . - -M. DUBOST: What were the results of these experiments? - -BALACHOWSKY: All these experiments resulted in death. - -M. DUBOST: Always in death? So each experiment is equivalent to a murder -for which the SS are collectively responsible? - -BALACHOWSKY: For which those who established this institution are -responsible. - -M. DUBOST: That is the SS as a whole, and the German medical corps in -particular? - -BALACHOWSKY: Definitely so, as the orders came from the -Versuchsabteilung 5 (Research Section 5). The SS were responsible as the -orders were issued by that section at Leipzig and, therefore, came from -the Supreme Command of the Waffen SS. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you. What were the results of the experiments made on -sexual hormones? - -BALACHOWSKY: They were less serious. Besides, these were ridiculous -experiments from the scientific point of view. There were, at -Buchenwald, a number of homosexuals, that is to say, men who had been -convicted by German tribunals for this vice. These homosexuals were sent -to concentration camps, especially to Buchenwald, and were mixed with -the other prisoners. - -M. DUBOST: Especially with the so-called political prisoners, who in -reality were patriots? - -BALACHOWSKY: With all kinds of prisoners. - -M. DUBOST: All were in the company of these German inverts? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes. They wore a pink triangle to distinguish them. - -M. DUBOST: Was the wearing of this triangle a well-established custom, -or on the contrary, was there much confusion in classification? - -BALACHOWSKY: At the very first, before my arrival, from what I heard, -order was kept with respect to triangular badges; but when I arrived at -Buchenwald, in January of 1944, there was the greatest confusion in the -badges, and many prisoners wore no badge at all. - -M. DUBOST: Or did they wear badges of a category different from their -own? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes, this was the case with many Frenchmen, who were sent -to Buchenwald because they were ordinary criminals and who finally wore -the red triangle of political prisoners. - -M. DUBOST: What was the color of the triangle worn by the ordinary -German criminals? - -BALACHOWSKY: They had a green triangle. - -M. DUBOST: Did they not wear eventually a red triangle? - -BALACHOWSKY: No, because they had more privileges than the others and -they wore the green triangle distinctly. - -M. DUBOST: And in the working groups? - -THE PRESIDENT: We have heard that they were all mixed up. - -M. DUBOST: The fact will not have escaped the Tribunal that these -questions are put to counter other questions which were asked this -morning by the Counsel for the Defense with the intent to confuse not -the Tribunal, but the witnesses. - -BALACHOWSKY: I repeat that we had a complete conglomeration of -nationalities and categories of prisoners. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is exactly what he said, that these triangles were -completely mixed up. - -M. DUBOST: I think, that the statement by this second witness will -definitively enlighten the Tribunal on this point, whatever the efforts -of the Defense might be to mislead us. - -[_Turning to the witness_] Do you know anything about the fate of -tattooed men? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes, indeed. - -M. DUBOST: Will you please tell us what you know about them? - -BALACHOWSKY: Tattooed human skins were stored in Block 2, which was -called at Buchenwald the Pathological Block. - -M. DUBOST: Were there many tattooed human skins in Block 2? - -BALACHOWSKY: There were always tattooed human skins in Block 2. I cannot -say whether there were many, as they were continuously being received -and passed on, but there were not only tattooed human skins, but also -tanned human skins—simply tanned, not tattooed. - -M. DUBOST: Did they skin people? - -BALACHOWSKY: They removed the skin and then tanned it. - -M. DUBOST: Will you continue your testimony on that point? - -BALACHOWSKY: I saw SS men come out of Block 2, the Pathological Block, -carrying tanned skins under their arms. I know, from my comrades who -worked in Pathological Block 2, that there were orders for skins; and -these tanned skins were given as gifts to certain guards and to certain -visitors, who used them to bind books. - -M. DUBOST: We were told that Koch, who was the head at that time, was -sentenced for this practice. - -BALACHOWSKY: I was not a witness of the Koch affair, which happened -before I came to the camp. - -M. DUBOST: So that even after he left there were still tanned and -tattooed skins? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes, there were constantly tanned and tattooed skins, and -when the camp was liberated by the Americans, they found in the camp, in -Block 2, tattooed and tanned skins on 11 April 1945. - -M. DUBOST: Where were these skins tanned? - -BALACHOWSKY: These skins were tanned in Block 2, and perhaps also in the -crematorium buildings, which were not far from Block 2. - -M. DUBOST: Then, according to your testimony, it was a customary -practice which continued even after Koch’s execution? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes, this practice continued, but I do not know to what -extent. - -M. DUBOST: Did you witness any inspections made at the camp by German -officials, and if so, who were these officials? - -BALACHOWSKY: I can tell you something about Dora, concerning such -visits. - -M. DUBOST: Excuse me, I have one more thing to ask you about the skins. -Do you know anything about Koch’s conviction? - -BALACHOWSKY: I heard rumors and remarks about Koch’s conviction from my -old comrades, who were in the camp at that time. But I personally was -not a witness of the affair. - -M. DUBOST: Never mind. It is enough for me to know that after his -conviction skins were still tanned and tattooed. - -BALACHOWSKY: Exactly. - -M. DUBOST: You expressly state it? - -BALACHOWSKY: Absolutely. Even after his conviction, tanned and tattooed -skins were still seen. - -M. DUBOST: Will you tell us now what visits were made to the camp by -German officials, and who these officials were? - -BALACHOWSKY: Contacts between the outside—that is German civilians and -even German soldiers—and the interior of the camp were made possible by -departures and furloughs that some political prisoners were able to -obtain from the SS in order to spend some time with their families; and, -vice versa, there were visits to the camp by members of the Wehrmacht. -In Block 50 we had a visit of Luftwaffe cadets. These Luftwaffe cadets, -members of the regular German armed forces, passed through the camp and -were able to see practically everything that went on there. - -M. DUBOST: What did they do in Block 50? - -BALACHOWSKY: They just came to see the equipment at the invitation of -Sturmbannführer Schuler. We received several visits. - -M. DUBOST: What was the equipment? - -BALACHOWSKY: Equipment for the manufacture of vaccines, laboratory -equipment. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you. - -BALACHOWSKY: There were other visits also, and some German Red Cross -nurses visited that block in October 1944. - -M. DUBOST: Do you know the names of German personalities who visited the -camp? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes, such personalities as the Crown Prince of Waldeck and -Pyrmont, who was an Obergruppenführer of the Waffen SS and the Chief of -Police of Hesse and Thuringia, who visited the camp on several -occasions, including Block 46 as well as Block 50. He was greatly -interested in the experiments. - -M. DUBOST: Do you know what the attitude of mind of the prisoners was -shortly before their liberation by the American forces? - -BALACHOWSKY: The prisoners of the camp expected the liberation to come -at any moment. On the 11th of April, in the morning, there was perfect -order in the camp and exemplary discipline. We hid, with extreme -difficulty and in the greatest secrecy, some weapons: cases of hand -grenades, and about two hundred and fifty guns which were divided in 2 -lots, 1 lot of 100 guns in the hospital, and another lot of about one -hundred and fifty guns in my Block 50. As soon as the Americans began to -appear below the camp of Buchenwald, about 3 o’clock in the afternoon of -the 11th of April 1945, the political prisoners assembled in line, -seized the weapons and made prisoners of most of the SS guards of the -camp or shot all those who resisted. These guards had great difficulty -in escaping as they carried rucksacks filled with booty—objects they -had stolen from the prisoners during the time they guarded the camp. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you. I have no further questions to put to the witness. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for ten minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any -questions of this witness? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Are you a specialist in research concerning the -manufacture of vaccines? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes, I am a specialist in matters of research. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: According to your opinion, was there any sense in the -treatment to which these people were subjected? - -BALACHOWSKY: It had no scientific significance; it only had a practical -purpose. It permitted the verification of the efficacy of certain -products. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: You must have your own opinion, as you were in contact -with these men. Did you really see these people? - -BALACHOWSKY: I saw these people at very close hand, since in Block 50 I -was in charge of a part of this manufacture of vaccine. Consequently, I -was quite able to realize what kind of experiments were being made in -Block 46 and the reasons for these experiments. Further, I also realized -the almost complete inefficiency of the SS doctors and how easy it was -for us to sabotage the vaccine for the German Army. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, these people must have gone through much misery and -suffering before they died. - -BALACHOWSKY: These people certainly suffered terribly, especially in the -case of certain experiments. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Can you certify that through your own experience, or is -that just hearsay? - -BALACHOWSKY: I saw in Block 50 photographs taken in Block 46 of -phosphorus burns, and it was not necessary to be a specialist to realize -what these patients, whose flesh was burned to the bone, must have -suffered. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Then, your conscience certainly revolted at these things. - -BALACHOWSKY: Absolutely. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Well then, I would like to ask you, how your conscience -allowed you to obey orders to help these people in some way? - -BALACHOWSKY: That is quite simple. When I arrived at Buchenwald as a -deportee, I did not hide my qualifications. I simply specified that I -was a “laborant”—that is a man who is trained in laboratory work, but -who has no special definite qualification. I was sent to Dora, where the -SS regime made me lose 30 kilos in weight in two months. I became -anaemic . . . - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, I am just concerned with Buchenwald. I do not -wish to know anything about Dora. I ask you . . . - -BALACHOWSKY: It was the prisoners at Buchenwald who, by their -connections within the camp, were the cause of my return to the -Buchenwald Camp. It was M. Julien Cain, a Frenchman, the Director of the -French National Library, who called my presence to the attention of a -German political prisoner, Walter Kummelschein, who was a secretary in -Block 50. He drew attention to my presence without my knowing it and -without my having spoken in Dora of being a French specialist. That is -the reason why the SS called me back from Dora to work in Block 50. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Please pardon the interruption. We do not wish to -elaborate too much on these matters. I believe everything that you have -just said is true—the reason why you were sent to Dora and why you were -sent back to Buchenwald—but my point is a completely different one. I -would like to ask you once more: You knew that these men were -practically martyrs. Is that correct? Please answer yes or no. - -BALACHOWSKY: I will answer the question. When I arrived at Block 50 I -knew nothing, either of the Block 50 or of the experiments. It was only -later when I was in Block 50, that little by little, and through the -acquaintances I was able to make in the block, I found out the details -of the experiments. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Very well. And after you had learned about the details of -the experiments, as you were a doctor, did you not feel great pity for -these poor creatures? - -BALACHOWSKY: My pity was very great, but it was not a question of having -pity or not; one had to carry out to the letter the orders that were -given, or be killed. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Very well. Then you are stating that if in any way you -had not followed the orders that you had received you might have been -killed? Is that right? - -BALACHOWSKY: There is no doubt about that. On the other hand, my work -consisted in manufacturing vaccine, and neither I nor any other -prisoners in Block 50 could ever enter Block 46 and actually witness -experiments. We knew what went on concerning the experiments only -through the index cards which were sent from Block 46 to be officially -registered in Block 50. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Very well, but I do not think it makes any difference to -one’s conscience whether one sees suffering with one’s own eyes, or -whether one has direct knowledge that in the same camp people are being -murdered in such a way. Now, I come to another question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was that a question you were putting there? Will you -confine yourself to questions. - -BALACHOWSKY: I beg your pardon. I should like to answer the last -question. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: That was not a question. I will put another question now. - -BALACHOWSKY: I should like to reply to this remark then. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: I am not interested in your answer. - -BALACHOWSKY: I am anxious to give it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question, please. - -BALACHOWSKY: Suffering was everywhere in the camps, and not only in the -experimental blocks. It was in the quarantine blocks; it was among all -the men who died every day by the hundreds. Suffering reigned everywhere -in the concentration camps. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Were there any injunctions that there was to be no talk -about these experiments? - -BALACHOWSKY: As a rule the experiments were kept absolutely secret. An -indiscreet remark with regard to the experiments might entail immediate -death. I must add that there were very few of us who knew the details of -these experiments. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: You mentioned visits to this camp, and you also mentioned -that German Red Cross nurses, and members of the Wehrmacht visited the -camp, and that furloughs were granted to political prisoners. Were you -ever present at one of these visits inside the camp? - -BALACHOWSKY: Yes, I was present at the visits inside the camp of which I -spoke. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did the visitors at this camp see that cardiac injections -were being given? Or did the visitors see that human skin was tanned? -Did those visitors witness any ill-treatment? - -BALACHOWSKY: I cannot answer this question in the affirmative, and I can -say only that visitors passed through my block. One had to pass almost -through the entire camp. I do not know where the visitors went either -before or after visiting my block. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did one of your own comrades tell you perhaps whether the -visitors personally saw these excesses? Yes or no. - -BALACHOWSKY: I do not understand the question. Would you mind repeating -it? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did perhaps one of your comrades tell you that the -visitors at the camp were present at these excesses? - -BALACHOWSKY: I never heard that visitors were present at experiments or -witnessed excesses of that kind. The only thing I can say, concerning -the tanned skins is that I saw, with my own eyes, SS noncommissioned -officers or officers—I cannot remember exactly whether they were -officers or noncommissioned officers—come out of Block 2, carrying -tanned skins under their arms. But these were SS men; they were not -visitors to the camp. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Did these visitors, and in particular Red Cross nurses, -know that these experiments were medically completely worthless, or did -they just wish to inspect the laboratories and the equipment? - -BALACHOWSKY: I repeat again that these visitors came to my laboratory -section, where they saw what was being done, that is, the sterilized -filling of the phials. I cannot say what they saw before or after. I -know only that these visitors of whom I am speaking, the Luftwaffe -cadets or the Red Cross people, visited the whole installation of the -block. They certainly knew, however, what was the source of this -culture, and that men might be used for experiments, as there were -charts and graphs showing the stages of cultures originating with men; -but it could have been from blood initially taken from typhus patients -and not necessarily from patients artificially inoculated with typhus. - -I really think that these visitors did not generally know about the -atrocities in the form of experiments that were being performed in Block -46, but it was impossible for visitors who went into the camp not to see -the horrible conditions in which the prisoners were kept. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you perhaps know whether people who received leave, -that is, inmates who temporarily were permitted to leave the camp, were -permitted to speak about their experiences inside the camp and relate -these experiences to the outside world? - -BALACHOWSKY: All the concentration camps were, after all, vast transit -camps. The inmates were constantly changing, passing from one camp to -another, coming and going. Consequently there were always new faces. But -most of the time, apart from those whom we knew before our arrest, or a -few other comrades, we knew nothing about those who came and went. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Perhaps I did not express myself clearly. I mean the -following: As you said before, political prisoners were permitted to -leave the camp temporarily from time to time. Did these inmates know -about these excesses, and if they did know, were they permitted to speak -about these experiments in the rest of Germany? - -BALACHOWSKY: The political prisoners (very few and all of German -nationality) who ever obtained leave were prisoners whom the SS had -entrusted with important posts in the camp and who had been imprisoned -for at least 10 years in the camp. This was so, for instance, in the -case of Karl, the Kapo, head of the canteen of the Buchenwald Camp, the -canteen of the Waffen SS, who was responsible for the canteen. He was -given a fortnight’s leave to visit his family at his home in the town of -Zeitz. Consequently this Kapo was free for 10 days and was able to tell -his family anything he wanted to; but I do not know, of course, what he -did. What I can say is that obviously he had to be careful. In any case, -the prisoners who were allowed to leave the camp were old inmates, as I -have said, who knew approximately everything that was going on, -including the experiments. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, one last question. If I assume that the people you -just described told anything to members of their families, even on the -pledge of secrecy, and the leaders of the camp came to know of these -indiscretions, do you not believe that the death penalty might have been -incurred? - -BALACHOWSKY: If there were indiscretions of that kind on the part of the -family (for such indiscretions may be repeated among one’s -acquaintances), or at least, if such indiscretions came to the knowledge -of the SS, it is obvious that those prisoners risked the death penalty. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you very much. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other Defense Counsel who wants to ask any -questions? - -HERR BABEL: I protest against the prosecutor’s declaration that I tried -to confuse witnesses with my questions. I am not here to worry about the -good opinion or otherwise of the press, but to do my duty as a defense -attorney . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast. - -HERR BABEL: [_Continuing_] . . . and I am of the opinion that things -should not be made more difficult by anyone taking part in this -Trial—not even the press. - -This war has brought me so much misfortune and sorrow that I have no -reason to vindicate anyone who was responsible for this personal -suffering or for the misfortune that fell on all our people. I will not -try to prevent any such person from receiving his proper punishment. I -am concerned only with helping the Tribunal to determine the truth, so -that just sentences may be pronounced, and that innocent people may not -be condemned. - -THE PRESIDENT: Kindly resume your seat. It is not fit for you to make a -speech. You have been making a speech, as I understood it; this is not -the occasion for it. - -HERR BABEL: I find it necessary because I was not protected against the -Prosecution’s reproach. - -[_Herr Babel left the stand to resume his seat._] - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment; come back. I do not know what you mean about -not being protected. Well! Listen to me. I don’t know what you mean by -not being protected against the Prosecution. The Prosecution called this -witness and the defendants’ counsel had the fullest opportunity to -cross-examine, and we understood you went to the Tribunal for the -purpose of cross-examining the witness. I do not understand your -protest. - -HERR BABEL: Your Honor, unfortunately I do not know the court procedure -customary in England, America, and other countries. According to the -German penal code and to German trial regulations, it is customary that -unjustified and unfounded attacks of this kind made against a -participant of a trial are rejected by the presiding judge. I therefore -expected that perhaps this would be done here too, but as it did not -happen, I took the occasion to. . . . If by doing so, I violated the -rules of court procedure, I beg to be excused. - -THE PRESIDENT: What unjust accusations are you referring to? - -HERR BABEL: The Prosecuting Attorney implied that I put questions to -witnesses calculated to confuse them, in order to prevent the witnesses -from testifying in a proper manner. This is an accusation against the -Defense which is an insult to us, at least to myself—I do not know what -the attitude of the other Defense Counsel is. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I do not understand what you mean. - -HERR BABEL: Your Honor, I am sorry. I think I cannot convince you as you -probably do not know this aspect of German mentality, for our German -regulations are entirely different. I do not wish to reproach our -President in any way. I merely wanted to point out that I consider this -accusation unjust and that I reject it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, I understand you are saying that the -Prosecuting Attorney said something to you? Now, what is it you say the -Prosecuting Attorney said to you? - -HERR BABEL: The Prosecuting Attorney said that I wanted to confuse -witnesses by my questions and, in my opinion that means I am doing -something improper. I am not here to confuse witnesses, but to assist -the Court to find the truth, and this cannot be done by confusing the -witnesses. - -THE PRESIDENT: I understand now. I do not think that the Prosecuting -Attorney meant to make accusations against your professional conduct at -all. If that is only what you wish to say, I quite understand the point -you wish to make. Do you want to ask this witness any questions? - -HERR BABEL: Yes, I have one question. [_Turning to the witness_] You -testified that weapons, 50 guns, if I understood correctly, were brought -into either Block 46 or 50. Who brought these weapons in? - -BALACHOWSKY: We, the prisoners, brought them in and hid them. - -HERR BABEL: For what purpose? - -BALACHOWSKY: To save our skins. - -HERR BABEL: I did not understand you. - -BALACHOWSKY: I said that we hid these guns because we meant to sell our -lives dearly at the last moment—that is, to defend ourselves to the -death rather than be exterminated, as were most of our comrades in the -camps, with flame-throwers and machine guns. In that case we would have -defended ourselves with the guns we had hidden. - -HERR BABEL: You said “we prisoners”; who were these prisoners? - -BALACHOWSKY: The internees inside the camp. - -HERR BABEL: What internees? - -BALACHOWSKY: We, the political prisoners. - -HERR BABEL: They were supposed to have been mostly German concentration -camp prisoners? - -BALACHOWSKY: They were of all nationalities. Unknown to the SS, there -was an international secret defense organization with shock battalions -within the camp. - -HERR BABEL: There were German concentration camp prisoners who wanted to -help you? - -BALACHOWSKY: German prisoners also belonged to these shock -battalions—German political prisoners, and in particular former German -Communists who had been imprisoned for 10 years and who were of great -help towards the end. - -HERR BABEL: Very well, that’s what I wanted to know. Then, with the -exception of the criminal who wore the green triangle, you and the other -inmates, even these of German origin, were on friendly terms and helped -each other; is that right? - -BALACHOWSKY: The question of the “greens” did not arise, because the SS -evacuated the “greens” in the last few days before the liberation of the -camp. They exterminated most of them; in any case they left the camp, -and we do not know what became of them. No doubt some are still hiding -among the German population. - -HERR BABEL: My question did not refer to those with the green badges, -but to your relations with the German political prisoners. - -BALACHOWSKY: The political prisoners, whether they were German, French, -Russian, Dutch, Belgian or from Luxembourg, formed inside the camp -secret shock battalions which took up arms at the last minute, and took -part in the liberation of the camp. The arms that were hidden came from -the Gustloff armament factory, which was located near the camp. These -arms were stolen by the workers employed in this factory, who every day -brought back with them either a butt hidden in their clothes, or a gun -barrel, or a breech. And, in secret, with much difficulty, the guns were -assembled from the different pieces and hidden. These were the guns we -used in the last days of the camp. - -HERR BABEL: Thank you. I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other German counsel wish to ask questions? Have -you any questions, M. Dubost? - -M. DUBOST: I have no further questions, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -M. DUBOST: These two days of testimony will obviate my reading the -documents any further, since it seems established in the eyes of the -Tribunal, that the excesses, ill-treatment, and crimes which our -witnesses have described to you, occurred repeatedly and were identical -in all the camps; and therefore are evidence of a higher will -originating in the government itself, a systematic will of extermination -and terror under which all occupied Europe had to suffer. - -Therefore I shall submit to you only, without reading them, the -documents we have collected, and confine myself to a brief analysis -whenever they might give you. . . - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you understand, of course, that the Tribunal -is satisfied with the evidence which it has heard up to date; but, of -course, it is expecting to hear evidence, or possibly may hear evidence, -from the defendants; and it naturally will suspend its judgment until it -has heard that evidence and, as I pointed out to you yesterday, I think, -under Article 24e of the Charter, you will have the opportunity of -applying to the Tribunal, if you think it right to call rebuttal -evidence in answer to any evidence which the defendants may call. All I -mean to indicate to you now is that the Tribunal is not making up its -mind at the present moment. It will wait until it has heard the evidence -for the Defense. - -M. DUBOST: I understand you, Mr. President, but I think that the -evidence we submitted in the form of testimony during these 2 days -constitutes an essential part of our accusation. It will allow us to -shorten the presentation of our documents, of which we shall simply -submit an analysis or very brief extracts. - -We had stopped at the description of the transports and under what -conditions they were made, when we started calling our witnesses. - -In order to establish who, among the defendants, are those particularly -responsible for these transports, I present Document UK-56, signed by -Jodl and ordering the deportation of Jews from Denmark. It appears in -the first book of documents as Exhibit Number RF-335. - -I will now continue presenting a question which was interrupted on -Friday, when the session was suspended at 1700 hours. This Document -Number UK-56 is a telegram transmitted en clair marked “Top Secret.” It -is the 8th in the first book. Its second paragraph reads as follows: - - “The deportation of Jews is to be carried out by the - Reichsführer SS, who is to detail two police battalions to - Denmark for this purpose. - - “Signed: Jodl.” - -Here we have the carrying out of a political act by a military -organization or at least by a leader belonging to a military -organization—the German General Staff. This charge therefore affects -both Jodl and the German General Staff. - -We submitted under Exhibit Number RF-324 (Document Number F-224), during -the Friday afternoon session, an extract from the report of the Dutch -Government. The Tribunal will find in this report a passage concerning -the transport of Dutch Jews detained in Westerbork—which I quote, -Paragraph 2: - - “All Jewish Netherlanders, whom the Germans could lay their - hands on . . . were brought together here. . . . “—Paragraph - 3—“Gradually all those interned in Westerbork were deported to - Poland.” - -Is it necessary to recall the consequences of these transports, carried -out in the conditions described to you, when witnesses have come to tell -you that each time the cars were opened numerous corpses had first to be -taken out before a few survivors could be found? - -The French Document Number F-115 (Exhibit Number RF-336), is the report -of Professor Richet. In it Professor Richet repeats what our witnesses -have said, that there were 75 to 120 deportees in each car. In every -transport men died. The fact is known that on arriving in Buchenwald -from Compiègne, after an average journey of 60 hours, at least 25 -percent of the men had succumbed. This testimony corroborates those of -Blaha, Madame Vaillant-Couturier and Professor Dupont. - -Blaha’s testimony appears in your document book under the Number -3249-PS. It is the second statement of Blaha. We have heard Blaha. I do -not think it necessary to read what he has already stated to us. - -Especially infamous is the transport to Dachau, during the months of -August and September 1944, when numerous trains which had left France, -generally from the camps in Brittany, arrived at this camp with four to -five hundred dead out of about two thousand men in a train. The first -page of Document Number F-140 states—and I quote so as not to have to -return to it again—in the fourth paragraph which deals with Auschwitz: -“About seven million persons died in this camp.” It repeats the -conditions under which the transports were made and which Madame -Vaillant-Couturier has described to you. On the train of 2 July 1944, -which left from Compiègne, men went mad and fought with each other and -more than six hundred of them died between Compiègne and Dachau. It is -with this convoy that Document Number F-83 deals, which we submit as -Exhibit Number RF-337, and which indicates in the minutes of Dr. -Bouvier, Rheims, 20 February 1945—that these prisoners by the time they -reached Rheims were already half-dead of thirst: “Eight dying men were -taken out already at Rheims; one of them was a priest.” This convoy was -to go to Dachau. A few kilometers past Compiègne there were already -numerous dead in every car. - -Document F-32, Exhibit Number RF-331, Page 21, contains many other -examples of the atrocious conditions under which our compatriots were -transported from France to Germany: - - “At the station at Bremen water was refused us by the German Red - Cross. - - “We were dying of thirst. At Breslau the prisoners again begged - German Red Cross nurses to give us a little water. They took no - notice of our appeals. . . .” - -To prevent escape, in disregard of the most natural and elementary -feelings of modesty, the deportees were forced in many convoys to strip -themselves of all their clothes, and they travelled like that for many -hours, entirely naked, from France to Germany. A testimony to this -effect is given by our official document already submitted under -Document Number RF-301: - - “One of the means used to prevent escapes, or as reprisal for - them, was to unclothe the prisoners completely.”—And the author - of the report adds—“This reprisal was also aimed at the moral - degradation of the individual.” - -The most restrained testimonies report that this crowding together of -naked men barely having room to breathe, was a horrible sight. When -escapes occurred in spite of the precautions, hostages were taken from -the cars and shot. Testimony to this effect is provided by the same -document—five deportees were executed: - - “That was how, near Montmorency, five deportees from the train - of 15 August 1944 were buried, and five others of the same train - were killed by pistol shots by German police and officers of the - Wehrmacht at Domprémy (Marne).” - -Added to this quotation is that of another official document, which we -have already submitted under F-321, Exhibit Number 331: - - “Several young men were rapidly chosen. The moment they reached - the trench the policemen each seized a prisoner, pushed him - against the side of the trench, and fired a pistol into the nape - of his neck.” - -The same thing prevailed in deportations from Denmark. The Danish Jews -were particularly affected. A certain number, warned in time, had been -able to escape to Sweden with the help of Danish patriots. -Unfortunately, eight to nine thousand persons were arrested by the -Germans and deported. It is estimated that 475 of them were transported -by boat and truck under inhuman conditions to Bohemia and Moravia to -Theresienstadt. This is stated in the Danish document submitted under -Document Number F-666, Exhibit Number RF-338. - -In connection with this country it is necessary to inform the Tribunal -of the deportation of the frontier guards: - - “At most places, however, the policemen were dismissed as soon - as they had been disarmed. Only in Copenhagen and in the large - provincial towns were they retained, and partly by ship and - partly by goods vans, taken southwards to Germany. - - “The policemen were taken via Neuengamme to the concentration - camp at Buchenwald. They were quartered there under - indescribably insanitary conditions; a very large proportion of - them were taken ill; about one hundred policemen and frontier - guardsmen died and several still bear traces of the sojourn.” - -When these deportations had been carried out, all the citizens of the -subjugated countries of the west of Europe found themselves in the -company of their comrades of misfortune of the east, in the -concentration camps of Germany. These camps were merely a means of -realizing the policy of extermination which Germany had pursued ever -since the National Socialists seized power. This policy of extermination -would lead, according to Hitler, to installing 250 million Germans in -Europe in the territories adjoining Germany, which constituted her vital -space. - -The police, the German Army, no longer dared to shoot their hostages, -but neither of the two had any mercy on them. More and more, were -transported in ever increasing numbers from 1943 to German concentration -camps, where all means were used to annihilate them—from exhausting -labor to the gas chambers. - -Censuses taken at various times in France enable us to ascertain that -there were more than 250,000 French deportees, of which only 35,000 -returned. Document Number F-497, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-339, -indicates that out of 600,000 arrests which the Germans made in France, -350,000 were carried out with a view to internment in France or in -Germany: - - “Total number deported, 250,000; number of deportees returned, - 35,000.” - -On the following page are a few names of deported French personages. - - “Prefects: M. Bussières, M. Bonnefoy, disappeared in the _Cap - Arcona_, Generals: de Lestraing, executed at Dachau; Job, - executed at Auschwitz; Frère, died at Struthof; Bardi de Fourtou - died at Neuengamme; Colonel Roger Masse died at Auschwitz. - - “High officials: Marquis of Moustier, died at Neuengamme; - Bouloche, Inspector General of Roads and Bridges died at - Buchenwald; his wife died at Ravensbrück, one of his sons died - during deportation, his other son alone returned from - Flossenbürg; Jean Devèze, engineer of roads and bridges, - disappeared at Nordhausen; Pierre Block, engineer of roads and - bridges, died at Auschwitz; Mme. Getting, founder of the social - service in France, disappeared at Auschwitz. - - “Among university professors, names well-known in France, such - as: Henri Maspéro, Professor at the College de France, died at - Buchenwald; Georges Bruhat, Director of the École Normale - Supérieure, died at Oranienburg; Professor Vieille died at - Buchenwald. . . .” - -It is impossible to name each of the intellectuals exterminated by -German fury. Among the doctors we must, however, mention the -disappearance of the Director of the Rothschild Hospital and of -Professor Florence, both murdered, one at Auschwitz, the other at -Neuengamme. - -As to Holland: 110,000 Dutch citizens of the Jewish faith were arrested, -only 5,000 returned; 16,000 patriots were arrested, only 6,000 returned. -Out of a total of 126,000 deportees, 11,000 were repatriated after the -liberation. - -In Belgium, there were 197,150 deportees, not including prisoners of -war; including prisoners of war, 250,000. - -In Luxembourg, 7,000 deportees—more than 700 were Jews. There were -4,000 Luxembourgers; out of these, 500 died. - -In Denmark (Exhibit Number RF-338, Document Number F-666 already -submitted) 6,104 Danes were interned; 583 died. - -There were camps within and outside Germany. Most of the latter were -used only for the sorting of prisoners, and I have already spoken about -them. However, some of them functioned like those in Germany and among -them, that of Westerbork in Holland must be mentioned. This camp is -dealt with in Document Number F-224, already submitted under Exhibit -Number RF-324, which, is the official report of the Dutch Government. -The camp of Amersfoort, also in Holland, is the subject of Document -Number F-677, which will be submitted as Exhibit Number RF-344. - -What we already know through direct testimony of the regime of the Nazi -internment camps makes it unnecessary for me to read the whole report, -which is rather voluminous, and which does not bring any noticeably new -facts on the regime of these camps. - -There is also the camp of Vught in Holland. Then in Norway the camps of -Grini, of Falstad, of Vlven; that of Espeland, and that of Sydspissen, -which are described in a document provided by the Norwegian -Government—Document Number F-240, Exhibit Number RF-292, which we have -already submitted. The Tribunal will excuse me for not reading this -document, which does not give us any information that we have not heard -before from the witnesses. - -The camps inside Germany, like all those outside Germany which were not -transit camps only, should be divided into three categories—which is in -accordance with German instructions themselves which fell into our -hands. You will find these instructions in your second document book, -Page 11. The pages follow in regular order. It is Document Number -1063-PS, USA-492. We read: - - “The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has given - his approval for the classification of the concentration camps - into various categories which take into account the prisoner’s - character and the degree of danger which he represents to the - State. Accordingly, the concentration camps will be classified - in the following categories: - - “Category 1: For all prisoners accused of minor - delinquencies. . . . - - “Category 1a: For aged prisoners and those able to work under - only certain conditions. - - “Category 2: For prisoners with more serious charges, but still - capable of re-education and improvement. - - “Category 3: For major offenders charged with particularly - serious crimes. . . .” - -On 2 January 1941, the date of this document, the German administration, -in dividing the camps into three categories, made an enumeration of the -principal German camps throughout Germany in each category. It seems -unnecessary to me to revert to the geographical location of these camps -within Germany, since my American colleagues, with the help of -geographical maps, have already dealt fully with this question. - -The organization and functioning of these camps had a double purpose: -The first, according to Document Number F-285, was to make good the -labor shortage, and obtain a maximum output at a minimum cost. This -document is submitted as Exhibit Number RF-346. I shall not read it _in -extenso_, but from Page 14 of your second document book, I shall read -the first paragraph: - - “For important military reasons . . .”—this is dated 17 - December 1942 and coincides with the difficulties encountered in - the course of the Russian campaign—“. . . because of great - difficulties of a military nature, which cannot be stated, the - Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police ordered on 14 - December 1942 that, by end of January 1943 at the latest, at - least 35,000 internees, fit for work, shall be sent to - concentration camps. - - “To obtain this number the following is ordered: - - “As from this date and to 1 February 1943, all Eastern or - foreign workers who escaped or broke their contracts, and who do - not belong to allied, friendly or neutral states, shall be sent - back to concentration camps, by the quickest means possible.” - -Arbitrary internments with a view to procuring, at the least possible -cost, the maximum output from labor which had already been deported to -Germany but which had to be paid since it was under labor contracts. - -The organization of these camps was further intended to exterminate all -unproductive forces which could no longer be exploited by German -industry, and which in general might hinder Nazi expansion. Evidence for -this is furnished by Document Number R-91, Pages 20 and 21 of the second -document book, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-347, which is a telegram -from the Chief of Staff of the Reichsführer SS, received at 2:10 o’clock -on 16 December 1942 from Berlin. - - “In connection with the increased allocation of labor to - concentration camps, ordered to be completed by 30 January 1943, - the following procedure may be applied regarding the Jews: - - “1) Total number: 45,000 Jews. - - “2) Start of transportation: 11 January 1943. End of - transportation: 31 January 1943. . . . - - “3)“—The most important part of the document—“The figure of - 45,000 Jews is to consist of 30,000 Jews from the district of - Bialystok; 10,000 Jews from the ghetto of Theresienstadt, 5,000 - of which are capable of work and until now have been used for - light tasks in the ghetto; and 5,000 Jews generally unfit for - work, including those over 60 years of age. In order to use this - opportunity for reducing the number of inmates now amounting to - 48,000 which is too high for the ghetto, I ask that special - powers be given to me. . . .” - -At the very end of this paragraph: - - “The number of 45,000 includes _those unfit for - work_”—underlined (italics)—“(old Jews and children included). - By applying suitable methods, the screening of newly-arrived - Jews in Auschwitz should yield at least _10,000 to 15,000 people - fit for work_.” - -This is underlined in the text. - -And here is an official document which corroborates the testimony of -Mme. Vaillant-Couturier, among various other testimonies on the same -question, as to how the systematic selections were made from each convoy -arriving at Auschwitz, not by the will of the chief of the camp of -Auschwitz, but the result of higher orders coming from the German -Government itself. - -If it please the Tribunal, my report will cease here this evening, and -will be continued tomorrow, dealing with the utilization of this -manpower, which I shall endeavor to treat as quickly as possible in the -light of the testimonies we have already had. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FORTY-SIXTH DAY - Wednesday, 30 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that Defendants -Kaltenbrunner and Seyss-Inquart will be absent from this morning’s -session on account of illness. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, I understand that you do not wish to -cross-examine that French witness. - -HERR BABEL: That is correct. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the French witness can go home. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, there is one reason that possibly that French -witness ought not to go. I think I saw she was moving out of Court. -Could you stop her, please? I am afraid that she must stay for today. - -M. Dubost, are you going to deal with documents this morning? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Would you be so good as to give us carefully and slowly -the number of the documents first, because we have a good deal of -difficulty in finding them. - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: And specify, also, so far as you can, the book in which -they are to be found. - -M. DUBOST: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall continue my -description of the organization of the camps and the way in which they -functioned. We began last night by submitting to the Tribunal Document -Number R-91 which showed that their purpose was: 1) to make good the -shortage of labor; 2) to eliminate useless forces. - -After Document R-91, which has been submitted under Exhibit Number -RF-347, we shall read Document Number F-285, already submitted under -Exhibit Number RF-346—second document book. This document is dated 17 -December 1942 and is the conclusion of the document which we read to you -yesterday. First paragraph: - - “For important military reasons, which cannot be stated, the - Reichsführer SS and the Chief of the German Police. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: You read that yesterday. - -M. DUBOST: That is correct, Mr. President, Page 18, sixth paragraph, at -the top of the page. - - “Poles eligible for German citizenship and prisoners for whom - special requests have been made, will not be transferred - to. . . .” - -Last paragraph, Page 19: - - “Other papers will not be required for Eastern workers.” - -This shows that arrests were made without discrimination in order to -obtain labor and that this labor was considered to be so unimportant -that it was sufficient to register it under serial numbers. - -Now, we will show how this labor was utilized. Men were housed, as the -witness, Balachowsky, said yesterday, near factories in Dora in -underground shelters which they themselves had dug and where they lived -under conditions which violated all the rules of hygiene. At Ohrdruf -near Gotha, the prisoners constructed munition factories. Buchenwald -supplied the labor for the factories of Hollerith and Dora and for the -salt mines of Neustassfurt. The Tribunal will read in Document Number -RF-301, at the bottom of Page 45: - - “Ravensbrück supplied the labor for the Siemens factories, those - of Czechoslovakia, and the workshops at Hanover.” - -These special measures, according to the witness, Balachowsky, enabled -the Germans to keep secret the manufacture of certain war weapons, such -as the V-1 and V-2: - - “The deportees had no contact with the outside world. The work - of deportees enabled the Germans to obtain an output which they - could not have obtained even from foreign workmen.” - -The French Prosecution will now submit Document R-129 as Exhibit Number -RF-348, which the Tribunal will find in the second document book. It -deals with the management of concentration camps: - - “The administration of a concentration camp, and of all economic - enterprises attached to it, rests with the camp commandant.” - -Fifth paragraph, Figure IV: - - “The camp commandant alone is responsible for the work carried - out by the workmen. This _work_”—I underline (italics) the word - work—“this work must be, in the true sense of the word, - exhausting in order to obtain the maximum output.” - -Two paragraphs lower on the page: - - “The hours of work are not limited. This duration depends on the - technical structure of the camp and the work to be done and is - determined by the camp commandant alone.” - -Further on, the last paragraph, Page 23 of the book: - - “He”—the camp commandant—“must combine a technical knowledge - of economic and military subjects with wise and clever - management of the men so as to reach a high potential of - output.” - -This document is signed by Pohl. It is dated, Berlin, 30 April 1942. - -I should just like to refer again to a document which we have already -quoted in relation to the camp of Ohrdruf, and which was submitted under -the Number RF-140. - -I will now read from Document 1584-PS, Exhibit Number RF-349. This -document is signed by Göring and is addressed to Himmler. It definitely -establishes the responsibility of Göring in the criminal utilization of -this deported labor. I shall read the second paragraph of the second -page: - - “Dear Himmler: - - “. . . at the same time I ask you to keep at my disposal for Air - Force armament the greatest possible number of KZ - prisoners.”—The initials “KZ” mean concentration camp. - - “Experience has so far shown that this labor can be put to very - good use. The situation of the war in the air necessitates the - transfer of this industry to underground workshops. In such - workshops, work and housing can be particularly well combined - for KZ prisoners.” - -We know then who was responsible for the frightful conditions which the -deportees of Dora had to endure. The person responsible is in the dock. - -THE PRESIDENT: You did not give us the date of that, did you? Is that 19 -February 1944? - -M. DUBOST: On the first page you will see that on 19 February 1944 a -letter was addressed to Dr. Brandt, referring to teletypes which were -sent by the Field Marshal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it the second letter, the letter that you read? Is the -date of that 19.2.44? - -M. DUBOST: It is 15 April 1944 on the original, of which this is a -photostat. - -THE PRESIDENT: And could you tell us what KZ means, the two letters, KZ? - -M. DUBOST: 15.4.44 on the original of the teletype, that means -concentration camp. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, for the accuracy of the record, it appears -that the letter on the second page is not 15 April 1944, but 14 -February. Is that not so? - -M. DUBOST: Yes. It is 14 February, 2030 hours. It is a teletype, which -was booked 15 April 1944. That was the cause of my error. - -THE PRESIDENT: But, M. Dubost, were you submitting or suggesting that -this letter showed that the defendant, Göring, was a party to the -experiments which took place, or only to the fact that these prisoners -were used for work? - -M. DUBOST: I was not referring to experiments. I was referring to -internment in underground camps, like the Dora Camp of which the witness -Balachowsky spoke yesterday in the first part of his testimony. With -regard to this will to exterminate, of which I have been speaking from -the beginning of my presentation this morning, I think it is proved -first of all by the text of Document Number R-91, submitted under -Exhibit Number RF-347, which I read yesterday afternoon at the end of -the session, a letter which has not as yet been authenticated, and by -statements made by the witnesses who brought you proof that, at all the -camps in which they were, the same methods of extermination by work were -carried out. - -As far as the brutal extermination by gas is concerned, we have the -invoices for poison gas, intended for Oranienburg and Auschwitz, which -we submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-350. The Tribunal will -find translations on Page 27 of the second document book, Document -Number 1553-PS. - -I must point out, to be quite honest, that the French translation of -these invoices is not absolutely in agreement with the German text. -Therefore, in the fifth line, instead of “extermination” it should be -“purification.” - -The testimony of Mme. Vaillant-Couturier showed us that these gases, -used for the destruction of lice and other parasites, were also used to -destroy human beings. Besides, the quantity of gas which was sent and -the frequency with which it was sent, as you can see from the great -number of invoices which we offer in evidence, prove that the gas was -used for a double purpose. We have invoices dated 14 February, 16 -February, 8 March, 13 March, 20 March, 11 April, 27 April, 12 May, 26 -May, and 31 May which are all submitted as Exhibit Number RF-350. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting in evidence the originals of these other -bills to which you refer on this document? - -M. DUBOST: I beg the clerk of the Court to hand them to Your Honor, and -I request the Tribunal to examine these invoices carefully. They will -observe that the quantities of toxic crystals sent to Oranienburg and -Auschwitz were considerable; from the invoice of 30 April 1944 the -Tribunal will see that 832 kilograms of crystals were sent, giving a net -weight of 555 kilograms. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is this document that you have just put in? - -M. DUBOST: The 30th of April 1944, but I am taking them at random. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am not asking the date. What I want to know is what is -the authority for this document? It comes, does it not, from one of the -committees set up by the French Republic? - -M. DUBOST: No, Mr. President. The Document is an American document which -was in the American archives, under the Document Number 1553-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, this note at the bottom of Document 1553-PS -was not on the original put in by the United States, was it? - -M. DUBOST: No, Mr. President, but you have before you all the originals -under the number which the clerk of the Court has just handed you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Unless you have an affidavit identifying these originals, -the originals do not prove themselves. You have got to prove these -documents which you have just handed up to us either by a witness or by -an affidavit. The documents are documents, but they do not prove -themselves. - -M. DUBOST: These documents were found by the American Army and filed in -the archives of the Nuremberg Trial. I took them from the archives of -the American Delegation, and I consider them to be as authentic as all -the other documents which were filed by my American colleagues in their -archives. They were no doubt captured by the American Army. - -THE PRESIDENT: There are two points, M. Dubost. The first is, that in -the case of the original exhibit, 1553-PS, it was certified, we imagine, -by an officer of the United States. These documents which you have now -drawn our attention to are not so certified by anyone as far as we have -been able to see. Certainly we cannot take judicial notice of these -documents, which are private documents; and therefore, unless they are -read in Court, they cannot be put in evidence. That can all be rectified -very simply by such a certificate or by an affidavit annexing these -documents and showing that they are analogous to the document which is -the United States exhibit. - -M. DUBOST: They are all United States documents, and they are all filed -in the archives of the United States in the American Delegation under -the Number 1553-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: The American Document Number 1553-PS has not yet been -submitted to the Tribunal and the Tribunal is of the opinion that they -cannot take judicial notice of this exhibit without any further -certification, and they think that some short affidavit identifying the -document must be made. - -M. DUBOST: I will request my colleagues of the American Prosecution to -furnish this affidavit. I did not think it possible that this document, -which was classified in their archives, could be ruled out. - -This purpose of extermination, moreover, does not need to be proved by -this document. It is sufficiently established by the testimony which we -have submitted to the Tribunal. The witness, Boix, spoke these words: -“No one is allowed to leave this camp alive . . . . There is only one -exit, and that is the chimney of the crematorium.” - -In Document F-321, Exhibit Number RF-331, Page 49, at the top of the -page, we read: - - “The only explanation which the SS men made to the prisoners was - that no captive should leave the place alive.” - -On Page 179, the paragraph before the last of the French text: - - “The SS told us there was only one exit—the chimney.” - -On Page 174, the last paragraph before the heading “Gassing and -Cremation”: - - “The essential purpose of this camp was the extermination of the - greatest possible number of men. It was known as the - extermination camp.” - -This destruction, this extermination of the internees, assumed two -different forms. One was progressive; the other was brutal. - -In the second document book which is before the Tribunal, we find the -report of a delegation of British Members of Parliament, dated April -1945, submitted under Exhibit Number RF-351, from which we quote these -words (the third paragraph on Page 29): - - “Although the work of cleaning out the camp had gone on busily - for over a week before our visit . . . our immediate and - continuing impression was of intense general squalor. . . .” - -Page 30, the last paragraph but one: - - “We should conclude, however, by stating that it is our - considered and unanimous opinion, on the evidence available to - us, that a policy of steady starvation and inhuman brutality was - carried out at Buchenwald for a long period of time; and that - such camps as this mark the lowest point of degradation to which - humanity has yet descended.” - -Likewise, in the report of a committee set up by General Eisenhower, -Document L-159, which we submit under Exhibit Number RF-352, Pages 31, -32, and 33 of the same document book, we read: - - “The purpose of this camp was extermination. . . .” - -Page 31: - - “Atrocities and other conditions in the concentration camps in - Germany. Report of a committee founded by General Eisenhower - under the auspices of the Chief of Staff, General George - Marshall, to the Congress of the United States, concerning - atrocities and other conditions in concentration camps in - Germany.” - -Page 32: - - “The mission of this camp was extermination, by starvation, - beatings, torture, incredibly crowded sleeping conditions, and - sickness. The result of these measures was heightened by the - fact that prisoners were obliged to work in an armament factory - adjoining the camp which manufactured small firearms, - rifles. . . .” - -The means which were used to carry out this progressive extermination -are numerous, as shown in documents which have just been handed to us. -These documents, which we are going to submit, have been communicated to -the Defense. They consist of printed formulas coming from Auschwitz, -concerning the number of blows which could be administered to the -internees or prisoners. - -These documents will be handed over to the Defense for their criticism. -They have just been given to us. I am not able to authenticate their -origin today. They appear to me to be of a genuinely authentic -character. Photostats of these documents have been given to the Defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that they cannot admit -these documents at present. It may be that after you have more time to -examine the matter you may be able to offer some evidence which -authenticates the documents, but we cannot admit the documents simply -upon your statement that you believe them to be genuine. - -M. DUBOST: Moreover, everything in the camps contributed to pave the way -for the progressive extermination of the people who were interned there. -Their situation was as follows: They were exposed to a hard climate; -some worked underground. Their living conditions have been brought to -light by the testimony which you have heard. When the internees arrived, -they were compelled to remain naked for hours while they were being -registered or waiting to be tattooed. - -Everything combined to cause the rapid death of those who were interned -in the camps. A good number of them were subjected to an even harder -regime, the description of which was given to the Tribunal by the -American Prosecution when they submitted Document Number USA-243 and the -following, dealing with the Nacht und Nebel regime, the NN. - -I do not think it is necessary to return to the description of this -regime. I shall merely submit a new document which shows the rigor with -which the NN regime was applied to our compatriots. It appears under the -Document Number F-278(b), submitted under Exhibit Number RF-326. It -comes from the German Armistice Commission of Wiesbaden and shows that -no steps were ever taken in reply to repeated protests by the French -population, and even by the _de facto_ government of Vichy, against the -silence which shrouded the internees of the NN camps. - -I shall now read Paragraph 2 which explains why no reply could be given -to families, who had good reason for anxiety: - - “This result was foreseen and desired by the Führer. His opinion - was that effective and lasting intimidation of the population, - which would put a stop to its criminal activities against the - occupation forces, would be achieved by the death sentence, or - by measures which would leave the offenders’ next of kin and the - population generally in the dark as to their fate.” - -We will not devote any more time to describing the blocks and the -hygienic conditions under which the internees in the blocks lived. Four -witnesses, who all came from different camps, have pointed out to you -that the hygienic conditions in these different camps were identical and -that the blocks were equally overcrowded in all these camps. We know -that in all cases the water supply was insufficient and that deportees -slept two or three in beds 75 to 80 centimeters wide. We know that the -bedding was never renewed or was in very bad condition. We know likewise -the conditions in which the medical services of the camp functioned. -Several witnesses belonging to the medical profession have testified to -this fact before you. The Tribunal will find confirmation of their -testimony in Document F-121, Exhibit Number RF-354. We shall read just -one line of Page 100 of your document book: - - “Because of lack of water the prisoners were obliged to fetch - stagnant water from the water closets to satisfy their thirst.” - -And then in Exhibit Number RF-331, (Document Number F-321), Page 119 of -the French text, third paragraph: - - “The surgical work was done by a German who claimed to be a - surgeon from Berlin, but who was an ordinary criminal. He killed - the patient in each operation. . . .” - -Two paragraphs lower: - - “The management of the block was in the hands of two Germans, - who acted as sick bay attendants—unscrupulous men, who carried - out surgical operations on the spot with the help of a certain H - . . ., who was a mason by trade.” - -After the statements of our witnesses, who in their capacity as doctors -of medicine were able to care for patients in the camp infirmaries, it -seems superfluous to give further quotations from our documents. - -When the workers had been worked to the point of exhaustion, when it -became impossible for them to recover, selections were made setting -apart those who were of no further use with a view to exterminating them -either in the gas chambers, as related by our first witness, Mme. -Vaillant-Couturier, or by intracardiac injections, as related by two -other French witnesses, Dr. Dupont and Dr. Balachowsky. This system of -selection was carried out in all the camps and was, moreover, in -response to general orders, proof of which we showed when reading -Document Number R-91, submitted under Exhibit Number RF-347. - -In the first document book the Tribunal will find the testimony of -Blaha, testimony which it will certainly recall and which was received -here the 9 January—it is the testimony of Blaha, 3249-PS. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have already given this as evidence, have you not? - -M. DUBOST: I am not going to read it. I merely wish to recall it to the -Tribunal because it forms part of my collection of proofs. - -THE PRESIDENT: We do not want affidavits by witnesses who have already -given evidence. This affidavit, 3249-PS, has not been put in, has it? - -M. DUBOST: No, I am merely recalling the testimony which was given at -the session. We shall not submit this document, Mr. President. We are -merely utilizing this document to remind the Tribunal that during the -session Blaha pointed out conditions existing in the infirmary. - -To all these wretched living conditions must be added work, exhausting -work, for all the deportees were intended to carry out extremely hard -work. We know that they worked in labor squads and in factories. We -know, according to the witnesses, that the work lasted 12 hours a day at -a minimum, and that it was often prolonged to suit the whim of the camp -commandant. - -Document R-129 (Exhibit Number RF-348), from which I have already read, -emanating from Pohl and addressed to Himmler, Pages 22 and 23 of the -second document book, suggests that the working hours should be -practically unlimited. - -This work was carried out, as the witnesses have told us, in water, in -the mud, in underground factories—in Dora for instance—and in the -quarries in Mauthausen. In addition to the work, which was exhausting in -itself, the deportees were subject to ill-treatment by the SS and the -Kapos, such as blows or being bitten by dogs. - -Our Document Number F-274, Exhibit Number RF-301, Pages 74 and 75, -brings official testimony to this effect. Is it necessary to read to the -Tribunal from this document, which is an official document to which we -constantly refer and which has been translated into German and into -English? - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need read it. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you, Mr. President. This same document, Page 77 and -Page 78, informs us that all the prisoners were forced to do the work -assigned to them, even under the worst conditions of health and hygiene. -There was no quarantine for them even in case of contagious diseases or -during epidemics. - -The French Document Number F-392, Exhibit Number RF-330, which we have -already submitted, which is the testimony of Dr. Steinberg, confirms -that of Mme. Vaillant-Couturier. It is the twelfth document of your -first document book. We shall read at Page 4: - - “We received half a liter of herb tea; this was when we were - awakened. A supervisor, who was at the door, hastened our - washing by giving us blows with a cudgel. The lack of hygiene - led to an epidemic of typhus. . . .” - -At the end of the third paragraph you will find the conditions under -which the prisoners were taken to the factories; in the fifth paragraph -a description of shoes: - - “We had been provided with wooden shoes which in a few days - caused wounds. These wounds produced boils which brought death - to many.” - -I shall now read Document R-129, Pages 22, 23, and 24 in the second -document book, and which we submit under the Number . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: One moment; the Tribunal will adjourn now for fifteen -minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal has been considering the question -of the evidence which you have presented on the concentration camps; and -they are of opinion that you have proved the case for the present, -subject, of course, to any evidence which may be produced on behalf of -the defendants and, of course, subject also to your right under Article -24-c of the Charter to bring in rebutting evidence, should the Tribunal -think it right to admit such evidence. They think, therefore, that it is -not in the interests of the Trial, which the Charter directs should be -an expeditious one, that further evidence should be presented at this -stage on the question of concentration camps, unless there are any -particular new points about the concentration camps to which you have -not yet drawn our attention; and, if there are such points, we should -like you to particularize them before you present any further evidence -upon them. - -M. DUBOST: I thank the Tribunal for this statement. I do not conceal -from the Tribunal that I shall need a few moments to select the points -which it seems necessary to stress. I did not expect this decision. - -With the authorization of the Tribunal, I shall pass to the examination -of the situation of prisoners of war. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, possibly you could, during the adjournment, -consider whether there are any particular points, new points, on -concentration camps which you wish to draw our attention to and present -them after the adjournment, in the meantime proceeding with some other -matter. - -M. DUBOST: The 1 o’clock recess? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is what I meant. - -M. DUBOST: I shall, therefore, consider as established provisionally the -proof that Germany, in its internment camps and in its concentration -camps, pursued a policy tending towards the annihilation and -extermination of its enemies, while at the same time creating a system -of terror which it exploited to facilitate the realization of its -political aims. - -Another aspect of this policy of terror and extermination appears when -one studies the war crimes committed by Germany on the persons of -prisoners of war. These crimes, as I shall prove to you, had two -motives, among others: To debase the captives as much as possible in -order to sap their energy; to demoralize them; to cause them to lose -faith in themselves and in the cause for which they fought, and to -despair of the future of their country. The second motive was to cause -the disappearance of those of them who, by reasons of their previous -history or indications given since their capture, showed that they could -not be adapted to the new order the Nazis intended to set up. - -With this aim, Germany multiplied the inhuman methods of treatment -intended to debase the men in her hands, men who were soldiers and who -had surrendered, trusting to the military honor of the army to which -they had surrendered. - -The transfer of prisoners was carried out under the most inhumane -conditions. The men were badly fed and were obliged to make long marches -on foot, exposed to every kind of punishment, and struck down when they -were tired and could no longer follow the column. No shelter was -provided at the halting places and no food. Evidence of this is given in -the report on the evacuation of the column that left Sagan on 28 January -1945 at 12:30 p.m. - -THE PRESIDENT: Where shall we find it? - -M. DUBOST: It is in the document book submitted by M. Herzog. It is the -report on the evacuation of the column that left Sagan on 28 January -1945. It is Document Number UK-78, submitted under Exhibit Number RF-46. -A column of 1,357 British soldiers, including soldiers of all ranks, -started out on 28 January 1945 for Spremberg. - -THE PRESIDENT: Possibly this is the first document in your document book -which has been handed up to us. - -M. DUBOST: That is right, Mr. President. I shall now read to you the -document on the evacuation of the Sagan Camp from 28 January to 4 -February 1945. As the Tribunal has not the copy before it, I pass to -Document Number UK-170, Exhibit Number RF-355. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am just telling you that I rather think this may be the -document, if it begins with “1,357 English prisoners of war. . . .” Does -it begin in that way? - -M. DUBOST: Yes. The document which you have before you, Mr. President, -deals with the transfer of British prisoners. The one about which I -wished to speak and from which I wanted to read to you dealt with the -transfer of French prisoners. I think that it is not necessary for me to -lengthen the session by showing the Tribunal that the British and the -French prisoners were treated in the same fashion. I shall, therefore, -restrict myself to your document. - - “1,357 British war prisoners of all ranks marched out of Stalag - Luft III in columns on 28 January 1945, and were thereafter - marched for distances varying from 17 to 31 kilometers a day to - Spremberg, where they were entrained for Luckenwalde. Food, - water, medical supplies, and adequate accommodation were more or - less nonexistent throughout the trip. At least three prisoners - . . . had to be left at Muskau. . . .” - -On the bottom of the page, three lines before the end: - - “On the 31st they covered the distance of 31 kilometers to - Muskau. It is small wonder that at this stage three men, - Lieutenants Kielly and Wise, and Sergeant Burton collapsed and - had to be left in the hospital at Muskau.” - -Page 2 at the end of the document: - - “On the march, apart from the Red Cross parcel already referred - to, the only rations issued to the men were one-half loaf of - bread and one issue of barley soup for each. The supply of water - is described as ‘haphazard’. . . . No fewer than 15 of them - escaped during the march.” - -Now a statement by M. Bondot: - - “The camp conditions of the Franco-Belgian column were even more - rigorous. The camps were organized in a manner which was - contrary to all the rules of hygiene. The prisoners were crowded - into a very narrow space. They had no heat or water. There were - 30 to 40 men to a room in Stalag III-C.” - -M. Boudot’s statement is to be found in the report on prisoners and -deportees which was also handed to you the other day by M. Herzog. I -believe that the Tribunal has kept its documents of last Thursday . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: We have kept those documents, but if we had them on the -Bench before us you would not be able to see us. - -M. DUBOST: Similar statements are found in the Red Cross reports. -Berger, who was in charge of prisoner-of-war camps under Himmler from 1 -October 1944, admitted in the course of his examination that the food -supply of prisoners of war was entirely insufficient. The Tribunal will -find on Page 3 of the document book, which is before it, an extract from -Berger’s examination. Second paragraph: - - “I visited a camp south of Berlin, the name of which I cannot - remember at the moment. I shall perhaps remember later. At that - time it was obvious to me that the food conditions were - absolutely inadequate and a violent argument between Himmler and - myself arose. Himmler was violently opposed to continuing the - distribution of packages of the Red Cross in the prisoner-of-war - camps at the same rate as before. As for me, I thought that in - this case we should be faced with serious problems regarding the - men’s health.” - -We present Document Number 826-PS as Exhibit Number RF-356. This -document was issued by the Führer’s headquarters and is a report on a -visit to Norway and Denmark. It is on Page 7 of your document book, -Paragraph 3: - - “All the prisoners of war in Norway receive only sufficient food - to keep them alive without working. The felling of timber, - however, makes such physical demands on these prisoners of war - that, if the food remains the same, a considerable decline in - production must soon be expected.” - -This note applies to the situation of the 82,000 prisoners of war held -captive in Norway, 30,000 of whom were employed on very hard -construction work which was being carried out by the Todt organization. -This is found in the first paragraph of Page 7. - -I now present to the Tribunal a document, Number 820-PS, Page 9 in the -document book. It deals with the establishment of prisoner-of-war camps -in the regions exposed to aerial bombardment. It was issued by -headquarters. It is dated 18 August 1943. It was sent by the -Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force to the Supreme Command of the -Wehrmacht. We submit it as Exhibit Number RF-358, and we shall read to -the Tribunal Paragraph 3: - - “The Commander-in-Chief, Air General Staff, proposes to erect - prisoner-of-war camps in the residential quarters of cities, in - order to obtain a certain protection thereby.” - -I skip a paragraph: - - “In view of the above reason, consideration should be given to - the immediate erection of such camps in a large number of cities - which appear to be endangered by air attacks. As the discussions - with the city of Frankfurt . . . have shown, the towns will - support and speed up the construction of the camps by all - available means.” - -The last paragraph: - - “So far, there are in Germany about 8,000 prisoners of war of - the British and American Air Forces (without counting those in - hospitals). By evacuating the camps actually in existence, which - might be used to house bombed-out people, we should immediately - have at our disposal prisoners of war for a fairly large number - of such camps.” - -This refers to the camps set up in bombed areas and areas which were -particularly exposed. - -On Page 10 the Tribunal will find a document issued by the Führer’s -headquarters, dated 3 September 1943, dealing with the establishment of -these new prisoner-of-war camps for British and American airmen. We -submit this document as Exhibit Number RF-339 (Document Number 823-PS): - - “1) The Commander-in-Chief, Air General Staff, is planning the - erection of further camps for air force prisoners, as the number - of new prisoners is mounting to more than 1,000 a month, and the - space available at the moment is insufficient. The Supreme - Commander of the Luftwaffe proposes to establish these camps - within residential quarters of cities, which would constitute at - the same time a protection for the populations of the town and, - in addition, to transfer all the existing camps, containing - about 8,000 British and American Air Force prisoners, to larger - towns threatened by enemy air attack. . . . - - “2) The Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, Chief of War - Prisoners, has approved this project in principle.” - -On Page 12 of the document book which the Tribunal has before it is a -document, Number F-551, which we shall submit as Exhibit Number RF-360. -It deals with the sentencing of prisoners of war in violation of Article -60 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention. The Geneva -Convention provides that the protecting power shall be advised of -judicial prosecutions that are made against prisoners of war and will -have the right to be represented at the trial. The document which we -submit as Exhibit Number RF-360 shows that these provisions were -violated: - - “In practice, the application of Articles 60 and 66, - particularly Paragraph 2 of Article 66 of the Convention of - 1929, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war causes - considerable difficulties. For the application of severe penal - jurisdiction, it is intolerable that precisely for the most - serious offenses, as for instance, attacks on the guards, the - death sentence cannot be carried out until 3 months after its - notification to the protecting power. The discipline of - prisoners of war is bound to suffer from this.” - -I pass over the rest of the paragraph. On Page 12: - - “The following regulation is proposed: - - “a) The French may be confident that the trials by German - courts-martial will be carried out thoroughly and - conscientiously as before; - - “b) Germany will designate, as before, a defense counsel and an - interpreter. . . . - - “c) In case of a death sentence an adequate respite will be - granted.” - -On top of Page 13: - - “In this respect, in urgent cases, however, Germany must reserve - for herself the right—even if not expressly stated—to execute - the sentence immediately.” - -Third paragraph: - - “There is no question of allowing France, by virtue of Article - 62, Paragraph III (POW), of the Geneva Convention, to delegate - representatives to the chief sessions of the German Military - Tribunals.” - -We possess an example of the violation of Articles 60 and those -following of the Geneva Convention in the report of the Netherlands -Government, which the Tribunal will find on Page 14 of its document -book. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think we better break off now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the -Defendants Kaltenbrunner and Seyss-Inquart will be absent from this -afternoon’s session due to illness. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make. - -When the attention of the Tribunal was called by the Defendant Hess to -the absence of his counsel, the Tribunal directed that the presentation -of the individual case against Hess be postponed, so that counsel could -be present when it was presented. So far as the cross-examination of -witnesses who testified to matters affecting the general case and not -against Hess specifically is concerned, it is the view of the Tribunal -that the cross-examination conducted by counsel representing the -defendants equally interested with Hess in this feature of the case was -sufficient to protect his interests, and the witnesses will therefore -not be recalled. - -The Tribunal has received a letter from the Defendant Hess dated 30 -January 1946, to the effect that he is dissatisfied with the services of -counsel who has been appearing for him and does not wish to be -represented by him further, but wishes to represent himself. - -The Tribunal is of the opinion that, having elected, in conformity with -Article 16 of the Charter, to be represented by counsel, the Defendant -Hess ought not to be allowed at this stage of the Trial to dispense with -the services of counsel and defend himself. The matter is of importance -to the Tribunal, as well as to the defendant, and the Tribunal is of the -opinion that it is not in the interests of the defendant that he should -be unrepresented by counsel. - -The Tribunal has therefore appointed Dr. Stahmer to represent the -Defendant Hess, in place of Dr. Von Rohrscheidt. - -[_Turning to M. Dubost_] Yes, M. Dubost. - -M. DUBOST: I beg the Tribunal to excuse me; I was completing the work -which they had requested me to do in relation to concentration camps. In -a few moments, when I have completed the exposé on the question of -prisoners of war, I shall present to the Tribunal the end of the French -presentation concerning concentration camps. This will not be much, for -we shall have only a few documents to cite. Subject to counter evidence -which the Defense may bring, the systematic repetition of the same -methods seems so far sufficiently established. - -We were at the point of reading a document of the Dutch Government, -which was already presented to the Tribunal under Document Number F-224 -(Exhibit Number RF-324) and which establishes that a protest was -formulated, following the secret condemnation to death and the execution -of three officers: Lieutenants J. J. B. ten Bosch, B. M. C. Braat, and -Thibo. - -I think that the document to which I alluded this morning, which is the -official report of the French Government concerning prisoners, is now in -the hands of the Tribunal. It is the document submitted by M. Herzog -under Exhibit Number RF-46, Document Number UK-78. I ask the Tribunal to -excuse me, as I cannot present this document again. I have no more -copies. - -It is evident from this document that the Nazis had a systematic policy -of intimidation. They strove to keep the greatest possible number of -prisoners of war in order to be able, if necessary, to exercise -efficacious pressure over the countries from which these prisoners came. -This policy was exercised by the irregular or improper capture of -prisoners, and also by the refusal, which was systematically upheld, to -repatriate the prisoners whose state of health would have justified this -measure. - -Concerning the irregular or improper capture of prisoners of war, we can -cite the example of what happened in France after the signing of the -armistice. - -The report of the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees, to which we -refer, indicates, on Page 4: - - “In 1940 certain French military formations laid down their arms - at the time of the armistice under the assurance given by the - German Army that troops who had thus surrendered would not be - taken into captivity. These troops were, nevertheless, captured. - The Alpine Army had passed over the Rhône in order to be - demobilized and was west of the region of Vienne. They were - taken prisoners and were sent to Germany until the end of July - 1940. - - “Moreover, noncombatant formations of special civilians were led - into captivity and imprisoned in accordance with Himmler’s - orders, which said that all Frenchmen of military age were to be - seized indiscriminately. In short, it was only through the - making of special exceptions and the private initiative of unit - commanders that all Frenchmen were not transferred to Germany. - - “Because of the enormous number of prisoners and the - difficulties that faced the German Army in taking all those men - to Germany, the German Army decided, in 1940, to create what - they called ‘Front-Stalags.’ - - “The promise had been made to the Vichy Government, which was - established after the armistice, that soldiers who were kept in - these ‘Front-Stalags’ would be kept in France. Yet, the men in - these camps began to be sent to Germany in October 1940.” - -In an additional report appended to the document book which is before -you, the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees points out the irregular -capture of the troops of the fortified sector of Haguenau, the 22d -R.I.F., the 81st B.C.P., the 51st and 58th Infantry Regiments and a -North African division. It is Document F-668 which I submit under -Exhibit Number RF-361, the pages of which are not numbered, it is -appended to the document book. I quote the document: - - “Troops of the fortified sector of Haguenau: the 22d R.I.F. and - the 81st B.C.P. - - “These troops fought until 25 June, 1:30, and only stopped - firing after an agreement between the colonel in charge of the - fortified sector of Haguenau and the German generals, an - agreement which guaranteed the troops the honors of war and - particularly that they would not be made prisoners. The 51st and - 58th Infantry Regiments, as well as a North African Division, - withdrew towards Toul only after an agreement, signed on the 22 - June, between the French General Dubuisson and the German - General Andreas, at Thuilleaux-Groseilles, Meurthe-et-Moselle, - an agreement guaranteeing military honors and confirming that - the troops would not be taken prisoners.” - -THE PRESIDENT: What official document does this document come from? - -M. DUBOST: From the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees. It is the -additional report which was made by the French Government. We submit it -under Exhibit Number RF-361. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the report on the captivity? - -M. DUBOST: This report will be submitted to you, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: It appears to be Addition Number 2 to the report on the -captivity, for the attention of the French Delegation to the Court of -Justice at Nuremberg. - -M. DUBOST: That is correct, Mr. President. The information which I have -just read to the Tribunal consists of extracts from a note from Darlan -to Ambassador Scapini on 22 April 1941. - -THE PRESIDENT: But M. Dubost, is there anything to show that it is an -official document, such as this book? - -M. DUBOST: This document, Mr. President, bears no relation to the one -which I am quoting. - -THE PRESIDENT: No, I know it does not, but this is an official document -produced by the Republic of France, is it not? - -M. DUBOST: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that this Addition Number 2 to the report -on captivity is equally an official document with this one? That is what -we want to know. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, it is a report which was submitted in the name -of the Government of the French Republic by the delegation which I have -the honor to represent. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see, this one here is headed “Service of -Information of War Crimes, Official French Edition.” Now, that seems to -us to be different from this mere typewritten copy, which has on it the -“Appendix Number 2 to the Report on the Captivity.” We do not know whose -report on the captivity. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, you have before you the official note of -transmission from our government. The clerk of the Court has just handed -it to you. - -THE PRESIDENT: We have this document, which appears to be an official -document, but this addition has no such seal upon it as this has. - -M. DUBOST: There is mention of an appendix to this document. - -THE PRESIDENT: The other is marked: Appendix. It must be identified by a -seal. - -M. DUBOST: The covering letter has a seal and the fact that it alludes -to the document is sufficient, in my opinion, to authenticate the -document transmitted. May I continue? - -THE PRESIDENT: No. This document here has a letter attached to it. This -document here is not referred to in that letter specifically. Therefore, -there is nothing to connect the two documents together. - -M. DUBOST: I think there is a manuscript note in the margin. I have not -the document before me here and cannot be positive about it but I think -there is a manuscript note in the margin. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wishes you to put this in as one document. I -see there is a manuscript note here at the side, in writing, which -refers to the Appendix. If you will put the whole thing in together -. . . - -M. DUBOST: It is all submitted in one file. - -Now I wish to read to the Tribunal extracts from two letters addressed -to the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden by the ex-Ambassador -Scapini, both dated 4 April 1941. The Tribunal will find them reproduced -in the document book before them, Pages 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22: - - “4 April 1941. - - “M. Georges Scapini, Ambassador of France. - - “To his Excellency Monsieur Abetz, German Ambassador in Paris. - - “Subject: Men captured after ‘the coming into force of the - Armistice Convention and treated as prisoners of war. . . .’” - -At the bottom of the page: - - “I. The Geneva Convention applies only during a state of war as - far as captures are concerned. Armistice, however, suspends war - operations; therefore, any man captured after the Armistice - Convention came into force and treated as a prisoner of war, is - wrongfully retained in captivity. . . .” - -Page 17, third paragraph: - - “The Armistice Convention, in its second paragraph, states only - that the French Armed Forces stationed in regions to be occupied - by Germany are to be brought back quickly into unoccupied - territory and demobilized, but does not say that they are to be - taken into captivity, which would be contrary to the Geneva - Convention. . . .” - -Fifth paragraph of the same page: - - “1. Civilians. If it is admitted that civilians captured before - the armistice cannot be treated as prisoners of war, as - discussed in my previous letter, surely there is all the more - reason not to consider as such those captured after the - armistice. I note in this respect that captures, some of which - were collective, were carried out several months after the end - of hostilities. . . .” - -Then on Page 18, the top of the page: - - “To the categories of civilians defined in my first letter, I - wish to add one more—that of demobilized civilians who were - going back to their homes in the occupied zone after the - armistice and who, more often than not, were captured on their - way home and sent into captivity as a result of the initiative - of local military authorities. - - “2. Soldiers. As such I would define, by convention, men who, - though freed after the armistice, could not for some reason—due - to the difficult circumstances of that period—be provided with - the regular demobilization papers. Many of them were captured - and taken into captivity under the same condition as those - mentioned above. . . .” - -I think the Tribunal will not require the reading of that example, but -if the President wishes, I shall read it. - -THE PRESIDENT: No. - -M. DUBOST: Let us turn to Page 19, the last paragraph, entitled: - - “A. Civilians not subject to military service. - - “It is obvious that these men could not be considered soldiers - according to French law. They can be classified, according to - age, into three groups: - - “(a) Men under 21 not yet called to the colors. Example: - Flanquart, Alexandre, 18 years old, captured by the German - troops at Courrières, Pas-de-Calais, at the time of the arrival - of the latter in that region. His address in captivity was - Number 65/388, Stalag II-B. - - “(b) Men between 21 and 48 who were not mobilized, who were - demobilized, or who were considered unfit for service.” - -There follows a rather lengthy list which the Tribunal will perhaps -accept without my reading it. It consists merely of proper names. In the -middle of the page: - - “(c) Men specially assigned to the army. I will classify them - into two groups: - - “1. Men mobilized into special corps, which are military - formations established at the time of the mobilization by - different ministerial departments, according to the following - chart . . . .” - -At the top of Page 21: - - “2. Men specially assigned, who at mobilization were kept in the - positions which they held in time of peace in military services - or establishments. Example: Workmen in artillery depots. - - “Civilians specially assigned. Contrary to those mentioned - above, the civilians who were specially assigned did not belong - to military formations and were not subject to military - authority. Nevertheless they were arrested. Example:”—I skip - several lines—“Moisset, Henri, specially assigned to the - Marret-Bonin factory.”—I skip a few more lines. - - “Address in captivity: Number 102 Stalag II-A.” - -Those people were not all freed, far from it. Some remained prisoners -until the end of the war. - -We shall cite now a document submitted under Exhibit Number RF-362 -(Document Number F-224), the text of which is in your document book, on -Page 15a. This text may be summarized in a few words. It is the story of -Dutch officers who were freed after the capitulation of the Dutch Army -and recaptured shortly afterwards and sent in captivity to Germany. -Paragraph 3 of this document: - - “On 9 May 1942 a summons addressed to all regular officers of - the former Dutch Army who were on active service on 10 May 1940 - was published in the Dutch newspapers, according to which they - were to present themselves on Friday, 15 May 1942, at the - Chassée Barracks in Breda . . . .” - -Paragraph 5: - - “More than one thousand regular officers reported to the Chassée - Barracks on 15 May 1942. The doors were closed after - them. . . .” - -Paragraph 7: - - “A German officer of high rank came into the barracks and - declared that the officers had not kept their word to undertake - no action against the Führer and, as a result of this, they were - to be kept in captivity. . . .” - -The following paragraph states that “they were taken from the station at -Breda to Nuremberg, in Germany.” - -Numerous obstacles were placed in the way of the release of French -prisoners of war who, for reasons of health, should have been sent back -to their families. I shall quote a document already submitted under -Exhibit Number RF-297 (Document Number F-417), Page 23 of your document -book; and I read, Paragraph 1: - - “The question of releasing French generals, prisoners of war in - German hands, for reasons of health or age was taken up on - several occasions by the French authorities.” - -This reproduction of the stencil is not quite clear. I continue with -Paragraph 2: - - “So far as this question is concerned, the Führer has always - refused to consider either their release or allowing them to be - placed in hospitals in neutral countries.” - -Paragraph 3: - - “Today release or sending to hospitals is more out of the - question than ever. . . .” - -And a written note reads: “No reply to be given to the French note.” - -This note, in fact, was addressed by the Supreme Command of the German -Army to the German Armistice Commission, who had asked for instructions -as to whether or not they should reply to the request concerning the -release of French generals who were ill, a request made by the Vichy -Government. - -Much more serious measures were undertaken against our prisoners of war -by the German authorities when, for reasons of a patriotic nature, some -of our prisoners gave the Germans to understand that they were not -willing to collaborate with Germany. The German authorities considered -them as incapable of being assimilated and dangerous; their courage and -their determination gave much concern to Germany, and the measures taken -against them amounted to nothing less than murder. We know of numerous -examples of murder of prisoners of war. The victims were mainly: 1) men -who had taken part in commando actions; 2) airmen; 3) escaped prisoners. -These murders were carried out by means of deportation and the -internment of these prisoners in concentration camps. - -While interned in these camps, they were subjected to the regime about -which you know and which was bound to cause their death, or else they -were killed quite simply with a bullet in the back of the neck, -according to the KA method which has been described by our American -colleagues and on which I will not dwell. In other cases they were -lynched on the spot by the population, in accordance with direct orders, -or with the tacit consent of the German Government. In yet other cases, -they were handed over to the Gestapo and the SD, who, as you will see at -the end of my statement, during the last years of the occupation had the -right to carry out executions. - -With the Tribunal’s permission, we shall study two cases of -extermination of combat troops captured after military operations: that -of commandos and that of airmen. - -As the Tribunal knows, men who were commandos were almost always -volunteers. In any case, they were selected from among the most -courageous fighters and those who showed the greatest physical aptitude -for combat. We can consider them, therefore, as the elite and the order -to exterminate them as an attempt to annihilate the elite and spread -terror through the ranks of the Allied Armies. From a legal point of -view the execution of the commandos cannot be justified. The Germans -themselves, moreover, used commandos quite extensively; but whereas, in -the case of their own men being taken prisoners, they always insisted -that they be recognized as belligerents, they denied that right to our -men or to those of the Allied Armies. - -The main order concerning this was signed by Hitler on 18 October 1942, -and it was extensively carried out. Moreover, this order was preceded by -other orders of the OKW, which show that the question had been carefully -studied by the General Staff before becoming the subject of a final -order by the head of the German Government. - -Under Document Number 553-PS, the Tribunal will find, on Page 24 of the -document book, an order signed by Keitel which we submit as Exhibit -Number RF-363. This order prescribes that all isolated parachutists or -small groups of parachutists carrying out a mission shall be executed. -It is dated 4 August 1942. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do not read it. - -M. DUBOST: I thank the Tribunal for sparing me the reading of it. - -On 7 October 1942 a communiqué of the OKW, disseminated by the press and -radio, announced the decision taken by the High Command to execute -saboteurs. On Page 26 the Tribunal will find in the document book -extracts from the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of 8 October 1942 (Document -Number RF-364): - - “In future all terrorist and sabotage units of the British and - their accomplices, who do not behave as soldiers but as bandits, - will be treated as such by the German troops and shot on the - spot without mercy, wherever it may be.” - -Under the Exhibit Number RF-365 (Document 1263-PS), we submit the -minutes of a meeting of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, dated 14 -October 1942. Paragraph 3: - - “During the era of total warfare sabotage has become one of the - most important elements in the conduct of war. It is sufficient - to state our attitude to this question. The enemy will find - evidence of it in the reports of our own propaganda - units. . . .” - -Page 29, the end of Paragraph 3: - - “Sabotage is an essential element . . . we ourselves have - strongly developed this means of combat.” - -Then the sixth paragraph. - - “We have already announced by radio our intention of - liquidating, in future, all groups of terrorists and saboteurs - acting like bandits. Therefore the WFSt has only to issue - regulations to the troops how to deal with terrorist and - sabotage groups.” - -Page 30. The Tribunal will see what orders were given concerning the -treatment of what the German General Staff called groups of terrorists -and British saboteurs. It is certain that the German General Staff never -called their own commandos groups of terrorists and saboteurs. - -Paragraph A refers to groups of the British Army without uniform or in -German uniform. I quote: - - “In combat or in flight they are to be killed without mercy.” - -Paragraph B: - - “Members of terrorist and sabotage groups of the British Army - wearing uniform, who in the opinion of our troops are guilty of - acting dishonorably or in any manner contrary to the law of - nations, are to be kept in separate custody after capture. . . . - - “Instructions concerning the treatment to be inflicted upon them - will be given by the WFSt in agreement with the Army legal - service and the Counter-Intelligence Department, Foreign Section - (Amt Ausland Abwehr).” - -Finally, Page 31, Paragraph 2: - - “Violation of the laws of war by terrorist or sabotage troops is - in the future always to be assumed when individual assailants as - saboteurs or agents, regardless of whether they were soldiers or - whatever their uniform might be, place themselves outside the - laws of war by committing surprise attacks or brutalities which - in the judgment of our troops “are inconsistent with the - fundamental rules of war.” - -Paragraph 3: - - “In such cases the assailants will be killed without mercy to - the last man, in combat or in flight.” - -Paragraph 4: - - “Confinement in prisoner-of-war camps, even temporarily, is - forbidden.” - -Thus in carrying out these orders, if British soldiers, even in uniform, -were captured during a commando operation, the German troops were to -judge whether they had acted according to the laws of war or not; and -without any appeal, subordinates could annihilate them to the last man, -even when they were not engaged in active fighting. These orders were -applied to British commandos. - -We shall now quote Document Number 498-PS, which was submitted by our -American colleagues under Exhibit Number USA-501 and which confirms the -information which we have just given to the Tribunal by the reading of -the preceding documents. It seems useless to read this document. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, there are two points to which I wish to draw -your attention. In the first place, it is said that you are not offering -these documents in evidence, you are simply reading them, and they must -be offered in evidence so that the document itself may be put in -evidence. You have not offered in evidence any of these documents; you -have just been reading from them or have given them numbers. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I have submitted them all—absolutely -all—except those which were already submitted by our colleagues; and -all were filed with a number, and can be handed to you immediately. I -shall ask the French secretary to hand them to you with the exhibit -numbers which I read out. - -THE PRESIDENT: They have all been put in evidence already? - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, some have been put in evidence and I quoted -them with their exhibit numbers; but those which have not been -submitted, I shall give French numbers when submitting. - -THE PRESIDENT: You are saying, “have been put in evidence by some other -member of the Prosecution”; is that right? - -M. DUBOST: That is correct, Mr. President. When I quote them I give the -number under which they were filed by my American colleagues. - -THE PRESIDENT: That was filed by the American Prosecution, was it not: -498? - -M. DUBOST: 498-PS on Page 32 has already been filed by my American -colleagues under the Number USA-501, as I said before, sir. I shall not -read it. I shall merely comment on it briefly. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. With reference to the document which preceded -it on Pages 27, 29, 30, and 31 . . . - -M. DUBOST: I shall ask the French secretary to give them to you with the -numbers under which they were filed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have they been filed by the American prosecutor too? - -M. DUBOST: Not all, Mr. President. Some were filed by the American -Prosecution, others were filed by me. - -THE PRESIDENT: What the Tribunal wants you to do is, when you put in a -document, if it has not already been put in, give it a number and -announce the exhibit number so that the record may be complete. Is that -clear? - -M. DUBOST: It is clear, Mr. President, but I believe that I have done so -from the beginning, since the French secretary has just given you the -file. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may have put numbers on the documents, but you have -not announced them in some cases. - -There is another matter which I wish to state and it is this: When I -spoke before, what I asked you to do was to confine yourself to any new -points, and you are now giving us evidence about commandos and about -British commandos, all of which has been already gone into in previous -stages of the Trial, and that appears to us to be unnecessary. - -M. DUBOST: The Tribunal will pardon me, but I have not read any of the -documents already mentioned. The documents I read were documents not -cited before. I had just reached a document which had been mentioned -before, and I asked the Tribunal to excuse me from even commenting on -it, since I thought the document was already well known to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have had a good deal of evidence already about -the treatment of commandos and sabotage groups, evidence, if I remember -right, which attempted to draw some distinction between troops which -were dropped from the air, for instance, close up to the battle zone and -troops that were dropped at a distance behind the battle zone. You had -quite a lot of evidence upon that subject. If there is anything which is -of special interest to the case of France we would be most willing to -hear it, but we do not desire to hear cumulative evidence upon subjects -which we have already heard. - -M. DUBOST: I did not think that I had brought cumulative proof to the -Tribunal in reading documents which had not previously been read; but -since that is so, I shall continue, but not without emphasizing that, in -our view, the responsibility of Keitel is seriously involved by the -orders which were given and by the execution of these orders. - -Document Number 510-PS, Page 48, has not been read. We submit it as -Exhibit Number RF-367, and we ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice -of it. It concerns the carrying out of the orders which were given -concerning the landing of British detachments at Patmos. - -A memorandum from the General Staff to the commander of the different -units, Document Number 532-PS, which is the appendix to the Tribunal’s -document book, repeats and specifies the instructions which the Tribunal -knows and does not bring anything new to the case. We submit this -document as Exhibit Number RF-368, and we ask the Tribunal to take -judicial notice of it. - -We shall now deal with the execution of Allied airmen who were captured. -From the statement which was made on this question, the Tribunal has -learned that a certain number of air operations were considered as -criminal acts by the German Government, which indirectly encouraged the -lynching of the airmen by the population or their immediate -extermination by the action “Sonderbehandlung” (special treatment); and -need not be discussed again. This was the subject of Document Number -USA-333, which has already been cited, and Document Number USA-334. - -Within the scope of these instructions, orders were given by the letter -of 4 June 1944 to the Minister of Justice to forbid any prosecution of -German civilians in connection with the murder of Allied airmen. This is -the subject of Document Number 635-PS, which you will find in the -appendix to the document book. This document will become Exhibit Number -RF-370. - - “The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery, 4 June - 1944. - - “To the Reich Minister of Justice, Doctor Thierack. - - “Subject: Lynch law for Anglo-American murderers. - - “My dear Dr. Thierack: - - “The Chief of the Party Chancellery has informed me of his - secret memorandum, a copy of which is enclosed, and has asked me - to make it known to you also. I am complying with this, and ask - you to consider to what extent you wish to inform the tribunals - and the public prosecutors.” - -On 6 June, two important conferences were held between Kaltenbrunner, -Ribbentrop, Göring (all three defendants), Himmler, Von Brauchitsch, -officers of the Luftwaffe, and members of the SS. They decided to draw -up a definite list of air operations which would be considered as acts -of terrorism. - -The original transcript, drawn up by Warlimont and bearing written notes -by Jodl and Keitel, is Document Number 735-PS, which I submit as Exhibit -Number RF-371. It was decided during this conference that lynching would -be the ideal punishment to stop certain types of air operations directed -against the civilian population. Kaltenbrunner, for his part, promised -the active collaboration of the SD. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was it already read? - -M. DUBOST: This document, so far as I know, was never read. - -PROFESSOR DOCTOR FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): I am -protesting against the presentation of Document 532-PS, dated 24 June -1944. That is a draft of an order which was presented to Jodl but which -was crossed out by him and therefore annulled. - -At this opportunity I would also like to call the attention of the Court -to the fact that we, the Counsel for the Defense, did not receive a -document book like the one presented to the Tribunal; and it is -therefore very hard for us to check and to follow the presentations of -the Prosecution. Every morning we receive a pile of documents, some of -which partly refer to future and some to past proceedings. But I have -not seen a document book in chronological order for weeks. Furthermore, -it would be desirable for us to receive the documents the day before. In -that case, when testimony is presented, we could be of assistance to -both sides. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, are you saying that you have not received the -document book or that you have not received the dossier? - -DR. EXNER: I did not receive the document book, I would like to add -something further. Some of the documents which have just been presented -were quoted without signatures and without date, and it is questionable -whether these so-called documents are to be considered as documents at -all. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, I imagine that you have just heard—I have told M. -Dubost that he must announce the exhibit number which the French -Prosecutor is giving to any document which he puts in evidence. As I -understand it, he has been putting numbers upon the documents; but in -certain cases he has not announced the number in open court. The -document, as you have seen, has been presented; and, as I understand, it -has a number upon it, but he has not in every case announced the number; -and the Tribunal has told M. Dubost that it wishes and it orders that -every document put in by the French Prosecutor should have an exhibit -number announced in Court. That meets the one point that you raised. - -As to your not having the document book, that is, of course, a breach of -the order which the Tribunal has made that a certain number of copies of -the documents should be deposited in the defendants’ Information Center -or otherwise furnished to defendants’ counsel. - -As to Document 532-PS . . . . - -[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred._] - -Dr. Exner, is there anything further you wish to say upon these points, -because we are just about to have a recess for a few moments. We would -like to hear what you have to say before we have the recess. - -DR. EXNER: I have nothing further to add to that; but if I may be -permitted to make a further remark, we were advised that it was Your -Honor’s wish that we should hear every day what is to be the subject of -the proceedings on the following day, which would, of course, be a great -help to our preparations. So far, that has never been the case. I myself -have never heard what was to be dealt with the following day. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. M. Dubost, the Tribunal would like to hear -what you have to say upon the points raised by Dr. Exner. First of all, -upon the Document 532-PS; secondly, why he did not receive a document -book; and lastly, why he has not received any program as to what is to -be gone into on the following day. - -M. DUBOST: As to the question of program, as Dr. Exner pointed out, the -custom of providing it has not been established by the Prosecution. No -one has ever given it, neither the French Prosecution nor its -predecessors. Perhaps I did not attend the session the day the Tribunal -requested that the program should be given. In any case I do not -remember that the Prosecution was ever requested to do that. - -As far as the document book is concerned, it is possible that this book -was not handed to the Defense in the form which is before the Tribunal, -that is to say, with the pages numbered in a certain order. However, I -am certain that yesterday I sent to the Defense Counsel’s rooms the text -in German and several texts in French of all the documents which I was -to submit today. I cannot assure the Tribunal that they were handed over -in the order in which you have them before you, but I am sure that they -were sent. - -THE PRESIDENT: As to Document 532-PS? - -M. DUBOST: I had not begun to read Document 532-PS, Mr. President, so I -could not have concealed the fact that there was a handwritten note in -the margin. - -THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document that had been put in before? - -M. DUBOST: I do not believe so, Mr. President. In my dossier there are a -certain number of documents which I have not read, as I knew it was the -Tribunal’s wish that I should shorten my presentation; and Document -532-PS, which I submitted under Exhibit Number RF-368, is one of those. - -THE PRESIDENT: The document, according to Dr. Exner, is a draft of a -decree which was presented to Jodl but was not granted by him. Those -were his words, as they came through on the translation; and, therefore, -he submits that it is not to be considered and there is nothing to show -that the document was ever anything more than a draft. - -If so, isn’t it clear that it ought not to be received in evidence? - -M. DUBOST: This is a question which the Tribunal will decide after -having heard the explanation of Dr. Exner. This document did not seem to -me of major importance to my presentation, since I did not read from it. -In any case, as I did not read it, I could not have hidden from the -Tribunal that there was a handwritten note in the margin. It is certain -that this handwritten note is an element to be taken into consideration, -and on which the Tribunal will base its decision whether Exhibit Number -RF-368 should be accepted or rejected, after having heard the -explanation of the Defense. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I had occasion during the recess to talk to my -client, Keitel. Before the recess, the French Prosecutor had submitted -as evidence Document Number F-668, Exhibit Number RF-361, an extract -from a note from Admiral Darlan, addressed to the French Ambassador -Scapini. The French Prosecutor believes, as I presume from his words, -that he has proved by this that the agreements between German generals -and French troops, who had laid down their arms, had not been kept. In -view of the gravity of these accusations I would be obliged to the -French Prosecution if they would declare, with respect to this document, -first, whether these serious accusations of the French Government had -also been brought to the attention of the German Government? The French -Prosecutor had concluded from this document that the information -contained therein was also proved. I would like to point out that it is -an excerpt from a note from Admiral Darlan to the French Ambassador, -Scapini. It is not clear from this document whether Ambassador Scapini -had taken the necessary steps with the German Government or, -furthermore, what reply was made by the German Government to this note. -For this reason I would like to ask the French Prosecutor to declare -whether he can establish from the documents he had whether these serious -accusations were brought to the attention of the German Government, and -secondly, what reply was made by the German Government. Since these -documents of the Armistice Commission are in possession of the -victorious powers, it is neither possible for the defendants nor the -Defense to produce evidence themselves. - -[_M. Dubost approached the lectern._] - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to M. Dubost._] Perhaps the most convenient -course would be, if you wish to say anything about the objection which -Dr. Nelte has just made, for you to say it now. As I understand it, that -objection is that this document, F-668 (RF-361), is a note by Admiral -Darlan complaining that certain French troops were surrendered on the -terms that they were not to be made prisoners of war, but were -afterwards sent to Germany as prisoners of war. What Dr. Nelte says is, -was that matter taken up with the German Government and if so, what -answer did the German Government give? That seems to the Tribunal to be -a reasonable request for Dr. Nelte to make. - -M. DUBOST: The reply was given, Mr. President, by Ambassador Scapini’s -letter addressed to Ambassador Abetz. - -THE PRESIDENT: My attention is drawn to the fact that the two documents -to which you refer are dated 4 April. The document to which Dr. Nelte -refers is a subsequent document, namely, 22 April. Therefore it does not -appear, from documents which were anterior to the document of 22 April, -as to what happened afterwards. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I, myself, am not aware of this. These -documents were forwarded to me by the Prisoners-of-War Department. They -are fragmentary archives forwarded by an official French office, which I -shall inform of the Tribunal’s wish. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it should be investigated and found out whether -the matter was taken up with the German Government and what answer the -German Government gave. - -M. DUBOST: I shall do so, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Not at the moment, but in the course of time. - -M. DUBOST: I shall have to apply to the French Government in order to -discover whether in our archives there is any trace of a communication -from the French Government to the German Government dated later than 26 -April. - -THE PRESIDENT: In the event of your not being able to get any -satisfactory explanation, the Tribunal will take notice of Dr. Nelte’s -objection, or criticism rather, of the document. - -It is pointed out to me, too, the fact that the two earlier documents to -which you are referring are documents addressed by the Ambassador of -France to M. Abetz, the Ambassador of Germany; and it may be, therefore, -that there is a similar correspondence in reference to Document Number -F-668 (Exhibit Number RF-361) here in the same file, which is the file -of which the French Government presumably has copies, or might have -copies. - -M. DUBOST: It is possible, but that is only a hypothesis which I do not -want to formulate before the Tribunal. I prefer to produce the -documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: I quite follow; you cannot deal with it for the moment. -As to the other matter which is raised by Dr. Exner, the Tribunal -considers that Document Number 532-PS, which has been submitted under -Exhibit Number RF-368, should be struck out of the Record in so far as -it is in the Record. If the United States and the French Prosecutors -wish the document to be put in evidence at a future date, they may apply -to do so. Similarly the defendant’s counsel, Dr. Exner, for instance, if -he wishes to make any use of the document, of course he is at liberty to -do so. - -In reference to the other matters which Dr. Exner raised, it is the wish -of the Tribunal to assist defendants’ counsel in any way possible in -their work; and they are, therefore, most anxious that the rules which -they have laid down as to documents should be strictly complied with, -and they think that copies of the original documents certainly should -contain anything the original documents themselves contain. - -This particular document, Number 532-PS, as a copy, I think I am right -in saying, does not contain the marginal note in the script which the -original contains. At any rate it is important that copies should -contain everything which is on the originals. - -Then there is another matter to which I wish to refer. I have already -said that it is very important that documents, when they are put in -evidence, should not only be numbered as exhibits, but that the exhibit -number should be stated at the time; and also even more important, or as -important, that the certificate certifying where the document comes from -should also be produced for the Tribunal. Every document put in by the -United States bore upon it a certificate stating where it had been found -or what was its origin, and it is important that that practice should be -adopted in every case. - -The only other thing I want to say is that it would be very convenient, -both to defendants’ counsel and to the Tribunal too, that they should be -informed at least the night before of the program which counsel proposes -to adopt for the following day. It is true, as was said, that perhaps -that has not been absolutely regularly carried out by the Prosecutor on -all occasions; but it has been done on quite a number of occasions -within my recollection, and it is at any rate the most convenient -practice, which the Tribunal desires should be carried out; and they -would be glad to know above all what you, M. Dubost, propose to address -yourself to tomorrow; and the Tribunal would be very grateful to know -how long the French Prosecutors anticipate their case will take. They -would like you, before you finish or at the conclusion of your address -this afternoon, to indicate to the Tribunal and to the defendants’ -counsel, what the program for tomorrow is to be. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Honor please, I wonder if I could say -one word in regard to the position as to documents, because I had an -opportunity during recess of consulting with my friend Mr. Dodd, and -also with my friend M. Dubost. All PS documents form a series of -captured documents, whose origin and the process taken subsequent to the -article, were verified on 22 November by an affidavit by Major Coogan, -which was put in by my friend Colonel Storey. It is the submission of -the Prosecution, which, of course, it is delighted to elaborate any time -convenient to the Tribunal, that all such documents being captured and -verified in that way are admissible. I stress the word admissible, but -the weight which the Tribunal will attach to any respective documents -is, of course, a matter at which the Tribunal would arrive from the -contents of the document and the circumstances under which it came into -being. That, I fear, is the only reason I ventured to intervene at the -moment, that there might be some confusion between the general -verification of the document as a captured document, which is done by -Major Coogan’s affidavit, and the individual certificate of translation, -that is, of the correctness of the translation of the different -documents, which appeared at the end of each individual American -document. The fact is that my friend, Mr. Dodd, and I were very anxious -that that matter should be before the Tribunal, and we should be only -too delighted to give to the Tribunal any further information which it -desires. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does that affidavit of Major Coogan apply to all the -other series of documents put in by the United States? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It applies to PS and I think it is D, C, L, R -and EC. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does that certificate then cover this particular sheet of -paper which is marked 532-PS, and has on it no other identifying mark? - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The affidavit proves that that was a -document captured from German sources; it gives the whole process—what -happens after. I have not troubled the Tribunal by reading it, because -as such we submit that it is admissible as a submission. Of course, the -matter of weight may vary. I do not want the Tribunal to be under a -misapprehension that every document was certified individually; what is -certified is, of course, a non-captured document. If a document comes -from any of the sources mentioned in Article 21, then someone with -authority from his government certifies it as coming from one of these -sources and that we do individually. But concerning captured documents, -we do not make any individual certification; we depend on Major Coogan’s -affidavit. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but just a moment. Sir David, it is perhaps right to -say in reference to this particular document, 532-PS, or the portion of -it which has been produced, first of all that the copy which was put -before us did not contain the marginal note, and that it is, therefore, -wrong. We are in agreement with your submission that it has been -certified, as you say, by Major Coogan’s affidavit, which is admissible; -but, of course, that has nothing to do with its weight. That is the -point on which Dr. Exner was addressing us. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I appreciated it, Your Honor. - -THE PRESIDENT: It is a document—being a private document and not a -document of which we can take judicial notice—which has not been read -in court by the United States or other prosecutors, and it is not in -evidence now because it has not been read by M. Dubost. - -SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor, with that, of course, I do not -desire anything further. That is the ruling of the Tribunal. The only -part that I did want to stress was that the PS as such is being verified -and, of course, subject to reading it in Court, it could be put in. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. We quite understand that. - -I ought to say, on behalf of the Tribunal, that we owe an apology to the -French Prosecutor and his staff, because it has just been pointed out to -me that this marginal note does appear upon the translation and, -therefore, M. Dubost, I tender to you my apology. - -M. DUBOST: I thank you, Mr. President. The Tribunal will certainly -remember that this morning Document Number 1553-PS was set aside, which -includes in it bills for gas destined for Oranienburg and Auschwitz. I -believe that, after the explanation given by Sir David, this Document -1553-PS may now be admitted by the Tribunal since it has already been -certified. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was it read, M. Dubost? - -M. DUBOST: Yes, Mr. President. I was in the process of reading it this -morning. It is the 27th document in the second document book of this -morning, but the Tribunal rejected it, with the demand that I furnish an -affidavit. The intervention of Sir David constitutes this affidavit. I -beg the Tribunal to forgive my making this request, but I should be -grateful if it would accept the document which was refused this morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -M. DUBOST: I thank you, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, it was a question of gas, was it not? - -M. DUBOST: That is right. - -THE PRESIDENT: There was one bill of lading and then there were a number -of other bills of lading which were referred to. - -M. DUBOST: Yes. And the whole constituted Document Number 1553-PS, -submitted under Exhibit Number RF-350. This document is included in the -series covered by the affidavit of which Sir David has spoken to you. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, if you attach importance to it, would it not -be possible for you to give us the figures from these other bills of -lading? I mean the amount of the gas. - -M. DUBOST: Certainly, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Just in order that it may be upon the shorthand note. - -M. DUBOST: 14 February 1944, gross weight 832 kilos, net weight 555 -kilos (destination Auschwitz); 16 February 1944, gross weight 832 kilos, -net weight 555 kilos (destination Oranienburg); 13 March 1944, gross -weight 896 kilos, net weight 598 kilos (destination Auschwitz); 13 March -1944, gross weight 896 kilos, net weight 598 kilos (destination -Oranienburg); 30 April 1944, gross weight 832 kilos, net weight 555 -kilos (destination Auschwitz); 30 April 1944, gross weight 832 kilos, -net weight 555 kilos (destination Oranienburg); 18 May 1944, gross -weight 832 kilos, net weight 555 kilos (destination Oranienburg); 31 May -1944, gross weight 832 kilos, net weight 555 kilos (destination -Auschwitz). This appears to me to be all. - -To Document 1553-PS is added the statement by Gerstein, and also the -statement by the chief of the American service who collected this -document. - -With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall proceed with the -presentation of the crimes of which we accuse the defendants against -Allied prisoners of war who were interned in Germany. Document Number -735-PS, Page 68 of the document book, which we submitted a short time -ago under Exhibit Number RF-371, is a report on important meetings which -brought together Kaltenbrunner, Ribbentrop, and Göring, in the course of -which the list of air operations which constituted acts of terrorism was -drawn up. - -It was decided in these meetings that lynching would be the ideal -punishment for all actions directed against civilian populations, which -the German Government claimed had the character of terrorism. - -On Page 68 Ribbentrop is involved. We read in one of the three copies of -the notes of the meetings that were held that day, in the first -paragraph, 11th line: - - “Contrary to the first proposals of the Minister of Foreign - Affairs, who wanted to include all terrorist attacks against the - civilian population and consequently air attacks against cities - . . . .” - -The proposals made by Ribbentrop were far in excess of what was accepted -at the time of this meeting. The three lines which follow deserve the -attention of the Tribunal: - - “Lynch law should be the rule. There was, on the other hand, no - question of a judgment rendered by a tribunal or handing over to - the police.” - -In Paragraph b), bottom of the page: - - “. . . one would have to distinguish between enemy airmen who - were suspected of criminal acts of this kind and prepare for - their admission in the airmen’s camp at Oberursel, and those who - should be turned over to the SD for special treatment when the - suspicions were confirmed.” - -The Tribunal will certainly remember the description which was given of -this “special treatment” by the American prosecution. What is involved -is purely and simply the extermination of Allied airmen who had fallen -into the hands of the German Army. - -On Page 69 the Tribunal may read, under Figure 3, the description and -the enumeration of the acts which are to be considered as terrorist acts -and as justifying lynching. - - “(a) Firing weapons at the civilian population, and gatherings - of civilians. - - “(b) Firing at German airmen who have bailed out of their - aircraft. - - “(c) Firing weapons at passenger trains and public conveyances. - - “(d) Firing weapons at hospital or hospital trains that are - clearly marked with a red cross.” - -Three lines below: - - “Should such acts be established in the course of interrogation, - the prisoners must be handed over to the SD.” - -This document originates from the Führer’s headquarters. It was drawn up -there on 6 June 1944, and it bears the stamp of the Deputy Chief of -Staff of the Wehrmacht. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think that has all been read, M. Dubost. I think that -document was all read before. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I was told that it had not been read. - -THE PRESIDENT: I have not verified it. - -M. DUBOST: We submit Document Number 729-PS, as Exhibit Number RF-372. -This document confirms the preceding one. It originates from the -Führer’s headquarters, is dated 15 June 1944, and reiterates the orders -I have read. But this document is signed by General Keitel, whereas the -preceding one was signed “J.” We have not been able to identify the -author of this initial. - -Document Number 730-PS, which we next submit as Exhibit Number RF-373, -is likewise from the Führer’s headquarters, and is also dated 15 June -1944. It is addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the -attention of Ambassador Ritter. The Tribunal will find it on Page 71 in -the document book. This document contains the instructions signed -“Keitel” in the preceding document, and it is likewise signed by Keitel. - -We shall submit as Exhibit Number RF-374, Document 733-PS, which -concerns the treatment which is to be meted out to airmen falling into -the hands of the German Army. It is a telephone message from the -Adjutant of the Reich Marshal, Captain Breuer. - -DR. NELTE: I assume that you have finished with the question of -lynching. In the presentation of this case the words “Orders of Keitel” -have been used repeatedly. The prosecutor has not read these documents. -I would be obliged if the prosecutor would produce a document which -contains an order, which raises lynch law to the level of an order, as -has been claimed by the Prosecution. The Defendants Keitel and Jodl -maintain that such an order was never given, that these conferences -concerning which documents have been produced—that these documents -never became orders because the authorities concerned prevented this. - -THE PRESIDENT: The documents speak for themselves. - -M. DUBOST: Does the Tribunal wish to listen to the complete reading of -these documents which are signed by Keitel? They are not orders, they -are projects. Moreover, I emphasized that point when I announced them to -the Tribunal. At Page 80 of our document book, you will find, dated 30 -June 1944, with Keitel’s visa: - - “Note for meeting. - - “Subject: The treatment of enemy terror flyers: - - “I. Enclosed, draft of written reply by the Reich Minister of - Foreign Affairs to the Chief of the OKW for the Operational - Staff of the Wehrmacht.” - -I am skipping a paragraph: - - “II. The Reich Marshal approves the definition of terror flyer - communicated by the OKW, as well as the procedure which is - proposed.” - -This document is submitted as Exhibit Number RF-375. I have not -submitted to the Tribunal a regular formal order; but I have brought -three documents which, in my opinion, are equivalent to a formal order -because, with the visa of Keitel, we have this note, signed by -Warlimont, which states: “The Reich Marshal approves the definition of -terror flyer communicated by the OKW, as well as the procedure which is -proposed.” This document bears the visa of Keitel. - -We shall now submit a document, Number L-154, which has already been -submitted by our American colleagues under Exhibit Number USA-335. My -colleague has read this text _in extenso_. I will merely refer to three -lines, in order not to delay the proceedings, “In principle, no -fighter-bomber pilots brought down are to be saved from the fury of the -people.” That text comes from the offices of Albert Hoffmann, Gauleiter -and Commissioner for the Defense of the Reich, of the Gau South -Westphalia. - -Under Exhibit Number RF-376 we shall submit Document Number F-686, on -Page 82 of our document book. This is the record of an interrogation of -Hugo Grüner on 29 December 1945. He was subordinate to Robert Wagner, -Gauleiter of Baden and Alsace. In the last lines of this document, Page -82, Grüner states: - - “Wagner gave a formal order to kill all Allied airmen we could - capture. In this connection Gauleiter Wagner explained to us - that Allied airmen were causing great ravages on German - territory, that he considered it was an inhuman war, and that - therefore, under the circumstances, any airmen captured should - not be considered as prisoners of war and deserved no mercy.” - -Page 83, at the top of the page: - - “He stated that Kreisleiter, if the occasion offered, should not - fail to capture and shoot the Allied airmen themselves. As I - have told you, Röhm was assistant to Wagner, but Wagner himself - did not speak. I can state that SS General Hoffmann, who was SS - chief of the police for the Southwest Region, was present when - the order was given to us by Wagner to kill Allied airmen.” - -This witness, Hugo Grüner, confesses that he participated in the -execution of Allied airmen in October or November 1944. - -Passing through Rheinweiler, he (Grüner) noticed that some English or -American airmen had been taken out of the Rhine by soldiers. The four -airmen were wearing khaki uniforms, were bareheaded, and were of average -height. He could not speak to them because he did not know the English -language. The Wehrmacht refused to take charge of them. - -That is the third paragraph at the bottom of the page and the witness -declares—I am reading: - - “I told the gendarmes that I had received orders from Wagner to - execute any Allied airman taken prisoner. The gendarmes replied - that it was the only thing to be done. I then decided to execute - the four Allied prisoners and one of the gendarmes present - advised the banks of the Rhine as the place of execution.” - -On Page 84, Paragraph 1, Grüner describes how he proceeded to -assassinate these airmen and admits that he killed them with machine gun -shots in the back. In the third paragraph he gives the name of one of -his accomplices, Erich Meissner, who was a Gestapo agent from Lorrach, -and then he denounces Meissner for having himself killed an airman as he -was getting out of his car and was walking toward the Rhine. I read: - - “He killed them by firing a machine gun salvo at each of them in - the back, after which each airman was dragged by the feet and - thrown into the Rhine.” - -This affidavit was received by the Police Magistrate of Strasbourg. The -document which we shall submit was signed by the magistrate’s clerk of -the court as a certified copy. This is how the orders given by the -leaders of the German Government were carried out by the German people. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, I see that it is 5 o’clock now, and perhaps -you would be able to tell us what your program would be for tomorrow. - -M. DUBOST: Tomorrow we shall complete the presentation of the question -of prisoners of war. We shall present to you in an abridged form -documents which seem to us to be indispensable, in spite of the hearing -of witnesses concerning the camps. There are only a few documents, but -they all directly inculpate one or other of the defendants. Then we -shall show how the orders given by the leaders of the German Army led -subordinates to commit acts of terrorism and banditry in France against -the innocent population, and also against patriots who were not treated -as francs-tireurs but as ordinary criminals. - -We expect to finish tomorrow morning. In the afternoon, my colleague, M. -Faure, could begin the presentation of this last part of the French -charges concerning crimes against humanity. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you not able to give us any estimate of the length of -the whole of the French Prosecution? - -M. DUBOST: I believe that three days will be sufficient for M. Faure. -The individual charges will be summarized in one-half day by our -colleague, M. Mounier, and that will be the end. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 31 January 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FORTY-SEVENTH DAY - Thursday, 31 January 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the -Defendants Kaltenbrunner and Seyss-Inquart will be absent from this -morning’s session on account of illness. - -M. DUBOST: Before finishing, Gentlemen, I must read you a few more -documents concerning war prisoners. - -First of all, it will be Document Number L-166, which we present as -Exhibit Number RF-377, Page 65 in your document book. It concerns a note -which summarizes an interview with the Reich Marshal, on 15 and 16 May -1944, on the subject of pursuit planes. Page 8, Paragraph Number 20: - - “The Reich Marshal will propose to the Führer that American and - English crews who fire indiscriminately on towns, on civilian - trains in motion, or on soldiers dropping by parachute, shall be - shot immediately on the spot.” - -The importance of this document need not be emphasized. It shows the -guilt of the Defendant Göring in reprisals against Allied airmen brought -down in Germany. - -We shall now read Document R-117, which we submit as Exhibit Number -RF-378. Two Liberators, brought down on 21 June 1944 in the District of -Mecklenburg, came to earth with their crews intact, 15 men all told. All -were shot on the pretext of attempting to escape. The document was found -in the files of the headquarters of the 11th Luftgaukommando, and states -that nine members of one crew were handed over to the local police. In -the next to the last paragraph, third line, we read that they were made -prisoners and handed over to the police in Waren. Lieutenants Helton and -Ludka were handed over on 21 June 1944 by the protective police to SS -Untersturmführer Stempel, of the Security Police, and former -Commissioner of the Criminal Police, at Fürstenberg: - - “These seven prisoners were shot _en route_ while attempting to - escape. - - “Lieutenants Helton and Ludka were also shot on the same day - while attempting to escape.” - -Regarding the second Liberator, at Page 91 we read: - - “Subject: Crash of a Liberator on 21 June 1944, at 11:30 a.m. - . . . six members of the crew shot while attempting to escape; - one, seriously wounded, brought to the garrison hospital at - Schwerin.” - -We now submit as Exhibit Number RF-379, Document F-553, which the -Tribunal will find on Page 101 of the document book. This document -concerns the internment in concentration camps and extermination camps -of prisoners of war. Among the escaped prisoners a discrimination was -made. If they were privates and noncommissioned officers who had agreed -to work, they were generally sent back to the camp and punished in -conformity with Articles 47, and following, of the Geneva Convention. If -it was a question of officers or noncommissioned officers—this is a -comment I am making on the document which I shall read to the -Tribunal—if it was a question of officers or noncommissioned officers -who had refused to work, they were handed over to the police and -generally murdered without trial. - -One can understand the aim of this discrimination. Those French -noncommissioned officers who, in spite of the pressure of the German -authorities, refused to work in the German war industry had a very high -conception of their patriotic duty. Their attempt to escape, therefore, -created against them a kind of presumption of inadaptability to the Nazi -order, and they had to be eliminated. Extermination of these elite -assumed a systematic character from the beginning of 1944; and the -responsibility of Keitel is unquestionably involved in this -extermination, which he approved if he did not specifically order. - -The document which the Tribunal has before it is a letter of protest by -General Bérard, head of the French Delegation to the German Armistice -Commission, addressed to the German General Vogl, the president of the -said commission. It deals specifically with information reaching France -concerning the extermination of escaped prisoners. - -First paragraph, fourth line: - - “This note reveals the existence of a German organization, - independent of the Army, under whose authority escaped prisoners - would come.” - -This note was addressed on 29 April 1944 by the commandant of Oflag X-C. -I read from Page 102: - - “Captain Lussus”—declares General Bérard to the German - Armistice Commission—“of Oflag X-C, and Lieutenant Girot, of - the same Oflag, who had made an attempt to escape on 27 April - 1944, were recaptured in the immediate vicinity by the camp - guard. - - “On 23 June 1944 the French senior officer of Oflag X-C received - two funeral urns containing the ashes of these two - officers. . . .” - -No particulars could be given to this French officer as to the cause of -the deaths of Captain Lussus and Lieutenant Girot. General Bérard -pointed out at the same time to the German Armistice Commission that the -note—which the Tribunal will find on Page 104—had been communicated by -the commandant of Oflag X-C to the French senior officer at that Oflag: - - “You will bring to the attention of your comrades the fact that - there exists, for the control of people moving about unlawfully, - a German organization whose field of action extends over regions - in a state of war from Poland to the Spanish frontier. Each - escaped prisoner who is recaptured and found in possession of - civilian clothes, false papers and identification cards, and - false photographs, falls under the authority of this - organization. What becomes of him then, I cannot tell you. Warn - your comrades that this matter is particularly serious.” - -The last two lines of this note assumed their full significance when the -urns containing the ashes of the two escaped French officers were handed -to the senior officer of the camp. - -Our Soviet colleagues of the Prosecution will present the conditions -under which the escapes of the officers from the Sagan Camp were -repressed. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was there any answer to this complaint? What you have -just been reading, as I understand it, is a complaint made by the French -general, Bérard, to the German head of the Armistice Commission, is that -right? - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I do not know if there was an answer. I know -only that the archives in Vichy at the time of the liberation were -partly pillaged and partly destroyed through military action. If there -was an answer we would have had it in the Vichy archives, for the -documents we present now are the documents from the German archives of -the German Armistice Commission. As to the French archives, I do not -know what has become of them. In any case it is possible they may have -disappeared as a result of military action. - -I was about to inform the Tribunal that my Soviet colleagues would set -forth the conditions under which repressive measures were carried out at -the camp of Sagan for attempts to escape. - -We submit as Exhibit Number RF-380, Document Number F-672, which the -Tribunal will find on Page 115 of its document book. This is a report -from the Service for War Prisoners and Deportees, dated 9 January 1946, -which relates to the deportation to Buchenwald of 20 French prisoners of -war. This report must be considered as an authentic document, as well as -the reports of war prisoners which are annexed thereto. On Page 116 is -the report of Claude Petit, former prisoners’ representative in Stalag -VI-G. - - “In September 1943 the French civilian workers in Germany and - the French prisoners of war who had been converted”—that means - converted into workers—“were deprived of all spiritual help, - there being no priest among them. Lieutenant Piard, head - chaplain of Stalag VI-G, after having spoken with the - prisoners-of-war chaplain, Abbé Rodhain, decided to turn into - workers six prisoner-of-war priests who volunteered to exercise - their ministerial functions among the French civilians. - - “This change in classification of priests was difficult to - accomplish, as the Gestapo did not authorize the presence of - chaplains among civilian workers. . . .” - -These priests and a few scouts organized a scout group, and a group of -Catholic Action. - -On Page 117: - - “From the beginning of 1944 the priests felt themselves being - watched by the Gestapo in their various activities. . . . - - “At the end of July 1944, the six priests were arrested almost - simultaneously and taken to the prison of Brauweiler, near - Cologne. . . .” - -Page 118, the same happened to the scouts. I quote: - - “Against this flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention I took - numerous steps and made several protests; for the prisoners of - war arrested by the Gestapo I even asked the reason for their - arrest. . . . - - “Owing to the rapid advance of the allies, who were approaching - Aachen, all the prisoners of Brauweiler were taken to - Cologne. . . .” - -[_Dr. Stahmer approached the lectern._] - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, before allowing the Defense Counsel to -interrupt, permit me to finish reading this document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Continue. - -M. DUBOST: Thank you, Mr. President. With the end of this paragraph the -Tribunal learns that the German military authorities themselves took -steps in order to learn the fate of these prisoners: - - “The military authorities having no knowledge thereof, - immediately undertook correspondence with Buchenwald, - correspondence which remained without answer.” - -And again: - - “At the beginning of March, Major Bramkamp, chief of the Abwehr - group, had to go personally to Buchenwald. . . .” - -On Pages 120-121 the Tribunal will find the list of the prisoners who -thus disappeared. - -On Page 122 there is a confirmation of this testimony by M. Souche, -prisoners’ representative at Kommando 624, who writes: - - “. . . certain war prisoners, converted into workers, and French - civilian workers had organized in Cologne a Catholic Action - group under the direction of the re-classified war-prisoner - priests, Pannier and Cleton. . . .” - -Finally, Page 123: - - “. . . the arrests began with members of the Catholic - Action”—and the accusations were—“anti-German - maneuvers. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what Dr. Stahmer’s objection is. - -DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): We are not in a -position to follow the exposé of the French Prosecutor. First of all, -the translation is not very good. Some sentences are left out. -Especially, wrong numbers are mentioned. For instance, 612 has been -mentioned. I have it here. It is quite a different document. We have not -the document books and therefore we cannot follow the page citations. -Also my colleagues complain that they are not in a position to follow -the proceedings under this manner of presentation. - -THE PRESIDENT: May I see your document? - -[_The document was handed to the President._] - -DR. STAHMER: This number was just mentioned, as can be confirmed by the -other gentlemen. - -THE PRESIDENT: The document which M. Dubost was reading was 672. The -Document you have got there is a different number. - -DR. STAHMER: But this was the number that came through to us, 612, and -not only I, but the other gentlemen heard the same number. And not only -this number, but all the numbers have been given incorrectly. - -Another difficulty is that we have not the document book. Page 118 had -been referred to, but the number of the page does not mean anything to -us. We cannot follow at this rate. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, I think the trouble really arises from the -fact that you give the numbers too fast and the numbers are very often -wrongly translated, not only into German, but sometimes into English. It -is very difficult for the interpreters to pick up all these numbers. -First of all, you are giving the number of the document, then the number -of the exhibit, then the page of the document book—and that means that -the interpreters have got to translate many numbers spoken very quickly. - -It is essential that the defendants should be able to follow the -document; and as I understand it, they have not got the document books -in the same shape we have. It is the only way we can follow. But we have -them now in this particular document book by page, and therefore it is -absolutely essential that you go slowly. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, the document books, all the documents, have -been handed to the Defense. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you telling us that document books have been handed -to the Defense in the same shape they are handed to us, let us say, with -pages on them? Speaking for myself, that is the only way I am able to -follow the document. You mentioned Page 115 and that does show me where -the document is. If I have not got that page, I should not be able to -find the document. - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I announced at the same time RF-380, which is -the number of the exhibit. F-672 is the classification number. All our -documents bear a classification number. It was not possible to hand to -the Defense a document book paginated like the one the Tribunal has, for -it is not submitted in the same language. It is submitted in German and -the pages are not in the same place. There is not an absolute identity -of pagination between the German document book and yours. - -THE PRESIDENT: I am telling you the difficulties under which the -defendants’ counsel are working, and if we had simply a number of -documents without the pagination we should be under a similar -difficulty. And it is a very great difficulty. Therefore you must go -very slowly in giving the identification of the document. - -M. DUBOST: I shall conform to the wishes of the Tribunal, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the document being read was Document F-672. - -DR. STAHMER: We cannot find Document 672. We have 673. We have nothing -but loose sheets, and we have to hunt through them first to find the -number. We have Number 673, but we have not yet found Number 672 among -our documents. It is very difficult for us to follow a citation, because -it takes us so much time to find the numbers even if they have been -mentioned correctly. - -THE PRESIDENT: I can understand the difficulty. Will you continue, M. -Dubost, and do as I say, going very slowly so as to give the defendants’ -counsel, as far as possible, the opportunity to find the document. And I -think that you ought to do something satisfactory, if possible, to make -it possible for them to find that document—by pagination or some other -letters. An index, for instance, giving the order in which the documents -are set out. - -M. DUBOST: Three days ago, two document books in French, paginated like -the books which the Tribunal has before it, were handed to the Defense. -We were able to hand only two to them, for reasons of a technical -nature. But at the same time we handed to the Defense a sufficient -number of documents in German to enable each Defense Counsel to have his -file in German. Does the Tribunal ask me to collate the pages of the -French document book which we submit to the Defense with the pages of a -document book which we set up, when the Defense can do it and has the -time to do it? Three days ago the two French document books were handed -to the Defense. They had the possibility of comparing the French texts -with the German texts to make sure that our translations were correct, -and to prepare themselves for the sessions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Dubost. As I say, do it slowly. - -DR. STAHMER: It is not correct that we received it 3 days ago. We found -this pile in our compartment yesterday evening. We simply have not had -time to number these pages. As I say, this was in our compartment -yesterday evening or this morning. - -THE PRESIDENT: Let’s go on now, M. Dubost, and go slowly in describing -the identification of the document. - -M. DUBOST: We shall pass to Document F-357, which will be submitted as -Exhibit Number RF-381. This document deals with the carrying out of -general orders concerning the execution of prisoners of war. It contains -the testimony of a German gendarme who was made prisoner on 25 May 1945, -and who declares (Page 127): - - “All prisoners of war, who had fallen into our hands in whatever - circumstances, were to be slain by us instead of being handed - over to the Wehrmacht as had been done hitherto.” - -This concerned an order which was given in the middle of August 1944. -The witness continues: - - “This execution was to be carried out in a deserted spot.” - -On Page 128, the same witness gives the names of Germans who had -executed prisoners of war. - -We shall now submit Document 1634-PS, which will become Exhibit Number -RF-382. The Tribunal will find it on Page 129 in their document book. It -is a document which has not yet been read. It relates to the murder of -129 American prisoners of war which was perpetrated by the German Army -in a field in the southwest, and west of Baignes in Belgium, on 17 -December 1944 during the German offensive. - -The author of this report summarizes the facts. The American prisoners -were brought together near the crossroad. A few soldiers, whose names -are indicated, rushed across the field toward the west, hid among the -trees in the high grass, in thickets, and ditches, and thus escaped the -massacre of their companions. A few others who, at the moment when this -massacre began, were in the proximity of a barn, were able to hide in -it. They also are survivors. - -Page 129: - - “. . . the artillery and machine gun fire on the column of - American vehicles continued for about 10 to 15 minutes, and then - two German tanks and some armored cars came down the road from - the direction of Weismes. Upon reaching the intersection, these - vehicles turned south on the road toward St. Vith. The tanks - directed machine gun fire into the ditch along the side of the - road in which the American soldiers were crouching; and upon - seeing this, the other American soldiers dropped their weapons - and raised their hands over their heads. The surrendered - American soldiers were then made to march back to the crossroad, - and as they passed by some of the German vehicles on highway - N-23, German soldiers on these vehicles took from the American - prisoners of war such personal belongings as wrist watches, - rings, and gloves. The American soldiers were then assembled on - the St. Vith road in front of a house standing on the southwest - corner of the crossroad. Other German soldiers, in tanks and - armored cars, halted at the crossroad and also searched some of - the captured Americans and took valuables from them. . . .” - -Top of Page 131: - - “. . . an American prisoner was questioned and taken with his - other comrades to the crossroads just referred to. - - “. . . at about this same time a German light tank attempted to - maneuver itself into position on the road so that its cannon - would be directed at the group of American prisoners gathered in - the field approximately 20 to 25 yards from the road. . . .” - -I again skip four lines. - - “. . . some of these tanks stopped when they came opposite the - field in which the unarmed American prisoners were standing in a - group, with their hands up or clasped behind their heads. A - German soldier, either an officer or a noncommissioned officer, - in one of these vehicles which had stopped, got up, drew his - revolver, took deliberate aim and fired into the group of - American prisoners. One of the American soldiers fell. This was - repeated a second time and another American soldier in the group - fell to the ground. At about the same time, from two of the - vehicles on the road, fire was opened on the group of American - prisoners in the field. All, or most, of the American soldiers - dropped to the ground and stayed there while the firing - continued, for 2 or 3 minutes. Most of the soldiers in the field - were hit by this machine gun fire. The German vehicles then - moved off toward the south and were followed by more vehicles - which also came from the direction of Weismes. As these latter - vehicles came opposite the field in which the American soldiers - were lying, they also fired with small arms from the moving - vehicles at the prostrate bodies in the field. . . .” - -Page 132: - - “. . . some German soldiers, evidently from the group of those - who were on guard at the crossroad, then walked to the group of - the wounded American prisoners who were still lying on the - ground in the field . . . and shot with pistol or rifle, or - clubbed with a rifle butt or other heavy object, any of the - American soldiers who still showed any sign of life. In some - instances, American prisoners were evidently shot at close - range, squarely between the eyes, in the temple, or the back of - the head. . . .” - -This deed constitutes an act of pure terrorism, the shame of which will -remain on the German Army, for nothing justified this. These prisoners -were unarmed and had surrendered. - -The Tribunal authorized me yesterday to present the documents on which -the French accusation is based for establishing the guilt of Göring, -Keitel, Jodl, Bormann, Frank, Rosenberg, Streicher, Schirach, Hess, -Frick, the OKW, OKH, OKL, the Reich Cabinet, and the Nazi Leadership -Corps, as well as of the SS and the Gestapo, for atrocities committed in -the camps. I shall be very brief. I have very few new documents to -present. - -The first concerns Kaltenbrunner. It is the American Document L-35 which -the Tribunal will find on Page 246 of the document book concerning -concentration camps, that is the second book. This document has not been -submitted. It is the testimony of Rudolf Mildner, Doctor of Law, Colonel -of the Police, who declares: - - “The internment orders were signed by the Chief of the Sipo and - SD, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, or, as deputy by the head of Amt IV, SS - Gruppenführer Müller.” - -In submitting this it becomes Exhibit Number RF-383 (bis). - -Concerning Göring we submit the American Document 343-PS, Exhibit Number -RF-384. This is a letter from Field Marshal Milch to Wolff. This letter -concludes with this phrase: - - “I express to the SS the special thanks of the - Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe for the aid they have - rendered.” - -Now, from what precedes, one can conclude that these thanks refer to the -biological experiments of Dr. Rascher. Thus, Göring is involved in -these. - -The German SS Medical Corps is implicated. This one can gather from -Document 1635-PS, which has not yet been handed to the Tribunal, which -becomes Exhibit Number RF-385, and which the Tribunal will find in the -annex of the second document book. These are extracts from reviews of -microscopic and anatomical research. They deal with experiments made on -persons who died suddenly, although in good health. The circumstances of -their death are stated by the experimenters in such a way that no reader -can be in any doubt as to the conditions under which they were put to -death. - -With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall read a few brief extracts. -Page 132 of the document which we submit to the Tribunal: - - “The thyroid glands of 21 persons between 20 and 40 years of - age, who were in supposedly good health and who suddenly died, - were examined. - - “The persons in question, 19 men and 2 women, until their death - lived for several months under identical conditions, also with - regard to food. The last food taken consisted chiefly of - carbohydrates. - - “Replacement products and examination methods:”—that is the - title. - - “Over a considerable period, substance for experiments was taken - from the livers of 24 adults in good health, who suddenly died - between 5 and 6 o’clock in the morning.” - -On examining these documents, as well as the originals, the Tribunal -will see that German medical literature is very rich in experiments -carried out on “adults in good health who died suddenly between 5 and 6 -o’clock in the morning.” - -No one in Germany could be deceived as to the conditions under which -these deaths occurred, since the accounts of the SS doctors’ experiments -in the camps were printed and published. - -One of the last documents is F-185(b), and (a), relative to an -experiment with poisoned bullets carried out on 11 August 1944, in the -presence of SS Sturmbannführer Dr. Ding and Dr. Widmann—Page 187 of the -second document book concerning concentration camps. These two documents -are submitted as Exhibit Numbers RF-386 and RF-387. The Tribunal will -find the description of this experiment, in which the victims are -described as persons sentenced to death. - -THE PRESIDENT: The document has been read already, I think. - -M. DUBOST: It is a document from the French archives. However, Mr. -President, I doubt whether the Tribunal has heard Document F-185(b), -Exhibit RF-386, which is the opinion of the French professor, M. May, -Fellow of Surgery, to whom the pseudo-scientific documents to which I -alluded just now were submitted—the reports from scientific reviews of -experiments. He wrote, Page 222: - - “The wickedness and the stupidity of the experimenters amazed - us. The symptoms of aconitine nitrate poisoning have been known - from time immemorial. This poison is sometimes employed by - certain savage tribes to poison their war arrows. But one has - never heard of them writing observations in a pretentious style, - on the anticipated result of their experiments—observations - which are completely inadequate and puerile—nor that they would - have them signed by a ‘Doz,’ that is to say, a professor.” - -We now submit Document F-278(a) as Exhibit Number RF-388. It involves -Keitel. It is a letter signed: “By order of the High Command of the -Wehrmacht, Dr. Lehmann.” It is dated 17 February 1942 and is addressed -to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it implicates him. It concerns -the regime in the internment camps: - - “Delinquents brought to Germany in application of the decree of - the Führer are to have no communication of any kind with the - outside world. They must, therefore, neither write themselves, - nor receive letters, packages, or visits. The letters, packages, - and visits are to be refused with the remark that all - communication with the outside world is forbidden.” - -The High Command gives its point of view in a letter of 31 January 1942, -according to which there can be no question of Belgian lawyers being -permitted for Belgian prisoners. - -We now submit Document 682-PS, which becomes Exhibit Number RF-389, Page -134 of the second document book. This document implicates the German -Government and the Reich Cabinet. It is a record of a conversation -between Dr. Goebbels and Thierack, Minister of Justice, in Berlin, on 14 -September 1942, from 1300 hours to 1415 hours. - - “With regard to the destruction of asocial life, Dr. Goebbels is - of the opinion that the following should be exterminated: All - Jews and Gypsies, Poles having to serve 3-4 years of penal - servitude, and Czechs and Germans sentenced to death, to penal - servitude for life, or to security custody - (Sicherungsverwahrung). The idea of exterminating them by work - is the best. . . .” - -We stress this last phrase which shows, even in the heart of the German -Government itself, the will to “exterminate by work.” - -The last document that we shall submit with regard to the concentration -camps is Document F-662, which becomes Exhibit Number RF-390, Pages 77 -and 78, second document book. This document is the testimony of M. -Poutiers, living in Paris, Place de Breteuil, who points out that the -internees in the detachments of Mauthausen-Ebens worked under the direct -control of civilians, the SS dealing only with the guarding of the -prisoners. This witness, who was in numerous work units, states that all -were ordered and controlled by civilians and only supervised by the SS -and that the inhabitants of the country, as the internees went to and -from their work and while at work, could therefore observe their misery; -which confirms the testimony which has already been given before the -Tribunal during these last few days. - -We shall summarize the increasing advance of the German criminal policy -in the West: At the beginning of the occupation, violation of Article 50 -of the Hague Convention; execution of hostages, but creation of a pseudo -“law of hostages” to legalize these executions in the eyes of the -occupied countries. - -In the years that follow, contempt for the rights of the human -individual increases, until it becomes complete in the last months of -the occupation. By that time arbitrary imprisonment, parodies of trials, -or executions without trial have become daily practice. - -The sentences, the Tribunal will remember, were not put into effect in -cases of acquittal or pardon; people acquitted by German tribunals, who -should have been set at liberty, were deported and died in concentration -camps. - -At the same time there developed and grew in strength the organization -of Frenchmen who remained on the soil of France and refused to let their -country die. At this stage German terrorism was intensified against them -ever increasingly. What follows is the description of the terrorist -repression carried out by the Germans against the patriots of the west -of Europe, against what was called the “Resistance,” without giving this -word any other meaning than its generic sense. - -From the time Germany understood that her policy of collaboration was -doomed to defeat, that her policy of hostages only exasperated the fury -of the people whom she was trying to subdue; instead of modifying her -policy with regard to the citizens of the occupied countries, she -reinforced the terror which already reigned there and tried to justify -it by saying it was an anti-Communist campaign. - -The Tribunal will recall Keitel’s order and will understand what was -thought of this pretext. All the French, all the citizens of Europe -without distinction, without any distinction of party, profession, -religion, or race, were involved in the resistance against Germany and -their heroes were mingled in the graves and in the collective charnel -houses into which the Germans threw them after their extermination. - -But this confusion was voluntary; it was calculated; it justified to a -certain degree the arbitrary measures of repression of which we already -had evidence in Document F-278, which we submit under Number RF-391. It -is dated 12 January 1943, and is signed “Von Falkenhausen.” - - “Persons who are found, without valid authorization, in - possession of explosives and military firearms, pistols of all - kinds, submachine guns, rifles, _et cetera_, with ammunition, - are liable in future to be shot immediately without trial.” - -This order and others analogous to it continued to be executed even -after the allied landing in the west of Europe. These orders were even -carried out against organized forces in Belgium as well as in France, -although the Germans themselves considered these forces as troops to a -certain extent. This can be verified by reference to Document F-673, -submitted under Exhibit Number RF-392, entitled “Terrorist action -against patriots.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a convenient time to break off. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Dubost. - -M. DUBOST: The document I have just submitted under Exhibit Number -RF-392 is a memorandum to the Wiesbaden Commission. We read the -following: - - “The action of the German troops, even if we admit the truth of - the facts presented by the French, is taking place in the form - of combat by far exceeding in scope any purely police action - against isolated outlaws. On the enemy side we have - organizations which absolutely refuse to accept the sovereignty - of the French Government of Vichy and which from the point of - view of numbers as well as of armament and command should almost - be designated as troops. It has been reiterated that these - revolutionary units consider themselves as being a part of the - forces fighting against Germany. - - “General Eisenhower has described the terrorists who are - fighting in France as troops under his command. It is against - such troops”—on the original is written in red pencil - “unfortunately not only”—“that repressive measures are - directed.” - -This document shows us that when in action the French Forces of the -Interior, as well as all French forces in the western occupied -countries, were considered as troops by the German Army. - -THE PRESIDENT: I see that it may be useful for the record. It is in the -document book on the extermination of innocent populations, on Page 167. - -M. DUBOST: I thank you, Mr. President. Are then these patriots, who were -consequently considered by the German Army as constituting regular -troops, treated as soldiers? No. - -The order of Falkenhausen is proof thereof. They were either to be -killed on the spot—and, after all, that is the fate of a combatant—or -else delivered to the Sipo, to the SD, and tortured to death by these -organisms, who dispensed with any legal formalities, as is shown by -Document 835-PS, which has already been submitted under Number USA-527, -and also by Document F-673, Page 6 in your document book, which we -submit under Exhibit Number RF-392. - -Document Number F-673 is a considerable bundle of papers which comes -from the archives of the German Commission at Wiesbaden, and we are -submitting it in its entirety under Exhibit Number RF-392. Whenever we -refer to Document F-673, it will be one of the documents in this big -German book. - - “Letter from the Führer’s headquarters, 18 August 1944, 30 - copies; copy 26; top secret. - - “Subject: Combatting terrorists and saboteurs in occupied - territories . . . . 2. Jurisdiction over non-German civilians in - occupied territories. - - “1) Enclosed herewith”—says the writer of this letter—“we are - transmitting a copy of the order of the Führer of 30 July - 1944. . . .” - -This order of the Führer will be found on Page 9 of your document book. -Paragraph 3. - - “I therefore order the troops and every individual member of the - Wehrmacht, the SS, and the police to shoot immediately on the - spot terrorists and saboteurs who are caught in the act . . . . - - “2) Whoever is captured later is to be transferred to the - nearest local office of the Security Police and of the SD. - - “3) Sympathizers, particularly women, who do not take an actual - part in hostilities, are to be assigned to work.” - -We know what that means. We know the regime of labor in concentration -camps. But I shall proceed with reading the text of the covering letter -of this order of the Führer, Paragraph 4. This paragraph is a commentary -on the order itself: - - “Present legal proceedings relating to any act of terror or - sabotage or any other crime committed by non-German civilians in - the occupied territories, which endanger the security or the - readiness for battle of the occupying power, are to be - suspended. Indictments are to be withdrawn. The carrying out of - sentences is not to be imposed. The accused and the records are - to be turned over to the nearest local office of the Security - Police and SD.” - -This order, to be transmitted to all commanding officers, as indicated -on Page 7, is accompanied by one last comment, Page 8, the penultimate -paragraph: - - “Non-German civilians in the occupied territories who endanger - the security or readiness for battle of the occupying power in a - manner other than through acts of terrorism and sabotage are to - be turned over to the SD.” - -This order is signed by Keitel. - -By this comment, Keitel has associated himself in spirit with the order -of his Führer. He has brought about the execution of numerous -individuals, for an order to kill without control any one suspected of -being a terrorist affects not only the terrorists but the innocent and -affects the innocent more than the terrorists. Moreover, Keitel’s -comment exceeds even Hitler’s own orders. Keitel applied Hitler’s -stipulation—on Page 9 of your document book—to a hypothetical case -which had not been foreseen, to wit: - - “Acts committed by non-German civilians in occupied territories - which endanger the security or readiness for battle, of the - occupying power.” - -This is on the general’s own initiative. It is a political act which has -nothing to do with the conduct of war. It is a political act which -compromises and involves him. It makes him participate in the -development and extension of the Hitlerian policy; for it is the -interpretation of an order from Hitler, within the spirit of the order -perhaps, but beyond its scope. - -Instructions were given to the Sipo and the SD to execute without -judgment. These instructions were carried out. Document F-574 on Page 10 -of your document book, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-393, is the -testimony of a certain Goldberg, an adjutant to the Sicherheitspolizei -in Chalon-sur-Saône before the liberation of that city. He was captured -by the patriots and interrogated by the divisional commissioner, who was -head of the regional judicial police officials at Dijon. The Defense -will certainly not accuse us of having had him examined by a subordinate -police officer. It was the chief himself of the judicial police -officials for the Dijon region who interrogated this witness. The -witness declared, Page 12: - - “At the end of May 1944, without my having seen any written - order on this subject, the Sicherheitspolizei of Chalon were - given the right to pronounce capital punishment and to have the - sentence executed without those concerned having appeared before - a tribunal and without the case having been submitted for - approval to the commander at Dijon. The chief of the SD in - Chalon, that is Krüger, had all necessary authority to make such - decisions. There was no opposition, so far as I know, on the - part of the SD of Dijon. I therefore conclude that this - procedure was regular and was the consequence of instructions - which were not officially communicated to me but which emanated - from higher authorities.” - -Execution was carried out by members of the SD. Their names are given by -the witness, but they are not of particular interest to this Tribunal, -which is only concerned with the punishment of the principal -criminals—those who gave the orders and from whom the orders emanated. - -How were these orders applied in the various countries of the West? In -Holland, according to the testimony found in the report given by the -Dutch Government, Page 15, I quote: - - “About 3 days after the attempt against Rauter—about 10 March - 1945—I witnessed the execution of several Dutch patriots by the - German ‘green’ police while I was working in the fields in - Waltrop.” - -This Dutch document is classified in the French file as Number F-224 -(Document F-224 (a), Exhibit RF-277) and has been submitted to you in -its entirety, but the specific passage to which I refer has not been -read. The witness continues, on Page 16 of your document book: - - “I spoke to an Oberwachtmeister of the ‘green’ police whose name - is unknown to me, and he told me that this execution was in - revenge for the attempt against Rauter. He told me also that - hundreds of Dutch ‘terrorists’ had been executed for similar - reasons.” - -Another witness stated: - - “About 6 o’clock in the evening”—this is the German who gave - the orders to execute the Dutch patriots—“when I went to my - office, I received the order to have 40 prisoners shot.” - -On Page 19, the investigators, who are Canadian officers, state the -conditions under which the corpses were discovered. I do not believe -that the Tribunal will want me to read this passage. - -On Page 21 the Tribunal will find the report of Munt, completing and -rectifying his report of 4 June on the execution of Dutchmen after the -attempt against Rauter. - -The execution was carried out on the order of Kolitz; 198 prisoners were -transported. Munt denies having sanctioned the execution of these Dutch -patriots, but says that it was nevertheless impossible for him to -prevent it, in view of the orders from higher sources which he had -received. - -On Page 22, next to the last paragraph, the same Munt states: - - “After an attack against two members of the Wehrmacht on two - consecutive days, in which both were wounded and their rifles - taken away, my chief insisted that 15 Dutch citizens be shot; 12 - were shot.” - -An important document is to be found on Page 30 in your document book. -It is included in F-224, which comprises the documents relative to -inquiries made by the Dutch Government. This is a decree concerning the -proclamation of summary police justice for the occupied Netherlands -territory. It is signed by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. Therefore one -has to go to him when seeking for the chief responsibility for these -summary executions of patriots in Holland. - -From this decree we take Paragraph 1: - - “. . . I proclaim, for the occupied Netherlands territory in its - entirety, summary police justice which shall enter into force - immediately. - - “Simultaneously, I order that everyone abstain from any kind of - agitation which might disturb public order and the security of - public life.” - -I skip a paragraph. - - “The senior SS and Police Leader will take every step deemed - necessary by him for the maintenance or restoration of public - order or the security of public life. - - “In the execution of his task the senior SS and Police Leader - may deviate from the law in force.” - -Summary police justice! These words do not deceive us. This is purely -and simply a matter of murder, in that the police is authorized in -executing its functions to deviate from the law in force. This sentence, -which Seyss-Inquart signed and which protected his subordinates who -assassinated Dutch, patriots as far as German law was concerned, is in -itself the condemnation of Seyss-Inquart. - -In execution of this decree the Tribunal will see that on 2 May—and -this is Page 32 of your document book—a summary police tribunal -pronounced the death sentence against ten Dutch patriots. On Page 34, -another summary police tribunal pronounced the death sentence on ten -other Dutch patriots. All of them were executed. On the next page, still -in application of the same decree, a summary police court pronounced the -death sentence on a patriot, and he was executed. - -This document, Document F-224(a), Exhibit RF-277, comprises a very long -list of similar texts which seems to me superfluous to cite. The -Tribunal may refer to the last only, which is especially interesting. We -will consider it for a moment; it is on Page 46 of your document book. -This is the report of the Identification and Investigation Service of -the Netherlands, according to which, while it was not possible to make -known at that time the number of Dutch citizens who were shot by the -military units of the occupying power, we can state now that a total of -more than 4,000 of them were executed. The details of the executions, -with the places where the corpses were discovered, follow. - -This constitutes only a very fragmentary aspect of the sufferings and -the sacrifices in human life endured by Holland. That needs to be stated -because it is the consequence of the criminal orders of the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart. - -In the case of Belgium, the basic document is the French Document F-685, -submitted as Exhibit Number RF-394; and you will find it on Page 48 of -your document book. It is a report drawn up by the Belgian War Crimes -Commission, which deals only with the crimes committed by the German -troops at the time of the liberation of Belgian territory, September -1944. These crimes were all committed against Belgian patriots who were -fighting against the German Army. It is not merely a question of -executions but of ill-treatment and torture as well. Page 50: - - “At Graide a camp of the secret army was attacked. 15 corpses - were discovered to have been frightfully mutilated. The Germans - had used bullets with sawn off tips. Some of the bodies had been - pierced with bayonets. Two of the prisoners had been beaten with - cudgels before being finished off with a pistol shot.” - -The prisoners were soldiers, taken with weapons in hand and in battle, -belonging to those units which officially, according to the testimony in -documents previously cited to you, were considered by the German General -Staff from that time on as being combatants. - - “At Fôret, on 6 September, several hundred men of the resistance - were billeted in the Château de Forêt. The Germans, having been - warned of their going into action, decided to carry out a - repressive operation. A certain number of unarmed members of the - resistance tried to flee. Some were killed; others succeeded in - getting back to the castle, not having been able to break - through the cordon of German troops; others were finally made - prisoner. - - “The Germans advanced with the resistance prisoners in front of - them. After 2 hours the fighting stopped for lack of ammunition. - The Germans promised to spare the lives of those who - surrendered. Some of the prisoners were loaded on a lorry; - others, in spite of the promise given, were massacred after - having been tortured. The castle and the corpses were sprinkled - with gasoline and set on fire: 20 men perished in this massacre; - 15 others had been killed during combat.” - -The examples are numerous. This testimony to heroic Belgium was -necessary. It was necessary that we should be reminded of what we owe -her, of what we owe to her combatants of the secret army, and how great -their sacrifice has been. - -With regard to Luxembourg, we have a document from the Ministry of -Justice of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which is Document Number -UK-77, already submitted under Exhibit Number RF-322, which the Tribunal -will find on Page 53 of the document book. - -The Tribunal will note that a special summary tribunal, similar to those -which functioned in Holland, was set up in Luxembourg; that it -functioned in that country and pronounced a certain number of death -sentences, 21—all of them equally arbitrary, in view of the arbitrary -character of the tribunal which pronounced them. - -The document contains the official indictment of the Grand Duchy of -Luxembourg against all the members of the Reich Cabinet, specifically -against the Ministers of the Interior, of Justice, and the Party -Chancellery, and against the leaders of the SS and Police, and -especially against the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German -Nationality. - -In the case of Norway, Document UK-79 already submitted under Exhibit -Number RF-323, Page 55 of the document book, shows that tribunals -similar to the special tribunal set up in Holland by the police were in -operation in Norway. They were called the SS tribunals. More than 150 -Norwegians were condemned to death. Besides, the Tribunal will remember -the testimony of M. Cappelen, who gave an account of what his country -and his compatriots had endured. - -Regarding Denmark, on Page 57 of your document book, Document Number -F-666, already submitted as Exhibit Number RF-338, the Tribunal will -note that according to this official report of the Danish Government -police courts-martial similar to those which functioned in Luxembourg, -in Norway, and in Holland, functioned against Danish patriots. These -summary police tribunals, composed of SS or police, in reality disguised -the arbitrary measures of the police and of the SS; measures not only -tolerated, but willed by the government, as can be shown by documents -which we placed before you at the beginning of this statement. - -We, therefore, can assert that the victims of those tribunals were -murdered without having been able to justify or defend themselves. - -In the case of France the question should be carefully examined. The -Tribunal knows that from the moment of the landing, answering the call -of the General Staff, the French Secret Army rose and began battle. -Undoubtedly, in spite of the warning given by the Allied General Staff, -these combatants, who a few weeks later were officially recognized by -the German side as being combatants, at the beginning found themselves -in a rather irregular situation. We do not contest that in many -instances they were _francs-tireurs_; we admit that they could be -condemned to death; but we protest because they were not condemned to -death, but were murdered after having been brutally tortured. We are -going to give you proof thereof. - -Document F-577, which is submitted under Exhibit Number RF-395, to be -found on Page 62 of your document book, states that on 17 August, the -day before the liberation of Rodez, the Germans shot 30 patriots with a -submachine gun. Then, to finish them off, they tore large stones from -the wall of the trench in which they were and hurled them on the bodies -with some earth. The chests and the skulls were crushed. - -Document F-580, Page 79 of your document book, which is submitted to you -as Exhibit Number RF-396, shows that five oblates from the order of -Marie—as far as I know these lay brothers were not communists—were -murdered after having been tortured, because they belonged to a group of -the Secret Army. In all, 36 corpses were discovered after this -execution, a “punitive measure” carried out by the German Army. - -On Page 85 the Tribunal will read the result of the inquiry and will see -under what conditions these 5 monks were killed after having been -tortured and under what conditions the staff of a resistance group, -which had been betrayed, was arrested and deported, together with a few -members of the same religious order. - -Evidence is produced that men from the Maquis in the forest of Achères -were arrested and tortured after having been incarcerated in the prison -of Fontainebleau. We even know the name of the German member of the -Gestapo who tortured these patriots. His name is unimportant—this -German, Korf, carried out orders that were given by Keitel and by the -other defendants whose names I mentioned just now. - -Document F-584, submitted under Exhibit Number RF-397, Pages 87 and 88, -shows the Tribunal that when the bodies were found it was discovered -that 10 of them had been blindfolded before being shot, that 8 had had -their arms broken by injury or torture, and many had wounds in the lower -parts of their legs as the result of being very tightly bound. That is -the report of the commissioner of the police at Pau, drawn up on 28 -August 1944, on the day following the liberation of Pau. - -We now submit Document F-585 as Exhibit Number RF-398. The Tribunal will -find it on Page 96 of the document book. I will give a summary: - -The day following the liberation, 38 corpses were found in two graves -near Signes in the mountain of Var. One of the leaders of the Resistance -of the Côte d’Azur, Valmy, and with him two parachutists, Pageot and -Manuel, were identified. Of this massacre a witness was found—his name -is Tuirot—whose statements are copied on Pages 105, 106, and 107 of -your document book. - -Tuirot was tortured, with his comrades, without having been given the -opportunity of help from a counsel or a chaplain. The 38 men were taken -to the woods. They appeared before a parody of a tribunal composed of -SS. They were condemned to death and the sentence was executed. - -We place now before the Tribunal Document F-586 as Exhibit Number -RF-399. The Tribunal will find it on Page 110 of the document book. It -deals with the execution at Saint Nazaire and Royans of 37 patriots, -members of the French Secret Army, who were tortured before being -executed. Here is the statement of facts by an eyewitness: - - “I came through the ruins and arrived at the Château of Madame - Laurent, a widow. There a frightful spectacle confronted me. The - castle, which the Gestapo had used as a place of torture for the - young Maquis, had been set on fire. In a cellar there was the - calcinated skeleton which prior to death had had its forearms - and a foot pulled off and which had perhaps been burned while - still alive.” - -But I proceed. Wherever the Gestapo was in operation there were the same -methods. - -Now we place before the Tribunal Document F-699, which relates to the -murder at Grenoble of 48 members of the Secret Army all of whom were -tortured. This document is submitted as Exhibit Number RF-400. - -I now come to Document F-587, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-401. -The Tribunal will find this document on Page 115 of the document book. -It concerns the execution by hanging of 12 patriots at Nîmes, 2 of whom -were dragged from the hospital where they were under care for wounds -received in battle. These young men had all been captured in combat at -St. Hippolyte-du-Fort. The bodies of these wretched men had been -defiled. On their chests was a placard saying: “Thus are French -terrorists punished.” When the French authorities wished to perform -funeral rites for these unfortunate men, the bodies had disappeared. The -German Army had removed them. They have never been discovered. It is a -fact that two of these victims were dragged from the hospital. Document -F-587 contains particularly the report of a witness who saw the men -taken from the hospital ward where they were being cared for. - -I now submit Document F-561 as Exhibit Number RF-402—Page 118 of your -book. It deals with the execution at Lyons of 109 patriots who were shot -under inhuman conditions. They were killed at the end of a day’s toil. -On 14 August Allied planes had bombed the Bron airfield. From 16 to 22 -August the German authorities had employed requisitioned civilians and -prisoners from the Fort of Montluc at Lyons to fill the bomb craters. At -the end of the day, when the work was finished, the civilian laborers -went away; but the prisoners were shot on the spot after having been -more or less ill-treated. Their bodies were stacked in half-filled -craters. - -Document F-591, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-403, Page 119 of -the document book, is a report of atrocities committed by the German -Army on 30 August 1944 at Tavaux (Aisne): - - “During the afternoon of that day soldiers of the Adolf Hitler - Division arrived at Tavaux. They appeared at the home of M. - Maujean, who was leader of the resistance. His wife opened the - door. Without explanation they shot at her, wounding her in the - thigh and also in the lower jaw. They dragged her to the kitchen - and broke one arm and one leg in the presence of her children, - aged 9, 8, 7, and 6 years, and 8 months. They poured inflammable - liquid over Madame Maujean and set fire to her in front of the - children. The elder son held his little sister, 8 months old, in - his arms. Then they told the children that they would shoot them - if they did not tell them where their father was. The children - said nothing, although they knew the whereabouts of their - father. Before leaving they took the children to the cellar and - locked them in. Then the Germans poured gasoline on the house - and set it on fire. The fire was put out and the children were - saved. These facts were told to M. Maujean by his eldest child. - No other person was a witness to these facts because the - inhabitants, frightened by the first houses set on fire, had - sought refuge either in trenches or in the neighboring fields - and woods. - - “During the same evening 21 persons were killed at Tavaux and 83 - houses were set on fire.” - -Next comes a report by the gendarme, Carlier, on the events of the -following day. - -Document F-589, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-404, shows the -number of murders of patriots committed in the region of Lyons. It is -dated 29 September 1944: 713 victims were found in 8 departments; 217 -only have been identified. This figure is approximate; it is definitely -less than the number of people who are missing in the 8 departments of -Ain, Ardèche, Drôme, Isère, Loire, Rhône, Savoie, and Haute Savoie. - -A German general, General Von Brodowski, confessed in his diary, which -fell into our hands, that he had caused the murder of numerous patriots, -and that the Wehrmacht, Police, and SS operated together and were -responsible for these murders. These troops murdered wounded men in the -hospital camps of the French forces of the interior. This document, -which is under Number F-257, is submitted as Exhibit Number RF-405 and -is to be found on Page 123 of your document book. In the last four -paragraphs the police and the army combine: - - “I have been charged with restoring the authority of the Army of - Occupation in the Department of Cantal and neighboring regions.” - -Dated 6 June 1944: - - “General Jesser had been charged with the tactical direction of - the undertaking. All troops available for the operation will be - subordinate to him, as well as all other forces. - - “The Commander of the Sipo and of the SD, Hauptsturmführer - Geissler, remains at my immediate disposal; he will submit to me - proposals for a possible utilization”—and so forth. - - “The staff and two battalions of the SS Panzer Division ‘Das - Reich’ are, in addition, to remain available for the operation - in Cantal.” - -General Brodowski turned over to the SD (which is equivalent to -execution without trial) the French prisoners who were wounded on 15 -June 1944. The Prefect of Le Puy asked the liaison staff whether the men -wounded in the battle of Montmouchet and taken into safety by the Red -Cross of Puy could be delivered to Puy as prisoners of war. This German -general, executing the orders of the German High Command—particularly -of Keitel and Jodl—said that those wounded men were to be treated as -_francs-tireurs_ and to be delivered to the SD or to the Abwehr. Those -wounded men were turned over to the German Police and tortured and -killed without trial. - -According to the statement of Goldberg, which I have submitted, any man -turned over to the SD was executed. Events took place on 21 June 1944 as -indicated by Goldberg, “Twelve suspects were arrested and turned over to -the SD.” - -Under the date of 16 August 1944, Page 133, this general of the German -Army had 40 men murdered after the battles at Bourg-Lastic and at -Cosnat: - - “In the course of operation Jesser, on 15 July 1944 in the - Bourg-Lastic region, 23 persons were executed. Martial law. - Attack on Cosnat; 3 kilometers east of St. Hilaire, during the - night of 17 July, 40 terrorists were shot.” - -On Page 136, this German general admits in his own diary that our -comrades were fighting as soldiers and not as assassins. This general of -the German Army acknowledges that the French Forces of the Interior took -prisoners: - - “Southeast of d’Argenton, 30 kilometers southwest of - Châteauroux, the ‘Jako’ discovered a center of terrorists; 16 - German soldiers were liberated; arms and ammunition were - captured; 7 terrorists were killed, 2 of them being captains. - One German soldier was seriously wounded.” - -Another similar incident is also related further on: - - “Discovery of two camps of terrorists in the region of - d’Argenton. Nine enemies were killed, two of whom were officers; - 16 German soldiers were liberated.” - -At the bottom of the page he states, “We liberated two SS men.” - -These French soldiers were entitled to the respect of their adversaries. -They conducted themselves as soldiers; they were assassinated. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until two o’clock. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the -Defendants Kaltenbrunner and Seyss-Inquart will be absent from this -afternoon’s session on account of illness. - -M. DUBOST: We had arrived, gentlemen, at the presentation of the -terrorist policy carried out by the German Army, Police, and SS, -indistinguishably united in their evil task against the French patriots. -Not only the militant patriots were to be the victims of this terrorist -policy. There were threats of reprisals against their relatives, and -these threats were carried into effect. - -We submit Document 719-PS as Exhibit Number RF-406, which you will find -on Page 147 of the document book. It is the copy of a teletype from the -German Embassy in Paris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. -The German Ambassador reports a conversation which the Vichy unit had -had with Laval. - -The author of this message, who is probably Abetz, explains that -Bousquet, who was with Laval at the time of this conversation, stated -that he was completely ignorant of the recent flight of Giraud’s -brother: - - “Madame Giraud, three of her daughters, her mother, another - brother and the daughter-in-law of Giraud, were in - Vals-les-Bains. I replied that such measures were insufficient - and that he must not be surprised if the German police some day - reverted to sterner measures, in view of the obvious - incompetence of the French police in numerous cases.” - -The threat was put into execution. We have already stated that the -family of General Giraud were deported. - -We submit Document F-717 under Exhibit Number RF-407, Page 149 of your -document book: “Paris, 1030 hours, 101, Official Government Telegram, -Paris, to the French Delegation of the IMT Nuremberg.” - -From this telegram it is evident that 17 persons, members of the family -of General Giraud, were deported to Germany. Madame Granger, daughter of -General Giraud, aged 32, was arrested without cause in Tunis in April -1943, as well as her four children, aged 2 to 11 years, with their young -nurse, and her brother-in-law, M. Granger. The family of General Giraud -was also arrested, on 9 October 1943. They were first deported to -Berlin, then to Thuringia. - -May I ask the forbearance of the Tribunal; the telegraphic style does -not lend itself to interpretation, “Sent first to Berlin and then to -Thuringia; women and children of M. Granger to Dachau.” (I suppose that -we must understand this to mean the wife of M. Granger and the nurse who -accompanied her.) - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, what is the document? - -M. DUBOST: This is a French official telegram. You have the original -before you, Mr. President, “—101—Official State Telegram Paris,” typed -on the text of the telegram itself. - -THE PRESIDENT: Can we receive a telegram from anybody addressed to the -Tribunal? - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, it is not addressed to the Tribunal; it is -addressed to the French Delegation. It is an official telegram from the -French Government in Paris, “Official State Paris,” and it was -transmitted as an official telegram. - -THE PRESIDENT: What does “IMT Paris” mean? - -M. DUBOST: The International Military Tribunal in Paris. It is our -office in Paris at Place Vendôme—it is an office of the French Ministry -of Justice. The telegram begins, “General Giraud.” It is a telegraphic -declaration. The letters “OFF” at the beginning of the telegram mean -“Official.” Please forgive me for insisting that the three letters “OFF” -at the beginning of the telegram mean “Government, official” from Paris. -No French telegraph office could transmit such a telegram if it did not -come from an official authority. This official authority is the French -Delegation of the IMT in Paris, which received the statement made by -General Giraud and transmitted it to us: “By General Giraud, French -Delegation of the IMT.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will receive the document under -Article 21 of the Charter. - -M. DUBOST: I am grateful to the Tribunal. I read further on, at Page -150: - - “On the other hand, the death of Madame Granger on 24 September - 1943 is undoubtedly due to lack of care and medicine, in spite - of her reiterated requests for both. After an autopsy of her - body, which took place in the presence of a French doctor, - specially summoned from Paris after her death, authorization was - given to this doctor, Dr. Claque to bring the four children back - to France, and then to Spain, where they would be handed over to - their father. This was refused by the Gestapo in Paris, and the - children were sent back to Germany as hostages, where their - grandmother found them only 6 months later.” - -The last four lines: - - “The health of Madame Giraud, her daughter Marie Theresa, and - two of her grandchildren has been gravely impaired by the - physical, and particularly by the moral, hardships of their - deportation.” - -As a reprisal for the escape of General Giraud, 17 persons were -arrested, all innocent of his escape. - -I have frequently shown that in their determination to impose their -reign of terror the Germans resorted to means which revolt the -conscience of decent people. Of these means one of the most repugnant is -the call for informers. - -Document F-278(b), Page 152, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-408, -is a reproduction of an ordinance of 20 December 1941, which is so -obviously contrary to international law that the Foreign Ministry of the -Reich itself took cognizance of it. The ordinance of 27 December 1941 -prescribes the following: - - “Whosoever may have knowledge that arms are in the possession or - keeping of an unauthorized person or persons is obliged to - declare that at the nearest police headquarters.” - -The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, on 29 June 1942, objected to -the draft of a reply to the French note, which we do not have here but -which must have been a protest against this ordinance of 27 December -1941. The Tribunal knows that in the military operations which -accompanied the liberation of our land many archives disappeared, and -therefore we cannot make known to the Tribunal the protest to which the -note of 29 June 1942, from the German Foreign Ministry refers. - -Paragraph 2 summarizes the arguments of the French protest. The French -evidently had written: If German territory were occupied by the French, -we would certainly consider as a man without honor any German who -denounced to the occupying power an infraction of their laws, and this -point of view was taken up and adopted by the German Foreign Ministry. -The note continues: - - “As a result of consideration of this matter, the Foreign Office - considers it questionable whether punishment should be inflicted - on whomsoever fails to denounce a person possessing or known to - possess arms. Such a prescription of penalty under this general - form is, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, the more - impracticable in that it would offer the French the possibility - of calling attention to the fact that the German Army is - demanding of them acts which would be considered Criminal if - committed by German citizens.” - -This German note, I repeat, comes from the Reich Ministry of Foreign -Affairs and is signed “Strack.” There is no more severe condemnation of -the German Army than that expressed by the Reich Ministry of Foreign -Affairs itself. The reply of the German Army will be found by the -Tribunal on Page 155, “Berlin. 8 December 1942. High Command of the -Wehrmacht.” The High Command of the Wehrmacht concludes: - - “. . . since it does not seem desirable to enter into discussion - with the French Government on the questions of law evoked by - them, we too consider it appropriate not to reply to the French - note.” - -This note begins, moreover, by asserting that any relaxing of the orders -given would be considered as a sign of weakness in France and in -Belgium. - -These are not the signs of weakness that the German Army gave in our -occupied countries of the West. The weakness manifested itself in -terror; it brought terror to reign throughout our countries, and that in -order to permit the development of the policy of extermination of the -vanquished nations which, in the minds of all Nazi leaders, remained the -principal purpose, if not the sole purpose, of this war. - -This terrorist policy, of which the Tribunal has just seen examples in -connection with the repression of attacks by our French Forces of the -Interior on the enemy, developed without any military necessity for it -in all the countries of the West. The devastations committed by the -enemy are extremely numerous. We shall limit our presentation to the -destruction of Rotterdam at a time when the city had already capitulated -and when only the question of the form of capitulation had to be -settled; and secondly, to a description of the inundations which the -German Army caused, without any military necessity of any sort, in 1945 -on the eve of its destruction when that Army already knew that it had -lost the game. - -We have chosen the example of Rotterdam because it is the first act of -terrorism of the German Army in the West. We have taken the inundations -because, without her dykes, without fresh water, Holland ceases to -exist. The day her dykes are destroyed, Holland disappears. One sees -here the fulfillment of the enemy’s aim of destruction, formulated long -ago by Germany as already shown by the citation from Hitler with which I -opened my speech, an aim which was pursued to the very last minute of -Germany’s existence as is proved by those unnecessary inundations. - -We submit to the Tribunal Document F-719 as Exhibit Number RF-409, which -comprises Dutch reports on the bombing of Rotterdam and the capitulation -of the Dutch Army. On Pages 38 and 39 of the second document book are -copies of the translations of documents exchanged between the commander -of the German troops before Rotterdam and the colonel who was in command -of the Dutch troops defending the city. - -Captain Backer relates the incidents of that evening which ended with -the burning of the city. At 1030 hours a German representative appeared -with an ultimatum, unsigned and without any indication of the sender, -demanding that the Dutch capitulate before 1230 hours. This document was -returned by the Dutch colonel, who asked to be told the name and the -military rank of the officer who had called upon him to surrender. - -At 1215 hours Captain Backer appeared before the German lines and was -received by a German officer. At 1235 hours he had an interview with -German officers in a dairy shop. A German general wrote his terms for -capitulation on the letter of reply, which the representative of the -Dutch General Staff had just brought to him. - -At 1320 hours Captain Backer left the place, this dairy shop where the -negotiations had taken place, with the terms to which a reply had to be -given. Two German officers escorted him. These escorting officers were -protected by the flight of German aircraft, and red rockets were fired -by them at 1322 and 1325 hours. At 1330 hours the first bomb fell upon -Rotterdam, which was to be completely set on fire. The entry of the -German troops was to take place at 1850 hours, but it was put forward at -1820 hours. Later the Germans said to Captain Backer that the purpose of -the red rockets was to prevent the bombing. However, there had been -excellent wireless communication from the ground to the aircraft. -Captain Backer expressed his surprise that this should have been done by -means of rockets. - -The work on the inundation of the “Wieringermeer” polder began on 9 and -10 April 1945. I quote a Dutch document. That day German soldiers -appeared on the polder, gave orders, and placed a guard for the dyke. - - “On 17 April 1945 at 1215 hours the dyke was dynamited so that - two parts of it were destroyed up to a height somewhat lower - than the surface of the water of the Ijesselmeer . . . . - - “As for the population, they were warned during the night of 16 - to 17 April”—that is, at the time when the water was about to - flood the polder—“In Wieringerwerf the news received by the - mayor was passed from house to house that at noon the dyke would - be destroyed. Altogether for this great polder, with an area of - 20,000 hectares, not more than 8½ to 9 hours were granted for - evacuation . . . . Telephone communications had been completely - interrupted; and it was impossible to use automobiles, which - meant that some individuals did not receive any warning until 8 - o’clock in the morning . . . . - - “The time given to the population was, therefore, too short for - the evacuation . . . . - - “The looting in the flooded polder has already been mentioned. - During the morning of 17 April, on the day of the disaster, - groups of German soldiers begin to loot . . . These soldiers - came from Wieringen . . . Moreover, they broke everything that - they did not want to take . . .” - -This polder by itself covers half of all the flooded lands in Northern -Holland. The polder was flooded on 17 April, when defeat was already a -fact as far as the German Army was concerned. The Dutch people are -seeking to recover the land which they have lost. Their courage, -industry and energy arouse our admiration, but it is an immense loss -which the German Army inflicted upon those people on 17 April. - -Terrorism and extermination are intimately interwoven in all countries -in the West. - -Document C-45, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-410 and which is the -first in the document book, is an order of 10 February 1944 showing that -repression, in the minds of the leaders of the German Army, was to be -carried out without consideration of any kind: - - “Fire must be immediately returned. If, as a result, innocent - people are struck, it is to be regretted but it is entirely the - fault of the terrorists.” - -These lines were written over the signature of an officer of the general -staff of the German Military Command in Belgium and Northern France. -This officer was never denounced by his superiors as can be seen by the -document. - -Document F-665, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-411, Page 2 of your -document book: - - “The search of suspected villages requires experience. SD or GFP - (Secret Field Police) personnel should be called upon. The real - accomplices of the guerillas must be disclosed, and apprehended - with all severity. Collective measures against the inhabitants - of entire villages (this includes the burning of villages) are - to be taken only in exceptional cases and may be ordered only by - divisional commands or by chiefs of the SS and Police.” - -This document is dated 6 May 1944. It comes from the High Command of the -Wehrmacht; and it, or at least the covering letter, is signed by Jodl. - -This document involves not only the Army General Staff, but the Labor -Service—that is to say, Sauckel—and the Todt Organization—that is to -say, Speer. Indeed, in the next to the last paragraph we may read: - - “The directive . . . is applicable to all branches of the - Wehrmacht and to all organizations which exercise their - activities in occupied territories (the Reich Labor Service, the - Todt Organization, _et cetera_).” - -These orders, aimed at the extermination of innocent civilian -populations, were to be carried out vigorously but at the price of a -constant collusion of the German Army, the SS, the SD, and the Sipo, -which the people of all countries of the West place together in the same -horror and in the same reprobation. - -In the war diary of General Von Brodowski submitted this morning under -Exhibit Number RF-405, an excerpt of which is to be found on Pages 3, 4, -and 5 of the document book, it is stated that repressive operations were -carried out: - - “An action against terrorists was undertaken in the southwestern - area of the Department of Dordogne near Lalinde, in which a - company of Georgians of Field Police, and members of the SD took - part . . .” - -Dated 14 June 1944 is a statement on the destruction of -Oradour-sur-Glane. I shall come back to the destruction of this village. -“600 persons are said to have been killed,” writes General Von -Brodowski. It is underscored in the text. - - “The whole male population of Oradour has been shot. Women and - children took refuge in the church. The church caught fire. - Explosives had been stored in the church. Even women and - children perished.” - -We shall let you know the results of the French inquiry. The Tribunal -will see to what degree General Von Brodowski lied when he described the -annihilation of Oradour in these terms. - -Concerning Tulle: - - “On 8 July 1944 in the evening the barracks occupied by the 13th - Company of the 95th Security Regiment were attacked by - terrorists. The struggle was terminated by the arrival of the - Panzer division, ‘Das Reich.’ 120 male inhabitants of Tulle were - hanged, and 1,000 sent to the SD at Limoges for investigation.” - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, could we see the original of this document? - -M. DUBOST: I showed it to you this morning, Mr. President, when I -submitted it. It is rather a large document, if you will remember, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We would like to see it. - -DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I should like -briefly to rectify an error now, before it is carried any further. - -The French Prosecutor mentioned that certain people were put at the -disposal of the Arbeitsdienst. I should like to point out that -Arbeitsdienst is not to be confused with the Arbeitseinsatz. The -Arbeitseinsatz was ultimately directed by Sauckel, whereas the -Arbeitsdienst had nothing whatsoever to do with Sauckel. I should like -to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that distinction. - -THE PRESIDENT: On account of a technical incident, the Tribunal will -adjourn. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: The attorney for Sauckel, I think, was addressing the -Tribunal. - -DR. SERVATIUS: I had pointed out the difference between the -Arbeitsdienst and the Arbeitseinsatz. The French prosecuting attorney -apparently confused the Arbeitsdienst with the Arbeitseinsatz, for he -said that the Arbeitsdienst was connected with Sauckel. That is not so. -The Arbeitsdienst was an organization for premilitary training which -existed before the war and in which young people had to render labor -service. These young people were to some extent used for military -purposes. The Arbeitseinsatz was concerned solely with the recruiting of -labor to be used in factories or other places of work. It follows, -therefore, that Sauckel cannot be associated with the accusations that -were made in this connection. That is what I wanted to say. - -M. DUBOST: The two German words were translated in an identical manner -in French. A verification having been made, the remarks of the defense -are correct and Sauckel is not involved, but only the Army. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -M. DUBOST: Here are a few examples of terrorist extermination in -Holland, in Belgium, and in other occupied countries of the West. - -In Holland, as one example out of a thousand, there were the massacres -of Putten of 30 September 1944. They are included in Document Number -F-224, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-324 and which is to be found -on Page 46 of the document book. On 30 September 1944 an attack was made -at Putten by members of the Dutch resistance against a German -automobile. The Germans concluded that the village was a refuge for -partisans. They searched the houses and assembled the population in the -church. - -A wounded German officer had been taken prisoner by the Dutch -resistance. The Germans declared that if this officer was released -within 24 hours no reprisals would be made. The officer was released, -after having received medical care from the soldiers of the Dutch -resistance who had captured him. However, in spite of the pledge given, -reprisals were made upon the village of Putten, whose inhabitants were -all innocent. - -I now cite Paragraph 2 of the Dutch report: - - “The population gathered in the church was informed that the men - would be deported and the women had to leave the village because - it would be destroyed. - - “150 houses were burned down (the total amount of houses in the - built-up area being about 2,000). - - “Eight people, amongst whom a woman who tried to escape, were - shot. - - “The men were taken to the concentration camp at Amersfoort. - Amongst them were many accidental passers-by who had been - admitted into the closed village but who had been prevented from - leaving the place. - - “At Amersfoort about 50 people were selected; and during the - transport, 12 jumped out of the train. 622 men were eventually - deported to Auschwitz. The majority of those died after two - months. - - “From the 622 deported men, only 32 inhabitants of the village - of Putten and 10 outsiders returned after the liberation.” - -In Belgium, we will cite only a few facts which are related in Document -Number F-685, already submitted under Exhibit Number RF-394. This -document is to be found on Page 48 in your document book. It describes -the murder of a young man who had sought refuge in a dug-out. He was -killed by the Germans who were looking for soldiers of the Belgian -secret army. - -At Hervé the Germans fired on a lorry filled with young men and killed -two of them. The same day some civilians were killed by a tank. - -On Page 49, the summary executions of members of the secret army are -described. I quote: - - “At Anhée, shots having been fired upon them, the Germans - crossed the river Meuse. They set fire to 58 houses and killed - 13 men. At Annevoie, on the 4th, the Germans came across the - river and burned 58 houses.” - -Then follows a report on destruction, useless from the military point of -view: - - “. . . At Arendonck, on the 3rd, 80 men were killed, five houses - were burned. At St. Hubert, on the 6th, three men killed and - four houses burned. At Hody, on the 6th, systematic destruction - of the village, 40 houses destroyed, 16 people killed. At - Marcourt, 10 people were shot, 35 houses were burned. At - Neroeteren, on the 9th, 9 people were killed. At Oost-Ham, on - the 10th, 5 persons were killed. At Balen-Neet, on the 11th, 10 - persons were shot.” - -Page 50 contains the description of German extortions at the time of the -temporary stabilization of the front. - - “At Hechtel, the Germans having withdrawn before the British - vanguard, the inhabitants hung out flags. But fresh German - troops came to drive out the British vanguard and reprisals were - taken; 31 people were shot; 80 houses were burned, and general - looting took place. At Helchteren 34 houses were set on fire and - 10 people were killed under similar circumstances. The same - thing took place at Herenthout . . . . - - “The circumstances in which these men were executed are always - identical. The Germans search the cellars, bring the men out, - line them along the highway, and shoot them, after having given - them the order to run. In the meantime, grenades are thrown into - the cellars, wounding women and children.” - -Another example: - - “At Lommel, the unexpected return of the German soldiers found - the village with flags out. Seventeen persons who had sought - refuge in a shelter were noticed by a German. He motioned to a - tank which ran against the shelter crushing it and killing 12 - people.” - -In the case of Norway we shall take an example from a document already -submitted under Exhibit Number RF-323, Pages 51 and 52 of your book: - - “. . . on 13 April 1940, two women 30 years of age were shot at - Ringerike. On 15 April, four civilians, of whom two were boys of - 15 and 16 years of age, were shot in Aadal. One of those - murdered was shot through the head, and had also been bayonetted - in the stomach. On 19 April four civilians, of whom two were - women and one a little boy 3 years of age, were shot at - Ringsaker. - - “To avenge the death of the two German policemen, who were shot - on the 26th of April 1942 at Televaag, the entire place was laid - waste. More than 90 properties with 334 buildings were totally - destroyed, causing damage to buildings and chattels (furniture - and fishing outfits) amounting to a total of 4,200,000 Kroner.” - -In this document the Tribunal will find the continuation of the -descriptions of German atrocities committed in Norway, without any -necessity of a military character, simply to maintain the reign of -terror. - -In France massacres and destructions without military purpose were -extremely numerous, and all of them were closely associated. We submit -Document F-243 as Exhibit Number RF-412. The Tribunal will find this -document on Pages 178 to 193 of the document book. It is a long list, -drawn up by the French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes, of the towns -that were destroyed and looted without any military necessity. The -Tribunal will undoubtedly be enlightened by the reading of this -document. We shall give but a few examples. In submitting this Document -F-909 as Exhibit Number RF-413, we intend to relate the conditions under -which a whole section of Marseilles was destroyed—Pages 56, 57, and 58, -of your document book. - -It is estimated that about 20,000 people were evacuated. This evacuation -was ordered on 23 January. It was carried out without warning during the -night of the 23rd to the 24th. I quote: - - “It is estimated that 20,000 persons were evacuated. From Fréjus - some of them were shipped by the Germans to the concentration - camp of Compiègne. . . . - - “The demolition operations began on 1 February at about 9 - o’clock in the morning. They were carried out by troops of the - German engineer corps. . . . - - “The area destroyed is equivalent to 14 hectares: that is - approximately 1,200 buildings.” - -Inquiry was made to find those who were responsible for this -destruction. After the liberation of Marseilles the German consul in -Marseilles, Von Spiegel, was interrogated. His testimony is in Document -F-908, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-414, Page 53 of your -document book. Spiegel stated: - - “I know that a very short time after the evacuation of the old - port the rumor spread that this measure had been brought about - by financial interests, but I can assure you that in my opinion - such a hypothesis is erroneous. The order came from the higher - authorities of the Reich Government and had only two - motives—the security of troops and the danger of epidemics.” - -We do not intend to give you a complete description of the attacks -committed by the Germans but merely a few examples. We submit Document -F-600 as Exhibit Number RF-415, Page 59: - - “At Ohis (Aisne) a civilian wanted to give an American soldier - some cider to drink. The Germans returned. The American soldier - was taken prisoner, and M. Hennebert was also taken away by the - Germans to a spot known as the ‘Black Mountain’ in the village - of Origny en Thiérache where his body was later discovered - partly hidden under a stack of wood. The body bore the trace of - two bayonet wounds in the back.” - -I submit Document F-604 as Exhibit Number RF-416, Page 61 of the -document book. A civilian was killed in his vineyard. Young men and -girls walking along the road were killed. The motive was given as -“presence of Maquis in the region.” All these victims were completely -innocent. - -Document F-904, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-417, Page 62 of your -document book. At Culoz “. . . young boys were arrested because they had -run away at the sight of the Germans. . . .” They were reported. “. . . -not one of them belonged to the resistance.” - -At St. Jean-de-Maurienne—Document F-906, submitted as Exhibit Number -RF-418, Page 63 of your document book: - - “On 23 August the gendarmes, Chavanne and Empereur, dressed in - civilian clothes, and M. Albert Taravel were arrested by German - soldiers without legitimate reason. The lieutenant who was in - charge of the Kommandantur promised the officer of the gendarmes - to release these three men. This German later surreptitiously - ordered his men to shoot these prisoners. - - “Mademoiselle Lucie Perraud, 21 years of age, who was a maid at - the Café Dentroux, was raped by a German soldier of Russian - origin, under threat of a pistol.” - -I will not mention any more of the atrocities described in this -document. - -I now come to the Vercors. This region was undeniably an important -assembly center for French Forces of the Interior. Document F-611, which -we submit as Exhibit Number RF-419, describes the atrocities committed -against the innocent population of this region in reprisal for the -presence of men of the Maquis. This document appears in your book on -Page 69 and following. In Paragraph 3 is an enumeration of police -operations in the Vercors area. - -On 15 June, in the region of St. Donat: rape and looting. Execution at -Portes-les-Valence on 8 July 1944 of 30 hostages taken from among the -political prisoners interned at Fort Montluc at Lyons. Police raids -carried out against the Maquis of the Vercors region from 21 July to 5 -August 1944. Rape and looting in the region of Crest, Saillans, and Die. -Bombing by aircraft of numerous villages in the Vercors area and in -particular at La Chapelle and Vassieux-en-Vercors; summary execution of -inhabitants of these places; looting. Execution, after summary judgment, -of about a hundred young men at St. Nazaire-en-Royans; deportation to -Germany of 300 others from this region. Murder of 50 gravely wounded -persons in the Grotto of La Luire. On 15 June 1944, attack by German -troops at St. Donat. I quote, “The Maquis had evacuated the town several -days earlier . . . 54 women or young girls from 13 to 50 years of age -were raped by the maddened soldiers.” - -The Tribunal will forgive me if I avoid citing the atrocious details -which follow. Bombing of the villages of Combovin, La Baume-Cornillanne, -Ourches, _et cetera_: - - “The losses caused by these bombings among the civilian - population are rather high, for in most cases the inhabitants, - caught by surprise, had no time to seek shelter . . . 2 women - were raped at Crest . . . 3 women were raped at Saillans . . . . - - “A young girl of twelve, who was wounded and pinned down between - beams, awaited death for 6 long days unable either to sit down - or sleep, and without receiving any food, and that under the - eyes of the Germans who were occupying the village.”—A medical - certificate from Doctor Nicolaides, who examined the women who - were raped in this region. - -I will pass on. - -I submit Document F-612 under Exhibit Number RF-420. To terrorize the -inhabitants at Trebeurden in Brittany they hanged innocent people, and -slashed the corpses to make the blood flow. - -I proceed. Document F-912 is submitted as Exhibit Number RF-421, Page 82 -of your book. It is the report of the massacre of 35 Jews at St. -Amand-Montrond. These men were arrested and killed with pistol shots in -the back by members of the Gestapo and of the German Army. They were -innocent of any crime. - -I submit Document F-913 as Exhibit Number RF-422—Page 96, I am quoting: - - “On 8 April 1944 German soldiers of the Gestapo arrested young - André Bézillon, 18 years of age, dwelling at Oyonnax (Ain), - whose brother was in the Maquis. The body of this young man was - discovered on 11 April 1944 at Siège (Jura) frightfully - mutilated. His nose and tongue had been cut off. There were - traces of blows over his whole body and of slashes on his legs. - Four other young men were also found at Siège at the same time - as Bézillon. All of them had been mutilated in such a manner - that they could not be identified. They bore no trace of - bullets, which clearly indicates that they died from the - consequences of ill-treatment.” - -I submit Document F-614 as Exhibit Number RF-423, at Page 98 of your -document book. It describes the destruction of the village of Cerizay, -(Deux-Sèvres). I quote: - - “The fire did not cause any accident to persons, but the bodies - of two persons killed by German convoys and those of two victims - of the bombardment were burned.” - -This village was destroyed by artillery fire; 172 buildings were -destroyed and 559 were damaged. We now submit another document, Document -F-919 as Exhibit Number RF-424, Page 103. It concerns the murder of a -young man of Tourc’h in Finistère. The murderers compelled the mother to -prepare a meal for them. Having been fed, they had the victim -disinterred. They searched and found that the body bore a card of -identity bearing the same name and address as his mother, brothers, and -sisters, who were present and in tears. One of the soldiers, finding no -excuse to explain this crime, said dryly before going away: “He was not -a terrorist! What a pity!” and the body was buried again. Document F-616 -submitted as Exhibit Number RF-425, Page 104, concerns the report of the -operations of the German Army in the region of Nice, about 20 July 1944. -I quote: - - “. . . having been attacked at Presles by several groups of - Maquis in the region, by way of reprisal, this Mongolian - detachment, as usual commanded by the SS, went to a farm where - two French members of the resistance had been hidden. Being - unable to take them prisoners, these soldiers then arrested the - proprietors of that farm (the husband and wife), and after - subjecting them to numerous atrocities, rape, et cetera, they - shot them with submachine guns. Then they took the son of these - victims, who was only 3 years of age; and, after having tortured - him frightfully, they crucified him on the gate of the - farmhouse.” - -We submit Document F-914 as Exhibit Number RF-426, Page 107 of your -document book. This is a long recital of murders committed without any -cause whatever by the German Army in Rue Tronchet at Lyons. I now read: - - “Without preliminary warning, without any effort having been - made to verify the exact character of the situation and, if - necessary, to seize those responsible for the act, the soldiers - opened fire. A certain number of civilians, men, women, and - children fell. Others who were untouched or only slightly - wounded fled in haste.” - -The Tribunal will find the official report that was drawn up on the -occasion of these murders. - -We submit without quoting, asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice -of it only, the report relating to the crimes of the German Army -committed in the region of Loches (Indre-et-Loire), Document F-617, -submitted as Exhibit Number RF-427, Page 115 of your document book. - -Document F-607, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-428, which is on Page 119 -of your document book, describes the looting, rape, and burnings at -Saillans during the months of July and of August 1944. I quote, “During -their sojourn in the region”—referring to German soldiers—“rapes were -committed against three women in that area.” I pass on. Document F-608, -Page 120 of your document book, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-429: A -person was burned alive at Puisots by a punitive expedition. This person -was innocent. - -I submit Document F-610 as Exhibit Number RF-430, Page 122 of your -document book. The whole region of Vassieux in the Vercors was -devastated. This document, Number F-610, is a report by the Red Cross -prepared prior to the liberation. I am quoting: - - “We found on a farm a wounded man, who had been hit by 8 bullets - in the following circumstances. The Germans forced him to set - fire to his own house, and tried to prevent him from escaping - the flames by shooting at him with their pistols. In spite of - his wounds, he was able miraculously to escape.” - -We submit Document F-618 as Exhibit Number RF-431, Page 124 of the -document book. I quote, concerning people who were executed: - - “Before being shot these people were tortured. One of them, M. - Francis Duperrier, had a broken arm and his face was completely - mutilated. Another, M. Feroud-Plattet, had been completely - disembowelled with a piece of sharp wood. His jaw bone was also - crushed.” - -We submit Document 605 as Exhibit Number RF-432, Page 126. This document -describes the burning of the hamlet of des Plaines near Moutiers, in -Savoy: “Two women, Madame Romanet, a widow, 72 years old, and her -daughter, age 41, were burned to death in a small room of their -dwelling, where they had sought refuge. In the same place a man, M. -Charvaz, who had had his thigh shattered by a bullet, was also found -burned.” - -We now submit as Exhibit Number RF-433 the French Document F-298, Page -127 and following in your document book, which describes the destruction -of Maillé in the department of Indre-et-Loire. That area was entirely -destroyed on 25 August 1944, and a large number of its inhabitants were -killed or seriously wounded. This destruction and these crimes had no -terrorist action, no action by the French Forces of the Interior as a -motive. - -Document F-907 submitted as Exhibit Number RF-434—Page 132 and -following in your document book—relates the incidents leading to German -crimes at Montpezat-de-Quercy. This is a letter written to the French -Delegation by the Bishop of Montauban, Monseigneur Théas, on 11 December -1945. This document really explains Document F-673, already submitted as -Exhibit Number RF-392, from which I will read. The first part consists -of a letter by the French Armistice Commission, and has been taken from -the archives of the Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden: - - “On the night of 6 to 7 June last, in the course of an operation - in the region of Montpezat-de-Quercy, German troops set fire to - four farmhouses which formed the hamlet called ‘Perches.’ Three - men, two women, and two children, 14 and 4 years old, were - burned alive. Two women and a child of ten who disappeared - probably suffered the same fate. - - “On Saturday, 10 June, having been fired at by two recalcitrants - at the village of Marsoulas, German troops killed these two men. - Moreover, they massacred without any explanation all the other - inhabitants of the village that they could lay their hands on. - - “Thus 7 men, 6 women, and 14 children were killed, most of them - still in their beds at the early hour when this happened. - - “On 10 June, at about 1900 hours, five Luftwaffe aircraft - attacked the town of Tarbes for half an hour with bombs and - machine guns. Several buildings were destroyed, among them the - Hôtel des Ponts et Chaussées, and the Academic Inspectorate. - There were 7 dead and about 10 wounded who were hit by chance - among the population of the town. On this occasion the general - in command of the VS-659 at Tarbes immediately informed the - Prefect of the Department of Basses-Pyrénées that the operation - had been neither caused nor ordered by him. - - “Following each of these events the Regional Prefect of Toulouse - addressed to the general commanding the HVS-564 letters in which - in dignified and measured terms he protested against the acts in - question, through which innocent women and children were - deliberately killed. He asserted very rightly that under no - circumstances could children in the cradle be considered as - accomplices of the terrorists. He requested finally that - instructions be given to avoid the recurrence of such painful - events. - - “Replying on 19 June to the three letters of the Regional - Prefect of Toulouse, the chief of staff of the general - commanding the head liaison staff 564 announced the principles - which determined the position taken by his chief, which - justified the acts of reprisal quoted on the following grounds: - - “The duty of the French population is not only to flee from - terrorists but also to render their operations impossible, which - will avoid any reprisals being taken against innocent people. In - the struggle against terrorism the German Army must and will - employ all means at its disposal, even methods of combat new to - Western Europe. - - “The terror raids of the Anglo-Americans also massacre thousands - and thousands of German children. There, too, innocent blood is - being shed through the action of the enemy, whose support of - terrorism is forcing the German soldier to use his arms in the - South of France. - - “I beg to ask you”—concluded General Bridoux, writing to the - German Commission—“whether the French Government is to consider - the arguments cited above as reflecting accurately the position - taken by the German High Command, in view of the facts disclosed - in the first part of the present letter.” - -We now submit Document E-190 as Exhibit Number RF-435, Page 141 of the -document book, which describes the crimes committed at Ascq by a German -unit which, in reprisal for the destruction of the railway, massacred 77 -men of all categories and all ages, among whom were 22 employees of the -French State railway, some industrialists, business men, and workmen. I -quote: - - “The oldest of these victims, M. Briet, retired, was 74 years - old; he was born on 3 October 1869 at Ascq. The youngest, Jean - Roques, student and son of the postmaster, was 15 years old, - born on 4 January 1929 at Saint Quentin. Father Gilleron, a - priest at Ascq, and his two protegées, M. Averlon and his son, - who had fled from the coast, were also shot.” - -This massacre was the cause of a protest made by the French Government -at that time, to which Commander-in-Chief Von Rundstedt replied on 3 May -1944 (Document F-673, already submitted as Exhibit Number RF-392, Page -154): - - “The population of Ascq bears the responsibility for the - consequences of its treacherous conduct, which I can only - severely condemn.” - -General Bérard, president of the French delegation attached to the -German Armistice Commission, was not satisfied with the reply given by -Rundstedt; and on 21 June 1944 he reiterated the French protest, -addressing it this time to General Vogl, president of the German -Armistice Commission. This is still Document F-673, Exhibit Number -RF-392. I quote: - - “In all, from 10 October 1943 to 1st May 1944, more than 1,200 - persons were made the victims of these measures of - repression. . . . - - “These measures of repression strike the innocent and cause - terror to reign among the French population . . . . - - “A great number of the acts that have been mentioned took place - in the course of repressive operations directed against - population accused of having relations with the Maquis. In these - operations there was never any care taken to discover whether - the people suspected of having served the Maquis were really - guilty; and still less in this case, to ascertain whether these - people had acted voluntarily or under duress. The number of - innocent people executed is therefore considerable. . . . - - “The repressive operation in Dordogne, from 26 March to 3 April - 1944, and particularly the tragic affair of Ascq, which have - already brought about the intervention of the head of the French - Government, are grievous examples. At Ascq, especially, 86 - innocent people paid with their lives for an attempted attack - which, according to my information, did not cause the death of a - single German soldier. . . . - - “Such acts can only stimulate the spirit of revolt in the - adversaries of Germany, who finally are the only ones to - benefit.” - -The reply of the Armistice Commission, Document F-707, submitted as -Exhibit Number RF-436, is the rejection of General Bérard’s request. The -document is before you. I do not think it is necessary for me to read -it. - -The general, on 3 August 1944, reiterated his protest. This is Document -F-673, Exhibit Number RF-392, already submitted. At the end of his -protest he writes: - - “An enemy who surrenders must not be killed even though he is a - _franc-tireur_ or a spy. The latter will receive just punishment - through the courts.” - -But this is only the text of stipulations to be applied within Germany. - -We submit Document F-706, Exhibit Number RF-437, which is a note from -the French Secretary of State for Defense to the German general -protesting against the measures of destruction taken by the German -troops in Chaudebonne and Chaveroche. We shall not read this document. -The Tribunal may take judicial notice of it, if it deems it necessary. - -We now come to the statement of the events of Tulle, in which 120 -Frenchmen were hanged, Page 169 (Document F-673, Exhibit RF-392). I am -quoting: - - “On 7 June a large group of _francs-tireurs_ attacked the French - forces employed in the maintenance of order and succeeded in - seizing the greater part of the town of Tulle after a struggle - which lasted until dawn. . . . - - “The same day, at about 2000 hours, important German armored - forces came to the assistance of the garrison and penetrated - into the city from which the terrorists withdrew in - haste. . . .” - -These troops, which re-took Tulle, decided to carry out reprisals. The -French Forces of the Interior that had taken the town had withdrawn. The -Germans had taken no prisoners. The reprisals were carried out upon -civilians. Without discrimination they were arrested. - - “The victims were selected without any inquiry, without even any - questioning, haphazardly; workmen, students, professors, - industrialists. There were even among them some militia - sympathizers and candidates for the Waffen SS. The 120 corpses - which were hanged from the balconies and lamp-posts of the - Avenue de la Gare, along a distance of 500 meters, were a - horrible spectacle that will remain in the memory of the - unfortunate population of Tulle for a long time.” - -We now come to the crowning event in these German atrocities: the -destruction of Oradour-sur-Glane, in the month of June 1944. The -Tribunal will accept, we hope, the presentation of Document F-236, which -now becomes Exhibit Number RF-438. This is an official book, published -by the French Government, which gives a full description of the events. -I will give you a brief analysis of the report which the _de facto_ -government of the time sent to the German general who was -Commander-in-Chief for the regions of the West: - - “On Saturday, 10 June, a detachment of SS belonging very likely - to the ‘Das Reich’ division which was present in the area, burst - into the village, after having surrounded it entirely, and - ordered the population to gather in the central square. It was - then announced that it had been reported that explosives had - been hidden in the village and that a search and the checking of - identity were about to take place. The men were asked to make - four or five groups, each of which was locked into a barn. The - women and children were taken to the church and locked in. It - was about 1400 hours. A little later machine-gunning began and - the whole village was set on fire, as well as the surrounding - farms. The houses were set on fire one by one. The operation - lasted undoubtedly several hours, in view of the extent of the - locality. - - “In the meantime the women and the children were in anguish as - they heard the sound of the fires and of the shootings. At 1700 - hours, German soldiers entered the church and placed upon the - communion table an asphyxiating apparatus which comprised a sort - of box from which lighted fuses emerged. Shortly after the - atmosphere became unbreathable. However someone was able to - break open the vestry door which enabled the women and children - to regain consciousness. The German soldiers then started to - shoot through the windows of the church, and they came inside to - finish off the last survivors with machine guns. Then they - spread upon the soil some inflammable material. One woman alone - was able to escape, having climbed on the window to run away. - The cries of a mother who tried to give her child to her, drew - the attention of one of the guards who fired on the would-be - fugitive and wounded her seriously. She saved her life by - simulating death and she was later cared for in a hospital at - Limoges. - - “At about 1800 hours the German soldiers stopped the local train - which was passing in the vicinity. They told passengers going to - Oradour to get off, and, having machine-gunned them, threw their - bodies into the flames. At the end of the evening, as well as - the following day, a Sunday morning, the inhabitants of the - surrounding hamlets, alarmed by the fire or made anxious because - of the absence of their children who had been going to school at - Oradour, attempted to approach, but they were either - machine-gunned or driven away by force by German sentinels who - were guarding the exits of the village. However, on the - afternoon of Sunday some were able to get into the ruins, and - they stated that the church was filled with the corpses of women - and children, all shrivelled up and calcinated. - - “An absolutely reliable witness was able to see the body of a - mother holding her child in her arms at the entrance of the - church, and in front of the altar the body of a little child - kneeling, and near the confessional the bodies of two children - in each other’s arms. - - “During the night from Sunday to Monday the German troops - returned and attempted to remove traces by proceeding with the - summary burial of the women and children outside the church. - - “The news of this drama began to spread through Limoges on the - 11th of June. - - “In the evening, the general commanding the Verbindungsstab - refused to grant the pass, which was personally requested by the - Regional Prefect, for him and the Deputy Prefect to move about - in the area. Only the Subprefect of Rochechouart was able to go - to Oradour and report to his chief on the following day that the - village, which comprised 85 houses, was only a mass of ruins and - that the greater part of the population, women and children - included, had perished. - - “On Tuesday, 13 June, the Regional Prefect finally obtained - authorization to go there and was able to proceed to the town, - accompanied by the Deputy Prefect and the Bishop of Limoges. In - the church, which was partly in ruins, there were still the - calcinated remains of children. Bones were mixed with the ashes - of the woodwork. The ground was strewn with shells with ‘STKAM’ - marked upon them, and on the walls there were numerous traces of - bullets at a man’s height. - - “Outside the church the soil was freshly dug; children’s - garments were piled up, half burned. Where the barns had stood, - completely calcinated human skeletons, heaped one on the other, - partially covered with various material made a horrible - charnel-house. - - “. . . although it is impossible to give the exact number of - these victims, it can be estimated that there were 800 to 1,000 - dead, among them many children who had been evacuated from - regions threatened by bombardment. There do not seem to have - been more than ten survivors among the persons who were present - in the village of Oradour at the beginning of the afternoon of - 10 June.” - -Such are the facts. - - “I have the honor, General, to ask you”—concluded General - Bridoux addressing his enemy—“to be good enough to communicate - these facts to the German High Command in France. I greatly hope - that they will be brought to the knowledge of the Government of - the Reich, because of the political importance which they will - assume from their repercussion on the mind of the French - population.” - -An inquiry has been conducted since; it is summed up in the book which -has just been placed before you. This inquiry has shown that no member -of the French Forces of the Interior was in the village, that there was -none within several kilometers. It seems even proved that the causes of -the massacre of Oradour-sur-Glane are remote. The unit which perpetrated -this crime apparently did so as an act of vengeance, because of an -attempt against it about 50 kilometers further away. - -The German Army ordered a judicial inquiry. Document F-673, already -submitted as RF-392, so indicates; Pages 175 and 176. This document is -dated 4 January 1945. There were no Germans in France at that time, at -least not in Oradour-sur-Glane. The version given by the German -authority is that the reprisals appear to be absolutely justified for -military reasons. The German military commander who was responsible for -it fell in combat in Normandy. - -We shall remember the phrase “The reprisals appear to be absolutely -justified, for military reasons.” Therefore, in the eyes of the German -Army, the crime of Oradour-sur-Glane which I have described to you -plainly, is a crime which is fully justified. - -The guilt of Keitel in all these matters is certain. - -In Document F-673, Exhibit Number RF-392—and this will be the end of my -statement—there is a strange document which is signed by him. It was -drawn up on 5 March 1945. It concerns alleged executions, without trial, -of French citizens. You will find it on Page 177. It will show the -Tribunal the manner in which these criminal inquiries were conducted, on -orders, by the German Army, following incidents as grave as that of -Oradour-sur-Glane, which had to be justified at any price. In this -document, which should be cited in its entirety, I wish only to look at -the next to the last paragraph. It was in the German interest to answer -these reproaches as promptly as possible. - -THE PRESIDENT: This is not a document of which we can take judicial -notice and therefore if you want to put the whole document in you must -put it in. - -M. DUBOST: I am surprised, Your Honor; you have already accepted it. -This is Document F-673. It was submitted as Exhibit Number RF-392 and is -the whole bundle of documents of the Wiesbaden German Armistice -Commission. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but is it a public document? It is not a public -document, is it? - -M. DUBOST: Am I to understand that the Tribunal wants me to read it in -its entirety? - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, F-673 seems to be a very large bundle of documents. -This particular part of it, this document signed by Keitel, is a private -document. - -M. DUBOST: It is a document which comes from the German Armistice -Commission in Wiesbaden, which was presented several hours ago under -Exhibit Number RF-392, and you accepted it. - -THE PRESIDENT: I know we accepted its being deposited, but that does not -mean that the whole of the document is in evidence. I mean, we have -ruled over and over again that documents of which we do not take -judicial notice must be read so that they will go through the -interpreting system and will be interpreted into German to the German -counsel. - -M. DUBOST: I am therefore going to give you the reading of the whole -document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - - M. DUBOST: “The High Command of the Wehrmacht, Headquarters of - the Führer, 5 March 1945. WFST Qu 2 (I) Number 01487/45-g; By - Captain Cartellieri. Secret. Subject: Alleged executions of - French citizens without trial. - - “1. German Armistice Commission. - - “2. High Command West. - - “In August 1944, the French Commission attached to the German - Armistice Commission addressed a note to the latter, giving an - exact statement of incidents concerning alleged arbitrary - executions of Frenchmen from 9 to 23 June 1944. - - “The information given in the French note was for the most part - so detailed that verification from the German side was - undoubtedly possible. - - “On 26 September 1944 the High Command of the Wehrmacht - entrusted the German Armistice Commission with the study of this - affair. The said commission later requested High Command West - for an inquiry on the incidents and an opinion on the facts - submitted in the French note. - - “On 12 February 1945 the German Armistice Commission received - from the Army Group B (from the President of the Military - Tribunal of Army Group B) a note stating that the documents - referring to this affair had been since November 1944 with the - Army Judge of Pz. AOK 6, and that Pz. AOK 6 and the Second SS - Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’ had in the meantime been detached - from Army Group B. - - “The manner in which this affair was inquired into causes the - following remarks to be made: - - “The French, that is, the Delegation of the Vichy Government - have in this memorandum brought on the German Wehrmacht the - grave charge of having carried out numerous executions of French - subjects, executions which are unjustified by law and therefore - murders. It was in the interest of Germany to reply as promptly - as possible to such charges. In the long period which has - elapsed since the receipt of the French note it should have been - possible, in spite of the development of the military situation - and the movement of troops resulting therefrom, to single out at - least part of these charges and to refute them by examination of - the facts. If merely one fraction of the charge had been - refuted”—this sentence is important—“it would have been - possible to show the French that all their claims were based - upon doubtful data. By the fact that nothing at all was done in - this matter by the Germans, the enemy must have the impression - that we are not in a position to answer these charges. - - “The study of this matter shows that there is often a - considerable lack of understanding of the importance of - counteracting all enemy propaganda and charges against the - German Army by immediately refuting alleged German atrocities. - - “The German Armistice Commission is hereby entrusted to continue - the study of this matter with all energy. We ask that every - assistance be given them for speeding up this work now, within - their own field of duty. The fact that Pz. AOK 6 is no longer - under High Command West is no reason for impeding the making of - the necessary investigations for clearing up and refuting the - French charges.” - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you stated, I think, that this document -implicated Keitel. - -M. DUBOST: It is signed by Keitel, Sir. - -THE PRESIDENT: Signed by him, yes, but how does it implicate him in the -affair of Oradour? - -M. DUBOST: Mr. President, the French Commission, together with the _de -facto_ Vichy Government, frequently brought to the attention of the -German authorities not only the atrocities of Oradbur-sur-Glane, but -numerous other atrocities. Orders were given by Keitel that these facts, -which constitute absolute reality not merely in the eyes of the French -but in the eyes of all those who have objectively and impartially -inquired into the matter, should be examined for the purpose of refuting -part of these charges. This letter refers to the protest lodged earlier -by the French, and we read part of it before you in the course of this -examination of the question, particularly the facts noted in the letter -of General Bridoux which mentions the murder of French people at -Marsoulas in the department of Haute-Garonne, among them fourteen -children. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think you said that that was the last document you were -going to refer to? - -M. DUBOST: It is the last document. - -THE PRESIDENT: Ten minutes past five. Shall we adjourn? M. Dubost, could -you let us know what subject is to be gone into tomorrow? - -M. DUBOST: Crimes against Humanity, by my colleague M. Faure. If you -will allow me to present my conclusion this evening—it will not take -long. Our work has been delayed somewhat this afternoon. - -THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you will take, M. Dubost, to make -your concluding statement? - -M. DUBOST: I think by five-thirty I shall be through. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps, if it is as convenient to you, we had -better hear you in the morning. Is it equally convenient to you? - -M. DUBOST: I am at the orders of the Tribunal. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 February 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FORTY-EIGHTH DAY - Friday, 1 February 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that Defendants -Kaltenbrunner and Seyss-Inquart will be absent from this morning’s -session on account of illness. - -M. DUBOST: I have now completed my presentation of facts. This -presentation has consisted of a dry enumeration of crimes, atrocities, -extortions of all sorts, which I deliberately presented to you without -any embellishments of oratory. The facts have a profound eloquence which -suffices. These facts are, it seems to me, definitely established. I do -not believe that the Defense, nor history—even German history—will be -able to set aside their essential aspects. They will no doubt be exposed -to criticism. - -Our evidence was hastily collected in a ruined country whose every means -of communication had been destroyed by an enemy in flight, in a country -where each individual was more concerned with preparation for the future -than with looking back upon the past, even to exact vengeance, for the -future is the life of our children, and the past is but death and -destruction. - -For the whole of France, for each country in the West, the demands of -daily life, the difficulty of preparing for a better future once again -give full meaning to the words of the Scriptures, _Sinite mortuos -sepelire mortuos_ (Let the dead bury their dead.); and that is why in -spite of all our efforts, all our endeavors, to prepare the work of -justice which France and universal conscience demand, we were not able -to be more thorough. That is why errors of detail may have slipped into -our work, but the rectifications which time and the Defense will effect -can be only accessory. They will not eliminate the fact that millions of -men have been deported, starved, exhausted through labor and privation -before being put to death, like cattle without value; that innumerable -innocent persons have been tortured before being turned over to the -executioner. Rectifications may affect circumstances of time, sometimes -of place; they will not change the essential facts even if a few details -are modified. - -But these facts, having been established in their general aspect, it -remains for us to complete our task by giving them juridical -significance, by analyzing them with reference to the law of which they -constitute a violation, and by making clear the inculpations, in other -words, by fixing the responsibilities, of each defendant in respect to a -law. - -What law shall we apply? Taken one by one and separated from the -systematic policy which conceived, willed, and ordered them as a means -of achieving domination through terror and beyond that as a means of -extermination pure and simple; these facts constitute crimes against -common law as much as violations of the laws and usages of war and of -international law. All of them could therefore be defined separately as -a violation of an international convention and of a penal provision of -one or another of our established domestic laws. Or rather all could be -qualified as a violation of a rule of common law which has emerged from -each of our own domestic laws, as shown by M. De Menthon in his address; -of that common law which, in the last analysis, was designated by him as -being the foundation, as the root of international customs, which, -beyond the Charter itself, is and remains the one and only guide of your -decisions. - -But it is right to know that this common law springs from our -established laws and, like them, punishes in principle actual misdeeds. -Now, all of our defendants remained physically divorced from each of the -criminal facts which in the ubiquity of their power they multiplied -throughout the world. It was their will which commanded; but, as Mr. -Justice Jackson recalled, they never reddened their own hands with the -blood of their victims. Therefore, if we refer exclusively to our -established laws and especially to French domestic law, the defendants -could not, in any case, be considered as principal authors but merely as -accomplices “who have provoked the act through abuse of authority or of -power.” All of that is indeed a contradiction to the conception which -each person in our countries holds of the guilt of the major war -criminals. To solve the problem thus would be to narrow singularly the -field of responsibility of each of the defendants. This responsibility -would appear merely accessory, where, in fact, it is the principal -responsibility; it would appear fragmentary, whereas to be truly fixed -it must be presented as one single time, in the whole of their thoughts, -intentions, and acts as chiefs of the Nazi government who conceived, -willed, ordered, or tolerated the development of that systematic policy -of terror and extermination, of which each fact taken separately is but -a particular aspect, merely a constituent element. Thus a simple -reference to common law does not bring us close enough to reality. If it -does not omit, as such, any of the facts to which guilt attaches, it -does leave aside the psychological factor and does not give us a -complete conception of the guilt of the accused in a single formula -embracing all the reality. That is because common law expresses a -certain status of common morality which is accepted by civilized nations -as law for the mutual relations of citizens. Profoundly imbued with the -concept of individualism, this common law is not adequate to meet the -exigencies of collective life which international morality must govern. -Furthermore, this common law which is the foundation of our tradition -has become static in a Cartesian sense, whereas our custom remains -enriched by all the dynamism of international penal law. The Charter has -not fixed the manner in which we are to qualify in a juridical sense the -facts which I have presented before you. In creating your Tribunal, the -authors of the Charter limited themselves to establishing the limits of -your jurisdiction: War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, Crimes against -Peace; and even then they did not give an exhaustive definition of each -of these crimes. The Tribunal may refer on this point to Article 6, -paragraphs b and c of the Charter of the Tribunal. This article gives -only an indicative enumeration. That is because the authors of the -Charter bore in mind that international penal law is only still in the -first phase of the birth of a custom in which law is developed by -reaction to the deed and where the judge intervenes only to save the -criminals from individual vengeance or where law is applied by the judge -alone and the penalty pronounced according to his sole judgment. Thus, -the authors of the Charter abstained from giving us a fixed method of -qualification by reference to common law or on the contrary, to custom. -They did not say to you: - - “You will take one by one the criminal facts submitted to you, - and each fact taken separately shall be isolated from the others - to be defined by reference to a stipulation of any one domestic - law or to a synthesis of domestic laws, yielding thus a common - law.” - -Nor did they say to you: - - “You will take these scattered criminal facts, you will group - them together to make of them one single crime of which the - definition, respecting in a general sense the rules of common - law, will be essentially determined by the sole intention or - purpose sought, without attempting to seek by analogy any - precedents in the different domestic laws which apply only, - moreover, to an entirely different subject.” - -The authors of the Charter have left you free, entirely free, within the -limits of custom; and consequently we, ourselves, within the same -limitations are free to propose to you such qualification which appears -to us most practical, which appears to us to come closest to the -changing reality of facts in their relation to the general principles of -law and the broad rules of morality which may seem to us to be such as -to meet best the demands of human conscience expressed by international -public opinion duly enlightened on Hitlerian atrocities, which will, in -fact, remain within the limits of international penal custom. This -custom is indeed still in a formulative stage; but although this Trial -is without precedent, the problems that are being examined in this Court -have arisen before; and the jurists who preceded us have already given -them solutions. These solutions constitute precedents; and, as such, -they constitute the first elements of your custom. In their memorandum -to the Commission to the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on -Sanctions at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920 the French jurists, M. -Larnaude and M. De Lapradelle wrote: - - “Criminal law could not foresee that through a singular defiance - of the essential laws of humanity, of civilization, of honor, an - army, by virtue of the instructions of its sovereign, could - systematically lend itself to perform deeds through the - perpetration of acts such as the enemy has not shrunk from - performing in order to achieve success and victory. Therefore, - domestic criminal law has never before been able to make - provisions which would permit the repression of such acts. And - still one must, in the interpretation of every law, cling to the - intention of the law maker. . . . If, in certain cases - considered particularly propitious, one might succeed in - apprehending individuals bearing responsibility of whom the - Emperor could be considered an accomplice one would only - succeed, and not without difficulty, in narrowing the field of - his responsibility by limiting it to a few precise cases. . . . - It is a very restricted approach to the problem of William II to - diminish it and reduce it to the proportions of a criminal or a - court-martial case. . . . The high justice which an anxious - world awaits would not be satisfied if the German Emperor were - judged only as an accomplice or even as the co-author of a - common-law crime. His actions as Chief of State must be - considered in conformity with their true juridical - character. . . .” - -But except for minor details all of this is indeed implicitly contained -in the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Charter of your Tribunal: - - “Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating - in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy - to commit any of the foregoing crimes”—Crimes against Peace, - War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity—“are responsible for all - acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.” - -Fundamentally, all this is within strict conformity with the primordial -German concept of Führertum, which places all responsibility on the -leader and those who are with the leader from the very start. Thus we -can, by as close as possible to reality, by applying the Charter of 8 -August and Article 6 of the Charter of your Tribunal, by respecting the -rules of common law defined by the chief of our delegation, M. De -Menthon, and by following custom, which is sketched in the field of -international penal law, require of your Tribunal to declare all the -defendants guilty of having, in their role as the chief Hitlerian -leaders of the German people, conceived, willed, ordained, or merely -tolerated by their silence that assassinations or other inhuman acts be -systematically committed, that violent treatment be systematically -imposed on prisoners of war or civilians, that devastations without -justification be systematically committed as a deliberate instrument for -the accomplishment of their purpose of dominating Europe and the world -through terrorism and the extermination of entire populations in order -to enlarge the living space of the German people. - -More specifically, we ask you to declare Göring, Keitel, and Jodl guilty -of having taken part in the execution of this plan by ordering the -seizure and the execution of hostages in violation of Article 50 of the -Hague Convention which prohibits collective sanctions and reprisals. - -We ask you to find Keitel, Jodl, Kaltenbrunner, Seyss-Inquart, Bormann, -and Ribbentrop guilty of having taken part in the execution of this -plan: 1. by ordering the terrorist murders of innocent civilians; 2. by -ordering the execution without trial and torture to death of members of -the resistance; 3. by ordering devastations without justification: - -To declare Göring, Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and Sauckel guilty of having -taken part in the execution of this plan by jeopardizing the health and -the lives of prisoners of war, notably by submitting them to privations -and hard treatments, by exposing them, or by attempting to expose them -to bombings or other risks of war: - -To declare Göring, Keitel, Jodl, Kaltenbrunner, and Bormann guilty of -having taken part in the execution of this plan, by personally ordering -or by provoking the formulation of orders leading to terrorist murder or -to the lynching by the population of certain combatants, more -specifically, of airmen and members of commando groups as well as the -terrorist murder or slow extermination of certain categories of -prisoners of war: - -To declare Keitel guilty of having taken part in the execution of this -plan by prescribing the deportation of innocent civilians and by -applying to some of them the NN (Nacht und Nebel) regime which marked -them for extermination: - -To declare Jodl guilty of having taken part in the execution of this -plan by ordering the arrest, with a view to deportation, of the Jews of -Denmark: - -To declare Frank, Rosenberg, Streicher, Von Schirach, Sauckel, Frick, -and Hess guilty of having taken part in the execution of this plan, by -justifying the extermination of Jews or by working out a statute with a -view to their extermination: - -To declare Göring guilty of having taken part in the execution of this -plan: 1. by creating concentration camps and by placing them under the -control of the State Police for the purpose of ridding National -Socialism of any opposition; 2. by tolerating and then by approving -fatal physiological experiments on the effect of cold, and of increasing -or decreasing pressure, which experiments were carried out—with -material provided by the Luftwaffe and controlled by Dr. Rascher, -medical officer of the Luftwaffe detailed to the concentration camp of -Dachau for that purpose—on healthy deportees who were involuntary -subjects for the said experiments with which he (Göring), as chief, -associated himself; 3. by utilizing in large numbers internees for -exhausting labor under inhuman conditions in the armament factories of -the Luftwaffe: - -To find Speer guilty of having taken part in the execution of this plan -by employing in large numbers the internees for exhausting labor under -inhumane conditions in the armament factories (Document Number 1584-PS): - -To find Bormann guilty of having taken part in the execution of this -plan by participating in the extermination of internees in concentration -camps (Document Number 654-PS). - -With regard to Dönitz, Raeder, Von Papen, Von Neurath, Fritzsche, Funk, -and Schacht, we associate ourselves with the conclusion of our British -and American colleagues. And in connection with the acts above defined, -we ask you further, in accordance with the stipulation of Article 9 of -the Charter of your Tribunal, to find the OKW and the OKH guilty of the -execution of this plan by having ordered and participated in the -deportation of innocent civilians from the occupied countries in the -West: - -To find the OKW, the OKH, and the OKL guilty of the execution of this -plan by participating in the setting-up of the doctrine of hostages as a -means to terrorize and by prescribing the seizure and execution of -hostages in the countries of the West, by reducing to a degrading level -the material living conditions of prisoners of war, by depriving the -latter of the guarantees granted them by international custom and by -positive international law, by ordering or by tolerating the employment -of prisoners of war in dangerous work or in labor directly connected -with military operations, by ordering the execution of escaped prisoners -or prisoners attempting to escape, and the execution of numerous groups -of commandos, and by giving the SS and SD directives for the -extermination of airmen: - -To find the OKL guilty of having participated in the execution of this -plan: 1. by employing in large numbers internees in concentration camps -for exhaustive labor under inhuman conditions in the armament factories -of the Luftwaffe; 2. by participating in fatal physiological experiments -on the effect of cold and of increasing or decreasing pressure, which -experiments were carried out for the benefit of the Luftwaffe and -conducted by Dr. Rascher, medical officer of the Luftwaffe, attached to -the concentration camp at Dachau (Documents 343-PS, 1610-PS, 669-PS, -L-90, 668-PS, UK-56, 835-PS, 834-PS, F-278 (B)): - -To find the SS and the SD guilty of the execution of this plan by having -deported and participated in the deportation of innocent civilians from -the occupied countries in the West and by having tortured them and -exterminated them by every means in concentration camps: - -To find the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo guilty of the execution of this -plan by having given direct orders for the execution or the deportation, -with a view to their slow extermination, of members of commando groups, -airmen, escaped prisoners, those who refused to accept forced labor, or -those who were rebellious to the Nazi order; by forbidding any -repression of acts of lynching committed by the German population on -airmen brought down: - -To find the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo guilty of having tortured and of -having executed without trial members of the resistance: - -To find the same organizations and in addition, the OKW and the OKH in -collusion with the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo guilty of having -committed or ordered massacres and devastations without justification -(Documents 1063-PS, F-285, R-91, R-129, 1553-PS, L-7, F-185(A)): - -To find the Gestapo guilty of having participated in the execution of -this plan by the deportation of innocent civilians from the occupied -countries of the West by the tortures and assassinations which were -inflicted on them: - -To find the Government of the Reich (Reichsregierung) and the Leadership -Corps of the National Socialist Party guilty of having, for the purpose -of dominating Europe and the world, conceived and prepared the -systematic extermination of innocent civilians from the occupied -countries of the West through their deportation and their assassination -in concentration camps: - -To find the Leadership Corps of the National Socialist Party and the -Government of the Reich guilty of having, for the purpose of dominating -Europe and the world through terrorism, systematically conceived and -provoked tortures, summary executions, massacres, and devastation -without cause as described above: - -To find the Government of the Reich and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi -Party guilty of having, for the purpose of dominating Europe and the -world, conceived and prepared the extermination of combatants who had -surrendered and the demoralization, extensive exploitation, and -extermination of prisoners of war, and having participated in it. - -Such are the juridical qualifications of the facts which I have the -honor of submitting to you. But a few lessons emerge from these facts. -May the Tribunal permit me to state them in conclusion. - -For hundreds of years humanity has renounced the deportation of the -vanquished, their enslavement, and their annihilation through misery, -through hunger, steel, and fire. It is because a message of brotherhood -had been given to the world, and the world could not entirely forget -this message even in the midst of the horrors of war. From generation to -generation we observed an upward effort ever since this message of peace -had been given. We were confident that it was without any thought of -regressing that man had taken the view of moral progress which formed a -part of the common heritage of civilized nations. All nations revered, -equally, good faith in relations among individuals. All of them had come -to accept good faith as the law of their mutual relationship. -International morality was little by little emerging and international -relationship, like that between individuals, was more and more falling -in line with the three precepts of the classical Roman jurists: -“_Honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere_.” (Live -honorably, inflict no harm on another, give each his due.) - -Every civilized nation had been impregnated with a common humanism, -growth of a long tradition, Christian and liberal. Based on this common -heritage and achieved at the price of given experience, each nation, -enlightened by the well-conceived interests of man, had understood or -was coming to understand that in public as in private affairs loyalty, -moderation, and mutual aid were golden rules which none could transgress -indefinitely and with impunity. - -The defeat, the catastrophe which has fallen upon Germany confirm us in -this thought and give only more meaning and more clarity to the solemn -warning addressed to the American people by President Roosevelt in his -address on 27 May 1940: - - “Although our Navy, our guns, and our planes are the first line - of defense, it is certain that back of all of that there is the - spirit and the morality of a free people which give to their - material defense power, support, and efficiency. . . .” - -And in this struggle, the echoes of which are still rumbling in our -ears, it was indeed those who could rest their strength upon law, -nourish their force with justice, who won out. But because we have -followed step by step the development of the criminal madness of the -defendants and the consequences of that madness throughout these last -years, we must conclude that the patrimony of man, of which we are the -recipients, is frail indeed, that all kinds of regressions are possible, -and that we must with care watch over their heritage. There is not a -nation which, ill-educated, badly led by evil masters, would not in the -long run revert to the barbarity of the early ages. - -The German people whose military virtue we recognize, whose poets and -musicians we love, whose application to work we admire, and who did not -fail to give examples of probity in the most noble works of the spirit; -this German people, which came rather late to civilization, beginning -only with the eighth century, had slowly raised itself to the ranks of -nations possessing the oldest culture. The contribution to modern or -contemporary thought seemed to prove that this conquest of the spirit -was final; Kant, Goethe, Johann Sebastian Bach belong to humanity just -as much as Calvin, Dante, or Shakespeare; nevertheless, we behold the -fact that millions of innocent men have been exterminated on the very -soil of this people, by men of this people, in execution of a common -plan conceived by their leaders, and this people made not a single -effort to revolt. - -This is what has become of it because it has scorned the virtues of -political freedom, of civic equality, of human fraternity. This is what -has become of it, because it forgot that all men are born free and equal -before the law, that the essential action of a state has for its purpose -the deeper and deeper penetration of a respect for spiritual liberty and -fraternal solidarity in social relations and in international -institutions. - -It allowed itself to be robbed of its conscience and its very soul. Evil -masters came who awakened its primitive passions and made possible the -atrocities which I have described to you. In truth, the crime of these -men is that they caused the German people to retrogress more than 12 -centuries. - -Their crime is that they conceived and achieved, as an instrument of -government, a policy of terrorism toward the whole of the subjugated -nations and toward their own people; their crime is that they pursued, -as an end in itself, a policy of extermination of entire categories of -innocent citizens. That alone would suffice to determine capital -punishment. And still, the French Prosecution, represented by M. Faure, -intends to present proof of a still greater crime, the crime of -attempting “to obliterate from the world certain ideas which are called -liberty, independence, security of nations, which are also called faith -in the given word and respect for the human person,” the crime of having -attempted to kill the very soul, the spirit of France and other occupied -nations in the West. We consider that to be the gravest crime committed -by these men, the gravest because it is written in the Scriptures, -Matthew, XII, 31-32: - - “All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men, but - the blasphemy unto the Spirit shall not be forgiven unto men. - Whosoever speaketh against the Spirit shall not be forgiven, - neither in this world, nor in the world to come. . . . For the - tree is known by its fruit. Race of vipers, how could ye speak - good words when ye are evil. . . .” - -THE PRESIDENT: [_To M. Faure of the French Delegation_] Yes, M. Faure. - -M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. -President, Honorable Judges, I have the honor of delivering to the -Tribunal the concluding address of the French Prosecution. This -presentation relates more particularly to the sections lettered (I) and -(J) of Count Three of the Indictment: oath of allegiance and -Germanization; and on the other hand to section (B) of Count Four, -persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds. - -First of all I should like to present in a brief introduction the -general ideas which govern the plan of my final pleading. The concept of -Germanization has been stated in the presentation of M. De Menthon. It -consists essentially in imposing upon the inhabitants of occupied -territories norms for their political and social life such as the Nazis -had determined according to their own doctrine and for their own profit. -The combined activities which carried out Germanization or which have -Germanization for their purpose, and which are illegal, have been -defined as a criminal undertaking against humanity. The complete process -of Germanization was employed in certain territories to annex them to -the Reich. The Germans intended even before the end of the war to -incorporate these territories within their own country. These -territories, annexed and then germanized in an absolute manner, are the -Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Belgian Cantons of Eupen, Malmédy, and -Moresnet, and the three French Departments of Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin and -the Moselle. - -These territories can be considered relatively small in comparison with -the total area of the territories occupied by the Germans. This in no -wise mitigates the reprehensible character of these annexations; -moreover, we should note at this point two essential aspects of our -subject. - -The first proposition: The Germans had conceived and prepared more -extensive annexations than those actually carried out in an official -manner. For reasons of expediency, they did not proceed with these -annexations during the period of time at their disposal. - -The second proposition: Annexation, on the other hand, was not the -unique or obligatory procedure of Germanization. The Nazis discovered -that they could employ different and various means to achieve their -purpose of universal domination. The selection of means which vary -according to circumstances, to attain and to camouflage an identical -result, was characteristic of what has been called Nazi Machiavellism. -Their conception is technically much more pliable, more clever, and more -dangerous than the classical conception of territorial conquest. In this -respect the most brutal competitor has over them the advantage of -candor. - -To begin with I say that the Germans had formulated the plan to annex -more extensive territory. Numerous indications point to this. I would -like to give you only two citations. - -The first of these is taken from the documentation collected by our -colleagues of the American Prosecution, an American document which has -not yet been submitted to the Tribunal. I should say in addition that in -my final pleading I shall refer only twice to very remarkable American -documents. All the other documents which I shall submit will be new ones -belonging to the French Prosecution. The document of which I speak now -is Number 1155-PS of the American documents, and it appears in the file -of documents submitted to you under Number RF-601, which will become, -may it please the Tribunal, that number in French documentation. - -This document is dated Berlin, 20 June 1940. It bears the notation: “Top -Secret Staff Document.” Its title is: “Note for the Dossier on the -Conference of 19 June 1940, at Headquarters of General Field Marshal -Göring.” - -The notes which are included in this document reflect, therefore, the -views of the leaders and not individual interpretations. I would like to -read to the Tribunal only Paragraph 6 of that document, which is to be -found on Page 3. It is the first document bearing Number RF-601 -(Document Number 1155-PS), I proceed with the reading of Paragraph 6, -Page 3: - - “General plans regarding the political development. - - “Luxembourg is to be annexed by the Reich. Norway is to become - German. Alsace-Lorraine is to be reincorporated into the Reich. - An autonomous Breton state is to be created. Considerations are - pending concerning Belgium, the special treatment of the Flemish - in that country, and the creation of a State of Burgundy.” - -The second citation which I shall submit to the Tribunal on this point -refers to a French document which I submit as Document Number RF-602. -This document comprises the minutes of the interrogation of Dr. Globke, -a former assistant of State Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, -Dr. Stuckart. It is dated 25 September 1945. This interrogation was -taken by Major Graff of the French Judicial Service. - -To the minutes of the interrogation has been added a memorandum which -was delivered following the questioning by Dr. Globke. I read a passage -from this interrogation, at the beginning of the document, Paragraph 1: - - “Question: ‘Have you any knowledge of plans which envisage the - annexation of other French territories at the conclusion of - peace between Germany and France? (Belfort, Nancy, Bassin de - Briey, the coal fields of the North, the so-called “Red Zone”, - territory attached to the Government General of Belgium)?’ - - “Answer: ‘Yes, those plans did exist. They were worked out by - Dr. Stuckart, upon the personal instruction of the Führer, and I - have seen them. They were communicated to the Ministry of - Foreign Affairs, to the OKW, and to the Armistice Commission in - Wiesbaden. All these documents have been destroyed (Dr. Globke - maintains). The State Secretary, M. Stuckart, was ordered to - deliver a preliminary draft at the headquarters of the Führer - (End of 1940, before the launching of the Russian campaign). - - “‘After examination the Führer considered the proposal was too - moderate; and he ordered provisions for the incorporation of - further territories, specifically those along the Channel. - - “‘Dr. Stuckart then prepared a second draft, with a map - attached, on which the approximate borders were indicated. I - have seen it, and I can show it to you roughly on a large scale - map of France. I do not know whether this second plan was - approved by Hitler.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, did you tell us who Dr. Globke was? - -M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President, he was the assistant of Dr. Stuckart, -State Secretary in the Ministry of Interior. He styled himself in his -interrogation “officer in charge of matters concerning Alsace-Lorraine -and Luxembourg in the Ministry of the Interior, since 1940.” - -I now read a passage from the attached memorandum. This appears in your -document book immediately after the passage I have just read. Still -under Document Number RF-602, I now read Paragraph 6 of the memorandum -in question; it is the beginning of the document before your eyes. - - “The plan of a new Franco-German border was elaborated upon in - the Ministry of Interior by the State Secretary Dr. Stuckart, - upon the order given to him by Hitler. This plan envisaged that - the territory in the north and the east of France which, for - historical, political, racial, geographical, or any other - reasons ostensibly did not belong to western but to central - Europe, should be given back to Germany. A first draft was - submitted to Hitler at his general headquarters and it was - approved by him in full. Hitler nevertheless wanted . . .” - -DR. STAHMER: The Defense has not received these documents. Consequently, -even today we are not in a position to follow the presentation. Above -all, we are not in a position to check individually whether the validity -of these documents really exists at all. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, is that correct, that none of these documents -have been deposited in the Defense Information Center? - -M. FAURE: They have been deposited with two photostatic copies in the -document center of the defendants’ counsel. Moreover, before I complete -my statement, I think that the Defense Counsel will have full -opportunity to study this very brief document and to make any -observations which he may desire; but I can give you assurance that -those documents were delivered. - -THE PRESIDENT: What assurance can you give me that the orders which the -Tribunal has given have been carried out? - -M. FAURE: The documents have been delivered to the Defense Counsel in -accordance with instruction and two photostatic copies have been -delivered in the document room of the Defense. These documents are, -moreover, in the German language, which should greatly facilitate the -task of the Defense Counsel, as the interrogation was taken in the -German language by an officer of the French Judiciary Services. - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, did you hear what M. Faure said? - -DR. STAHMER: I should certainly not raise any objections if these -documents had actually been sent to our document room and put at our -disposal. This morning I and several others looked into the matter and -made an effort to determine whether the documents were really there. We -could not find out. Dr. Steinbauer and I went there; we could not find -the documents. I shall go there again to see whether they may not have -come in the meantime. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has stated on a variety of occasions that -they attach a great importance to the documents being deposited in the -defendants’ Information Center and copies supplied in accordance with -the regulations which they have laid down. Whether that has been done on -this occasion, is disputed by Dr. Stahmer. The Tribunal proposes -therefore to have the matter investigated as soon as possible and to see -exactly whether the rules have been carried out or not. And in future -they hope that they will be carried out with the greatest strictness. In -the meantime, I think it will be most convenient for you to continue. - -M. FAURE: The defendants’ counsel tells me that the documents are in the -Defense Counsel Room, but they have not yet been distributed. It can be -seen, therefore, that the orders were fully respected; but because of -the burden of work it may be that the Defense may not individually have -received these documents. In any event, I am prepared to submit -immediately to the Defense Counsel mainly concerned with this, -photostatic copies which will enable them to follow my reading of the -documents, which, incidentally, are quite brief. - -THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will have the facts investigated by -the Marshal. And in the meantime, you can continue. The Marshal of the -Court will immediately find out and report to the Tribunal what the -facts are about the deposition of the documents and the time at which -they were deposited. In the meantime you can continue, and we shall be -glad if you will assist the defendants’ counsel by giving them any -copies you may have available. - -M. FAURE: I was reading then, Document Number RF-602, the attached -memorandum. If the Tribunal wishes to follow the reading of this -document will it kindly take the book entitled “Exposé” or -“Presentation,” and turn to Page 6 thereof. The passage which I am now -coming to is the last paragraph of Page 6. “Introduction—Exposé,” Page -6, third and last paragraph, I am continuing: - - “A first draft was submitted to Hitler at his general - headquarters and was approved by him as a whole; but, - nevertheless, he called for an enlargement of the territory - falling to Germany, in particular, along the Channel coast. The - final draft was to serve as the basis for future discussions - with the administrative departments concerned. These discussions - did not take place. The intended frontier followed approximately - a course beginning at the mouth of the Somme, turning eastward - along the northern edge of the Paris Basin and Champagne to the - Argonne, then bent to the south crossing Burgundy, and westward - of the Franche-Comte, reaching the Lake of Geneva. For some - districts alternative solutions were suggested.” - -These German plans were indicated on several occasions by specific -measures having to do with the territories in question, measures which -might be designated preannexation measures. - -I come now to the second proposal which I referred to a while ago. With -or without annexation, the Germans had in mind to take and maintain -under their domination all the occupied countries. As a matter of fact -their determination was to germanize and to nazify all of Western Europe -and even the African Continent. This intention appears from the very -fact of the conspiracy which has been laid bare before the Tribunal so -completely by my colleagues of the American Prosecution. That will also -be shown by the applications made of it, of which the principal ones -will be retraced in this concluding address. - -I merely want to recall to the Tribunal this general point that the plan -for Germanic predominance is defined according to the German -interpretation itself in a public diplomatic document, which is the -Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 between Germany, Italy, and Japan. -In this connection I would like to quote before the Tribunal a few -sentences of a comment made upon this treaty by an official German -author, Von Freytagh-Loringhoven, a member of the Reichstag, who wrote a -book on German foreign policy from 1933 to 1941. This book was published -in a French translation in Paris at the publishing house of Sorlot, -during the occupation. - -I do not want to submit this as a document, but merely as a quotation -from a published work, a book, which is here in your hands. I read from -Page 311: - - “This treaty granted Germany and Italy a dominant position in - the new European order, and it accorded Japan a similar role in - the area of eastern Asia.” - -I am now skipping a sentence that has no significance. - - “At first glance, one could realize that the Tripartite Pact had - in mind a double purpose.” - -I shall skip the following sentence which is without interest, and I go -to the sentence dealing with the second purpose: - - “Moreover, it entrusted the parties with a mission for the - future, that is to say, the establishment of a new order in - Europe and eastern Asia. - - “Without seeking to lessen the importance of the first question, - there can be no doubt that this second purpose, dealing with the - future, involved vaster projects and was, in fact, the principal - point. For the first time in an international treaty, in the - Tripartite Pact, the terms ‘space’ and ‘orientation’ were used - linking one with the other.” - -I now go to Page 314 where the author makes a remark which appears to me -to be significant: - - “Now, the Tripartite Pact places a clear delimitation of the - wider spaces created by nature on our globe. The concept of - space, it is true, is employed explicitly only for the Far East, - but it is equally applicable to Europe and that within this - conception Africa is comprised. The latter is certainly - politically and economically a complement, or if one wishes, an - annex of Europe. Moreover, it is obvious that the Tripartite - Pact fixes the limits of the two great regions or spaces - reserved for the partners, that the pact tacitly recognizes the - third area, that is Asia, properly speaking, and that it leaves - aside the fourth, the American Continent, thus leaving the - latter to its own destiny. In this way the whole surface of the - globe is concerned; and an idea, which as yet has not been - considered except in theory, was given the significance of a - political principle derived from international law.” - -I have felt that this text was of interest because, on the one hand, it -clarifies the fact that the African Continent is itself included in the -space reserved to the German claimants, and on the other, it states that -the government of such an immense space by Germany constitutes -international law. This pretense of acting juridically is one of the -characteristics of the undertaking to germanize the world from 1940 to -1945. It is undoubtedly one of the reasons which inspired Nazi Germany -to proceed only on rare occasions by the annexation of territories. - -Annexation is not indispensable for the domination of a great area. It -can be replaced by other methods which correspond rather accurately to -the usual term of “vassalization.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you not think this will be a convenient time to break -off? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. FAURE: Mr. President, before resuming my brief, I should like to ask -the Tribunal if they could agree to hear, during the afternoon session, -a witness who is M. Reuter, President of the Chamber of Luxembourg. - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, M. Faure, if that is convenient to you, the -Tribunal is quite willing to hear the witness you name. - -M. FAURE: I propose on those conditions to have him heard at the -beginning of the second part of the afternoon session. - -I pointed out a moment ago that the different methods of disguised -annexation can correspond to the term “vassalization.” From a German -author I shall borrow a formula which is eloquent. It is Dr. Sperl, in -an article in the _Krakauer Zeitung_, who used this expression: “A -differentiation in methods of German domination.” In using, thus, -indirect and differentiated methods of domination, the Germans acted in -political matters, as we have seen before, in the same way as they acted -in economic matters. I had the opportunity to point out to the Tribunal, -in my first brief, that the Germans immediately seized the keys of -economic life. If you will permit me to use this Latin expression, I -shall say as far as sovereignty in the occupied countries is concerned, -they insured for themselves the power of the keys, “_potestas clavium_.” -They seized the keys of sovereignty in each country. In that fashion, -without being obliged to abolish officially national sovereignty as in -the case of annexation, they were able to control and direct the -exercise of this sovereignty. - -Beginning with these principle ideas, the plan of my brief was conceived -as follows: - -In the first chapter I shall examine the regime in annexed territories -where national sovereignty was abolished. In a second chapter I shall -examine the mechanism of the seizure of sovereignty for the benefit of -the occupying power in the regions which were not annexed. Then it will -be suitable to examine the results of these usurpations of sovereignty -and the violation of the rights of the population which resulted from -them. I thought it necessary that I should group these results by -dealing with the principal ones in a third and fourth chapter. The third -chapter will be devoted to spiritual Germanization, that is, to the -propaganda in the very extensive sense that the German concept gives to -this term. Chapter four, and the last, will bear the heading, “The -Administrative Organization of Criminal Action.” - -I would now like to point out, as far as the documentation of my brief -is concerned, I have forced myself to limit the number of texts which -will be presented to the Tribunal; and I shall attempt to make my -quotations as short as possible. For the fourth chapter, for example, I -might point out that the French Delegation examined more than 2,000 -documents, counting only the original German documents, of which I have -kept only about fifty. - -I should like also to point out to the Tribunal how the documents will -be presented in the document books which you have before you. The -documents are numbered at the top of the page to the right; they are -numbered in pencil and correspond to the order in which I shall quote -them. Each dossier has a pagination which begins with the number 100. - -I would ask the Tribunal now to take up the document book entitled: “The -Annexed Territories of Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet.” - -In carrying out, without any attempt or cloak of legality, the -annexation of occupied territories, Germany did something much more -serious than violating the rules of law. It is the negation of the very -idea of international law. The lawyer, Bustamante y Sirven, in his -treatise on international law expresses himself in the following terms -regarding this subject: - - “It can be observed that never have we alluded at any moment to - the hypothesis that an occupation terminates because the - occupying power takes possession of the occupied territory - through his military forces and without any convention. The - motive for this mission is very simple and very clear. Since - conquest cannot be considered as a legitimate mode of - acquisition, these results are uniquely the result of force and - can be neither determined nor measured by the rules of law.” - -On the other hand, I have said just now that Germanization did not -necessarily imply annexation. Inversely, we might conceive that -annexation did not necessarily mean Germanization. We shall prove to the -Tribunal that annexation was only a means, the most brutal one of -Germanization, that is to say, nazification. - -The annexation of the Belgian cantons of Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet -was made possible by a German law of 18 May 1940 and was the subject of -an executive decree of 23 May 1940. These are public regulations, which -were published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Pages 777 and 804. I should -like to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this. - -As a result of this decree the three Belgian districts were attached to -the province of the Rhineland, district of Aachen. - -A decree dated 24 September 1940 installed local German government and -German municipal laws. A decree of 28 July 1940 introduced the German -judicial system in these territories. Local courts were established in -Malmédy, in Eupen and St. Vith, and district courts at Aachen, which -could judge cases on equality with the local courts. - -The Court of Appeal of Cologne replaced the Belgian Court of Cassation -for cases where the latter would have been competent. German law was -introduced in these territories by the decree of 23 May 1940, signed by -Hitler, Göring, Frick, and Lammers and was effective as from September -1940. - -A decree of 3 September 1940 regulates the details of the transition of -Belgian law into German law in the domains of private law, commercial -law, and law of procedure. - -By the decree of annexation German nationality was conferred upon the -inhabitants of German racial origin in this Belgian territory. The -details of this measure were specified and stipulated by the decree of -23 September 1941. All persons who had acquired Belgian nationality as a -result of the ceding of these territories could, according to the terms -of the decree, resume their German nationality, with the exception, -however, of Jews and Gypsies. All the other inhabitants, on condition -that they were racially German, could acquire German nationality, which -might be revoked after 10 years. - -I shall not take up at great length the situation which resulted from -the annexation of these Belgian territories, for the developments of the -situation are analogous to those which we shall examine in the other -countries. I simply would like to point out a special detail of this -subject: A law of 4 February 1941, signed by Hitler, Göring, Frick, and -Lammers granted the citizens of Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet -representation in the Reichstag, that is to say, the benefits of the -German parliamentary regime, the democratic character of which is known. - -I shall ask the Tribunal to now take up the file entitled “Alsace and -Lorraine.” There is a file, “Exposé,” and a file, “Documents.” - -Contrary to what took place in the Belgian cantons the Germans did not -officially proclaim by law the annexation of the three French -departments which constitute Alsace and Lorraine. The fact of this -annexation, however, is in no way doubtful. I should like to remind the -Tribunal here of extracts from a document which has already been -submitted to it, which is Document Number RF-3 of the French -documentation. It concerns a deposition made before the French High -Court of Justice, by the French Ambassador, Léon Noël, who was a member -of the Armistice Delegation. I did not put this document in your book -because I shall cite only one sentence from it. The document has already -been submitted to the Tribunal, as I have just said. - -Ambassador Noël, in this document, pointed out the conversations which -he had at the time of the signing of the Armistice Convention with the -German representatives, notably with the accused Keitel and Jodl. The -sentence which I would like to remind the Tribunal of is as follows: - - “. . . and likewise, in thinking of Alsace and Lorraine, I - required them to say that the administrative and judicial - authorities of the occupied territories would keep their - positions and functions and would be able to correspond freely - with the government.” - -The affirmations are dated 22 June 1940. - -I am now going to submit to the Tribunal a document of 3 September 1940, -which is a note of protest of the French Delegation, addressed to the -Armistice Commission. I submit this to the Tribunal in order that the -Tribunal may see that during the period which elapsed between these two -dates, a period which covers barely 2 months, the Nazis had applied a -series of measures which created, in an incontestable manner, a state of -annexation. - -This document which I submit bears the Number RF-701 of the French -documentation. It is the first document of the document book which the -Tribunal has before it. All the documents in this chapter will bear -numbers beginning with the Number 7, that is to say, beginning with -RF-701. - -This document comes from the file of the French High Court of Justice, -and the copy submitted to the Tribunal has been certified by the clerk -of this jurisdiction. I should like to quote from this document, -beginning with the fourth paragraph on Page 1 of the Document Number -RF-701: - - “1. Prefects, subprefects, and mayors, as well as a number of - local officials whose tendencies were considered suspicious, - have been evicted from their respective offices. - - “2. Monseigneur Heintz, bishop appointed under the Concordat to - Metz, was driven from his diocese. Several members of the - clergy, secular as well as regular, were also expelled under the - pretext that they were French in tongue and mentality. - - “3. Monseigneur Ruch, the bishop appointed under the Concordat - to Strasbourg, was forbidden to enter his diocese and, - consequently, to resume his ministry. - - “4. M. Joseph Bürckel was appointed on 7 August, Gauleiter of - Lorraine and M. Robert Wagner, Gauleiter of Alsace. The first of - these provinces was attached to the Gau of Saar-Palatinate; the - second to the Gau of Baden. - - “5. Alsace and Lorraine were incorporated in the civil - administration of Germany. The frontier and custom police were - then placed on the western limits of these territories. - - “6. The railroads were incorporated in the German network. - - “7. The post office, telegraph, and telephone administration was - taken over by the German postal authorities, who gradually - substituted their own personnel for the Alsatian personnel. - - “8. The French language was eliminated, not only in - administrative life but also from public use. - - “9. Names of localities were germanized. - - “10. The racial legislation of Germany was introduced into the - country; and as a result of this measure, the Jews were expelled - as well as nationals which the German authorities considered to - be intruders. - - “11. Only the Alsatians and Lorrainers who agreed to consider - themselves as being of German stock were permitted to return to - their homes. - - “12. The property of associations of a political character and - of Jews was confiscated as well as property acquired after 11 - November 1918 by French persons. - - “Nothing illustrates better the spirit which animates these - measures, in themselves arbitrary, than the words pronounced - publicly 16 July at Strasbourg by M. Robert Wagner. Stressing - the elimination of all elements of foreign stock or nationality - which was taking place, this high official affirmed that the - purpose of Germany was to settle once and for all the Alsatian - question. - - “Such a policy, which could not be the function of subordinate - occupational authorities, was equivalent to disguised annexation - and is strictly contrary to agreements subscribed to by Germany - at Rethondes.” - -Numerous protests were subsequently lodged by the French Delegation. We -have attached to our file a list of these protests; there are 62 of -them. This list is found in the book under the Document Number RF-702. - -The development of the German policy may now be studied through three -series of measures which were carried out. First, a body of measures -destined to assure the elimination of what can be called the French -complex, that is to say, of everything which can tie an inhabitant of an -annexed country to his way of life and to his national tradition. -Second, a body of measures destined to impose German standards in all -domains of life of the population. Third, the measures of transportation -and of colonization. We use here the German terminology. - -First, elimination of the French complex. - -The elimination of French nationality and of French law resulted -automatically from the measures which we shall study relative to the -imposition of German standards. I should like to point out particularly, -that the Germans tried to fight against all elements of French -organization which might have survived the suppression of their national -juridical conditions. - -At first they proscribed, in an extraordinarily brutal way, the use of -the French language. Several regulations were formulated relative to -this. I shall cite only the third regulation, bearing the date of 16 -August 1940, entitled, “Concerning the Reintroduction of the Mother -Tongue.” This document is published in the Journal of German Ordinances -or Decrees of 1940, (_Verordnungsblatt_) on Page 2. It bears Document -Number RF-703. The Tribunal will find it in the document book after the -Document Number 702, which is the list of French protests. I should like -to read a large part of this document, which is interesting; and I shall -start at the beginning: - - “Following the measures undertaken with a view of reintroducing - the mother tongue of the Alsatian people, I decree as follows: - - “1. Official Language. - - “All public services in Alsace, including administration of - communes, of corporations within the meaning of civil law, - public establishments, churches, and foundations, as well as - tribunals, will use exclusively the German language orally and - in writing. The Alsatian population will use exclusively its - German mother tongue in both oral and written applications to - the above establishments. - - “2. Christian and Family Names. - - “Christian names will be exclusively used in their German form - orally and in writing, even when they have been inscribed in the - French language on the birth register. As soon as this present - decree comes into force, only German Christian names may be - inscribed upon the birth register. Alsatians who bear French - Christian names, which do not exist in German form, are asked to - apply for a change of their Christian names in order to show - their attachment to Germanism. The same holds good for French - family names.” - -I shall skip the following sentence and go to Paragraph 4: - - “4. It is forbidden to draw up, in the French language, - contracts and accounts under private seal of whatever nature - they may be. Anything printed on business paper and on forms - must be drawn up in the German language. Books and accounts of - all business firms, establishments, and companies must be kept - in the German language. - - “5. Inscriptions in Cemeteries. - - “In the future, inscriptions on crosses and on tombstones can be - written only in the German language. This provision applies as - well to a new inscription as to the renewal of old - inscriptions.” - -These measures were accompanied by a press campaign. Because of the -resistance of the population, this campaign was carried on throughout -the occupation. - -I should like to make one citation of an article which is particularly -significant, published in the _Dernières Nouvelles de Strasbourg_ on 30 -March 1943. This is not introduced as a document; it is a quotation of a -published article. When we read such an article, we think it at first a -joke; but we see, subsequently, that it is serious because repressive -measures had to be taken against people who sabotaged the German -language. I cite: - - “Germans greet one another with ‘Heil Hitler.’ We do not want - any more French greetings, which we still hear constantly in a - thousand different forms. The elegant salutation ‘Bonjour’ is - not made for these rough Alsatian throats, accustomed to the - German tongue since the distant epoch of Osfried von - Weissenburg. The Alsatian hurts our ears when he says - ‘boschurr.’ When he says ‘Au Revoir,’ the French think they are - listening to an Arabic word, which sounds like ‘arwar.’ - Sometimes they say ‘Adje’ (Adieu). - - “These phonetic monstrosities which disfigure our beautiful - Alsatian-Germanic dialect resemble a thistle in a flower bed. - Let us weed them out! They are not worthy of Alsace. Do you - believe feminine susceptibility is wounded by saying ‘Frau’ - instead of ‘Madame’? We are sure that Alsatians will drop the - habit of linguistic whims so that the authorities will not have - to use rigorous measures against saboteurs of the German - language.” - -After this attack on the language, the National Socialists attacked -music. This is the purpose of a decree of 1 March 1941, signed by -Dressler, the Chief of the Department of Public Enlightenment and -Propaganda in the Office of the Chief of Civil Administration for -Alsace. - -This is Document Number RF-704, published in the German Official Journal -(_Verordnungsblatt_) Page 170 of the year 1941. I shall simply cite the -title of this decree: “Decree Concerning Undesirable and Injurious -Music.” The first 3 lines are: - - “Musical works contrary to the cultural will of National - Socialists will be entered on a list of undesirable and - injurious music by the Department for Public Enlightenment and - Propaganda.” - -After music, now, we have the question of hairdress. In this regulation -the ridiculous constantly disputes supremacy with the odious. I would -almost like to ask the Tribunal to pardon me, but, truly, nothing in -this is invented by us. - -Here is Document Number RF-705. It is a decree of 13 December 1941 -published in the Official Bulletin of 1941, Page 744. This Document -RF-705 concerns the wearing of French berets (Basque berets) in Alsace. -I read only the first paragraph: - - “The wearing of French berets (Basque berets) is forbidden in - Alsace. Under this prohibition are included all berets which by - form or appearance resemble French berets.” - -I may add that any violation of this decree was punishable by fine or -imprisonment. - -The leaders also undertook a long struggle against French flags which -the inhabitants kept in their houses. I cite as an example Document -Number RF-706, a German administrative document which we found in the -archives of the Gau Administration of Strasbourg. It is dated 19 -February 1941. I read 3 paragraphs of this document. - - “The Gauleiter desires that the Alsatian population be - recommended by the organization of the Block- and Zellenleiter - to rip up the French flags still in possession of the people and - to use them in a suitable way for household needs. - - “By the 1st of next May no French flag should be in private - hands. This goal should be attained in a way by which the - Blockleiter are to visit each household and recommend the - families to use the flags for household needs. It should also be - pointed out that after the 1st of next May corresponding - conclusions shall be drawn concerning the attitude of owners if, - after this date, French flags are still found in private - possession.” - -The following document is our Document Number RF-707, which is also an -administrative memorandum on the same subject, dated Strasbourg, 26 -April 1941, of which I should simply like to read the last sentence: - - “If, after 1 June 1941, Alsatians are found still to have French - flags in their possession, they are to be sent to a - concentration camp for one year.” - -The Nazis feared French influence to such a degree that they even took a -special measure to prevent the coming to Alsace of French workers among -the laborers brought into this territory for compulsory labor service. -This is the purpose of a memorandum of 7 September 1942 of the civil -administration in Alsace, which is our Document Number RF-708, also -found in the archives of the Gauleitung of Strasbourg. I read the first -few lines of this Document Number RF-708. - - “Given the general situation of the labor market, the Chief of - the Civil Administration in Alsace has decided that foreign - labor from all European countries could, in the future, be used - in Alsace. There is but one exception, for French and Belgians, - who cannot be employed in Alsace . . . .” - -The German undertaking against the French sentiment of Alsatians . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: The translation which came through to me came to me as -“must.” It came through that the foreign workers of all countries of -Europe _must_, in the future, be used. The word is “pouvait.” That does -not mean “must,” does it? It is “pouvait.” Does not that mean “could”? - -M. FAURE: “Could,” according to necessity. The interesting aspect is -that those who are French may not work there, even if labor is needed in -Alsace. - -The German undertaking against the French sentiments of the Alsatians -found its complementary aspect in the attempt also to destroy, on the -outside, anything which might be an indication of Alsace belonging to -the motherland, France. I shall cite one example in relation to this -point. This is our Document Number RF-709. - -It is a letter of the German Embassy in Paris, 7 May 1941, which is -reproduced in a memorandum of the French Delegation, which is found in -the archives of the government. I read this Document Number RF-709, -which is short: - - “The German Embassy has the honor to point out the following to - the General Delegation of the French Government in occupied - territory: - - “The German Embassy has been informed that in a series of - reports on a theme concerning the fatherland, a French radio - station in the unoccupied territory, on 16 or 17 April 1941, - about 2100 hours, is said to have made a broadcast about the - village of Brumath. - - “As Brumath, near Strasbourg, is in a German language territory, - the German Embassy requests that they inform it if such a - broadcast was actually made.” - -There exist numerous claims and protests of this kind, which fortunately -have often an anecdotal character. We must now cite two especially -serious cases, for they included assault, flagrant violations of -sovereignty, and even crime. - -The first case concerns the seizure and profanation of the treasure of -the Cathedral of Strasbourg. I shall submit, concerning this subject, -Document Number RF-710, which is a letter of protest of 14 August 1943 -written by General Bérard, President of the French Delegation of the -Armistice Commission. I read the beginning of the letter and repeat that -the date is 14 August 1943: - - “Dear General, - - “From the beginning of the war, the treasure of Strasbourg - Cathedral and the property of certain parishes of this diocese - had been entrusted by Monseigneur Ruch, Bishop of Strasbourg, to - the Beaux-Arts Department. This department had put them in a - safe place in the castles of Hautefort and of Bourdeilles in - Dordogne, where they still were on the date of 20 May 1943. - - “The treasure and this property included, in particular, the - pontificalia reserved for the exclusive use of the Bishop, - several of which were his personal property, the relics of - saints, vessels, or objects for the performance of ceremonies. - - “After having sought on several occasions—but in vain—to - obtain the consent of Monseigneur Ruch, the Ministerial - Counsellor Kraft, on 20 May, requested not only the prefect of - Dordogne, but also the director of religious matters, for - authority to remove the objects deposited. Faced with the - refusal of these high officials, he declared that the - repatriation to Alsace of the property of the Catholic Church - would be entrusted to the Sicherheitspolizei. - - “As a result, at dawn on 21 May, the castles of Hautefort and - Bourdeilles were opened and occupied by troops, despite the - protests of the guardian. The sacred objects were placed in - trucks and taken to an unknown destination. - - “This seizure, moreover, was extended to consecrated vessels and - ceremonial objects and the relics of saints worshipped by the - faithful. The seizure of these sacred objects by laymen not - legally authorized and the conditions under which the operation - was carried out aroused the emotion and unanimous reprobation of - the faithful.” - -Relative to this document I would like to emphasize to the Tribunal one -fact which we shall find frequently hereafter, and which is, in our -opinion, very important in this Trial. It is the constant interference -and collaboration of different or diverse German administrations. Thus, -the Tribunal must through this document see that Ministerial Counsellor -Kraft, belonging to the civilian service dealing with national -education, appeals to the police of the SS to obtain objects which he -cannot obtain through his own efforts. - -The second case which I would like to cite concerns the University of -Strasbourg. From the beginning of the war the University of Strasbourg, -which was one of the finest in France, had withdrawn to Clermont-Ferrand -to continue its teaching there. After the occupation of Alsace and since -this occupation really meant annexation, it was not reinstated in -Strasbourg and remained in its city of refuge. The Nazis expressed their -great disapproval of this in numerous threatening memoranda. - -We would like to submit Document Number RF-711 relative to this. In this -document we shall again come across the Ministerial Counsellor, Herbert -Kraft, about whom I spoke in the preceding document. The document, which -I submit, bears the Document Number RF-711 and is an original signed by -Kraft. It was found in the archives of the German Embassy. In this -memorandum, which is dated 4 July 1941, Counsellor Kraft expresses his -disappointment at the result of steps which he had undertaken with the -Rector of the University of Strasbourg, M. Danjon. - -I believe that it is adequate if I read a very short passage of this -memorandum in order to show the insolence and the threatening methods -which the Germans used, even in the part of France which was not yet -occupied. The passage which I am going to read will be the last -paragraph on Page 2 of Document Number RF-711. Mr. Kraft relates the end -of his conversation with the rector. I cite: - - “I cut off the conversation, rose, and asked him, by chance, - whether the decisions of Admiral Darlan did not represent for - him an order from his government. As I went out I added, ‘I hope - that you will be arrested.’ He ran after me, made me repeat my - remark, and called out, ironically, that this would be a great - honor for him.” - -This document gives an amusing impression, but the matter as a whole was -very serious. - -The 15th of June 1943 the German Embassy wrote a note which I submit as -Document Number RF-712. This document is an extract from the archives of -the High Court of Justice, and has been certified by the clerk of that -jurisdiction. Here is the text of this Document RF-712. I shall not read -the beginning of the document: - - “The German Embassy considers it very desirable to find a - solution of the affair of the University of Strasbourg at - Clermont-Ferrand. - - “We would be happy to learn that no further publication would - appear under the heading ‘University of Strasbourg’ so that new - disagreements may not result from publications of that kind. - - “The German Embassy has taken note of the fact that the Ministry - of National Education will no longer fill vacant professorial - chairs. - - “Furthermore, it is requested that in the future no examination - certificates be awarded under the title ‘University of - Strasbourg.’” - -I must, in concluding this subject of the University of Strasbourg, -point out to the Tribunal a fact which is notorious, that is that -Thursday, 25 November 1943, the German police took possession of the -buildings of the University of Strasbourg in Clermont-Ferrand, arrested -the professors and students, screened them, and deported a great number -of persons. During this operation, they even shot at two professors; one -was killed and the other seriously wounded. - -I will be able to produce a document relative to this; but I think that -is not indispensable, since there are no proofs for the Prosecution that -these murders were committed under orders which definitely show -governmental responsibility. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, did you say that you had or had not got proof -of the facts that you have just stated about the seizure of the property -of the university? - -M. FAURE: I said this, Mr. President: We consider that these facts are -facts of public knowledge; but because of the interpretation which was -given by the Tribunal, I have considered that it would be better to -prove it by a document. As this document was not added to my file at -that time, this document will be submitted as an appendix. I am going to -read a passage of this document; but I should like to explain that it is -not found in its proper place, as I added it to the brief after the -statement of the Tribunal the other day on the interpretation of facts -of “public knowledge.” - -THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now. - -Tomorrow being Saturday, the Tribunal will sit from 10 o’clock in the -morning until 1 o’clock. We will then adjourn. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: It was said that this afternoon there will be a witness. -I would like to ask that this testimony be postponed to another day. I -believe that we have reached a so-called silent agreement that we shall -be notified in advance as to whether there will be witnesses and what -the subject of their evidence will be. - -I do not know whether there will be cross-examination; but the -possibility exists, of course, and pertinent questions can only be put -when we know, first of all, who the witness is to be, and secondly, what -the subject will be on which the witness is to be cross-examined, -perhaps just a clue. - -THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think it is necessary to postpone -the evidence of this witness. As a matter of courtesy on the part of the -Prosecution, it would be well, perhaps, but the subject matter—not -necessarily the name, but the subject matter upon which the witness is -to give evidence—should be communicated to the Defense so that they may -prepare themselves upon that subject matter for any cross-examination. - -I understand that this afternoon you propose to call a witness who will -deal with the circumstances in respect to the German occupation of -Luxembourg. That is right, is it not? - -M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you will give the defendants’ counsel the subject -matter upon which they can prepare themselves for cross-examination. I -am told that this subject matter has already been communicated to the -defendants and is on their bulletin board at the present moment. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the -Defendants Kaltenbrunner, Seyss-Inquart, and Streicher will be absent -from this afternoon’s session on account of illness. - -THE PRESIDENT: The question which was raised this morning about certain -documents has been investigated, and the Tribunal understands that the -documents were placed in the Defense Counsel’s Information Center -yesterday; but it may be that the misunderstanding arose owing to those -documents not having been in any way indexed, and it would, I think, be -very helpful to the Defense Counsel if Prosecuting Counsel could, with -the documents, deposit also some sort of index which would enable the -Defense Counsel to find the documents. - -M. FAURE: It is understood that we shall present a table of contents of -the documents. - -THE PRESIDENT: I think if you could, yes. - -M. FAURE: Your Honors, I was speaking this morning of the incident which -occurred at the Strasbourg faculty in Clermont-Ferrand, on 25 November -1943. I pointed out to the Tribunal that I shall produce to this effect -a document. This document has not been classified in the document book, -and I shall ask the Tribunal to accept it as an annex number or as the -last document of this book, if that is agreeable. - -This is a report of M. Hoeppfner, Dean of the Faculty of Letters, -established on 8 January 1946, and transmitted from Lorraine to the -French Prosecution. I should like simply to read to the Tribunal, in -order not to take up too much of its time, the two passages which -constitute the texts which were submitted to it as an appendix. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the original document here? - -M. FAURE: Yes, Your Honor. - - “It is the 25th of November 1943, a Thursday. The 10 o’clock - class is drawing to an end. As I come out of the room, a student - posted at a window in the hall signals me to approach and shows - me in the inner court in front of the Department of Physics a - Wehrmacht soldier with helmet, boots, a submachine gun in his - arm, mounting guard. ‘Let us try to flee.’ Too late. At the same - moment, wild cries arise from all directions—the corridors, the - stairways are filled with the sound of heavy boots, the clanking - of weapons, fierce cries, a frantic shuffling. A soldier rushes - down the hall shouting, ‘Everybody in the courtyard—tell the - others.’ Naturally, everyone understood.” - -Second passage: - - “One of our people, Paul Collomp, was cold-bloodedly murdered - with a shot in the chest, and an eyewitness confirms the fact. - Alas, it is only too true. Asked to leave the Secretariat where - he was, Collomp no doubt obeyed too slowly to suit the - policeman, for the latter gave him a violent blow on the back; - instinctively, our colleague turned around, and the other then - fired a shot directly into his chest. Death was almost - immediate, but the body was left lying there alone until that - evening. Another rumor reached us. We didn’t know from where. A - colleague in Protestant Theology, M. Eppel, was apparently also - shot down, in his own house, where they had gone to look for - him. He received, as was later learned, several bullet shots in - the abdomen but miraculously recovered and even survived the - horrors of Buchenwald Camp.” - -As I indicated to the Tribunal this morning, I wish to say that the -Prosecution has no proof that such crimes were due to a German -governmental order; but I believe that it is nevertheless interesting to -advise the Tribunal of this last episode in the German undertakings -against the University of Strasbourg, for the episode constitutes the -sequel and, in a sense, the climax of the preceding incidents. We have -seen, indeed, that German procedure began at first regularly and that -after these regular procedures it reached the stage of recourse to the -police. Brutality and violation accompanied this recourse. - -I wish to advise you that this document which I have just read bears the -Document Number RF-712 (bis). - -I come now to the second part of this subject, which is the imposition -of German standards. The leaders of the Reich began by organizing a -specifically German administration. I already indicated a while ago the -appointment of Gauleiter as heads of the civil administration. I -continue on this point by producing as Document Number RF-713 the -Ordinance of 28 August 1940, _Official Gazette_ of the Reich, 1940, Page -22. The Ordinance is entitled: “Concerning the Introduction of the -German Regime in Alsace.” I shall not read this Ordinance. I simply -indicate that its object is to put into effect, from 1 October 1940 on, -the German municipal regime of 30 January 1935. - -The text and the organization show that the territories annexed were -reorganized on the basis of German administrative concepts. At the head -of each district (arrondissement) we no longer have a French subprefect -but a Landkommissar, who has under his orders the different offices of -Finance, Labor, School Inspection, Commerce, and Health. The large -towns, the chief towns of arrondissements and even of cantons, were -endowed with a Stadtkommissar instead of, and replacing, the mayors and -elected counsellors, who had been eliminated. The judicial offices were -attached to the court of appeals in Karlsruhe. The economic departments -and, in particular, the chambers of commerce were run by the -representatives of the chambers of commerce of Karlsruhe for Alsace and -of Saarbrücken for Moselle. - -After having germanized the forms of administrative activity, the -Germans undertook to germanize the staffs. They nominated numerous -German officials to posts of authority. They attempted, moreover, on a -number of occasions, to make the officials who had remained in office -sign declarations of loyalty to the Germans. These attempts, however, -met with a refusal from the officials. They were therefore renewed on a -number of occasions in different forms. We have recovered from the -archives of the Gauleiter of Strasbourg 8 or 10 different formulas for -these declarations of loyalty. I shall produce one of these for the -Tribunal, by way of example. - -This is Document Number RF-714. It is the formula for the new -declaration which the officials are obliged to sign if they wish to -retain their positions: - - “Name and first name, grade and service, residence. - - “I have been employed from —— 1940 to this date in the public - service of the German administration in Alsace. During this - period I have had, from my own observation as well as from the - Party and the authorities, verbally and in writing, occasion to - learn the obligations of a German official and the requirements - which are exacted of him from a political and ideological point - of view. I approve these obligations and these requirements - without reservation and am resolved to be ruled by them in my - personal and professional life. I affirm my adherence to the - German people and to the National Socialist ideals of Adolf - Hitler.” - -Along with the administration, properly speaking, the Nazis set up in -Alsace the parallel administration of the National Socialist Party, as -well as that of the Arbeitsfront, which was the sole labor organization. - -German currency legislation was introduced in Alsace on 19 October and -in Lorraine on 25 October 1940. The Reichsmark became thenceforth the -legal means of payment in the annexed territory. The German judicial -organization was introduced by a series of successive measures leading -up to the decree of 30 September 1941 concerning the simplification of -the judicial organization in Alsace. I produce this ordinance as -Document Number RF-715, without reading it. - -In regard to the teaching system, the German authorities established a -series of regulations and ordinances which were aimed at assuring the -unification of the Alsatian school system with the German teaching -system. I shall simply mention the dates of the principal texts, which -we produce as documents, and which are of a public nature, since they -were all published in the _Official Gazette_ of the Reich in Alsace. -Here are the main texts: - -Document Number RF-717, regulation of 2 October 1940. - -Document Number RF-718, ordinance of 24 March 1941 on elementary -teaching in Alsace. - -Document Number RF-719, ordinance of 21 April 1941 concerning the -allocation of subsidies for education in Alsace. - -Document Number RF-720, ordinance of 11 June 1941 on obligatory -education in Alsace. - -I now quote a series of measures ordering the introduction in Alsace and -Lorraine of German civil law, German criminal law, and even procedure. I -shall quote as the most important, under Document Number RF-721, the -ordinance of 19 June 1941 concerning the application of the provisions -of German legislation to Alsatians. I should like to read the first -paragraph of Article 1 because it contains an interesting item: - - “Article 1: - - “1. The legal relationships of persons who acquired French - citizenship under the Appendix to Articles 51 to 79 of the - Versailles dictate and of those who derive their nationality - from those persons, in particular in the domain of personal and - family law, are governed by the legislation in force in the - former Empire, in accordance with the law of the country of - origin, insofar as this legislation applies to the country of - origin.” - -A similar ordinance was drawn up for Lorraine, Document Number RF-722, -ordinance of 15 September 1941 concerning the application of German -legislation to personal and family status in Lorraine. _Official -Bulletin_ of the Reich, Page 817. - -I should like to quote, indicating the titles and references, the -principal measures which have been introduced in penal matters: - -Document Number RF-723, notice of 14 February 1941 relative to the penal -dispositions declared applicable in Lorraine by virtue of Section 1 of -the second ordinance concerning certain transitory measures in the -domain of justice. - -Document Number RF-724, ordinance of 29 October 1941 relative to the -introduction into Alsace of the German legislation of penal procedure -and of other penal laws. - -Document Number RF-725, ordinance of 30 January 1942 relative to the -introduction into Alsace of the German penal code and other penal laws. - -I do not wish to read this text which is long, but I should like to draw -the attention of the Tribunal to two features which show that the -Germans introduced into Alsace the most extraordinary provisions of -their penal law, conceived from the point of view of the National -Socialist regime. The Tribunal will thus see, in this Document Number -RF-725, Page 1 under Number 6 of the enumeration, that the law of 20 -December 1934, repressing perfidious attacks directed against the State -and the Party and protecting Party uniforms, was introduced into Alsace, -as well as the ordinance of 25 November 1939, under Number 11 of the -enumeration, completing the penal provisions relating to the protection -of the military power of the German people. - -As concerns public freedom, the Germans eliminated from the beginning -the right of association; and they dissolved all existing associations. -They intended to leave free room for the Nazi system, which was to be -the only and obligatory association. - -I shall quote in the same way a number of documents, with the titles of -these public texts: - -Document Number RF-726, regulation of 16 August 1940, dissolving the -youth organizations in Alsace. - -Document Number RF-727, regulation of 22 August 1940, setting up a -supervising commission for associations in Lorraine. - -Document Number RF-728, regulation of 3 September 1940, providing for -the dissolution of teachers’ unions. I point out, in regard to this -Document RF-728, that the last article provides an exception in favor of -the organization called “Union of National Socialist Teachers.” - -Document Number RF-729, regulation of 3 September 1940, providing for -the dissolution of gymnastic societies and of sports associations in -Alsace. I should like to read Article 4 of this Document RF-729: - - “My Commissioner of Physical Culture will take, in regard to - other gymnastic societies and sports associations in Alsace, all - necessary provisions in view of their re-integration into the - Reich’s National Socialist Union for Physical Culture.” - -Following up these measures of Germanization, we now encounter two texts -which are very characteristic and which I produce as Documents Numbers -RF-730 and RF-731. Of Document Number RF-730 I read simply the title, -which is significant: “Ordinance of 7 February 1942 Relative to the -Creation of an Office of the Upper Rhine for Genealogical Research.” I -shall likewise read the title of Document Number RF-731, “Regulation of -17 February 1942 Concerning the Creation of the Department of the Reich -Commission for the Strengthening of Germanism.” - -I indicated a moment ago to the Tribunal that the Party had been -established in Alsace and in Lorraine in a way that was parallel with -the administration in Germany. I shall produce in this connection -Document Number RF-732, which is a confidential note of the National -Socialist Workers Party of the province of Baden dated Strasbourg, 5 -March 1942. This document belongs likewise to the series found in the -files of the Gauleitung of Strasbourg. It bears as a heading, -“Gaudirektion—Auxiliary Bureau of Strasbourg.” If it please the -Tribunal, I shall read the beginning of this document: - - “Evaluation of recruiting possibilities of the Party, its - subdivisions and related groups in Alsace. - - “In the framework of the drive of 19 June organized for the - recruiting of party members, the Kreisleiter in collaboration - with the Ortsgruppenleiter have to investigate Alsatians above - the age of 18, even if their membership is not yet to be - obtained within this drive which may be”—the word “which” was - omitted in the text—“considered for prospective membership of - the Party, its sections, and affiliated organizations and which - men between the age of 17 and 48 could be actively employed in - the Party or in its subdivisions. In order to gain a numerical - survey, these investigations should also comprise all persons - already enrolled in the Party, in the Opferring”—this is the - collecting organization of the Party—“in the sections, and - affiliated organizations. - - “The Kreisleiter may call upon the collaboration of the - Kreisorganisationsleiter”—these are the organizing directors of - the section—“and of the Kreispersonalamtsleiter”—the personnel - information offices of the sections—“In spite of this work the - 19 June drive for recruiting members should not suffer but must - be carried on by all possible means and gain the goal set by the - Gauleiter at the given date. - - “The results of the screening of the population are to be - compiled in five lists, namely: List 1a; List 1b; List 2a; List - 2b; Control list.” - -I shall skip over the following paragraphs, which are rather long and -purely administrative, and I shall continue on Page 2 of the document, -Paragraph 9: - - “Since it is the aim of the National Socialist movement to - embrace all Germans in a National Socialist organization in - order to mould and direct them in compliance with the intentions - of the Movement, 90 percent of the population will have to - figure on Lists 1a and b and 2a and b, while on the Control List - only those shall be named who, on account of racial inferiority - or asocial or anti-German attitude are considered unworthy of - belonging to an organization, are not deemed worthy of - membership in Party organizations.” - -I shall now enter upon the two most serious questions which are directly -interconnected, questions which, on the one hand, concern nationality -and, on the other hand, military recruiting. - -The German policy in the matter of nationality reveals a certain -hesitation, which is related to the German policy in regard to military -recruiting. Indeed, the German leaders seem to have been swayed by two -contradictory trends. One of these trends was that of bestowing the -German nationality on a large number of people, in order to impose the -corresponding obligation for military service. The other trend was that -of conferring nationality only with discrimination. According to this -viewpoint it was considered, first of all, that the possession of -nationality was an honor and should to some extent constitute a reward -when conferred on those who had not previously possessed it. On the -other hand, nationality confers on its possessor a certain special -quality. In spite of the abolition of all democracy, it gives that -person a certain influence in the German community. It should, -therefore, be granted only to persons who give guarantees in certain -regards, notably that of loyalty; and we know that, from the German -point of view, loyalty is not only a matter of mental attitude and -choice but that it also applies to certain well-known physical elements, -such as those of blood, race, and origin. - -These are the two opposed trends in the German policy of conferring -nationality. This is how they develop: - -At first—and up to the month of August 1942—the Reich, not yet -requiring soldiers as urgently as it did later, deferred the -introduction of compulsory recruiting. Along with this they also -deferred any action to impose German nationality on the population -generally. During this earlier period the Nazis did not resort to -compulsory recruiting but relied simply on voluntary recruiting which, -however, they tried to render more effective by offering all kinds of -inducements and exercising pressure in various ways. - -I shall not go into details regarding these German procedures for -voluntary recruitment. I should like simply to give, by way of example, -the subject matter of Document Number RF-733. It is an appeal posted in -Alsace on 15 January 1942 and constitutes one of the appendices of the -governmental report, which was submitted previously under Document -Number UK-72. In this document, I shall read simply the first sentence -of the second paragraph: - - “Alsatians: Since the beginning of the campaign in the East, - hundreds of Alsatians have freely decided to march as - volunteers, side by side with the men of the other German - regions, against the enemy of civilization and European - culture.” - -For anyone who knows German propaganda and its technique of -exaggeration, the term “hundreds” which is used in this document -immediately betrays the failure of the Nazi recruiters. “Hundreds” may -obviously be translated by “tens,” and it must be admitted that this was -a very poor supply for the Wehrmacht. - -During the period that I am speaking of the Nazis practiced, in regard -to nationality, a policy similar to their policy in recruiting military -forces, that is, a policy of selective nationalization. They appealed -for volunteers for German nationality. It is desirable to quote in this -regard an ordinance of 20 January 1942, a general ordinance of the -Reich, not a special one for the annexed territories. - -This ordinance in its first article increases the possibilities of -naturalization, which until then had been extremely limited, in -accordance with the Reich statute book. In Article 3 it gives the -following provision: (This ordinance is not produced in the document -book, for it is an ordinance of the German Reich and, therefore, a -public document.) - - “The Reich Minister of the Interior may, by means of a general - regulation, grant German nationality to categories of foreigners - established on a territory placed under the sovereign power of - Germany or having their origin in such territory.” - -In connection with this earlier period it is necessary to stress that -natives of Alsace-Lorraine who did not become German citizens did not -retain their French nationality. They are all considered as German -subjects. They are qualified in the documents of the period as “members -of the German community (Volksdeutsch),” and are consequently liable for -German labor service. I submit Document Number RF-734 in this -connection, “Regulation of 27 August 1942, on Compulsory Military -Service and on Labor Service in Alsace.” I shall return to this document -presently with regard to military service, but I would like to quote now -the passages relative to service in the Hitler Youth, one of which bears -an earlier date, the ordinance of 2 January 1942 for Alsace and -ordinance of 4 August 1942 for Lorraine. - -The German policy regarding nationality and military recruiting reaches -its turning point in the month of August 1942. At this moment, on -account of military difficulties and the need for extensive recruiting, -the Germans instituted compulsory military service in Lorraine by an -ordinance of 19 August 1942 and in Alsace by an ordinance of 25 August -1942. These two ordinances, relative to the introduction of compulsory -military service, constitute Document Number RF-735, ordinance for -Lorraine, and Document Number RF-736, ordinance for Alsace. - -At the same time, the Germans promulgated an ordinance of 23 August 1942 -on German nationality in Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg. This text is -the subject of a circular issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior, -which constitutes Document Number RF-737. These provisions are the -following: - - “Full rights of nationality are acquired by natives of Alsace - and Lorraine and Luxembourgers of German origin: - - “When they have been or will be called upon to serve in the - armed forces of the Reich or in SS armed formations; - - “when they are recognized as having acted as good Germans.” - -As concerns the expression “of German origin,” which is used in these -texts, this concerns Alsatians and Lorrainers who have become French -either through the Treaty of Versailles or subsequently on condition of -having previously been German nationals or having transferred their -domicile from Alsace or Lorraine to the territory of the Reich after 1 -September 1939; and, finally, children, grandchildren, and spouses of -the preceding categories of persons are likewise considered as of German -origin. - -Lastly, it was anticipated that the Alsatians, Lorrainers, and -Luxembourgers who did not acquire German nationality absolutely could -obtain it provisionally. - -I should like to mention, to complete this question of nationality, that -an ordinance of 2 February 1943 gave details as to the German -nationality laws applicable in Alsace, and that an ordinance of 2 -November 1943 likewise conferred German nationality upon persons who had -been in concentration camps during the war. - -The German texts indicate that, on the one hand, German nationality was -imposed upon a great number of persons; and, on the other hand, that -Alsatians and Lorrainers who were French were forced to comply with the -exorbitant and truly criminal requirements of military service in the -German Army against their own country. These military obligations were -constantly extended by the calling-up of successive classes, as far as -the 1908 class. - -These German exigencies provoked a solemn protest on the part of the -French National Committee, which in London represented the Free French -Government authority. I should like to read to the Tribunal the text of -this protest, which is dated 16 September 1942, and which I submit as -Exhibit Number RF-739. I shall read only the three paragraphs of the -official protest, which constitute the beginning of this document of the -Information Agency in London. - - “After having proclaimed, in the course of the war, the - annexation of Alsace and of Lorraine, banished and robbed a - great number of the inhabitants, and enforced the most rigorous - measures of Germanization, the Reich now constrains Alsatians - and Lorrainers—declared German by the Reich—to serve in the - German armies against their own compatriots and against the - allies of France. - - “The National Committee, defender of the integrity and of the - unity of France and trustee of the principle of the rights of - peoples, protests, in the face of the civilized world, against - these new crimes committed in contempt of international - conventions against the will of populations ardently attached to - France. It proclaims inviolable the right of Alsatians and of - Lorrainers to remain members of the French family.” - -This protest could not have been unknown to the Germans, for it was read -and commented on over the radio by the French National Commissioner of -Justice, Professor René Cassin, on a number of occasions. - -In regard to this solemn protest on the part of France, I shall allow -myself to quote the justifications, if one may use this term, which were -furnished in a speech by Gauleiter Wagner delivered in Colmar on 20 June -1943. This quotation is drawn from the _Mühlhäuser Tageblatt_ of 21 June -1943. In view of its importance I shall not deal with it simply as a -quotation, but I produce it as a document and submit it as Document -Number RF-740. The clerk has been given this paper. I read the -explanations of Gauleiter Wagner, as they are reproduced in this -newspaper under the title “Alsace will not Stand Aloof”: - - “The decisive event for Alsace in 1942 was therefore the - introduction of compulsory military service. It cannot be my - intention to justify legally a measure which strikes so deeply - at the life of Alsace. There is no reason for this either. Every - decision which the Greater Reich is taking, here is motivated - and cannot be attacked as to its juridical and its _de facto_ - form.” - -Naturally, the Alsatians and Lorrainers refused to accept the criminal -orders of the German authorities, and they undertook to avoid these by -every means. The Nazis then decided to compel them by means of merciless -measures. The frontiers were strictly guarded, and the guards had orders -to fire on the numerous recalcitrants who attempted to escape across the -border. I should like to quote in this connection a sentence from a -newspaper article, which appeared in the _Dernières Nouvelles de -Strasbourg_ of 28 August 1942. This is Document Number RF-741. This -article deals with the death of one of these men who refused to serve in -the German Army, and it concludes with the following sentence: “We -insist most particularly on the fact that it is suicidal to attempt to -cross the frontier illegally.” - -Naturally, judicial penalties were applied with great severity and in a -large number of cases. I do not consider that I should bring to the -Tribunal all the instances of these cases, which would take too long; -but I should like simply to insist on the principle that governed this -form of repression. - -I shall quote first of all a document which is entirely characteristic -of the conception which the German administration had of justice and of -the independence of judicial power. This is Document Number RF-742. It -is a part of a series of documents discovered in the files of the -Gauleitung. It is a teletype message dated Strasbourg, 8 June 1944, -addressed by Gauleiter Wagner to the Chief of the Court of Appeals in -Karlsruhe. I shall read Paragraph 2 of this document, which is on Page 1 -of the same document: - - “Especially in Alsace it is required that the sentences for - refusal of military service should be intimidating. But upon - those trying to evade military service, for fear of personal - danger, this intimidating effect can be produced only by the - death penalty, the more so, as an Alsatian bent upon escaping - military service by emigration counts generally on an early - victory of the enemy and, therefore, in case of conviction with - punishment other than death, with a near cancellation of the - penalty. The death penalty is, therefore, to be applied in all - cases in which after 6 June 1944 an evasion of military service - is attempted by illegal emigration, irrespectively of any other - legal practice used in Germany proper.” - -But I wish to indicate that the consideration of personal risk, even -that of being killed at the frontier or condemned to death, was not -sufficient to make the people of Alsace and Lorraine acknowledge the -obligation for military service. Thus the Nazis decided to have recourse -to the only threat which could be effective, the threat of reprisals -against families. After 4 September 1942, there appeared in the -_Dernières Nouvelles de Strasbourg_ a notice entitled “Severe Sanctions -Against Those Who Fail to Appear Before the Revision Council.” An -extract from this notice constitutes Document Number RF-743. I shall -read from it: - - “In the case mentioned above it has been shown that parents have - not given proof of authority in this regard. They have thus - proved that they do not yet understand the requirements of the - present time, which can tolerate in Alsace only reliable - persons. The parents of the above-named young men will therefore - shortly be deported to the Aleichem in order to re-acquire, in a - National Socialist atmosphere, an attitude in conformity with - the German spirit.” - -Thus the deportation of families was decreed, not to punish a definite -insubordination, but to punish failure to appear before the recruiting -board. - -In order to avoid repeated readings, I shall now present to the -Tribunal, under the heading of Document Number RF-744, the ordinance of -1 October 1943, to check failure to perform military service (_Official -Bulletin_ of the Reich for 1943, Page 152). I shall read the first two -articles: - - “Article 1: The chief of the civil administration in Alsace may - deny residence in Alsace to deserters and to persons who fail to - fulfill their military obligations or those of the compulsory - labor service, as well as to members of their families. This - prohibition entails, for persons of German origin whom it may - affect, transplantation to Reich territory by the - Plenipotentiary for the Reich, Reich Commissioner for the - Preservation of German Nationality. Measures to be taken in - regard to property, seizure, indemnity, _et cetera_, are - prescribed in the ordinance of 2 February 1943, concerning - property measures to be applied in the case of persons of German - origin transferred from Alsace to Reich territory. - - “Paragraph 2: Independently of the preceding measures, criminal - proceedings may be instituted under the penal code for violation - of the provisions of the penal laws.” - -THE PRESIDENT: Exactly what did “souche allemande” mean? How far did it -go? - -M. FAURE: The term “souche allemande” applies, as indicated in -connection with the preceding text, to the following categories of -persons: In the first place, persons who were in Alsace and Lorraine -before the Treaty of Versailles and who became French by the treaty; -persons whose nationality before 1919 was German are considered as of -German origin, as well as their children, their grandchildren, and their -spouses. This affects the great majority of the population of the three -departments. - -I continue reading Paragraph 2 of the first article of Document Number -RF-744. - - “Independently of the foregoing measures, penal prosecutions may - be brought for violation of the provisions of the penal laws.” - -According to Article 52, Paragraph 2, of the Reich Penal Code, members -of the family who bring proof of their genuine efforts to prevent or -dissuade the fugitive from committing his act or avoiding the necessity -of flight shall not be punishable. - -These abominable measures, the obligation of denunciation, punishment -inflicted upon families, permitted the German authorities to carry out -the enlistment of Alsatians and Lorrainers, which for many of them had -fatal consequences and which was for all of them a particularly tragic -ordeal. - -I must finally indicate, to conclude this part, that the Germans -proceeded to the mobilization of women for war work. I produce a -Document Number RF-745, the ordinance of 26 January 1942, completing the -war organization of labor service for the young women of Lorraine. - -Then we find an ordinance of 2 February 1943, Document Number RF-746, -concerning the declaration of men and women for the accomplishment of -tasks pertaining to national defense. (_Official Bulletin_ of the Reich, -1943, Page 26.) This ordinance concerns Alsace. - -The following Document, Number RF-747, deals with Lorraine. This is an -ordinance of 8 February 1943 concerning the enrollment of men and women -for tasks relating to the organization of labor. The Tribunal will note -that the ordinance concerning Alsace used the expression “tasks of -interest to national defense,” whereas the ordinance relative to -Lorraine specifies simply “tasks concerning the organization of labor”; -but in principle these are the same. Article 1 of this second ordinance, -Document Number RF-747, refers to the ordinance of the General Delegate -for the Organization of Labor, relative to the declaration of men and -women for tasks of interest to national defense, et cetera. This is a -question of making not only men, but also women, work for the German war -effort. I shall read for the Tribunal an extract from a newspaper -article which comments on this legislation and likewise on the measures -which Gauleiter Wagner proposed to undertake in this connection. This -constitutes Document Number RF-748, taken from the newspaper _Dernières -Nouvelles de Strasbourg_, dated 23 February 1943. - - “In his speech at Karlsruhe Gauleiter Robert Wagner stressed - that measures of total mobilization would be applied to Alsace - and that the authorities would abstain from any bureaucratic - working method. The Alsatian labor offices have already invited - the first category of young women liable for mobilization to - fill out the enlistment form. - - “In principle, all women who until the present have worked only - at home, who have had to care only for their husbands, and who - have no other relatives, shall work a full day. Many married men - who until now had never offered to help their wives with the - household work will be obliged to put their shoulder to the - wheel. They will work in the household and do errands. With a - little goodwill, everything will work out. Women who have - received a professional education shall be put, if possible, to - tasks that relate to their professions, on condition that they - have an important bearing on the war effort. This prescription - applies only to all feminine professions which imply care given - to other persons.” - -Here again a rather comical or clumsily worded presentation should not -prevent one from perceiving the odious character of these measures, -which obliged French women to work for the German war effort. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for ten minutes. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. FAURE: Mr. Dodd would like to speak to the Tribunal concerning a -question he wishes to put to the Tribunal. - -MR. DODD: Mr. President, I ask to be heard briefly to inform the -Tribunal that the affiant Andreas Pfaffenberger, whom the Tribunal -directed the Prosecution for the United States to locate, if possible, -was located yesterday and he is here in Nuremberg today. He is available -for the cross-examination which, if I remember correctly, was requested -by Counsel for the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. - -THE PRESIDENT: Was his affidavit read? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, it was. - -THE PRESIDENT: It was read, and on the condition that he should be -brought here for cross-examination? - -MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. He asked for him to be brought, if I recall it. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does counsel for Kaltenbrunner wish to cross-examine him -now—I mean, not this moment—does he still wish to cross-examine him? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: I believe that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner does not need -the testimony of this witness. However, I would have to take this -question up with him once more, for up till today it was not certain -that Pfaffenberger would be in court, and if he is to be cross-examined -and to testify, I believe Kaltenbrunner would have to be present at the -hearing. - -THE PRESIDENT: It seems somewhat unfortunate that the witness should be -brought here for cross-examination and that then you should be saying -that you don’t want to cross-examine him after reading the affidavit. It -seems to me that the reasonable thing to do would be to make up your -mind whether you do, or do not, want to cross-examine him; and I should -have thought that would have been done and he would have been brought -here, if you want to cross-examine, and not brought here if you did not -want to cross-examine. Anyway, as he has been brought here now, it seems -to me that if you want to cross-examine him you must do so. Mr. Dodd, -can he be kept here for some time? - -MR. DODD: He can, Your Honor, except that he was in a concentration camp -for 6 years; and we have to keep him here under certain security, and it -is somewhat of a hardship on him to be kept too long. We would like not -to keep him any longer than necessary. We located him with some -difficulty with the help of the United States Forces. - -DR. KAUFFMANN: In perhaps 2 or 3 days we might wish to cross-examine; -perhaps two or three days. - -THE PRESIDENT: I imagine that if after the affidavit had been read that -you demanded to cross-examine him and that he has therefore been -produced—well, in those circumstances it seems to me unreasonable that -you should ask that he should now be kept for 2 or 3 days when he is -produced. Mr. Dodd, would it be possible to keep him here until Monday? - -MR. DODD: Yes, he can be kept here until Monday. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will keep him here until Monday, and you can -cross-examine as you wish, Dr. Kauffmann. You understand what I mean; -when an affidavit has been put in and one of the Defense Counsel said -that he wants to cross-examine, he ought to inform the Prosecution if, -after reading and considering the affidavit, he finds that he does not -want to cross-examine him; they ought to inform the Prosecution so as to -avoid all the cost and trouble of bringing a witness from some distance -off. Do you follow? - -DR. KAUFFMANN: I will proceed with the cross-examination on Monday. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. - -M. FAURE: Mr. President, I would ask the Tribunal whether they would -agree to hear the witness Emil Reuter at this point? - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -[_The witness, Emil Reuter, took the stand._] - -What is your name? - -EMIL REUTER (Witness): Reuter, Emil. - -THE PRESIDENT: Emil Reuter, do you swear to speak without hate or fear, -to tell the truth, the whole truth, nothing but the truth? - -[_The witness repeated the oath in French._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Raise the right hand and say, “I swear.” - -REUTER: I swear. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. - -M. FAURE: M. Reuter, you are a lawyer of the Luxembourg Bar? - -REUTER: Yes. - -M. FAURE: You are President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Grand -Duchy of Luxembourg? - -REUTER: Yes. - -M. FAURE: You had been exercising these functions at the time of the -invasion of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg by the German troops? - -REUTER: Yes. - -M. FAURE: Can you give us any indication on the fact that the Government -of the Reich had, a few days before the invasion of Luxembourg, given to -the Government of the Grand Duchy assurances of their peaceful -intentions? - -REUTER: In August 1939 the German Minister for Luxembourg gave to the -Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country a statement according to -which the German Reich, in the event of a European war, would respect -the independence and neutrality of the country, provided that Luxembourg -would not violate its own neutrality. A few days before the invasion, in -May 1940, the Germans constructed pontoon bridges over half of the -Moselle River which separates the two countries. An explanation from the -German Minister in Luxembourg represented such construction of pontoon -bridges as landing stages in the interest of navigation. In the general -public opinion of the country, these installations were really of a -military character. - -M. FAURE: Can you tell us about the situation of public authorities in -Luxembourg following the departure of Her Royal Highness, the Grand -Duchess, and of her government? - -REUTER: The continuity of administration in the country was assured by a -government commission which possessed the necessary powers bestowed upon -it by the competent constitutional authorities. There was, therefore, no -lack of authority in the administration. - -M. FAURE: Is it not true, however, that the Germans claimed, upon their -arrival in that country, that the government had failed to carry out its -functions; and, following the departure of the government, that there -was no regular authority in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg? - -REUTER: Yes, such declaration was made by the Ministers of the Reich in -Luxembourg before a Parliamentary Commission. - -M. FAURE: Do I understand correctly that these statements on the part of -the German authorities did not in fact correspond to the truth inasmuch -as you have told us that there did exist a higher organism for the -administration of the country? - -REUTER: This statement did not correspond to the reality. It was -obviously aimed at usurping authority. - -M. FAURE: M. Reuter, the Germans never proclaimed by law the annexation -of Luxembourg. Do you consider that the measures adopted by the Germans -in that country were equivalent to annexation? - -REUTER: The measures that were taken by the Germans in the Grand Duchy -were obviously equivalent to a _de facto_ annexation of that country. -Shortly after the invasion the leaders of the Reich in Luxembourg stated -in public and official speeches that the annexation by law would occur -at a time which would be freely selected by the Führer. The proof of -this _de facto_ annexation is shown in a clear manner by the whole -series of ordinances which the Germans published in the Grand Duchy. - -M. FAURE: The Germans organized an operation which was called a census -in Luxembourg. In the form that was given the inhabitants of Luxembourg -to effect the census, there was one question concerning the native or -usual language and another question as to the racial background of the -individual. Are you prepared to assert that in view of these two -questions this census was considered as having the character of a -plebiscite, a political character? - -REUTER: From the menacing instructions published by the German -authorities in connection with this census, the political purpose was -obvious; therefore public opinion never envisaged this census except as -a sort of attempt to achieve a plebiscite camouflaged as a census, a -political operation destined to give a certain justification to the -annexation which was to follow. - -M. FAURE: The report of the Luxembourg Government does not give any -indication of the statistical results of this census, specifically with -regard to the political question of which I spoke a moment ago. Would -you be kind enough to tell us why these statistical data are not to be -found in any document? - -REUTER: The complete statistical data have never been collected because -after a partial examination of the first results the German authorities -noted that only an infinitesimal fraction of the population had answered -the two tricky questions in the German sense. The German authorities -then preferred to stop the operation, and the forms distributed in the -country for obtaining the answers were never collected. - -M. FAURE: Do you remember the date of the census? - -REUTER: This census must have taken place in 1942. - -M. FAURE: After the census the Germans realized that there was no -majority, and not even any considerable part of the population which was -desirous of being incorporated into the German Reich. However, did they -continue to apply their measures of annexation? - -REUTER: Measures tending to Germanization and later to the annexation of -the country were continued, and later on they were even reinforced by -further new measures. - -M. FAURE: Am I to understand, therefore, that during the application of -these measures the Germans could not be ignorant of the fact that the -Luxembourg population was opposed to them? - -REUTER: There can be no doubt at all on this question. - -M. FAURE: Can you tell us whether it is correct that the German -authorities obliged members of the constabulary force and the police to -take an oath of allegiance to the Chancellor of the Reich? - -REUTER: Yes. This was forced upon the constabulary corps and the police -with very serious threats and punishments. Recalcitrants were usually -deported, if I remember rightly, to Sachsenhausen; and on the approach -of the Russian Army all or a part of the recalcitrants who were in the -camp were shot. There were about 150 of them. - -M. FAURE: Can you tell us anything concerning the transfer—I believe -the Germans call it “Umsiedlung”—of a certain number of inhabitants and -families living in your country? - -REUTER: The transplanting was ordered by the German authority of -Luxembourg for elements which appeared to be unfit for assimilation or -unworthy of, or undesirable for, residence on the frontiers of the -Reich. - -M. FAURE: Can you indicate the approximate number of people who were -victims of this transplanting? - -REUTER: There must have been about 7,000 people who were transplanted in -this manner, because we found in Luxembourg a list mentioning between -2,800 and 2,900 homes or families. - -M. FAURE: These indications are based on knowledge you received as -President of the Chamber of Deputies? - -REUTER: Not exactly, the list was found in Luxembourg; it is still -deposited there and the Office of War Criminals took cognizance of it, -like all the judicial authorities in Luxembourg. - -M. FAURE: Can you state, M. Reuter, how the people who were transplanted -were informed of this measure concerning them, and how much time they -had to be ready? - -REUTER: In general, the families to be transplanted were not given -notice in advance, officially, at least. About 6 o’clock in the morning -the Gestapo rang at the door, and they notified those who were selected -to be ready for departure within 1 or 2 hours with a minimum of luggage. -Then they were taken to the station and put on a train for the camp to -which they were at first to be sent. - -M. FAURE: Can you tell us whether these measures were applied to people -whom you know personally? - -REUTER: I know personally a very large number of people who were -transplanted, among them members of my own family, a great number of -colleagues of the Chamber of Deputies, many members of the Bar, many -magistrates, and so forth. - -M. FAURE: In addition to these transplantations, were there also -deportations to concentration camps? This is another question. - -REUTER: Yes, there were deportations to concentration camps which -everyone knew about. The number of such deportations in the Grand Duchy -may be approximately four thousand. - -M. FAURE: M. Reuter, it has been established, through their ordinances, -that the German authorities prescribed compulsory military service. I -will not ask you, therefore, any question on this particular point. -However, I would like to ask you whether you are able to state, -approximately, the number of Luxembourg citizens who were enrolled in -the German Army. - -REUTER: The young people who were incorporated into the German Army by -force belonged to 5 classes, beginning with the class of 1920. The -number is about eleven thousand to twelve thousand, at least. A certain -number of them, I think about one-third, succeeded in avoiding -conscription and became refractory. Others later deserted the German -Army and fled to other countries. - -M. FAURE: Can you indicate the approximate number of Luxembourgers who -died as a result of their forced enlistment? - -REUTER: At the end of September 1944 we had 2,500 dead. Searches have -continued and at present I think we have established the names of at -least 3,000. - -M. FAURE: The sanctions that had been provided to force the enlistment -of the Luxembourgers, were they very severe? - -REUTER: These sanctions were extremely severe. First of all, the young -people who were refractory were pursued and hunted by the police and by -the Gestapo. Then they were brought before various types of Tribunals, -in Luxembourg, France, Belgium, or Germany. Their families were -deported; the family fortune was generally confiscated. The penalties -pronounced by the Tribunals against these young people were very severe. -The death penalty was general, or else imprisonment, forced labor, or -deportation to concentration camps. Some of them were released later on, -but there were some who were shot as hostages after having been -released. - -M. FAURE: I would like to ask one last question. Do you think it is -possible that the measures which constituted a _de facto_ annexation of -Luxembourg could have been unknown to the persons who belonged to the -Reich Government, or to the German High Command? - -REUTER: I believe that it is hardly possible that such a situation could -have been unknown to the members of the Reich and the supreme military -authority. My opinion is based on the following facts: First of all, our -young people, when mobilized by force, frequently protested at the time -of their arrival in Germany by invoking the fact that they were all of -Luxembourg nationality, and that they were the victims of force, so that -the military authorities must have been informed of the situation in the -Grand Duchy. - -In the second place, several Ministers of the Reich—among them, -Thierack, Rust, and Ley—visited the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and -could see for themselves the situation of the country and the reaction -of the population; other high political personalities of the Reich, such -as Bormann and Sauckel, also paid visits. - -Finally there were German decrees and ordinances concerning the -denationalization of certain categories of Luxembourg citizens. These -ordinances bore the signature of the Minister of the Reich. The -executive measures implementing these ordinances were published in the -_Official Gazette of the Reich Ministry of the Interior_ under the -signature of the Minister of Interior Frick with the indication that -these instructions were to be communicated to all the superior Reich -authorities. - -M. FAURE: I thank you. Those are all the questions I have to put to you. - -[_The American, British and Russian prosecutors had no questions._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Is there any member of the defendants’ counsel who wishes -to ask the witness any questions? [_No response._] Then M. Faure the -witness can retire. - -M. FAURE: Mr. President, am I to understand that the witness will not -have to remain any longer at the disposal of the Tribunal and he may -return to his home? - -THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -M. FAURE: I had stopped my presentation at the end of the second part. -That is to say, I have examined so far, in the first place, the -elimination of the French regime and secondly, the imposition of German -rules. - -I now come to the third part, which gives measures for transplantation -in Alsace-Lorraine. The German authorities applied in these annexed -departments characteristic methods for the transport of populations. It -so happens that, as the witness from Luxembourg was heard sooner than I -had anticipated, the Tribunal is already informed of the aspect which -these measures of transplantation assumed in the annexed territories. - -The situation which I am about to describe with respect to Alsace and -Lorraine is, indeed, analogous to the situation which existed with -regard to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The principal purpose of the -application of such methods by the Germans was to enable them to -colonize by bringing German subjects into the country, who then seized -the lands and property of the inhabitants who had been expelled. - -A second advantage was the elimination of groups considered especially -difficult to assimilate. I should like to quote in this connection—this -will be Document Number RF-749—what Gauleiter Wagner stated in a speech -given at Saverne, according to the _Dernières Nouvelles de Strasbourg_, -of 15 December 1941. - - “Today we must make up our mind. In the moment of our nation’s - supreme struggle—a struggle in which you, too, must - participate—I can only say to anyone who says ‘I am a - Frenchman!’ ‘Get the hell out of here! In Germany there is room - only for Germans.’” - -From the beginning the Germans proceeded, firstly, to the expulsion of -individuals or small groups, especially Jews and members of the teaching -profession. Moreover, as is shown by a document which I have already -cited this morning under Number RF-701 and which was the first general -protest made by the French Delegation, under date of 3 September 1940, -the Germans authorized the people of Alsace-Lorraine to return to their -homes only if they acknowledged themselves to be of German origin. Now -the Tribunal will understand that these restrictions upon the return of -refugees were in themselves equivalent to expulsion. Mass expulsions -began in September 1940. I now submit in this connection Document Number -RF-750; it is again a note from the French Armistice Delegation taken -from the files of the High Court of Justice. I shall now read this -document, Paragraph 2: - - “Since then it has been brought to the knowledge of the French - Government that the German authorities are proceeding to mass - expulsions of families in the three eastern departments. Every - day French citizens, forced to abandon all their belongings on - the spot, are driven into the unoccupied part of France in - groups of 800 to 1,000 persons.” - -It was only the 19th of September. On the 3rd of November the Germans -undertook the systematic expulsion of the populations of the Moselle -region. This operation was accomplished with extreme perfidy. The -Germans, as a matter of fact, gave the Lorrainers of certain localities -the choice of either going to eastern Germany or going to France. They -gave them only a few hours to make up their minds. Moreover, they sought -to promote the belief that such a choice was imposed upon the Lorrainers -as a result of an agreement reached with the French authorities. - -From the physical point of view, the transport of these people was -effected under very difficult conditions. The Lorrainers were allowed to -take away only a very small part of their personal belongings and a sum -of 2,000 francs, plus 1,000 francs for the children. On 18 November, -four trains filled with Lorrainers who had been torn away from their -homes were headed for Lyons. The arrival in unoccupied France of these -people who had been so sorely tried was for them, nevertheless, an -opportunity for nobly manifesting their patriotic sentiments. With -regard to the facts which I have presented I place before the Tribunal -Document Number RF-751, which is a note of protest on the part of the -French Delegation signed by General Doyen, dated 18 November 1940. I -shall read excerpts of this Document Number RF-751, beginning with -Paragraph 3 of Page 1: - - “France is faced with an act of force which is in formal - contradiction to the armistice convention as well as the - assurance, recently given, of a desire for collaboration between - the two countries. On the contrary, in Article 16, which the - German commission had frequently invoked with specific regard to - the departments of the East, the armistice convention stipulates - the reinstallation of refugees in the regions in which they were - domiciled. The creation of new refugees constitutes, therefore, - a violation of the armistice convention. France is faced with an - unjust act affecting peaceful populations against whom the Reich - has nothing to reproach and who, settled for centuries on these - territories, have made of them a particularly prosperous region. - - “The unexpected decision of the German authorities is likewise - an inhuman act. In the very middle of winter, without warning, - families have to leave their homes, taking with them only a - strict minimum of personal property and a sum of money - absolutely insufficient to enable them to live even for a few - weeks. Thousands of Frenchmen were thus suddenly hurled into - misery without their country—already too heavily tried and - surprised by the suddenness and amplitude of the measures - adopted without its knowledge—being in a position to assure - them, from one day to the next, a normal livelihood. This exodus - and the conditions under which it is taking place cause most - painful and sorrowful impressions throughout the French nation. - The French people are particularly disturbed by the explanations - given to the Lorrainers, according to which the French - Government was reputed to be the source of their misfortune. - - “It is that impression, in fact, which the poster in certain - villages, where the population had to choose between leaving for - eastern Germany or for Unoccupied France, was intended to - convey. - - “The poster is appended hereto, but we are not in possession of - the text of this poster. That also encouraged the belief that - these populations had themselves requested permission to leave - following the appeals broadcast by the Bordeaux radio. Even if - we admit that such appeals had been made by radio, it should be - noted that the Bordeaux radio station is under German control. - The good faith of the Lorrainers has been deceived as was shown - by their reaction on arrival in the free zone.” - -In spite of these protests, the expulsions continued. They reached a -total of about 70,000 people, augmented by the deportation of Alsatians -and Lorrainers to Eastern Germany and to Poland. These deportations were -meant to create terror, and they particularly affected the families of -men who had rightfully decided to refuse the German demand for forced -labor and military service. (I am at present regarding the whole -question of a French protest dated 3 September 1942; it is Document -Number RF-752). - -Since I do not wish to read to the Tribunal texts dealing with an -identical subject I submit this document solely to show that this -protest was made, and I believe that I can refrain from reading its -content. - -I shall refer, desiring to give only a short citation, to a document -belonging to the American Prosecution. This document bears the Number -R-114. It is a memorandum of the minutes of a meeting which took place -between several officials of the SS concerning general directions in -regard to the treatment of deported Alsatians. - -It will be observed that this document has already been submitted by my -American colleagues under Document Number R-114, Exhibit Number USA-314, -the French Number RF-753. I merely wish to read one paragraph of that -document, which may be interpreted as a supplement to this problem of -deportation. I must say that these sentences have not been formally read -in Court. The passage that I cite is on Page 2 of the document. At the -end of that there is a paragraph which begins with the letter “d”: - - “For further resettlement are destined: - - “Members of the patois group. The Gauleiter would like to keep - only those persons in the patois area who by their customs, - language, and general attitude testify their adherence to - Germany. - - “Regarding the cases mentioned under a-d, it is to be noted that - the racial problem is to be given foremost consideration, that - is, in a way by which racially valuable persons shall be - resettled in Germany proper, and the racially inferior in - France.” - -Finally, I should like to read to the Tribunal a few sentences from a -newspaper article, which appeared in _Dernières Nouvelles de -Strasbourg_, August 31, 1942—we are here dealing with a citation and -not a document: - - “On the 28th of August the families designated hereafter, of the - Arrondissements of Mulhouse and Guebwiller, were deported to the - Reich in order that they might recover a trustworthy German - outlook in National Socialist surroundings. In several cases the - persons involved did not conceal their hostility in that they - stirred up sentiments of opposition, spoke French in public in a - provocative manner, did not obey the ordinances concerning the - education of youth, or in other ways showed a lack of loyalty.” - -I would now like to indicate to the Tribunal that deportation or -transportation entailed also the spoliation of property. This is not -merely a fact; for the Germans it is a law. Indeed, there is an -ordinance of 28 January 1943, which appeared in the _Official Bulletin_ -for 1943, Page 40, bearing the title, “Ordinance Concerning the -Safeguarding of Property in Lorraine as a Result of Transplantation -Measures.” I have placed this ordinance before you as Document Number -RF-754. I would like to read Article One and the first paragraph of -Article Two. I believe that the title itself is a sufficient indication -of the contents: - - “Article One. The safeguarding of property of people - transplanted from Lorraine to the Greater German Reich or to - territory placed under the sovereign power of Germany has been - entrusted to the transfer services for Lorraine under the Chief - of the Administration. - - “Article Two. These services are authorized to put in effective - safekeeping the property of the Lothringians who have been - transplanted in order that such property may be administered, - and—insofar as orders may have been given for this—exploited.” - -This ordinance, therefore, still manifests some scruples of form. The -intention is to “safeguard,” but we now know what the word “safeguard” -means in Nazi terminology. We have already seen what safeguarding meant -in the case of works of art and Jewish property. Even here, we have been -specifically warned that the term “safeguard” carries with it the right -of disposal or exploitation. - -Other texts are even more specific or clear. - -Here is Document Number RF-755. This is the ordinance of 6 November 1940 -pertaining to the declaration of property in Lorraine belonging to the -enemies of the people and of the Reich. And on the same subject I shall -also submit to you Document Number RF-756, which is the regulation of 13 -July 1940 applying to property in Alsace belonging to the enemies of the -people and of the Reich. These two texts, one of which applies to Alsace -and the other to Lorraine, permit the seizure and confiscation of -properties designated as “enemy property.” Now, to realize the extent of -the property covered by this term, I will read Document 756: - - “Any objects and rights of any nature whatsoever, without regard - to conditions of title, which are utilized for, or intended for - use in, activities hostile to the people of Germany or the Reich - will be considered as property belonging to the people and to - the Reich. - - “Such stipulation shall apply to the entire patrimony: - - “(a) of all political parties, as well as of secondary or - complementary organizations depending thereon; - - “(b) of lodges and similar associations; - - “(c) of Jews; - - “(d) of Frenchmen who have acquired property in Alsace since 11 - November 1918; - - “(e) The Chief of the Administration Department and the Police - will decide what patrimony in addition to the property mentioned - above is likewise to be considered as property belonging to the - enemies of the people and of the Reich. He will likewise decide - on doubtful cases.” - -We see, therefore, that in spite of the title, we are not dealing here -with the measures of sequestration of enemy property taken in all -countries within the scope of the laws of war. First of all, these are -measures of definite confiscation; and in addition, they are applied to -the property of numerous individuals who are in no wise subjects of -enemy countries. We also see at this point the absolutely arbitrary -power placed in the hands of the administration. - -These texts are accompanied by many regulations; although the -spoliations are particularly important in Alsace and in Lorraine, I -shall not speak of them here in more detail, as the Prosecution has -already dealt with the subject. I shall merely limit myself to the -mentioning of two institutions special to Alsace and to Lorraine, that -is, agricultural colonization, and industrial colonization. - -In the first place, agricultural colonization is not a term that has -been invented by the Prosecution; it is an expression which the Germans -used. I submit in this connection, Document Number RF-757, which is the -ordinance of 7 December 1940, “Pertaining to the New Regime of -Settlement or Colonization in Lorraine.” I shall read the beginning of -this Document Number RF-757: - - “Real estate which has been vacated in Lorraine as a result of - deportations will serve principally for the reconstitution of a - German peasant class and for the requirements of internal - colonization. In this connection and specifically in order to - set us the required programs, I order, by virtue of the powers - which have been conferred upon me by the Führer, the following: - - “Article One. Real estate property of individuals deported from - Lorraine shall be seized and confiscated for the benefit of the - Chief of the Civil Administration.” - -I will not cite the second paragraph of Article One, but I will cite -Article Two: - - “Agricultural properties or forest properties which are seized - in consequence of the ordinance concerning enemy property of the - people and the Reich in Lorraine are confiscated. Insofar as - they are needed, they are included in the methodical - organization of the region.” - -Article Three: - - “In addition to the cases provided for in Articles One and Two - and according to the needs, other real estate property may be - included in the programs for methodical reorganization if - appropriate compensation is provided for. - - “The Chief of the Civilian Administration and the services - designated by him will decide upon the amount and nature of the - compensation. Any recourse to the law on the part of the person - involved is forbidden.” - -Thus the Tribunal can see in a striking manner the processes and the -methods pursued by the German authorities. - -The first ordinance, cited earlier, spoke only of safeguarding the -property of people who had been deported or displaced. A second -ordinance now speaks of confiscations. It still refers only to the -notion of enemies of the people and of the Reich. - -The third ordinance is more complete, since it comprises confiscation -prescriptions which are quite formal in their character, and which are -no longer qualified as “safeguarding” property which has become vacant -as the result of deportations. - -This agricultural colonization of which I have spoken assumed a special -importance in Lorraine. On the other hand, it is in Alsace that we find -the greatest number of measures involving a veritable industrial -colonization. These measures consisted in stripping the French -industrial enterprises for the benefit of German firms. On this subject -there are protests of the French Delegation to the Armistice Commission. - -I submit as documents three of these protests, Documents Numbers RF-758, -759 and 760, which are notes under date of—respectively—27 April 1941, -9 May 1941, and 8 April 1943. I believe that it is preferable for me not -to read these documents to the Tribunal and that I merely ask the -Tribunal to take judicial notice of them, as proof of the existence of -these protests, because I fear that such a reading would be a mere -repetition to the Tribunal, to whom the matter of economic spoliation -has already been explained in sufficient detail. - -I shall say, finally, that the Germans carried their audacity to the -point of demanding the seizure in Unoccupied France and the -transportation to Alsace of assets belonging to French companies which -were by this means stripped of their property and actually “colonized.” -I am speaking of assets belonging to companies in the other zone of -France, under the control of the regular shareholders of such companies. - -I think it is worth while considering just one example of such -procedure, contained in a very short document, which I submit to you -under Document Number RF-761. This document appears in the Archives of -the French Agencies of the Armistice Commission, to which it had been -sent by the director of the company mentioned in the document. It is a -paper which is partly written in German and partly translated into -French—in the same document—and it is signed by the German -Commissioner for a French enterprise called the Société Alsacienne et -Lorraine d’Electricité. In Alsace this enterprise had been placed -illegally under the administration of this commissioner, and the -commissioner—as the document will show—had come to Paris to seize the -remainder of the company’s assets. He drafted this document, which he -signed and which he also made the president of the French company sign. -This document is of interest as revealing the insolence of German -procedure and also the Germans’ odd conception of law. I quote now: - - “Today the undersigned has instructed me that in future I am - strictly forbidden to take legal action with regard to the - property of the former Société Alsacienne et Lorraine - d’Electricité. If I should transgress this order in any way, I - know that I shall be punished. - - “Paris, 10 March 1941. - - “Signed: Kucka. - - “F. B. Kommissar. - - “Signed: Garnier.” - -Now this German economic colonization in the areas annexed was to serve -as an experiment for the application of similar methods on a broader -scale. - -There will be submitted to the Tribunal, in this connection, a document -concerning a colonization attempt in the French Department Ardennes. On -this procedure of annexation by the Germans of Alsace and of Lorraine, -many other items could be cited; and I could submit many more -documents—even if I were to deal only with the circumstances and the -documents which are useful from the point of view of our own -Prosecution. - -I want to limit myself in order to save the time of the Tribunal and to -comply with the necessities of this Trial where so many items have to be -discussed. Therefore I have limited myself to the submission of -documents or to examples which are particularly characteristic. I -believe that this documentation will enable the Tribunal to appraise the -criminality of the German undertakings which I have brought to its -attention—criminality which is particularly characteristic of military -conscription, which is a criminal offence since it entails deaths. At -the same time I believe the Tribunal can evaluate the grave sufferings -that were imposed for five years on the populace of these French -provinces, already so sorely tried, in the course of history. - -I have submitted a few details which may have seemed ridiculous or -facetious; but I did so because I thought it desirable that one should -visualize the oppression exercised by the German Administration in all -circumstances of life—even in private life—that general oppression -characterized by the attempt to destroy and annihilate, and extended in -a most complete manner over the departments and regions which were -annexed. - -I believe that the Tribunal will possibly prefer me to leave until -tomorrow my comments with respect to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. - -I would like, moreover, to have the Tribunal’s assent concerning a -question of testimony. I should like to put a witness on the stand, but -it is only a little while ago that I gave the Tribunal a letter -concerning this request. May I ask to be excused for not having done so -earlier because there has been some uncertainty on this point. - -If the Tribunal finds it convenient, I should like to have this witness -here at tomorrow, Saturday morning’s session. I state that this witness -would be Mr. Koos Vorrink, who is of Dutch nationality. I also wish to -say, for the benefit of Defense, that the question I would like to -submit to the witness will deal with certain items concerning -Germanization in the Netherlands. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to call him tomorrow? - -M. FAURE: If that is convenient to the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, call him tomorrow. - -M. FAURE: If it please the Tribunal, his testimony could be taken after -the recess tomorrow morning. - -DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr. -President, I do not wish to prolong the proceedings; but I believe it -will be in the interest of justice if I ask that the Dutch witness be -heard, not tomorrow but Monday, on the assumption that Seyss-Inquart who -is now ill may be expected back on that date. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, would it be equally convenient to you to call -him on Monday? - -M. FAURE: Mr. President, I do not desire to vex the Defense; but the -witness might like to leave Nuremberg fairly promptly. Perhaps I might -suggest that he be heard tomorrow and that after he has been heard, if -Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart expresses his desire to -cross-examine him, the witness could remain until Monday’s session. - -If, on the other hand, after having heard the questions involved, the -Counsel considers that there is no need for any cross-examination, then -Seyss-Inquart’s absence would not matter. But I will naturally accept -the decision of the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: That seems a very reasonable suggestion. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I am agreeable to the suggestion of the French -Prosecutor. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 February 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FORTY-NINTH DAY - Saturday, 2 February 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the -Defendants Kaltenbrunner, Seyss-Inquart, and Streicher will be absent -from this morning’s session due to illness. - -M. FAURE: Gentlemen, I shall ask the Tribunal to be kind enough now to -take the file which is entitled “Luxembourg.” - -The Tribunal has already been informed of the essential elements of the -situation concerning Luxembourg by the testimony of President Reuter, -who was heard during yesterday’s session. I shall, therefore, be able to -shorten my explanations about this file; but it is nevertheless -indispensable that I submit some documents to the Tribunal. - -The annexation of Luxembourg has quite a special character, in that it -carried with it the total abolition of the sovereignty of this occupied -country. It therefore concerns a case which corresponds to the -hypothesis which we call “_debellatio_” in classic law, that is to say, -the cessation of hostilities by the disappearance of the body of public -law of one of the belligerents. - -This total annexation of Luxembourg completes the proof that there was -criminal premeditation on the part of the Reich against this State to -which it was bound by diplomatic treaties, notably the Treaty of London -of 11 May 1867, and the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation of 2 -September 1929. And the Tribunal knows by the testimony of Mr. Reuter -that these pledges were confirmed, first by a spontaneous diplomatic -step taken on 26 August 1939 by M. Von Radowitz, the Minister -Plenipotentiary for Germany, and afterwards by a re-assuring declaration -a few days before the invasion, in circumstances which have already been -explained to the Tribunal. - -In view of the fact that Luxembourg—unlike Alsace and Lorraine, which -were French departments—I say, in view of the fact that Luxembourg was -a state, the Germans, in order to carry out this _de facto_ annexation, -had to issue special regulations concerning the suppression of public -institutions; and this they did. Two ordinances of 23 August and 22 -October 1940 announced, on the one hand, the ban on Luxembourg’s -political parties; and, on the other, the dissolution of the Chamber of -Deputies and the State Council. These two decrees are submitted as -Documents RF-801 and RF-802. I request the Tribunal only to take -judicial notice of these documents which are public texts. - -Moreover, from 26 August 1940 on, a German decree had abolished the -constitutional executive formula, according to which justice is rendered -in the name of the sovereign. A formula, according to which justice is -rendered in the name of the people, was substituted at that time for -this executive formula. On 15 October 1941, the formula was again -modified in a more obvious way and became “In the name of the German -people.” - -I shall now follow in my supplementary explanation the order of ideas -which I adopted for Alsace and Lorraine; and naturally I shall dwell -only on those circumstances peculiar to Luxembourg. - -As in the case of Alsace and Lorraine, the Germans attempted to -extirpate the national sentiment of Luxembourg and to render impossible -all manifestations of the traditional culture of this country. Thus, the -ordinances of 28 August 1940 and 23 October 1940 banned all associations -of a cultural or educational nature. - -As in Alsace and Lorraine, the Germans imposed Germanization of family -and Christian names. This was the object of a decree of 31 January 1941, -Document Number RF-803. I point out, in passing, that the wearing of a -beret was also forbidden in Luxembourg, by a decree of 14 February 1941. -At the same time they did away with national institutions, the Germans -set up, according to their custom, their own administration and -appointed a Gauleiter in the person of Gustav Simon, the former -Gauleiter of Koblenz-Trier. - -From the administrative point of view, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was -administered as a Bezirk (district) of the Chief of the Civilian -Administrative Service but by the German administrative services. As far -as the Party was concerned—the National Socialist Party—it was -officially joined to the Reich, as a dependency of the Mosel Gau. - -I shall not dwell on the introduction of German civilian and penal -legislation, which was introduced in the same way as in Alsace and -Lorraine. Sufficient proof of this must be considered to have been given -by the submission of the official report of the government of the Grand -Duchy. - -As regards nationality and conscription, we also notice a parallelism -between the provisions which concern Luxembourg and those which concern -other annexed countries. - -On 30 August 1942, two ordinances were promulgated. It must be pointed -out that these two ordinances, the one concerning nationality and the -other military service, bear the same date. The ordinance concerning -military service is submitted as Document Number RF-804 and the one -concerning nationality is submitted as Document Number RF-805. The -legislation concerning nationality includes, moreover, a provision which -is peculiar to Luxembourg, although it is in conformity with the general -spirit of German legislation concerning nationality in annexed -countries. - -The Germans had created in Luxembourg various organizations of the Nazi -type, of which the main one was the Volksdeutsche Bewegung (German -nationalist movement); and here is the special circumstance which I wish -to point out. The ordinance of 30 August 1942 concerning nationality -grants German nationality to persons who gave their adherence to this -association, the Volksdeutsche Bewegung. But this nationality could be -revoked. This is shown in the last paragraph of title 1 of this -ordinance, Document Number RF-805. In fact, this conferring of -nationality in this special case was valid provisionally for 2 years -only. - -At the same time that the Nazis were establishing conscription, they -made it obligatory for all young Luxembourgers to serve in the -premilitary formations of the Hitler Youth. This is laid down in an -ordinance of 25 August 1942 concerning the Hitler Youth camps, which is -Document Number RF-806. - -Just as in Alsace and Lorraine, compulsory labor was imposed in -Luxembourg, not only for men but also for women and for work of military -concern. These provisions are found chiefly in three ordinances: the -ordinance of 23 May 1941, the ordinance of 10 February 1943, and the -ordinance of 12 February 1943. These last two ordinances are introduced -as Documents RF-807 and RF-808. - -I should now like to cite another circumstance, which is peculiar to -Luxembourg and of which proof is found in the official report of the -Luxembourg Government already submitted to the Tribunal. According to -this report, Page 4, Paragraphs 7 to 8, it is stipulated—the quotation -is very short and I did put the whole of the Luxembourg report in my -document book; I shall cite only one sentence which bears the reference -I have given: - - “By ordinance, which appeared in the Official Gazette for - Luxembourg, 1942, Page 232, part of the Luxembourg population - was forced to join the formations of a corps called - Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst (Security and Emergency Service), a - premilitary formation which had to do military drills. Part of - it was sent forcibly to Germany to carry out very dangerous - tasks at the time of the air attacks of the Allied forces.” - -The Nazis made a special effort to bring about the nazification of -Luxembourg; and for this country they thought out a special method, the -basic point of which was the language element. They developed the -official thesis that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg belonged to the -German language group. By means of propaganda they spread the idea that -the dialect spoken in Luxembourg was a Franconian dialect of the Moselle -and constituted a variant of the High German. Having developed this -theory, they took a census of the population, as mentioned yesterday by -the witness who gave evidence before the Tribunal. I especially mention -that this census took place on 10 October 1941. I wished to have the -witness speak on this point because no information on the result of the -census was furnished in the government report; and the Tribunal knows -now the reason why the German authorities immediately stopped the census -as soon as they discovered that the number of persons answering in the -way they desired was ridiculously small. - -After this failure the Germans considered that the Luxembourg dialect -was no longer their political friend and in a circular dated 13 January -1942, which I submit as Document Number RF-809, they forbade the civil -servants to use this dialect in conversations with the public or on the -telephone. This was very inconvenient to a great many people. - -The nazification campaign was carried out also by the creation of groups -with the same end in view. I have already said that the most important -of these groups was the Volksdeutsche Bewegung and I shall merely -supplement this by citing a sentence from the Luxembourg report, namely: - - “Membership in the Volksdeutsche Bewegung was the condition - _sine qua non_ on which civil servants were allowed to keep - their positions, private employees their positions, professional - people—such as lawyers, doctors, _et cetera_—to exercise their - profession, industrialists to run their factories, and everybody - to earn his livelihood. Failure to comply meant dismissal, - expulsion from the country, and the deportation of whole - families.” - -The penalties imposed on the Luxembourgers who refused these -solicitations were accompanied by a formula which shows very well the -Nazi mentality and which I shall read to the Tribunal from the text of -the government report. It is a very short quotation. - - “Because of their attitude these persons do not offer the - guarantee that they will fulfill, in an exemplary manner at all - times and without any reservation, during and outside their - professional activity, the duties which have their foundation in - the establishment of the civil administration in Luxembourg and - in the pro-German attitude.” - -The Nazis also sought to develop in Luxembourg the SA formation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have we got this report? Has this governmental report -been deposited? - -M. FAURE: The report of the Luxembourg Government was submitted to the -Tribunal by my colleague, M. Dubost. - -THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. - -M. FAURE: As I am making only very short quotations from it I did not -put it in my document book. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure, it would help me if you would give me the -page of the dossier, when you are citing a document which is not in the -document book. - -M. FAURE: The Nazis also used all kinds of constraint to obtain members -for their SA formation as well as for the motorized group of the SA -which is known under the initials NSKK. - -I would like now to point out to the Tribunal that a special effort was -directed towards the youth, because the Nazis thought it would be easier -to get young people—and I may say, even children—to accept their -precepts and doctrines. - -I think I may submit to the Tribunal Document Number RF-810, which is a -circular dated 22 May 1941, addressed to the principals of high schools. -This is a very short document and I ask your permission to read it. - - “By order of the Gauleiter, all teachers are bound to buy the - book of the Führer, _Mein Kampf_, before 1 June 1941. By - September 1941 every member of the teaching profession must make - a declaration on his honor that he has read this work.” - -The Germans thought that the compulsory reading of _Mein Kampf_—they -allowed three months to assimilate this important work—might convince -the teachers, who in turn would teach it to their pupils in the -prescribed spirit. - -I have here another document, Number RF-811, which I should like to read -to the Tribunal, because it is not long and is also very characteristic. -It is an extract from a collection of circulars addressed to the pupils -of the Athenaeum: - - “Luxembourg, 16 June 1941: - - “1. All pupils must stand up when the teacher enters to begin - the lesson and when leaving the classroom at the end of the - lesson. - - “2. The German salute will be given in the following manner: a) - Raise the outstretched right arm to shoulder level, b) Shout: - ‘Heil Hitler.’ - - “3. The pupils must return the same salute which the teachers - use at the beginning and end of the lessons. - - “4. I also expect all pupils to give the German salute in the - street, especially to those gentlemen known to be enthusiastic - partisans of the German salute.” - -These German methods reached their culminating point with the imposition -of the oath of allegiance to Hitler, which oath was imposed upon the -gendarmes and the police. I refer here to the testimony of M. Reuter, -who made the terrible statement that those who refused to do so were -deported and afterwards most of them were shot. I also submit as proof -of this the government report which gives the same information, on Page -12. - -Naturally, as in the other annexed territories, the Luxembourgers did -not yield to these German methods; and there also endeavors were made to -break the resistance by terror. I must mention a quite special -regulation, the ordinance of 2 June 1941. This will be Document Number -RF-812, which has as title “Ordinance on the Putting into Force in -Luxembourg of the Law of 10 February 1936 Concerning the Gestapo.” This -title suffices to show the subject. - -The Gestapo established in Luxembourg special tribunals, a special -summary court known as Standgericht, and SS tribunals. These -jurisdictions, if we can use the term jurisdiction, passed many -sentences for political reasons. A detailed list of these convictions is -appended to the government report. One tribunal, the Standgericht of -which I spoke just now, passed 16 death sentences and sentenced 384 -people to penalties involving loss of their liberty. But this tribunal -was not the only one, and the report states—and the witnesses also -confirmed it—that about 500 were condemned to death in this country, -which is a considerable number, because the population is not very -large. - -I think I should likewise mention, in connection with the Germanization, -the measures concerning deportation already known to the Tribunal -through the testimony of M. Reuter. These measures concerning -deportation were applied systematically to the intellectual elite of the -country, to the clergy, and to persons who had served in the army. This -proves that it was deliberately intended to do away with the social, -intellectual, and moral structure of this country. - -To the Luxembourg report is appended a list of names of deportees, -including officers, magistrates, men who took part in politics in the -Grand Duchy, writers, economic leaders, and in particular—I shall give -only one figure which is striking—the Germans expelled or deported 75 -clergymen, which, with regard to a population as small as that of -Luxembourg, shows clearly the will to abolish completely the right to -worship. The official report also states that the property of religious -orders was confiscated, and most of the places of worship were either -destroyed or desecrated. - -Just a word about agricultural colonization: An organization called “Für -Deutsches Volkstum und Siedelung” (For the Settlement of Racial Germans) -was entrusted with the liquidation of the property of Luxembourg -deportees for the benefit of southern Tyroleans who were settled in the -Grand Duchy. Also, industrial and economic colonization: Here we find -the same methods, the same spoliations, and therefore I do not want to -go over this ground again. The Tribunal already knows the way in which -this was carried out. But I should like to give one example concerning -Luxembourg because when dealing with points, even general points, I -think the best method is to give a documentary example, and also -because, from this document that I am going to cite, I think it is -possible to draw some important conclusions from the point of view of -the Prosecution. - -The document which I am going to cite concerns many cases where the -German authorities compelled private citizens and firms to transfer -their assets and the control of their businesses to Germans. That was -called colonization, and consisted in putting German nationals into the -businesses with large assets and economic functions. The Reich Minister -of Economy himself devised these illicit methods by which it was -intended to plunder private citizens and to germanize the economy of the -country. The document that I am going to read to the Tribunal bears the -Document Number 813. It is offered as a document by the Luxembourg -Government, and it is an original document with the signature, bearing -the heading “The Reich Minister of Economy,” Berlin, 5 January 1942. -This letter with the heading “The Minister of Reich Economy” is signed -“By order: Dr. Saager.” He is a subordinate who is acting regularly, -administratively, by order of his minister. It is Number RF-813, the -last but one. This letter is marked “Secret.” It concerns the -“Accumulateurs Tudor, S. A., Bruxelles,” and is addressed to the battery -factory in the hands of Mr. Von Holtzendorff of Berlin, Askanischer -Platz 3. The Tribunal will understand that the Minister of Economy is -writing to the German firm which is going to benefit by the pressure to -be exercised on the Luxembourg firm. - - “Referring to our repeated conversations I confirm that in the - interest of the Reich it would be considered very desirable if - your company would obtain a participation in the stock of the - Tudor Batteries. The interest of the Reich is based in no small - degree on economic requirements of national defense. - - “In order to obtain a majority the stock owned by M. Léon Laval, - formerly in Luxembourg and now in Bad Mergentheim, would have to - be considered first. This concerns not only the shares which M. - Laval possesses personally, but also the 3,000 shares deposited - with Sogeco.” - -I now come to a very important paragraph: - - “I therefore request that the necessary negotiations be started - immediately. I would point out that, first of all, you will have - to apply to the Gestapo for the authorization of the State - Police to negotiate with M. Laval, and then request them to give - their agreement to the transfer of these shares to your company - in case M. Laval should be willing to cede them. - - “I have already informed the Gestapo of the matter. If the - result of your negotiations should make it necessary I am - prepared to point out once again to the Gestapo how urgent your - mission is.” - -Now I should like to read to the Tribunal the sequel to this, Document -Number RF-814, which shows a further stage of the maneuver by which the -Reich Minister of Economy, in conjunction with the Gestapo, sought to -plunder a private citizen. This is a letter addressed to a private -citizen, who was going to be compelled to sell his shares, Dr. Engineer -Léon Laval, and we are going to see who writes to him. Here is the text -of this letter, which is dated Luxembourg, 14 January 1942, and which -bears the heading of the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the -SD in Luxembourg: - - “On 19 January 1942 and the following days you must remain at - your residence to be at the disposal of the representative of - the Accumulatoren-Fabrik, A.G., Berlin, Director Von - Holtzendorff.” - -The Tribunal will recognize the name of Von Holtzendorff, who was the -recipient of the letter from the Reich Minister of Economy in the -previous document. I continue the quotation: - - “Mr. Von Holtzendorff, who is in possession of a special - authorization from the Redchssicherheitshauptamt, will discuss - business matters with you. Heil Hitler! Signed, Hartmann.” - -The Tribunal will understand, I am sure, that if I have read these two -documents, it is not because I think it very important in the scope of -this Trial that the Tudor battery firm was despoiled, an illicit act -which was to their prejudice; but I want especially, and I think it is -very important in the Trial, to emphasize—and I shall do it each time -when the document gives me the opportunity—the co-ordination which -existed between the different German services of which these defendants -here were the leaders. Certain persons are sometimes inclined to believe -that all the German crimes must be imputed to the Gestapo, and it is -true that the Gestapo was a characteristic criminal organization; but -the Gestapo did not function all by itself. The Gestapo acted on the -order of, and in conjunction with, the civil administrations and with -the military command. We heard yesterday, in connection with the -pontificals of the Bishopric of Strasbourg and also in connection with -the University of Strasbourg, of the scheme which allowed the civil -minister or his representative to have recourse to the police agents for -the enforcement of orders. We also noted this fact when reading these -documents which dealt with economic matters. - -I now conclude the first chapter of my brief. I should like to mention -that the work on the documentation and the preparation of this chapter -was carried out with the aid of my assistant, M. Albert Lentin. - -I should like now to hand to the Tribunal the first part of the second -chapter, concerning the seizure of sovereignty. This first part includes -general ideas which I think I should expound to the Tribunal before -supporting them by documents. Consequently, the Tribunal will have -before them a file entitled “Exposé” for which there is no corresponding -document book. - -The Germans occupied the territories of five powers, without counting -Luxembourg which was annexed and of which I spoke just now. Of these -five countries, three kept governmental authority. These are Denmark, -Norway, and France, but even in these three countries the cases are -entirely different. The government of Denmark was a legitimate -government; the government of France was a _de facto_ government, which -at the beginning exercised real authority over unoccupied territories; -the government of Norway was also a _de facto_ government, typical -example of a puppet government. The two other powers, Belgium and -Holland, retained no governmental authority but only administrative -authorities, of which the highest were the general secretariats of the -ministerial departments. - -In view of these situations, the Germans, as I said previously, varied -their methods of domination. On the other hand, they did not establish a -specific form of government corresponding to the internal organization -of each country; therefore looking at it as a whole, it would seem at -first sight to be somewhat complex. The usurpation of sovereignty by the -occupying power assumed three different forms. We are speaking here of -the external procedure. - -First form: Direct exercise of power to legislate or issue regulations. -By this we mean the exercise of power above and beyond the limited power -to issue regulations accorded by international law to occupation armies. - -Second form: The indirect exercise of power to legislate or issue -regulations through local authorities. This was also done in two ways: -1. By injunction, pure and simple, which is the case when the local -authorities are the administrative authorities. 2. By pressure, which is -the case when the local authorities are authorities of a governmental -character, either _de facto_ or _de jure_. It should be noted, moreover, -that the pressure is sometimes such that it bears a complete resemblance -to an injunction, pure and simple. We also understand such pressure to -include recourse to the complicity of traitors. - -Third form: The third form is purely and simply that of assault and -battery. We do not mean physical force used in individual cases, for -this does not concern us here: but physical force used as a result of -the order of a competent occupation authority, which consequently -entails the responsibility of a superior. - -If we now consider the question of determining who or what the -instruments of usurpation were, we observe that these instruments fall -into five categories: - -In the first place, we have the Reich Commissioner, who was appointed in -Norway and Holland only, that is to say, in the one case in a country -which retained governmental authority at least in appearance and for a -certain length of time, and in the other, in a country which retained -administrative authority only. - -In the second place, we have the military administration. In all -countries the military authorities exercised powers absolutely -disproportionate to those which belonged to them lawfully. - -I must note here that only these two instruments, the Reich Commissioner -and the military authority, were able to carry out usurpation by issuing -direct legislative or regulatory decrees. In each of the two powers -where there was a Reich Commissioner, the powers conferred were -naturally shared by the Reich Commissioner and the military authority. - -A third instrument of usurpation took the form of diplomatic -administration responsible to the Foreign Office. Diplomatic -representations existed only in countries which had governmental -authorities and where there was no Reich Commissioner. We refer to -Denmark and France. - -These diplomatic representatives of the Reich, unlike the Reich -Commissioner and the military occupation authority, did not have -power—illicit but formal power—to legislate or issue regulations. -However, this does not mean that their role in the usurpation of -sovereignty is a secondary one. On the contrary, it is an important one. -Their principal activity consisted, naturally, in bringing pressure to -bear on local authorities to whom they were accredited. - -I should like to bring out two points here. It might be thought from a -logical point of view, that in an occupied country such as France, the -intervention by the occupying power in the administration of the local -authorities would be the exclusive competence of the diplomatic -representatives. That is not the case. The military authority also -intervened on frequent occasions through direct contact with the French -authorities. In their turn, the diplomatic representatives did not limit -themselves to the powers conferred by their functions. One of the -characteristics of the Nazi method is this exceeding of powers -conferred. It is, moreover, when one thinks of it, a necessary result of -the Nazi enterprise. - -In view of the fact that the usurpation of sovereignty in a country -which is militarily occupied is an illegal and abnormal thing, it does -not come within the normal competency of the categories of public -functions as understood by civilized nations. Thus the diplomats, as -well as the military authorities, exceeded their powers; and there was -also an overlapping of functions. The diplomats and the military -authorities dealt with the same things. We see this in regard to -propaganda, for instance; and in regard to the persecution of the Jews. -Generally speaking, the military authority acted in a more obvious way; -the diplomatic administration preferred to act in domains where -publicity could be evaded. There was a constant liaison between them on -all questions concerning the occupied country. - -The fourth instrument of usurpation was the police administration. The -German police was installed in all occupied countries, often under -several distinct administrations, according to the principles which were -presented to the Tribunal when the American Prosecution revealed the -inner workings of the immense, complex, and terrible police organism of -the Nazis. Neither did the police have limited or exclusive functions. -They acted in close and constant liaison with the other instruments we -have defined. - -The fifth instrument which we must mention consisted of the local -branches of the National Socialist Party and the similarly inspired -organizations which sought to organize nationals in the occupied -country. These organizations served as auxiliaries to the German -authorities; and in a specific case, that of Norway, they provided the -foundation of a so-called government. - -I have thought fit to outline this picture, as it seems to me that the -Prosecution may draw from it an interesting conclusion in regard to the -points I have already touched on in my statement on Luxembourg. - -We have seen, in effect, that the German line of policy for the usurping -of sovereignty was carried out by means of various organs which were -associated with this action. In the occupied countries—and we must not -forget that this usurpation provided the method for the commission of -crimes—this usurpation was not the exclusive work of an official, or of -an ambassador, or of a military commander. In countries which had a -Reich Commissioner there also existed a military administration. A -country placed under the sole regulating authority of the Army also had -diplomatic agents. In all countries there were police authorities. - -In all these occupied countries, as a result of the occupation and the -usurpation of sovereignty, there were systematic abuses and crimes. Many -of them are already known to the Tribunal. Others have still to be -mentioned. - -From what I have just said, we see that the responsibility for these -abuses does not exist only with one or the other of these -administrations which we have mentioned, it exists with all of them. It -may be true that in Belgium, for instance, there was no diplomatic -representation; but there was such representation in France and in -Denmark. It therefore follows that the Department of Foreign Affairs and -its head could not help being aware of the conditions under the -occupation which, as far as the principal features are concerned, were -similar in the different countries. - -Moreover, as I have just said, these coexisting administrations had no -fixed division of functions. Even if this division of functions had -existed, it must be pointed out that the responsibility and the -complicity of each in the action of the others would have been -sufficiently proved by their knowledge and their approval—which was at -least implicit with regard to this action. But even this division did -not exist, and we shall show that all were associated and accomplices in -a common action. - -Now, this very fact involves a more far reaching consequence. The -association and complicity of these various departments involves all the -leaders and all the organizations here accused in a general -responsibility. I shall explain this point by giving an example. If, for -instance, all the abuses and all the crimes had been committed only by -the Army without a single interference, perhaps it would be possible for -one important person, or organization, having no military functions, to -claim that it had no knowledge of these abuses and of these crimes. Even -in this case I think this claim would be difficult to uphold, because -the vast scope of the enterprises which we denounce made it impossible -for anyone who exercised a higher authority not to know of these things. -However, since several administrations are jointly responsible, it -necessarily follows that the other authorities are also responsible, -because the question at this point is no longer the question whether one -administration is involved, or even three, but all the administrations; -it involves the consubstantial element of all the authorities of the -State. - -I shall speak later of the order concerning the deportation of the Jews; -and I shall show that this order was the result of a common action of -the military administration, the diplomatic administration, and the -Security Police, in the case of France. It follows that in the first -place the Chief of the High Command, in the second place, the Minister -of Foreign Affairs, and in the third place, the Chief of the Security -Police and Reich Security Service—these three persons—were all -necessarily informed and necessarily approved this action, for it is -clear that their offices did not keep them in ignorance of such plans -concerning important affairs and that, moreover, decisions were agreed -upon on the same level in the three different administrations. - -Therefore these three persons are responsible and guilty. But is it -possible that, by an extraordinary chance, among the persons who -directed the affairs of the Reich, as ministers or as persons holding -equivalent offices, these three persons turned out to be criminals and -the only ones to be criminals and that they had conspired among -themselves to hide from the others their criminal actions? This idea is -manifestly absurd. In view of the interpenetration of all the executive -departments in a modern state, all the leaders of the Reich were -necessarily aware of and agreed with the usurpation of sovereignty in -the occupied countries, as well as the criminal abuses resulting -therefrom. - -In this chapter I shall go on to speak first of Denmark, which is a -special case. Then I shall speak of the civil administration which -existed in Norway and in Holland, and finally I shall speak of the -military administration which was the regime in Belgium and in France. - -I think it would be a suitable time now for the Tribunal to have a -recess; or if the Tribunal prefers, I can continue my brief. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - -M. FAURE: After the recess I should like to call the witness of whom I -spoke to the Tribunal yesterday. I should like to mention one fact, -however. Yesterday the lawyer for Seyss-Inquart requested that he be -allowed to cross-examine this witness on Monday. Senator Vorrink, who is -my witness, is absolutely obliged to leave Nuremberg this evening. I -think, therefore, that the lawyer for Seyss-Inquart might cross-examine -him today. In any case I should like to notify him of the modification -of the request which I made yesterday. - -THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be possible, if the counsel for Seyss-Inquart -wants to cross-examine the witness, for the witness to be brought back -at some other date? - -M. FAURE: My witness can of course be brought back at another date, if -it should be necessary. - -THE PRESIDENT: That is what I meant. Let him go this evening in -accordance with arrangements that he has made, and then at some date -convenient to him he could be brought back if the defendant’s counsel -wants to cross-examine him. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. FAURE: Mr. President, may I ask the permission of the Tribunal to -call the witness, Jacobus Vorrink. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, have him called. - -M. FAURE: This witness speaks Dutch as his native tongue. Since the -interpreting system does not include this language, I propose that he -speak in the German language, which he knows well. - -[_The witness, Jacobus Vorrink, took the stand._] - -THE PRESIDENT: What is your name? - -JACOBUS VORRINK (Witness): Vorrink. - -THE PRESIDENT: Your Christian name, your first name? - -VORRINK: Jacobus. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you swear to speak without hate or fear, to say the -truth, all the truth, and only the truth? Will you raise your right hand -and say, “I swear”? - -VORRINK: I swear. - -M. FAURE: Sit down, Mr. Vorrink. You are a Dutch Senator? - -VORRINK: Yes, Sir. - -M. FAURE: You are President of the Socialist Party of the Netherlands? - -VORRINK: Yes, Sir. - -M. FAURE: You exercised these functions in 1940 at the time of the -invasion of the Netherlands, by the Germans? - -VORRINK: Yes. - -M. FAURE: I should like to ask you to give a few explanations on the -following situation: There existed in the Netherlands, before the -invasion, a National Socialist Party. I should like you to state what -the situation was, after the invasion by the Germans and during the -occupation, with regard to the various political parties in the -Netherlands, and more particularly the National Socialist Party, and -what were the activities of this Party in liaison with the German -occupation? - -VORRINK: I should prefer to speak in the Dutch language. I am sorry I do -not know French and English well enough to use these languages—but in -order not to delay the proceedings, I shall make my declarations in -German. This is the only reason why I am using the German language. - -The political situation in Holland after the invasion by the Germans was -that first and foremost the German Army wanted to maintain public order -in Holland. But the real Nazis immediately came with the Wehrmacht and -tried to direct and organize public life in Holland according to their -concepts. There were among the Germans three main categories. In the -first place, there were those who believed in the “blood and soil” (Blut -und Boden) theory. They wanted to win over the whole of the Dutch people -to their National Socialist concepts. I must say that, in certain -respects, this was our misfortune because these people, on the basis of -their “blood and soil” theory, loved us too much and when that love was -not reciprocated it turned to hate. - -The second category consisted of the politically informed; and these -people knew perfectly well that the Dutch National Socialists in Holland -were only a very small and much hated group. At the elections of 1935 -they received only 8 percent of the votes, and 2 years later this -percentage had been reduced by one-half. These people were tactlessness -itself. For instance, when the ruins of Rotterdam were still smoking, -they saw fit to make a demonstration at which the leader of the Dutch -National Socialists, Mussert, dedicated to Göring a new bell as a thank -offering for what he had done for Holland. Fortunately, it did not -prevent him from being defeated. - -In the third place there were the so-called intriguers, those who wanted -to destroy the national unity of Holland and who, first of all, tried -through Seyss-Inquart to gain the favor of the Dutch people by flattery. -In the same way as Seyss-Inquart, they always stressed that the two -peoples were kindred races and should therefore work together, while -behind the scenes they played off one Nazi group against the other. - -In Holland at that time there existed the Dutch National Socialist -Workers’ Party, the Dutch National Socialist Front, and the so-called -National Front. All these three movements had their contacts with -certain German organizations. The Germans first tried to find out -whether it was possible to use these groups for their purposes. Slowly, -however, they recognized that it was not possible to work with these -groups; and so they decided to adopt the National Socialist movement -only. These National Socialists gradually occupied the key positions in -the Dutch administration. They were appointed general secretaries for -internal administration, they became commissioners of the provinces, -mayors, _et cetera_. - -I should like to mention in this connection that at that time there were -not enough people qualified to become mayors, so that short courses of -instruction were arranged which performed the record feat of turning out -Dutch mayors in 3 weeks. You can imagine what kind of mayors they were. - -Furthermore, they became administrators in nazified organizations and -commercial undertakings, which gave them certain power in Holland; and -they behaved like cowardly Nazi lackeys. - -Mr. Rost von Tonningen, for instance, used millions of Dutch guilders to -finance the war against Russia in order to fight against Bolshevism as -he called it. Finally, in December 1942, Seyss-Inquart declared the Nazi -Party to be the representative of the political life of Holland. If it -had not been so tragic, one might have laughed at it. Mussert was then -appointed as the Leader of Holland. I must add that the Nazi Party had -only a shadow existence from the political point of view, with the -single but important exception that these people had occasionally the -opportunity to deal with matters of personnel. I should also add that -sometimes they turned the heads of young Dutchmen and persuaded several -thousands of them to enter the SS formations; and during the last years -it became even worse. Then they even went so far as to put young boys -into the SS without their parents’ consent. They even forced minors from -correctional institutions into the SS. Sometimes—I know of cases -myself—young boys who for certain reasons were at loggerheads with -their parents, were taken into the SS. To realize the harm done you -must, as I have sometimes done, go and speak to these children who are -now in camps in Holland. You will then see what a monstrous crime has -been committed against these young people. - -M. FAURE: Am I to understand that all these methods employed by the -Germans were intended to achieve the nazification of Holland and that if -there were, as you have indicated, several varying tendencies among the -Germans, these tendencies differed only as to the means to be employed -and not in regard to the purpose of Germanization? - -VORRINK: The actual nazification of Holland extended to practically all -spheres of our national life. They tried in every domain to introduce -the Leadership Principle. I would like to point out, for instance, that -contrary to our expectations, they did not ban the Socialist Trade -Unions but just tried to employ them. They merely sent a Nazi -commissioner who told the people, “The era of democracy is past, just go -on working under the leadership of the commissioner and you can still -help the workers. It is not necessary to change anything.” They even -tried that with the Dutch political parties. - -As President of the Socialist Democratic Workers’ Party of Holland, I -had a long conversation with Rost von Tonningen, who personally told me -that it was a pity that the good cultural work done to educate the -workers should cease. We both wanted socialism and all we had to do was -to work together calmly. I denied that at the time of that conversation. -I told him that for us democracy was not a question of opportunism but a -part of our ideology and that we were not prepared to betray our -convictions and our principles. - -They tried to keep the workers in their organizations; but slowly the -workers, thousands and tens of thousands of them, left their -organizations. When finally the National Labor Front was created, with -the Catholic and Christian Trade Unions, there certainly was an -organization but no longer any members. - -M. FAURE: Can you state with accuracy whether in your country -persecutions against the Jews were started? - -VORRINK: One of the worst chapters of our sufferings in Holland was the -persecution of the Jews. You may know that we in Holland, and especially -in Amsterdam, had a strong Jewish minority. These Jews took a very -active part in the public and cultural life of Holland, and one can say -there was no anti-Semitism in Holland. - -When the Germans first came to Holland, they promised us that they would -not harm the Jews at all. Nevertheless, even in the first weeks there -was a wave of suicides. In the following months the measures against the -Jews started. The professors in the universities were forced to resign. -The president of the highest court in Holland was dismissed. Then the -Jews had to present themselves for registration, and then came the time -when the Jews were deported in great numbers. - -I am proud to say that the Dutch population did not suffer this without -protesting. The Dutch students went on strike when their Jewish -professors were driven out, and the workers of Amsterdam went on strike -for several days when the persecution of the Jews started. But one has -to have seen this with one’s own eyes, as I have, to know what a -barbaric system this National Socialism was. - -The Green Police sealed off whole sections of cities, went into houses, -even went on the roofs, and drove out young and old and took them off in -their trucks. No difference was made between young and old. We have seen -old women of over 70, who were lying ill at home and had no other desire -than to be allowed to die quietly in their own home, put on stretchers -and carried out of their home, to be sent to Westernborg and from there -to Germany, where they died. - -I myself remember very well how a mother, when she was dragged from her -home, gave her baby to a stranger, who was not a Jewess, and asked her -to look after her child. At this moment there are still hundreds of -families in Holland where these small Jewish children are being looked -after and brought up as their own. - -M. FAURE: Can you state whether, apart from these measures against the -Jews, the Germans concerned themselves with other confessions? - -VORRINK: From the beginning the Germans always tried to get the churches -into their power. All the churches, the Catholic as well as the -Protestant, protested whenever the Germans violated human rights. The -churches protested against the arbitrary arrest of persons, against the -mass deportation of our workers, and the church never failed to testify -for the Jews. - -Of course, the church dignitaries, the priests and pastors, had to -suffer for that; and hundreds of our pastors and priests were taken to -concentration camps, and of the 20 parsons and priests whom I knew in -the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen, only one has returned to -Holland. - -M. FAURE: Can you state what measures were adopted with regard, for -example, to culture, propaganda, and teaching? - -VORRINK: What incensed us most in Holland was not so much our military -defeat. We were a small people, and I can say that during those 5 days -we fought as well as we could. Perhaps it would have been possible to -maintain a correct attitude with the occupation forces, if it hadn’t -been for the Nazis’ determination to dominate us, not only in a military -sense, but also to break our spirit and to crush us morally. Therefore, -they never lost an opportunity of encroaching on our cultural life in -their efforts to nazify us. - -In regard to the press, for instance, they forced us to publish in our -press editorials which were written by Germans and to print them on the -front page in order to create the impression that the editor in chief of -the paper had written them. One can even say that these measures were -the starting point for the very extensive underground press in Holland, -because we wouldn’t allow the Germans to lie to us systematically. We -had to have a press which told us the truth. - -Also in regard to the radio, it was soon forbidden to listen to foreign -stations; and they dealt out exceedingly harsh punishment to people who -defied this ban; and there were a great many people in Holland who -listened to the foreign radio, especially the BBC. And we in Holland -were always glad to hear the British radio which never hesitated to give -the people, _in extenso_, all the affecting speeches of Hitler and -Göring, while we were not allowed to listen to Churchill’s speeches. In -those moments we were deeply conscious of the reasons why we had built -up our resistance, and we also knew why our Allied friends strove with -all their might to deliver the world from the Nazi tyranny. - -It was the same in the field of the arts. Quite a number of guilds for -painters, musicians, and writers were forced to organize themselves. An -author could not even publish a book without submitting it to some Nazi -illiterate. - -They also encroached on school life and tried to influence elementary -education; for instance, in the text books for children of 6 to 12 years -they ordered that whole sentences should be struck out. A sentence like -the following, “When the Queen visited them the people cheered.” In the -schools and public buildings they organized real hunts for pictures of -our Royal Family. - -M. FAURE: I thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: You have finished your examination, have you? - -M. FAURE: Yes. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko? - -GENERAL RUDENKO: No questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Have the British or American prosecutors any questions? -[_There was no response._] Does any member of the defendants’ counsel -wish now to cross-examine? - -DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in order to avoid the witness having to -make the long trip from Holland a second time, I should like to -cross-examine him today, although my client is absent. - -Witness, when Seyss-Inquart took over the government in Holland under -the decree of 18 May 1940, was the Queen or were members of the Dutch -Government still on Dutch territory? - -VORRINK: No, they were no longer on Dutch territory. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did the government of Seyss-Inquart, the Reich -Commissioner, leave in office the functionaries of the former -government? - -VORRINK: Yes. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that of the nine General Secretaries -appointed by the former Royal Government and still in office only one -was dismissed? - -VORRINK: Well, it is possible. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you further know that of the 11 Commissioners of the -Provinces only four were dismissed from the government for political -reasons? - -VORRINK: I do not know the exact number but that is possible. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know how many mayors were appointed by the Royal -Government and in particular is it correct that there were more than -one-half still in office in 1944? - -VORRINK: Yes, I believe so. - -DR. STEINBAUER: You have not answered fully the question which was asked -you by the prosecutor. He asked you how many political parties there -were in parliament at the time of the invasion. Which were those -parties? - -VORRINK: The Catholic Party, two Protestant Christian parties, two -liberal parties, the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party, and -some minor parties. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I shall now talk about two subjects mentioned by -you—schools and churches. Is it correct that the Dutch school system, -throughout the Seyss-Inquart regime, was under the direction of a -Dutchman, Van Hann? - -VORRINK: It was under a Dutchman during the whole time, but we do not -consider him as a Dutchman. He is today in prison because he betrayed -his country. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But he was not a German? - -VORRINK: He was a Dutch traitor. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Is it correct that Seyss-Inquart showed great interest -in the Dutch school system? - -VORRINK: I cannot remember that. - -DR. STEINBAUER: For instance, Seyss-Inquart added an eighth class to the -elementary school? - -VORRINK: That is not correct. - -DR. STEINBAUER: And that in this way adolescents did not have to enter -the labor services until later? - -VORRINK: Correct. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Did he show an interest in a long standing wish of the -Dutch concerning the spelling of the Dutch language and did he not -appoint a special committee to investigate the matter? - -VORRINK: In this connection he did take some interest in a thing about -which he knew nothing; he got his information from the wrong people. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But he did make an effort. - -VORRINK: Yes, but in the wrong direction. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Is it correct that he endeavored to increase the number -of teachers? - -VORRINK: No, certainly not. - -DR. STEINBAUER: That, in particular, he employed junior teachers and -reduced expenses thereby? - -VORRINK: He did that because he wanted to influence the Dutch youth. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know, for instance, that as a result of protests, -Seyss-Inquart rescinded measures that had been taken against the School -of Commerce in Rotterdam? - -VORRINK: Will you repeat the question? I did not understand it. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that Seyss-Inquart, as a result of protests, -took steps to see that the School of Commerce in Rotterdam was not -interfered with? - -VORRINK: I do not know. - -DR. STEINBAUER: As far as the churches are concerned, apart from -deportation, as you say for political reasons, were the Catholics and -Protestants ever prevented from practicing their religion? - -VORRINK: The Germans interfered very much with the right to worship. -They put spies in the churches to listen to the sermons with the idea of -possibly denouncing the pastors. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, but that has happened in other countries too. -Please, tell me, could the priest or the parson still continue to preach -according to his conscience? - -VORRINK: No, certainly not according to his conscience. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that during the whole of the occupation the -prayer for the Queen was allowed in churches of all denominations? - -VORRINK: It was certainly not allowed. Several ministers were arrested -for that very reason. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that Seyss-Inquart prevented 27 convents -from being confiscated for German refugees? Is it correct? - -VORRINK: I know nothing about it. - -DR. STEINBAUER: But perhaps you may know that he prevented the -destruction of the synagogues in Rotterdam and in The Hague. The police -wanted to destroy them, and he prevented them from doing it. Do you know -anything about that? - -VORRINK: I do not know whether he wanted to prevent it; but in any case, -the synagogues were destroyed; and those who destroyed them went -unpunished and later took part in the worst persecution of the Jews. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, do you know that out of the Catholic and -Protestant Dutch clergymen deported to Germany, Seyss-Inquart succeeded -in getting two-thirds sent back to their country? - -VORRINK: I do not know. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that he prevented the departure of valuable -cultural treasures, especially libraries, which were already prepared -for transportation from Holland to the Reich? - -VORRINK: I do not know whether he used his personal influence in that -respect; I only know that enormous quantities of our art treasures and -books were taken away by the Germans, and in any case he was then -powerless to prevent it. - -DR. STEINBAUER: You said also that the radio was prohibited because it -stimulated the organization of resistance. As a leader, would you have -allowed a radio speaking against you? - -VORRINK: I would by all means allow the radio. I am of the opinion that -there can be no human dignity if people are not allowed to form their -opinions by hearing reasons for and against. - -DR. STEINBAUER: Was Mussert given the task of forming a government, or -was that not done because Seyss-Inquart objected? - -VORRINK: I really do not know what happened behind the scenes, but -perhaps you may be right that Seyss-Inquart was no friend of Mussert. -While in prison I was taken out of my cell one night and asked to write -an article on the National Socialist movement in Holland, and I was -requested to give my own personal opinion about Mussert. When I -answered, ‘Why should I do this? You know what I think of Mussert and of -all the Nazis,’ they said: ‘You cannot make it bad enough.’ I took this -to be one of the many machinations of the Nazi cliques which fought -against each other. - -DR. STEINBAUER: I thank you. I have no further questions. - -HERR BABEL: Witness, you spoke of Dutch youngsters who had entered the -SS. Could you tell me approximately what the total number was? - -VORRINK: I would say a few thousand. - -HERR BABEL: In your opinion how many of those entered the ranks -voluntarily and how many were forced? - -VORRINK: I cannot give you an exact figure; but I am of the opinion that -if minors entered such organizations without the consent of their -parents, they did not do it voluntarily. They could not judge the -consequences of their actions. - -HERR BABEL: I did not ask that question. I asked you how many, in your -opinion, joined the SS voluntarily and how many were forced. Will you -answer this question and no other? - -VORRINK: I have already said that I cannot give you the exact number. - -HERR BABEL: Well, an approximate figure. - -VORRINK: I should say several hundred were forced. - -HERR BABEL: Good, and you gave the total number as several thousand. - -VORRINK: They were youngsters who for some reason or another left their -homes, and they were taken by the Green Police or the Security Police -and pressed into the SS. I myself have come across quite a few cases of -this in Dutch concentration camps. As an old leader in the Youth -Movement I was able to speak to these youngsters and got them to tell me -about their life. - -HERR BABEL: You say “pressed”? What do you mean by “pressed”? - -VORRINK: That means that they were threatened with imprisonment if they -were not willing to join the SS. - -HERR BABEL: You heard that yourself? - -VORRINK: Yes. - -HERR BABEL: You further said that thousands of workmen left their -organizations. I think you said tens of thousands. Did they do so -voluntarily, or what was the reason for this? - -VORRINK: The reasons were that the workmen refused to be in a nazified -trade union and to submit to the Leadership Principle. They wanted to be -in their old trade unions where they could have a say in the running of -their organizations. - -HERR BABEL: The resignations, therefore, were voluntary? - -VORRINK: Yes. - -HERR BABEL: In regard to the Jewish question you said that at first -nothing happened to the Jews, but that nevertheless there was a wave of -suicides. Why? What was the reason for those suicides when it had been -said, “nothing will happen to you.” - -VORRINK: These Jews were the most sensible ones. We in Holland did not -live on an island, and we knew all that had happened between 1933 and -1940 in Germany. We knew that in Germany the Jews had been persecuted to -death, and I personally still have in my possession quite a few sworn -statements of German Jews who had emigrated, who kept us hourly informed -of how they had been tortured and martyred by the SS during the period -before the war. That of course was known to the Dutch Jews, and in my -opinion in that respect they were more sensible since they knew they -would suffer the same fate. - -HERR BABEL: You put it in such a way as to make it sound as if there -were a large number of suicides. Was that so, or were there a few -individual cases? - -VORRINK: This happened to about 30 or 50 people, but in Holland; where -we value life very highly, that is quite a large number. - -HERR BABEL: Now, you used the word “Nazi illiterate.” Quite apart from, -I would say, your not very friendly attitude towards us Germans, have -you any justification for saying this? Have you met a single German who -was illiterate? - -VORRINK: I am rather surprised at this question. By an “illiterate Nazi” -I meant a man who talks about things about which he has no knowledge, -and the people who judged an author’s work were people who had been set -to read through the book to find out whether a Jew appeared in it and -was presented as a good and humane character. According to the Nazi -concepts, such a book could not be published. I would add that I have -used the word “Nazi illiterate” from the days when there were found in -the German cities, in the country of Goethe and Schiller, great piles of -burned books, books that we had read and admired in Holland. - -HERR BABEL: I understand you to mean that you can bring no positive -facts which might justify this derogatory word “Nazi illiterate.” - -Thank you. - -DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): I have just one -question, Witness. You just said that young people who did not enter the -SS were threatened with prison. Do I understand you to say that they -would be given prison sentences for an offense committed previously or -that they would be imprisoned only because they did not enter the SS? - -VORRINK: They would be given a prison sentence, of course, because they -had been threatened. Whether they would have put them in prison, I do -not know, but it was a threat. It was one of the usual methods of the -Nazis to say “We want you to do this or that, and if you do not we will -put you in prison.” There were so many instances of this sort that one -could have no illusions about it. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: But it is correct in this case that these were -youngsters who had run away from home because of differences with their -parents? - -VORRINK: Those are cases which I know of personally. - -DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions? -[_There was no response._] M. Faure, do you wish to ask any questions? - -M. FAURE: I have no further questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then, the witness can leave. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -M. FAURE: I shall ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to take the brief -and the document book, bearing the title “Denmark.” - -The Tribunal knows that Denmark was invaded on 9 April 1940 in -violation, as in other cases, of treaties, and particularly, of a treaty -which was not very old, since it was the Non-Aggression Treaty which had -been concluded on 31 May 1939. - -Inasmuch as Denmark was not in a position to offer armed resistance to -this invasion, the Germans sought to establish and maintain the fiction -according to which that country was not an occupied country. Therefore -they did not set up a civil administration with powers to issue -regulations as they were to do in the case of Belgium and Holland. - -On the other hand, there was a military command, inasmuch as troops were -garrisoned there. But this military command, contrary to what happened -in the other occupied countries, did not exercise any official authority -by issuing ordinances or general regulations. - -In spite of this fiction, the Germans did commit in this country which -they pretended they were not occupying, usurpations of sovereignty. -These usurpations were all the more blatant, inasmuch as they had no -juridical justification whatsoever, even from the Nazi point of view. - -During the first period, which extended to the middle of 1943, German -usurpations were discreet and camouflaged. There were two reasons for -this. The first was that one had to take into account international -public opinion, inasmuch as Denmark was not officially occupied. The -second reason was that the Germans had conceived the plan to germanize -the country from within by developing National Socialist political -propaganda there. - -I think it should be noted, very briefly, that this Germanization from -within had already begun before the war. It is set forth in detail and -in a most interesting manner in a part of the official report of the -Danish Government, which I place before the Tribunal as Document Number -RF-901. - -This Document Number RF-901 comprises the whole of the green dossier -which the Tribunal has before it. There are several sections. The -subject of which I am now speaking is to be found in the first document -of this bundle. This first document starts with the heading -“Memorandum.” - -This document shows that even before the war the Germans had organized -an information service which was supplemented by a clever espionage -service. In particular they had established a branch of the National -Socialist Party, into which Germans living in Denmark were recruited. -The idea was first of all to form a party made up of Germans and we -shall shortly see how this National Socialist Party was afterwards -called the Danish Party. - -This branch of the German Party was called NSDAP, Ausland-Organisation, -Landeskreis Danemark (Foreign Section, Regional District Denmark). It -acted in co-ordination with other institutions; particularly, the -Deutsche Akademie, the Danish-German Chamber of Commerce, and the -Nordische Gesellschaft (Nordic Association). - -A German organization in Hamburg called the Deutsche Fichtebund, which -was directly under the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and -Propaganda, undertook a systematic propaganda campaign in order to gain -favorable Danish public opinion. - -In this connection I should like to quote a passage of the document -which is worthy of note from the point of view of German premeditation -and of the methods employed. This passage is in the first document which -I have just mentioned and which is called “Memorandum”—on Page 6 of -this first document. I shall skip the first sentence of this paragraph. - -I would point out to the Tribunal, in case it should be more convenient -for them because of the length of the document, that these quotations -are to be found in the exposé: - - “This information agency, which functioned in Hamburg with no - less than eight different addresses, gave in one of its - publications the following details about itself. It was - established in January 1914 in memory of the German philosopher, - Fichte, and was to be looked upon as a ‘union for world truth.’ - The objects were: (1) The promotion of mutual understanding by - the free publication of information on the new Germany. (2) The - protection of culture and civilization by the propagation of - truth concerning the destructive forces in the world.” - -I skip one sentence and continue: - - “This German propaganda had for its essential purpose the - creation in Denmark of a nation-wide sentiment favorable to - Germany and hostile to England, but it could also represent an - attempt to prepare the ground for the introduction into Denmark - of a Nazi system of government by collecting surreptitiously all - manifestations of discontent in Denmark against the democratic - regime in order to use such data as documentary proof in the - event of a liberation action in the future. Thus, in January - 1940, the propaganda was no longer content merely with attacking - England and her methods of conducting the war, or the Jews and - their mentality; but it proceeded to make serious attacks on the - mentality of the government and the Danish Parliament.” - -Finally, in this connection the Danish report mentions a very revealing -incident: - - “At the end of February 1940, the Danish police seized from a - German subject, a document entitled, ‘Project for Propaganda in - Denmark.’” - -In saying this, I am summarizing the first paragraph of Page 7 of this -report. This document contains a characteristic sentence. It is the last -sentence in that paragraph, in German, and is in quotation marks with a -French translation in parenthesis: - - “It should be possible for the Legation and its collaborators to - control the daily press.” - -Germany did not limit herself to the use of her own subjects as agents -inside the country and for carrying out propaganda, but the Nazis also -inspired the organization of Danish political groups which were -affiliated with the Nazi Party. - -This campaign first of all found favorable ground in southern Jutland, -where there was a German minority. The Germans thus were able to promote -the organization of a group called Schleswig’sche Kameradschaft, or SK, -which exactly corresponds to the German SA. The members of this group -received military training. Likewise a group called Deutsche -Jugendschaft Nordschleswig had been organized on the pattern of the -Hitler Jugend. - -I want to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that I am now -summarizing the statements in the Danish report in order to avoid -reading in full. These statements are developed in detail in the -following chapters of the report and what I have just said is on Page 7. - -This German infiltration had been completed by social institutions such -as the Wohlfahrtsdienst founded in 1929 at Tinglev, and the Deutsche -Selbsthilfe, founded in 1935, and also by economic organizations, the -model of which was Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang, which by very clever and -secret financing on the part of the Reich, had succeeded in taking over -important agricultural properties. - -The movement formed in southern Jutland then tried to spread to the -whole of Denmark. Thus, there existed, even before the war, a National -Socialist Party of Denmark, whose leader was Fritz Clausen. We read in -the governmental report, Pages 6 and 7: - - “With regard to the relations of the Party with Germany prior to - the occupation it can be said that Fritz Clausen, himself, as - well as the members of the Party, were assiduous participants at - the Party Days held in Nuremberg and at the Congress of - Streicher at Erfurt and that, in any event, Fritz Clausen - personally was in very close relation with the German Foreign - Office. - - “This propagation of Nazism in Denmark, starting in southern - Jutland and spreading to the rest of the country, is illustrated - by the fact that the Nazi newspaper, called _Das Vaterland_, - which at first was published in Jutland, was transferred in - October 1939 to Copenhagen, where it was published from then on - as a morning daily.” - -Such, then, was the situation when the occupation started. As I have -indicated, the Germans did not establish a formal occupation authority; -and it follows that the two principal agents for the usurpation of -sovereignty in Denmark were diplomatic representation, on the one hand, -and the Danish Nazi Party on the other. - -The German Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark was at first Von -Renthe-Fink, and from October 1942, Dr. Best. - -Cases of diplomatic infringement on Danish sovereignty were numerous; -and the demands, made at first in a discreet manner, became more and -more sweeping. I shall quote, for example, a document which is contained -in the government report. This document is a memorandum submitted by the -Reich Plenipotentiary on 12 April 1941. - -May I point out to the Tribunal that this text is to be found in Book -Number 3 of the report submitted. This third book is entitled, “Second -Memorandum,” or rather, it is a continuation of this third book and -there is a sheet entitled “Annex One.” I am now quoting: - - “The German Reich Plenipotentiary has received instructions to - demand from the Royal Government of Denmark: - - “First: A formal declaration as to whether His Majesty, the King - of Denmark, to whom M. De Kauffmann, Minister of Denmark now - refers, or any other member of the Royal Danish Government had, - prior to its publication, any knowledge of the treaty concluded - between M. De Kauffmann and the American Government. - - “Second: The immediate putting into effect of the recall of M. - De Kauffmann, Minister of Denmark, by His Majesty, the King of - Denmark. - - “Third: The delivery without delay to the American Chargé - d’Affaires in Copenhagen of a note disavowing M. De Kauffmann, - communicating the fact that he is being recalled, and stating - that the treaty thus concluded is not binding upon the Danish - Government, and formulating the most energetic protest against - the American procedure. - - “Fourth: A communication to be published in the press, according - to which the Danish Royal Government clearly states that M. De - Kauffmann acted against the will of His Majesty, the King, and - of the Danish Royal Government and without their authorization; - that he has been recalled, and that the Danish Government - considers the treaty thus concluded as not binding upon it and - has formulated the most energetic protests against the American - procedure. - - “Fifth: The promulgation of a law according to which the loss of - nationality and the confiscation of property may be pronounced - against any Danish subject who has been guilty of grave offenses - abroad against the interests of Denmark, or against the - provisions laid down by the Danish Government. - - “Sixth: M. De Kauffmann is to be brought to trial for the crime - of high treason, by virtue of Article 98 of the penal code, and - of Article 3, Section 3, of the law of 18 January 1941, and to - lose his nationality in conformity with a law to be promulgated, - as mentioned under Paragraph 5.” - -I believe that this very characteristic example shows how the -sovereignty of the legitimate Danish Government was violated by the -Germans. They gave orders in the sphere of international relations, -although liberty in this sphere constitutes the essential attribute of -the sovereignty and the independence of the State. They even go so far, -as the Tribunal has seen in the last two paragraphs, as to demand that a -law be passed in accordance with their wishes and that a prosecution for -high treason be made in conformity with such law, on the supposition -that it will be promulgated at their instance. - -To conclude the subject, I should like to read a passage from the Danish -Government report which appears in the second supplementary memorandum -on Page 4, the third book in the green file: - - “In the month of October there occurred a sudden crisis. The - Germans claimed that His Majesty, the King, had offended Hitler - by giving too short a reply to a telegram which the latter had - sent to him. The Germans reacted abruptly and with extreme - violence. The German Minister in Copenhagen was immediately - recalled. The Danish Minister in Berlin was then recalled to - Denmark. Minister Von Renthe-Fink was replaced by Dr. Best, who - arrived in the country with the title of Plenipotentiary of the - German Reich and who brought with him sweeping demands on the - part of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Ribbentrop, - including a demand for a change in the Danish Government and the - admission of National Socialists into the Government. These - demands were refused by Denmark and, the government having - dragged out the matter, they were finally abandoned by Dr. - Best.” - -THE PRESIDENT: This may be a convenient time to break off. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 February 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - FIFTIETH DAY - Monday, 4 February 1946 - - - _Morning Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the -Defendant Kaltenbrunner will be absent from this morning’s session on -account of illness. - -M. FAURE: May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Dodd would like to give some -explanations. - -MR. DODD: May it please the Court, with reference to the prospective -witness Pfaffenberger, over the weekend it occurred to us, after talking -with him, that perhaps if Defense Counsel had an opportunity to talk to -him we might save some time for the Court. Accordingly we made this -Witness available to Dr. Kauffmann for conversation and interview; he -has talked with him as long as he has pleased, and has notified us that -in view of this conversation he does not care to cross-examine him, and -as well other Counsel for the Defense have no desire to cross-examine -him. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness Pfaffenberger can be released? - -MR. DODD: That is what we would like to do, at the order of the Court. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -M. FAURE: Gentlemen, during the last session I reached the end of the -first period of the German occupation of Denmark. In connection with -that first period I should like still to mention a circumstance which is -established by the Danish report, Document Number RF-901, second -memorandum, Page 4. I quote: - - “When the German aggression against Russia took place on 22 June - 1941”—that is the third book of the report—“one of the most - serious encroachments was made on the political liberties which - the Germans had promised to respect. They forcibly obliged the - government to intern the Communists, the total number of which - was 300.” - -The explanations which I gave in the previous session related to the -improper interference on the part of the first instrument of German -usurpation, the diplomatic representation. - -The second instrument of German interference was, as might be expected, -the local National Socialist Party of Fritz Clausen, about which I spoke -previously. The Germans hoped that in the favorable circumstances of the -occupation, and thanks to the support they would bring to it, this party -might develop enormously. But their calculations were completely wrong. -In effect, in March 1943 elections took place in Denmark; and these -elections resulted in the total defeat of the Nazi Party. This party -obtained only a proportion which represented 2.5 percent of the votes, -and it obtained only 3 seats out of 149 seats in the Chamber of -Deputies. I point out to the Tribunal that in some copies of my brief -there is a printing mistake and that 25 percent is indicated instead of -2.5 percent, which is the correct figure and which shows what very -little success the Clausen party had at the elections. - -The conduct of the Germans in Denmark showed a notable change in the -period following the month of August 1943. The first reason for this -change was clearly the failure of the plan which consisted in seizing -power in a legal manner, thanks to the aid of the Clausen party. On the -other hand, about the same time, the Germans were equally disappointed -in another direction. They had sought, as has been shown in my brief on -economic questions, to mobilize Danish economy for the benefit of their -war effort. But the Danish population, which had refused political -nazification, did not wish to lend itself to economic nazification -either. And so the Danish industries and the Danish workmen offered -passive resistance, and by a legitimate reaction against the irregular -undertakings of the occupying power they organized a sabotage program. -There were strikes accompanied by various incidents. Faced with this -double failure, the Germans decided to modify their tactics. - -In this connection we read in the government report, Page 6 of the -second memorandum, the following sentence: - - “As a result of these events, the Plenipotentiary of the German - Reich, Dr. Best, was on 24 August 1943, called to Berlin, from - whence he returned with claims in the nature of an ultimatum - addressed to the Danish Government.” - -I should now like to submit the text of this ultimatum, which is also to -be found in the official Danish report. This is Appendix Number 2 of -this report. The ultimatum is dated Copenhagen, 28 August 1943. At the -end of the first three books there are several loose sheets which are -the appendices. I now come to the second appendix—on Saturday I read -the first appendix—which is the second sheet and it has also been -copied in my brief: - - “Claims of the Reich Government: - - “The Danish Government must immediately declare the entire - country in a state of military emergency. - - “The state of military emergency must include the following - measures: - - “1. Prohibition of public gatherings of more than five persons. - - “2. Prohibition of all strikes and of any aid given to strikers. - - “3. Prohibition of all meetings in closed premises or in the - open air; prohibition to be in the streets between 2030 hours - and 0530 hours; closing of restaurants at 1930 hours. By 1 - September 1943 all firearms and explosives to be handed over. - - “4. Prohibition to hamper in any way whatsoever Danish nationals - because of their collaboration or the collaboration of their - relatives with the German authorities, or because of their - relations with the Germans. - - “5. Establishment of a press censorship with German - collaboration. - - “6. Establishment of courts-martial to judge acts contravening - the measures taken to maintain order and security. - - “Infringement of the measures mentioned above will be punished - by the most severe penalties which can be imposed in conformity - with the law in force concerning the power of the Government to - take measures to maintain calm, order, and security. The death - penalty must be introduced without delay for acts of sabotage - and for any aid given in committing these acts, for attacks - against the German forces, for possession after 1 September 1943 - of firearms and explosives. - - “The Reich Government expects to receive today before. 1600 - hours the acceptance by the Danish Government of the - above-mentioned demands.” - -The Danish Government, mindful of its dignity, courageously refused to -yield to that ultimatum, although it found itself under the material -constraint of the military occupation. Direct encroachments upon the -sovereignty then started. The Germans themselves took the measures which -they had not succeeded in getting the national government to accept. -They declared a state of military emergency; they took hostages; they -attacked without warning, which is contrary to the laws of war; and at a -time when—let me recall it—a state of war did not exist, they attacked -the Danish Army and Navy and disarmed and imprisoned their forces. They -pronounced death sentences and deported a certain number of persons -considered to be Communists and whose internment, as I pointed out, they -had previously required. From 29 August 1943, the King, the Government, -and the Parliament ceased to exercise their functions. The -administration continued under the direction of high officials who in -urgent cases took measures called, “Emergency Laws.” During this same -period there existed three German authorities in Denmark: - -First, the Plenipotentiary, who was still Dr. Best; second, the military -authority under the orders of General Hannecken, replaced subsequently -by General Lindemann; and third, the German police. - -Indeed, the German police were installed in Denmark a few days after the -crisis of which I have just spoken to you. The SS Standartenführer, -Colonel Dr. Mildner, arrived in September as Chief of the German -Security; and on 1 November there arrived in Denmark as the Supreme -Chief of the Police, the Obergruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the -Police, Günther Pancke, of whom I shall have occasion to speak again. -General of Police Günther Pancke had under his authority Dr. Mildner, -whose name I mentioned at first and who was replaced on 5 January 1944 -by SS Standartenführer Bovensiepen. - -The Tribunal will find in the Danish Government’s report, on which I -base this information, a chart showing the German officials in Denmark. -This chart is to be found in the second memorandum, Page 2. It is -interesting, although we are not concerned here with individual cases, -insofar as it shows the organization of the German network in this -country. During the whole period which I am speaking about now, of the -three German authorities already mentioned, the police played the most -important role and was the principal organ of usurpation of sovereignty -by the Germans. For that reason we might consider that while Norway and -Holland represent cases of civil administration and Belgium and France -represent cases of military administration, Denmark represents the -typical case of police administration. At the same time we must never -forget that these different types of administration in all these -occupied countries were always interdependent. The seizure of authority -by the German police in Denmark during the period from September 1943 -until the liberation was responsible for an extraordinary number of -crimes. Unlike other administrations, the police did not act under legal -or statutory regulations, but it interfered very effectually in the life -of the country by the exercise of orderly and systematic _de facto law_. -I shall have the opportunity of treating certain aspects of this police -administration in the fourth section of my brief. For the moment, within -the scope of my subject, I should like simply to cite the facts which -constitute direct and general violation of sovereignty. In this -connection, I believe that it is indispensable that I inform the -Tribunal of a quite exceptional event which took place on 19 September -1944. At that date the Germans suppressed the police—I mean the -national police of Denmark—and totally abolished this same institution -which is naturally indispensable and essential in all states. - -I am going to read on this point what the government report says, second -memorandum, that is to say, still the third book of the file, Page 29. I -shall begin in the middle of the paragraph, after the first sentence. -The extract is to be found in my brief. I quote: - - “The fact that the Germans had not succeeded in exerting any - influence among the Danish police or among their leaders or in - the ranks, was partly the reason why the German military - authorities at the end of the summer of 1944 began to fear the - police. Pancke explained that General Hannecken himself was - afraid that the police, numbering 8,000 to 10,000 well-trained - men, might fall upon the Germans in the event of an invasion. In - September 1944, believing that an invasion of Denmark was - probable, Pancke and Hannecken planned the disarming of the - police and the deportation of a part of it. Pancke submitted the - plan to Himmler, who consented to it in writing, adding in the - letter that the plan had been approved by Hitler. He had - moreover discussed the plan with Kaltenbrunner. The operation - was carried out by Pancke and Bovensiepen, who had discussed the - plan with Kaltenbrunner and Müller of the RSHA, and the regular - troops aided this operation with the consent of General - Hannecken. - - “At 11 o’clock in the morning of 19 September 1944 the Germans - caused a false air-raid alarm to be given. Immediately - afterwards, the police soldiers forcibly entered the police - headquarters in Copenhagen as well as the police stations in the - city. Some policemen were killed. They acted in the same way - throughout the whole country. Most of the policemen on duty were - captured. In Copenhagen and in the large cities of the country - the prisoners were taken to Germany in ships, which - Kaltenbrunner had sent for this purpose, or in box cars. As has - already been said before, the treatment to which they were - subjected in German concentration camps was horrible beyond - description. In the small country towns the policemen were - freed. - - “At the same time Pancke decreed what he called a state of - police emergency. The exact meaning of this expression has never - been explained, and even the Germans do not seem to have - understood what it meant. In practice, the result was that all - police activities, ordinary as well as judicial, were suspended. - Maintenance of order and public security was left to the - inhabitants themselves. - - “During the last 6 months of the occupation, the Danish nation - found itself in the unheard-of situation, unknown in other - civilized countries, of being deprived of its police force and - the possibility to maintain order and public security. This - state of affairs might have ended in complete chaos if the - respect for the law and the discipline of the population, - strengthened by the indignation at this act of violence, had not - warded off the most serious consequences.” - -Despite the bearing of the Danish population, the absence of the police -during these last 6 months of the occupation naturally resulted in a -recrudescence of all forms of criminality. You can get an idea of this -if you consider—and that detail will suffice—that the premiums of -insurance companies had to be raised to 480 percent—it says so in the -report—whereas previously they were limited to half of the normal rate. -We are justified in considering that the crimes committed under these -conditions involved the responsibility of the German authorities who -could not fail to foresee and who accepted this state of affairs. We see -here further proof of the total indifference of the Germans to the -consequences arising from decisions taken by them to suit their ends at -the time. - -Finally, I should like to conclude this section on Denmark by quoting to -the Tribunal a passage from a document which I shall present as Exhibit -Number RF-902. This document belongs to the American documentation under -the Number 705-PS, but it has not yet been submitted, and I should like -to read an extract, one quotation, which seems to me to be interesting. -This is a report drawn up in Berlin on 12 January 1943, and concerns a -meeting of the SS Committee of the Research Institute for Germanic -Regions (Ausschuss der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für den Germanischen Raum). -At this meeting there were present 14 personages of the SS. This report -contains a special paragraph which concerns Denmark. Other paragraphs of -the same document are of interest in connection with the section which -will follow this. Therefore, in order to avoid having to refer to this -document twice, I shall read the whole of the passages which I should -like to submit as evidence. I start on Page 3 of the document, towards -the end of the page. - - “Norway. In Norway the Minister Fuglesang meanwhile has become - the successor to the Minister Lunde, who has been killed in an - accident. Despite the promises made by Quisling’s party, Norway - may not be expected to furnish an important quota. - - “Denmark. In Denmark the situation is extremely encouraging on - account of the taking over of power by SS Gruppenführer Dr. - Best. We may be convinced that the SS Gruppenführer Dr. Best - will furnish a classical example of the ethnical policy of the - Reich. The relations with the Party Leader Clausen have recently - become difficult. Clausen agreed only to the project for the - establishment of a Front Combatant Corps as a preliminary to the - Germanic Schutzstaffel in Denmark, on the condition that members - of this corps will be barred from membership to the Party. - Negotiations about this urgently needed central organization of - front combatants are going on. The monopoly of the Party is - untenable; all rejuvenating elements must be mobilized although - Clausen personally has to stand in the foreground but without - his clique. - - “Netherlands. In the Netherlands Mussert has in the meantime - been proclaimed Führer of the Dutch people by the Reich - Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart. This measure has produced an - extremely disquieting effect in other Germanic countries, - particularly in Flanders. The decisive role again falls to the - General Commissioner whose principle of exploiting Mussert and - then dropping him cannot be accepted under a Germanic Reich - policy as approved by the SS. - - “Flanders: In Flanders the development of the VNV (the Flemish - National Movement) continues to be unfavorable. Even the shrewd - policy of the new leader of the VNV, Dr. Elias, can no longer - deceive us about this. Besides, he once expressed the opinion - that Germany was prepared to make concessions in ethnological - policy only when she was in bad straits.” - -This information is quite characteristic. In the first place, it is -firmly established that the Germanic regions should include Norway, -Denmark, the Netherlands, and Flanders. Naturally I speak only of the -western countries. In the second place, we clearly see how the Germans -used the Nazi-inspired local parties as an instrument for the usurpation -of sovereignty. In the third place, we see it is quite true that the -German diplomatic agents were also instruments for this policy of -usurpation and completely exceeded their normal functions. In the fourth -place, the document confirms the interdependence which existed between -the different agents of German interference, which we stressed a short -time ago and on which we cannot lay too much emphasis. The case of Dr. -Best is a good example. Dr. Best was a minister with plenipotentiary -powers; therefore, he was a diplomatic agent. We have seen that this -same Dr. Best was previously an agent of the military administration in -France, and we see by this document that besides his being a -Plenipotentiary Minister he is a General in the SS, and in this -capacity, so the document states, he seized power in Denmark. The -information contained in the document concerning Norway and the -Netherlands is a transition for the following part of this section, and -I ask the Tribunal to take the file entitled, “Norway and the -Netherlands.” - -The institution of Reich Commissioner was applied in Norway and in the -Netherlands, and in these two countries only; it constitutes a definite -concept in the general plan of Germanization, in which these two -countries occupy parallel positions. In both cases the establishment of -the civil administration followed hard upon the military occupation of -the country. The military men, therefore, did not have to take over the -administration, and during the few days which preceded the appointment -of the Reich Commissioner, they confined themselves to measures -concerning order. - -In Norway the decree of 24 April 1940 appointed Terboven as Reich -Commissioner. This decree is signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the -Defendants Keitel and Frick. In Holland the decree of 18 May 1940 -appointed the Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissioner. This decree -is signed by the same persons as the preceding decree, and it bears in -addition the signatures of Göring and Ribbentrop. - -The decrees appointing the Reich-Commissioners also defined their -functions as well as the division of the functions between the civil -commissioner and the military authorities. I am not submitting these two -decrees as documents since they are direct acts of German legislation. -The decree concerning Norway provides in its first article: - - “The Reich Commissioner has the task of safeguarding the - interests of the Reich, and of exercising supreme power in the - civil domain.”—The decree adds—“The Reich Commissioner is - directly under me and receives from me directives and - instructions.” - -As far as the division of functions is concerned, I give the text of -Article 4, “The Commander of the German troops in Norway exercises the -rights of military sovereignty. His orders are carried out in the civil -domain by the Reich Commissioner.” - -This decree was published in the _Official Gazette of German Decrees_ -for 1940, Number 1. The same instructions are given in a similar decree -of 18 May 1940 concerning the Netherlands. The establishment of -Reich-Commissioners was accompanied at the beginning by some -pronouncement intended to reassure the population. Terboven proclaimed -that he intended to limit, as much as possible, the inconveniences and -costs of the occupation. This is in a proclamation of 25 April 1940 -which is in the _Official Gazette_, Page 2. - -Likewise, after his appointment, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart addressed -an appeal to the Dutch people. This is to be found in the _Official -Gazette_ for Holland for 1940, Page 2, and in it he expressed himself as -follows—he starts off with a categorical phrase: - - “I shall take all measures, including those of a legislative - nature, which will be necessary for carrying out this - mandate”—and he says also—“it is my will that the laws in - force up to now shall remain in force and that the Dutch - authorities shall be associated with the carrying out of - government affairs and that the independence of justice be - maintained.” - -But these promises were not kept. It is evident that the Reich -Commissioner was to become in Norway and in Holland the principal -instrument for the usurpation of sovereignty. He was to act, however, in -close relation with a second instrument of usurpation, the National -Socialist organization in the country. This collaboration of the local -Nazi Party with the German authority, represented by the Reich -Commissioner, took perceptibly different forms in each of the two -countries under consideration. Thus, the exercise of power by the Reich -Commissioner presents in itself differences between Norway and Holland -which were more apparent than real. - -In both countries the local National Socialist Party existed before the -war. It grew and was inspired by the German Nazi Party and had its place -in the general plan of war preparations and the plan for Germanization. -I should like to give some information concerning Norway. - -The National Socialist Party was called “Nasjonal Samling.” It had as -leader the famous Quisling. It was a perfect imitation of the German -Nazi Party. I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-920, the text -of the oath of fidelity subscribed to by members of this Nasjonal -Samling Party. I quote: - - “My pledge of allegiance: I promise on my honor: - - “1. Unflinching allegiance and loyalty towards the National - Socialist movement, its idea, and its Führer.”—This is the - third page of the Document RF-920. - - “2. To stand up energetically and fearlessly for the cause, - always to offer reliability and loyal discipline at my work, and - to do all I can in order to acquire the knowledge and abilities - which my work for the Movement demands. - - “3. To the best of my abilities to live in compliance with the - National Socialist concept and to show solidarity, - understanding, and good comradeship to all my companions. - - “4. To obey any orders given by the Führer or by his appointed - officials insofar as such orders are not in disagreement or do - not violate the directions of the Führer. - - “5. Never to reveal to unauthorized persons details of NS - methods of work or anything detrimental to the Movement. - - “6. At all times to make the utmost effort to contribute to the - progress of the Movement, and to the achievement of its purpose, - and to play the part in the fighting organization which I have - undertaken to do under promise of fidelity, quite conscious that - I should be guilty of an unworthy and vile act if I broke this - promise. - - “7. If circumstances should make it impossible for me to - continue as a member of the fighting organization, I promise to - withdraw in a loyal manner. I shall remain bound by the vow of - secrecy which I made and I shall do nothing to harm the - Movement. - - “Our aim. The aim of the Nasjonal Samling is: A new state, a - Norwegian and Nordic fellowship within the world community, - organically constructed on the basis of work, with a strong and - stable administration, a combination of common and private - weal.” - -This party therefore conforms completely to the Leadership Principle and -while it shows a Norwegian facade, it is nothing but a facade. In fact -on the very day of the invasion the Nazis imposed the establishment of -an alleged Norwegian Government, presided over by Quisling. At that time -the Norwegian Supreme Court appointed a board of officials who were to -be invested, under the title of Administrative Council, with powers of -higher administration. This Administrative Council constituted -therefore, in the exceptional circumstances in which it was set up, a -qualified authority for representing the legitimate sovereignty, at -least in a conservative way. It functioned only for a short time. By -September the Nazis found that it was not possible for them to obtain -the participation or even passive acceptance of the Administrative -Council and of the administrators. They themselves then appointed 13 -commissioners, of whom 10 were selected among the members of the -Quisling party. Quisling himself did not exercise any nominal function, -but he remained the Führer of his party. - -Finally, a third period began on 1 February 1942. At that date Quisling -returned to power as Minister President, and the commissioners -themselves assumed the title of ministers. This situation lasted until -the liberation of Norway. Thus, except for a few months in 1940, the -Germans completely usurped all sovereignty in Norway. This sovereignty -was divided between their direct agent, the Reich Commissioner, and -their indirect agents, first called State Councillors and then the -Quisling Government, but always an emanation of National Socialism. - -There is no doubt whatever that the independence of these organizations -vis-à-vis the German authorities was absolutely nil. The fact that the -second organization was called a government did not mean a strengthening -of its autonomous authority. These were merely differences of form, the -nature of which I shall point out to the Tribunal. I submit, in this -connection, two documents, Documents RF-921 and RF-922. By comparing -these two documents you will see that what I have just affirmed is -correct. These two documents are instructions addressed by the Reich -Commissioner to his offices concerned with legislative procedure. - -Document Number RF-921 is dated 10 October 1940; that is the very -beginning of the period of the State Councillors. I quote an extract -from this document, “All the decrees of the State Councillors must be -submitted to the Reich Commissioner before publication.” This is to be -found in the second paragraph. It is the only point which I should like -to bring out in this document. Therefore all the decrees of the higher -Norwegian administration were under the control of the Reich -Commissioner. - -The second document, Document Number RF-922, is dated 8 April 1942. It -relates to the period shortly after the establishment of the second -Quisling Government. I start at the second sentence of this document: - - “In view of the formation of the National Norwegian Government - on 1 February 1942 the Reich Commissioner has decided that from - now on this form of agreement”—a prior agreement in - writing—“is no longer required. Nevertheless, this modification - of formal legislative procedure does not mean that the Norwegian - Government may proclaim laws and decrees without the knowledge - of the competent department of the Reich Commissioner. His - Excellency, the Reich Commissioner, expects every department - chief to acquaint himself, by close contact with the competent - Norwegian departments, with all legislative measures which are - in preparation, and to find out in each case whether these - measures concern German interests, and to assure himself, if - necessary, that German interests will be taken into - consideration.” - -Thus, in the one case, there is a formal control with written -authorization. In the other case there is a control by information among -the different departments, but the principle is the same. The -establishment of local authority under one form or under another form -was merely a means of finding out the best way of deceiving public -opinion. When the Germans put Quisling into the background, it was -because they thought the State Councillors, being less well-known, might -more easily deceive the public. When they returned Quisling, it was -because the first maneuver had obviously failed and because they thought -that perhaps the official establishment of an authority qualified as -governmental would give the impression that the sovereignty of the -country had not been abolished. One might, however, wonder what was the -reason for these artifices and why the Nazis used them, instead of -purely and simply annexing the country. There is a very important reason -for that. It operates for Norway and it will operate for the -Netherlands. The Nazis always preferred to maintain the fiction of an -independent state and to gain a definite hold from within by using and -developing the local Party. It is with this end in view that they -granted the Party in Norway advantages of prestige; and if they did not -act in an identical manner in Holland, their general conduct was, -however, imbued with the same spirit. - -This policy of the Germans in Norway is perfectly illustrated by the -Norwegian law, or so-called Norwegian law, of 12 March 1942, (Norwegian -_Official Gazette_, 1942, Page 215, which I offer in evidence as -Document Number RF-923). I quote: - - “Law concerning the Party and the State, 12 March 1942, Number - 2. - - “Paragraph 1. In Norway the Nasjonal Samling is the fundamental - party of the State and closely linked with the State. - - “Paragraph 2. The organization of the Party, its activity, and - the duties of its members are laid down by the Führer of the - Nasjonal Samling. - - “Oslo, 12 March 1942”—signed—“Quisling, Minister President.” - -On the other hand, the Nazis organized on a large scale the system of -the duplication of functions which existed among the higher authorities. -In fact, it is the transposition of the German system, which shows a -constant parallelism between the state administration and the party -organizations. Everywhere German Nazis were installed to second and -supervise the Norwegian Nazis who had been put in official positions. - -As this point is interesting from the point of view of seizure of -sovereignty and of action taken in the administration, I think I may -submit two documents, which are Documents RF-924 and RF-925. These are -extracts of judicial interrogations by the Norwegian Court of two high -German officials of the Reich Commission at Oslo. Document Number RF-924 -refers to the interrogation of Georg Wilhelm Müller, interrogation dated -5 January 1946. Wilhelm Müller was the Ministerial Director in the -Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. The information which -he gives concerns more particularly the functioning of the propaganda -service, but similar methods were used in a general way, as this -statement admits. I quote Document RF-924: - - “Question: ‘In 1941 nobody in your country thought that military - difficulties would arise. At that time they certainly tried to - mold the Norwegian people along Nationalist Socialist lines?’ - - “Answer: ‘They did this until the very end.’ - - “Question: ‘Which were the practical measures for achieving this - National Socialist molding?’ - - “Answer: ‘They supported the NS Samling as far as possible; and - they did it, in the first place, by strengthening the Party - organization considerably.’” - -I may point out that this translation into French is not first rate; it -is, however, comprehensible. - - “Question: ‘In what way was it strengthened?’ - - “Answer: ‘In each Fylke’—or province—‘picked German National - Socialists were assigned to aid the Norwegian National - Socialists.’ - - “Question: ‘Were there other practical measures?’ - - “Answer: ‘That was done in all domains, even in the field of - propaganda, by the Einsatzstab propagandists placed at their - disposal. This was also done in Oslo at the central offices of - the NS Samling.’ - - “Question: ‘How did these propagandists work?’ - - “Answer: ‘They worked closely with similar Norwegian - propagandists and made suggestions to them. Grebe did this by - virtue of his double capacity as Chief of Propaganda in the - Reichskommissariat and Chief of the Landesgruppe.’ - - “Question: ‘How was this done?’ - - “Answer: ‘These consultations and conferences were even arranged - for the very top of the Party hierarchy. There was a man who was - specially appointed for this; first Wegeler, then Neumann, then - Schnurbusch, who had the task of strengthening National - Socialist ideas within the NS Samling.’ - - “Question: ‘In the Einsatzstab there were experts from the - different branches whose task it was to contact Norwegians and - give them useful advice. In what domains?’ - - “Answer: ‘There were organizers, and above all instructors for - the Hird, leaders of the SA and SS. Until he, himself, became - leader of the Einsatzstab, we had at the head a press man, a - propagandist, Herr Schnurbusch, an accountant, an expert on - social welfare questions in the same way as in the NSV in - Germany.’” - -The Tribunal will notice in this document the name of Schnurbusch, as -being that of the leader of the Einsatzstab, and of the organism for -liaison with, and penetration into, the local Party. I am now going to -quote an extract from the interrogation of Schnurbusch, which is found -in Document Number RF-925. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting these documents in? - -M. FAURE: Yes, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you say, for the purposes of the shorthand note, -that you offer them in evidence? - -M. FAURE: Will you excuse me? I should like to point out that I submit -as evidence Document Number RF-925 as well as Document Number RF-924 of -which I spoke just now. - -This is from the interrogation of Heinrich Schnurbusch, leader of the -liaison service in the Reich Commission on 8 January 1946 in Oslo: - - “Question: ‘How did the German departments try to achieve this - National Socialist conversion?’ - -I wish to point out to the Tribunal that I have passed over the first -three questions as they are not of much interest. - - “Answer: ‘We sought to strengthen this movement by the means - which we were accustomed to apply in Germany for leading the - masses. The Nasjonal Samling benefited by having at their - disposal all the means of news service and propaganda. But we - soon saw that the object could not be achieved. After 25 - September 1940 the public mood in Norway changed suddenly when - some State Councillors were appointed as NS State Councillors, - for Quisling’s action in the days of April 1940 was considered - treason by the Norwegian people.’ - - “Question: ‘In what way did you assist materially the NS Samling - in this propaganda? In what way did you counsel the NS Samling?’ - - “Answer: ‘During the time I was in office, when a propaganda - drive was made, it was always brought into line with the - propaganda which the Germans made in Norway.’ - - “Question: ‘Did you issue any directives for the NS Samling?’ - - “Answer: ‘No. In my time the NS Samling worked independently in - this respect, and partly even contrary to our advice. The NS - Samling took the view that it understood better the Norwegian - mentality, but it made many mistakes.’ - - “Question: ‘Was financial support given?’ - - “Answer: ‘Certainly, financial help was given, but I don’t know - the exact amount.’” - -THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn for 10 minutes? - - [_A recess was taken._] - -M. FAURE: I should like first of all to point out to the Tribunal that, -with its permission, I shall examine this afternoon the Witness Van der -Essen concerning whom a formal request has already been submitted. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Faure. - -M. FAURE: This witness can then be called at the beginning of the -afternoon session. - -The observations which I have just presented had to do with Norway. - -In the Netherlands, unlike what happened in Norway, the Nazis did not -utilize the local Party as an official instrument of government. The -governmental authority was completely in the hands of the Reich -Commissioner who set up a sort of ministry, including four German -General Commissioners, respectively competent for government and -justice, public security, finance, and economic affairs, and special -affairs. This organization was created by a decree of 3 June 1940 -(_Official Gazette_ for Holland, 1940, Number 5). I point out that, as -the Dutch _Official Gazette_ has already been submitted in evidence to -the Tribunal, I shall not again submit each of these texts, which are a -part of it. I shall, therefore, simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial -notice of them and to consider them as proved. - -The holders of the posts of General Commissioners were appointed by the -decree of 5 June 1940. - -The local authorities were represented at the higher level only by the -Secretaries General of the Ministries, who were entirely under the -authority of the Reich Commissioner and of the General Commissioners. - -The decree of 29 May 1940, which is in the Dutch _Official Gazette_, -1940, Page 8, lays down in its first article: - - “The Reich Commissioner will exercise the powers invested until - now in the King and the Government. . . .” - -And in Article 3: - - “The Secretaries General of the Dutch ministries are responsible - to the Reich Commissioner.” - -If the Nazi Party did not constitute the Government, it nevertheless -received the official blessing. - -I shall quote to the Tribunal in this connection the decree of 30 -January 1943, which likewise is in the Dutch _Official Gazette_, 1943, -Page 63. I read the following passage: - - “The representative of the political will of the Dutch people is - the National Socialist movement of the Netherlands. I have, - therefore, decreed that all the German offices under my orders, - of the administration and those of the National Socialist - movement, shall maintain close contact with the leader of the - Movement in order to assure the co-ordination of the tasks in - carrying out important administrative measures and particularly - for all matters concerning personnel.” - -The Tribunal knows already, for it is common knowledge, and insofar as -it might be necessary through the witness who has already been heard, -how outrageously untrue it was to claim that the Dutch National -Socialist Party represented the political will of the people of this -country. - -Having commented on these two forms of utilization of the local party as -agents of sovereignty, I should now like to point out to the Tribunal -the main features of these usurpations which were committed by the -Germans. - -A first line of action is exemplified by the attempt to induce the -occupied countries to participate in the war or, at the very least, to -initiate recruitment for the German Army. In Norway the Nazis created -the “SS Norge,” a formation which later was called the “Germanske SS -Norge.” I submit as evidence Document Number RF-926, which is the decree -of 21 July 1942, concerning the “Germanske SS Norge,” and I quote -Paragraph 2 of this decree, which is a Quisling decree. - - “2. ‘The Germanske SS Norge’ is a National Socialist order of - soldiers which shall consist of men of Nordic blood and ideas. - It is an independent subdivision of the Nasjonal Samling, - directly under the NS Foerer (NS Leader) and responsible to him. - It is, at the same time, a section of the ‘Stor-Germanske - SS’”—the SS of Greater Germany—“and shall help to lead the - Germanic peoples towards a new future and create the basis of a - Germanic fellowship.” - -We see again, by this example, that the interventions of the so-called -Norwegian Government are perfectly obvious methods of Germanization. In -order to facilitate the recruiting into this legion, the German or -Norwegian Nazis did not hesitate to upset the civil legislation and to -abolish the abiding principles of family rights by making a law which -exempted minors from having to obtain the consent of their parents. This -is a law of 1 February 1941, Norwegian _Official Gazette_, 1941, Page -153, which I submit in evidence as Document Number RF-927. - -In the Netherlands the Germans were obliged to upset even more the -national legislation in order to permit military recruitment. As they -did not create a factitious government and as the legitimate government -was still at war with the Reich, the volunteers came under Articles 101 -and the following articles of the Dutch penal code, which punished those -enlisted in the army of a foreign power at war with the Netherlands and -likewise those who give aid to the enemy. - -By reason of the _de facto_ occupation of the country there was little -chance of these penalties being effectively applied, but it is very -curious and very revealing that the Reich Commissioner issued a decree -of 25 July 1941, Dutch _Official Gazette_, 1941, Number 135. This decree -states that the taking of Dutchmen for service in the German Army, the -Waffen SS, or the Legion of Netherlands Volunteers does not bring them -under the provisions of the penal texts mentioned above, and this decree -is declared retroactive to 10 May 1940. It is therefore very convenient, -when one commits a criminal act according to the general code, to be -able to modify the law to suppress the crime in question. - -Another decree of 25 July 1941, _Official Gazette_ for 1941, Page 548, -stipulates that enrollment in the German Army will no longer involve -loss of Dutch nationality. - -Finally, a decree of 8 August 1941, _Official Gazette_ for 1941, Page -622, declares that the acquisition of German nationality no longer -entails the loss of Dutch nationality except in cases of express -renunciation. Although this last text seems to bring out a point of -detail, it may be regarded as an initial attempt to create later a -double Dutch and German nationality, which will fit into the general -procedures for the advancement of the whole plan of Germanization. - -In regard to these measures for military recruitment, I should like to -state precisely the attitude of the Prosecution as a result of the -examination and cross-examination of the witness, Vorrink, who was heard -on Saturday. The Prosecution does not consider that the criminal -character of this military recruitment is established only by the fact -of having recruited persons by force or by pressure upon their will. -This pressure and this constraint are an aggravating and characteristic -aspect but not a necessary aspect of the criminal action which we -reprehend. The fact of having recruited persons, even on a voluntary -basis, in the occupied countries for service in the German Army, is -considered by us as a crime. This crime is moreover punishable under the -internal legislation of all these countries, whose legislation covers -such acts as those committed in these countries, in accordance with the -rules of law in matters of legislative competence. - -It is even relatively of small importance, except for knowing all the -details, whether the recruiting of traitors was favored or not by -particular pressure according to the situation in which these traitors -found themselves. - -I should like also to indicate in a more general way, that the -Prosecution does not consider that the recruiting of traitors, either -for service in the Army or in other activities, is for the Nazi leaders -an extenuating circumstance or an exonerating one. On the contrary, it -is one of the characteristics of their criminal activity; and the -responsibility of the traitors in no way exempts them from -responsibility. On the contrary, we hold against them this corruption -which they attempted to spread in the occupied countries by appealing to -those elements of weak morality which may be found in the population of -a country and by instilling in the mind of each person the thought of -possible immoral and criminal activity against his country. - -This was a first line of action for German usurpation: namely, the -enrollment of troops. - -A second general line of action is identified with the whole of the -measures designed to abolish civil liberties and to set up the -Leadership Principle. I shall quote some of these measures by way of -example. - -In Norway, suppression of political parties, German decree of 25 -September 1940, which is in the _Official Gazette_ for 1940, Page 19; a -decree forbidding all activity in favor of the legitimate dynasty, -decree of 7 October 1940, in the _Official Gazette_ for 1940, Page 10; -the guarantees under the statutory rules for officials were suppressed, -they could be transferred or dismissed for political reasons, German -decree of 4 October 1940, Page 24. Finally, a Norwegian law of 18 -September 1943, setting up a characteristic institution, that of -departmental chief representing the Party, and responsible to the -Minister President and to no other authority of the State (Document -Number RF-928). He exercised in the department the supreme political -control over all public authorities of the department. - -All professions came under the system of compulsory membership with -application of the Leadership Principle. - -In Holland we likewise observe the suppression of elected bodies, decree -of 11 August 1941, _Official Gazette_ for 1941, Page 637, which confirms -the decree of 21 June 1940, _Official Gazette_ for 1940, Page 54; the -dissolution of political parties, decree of 4 July 1941, _Official -Gazette_ for 1941, Page 583; creation of the Labor Front, decree of 30 -April 1942, _Official Gazette_ for 1942, Page 211; setting up of the -Peasant Corporation, decree of 22 October 1941, _Official Gazette_ for -1941, Page 838. - -I have given only a few examples of this principle; and to conclude I -shall quote a decree of 12 August 1941, _Official Gazette_ for 1941, -Page 34, which created a special judicial competence for all offenses -and infringements committed against political peace and against -political interests, or committed for political motives. In fact, the -justices of the peace charged with exercising these oppressive powers -were always chosen from among the members of the Nazi Party. - -Finally a third line of action in this campaign of usurpation can be -defined as a systematic campaign against the elite of the country and -against its spiritual life. In fact it is always in this sphere that the -Nazis met with the greatest resistance to their designs. They attacked -the universities and teaching establishments. - -In Holland a decree of 25 July 1941, _Official Gazette_ for 1941, Page -559, gives the administration the right to close arbitrarily all private -institutions. In the Netherlands the University of Leyden was closed on -11 November 1941. - -By a decree of the Reich Commissioner of 10 May 1943, _Official Gazette_ -for 1943, Page 127, the students were forced to sign a declaration of -loyalty drawn up in the following terms: - - “The undersigned, ——, hereby solemnly declares on his word of - honor that he will conscientiously conform to the laws, decrees, - and other dispositions in force in Dutch occupied territory and - will abstain from any act directed against the German Reich, the - German Army, or the Dutch authorities, or engage in any activity - which might imperil public order in the higher teaching - institutions in view of the present circumstances and danger.” - -In Norway rigorous measures were taken against the University of Oslo. I -offer in evidence Document Number RF-933. I point out to the Tribunal -that this is not in strict order and that Document Number RF-933 is the -last in the document book. - -This Document Number RF-933 is an article in the _Deutsche Zeitung_ of 1 -December 1943, reproduced in a Norwegian newspaper. It is entitled, “A -Cleaning-Up Measure Necessary in Oslo; Purge in the Student World.” I -shall read only a few paragraphs of this article. I begin with the -second paragraph: - -“The students of the University of Oslo”—will the Tribunal excuse me. I -shall read also the first paragraph: - - “By order of the Reich Commissioner Terboven, the SS - Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Rediess made the - following announcement to the students in the lecture room of - the University of Oslo on Tuesday afternoon: - - “The students of the University of Oslo have attempted to offer - resistance to the German Army of occupation and to the Norwegian - Government recognized by the Reich, since the occupation of - Norway, that is, since 1940.” - -I shall end the quotation here, and continue at Paragraph 5: - - “In order to protect the interests of the occupying power and to - assure maintenance of peace and order within this country, - rigorous measures are indispensable. Therefore, by order of the - Reich Commissioner, I have to make known to you the following: - - “1. The students of the University of Oslo will be transferred - to a special camp in Germany. - - “2. The women students will be dismissed from the University and - must return by the quickest means to their original place of - residence, where they will immediately report to the police. - Until further notice they are forbidden to leave these places - without permission from the police.” - -I break off the quotation here and continue at the last paragraph but -one, on the second page of this Document Number RF-933: - - “You ought to be thankful to the Reich Commissioner that other - much more Draconian measures are not being applied. Moreover, - thanks to this measure, most of you have been saved from - forfeiting your life and wealth in the future.” - -As concerns religious life, the Germans multiplied their harassing -methods. By way of example, I offer in evidence Document Number RF-929, -which I shall read: - - “Oslo, 28 May 1941: To the Commanders of the Sipo and the SD in - Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim, Tromosoe. Subject: Surveillance of - Religious Services during the Whitsuntide Feasts. Incidents: - none. - - “It is requested that you watch the religious services and send - in a report here on the result. - - “BDS”—commander—“of the Sipo and the SD. Oslo. Signature: - (illegible) SS Hauptsturmführer.” - -Now here is the report following this order to watch the church -services. I offer this report in evidence as Document Number RF-930. I -shall read this document, which is very short. - - “Trondheim, 5 June 1941. - - “The surveillance of religious services during the Whitsuntide - Feasts showed no new essential points. Domprobst Fjellbu adheres - to his provocative preaching, but so cleverly that he is able to - excuse every phrase as applied to religious subjects and void of - any political meaning.” - -The rest of the letter is partly burned. - -Finally I should like, in order not to dwell on this matter too long, to -quote two examples which show, on the one hand, the constant immorality -of the German methods and, on the other hand, the justified protests to -which they gave rise on the part of the most qualified authorities. The -first example concerns the Netherlands. - -The Dutch magistrates were roused to righteous indignation by the German -practice of arbitrary detentions in concentration camps. They found the -opportunity of making known their disapproval in a manner which came -within the normal exercise of their juridical functions. Thus, in -connection with a particular case, the Court of Appeal at Leeuwarden -rendered a decision of which I wish to read an extract to the Tribunal. -This is submitted as Document Number RF-931. I shall read to you an -extract from this document: - - “Whereas the Court cannot declare itself in agreement in the - matter of the penalty inflicted upon the accused by the Chief - Judge and his presentation of motives, the Court is of the - opinion that this penalty should be determined as follows: - - “Whereas as regards the penalty to be inflicted: - - “The Court desires to take into account the fact that for some - time various penalties of detention inflicted by the Dutch Judge - upon delinquents of masculine sex, contrary to legal principles - and contrary to the intention of the Legislator and of the - Judge, have been executed, or are being executed in camps in a - manner which aggravates the penalty to a degree such as it was - impossible for the Judge to foresee or even to suppose when - determining the degree of the punishment. - - “Whereas the Court, taking into account the possibility of this - manner of executing the penalty to be inflicted at present, will - abstain, for conscience sake, from condemning the suspect to a - period of detention in conformity, in this case, with the - gravity of the offense committed by the defendant, because the - latter would be exposed to the possibility of an execution of - the penalty as indicated here above. - - “Whereas the Court, on the strength of this consideration, will - confine itself to condemning the suspect to a penalty of - detention to be determined hereafter, after deducting the time - spent by him in preventive detention, and the duration of which - is such that the penalty at the moment of the pronouncing of the - penalty will have almost entirely expired during the period of - preventive detention.” - -This example is especially interesting, because I now have to indicate -that as a result of this decision of the Court of Appeal, the Defendant -Seyss-Inquart dismissed the President of the Court by a decree of the -9th of April 1943, which is likewise submitted in evidence under the -same document number, RF-931. These two documents constitute a whole. - - “By virtue of paragraph 3 of my decree,”—_et cetera_—“I - dismiss from his office as Counsellor of the Court of Appeal at - Leeuwarden, such dismissal to take effect immediately, Doctor of - Law F.F. Viehoff.”—Signed—“Seyss-Inquart.” - -The second example which I give in conclusion will now be taken from -Norway. It is a solemn protest made by the Norwegian bishops. The -special occasion which called forth this protest is the following: The -Minister for Police had issued a decree, dated 13 December 1940, by -which he arrogated to himself the right to suppress the obligation of -professional secrecy for priests and provided that priests who refused -to break the secrecy of the confession would be subjected to -imprisonment by his orders. - -On 15 January 1941, the Norwegian bishops addressed themselves to the -Ministry of Public Education and Religious Affairs, and handed to it a -memorandum. In this memorandum they made known their protests against -this extraordinary demand by the police and at the same time they -protested against other abuses; violent acts committed by Nazi -organizations, and illegal acts in judicial matters. This protest of the -Norwegian bishops is transcribed in a pastoral letter addressed to their -parishes in February 1941. I submit it as Document Number RF-932. I -should like to quote an extract from this document on Page 9, top of the -page: - - “The decree of the Ministry of Police, dated 13 December 1940, - just published, gravely affects the mission of the priests. - According to this decree, the obligation of professional secrecy - for priests and ministers may be suppressed by the Ministry of - Police. - - “Our obligation to maintain professional secrecy is not only - established by law, but has always been a fundamental condition - for the work of the Church and of the priests in the exercise of - their care of souls and in receiving the confession of persons - in distress. It is an unalterable condition for the work of the - Church, that a person may have absolute and unlimited confidence - in the priest who is unreservedly bound by his obligation to - keep professional secrecy, as it has been formulated in the - Norwegian legislation and in the regulations of the Church at - all times and in all Christian countries. - - “To abolish this _Magna Charta_ of the conscience is to strike - at the very heart of the work of the Church, which is all the - more serious because Paragraph 5 of the decree stipulates that - the Ministry of Police may imprison the priest in question, in - order to force a statement without the case having been - submitted to a tribunal.” - -Yet all this was happening during the first year of the occupation. -Already the highest spiritual authorities of Norway found themselves in -the position of having not only to protest against a particularly -intolerable act, but also to enunciate a judgment upon the whole of the -methods of the occupation, which judgment appears on Page 16 of the -pastoral letter, and which I shall read to the Tribunal (last -paragraph): - - “For this reason the bishops of the Church have placed before - the Ministry some of the acts and official proclamations about - the government of society during these latter times, acts and - proclamations which the Church finds in contradiction with the - Commandments of God and which give the impression of - revolutionary conditions prevailing in the country, instead of a - state of occupation by which the laws are upheld as long as they - are not directly incompatible with this state of occupation.” - -This is a very correct juridical analysis; and now, if it please the -Tribunal, I should also like to read a last sentence which preceded -this, on Page 16: - - “When the public authority of society permits violence and - injustice and exercises pressure over souls, then the Church - becomes the guardian of consciences. A human soul is of more - importance than the whole world.” - -I shall now ask the Tribunal to take the file entitled “Belgium.” I -point out immediately to the Tribunal that this file does not include -any document book. This statement, which deals with very general facts, -will be supported as being evidence by the report of the Belgian -Government, which has already been submitted by my colleagues under -Document Number RF-394. The section which I now take up is a general -section concerning military administration in two cases, in Belgium and -France; and I shall begin with the file concerning Belgium. - -In Belgium the usurpations of national sovereignty by the occupying -power are imputable to the military command which committed them either -by direct decrees or by injunctions to the Belgian administrative -authorities who in this case were the Secretaries General of the -Ministries. - -Concerning the setting up of this apparatus of usurpation I shall read -out to the Tribunal two paragraphs of the Belgian report, Chapter 4, -concerning Germanization and nazification, Page 3, Paragraph 3: - - “The legal government of Belgium, having withdrawn to France, - then to London, it was the Secretaries General of the - Ministries, that is to say, the highest officials in the - hierarchic order, who, by virtue of Article 5 of the law of 10 - May 1940, exercised within the framework of their professional - activity and in cases of urgency, all the powers of the highest - authority.” - -In other words, these high officials, animated, at least during the -first months of the occupation, by the desire to keep the occupying -authorities as far removed as possible from the administration of the -country, took upon themselves governmental and administrative powers. At -the order of the Germans this administrative power after a time became a -real legislative power. - -This regime of the Secretaries General pleased the Germans who adopted -it. In appointing to these posts Belgians paid by them they could -introduce into Belgium under the appearance of legality absolutely -radical reforms, which would make of this country a National Socialist -vassal state. - -It is interesting to note at this point that in order to strengthen -their hold on the public life through the local authorities, the Germans -did not hesitate by a decree of 14 May 1942, which is referred to in the -official report, to suppress the jurisdictional control of the legality -of the orders of the Secretaries General, which was a violation of -Article 107 of the Belgian Constitution. The Belgian report states in -the following paragraphs where the responsibility lies in this matter of -breaches of public order, and I shall quote here the actual terms of -this report on Page 4, Paragraph 3: - - “In conclusion, whether the transformation of the legal - institutions be the consequence of German decrees or that of - orders emanating from the Secretaries General makes no - difference. It is the Germans who bear the responsibility for - these, the Secretaries General being in relation to them only - faithful agents for carrying out their instructions.” - -I think that it will likewise be interesting to read the three following -paragraphs of the report, for they reveal characteristic facts as to -German methods in their seizure of sovereignty. - - “If it is necessary to furnish a new argument to support this - thesis further, it is sufficient to recall that the occupying - power employed all means to introduce into the structure which - was to be transformed, from top to bottom, devoted National - Socialist agents. This was really the work of termites. - - “The decree of 7 March 1941, under the pretext of bringing - younger men into the administration, provided for the removal of - a great number of officials. They would naturally be replaced by - Germanophiles. - - “Finally, the Germans set up at the head of the Ministry of the - Interior one of their most devoted agents, who arrogated to - himself, as we shall see subsequently, the right to designate - aldermen, permanent deputies, burgomasters, _et cetera_, and - used his rights to proceed to certain appointments of district - commissioners, for instance, by putting into office tools of the - enemy.” - -The Belgian report then analyzes in a remarkably clear manner the -violations by the Germans of Belgian public order, classifying these -under two headings. The first is entitled “Modifications Made in the -Original Constitutional Structure.” - -Under this heading we find particular mention of the decree of 18 July -1940, which immediately abolished all public activity; then a series of -decrees by which the Germans suppressed the election of aldermen and -decided that these aldermen would henceforth be designated by the -central authority. This meant the overthrow of the traditional -democratic order of communal administrations. - -In the same way the Germans, in violation of Article 3 of the Belgian -Constitution, ordered by the decree of 26 January 1943 the absorption of -numerous communes into great urban areas. - -The report then mentions here the fiscal exemptions granted in violation -of the Constitution, to persons engaged in the service of the German -Army or the Waffen SS. We find here a fresh example of the German -criminal and general methods of military recruitment in the occupied -countries. - -The second heading of the report reads: “Introduction into Belgian -Public Life of New Institutions Inspired by National Socialism and the -Idea of the State.” Such institutions were, in fact, created by the -German authorities. The most remarkable are the National Agricultural -and Food Corporation and the Central Merchandise Offices. The report -analyzes the characteristics of these institutions and proves that they -aimed at destroying traditional liberties. They were organs of -totalitarian inspiration in which the Leadership Principle was applied, -as we have seen was the case in similar institutions in the Netherlands. - -I should like now to read the brief but revealing conclusion of the -Belgian report on Germanization. We think that it has been sufficiently -established by the preceding statement that the Belgian Constitution and -laws were deliberately violated by the German occupying power, and this -with the purpose, not of assuring its own security, which is obvious, -but with the skillfully premeditated intention of making of Belgium a -National Socialist State and, consequently, capable of being annexed, -seeing that two nationalist states that are neighbors must necessarily -exclude each other, the stronger absorbing the weaker. - -This policy was carried out in violation of international laws and -customs, of the Declaration of Brussels of 1874, and of the Hague -Regulations of 1899. - -I shall not give detailed indications concerning other applications of -this usurpation in connection with Belgium, because many indications -have been furnished to the Tribunal already, notably in the economic -statement and likewise in M. Dubost’s presentation. And, moreover, as -the regime in Belgium was closely bound up with the regime in France, -the indications which I shall give in the two other sections of my brief -will relate particularly to these two countries. - -However, before concluding the presentation which I am now making, I -should like to mention the abuses committed by the Germans against the -universities of Belgium. We find here again the same phenomenon of -hostility—very understandable of course—on the part of the -doctrinaires and Nazi leaders against the centers of culture; and this -hostility showed itself especially with regard to the four great Belgian -universities, which have such a fine tradition of spiritual life. I must -point out to the Tribunal that the observations which I intend to -present on this point have been taken from the appendices to the Belgian -report of which I read some extracts. I must point out that these -appendices have not been submitted as documents, although they are -attached to one of these originals, which marks their authenticity. I -shall have these appendices translated and submitted later and I shall -ask the Tribunal, therefore, to consider the indications which I shall -give it as affirmations, the proof of which will be furnished, on the -one hand, by the deposit of documents and, on the other hand, by oral -evidence, since I have called a witness on the subject of these -questions. If this method satisfies the Tribunal, and I beg to be -excused for the fact that the appendices have not been actually -presented with the document, I shall continue my statement on this -point. - -THE PRESIDENT: M. Faure, what are the appendices to which you are -referring? - -M. FAURE: They are documents which are in the appendix of the Belgian -report. They are as follows: - -The subject matter of this report is to be found in the Belgian report -itself, which has already been submitted. On the other hand, another -copy of the same section has been established as the original with a -series of appendices. For this reason the appendices were not translated -and submitted at the same time as the main report, of which this was -only a part. They are appended notes which trace events that occurred in -university life. But, as I indicated to the Tribunal, I propose to prove -these points by the hearing of a witness. I thought, therefore, that I -could make a statement which would constitute an affirmation of the -Prosecution and on which I would produce oral evidence. On the other -hand, I shall submit the appendices as soon as they have been translated -into German, which has not yet been done. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal is satisfied with the course which you -propose, M. Faure. - -M. FAURE: I shall mention first that in the University of Ghent the -Germans undertook special propaganda among the students, with a view to -germanizing these young generations. They utilized for this purpose an -organization called “Genter Studenten Verband,” but their efforts to -develop this organization did not achieve the success they had hoped. -They set up in this university and in others a real espionage system -under the cover of an ingenious formula, namely, that of “invited -professors,” German professors who were supposed to have been invited -and who were observers and spies. - -The report of one of these invited professors has been found in Belgium. -This report shows the procedure adopted as well as the complete failure -of the German efforts to exert influence. - -In all the universities, the Germans made arrests and deported -professors and students, and this action was resorted to particularly -when the students refused—and rightly so—to obey the German illegal -orders which compelled them to enter the labor service. - -As regards the University of Brussels, it should be pointed out that -this university had been, from the beginning, provided with a German -Commissioner, and that 14 professors had been irregularly dismissed. -Later, the University of Brussels was obliged to discontinue the -courses, and this as a result of a characteristic incident: - -On the occasion of the vacancy of three chairs at the university, the -Germans refused to accept the nomination of the candidates proposed in -the usual way, and decided that they would appoint professors whose -views suited them. This clearly shows the generally applied German -method of interfering in everything and putting into office everywhere -agents under their influence. - -On 22 November 1941 the German military administration notified the -President of the University of this decision. Therefore, the university -decided to go on a sort of strike and, in spite of all the efforts of -the Germans, this strike of the University of Brussels lasted until the -liberation. - -On this question of the Belgian universities, I should like now to read -something to the Tribunal. This concerns the University of Louvain. -Before reading this, I must indicate to the Tribunal the circumstances. - -The Germans had in this university, as in the others, imposed upon the -students compulsory labor. This we already know. But what I am going to -read has to do with an additional requirement which is altogether -shocking. - -The Germans wished to oblige the Rector of the University, Monseigneur -Van Wayenberg, to give them a complete list with the addresses of those -students who were liable to compulsory service and who evaded it. They -wished, therefore, to impose upon the rector an act whereby he would -become an informer and this under threat of very severe penalties. The -Cardinal Archbishop of Malines intervened on this occasion and on 4 June -1943 addressed a letter to General Von Falkenbausen, Military Commander -in Belgium. I should like to read this letter to the Tribunal. This -letter is to be found in a book which I have here and which is published -in Belgium, entitled “Cardinal Van Roey and the German Occupation in -Belgium.” I do not submit this letter as a document. I ask the Tribunal -to consider it as a quotation from a publication. This is what Cardinal -Archbishop of Malines writes: - - “By an oral communication, of which I have asked in vain for the - confirmation in writing, the Chief of the Military - Administration Reeder has informed me that in case Monseigneur - the Rector of the Catholic University of Louvain should persist - in refusing to furnish the list with the addresses of the first - year students, the occupying authority will take the following - measures: - - “Close down the university; forbid the students to enroll in - another university; subject all the students to forced labor in - Germany and, should they evade this measure, take reprisals - against their families. - - “This communication is all the more surprising, as a few days - previously, following a note addressed to your Excellency by - Monseigneur the Rector, the latter received from the - Kreiskommandant of Louvain a notification that the academic - authority would have no further trouble with regard to the - lists. It is true that the Chief of Military Administration - Reeder informed me that this answer was due to a - misunderstanding. - - “As President of the Board of the University of Louvain, I have - informed the Belgian bishops, who make up this board, of the - serious nature of the communication which I have received; and I - have the duty to inform you, in the name of all the bishops, - that it is impossible for us to advise Monseigneur the Rector to - hand over the lists of his students, and that we approve the - passive attitude which he has observed up to now. To furnish the - lists would, in effect, imply positive co-operation in measures - which the Belgian bishops have condemned in the pastoral letter - of 15 March 1943 as being contrary to international law, to - natural rights, and to Christian morality. - - “If the University of Louvain were subjected to sanctions - because it refuses this co-operation, we consider that it would - be punished for carrying out its duty and that however hard and - painful the difficulties it would have to undergo temporarily, - its honor at least would not be sullied. We believe, with the - famous Bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose, that honor is above - everything—‘_Nihil praeferandum honestati._’ - - “Moreover, Your Excellency cannot be ignorant of the fact that - the Catholic University of Louvain is a dependency of the Holy - See. Canonically established by the Papacy, it is under the - authority and the control of the Roman Congregation of - Seminaries and Universities and it is the Holy See which - approved the appointment of Monseigneur Van Wayenberg as Rector - Magnifique of the University. If the measures announced were to - be carried out, it would constitute a violent attack on the - rights of the Holy See. Consequently His Holiness the Pope will - be informed of the extreme dangers which threaten our Catholic - University.” - -I shall end here the quotation of the letter, but I must point out to -the Tribunal that in spite of this protest and any considerations of -simple practical interest, which the Germans might have had in -maintaining correct attitude in this matter, the Rector Magnifique was -arrested on 5 June 1943, and was condemned by the German military court -to 18 months imprisonment. - -Having recalled the painful facts which the Tribunal has just heard, I -should like to observe that they might almost give us the impression -that such an event as the arrest and sentence of a prelate, rector of a -university, for a wrongful reason was, since there were no tragic -consequences, of relatively secondary importance. But I think we should -not subordinate our intellectual judgment to the direct test of our -sensibility, now grown so accustomed to horrors; and if we reflect upon -it, we consider that such an outrage is in itself very characteristic, -and the fact that such treatment should have been considered by the -Germans as the expression of justice, that is truly characteristic of -the plan of Germanization with its repercussions on the world. - -THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. - - [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._] - - - - - _Afternoon Session_ - -MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the -Defendant Kaltenbrunner will be absent from this afternoon’s session on -account of illness. - -M. FAURE: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to call the witness, -Van der Essen. - -THE PRESIDENT: Very well. - -[_The witness, Van der Essen, took the stand._] - -M. FAURE: What is your name? - -VAN DER ESSEN (Witness): Van der Essen. - -THE PRESIDENT: Do you swear to speak without hate or fear, to say the -truth, all the truth, and only the truth? - -Raise your right hand and say “I swear.” - -VAN DER ESSEN: I swear. - -THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down, if you wish. - -M. FAURE: M. Van der Essen, you are a professor of history in the -Faculty of Letters at the University of Louvain? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes. - -M. FAURE: You are the General Secretary of the University of Louvain? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes. - -M. FAURE: You have stayed in Belgium during the whole period of the -occupation? - -VAN DER ESSEN: To the end; from the end of July 1940 I never left -Belgium. - -M. FAURE: Can you give information on the destruction of the Library of -Louvain? - -VAN DER ESSEN: It will be remembered that in 1914 this library, which -was certainly one of the best university libraries in Europe, containing -many early printed books, manuscripts and books of the 16th and 17th -centuries, was systematically destroyed by means of incendiary material -by the German soldiers of the 9th Reserve Corps, commanded by General -Von Ston. This time, in 1940, the same thing happened again. This -library was systematically destroyed by the German Army; and in order -that you may understand, I must first say that the fire began, according -to all the witnesses, during the night from the 16th to the 17th of May -1940 at about 1:30 in the morning. It was on the 17th at dawn that the -English Army made the necessary withdrawal maneuver to leave the Q. W. -line of defense. On the other hand, it is absolutely certain that the -first German troops entered on the morning of the 17th, only about 8 -o’clock. This interval between the departure of the British troops, on -the one hand, and the arrival of the Germans on the other, enabled the -latter to make it appear as if the library had been systematically -destroyed by the British troops. I must here categorically give the lie -to such a version. The library of the University of Louvain was -systematically destroyed by German gun fire. - -Two batteries were posted, one in the village of Corbek, and the other -in the village of Lovengule. These two batteries on each side -systematically directed their fire on the library and on nothing but the -library. The best proof of this is that all the shells fell on the -library; only one house near the library received a chance hit. The -tower was hit 11 times, 4 times by the battery which fired from -Lovengule, and 7 times by the battery which fired from Corbek. - -At the moment when the Lovengule battery was about to begin firing the -officer who commanded it asked an inhabitant of the village to accompany -him into the field; when they arrived at a place from where they could -see the tower of the library, the officer asked, “Is that the tower of -the university Library?” The reply was “Yes.” The officer insisted, “Are -you sure?” “Yes,” replied the peasant, “I see it every day, as you see -it now.” - -Five minutes later the shelling began, and immediately a column of smoke -arose quite near the tower. So there can be no doubt that this -bombardment was systematic and aimed only at the library. On the other -hand, it is also certain that a squadron of 43 airplanes flew over the -library and dropped bombs on the monument. - -M. FAURE: M. Van der Essen, you are a member of the official Belgian -Commission for War Crimes? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes. - -M. FAURE: In this capacity you investigated the events of which you -speak? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed. - -M. FAURE: The information which you have given the Tribunal, then, is -the result of an inquiry which you made and evidence by witnesses which -you heard yourself? - -VAN DER ESSEN: What I have just stated here is most certainly the result -of the official inquiry made by the Belgian War Crimes Commission, -assisted by several witnesses heard under oath. - -M. FAURE: Can you give information on the attempt at nazification of -Belgium by the Germans, and especially the attempt to undermine the -normal and constitutional organization of the public authorities. - -VAN DER ESSEN: Certainly. First, I think it is interesting to point out -that the Germans violated one of the fundamental principles of the -Belgian Constitution and institutions, which consisted of the separation -of powers, that is to say, separation of judicial powers, of executive -powers, and legislative powers; because in the numerous organizations of -the New Order, which they themselves created either by decree or by -suggesting the creation of these organizations to their collaborators, -they never made a distinction between legislative and executive powers. -Also, in these organizations freedom of speech for the defense was -never, or very little, respected. But what is much more important is -that they attacked an organization which goes far back in our history, -which dates back to the Middle Ages; I mean the communal autonomy which -safeguards us and safeguards the people against any too dangerous -interference on the part of the central authority. This is what happened -in this domain: It would be sufficient to read, or to have read for a -short time, the present day Belgian newspapers, to observe that the -burgomasters, that is to say the chiefs of the communes, the aldermen of -the principal Belgian towns, such as Brussels, Ghent, Liège, Charleroi, -and also of many towns of secondary importance—all these aldermen and -burgomasters are either in prison or about to appear before -courts-martial. - -That shows sufficiently, I think, that these burgomasters and these -aldermen are not those who were appointed by the King and by the Belgian -Government before 1940, but all of them were people who were imposed by -the enemy by means of groups of collaborators, VNV or “Rexists.” - -It is of capital importance to establish that fact, because the -burgomaster, as soon as he was directly responsible to the central -authority—in other words, as soon as the Leadership Principle was -applied—could interfere in all kinds of ways in the administrative, -political, and social life. The burgomaster appointed the aldermen; the -aldermen appointed the communal officials and employees, and the moment -the burgomaster belonged to that Party and was appointed by that Party, -he appointed as communal officials members of the Party who could refuse -ration cards to refractory people, or order the police to give, for -instance, the list of Communists, or of those suspected of being -Communists; in short, they could interfere in almost any way they -wished, and by every possible means, in the communal life of Belgium. - -If we examine the big towns and the small towns, we can say that -everywhere there was truly a veritable network of espionage and -interference following the events or acts of which I have just informed -you. - -M. FAURE: It is true, then, to say that this meddling by the Germans -with the administration of the communes constituted a seizure of Belgian -national sovereignty? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Certainly, since it made the fundamental principle of the -Belgian constitution disappear, that is to say, the sovereignty that -belongs to the nation and more especially to the Communal Council which -appointed aldermen and burgomasters. From then on it was impossible for -them to make themselves heard in the normal way, so that the sovereignty -of the Belgian people was directly attacked by the fact itself. - -M. FAURE: Since you are a professor of higher education, can you give us -information concerning the interference in education? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, sir, certainly. - -First, there was interference in the domain of elementary and secondary -education through the General Secretary of Public Education, on whom the -Germans exercised pressure. A commission was set up which was entrusted -with the task of purging the text books. It was forbidden to use text -books which mentioned what the Germans did in Belgium during the 1914-18 -war; this chapter was absolutely forbidden. The booksellers and -publishing houses could still sell these books, but only on the -condition that the bookseller or library should tear out this chapter. -As for new books which had to be reprinted or republished, this -commission indicated exactly which ones should be cancelled or removed. -That was serious and alarming interference with primary and secondary -education. - -As regards higher education, the interference was unleashed, so to -speak, from the very beginning of the occupation; and first of all, for -motives which I need not explain here but which are well known, in the -free University of Brussels. - -The Germans first imposed on the University of Brussels a German -Commissioner, who thus had in his hands the whole organization of the -university and even controlled it, as far as I know, from the point of -view of accountancy. Moreover they imposed exchange professors. But -serious difficulties began the day when, in Brussels as elsewhere, they -required that they should be informed of all projects of new -appointments and all new appointments of professors, in the same way as -the assignment of lecture courses and other subjects taught in the -university. The result was that in Brussels, by virtue of this right -which they had arrogated, they wished to impose three professors, of -whom two were obviously not acceptable to any Belgian worthy of the -name. There was one, notably, who, having been a member of the Council -of Flanders during the occupation of 1914-18, had been condemned to -death by the justice of this country and whom they wanted to impose as a -professor in the University of Brussels in 1940. Under these conditions -the university refused to accept this professor, and this was considered -by the occupying authorities as sabotage. - -As a penalty, the President of the Board of the University, the -principal members of the board, the deans of the principal faculties, -and a few other professors, who were especially well known as being -anti-Fascists, were arrested and imprisoned in the prison of Witte with -the aggravating circumstance that they were considered as hostages and -that, if any act whatsoever of sabotage or resistance occurred, they, -being hostages, could be shot. - -As far as the other universities were concerned, as I have just said -here, they wished to impose exchange professors. There were none at -Louvain because we refused categorically to receive them, the more so as -it appeared that these exchange professors were not, primarily, scholars -who had come to communicate the result of their researches and their -scientific work, but a great many of them were observers for the -occupying authorities. - -M. FAURE: In this connection, is it true that the Belgian authorities -discovered the report made by one of these so-called “invited” -professors? - -VAN DER ESSEN: That is indeed the case. The Belgian authorities got hold -of a report by Professor Von Mackensen, who was sent as an exchange -professor to the University of Ghent. In this report—drawn up with -infinite care and which is extraordinarily interesting to read because -of the personal and psychological observations which it contains -concerning the various members of the faculty of Ghent—in this report -we see that everyone was observed and followed day by day, that his -tendencies were labeled, that a note was made as to whether he was for -or against the system of the occupying power, or whether he had any -relations with students who were N.P. or Rexists. The slightest -movements and actions of all the professors were carefully noted; and I -add, with great care and precision. It was almost a scientific piece -. . . - -M. FAURE: M. Van der Essen, I described this morning to the Tribunal -various incidents which occurred in the University of Louvain, of which -you were the General Secretary. Therefore I should like you to tell the -Tribunal briefly the actual facts connected with these incidents, -especially, those connected with the imprisonment of the Rector -Monseigneur Van Wayenberg. - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed, sir. Serious difficulties began in the -University of Louvain after the appearance of the decree of compulsory -labor of 6 March 1943, by which students of the university were forced -to accept compulsory labor. I would add, not in Reich territory, but in -Belgium. But this action, which was held out to the university students -as a sort of privilege, was entirely inacceptable to Belgian patriots -for the simple reason that, if the university students accepted to go -and work in the Belgian factories, they automatically expelled workmen, -who were then sent to Germany as the students took their place. - -That was the first reason why they did not wish to work for the enemy; -the second was because, from a social point of view, they wanted to show -solidarity with the workers, who suffered very much because the students -had refused. At least two-thirds of the students of Louvain refused to -do compulsory work. They became refractory, the classes became empty, -they hid themselves as best they could, and several went into the -Maquis. - -The German authorities, when they saw the way things were going, -demanded that the list of students be given to them, with their -addresses, so that they could arrest them in their homes or, if they -couldn’t find them, they could arrest a brother, or sister, or father, -or any member of the family in their place. This was the principle of -collective responsibility which was applied here the same as in all -other cases. - -After having used gentle means, they resorted to blackmail and ended up -by adopting really brutal measures. They renewed the raids, they -dismissed Dr. Tschacke and Dr. Kalische, I think, and many others. They -ordered searches to be made in the university offices to lay their hands -on the list of students; but as this list was carefully hidden, they had -to go away empty-handed. It was then that they decided to arrest the -Rector of the University, Monseigneur Van Wayenberg, who had hidden the -lists in a place known only to him. He declared that he alone knew the -place so as not to endanger his colleagues and the members of the -faculty. - -One morning in June two members of the Secret Police from Brussels, -accompanied by Military Police, came to the Hall. They arrested the -rector in his office and transferred him to the prison of Saint-Gilles -in Brussels, where he was imprisoned. Shortly afterwards he appeared -before a German tribunal which condemned him to 18 months imprisonment -for sabotage. To tell the truth, he was in jail for only 6 months, -because the doctor of Saint-Gilles saw that the rector’s health was -beginning to fail and it would be dangerous to keep him longer if one -wished to avoid a serious incident, also because of the many petitions -by all sorts of authorities. Thus the rector was freed. However, he was -forbidden to set foot on the territory of Louvain; and they enjoined the -university to appoint, immediately, another rector. This was refused. - -M. FAURE: Very well. Is it true to say that the German authorities -persecuted, more systematically, persons who belonged to the -intellectual elite? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, there can be no doubt as to this. I might give, as -examples, the following facts: - -When hostages were taken it was nearly always university professors, -doctors, lawyers, men of letters, who were taken as hostages and sent to -escort military trains. At the time when the resistance was carrying out -acts of sabotage to railways and blowing up trains, university -professors from Ghent, Liège and Brussels, whom I know, were taken and -put in the first coach after the locomotive so that, if an explosion -took place, they could not miss being killed. I know of a typical case, -which will show you that it was not exactly a pleasure trip. Two -professors of Liège, who were in a train of this kind, witnessed the -following scene: The locomotive passed over the explosive. The coach in -which they were, by an extraordinary chance, also went over it; and it -was the second coach containing the German guards which blew up, so that -all the German guards were killed. - -On the other hand, several professors and intellectuals were deported to -that sinister camp of Breendonck, about which you know, some for acts of -resistance, others for entirely unknown reasons; others were deported to -Germany. Professors from Louvain were sent to Buchenwald, to Dora, to -Neuengamme, to Gross-Rosen, and perhaps to other places too. I must add -that it was not only professors from Louvain who were deported, but also -intellectuals who played an important role in the life of the country. I -can give you immediate proof. At Louvain, on the occasion of the -reopening ceremony of the university this year, as Secretary General of -the University, I read out the list of those who had died during the -war. This list included 348 names, if I remember rightly. Perhaps some -thirty of these names were those of soldiers who died during the Battles -of the Scheldt and the Lys in 1940, all the others were victims of the -Gestapo, or had died in camps in Germany, especially in the camps of -Gross-Rosen and Neuengamme. - -Moreover, it is certain that the Germans hated particularly the -intellectuals because, from time to time, they organized a synchronized -campaign in the press to give prominence to the fact that the great -majority of intellectuals refused categorically to rally to the New -Order and refused to understand the necessity for the struggle against -bolshevism. These articles always concluded by stressing the necessity -of taking measures against them. I remember well certain newspaper -articles which simply proposed to send these intellectuals to -concentration camps. There can be no doubt therefore that the -intellectuals were deliberately selected. - -M. FAURE: I shall ask you no questions on anything relating to -deportations or to camps, because all that is already well known to the -Tribunal. I shall ask you, when replying to the following question, not -to mention deportation. - -Now, my question concerns the whole of the atrocities which were -committed by the Germans in Belgium and, especially, at the time of the -December 1944 offensive by the German armies. Can you give information -concerning these atrocities? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I can give you exact and -detailed information, if necessary, on the crimes and atrocities -committed during the offensive of Von Rundstedt in the Ardennes, because -as a member of the War Crimes Commission I went there to make an -inquiry, and I questioned witnesses and survivors of these massacres; -and I know perfectly well, from personal knowledge, what happened. - -During the Von Rundstedt offensive in the Ardennes they committed crimes -which were truly abominable in 31 localities of the Ardennes, crimes -committed against men, women, and children. These crimes were committed, -on the one hand, as it happened elsewhere and as it happens in all wars, -by individual soldiers, so I shall let that pass; but what I -particularly want to stress are the crimes committed by whole units who -received formal instructions, as well as crimes committed by known -organizations; if I remember rightly, I think they were called Kommandos -zur besonderen Verwendung, that is to say, commandos with special tasks -which operated unchecked not only in the Belgian Ardennes but which also -committed the same kind of crimes, carried out in the same way, in the -Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. - -As regards the first, the crimes committed by whole units, I should like -merely to give one very typical example, in order not to take up the -time of the Tribunal. It happened at Stavelot, where about 140 -persons—the number varies, let us say between 137 and 140—first it was -137, then they discovered some more bodies—about 140 persons, of whom -36 were women and 22 were children, of which the oldest was 14 years and -the youngest 4 years, were savagely slaughtered by German units -belonging to SS tank divisions, one the Hohenstaufen Division, the other -the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Division. This is what the divisions -did. We have full information about this from the testimony of a soldier -who took part in it. He was arrested by the Belgian Security Police. He -deserted during the Von Rundstedt campaign, dressed himself as a -civilian, and then worked as a laborer on an Ardennes farm. One day as -he was working stripped to the waist, he was seen by Belgian gendarmes, -who saw by the tattooing on his body that he was an SS man. He was -immediately arrested and interrogated. - -This is the method used by the soldiers of the Hohenstaufen Division. -There was a line of tanks, some were Königstiger (Royal Tigers), -followed and preceded by Schützenpanzer. At a certain moment the -Obersturmführer of this group stopped his men and delivered them a -little speech telling them that all civilians whom they encountered -should be killed. They then went back to their tanks, and as the tanks -advanced along the road, the Obersturmführer would point to a house. -Then the soldiers entered it with machine guns in their hands. If they -found people in the kitchen, they killed them in the kitchen; if they -found them sheltering in the cellar, they machine-gunned them in the -cellar; if they found them on the road, they killed them on the road. -Not only the Hohenstaufen Division, but also the Leibstandarte Adolf -Hitler Division, and others acted in this manner on formal orders -according to which all civilians were to be killed. And what was the -reason for this measure? Precisely because, during the retreat in -September, it was mainly in that part of the Ardennes that the -resistance went into action and quite a number of German soldiers were -killed during that retreat. It was therefore to revenge this defeat, to -avenge themselves for the action of the resistance, that orders were -given that all civilians should be killed without mercy during the -offensive launched in this region. - -As far as the other method is concerned, this is still more important -from the point of view of responsibility, for it concerns persons -commanding troops of the Sicherheitspolizei, that is to say, of the -Security Police, who in most villages they came to immediately set about -questioning the people as to those who had taken part in the resistance, -about the secret army, where these people lived, whether they were still -there or whether they had fled. In short, they had special typed -questionnaires with 27 questions, always the same, which were put to -everyone in the villages to which they came. - -Here again I shall proceed as I did in the first case. In order not to -take up too much of the Tribunal’s time, I shall simply give the example -of Bande, in the Arrondissement of Marche. At Bande one of these SD -detachments, the officers of which said they were sent especially by -Himmler to execute members of the resistance, seized all men between 17 -and 32 years of age. After having questioned them thoroughly and after -sorting them out in a quite arbitrary manner—they didn’t keep any -people belonging to the resistance, for most of them had never taken -part in it; there were only four who were members of the -resistance—they led them away along the road from Marche to Basteuil -with their hands raised behind their heads. When they reached a ruined -house, which had been burned down in September, the officer who -commanded the detachment posted himself at the entrance of the house, a -Feldwebel joined him and put his hand on the shoulder of the last man of -the third row who was making his way towards the entrance to the house; -and there the officer, armed with a machine gun, killed a prisoner with -a bullet in the neck. Then this same officer executed in this manner the -34 young men who had been kept back. - -Not content with killing them, he kicked the bodies into the cellar; and -then fired a volley of machine gun bullets to make sure that they were -dead. - -M. FAURE: M. Van der Essen, you are a historian; you have taught -scholars; therefore you are accustomed to submitting the sources of -history to criticism. Can you say that your inquiry leaves no doubt in -your mind, that these atrocities reveal that there was an over-all plan -and that instructions were certainly given by superior officers? - -VAN DER ESSEN: I think that I can affirm it, I am quite convinced that -there was an over-all plan. - -M. FAURE: I would like to ask you a last question: I think I understood -that you yourself were never arrested or particularly worried by the -Germans. I would like to know if you consider that a free man, against -whom the German administration or police have nothing in particular, -could during the Nazi occupation lead a life in accordance with the -conception a free man has of his dignity? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Well, you see me here before you, I weigh 67 kilos, my -height is 1 meter 67 centimeters. According to my colleagues in the -Faculty of Medicine that is quite normal. Before the 10th of May 1940, -before the airplanes of the Luftwaffe suddenly came without any -declaration of war and spread death and desolation in Belgium, I weighed -82 kilos. This difference is incontestably the result of the occupation. -But I don’t want to dwell on personal considerations or enter into -details of a general nature or of a theoretical or philosophical nature. -I should like simply to give you an account—it will not take more than -2 minutes—of the ordinary day of an average Belgian during the -occupation. - -I take a day in the winter of 1943: At 6 o’clock in the morning there is -a ring at the door. One’s first thought—indeed we all had this -thought—was that it was the Gestapo. It wasn’t the Gestapo. It was a -city policeman who had come to tell me that there was a light in my -office and that in view of the necessities of the occupation I must be -careful about this in the future. But there was the nervous shock. - -At 7:30 the postman arrives bringing me my letters; he tells the maid -that he wishes to see me personally. I go downstairs and the man says to -me, “You know, Professor, I am a member of the secret army and I know -what is going on. The Germans intend to arrest today at 10 o’clock all -the former soldiers of the Belgian Army who are in this region. Your son -must disappear immediately.” I hurry upstairs and wake up my son. I make -him prepare his kit and send him to the right place. At 10 o’clock I -take the tram for Brussels. A few kilometers out of Louvain the tram -stops. A military police patrol makes us get down and lines us -up—irrespective of our social status or position—in front of a wall, -with our arms raised and facing the wall. We are thoroughly searched, -and having found neither arms nor compromising papers of any kind, we -are allowed to go back into the tram. A few kilometers farther on the -tram is stopped by a crowd which prevents the tram from going on. I see -several women weeping, there are cries and wailings. I make inquiries -and am told that their men folk living in the village had refused to do -compulsory labor and were to have been arrested that night by the -Security Police. Now they are taking away the old father of 82 and a -young girl of 16 and holding them responsible for the disappearance of -the young men. - -I arrive in Brussels to attend a meeting of the academy. The first thing -the president says to me is: - - “Have you heard what has happened? Two of our colleagues were - arrested yesterday in the street. Their families were in a - terrible state. Nobody knows where they are.” - -I go home in the evening and we are stopped on the way three times, once -to search for terrorists, who are said to have fled, the other times to -see if our papers are in order. At last I get home without anything -serious having happened to me. - -I might say here that only at 9 o’clock in the evening can we give a -sigh of relief, when we turn the knob of our radio set and listen to -that reassuring voice which we hear every evening, the voice of Fighting -France: “Today is the 189th day of the struggle of the French people for -their liberation,” or the voice of Victor Delabley, that noble figure of -the Belgian radio in London, who always finished up by saying, “Courage, -we will get them yet, the Boches!” That was the only thing that enabled -us to breathe and go to sleep at night. - -That was an average day, a normal day of an average Belgian during the -German occupation. And you can well understand that we could hardly call -that time the reign of happiness and felicity that we were promised when -the German troops invaded Belgium on 10 May 1940. - -M. FAURE: Excuse me, M. Van der Essen. The only satisfaction that you -had was to listen to the London radio; this was punished by a severe -penalty, if you were caught, I suppose? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, it meant imprisonment. - -M. FAURE: Thank you. - -THE PRESIDENT: Are you finished, M. Faure? - -M. FAURE: No more questions, Mr. President. - -THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko? The American and British prosecutors? - -[_Each indicated that he had no question._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any -questions? - -DR. EXNER: You have been speaking about the university library at -Louvain. I should like to ask something: Were you yourself in Louvain -when the two batteries were firing at the library, and at the library -only, in 1940? - -VAN DER ESSEN: I was not in Louvain, but I should say this: Louvain was -in the K. O. line, that is in the very front line; and the population of -Louvain was obliged by the British military authorities to evacuate the -town on the 14th so that nearly all the inhabitants of Louvain had left -at the time when these events took place and only paralytics and sick -persons, who could not be transported and who had hidden in their -cellars, were left; but what I said concerning these batteries, I know -from the interrogation of the two witnesses who were on the spot just -outside Louvain. The library was not set on fire from within, but -shelled from without. And these witnesses of whom I speak lived in these -two villages outside the town where the batteries were located. - -DR. EXNER: Were there any Belgian or British troops still left in the -town? - -VAN DER ESSEN: The Belgian troops were no longer there. They had been -replaced by the British troops when the British had taken over the -sector and at the time when the library was seen to be on fire. The -first flames were seen in the night of the 16th to the 17th at 1:30 in -the morning. The British troops had left. There remained only a few -tanks which were operating a withdrawal movement. These fired an -occasional shot to give the impression that the sector was still -occupied by the British Army. - -DR. EXNER: So there were still British troops in the town when the -bombardment started? - -VAN DER ESSEN: There were no longer any British troops; there were -merely a few tanks on the hills outside Louvain in the direction of -Brussels, a few tanks which, as I said, were carrying out necessary -maneuvers for withdrawal. - -I would have liked to add a few words and to say to the very honorable -Counsel for the Defense that, according to the testimony of persons who -were in the library—the ushers and the janitors—not a single British -soldier ever set foot in the library buildings. - -DR. EXNER: That is not surprising. At the time the German batteries were -firing were there still British batteries or Belgian batteries firing? - -VAN DER ESSEN: No. - -DR. EXNER: So all was quiet in the town of Louvain; the troops had left; -the enemy was not there yet, and the batteries didn’t fire? - -VAN DER ESSEN: That was the rather paradoxical situation in Louvain; -there was a moment when the British had left and the Germans had not yet -arrived; and there remained only the few ill persons, the few paralytics -who could not be moved and who were left behind in cellars. A few other -persons remained too: the Chief of the Fire Service and Monseigneur Van -Wayenberg, the Rector of the University, who had brought the dead and -the dying from Brussels to Louvain in the firemen’s car and made the -journey several times. There was also my colleague, Professor Kennog, a -member of the Faculty of Medicine who had taken over the direction of -the city. - -DR. EXNER: Do you know where these German batteries were located? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed. One was located at Corbek and the other at -Lovengule, one on the west side and one on the north side. The only -shell hits on the tower of the library were four hits from the east side -and seven from the north side. If there had still been British or -Belgian batteries, the shells would have come from the opposite side. - -DR. EXNER: Can you tell me anything about the caliber of these -batteries? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, we saved the shells and at present they are in the -Library of Louvain, or rather in what serves as a library for the -university. There are four shells and two or three fragments of shells. - -DR. EXNER: And do you know the name of the peasant who was supposed to -have been asked by a German officer whether that was really the -University of Louvain? Do you know the peasant personally? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed, his name is M. Vigneron. - -DR. EXNER: Do you know the peasant yourself? Do you know him? - -VAN DER ESSEN: I do not know him personally. It was the librarian of the -university who had a conversation with him and who induced the War -Crimes Commission to interrogate this peasant. - -DR. EXNER: You are a member of that commission yourself? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, I am ready to declare that I took no direct part in -the inquiry concerning the Library of Louvain, just as Monseigneur the -Rector and the librarian took no active part in the inquiry concerning -the Library of Louvain. It was made by an officer of the judicial -delegation who acted alone and quite independently upon the order of the -Prosecutor of Louvain, and we kept entirely out of the matter. - -DR. EXNER: Have you seen the official files of this commission? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, certainly. - -DR. EXNER: I am surprised they weren’t brought here. Tell me, why did -the director of the library or the person who was directly concerned not -go, after the occupation of the town, to the mayor or to the commander -of the town? - -VAN DER ESSEN: I don’t think I understand the question very well. - -DR. EXNER: When the German Army came, a town commander was appointed. -Why didn’t the mayor of the town, or the Director of the University -Library go to the town commander and tell him about these things? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Why didn’t he tell him about these things—for the very -simple reason that at that time everything was in complete disorder and -there was hardly anybody left in the town, and on the other hand as soon -as the German Army arrived, it systematically closed the entrance gate -of the library so that the Belgians could not make any inquiry. Then two -German inquiry commissions came upon the scene. The first worked on 26 -May 1940 with an expert, Professor Kellermann of the School of -Technology in Aachen, accompanied by a Party man in a brown shirt. They -examined what was left and they summoned before them as witnesses the -Rector of the University and the Librarian. From the very beginning of -the inquiry they wished to force the rector and the librarian to declare -and admit that it was the British who had set fire to the library. And -as a proof, this expert showed shell cases saying, “Here, sniff this, it -smells of gasoline and shows that chemicals were used to set fire to the -library.” Whereupon the Rector and the Librarian of the University said -to him, “Where did you find this shell case, Mr. Expert?” “In such and -such a place.” “When we went by that place,” said the rector, “it wasn’t -there.” It had been placed there by the German expert. And I will add, -if you will permit me, because this is of considerable importance, that -a second inquiry commission came in August 1940, presided over by a very -distinguished man, District Court of Appeal Judge Von Neuss. He was -accompanied this time by the expert who had directed the inquiry into -the firing of the Reichstag. This commission again examined everything, -and before the rector and another witness, Krebs, from the Benedictine -Abbey of Mont-César, they simply laughed at the conclusions of the first -commission, and said they were ridiculous. - -DR. EXNER: You have said that the library building had towers. Do you -know whether there were artillery observers in these towers? - -VAN DER ESSEN: You ask whether there were artillery observers? All I can -say is that the rector had always opposed this from the beginning, and -he certainly would have opposed any attempt of this kind, knowing that -the presence of artillery observers in the tower would obviously provide -the enemy with a reason to fire on the library. The rector knew this and -he always said to me, “We must be extremely careful to see that British -soldiers or others who might take the sector do not go up in the tower.” -I know from the statements of the janitor that no Englishman, no British -soldier, went into the tower. That is absolutely certain. As for -Belgians, I must confess that I cannot answer your question, as I don’t -know. - -DR. EXNER: It would not be so very amazing, would it, if the university -library had been hit by German artillery. After all, it has happened -that the libraries of the Universities of Berlin, Leipzig, Munich, -Breslau, Cologne, _et cetera_, have been hit. The only question is -whether this was done deliberately, and here it occurs to me that the -peasant . . . - -VAN DER ESSEN: The peasant . . . - -DR. EXNER: I would like to ask you: Was there any mention in these -inquiries as to the motive which might have induced the German Army to -make this an objective? - -VAN DER ESSEN: All the evidence seems to indicate, and this was the -conclusion arrived at by the commission, that the motive—I will not say -the main motive, because there is no certainty in this sort of -thing—that the motive which is very probable, almost certain, for the -destruction of the library was the German Army’s desire to do away with -a monument which commemorates the Treaty of Versailles. On the library -building there was a virgin wearing a helmet crushing under her foot a -dragon which symbolized the enemy. Certain conversations of German -officers gave the very clear impression that the reason why they wished -to set fire systematically to this building was their desire to get rid -of a testimony of the defeat in the other war, and above all, a reminder -of the Treaty of Versailles. I may add that this is not the first time -that the Germans have destroyed the University of Louvain. - -DR. EXNER: You believe that the commander of that battery knew that? - -VAN DER ESSEN: There is very interesting testimony which I should like -to submit to the honorable Counsel for the Defense. On the day when the -batteries were installed, the two batteries which I mentioned, I spoke -to a tax collector, a civil servant, who lived in a villa on the road to -Roosweek, a few kilometers from Louvain. That afternoon some German -high-ranking officers came to his house to ask for hospitality. These -officers had with them a truck with all the necessary radio apparatus -for sending wireless orders to the German artillery to fire. These -officers installed themselves in his house, and dinner was naturally -served to them, and they invited him to sit with them. After hesitating -a moment, he accepted, and during the meal there was a violent -discussion. The officers said, “These Belgian swine”—excuse my using -this expression, but they used it—“at any rate they did put that -inscription on the library.” They were referring to the famous -inscription “_Furore Teutonica_” which in fact was never on the library; -but all the German officers were absolutely convinced that this -inscription “_Furore teutonica diruta, dono americano restituta_” -(destroyed by German fury, restored by American generosity) was on the -building, whereas, in fact, it never has been there. However, I am quite -willing to admit that in Germany they might have believed that it was -there; and the very fact that there should have been a discussion among -the officers in command of these two batteries, seems to prove that if -they directed the fire onto the library, it was in order to destroy this -monument. It was probable that they wanted to get rid of a monument -which, according to their idea, bore an inscription which was insulting -to the German Army and the German people. That is the testimony which I -can give to the honorable Counsel for the Defense. I give it as it is. - -DR. EXNER: You mean that the captain who commanded this battery knew -about that inscription! I don’t believe it. - -VAN DER ESSEN: Certainly. - -DR. EXNER: Thank you. - -DR. STAHMER: Witness, you have said that 43 airplanes flew over the -library and dropped bombs on it. As you told us yourself, in reply to -Professor Exner’s question, you were not in the town at the time; where -did you get that information? - -VAN DER ESSEN: As I have already said, it is not my testimony which I am -giving here, because for my part I have none; but it is the testimony of -the lawyer, Davids, who had a country house at Kesseloo. - -This lawyer went out in the morning to look at the sky. He had a -considerable number of refugees in his home, among them women and -children, and as airplanes were continually overhead he had gone out in -the morning to see what was going on. He saw this squadron of airplanes -which he counted—remember he was an old soldier himself—and there were -43 which were flying in the direction of the library; and when they -arrived over the library, exactly over the gable at the farthest point -from the house of the witness, they dropped a bomb, and he saw smoke -immediately arise from the roof of the library. That is the testimony on -which I base the statement I just made. - -DR. STAHMER: So it was just one bomb that hit the library? - -VAN DER ESSEN: We must distinguish here, sir, between artillery fire and -bombs which are dropped by planes. From a technical point of view, it -seems absolutely certain that a bomb from a plane hit the library, -because the roof has metal covering and this metal roofing is quite -level, except in one part where it caves in. We consulted technicians, -who told us that a metallic surface would never have sunk in to such an -extent if it had been hit by artillery fire and could only have been -caused by a bomb from a plane. - -DR. STAHMER: How many bombs in all were dropped by airplanes? - -VAN DER ESSEN: As the witness was at a height dominating the Louvain -area from where he could see the library on the plain, it was impossible -for him to count exactly the bombs which these planes dropped. He only -saw the bombs fall. Then he saw the smoke which arose from the roof of -the library. That’s all I have to say concerning this point. - -DR. STAHMER: How many bomb hits were counted in the city? - -VAN DER ESSEN: On this point I can give you no information, but I know -that some airplanes passed over the library quarters in a straight line -going north to south. These bombs, at that time, in May 1940, damaged, -but not very seriously, the Higher Institute of Philosophy, the -Institute of Pharmacy, and a few other university buildings; also a -certain number of private houses. - -DR. STAHMER: When were the bombs dropped, before the artillery fire or -afterwards? - -VAN DER ESSEN: The bombs were dropped before and afterwards. There were -some air raids. I myself was present during a terrible air-raid on the -afternoon of 10 May 1940 by a squadron of seven planes. I am not a -military technician, but I saw with my own eyes the planes which -dive-bombed the Tirlemont Bridge. The result of this bombing was that a -considerable number of houses were destroyed and 208 persons killed on -the spot, on the afternoon of 10 May 1940. - - [_A recess was taken._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Defense Counsel wish to -cross-examine? - -HERR BABEL: Witness, when did you last see the university building; that -is, before the attack? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Before the fire? I saw it on 11 May 1940. - -HERR BABEL: That is to say, before the attack? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Before the attack. - -HERR BABEL: Was it damaged at that time, and to what extent? - -VAN DER ESSEN: On 11 May absolutely nothing had happened to the library. -It was intact. Until the night of the 16th to 17th of May, when I left, -there was absolutely no damage. - -HERR BABEL: Apart from the hits on the tower, did you notice any other -traces of artillery fire on the building? - -VAN DER ESSEN: On the building I don’t think so. There were only traces -of artillery fire . . . - -HERR BABEL: From the fact that only the tower had been hit, couldn’t it -be thought that the tower and not the building was the target? - -VAN DER ESSEN: When I said that the tower was struck, I meant only the -traces that could be seen on the walls, on the balcony of the first -story, and on the dial of the clock. Apart from that, nothing could be -seen on the building for the simple reason that the building had been -completely burned out inside and nothing could be seen on the charred -walls. But it is absolutely certain that either a bomb from a plane or -an artillery shell—I personally think it was the latter—hit the -building on the north side, after the fire. The trace of shell fire can -be seen very visibly. It is just here that the fire began. Witnesses who -saw the fire of the Abbey of Mont César. . . . - -HERR BABEL: After the fire, when did you see the building for the first -time? - -VAN DER ESSEN: After the fire, in July 1940. - -HERR BABEL: That is, much later? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, but still in the same condition. Nothing had been -done to it. It was still as it was originally. - -HERR BABEL: Do you know whether, while the building was burning, an -attempt was made to stop the fire and save the building? - -VAN DER ESSEN: It is absolutely certain that attempts were made to stop -the fire. The Rector of the University, Monseigneur Van Wayenberg, told -me himself and has stated that he sent for the firemen, but the firemen -had gone. Only the chief and two members of the fire brigade were left, -and all the water mains at that time were broken as a result of the -bombardment. There was no water supply for several days. - -HERR BABEL: Did German troops take part in these attempts to save the -building? - -VAN DER ESSEN: No, they were not there yet. - -HERR BABEL: How do you know that? You weren’t there. - -VAN DER ESSEN: But the Rector of the University did not leave the town -of Louvain. The rector was there and so was the librarian. - -HERR BABEL: Did you speak to the rector on this question, as to whether -German troops took part in the attempt to save the building? - -VAN DER ESSEN: I spoke to the rector and to the librarian. In my -capacity as General Secretary of the University I discussed with the -rector all general questions concerning the university. We discussed -this point especially, and he told me categorically that no soldier of -the German Army tried to fight the fire. - -HERR BABEL: You also have spoken about the resistance movement. Do you -know whether the civilian population was called upon to resist the -German troops? - -VAN DER ESSEN: Where? In the Ardennes? - -HERR BABEL: In Belgium? - -VAN DER ESSEN: In Belgium the resistance was mainly composed of the -secret army, which was a military organization with responsible and -recognized commanders, and wore a distinctive badge so that they could -not be confused with simple _francs-tireurs_. - -HERR BABEL: Do you know how many German soldiers fell victims to the -resistance movement? - -VAN DER ESSEN: How German soldiers fell victims to this resistance? I -know very well because everywhere in the Ardennes the resistance went -into action, and legally, with chiefs at their head, carrying arms -openly, and with distinctive badges. They openly attacked the German -troops from the front. - -HERR BABEL: That was not my question. I asked you if you knew roughly -how many German soldiers became victims of that resistance movement? - -VAN DER ESSEN: I don’t understand what is implied by the question of the -honorable Counsel for the Defense. - -HERR BABEL: That is not for you to judge, it is for the Tribunal. - -VAN DER ESSEN: Does the honorable Counsel for the Defense mean the -events of the Ardennes which I alluded to a while ago, or does he speak -in a quite general sense? - -HERR BABEL: The witness in his statements had himself brought up the -question of the resistance movement, and that is why I asked whether the -witness knows . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, the witness has already answered the question -by saying that he cannot say how many Germans were killed by the -resistance movement. - -HERR BABEL: But he can say whether a certain number of Germans did fall -victims to the resistance. - -VAN DER ESSEN: There were real battles. - -HERR BABEL: The witness will also be able to confirm that the members of -the resistance are today considered heroes in Belgium. From what we have -read in the papers and from what has been brought up here, these people -who were active in the resistance movement are now considered heroes. At -least I could draw that conclusion. - -THE PRESIDENT: Will you please continue your examination. - -HERR BABEL: Witness, you have said, if I understood you correctly, that -you lost 15 kilograms weight. - -VAN DER ESSEN: Yes, indeed. - -HERR BABEL: What conclusion did you draw from that fact? I could not -quite understand what you said. - -VAN DER ESSEN: I simply meant to say that I lost these 15 kilos as a -result of the mental suffering which we underwent during the occupation, -and it was an answer to a question of M. Faure on whether I considered -this occupation compatible with the dignity of a free man. I wanted to -answer “no,” giving the proof that as a result of this occupation we -suffered much anguish, and I think the loss of weight is sufficient -proof of this. - -HERR BABEL: During the war, I also, without having been ill, lost 35 -kilos. What conclusion could be drawn from that, in your opinion? - -[_Laughter._] - -THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Babel, we are not interested in your -experiences. - -HERR BABEL: Thank you, Sir. That was my last question. - -THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Counsel wish to ask any questions? [_There -was no response._] M. Faure? - -M. FAURE: I have no questions. - -THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire. - -[_The witness left the stand._] - -M. FAURE: I ask the Tribunal kindly to take the presentation file and -the document book constituting the end of the section on the seizure of -sovereignty, which bears the title “France.” - -France, like Belgium, was placed under the regime of the military -occupation administration. There was, moreover, in France a diplomatic -representation. Finally, it must be noted that the police administration -always played an important role there. It became increasingly important -and was extended, particularly during the period which followed the -appointment of General Oberg in 1942. - -As regards this last part of my section on the seizure of sovereignty, I -should like to limit myself to mentioning a few special features of -these usurpations in France and certain original methods employed by the -Germans in this country, for this question has already been extensively -dealt with, and will be further dealt with by me under the heading of -consequences of German activities in France. - -I wish to draw the attention of the Tribunal to four considerations. -First, the German authorities in France, at the very beginning, got hold -of a special key to sovereignty. I speak of the splitting up of the -country into five different zones. This splitting up of the country by -the Germans compensated to a certain extent for the special situation -which the existence of unoccupied French territories created for them. - -I have already indicated that the Armistice Convention of 22 June, which -has already been deposited with the Tribunal, provided for the -establishment of a line of demarcation between the occupied zone and the -so-called unoccupied zone. It might have been thought at that time that -this demarcation between the occupied and the unoccupied zone was -chiefly drawn to meet the necessity of military movements in the -occupied zone. It might also have been concluded that the separation of -the zones would be manifested only through the exercise in the occupied -zone of the ordinary rights of an armed force occupation. I have already -had occasion to quote to the Tribunal a document, the testimony of M. -Léon Noël, which contained the verbal assurances given in this respect -by General Keitel and by General Jodl, who are now the defendants before -you bearing these names. - -Now, in fact, this demarcation of zones was interpreted and applied with -extreme rigor and in a manner that was wholly unforeseen. We have -already seen the far reaching consequences of this from the point of -view of the economic life of the country. There were also serious -consequences from the point of view of local administration, which was -continually hampered in its tasks, and from the point of view of the -life of the population, which could move from one part of French -territory to another only with great difficulty. In this way the Germans -acquired a first means of pressure on the French authorities. This means -of pressure was all the more effective as it could be used at any time -and was very elastic. At times the Germans could relax the rules of -separation of the zones, at others they could apply them with the -greatest severity. - -By way of example, I quote an extract from a document, which I present -in evidence under the Document Number RF-1051. - -This document is a letter of 20 December 1941 addressed by Schleier of -the German Embassy to the French Delegate De Brinon, a letter concerning -passes to German civilians wishing to enter the unoccupied zone. The -French authorities of the _de facto_ government had protested against -the fact that the Germans obliged the French authorities to allow any -person provided with German passes to enter the unoccupied zone where -they could take on any kind of work, particularly spying, as one may -imagine. - -The letter which I quote is in answer to this French protest, and I wish -to mention only the last paragraph which is the second paragraph on page -2 of this Document Number 1051. - - “In case the French Government should create difficulties - concerning requests for passes presented with the German - approval, it will no longer be possible to exercise that same - generosity as shown hitherto when granting passes to French - nationals.” - -But what I have just said is only a first point concerning the division -of the country. This first division had as basis an instrument which was -the Armistice Convention, although this basis was exceeded and was -contestable. On the other hand, the other divisions which I am going to -mention were simply imposed by the Germans without warning of any kind, -and without the enunciation of any plausible pretext. - -I must recall that a first supplementary division was that which -separated the annexed Departments of the Haut-Rhin, the Bas-Rhin, and -the Moselle from the rest of France; and in this connection I have -already proved that they had been really annexed. - -A second division affected the Departments of Nord and the -Pas-de-Calais. These departments were in fact attached to the German -Military Administration of Belgium. This fact is shown by the headings -of the German Military Command decrees, which are submitted to the -Tribunal in the Belgian _Official Gazette_. Not only did this separation -exist from the point of view of the German Military Command -Administration, but it also existed from the point of view of the French -Administration. This last mentioned administration was not excluded in -the departments under consideration, but its communications with the -central services were extremely difficult. - -As I do not wish to develop this point at length, I should like simply -to quote a document which will serve as an example, and which I submit -as Document Number RF-1052. This is a letter from the military commander -under the date of 17 September 1941, which communicates his refusal to -re-establish telegraphic and telephonic communications with the rest of -France. I quote the single sentence of this letter: - - “Upon decision of the High Command of the Army it is so far not - yet possible to concede the application for granting direct - telegraphic service between the Vichy Government and the two - departments of the North.” - -A third division consisted in the creation within the unoccupied zone of -a so-called forbidden zone. The conception of this forbidden zone -certainly corresponded to the future projects of the Germans as to the -annexation of larger portions of France. In this connection I produced -documents at the beginning of my presentation. This forbidden zone did -not have any special rules of administration, but special authorization -was required to enter or to leave it. The return to this zone of persons -who had left it in order to seek refuge in other regions was possible -only in stages, and with great difficulty. Administrative relations, the -same as economic relations between the forbidden zone and the other -zones were constantly hampered. This fact is well known. Nevertheless, I -wish to quote a document also as an example, and I submit this document, -Number RF-1053. It is a letter from the military commander, dated 22 -November 1941, addressed to the French Delegation. I shall simply -summarize this document by saying that the German Command agreed to -allow a minister of the _de facto_ government to go into the occupied -zone, but refused to allow him to go into the forbidden zone. - -In order that the Tribunal may realize the situation of these five zones -which I have just mentioned, I have attached to the document book a map -of France indicating these separations. This map of France was numbered -RF-1054, but I think it is not necessary for me to produce it as a -document properly speaking. It is intended to enable the Tribunal to -follow this extreme partitioning by looking, first at the annexed -departments, and then at Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, the boundaries of -these departments being indicated on the map, then at the forbidden -unoccupied zone, which is indicated by a first line; and, finally, the -line of demarcation with the unoccupied zone. This is, by the way, a -reproduction of the map which was published and sold in Paris during the -occupation by Publishers Girard and Barère. - -To conclude this question of the division I should like to remind the -Tribunal that on 11 November 1942 the German Army forces invaded the -so-called unoccupied zone. The German authorities declared at that time -that they did not intend to establish a military occupation of this -zone, and that there would simply be what was called a zone of -operations. - -The German authorities did not respect this juridical conception that -they had thought out any more than they had respected the rules of the -law of the occupation; and the proof of this violation of law in the -so-called operational zone has already been brought in a number of -circumstances and will be brought again later in the final parts of this -presentation. - -Apart from this division, the inconveniences of which can well be -imagined for a country which is not very extensive and whose life is -highly centralized, I shall mention the second seizure of sovereignty, -which consisted in the control by the Germans of the legislative acts of -the French _de facto_ government. - -Naturally, the German military administration, in conformity with its -doctrine, constantly exercised by its own decrees, a real legislative -power in regard to the French. On the other hand—and it is this fact -which I am dealing with now—in respect to the French power the -sovereignty of which the Germans pretended still to recognize, they -exercised a veritable legislative censorship. I shall produce several -documents by way of example and proof of this fact. - -The first, which I submit as Document Number RF-1055, is a letter from -the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces in France to the French -Delegate General; the letter is dated 29 December 1941. We see that the -signature on this letter is that of Dr. Best, of whom I spoke this -morning in connection with Denmark, where he went subsequently and where -he was given both diplomatic and police functions. I think it is not -necessary for me to read the text of this letter. I shall read simply -the heading: “Subject: Bill Concerning the French Budget of 1942, and -the New French Finance Law.” - -The German authorities considered that they had the power to take part -in the drawing up of the French _de facto_ government’s budget, although -this bore no relation to the necessities of their military occupation. -Not only did the Germans check the contents of the laws prepared by the -_de facto_ government, but they made peremptory suggestions. I shall not -quote any document on this point at the moment, as I shall be producing -two: One in connection with propaganda and the other in connection with -the regime imposed upon the Jews. - -The third seizure of sovereignty which the Germans exercised consisted -in their intervention in the appointment and assignment of officials. -According to the method which I have already followed, I submit, on this -question, documents by way of example. First I submit a document which -will be Document Number RF-1056, a letter of 23 September 1941, from the -Commander-in-Chief Von Stülpnagel to De Brinon. This letter puts forth -various considerations, which it is not necessary to read, on the -sabotage of harvests and the difficulties of food supplies. I read the -last paragraph of Document RF-1056. - - “I must, therefore, peremptorily demand a speedy and unified - direction of the measures necessary for assuring the food - supplies for the population. A possibility of achieving this aim - I can see only by uniting both ministries in the hands of one - single and energetic expert.” - -It was, therefore, a case of interference on the very plane of the -composition of a ministry, of an authority supposedly governmental. As -regards the control of appointments, I produce Document Number RF-1057, -which is a letter from the Military Command of 29 November 1941. I shall -simply summarize this document by indicating that the German authorities -objected to the appointment of the President of the Liaison Committee -for the Manufacture of Beet Sugar. You see, therefore, how little this -has to do with military necessities. - -I next produce Document Number RF-1058, which is likewise a letter from -the Military Command. It is brief and I shall read it by way of example: - - “I beg you to take the necessary measures in order that the - Subprefect of St. Quentin, M. Planacassagne, be relieved of his - functions and replaced as soon as possible by a competent - official. M. Planacassagne is not capable of carrying out his - duties.” - -I shall now quote a text of a more general scope. I produce Document -Number RF-1059, which is a secret circular of 10 May 1942, addressed by -the Military Command Administrative Staff to all the chief town majors. -Here again we find the signature of Dr. Best. - - “Control of French policy as regards personnel in the occupied - territories. - - “The remodelling of the French Government presents certain - possibilities for exercising a positive influence on French - police in the occupied territories as regards personnel. I, - therefore, ask you to designate those French officials, who, - from the German point of view, appear particularly usable and - whose names could be submitted to the French Government when the - question of appointing holders for important posts arises.” - -Thus we see in the process of formation this general network of German -control and German usurpation. I now produce Document Number RF-1060. -This document is an interrogation of Otto Abetz, who had the function of -German ambassador in France. This interrogation took place on 17 -November 1945 before the Commissioners Berge and Saulas at the General -Information Bureau in Paris. This document confirms German interferences -in French administration and likewise gives details about the -duplications of these controls by the military commander and the -Gestapo. I quote: - - “The Military Commander in France, basing himself on the various - conventions of international law”—this is Otto Abetz who is - speaking and it is not necessary to say that we in no way accept - his conception of international law—“considered himself - responsible and supreme judge for the maintenance of order and - public security in the occupied zone. This being so, he claimed - the right to give his approval for the appointment or the - retaining of all French officials nominated to occupy posts in - the occupied zone. As regards officials residing in the free - zone who were obliged by reason of their functions to exercise - them subsequently in the occupied zone, the Military Commander - also stressed the necessity for his approval of their - nomination. In practice the Military Commander made use of the - right thus claimed only when the officials were nominated and - solely in the sense of a right to veto, that is to say, he did - not intervene in the choice of officials to be nominated and - contented himself with making observations on certain names - proposed. These observations were based on information which the - Military Commander received from his regional and local - commanders, from his various administrative and economic - departments in Paris, and from the police and the Gestapo, which - at that time were still under the authority of the Military - Commander. - - “From 11 November 1942 on, this state of things changed because - of the occupation of the free zone. The German military - authorities settled in this zone demanded that they should give - their opinion in regard to the nomination of officials in all - cases where the security of the German Army might be affected. - The Gestapo for its part acquired in the two zones a _de facto_ - independence with regard to the regional and local military - chiefs and with regard to the Military Commander. It claimed the - right to intervene in connection with any appointment which - might affect the carrying out of their police tasks. - - “Having been recalled to Germany from November 1942 to December - 1943, I did not myself witness the conflicts which resulted from - this state of things and which could not fail to compromise in - the highest degree the so-called sovereignty of the Vichy - Government. When I returned to France the situation was - considerably worse because the Gestapo claimed, in the occupied - as well as in the unoccupied zone, the right to make the - nomination of prefects subject to its consent. It even went so - far as to propose itself the officials to be nominated by the - French Government. Seconded by me, the Military Commander took - up again the struggle against these abusive demands and - succeeded in part in restoring the situation to what it was - before November 1942 . . . .” - -The document which I have just read constitutes a transition to the -fourth consideration which I should like to submit to the Tribunal. In -putting this consideration I should like to stress the juxtaposition and -the collaboration of the various agents of usurpation, that is to say, -the military command, the embassy, and the police. As regards the latter -I shall deal at greater length with its role in the last part of my -brief. - -With regard to the setting up of the German Embassy in France, I produce -before the Tribunal Exhibit Number RF-1061. This document was in my file -as a judicial translation of a judicial document in the file concerning -Otto Abetz in Paris. On the other hand, it is also contained in the -American documentation and bears the Document Number 3614-PS. It has -not, however, as yet been submitted to the Tribunal. It deals with the -official appointment of Otto Abetz as ambassador. I should like to read -this Document RF-1061. - - “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 August 1940. - - “In answer to a question of the General Quartermaster, addressed - to the High Command of the Armed Forces and transmitted by the - latter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Führer had - appointed Abetz, up to now minister, as ambassador and upon my - report has decreed the following: - - “I. Ambassador Abetz has the following functions in France: - - “1. To advise the military agencies on political matters. - - “2. To maintain permanent contact with the Vichy Government and - its representatives in the occupied zone. - - “3. To influence the important political personalities in the - occupied zone and in the unoccupied zone in a way favorable to - our intentions. - - “4. To guide from the political point of view the press, the - radio, and the propaganda in the occupied zone and to influence - the responsive elements engaged in the molding of public opinion - in the unoccupied zone. - - “5. To take care of the German, French, and Belgian citizens - returning from internment camps. - - “6. To advise the secret military police and the Gestapo on the - seizure of politically important documents. - - “7. To seize and secure all public art treasures and private art - treasures, and particularly art treasures belonging to Jews, on - the basis of special instructions relating thereto. - - “II. The Führer has expressly ordered that only Ambassador Abetz - shall be responsible for all political questions in Occupied and - Unoccupied France. Insofar as military interests are involved by - his duties, Ambassador Abetz shall act only in agreement with - the Military Command in France. - - “III. Ambassador Abetz will be attached to the Military - Commander in France as his delegate. His domicile shall continue - to be in Paris as hitherto. He will receive from me instructions - for the accomplishment of his tasks and will be responsible - solely to me. I shall greatly appreciate it if the High Command - of the Armed Forces (the OKW) will give the necessary orders to - the military agencies concerned as quickly as possible. - - “Signed: Ribbentrop.” - -This document shows the close collaboration that existed between the -military administration and the administration of foreign affairs, a -collaboration which, as I have already said on several occasions, is one -of the determining elements for establishing responsibility in this -Trial, a collaboration of which I shall later on give examples of a -criminal character. - -I now wish to mention to the Tribunal that I eliminate the production of -the next document which was numbered RF-1062. Although I am personally -certain of the value of this document which comes from a French judicial -file, I have not the original German text. This being so, the -translation might create difficulties, and it is naturally essential -that each document produced should present incontestable guarantees. I -shall therefore pass directly to the last document, which I wish to put -in and which I submit as Document Number RF-1063. This is a detail, if I -may call it such, concerning this problem of the collaboration of the -German administrations, but sometimes formal documents concerning -details may present some interest. It is a note taken from the German -archives in Paris, a note dated 5 November 1943, which gives the -distribution of the numbering of the files in the German Embassy. I -shall read simply the first three lines of this note: “In accordance -with the method adopted by the military administration in France, the -files are divided into 10 chief groups.” There follows the enumeration -of these methods and groups used for the classification of the files. I -wish simply to point out that under their system of close collaboration -the German Embassy, a civil service department of the foreign office, -and the Military Command had adopted filing systems under which all -records and all files could be kept in the same way. - -I have now concluded my second section which was devoted to the general -examination of this seizure of sovereignty in the occupied territories, -and I should like to point out that these files have been established -with the collaboration of my assistant, M. Monneray, a collaboration -which also included the whole brief which I present to the Tribunal. - -I shall now ask the Tribunal to take the files relative to Section 3, -devoted to the ideological Germanization, and to propaganda. - -When I had occasion to speak to the Tribunal about forced labor and -economic pillage I said that the Germans had taken all available -manpower, goods, and raw materials from the occupied countries. They -drained these countries of their reserves. The Germans acted in exactly -the same manner with regard to the intellectual and moral resources. -They wished to seize and eliminate the spiritual reserves. This -expression “spiritual reserves,” which is extremely significant, was not -invented by the Prosecution. I have borrowed it from the Germans -themselves. I have quoted to the Tribunal another extract from a work -which was submitted as a document under Number RF-5 of the French -documentation. This was a book published in Berlin by the Nazi Party. -The author was Dr. Friedrich Didier. This work has a preface by the -Defendant Sauckel and is entitled _Working For Europe_. The quotation -which I should like to make appears in the document book under 1100, -which is simply the order of sequence, as the book itself has already -been presented and submitted. The book includes a chapter entitled -“Ideological Guidance and Social Assistance.” The author is concerned -with the ideological guidance of the foreign workers who were taken away -by millions to the Reich by force. This preoccupation with the -ideological guidance of such an important element of the population of -the occupied countries is already remarkable in itself; but it is, on -the other hand, quite evident that this preoccupation is general with -regard to all the inhabitants of the occupied countries, and the author -in this case has simply confined himself to his subject. I have chosen -this quotation to begin my section because its wording seemed to me to -be particularly felicitous to enable us to get an idea of the German -plans in regard to propaganda. - -Page 69 of the book that has been put in evidence reads: - - “The problem of ideological guidance of the foreign worker is - not as simple as in the case of the German fellow worker. In - employing foreigners far more importance must be paid to the - removal of psychological reservations. The foreigner must get - accustomed to unfamiliar surroundings. His ideological scruples - must be dispersed, if he has any. The mental attitude of the - nationals of former enemy states must be just as effectively - refuted as the consequences of foreign ideologies.” - -In the occupied countries the Germans undertook to eliminate the mental -reserves and to expurgate the ideology of each man in order to -substitute for them the Nazi conception. Such was the object of the -propaganda. This propaganda had already been introduced in Germany and -it was carried on there unceasingly. We have seen from the article just -quoted that there was also a preoccupation with the ideological guidance -of the German worker, although the problem was considered there to be -more simple. When we speak today of Nazi propaganda we are often tempted -to underestimate the importance of this propaganda. There are grounds -for underestimating it, but they are false grounds. On the one hand, -when we consider the works and the themes of propaganda, we are often -struck by their crudeness, their obviously mendacious character, their -intellectual or artistic poverty. But we must not forget that the Nazi -propaganda utilized all means, the most crude as well as the more subtle -and often skillful methods. From another point of view the crudest -affirmations are those that carry most weight with some simple minds. - -Finally, we must not forget that if the Germans had won the war, these -writings, these films, which we find ridiculous, would have constituted -in the future our principal and soon our sole spiritual food. - -Another remark that is often heard is that German propaganda achieved -only very poor results. Indeed, these results are quite insignificant, -especially if one takes into account the means which this propaganda had -at its disposal. The enslaved peoples did not listen to the news and to -the exhortations of the Germans. They threw themselves into the -resistance. But here again we must consider that the war continued, that -the broadcasts from the countries which had remained free gave out -magnificent counter propaganda, and that finally the Germans after a -time suffered military reverses. - -If events had been different perhaps this propaganda would, in the long -run, have brought about an acquiescence on the part of the more -important elements of the populations which would have been worse than -the oppression itself. It is fortunate that only a very small minority -in the different countries were corrupted by the Nazi propaganda, but -however small this minority may have been, it is for us a cause for -sadness and of just complaint. - -The slogans of Nazi propaganda appear to us less childish and less -ridiculous when we consider the few wretches who, influenced by it, -enrolled in a legion or in the Waffen SS to fight against their -countries and against humanity. By their death in this dishonorable -combat or after their condemnation some of these men have expiated their -crimes. But Nazi propaganda is responsible for the death of each one of -them and for each one of these crimes. - -Finally, we are not sure that we know today exactly the real effect of -Nazi propaganda. We are not sure that we are able to measure all the -harm which it has done to us. The nations count their visible wounds, -but propaganda is a poison which dissolves in the mental organism and -leaves traces that cannot be discerned. There are still men in the world -who, because of the propaganda to which they have been subjected, -believe, perhaps obscurely, that they have the right to despise or to -eliminate another man because he is a Jew or because he is a Communist. -The men who believe this still remain accomplices and, at the same time, -are victims of Nazism. - -One of my colleagues has shown that while the physical health of the -occupied peoples was severely undermined, their moral health appears -more robust; but it must still be anxiously watched for a certain time -in the future. - -For these reasons, the French Prosecution has considered that there was -room in this accusation for the section on spiritual Germanization and -propaganda. This propaganda is a criminal enterprise in itself. It is an -onslaught against the spiritual condition, according to the definition -of M. de Menthon, but it is also a means and an aggravating circumstance -of the whole of the criminal methods of the Nazis, since it prepared -their success and since it was to maintain their success. It was -considered by the Germans themselves, as numerous quotations show, as -one of the most reliable weapons of total war. It is more particularly a -means and an aspect of the Germanization which we are studying at this -moment. I should add that German propaganda has been constantly -developed for many years and over considerable areas. It assumed very -diverse forms. We have therefore only to define some of its principal -features and to quote merely a few characteristic documents, chiefly -from the point of view of the responsibility of certain persons or of -certain organizations. - -Over a long period of time the Reich had developed official propaganda -services in a ministerial department created as early as 1933 under the -name of Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, with Goebbels -at the head and the Defendant Fritzsche performing important functions. -But this ministry and its department were not the only ones responsible -for questions of propaganda. We shall show that the responsibility of -the Minister and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is equally involved. -We shall likewise show that the Party took an active part in propaganda. - -Finally, I mention here that in the occupied countries the military -commands constituted organs of propaganda and were very active. This -fact must be added to all those which show that the German military -command exercised powers wholly different from what are normally -considered to be military powers. By this abnormal extension of their -activities, apart from the crimes committed within the framework of -their direct competence, the military chiefs and the High Command have -furnished justification for the allegation of joint responsibility. - -The German propaganda always presents two complementary aspects, a -negative aspect and a positive aspect: A negative or, in a sense, a -destructive aspect, that of forbidding or of limiting certain liberties, -certain intellectual possibilities which existed before; a positive -aspect, that of creating documents or instruments of propaganda, of -spreading this propaganda, of imposing it on the eyes, on the ears, and -on the mind. An authority has already said that there are two different -voices: The voice that refuses truth and the voice that tells lies. This -duality of restrictive propaganda and of constructive propaganda exists -in the different realms of the expression of thought. - -I shall mention now, in my first paragraph, the measures taken by the -Germans as regards meetings and associations. The German authorities -have always taken measures to suppress the right of assembly and -association in the occupied countries. We are here concerned both with -the question of political rights and of thought. In France, a decree of -21 August 1940, which appeared in the _Official Gazette_ of German -Decrees of 16 September 1940, forbade any meeting or association without -the authorization of the German military administration. - -It must not be thought that the Germans utilized their powers in this -matter only in regard to associations and groups which were hostile to -them, or even those whose object was political. They were anxious to -avoid any spreading of an intellectual or moral influence which would -not be directly subordinated to them. In this connection I present to -the Tribunal, merely by way of example, Document Number RF-1101, which -is a letter from the Military Commander dated 13 December 1941, -addressed to the General Delegate of the French Government. This deals -with the youth groups. Even with regard to associations or groups which -should have a general public character, the German authorities gave -their authorization only on condition that they would be able to -exercise not only their control over these organizations, but a real -influence by means of these organizations. - -I shall read the first paragraph of this Document Number RF-1101. - - “The General Secretariat of Youth has informed us by letter of - 11 November 1941 of its intention to establish so-called social - youth centers whose aim shall be to give to youth a civic - education and to safeguard it from the moral degeneracy which - threatens it. The creation of these social youth centers, as - well the establishment of youth camps, must be sanctioned by the - Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces in France. Before - being able to make a final decision as to the creation of these - social centers, it appears indispensable that greater details - should be furnished, particularly about the persons responsible - for these centers in the various communes, the points of view - which will prevail when selecting the leaders of these centers, - the principal categories of youth to be recruited and detailed - plans for the intended instruction and education of these young - people.” - -I shall now produce Document Number RF-1102. This document is a note, -dealing with . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing_] M. Faure, could you tell us how long you -think you will be on this subject of propaganda? - -M. FAURE: I expect to speak for about two hours, or two and a half -hours. - -THE PRESIDENT: What is the program after you have done with this subject -of propaganda? - -M. FAURE: Mr. President, as I indicated at the beginning of my -presentation, it includes four sections. The propaganda section, about -which I am speaking now, constitutes Section 3. The fourth section is -devoted to the administrative organization of the criminal action. It -corresponds, more exactly, to the second heading under Count Four of the -Indictment relative to the persecution of the Jews in the occupied -countries of the West. After this section I shall have completed my -presentation. Does the Tribunal likewise Pg571 wish me to indicate what -will follow in the program of the French Prosecution? - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we would like to know. - -M. FAURE: M. Mounier will deal with the analytical brief and the -recapitulation of the individual accusations of the Prosecution. Then I -think M. Gerthoffer is to speak rather briefly about the pillage of art -treasures which has not been dealt with; it appears now that it would be -suitable to deal with it within the framework of the presentation. - -THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn now. - -M. FAURE: Mr. President, I should like to ask the Tribunal if it is -convenient for it to see tomorrow, in the course of my propaganda -section, a few projections on the screen of documents which relate to -this chapter. - -THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think so. Certainly. - -HERR BABEL: Regarding the questions which I asked the witness, there is -something I did not understand. I did not want, in any case, to speak -about the resistance or about its methods which were animated by -patriotism. I did not want to judge, or even think anything derogatory -about it. I wanted only to prove that deeds which are said to have been -committed by the German troops were in many cases caused by the attitude -of the civilian population and that actions against Germans which were -contrary to international law have not been judged in the same way as -lapses laid to the charge of members of the German Wehrmacht. I am of -the opinion that the Indictment of the organizations . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Babel, will you forgive me for a moment. You -concluded your cross-examination some time ago, and the Tribunal doesn’t -desire . . . - -HERR BABEL: Yes, Mr. President, but I thought that by this statement I -could clarify it for the Tribunal. - -THE PRESIDENT: We don’t need any clarification at all. We quite -understand the point of your cross-examination and we shall hear you -when the time comes, very fully in all probability, in support of the -arguments which you desire to present. - -HERR BABEL: I did so because I thought that you . . . - -THE PRESIDENT: You must give the Tribunal credit for understanding your -cross-examination. We really cannot continue to have interruptions of -this sort. We have some twenty defendants and some twenty counsels, and -if they are all going to get up in the way that you do and make -protests, we shall never get to the end of this Trial. - - [_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 February 1946 at 1000 hours._] - - - - - TRANSCRIBER NOTES - -Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious -printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for -periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; -however, American spellings are the rule, hence, ‘Defense’ versus -‘Defence’. Unlike prior Blue Series volumes I and II, all French, German -and eastern European names and terms include accents and umlauts: hence -Führer and Göring, etc. throughout. - -Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb -tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the -tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations -between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in -the trial. - -An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as -possible to the original document presentation and layout. - -[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International -Military Tribunal Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 6)_, -by Various.] - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals -Before the International Militar, by Various - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRIAL--MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS--VOL VI *** - -***** This file should be named 55144-0.txt or 55144-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/5/1/4/55144/ - -Produced by Larry Harrison, Cindy Beyer, and the online -Distributed Proofreaders Canada team at -http://www.pgdpcanada.net with images provided by TIA-US. - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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