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diff --git a/old/adlr10.txt b/old/adlr10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fca1f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/adlr10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8595 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Advancement of Learning, by Francis Bacon +(#4 in our series by Francis Bacon) + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: The Advancement of Learning + +Author: Francis Bacon + +Release Date: April, 2004 [EBook #5500] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on July 16, 2002] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING *** + + + + +Transcribed from the 1893 Cassell & Company edition by David Price, +email ccx074@coventry.ac.uk + + + + +THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + + +"The TVVOO Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and +aduancement of Learning, divine and humane. To the King. At +London. Printed for Henrie Tomes, and are to be sould at his shop +at Graies Inne Gate in Holborne. 1605." That was the original +title-page of the book now in the reader's hand--a living book that +led the way to a new world of thought. It was the book in which +Bacon, early in the reign of James the First, prepared the way for a +full setting forth of his New Organon, or instrument of knowledge. + +The Organon of Aristotle was a set of treatises in which Aristotle +had written the doctrine of propositions. Study of these treatises +was a chief occupation of young men when they passed from school to +college, and proceeded from Grammar to Logic, the second of the +Seven Sciences. Francis Bacon as a youth of sixteen, at Trinity +College, Cambridge, felt the unfruitfulness of this method of search +after truth. He was the son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Queen +Elizabeth's Lord Keeper, and was born at York House, in the Strand, +on the 22nd of January, 1561. His mother was the Lord Keeper's +second wife, one of two sisters, of whom the other married Sir +William Cecil, afterwards Lord Burleigh. Sir Nicholas Bacon had six +children by his former marriage, and by his second wife two sons, +Antony and Francis, of whom Antony was about two years the elder. +The family home was at York Place, and at Gorhambury, near St. +Albans, from which town, in its ancient and its modern style, Bacon +afterwards took his titles of Verulam and St. Albans. + +Antony and Francis Bacon went together to Trinity College, +Cambridge, when Antony was fourteen years old and Francis twelve. +Francis remained at Cambridge only until his sixteenth year; and Dr. +Rawley, his chaplain in after-years, reports of him that "whilst he +was commorant in the University, about sixteen years of age (as his +lordship hath been pleased to impart unto myself), he first fell +into dislike of the philosophy of Aristotle; not for the +worthlessness of the author, to whom he would ascribe all high +attributes, but for the unfruitfulness of the way, being a +philosophy (as his lordship used to say) only strong for +disputatious and contentions, but barren of the production of works +for the benefit of the life of man; in which mind he continued to +his dying day." Bacon was sent as a youth of sixteen to Paris with +the ambassador Sir Amyas Paulet, to begin his training for the +public service; but his father's death, in February, 1579, before he +had completed the provision he was making for his youngest children, +obliged him to return to London, and, at the age of eighteen, to +settle down at Gray's Inn to the study of law as a profession. He +was admitted to the outer bar in June, 1582, and about that time, at +the age of twenty-one, wrote a sketch of his conception of a New +Organon that should lead man to more fruitful knowledge, in a little +Latin tract, which he called "Temporis Partus Maximus" ("The +Greatest Birth of Time"). + +In November, 1584, Bacon took his seat in the House of Commons as +member for Melcombe Regis, in Dorsetshire. In October, 1586, he sat +for Taunton. He was member afterwards for Liverpool; and he was one +of those who petitioned for the speedy execution of Mary Queen of +Scots. In October, 1589, he obtained the reversion of the office of +Clerk of the Council in the Star Chamber, which was worth 1,600 +pounds or 2,000 pounds a year; but for the succession to this office +he had to wait until 1608. It had not yet fallen to him when he +wrote his "Two Books of the Advancement of Learning." In the +Parliament that met in February, 1593, Bacon sat as member for +Middlesex. He raised difficulties of procedure in the way of the +grant of a treble subsidy, by just objection to the joining of the +Lords with the Commons in a money grant, and a desire to extend the +time allowed for payment from three years to six; it was, in fact, +extended to four years. The Queen was offended. Francis Bacon and +his brother Antony had attached themselves to the young Earl of +Essex, who was their friend and patron. The office of Attorney- +General became vacant. Essex asked the Queen to appoint Francis +Bacon. The Queen gave the office to Sir Edward Coke, who was +already Solicitor-General, and by nine years Bacon's senior. The +office of Solicitor-General thus became vacant, and that was sought +for Francis Bacon. The Queen, after delay and hesitation, gave it, +in November, 1595, to Serjeant Fleming. The Earl of Essex consoled +his friend by giving him "a piece of land"--Twickenham Park--which +Bacon afterwards sold for 1,800 pounds--equal, say, to 12,000 pounds +in present buying power. In 1597 Bacon was returned to Parliament +as member for Ipswich, and in that year he was hoping to marry the +rich widow of Sir William Hatton, Essex helping; but the lady +married, in the next year, Sir Edward Coke. It was in 1597 that +Bacon published the First Edition of his Essays. That was a little +book containing only ten essays in English, with twelve +"Meditationes Sacrae," which were essays in Latin on religious +subjects. From 1597 onward to the end of his life, Bacon's Essays +were subject to continuous addition and revision. The author's +Second Edition, in which the number of the Essays was increased from +ten to thirty-eight, did not appear until November or December, +1612, seven years later than these two books on the "Advancement of +Learning;" and the final edition of the Essays, in which their +number was increased from thirty-eight to fifty-eight, appeared only +in 1625; and Bacon died on the 9th of April, 1626. The edition of +the Essays published in 1597, under Elizabeth, marked only the +beginning of a course of thought that afterwards flowed in one +stream with his teachings in philosophy. + +In February, 1601, there was the rebellion of Essex. Francis Bacon +had separated himself from his patron after giving him advice that +was disregarded. Bacon, now Queen's Counsel, not only appeared +against his old friend, but with excess of zeal, by which, perhaps, +he hoped to win back the Queen's favour, he twice obtruded violent +attacks upon Essex when he was not called upon to speak. On the +25th of February, 1601, Essex was beheaded. The genius of Bacon was +next employed to justify that act by "A Declaration of the Practices +and Treasons attempted and committed by Robert late Earle of Essex +and his Complices." But James of Scotland, on whose behalf Essex +had intervened, came to the throne by the death of Elizabeth on the +24th of March, 1603. Bacon was among the crowd of men who were made +knights by James I., and he had to justify himself under the new +order of things by writing "Sir Francis Bacon his Apologie in +certain Imputations concerning the late Earle of Essex." He was +returned to the first Parliament of James I. by Ipswich and St. +Albans, and he was confirmed in his office of King's Counsel in +August, 1604; but he was not appointed to the office of Solicitor- +General when it became vacant in that year. + +That was the position of Francis Bacon in 1605, when he published +this work, where in his First Book he pointed out the discredits of +learning from human defects of the learned, and emptiness of many of +the studies chosen, or the way of dealing with them. This came, he +said, especially by the mistaking or misplacing of the last or +furthest end of knowledge, as if there were sought in it "a couch +whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit; or a terrace for +a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair +prospect; or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon; +or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention; or a shop +for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the +Creator and the relief of man's estate." The rest of the First Book +was given to an argument upon the Dignity of Learning; and the +Second Book, on the Advancement of Learning, is, as Bacon himself +described it, "a general and faithful perambulation of learning, +with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not +improved and converted by the industry of man; to the end that such +a plot made and recorded to memory may both minister light to any +public designation and also serve to excite voluntary endeavours." +Bacon makes, by a sort of exhaustive analysis, a ground-plan of all +subjects of study, as an intellectual map, helping the right +inquirer in his search for the right path. The right path is that +by which he has the best chance of adding to the stock of knowledge +in the world something worth labouring for; and the true worth is in +labour for "the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's +estate." + +H. M. + + + +THE FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON; OF THE PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT +OF LEARNING, DIVINE AND HUMAN. + + + +To the King. + + + +There were under the law, excellent King, both daily sacrifices and +freewill offerings; the one proceeding upon ordinary observance, the +other upon a devout cheerfulness: in like manner there belongeth to +kings from their servants both tribute of duty and presents of +affection. In the former of these I hope I shall not live to be +wanting, according to my most humble duty and the good pleasure of +your Majesty's employments: for the latter, I thought it more +respective to make choice of some oblation which might rather refer +to the propriety and excellency of your individual person, than to +the business of your crown and state. + +Wherefore, representing your Majesty many times unto my mind, and +beholding you not with the inquisitive eye of presumption, to +discover that which the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable, but +with the observant eye of duty and admiration, leaving aside the +other parts of your virtue and fortune, I have been touched--yea, +and possessed--with an extreme wonder at those your virtues and +faculties, which the philosophers call intellectual; the largeness +of your capacity, the faithfulness of your memory, the swiftness of +your apprehension, the penetration of your judgment, and the +facility and order of your elocution: and I have often thought that +of all the persons living that I have known, your Majesty were the +best instance to make a man of Plato's opinion, that all knowledge +is but remembrance, and that the mind of man by Nature knoweth all +things, and hath but her own native and original notions (which by +the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the body are +sequestered) again revived and restored: such a light of Nature I +have observed in your Majesty, and such a readiness to take flame +and blaze from the least occasion presented, or the least spark of +another's knowledge delivered. And as the Scripture saith of the +wisest king, "That his heart was as the sands of the sea;" which, +though it be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the +smallest and finest portions; so hath God given your Majesty a +composition of understanding admirable, being able to compass and +comprehend the greatest matters, and nevertheless to touch and +apprehend the least; whereas it should seem an impossibility in +Nature for the same instrument to make itself fit for great and +small works. And for your gift of speech, I call to mind what +Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Caesar: Augusto profluens, et +quae principem deceret, eloquentia fuit. For if we note it well, +speech that is uttered with labour and difficulty, or speech that +savoureth of the affectation of art and precepts, or speech that is +framed after the imitation of some pattern of eloquence, though +never so excellent; all this hath somewhat servile, and holding of +the subject. But your Majesty's manner of speech is, indeed, +prince-like, flowing as from a fountain, and yet streaming and +branching itself into Nature's order, full of facility and felicity, +imitating none, and inimitable by any. And as in your civil estate +there appeareth to be an emulation and contention of your Majesty's +virtue with your fortune; a virtuous disposition with a fortunate +regiment; a virtuous expectation (when time was) of your greater +fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the due time; a +virtuous observation of the laws of marriage, with most blessed and +happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and most Christian desire of +peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes +thereunto: so likewise in these intellectual matters there seemeth +to be no less contention between the excellency of your Majesty's +gifts of Nature and the universality and perfection of your +learning. For I am well assured that this which I shall say is no +amplification at all, but a positive and measured truth; which is, +that there hath not been since Christ's time any king or temporal +monarch which hath been so learned in all literature and erudition, +divine and human. For let a man seriously and diligently revolve +and peruse the succession of the Emperors of Rome, of which Caesar +the Dictator (who lived some years before Christ) and Marcus +Antoninus were the best learned, and so descend to the Emperors of +Graecia, or of the West, and then to the lines of France, Spain, +England, Scotland, and the rest, and he shall find this judgment is +truly made. For it seemeth much in a king if, by the compendious +extractions of other men's wits and labours, he can take hold of any +superficial ornaments and shows of learning, or if he countenance +and prefer learning and learned men; but to drink, indeed, of the +true fountains of learning--nay, to have such a fountain of learning +in himself, in a king, and in a king born--is almost a miracle. And +the more, because there is met in your Majesty a rare conjunction, +as well of divine and sacred literature as of profane and human; so +as your Majesty standeth invested of that triplicity, which in great +veneration was ascribed to the ancient Hermes: the power and +fortune of a king, the knowledge and illumination of a priest, and +the learning and universality of a philosopher. This propriety +inherent and individual attribute in your Majesty deserveth to be +expressed not only in the fame and admiration of the present time, +nor in the history or tradition of the ages succeeding, but also in +some solid work, fixed memorial, and immortal monument, bearing a +character or signature both of the power of a king and the +difference and perfection of such a king. + +Therefore I did conclude with myself that I could not make unto your +Majesty a better oblation than of some treatise tending to that end, +whereof the sum will consist of these two parts: the former +concerning the excellency of learning and knowledge, and the +excellency of the merit and true glory in the augmentation and +propagation thereof; the latter, what the particular acts and works +are which have been embraced and undertaken for the advancement of +learning; and again, what defects and undervalues I find in such +particular acts: to the end that though I cannot positively or +affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound unto you framed +particulars, yet I may excite your princely cogitations to visit the +excellent treasure of your own mind, and thence to extract +particulars for this purpose agreeable to your magnanimity and +wisdom. + +I. (1) In the entrance to the former of these--to clear the way and, +as it were, to make silence, to have the true testimonies concerning +the dignity of learning to be better heard, without the interruption +of tacit objections--I think good to deliver it from the discredits +and disgraces which it hath received, all from ignorance, but +ignorance severally disguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and +jealousy of divines, sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of +politics, and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned +men themselves. + +(2) I hear the former sort say that knowledge is of those things +which are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution; that +the aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original temptation and +sin whereupon ensued the fall of man; that knowledge hath in it +somewhat of the serpent, and, therefore, where it entereth into a +man it makes him swell; Scientia inflat; that Solomon gives a +censure, "That there is no end of making books, and that much +reading is weariness of the flesh;" and again in another place, +"That in spacious knowledge there is much contristation, and that he +that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety;" that Saint Paul gives +a caveat, "That we be not spoiled through vain philosophy;" that +experience demonstrates how learned men have been arch-heretics, how +learned times have been inclined to atheism, and how the +contemplation of second causes doth derogate from our dependence +upon God, who is the first cause. + +(3) To discover, then, the ignorance and error of this opinion, and +the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appear +these men do not observe or consider that it was not the pure +knowledge of Nature and universality, a knowledge by the light +whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise as they +were brought before him according unto their proprieties, which gave +the occasion to the fall; but it was the proud knowledge of good and +evil, with an intent in man to give law unto himself, and to depend +no more upon God's commandments, which was the form of the +temptation. Neither is it any quantity of knowledge, how great +soever, that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can +fill, much less extend the soul of man, but God and the +contemplation of God; and, therefore, Solomon, speaking of the two +principal senses of inquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that +the eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; +and if there be no fulness, then is the continent greater than the +content: so of knowledge itself and the mind of man, whereto the +senses are but reporters, he defineth likewise in these words, +placed after that calendar or ephemerides which he maketh of the +diversities of times and seasons for all actions and purposes, and +concludeth thus: "God hath made all things beautiful, or decent, in +the true return of their seasons. Also He hath placed the world in +man's heart, yet cannot man find out the work which God worketh from +the beginning to the end"--declaring not obscurely that God hath +framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of +the universal world, and joyful to receive the impression thereof, +as the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in +beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but raised +also to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees which +throughout all those changes are infallibly observed. And although +he doth insinuate that the supreme or summary law of Nature (which +he calleth "the work which God worketh from the beginning to the +end") is not possible to be found out by man, yet that doth not +derogate from the capacity of the mind; but may be referred to the +impediments, as of shortness of life, ill conjunction of labours, +ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand, and many other +inconveniences, whereunto the condition of man is subject. For that +nothing parcel of the world is denied to man's inquiry and +invention, he doth in another place rule over, when he saith, "The +spirit of man is as the lamp of God, wherewith He searcheth the +inwardness of all secrets." If, then, such be the capacity and +receipt of the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no danger +at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge, how large soever, +lest it should make it swell or out-compass itself; no, but it is +merely the quality of knowledge, which, be it in quantity more or +less, if it be taken without the true corrective thereof, hath in it +some nature of venom or malignity, and some effects of that venom, +which is ventosity or swelling. This corrective spice, the mixture +whereof maketh knowledge so sovereign, is charity, which the Apostle +immediately addeth to the former clause; for so he saith, "Knowledge +bloweth up, but charity buildeth up;" not unlike unto that which he +deilvereth in another place: "If I spake," saith he, "with the +tongues of men and angels, and had not charity, it were but as a +tinkling cymbal." Not but that it is an excellent thing to speak +with the tongues of men and angels, but because, if it be severed +from charity, and not referred to the good of men and mankind, it +hath rather a sounding and unworthy glory than a meriting and +substantial virtue. And as for that censure of Solomon concerning +the excess of writing and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit +which redoundeth from knowledge, and that admonition of St. Paul, +"That we be not seduced by vain philosophy," let those places be +rightly understood; and they do, indeed, excellently set forth the +true bounds and limitations whereby human knowledge is confined and +circumscribed, and yet without any such contracting or coarctation, +but that it may comprehend all the universal nature of things; for +these limitations are three: the first, "That we do not so place +our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our mortality;" the second, +"That we make application of our knowledge, to give ourselves repose +and contentment, and not distaste or repining;" the third, "That we +do not presume by the contemplation of Nature to attain to the +mysteries of God." For as touching the first of these, Solomon doth +excellently expound himself in another place of the same book, where +he saith: "I saw well that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance +as light doth from darkness; and that the wise man's eyes keep watch +in his head, whereas this fool roundeth about in darkness: but +withal I learned that the same mortality involveth them both." And +for the second, certain it is there is no vexation or anxiety of +mind which resulteth from knowledge otherwise than merely by +accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of +knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself; but when men fall +to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to their +particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast +desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is +spoken of; for then knowledge is no more Lumen siccum, whereof +Heraclitus the profound said, Lumen siccum optima anima; but it +becometh Lumen madidum, or maceratum, being steeped and infused in +the humours of the affections. And as for the third point, it +deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly passed +over; for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into these +sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby he may +reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, then, indeed, is he +spoiled by vain philosophy; for the contemplation of God's creatures +and works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures +themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God no perfect +knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge. And, therefore, +it was most aptly said by one of Plato's school, "That the sense of +man carrieth a resemblance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth +and revealeth all the terrestrial globe; but then, again, it +obscureth and concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth the +sense discover natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up +divine." And hence it is true that it hath proceeded, that divers +great learned men have been heretical, whilst they have sought to +fly up to the secrets of the Deity by this waxen wings of the +senses. And as for the conceit that too much knowledge should +incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance of second causes +should make a more devout dependence upon God, which is the first +cause; first, it is good to ask the question which Job asked of his +friends: "Will you lie for God, as one man will lie for another, to +gratify him?" For certain it is that God worketh nothing in Nature +but by second causes; and if they would have it otherwise believed, +it is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards God, and nothing +else but to offer to the Author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a +lie. But further, it is an assured truth, and a conclusion of +experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may +incline the mind of men to atheism, but a further proceeding therein +doth bring the mind back again to religion. For in the entrance of +philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, +do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there +it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man +passeth on further and seeth the dependence of causes and the works +of Providence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will +easily believe that the highest link of Nature's chain must needs he +tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair. To conclude, therefore, let no +man upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation +think or maintain that a man can search too far, or be too well +studied in the book of God's word, or in the book of God's works, +divinity or philosophy; but rather let men endeavour an endless +progress or proficience in both; only let men beware that they apply +both to charity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to +ostentation; and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound +these learnings together. + +II. (1) And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from +politics, they be of this nature: that learning doth soften men's +minds, and makes them more unapt for the honour and exercise of +arms; that it doth mar and pervert men's dispositions for matter of +government and policy, in making them too curious and irresolute by +variety of reading, or too peremptory or positive by strictness of +rules and axioms, or too immoderate and overweening by reason of the +greatness of examples, or too incompatible and differing from the +times by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that +it doth divert men's travails from action and business, and bringeth +them to a love of leisure and privateness; and that it doth bring +into states a relaxation of discipline, whilst every man is more +ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out of this conceit Cato, +surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed that ever lived, +when Carneades the philosopher came in embassage to Rome, and that +the young men of Rome began to flock about him, being allured with +the sweetness and majesty of his eloquence and learning, gave +counsel in open senate that they should give him his despatch with +all speed, lest he should infect and enchant the minds and +affections of the youth, and at unawares bring in an alteration of +the manners and customs of the state. Out of the same conceit or +humour did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage of his country +and the disadvantage of his own profession, make a kind of +separation between policy and government, and between arts and +sciences, in the verses so much renowned, attributing and +challenging the one to the Romans, and leaving and yielding the +other to the Grecians: Tu regere imperio popules, Romane, memento, +Hae tibi erunt artes, &c. So likewise we see that Anytus, the +accuser of Socrates, laid it as an article of charge and accusation +against him, that he did, with the variety and power of his +discourses and disputatious, withdraw young men from due reverence +to the laws and customs of their country, and that he did profess a +dangerous and pernicious science, which was to make the worse matter +seem the better, and to suppress truth by force of eloquence and +speech. + +(2) But these and the like imputations have rather a countenance of +gravity than any ground of justice: for experience doth warrant +that, both in persons and in times, there hath been a meeting and +concurrence in learning and arms, flourishing and excelling in the +same men and the same ages. For as 'for men, there cannot be a +better nor the hike instance as of that pair, Alexander the Great +and Julius Caesar, the Dictator; whereof the one was Aristotle's +scholar in philosophy, and the other was Cicero's rival in +eloquence; or if any man had rather call for scholars that were +great generals, than generals that were great scholars, let him take +Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian; whereof the one +was the first that abated the power of Sparta, and the other was the +first that made way to the overthrow of the monarchy of Persia. And +this concurrence is yet more visible in times than in persons, by +how much an age is greater object than a man. For both in Egypt, +Assyria, Persia, Graecia, and Rome, the same times that are most +renowned for arms are, likewise, most admired for learning, so that +the greatest authors and philosophers, and the greatest captains and +governors, have lived in the same ages. Neither can it otherwise +he: for as in man the ripeness of strength of the body and mind +cometh much about an age, save that the strength of the body cometh +somewhat the more early, so in states, arms and learning, whereof +the one correspondeth to the body, the other to the soul of man, +have a concurrence or near sequence in times. + +(3) And for matter of policy and government, that learning, should +rather hurt, than enable thereunto, is a thing very improbable; we +see it is accounted an error to commit a natural body to empiric +physicians, which commonly have a few pleasing receipts whereupon +they are confident and adventurous, but know neither the causes of +diseases, nor the complexions of patients, nor peril of accidents, +nor the true method of cures; we see it is a like error to rely upon +advocates or lawyers which are only men of practice, and not +grounded in their books, who are many times easily surprised when +matter falleth out besides their experience, to the prejudice of the +causes they handle: so by like reason it cannot be but a matter of +doubtful consequence if states be managed by empiric statesmen, not +well mingled with men grounded in learning. But contrariwise, it is +almost without instance contradictory that ever any government was +disastrous that was in the hands of learned governors. For +howsoever it hath been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and +disable learned men by the names of pedantes; yet in the records of +time it appeareth in many particulars that the governments of +princes in minority (notwithstanding the infinite disadvantage of +that kind of state)--have nevertheless excelled the government of +princes of mature age, even for that reason which they seek to +traduce, which is that by that occasion the state hath been in the +hands of pedantes: for so was the state of Rome for the first five +years, which are so much magnified, during the minority of Nero, in +the hands of Seneca, a pedenti; so it was again, for ten years' +space or more, during the minority of Gordianus the younger, with +great applause and contentation in the hands of Misitheus, a +pedanti: so was it before that, in the minority of Alexander +Severus, in like happiness, in hands not much unlike, by reason of +the rule of the women, who were aided by the teachers and +preceptors. Nay, let a man look into the government of the Bishops +of Rome, as by name, into the government of Pius Quintus and Sextus +Quintus in our times, who were both at their entrance esteemed but +as pedantical friars, and he shall find that such Popes do greater +things, and proceed upon truer principles of state, than those which +have ascended to the papacy from an education and breeding in +affairs of state and courts of princes; for although men bred in +learning are perhaps to seek in points of convenience and +accommodating for the present, which the Italians call ragioni di +stato, whereof the same Pius Quintus could not hear spoken with +patience, terming them inventions against religion and the moral +virtues; yet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect +in those same plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, and moral +virtue, which if they be well and watchfully pursued, there will be +seldom use of those other, no more than of physic in a sound or +well-dieted body. Neither can the experience of one man's life +furnish examples and precedents for the event of one man's life. +For as it happeneth sometimes that the grandchild, or other +descendant, resembleth the ancestor more than the son; so many times +occurrences of present times may sort better with ancient examples +than with those of the later or immediate times; and lastly, the wit +of one man can no more countervail learning than one man's means can +hold way with a common purse. + +(4) And as for those particular seducements or indispositions of the +mind for policy and government, which learning is pretended to +insinuate; if it be granted that any such thing be, it must be +remembered withal that learning ministereth in every of them greater +strength of medicine or remedy than it offereth cause of +indisposition or infirmity. For if by a secret operation it make +men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side by plain precept it +teacheth them when and upon what ground to resolve; yea, and how to +carry things in suspense, without prejudice, till they resolve. If +it make men positive and regular, it teacheth them what things are +in their nature demonstrative, and what are conjectural, and as well +the use of distinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of +principles and rules. If it mislead by disproportion or +dissimilitude of examples, it teacheth men the force of +circumstances, the errors of comparisons, and all the cautions of +application; so that in all these it doth rectify more effectually +than it can pervert. And these medicines it conveyeth into men's +minds much more forcibly by the quickness and penetration of +examples. For let a man look into the errors of Clement VII., so +lively described by Guicciardini, who served under him, or into the +errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in his Epistles to +Atticus, and he will fly apace from being irresolute. Let him look +into the errors of Phocion, and he will beware how he be obstinate +or inflexible. Let him but read the fable of Ixion, and it will +hold him from being vaporous or imaginative. Let him look into the +errors of Cato II., and he will never be one of the Antipodes, to +tread opposite to the present world. + +(5) And for the conceit that learning should dispose men to leisure +and privateness, and make men slothful: it were a strange thing if +that which accustometh the mind to a perpetual motion and agitation +should induce slothfulness, whereas, contrariwise, it may be truly +affirmed that no kind of men love business for itself but those that +are learned; for other persons love it for profit, as a hireling +that loves the work for the wages; or for honour, as because it +beareth them up in the eyes of men, and refresheth their reputation, +which otherwise would wear; or because it putteth them in mind of +their fortune, and giveth them occasion to pleasure and displeasure; +or because it exerciseth some faculty wherein they take pride, and +so entertaineth them in good-humour and pleasing conceits towards +themselves; or because it advanceth any other their ends. So that +as it is said of untrue valours, that some men's valours are in the +eyes of them that look on, so such men's industries are in the eyes +of others, or, at least, in regard of their own designments; only +learned men love business as an action according to nature, as +agreeable to health of mind as exercise is to health of body, taking +pleasure in the action itself, and not in the purchase, so that of +all men they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards any +business which can hold or detain their mind. + +(6) And if any man be laborious in reading and study, and yet idle +in business and action, it groweth from some weakness of body or +softness of spirit, such as Seneca speaketh of: Quidam tam sunt +umbratiles, ut putent in turbido esse quicquid in luce est; and not +of learning: well may it be that such a point of a man's nature may +make him give himself to learning, but it is not learning that +breedeth any such point in his nature. + +(7) And that learning should take up too much time or leisure: I +answer, the most active or busy man that hath been or can be, hath +(no question) many vacant times of leisure while he expecteth the +tides and returns of business (except he be either tedious and of no +despatch, or lightly and unworthily ambitious to meddle in things +that may be better done by others), and then the question is but how +those spaces and times of leisure shall be filled and spent; whether +in pleasure or in studies; as was well answered by Demosthenes to +his adversary AEschines, that was a man given to pleasure, and told +him "That his orations did smell of the lamp." "Indeed," said +Demosthenes, "there is a great difference between the things that +you and I do by lamp-light." So as no man need doubt that learning +will expel business, but rather it will keep and defend the +possession of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which +otherwise at unawares may enter to the prejudice of both. + +(8) Again, for that other conceit that learning should undermine the +reverence of laws and government, it is assuredly a mere depravation +and calumny, without all shadow of truth. For to say that a blind +custom of obedience should be a surer obligation than duty taught +and understood, it is to affirm that a blind man may tread surer by +a guide than a seeing man can by a light. And it is without all +controversy that learning doth make the minds of men gentle, +generous, manageable, and pliant to government; whereas ignorance +makes them churlish, thwart, and mutinous: and the evidence of time +doth clear this assertion, considering that the most barbarous, +rude, and unlearned times have been most subject to tumults, +seditious, and changes. + +(9) And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was well punished +for his blasphemy against learning, in the same kind wherein he +offended; for when he was past threescore years old, he was taken +with an extreme desire to go to school again, and to learn the Greek +tongue, to the end to peruse the Greek authors; which doth well +demonstrate that his former censure of the Grecian learning was +rather an affected gravity, than according to the inward sense of +his own opinion. And as for Virgil's verses, though it pleased him +to brave the world in taking to the Romans the art of empire, and +leaving to others the arts of subjects, yet so much is manifest-- +that the Romans never ascended to that height of empire till the +time they had ascended to the height of other arts. For in the time +of the two first Caesars, which had the art of government in +greatest perfection, there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro; the +best historiographer, Titus Livius; the best antiquary, Marcus +Varro; and the best or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to the +memory of man are known. As for the accusation of Socrates, the +time must be remembered when it was prosecuted; which was under the +Thirty Tyrants, the most base, bloody, and envious persons that have +governed; which revolution of state was no sooner over but Socrates, +whom they had made a person criminal, was made a person heroical, +and his memory accumulate with honours divine and human; and those +discourses of his which were then termed corrupting of manners, were +after acknowledged for sovereign medicines of the mind and manners, +and so have been received ever since till this day. Let this, +therefore, serve for answer to politiques, which in their humorous +severity, or in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw +imputations upon learning; which redargution nevertheless (save that +we know not whether our labours may extend to other ages) were not +needful for the present, in regard of the love and reverence towards +learning which the example and countenance of two so learned +princes, Queen Elizabeth and your Majesty, being as Castor and +Pollux, lucida sidera, stars of excellent light and most benign +influence, hath wrought in all men of place and authority in our +nation. + +III. (1) Now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit or +diminution of credit that groweth unto learning from learned men +themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest: it is either from +their fortune, or from their manners, or from the nature of their +studies. For the first, it is not in their power; and the second is +accidental; the third only is proper to be handled: but because we +are not in hand with true measure, but with popular estimation and +conceit, it is not amiss to speak somewhat of the two former. The +derogations therefore which grow to learning from the fortune or +condition of learned men, are either in respect of scarcity of +means, or in respect of privateness of life and meanness of +employments. + +(2) Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men usually +to begin with little, and not to grow rich so fast as other men, by +reason they convert not their labours chiefly to lucre and increase, +it were good to leave the commonplace in commendation of povery to +some friar to handle, to whom much was attributed by Machiavel in +this point when he said, "That the kingdom of the clergy had been +long before at an end, if the reputation and reverence towards the +poverty of friars had not borne out the scandal of the superfluities +and excesses of bishops and prelates." So a man might say that the +felicity and delicacy of princes and great persons had long since +turned to rudeness and barbarism, if the poverty of learning had not +kept up civility and honour of life; but without any such +advantages, it is worthy the observation what a reverent and +honoured thing poverty of fortune was for some ages in the Roman +state, which nevertheless was a state without paradoxes. For we see +what Titus Livius saith in his introduction: Caeterum aut me amor +negotii suscepti fallit aut nulla unquam respublica nec major, nec +sanctior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit; nec in quam tam sero +avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint; nec ubi tantus ac tam diu +paupertati ac parsimoniae honos fuerit. We see likewise, after that +the state of Rome was not itself, but did degenerate, how that +person that took upon him to be counsellor to Julius Caesar after +his victory where to begin his restoration of the state, maketh it +of all points the most summary to take away the estimation of +wealth: Verum haec et omnia mala pariter cum honore pecuniae +desinent; si neque magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda, venalia +erunt. To conclude this point: as it was truly said that Paupertas +est virtutis fortuna, though sometimes it come from vice, so it may +be fitly said that, though some times it may proceed from +misgovernment and accident. Surely Solomon hath pronounced it both +in censure, Qui festinat ad divitias non erit insons; and in +precept, "Buy the truth, and sell it not; and so of wisdom and +knowledge;" judging that means were to be spent upon learning, and +not learning to be applied to means. And as for the privateness or +obscureness (as it may be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life of +contemplative men, it is a theme so common to extol a private life, +not taxed with sensuality and sloth, in comparison and to the +disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, liberty, pleasure, and +dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, as no man handleth it +but handleth it well; such a consonancy it hath to men's conceits in +the expressing, and to men's consents in the allowing. This only I +will add, that learned men forgotten in states and not living in the +eyes of men, are like the images of Cassius and Brutus in the +funeral of Junia, of which, not being represented as many others +were, Tacitus saith, Eo ipso praefulgebant quod non visebantur. + +(3) And for meanness of employment, that which is most traduced to +contempt is that the government of youth is commonly allotted to +them; which age, because it is the age of least authority, it is +transferred to the disesteeming of those employments wherein youth +is conversant, and which are conversant about youth. But how unjust +this traducement is (if you will reduce things from popularity of +opinion to measure of reason) may appear in that we see men are more +curious what they put into a new vessel than into a vessel seasoned; +and what mould they lay about a young plant than about a plant +corroborate; so as this weakest terms and times of all things use to +have the best applications and helps. And will you hearken to the +Hebrew rabbins? "Your young men shall see visions, and your old men +shall dream dreams:" say they, youth is the worthier age, for that +visions are nearer apparitions of God than dreams? And let it be +noted that howsoever the condition of life of pedantes hath been +scorned upon theatres, as the ape of tyranny; and that the modern +looseness or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of +schoolmasters and tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the best times +did always make a just complaint, that states were too busy with +their laws and too negligent in point of education: which excellent +part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort revived of late +times by the colleges of the Jesuits; of whom, although in regard of +their superstition I may say, Quo meliores, eo deteriores; yet in +regard of this, and some other points concerning human learning and +moral matters, I may say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy +Pharnabazus, Talis quum sis, utunam noster esses. And that much +touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of learned men. + +(4) As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing personal +and individual: and no doubt there be amongst them, as in other +professions, of all temperatures: but yet so as it is not without +truth which is said, that Abeunt studua in mores, studies have an +influence and operation upon the manners of those that are +conversant in them. + +(5) But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my part +cannot find any disgrace to learning can proceed from the manners of +learned men; not inherent to them as they are learned; except it be +a fault (which was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato +II., Seneca, and many more) that because the times they read of are +commonly better than the times they live in, and the duties taught +better than the duties practised, they contend sometimes too far to +bring things to perfection, and to reduce the corruption of manners +to honesty of precepts or examples of too great height. And yet +hereof they have caveats enough in their own walks. For Solon, when +he was asked whether he had given his citizens the best laws, +answered wisely, "Yea, of such as they would receive:" and Plato, +finding that his own heart could not agree with the corrupt manners +of his country, refused to bear place or office, saying, "That a +man's country was to be used as his parents were, that is, with +humble persuasions, and not with contestations." And Caesar's +counsellor put in the same caveat, Non ad vetera instituta revocans +quae jampridem corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt; and Cicero noteth +this error directly in Cato II. when he writes to his friend +Atticus, Cato optime sentit, sed nocet interdum reipublicae; +loquitur enim tanquam in republica Platonis, non tanquam in faece +Romuli. And the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the +philosophers for going too far and being too exact in their +prescripts when he saith, Isti ipse praeceptores virtutis et +magistri videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet +protulisse, ut cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus, ibi tamen, ubi +oportet, consisteremus: and yet himself might have said, Monitis +sum minor ipse meis; for it was his own fault, though not in so +extreme a degree. + +(6) Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been incident to +learned men, which is, that they have esteemed the preservation, +good, and honour of their countries or masters before their own +fortunes or safeties. For so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians: +"If it please you to note it, my counsels unto you are not such +whereby I should grow great amongst you, and you become little +amongst the Grecians; but they be of that nature as they are +sometimes not good for me to give, but are always good for you to +follow." And so Seneca, after he had consecrated that Quinquennium +Neronis to the eternal glory of learned governors, held on his +honest and loyal course of good and free counsel after his master +grew extremely corrupt in his government. Neither can this point +otherwise be, for learning endueth men's minds with a true sense of +the frailty of their persons, the casualty of their fortunes, and +the dignity of their soul and vocation, so that it is impossible for +them to esteem that any greatness of their own fortune can be a true +or worthy end of their being and ordainment, and therefore are +desirous to give their account to God, and so likewise to their +masters under God (as kings and the states that they serve) in those +words, Ecce tibi lucrefeci, and not Ecce mihi lucrefeci; whereas the +corrupter sort of mere politiques, that have not their thoughts +established by learning in the love and apprehension of duty, nor +never look abroad into universality, do refer all things to +themselves, and thrust themselves into the centre of the world, as +if all lines should meet in them and their fortunes, never caring in +all tempests what becomes of the ship of state, so they may save +themselves in the cockboat of their own fortune; whereas men that +feel the weight of duty and know the limits of self-love use to make +good their places and duties, though with peril; and if they stand +in seditious and violent alterations, it is rather the reverence +which many times both adverse parts do give to honesty, than any +versatile advantage of their own carriage. But for this point of +tender sense and fast obligation of duty which learning doth endue +the mind withal, howsoever fortune may tax it, and many in the depth +of their corrupt principles may despise it, yet it will receive an +open allowance, and therefore needs the less disproof or excuse. + +(7) Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may be +more properly defended than truly denied, is that they fail +sometimes in applying themselves to particular persons, which want +of exact application ariseth from two causes--the one, because the +largeness of their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the +exquisite observation or examination of the nature and customs of +one person, for it is a speech for a lover, and not for a wise man, +Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus. Nevertheless I shall +yield that he that cannot contract the sight of his mind as well as +disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But there is a +second cause, which is no inability, but a rejection upon choice and +judgment. For the honest and just bounds of observation by one +person upon another extend no further but to understand him +sufficiently, whereby not to give him offence, or whereby to be able +to give him faithful counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable +guard and caution in respect of a man's self. But to be speculative +into another man to the end to know how to work him, or wind him, or +govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven, and +not entire and ingenuous; which as in friendship it is want of +integrity, so towards princes or superiors is want of duty. For the +custom of the Levant, which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or +fix their eyes upon princes, is in the outward ceremony barbarous, +but the moral is good; for men ought not, by cunning and bent +observations, to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings, +which the Scripture hath declared to be inscrutable. + +(8) There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this +part) which is often noted in learned men, that they do many times +fail to observe decency and discretion in their behaviour and +carriage, and commit errors in small and ordinary points of action, +so as the vulgar sort of capacities do make a judgment of them in +greater matters by that which they find wanting in them in smaller. +But this consequence doth oft deceive men, for which I do refer them +over to that which was said by Themistocles, arrogantly and +uncivilly being applied to himself out of his own mouth, but, being +applied to the general state of this question, pertinently and +justly, when, being invited to touch a lute, he said, "He could not +fiddle, but he could make a small town a great state." So no doubt +many may be well seen in the passages of government and policy which +are to seek in little and punctual occasions. I refer them also to +that which Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he compared to +the gallipots of apothecaries, which on the outside had apes and +owls and antiques, but contained within sovereign and precious +liquors and confections; acknowledging that, to an external report, +he was not without superficial levities and deformities, but was +inwardly replenished with excellent virtues and powers. And so much +touching the point of manners of learned men. + +(9) But in the meantime I have no purpose to give allowance to some +conditions and courses base and unworthy, wherein divers professors +of learning have wronged themselves and gone too far; such as were +those trencher philosophers which in the later age of the Roman +state were usually in the houses of great persons, being little +better than solemn parasites, of which kind, Lucian maketh a merry +description of the philosopher that the great lady took to ride with +her in her coach, and would needs have him carry her little dog, +which he doing officiously and yet uncomely, the page scoffed and +said, "That he doubted the philosopher of a Stoic would turn to be a +Cynic." But, above all the rest, this gross and palpable flattery +whereunto many not unlearned have abased and abused their wits and +pens, turning (as Du Bartas saith) Hecuba into Helena, and Faustina +into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and estimation of +learning. Neither is the modern dedication of books and writings, +as to patrons, to be commended, for that books (such as are worthy +the name of books) ought to have no patrons but truth and reason. +And the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to private and +equal friends, or to entitle the books with their names; or if to +kings and great persons, it was to some such as the argument of the +book was fit and proper for; but these and the like courses may +deserve rather reprehension than defence. + +(10) Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or application +of learned men to men in fortune. For the answer was good that +Diogenes made to one that asked him in mockery, "How it came to pass +that philosophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men +of philosophers?" He answered soberly, and yet sharply, "Because +the one sort knew what they had need of, and the other did not." +And of the like nature was the answer which Aristippus made, when +having a petition to Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell +down at his feet, whereupon Dionysius stayed and gave him the +hearing, and granted it; and afterwards some person, tender on the +behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus that he would offer the +profession of philosophy such an indignity as for a private suit to +fall at a tyrant's feet; but he answered, "It was not his fault, but +it was the fault of Dionysius, that had his ears in his feet." +Neither was it accounted weakness, but discretion, in him that would +not dispute his best with Adrianus Caesar, excusing himself, "That +it was reason to yield to him that commanded thirty legions." These +and the like, applications, and stooping to points of necessity and +convenience, cannot be disallowed; for though they may have some +outward baseness, yet in a judgment truly made they are to be +accounted submissions to the occasion and not to the person. + +IV. (1) Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which have +intervened amongst the studies themselves of the learned, which is +that which is principal and proper to the present argument; wherein +my purpose is not to make a justification of the errors, but by a +censure and separation of the errors to make a justification of that +which is good and sound, and to deliver that from the aspersion of +the other. For we see that it is the manner of men to scandalise +and deprave that which retaineth the state and virtue, by taking +advantage upon that which is corrupt and degenerate, as the heathens +in the primitive Church used to blemish and taint the Christians +with the faults and corruptions of heretics. But nevertheless I +have no meaning at this time to make any exact animadversion of the +errors and impediments in matters of learning, which are more secret +and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto such as do +fall under or near unto a popular observation. + +(2) There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies, whereby +learning hath been most traduced. For those things we do esteem +vain which are either false or frivolous, those which either have no +truth or no use; and those persons we esteem vain which are either +credulous or curious; and curiosity is either in matter or words: +so that in reason as well as in experience there fall out to be +these three distempers (as I may term them) of learning--the first, +fantastical learning; the second, contentious learning; and the +last, delicate learning; vain imaginations, vain altercations, and +vain affectations; and with the last I will begin. Martin Luther, +conducted, no doubt, by a higher Providence, but in discourse of +reason, finding what a province he had undertaken against the Bishop +of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the Church, and finding his +own solitude, being in nowise aided by the opinions of his own time, +was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former times to his +succours to make a party against the present time. So that the +ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long +time slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved. +This, by consequence, did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite +travail in the languages original, wherein those authors did write, +for the better understanding of those authors, and the better +advantage of pressing and applying their words. And thereof grew, +again, a delight in their manner of style and phrase, and an +admiration of that kind of writing, which was much furthered and +precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the propounders of +those primitive but seeming new opinions had against the schoolmen, +who were generally of the contrary part, and whose writings were +altogether in a differing style and form; taking liberty to coin and +frame new terms of art to express their own sense, and to avoid +circuit of speech, without regard to the pureness, pleasantness, and +(as I may call it) lawfulness of the phrase or word. And again, +because the great labour then was with the people (of whom the +Pharisees were wont to say, Execrabilis ista turba, quae non novit +legem), for the winning and persuading of them, there grew of +necessity in chief price and request eloquence and variety of +discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access into the capacity of +the vulgar sort; so that these four causes concurring--the +admiration of ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen, the exact +study of languages, and the efficacy of preaching--did bring in an +affectionate study of eloquence and copy of speech, which then began +to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess; for men began to hunt +more after words than matter--more after the choiceness of the +phrase, and the round and clean composition of the sentence, and the +sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of +their works with tropes and figures, than after the weight of +matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, +or depth of judgment. Then grew the flowing and watery vein of +Osorius, the Portugal bishop, to be in price. Then did Sturmius +spend such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero the Orator and +Hermogenes the Rhetorician, besides his own books of Periods and +Imitation, and the like. Then did Car of Cambridge and Ascham with +their lectures and writings almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and +allure all young men that were studious unto that delicate and +polished kind of learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion to make +the scoffing echo, Decem annos consuumpsi in legendo Cicerone; and +the echo answered in Greek, One, Asine. Then grew the learning of +the schoolmen to be utterly despised as barbarous. In sum, the +whole inclination and bent of those times was rather towards copy +than weight. + +(3) Here therefore [is] the first distemper of learning, when men +study words and not matter; whereof, though I have represented an +example of late times, yet it hath been and will be secundum majus +et minus in all time. And how is it possible but this should have +an operation to discredit learning, even with vulgar capacities, +when they see learned men's works like the first letter of a patent +or limited book, which though it hath large flourishes, yet it is +but a letter? It seems to me that Pygmalion's frenzy is a good +emblem or portraiture of this vanity; for words are but the images +of matter, and except they have life of reason and invention, to +fall in love with them is all one as to fall in love with a picture. + +(4) But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be +condemned, to clothe and adorn the obscurity even of philosophy +itself with sensible and plausible elocution. For hereof we have +great examples in Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato +also in some degree; and hereof likewise there is great use, for +surely, to the severe inquisition of truth and the deep progress +into philosophy, it is some hindrance because it is too early +satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire of further +search before we come to a just period. But then if a man be to +have any use of such knowledge in civil occasions, of conference, +counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like, then shall he find it +prepared to his hands in those authors which write in that manner. +But the excess of this is so justly contemptible, that as Hercules, +when he saw the image of Adonis, Venus' minion, in a temple, said in +disdain, Nil sacri es; so there is none of Hercules' followers in +learning--that is, the more severe and laborious sort of inquirers +into truth--but will despise those delicacies and affectations, as +indeed capable of no divineness. And thus much of the first disease +or distemper of learning. + +(5) The second which followeth is in nature worse than the former: +for as substance of matter is better than beauty of words, so +contrariwise vain matter is worse than vain words: wherein it +seemeth the reprehension of St. Paul was not only proper for those +times, but prophetical for the times following; and not only +respective to divinity, but extensive to all knowledge: Devita +profanas vocum novitates, et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiae. +For he assigneth two marks and badges of suspected and falsified +science: the one, the novelty and strangeness of terms; the other, +the strictness of positions, which of necessity doth induce +oppositions, and so questions and altercations. Surely, like as +many substances in nature which are solid do putrefy and corrupt +into worms;--so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to +putrefy and dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and +(as I may term them) vermiculate questions, which have indeed a kind +of quickness and life of spirit, but no soundness of matter or +goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly +reign amongst the schoolmen, who having sharp and strong wits, and +abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading, but their wits +being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their +dictator) as their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries +and colleges, and knowing little history, either of nature or time, +did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit +spin out unto us those laborious webs of learning which are extant +in their books. For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon +matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh +according to the stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon +itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and +brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness +of thread and work, but of no substance or profit. + +(6) This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two sorts: +either in the subject itself that they handle, when it is a +fruitless speculation or controversy (whereof there are no small +number both in divinity and philosophy), or in the manner or method +of handling of a knowledge, which amongst them was this--upon every +particular position or assertion to frame objections, and to those +objections, solutions; which solutions were for the most part not +confutations, but distinctions: whereas indeed the strength of all +sciences is, as the strength of the old man's faggot, in the bond. +For the harmony of a science, supporting each part the other, is and +ought to be the true and brief confutation and suppression of all +the smaller sort of objections. But, on the other side, if you take +out every axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by one, you may +quarrel with them and bend them and break them at your pleasure: so +that, as was said of Seneca, Verborum minutiis rerum frangit +pondera, so a man may truly say of the schoolmen, Quaestionum +minutiis scientiarum frangunt soliditatem. For were it not better +for a man in fair room to set up one great light, or branching +candlestick of lights, than to go about with a small watch-candle +into every corner? And such is their method, that rests not so much +upon evidence of truth proved by arguments, authorities, +similitudes, examples, as upon particular confutations and solutions +of every scruple, cavillation, and objection; breeding for the most +part one question as fast as it solveth another; even as in the +former resemblance, when you carry the light into one corner, you +darken the rest; so that the fable and fiction of Scylla seemeth to +be a lively image of this kind of philosophy or knowledge; which was +transformed into a comely virgin for the upper parts; but then +Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris: so the +generalities of the schoolmen are for a while good and +proportionable; but then when you descend into their distinctions +and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb for the use and benefit of +man's life, they end in monstrous altercations and barking +questions. So as it is not possible but this quality of knowledge +must fall under popular contempt, the people being apt to contemn +truths upon occasion of controversies and altercations, and to think +they are all out of their way which never meet; and when they see +such digladiation about subtleties, and matters of no use or moment, +they easily fall upon that judgment of Dionysius of Syracusa, Verba +ista sunt senum otiosorum. + +(7) Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those schoolmen to their +great thirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit had joined +variety and universality of reading and contemplation, they had +proved excellent lights, to the great advancement of all learning +and knowledge; but as they are, they are great undertakers indeed, +and fierce with dark keeping. But as in the inquiry of the divine +truth, their pride inclined to leave the oracle of God's word, and +to vanish in the mixture of their own inventions; so in the +inquisition of nature, they ever left the oracle of God's works, and +adored the deceiving and deformed images which the unequal mirror of +their own minds, or a few received authors or principles, did +represent unto them. And thus much for the second disease of +learning. + +(8) For the third vice or disease of learning, which concerneth +deceit or untruth, it is of all the rest the foulest; as that which +doth destroy the essential form of knowledge, which is nothing but a +representation of truth: for the truth of being and the truth of +knowing are one, differing no more than the direct beam and the beam +reflected. This vice therefore brancheth itself into two sorts; +delight in deceiving and aptness to be deceived; imposture and +credulity; which, although they appear to be of a diverse nature, +the one seeming to proceed of cunning and the other of simplicity, +yet certainly they do for the most part concur: for, as the verse +noteth - + + +"Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est," + + +an inquisitive man is a prattler; so upon the like reason a +credulous man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he that +will easily believe rumours will as easily augment rumours and add +somewhat to them of his own; which Tacitus wisely noteth, when he +saith, Fingunt simul creduntque: so great an affinity hath fiction +and belief. + +(9) This facility of credit and accepting or admitting things weakly +authorised or warranted is of two kinds according to the subject: +for it is either a belief of history, or, as the lawyers speak, +matter of fact; or else of matter of art and opinion. As to the +former, we see the experience and inconvenience of this error in +ecclesiastical history; which hath too easily received and +registered reports and narrations of miracles wrought by martyrs, +hermits, or monks of the desert, and other holy men, and their +relics, shrines, chapels and images: which though they had a +passage for a time by the ignorance of the people, the superstitious +simplicity of some and the politic toleration of others holding them +but as divine poesies, yet after a period of time, when the mist +began to clear up, they grew to be esteemed but as old wives' +fables, impostures of the clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges +of Antichrist, to the great scandal and detriment of religion. + +(10) So in natural history, we see there hath not been that choice +and judgment used as ought to have been; as may appear in the +writings of Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and divers of the Arabians, +being fraught with much fabulous matter, a great part not only +untried, but notoriously untrue, to the great derogation of the +credit of natural philosophy with the grave and sober kind of wits: +wherein the wisdom and integrity of Aristotle is worthy to be +observed, that, having made so diligent and exquisite a history of +living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any vain or feigned +matter; and yet on the other side hath cast all prodigious +narrations, which he thought worthy the recording, into one book, +excellently discerning that matter of manifest truth, such whereupon +observation and rule was to be built, was not to be mingled or +weakened with matter of doubtful credit; and yet again, that +rarities and reports that seem uncredible are not to be suppressed +or denied to the memory of men. + +(11) And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to arts and +opinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when too much belief +is attributed to the arts themselves, or to certain authors in any +art. The sciences themselves, which have had better intelligence +and confederacy with the imagination of man than with his reason, +are three in number: astrology, natural magic, and alchemy; of +which sciences, nevertheless, the ends or pretences are noble. For +astrology pretendeth to discover that correspondence or +concatenation which is between the superior globe and the inferior; +natural magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural philosophy from +variety of speculations to the magnitude of works; and alchemy +pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts of bodies +which in mixtures of natures are incorporate. But the derivations +and prosecutions to these ends, both in the theories and in the +practices, are full of error and vanity; which the great professors +themselves have sought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical +writings, and referring themselves to auricular traditions and such +other devices, to save the credit of impostures. And yet surely to +alchemy this right is due, that it may be compared to the husbandman +whereof AEsop makes the fable; that, when he died, told his sons +that he had left unto them gold buried underground in his vineyard; +and they digged over all the ground, and gold they found none; but +by reason of their stirring and digging the mould about the roots of +their vines, they had a great vintage the year following: so +assuredly the search and stir to make gold hath brought to light a +great number of good and fruitful inventions and experiments, as +well for the disclosing of nature as for the use of man's life. + +(12) And as for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto +authors in sciences, in making them dictators, that their words +should stand, and not consuls, to give advice; the damage is +infinite that sciences have received thereby, as the principal cause +that hath kept them low at a stay without growth or advancement. +For hence it hath come, that in arts mechanical the first deviser +comes shortest, and time addeth and perfecteth; but in sciences the +first author goeth furthest, and time leeseth and corrupteth. So we +see artillery, sailing, printing, and the like, were grossly managed +at the first, and by time accommodated and refined; but +contrariwise, the philosophies and sciences of Aristotle, Plato, +Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour at the +first, and by time degenerate and imbased: whereof the reason is no +other, but that in the former many wits and industries have +contributed in one; and in the latter many wits and industries have +been spent about the wit of some one, whom many times they have +rather depraved than illustrated; for, as water will not ascend +higher than the level of the first spring-head from whence it +descendeth, so knowledge derived from Aristotle, and exempted from +liberty of examination, will not rise again higher than the +knowledge of Aristotle. And, therefore, although the position be +good, Oportet discentem credere, yet it must be coupled with this, +Oportet edoctum judicare; for disciples do owe unto masters only a +temporary belief and a suspension of their own judgment till they be +fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation or perpetual +captivity; and therefore, to conclude this point, I will say no +more, but so let great authors have their due, as time, which is the +author of authors, be not deprived of his due--which is, further and +further to discover truth. Thus have I gone over these three +diseases of learning; besides the which there are some other rather +peccant humours than formed diseases, which, nevertheless, are not +so secret and intrinsic, but that they fall under a popular +observation and traducement, and, therefore, are not to be passed +over. + +V. (1) The first of these is the extreme affecting of two +extremities: the one antiquity, the other novelty; wherein it +seemeth the children of time do take after the nature and malice of +the father. For as he devoureth his children, so one of them +seeketh to devour and suppress the other; while antiquity envieth +there should be new additions, and novelty cannot be content to add +but it must deface; surely the advice of the prophet is the true +direction in this matter, State super vias antiquas, et videte +quaenam sit via recta et bona et ambulate in ea. Antiquity +deserveth that reverence, that men should make a stand thereupon and +discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well taken, +then to make progression. And to speak truly, Antiquitas saeculi +juventus mundi. These times are the ancient times, when the world +is ancient, and not those which we account ancient ordine +retrogrado, by a computation backward from ourselves. + +(2) Another error induced by the former is a distrust that anything +should be now to be found out, which the world should have missed +and passed over so long time: as if the same objection were to be +made to time that Lucian maketh to Jupiter and other the heathen +gods; of which he wondereth that they begot so many children in old +time, and begot none in his time; and asketh whether they were +become septuagenary, or whether the law Papia, made against old +men's marriages, had restrained them. So it seemeth men doubt lest +time is become past children and generation; wherein contrariwise we +see commonly the levity and unconstancy of men's judgments, which, +till a matter be done, wonder that it can be done; and as soon as it +is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done: as we see in the +expedition of Alexander into Asia, which at first was prejudged as a +vast and impossible enterprise; and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy +to make no more of it than this, Nil aliud quam bene ausus vana +contemnere. And the same happened to Columbus in the western +navigation. But in intellectual matters it is much more common, as +may be seen in most of the propositions of Euclid; which till they +be demonstrate, they seem strange to our assent; but being +demonstrate, our mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as +the lawyers speak), as if we had known them before. + +(3) Another error, that hath also some affinity with the former, is +a conceit that of former opinions or sects after variety and +examination the best hath still prevailed and suppressed the rest; +so as if a man should begin the labour of a new search, he were but +like to light upon somewhat formerly rejected, and by rejection +brought into oblivion; as if the multitude, or the wisest for the +multitude's sake, were not ready to give passage rather to that +which is popular and superficial than to that which is substantial +and profound for the truth is, that time seemeth to be of the nature +of a river or stream, which carrieth down to us that which is light +and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and +solid. + +(4) Another error, of a diverse nature from all the former, is the +over-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and +methods; from which time commonly sciences receive small or no +augmentation. But as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, +do seldom grow to a further stature, so knowledge, while it is in +aphorisms and observations, it is in growth; but when it once is +comprehended in exact methods, it may, perchance, be further +polished, and illustrate and accommodated for use and practice, but +it increaseth no more in bulk and substance. + +(5) Another error which doth succeed that which we last mentioned +is, that after the distribution of particular arts and sciences, men +have abandoned universality, or philosophia prima, which cannot but +cease and stop all progression. For no perfect discovery can be +made upon a flat or a level; neither is it possible to discover the +more remote and deeper parts of any science if you stand but upon +the level of the same science, and ascend not to a higher science. + +(6) Another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence, and a +kind of adoration of the mind and understanding of man; by means +whereof, men have withdrawn themselves too much from the +contemplation of nature, and the observations of experience, and +have tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceits. Upon +these intellectualists, which are notwithstanding commonly taken for +the most sublime and divine philosophers, Heraclitus gave a just +censure, saying: --"Men sought truth in their own little worlds, and +not in the great and common world;" for they disdain to spell, and +so by degrees to read in the volume of God's works; and contrariwise +by continual meditation and agitation of wit do urge and, as it +were, invocate their own spirits to divine and give oracles unto +them, whereby they are deservedly deluded. + +(7) Another error that hath some connection with this latter is, +that men have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and +doctrines with some conceits which they have most admired, or some +sciences which they have most applied, and given all things else a +tincture according to them, utterly untrue and improper. So hath +Plato intermingled his philosophy with theology, and Aristotle with +logic; and the second school of Plato, Proclus and the rest, with +the mathematics; for these were the arts which had a kind of +primogeniture with them severally. So have the alchemists made a +philosophy out of a few experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus +our countryman hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a +loadstone. So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of the +nature of the soul, he found a musician that held the soul was but a +harmony, saith pleasantly, Hic ab arte sua non recessit, &c. But of +these conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely when he +saith, Qui respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant. + +(8) Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to assertion +without due and mature suspension of judgment. For the two ways of +contemplation are not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken +of by the ancients: the one plain and smooth in the beginning, and +in the end impassable; the other rough and troublesome in the +entrance, but after a while fair and even. So it is in +contemplation: if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end +in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall +end in certainties. + +(9) Another error is in the manner of the tradition and delivery of +knowledge, which is for the most part magistral and peremptory, and +not ingenuous and faithful; in a sort as may be soonest believed, +and not easiest examined. It is true, that in compendious treatises +for practice that form is not to be disallowed; but in the true +handling of knowledge men ought not to fall either on the one side +into the vein of Velleius the Epicurean, Nil tam metuens quam ne +dubitare aliqua de revideretur: nor, on the other side, into +Socrates, his ironical doubting of all things; but to propound +things sincerely with more or less asseveration, as they stand in a +man's own judgment proved more or less. + +(10) Other errors there are in the scope that men propound to +themselves, whereunto they bend their endeavours; for, whereas the +more constant and devote kind of professors of any science ought to +propound to themselves to make some additions to their science, they +convert their labours to aspire to certain second prizes: as to be +a profound interpreter or commentor, to be a sharp champion or +defender, to be a methodical compounder or abridger, and so the +patrimony of knowledge cometh to be sometimes improved, but seldom +augmented. + +(11) But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or +misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge. For men have +entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes upon a +natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain +their minds with variety and delight; sometimes for ornament and +reputation; and sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and +contradiction; and most times for lucre and profession; and seldom +sincerely to give a true account of their gift of reason to the +benefit and use of men: as if there were sought in knowledge a +couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit; or a +terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a +fair prospect; or a tower of state, for a proud mind to raise itself +upon; or a fort or commanding ground, for strife and contention; or +a shop, for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory +of the Creator and the relief of man's estate. But this is that +which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and +action may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and united together +than they have been: a conjunction like unto that of the two +highest planets, Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation; and +Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action, howbeit, I do not +mean, when I speak of use and action, that end before-mentioned of +the applying of knowledge to lucre and profession; for I am not +ignorant how much that diverteth and interrupteth the prosecution +and advancement of knowledge, like unto the golden ball thrown +before Atalanta, which, while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take +up, the race is hindered, + + +"Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit." {1} + + +Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call philosophy +down from heaven to converse upon the earth--that is, to leave +natural philosophy aside, and to apply knowledge only to manners and +policy. But as both heaven and earth do conspire and contribute to +the use and benefit of man, so the end ought to be, from both +philosophies to separate and reject vain speculations, and +whatsoever is empty and void, and to preserve and augment whatsoever +is solid and fruitful; that knowledge may not be as a courtesan, for +pleasure and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire and gain to +her master's use; but as a spouse, for generation, fruit, and +comfort. + +(12) Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of dissection, +those peccant humours (the principal of them) which have not only +given impediment to the proficience of learning, but have given also +occasion to the traducement thereof: wherein, if I have been too +plain, it must be remembered, fidelia vulnera amantis, sed dolosa +oscula malignantis. This I think I have gained, that I ought to be +the better believed in that which I shall say pertaining to +commendation; because I have proceeded so freely in that which +concerneth censure. And yet I have no purpose to enter into a +laudative of learning, or to make a hymn to the Muses (though I am +of opinion that it is long since their rites were duly celebrated), +but my intent is, without varnish or amplification justly to weigh +the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other things, and to +take the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments, divine and +human. + +VI. (1) First, therefore, let us seek the dignity of knowledge in +the archetype or first platform, which is in the attributes and acts +of God, as far as they are revealed to man and may be observed with +sobriety; wherein we may not seek it by the name of learning, for +all learning is knowledge acquired, and all knowledge in God is +original, and therefore we must look for it by another name, that of +wisdom or sapience, as the Scriptures call it. + +(2) It is so, then, that in the work of the creation we see a double +emanation of virtue from God; the one referring more properly to +power, the other to wisdom; the one expressed in making the +subsistence of the matter, and the other in disposing the beauty of +the form. This being supposed, it is to be observed that for +anything which appeareth in the history of the creation, the +confused mass and matter of heaven and earth was made in a moment, +and the order and disposition of that chaos or mass was the work of +six days; such a note of difference it pleased God to put upon the +works of power, and the works of wisdom; wherewith concurreth, that +in the former it is not set down that God said, "Let there be heaven +and earth," as it is set down of the works following; but actually, +that God made heaven and earth: the one carrying the style of a +manufacture, and the other of a law, decree, or counsel. + +(3) To proceed, to that which is next in order from God, to spirits: +we find, as far as credit is to be given to the celestial hierarchy +of that supposed Dionysius, the senator of Athens, the first place +or degree is given to the angels of love, which are termed seraphim; +the second to the angels of light, which are termed cherubim; and +the third, and so following places, to thrones, principalities, and +the rest, which are all angels of power and ministry; so as this +angels of knowledge and illumination are placed before the angels of +office and domination. + +(4) To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to sensible and +material forms, we read the first form that was created was light, +which hath a relation and correspondence in nature and corporal +things to knowledge in spirits and incorporal things. + +(5) So in the distribution of days we see the day wherein God did +rest and contemplate His own works was blessed above all the days +wherein He did effect and accomplish them. + +(6) After the creation was finished, it is set down unto us that man +was placed in the garden to work therein; which work, so appointed +to him, could be no other than work of contemplation; that is, when +the end of work is but for exercise and experiment, not for +necessity; for there being then no reluctation of the creature, nor +sweat of the brow, man's employment must of consequence have been +matter of delight in the experiment, and not matter of labour for +the use. Again, the first acts which man performed in Paradise +consisted of the two summary parts of knowledge; the view of +creatures, and the imposition of names. As for the knowledge which +induced the fall, it was, as was touched before, not the natural +knowledge of creatures, but the moral knowledge of good and evil; +wherein the supposition was, that God's commandments or prohibitions +were not the originals of good and evil, but that they had other +beginnings, which man aspired to know, to the end to make a total +defection from God and to depend wholly upon himself. + +(7) To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after the fall of +man, we see (as the Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not +violating at all the truth of this story or letter) an image of the +two estates, the contemplative state and the active state, figured +in the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in the two simplest and +most primitive trades of life; that of the shepherd (who, by reason +of his leisure, rest in a place, and lying in view of heaven, is a +lively image of a contemplative life), and that of the husbandman, +where we see again the favour and election of God went to the +shepherd, and not to the tiller of the ground. + +(8) So in the age before the flood, the holy records within those +few memorials which are there entered and registered have vouchsafed +to mention and honour the name of the inventors and authors of music +and works in metal. In the age after the flood, the first great +judgment of God upon the ambition of man was the confusion of +tongues; whereby the open trade and intercourse of learning and +knowledge was chiefly imbarred. + +(9) To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God's first pen: he is +adorned by the Scriptures with this addition and commendation, "That +he was seen in all the learning of the Egyptians," which nation we +know was one of the most ancient schools of the world: for so Plato +brings in the Egyptian priest saying unto Solon, "You Grecians are +ever children; you have no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of +knowledge." Take a view of the ceremonial law of Moses; you shall +find, besides the prefiguration of Christ, the badge or difference +of the people of God, the exercise and impression of obedience, and +other divine uses and fruits thereof, that some of the most learned +Rabbins have travailed profitably and profoundly to observe, some of +them a natural, some of them a moral sense, or reduction of many of +the ceremonies and ordinances. As in the law of the leprosy, where +it is said, "If the whiteness have overspread the flesh, the patient +may pass abroad for clean; but if there be any whole flesh +remaining, he is to be shut up for unclean;" one of them noteth a +principle of nature, that putrefaction is more contagious before +maturity than after; and another noteth a position of moral +philosophy, that men abandoned to vice do not so much corrupt +manners, as those that are half good and half evil. So in this and +very many other places in that law, there is to be found, besides +the theological sense, much aspersion of philosophy. + +(10) So likewise in that excellent hook of Job, if it be revolved +with diligence, it will be found pregnant and swelling with natural +philosophy; as for example, cosmography, and the roundness of the +world, Qui extendit aquilonem super vacuum, et appendit terram super +nihilum; wherein the pensileness of the earth, the pole of the +north, and the finiteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly +touched. So again, matter of astronomy: Spiritus ejus ornavit +caelos, et obstetricante manu ejus eductus est Coluber tortuoses. +And in another place, Nunquid conjungere valebis micantes stellas +Pleiadas, aut gyrum Arcturi poteris dissipare? Where the fixing of +the stars, ever standing at equal distance, is with great elegancy +noted. And in another place, Qui facit Arcturum, et Oriona, et +Hyadas, et interiora Austri; where again he takes knowledge of the +depression of the southern pole, calling it the secrets of the +south, because the southern stars were in that climate unseen. +Matter of generation: Annon sicut lac mulsisti me, et sicut caseum +coagulasti me? &c. Matter of minerals: Habet argentum venarum +suarum principia; et auro locus est in quo conflatur, ferrum de +terra tollitur, et lapis solutus calore in aes vertitur; and so +forwards in that chapter. + +(11) So likewise in the person of Solomon the king, we see the gift +or endowment of wisdom and learning, both in Solomon's petition and +in God's assent thereunto, preferred before all other terrene and +temporal felicity. By virtue of which grant or donative of God +Solomon became enabled not only to write those excellent parables or +aphorisms concerning divine and moral philosophy, but also to +compile a natural history of all verdure, from the cedar upon the +mountain to the moss upon the wall (which is but a rudiment between +putrefaction and an herb), and also of all things that breathe or +move. Nay, the same Solomon the king, although he excelled in the +glory of treasure and magnificent buildings, of shipping and +navigation, of service and attendance, of fame and renown, and the +like, yet he maketh no claim to any of those glories, but only to +the glory of inquisition of truth; for so he saith expressly, "The +glory of God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the king is to +find it out;" as if, according to the innocent play of children, the +Divine Majesty took delight to hide His works, to the end to have +them found out; and as if kings could not obtain a greater honour +than to be God's playfellows in that game; considering the great +commandment of wits and means, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden +from them. + +(12) Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times after our +Saviour came into the world; for our Saviour himself did first show +His power to subdue ignorance, by His conference with the priests +and doctors of the law, before He showed His power to subdue nature +by His miracles. And the coming of this Holy Spirit was chiefly +figured and expressed in the similitude and gift of tongues, which +are but vehicula scientiae. + +(13) So in the election of those instruments, which it pleased God +to use for the plantation of the faith, notwithstanding that at the +first He did employ persons altogether unlearned, otherwise than by +inspiration, more evidently to declare His immediate working, and to +abase all human wisdom or knowledge; yet nevertheless that counsel +of His was no sooner performed, but in the next vicissitude and +succession He did send His divine truth into the world, waited on +with other learnings, as with servants or handmaids: for so we see +St. Paul, who was only learned amongst the Apostles, had his pen +most used in the Scriptures of the New Testament. + +(14) So again we find that many of the ancient bishops and fathers +of the Church were excellently read and studied in all the learning +of this heathen; insomuch that the edict of the Emperor Julianus +(whereby it was interdicted unto Christians to be admitted into +schools, lectures, or exercises of learning) was esteemed and +accounted a more pernicious engine and machination against the +Christian Faith than were all the sanguinary prosecutions of his +predecessors; neither could the emulation and jealousy of Gregory, +the first of that name, Bishop of Rome, ever obtain the opinion of +piety or devotion; but contrariwise received the censure of humour, +malignity, and pusillanimity, even amongst holy men; in that he +designed to obliterate and extinguish the memory of heathen +antiquity and authors. But contrariwise it was the Christian +Church, which, amidst the inundations of the Scythians on the one +side from the north-west, and the Saracens from the east, did +preserve in the sacred lap and bosom thereof the precious relics +even of heathen learning, which otherwise had been extinguished, as +if no such thing had ever been. + +(15) And we see before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves and +our fathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of Rome to +account for their degenerate manners and ceremonies, and sundry +doctrines obnoxious and framed to uphold the same abuses; at one and +the same time it was ordained by the Divine Providence that there +should attend withal a renovation and new spring of all other +knowledges. And on the other side we see the Jesuits, who partly in +themselves, and partly by the emulation and provocation of their +example, have much quickened and strengthened the state of learning; +we see (I say) what notable service and reparation they have done to +the Roman see. + +(16) Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed, that +there be two principal duties and services, besides ornament and +illustration, which philosophy and human learning do perform to +faith and religion. The one, because they are an effectual +inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God. For as the Psalms +and other Scriptures do often invite us to consider and magnify the +great and wonderful works of God, so if we should rest only in the +contemplation of the exterior of them as they first offer themselves +to our senses, we should do a like injury unto the majesty of God, +as if we should judge or construe of the store of some excellent +jeweller by that only which is set out toward the street in his +shop. The other, because they minister a singular help and +preservative against unbelief and error. For our Saviour saith, +"You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God;" laying +before us two books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from +error: first the Scriptures, revealing the will of God, and then +the creatures expressing His power; whereof the latter is a key unto +the former: not only opening our understanding to conceive the true +sense of the Scriptures by the general notions of reason and rules +of speech, but chiefly opening our belief, in drawing us into a due +meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is chiefly signed and +engraven upon His works. Thus much therefore for divine testimony +and evidence concerning the true dignity and value of learning. + +VII. (1) As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a +discourse of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to use choice +of those things which we shall produce, than to embrace the variety +of them. First, therefore, in the degrees of human honour amongst +the heathen, it was the highest to obtain to a veneration and +adoration as a God. This unto the Christians is as the forbidden +fruit. But we speak now separately of human testimony, according to +which--that which the Grecians call apotheosis, and the Latins +relatio inter divos--was the supreme honour which man could +attribute unto man, specially when it was given, not by a formal +decree or act of state (as it was used among the Roman Emperors), +but by an inward assent and belief. Which honour, being so high, +had also a degree or middle term; for there were reckoned above +human honours, honours heroical and divine: in the attribution and +distribution of which honours we see antiquity made this difference; +that whereas founders and uniters of states and cities, lawgivers, +extirpers of tyrants, fathers of the people, and other eminent +persons in civil merit, were honoured but with the titles of +worthies or demigods, such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minus, +Romulus, and the like; on the other side, such as were inventors and +authors of new arts, endowments, and commodities towards man's life, +were ever consecrated amongst the gods themselves, as was Ceres, +Bacchus, Mercurius, Apollo, and others. And justly; for the merit +of the former is confined within the circle of an age or a nation, +and is like fruitful showers, which though they be profitable and +good, yet serve but for that season, and for a latitude of ground +where they fall; but the other is, indeed, like the benefits of +heaven, which are permanent and universal. The former again is +mixed with strife and perturbation, but the latter hath the true +character of Divine Presence, coming in aura leni, without noise or +agitation. + +(2) Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing +the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the +former, of relieving the necessities which arise from nature, which +merit was lively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation +of Orpheus' theatre, where all beasts and birds assembled, and, +forgetting their several appetites--some of prey, some of game, some +of quarrel--stood all sociably together listening unto the airs and +accords of the harp, the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was +drowned by some louder noise, but every beast returned to his own +nature; wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men, +who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires, of profit, of lust, +of revenge; which as long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to +religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of +sermons, of harangues, so long is society and peace maintained; but +if these instruments be silent, or that sedition and tumult make +them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion. + +(3) But this appeareth more manifestly when kings themselves, or +persons of authority under them, or other governors in commonwealths +and popular estates, are endued with learning. For although he +might be thought partial to his own profession that said "Then +should people and estates be happy when either kings were +philosophers, or philosophers kings;" yet so much is verified by +experience, that under learned princes and governors there have been +ever the best times: for howsoever kings may have their +imperfections in their passions and customs, yet, if they be +illuminate by learning, they have those notions of religion, policy, +and morality, which do preserve them and refrain them from all +ruinous and peremptory errors and excesses, whispering evermore in +their ears, when counsellors and servants stand mute and silent. +And senators or counsellors, likewise, which be learned, to proceed +upon more safe and substantial principles, than counsellors which +are only men of experience; the one sort keeping dangers afar off, +whereas the other discover them not till they come near hand, and +then trust to the agility of their wit to ward or avoid them. + + (4) Which felicity of times under learned princes (to keep still +the law of brevity, by using the most eminent and selected examples) +doth best appear in the age which passed from the death of +Domitianus the emperor until the reign of Commodus; comprehending a +succession of six princes, all learned, or singular favourers and +advancers of learning, which age for temporal respects was the most +happy and flourishing that ever the Roman Empire (which then was a +model of the world) enjoyed--a matter revealed and prefigured unto +Domitian in a dream the night before he was slain: for he thought +there was grown behind upon his shoulders a neck and a head of gold, +which came accordingly to pass in those golden times which +succeeded; of which princes we will make some commemoration; +wherein, although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought +fitter for a declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded as +this is, yet, because it is pertinent to the point in hand--Neque +semper arcum tendit Apollo--and to name them only were too naked and +cursory, I will not omit it altogether. The first was Nerva, the +excellent temper of whose government is by a glance in Cornelius +Tacitus touched to the life: Postquam divus Nerva res oluim +insociabiles miscuisset, imperium et libertatem. And in token of +his learning, the last act of his short reign left to memory was a +missive to his adopted son, Trajan, proceeding upon some inward +discontent at the ingratitude of the times, comprehended in a verse +of Homer's - + + +"Telis, Phoebe, tuis, lacrymas ulciscere nostras." + + +(5) Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not learned; but if we +will hearken to the speech of our Saviour, that saith, "He that +receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall have a prophet's +reward," he deserveth to be placed amongst the most learned princes; +for there was not a greater admirer of learning or benefactor of +learning, a founder of famous libraries, a perpetual advancer of +learned men to office, and familiar converser with learned +professors and preceptors who were noted to have then most credit in +court. On the other side how much Trajan's virtue and government +was admired and renowned, surely no testimony of grave and faithful +history doth more lively set forth than that legend tale of +Gregorius Magnum, Bishop of Rome, who was noted for the extreme envy +he bare towards all heathen excellency; and yet he is reported, out +of the love and estimation of Trajan's moral virtues, to have made +unto God passionate and fervent prayers for the delivery of his soul +out of hell, and to have obtained it, with a caveat that he should +make no more such petitions. In this prince's time also the +persecutions against the Christians received intermission upon the +certificate of Plinius Secundus, a man of excellent learning and by +Trajan advanced. + +(6) Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that lived, and +the most universal inquirer: insomuch as it was noted for an error +in his mind that he desired to comprehend all things, and not to +reserve himself for the worthiest things, falling into the like +humour that was long before noted in Philip of Macedon, who, when he +would needs overrule and put down an excellent musician in an +argument touching music, was well answered by him again--"God +forbid, sir," saith he, "that your fortune should be so bad as to +know these things better than I." It pleased God likewise to use +the curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the peace of His +Church in those days; for having Christ in veneration, not as a God +or Saviour, but as a wonder or novelty, and having his picture in +his gallery matched with Apollonius (with whom in his vain +imagination he thought its had some conformity), yet it served the +turn to allay the bitter hatred of those times against the Christian +name, so as the Church had peace during his time. And for his +government civil, although he did not attain to that of Trajan's in +glory of arms or perfection of justice, yet in deserving of the weal +of the subject he did exceed him. For Trajan erected many famous +monuments and buildings, insomuch as Constantine the Great in +emulation was wont to call him Parietaria, "wall-flower," because +his name was upon so many walls; but his buildings and works were +more of glory and triumph than use and necessity. But Adrian spent +his whole reign, which was peaceable, in a perambulation or survey +of the Roman Empire, giving order and making assignation where he +went for re-edifying of cities, towns, and forts decayed, and for +cutting of rivers and streams, and for making bridges and passages, +and for policing of cities and commonalties with new ordinances and +constitutions, and granting new franchises and incorporations; so +that his whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses and +decays of former times. + +(7) Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince excellently +learned, and had the patient and subtle wit of a schoolman, insomuch +as in common speech (which leaves no virtue untaxed) he was called +Cymini Sector, a carver or a divider of cummin seed, which is one of +the least seeds. Such a patience he had and settled spirit to enter +into the least and most exact differences of causes, a fruit no +doubt of the exceeding tranquillity and serenity of his mind, which +being no ways charged or encumbered, either with fears, remorses, or +scruples, but having been noted for a man of the purest goodness, +without all fiction or affectation, that hath reigned or lived, made +his mind continually present and entire. He likewise approached a +degree nearer unto Christianity, and became, as Agrippa said unto +St. Paul, "half a Christian," holding their religion and law in good +opinion, and not only ceasing persecution, but giving way to the +advancement of Christians. + +(5) There succeeded him the first Divi fratres, the two adoptive +brethren--Lucius Commodus Verus, son to AElius Verus, who delighted +much in the softer kind of learning, and was wont to call the poet +Martial his Virgil; and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: whereof the +latter, who obscured his colleague and survived him long, was named +the "Philosopher," who, as he excelled all the rest in learning, so +he excelled them likewise in perfection of all royal virtues; +insomuch as Julianus the emperor, in his book entitled Caersares, +being as a pasquil or satire to deride all his predecessors, feigned +that they were all invited to a banquet of the gods, and Silenus the +jester sat at the nether end of the table and bestowed a scoff on +everyone as they came in; but when Marcus Philosophus came in, +Silenus was gravelled and out of countenance, not knowing where to +carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance at his patience +towards his wife. And the virtue of this prince, continued with +that of his predecessor, made the name of Antoninus so sacred in the +world, that though it were extremely dishonoured in Commodus, +Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bare the name, yet, when +Alexander Severus refused the name because he was a stranger to the +family, the Senate with one acclamation said, Quomodo Augustus, sic +et Antoninus. In such renown and veneration was the name of these +two princes in those days, that they would have had it as a +perpetual addition in all the emperors' style. In this emperor's +time also the Church for the most part was in peace; so as in this +sequence of six princes we do see the blessed effects of learning in +sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest table of the world. + +(9) But for a tablet or picture of smaller volume (not presuming to +speak of your Majesty that liveth), in my judgment the most +excellent is that of Queen Elizabeth, your immediate predecessor in +this part of Britain; a prince that, if Plutarch were now alive to +write lives by parallels, would trouble him, I think, to find for +her a parallel amongst women. This lady was endued with learning in +her sex singular, and rare even amongst masculine princes--whether +we speak of learning, of language, or of science, modern or ancient, +divinity or humanity--and unto the very last year of her life she +accustomed to appoint set hours for reading, scarcely any young +student in a university more daily or more duly. As for her +government, I assure myself (I shall not exceed if I do affirm) that +this part of the island never had forty-five years of better tines, +and yet not through the calmness of the season, but through the +wisdom of her regiment. For if there be considered, of the one +side, the truth of religion established, the constant peace and +security, the good administration of justice, the temperate use of +the prerogative, not slackened, nor much strained; the flourishing +state of learning, sortable to so excellent a patroness; the +convenient estate of wealth and means, both of crown and subject; +the habit of obedience, and the moderation of discontents; and there +be considered, on the other side, the differences of religion, the +troubles of neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain, and +opposition of Rome, and then that she was solitary and of herself; +these things, I say, considered, as I could not have chosen an +instance so recent and so proper, so I suppose I could not have +chosen one more remarkable or eminent to the purpose now in hand, +which is concerning the conjunction of learning in the prince with +felicity in the people. + +(10) Neither hath learning an influence and operation only upon +civil merit and moral virtue, and the arts or temperature of peace +and peaceable government; but likewise it hath no less power and +efficacy in enablement towards martial and military virtue and +prowess, as may be notably represented in the examples of Alexander +the Great and Caesar the Dictator (mentioned before, but now in fit +place to be resumed), of whose virtues and acts in war there needs +no note or recital, having been the wonders of time in that kind; +but of their affections towards learning and perfections in learning +it is pertinent to say somewhat. + +(11) Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle, the great +philosopher, who dedicated divers of his books of philosophy unto +him; he was attended with Callisthenes and divers other learned +persons, that followed him in camp, throughout his journeys and +conquests. What price and estimation he had learning in doth +notably appear in these three particulars: first, in the envy he +used to express that he bare towards Achilles, in this, that he had +so good a trumpet of his praises as Homer's verses; secondly, in the +judgment or solution he gave touching that precious cabinet of +Darius, which was found among his jewels (whereof question was made +what thing was worthy to be put into it, and he gave his opinion for +Homer's works); thirdly, in his letter to Aristotle, after he had +set forth his books of nature, wherein he expostulateth with him for +publishing the secrets or mysteries of philosophy; and gave him to +understand that himself esteemed it more to excel other men in +learning and knowledge than in power and empire. And what use he +had of learning doth appear, or rather shine, in all his speeches +and answers, being full of science and use of science, and that in +all variety. + +(12) And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and somewhat +idle to recite things that every man knoweth; but yet, since the +argument I handle leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that men shall +perceive I am as willing to flatter (if they will so call it) an +Alexander, or a Caesar, or an Antoninus, that are dead many hundred +years since, as any that now liveth; for it is the displaying of the +glory of learning in sovereignty that I propound to myself, and not +a humour of declaiming in any man's praises. Observe, then, the +speech he used of Diogenes, and see if it tend not to the true state +of one of the greatest questions of moral philosophy: whether the +enjoying of outward things, or the contemning of them, be the +greatest happiness; for when he saw Diogenes so perfectly contented +with so little, he said to those that mocked at his condition, "were +I not Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes." But Seneca inverteth +it, and saith, "Plus erat, quod hic nollet accipere, quam quod ille +posset dare." There were more things which Diogenes would have +refused than those were which Alexander could have given or enjoyed. + +(13) Observe, again, that speech which was usual with him,--"That he +felt his mortality chiefly in two things, sleep and lust;" and see +if it were not a speech extracted out of the depth of natural +philosophy, and liker to have come out of the mouth of Aristotle or +Democritus than from Alexander. + +(14) See, again, that speech of humanity and poesy, when, upon the +bleeding of his wounds, he called unto him one of his flatterers, +that was wont to ascribe to him divine honour, and said, "Look, this +is very blood; this is not such a liquor as Homer speaketh of, which +ran from Venus' hand when it was pierced by Diomedes." + +(15) See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic in the +speech he used to Cassander, upon a complaint that was made against +his father Antipater; for when Alexander happened to say, "Do you +think these men would have come from so far to complain except they +had just cause of grief?" and Cassander answered, "Yea, that was the +matter, because they thought they should not be disproved;" said +Alexander, laughing, "See the subtleties of Aristotle, to take a +matter both ways, pro et contra, &c." + +(16) But note, again, how well he could use the same art which he +reprehended to serve his own humour: when bearing a secret grudge +to Callisthenes, because he was against the new ceremony of his +adoration, feasting one night where the same Callisthenes was at the +table, it was moved by some after supper, for entertainment sake, +that Callisthenes, who was an eloquent man, might speak of some +theme or purpose at his own choice; which Callisthenes did, choosing +the praise of the Macedonian nation for his discourse, and +performing the same with so good manner as the hearers were much +ravished; whereupon Alexander, nothing pleased, said, "It was easy +to be eloquent upon so good a subject; but," saith he, "turn your +style, and let us hear what you can say against us;" which +Callisthenes presently undertook, and did with that sting and life +that Alexander interrupted him, and said, "The goodness of the cause +made him eloquent before, and despite made him eloquent then again." + +(17) Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent use of +a metaphor or translation, wherewith he taxeth Antipater, who was an +imperious and tyrannous governor; for when one of Antipater's +friends commended him to Alexander for his moderation, that he did +not degenerate as his other lieutenants did into the Persian pride, +in uses of purple, but kept the ancient habit of Macedon, of black. +"True," saith Alexander; "but Antipater is all purple within." Or +that other, when Parmenio came to him in the plain of Arbela and +showed him the innumerable multitude of his enemies, specially as +they appeared by the infinite number of lights as it had been a new +firmament of stars, and thereupon advised him to assail them by +night; whereupon he answered, "That he would not steal the victory." + +(18) For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction, so +much in all ages embraced, that he made between his two friends +Hephaestion and Craterus, when he said, "That the one loved +Alexander, and the other loved the king:" describing the principal +difference of princes' best servants, that some in affection love +their person, and other in duty love their crown. + +(19) Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary with +counsellors of princes, that they counsel their masters according to +the model of their own mind and fortune, and not of their masters. +When upon Darius' great offers Parmenio had said, "Surely I would +accept these offers were I as Alexander;" saith Alexander, "So would +I were I as Parmenio." + +(20) Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply which he made when he +gave so large gifts to his friends and servants, and was asked what +he did reserve for himself, and he answered, "Hope." Weigh, I say, +whether he had not cast up his account aright, because hope must be +the portion of all that resolve upon great enterprises; for this was +Caesar's portion when he went first into Gaul, his estate being then +utterly overthrown with largesses. And this was likewise the +portion of that noble prince, howsoever transported with ambition, +Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it was usually said that he was the +greatest usurer in France, because he had turned all his estate into +obligations. + +(21) To conclude, therefore, as certain critics are used to say +hyperbolically, "That if all sciences were lost they might be found +in Virgil," so certainly this may be said truly, there are the +prints and footsteps of learning in those few speeches which are +reported of this prince, the admiration of whom, when I consider him +not as Alexander the Great, but as Aristotle's scholar, hath carried +me too far. + +(22) As for Julius Caesar, the excellency of his learning needeth +not to be argued from his education, or his company, or his +speeches; but in a further degree doth declare itself in his +writings and works: whereof some are extant and permanent, and some +unfortunately perished. For first, we see there is left unto us +that excellent history of his own wars, which he entitled only a +Commentary, wherein all succeeding times have admired the solid +weight of matter, and the real passages and lively images of actions +and persons, expressed in the greatest propriety of words and +perspicuity of narration that ever was; which that it was not the +effect of a natural gift, but of learning and precept, is well +witnessed by that work of his entitled De Analogia, being a +grammatical philosophy, wherein he did labour to make this same Vox +ad placitum to become Vox ad licitum, and to reduce custom of speech +to congruity of speech; and took as it were the pictures of words +from the life of reason. + +(23) So we receive from him, as a monument both of his power and +learning, the then reformed computation of the year; well expressing +that he took it to be as great a glory to himself to observe and +know the law of the heavens, as to give law to men upon the earth. + +(24) So likewise in that book of his, Anti-Cato, it may easily +appear that he did aspire as well to victory of wit as victory of +war: undertaking therein a conflict against the greatest champion +with the pen that then lived, Cicero the orator. + +(25) So, again, in his book of Apophthegms, which he collected, we +see that he esteemed it more honour to make himself but a pair of +tables, to take the wise and pithy words of others, than to have +every word of his own to be made an apophthegm or an oracle, as vain +princes, by custom of flattery, pretend to do. And yet if I should +enumerate divers of his speeches, as I did those of Alexander, they +are truly such as Solomon noteth, when he saith, Verba sapientum +tanquam aculei, et tanquam clavi in altum defixi: whereof I will +only recite three, not so delectable for elegancy, but admirable for +vigour and efficacy. + +(26) As first, it is reason he be thought a master of words, that +could with one word appease a mutiny in his army, which was thus: +The Romans, when their generals did speak to their army, did use the +word Milites, but when the magistrates spake to the people they did +use the word Quirites. The soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously +prayed to be cashiered; not that they so meant, but by expostulation +thereof to draw Caesar to other conditions; wherein he being +resolute not to give way, after some silence, he began his speech, +Ego Quirites, which did admit them already cashiered--wherewith they +were so surprised, crossed, and confused, as they would not suffer +him to go on in his speech, but relinquished their demands, and made +it their suit to be again called by the name of Milites. + +(27) The second speech was thus: Caesar did extremely affect the +name of king; and some were set on as he passed by in popular +acclamation to salute him king. Whereupon, finding the cry weak and +poor, he put it off thus, in a kind of jest, as if they had mistaken +his surname: Non Rex sum, sed Caesar; a speech that, if it be +searched, the life and fulness of it can scarce be expressed. For, +first, it was a refusal of the name, but yet not serious; again, it +did signify an infinite confidence and magnanimity, as if he +presumed Caesar was the greater title, as by his worthiness it is +come to pass till this day. But chiefly it was a speech of great +allurement toward his own purpose, as if the state did strive with +him but for a name, whereof mean families were vested; for Rex was a +surname with the Romans, as well as King is with us. + +(28) The last speech which I will mention was used to Metellus, when +Caesar, after war declared, did possess himself of this city of +Rome; at which time, entering into the inner treasury to take the +money there accumulate, Metellus, being tribune, forbade him. +Whereto Caesar said, "That if he did not desist, he would lay him +dead in the place." And presently taking himself up, he added, +"Young man, it is harder for me to speak it than to do it-- +Adolescens, durius est mihi hoc dicere quam facere." A speech +compounded of the greatest terror and greatest clemency that could +proceed out of the mouth of man. + +(29) But to return and conclude with him, it is evident himself knew +well his own perfection in learning, and took it upon him, as +appeared when upon occasion that some spake what a strange +resolution it was in Lucius Sylla to resign his dictators, he, +scoffing at him to his own advantage, answered, "That Sylla could +not skill of letters, and therefore knew not how to dictate." + +(30) And here it were fit to leave this point, touching the +concurrence of military virtue and learning (for what example should +come with any grace after those two of Alexander and Caesar?), were +it not in regard of the rareness of circumstance, that I find in one +other particular, as that which did so suddenly pass from extreme +scorn to extreme wonder: and it is of Xenophon the philosopher, who +went from Socrates' school into Asia in the expedition of Cyrus the +younger against King Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that time was +very young, and never had seen the wars before, neither had any +command in the army, but only followed the war as a voluntary, for +the love and conversation of Proxenus, his friend. He was present +when Falinus came in message from the great king to the Grecians, +after that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they, a handful of men, +left to themselves in the midst of the king's territories, cut off +from their country by many navigable rivers and many hundred miles. +The message imported that they should deliver up their arms and +submit themselves to the king's mercy. To which message, before +answer was made, divers of the army conferred familiarly with +Falinus; and amongst the rest Xenophon happened to say, "Why, +Falinus, we have now but these two things left, our arms and our +virtue; and if we yield up our arms, how shall we make use of our +virtue?" Whereto Falinus, smiling on him, said, "If I be not +deceived, young gentleman, you are an Athenian, and I believe you +study philosophy, and it is pretty that you say; but you are much +abused if you think your virtue can withstand the king's power." +Here was the scorn; the wonder followed: which was that this young +scholar or philosopher, after all the captains were murdered in +parley by treason, conducted those ten thousand foot, through the +heart of all the king's high countries, from Babylon to Graecia in +safety, in despite of all the king's forces, to the astonishment of +the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians in times succeeding +to make invasion upon the kings of Persia, as was after purposed by +Jason the Thessalian, attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and +achieved by Alexander the Macedonian, all upon the ground of the act +of that young scholar. + +VIII. (1) To proceed now from imperial and military virtue to moral +and private virtue; first, it is an assured truth, which is +contained in the verses:- + + +"Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes +Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros." + + +It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men's +minds; but indeed the accent had need be upon fideliter; for a +little superficial learning doth rather work a contrary effect. It +taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolency, by copious +suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the mind +to balance reasons on both sides, and to turn back the first offers +and conceits of the mind, and to accept of nothing but examined and +tried. It taketh away vain admiration of anything, which is the +root of all weakness. For all things are admired, either because +they are new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man that +wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly but will find that +printed in his heart, Nil novi super terram. Neither can any man +marvel at the play of puppets, that goeth behind the curtain, and +adviseth well of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the +Great, after that he was used to great armies, and the great +conquests of the spacious provinces in Asia, when he received +letters out of Greece, of some fights and services there, which were +commonly for a passage or a fort, or some walled town at the most, +he said: --"It seemed to him that he was advertised of the battles +of the frogs and the mice, that the old tales went of." So +certainly, if a man meditate much upon the universal frame of +nature, the earth with men upon it (the divineness of souls except) +will not seem much other than an ant-hill, whereas some ants carry +corn, and some carry their young, and some go empty, and all to and +fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of +death or adverse fortune, which is one of the greatest impediments +of virtue and imperfections of manners. For if a man's mind be +deeply seasoned with the consideration of the mortality and +corruptible nature of things, he will easily concur with Epictetus, +who went forth one day and saw a woman weeping for her pitcher of +earth that was broken, and went forth the next day and saw a woman +weeping for her son that was dead, and thereupon said, "Heri vidi +fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori." And, therefore, Virgil +did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of causes and +the conquest of all fears together, as concomitantia. + + +"Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, +Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum +Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari." + + +(2) It were too long to go over the particular remedies which +learning doth minister to all the diseases of the mind: sometimes +purging the ill humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, +sometimes helping digestion, sometimes increasing appetite, +sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the +like; and, therefore, I will conclude with that which hath rationem +totius--which is, that it disposeth the constitution of the mind not +to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof, but still to be +capable and susceptible of growth and reformation. For the +unlearned man knows not what it is to descend into himself, or to +call himself to account, nor the pleasure of that suavissima vita, +indies sentire se fieri meliorem. The good parts he hath he will +learn to show to the full, and use them dexterously, but not much to +increase them. The faults he hath he will learn how to hide and +colour them, but not much to amend them; like an ill mower, that +mows on still, and never whets his scythe. Whereas with the learned +man it fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction +and amendment of his mind with the use and employment thereof. Nay, +further, in general and in sum, certain it is that Veritas and +Bonitas differ but as the seal and the print; for truth prints +goodness, and they be the clouds of error which descend in the +storms of passions and perturbations. + +(3) From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and +commandment, and consider whether in right reason there be any +comparable with that wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth +man's nature. We see the dignity of the commandment is according to +the dignity of the commanded; to have commandment over beasts as +herdmen have, is a thing contemptible; to have commandment over +children as schoolmasters have, is a matter of small honour; to have +commandment over galley-slaves is a disparagement rather than an +honour. Neither is the commandment of tyrants much better, over +people which have put off the generosity of their minds; and, +therefore, it was ever holden that honours in free monarchies and +commonwealths had a sweetness more than in tyrannies, because the +commandment extendeth more over the wills of men, and not only over +their deeds and services. And therefore, when Virgil putteth +himself forth to attribute to Augustus Caesar the best of human +honours, he doth it in these words:- + + + "Victorque volentes +Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo." + + +But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the +commandment over the will; for it is a commandment over the reason, +belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest part of the +mind, and giveth law to the will itself. For there is no power on +earth which setteth up a throne or chair of estate in the spirits +and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, +and beliefs, but knowledge and learning. And therefore we see the +detestable and extreme pleasure that arch-heretics, and false +prophets, and impostors are transported with, when they once find in +themselves that they have a superiority in the faith and conscience +of men; so great as if they have once tasted of it, it is seldom +seen that any torture or persecution can make them relinquish or +abandon it. But as this is that which the author of the Revelation +calleth the depth or profoundness of Satan, so by argument of +contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men's +understanding, by force of truth rightly interpreted, is that which +approacheth nearest to the similitude of the divine rule. + +(4) As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of learning is +not so confined to give fortune only to states and commonwealths, as +it doth not likewise give fortune to particular persons. For it was +well noted long ago, that Homer hath given more men their livings, +than either Sylla, or Caesar, or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding +their great largesses and donatives, and distributions of lands to +so many legions. And no doubt it is hard to say whether arms or +learning have advanced greater numbers. And in case of sovereignty +we see, that if arms or descent have carried away the kingdom, yet +learning hath carried the priesthood, which ever hath been in some +competition with empire. + +(5) Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning, +it far surpasseth all other in nature. For, shall the pleasures of +the affections so exceed the pleasure of the sense, as much as the +obtaining of desire or victory exceedeth a song or a dinner? and +must not of consequence the pleasures of the intellect or +understanding exceed the pleasures of the affections? We see in all +other pleasures there is satiety, and after they be used, their +verdure departeth, which showeth well they be but deceits of +pleasure, and not pleasures; and that it was the novelty which +pleased, and not the quality. And, therefore, we see that +voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitions princes turn melancholy. +But of knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and appetite +are perpetually interchangeable; and, therefore, appeareth to be +good in itself simply, without fallacy or accident. Neither is that +pleasure of small efficacy and contentment to the mind of man, which +the poet Lucretius describeth elegantly:- + + +"Suave mari magno, turbantibus aequora ventis, &c." + + +"It is a view of delight," saith he, "to stand or walk upon the +shore side, and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon the sea; or +to be in a fortified tower, and to see two battles join upon a +plain. But it is a pleasure incomparable, for the mind of man to be +settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth; and from +thence to descry and behold the errors, perturbations, labours, and +wanderings up and down of other men. + +(6) Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning man +excelleth man in that wherein man excelleth beasts; that by learning +man ascendeth to the heavens and their motions, where in body he +cannot come; and the like: let us conclude with the dignity and +excellency of knowledge and learning in that whereunto man's nature +doth most aspire, which is immortality, or continuance; for to this +tendeth generation, and raising of houses and families; to this tend +buildings, foundations, and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of +memory, fame, and celebration; and in effect the strength of all +other human desires. We see then how far the monuments of wit and +learning are more durable than the monuments of power or of the +hands. For have not the verses of Homer continued twenty-five +hundred years, or more, without the loss of a syllable or letter; +during which the infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities, have +been decayed and demolished? It is not possible to have the true +pictures or statues of Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar, no nor of the kings +or great personages of much later years; for the originals cannot +last, and the copies cannot but leese of the life and truth. But +the images of men's wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted +from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual renovation. Neither +are they fitly to be called images, because they generate still, and +cast their seeds in the minds of others, provoking and causing +infinite actions and opinions in succeeding ages. So that if the +invention of the ship was thought so noble, which carrieth riches +and commodities from place to place, and consociateth the most +remote regions in participation of their fruits, how much more are +letters to be magnified, which as ships pass through the vast seas +of time, and make ages so distant to participate of the wisdom, +illuminations, and inventions, the one of the other? Nay, further, +we see some of the philosophers which were least divine, and most +immersed in the senses, and denied generally the immortality of the +soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the spirit of +man could act and perform without the organs of the body, they +thought might remain after death, which were only those of the +understanding and not of the affection; so immortal and +incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto them to be. But we, +that know by divine revelation that not only the understanding but +the affections purified, not only the spirit but the body changed, +shall be advanced to immortality, do disclaim in these rudiments of +the senses. But it must be remembered, both in this last point, and +so it may likewise be needful in other places, that in probation of +the dignity of knowledge or learning, I did in the beginning +separate divine testimony from human, which method I have pursued, +and so handled them both apart. + +(7) Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know it will be impossible +for me, by any pleading of mine, to reverse the judgment, either of +AEsop's cock, that preferred the barleycorn before the gem; or of +Midas, that being chosen judge between Apollo, president of the +Muses, and Pan, god of the flocks, judged for plenty; or of Paris, +that judged for beauty and love against wisdom and power; or of +Agrippina, occidat matrem, modo imperet, that preferred empire with +any condition never so detestable; or of Ulysses, qui vetulam +praetulit immortalitati, being a figure of those which prefer custom +and habit before all excellency, or of a number of the like popular +judgments. For these things must continue as they have been; but so +will that also continue whereupon learning hath ever relied, and +which faileth not: Justificata est sapientia a filiis suis. + + + +THE SECOND BOOK. +To the King. + + + +1. It might seem to have more convenience, though it come often +otherwise to pass (excellent King), that those which are fruitful in +their generations, and have in themselves the foresight of +immortality in their descendants, should likewise be more careful of +the good estate of future times, unto which they know they must +transmit and commend over their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth +was a sojourner in the world in respect of her unmarried life, and +was a blessing to her own times; and yet so as the impression of her +good government, besides her happy memory, is not without some +effect which doth survive her. But to your Majesty, whom God hath +already blessed with so much royal issue, worthy to continue and +represent you for ever, and whose youthful and fruitful bed doth yet +promise many the like renovations, it is proper and agreeable to be +conversant not only in the transitory parts of good government, but +in those acts also which are in their nature permanent and +perpetual. Amongst the which (if affection do not transport me) +there is not any more worthy than the further endowment of the world +with sound and fruitful knowledge. For why should a few received +authors stand up like Hercules' columns, beyond which there should +be no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a +star as your Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return therefore +where we left, it remaineth to consider of what kind those acts are +which have been undertaken and performed by kings and others for the +increase and advancement of learning, wherein I purpose to speak +actively, without digressing or dilating. + +2. Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are over +common by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the +conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth endeavour, the second +preventeth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man. But +the principal of these is direction, for claudus in via antevertit +cursorem extra viam; and Solomon excellently setteth it down, "If +the iron be not sharp, it requireth more strength, but wisdom is +that which prevaileth," signifying that the invention or election of +the mean is more effectual than any enforcement or accumulation of +endeavours. This I am induced to speak, for that (not derogating +from the noble intention of any that have been deservers towards the +state of learning), I do observe nevertheless that their works and +acts are rather matters of magnificence and memory than of +progression and proficience, and tend rather to augment the mass of +learning in the multitude of learned men than to rectify or raise +the sciences themselves. + +3. The works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant about +three objects--the places of learning, the books of learning, and +the persons of the learned. For as water, whether it be the dew of +heaven or the springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese itself in +the ground, except it be collected into some receptacle where it may +by union comfort and sustain itself; and for that cause the industry +of man hath made and framed springheads, conduits, cisterns, and +pools, which men have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with +accomplishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use and +necessity; so this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend +from divine inspiration, or spring from human sense, would soon +perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not preserved in books, +traditions, conferences, and places appointed, as universities, +colleges, and schools, for the receipt and comforting of the same. + +4. The works which concern the seats and places of learning are +four--foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, +endowments with franchises and privileges, institutions and +ordinances for government--all tending to quietness and privateness +of life, and discharge of cares and troubles; much like the stations +which Virgil prescribeth for the hiving of bees: + + +"Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda, +Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c." + + +5. The works touching books are two--first, libraries, which are as +the shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints, full of true +virtue, and that without delusion or imposture, are preserved and +reposed; secondly, new editions of authors, with more correct +impressions, more faithful translations, more profitable glosses, +more diligent annotations, and the like. + +6. The works pertaining to the persons of learned men (besides the +advancement and countenancing of them in general) are two--the +reward and designation of readers in sciences already extant and +invented; and the reward and designation of writers and inquirers +concerning any parts of learning not sufficiently laboured and +prosecuted. + +7. These are summarily the works and acts wherein the merits of +many excellent princes and other worthy personages, have been +conversant. As for any particular commemorations, I call to mind +what Cicero said when he gave general thanks, Difficile non aliquem, +ingratum quenquam praeterire. Let us rather, according to the +Scriptures, look unto that part of the race which is before us, than +look back to that which is already attained. + +8. First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations of colleges +in Europe, I find strange that they are all dedicated to +professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at large. For +if men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge +well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient +fable, in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach +had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as +the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet +notwithstanding it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to +all the rest. So if any man think philosophy and universality to be +idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from +thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause +that hath hindered the progression of learning, because these +fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if you +will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not +anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the +earth and putting new mould about thee roots that must work it. +Neither is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating of foundations +and dotations to professory learning hath not only had a malign +aspect and influence upon the growth of sciences, but hath also been +prejudicial to states, and governments. For hence it proceedeth +that princes find a solitude in regard of able men to serve them in +causes of estate, because there is no education collegiate which is +free, where such as were so disposed might give themselves in +histories, modern languages, books of policy and civil discourse, +and other the like enablements unto service of estate. + +9. And because founders of colleges do plant, and founders of +lectures do water, it followeth well in order to speak of the defect +which is in public lectures; namely, in the smallness, and meanness +of the salary or reward which in most places is assigned unto them, +whether they be lectures of arts, or of professions. For it is +necessary to the progression of sciences that readers be of the most +able and sufficient men; as those which are ordained for generating +and propagating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This +cannot be, except their condition and endowment be such as may +content the ablest man to appropriate his whole labour and continue +his whole age in that function and attendance; and therefore must +have a proportion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of +advancement, which may be expected from a profession or the practice +of a profession. So as, if you will have sciences flourish, you +must observe David's military law, which was, "That those which +stayed with the carriage should have equal part with those which +were in the action;" else will the carriages be ill attended. So +readers in sciences are indeed the guardians of the stores and +provisions of sciences, whence men in active courses are furnished, +and therefore ought to have equal entertainment with them; otherwise +if the fathers in sciences be of the weakest sort or be ill +maintained, + + +"Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati." + + +10. Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some alchemist to +help me, who call upon men to sell their books, and to build +furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren +virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that unto the +deep, fruitful, and operative study of many sciences, specialty +natural philosophy and physic, books be not only the instrumentals; +wherein also the beneficence of men hath not been altogether +wanting. For we see spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps, and the +like, have been provided as appurtenances to astronomy and +cosmography, as well as books. We see likewise that some places +instituted for physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for +simples of all sorts, and do likewise command the use of dead bodies +for anatomies. But these do respect but a few things. In general, +there will hardly be any main proficience in the disclosing of +nature, except there be some allowance for expenses about +experiments; whether they be experiments appertaining to Vulcanus or +Daedalus, furnace or engine, or any other kind. And therefore as +secretaries and spials of princes and states bring in bills for +intelligence, so you must allow the spials and intelligencers of +nature to bring in their bills; or else you shall be ill advertised. + +11. And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to Aristotle +of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the +like, that he might compile a history of nature, much better do they +deserve it that travail in arts of nature. + +12. Another defect which I note is an intermission or neglect in +those which are governors in universities, of consultation, and in +princes or superior persons, of visitation: to enter into account +and consideration, whether the readings, exercises, and other +customs appertaining unto learning, anciently begun and since +continued, be well instituted or no; and thereupon to ground an +amendment or reformation in that which shall be found inconvenient. +For it is one of your Majesty's own most wise and princely maxims, +"That in all usages and precedents, the times be considered wherein +they first began; which if they were weak or ignorant, it derogateth +from the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for suspect." And +therefore inasmuch as most of the usages and orders of the +universities were derived from more obscure times, it is the more +requisite they be re-examined. In this kind I will give an instance +or two, for example sake, of things that are the most obvious and +familiar. The one is a matter, which though it be ancient and +general, yet I hold to be an error; which is, that scholars in +universities come too soon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric, +arts fitter for graduates than children and novices. For these two, +rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences, being the arts of arts; +the one for judgment, the other for ornament. And they be the rules +and directions how to set forth and dispose matter: and therefore +for minds empty and unfraught with matter, and which have not +gathered that which Cicero calleth sylva and supellex, stuff and +variety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to weigh, +or to measure, or to paint the wind) doth work but this effect, that +the wisdom of those arts, which is great and universal, is almost +made contemptible, and is degenerate into childish sophistry and +ridiculous affectation. And further, the untimely learning of them +hath drawn on by consequence the superficial and unprofitable +teaching and writing of them, as fitteth indeed to the capacity of +children. Another is a lack I find in the exercises used in the +universities, which do snake too great a divorce between invention +and memory. For their speeches are either premeditate, in verbis +conceptis, where nothing is left to invention, or merely extemporal, +where little is left to memory. Whereas in life and action there is +least use of either of these, but rather of intermixtures of +premeditation and invention, notes and memory. So as the exercise +fitteth not the practice, nor the image the life; and it is ever a +true rule in exercises, that they be framed as near as may be to the +life of practice; for otherwise they do pervert the motions and +faculties of the mind, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is +not obscure, when scholars come to the practices of professions, or +other actions of civil life; which when they set into, this want is +soon found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this part, +touching the amendment of the institutions and orders of +universities, I will conclude with the clause of Caesar's letter to +Oppius and Balbes, Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit, nonnulla mihi in +mentem veniunt, et multa reperiri possunt: de iis rebus rgo vos ut +cogitationem suscipiatis. + +13. Another defect which I note ascendeth a little higher than the +precedent. For as the proficience of learning consisteth much in +the orders and institutions of universities in the same states and +kingdoms, so it would be yet more advanced, if there were more +intelligence mutual between the universities of Europe than now +there is. We see there be many orders and foundations, which though +they be divided under several sovereignties and territories, yet +they take themselves to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and +correspondence one with the other, insomuch as they have provincials +and generals. And surely as nature createth brotherhood in +families, and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in communalties, +and the anointment of God superinduceth a brotherhood in kings and +bishops, so in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in +learning and illumination, relating to that paternity which is +attributed to God, who is called the Father of illuminations or +lights. + +14. The last defect which I will note is, that there hath not been, +or very rarely been, any public designation of writers or inquirers +concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been +already sufficiently laboured or undertaken; unto which point it is +an inducement to enter into a view and examination what parts of +learning have been prosecuted, and what omitted. For the opinion of +plenty is amongst the causes of want, and the great quantity of +books maketh a show rather of superfluity than lack; which surcharge +nevertheless is not to be remedied by making no more books, but by +making more good books, which, as the serpent of Moses, might devour +the serpents of the enchanters. + +15. The removing of all the defects formerly enumerate, except the +last, and of the active part also of the last (which is the +designation of writers), are opera basilica; towards which the +endeavours of a private man may be but as an image in a crossway, +that may point at the way, but cannot go it. But the inducing part +of the latter (which is the survey of learning) may be set forward +by private travail. Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general +and faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts +thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the +industry of man, to the end that such a plot made and recorded to +memory may both minister light to any public designation, and, also +serve to excite voluntary endeavours. Wherein, nevertheless, my +purpose is at this time to note only omissions and deficiences, and +not to make any redargution of errors or incomplete prosecutions. +For it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanured, and +another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured. + +In the handling and undertaking of which work I am not ignorant what +it is that I do now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine own +weakness to sustain my purpose. But my hope is, that if my extreme +love to learning carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of +affection; for that "It is not granted to man to love and to be +wise." But I know well I can use no other liberty of judgment than +I must leave to others; and I for my part shall be indifferently +glad either to perform myself, or accept from another, that duty of +humanity--Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam, &c. I do foresee +likewise that of those things which I shall enter and register as +deficiences and omissions, many will conceive and censure that some +of them are already done and extant; others to be but curiosities, +and things of no great use; and others to be of too great +difficulty, and almost impossibility to be compassed and effected. +But for the two first, I refer myself to the particulars. For the +last, touching impossibility, I take it those things are to be held +possible which may be done by some person, though not by every one; +and which may be done by many, though not by any one; and which may +be done in the succession of ages, though not within the hourglass +of one man's life; and which may be done by public designation, +though not by private endeavour. But, notwithstanding, if any man +will take to himself rather that of Solomon, "Dicit piger, Leo est +in via," than that of Virgil, "Possunt quia posse videntur," I shall +be content that my labours be esteemed but as the better sort of +wishes; for as it asketh some knowledge to demand a question not +impertinent, so it requireth some sense to make a wish not absurd. + +I. (1) The parts of human learning have reference to the three parts +of man's understanding, which is the seat of learning: history to +his memory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason. +Divine learning receiveth the same distribution; for, the spirit of +man is the same, though the revelation of oracle and sense be +diverse. So as theology consisteth also of history of the Church; +of parables, which is divine poesy; and of holy doctrine or precept. +For as for that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy, +it is but divine history, which hath that prerogative over human, as +the narration may be before the fact as well as after. + +(2) History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary; whereof +the first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. +For no man hath propounded to himself the general state of learning +to be described and represented from age to age, as many have done +the works of Nature, and the state, civil and ecclesiastical; +without which the history of the world seemeth to me to be as the +statue of Polyphemus with his eye out, that part being wanting which +doth most show the spirit and life of the person. And yet I am not +ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the +jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the +philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the +schools, authors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations +touching the invention of arts or usages. But a just story of +learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges and +their sects, their inventions, their traditions, their diverse +administrations and managings, their flourishings, their +oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes, with the +causes and occasions of them, and all other events concerning +learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be +wanting; the use and end of which work I do not so much design for +curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning, +but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is this in +few words, that it will make learned men wise in the use and +administration of learning. For it is not Saint Augustine's nor +Saint Ambrose's works that will make so wise a divine as +ecclesiastical history thoroughly read and observed, and the same +reason is of learning. + +(3) History of Nature is of three sorts; of Nature in course, of +Nature erring or varying, and of Nature altered or wrought; that is, +history of creatures, history of marvels, and history of arts. The +first of these no doubt is extant, and that in good perfection; the +two latter are bandied so weakly and unprofitably as I am moved to +note them as deficient. For I find no sufficient or competent +collection of the works of Nature which have a digression and +deflexion from the ordinary course of generations, productions, and +motions; whether they be singularities of place and region, or the +strange events of time and chance, or the effects of yet unknown +properties, or the instances of exception to general kinds. It is +true I find a number of books of fabulous experiments and secrets, +and frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness; but a +substantial and severe collection of the heteroclites or irregulars +of Nature, well examined and described, I find not, specially not +with due rejection of fables and popular errors. For as things now +are, if an untruth in Nature be once on foot, what by reason of the +neglect of examination, and countenance of antiquity, and what by +reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of +speech, it is never called down. + +(4) The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in Aristotle, is +nothing less than to give contentment to the appetite of curious and +vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries is to do; but for two +reasons, both of great weight: the one to correct the partiality of +axioms and opinions, which are commonly framed only upon common and +familiar examples; the other because from the wonders of Nature is +the nearest intelligence and passage towards the wonders of art, for +it is no more but by following and, as it were, hounding Nature in +her wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the same place +again. Neither am I of opinion, in this history of marvels, that +superstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams, +divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance and clear +evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet +known in what cases and how far effects attributed to superstition +do participate of natural causes; and, therefore, howsoever the +practice of such things is to be condemned, yet from the speculation +and consideration of them light may be taken, not only for the +discerning of the offences, but for the further disclosing of +Nature. Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering into these +things for inquisition of truth, as your Majesty hath showed in your +own example, who, with the two clear eyes of religion and natural +philosophy, have looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, and +yet proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun, which passeth +through pollutions and itself remains as pure as before. But this I +hold fit, that these narrations, which have mixture with +superstition, be sorted by themselves, and not to be mingled with +the narrations which are merely and sincerely natural. But as for +the narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, +they are either not true or not natural; and, therefore, impertinent +for the story of Nature. + +(5) For history of Nature, wrought or mechanical, I find some +collections made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but +commonly with a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar; for it +is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to descend to inquiry +or meditation upon matters mechanical, except they be such as may be +thought secrets, rarities, and special subtleties; which humour of +vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided in Plato, where he +brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates, a +true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth; where, the subject being +touching beauty, Socrates, after his wandering manner of inductions, +put first an example of a fair virgin, and then of a fair horse, and +then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat Hippias was offended, and +said, "More than for courtesy's sake, he did think much to dispute +with any that did allege such base and sordid instances." Whereunto +Socrates answereth, "You have reason, and it becomes you well, being +a man so trim in your vestments," &c., and so goeth on in an irony. +But the truth is, they be not the highest instances that give the +securest information, as may be well expressed in the tale so common +of the philosopher that, while he gazed upwards to the stars, fell +into the water; for if he had looked down he might have seen the +stars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water in +the stars. So it cometh often to pass that mean and small things +discover great, better than great can discover the small; and +therefore Aristotle noteth well, "That the nature of everything is +best seen in his smallest portions." And for that cause he +inquireth the nature of a commonwealth, first in a family, and the +simple conjugations of man and wife, parent and child, master and +servant, which are in every cottage. Even so likewise the nature of +this great city of the world, and the policy thereof, must be first +sought in mean concordances and small portions. So we see how that +secret of Nature, of the turning of iron touched with the loadstone +towards the north, was found out in needles of iron, not in bars of +iron. + +(6) But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of history +mechanical is of all others the most radical and fundamental towards +natural philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in +the fume of subtle, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as +shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of man's life. For +it will not only minister and suggest for the present many ingenious +practices in all trades, by a connection and transferring of the +observations of one art to the use of another, when the experiences +of several mysteries shall fall under the consideration of one man's +mind; but further, it will give a more true and real illumination +concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. For like as +a man's disposition is never well known till he be crossed, nor +Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast; so +the passages and variations of nature cannot appear so fully in the +liberty of nature as in the trials and vexations of art. + +II. (1) For civil history, it is of three kinds; not unfitly to be +compared with the three kinds of pictures or images. For of +pictures or images we see some are unfinished, some are perfect, and +some are defaced. So of histories we may find three kinds: +memorials, perfect histories, and antiquities; for memorials are +history unfinished, or the first or rough drafts of history; and +antiquities are history defaced, or some remnants of history which +have casually escaped the shipwreck of time. + +(2) Memorials, or preparatory history, are of two sorts; whereof the +one may be termed commentaries, and the other registers. +Commentaries are they which set down a continuance of the naked +events and actions, without the motives or designs, the counsels, +the speeches, the pretexts, the occasions, and other passages of +action. For this is the true nature of a commentary (though Caesar, +in modesty mixed with greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name +of a commentary to the best history of the world). Registers are +collections of public acts, as decrees of council, judicial +proceedings, declarations and letters of estate, orations, and the +like, without a perfect continuance or contexture of the thread of +the narration. + +(3) Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said, tanquam +tabula naufragii: when industrious persons, by an exact and +scrupulous diligence and observation, out of monuments, names, +words, proverbs, traditions, private records and evidences, +fragments of stories, passages of books that concern not story, and +the like, do save and recover somewhat from the deluge of time. + +(4) In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no deficience, +for they are tanquam imperfecte mista; and therefore any deficience +in them is but their nature. As for the corruptions and moths of +history, which are epitomes, the use of them deserveth to be +banished, as all men of sound judgment have confessed, as those that +have fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent +histories, and wrought them into base and unprofitable dregs. + +(5) History, which may be called just and perfect history, is of +three kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth, or +pretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a time, or a +person, or an action. The first we call chronicles, the second +lives, and the third narrations or relations. Of these, although +the first be the most complete and absolute kind of history, and +hath most estimation and glory, yet the second excelleth it in +profit and use, and the third in verity and sincerity. For history +of times representeth the magnitude of actions, and the public faces +and deportments of persons, and passeth over in silence the smaller +passages and motions of men and matters. But such being the +workmanship of God, as He doth hang the greatest weight upon the +smallest wires, maxima e minimis, suspendens, it comes therefore to +pass, that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business +than the true and inward resorts thereof. But lives, if they be +well written, propounding to themselves a person to represent, in +whom actions, both greater and smaller, public and private, have a +commixture, must of necessity contain a more true, native, and +lively representation. So again narrations and relations of +actions, as the war of Peloponnesus, the expedition of Cyrus Minor, +the conspiracy of Catiline, cannot but be more purely and exactly +true than histories of times, because they may choose an argument +comprehensible within the notice and instructions of the writer: +whereas he that undertaketh the story of a time, specially of any +length, cannot but meet with many blanks and spaces, which he must +be forced to fill up out of his own wit and conjecture. + +(6) For the history of times, I mean of civil history, the +providence of God hath made the distribution. For it hath pleased +God to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the world for +arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the state of Graecia +and the state of Rome; the histories whereof occupying the middle +part of time, have more ancient to them histories which may by one +common name be termed the antiquities of the world; and after them, +histories which may be likewise called by the name of modern +history. + +(7) Now to speak of the deficiences. As to the heathen antiquities +of the world it is in vain to note them for deficient. Deficient +they are no doubt, consisting most of fables and fragments; but the +deficience cannot be holpen; for antiquity is like fame, caput inter +nubila condit, her head is muffled from our sight. For the history +of the exemplar states, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I +could wish there were a perfect course of history for Graecia, from +Theseus to Philopoemen (what time the affairs of Graecia drowned and +extinguished in the affairs of Rome), and for Rome from Romulus to +Justinianus, who may be truly said to be ultimus Romanorum. In +which sequences of story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon in the +one, and the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Caesar, +Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire, +without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and +continued. But this is a matter of magnificence, rather to be +commended than required; and we speak now of parts of learning +supplemental, and not of supererogation. + +(8) But for modern histories, whereof there are some few very +worthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, leaving the care of +foreign stories to foreign states, because I will not be curiosus in +aliena republica, I cannot fail to represent to your Majesty the +unworthiness of the history of England in the main continuance +thereof, and the partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland in the +latest and largest author that I have seen: supposing that it would +be honour for your Majesty, and a work very memorable, if this +island of Great Britain, as it is now joined in monarchy for the +ages to come, so were joined in one history for the times passed, +after the manner of the sacred history, which draweth down the story +of the ten tribes and of the two tribes as twins together. And if +it shall seem that the greatness of this work may make it less +exactly performed, there is an excellent period of a much smaller +compass of time, as to the story of England; that is to say, from +the uniting of the Roses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion +of time wherein, to my understanding, there hath been the rarest +varieties that in like number of successions of any hereditary +monarchy hath been known. For it beginneth with the mixed adoption +of a crown by arms and title; an entry by battle, an establishment +by marriage; and therefore times answerable, like waters after a +tempest, full of working and swelling, though without extremity of +storm; but well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, being one +of the most sufficient kings of all the number. Then followeth the +reign of a king, whose actions, howsoever conducted, had much +intermixture with the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining +them variably; in whose time also began that great alteration in the +state ecclesiastical, an action which seldom cometh upon the stage. +Then the reign of a minor; then an offer of a usurpation (though it +was but as febris ephemera). Then the reign of a queen matched with +a foreigner; then of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and +yet her government so masculine, as it had greater impression and +operation upon the states abroad than it any ways received from +thence. And now last, this most happy and glorious event, that this +island of Britain, divided from all the world, should be united in +itself, and that oracle of rest given to AENeas, antiquam exquirite +matrem, should now be performed and fulfilled upon the nations of +England and Scotland, being now reunited in the ancient mother name +of Britain, as a full period of all instability and peregrinations. +So that as it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that they have +certain trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle, so it +seemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy, before it was +to settle in your majesty and your generations (in which I hope it +is now established for ever), it had these prelusive changes and +varieties. + +(9) For lives, I do find strange that these times have so little +esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writings of lives +should be no more frequent. For although there be not many +sovereign princes or absolute commanders, and that states are most +collected into monarchies, yet are there many worthy personages that +deserve better than dispersed report or barren eulogies. For herein +the invention of one of the late poets is proper, and doth well +enrich the ancient fiction. For he feigneth that at the end of the +thread or web of every man's life there was a little medal +containing the person's name, and that Time waited upon the shears, +and as soon as the thread was cut caught the medals, and carried +them to the river of Lathe; and about the bank there were many birds +flying up and down, that would get the medals and carry them in +their beak a little while, and then let them fall into the river. +Only there were a few swans, which if they got a name would carry it +to a temple where it was consecrate. And although many men, more +mortal in their affections than in their bodies, do esteem desire of +name and memory but as a vanity and ventosity, + + +"Animi nil magnae laudis egentes;" + + +which opinion cometh from that root, Non prius laudes contempsimus, +quam laudanda facere desivimus: yet that will not alter Solomon's +judgment, Memoria justi cum laudibus, at impiorum nomen putrescet: +the one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion, +or turneth to an ill odour. And therefore in that style or +addition, which is and hath been long well received and brought in +use, felicis memoriae, piae memoriae, bonae memoriae, we do +acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes, +that bona fama propria possessio defunctorum; which possession I +cannot but note that in our times it lieth much waste, and that +therein there is a deficience. + +(10) For narrations and relations of particular actions, there were +also to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is no great +action but hath some good pen which attends it. And because it is +an ability not common to write a good history, as may well appear by +the small number of them; yet if particularity of actions memorable +were but tolerably reported as they pass, the compiling of a +complete history of times might be the better expected, when a +writer should arise that were fit for it: for the collection of +such relations might be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant a fair +and stately garden when time should serve. + +(11) There is yet another partition of history which Cornelius +Tacitus maketh, which is not to be forgotten, specially with that +application which he accoupleth it withal, annals and journals: +appropriating to the former matters of estate, and to the latter +acts and accidents of a meaner nature. For giving but a touch of +certain magnificent buildings, he addeth, Cum ex dignitate populi +Romani repertum sit, res illustres annalibus, talia diurnis urbis +actis mandare. So as there is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as +well as civil. And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a +state more than confusion of degrees, so it doth not a little imbase +the authority of a history to intermingle matters of triumph, or +matters of ceremony, or matters of novelty, with matters of state. +But the use of a journal hath not only been in the history of time, +but likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly of actions; for +princes in ancient time had, upon point of honour and policy both, +journals kept, what passed day by day. For we see the chronicle +which was read before Ahasuerus, when he could not take rest, +contained matter of affairs, indeed, but such as had passed in his +own time and very lately before. But the journal of Alexander's +house expressed every small particularity, even concerning his +person and court; and it is yet a use well received in enterprises +memorable, as expeditions of war, navigations, and the like, to keep +diaries of that which passeth continually. + +(12) I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which some +grave and wise men have used, containing a scattered history of +those actions which they have thought worthy of memory, with politic +discourse and observation thereupon: not incorporate into the +history, but separately, and as the more principal in their +intention; which kind of ruminated history I think more fit to place +amongst books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak, than +amongst books of history. For it is the true office of history to +represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to +leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and +faculty of every man's judgment. But mixtures are things irregular, +whereof no man can define. + +(13) So also is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed, and +that is history of cosmography: being compounded of natural +history, in respect of the regions themselves; of history civil, in +respect of the habitations, regiments, and manners of the people; +and the mathematics, in respect of the climates and configurations +towards the heavens: which part of learning of all others in this +latter time hath obtained most proficience. For it may be truly +affirmed to the honour of these times, and in a virtuous emulation +with antiquity, that this great building of the world had never +through-lights made in it, till the age of us and our fathers. For +although they had knowledge of the antipodes, + + +"Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis, +Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper," + + +yet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by +travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But to +circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not done nor +enterprised till these later times: and therefore these times may +justly bear in their word, not only plus ultra, in precedence of the +ancient non ultra, and imitabile fulmen, in precedence of the +ancient non imitabile fulmen, + + +"Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen," &c. + + +but likewise imitabile caelum; in respect of the many memorable +voyages after the manner of heaven about the globe of the earth. + +(14) And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant +also an expectation of the further proficience and augmentation of +all sciences; because it may seem they are ordained by God to be +coevals, that is, to meet in one age. For so the prophet Daniel +speaking of the latter times foretelleth, Plurimi pertransibunt, et +multiplex erit scientia: as if the openness and through-passage of +the world and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the +same ages; as we see it is already performed in great part: the +learning of these later times not much giving place to the former +two periods or returns of learning, the one of the Grecians, the +other of the Romans. + +III. (1) History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with +history civil: but further in the propriety thereof may be divided +into the history of the Church, by a general name; history of +prophecy; and history of providence. The first describeth the times +of the militant Church, whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah, +or movable, as the ark in the wilderness, or at rest, as the ark in +the Temple: that is, the state of the Church in persecution, in +remove, and in peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as +deficient; only I would that the virtue and sincerity of it were +according to the mass and quantity. But I am not now in hand with +censures, but with omissions. + +(2) The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of two +relatives--the prophecy and the accomplishment; and, therefore, the +nature of such a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the +Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the same throughout +the ages of the world, both for the better confirmation of faith and +for the better illumination of the Church touching those parts of +prophecies which are yet unfulfilled: allowing, nevertheless, that +latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies, +being of the nature of their Author, with whom a thousand years are +but as one day, and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once, +but have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many +ages, though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one +age. This is a work which I find deficient, but is to be done with +wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all. + +(3) The third, which is history of Providence, containeth that +excellent correspondence which is between God's revealed will and +His secret will; which though it be so obscure, as for the most part +it is not legible to the natural man--no, nor many times to those +that behold it from the tabernacle--yet, at some times it pleaseth +God, for our better establishment and the confuting of those which +are as without God in the world, to write it in such text and +capital letters, that, as the prophet saith, "He that runneth by may +read it"--that is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God's +judgments, and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are +nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it. Such +are the notable events and examples of God's judgments, +chastisements, deliverances, and blessings; and this is a work which +has passed through the labour of many, and therefore I cannot +present as omitted. + +(4) There are also other parts of learning which are appendices to +history. For all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words +and deeds, whereof history doth properly receive and retain in +memory the deeds; and if words, yet but as inducements and passages +to deeds; so are there other books and writings which are +appropriate to the custody and receipt of words only, which likewise +are of three sorts--orations, letters, and brief speeches or +sayings. Orations are pleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives, +invectives, apologies, reprehensions, orations of formality or +ceremony, and the like. Letters are according to all the variety of +occasions, advertisements, advises, directions, propositions, +petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of compliment, +of pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of action. And +such as are written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in +my judgment, the best; for they are more natural than orations and +public speeches, and more advised than conferences or present +speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as manage them, or +are privy to them, are of all others the best instructions for +history, and to a diligent reader the best histories in themselves. +For apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book of Caesar's; for as +his history, and those few letters of his which we have, and those +apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men's else, so I +suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done; for as for +those which are collected by others, either I have no taste in such +matters or else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these +three kinds of writings I do not insist, because I have no +deficiences to propound concerning them. + +(5) Thus much therefore concerning history, which is that part of +learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices +of the mind of man, which is that of the memory. + +IV. (1) Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words, for the +most part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, +and doth truly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to +the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath +severed, and sever that which nature hath joined, and so make +unlawful matches and divorces of things--Pictoribus atque poetis, +&c. It is taken in two senses in respect of words or matter. In +the first sense, it is but a character of style, and belongeth to +arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present. In the +latter, it is--as hath been said--one of the principal portions of +learning, and is nothing else but feigned history, which may be +styled as well in prose as in verse. + +(2) The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of +satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature +of things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to +the soul; by reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of +man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more +absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things. +Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not that +magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and +events greater and more heroical. Because true history propoundeth +the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits +of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in +retribution, and more according to revealed Providence. Because +true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less +interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and +more unexpected and alternative variations. So as it appeareth that +poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality and to +delectation. And therefore, it was ever thought to have some +participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the +mind, by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind; +whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of +things. And we see that by these insinuations and congruities with +man's nature and pleasure, joined also with the agreement and +consort it hath with music, it hath had access and estimation in +rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning stood +excluded. + +(3) The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof +(besides those divisions which are common unto it with history, as +feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as +feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) is into poesy +narrative, representative, and allusive. The narrative is a mere +imitation of history, with the excesses before remembered, choosing +for subjects commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes +pleasure or mirth. Representative is as a visible history, and is +an image of actions as if they were present, as history is of +actions in nature as they are (that is) past. Allusive, or +parabolical, is a narration applied only to express some special +purpose or conceit; which latter kind of parabolical wisdom was much +more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of AEsop, and the +brief sentences of the seven, and the use of hieroglyphics may +appear. And the cause was (for that it was then of necessity to +express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtle than the +vulgar in that manner) because men in those times wanted both +variety of examples and subtlety of conceit. And as hieroglyphics +were before letters, so parables were before arguments; and +nevertheless now and at all times they do retain much life and +rigour, because reason cannot be so sensible nor examples so fit. + +(4) But there remaineth yet another use of poesy parabolical, +opposite to that which we last mentioned; for that tendeth to +demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and +this other to retire and obscure it--that is, when the secrets and +mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are involved in fables +or parables. Of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorised. +In heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out +sometimes with great felicity: as in the fable that the giants +being overthrown in their war against the gods, the earth their +mother in revenge thereof brought forth Fame: + + +"Illam terra parens, ira irritat Deorum, +Extremam, ut perhibent, Coeo Enceladoque soroem, +Progenuit." + + +Expounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and +open rebels, then the malignity of people (which is the mother of +rebellion) doth bring forth libels and slanders, and taxations of +the states, which is of the same kind with rebellion but more +feminine. So in the fable that the rest of the gods having +conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called Briareus with his hundred +hands to his aid: expounded that monarchies need not fear any +curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, as long as by +wisdom they keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come +in on their side. So in the fable that Achilles was brought up +under Chiron, the centaur, who was part a man and part a beast, +expounded ingeniously but corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth +to the education and discipline of princes to know as well how to +play the part of a lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the +man in virtue and justice. Nevertheless, in many the like +encounters, I do rather think that the fable was first, and the +exposition devised, than that the moral was first, and thereupon the +fable framed; for I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, +that troubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions +of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient poets; but yet that +all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not +figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of these poets which are now +extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made a kind of +scripture by the later schools of the Grecians), yet I should +without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such +inwardness in his own meaning. But what they might have upon a more +original tradition is not easy to affirm, for he was not the +inventor of many of them. + +(5) In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no +deficience; for being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the +earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad +more than any other kind. But to ascribe unto it that which is due, +for the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and +customs, we are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers' +works; and for wit and eloquence, not much less than to orators' +harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let +us now pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which we +are to approach and view with more reverence and attention. + +V. (1) The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from +above, and some springing from beneath: the one informed by the +light of nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. The light +of nature consisteth in the notions of the mind and the reports of +the senses; for as for knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it +is cumulative and not original, as in a water that besides his own +spring-head is fed with other springs and streams. So then, +according to these two differing illuminations or originals, +knowledge is first of all divided into divinity and philosophy. + +(2) In philosophy the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto +God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted +upon himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three +knowledges--divine philosophy, natural philosophy, and human +philosophy or humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with +this triple character--the power of God, the difference of nature +and the use of man. But because the distributions and partitions of +knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so +touch but in a point, but are like branches of a tree that meet in a +stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and +continuance before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms +and boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into the former +distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the +name of philosophia prima, primitive or summary philosophy, as the +main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide +themselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or +no, I stand doubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody of natural +theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that part of natural +philosophy which concerneth the principles, and of that other part +of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit--all these +strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to +me rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto +some height of terms, than anything solid or substantive of itself. +Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is +current, that the same things are handled but in several respects. +As for example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in +notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature--the one in +appearance, the other in existence; but I find this difference +better made than pursued. For if they had considered quantity, +similitude, diversity, and the rest of those extern characters of +things, as philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of +force have been of a far other kind than they are. For doth any of +them, in handling quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how +far it multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason why some things +in nature are so common, and in so great mass, and others so rare, +and in so small quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and +diversity, assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which +is more like, but move to the loadstone, which is less like? Why in +all diversities of things there should be certain participles in +nature which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be +referred? But there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature +and operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in nature; and +only a resuming and repeating of the force and use of them in speech +or argument. Therefore, because in a writing of this nature I avoid +all subtlety, my meaning touching this original or universal +philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by negative: +"That it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations and +axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of +philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage." + +(3) Now that there are many of that kind need not be doubted. For +example: Is not the rule, Si inoequalibus aequalia addas, omnia +erunt inaequalia, an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics? +and is there not a true coincidence between commutative and +distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? +Is not that other rule, Quae in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se +conveniunt, a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent in +logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the observation, +Omnia mutantur, nil interit, a contemplation in philosophy thus, +that the quantum of nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, +that it requireth the same omnipotency to make somewhat nothing, +which at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the +Scripture, Didici quod omnia opera, quoe fecit Deus, perseverent in +perpetuum; non possumus eis quicquam addere nec auferre. Is not the +ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth concerning +governments, that the way to establish and preserve them is to +reduce them ad principia--a rule in religion and nature, as well as +in civil administration? Was not the Persian magic a reduction or +correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature to the +rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept of a musician, +to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet +accord, alike true in affection? Is not the trope of music, to +avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common with the trope of +rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of the +quavering upon a stop in music the same with the playing of light +upon the water? + + +"Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus." + + +Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of +reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait, +determined and bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as men +of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same +footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or +matters. This science therefore (as I understand it) I may justly +report as deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of +wits, in handling some particular argument, will now and then draw a +bucket of water out of this well for their present use; but the +spring-head thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited, being of +so excellent use both for the disclosing of nature and the +abridgment of art. + +VI. (1) This science being therefore first placed as a common parent +like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, omnes +coelicolas, omnes supera alta tenetes; we may return to the former +distribution of the three philosophies--divine, natural, and human. +And as concerning divine philosophy or natural theology, it is that +knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God which may be +obtained by the contemplation of His creatures; which knowledge may +be truly termed divine in respect of the object, and natural in +respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it +sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion; and +therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert an +atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a +God; but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the +superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to declare the +will and true worship of God. For as all works do show forth the +power and skill of the workman, and not his image, so it is of the +works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, +but not His image. And therefore therein the heathen opinion +differeth from the sacred truth: for they supposed the world to be +the image of God, and man to be an extract or compendious image of +the world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the +world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only THE WORK OF +HIS HANDS; neither do they speak of any other image of God but man. +Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and enforce the +acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, providence, and +goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently +handled by divers, but on the other side, out of the contemplation +of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or +persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not +safe; Da fidei quae fidei sunt. For the heathen themselves conclude +as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain, +"That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; +but, contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven." So +as we ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of +God to our reason, but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason +to the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, touching +divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficience, as I +rather note an excess; whereunto I have digressed because of the +extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy hath received +and may receive by being commixed together; as that which +undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and +fabulous philosophy. + +(2) Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an +appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither +inscrutable nor interdicted. For although the Scripture saith, "Let +no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching the worship of +angels, pressing into that he knoweth not," &c., yet notwithstanding +if you observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that there +be two things only forbidden--adoration of them, and opinion +fantastical of them, either to extol them further than appertaineth +to the degree of a creature, or to extol a man's knowledge of them +further than he hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry, +which may arise out of the passages of Holy Scriptures, or out of +the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and +revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the employment of them +is prohibited, much more any veneration towards them; but the +contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their +illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual +wisdom. For so the apostle saith, "We are not ignorant of his +stratagems." And it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of +evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the +nature of sin and vice in morality. But this part touching angels +and spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied +themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many of the writers +thereof, as fabulous and fantastical. + +VII. (1) Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology +(not divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of +all as the haven and sabbath of all man's contemplations) we will +now proceed to natural philosophy. If then it be true that +Democritus said, "That the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep +mines and caves;" and if it be true likewise that the alchemists do +so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth +that dexterously and compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages +and length of time, it were good to divide natural philosophy into +the mine and the furnace, and to make two professions or occupations +of natural philosophers--some to be pioneers and some smiths; some +to dig, and some to refine and hammer. And surely I do best allow +of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and scholastical +terms: namely, that these be the two parts of natural philosophy-- +the inquisition of causes, and the production of effects; +speculative and operative; natural science, and natural prudence. +For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom +of direction; so is it in natural. And here I will make a request, +that for the latter (or at least for a part thereof) I may revive +and reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of natural magic, +which in the true sense is but natural wisdom, or natural prudence; +taken according to the ancient acception, purged from vanity and +superstition. Now although it be true, and I know it well, that +there is an intercourse between causes and effects, so as both these +knowledges, speculative and operative, have a great connection +between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful natural +philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, +ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and +descending from causes to the invention of new experiments; +therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be +severally considered and handled. + +(2) Natural science or theory is divided into physic and metaphysic; +wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysic +in a differing sense from that that is received. And in like +manner, I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of judgment, +that in this and other particulars, wheresoever my conception and +notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the +ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by +the order and perspicuous expressing of that I do propound, I am +otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from +antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and +the proficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little marvel +at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of +difference and contradiction towards all antiquity; undertaking not +only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and +extinguish all ancient wisdom; insomuch as he never nameth or +mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and reprove; +wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he took the +right course. For certainly there cometh to pass, and hath place in +human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest +truth:- Veni in nomine partis, nec recipits me; si quis venerit in +nomine suo eum recipietis. But in this divine aphorism (considering +to whom it was applied, namely, to antichrist, the highest +deceiver), we may discern well that the coming in a man's own name, +without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth, +although it be joined with the fortune and success of an eum +recipietis. But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will think +of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom it +seemeth he did emulate; the one to conquer all opinions, as the +other to conquer all nations. Wherein, nevertheless, it may be, he +may at some men's hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a +like title as his scholar did:- + + +"Felix terrarum praedo, non utile mundo +Editus exemplum, &c." + + +So, + + +"Felix doctrinae praedo." + + +But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my +pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and +proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity usque ad +aras; and, therefore, to retain the ancient terms, though I +sometimes alter the uses and definitions, according to the moderate +proceeding in civil government; where, although there be some +alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, eadem +magistratuum vocabula. + +(3) To return, therefore, to the use and acception of the term +metaphysic as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that +which hath been already said, that I intend philosophia prima, +summary philosophy and metaphysic, which heretofore have been +confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For the one I have +made as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and the other +I have now brought in as a branch or descendant of natural science. +It appeareth likewise that I have assigned to summary philosophy the +common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent +to several sciences; I have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry +touching the operation or the relative and adventive characters of +essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility, and the +rest, with this distinction and provision; that they be handled as +they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth +likewise that natural theology, which heretofore hath been handled +confusedly with metaphysic, I have enclosed and bounded by itself. +It is therefore now a question what is left remaining for +metaphysic; wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of +the conceit of antiquity, that physic should contemplate that which +is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that +which is abstracted and fixed. And again, that physic should handle +that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and +metaphysic should handle that which supposeth further in nature a +reason, understanding, and platform. But the difference, +perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For as we +divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes and +productions of effects, so that part which concerneth the inquiry of +causes we do subdivide according to the received and sound division +of causes. The one part, which is physic, inquireth and handleth +the material and efficient causes; and the other, which is +metaphysic, handleth the formal and final causes. + +(4) Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and not according +to our idiom for medicine) is situate in a middle term or distance +between natural history and metaphysic. For natural history +describeth the variety of things; physic the causes, but variable or +respective causes; and metaphysic the fixed and constant causes. + + +"Limus ut hic durescit, et haec ut cera liquescit, +Uno eodemque igni." + + +Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is the +cause of colliquation, but respective to wax. But fire is no +constant cause either of induration or colliquation; so then the +physical causes are but the efficient and the matter. Physic hath +three parts, whereof two respect nature united or collected, the +third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. Nature is +collected either into one entire total, or else into the same +principles or seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching the +contexture or configuration of things, as de mundo, de universitate +rerum. The second is the doctrine concerning the principles or +originals of things. The third is the doctrine concerning all +variety and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing +substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof there +needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss or paraphrase +that attendeth upon the text of natural history. Of these three I +cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or perfection they +are handled, I make not now any judgment; but they are parts of +knowledge not deserted by the labour of man. + +(5) For metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal +and final causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may +seem to be nugatory and void, because of the received and inveterate +opinion, that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out +essential forms or true differences; of which opinion we will take +this hold, that the invention of forms is of all other parts of +knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found. +As for the possibility, they are ill discoverers that think there is +no land, when they can see nothing but sea. But it is manifest that +Plato, in his opinion of ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation +situate as upon a cliff, did descry that forms were the true object +of knowledge; but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering +of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and +determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon theology, +wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. But if any man +shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action, +operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice +what are the forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and +important to the state of man. For as to the forms of substances +(man only except, of whom it is said, Formavit hominem de limo +terrae, et spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae, and not as of +all other creatures, Producant aquae, producat terra), the forms of +substances I say (as they are now by compounding and transplanting +multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired; no +more than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the +forms of those sounds which make words, which by composition and +transposition of letters are infinite. But, on the other side, to +inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters +is easily comprehensible; and being known induceth and manifesteth +the forms of all words, which consist and are compounded of them. +In the same manner to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of +gold; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the +forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of +gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and +all other natures and qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not +many, and of which the essences (upheld by matter) of all creatures +do consist; to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, is that part +of metaphysic which we now define of. Not but that physic doth make +inquiry and take consideration of the same natures; but how? Only +as to the material and efficient causes of them, and not as to the +forms. For example, if the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be +inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the subtle intermixture of +air and water is the cause, it is well rendered; but, nevertheless, +is this the form of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which +is ever but vehiculum formae. This part of metaphysic I do not find +laboured and performed; whereat I marvel not; because I hold it not +possible to be invented by that course of invention which hath been +used; in regard that men (which is the root of all error) have made +too untimely a departure, and too remote a recess from particulars. + +(6) But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I report as +deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the +one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge +the infinity of individual experience, as much as the conception of +truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of vita brevis, ars +longa; which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of +sciences. For knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the +basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the +stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is +metaphysic. As for the vertical point, opus quod operatur Deus a +principio usque ad finem, the summary law of nature, we know not +whether man's inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the +true stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no +better than the giants' hills:- + + +"Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam, +Scilicet atque Ossae frondsum involvere Olympum." + + +But to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they are as +the three acclamations, Sante, sancte, sancte! holy in the +description or dilatation of His works; holy in the connection or +concatenation of them; and holy in the union of them in a perpetual +and uniform law. And, therefore, the speculation was excellent in +Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all +things by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that knowledge +is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, which +appeareth to be metaphysic; as that which considereth the simple +forms or differences of things, which are few in number, and the +degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety. The +second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of +metaphysic, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the +greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For physic +carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to many +accidents and impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses +of nature. But latae undique sunt sapientibus viae; to sapience +(which was anciently defined to be rerum divinarum et humanarum +scientia) there is ever a choice of means. For physical causes give +light to new invention in simili materia. But whosoever knoweth any +form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature +upon any variety of matter; and so is less restrained in operation, +either to the basis of the matter, or the condition of the +efficient; which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, though in a +more divine sense, elegantly describeth: non arctabuntur gressus +tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum. The ways of sapience are +not much liable either to particularity or chance. + +(7) The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of final causes, +which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced. And +yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it; for +order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance +of sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at +least a great improficience in the sciences themselves. For the +handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, +hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and +physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these +satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice +of further discovery. For this I find done not only by Plato, who +ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others +which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing +causes. For to say that "the hairs of the eyelids are for a +quickset and fence about the sight;" or that "the firmness of the +skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the +extremities of heat or cold;" or that "the bones are for the columns +or beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of living creatures are +built;" or that "the leaves of trees are for protecting of the +fruit;" or that "the clouds are for watering of the earth;" or that +"the solidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of living +creatures;" and the like, is well inquired and collected in +metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. Nay, they are, +indeed, but remoras and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from +further sailing; and have brought this to pass, that the search of +the physical causes hath been neglected and passed in silence. And, +therefore, the natural philosophy of Democritus and some others, who +did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, but +attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite +essays or proofs of Nature, which they term fortune, seemeth to me +(as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which remain +unto us) in particularities of physical causes more real and better +inquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled +final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part +of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both +those persons; not because those final causes are not true and +worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province, but +because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath +bred a vastness and solitude in that tract. For otherwise, keeping +their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they +think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them. For the +cause rendered, that "the hairs about the eyelids are for the +safeguard of the sight," doth not impugn the cause rendered, that +"pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture--muscosi fontes, &c." +Nor the cause rendered, that "the firmness of hides is for the +armour of the body against extremities of heat or cold," doth not +impugn the cause rendered, that "contraction of pores is incident to +the outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or +unlike bodies;" and so of the rest, both causes being true and +compatible, the one declaring an intention, the other a consequence +only. Neither doth this call in question or derogate from Divine +Providence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil +actions he is the greater and deeper politique that can make other +men the instruments of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint +them with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know what +they do, than he that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth; +so is the wisdom of God more admirable, when Nature intendeth one +thing and Providence draweth forth another, than if He had +communicated to particular creatures and motions the characters and +impressions of His Providence. And thus much for metaphysic; the +latter part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his +proper place. + +VIII. (1) Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another part of natural +philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and holdeth +rank with physic special and metaphysic, which is mathematic; but I +think it more agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of +order, to place it as a branch of metaphysic. For the subject of it +being quantity, not quantity indefinite, which is but a relative, +and belongeth to philosophia prima (as hath been said), but quantity +determined or proportionable, it appeareth to be one of the +essential forms of things, as that that is causative in Nature of a +number of effects; insomuch as we see in the schools both of +Democritus and of Pythagoras that the one did ascribe figure to the +first seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the +principles and originals of things. And it is true also that of all +other forms (as we understand forms) it is the most abstracted and +separable from matter, and therefore most proper to metaphysic; +which hath likewise been the cause why it hath been better laboured +and inquired than any of the other forms, which are more immersed in +matter. For it being the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme +prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of +generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of +particularity, the mathematics of all other knowledge were the +goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite. But for the placing of +this science, it is not much material: only we have endeavoured in +these our partitions to observe a kind of perspective, that one part +may cast light upon another. + +(2) The mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the pure +mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle quantity +determinate, merely severed from any axioms of natural philosophy; +and these are two, geometry and arithmetic, the one handling +quantity continued, and the other dissevered. Mixed hath for +subject some axioms or parts of natural philosophy, and considereth +quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto them. For +many parts of Nature can neither be invented with sufficient +subtlety, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor +accommodated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and +intervening of the mathematics, of which sort are perspective, +music, astronomy, cosmography, architecture, engineery, and divers +others. In the mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be +that men do not sufficiently understand this excellent use of the +pure mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many defects in +the wit and faculties intellectual. For if the wit be too dull, +they sharpen it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent in +the sense, they abstract it. So that as tennis is a game of no use +in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a +body ready to put itself into all postures, so in the mathematics +that use which is collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than +that which is principal and intended. And as for the mixed +mathematics, I may only make this prediction, that there cannot fail +to be more kinds of them as Nature grows further disclosed. Thus +much of natural science, or the part of Nature speculative. + +(3) For natural prudence, or the part operative of natural +philosophy, we will divide it into three parts--experimental, +philosophical, and magical; which three parts active have a +correspondence and analogy with the three parts speculative, natural +history, physic, and metaphysic. For many operations have been +invented, sometimes by a casual incidence and occurrence, sometimes +by a purposed experiment; and of those which have been found by an +intentional experiment, some have been found out by varying or +extending the same experiment, some by transferring and compounding +divers experiments the one into the other, which kind of invention +an empiric may manage. Again, by the knowledge of physical causes +there cannot fail to follow many indications and designations of new +particulars, if men in their speculation will keep one eye upon use +and practice. But these are but coastings along the shore, premendo +littus iniquum; for it seemeth to me there can hardly be discovered +any radical or fundamental alterations and innovations in Nature, +either by the fortune and essays of experiments, or by the light and +direction of physical causes. If, therefore, we have reported +metaphysic deficient, it must follow that we do the like of natural +magic, which hath relation thereunto. For as for the natural magic +whereof now there is mention in books, containing certain credulous +and superstitious conceits and observations of sympathies and +antipathies, and hidden proprieties, and some frivolous experiments, +strange rather by disguisement than in themselves, it is as far +differing in truth of Nature from such a knowledge as we require as +the story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bourdeaux, differs +from Caesar's Commentaries in truth of story; for it is manifest +that Caesar did greater things de vero than those imaginary heroes +were feigned to do. But he did them not in that fabulous manner. +Of this kind of learning the fable of Ixion was a figure, who +designed to enjoy Juno, the goddess of power, and instead of her had +copulation with a cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and +chimeras. So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous +imaginations, instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of truth, +shall beget hopes and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes. +And, therefore, we may note in these sciences which hold so much of +imagination and belief, as this degenerate natural magic, alchemy, +astrology, and the like, that in their propositions the description +of the means is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end. For +it is a thing more probable that he that knoweth well the natures of +weight, of colour, of pliant and fragile in respect of the hammer, +of volatile and fixed in respect of the fire, and the rest, may +superinduce upon some metal the nature and form of gold by such +mechanic as longeth to the production of the natures afore +rehearsed, than that some grains of the medicine projected should in +a few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver or other material +into gold. So it is more probable that he that knoweth the nature +of arefaction, the nature of assimilation of nourishment to the +thing nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of spirits, the +manner of the depredations which spirits make upon the humours and +solid parts, shall by ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, +medicines, motions, and the like, prolong life, or restore some +degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be done with the use +of a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receipt. To conclude, +therefore, the true natural magic, which is that great liberty and +latitude of operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of forms, I +may report deficient, as the relative thereof is. To which part, if +we be serious and incline not to vanities and plausible discourse, +besides the deriving and deducing the operations themselves from +metaphysic, there are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one +by way of preparation, the other by way of caution. The first is, +that there be made a calendar, resembling an inventory of the estate +of man, containing all the inventions (being the works or fruits of +Nature or art) which are now extant, and whereof man is already +possessed; out of which doth naturally result a note what things are +yet held impossible, or not invented, which calendar will be the +more artificial and serviceable if to every reputed impossibility +you add what thing is extant which cometh the nearest in degree to +that impossibility; to the end that by these optatives and +potentials man's inquiry may be the more awake in deducing direction +of works from the speculation of causes. And secondly, that these +experiments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and present +use, but those principally which are of most universal consequence +for invention of other experiments, and those which give most light +to the invention of causes; for the invention of the mariner's +needle, which giveth the direction, is of no less benefit for +navigation than the invention of the sails which give the motion. + +(4) Thus have I passed through natural philosophy and the +deficiences thereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient and +received doctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction, for my +part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If +it be truth, + + +"Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvae," + + +the voice of Nature will consent, whether the voice of man do or no. +And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the +French for Naples, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark +up their lodgings, and not with weapons to fight; so I like better +that entry of truth which cometh peaceably with chalk to mark up +those minds which are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that +which cometh with pugnacity and contention. + +(5) But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy according +to the report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning the matter or +subject: and that is positive and considerative, when the inquiry +reporteth either an assertion or a doubt. These doubts or non +liquets are of two sorts, particular and total. For the first, we +see a good example thereof in Aristotle's Problems which deserved to +have had a better continuance; but so nevertheless as there is one +point whereof warning is to be given and taken. The registering of +doubts hath two excellent uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy +from errors and falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing +is not collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but +reserved in doubt; the other, that the entry of doubts are as so +many suckers or sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as that +which if doubts had not preceded, a man should never have advised, +but passed it over without note, by the suggestion and solicitation +of doubts is made to be attended and applied. But both these +commodities do scarcely countervail and inconvenience, which will +intrude itself if it be not debarred; which is, that when a doubt is +once received, men labour rather how to keep it a doubt still, than +how to solve it, and accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see +the familiar example in lawyers and scholars, both which, if they +have once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for a +doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be allowed, which +laboureth to make doubtful things certain, and not those which +labour to make certain things doubtful. Therefore these calendars +of doubts I commend as excellent things; so that there he this +caution used, that when they be thoroughly sifted and brought to +resolution, they be from thenceforth omitted, discarded, and not +continued to cherish and encourage men in doubting. To which +calendar of doubts or problems I advise be annexed another calendar, +as much or more material which is a calendar of popular errors: I +mean chiefly in natural history, such as pass in speech and conceit, +and are nevertheless apparently detected and convicted of untruth, +that man's knowledge be not weakened nor embased by such dross and +vanity. As for the doubts or non liquets general or in total, I +understand those differences of opinions touching the principles of +nature, and the fundamental points of the same, which have caused +the diversity of sects, schools, and philosophies, as that of +Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the rest. For +although Aristotle, as though he had been of the race of the +Ottomans, thought he could not reign except the first thing he did +he killed all his brethren; yet to those that seek truth and not +magistrality, it cannot but seem a matter of great profit, to see +before them the several opinions touching the foundations of nature. +Not for any exact truth that can be expected in those theories; for +as the same phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by this received +astronomy of the diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the +planets, with their eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the +theory of Copernicus, who supposed the earth to move, and the +calculations are indifferently agreeable to both, so the ordinary +face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several +theories and philosophies; whereas to find the real truth requireth +another manner of severity and attention. For as Aristotle saith, +that children at the first will call every woman mother, but +afterward they come to distinguish according to truth, so +experience, if it be in childhood, will call every philosophy +mother, but when it cometh to ripeness it will discern the true +mother. So as in the meantime it is good to see the several glosses +and opinions upon Nature, whereof it may be everyone in some one +point hath seen clearer than his fellows, therefore I wish some +collection to be made painfully and understandingly de antiquis +philosophiis, out of all the possible light which remaineth to us of +them: which kind of work I find deficient. But here I must give +warning, that it be done distinctly and severedly; the philosophies +of everyone throughout by themselves, and not by titles packed and +faggoted up together, as hath been done by Plutarch. For it is the +harmony of a philosophy in itself, which giveth it light and +credence; whereas if it be singled and broken, it will seem more +foreign and dissonant. For as when I read in Tacitus the actions of +Nero or Claudius, with circumstances of times, inducements, and +occasions, I find them not so strange; but when I read them in +Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and bundles and not in +order of time, they seem more monstrous and incredible: so is it of +any philosophy reported entire, and dismembered by articles. +Neither do I exclude opinions of latter times to be likewise +represented in this calendar of sects of philosophy, as that of +Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into an harmony by the +pen of Severinus the Dane; and that of Tilesius, and his scholar +Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of sense, but of no +great depth; and that of Fracastorius, who, though he pretended not +to make any new philosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own +sense upon the old; and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who +revived, with some alterations and demonstrations, the opinions of +Xenophanes; and any other worthy to be admitted. + +(6) Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of man's +knowledge; that is radius directus, which is referred to nature, +radius refractus, which is referred to God, and cannot report truly +because of the inequality of the medium. There resteth radius +reflexus, whereby man beholdeth and contemplateth himself. + +IX. (1) We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the +ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; +which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth +us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of +natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is +but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of Nature. And +generally let this be a rule, that all partitions of knowledges be +accepted rather for lines and veins than for sections and +separations; and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be +preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to +become barren, shallow, and erroneous, while they have not been +nourished and maintained from the common fountain. So we see +Cicero, the orator, complained of Socrates and his school, that he +was the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon +rhetoric became an empty and verbal art. So we may see that the +opinion of Copernicus, touching the rotation of the earth, which +astronomy itself cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any +of the phenomena, yet natural philosophy may correct. So we see +also that the science of medicine if it be destituted and forsaken +by natural philosophy, it is not much better than an empirical +practice. With this reservation, therefore, we proceed to human +philosophy or humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth +man segregate or distributively, the other congregate or in society; +so as human philosophy is either simple and particular, or conjugate +and civil. Humanity particular consisteth of the same parts whereof +man consisteth: that is, of knowledges which respect the body, and +of knowledges that respect the mind. But before we distribute so +far, it is good to constitute. For I do take the consideration in +general, and at large, of human nature to be fit to be emancipate +and made a knowledge by itself, not so much in regard of those +delightful and elegant discourses which have been made of the +dignity of man, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like +adjuncts of his common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard +of the knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances between +the mind and body, which being mixed cannot be properly assigned to +the sciences of either. + +(2) This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and +amities consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so this +league of mind and body hath these two parts: how the one +discloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon the other; +discovery and impression. The former of these hath begotten two +arts, both of prediction or prenotion; whereof the one is honoured +with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. And +although they have of later time been used to be coupled with +superstitions and fantastical arts, yet being purged and restored to +their true state, they have both of them a solid ground in Nature, +and a profitable use in life. The first is physiognomy, which +discovereth the disposition of the mind by the lineaments of the +body. The second is the exposition of natural dreams, which +discovereth the state of the body by the imaginations of the mind. +In the former of these I note a deficience. For Aristotle hath very +ingeniously and diligently handled the factures of the body, but not +the gestures of the body, which are no less comprehensible by art, +and of greater use and advantage. For the lineaments of the body do +disclose the disposition and inclination of the mind in general; but +the motions of the countenance and parts do not only so, but do +further disclose the present humour and state of the mind and will. +For as your majesty saith most aptly and elegantly, "As the tongue +speaketh to the ear so the gesture speaketh to the eye." And, +therefore, a number of subtle persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the +faces and fashions of men, do well know the advantage of this +observation, as being most part of their ability; neither can it be +denied, but that it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and a +great direction in business. + +(3) The latter branch, touching impression, hath not been collected +into art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it hath the same +relation or antistrophe that the former hath. For the consideration +is double--either how and how far the humours and affects of the +body do alter or work upon the mind, or, again, how and how far the +passions or apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the +body. The former of these hath been inquired and considered as a +part and appendix of medicine, but much more as a part of religion +or superstition. For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in +frenzies and melancholy passions, and pretendeth also to exhibit +medicines to exhilarate the mind, to control the courage, to clarify +the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like; but the scruples +and superstitions of diet and other regiment of the body in the sect +of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the Manichees, and in the law +of Mahomet, do exceed. So likewise the ordinances in the ceremonial +law, interdicting the eating of the blood and the fat, +distinguishing between beasts clean and unclean for meat, are many +and strict; nay, the faith itself being clear and serene from all +clouds of ceremony, yet retaineth the use of fastlings, abstinences, +and other macerations and humiliations of the body, as things real, +and not figurative. The root and life of all which prescripts is +(besides the ceremony) the consideration of that dependency which +the affections of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and +disposition of the body. And if any man of weak judgment do +conceive that this suffering of the mind from the body doth either +question the immortality, or derogate from the sovereignty of the +soul, he may be taught, in easy instances, that the infant in the +mother's womb is compatible with the mother, and yet separable; and +the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his servants, and yet +without subjection. As for the reciprocal knowledge, which is the +operation of the conceits and passions of the mind upon the body, we +see all wise physicians, in the prescriptions of their regiments to +their patients, do ever consider accidentia animi, as of great force +to further or hinder remedies or recoveries: and more specially it +is an inquiry of great depth and worth concerning imagination, how +and how far it altereth the body proper of the imaginant; for +although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not it hath +the same degree of power to help. No more than a man can conclude, +that because there be pestilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man in +health, therefore there should be sovereign airs, able suddenly to +cure a man in sickness. But the inquisition of this part is of +great use, though it needeth, as Socrates said, "a Delian diver," +being difficult and profound. But unto all this knowledge de +communi vinculo, of the concordances between the mind and the body, +that part of inquiry is most necessary which considereth of the +seats and domiciles which the several faculties of the mind do take +and occupate in the organs of the body; which knowledge hath been +attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be much better +inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the understanding in +the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, having a +greater mixture with pride) in the heart, and concupiscence or +sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to be despised, but much less +to be allowed. So, then, we have constituted (as in our own wish +and advice) the inquiry touching human nature entire, as a just +portion of knowledge to be handled apart. + +X. (1) The knowledge that concerneth man's body is divided as the +good of man's body is divided, unto which it referreth. The good of +man's body is of four kinds--health, beauty, strength, and pleasure: +so the knowledges are medicine, or art of cure; art of decoration, +which is called cosmetic; art of activity, which is called athletic; +and art voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth eruditus luxus. +This subject of man's body is, of all other things in nature, most +susceptible of remedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible of +error; for the same subtlety of the subject doth cause large +possibility and easy failing, and therefore the inquiry ought to be +the more exact. + +(2) To speak, therefore, of medicine, and to resume that we have +said, ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that man was +microcosmus--an abstract or model of the world--hath been +fantastically strained by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as if there +were to be found in man's body certain correspondences and +parallels, which should have respect to all varieties of things, as +stars, planets, minerals, which are extant in the great world. But +thus much is evidently true, that of all substances which nature +hath produced, man's body is the most extremely compounded. For we +see herbs and plants are nourished by earth and water; beasts for +the most part by herbs and fruits; man by the flesh of beasts, +birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the manifold +alterations, dressings, and preparations of these several bodies +before they come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto that +beasts have a more simple order of life, and less change of +affections to work upon their bodies, whereas man in his mansion, +sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite variations: and it cannot +be denied but that the body of man of all other things is of the +most compounded mass. The soul, on the other side, is the simplest +of substances, as is well expressed: + + + "Purumque reliquit +AEthereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem." + + +So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if +that principle be true, that Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum, +placidus in loco. But to the purpose. This variable composition of +man's body hath made it as an instrument easy to distemper; and, +therefore, the poets did well to conjoin music and medicine in +Apollo, because the office of medicine is but to tune this curious +harp of man's body and to reduce it to harmony. So, then, the +subject being so variable hath made the art by consequent more +conjectural; and the art being conjectural hath made so much the +more place to be left for imposture. For almost all other arts and +sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, and +not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue +of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause; this master in +this ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by +the fortune of the voyage; but the physician, and perhaps this +politique, hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability, but +is judged most by the event, which is ever but as it is taken: for +who can tell, if a patient die or recover, or if a state be +preserved or ruined, whether it be art or accident? And therefore +many times the impostor is prized, and the man of virtue taxed. +Nay, we see [the] weakness and credulity of men is such, as they +will often refer a mountebank or witch before a learned physician. +And therefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this +extreme folly when they made AEsculapius and Circe, brother and +sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses - + + +"Ipse repertorem medicinae talis et artis +Fulmine Phoebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas." + + +And again - + + +"Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos," &c. + + +For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and old +women and impostors, have had a competition with physicians. And +what followeth? Even this, that physicians say to themselves, as +Solomon expresseth it upon a higher occasion, "If it befall to me as +befalleth to the fools, why should I labour to be more wise?" And +therefore I cannot much blame physicians that they use commonly to +intend some other art or practice, which they fancy more than their +profession; for you shall have of them antiquaries, poets, +humanists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and in every of these +better seen than in their profession; and no doubt upon this ground +that they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art maketh no +difference in profit or reputation towards their fortune: for the +weakness of patients, and sweetness of life, and nature of hope, +maketh men depend upon physicians with all their defects. But, +nevertheless, these things which we have spoken of are courses +begotten between a little occasion and a great deal of sloth and +default; for if we will excite and awake our observation, we shall +see in familiar instances what a predominant faculty the subtlety of +spirit hath over the variety of matter or form. Nothing more +variable than faces and countenances, yet men can bear in memory the +infinite distinctions of them; nay, a painter, with a few shells of +colours, and the benefit of his eye, and habit of his imagination, +can imitate them all that ever have been, are, or may be, if they +were brought before him. Nothing more variable than voices, yet men +can likewise discern them personally: nay, you shall have a buffon +or pantomimus will express as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more +variable than the differing sounds of words; yet men have found the +way to reduce them to a few simple letters. So that it is not the +insufficiency or incapacity of man's mind, but it is the remote +standing or placing thereof that breedeth these mazes and +incomprehensions; for as the sense afar off is full of mistaking, +but is exact at hand, so is it of the understanding, the remedy +whereof is, not to quicken or strengthen the organ, but to go nearer +to the object; and therefore there is no doubt but if the physicians +will learn and use the true approaches and avenues of nature, they +may assume as much as the poet saith: + + +"Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes; +Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt." + + +Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth deserve: +well shadowed by the poets, in that they made AEsculapius to be the +son of [the] sun, the one being the fountain of life, the other as +the second-stream; but infinitely more honoured by the example of +our Saviour, who made the body of man the object of His miracles, as +the soul was the object of His doctrine. For we read not that ever +He vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or money (except that +one for giving tribute to Caesar), but only about the preserving, +sustaining, and healing the body of man. + +(3) Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have said) more +professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; the +labour having been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in +progression. For I find much iteration, but small addition. It +considereth causes of diseases, with the occasions or impulsions; +the diseases themselves, with the accidents; and the cures, with the +preservations. The deficiences which I think good to note, being a +few of many, and those such as are of a more open and manifest +nature, I will enumerate and not place. + +(4) The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious +diligence of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of the +special cases of his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they +were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having an example +proper in the father of the art, I shall not need to allege an +example foreign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who are careful to +report new cases and decisions, for the direction of future +judgments. This continuance of medicinal history I find deficient; +which I understand neither to be so infinite as to extend to every +common case, nor so reserved as to admit none but wonders: for many +things are new in this manner, which are not new in the kind; and if +men will intend to observe, they shall find much worthy to observe. + +(5) In the inquiry which is made by anatomy, I find much deficience: +for they inquire of the parts, and their substances, figures, and +collocations; but they inquire not of the diversities of the parts, +the secrecies of the passages, and the seats or nestling of the +humours, nor much of the footsteps and impressions of diseases. The +reason of which omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry +may be satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies; but the +latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from the view of +many. And as to the diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the +facture or framing of the inward parts is as full of difference as +the outward, and in that is the cause continent of many diseases; +which not being observed, they quarrel many times with the humours, +which are not in fault; the fault being in the very frame and +mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine +alterative, but must be accommodated and palliated by diets and +medicines familiar. And for the passages and pores, it is true +which was anciently noted, that the more subtle of them appear not +in anatomies, because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, +though they be open and manifest in life: which being supposed, +though the inhumanity of anatomia vivorum was by Celsus justly +reproved; yet in regard of the great use of this observation, the +inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been relinquished +altogether, or referred to the casual practices of surgery; but +might have been well diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive, +which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts may +sufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, they are +commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments; whereas it is most +necessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and receptacles the +humours do find in the parts, with the differing kind of the humour +so lodged and received. And as for the footsteps of diseases, and +their devastations of the inward parts, impostumations, +exulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, +contractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, obstructions, +repletions, together with all preternatural substances, as stones, +carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to have +been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and the +contribution of men's several experiences, and carefully set down +both historically according to the appearances, and artificially +with a reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from +them, in case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas now +upon opening of bodies they are passed over slightly and in silence. + +(6) In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of many, +some as in their nature incurable, and others as past the period of +cure; so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed so many men +to die, as they do by their ignorant edicts: whereof numbers do +escape with less difficulty than they did in the Roman +prescriptions. Therefore I will not doubt to note as a deficience, +that they inquire not the perfect cures of many diseases, or +extremities of diseases; but pronouncing them incurable do enact a +law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from discredit. + +(7) Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician not only to +restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and not only when +such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to +make a fair and easy passage. For it is no small felicity which +Augustus Caesar was wont to wish to himself, that same Euthanasia; +and which was specially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose +death was after the fashion, and semblance of a kindly and pleasant +sheep. So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was +judged desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a large +draught and ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made, +Hinc Stygias ebrius hausit aquas; he was not sober enough to taste +any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the physicians +contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the +patient after the disease is deplored; whereas in my judgment they +ought both to inquire the skill, and to give the attendances, for +the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death. + +(5) In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a +deficience in the receipts of propriety, respecting the particular +cures of diseases: for the physicians have frustrated the fruit of +tradition and experience by their magistralities, in adding and +taking out and changing quid pro qua in their receipts, at their +pleasures; commanding so over the medicine, as the medicine cannot +command over the disease. For except it be treacle and mithridatum, +and of late diascordium, and a few more, they tie themselves to no +receipts severely and religiously. For as to the confections of +sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness and not for +propriety. For they are upon general intentions of purging, +opening, comforting, altering, and not much appropriate to +particular diseases. And this is the cause why empirics and old +women are more happy many times in their cures than learned +physicians, because they are more religious in holding their +medicines. Therefore here is the deficience which I find, that +physicians have not, partly out of their own practice, partly out of +the constant probations reported in books, and partly out of the +traditions of empirics, set down and delivered over certain +experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases, besides +their own conjectural and magistral descriptions. For as they were +the men of the best composition in the state of Rome, which either +being consuls inclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined to +the senate; so in the matter we now handle, they be the best +physicians, which being learned incline to the traditions of +experience, or being empirics incline to the methods of learning. + +(9) In preparation of medicines I do find strange, specially +considering how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they +are safer for the outward than inward parts, that no man hath sought +to make an imitation by art of natural baths and medicinable +fountains: which nevertheless are confessed to receive their +virtues from minerals; and not so only, but discerned and +distinguished from what particular mineral they receive tincture, as +sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like; which nature, if it may be +reduced to compositions of art, both the variety of them will be +increased, and the temper of them will be more commanded. + +(10) But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable either +to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the +note of one deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest +consequence: which is, that the prescripts in use are too +compendious to attain their end; for, to my understanding, it is a +vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so +sovereign or so happy, as that the receipt or miss of it can work +any great effect upon the body of man. It were a strange speech +which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to +which he were by nature subject. It is order, pursuit, sequence, +and interchange of application, which is mighty in nature; which +although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing, and more +precise obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with the +magnitude of effects. And although a man would think, by the daily +visitations of the physicians, that there were a pursuance in the +cure, yet let a man look into their prescripts and ministrations, +and he shall find them but inconstancies and every day's devices, +without any settled providence or project. Not that every +scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual, no more than +every straight way is the way to heaven; but the truth of the +direction must precede severity of observance. + +(11) For cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: for +cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence +to God, to society, and to ourselves. As for artificial decoration, +it is well worthy of the deficiences which it hath; being neither +fine enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor wholesome to +please. + +(12) For athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is to say, +for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought, +whether it be of activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two +parts, strength and swiftness; and patience likewise hath two parts, +hardness against wants and extremities, and endurance of pain or +torment; whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in savages, and +in those that suffer punishment. Nay, if there be any other faculty +which falls not within any of the former divisions, as in those that +dive, that obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and the +like, I refer it to this part. Of these things the practices are +known, but the philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired; +the rather, I think, because they are supposed to be obtained, +either by an aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, or only by +continual custom, which is soon prescribed which though it be not +true, yet I forbear to note any deficiences; for the Olympian games +are down long since, and the mediocrity of these things is for use; +as for the excellency of them it serveth for the most part but for +mercenary ostentation. + +(13) For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them is +of laws to repress them. For as it hath been well observed, that +the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are +military; and while virtue is in state, are liberal; and while +virtue is in declination, are voluptuary: so I doubt that this age +of the world is somewhat upon the descent of the wheel. With arts +voluptuary I couple practices joculary; for the deceiving of the +senses is one of the pleasures of the senses. As for games of +recreation, I hold them to belong to civil life and education. And +thus much of that particular human philosophy which concerns the +body, which is but the tabernacle of the mind. + +XI. (1) For human knowledge which concerns the mind, it hath two +parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul +or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions +thereof. Unto the first of these, the considerations of the +original of the soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far +it is exempted from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof, +and many other points, do appertain: which have been not more +laboriously inquired than variously reported; so as the travail +therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way. +But although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really +and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath been, yet I hold +that in the end it must be hounded by religion, or else it will be +subject to deceit and delusion. For as the substance of the soul in +the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth +by the benediction of a producat, but was immediately inspired from +God, so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by +accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the +subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the +nature and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that +gave the substance. Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul +there be two appendices; which, as they have been handled, have +rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth: divination and +fascination. + +(2) Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial +and natural: whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a +prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural +is, when the mind hath a presention by an internal power, without +the inducement of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts: either when +the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is +rational; or when it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the +effect, which is experimental: whereof the latter for the most part +is superstitious, such as were the heathen observations upon the +inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of +bees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For +artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed +amongst particular knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions, +as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician +hath his predictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and +issues of diseases. The politique hath his predictions; O urbem +venalem, et cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit! which stayed not +long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in Caesar: so as +these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred over. But +the divination which springeth from the internal nature of the soul +is that which we now speak of; which hath been made to be of two +sorts, primitive and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the +supposition that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into +itself, and not diffused into the organs of the body, hath some +extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore appeareth most in +sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in waking +apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and +observances which make the mind most to consist in itself. By +influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror +or glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and +spirits: unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce. For +the retiring of the mind within itself is the state which is most +susceptible of divine influxions; save that it is accompanied in +this case with a fervency and elevation (which the ancients noted by +fury), and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other. + +(3) Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive upon +other bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that we spake in +the proper place. Wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the +disciples of pretended natural magic, have been so intemperate, as +they have exalted the power of the imagination to be much one with +the power of miracle-working faith. Others, that draw nearer to +probability, calling to their view the secret passages of things, +and specially of the contagion that passeth from body to body, do +conceive it should likewise be agreeable to nature that there should +be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without +the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown (now +almost made civil) of the mastering spirit, and the force of +confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to +raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified +have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. +And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a +great part of ceremonial magic. For it may be pretended that +ceremonies, characters, and charms do work, not by any tacit or +sacramental contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen +the imagination of him that useth it; as images are said by the +Roman Church to fix the cogitations and raise the devotions of them +that pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted +that imagination hath power, and that ceremonies fortify +imagination, and that they be used sincerely and intentionally for +that purpose; yet I should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that +first edict which God gave unto man, In sudore vultus comedes panem +tuum. For they propound those noble effects, which God hath set +forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained +by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiences in these +knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, +that it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much +vanity. + +XII. (1) The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of +man is of two kinds--the one respecting his understanding and +reason, and the other his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the +former produceth position or decree, the latter action or execution. +It is true that the imagination is an agent or nuncius in both +provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth +over to imagination before reason have judged, and reason sendeth +over to imagination before the decree can be acted. For imagination +ever precedeth voluntary motion. Saving that this Janus of +imagination hath differing faces: for the face towards reason hath +the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the print of +good; which nevertheless are faces, + + +"Quales decet esse sororum." + + +Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is +invested with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in +itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well said by +Aristotle, "That the mind hath over the body that commandment, which +the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason hath over the +imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free +citizen," who may come also to rule in his turn. For we see that, +in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our +reason, which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the +mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again, +in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other +impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true +appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from +the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science that +doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to +alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a +pleasure or play of imagination than a work or duty thereof. And if +it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the +imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and consider +of the imagination. No more than we shall speak now of such +knowledges as reason produceth (for that extendeth to all +philosophy), but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the +faculty of reason: so as poesy had his true place. As for the +power of the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the +same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, whereunto most +fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative +reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer +it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content ourselves with +the former division, that human philosophy, which respecteth the +faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral. + +(2) The part of human philosophy which is rational is of all +knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but +a net of subtlety and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that +knowledge is pabulum animi; so in the nature of men's appetite to +this food most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in +the desert, that would fain have returned ad ollas carnium, and were +weary of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less +nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges +that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, +policy, about the which men's affections, praises, fortunes do turn +and are conversant. But this same lumen siccum doth parch and +offend most men's watery and soft natures. But to speak truly of +things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are the keys of all +other arts, for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, "That the +hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of +forms;" so these be truly said to be the art of arts. Neither do +they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the +habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but +also to draw a stronger bow. + +(3) The arts intellectual are four in number, divided according to +the ends whereunto they are referred--for man's labour is to invent +that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is +invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that +which is retained. So as the arts must be four--art of inquiry or +invention; art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; +and art of elocution or tradition. + +XIII. (1) Invention is of two kinds much differing--the one of arts +and sciences, and the other of speech and arguments. The former of +these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a +deficience as if, in the making of an inventory touching the state +of a defunct, it should be set down that there is no ready money. +For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is +that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West +Indies had never been discovered if the use of the mariner's needle +had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and +the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences +be no further discovered, if the art itself of invention and +discovery hath been passed over. + +(2) That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth +plainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to invent +sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a +cuique in sua arte credendum. And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, +speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, "That +medicines and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons +and causes were discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and +by light from them the medicines and cures discovered." And Plato +in his "Theaetetus" noteth well, "That particulars are infinite, and +the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; and that the +pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the +inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular +knowledge are taken from tradition and experience." And therefore +we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of +things refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to +beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men. + + +"Dictamnum genetrix Cretaea carpit ab Ida, +Puberibus caulem foliis et flore camantem +Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris +Gramina, cum tergo volucres haesere sagittae." + + +So that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being to +consecrate inventors) that the Egyptians had so few human idols in +their temples, but almost all brute: + + +"Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis, +Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c." + + +And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe +the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that +Prometheus first stroke the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than +that when he first stroke the flints he expected the spark; and +therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with +the European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave +the first occasion. So as it should seem, that hitherto men are +rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for +music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot-lid +that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance or anything +else than to logic for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither +is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other: + + +"Ut varias usus meditande extunderet artes +Paulatim." + + +For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that +which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which is a +perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed +by an absolute necessity of conservation of being. For so Cicero +saith very truly, Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem saepe +vincit. And therefore if it be said of men, + + + "Labor omnia vincit +Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas," + + +it is likewise said of beasts, Quis psittaco docuit suum ?a??e? Who +taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, +where she spied water, that the water might rise so as she might +come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea or +air, and to find the way from a field in a flower a great way off to +her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she +burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then +the word extundere, which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the +word paulatim, which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are +where we were, even amongst the Egyptians' gods; there being little +left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty or art, for +matter of invention. + +(3) Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which +seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of sciences may +be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by +derivation from the principles; their form of induction, I say, is +utterly vicious and incompetent; wherein their error is the fouler, +because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they +contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For he that +shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent +dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, Aerei +mellis caelestia dona, distilling and contriving it out of +particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and +garden, shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth manage +and act an induction much better than they describe it. For to +conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance +contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can +assure (in many subjects) upon those particulars which appear of a +side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear +not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which +were brought before him, and failed of David which was in the field. +And this form (to say truth), is so gross, as it had not been +possible for wits so subtle as have managed these things to have +offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and +dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars; +which their manner was to use but as lictores and viatores, for +sergeants and whifflers, ad summovendam turbam, to make way and make +room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service. +Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to +see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and +human truth; for, as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as +a child, so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions +(whereof we speak), as if it were a second infancy or childhood. + +(4) Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, +yet, nevertheless, certain it is that middle propositions cannot be +deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism--that is, by +touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is +true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, +yea, and divinity (because it pleaseth God to apply Himself to the +capacity of the simplest), that form may have use; and in natural +philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, Quae +assensum parit operis effaeta est; but the subtlety of nature and +operations will not be enchained in those bonds. For arguments +consist of propositions, and propositions of words, and words are +but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things; which +notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of +particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of +consequences of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can +ever correct that error, being (as the physicians speak) in the +first digestion. And, therefore, it was not without cause, that so +many excellent philosophers became sceptics and academics, and +denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion +that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances and +probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be +but a form of irony, Scientiam dissimulando simulavit; for he used +to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge; like +the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but +would not acknowledge so much. And in the later academy, which +Cicero embraced, this opinion also of acatalepsia (I doubt) was not +held sincerely; for that all those which excelled in copy of speech +seem to have chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give +glory to their eloquence and variable discourses; being rather like +progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end. But assuredly many +scattered in both academies did hold it in subtlety and integrity. +But here was their chief error: they charged the deceit upon the +senses; which in my judgment (notwithstanding all their +cavillations) are very sufficient to certify and report truth, +though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of +instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too +subtle for the sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and +other like assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit +upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of +collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I +speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek +help; for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a +straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be +easily done by help of a ruler or compass. + +(5) This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I +purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound, having +digested it into two parts: whereof the one I term experientia +literata, and the other interpretatio naturae; the former being but +a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, +nor speak too great upon a promise. + +(6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an +invention; for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to +recover or resummon that which we already know; and the use of this +invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is +already possessed to draw forth or call before us that which may be +pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So +as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or +suggestion, with an application; which is the cause why the schools +do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. +Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an +enclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already +obtained the name, let it be called invention; so as it be perceived +and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is readiness +and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification +thereof. + +(7) To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, +preparation and suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a +part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any +artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, +doth deride the sophists near his time, saying, "They did as if one +that professed the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make up +a shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all +fashions and sizes." But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker +should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, +he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine +knowledge, saith, "That the kingdom of heaven is like a good +householder, that bringeth forth both new and old store;" and we see +the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, that pleaders +should have the places, whereof they have most continual use, ready +handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for the +literal interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and +to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and +contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great +experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have +occasion to speak of (if he will take the pains), he may have it in +effect premeditate and handled in thesi. So that when he cometh to +a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names, and +times, and places, and such other circumstances of individuals. We +see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of +the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to +make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for +orations and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may +overweigh Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich +wardrobe for a pair of shears. + +(8) But the nature of the collection of this provision or +preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, +yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be +spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further handling of it to +rhetoric. + +(9) The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth +assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite +our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly +collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use +(truly taken) only to furnish argument to dispute, probably with +others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude +aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve only to +apprompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a +faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato +saith, "Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a +general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it?" +And, therefore, the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and +compendious is your search. But the same places which will help us +what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if +a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we +have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and +revolve; so as I cannot report that this part of invention, which is +that which the schools call topics, is deficient. + +(10) Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and special. +The general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched +by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But +leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools (which +is, to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their +command, and to reject the rest), I do receive particular topics; +that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every +particular knowledge, as things of great use, being mixtures of +logic with the matter of sciences. For in these it holdeth ars +inveniendi adolescit cum inventis; for as in going of a way, we do +not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the +better sight of that part of the way which remaineth, so every +degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which +followeth; which light, if we strengthen by drawing it forth into +questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit. + +XIV. (1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle the +natures of proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction hath a +coincidence with invention; for all inductions, whether in good or +vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth-- +all one as in the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syllogism, +for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the +mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another; +the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real +and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have +spoken of interpretation of Nature. + +(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most +agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently end +excellently laboured. For the nature of man doth extremely covet to +have somewhat in his understanding fixed and unmovable, and as a +rest and support of the mind. And, therefore, as Aristotle +endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point +quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas +(that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) to be meant +of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is +accomplished, so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or +axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a +perpetual peril of falling. Therefore men did hasten to set down +some principles about which the variety of their disputatious might +turn. + +(3) So, then, this art of judgment is but the reduction of +propositions to principles in a middle term. The principles to be +agreed by all and exempted from argument; the middle term to be +elected at the liberty of every man's invention; the reduction to be +of two kinds, direct and inverted: the one when the proposition is +reduced to the principle, which they term a probation ostensive; the +other, when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the +contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call per +incommodum, or pressing an absurdity; the number of middle terms to +be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the +principle. + +(4) But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by +way of direction, the other by way of caution: the former frameth +and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and +deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly +judged. Toward the composition and structure of which form it is +incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and +the parts of propositions, which are simple words. And this is that +part of logic which is comprehended in the Analytics. + +(5) The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use +and assurance sake, discovering the more subtle forms of sophisms +and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is +termed elenches. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies +it happeneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling +feats, which, though we know not how they are done, yet we know well +it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the more subtle sort of them doth +not only put a man besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his +judgment. + +(6) This part concerning elenches is excellently handled by +Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example; not +only in the persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates himself, +who, professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was +affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of +objection, fallace, and redargution. And although we have said that +the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the +degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which +passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great +advantage, though the difference be good which was made between +orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath +his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her +advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker +creature. + +(7) But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more ample +latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of +knowledge, whereof some are laboured and other omitted. For first, +I conceive (though it may seem at first somewhat strange) that that +part which is variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to +metaphysic, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an +elenche; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or +ambiguity of words and phrase, specially of such words as are most +general and intervene in every inquiry, it seemeth to me that the +true and fruitful use (leaving vain subtleties and speculations) of +the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, +diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, +and the like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech. +So, again, the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we +call categories or predicaments, are but cautions against the +confusion of definitions and divisions. + +(8) Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of +the impression, and not by the subtlety of the illaqueation--not so +much perplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the +imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle when I +shall speak of rhetoric. + +(9) But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind +of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or +inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all +others appertaineth most to rectify judgment, the force whereof is +such as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some +particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt +the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a +clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect +according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an +enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not +delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false +appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the +mind, beholding them in an example or two; as first, in that +instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, that to the +nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or +active to affect more than the negative or privative. So that a few +times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failing or absence, +as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune's +temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped +shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, "Advise now, +you that think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest." "Yea, +but," saith Diagoras, "where are they painted that are drowned?" +Let us behold it in another instance, namely, that the spirit of +man, being of an equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose +and feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in +truth. Hence it cometh that the mathematicians cannot satisfy +themselves except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to +perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be +discharged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh that whereas there are +many things in Nature as it were monodica, sui juris, yet the +cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and +conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an +element of fire to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the +like. Nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of +fictions and fantasies the similitude of human actions and arts, +together with the making of man communis mensura, have brought into +natural philosophy; not much better than the heresy of the +Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, +and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, +who supposed the gods to be of human shape. And, therefore, +Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked why God should have +adorned the heavens with stars, as if He had been an aedilis, one +that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if +that great Work-master had been of a human disposition, He would +have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and +orders like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce +find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst +such an infinite number, so differing a harmony there is between the +spirit of man and the spirit of Nature. + +(10) Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon us by +every man's own individual nature and custom in that feigned +supposition that Plato maketh of the cave; for certainly if a child +were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of +age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd +imaginations. So, in like manner, although our persons live in the +view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own +complexions and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and +vain opinions if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we +have given many examples in one of the errors, or peccant humours, +which we ran briefly over in our first book. + +(11) And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are +imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to +the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think +we govern our words, and prescribe it well loquendum ut vulgus +sentiendum ut sapientes, yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's +bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and +mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. So as it is almost +necessary in all controversies and disputations to imitate the +wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning +the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we +accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. +For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end +there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and +differences about words. To conclude, therefore, it must be +confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these +fallacies and false appearances because they are inseparable from +our nature and condition of life; so yet, nevertheless, the caution +of them (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions) doth +extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular +elenches or cautions against these three false appearances I find +altogether deficient. + +(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency which +to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that +also deficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of +proofs to the differing kinds of subjects. For there being but four +kinds of demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the +mind or sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by congruity, which +is that which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and +not a notioribus, every of these hath certain subjects in the matter +of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; and +certain others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded; +and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in +some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with +the more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest +causes of detriment and hindrance to knowledge. The distributions +and assignations of demonstrations according to the analogy of +sciences I note as deficient. + +XV. (1) The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing +or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the +character and the order of the entry. For the art of characters, or +other visible notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation +with grammar, and, therefore, I refer it to the due place; for the +disposition and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in +writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places, wherein I +am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-place +books, as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or +relaxation of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in +knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and +full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of great use +and essence in studying, as that which assureth copy of invention, +and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of +the methods of common-places that I have seen, there is none of any +sufficient worth, all of them carrying merely the face of a school +and not of a world; and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical +divisions, without all life or respect to action. + +(2) For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which +is memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. +An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are +better precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than +those received. It is certain the art (as it is) may be raised to +points of ostentation prodigious; but in use (as is now managed) it +is barren, not burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is +imagined, but barren, that is, not dexterous to be applied to the +serious use of business and occasions. And, therefore, I make no +more estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon +once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhymes +extempore, or the making of a satirical simile of everything, or the +turning of everything to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting +of everything by cavil, or the like (whereof in the faculties of the +mind there is great copy, and such as by device and practice may be +exalted to an extreme degree of wonder), than I do of the tricks of +tumblers, funambuloes, baladines; the one being the same in the mind +that the other is in the body, matters of strangeness without +worthiness. + +(3) This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one +prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite +seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a +narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place +of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images +sensible, which strike the memory more; out of which axioms may be +drawn much better practice than that in use; and besides which +axioms, there are divers more touching help of memory not inferior +to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report +those things deficient, which are but only ill managed. + +XVI. (1) There remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge, +which is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our +knowledge to others, which I will term by the general name of +tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three parts: the first +concerning the organ of tradition; the second concerning the method +of tradition; and the third concerning the illustration of +tradition. + +(2) For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing; for +Aristotle saith well, "Words are the images of cogitations, and +letters are the images of words." But yet it is not of necessity +that cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. For +whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, and those +perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to express +cogitations. And, therefore, we see in the commerce of barbarous +people that understand not one another's language, and in the +practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds are +expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. +And we understand further, that it is the use of China and the +kingdoms of the High Levant to write in characters real, which +express neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; +insomuch as countries and provinces which understand not one +another's language can nevertheless read one another's writings, +because the characters are accepted more generally than the +languages do extend; and, therefore, they have a vast multitude of +characters, as many, I suppose, as radical words. + +(3) These notes of cogitations are of two sorts: the one when the +note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the other ad +placitum, having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the +former sort are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics +(things of ancient use and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of +the most ancient nations), they are but as continued impresses and +emblems. And as for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, +and are to hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in +that they abide not; but they have evermore, as well as the other, +an affinity with the things signified. As Periander, being +consulted with how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the +messenger attend and report what he saw him do; and went into his +garden and topped all the highest flowers, signifying that it +consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility and +grandees. Ad placitum, are the characters real before mentioned, +and words: although some have been willing by curious inquiry, or +rather by apt feigning, to have derived imposition of names from +reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it +searcheth into antiquity, reverent, but sparingly mixed with truth, +and of small fruit. This portion of knowledge touching the notes of +things and cogitations in general, I find not inquired, but +deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering +that words and writings by letters do far excel all the other ways; +yet because this part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge +(for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as +moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that +moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver), I thought good +to propound it to better inquiry. + +(4) Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath +produced the science of grammar. For man still striveth to +reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault +he hath been deprived; and as he hath striven against the first +general curse by the invention of all other arts, so hath he sought +to come forth of the second general curse (which was the confusion +of tongues) by the art of grammar; whereof the use in a mother +tongue is small, in a foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign +tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to +learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures: the one +popular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as +well for intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; the +other philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as +they are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy +between words and reason is handled sparsim, brokenly though not +entirely; and, therefore, I cannot report it deficient, though I +think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself. + +(5) Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration +of the accidents of words; which are measure, sound, and elevation +or accent, and the sweetness and harshness of them: whence hath +issued some curious observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as +we consider it, in respect of the verse and not of the argument. +Wherein though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the +ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free +to make new measures of verses as of dances; for a dance is a +measured pace, as a verse is a measured speech. In these things +this sense is better judge than the art: + + + "Coenae fercula nostrae +Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis." + + +And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an unfit +subject, it is well said, "Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id +incongruitate est maxime novum." + +(6) For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets, but may +be in words. The kinds of ciphers (besides the simple ciphers, with +changes, and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants) are many, +according to the nature or rule of the infolding, wheel-ciphers, +key-ciphers, doubles, &c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are +to be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write and +read; that they be impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that +they be without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write +omnia per omnia; which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion +quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, +and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath for +relative an art of deciphering, by supposition unprofitable, but, as +things are, of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well +managed, there be multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer. +But in regard of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands through +which they pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the +weakest ciphers. + +(7) In the enumeration of these private and retired arts it may be +thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them +for show and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let +those, which are skilful in them, judge whether I bring them in only +for appearance, or whether in that which I speak of them (though in +few words) there be not some seed of proficience. And this must be +remembered, that as there be many of great account in their +countries and provinces, which, when they come up to the seat of the +estate, are but of mean rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts, +being here placed with the principal and supreme sciences, seem +petty things: yet to such as have chosen them to spend their +labours and studies in them, they seem great matters. + +XVII. (1) For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a +controversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there be a +meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of the +matter for that time, and no proceeding at all; so in learning, +where there is much controversy, there is many times little inquiry. +For this part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly +inquired as I shall report it deficient. + +(2) Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in logic, as a part +of judgment. For as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the +rules of judgment upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of +method containeth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be +delivered; for judgment precedeth delivery, as it followeth +invention. Neither is the method or the nature of the tradition +material only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the +progression of knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man +cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the +tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance and +proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity of method is of +method referred to use, and method referred to progression: whereof +the one may be termed magistral, and the other of probation. + +(3) The latter whereof seemeth to be via deserta et interclusa. For +as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of +error between the deliverer and the receiver. For he that +delivereth knowledge desireth to deliver it in such form as may be +best believed, and not as may be best examined; and he that +receiveth knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction than +expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt, than not to err: +glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth +making the disciple not to know his strength. + +(4) But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on ought +to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same +method wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge +induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no +man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. +But yet, nevertheless, secundum majus et minus, a man may revisit +and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and +so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it +is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, +it is no matter for the roots--but if you mean to remove it to grow, +then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the +delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair bodies of +trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the +planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for +the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of +the roots. Of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, +in that subject, hath some shadow: but generally I see it neither +put in use nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for +deficient. + +(5) Another diversity of method there is, which hath some affinity +with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the +ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain +persons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit +merchandises; and that is enigmatical and disclosed. The pretence +whereof is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to +the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, +or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil. + +(6) Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great, +is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we +may observe that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a +few axioms or observations upon any subject, to make a solemn and +formal art, filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it +with examples, and digesting it into a sensible method. But the +writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the +writing in method doth not approach. + +(7) For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or +solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be +made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of +illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse +of connection and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut +off. So there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good +quantity of observation; and therefore no man can suffice, nor in +reason will attempt, to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and +grounded. But in methods, + + + "Tantum series juncturaque pollet, +Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris," + + +as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were +disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to +win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for they +carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part +illuminating another, and therefore satisfy. But particulars being +dispersed do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, +aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire +further; whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure +men, as if they were at furthest. + +(8) Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, +is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by +questions and their determinations. The latter kind whereof, if it +be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of +learning as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to +besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and +the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in +of themselves: indeed a man would not leave some important piece +enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the +delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to +remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to minister +and excite disputatious and doubts. + +(9) Another diversity of method is, according to the subject or +matter which is handled. For there is a great difference in +delivery of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of +knowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed. And howsoever +contention hath been moved, touching a uniformity of method in +multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the +weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that +which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain empty and barren +generalities; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all +the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and press +of the method. And, therefore, as I did allow well of particular +topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular methods +of tradition. + +(10) Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and teaching of +knowledge is, according unto the light and presuppositions of that +which is delivered. For that knowledge which is new, and foreign +from opinions received, is to be delivered in another form than that +that is agreeable and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he +thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith +"If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes," &c. +For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions need only +but to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular +opinions, have a double labour; the one to make themselves +conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate. So that it is of +necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations +to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, +and in rude times when those conceits which are now trivial were +then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else +would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for +paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood or +judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and +tropes are, for it is a rule, that whatsoever science is not +consonant to presuppositions must pray in aid of similitudes. + +(11) There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received: +as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of +concealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though I have +stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I +have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and +constitute one general inquiry (which seems to me deficient) +touching the wisdom of tradition. + +(12) But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, doth +further belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a +work, but also the several beams and columns thereof; not as to +their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure. And therefore +method considereth not only the disposition of the argument or +subject, but likewise the propositions: not as to their truth or +matter, but as to their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus +merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules of +propositions--?a????? p??t??, ??ta pa?t?? &c.--than he did in +introducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the condition +of human things that, according to the ancient fables, "the most +precious things have the most pernicious keepers") it was so, that +the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. For he had +need be well conducted that should design to make axioms +convertible, if he make them not withal circular, and non-promovent, +or incurring into themselves; but yet the intention was excellent. + +(13) The other considerations of method, concerning propositions, +are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the +dimensions of sciences: for every knowledge may be fitly said, +besides the profundity (which is the truth and substance of it, that +makes it solid), to have a longitude and a latitude; accounting the +latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude towards action; +that is, from the greatest generality to the most particular +precept. The one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to +intermeddle within the province of another, which is the rule they +call ?a?a?t?; the other giveth rule unto what degree of +particularity a knowledge should descend: which latter I find +passed over in silence, being in my judgment the more material. For +certainty there must be somewhat left to practice; but how much is +worthy the inquiry? We see remote and superficial generalities do +but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more +aiding to practice than an Ortelius' universal map is to direct the +way between London and York. The better sort of rules have been not +unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see +the images of things, but first they must be filed: so the rules +will help if they be laboured and polished by practice. But how +crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far forth they +may be polished aforehand, is the question, the inquiry whereof +seemeth to me deficient. + +(14) There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, +which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture: which is, +to deliver knowledges in such manner as men may speedily come to +make a show of learning, who have it not. Such was the travail of +Raymundus Lullius in making that art which bears his name; not +unlike to some books of typocosmy, which have been made since; being +nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance, +that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the +art; which collections are much like a fripper's or broker's shop, +that hath ends of everything, but nothing of worth. + +XVIII. (1) Now we descend to that part which concerneth the +illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we +call rhetoric, or art of eloquence, a science excellent, and +excellently well laboured. For although in true value it is +inferior to wisdom (as it is said by God to Moses, when he disabled +himself for want of this faculty, "Aaron shall be thy speaker, and +thou shalt be to him as God"), yet with people it is the more +mighty; for so Solomon saith, Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, +sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet, signifying that profoundness of +wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is +eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the +labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of +his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their +works of rhetoric exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of +examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, +added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled +the progression in this art; and therefore the deficiences which I +shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as +handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art +itself. + +(2) Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of +this science, as we have done of the rest, the duty and office of +rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of +the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the administration +thereof by three means--by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains +to logic; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; +and by passion or affection, which pertains to morality. And as in +negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by importunity, +and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are +undermined by inconsequences, solicited and importuned by +impressions or observations, and transported by passions. Neither +is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers +and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish +and advance it. For the end of logic is to teach a form of argument +to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of morality is to +procure the affections to obey reason, and not to invade it; the end +of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to +oppress it; for these abuses of arts come in but ex oblique, for +caution. + +(3) And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing +out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of +rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did +mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to +the pleasure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more +conversant in adorning that which is good than in colouring that +which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than +he can do or think; and it was excellently noted by Thucydides, in +Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of +estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good +speech, knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and +base. And therefore, as Plato said elegantly, "That virtue, if she +could be seen, would move great love and affection;" so seeing that +she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree +is to show her to the imagination in lively representation; for to +show her to reason only in subtlety of argument was a thing ever +derided in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics, who thought to thrust +virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no +sympathy with the will of man. + +(4) Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient +to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions +and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and +proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditious of the +affections - + + + "Video meliora, proboque, +Deteriora sequor," + + +reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions +did not practise and win the imagination from the affections' part, +and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination +against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an +appetite to good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the +affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future +and sum of time. And, therefore, the present filling the +imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that +force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote +appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason +prevaileth. + +(5) We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged +with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or +morality with vice; for we know the doctrines of contraries are the +same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic +differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm--the one +close, the other at large--but much more in this, that logic +handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it +is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle +doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and +moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both; for +the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men +indifferent and the same, but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric +ought to differ according to the auditors: + + +"Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion." + + +Which application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far that +if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he +should speak to them all respectively and several ways; though this +politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the +greatest orators to want: whilst, by the observing their well- +graced forms of speech, they leese the volubility of application; +and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better +inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here or in that part +which concerneth policy. + +(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as I +said, are but attendances; and first, I do not find the wisdom and +diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection +of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and +comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric (as I touched +before). For example - + + + "Sophisma. +Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum. + Redargutio. +Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces." + + +Malum est, malum est (inquit emptor): sed cum recesserit, tum +gloriabitur! The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three--one, +that there be but a few of many; another, that there elenches are +not annexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use +of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in +impression. For many forms are equal in signification which are +differing in impression, as the difference is great in the piercing +of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength +of the percussion be the same. For there is no man but will be a +little more raised by hearing it said, "Your enemies will be glad of +this" - + + +"Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae." + + +than by hearing it said only, "This is evil for you." + +(7) Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, +touching provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech +and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts: the +one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a +shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to that which is +frequent and most in request. The former of these I will call +antitheta, and the latter formulae. + +(8) Antitheta are theses argued pro et contra, wherein men may be +more large and laborious; but (in such as are able to do it) to +avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments +to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, +but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large +when they come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by +reference. + + + "Pro verbis legis. +Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quae recedit a litera: +Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem. + + Pro sententia legis. +Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula." + + +(9) Formulae are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of +speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of +preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. For as +in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well casting of +the staircases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, +the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect. + + +"A conclusion in a deliberative. +So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences +future." + + +XIX. (1) There remain two appendices touching the tradition of +knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical. For all +knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's +proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal part of tradition +of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the relative +part thereof concerneth reading of books; whereunto appertain +incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true +correction and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash +diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often +presumed that that which they understand not is false set down: as +the priest that, where he found it written of St. Paul Demissus est +per sportam, mended his book, and made it Demissus est per portam; +because sporta was a hard word, and out of his reading: and surely +their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are +of the same kind. And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the +most corrected copies are commonly the least correct. + +The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, +which resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein it is over +usual to blanch the obscure places and discourse upon the plain. + +The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great +light to true interpretations. + +The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the +authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves +what books to read. + +And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; +that men may know in what order or pursuit to read. + +(2) For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of +tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers +considerations of great fruit. + +As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to +initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them. + +Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so +proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to press the more +difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy; for it is one +method to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise +dancing with heavy shoes. + +A third is the application of learning according unto the propriety +of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, +but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as, +for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the +faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for +in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to +begin. And as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure +and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences +for excellency or speedy profiting: and therefore it is an inquiry +of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and +proper for what sciences. + +Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence +to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in +exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise +their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a +great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of +exercises. It were too long to particularise a number of other +considerations of this nature, things but of mean appearance, but of +singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or +young plants is that that is most important to their thriving, and +as it was noted that the first six kings being in truth as tutors of +the state of Rome in the infancy thereof was the principal cause of +the immense greatness of that state which followed, so the culture +and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible (though unseen) +operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can +countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also how +small and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall +into great men or great matters, do work great and important +effects: whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus of two stage +players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing +put the Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combustion. For +there arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus +Caesar, Blaesus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutineers, +which were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard +speak, which he did in this manner:- "These poor innocent wretches +appointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold the light; but +who shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that +was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of +the common cause? and he hath murdered him this last night by some +of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his +executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blaesus, what is done with his +body? The mortalest enemies do not deny burial. When I have +performed my last duties to the corpse with kisses, with tears, +command me to be slain besides him; so that these my fellows, for +our good meaning and our true hearts to the legions, may have leave +to bury us." With which speech he put the army into an infinite +fury and uproar: whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was +there any such matter; but he played it merely as if he had been +upon the stage. + +(3) But to return: we are now come to a period of rational +knowledges; wherein if I have made the divisions other than those +that are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those +divisions which I do not use. For there is a double necessity +imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The one, because it +differeth in end and purpose, to sort together those things which +are next in nature, and those things which are next in use. For if +a secretary of estate should sort his papers, it is like in his +study or general cabinet he would sort together things of a nature, +as treaties, instructions, &c. But in his boxes or particular +cabinet he would sort together those that he were like to use +together, though of several natures. So in this general cabinet of +knowledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the +nature of things; whereas if myself had been to handle any +particular knowledge, I would have respected the divisions fittest +for use. The other, because the bringing in of the deficiences did +by consequence alter the partitions of the rest. For let the +knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be fifteen. Let the +knowledge with the deficiences be twenty; the parts of fifteen are +not the parts of twenty; for the parts of fifteen are three and +five; the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as these +things are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be. + +XX. (1) We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the +appetite and will of man: whereof Solomon saith, Ante omnia, fili, +custodi cor tuum: nam inde procedunt actiones vitae. In the +handling of this science, those which have written seem to me to +have done as if a man, that professed to teach to write, did only +exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving +any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing +of the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and +copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, virtue, +duty, felicity; propounding them well described as the true objects +and scopes of man's will and desires. But how to attain these +excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to +become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over +altogether, or slightly and unprofitably. For it is not the +disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not +by nature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by +doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and +punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches, that can +excuse the absence of this part. + +(2) The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden rock +whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast +away; which is, that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary +and common matters, the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is +the wisest doctrine (for life consisteth not in novelties nor +subtleties), but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly +of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give +glory either to the subtlety of disputatious, or to the eloquence of +discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence, +Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit, sed sui. +Doctrine should be such as should make men in love with the lesson, +and not with the teacher; being directed to the auditor's benefit, +and not to the author's commendation. And therefore those are of +the right kind which may be concluded as Demosthenes concludes his +counsel, Quae si feceritis, non oratorem dumtaxat in praesentia +laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam non ita multo post statu rerum +vestraram meliore. + +(3) Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of a +fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed +obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in +the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroical +acts of AEneas: + + +"Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum +Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem." + + +And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at +leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct +and suborn action and active life, these Georgics of the mind, +concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy +than the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty, and felicity. +Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth +to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or +culture of the mind: the one describing the nature of good, the +other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the +will of man thereunto. + +(4) The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good considereth +it either simple or compared; either the kinds of good, or the +degrees of good; in the latter whereof those infinite disputatious +which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term +felicity, beatitude, or the highest good, the doctrines concerning +which were as the heathen divinity, are by the Christian faith +discharged. And as Aristotle saith, "That young men may be happy, +but not otherwise but by hope;" so we must all acknowledge our +minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future +world. + +(5) Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the +philosopher's heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of +man's nature than was (for we see in what height of style Seneca +writeth, Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei), +we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their +inquiries and labours. Wherein for the nature of good positive or +simple, they have set it down excellently in describing the forms of +virtue and duty, with their situations and postures; in distributing +them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and +administrations, and the like: nay further, they have commended +them to man's nature and spirit with great quickness of argument and +beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and entrenched them (as +much as discourse can do) against corrupt and popular opinions. +Again, for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have +also excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the +comparisons between a contemplative and an active life, in the +distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, in +their encounters between honesty and profit, in their balancing of +virtue with virtue, and the like; so as this part deserveth to be +reported for excellently laboured. + +(6) Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular and +received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the +rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning +the roots of good and evil, and the strings of those roots, they had +given, in my opinion, a great light to that which followed; and +specially if they had consulted with nature, they had made their +doctrines less prolix and more profound: which being by them in +part omitted and in part handled with much confusion, we will +endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner. + +(7) There is formed in everything a double nature of good--the one, +as everything is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it +is a part or member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in +degree the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the +conservation of a more general form. Therefore we see the iron in +particular sympathy moveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a +certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and +like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and +country of massy bodies; so may we go forward, and see that water +and massy bodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to +suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move +upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the +earth in regard of their duty to the world. This double nature of +good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven upon man, +if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation of duty to the +public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life +and being; according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, +when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and +being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his friends +about him, that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity +of weather, he said only to them, Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam. +But it may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, +religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt +the good which is communicative, and depress the good which is +private and particular, as the Holy Faith; well declaring that it +was the same God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those +laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before; for +we read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves +anathematised and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of +charity and infinite feeling of communion. + +(8) This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and +determine most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is +conversant. For first, it decideth the question touching the +preferment of the contemplative or active life, and decideth it +against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he bringeth for the +contemplative are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity +of a man's self (in which respects no question the contemplative +life hath the pre-eminence), not much unlike to that comparison +which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy +and contemplation, who being asked what he was, answered, "That if +Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that some +came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as merchants +to utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer and +meet their friends, and some came to look on; and that he was one of +them that came to look on." But men must know, that in this theatre +of man's life it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers +on. Neither could the like question ever have been received in the +Church, notwithstanding their Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors +sanctorum ejus, by which place they would exalt their civil death +and regular professions, but upon this defence, that the monastical +life is not simple contemplative, but performeth the duty either of +incessant prayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed +as an office in the Church, or else of writing or taking +instructions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did +when he abode so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch, the +seventh from Adam, who was the first contemplative and walked with +God, yet did also endow the Church with prophecy, which Saint Jude +citeth. But for contemplation which should be finished in itself, +without casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it +not. + +(9) It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, +and their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed +felicity in virtue simply or attended, the actions and exercises +whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society; and on the other +side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and +made virtue (as it is used in some comedies of errors, wherein the +mistress and the maid change habits) to be but as a servant, without +which pleasure cannot be served and attended; and the reformed +school of the Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and +freedom from perturbation; as if they would have deposed Jupiter +again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there was no +summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and +season; and Herillus, which placed felicity in extinguishment of the +disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, +esteeming things according to the clearness of the desires, or the +reluctation; which opinion was revived in the heresy of the +Anabaptists, measuring things according to the motions of the +spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief; all which are +manifest to tend to private repose and contentment, and not to point +of society. + +(10) It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which +presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are +in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance; as if it +were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends +for the public, than to obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in +our proper fortune: as Consalvo said to his soldiers, showing them +Naples, and protesting he had rather die one foot forwards, than to +have his life secured for long by one foot of retreat. Whereunto +the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath signed, who hath affirmed +that "a good conscience is a continual feast;" showing plainly that +the conscience of good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more +continual joy to nature than all the provision which can be made for +security and repose. + +(11) It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which grew +general about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an +occupation or profession; as if the purpose had been, not to resist +and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of +them, and to shape a particular kind and course of life to that end; +introducing such a health of mind, as was that health of body of +which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did nothing all his life +long but intend his health; whereas if men refer themselves to +duties of society, as that health of body is best which is ablest to +endure all alterations and extremities, so likewise that health of +mind is most proper which can go through the greatest temptations +and perturbations. So as Diogenes' opinion is to be accepted, who +commended not them which abstained, but them which sustained, and +could refrain their mind in praecipitio, and could give unto the +mind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn. + +(12) Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in +some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical +men, that did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of +indignities and perturbations; whereas the resolution of men truly +moral ought to be such as the same Consalvo said the honour of a +soldier should be, e tela crassiore, and not so fine as that +everything should catch in it and endanger it. + +XXI. (1) To resume private or particular good, it falleth into the +division of good active and passive; for this difference of good +(not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the +familiar or household terms of promus and condus) is formed also in +all things, and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in +creatures; the one to preserve or continue themselves, and the other +to dilate or multiply themselves, whereof the latter seemeth to be +the worthier; for in nature the heavens, which are the more worthy, +are the agent, and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the +patient. In the pleasures of living creatures, that of generation +is greater than that of food. In divine doctrine, beatius est dare +quam accipere. And in life, there is no man's spirit so soft, but +esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his +desire, more than sensuality, which priority of the active good is +much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and +exposed to fortune. For if we might have a perpetuity and certainty +in our pleasures, the state of them would advance their price. But +when we see it is but magni aestimamus mori tardius, and ne +glorieris de crastino, nescis partum diei, it maketh us to desire to +have somewhat secured and exempted from time, which are only our +deeds and works; as it is said, Opera eorum sequuntur eos. The pre- +eminence likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection +which is natural in man towards variety and proceeding, which in the +pleasures of the sense, which is the principal part of passive good, +can have no great latitude. Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris; cibus, +somnus, ludus per hunc circulum curritur; mori velle non tantum +fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest. But +in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much +variety; whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, +progressions, recoils, reintegrations, approaches and attainings to +their ends. So as it was well said, Vita sine proposito languida et +vaga est. Neither hath this active good an identity with the good +of society, though in some cases it hath an incidence into it. For +although it do many times bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is +with a respect private to a man's own power, glory, amplification, +continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it findeth a contrary +subject. For that gigantine state of mind which possesseth the +troublers of the world, such as was Lucius Sylla and infinite other +in smaller model, who would have all men happy or unhappy as they +were their friends or enemies, and would give form to the world, +according to their own humours (which is the true theomachy), +pretendeth and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth furthest +from good of society, which we have determined to be the greater. + +(2) To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of +conservative and effective. For let us take a brief review of that +which we have said: we have spoken first of the good of society, +the intention whereof embraceth the form of human nature, whereof we +are members and portions, and not our own proper and individual +form; we have spoken of active good, and supposed it as a part of +private and particular good. And rightly, for there is impressed +upon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to +themselves: one of preserving and continuing their form; another of +advancing and perfecting their form; and a third of multiplying and +extending their form upon other things: whereof the multiplying, or +signature of it upon other things, is that which we handled by the +name of active good. So as there remaineth the conserving of it, +and perfecting or raising of it, which latter is the highest degree +of passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, to preserve +with advancement is the greater. So in man, + + +"Igneus est ollis vigor, et caelestis origo." + + +His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the +perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good +is that which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon the +instinct of an advancement, formal and essential, is carried to seek +an advancement local. For as those which are sick, and find no +remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if by a remove +local they could obtain a remove internal, so is it with men in +ambition, when failing of the mean to exalt their nature, they are +in a perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good +is, as was said, either conservative or perfective. + +(3) To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth +in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it +seemeth to be most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the +softest and lowest. And this also receiveth a difference, which +hath neither been well judged of, nor well inquired; for the good of +fruition or contentment is placed either in the sincereness of the +fruition, or in the quickness and vigour of it; the one superinduced +by equality, the other by vicissitude; the one having less mixture +of evil, the other more impression of good. Whether of these is the +greater good is a question controverted; but whether man's nature +may not be capable of both is a question not inquired. + +(4) The former question being debated between Socrates and a +sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of +mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell +from argument to ill words: the sophist saying that Socrates' +felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying +that the sophist's felicity was the felicity of one that had the +itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these opinions +do not want their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much +upheld by the general consent even of the epicures themselves, that +virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, +that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations then in +compassing desires. The sophist's opinion is much favoured by the +assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is greater than +good of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a +show of advancement, as motion though in a circle hath a show of +progression. + +(5) But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former +superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there are some who +take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet, +nevertheless, are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them? +So as this same, Non uti ut non appetas, non appetere ut non metuas, +sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis. And it seemeth to me that most +of the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautious +than the nature of things requireth. So have they increased the +fear of death in offering to cure it. For when they would have a +man's whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, they +must needs make men think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom +there is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet:- + + +"Qui finem vitae extremum inter munera ponat +Naturae." + + +So have they sought to make men's minds too uniform and harmonical, +by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions; the reasons +whereof I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated +to a private, free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, +upon the lute or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and +have show of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange +and hard stops and passages, as a set song or voluntary; much after +the same manner was the diversity between a philosophical and civil +life. And, therefore, men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers: +who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice which may be ground +forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it; but if it +should lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle +with it: so ought men so to procure serenity as they destroy not +magnanimity. + +(6) Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private and +particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that good +of man which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term +duty; because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed +and disposed towards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a +mind well formed and composed in itself; though neither can a man +understand virtue without some relation to society, nor duty without +an inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to +science civil and politic; but not if it be well observed. For it +concerneth the regiment and government of every man over himself, +and not over others. And as in architecture the direction of +framing the posts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the +same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and +in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or engine +is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing +it; and yet, nevertheless, in expressing of the one you incidently +express the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine of +conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their +conformity thereunto. + +(7) This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common duty +of every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the +respective or special duty of every man in his profession, vocation, +and place. The first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath +been said. The second likewise I may report rather dispersed than +deficient; which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of +argument I acknowledge to be best. For who can take upon him to +write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every +several vocation, profession, and place? For although sometimes a +looker on may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more +arrogant than sound, "That the vale best discovereth the hill;" yet +there is small doubt but that men can write best and most really and +materially in their own professions; and that the writing of +speculative men of active matter for the most part doth seem to men +of experience, as Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, +to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which +accompanieth them that write in their own professions, that they +magnify them in excess. But generally it were to be wished (as that +which would make learning indeed solid and fruitful) that active men +would or could become writers. + +(8) In which kind I cannot but mention, honoris causa, your +Majesty's excellent book touching the duty of a king; a work richly +compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion +of all other arts; and being in some opinion one of the most sound +and healthful writings that I have read: not distempered in the +heat of invention, nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of +dizziness, as those are who leese themselves in their order, nor of +convulsions, as those which cramp in matters impertinent; not +savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do who seek to please +the reader more than nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in +the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for action; +and far removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those +that write in their own professions to be subject--which is, that +they exalt it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly described, +not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory, but a Moses +or a David, pastors of their people. Neither can I ever leese out +of my remembrance what I heard your Majesty in the same sacred +spirit of government deliver in a great cause of judicature, which +was, "That kings ruled by their laws, as God did by the laws of +nature; and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative +as God doth His power of working miracles." And yet notwithstanding +in your book of a free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, +that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a king, as +well as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to +allege this excellent writing of your Majesty, as a prime or eminent +example of tractates concerning special and respective duties; +wherein I should have said as much, if it had been written a +thousand years since. Neither am I moved with certain courtly +decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence. No, it +is flattery to praise in absence--that is, when either the virtue is +absent, or the occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, +but forced, either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in +his oration pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent table of +Caesar's virtue, and made to his face; besides the example of many +other excellent persons, wiser a great deal than such observers; and +we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises to +present or absent. + +(9) But to return; there belongeth further to the handling of this +part, touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative +or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of +every profession, which hath been likewise handled; but how? rather +in a satire and cynically, than seriously and wisely; for men have +rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is +good in professions, than with judgment to discover and sever that +which is corrupt. For, as Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek +after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure shall be sure to +find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: +Quaerenti derisori scientiam ipsa se abscondit; sed studioso fit +obviam. But the managing of this argument with integrity and truth, +which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best +fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For, as +the fable goeth of the basilisk--that if he see you first, you die +for it; but if you see him first, he dieth--so is it with deceits +and evil arts, which, if they be first espied they leese their life; +but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden to +Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they +ought to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with +the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions +of the serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his +volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest--that is, +all forms and natures of evil. For without this, virtue lieth open +and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are +wicked, to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil. +For men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of +simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, +and men's exterior language. So as, except you can make them +perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt +opinions, they despise all morality. Non recipit stultus verba +prudentiae, nisi ea dixeris quae, versantur in corde ejus. + +(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain +the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and +servant. So likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the +civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of +neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not as they are +parts of government and society, but as to the framing of the mind +of particular persons. + +(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it +also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the +weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, +particular and public. As we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus +against his own sons, which was so much extolled, yet what was said? + + +"Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores." + + +So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we +see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose +opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their +associates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a +tyrant being a usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding +that servitude was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was +better than a civil war: and a number of the like cases there are +of comparative duty. Amongst which that of all others is the most +frequent, where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of +a small injustice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the +truth: Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, ut multa juste fieri possint. +But the reply is good: Auctorem praesentis justitiae habes, +sponsorem futurae non habes. Men must pursue things which are just +in present, and leave the future to the Divine Providence. So then +we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and +description of good. + +XXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of life, +it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, +without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair +image or statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without +life and motion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these +words: Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex +quibus gignatur. Inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, +acquirendae autem ejus modos et vias ignorare. Non enum de virtute +tantum, qua specie sit, quaerendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam +faciat: utrumque enum volumeus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus +compotes fieri: hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex +quibus et quomodo. In such full words and with such iteration doth +he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great commendation of +Cato the second, that he had applied himself to philosophy, Non ita +disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi. And although the neglect of our +times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the +reformation of their life (as Seneca excellently saith, De partibus +vitae quisque deliberat, de summa nemo), may make this part seem +superfluous; yet I must conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, +Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens aegrotat. +They need medicine, not only to assuage the disease, but to awake +the sense. And if it be said that the cure of men's minds belongeth +to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral philosophy may be +preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as +the Psalm saith, "That the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually +towards the mistress," and yet no doubt many things are left to the +discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress' will; so +ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines +of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due +limits) many sound and profitable directions. + +(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I +cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written +inquiry; the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein +both speech and action is often conversant; and such wherein the +common talk of men (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) +is wiser than their books. It is reasonable, therefore, that we +propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and +because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient, which +seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and +presupposed by those themselves that have written. We will, +therefore, enumerate some heads or points thereof, that it may +appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant. + +(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical +we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; +for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by +way of application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the +nature of the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the +physician the constitution of the patient nor the variety of +accidents. So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two +things are without our command: points of Nature, and points of +fortune. For to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the +other, our work is limited and tied. In these things, therefore, it +is left unto us to proceed by application + + +"Vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:" + + +and so likewise, + + +"Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo." + + +But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and +neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which +draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth +adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call +accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth +principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent +state or disposition, unto which we do apply; for we cannot fit a +garment except we first take measure of the body. + +(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down +sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several +characters and tempers of men's natures and dispositions, specially +having regard to those differences which are most radical in being +the fountains and causes of the rest, or most frequent in +concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a few +of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities of +virtues, that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be +considered, that there are minds which are proportioned to great +matters, and others to small (which Aristotle handleth, or ought to +have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it not deserve as +well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to intend +many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide +themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be +but in few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of +mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are +proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a +short return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and is +to be won with length of pursuit:- + + +"Jam tum tenditqus fovetque." + + +So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is +commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved +it to be considered by Aristotle, "That there is a disposition in +conversation (supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or +concern a man's self) to soothe and please, and a disposition +contrary to contradict and cross;" and deserveth it not much better +to be considered. "That there is a disposition, not in conversation +or talk, but in matter of more serious nature (and supposing it +still in things merely indifferent), to take pleasure in the good of +another; and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the +good of another?" which is that properly which we call good nature +or ill nature, benignity or malignity; and, therefore, I cannot +sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the +several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted +both in morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry +and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions +of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men's natures, +according to the predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, +lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of +pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man +shall find in the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians +make touching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals +handsomely and lively painted forth. A man shall meet with in every +day's conference the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, real, +humorous, certain, huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima +impressione, and the like; and yet, nevertheless, this kind of +observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For +the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no +precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both +history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where +these observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our +hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary that receipts +might be made of them for use of life. + +(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which are +imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by +health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which +are inherent and not extern; and again, those which are caused by +extern fortune, as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, +want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant +fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the +like. And, therefore, we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see +an old man beneficent, benignitas hujis ut adolescentuli est. Saint +Paul concludeth that severity of discipline was to be used to the +Cretans, increpa eos dure, upon the disposition of their country, +Cretensus semper mendaces, malae bestiae, ventres. Sallust noteth +that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories: Sed +plerumque regiae voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, +saepeque ipsae sibi advers. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of +the fortune mendeth the disposition: solus Vespasianus mutatus in +melius. Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and sudden +fortune for the most part defeateth men qui magnam felicitatem +concoquere non possunt. So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to +keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of +fortune; Divitiae si affluant, nolite cor apponere. These +observations and the like I deny not but are touched a little by +Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some +scattered discourses; but they were never incorporate into moral +philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the knowledge +of this diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and the +knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to +the physician, except we mean to follow the indiscretion of +empirics, which minister the same medicines to all patients. + +(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the +affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first +to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the +diseases; and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, +after knowledge of the divers characters of men's natures, it +followeth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind, +which are no other than the perturbations and distempars of the +affections. For as the ancient politiques in popular estates were +wont to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds; +because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds +did not move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and +tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in working and +agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature +thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, +did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find +strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers +volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which is the +principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are +considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be +moved by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well +for the quantity; but where their true place is he pretermitteth +them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that +can satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that should generally +handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of +colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections as +light is to particular colours. Better travails, I suppose, had the +Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which +we have at second hand. But yet it is like it was after their +manner, rather in subtlety of definitions (which in a subject of +this nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample +descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular +writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections: as +of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of +countenance, and other. But the poets and writers of histories are +the best doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth, +with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how +pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further +degree; how they disclose themselves; how they work; how they vary; +how they gather and fortify: how they are enwrapped one within +another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and +other the like particularities. Amongst the which this last is of +special use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection +against affection, and to master one by another; even as we used to +hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise +percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is +erected that excellent use of praemium and paena, whereby civil +states consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and +hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the +government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction +with another, so it is in the government within. + +(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own command, +and have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and +appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled +custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, +company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, +studies: these as they have determinate use in moralities, from +these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receipts and +regiments compounded and described, as may serve to recover or +preserve the health and good estate of the mind, as far as +pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we will insist upon +some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too long +to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and habit to +speak of. + +(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that +of those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by +custom; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand +times up it will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or +hearing we do not learn to see or hear the better. For though this +principle be true in things wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason +whereof we cannot now stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in +things wherein Nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a +strait glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will +by use bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we +speak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold +we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort have a +nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, than +those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, +that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more +to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be +many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as +there is of ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will +recite a few. + +(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first +either too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a +diffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature you breed an +opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a +further expectation than can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in +the end: if too weak, of the other side, you may not look to +perform and overcome any great task. + +(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two +several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other +when it is worst disposed; that by the one you may gain a great +step, by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the +mind, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant. + +(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, +which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto +we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, +or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural +crookedness. + +(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better, +and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend +be not first in the intention, but tanquam aliud agendo, because of +the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. +Many other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and +custom, which being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature; +but, being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of +Nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit. + +(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence +and operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts +of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one +of the fathers in great indignation call poesy vinum daemonum, +because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? +Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he +saith, "That young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, +because they are not settled from the boiling heat of their +affections, nor attempered with time and experience"? And doth it +not hereof come, that those excellent books and discourses of the +ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most +effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and popular +opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats fit to be scorned +and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty of life, +because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and +settled years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it +not true also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters +of policy, till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and +morality; lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think +that there are no true differences of things, but according to +utility and fortune, as the verse describes it, Prosperum et felix +scelus virtus vocatur; and again, Ille crucem pretium sceleris +tulit, hic diadema: which the poets do speak satirically and in +indignation on virtue's behalf; but books of policy do speak it +seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, "That +if Caesar had been overthrown, he would have been more odious than +ever was Catiline;" as if there had been no difference, but in +fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most +excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is +there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of +moralities themselves (some kinds of them), lest they make men too +precise, arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, In Marco +Catone haec bona quae videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse +propria; quae nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura, sed a +magistro? Many other axioms and advices there are touching those +proprieties and effects, which studies do infuse and instil into +manners. And so, likewise, is there touching the use of all those +other points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited +in the beginning in the doctrine of morality. + +(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet +more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this +ground; that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more +perfect, and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose, +therefore, of this practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of +the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of +the good hath been practised by two means, vows or constant +resolutions, and observances or exercises; which are not to be +regarded so much in themselves, as because they keep the mind in +continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been +practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that +which is past, and an inception or account de novo for the time to +come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for +all good moral philosophy (as was said) is but a handmaid to +religion. + +(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of +all other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the +most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and +good estate; which is, the electing and propounding unto a man's +self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a +reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For if these two +things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, +and again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them; it +will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. +And this indeed is like the work of nature; whereas the other course +is like the work of the hand. For as when a carver makes an image, +he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as if he be upon the +face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, +till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when nature +makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the +parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man +practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the +like but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, +what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth +commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to +conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth +excellently express himself, that it ought not to be called +virtuous, but divine. His words are these: Immanitati autem +consentaneum est opponere eam, quae supra humanitatem est, heroicam +sive divinam virtutem; and a little after, Nam ut ferae neque vitium +neque virtus est, swic neque Dei: sed hic quidem status altius +quiddam virtute est, ille aluid quiddam a vitio. And therefore we +may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to +Trajan in his funeral oration, where he said, "That men needed to +make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as +good lords to them as Trajan had been;" as if he had not been only +an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be +heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine +state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men +unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently +called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and +fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is elegantly said by +Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of divine +love, Amor melior Sophista loevo ad humanam vitam--that love +teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or +preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules +and preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that +facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so +certainly, if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth +work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of +morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. +Nay, further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, +though they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and +uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt the +mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose +it: so in all other excellences, though they advance nature, yet +they are subject to excess. Only charity admitteth no excess. For +so we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the angels transgressed +and fell; Ascendam, et ero similis altissimo: by aspiring to be +like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; Eritis sicut Dii, +scientes bonum et malum: but by aspiring to a similitude of God in +goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall +transgress. For unto that imitation we are called: Diligite +inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro +persequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii Patris vestri +qui in coelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, +et pluit super justos et injustos. So in the first platform of the +divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, Optimus +Maximus: and the sacred Scriptures thus, Miscericordia ejus super +omnia opera ejus. + +(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, +concerning the culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, +considering the arts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that +my labour is but to collect into an art or science that which hath +been pretermitted by others, as matter of common sense and +experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates sported with +Demosthenes, "You may not marvel (Athenians) that Demosthenes and I +do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink wine;" and like as we +read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleep - + + +"Sunt geminae somni portae: quarum altera fertur +Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris: +Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, +Sed falsa ad coelum mittunt insomnia manes:" + + +so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure +maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor ("of wine") is the +more vaporous, and the braver gate ("of ivory") sendeth forth the +falser dreams. + +(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human +philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth +of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth +to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the +good of the body. For as we divided the good of the body into +health, beauty, strength, and pleasure, so the good of the mind, +inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make +the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with +decency; and strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, +as in the body, so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. +For it is easy to observe, that many have strength of wit and +courage, but have neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty +or decency in their doings; some again have an elegancy and fineness +of carriage which have neither soundness of honesty nor substance of +sufficiency; and some again have honest and reformed minds, that can +neither become themselves nor manage business; and sometimes two of +them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise +determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to +retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it, than in the +strength and vigour of it. + +XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of +all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to +axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, "That the Romans were +like sheep, for that a man were better drive a flock of them, than +one of them; for in a flock, if you could get but some few go right, +the rest would follow:" so in that respect moral philosophy is more +difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to +itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge +requireth only an external goodness; for that as to society +sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil +times in good governments: for so we find in the Holy story, when +the kings were good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc poulus non direxerat +cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum. Again, states, as great +engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of frame: for as +in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so +governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following; +but the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. +These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil +knowledge. + +(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary +actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and +government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and +protection; and they be three wisdoms of divers natures which do +often sever--wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom +of state. + +(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, +but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, +but an influence also into business and government. The poet saith, +Nec vultu destrue verba tuo: a man may destroy the force of his +words with his countenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, +recommending to his brother affability and easy access; Nil interest +habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum: it is nothing won to admit +men with an open door, and to receive them with a shut and reserved +countenance. So we see Atticus, before the first interview between +Caesar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero +touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. +And if the government of the countenance be of such effect, much +more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to +conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well expressed by +Livy, though not meant for this purpose: Ne aut arrogans videar, +aut obnoxius; quorum alterum est alienae libertatis obliti, alterum +suae: the sum of behaviour is to retain a man's own dignity, +without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if +behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may +pass into affectation, and then Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam +transferre--to act a man's life? But although it proceed not to +that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too +much. And therefore as we use to advise young students from company +keeping, by saying, Amici fures temporis: so certainly the +intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of +meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that form of +urbanity please themselves in it, and seldom aspire to higher +virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by +reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything becometh; but +where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos and compliments. +Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an over-curious +observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and +season. For as Solomon saith, Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat; +et qui respicit ad nubes, non metet: a man must make his +opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to +me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a +garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too +curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of +the mind and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be +too strait or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of +civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot +report it for deficient. + +(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been +hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning +and the professors of learning. For from this root springeth +chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to +this effect, that there is no great concurrence between learning and +wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain +to civil life, for wisdom of behaviour, it is by learned men for the +most part despised, as an inferior to virtue and an enemy to +meditation; for wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well +when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few; but for the +wisdom of business, wherein man's life is most conversant, there be +no books of it, except some few scattered advertisements, that have +no proportion to the magnitude of this subject. For if books were +written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned men with mean +experience would far excel men of long experience without learning, +and outshoot them in their own bow. + +(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge +should be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is +much less infinite than science of government, which we see is +laboured and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some +of the ancient Romans in the saddest and wisest times were +professors; for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in use for +senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as +Coruncanius, Curius, Laelius, and many others, to walk at certain +hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use +their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto +them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the +employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an +accusation, and every other occasion incident to man's life. So as +there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, +arising out of a universal insight into the affairs of the world; +which is used indeed upon particular causes propounded, but is +gathered by general observation of causes of like nature. For so we +see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother, De petitione +consulatus (being the only book of business that I know written by +the ancients), although it concerned a particular action then on +foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic +axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a perpetual direction in +the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may see in those +aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed by +Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was +as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly +matters, we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, +precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions; +whereupon we will stay a while, offering to consideration some +number of examples. + +(6) Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam, +ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi. Here is commended +the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to +find: as it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he +burned Sertorius' papers unperused. + +Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur, sive rideat, +non inveniet requiem. Here is described the great disadvantage +which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself; +which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to +jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no +ways quit himself well of it. + +Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet eum +contumacem. Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch +in his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and +unthankfulness. + +Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo? coram regibus stabit, nec erit +inter ignobiles. Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising +to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many +times love not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, +but ready and diligent. + +Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, cum adolescente secundo +qui consurgit pro eo. Here is expressed that which was noted by +Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius. Plures adorant solem +orientem quam occidentem vel meridianum. + +Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne +demiseris; quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima. Here caution +is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the +unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself +of means to make them better. + +Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri: venit contra eam rex +magnus, et vallavit eam, instruxitque munitones per gyrum, et +perfecta est obsidio; inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens, +et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam; et nullus deinceps recordatus +est huminis illius pauperis. Here the corruption of states is set +forth, that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of +it. + +Millis responsio frangit iram. Here is noted that silence or rough +answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth. + +Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum. Here is lively represented how +laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred +till the last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step +findeth a briar or impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth. + +Melior est finis orationis quam principium. Here is taxed the +vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and +inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of speech. + +Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non bene facit; iste et pro +buccella panis deseret veritatem. Here is noted, that a judge were +better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge +offendeth not so lightly as a facile. + +Vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri vehementi, in quo +paratur fames. Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous +extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry +horseleech. + +Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens coram impio. +Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face +of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many +particular injuries passed over by connivance. + +Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc non esse +peccatum, particeps est homicidii. Here is noted that, whereas men +in wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if +they might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed +aggravate their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety. + +Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso. +Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do +principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will +espouse us to many factions and quarrels. + +Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum. Here is noted, that in +domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves +quieting of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived +of their expectation, and it turneth to wind. + +Filius sapiens laetificat patrem: filius vero stultus maestitia est +matri suae. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort +of the good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of +their ill proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but +of fortune. + +Qui celat delictum, quaerit amicitiam; sed qui altero sermone +repetit, separat faederatos. Here caution is given, that +reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that +which is past, than by apologies and excuses. + +In omni opere bono erit abundantia; ubi autem verba sunt plurima, +ibi frequenter egestas. Here is noted, that words and discourse +aboundeth most where there is idleness and want. + +Primus in sua causa justus: sed venit altera pars, et inquiret in +eum. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth +much; in sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly +removed, except some abuse or falsity in the information be +detected. + +Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora +ventris. Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, +which seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth +deep which hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity. + +Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi injuriam facit; et qui arguit +impium, sibi maculam generat. Here caution is given how we tender +reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to +esteem it for contumely, and accordingly to return it. + +Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia. Here is +distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but +verbal and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon the occasion +presented is quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and +confused. + +Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda +hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus. Here the mind of a wise man is +compared to a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures +and customs are represented; from which representation proceedeth +that application, + + +"Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit." + + +(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic +of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led +with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I +noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also +attended them with brief observations, such as to my understanding +offer no violence to the sense, though I know they may be applied to +a more divine use: but it is allowed, even in divinity, that some +interpretations, yea, and some writings, have more of the eagle than +others; but taking them as instructions for life, they might have +received large discourse, if I would have broken them and +illustrated them by deducements and examples. + +(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is +generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that +as men found out any observation that they thought was good for +life, they would gather it and express it in parable or aphorism or +fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where +examples failed: now that the times abound with history, the aim is +better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing +which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of +negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and +aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories or examples. +For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particulars, +knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it hath much greater +life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, +than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no +point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when +the example is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it +is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the +discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern +for action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake +are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile +aspect towards the discourse which they are brought in to make good. + +(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as +history of times is the best ground for discourse of government, +such as Machiavel handleth, so histories of lives is the most +popular for discourse of business, because it is more conversant in +private actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this +purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon letters, such +as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero ad Atticum, and +others. For letters have a great and more particular representation +of business than either chronicles or lives. Thus have we spoken +both of the matter and form of this part of civil knowledge, +touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient. + +(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as +much from that whereof we have spoken as sapere and sibi sapere, the +one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. +For there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of +pressing a man's own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often +sever. For many are wise in their own ways that are weak for +government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature for +itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did +take much knowledge of: Nam pol sapiens (saith the comical poet) +fingit fortunam sibi; and it grew to an adage, Faber quisque +fortunae propriae; and Livy attributed it to Cato the first, In hoc +viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus +esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur. + +(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and +professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was +observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great +services to the state in his government, and giving an account +thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude every +particular with this clause, "And in this fortune had no part." And +it came so to pass, that he never prospered in anything he took in +hand afterwards. For this is too high and too arrogant, savouring +of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, Dicis, Fluvius est neus et +ego feci memet ipsum; or of that which another prophet speaketh, +that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and that which +the poet expresseth, + + +"Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro, +Nunc adsint!" + + +For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; and, +therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed +their successes to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue. +For so Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus. So Caesar said to +the master of the ship, Caesarem portas et fortunam ejus. + +(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, Faber quisque fortunae +suae: Sapiens dominabitur astris: Invia virtuti null est via, and +the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as +stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for the +presumption or outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and +good; and are no question imprinted in the greatest minds, who are +so sensible of this opinion as they can scarce contain it within. +As we see in Augustus Caesar (who was rather diverse from his uncle +than inferior in virtue), how when he died he desired his friends +about him to give him a plaudite, as if he were conscious to himself +that he had played his part well upon the stage. This part of +knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is +practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And, +therefore, lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible +by axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down +some heads or passages of it. + +(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument +to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein +every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till +he see the difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as +virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, +as to be truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning +greatly, both in honour and in substance. In honour, because +pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is +like a lark, that can mount and sing, and please herself, and +nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, +that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey. +In substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, +that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise +in the globe of crystal or form; that is, that there be not anything +in being and action which should not be drawn and collected into +contemplation and doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem +of this architecture of fortune otherwise than as of an inferior +work, for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of his being, and +many times the worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for +better respects: but nevertheless fortune as an organ of virtue and +merit deserveth the consideration. + +(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most +summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window +which Momus did require; who seeing in the frame of man's heart such +angles and recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into +them; that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching +persons, their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and +fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly +stand, so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they +lie most open and obnoxious, their friends, factions, dependences; +and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and +times, Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras; their principles, +rules, and observations, and the like: and this not only of persons +but of actions; what are on foot from time to time, and how they are +conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the like. +For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself, +but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous: for +men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are +one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These +informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as +the minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency +of observations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to +ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors. + +(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who +saith, Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda; sed vir +prudens exhauriet illud. And although the knowledge itself falleth +not under precept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions +for the obtaining of it may. + +(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the +ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief +and distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds +than to words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised +words than to set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared +which is said, Fronti nulla fides, which is meant of a general +outward behaviour, and not of the private and subtle motions and +labours of the countenance and gesture; which, as Q. Cicero +elegantly saith, is Animi janua, "the gate of the mind." None more +close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, Etenim vultu +offensionem conjectaverat. So again, noting the differing character +and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the Senate, he +saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of +Germanicus, thus: Magis in speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut +penitus sentire crederetur; but of Drusus thus: Paucioribus sed +intentior, et fida oratione; and in another place, speaking of his +character of speech when he did anything that was gracious and +popular, he saith, "That in other things he was velut eluctantium +verborum;" but then again, solutius loquebatur quando subveniret. +So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such +commanded countenance (vultus jussus), that can sever from a feigned +tale some of these fashions, either a more slight and careless +fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and wandering, or +coming from a man more drily and hardly. + +(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be +trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and +nature: Fraus sibi in parvis fidem praestruit ut majore emolumento +fallat; and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought +and sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be without +manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull men to sleep, +both as to caution and as to industry; and are, as Demosthenes +calleth them, Alimenta socordiae. So again we see how false the +nature of some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus +practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful +reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus +advanced many of the friends of Antonius, Simul amicis ejus +praefecturas et tribunatus largitur: wherein, under pretence to +strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his +dependents. + +(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of +flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially +with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see +Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a +step forth of his dissimulation when he said, "You are hurt because +you do not reign;" of which Tacitus saith, Audita haec raram occulti +pectoris vocem elicuere: correptamque Graeco versu admonuit, ideo +laedi quia non regnaret. And, therefore, the poet doth elegantly +call passions tortures that urge men to confess their secrets:- + + +"Vino torus et ira." + + +And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and +so settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, +sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and +weakness, they open themselves; specially if they be put to it with +a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, Di +mentira, y sacar as verdad: "Tell a lie and find a truth." + +(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports: +men's weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their +virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times +from their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar +friends, with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and +the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to +such men are more masked: Verior fama e domesticis emanat. + +(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their +natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best +interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it +was both pleasantly and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by +a nuncio of the Pope, returning from a certain nation where he +served as lidger; whose opinion being asked touching the appointment +of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case they did not +send one that was too wise; because no very wise man would ever +imagine what they in that country were like to do. And certainly it +is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper +ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian proverb being +elegant, and for the most part true:- + + +"Di danari, di senno, e di fede, +C'e ne manco che non credi." + + +"There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than +men do account upon." + +(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by +their natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being +at the top of human desires, they have for the most part no +particular ends whereto they aspire, by distance from which a man +might take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and +desires; which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more +inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men's +ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also of the +predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally +sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by +Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humours of pleasures, metus ejus +rimatur, he wrought upon Nero's fears, whereby he broke the other's +neck. + +(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way +resteth in three things; the first, to have general acquaintance and +inwardness with those which have general acquaintance and look most +into the world; and specially according to the diversity of +business, and the diversity of persons, to have privacy and +conversation with some one friend at least which is perfect and +well-intelligenced in every several kind. The second is to keep a +good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in most things +liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech inviteth +and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to a +man's knowledge; and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and +inwardness. The last is the reducing of a man's self to this +watchful and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every +conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as +Epictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to say +to himself, Et hoc volo, et etiam institutum servare; so a politic +man in everything should say to himself, Et hoc volo, ac etiam +aliquid addiscere. I have stayed the longer upon this precept of +obtaining good information because it is a main part by itself, +which answereth to all the rest. But, above all things, caution +must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of themselves, and +that this much knowing do not draw on much meddling; for nothing is +more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many matters. +So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to +this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which may +concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more +dexterity. + +(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to +take good information touching their own person, and well to +understand themselves; knowing that, as St. James saith, though men +look oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein +as the divine glass is the Word of God, so the politic glass is the +state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the which we are to +behold ourselves. + +(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities +and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting +these with the most, and those other with the least; and from this +view and examination to frame the considerations following. + +(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth +with the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable +and fit, then in all things to give themselves more scope and +liberty; but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of +their life to be more close retired, and reserved; as we see in +Tiberius, who was never seen at a play, and came not into the senate +in twelve of his last years; whereas Augustus Caesar lived ever in +men's eyes, which Tacitus observeth, alia Tiberio morum via. + +(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions +and courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be +free; and, if engaged, to make the departure at the first +opportunity; as we see was done by Duke Valentine, that was designed +by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after +in regard of his parts and inclination; being such, nevertheless, as +a man cannot tell well whether they were worse for a prince or for a +priest. + +(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are +like to have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course +wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most +eminent; as Caesar Julius did, who at first was an orator or +pleader; but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, +Catulus, and others for eloquence, and saw there was no man of +reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the state was forced +to rely, he forsook his course begun towards a civil and popular +greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial greatness. + +(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents, to +proceed according to the composition of their own nature; as we may +see in Caesar, all whose friends and followers were men active and +effectual, but not solemn, or of reputation. + +(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by +examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas +perhaps their natures and carriages are far differing. In which +error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith that he was wont +often to say, Sylla potuit, ego non potero? Wherein he was much +abused, the natures and proceedings of himself and his example being +the unlikest in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and +pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of majesty and +circumstance, and therefore the less effectual. + +But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath +many other branches, whereupon we cannot insist. + +(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man's self, +there followeth the well opening and revealing a man's self; wherein +we see nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the +less show. For there is a great advantage in the well setting forth +of a man's virtues, fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial +covering of a man's weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the +one, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by circumstances, +gracing the other by exposition, and the like. Wherein we see what +Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest politique of his +time, Omnium quae dixerat feceratque arte quadam ostentator, which +requireth indeed some art, lest it turn tedious and arrogant; but +yet so, as ostentation (though it be to the first degree of vanity) +seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than in policy; for as it is +said, Audacter calumniare, semper aliquid haeret; so, except it be +in a ridiculous degree of deformity, Audacter te vendita, semper +aluquid haeret. For it will stick with the more ignorant and +inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile at it +and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth countervail +the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and +government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or +at times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in +military persons); or at times when others are most envied; or with +easy and careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too +long, or being too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a +man's self, as well as gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling +or putting down others' injury or insolency; it doth greatly add to +reputation: and surely not a few solid natures, that want this +ventosity and cannot sail in the height of the winds, are not +without some prejudice and disadvantage by their moderation. + +(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they +are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that +virtue be not disvalued and embased under the just price, which is +done in three manners--by offering and obtruding a man's self, +wherein men think he is rewarded when he is accepted; by doing too +much, which will not give that which is well done leave to settle, +and in the end induceth satiety; and by finding too soon the fruit +of a man's virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour; +wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him hear what is +truly said: Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris, si haec te +res parva sicuti magna delectat. + +(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the +valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners-- +by caution, by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do +ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for +which they are not proper; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet +spirits will thrust themselves into matters without difference, and +so publish and proclaim all their wants. Colour is when men make a +way for themselves to have a construction made of their faults or +wants, as proceeding from a better cause or intended for some other +purpose. For of the one it is well said, + + +"Saepe latet vitium proximitate boni," + + +and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he +pretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must +affect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so the rest. For the +second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not do +his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities; and for that +purpose must use to dissemble those abilities which are notorious in +him, to give colour that his true wants are but industries and +dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last but the surest +remedy--namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man +cannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who +endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat +down the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth +this other, which is to face out a man's own defects, in seeming to +conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, +to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath least +opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best: like as we +shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show their verses, and +you except to any, they will say, "That that line cost them more +labour than any of the rest;" and presently will seem to disable and +suspect rather some other line, which they know well enough to be +the best in the number. But above all, in this righting and helping +of a man's self in his own carriage, he must take heed he show not +himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much +dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some sparkles +of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage, +with a ready rescussing of a man's self from scorns, is sometimes of +necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; +but it ever succeedeth with good felicity. + +(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour +to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing +hindereth men's fortunes so much as this: Idem manebat, neque idem +decebat--men are where they were, when occasions turn: and +therefore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he +addeth that he had versatile ingenium. And thereof it cometh that +these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves and cannot +make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is +nature to be somewhat vicious and enwrapped, and not easy to turn. +In some it is a conceit that is almost a nature, which is, that men +can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their +course, when they have found good by it in former experience. For +Machiavel noted wisely how Fabius Maximus would have been +temporising still, according to his old bias, when the nature of the +war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it is want +of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not discern +when things have a period, but come in too late after the occasion; +as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows, +when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then +they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some +other it is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that +they can bring about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, +when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with +disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of +Sibylla's books the treble price, when he might at first have had +all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause this +restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; and +nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind +concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune. + +(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity +with that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is +well expressed, Fatis accede deisque, that men do not only turn with +the occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their +credit or strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in +their actions that which is most passable: for this will preserve +men from foil, not occupy them too much about one matter, win +opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a show of a +perpetual felicity in all they undertake: which cannot but mightily +increase reputation. + +(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy +with the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that +which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: Et quemadmodum receptum +est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsae +ducendae; ut quaeipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus +persequi cogantur. For if we observe we shall find two differing +kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of +occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and +pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; +either of which is very imperfect without the other. + +(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good +mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a man's self: for +although depth of secrecy, and making way (qualis est via navis in +mari, which the French calleth sourdes menees, when men set things +in work without opening themselves at all), be sometimes both +prosperous and admirable; yet many times dissimulatio errores parit, +qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant. And therefore we see the +greatest politiques have in a natural and free manner professed +their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised in them. For +so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, "that he +wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or +enemies." So Caesar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple +to profess "that he had rather be first in a village than second at +Rome." So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what +Cicero saith of him, Alter (meaning of Caesar) non recusat, sed +quodammodo postulat, ut (ut est) sic appelletur tyrannus. So we may +see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Caesar, in his +very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet +in his harangues to the people would swear, Ita parentis honores +consequi liceat (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to +help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of +Caesar's that was erected in the place: and men laughed and +wondered, and said, "Is it possible?" or, "Did you ever hear the +like?" and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so handsomely and +ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who +tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and dissembling manner +as Tacitus saith of him, Occultior non melior, wherein Sallust +concurreth, Ore probo, animo inverecundo, made it his design, by +infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute anarchy +and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for +necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon +him, and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he +thought) to that point when he was chosen consul alone, as never any +was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men understood +him not; but was fain in the end to go the beaten track of getting +arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of Caesar's designs: so +tedious, casual, and unfortunate are these deep dissimulations: +whereof it seemeth Tacitus made this judgment, that they were a +cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy; attributing +the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius; where, speaking of +Livia, he saith, Et cum artibus mariti simulatione filii bene +compostia: for surely the continual habit of dissimulation is but a +weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic. + +(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom +our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they +conduce and are material to our particular ends; and that to do +substantially and not superficially. For we shall find the logical +part (as I may term it) of some men's minds good, but the +mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of +consequences, but not of proportions and comparison, preferring +things of show and sense before things of substance and effect. So +some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular fame +and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in +many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So +some measure things according to the labour and difficulty or +assiduity which are spent about them; and think, if they be ever +moving, that they must needs advance and proceed; as Caesar saith in +a despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how +laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose, Haec omnia +magno studio agebat. So in most things men are ready to abuse +themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should +be the fittest. + +(38) As for the true marshalling of men's pursuits towards their +fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand +thus. First the amendment of their own minds. For the removal of +the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of +fortune than the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of +the mind. In the second place I set down wealth and means; which I +know most men would have placed first, because of the general use +which it beareth towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion +I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that +moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the true +sinews of the wars are the sinews of men's arms, that is, a valiant, +populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority +of Solon, who, when Croesus showed him his treasury of gold, said to +him, that if another came that had better iron, he would be master +of his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not +moneys that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and +steel of men's minds, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, +industry, and the like. In the third place I set down reputation, +because of the peremptory tides and currents it hath; which, if they +be not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being +extreme hard to play an after-game of reputation. And lastly I +place honour, which is more easily won by any of the other three, +much more by all, than any of them can be purchased by honour. To +conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in matter, so +is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the +commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they should +intend their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as +they come on, but marshal them according to greatness and not +according to instance; not observing the good precept, Quod nunc +instat agamus. + +(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters +which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that +sounding in a man's ears, Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile +tempus: and that is the cause why those which take their course of +rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful +divines, and the like, are not commonly so politic for their own +fortune, otherwise than in their ordinary way, because they want +time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and to devise plots. + +(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature, which +doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well +interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon that +which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in every particular +action so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing +under another, as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best +degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third; and if he can +have no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to +somewhat else; and if he cannot make anything of it for the present, +yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if he can +contrive no effect or substance from it, yet to win some good +opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact an account of +himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed +and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is +more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that +doth so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many +times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need +afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present; and +therefore men must be perfect in that rule, Haec oportet facere, et +illa non imittere. + +(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man's +self peremptorily in anything, though it seem not liable to +accident; but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a way to +retire: following the wisdom in the ancient fable of the two frogs, +which consulted when their plash was dry whither they should go; and +the one moved to go down into a pit, because it was not likely the +water would dry there; but the other answered, "True, but if it do, +how shall we get out again?" + +(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of +Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but to caution +and moderation, Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam +amaturus. For it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark +themselves too far into unfortunate friendships, troublesome +spleens, and childish and humorous envies or emulations. + +(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, +because I would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, +to be thought things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or +two much made of, but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is +more hardly made than a beginning. It must be likewise conceived, +that in these points which I mention and set down, they are far from +complete tractates of them, but only as small pieces for patterns. +And lastly, no man I suppose will think that I mean fortunes are not +obtained without all this ado; for I know they come tumbling into +some men's laps; and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a +plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross +errors. + +(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect +orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so +likewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been described by such as +have handled those subjects, the mould hath used to be made +according to the perfection of the art, and not according to common +practice: so I understand it, that it ought to be done in the +description of a politic man, I mean politic for his own fortune. + +(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts +which we have set down are of that kind which may be counted and +called Bonae Artes. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for +himself that principle of Machiavel, "That a man seek not to attain +virtue itself, but the appearance only thereof; because the credit +of virtue is a help, but the use of it is cumber:" or that other of +his principles, "That he presuppose that men are not fitly to be +wrought otherwise but by fear; and therefore that he seek to have +every man obnoxious, low, and in straits," which the Italians call +seminar spine, to sow thorns: or that other principle, contained in +the verse which Cicero citeth, Cadant amici, dummodo inimici +intercidant, as the triumvirs, which sold every one to other the +lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies: or that +other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble +states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their +fortunes, Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id +non aqua sed ruina restinguam: or that other principle of Lysander, +"That children are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths:" +and the like evil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in all things) +there are more in number than of the good: certainly with these +dispensations from the laws of charity and integrity, the pressing +of a man's fortune may be more hasty and compendious. But it is in +life as it is in ways, the shortest way is commonly the foulest, and +surely the fairer way is not much about. + +(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain +themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of +ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before +their eyes not only that general map of the world, "That all things +are vanity and vexation of spirit," but many other more particular +cards and directions: chiefly that, that being without well-being +is a curse, and the greater being the greater curse; and that all +virtue is most rewarded and all wickedness most punished in itself: +according as the poet saith excellently: + + +"Quae vobis, quae digna, viri pro laudibus istis +Praemia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum +Dii moresque dabunt vestri." + + +And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look up to the +Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often subverteth the +wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according to that scripture, +"He hath conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing." +And although men should refrain themselves from injury and evil +arts, yet this incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man's fortune +leaveth not tribute which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) +demandeth a tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more +strict, of our time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected +face towards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth, +eating dust as doth the serpent, Atque affigit humo divinae +particulam aurae. And if any man flatter himself that he will +employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as was said +concerning Augustus Caesar, and after of Septimius Severus, "That +either they should never have been born, or else they should never +have died," they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of +their greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet +these compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never +good to be purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in their +race towards their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that +conceit which is elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles V., in +his instructions to the king his son, "That fortune hath somewhat of +the nature of a woman, that if she he too much wooed she is the +farther off." But this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes +are corrupted: let men rather build upon that foundation which is +as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join +close, namely that same Primum quaerite. For divinity saith, Primum +quaerite regnum Dei, et ista omnia adjicientur vobis: and +philosophy saith, Primum quaerite bona animi; caetera aut aderunt, +aut non oberunt. And although the human foundation hath somewhat of +the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he broke forth into that +speech, + + +"Te colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es;" + + +yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for +a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient. + +(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and +retired in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; +for some things are secret because they are hard to know, and some +because they are not fit to utter. We see all governments are +obscure and invisible: + + + "Totamque infusa per artus +Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet." + + +Such is the description of governments. We see the government of +God over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate +of much irregularity and confusion. The government of the soul in +moving the body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof +hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of +antiquity (the shadows whereof are in the poets) in the description +of torments and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which was +the giants' offence, doth detest the offence of futility, as in +Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars: +nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses of policy +and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling. + +(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, all +things ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be manifest +and revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the +government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and +shady body, is in the view of God as crystal: Et in conspectu sedis +tanquam mare vitreum simile crystallo. So unto princes and states, +and specially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and +dispositions of the people, their conditions and necessities, their +factions and combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought +to be, in regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom +of their observations, and the height of their station where they +keep sentinel, in great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, +considering that I write to a king that is a master of this science, +and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part in +silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the +ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being silent, when others +contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, +desired it might be certified for his part, "That there was one that +knew how to hold his peace." + +(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which +is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that +all those which have written of laws have written either as +philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the +philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, +and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light +because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write according to +the states where they live what is received law, and not what ought +to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker is one, and of a lawyer is +another. For there are in nature certain fountains of justice +whence all civil laws are derived but as streams; and like as waters +do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, +so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where +they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains. +Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a platform +of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into +consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are +the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; +by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what +are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what +influence laws touching private right of meum and tuum have into the +public state, and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws +are to be penned and delivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief +or large, with preambles or without; how they are to be pruned and +reformed from time to time, and what is the best means to keep them +from being too vast in volume, or too full of multiplicity and +crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent +and judicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences +touching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed, +rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and +good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be +mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, +how the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured +and governed; and many other points touching the administration and +(as I may term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, +because I purpose (if God give me leave), having begun a work of +this nature in aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the +meantime for deficient. + +(50) And for your Majesty's laws of England, I could say much of +their dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but +excel the civil laws in fitness for the government, for the civil +law was nonhos quaesitum munus in usus; it was not made for the +countries which it governeth. Hereof I cease to speak because I +will not intermingle matter of action with matter of general +learning. + +XXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil +knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; +and with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at +some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this +writing seemeth to me (si nunquam fallit imago), as far as a man can +judge of his own work, not much better than that noise or sound +which musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments, +which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music +is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content to tune the +instruments of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. +And surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in +which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the +qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of +this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails +of ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books +to men of all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, +which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of +natural history; the leisure wherewith these times abound, not +employing men so generally in civil business, as the states of +Graecia did, in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome, +in respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the present +disposition of these times at this instant to peace; the consumption +of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion, which +have so much diverted men from other sciences; the perfection of +your Majesty's learning, which as a phoenix may call whole volleys +of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time, which +is ever more and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to +this persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass +that of the Grecian and Roman learning; only if men will know their +own strength and their own weakness both; and take, one from the +other, light of invention, and not fire of contradiction; and esteem +of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a +quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence to things of +worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular +estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himself or +others in the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient and +patient request, Verbera, sed audi: let men reprehend them, so they +observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful (though it may be +it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of men to their +second, and from the nearer times to the times further off. Now let +us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so +blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and +port of all men's labours and peregrinations. + +XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as +to the will of man: so that as we are to obey His law, though we +find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word, +though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only +that which is agreeable to our sense we give consent to the matter, +and not to the author; which is no more than we would do towards a +suspected and discredited witness; but that faith which was +accounted to Abraham for righteousness was of such a point as +whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an image of natural reason. + +(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to +believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man's mind +suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such +one as it holdeth for more authorised than itself and so suffereth +from the worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man +glorified; for then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are +known. + +(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our idiom +we call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, +and not upon the light of nature: for it is written, Caeli enarrant +gloriam Dei; but it is not written, Caeli enarrant voluntatem Dei: +but of that it is said, Ad legem et testimonium: si non fecerint +secundum verbum istud, &c. This holdeth not only in those points of +faith which concern the great mysteries of the Deity, of the +creation, of the redemption, but likewise those which concern the +law moral, truly interpreted: "Love your enemies: do good to them +that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father, that suffereth His +rain to fall upon the just and unjust." To this it ought to be +applauded, Nec vox hominem sonat: it is a voice beyond the light of +nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a +libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as +if they were opposite and malignant to nature: Et quod natura +remittit, invida jura negant. So said Dendamis the Indian unto +Alexander's messengers, that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, +and some other of the wise men of Graecia, and that he held them for +excellent men: but that they had a fault, which was that they had +in too great reverence and veneration a thing they called law and +manners. So it must be confessed that a great part of the law moral +is of that perfection whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire: +how then is it that man is said to have, by the light and law of +nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and vice, justice and +wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the light of nature is used in +two several senses: the one, that which springeth from reason, +sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and +earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by +an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a +sparkle of the purity of his first estate: in which latter sense +only he is participant of some light and discerning touching the +perfection of the moral law; but how? sufficient to check the vice +but not to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as +well moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration and +revelation from God. + +(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the +latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for +nothing that the apostle calleth religion "our reasonable service of +God;" insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law +were full of reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies +of idolatry and magic, that are full of non-significants and surd +characters. But most specially the Christian faith, as in all +things so in this, deserveth to be highly magnified; holding and +preserving the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of +the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have embraced the two +extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no constant belief or +confession, but left all to the liberty of agent; and the religion +of Mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument altogether: the +one having the very face of error, and the other of imposture; +whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject disputation with +difference. + +(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the +former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God +to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine +and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries +themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and not by way of +argument. The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. +In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in +the expressing of His mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; +and doth graft His revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of +our reason, and applieth His inspirations to open our understanding, +as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter +there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and +respective, although not original and absolute. For after the +articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from +examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make +derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of +them, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not; for +both the principles are examinable by induction, though not by a +medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles or first +positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down +and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in +religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller +nature, namely, wherein there are not only posita but placita; for +in such there can be no use of absolute reason. We see it +familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the like. The draughts and +first laws of the game are positive, but how? merely ad placitum, +and not examinable by reason; but then how to direct our play +thereupon with best advantage to win the game is artificial and +rational. So in human laws there be many grounds and maxims which +are placita juris, positive upon authority, and not upon reason, and +therefore not to be disputed: but what is most just, not absolutely +but relatively, and according to those maxims, that affordeth a long +field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason, +which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the placets of +God. + +(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, +to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true +limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine +dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing +usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which is revealed, to +search and mine into that which is not revealed; and by pretext of +enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine that which is +positive. The one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, +demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to +reveal them, Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex? The other +sort into the error of the disciples, which were scandalised at a +show of contradiction, Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis? Modicum et +non videbitis me; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis me, &c. + +(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and +blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined of +would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the +vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but +the fury of controversies, wherewith the Church laboureth. For it +cannot but open men's eyes to see that many controversies do merely +pertain to that which is either not revealed or positive; and that +many others do grow upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations: +which latter sort, if men would revive the blessed style of that +great doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus, ego, non +dominus; and again, secundum consilium meum, in opinions and +counsels, and not in positions and oppositions. But men are now +over-ready to usurp the style, non ego, sed dominus; and not so +only, but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and +anathemas, to the terror of those which have not sufficiently +learned out of Solomon that "The causeless curse shall not come." + +(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or +revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation; and with +the latter we will begin, because it hath most coherence with that +which we have now last handled. The nature of the information +consisteth of three branches: the limits of the information, the +sufficiency of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining the +information. Unto the limits of the information belong these +considerations: how far forth particular persons continue to be +inspired; how far forth the Church is inspired; and how far forth +reason may be used; the last point whereof I have noted as +deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong two +considerations: what points of religion are fundamental, and what +perfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one +and the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light +according to the dispensation of times are material to the +sufficiency of belief. + +(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as +deficient, that the points fundamental, and the points of further +perfection only, ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; a +subject tending to much like end as that I noted before; for as that +other were likely to abate the number of controversies, so this is +likely to abate the heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw +the Israelite and the Egyptian fight, he did not say, "Why strive +you?" but drew his sword and slew the Egyptian; but when he saw the +two Israelites fight, he said, "You are brethren, why strive you?" +If the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be slain by the +sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it be an Israelite, +though in the wrong, then, "Why strive you?" We see of the +fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, "He that is +not with us is against us;" but of points not fundamental, thus, "He +that is not against us is with us." So we see the coat of our +Saviour was entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the +Scriptures in itself; but the garment of the Church was of divers +colours and yet not divided. We see the chaff may and ought to be +severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may not be pulled up +from the corn in the field. So as it is a thing of great use well +to define what, and of what latitude, those points are which do make +men mere aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God. + +(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true +and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains +of the water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are of +two sorts: methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine +water, which excelleth so much that of Jacob's well, is drawn forth +much in the same kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and +fountains; either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from +thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and received +in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth. The former +sort whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my +judgment is more subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath +exhibited unto us the scholastical divinity; whereby divinity hath +been reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of +doctrine or positions fetched and derived from thence. + +(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a +compacted strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first +they fail to find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to +brevity, we see in all summary methods, while men purpose to +abridge, they give cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgment by +contraction becometh obscure; the obscurity requireth exposition, +and the exposition is deduced into large commentaries, or into +commonplaces and titles, which grow to be more vast than the +original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted. So we see +the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first +writings of the fathers, whence the master of the sentences made his +sum or collection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern +doctors of the civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, +of which Tribonian compiled the digest. So as this course of sums +and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of +sciences more immense in quantity, and more base in substance. + +(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact +methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to +support and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than +substantial, like unto buildings which stand by architecture and +compaction, which are more subject to ruin than those that are built +more strong in their several parts, though less compacted. But it +is plain that the more you recede from your grounds, the weaker do +you conclude; and as in nature, the more you remove yourself from +particulars, the greater peril of error you do incur; so much more +in divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures by inferences +and consequences, the more weak and dilute are your positions. + +(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to +be sought, which makes this course of artificial divinity the more +suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art will make +it round and uniform; but in divinity many things must be left +abrupt, and concluded with this: O altitudo sapientiae et scientiae +Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus, et non +investigabiles viae ejus. So again the apostle saith, Ex parte +scimus: and to have the form of a total, where there is but matter +for a part, cannot be without supplies by supposition and +presumption. And therefore I conclude that the true use of these +sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions +preparatory unto knowledge; but in them, or by deducement from them, +to handle the main body and substance of a knowledge is in all +sciences prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous. + +(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large, +there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them +rather curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. +Notwithstanding, thus much must be confessed, that the Scriptures, +being given by inspiration and not by human reason, do differ from +all other books in the Author, which by consequence doth draw on +some difference to be used by the expositor. For the Inditer of +them did know four things which no man attains to know; which are-- +the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of +nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession +of all ages. For as to the first it is said, "He that presseth into +the light shall be oppressed of the glory." And again, "No man +shall see My face and live." To the second, "When He prepared the +heavens I was present, when by law and compass He enclosed the +deep." To the third, "Neither was it needful that any should bear +witness to Him of man, for He knew well what was in man." And to +the last, "From the beginning are known to the Lord all His works." + +(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain senses and +expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the +bounds of sobriety--the one anagogical, and the other philosophical. +But as to the former, man is not to prevent his time: Videmus nunc +per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; wherein +nevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as +the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication of this +enigma. But to press too far into it cannot but cause a dissolution +and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three +degrees of that we receive into it--aliment, medicine, and poison; +whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter +and overcome; medicine is that which is partly converted by nature, +and partly converteth nature; and poison is that which worketh +wholly upon nature, without that nature can in any part work upon +it. So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work +upon and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a +dissolution of the mind and understanding. + +(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late +time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have +pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the +Scriptures; scandalising and traducing all other philosophy as +heathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity between God's +Word and His works; neither do they give honour to the Scriptures, +as they suppose, but much embase them. For to seek heaven and earth +in the Word of God, whereof it is said, "Heaven and earth shall +pass, but My word shall not pass," is to seek temporary things +amongst eternal: and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek +the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to +seek the dead amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, +whose place was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in +the holiest place of all where the ark of the testimony was seated. +And again, the scope or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to +express matters of nature in the Scriptures, otherwise than in +passage, and for application to man's capacity and to matters moral +or divine. And it is a true rule, Auctoris aliud agentis parva +auctoritas. For it were a strange conclusion, if a man should use a +similitude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature +or history according to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, a unicorn, +a centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like, that therefore he must +needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof positively to be true. +To conclude therefore these two interpretations, the one by +reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, which +have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and +cabalists, are to be confined with a a noli akryn sapere, sed time. + +(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to man, +touching the secrets of the heart and the successions of time, doth +make a just and sound difference between the manner of the +exposition of the Scriptures and all other books. For it is an +excellent observation which hath been made upon the answers of our +Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to +Him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question +demanded: the reason whereof is, because not being like man, which +knows man's thoughts by his words, but knowing man's thoughts +immediately, He never answered their words, but their thoughts. +Much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being +written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, +with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates +of the Church, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be +interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of +the place, and respectively towards that present occasion whereupon +the words were uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with +the words before or after, or in contemplation of the principal +scope of the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or +collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite +springs and streams of doctrine to water the Church in every part. +And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were, the main stream +or river, so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical +or typical, are they whereof the Church hath most use; not that I +wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in +allusions: but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the +Scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a +profane book. + +(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can +report no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will add. In +perusing books of divinity I find many books of controversies, and +many of commonplaces and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as +it is made an art: a number of sermons and lectures, and many +prolix commentaries upon the Scriptures, with harmonies and +concordances. But that form of writing in divinity which in my +judgment is of all others most rich and precious is positive +divinity, collected upon particular texts of Scriptures in brief +observations; not dilated into commonplaces, not chasing after +controversies, not reduced into method of art; a thing abounding in +sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books which will +remain, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded, +and I may speak it with an absit invidia verbo, and nowise in +derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine +and the olive, that if the choice and best of those observations +upon texts of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons +within this your Majesty's Island of Brittany by the space of these +forty years and more (leaving out the largeness of exhortations and +applications thereupon) had been set down in a continuance, it had +been the best work in divinity which had been written since the +Apostles' times. + +(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter of +belief and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration; +which is also judged and directed by the former--the one being as +the internal soul of religion, and the other as the external body +thereof. And, therefore, the heathen religion was not only a +worship of idols, but the whole religion was an idol in itself; for +it had no soul; that is, no certainty of belief or confession: as a +man may well think, considering the chief doctors of their church +were the poets; and the reason was because the heathen gods were no +jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had +reason. Neither did they respect the pureness of heart, so they +might have external honour and rites. + +(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of +divinity: faith, manners, liturgy, and government. Faith +containeth the doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of +God, and of the works of God. The nature of God consisteth of three +persons in unity of Godhead. The attributes of God are either +common to the Deity, or respective to the persons. The works of God +summary are two, that of the creation and that of the redemption; +and both these works, as in total they appertain to the unity of the +Godhead, so in their parts they refer to the three persons: that of +the creation, in the mass of the matter, to the Father; in the +disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the continuance and +conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that of the +redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father; in the whole +act and consummation, to the Son; and in the application, to the +Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, +and by the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work +likewise we consider either effectually, in the elect; or privately, +in the reprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible Church. + +(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, +which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the +edition thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law +positive; and according to the style, into negative and affirmative, +prohibitions and commandments. Sin, in the matter and subject +thereof, is divided according to the commandments; in the form +thereof it referreth to the three persons in Deity: sins of +infirmity against the Father, whose more special attribute is power; +sins of ignorance against the Son, whose attribute is wisdom; and +sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, whose attribute is grace or +love. In the motions of it, it either moveth to the right hand or +to the left; either to blind devotion or to profane and libertine +transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth +liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the +degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, +or act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of +God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, +and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which +quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners is the +elevation and consent of the heart; whereunto appertain books of +exhortation, holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like. + +(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal +acts between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the +preaching of the word, and the sacraments, which are seals to the +covenant, or as the visible word; and on the part of man, invocation +of the name of God; and under the law, sacrifices; which were as +visible prayers or confessions: but now the adoration being in +spiritu et veritate, there remaineth only vituli labiorum; although +the use of holy vows of thankfulness and retribution may be +accounted also as sealed petitions. + +(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of the +patrimony of the Church, the franchises of the Church, and the +offices and jurisdictions of the Church, and the laws of the Church +directing the whole; all which have two considerations, the one in +themselves, the other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the +civil estate. + +(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of +instruction of truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The +declinations from religion, besides the privative, which is atheism +and the branches thereof, are three--heresies, idolatry, and +witchcraft: heresies, when we serve the true God with a false +worship; idolatry, when we worship false gods, supposing them to be +true; and witchcraft, when we adore false gods, knowing them to be +wicked and false. For so your Majesty doth excellently well +observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And yet we see +though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are all +of a nature, when there is once a receding from the Word of God; for +so he saith, Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, et quasi scelus +idololatriae nolle acquiescere. + +(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I can report +no deficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or ground +that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity, so diligent +have men been either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares. + + +Thus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world, +as truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and +description of those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, +or not well converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in +any point receded from that which is commonly received, it hath been +with a purpose of proceeding in melius, and not in aliud; a mind of +amendment and proficiency, and not of change and difference. For I +could not be true and constant to the argument I handle if I were +not willing to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to +have others go beyond me again: which may the better appear by +this, that I have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not +seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men's judgments by +confutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am in good +hope that if the first reading move an objection, the second reading +will make an answer. And in those things wherein I have erred, I am +sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which +certainly have this contrary effect and operation, that they add +authority to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well +invented. For question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as +on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim +and challenge to myself as mine own. The good, it any be, is due +tanquam adeps sacrificii, to be incensed to the honour, first of the +Divine Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most +bounden. + + + + +Footnotes: + +{1} Stoops in the rice and takes the speeding gold. Ovid. Metam, +x. 667. + + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING *** + +This file should be named adlr10.txt or adlr10.zip +Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks get a new NUMBER, adlr11.txt +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, adlr10a.txt + +Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US +unless a copyright notice is included. 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