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diff --git a/5500-h/5500-h.htm b/5500-h/5500-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b069c30 --- /dev/null +++ b/5500-h/5500-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,8938 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=UTF-8" /> + <title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Advancement of Learning, by Francis Bacon</title> + <link rel="coverpage" href="images/cover.jpg" /> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + P { margin-top: .75em; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + .GutSmall { font-size: 0.7em; } + H1, H2 { + text-align: center; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + } + H3, H4, H5 { + text-align: center; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + } + BODY{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + table { border-collapse: collapse; } +table {margin-left:auto; margin-right:auto;} + td { vertical-align: top; border: 1px solid black;} + td p { margin: 0.2em; } + + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + + img { border: none; } + div.gapspace { height: 0.8em; } + div.gapshortline { height: 0.3em; width: 20%; margin-left:40%; + border-top: 1px solid; } + .citation {vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: none;} + --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} +h2,h3,.footnote {page-break-before: avoid;} + </style> + </head> + <body> +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold;'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Advancement of Learning, by Francis Bacon</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: The Advancement of Learning</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Francis Bacon</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Editor: Henry Morley</div> +<div style='display:block;margin:1em 0'>Release Date: April 1, 2004 [eBook #5500]<br /> +[Most recently updated: April 12, 2021]</div> +<div style='display:block;margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block;margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Transcribed from the 1893 Cassell & Company edition by +David Price, email ccx074@pglaf.org and Richard Tonsing</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em;margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING ***</div> +<p>Transcribed from the 1893 Cassell & Company edition by +David Price, email ccx074@pglaf.org</p> +<p>Transcriber’s note: +Changed “considering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned +times have been most subject to tumults, seditious, and changes” to +“considering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have +been most subject to tumults, seditions, and changes”.</p> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="GutSmall">CASSELL’S NATIONAL LIBRARY.</span></p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<h1><span class="GutSmall">THE</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">Advancement</span><br /> +<span class="GutSmall">OF</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">Learning</span>.</h1> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="GutSmall">BY</span><br /> +FRANCIS BACON.</p> +<p style="text-align: center"> +<a href="images/tpb.jpg"> +<img alt= "Decorative graphic" title="Decorative graphic" src="images/tps.jpg" /> +</a></p> +<p style="text-align: center">CASSELL & COMPANY, Limited:<br /> +<span class="GutSmall"><i>LONDON</i></span><span class="GutSmall">, </span><span class="GutSmall"><i>PARIS & +MELBOURNE</i></span><span class="GutSmall">.</span><br /> +1893.</p> +<div class='chapter' /><h2>INTRODUCTION.</h2> +<p>“<span class="smcap">The Tvvoo</span> Bookes of Francis +Bacon. Of the proficience and aduancement of Learning, +divine and humane. To the King. At London. +Printed for Henrie Tomes, and are to be sould at his shop at +Graies Inne Gate in Holborne. 1605.” That was +the original title-page of the book now in the reader’s +hand—a living book that led the way to a new world of +thought. It was the book in which Bacon, early in the reign +of James the First, prepared the way for a full setting forth of +his New Organon, or instrument of knowledge.</p> +<p>The Organon of Aristotle was a set of treatises in which +Aristotle had written the doctrine of propositions. Study +of these treatises was a chief occupation of young men when they +passed from school to college, and proceeded from Grammar to +Logic, the second of the Seven Sciences. Francis Bacon as a +youth of sixteen, at Trinity College, Cambridge, felt the +unfruitfulness of this method of search after truth. He was +the son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Queen Elizabeth’s Lord +Keeper, and was born at York House, in the Strand, on the 22nd of +January, 1561. His mother was the Lord Keeper’s +second wife, one of two sisters, of whom the other married Sir +William Cecil, afterwards Lord Burleigh. Sir Nicholas Bacon +had six children by his former marriage, and by his second wife +two sons, Antony and Francis, of whom Antony was about two years +the elder. The family home was at York Place, and at +Gorhambury, near St. Albans, from which town, in its ancient and +its modern style, Bacon afterwards took his titles of Verulam and +St. Albans.</p> +<p>Antony and Francis Bacon went together to Trinity College, +Cambridge, when Antony was fourteen years old and Francis +twelve. Francis remained at Cambridge only until his +sixteenth year; and Dr. Rawley, his chaplain in after-years, +reports of him that “whilst he was commorant in the +University, about sixteen years of age (as his lordship hath been +pleased to impart unto myself), he first fell into dislike of the +philosophy of Aristotle; not for the worthlessness of the author, +to whom he would ascribe all high attributes, but for the +unfruitfulness of the way, being a philosophy (as his lordship +used to say) only strong for disputatious and contentions, but +barren of the production of works for the benefit of the life of +man; in which mind he continued to his dying day.” +Bacon was sent as a youth of sixteen to Paris with the ambassador +Sir Amyas Paulet, to begin his training for the public service; +but his father’s death, in February, 1579, before he had +completed the provision he was making for his youngest children, +obliged him to return to London, and, at the age of eighteen, to +settle down at Gray’s Inn to the study of law as a +profession. He was admitted to the outer bar in June, 1582, +and about that time, at the age of twenty-one, wrote a sketch of +his conception of a New Organon that should lead man to more +fruitful knowledge, in a little Latin tract, which he called +“Temporis Partus Maximus” (“The Greatest Birth +of Time”).</p> +<p>In November, 1584, Bacon took his seat in the House of Commons +as member for Melcombe Regis, in Dorsetshire. In October, +1586, he sat for Taunton. He was member afterwards for +Liverpool; and he was one of those who petitioned for the speedy +execution of Mary Queen of Scots. In October, 1589, he +obtained the reversion of the office of Clerk of the Council in +the Star Chamber, which was worth £1,600 or £2,000 a +year; but for the succession to this office he had to wait until +1608. It had not yet fallen to him when he wrote his +“Two Books of the Advancement of Learning.” In +the Parliament that met in February, 1593, Bacon sat as member +for Middlesex. He raised difficulties of procedure in the +way of the grant of a treble subsidy, by just objection to the +joining of the Lords with the Commons in a money grant, and a +desire to extend the time allowed for payment from three years to +six; it was, in fact, extended to four years. The Queen was +offended. Francis Bacon and his brother Antony had attached +themselves to the young Earl of Essex, who was their friend and +patron. The office of Attorney-General became vacant. +Essex asked the Queen to appoint Francis Bacon. The Queen +gave the office to Sir Edward Coke, who was already +Solicitor-General, and by nine years Bacon’s senior. +The office of Solicitor-General thus became vacant, and that was +sought for Francis Bacon. The Queen, after delay and +hesitation, gave it, in November, 1595, to Serjeant +Fleming. The Earl of Essex consoled his friend by giving +him “a piece of land”—Twickenham +Park—which Bacon afterwards sold for +£1,800—equal, say, to £12,000 in present buying +power. In 1597 Bacon was returned to Parliament as member +for Ipswich, and in that year he was hoping to marry the rich +widow of Sir William Hatton, Essex helping; but the lady married, +in the next year, Sir Edward Coke. It was in 1597 that +Bacon published the First Edition of his Essays. That was a +little book containing only ten essays in English, with twelve +“Meditationes Sacræ,” which were essays in +Latin on religious subjects. From 1597 onward to the end of +his life, Bacon’s Essays were subject to continuous +addition and revision. The author’s Second Edition, +in which the number of the Essays was increased from ten to +thirty-eight, did not appear until November or December, 1612, +seven years later than these two books on the “Advancement +of Learning;” and the final edition of the Essays, in which +their number was increased from thirty-eight to fifty-eight, +appeared only in 1625; and Bacon died on the 9th of April, +1626. The edition of the Essays published in 1597, under +Elizabeth, marked only the beginning of a course of thought that +afterwards flowed in one stream with his teachings in +philosophy.</p> +<p>In February, 1601, there was the rebellion of Essex. +Francis Bacon had separated himself from his patron after giving +him advice that was disregarded. Bacon, now Queen’s +Counsel, not only appeared against his old friend, but with +excess of zeal, by which, perhaps, he hoped to win back the +Queen’s favour, he twice obtruded violent attacks upon +Essex when he was not called upon to speak. On the 25th of +February, 1601, Essex was beheaded. The genius of Bacon was +next employed to justify that act by “A Declaration of the +Practices and Treasons attempted and committed by Robert late +Earle of Essex and his Complices.” But James of +Scotland, on whose behalf Essex had intervened, came to the +throne by the death of Elizabeth on the 24th of March, +1603. Bacon was among the crowd of men who were made +knights by James I., and he had to justify himself under the new +order of things by writing “Sir Francis Bacon his Apologie +in certain Imputations concerning the late Earle of +Essex.” He was returned to the first Parliament of +James I. by Ipswich and St. Albans, and he was confirmed in his +office of King’s Counsel in August, 1604; but he was not +appointed to the office of Solicitor-General when it became +vacant in that year.</p> +<p>That was the position of Francis Bacon in 1605, when he +published this work, where in his First Book he pointed out the +discredits of learning from human defects of the learned, and +emptiness of many of the studies chosen, or the way of dealing +with them. This came, he said, especially by the mistaking +or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge, as if +there were sought in it “a couch whereupon to rest a +searching and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and +variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a +tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort +or commanding ground for strife and contention; or a shop for +profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the +Creator and the relief of man’s estate.” The +rest of the First Book was given to an argument upon the Dignity +of Learning; and the Second Book, on the Advancement of Learning, +is, as Bacon himself described it, “a general and faithful +perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie +fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the industry +of man; to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory +may both minister light to any public designation and also serve +to excite voluntary endeavours.” Bacon makes, by a +sort of exhaustive analysis, a ground-plan of all subjects of +study, as an intellectual map, helping the right inquirer in his +search for the right path. The right path is that by which +he has the best chance of adding to the stock of knowledge in the +world something worth labouring for; and the true worth is in +labour for “the glory of the Creator and the relief of +man’s estate.”</p> +<p style="text-align: right">H. M.</p> +<div class='chapter' /><h2><span class="GutSmall">THE</span><br /> +FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON;<br /> +<span class="GutSmall">OF THE PROFICIENCE AND</span><br /> +ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,<br /> +<span class="GutSmall">DIVINE AND HUMAN.</span></h2> +<p style="text-align: center"><i>To the King</i>.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">There</span> were under the law, excellent +King, both daily sacrifices and freewill offerings; the one +proceeding upon ordinary observance, the other upon a devout +cheerfulness: in like manner there belongeth to kings from their +servants both tribute of duty and presents of affection. In +the former of these I hope I shall not live to be wanting, +according to my most humble duty and the good pleasure of your +Majesty’s employments: for the latter, I thought it more +respective to make choice of some oblation which might rather +refer to the propriety and excellency of your individual person, +than to the business of your crown and state.</p> +<p>Wherefore, representing your Majesty many times unto my mind, +and beholding you not with the inquisitive eye of presumption, to +discover that which the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable, but +with the observant eye of duty and admiration, leaving aside the +other parts of your virtue and fortune, I have been +touched—yea, and possessed—with an extreme wonder at +those your virtues and faculties, which the philosophers call +intellectual; the largeness of your capacity, the faithfulness of +your memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, the penetration +of your judgment, and the facility and order of your elocution: +and I have often thought that of all the persons living that I +have known, your Majesty were the best instance to make a man of +Plato’s opinion, that all knowledge is but remembrance, and +that the mind of man by Nature knoweth all things, and hath but +her own native and original notions (which by the strangeness and +darkness of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered) again +revived and restored: such a light of Nature I have observed in +your Majesty, and such a readiness to take flame and blaze from +the least occasion presented, or the least spark of +another’s knowledge delivered. And as the Scripture +saith of the wisest king, “That his heart was as the sands +of the sea;” which, though it be one of the largest bodies, +yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest portions; so hath +God given your Majesty a composition of understanding admirable, +being able to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, and +nevertheless to touch and apprehend the least; whereas it should +seem an impossibility in Nature for the same instrument to make +itself fit for great and small works. And for your gift of +speech, I call to mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus +Cæsar: <i>Augusto profluens</i>, <i>et quæ principem +deceret</i>, <i>eloquentia fuit</i>. For if we note it +well, speech that is uttered with labour and difficulty, or +speech that savoureth of the affectation of art and precepts, or +speech that is framed after the imitation of some pattern of +eloquence, though never so excellent; all this hath somewhat +servile, and holding of the subject. But your +Majesty’s manner of speech is, indeed, prince-like, flowing +as from a fountain, and yet streaming and branching itself into +Nature’s order, full of facility and felicity, imitating +none, and inimitable by any. And as in your civil estate +there appeareth to be an emulation and contention of your +Majesty’s virtue with your fortune; a virtuous disposition +with a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation (when time was) +of your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in +the due time; a virtuous observation of the laws of marriage, +with most blessed and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and +most Christian desire of peace, with a fortunate inclination in +your neighbour princes thereunto: so likewise in these +intellectual matters there seemeth to be no less contention +between the excellency of your Majesty’s gifts of Nature +and the universality and perfection of your learning. For I +am well assured that this which I shall say is no amplification +at all, but a positive and measured truth; which is, that there +hath not been since Christ’s time any king or temporal +monarch which hath been so learned in all literature and +erudition, divine and human. For let a man seriously and +diligently revolve and peruse the succession of the Emperors of +Rome, of which Cæsar the Dictator (who lived some years +before Christ) and Marcus Antoninus were the best learned, and so +descend to the Emperors of Græcia, or of the West, and then +to the lines of France, Spain, England, Scotland, and the rest, +and he shall find this judgment is truly made. For it +seemeth much in a king if, by the compendious extractions of +other men’s wits and labours, he can take hold of any +superficial ornaments and shows of learning, or if he countenance +and prefer learning and learned men; but to drink, indeed, of the +true fountains of learning—nay, to have such a fountain of +learning in himself, in a king, and in a king born—is +almost a miracle. And the more, because there is met in +your Majesty a rare conjunction, as well of divine and sacred +literature as of profane and human; so as your Majesty standeth +invested of that triplicity, which in great veneration was +ascribed to the ancient Hermes: the power and fortune of a king, +the knowledge and illumination of a priest, and the learning and +universality of a philosopher. This propriety inherent and +individual attribute in your Majesty deserveth to be expressed +not only in the fame and admiration of the present time, nor in +the history or tradition of the ages succeeding, but also in some +solid work, fixed memorial, and immortal monument, bearing a +character or signature both of the power of a king and the +difference and perfection of such a king.</p> +<p>Therefore I did conclude with myself that I could not make +unto your Majesty a better oblation than of some treatise tending +to that end, whereof the sum will consist of these two parts: the +former concerning the excellency of learning and knowledge, and +the excellency of the merit and true glory in the augmentation +and propagation thereof; the latter, what the particular acts and +works are which have been embraced and undertaken for the +advancement of learning; and again, what defects and undervalues +I find in such particular acts: to the end that though I cannot +positively or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound unto +you framed particulars, yet I may excite your princely +cogitations to visit the excellent treasure of your own mind, and +thence to extract particulars for this purpose agreeable to your +magnanimity and wisdom.</p> +<p>I. (1) In the entrance to the former of these—to clear +the way and, as it were, to make silence, to have the true +testimonies concerning the dignity of learning to be better +heard, without the interruption of tacit objections—I think +good to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces which it +hath received, all from ignorance, but ignorance severally +disguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of +divines, sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politics, and +sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men +themselves.</p> +<p>(2) I hear the former sort say that knowledge is of those +things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and +caution; that the aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original +temptation and sin whereupon ensued the fall of man; that +knowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent, and, therefore, +where it entereth into a man it makes him swell; <i>Scientia +inflat</i>; that Solomon gives a censure, “That there is no +end of making books, and that much reading is weariness of the +flesh;” and again in another place, “That in spacious +knowledge there is much contristation, and that he that +increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety;” that Saint Paul +gives a caveat, “That we be not spoiled through vain +philosophy;” that experience demonstrates how learned men +have been arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to +atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes doth derogate +from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause.</p> +<p>(3) To discover, then, the ignorance and error of this +opinion, and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may +well appear these men do not observe or consider that it was not +the pure knowledge of Nature and universality, a knowledge by the +light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise +as they were brought before him according unto their proprieties, +which gave the occasion to the fall; but it was the proud +knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give law +unto himself, and to depend no more upon God’s +commandments, which was the form of the temptation. Neither +is it any quantity of knowledge, how great soever, that can make +the mind of man to swell; for nothing can fill, much less extend +the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of God; and, +therefore, Solomon, speaking of the two principal senses of +inquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that the eye is never +satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; and if there be +no fulness, then is the continent greater than the content: so of +knowledge itself and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but +reporters, he defineth likewise in these words, placed after that +calendar or ephemerides which he maketh of the diversities of +times and seasons for all actions and purposes, and concludeth +thus: “God hath made all things beautiful, or decent, in +the true return of their seasons. Also He hath placed the +world in man’s heart, yet cannot man find out the work +which God worketh from the beginning to the +end”—declaring not obscurely that God hath framed the +mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of the +universal world, and joyful to receive the impression thereof, as +the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in +beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but +raised also to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees +which throughout all those changes are infallibly observed. +And although he doth insinuate that the supreme or summary law of +Nature (which he calleth “the work which God worketh from +the beginning to the end”) is not possible to be found out +by man, yet that doth not derogate from the capacity of the mind; +but may be referred to the impediments, as of shortness of life, +ill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from +hand to hand, and many other inconveniences, whereunto the +condition of man is subject. For that nothing parcel of the +world is denied to man’s inquiry and invention, he doth in +another place rule over, when he saith, “The spirit of man +is as the lamp of God, wherewith He searcheth the inwardness of +all secrets.” If, then, such be the capacity and +receipt of the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no +danger at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge, how +large soever, lest it should make it swell or out-compass itself; +no, but it is merely the quality of knowledge, which, be it in +quantity more or less, if it be taken without the true corrective +thereof, hath in it some nature of venom or malignity, and some +effects of that venom, which is ventosity or swelling. This +corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so +sovereign, is charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth to +the former clause; for so he saith, “Knowledge bloweth up, +but charity buildeth up;” not unlike unto that which he +deilvereth in another place: “If I spake,” saith he, +“with the tongues of men and angels, and had not charity, +it were but as a tinkling cymbal.” Not but that it is +an excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men and angels, +but because, if it be severed from charity, and not referred to +the good of men and mankind, it hath rather a sounding and +unworthy glory than a meriting and substantial virtue. And +as for that censure of Solomon concerning the excess of writing +and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth +from knowledge, and that admonition of St. Paul, “That we +be not seduced by vain philosophy,” let those places be +rightly understood; and they do, indeed, excellently set forth +the true bounds and limitations whereby human knowledge is +confined and circumscribed, and yet without any such contracting +or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal +nature of things; for these limitations are three: the first, +“That we do not so place our felicity in knowledge, as we +forget our mortality;” the second, “That we make +application of our knowledge, to give ourselves repose and +contentment, and not distaste or repining;” the third, +“That we do not presume by the contemplation of Nature to +attain to the mysteries of God.” For as touching the +first of these, Solomon doth excellently expound himself in +another place of the same book, where he saith: “I saw well +that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth from +darkness; and that the wise man’s eyes keep watch in his +head, whereas this fool roundeth about in darkness: but withal I +learned that the same mortality involveth them both.” +And for the second, certain it is there is no vexation or anxiety +of mind which resulteth from knowledge otherwise than merely by +accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of +knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself; but when men +fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it +to their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak +fears or vast desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble +of mind which is spoken of; for then knowledge is no more +<i>Lumen siccum</i>, whereof Heraclitus the profound said, +<i>Lumen siccum optima anima</i>; but it becometh <i>Lumen +madidum</i>, or <i>maceratum</i>, being steeped and infused in +the humours of the affections. And as for the third point, +it deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly +passed over; for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into +these sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby +he may reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, then, +indeed, is he spoiled by vain philosophy; for the contemplation +of God’s creatures and works produceth (having regard to +the works and creatures themselves) knowledge, but having regard +to God no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken +knowledge. And, therefore, it was most aptly said by one of +Plato’s school, “That the sense of man carrieth a +resemblance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth and revealeth +all the terrestrial globe; but then, again, it obscureth and +concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense +discover natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up +divine.” And hence it is true that it hath proceeded, +that divers great learned men have been heretical, whilst they +have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity by this waxen +wings of the senses. And as for the conceit that too much +knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance +of second causes should make a more devout dependence upon God, +which is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question +which Job asked of his friends: “Will you lie for God, as +one man will lie for another, to gratify him?” For +certain it is that God worketh nothing in Nature but by second +causes; and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is mere +imposture, as it were in favour towards God, and nothing else but +to offer to the Author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a +lie. But further, it is an assured truth, and a conclusion +of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of +philosophy may incline the mind of men to atheism, but a further +proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to +religion. For in the entrance of philosophy, when the +second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer +themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may +induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth +on further and seeth the dependence of causes and the works of +Providence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will +easily believe that the highest link of Nature’s chain must +needs he tied to the foot of Jupiter’s chair. To +conclude, therefore, let no man upon a weak conceit of sobriety +or an ill-applied moderation think or maintain that a man can +search too far, or be too well studied in the book of God’s +word, or in the book of God’s works, divinity or +philosophy; but rather let men endeavour an endless progress or +proficience in both; only let men beware that they apply both to +charity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to ostentation; and +again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these +learnings together.</p> +<p>II. (1) And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from +politics, they be of this nature: that learning doth soften +men’s minds, and makes them more unapt for the honour and +exercise of arms; that it doth mar and pervert men’s +dispositions for matter of government and policy, in making them +too curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too +peremptory or positive by strictness of rules and axioms, or too +immoderate and overweening by reason of the greatness of +examples, or too incompatible and differing from the times by +reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that it +doth divert men’s travails from action and business, and +bringeth them to a love of leisure and privateness; and that it +doth bring into states a relaxation of discipline, whilst every +man is more ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out of +this conceit Cato, surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men +indeed that ever lived, when Carneades the philosopher came in +embassage to Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flock +about him, being allured with the sweetness and majesty of his +eloquence and learning, gave counsel in open senate that they +should give him his despatch with all speed, lest he should +infect and enchant the minds and affections of the youth, and at +unawares bring in an alteration of the manners and customs of the +state. Out of the same conceit or humour did Virgil, +turning his pen to the advantage of his country and the +disadvantage of his own profession, make a kind of separation +between policy and government, and between arts and sciences, in +the verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging the one +to the Romans, and leaving and yielding the other to the +Grecians: <i>Tu regere imperio popules</i>, <i>Romane</i>, +<i>memento</i>, <i>Hæ tibi erunt artes</i>, &c. +So likewise we see that Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, laid it +as an article of charge and accusation against him, that he did, +with the variety and power of his discourses and disputatious, +withdraw young men from due reverence to the laws and customs of +their country, and that he did profess a dangerous and pernicious +science, which was to make the worse matter seem the better, and +to suppress truth by force of eloquence and speech.</p> +<p>(2) But these and the like imputations have rather a +countenance of gravity than any ground of justice: for experience +doth warrant that, both in persons and in times, there hath been +a meeting and concurrence in learning and arms, flourishing and +excelling in the same men and the same ages. For as +‘for men, there cannot be a better nor the hike instance as +of that pair, Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar, the +Dictator; whereof the one was Aristotle’s scholar in +philosophy, and the other was Cicero’s rival in eloquence; +or if any man had rather call for scholars that were great +generals, than generals that were great scholars, let him take +Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian; whereof the one +was the first that abated the power of Sparta, and the other was +the first that made way to the overthrow of the monarchy of +Persia. And this concurrence is yet more visible in times +than in persons, by how much an age is greater object than a +man. For both in Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Græcia, and +Rome, the same times that are most renowned for arms are, +likewise, most admired for learning, so that the greatest authors +and philosophers, and the greatest captains and governors, have +lived in the same ages. Neither can it otherwise he: for as +in man the ripeness of strength of the body and mind cometh much +about an age, save that the strength of the body cometh somewhat +the more early, so in states, arms and learning, whereof the one +correspondeth to the body, the other to the soul of man, have a +concurrence or near sequence in times.</p> +<p>(3) And for matter of policy and government, that learning, +should rather hurt, than enable thereunto, is a thing very +improbable; we see it is accounted an error to commit a natural +body to empiric physicians, which commonly have a few pleasing +receipts whereupon they are confident and adventurous, but know +neither the causes of diseases, nor the complexions of patients, +nor peril of accidents, nor the true method of cures; we see it +is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers which are only +men of practice, and not grounded in their books, who are many +times easily surprised when matter falleth out besides their +experience, to the prejudice of the causes they handle: so by +like reason it cannot be but a matter of doubtful consequence if +states be managed by empiric statesmen, not well mingled with men +grounded in learning. But contrariwise, it is almost +without instance contradictory that ever any government was +disastrous that was in the hands of learned governors. For +howsoever it hath been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and +disable learned men by the names of <i>pedantes</i>; yet in the +records of time it appeareth in many particulars that the +governments of princes in minority (notwithstanding the infinite +disadvantage of that kind of state)—have nevertheless +excelled the government of princes of mature age, even for that +reason which they seek to traduce, which is that by that occasion +the state hath been in the hands of <i>pedantes</i>: for so was +the state of Rome for the first five years, which are so much +magnified, during the minority of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, a +<i>pedenti</i>; so it was again, for ten years’ space or +more, during the minority of Gordianus the younger, with great +applause and contentation in the hands of Misitheus, a +<i>pedanti</i>: so was it before that, in the minority of +Alexander Severus, in like happiness, in hands not much unlike, +by reason of the rule of the women, who were aided by the +teachers and preceptors. Nay, let a man look into the +government of the Bishops of Rome, as by name, into the +government of Pius Quintus and Sextus Quintus in our times, who +were both at their entrance esteemed but as pedantical friars, +and he shall find that such Popes do greater things, and proceed +upon truer principles of state, than those which have ascended to +the papacy from an education and breeding in affairs of state and +courts of princes; for although men bred in learning are perhaps +to seek in points of convenience and accommodating for the +present, which the Italians call <i>ragioni di stato</i>, whereof +the same Pius Quintus could not hear spoken with patience, +terming them inventions against religion and the moral virtues; +yet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect in +those same plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, and moral +virtue, which if they be well and watchfully pursued, there will +be seldom use of those other, no more than of physic in a sound +or well-dieted body. Neither can the experience of one +man’s life furnish examples and precedents for the event of +one man’s life. For as it happeneth sometimes that +the grandchild, or other descendant, resembleth the ancestor more +than the son; so many times occurrences of present times may sort +better with ancient examples than with those of the later or +immediate times; and lastly, the wit of one man can no more +countervail learning than one man’s means can hold way with +a common purse.</p> +<p>(4) And as for those particular seducements or indispositions +of the mind for policy and government, which learning is +pretended to insinuate; if it be granted that any such thing be, +it must be remembered withal that learning ministereth in every +of them greater strength of medicine or remedy than it offereth +cause of indisposition or infirmity. For if by a secret +operation it make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side +by plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what ground to +resolve; yea, and how to carry things in suspense, without +prejudice, till they resolve. If it make men positive and +regular, it teacheth them what things are in their nature +demonstrative, and what are conjectural, and as well the use of +distinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of principles and +rules. If it mislead by disproportion or dissimilitude of +examples, it teacheth men the force of circumstances, the errors +of comparisons, and all the cautions of application; so that in +all these it doth rectify more effectually than it can +pervert. And these medicines it conveyeth into men’s +minds much more forcibly by the quickness and penetration of +examples. For let a man look into the errors of Clement +VII., so lively described by Guicciardini, who served under him, +or into the errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in +his Epistles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from being +irresolute. Let him look into the errors of Phocion, and he +will beware how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but +read the fable of Ixion, and it will hold him from being vaporous +or imaginative. Let him look into the errors of Cato II., +and he will never be one of the Antipodes, to tread opposite to +the present world.</p> +<p>(5) And for the conceit that learning should dispose men to +leisure and privateness, and make men slothful: it were a strange +thing if that which accustometh the mind to a perpetual motion +and agitation should induce slothfulness, whereas, contrariwise, +it may be truly affirmed that no kind of men love business for +itself but those that are learned; for other persons love it for +profit, as a hireling that loves the work for the wages; or for +honour, as because it beareth them up in the eyes of men, and +refresheth their reputation, which otherwise would wear; or +because it putteth them in mind of their fortune, and giveth them +occasion to pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth +some faculty wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in +good-humour and pleasing conceits towards themselves; or because +it advanceth any other their ends. So that as it is said of +untrue valours, that some men’s valours are in the eyes of +them that look on, so such men’s industries are in the eyes +of others, or, at least, in regard of their own designments; only +learned men love business as an action according to nature, as +agreeable to health of mind as exercise is to health of body, +taking pleasure in the action itself, and not in the purchase, so +that of all men they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards +any business which can hold or detain their mind.</p> +<p>(6) And if any man be laborious in reading and study, and yet +idle in business and action, it groweth from some weakness of +body or softness of spirit, such as Seneca speaketh of: <i>Quidam +tam sunt umbratiles</i>, <i>ut putent in turbido esse quicquid in +luce est</i>; and not of learning: well may it be that such a +point of a man’s nature may make him give himself to +learning, but it is not learning that breedeth any such point in +his nature.</p> +<p>(7) And that learning should take up too much time or leisure: +I answer, the most active or busy man that hath been or can be, +hath (no question) many vacant times of leisure while he +expecteth the tides and returns of business (except he be either +tedious and of no despatch, or lightly and unworthily ambitious +to meddle in things that may be better done by others), and then +the question is but how those spaces and times of leisure shall +be filled and spent; whether in pleasure or in studies; as was +well answered by Demosthenes to his adversary Æschines, +that was a man given to pleasure, and told him “That his +orations did smell of the lamp.” +“Indeed,” said Demosthenes, “there is a great +difference between the things that you and I do by +lamp-light.” So as no man need doubt that learning +will expel business, but rather it will keep and defend the +possession of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which +otherwise at unawares may enter to the prejudice of both.</p> +<p>(8) Again, for that other conceit that learning should +undermine the reverence of laws and government, it is assuredly a +mere depravation and calumny, without all shadow of truth. +For to say that a blind custom of obedience should be a surer +obligation than duty taught and understood, it is to affirm that +a blind man may tread surer by a guide than a seeing man can by a +light. And it is without all controversy that learning doth +make the minds of men gentle, generous, manageable, and pliant to +government; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, and +mutinous: and the evidence of time doth clear this assertion, +considering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times +have been most subject to tumults, seditions, and changes.</p> +<p>(9) And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was well +punished for his blasphemy against learning, in the same kind +wherein he offended; for when he was past threescore years old, +he was taken with an extreme desire to go to school again, and to +learn the Greek tongue, to the end to peruse the Greek authors; +which doth well demonstrate that his former censure of the +Grecian learning was rather an affected gravity, than according +to the inward sense of his own opinion. And as for +Virgil’s verses, though it pleased him to brave the world +in taking to the Romans the art of empire, and leaving to others +the arts of subjects, yet so much is manifest—that the +Romans never ascended to that height of empire till the time they +had ascended to the height of other arts. For in the time +of the two first Cæsars, which had the art of government in +greatest perfection, there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro; +the best historiographer, Titus Livius; the best antiquary, +Marcus Varro; and the best or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that +to the memory of man are known. As for the accusation of +Socrates, the time must be remembered when it was prosecuted; +which was under the Thirty Tyrants, the most base, bloody, and +envious persons that have governed; which revolution of state was +no sooner over but Socrates, whom they had made a person +criminal, was made a person heroical, and his memory accumulate +with honours divine and human; and those discourses of his which +were then termed corrupting of manners, were after acknowledged +for sovereign medicines of the mind and manners, and so have been +received ever since till this day. Let this, therefore, +serve for answer to politiques, which in their humorous severity, +or in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw imputations +upon learning; which redargution nevertheless (save that we know +not whether our labours may extend to other ages) were not +needful for the present, in regard of the love and reverence +towards learning which the example and countenance of two so +learned princes, Queen Elizabeth and your Majesty, being as +Castor and Pollux, <i>lucida sidera</i>, stars of excellent light +and most benign influence, hath wrought in all men of place and +authority in our nation.</p> +<p>III. (1) Now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit +or diminution of credit that groweth unto learning from learned +men themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest: it is either +from their fortune, or from their manners, or from the nature of +their studies. For the first, it is not in their power; and +the second is accidental; the third only is proper to be handled: +but because we are not in hand with true measure, but with +popular estimation and conceit, it is not amiss to speak somewhat +of the two former. The derogations therefore which grow to +learning from the fortune or condition of learned men, are either +in respect of scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of +life and meanness of employments.</p> +<p>(2) Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men +usually to begin with little, and not to grow rich so fast as +other men, by reason they convert not their labours chiefly to +lucre and increase, it were good to leave the commonplace in +commendation of povery to some friar to handle, to whom much was +attributed by Machiavel in this point when he said, “That +the kingdom of the clergy had been long before at an end, if the +reputation and reverence towards the poverty of friars had not +borne out the scandal of the superfluities and excesses of +bishops and prelates.” So a man might say that the +felicity and delicacy of princes and great persons had long since +turned to rudeness and barbarism, if the poverty of learning had +not kept up civility and honour of life; but without any such +advantages, it is worthy the observation what a reverent and +honoured thing poverty of fortune was for some ages in the Roman +state, which nevertheless was a state without paradoxes. +For we see what Titus Livius saith in his introduction: +<i>Cæterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit aut nulla +unquam respublica nec major</i>, <i>nec sanctior</i>, <i>nec +bonis exemplis ditior fuit</i>; <i>nec in quam tam sero avaritia +luxuriaque immigraverint</i>; <i>nec ubi tantus ac tam diu +paupertati ac parsimoniæ honos fuerit</i>. We see +likewise, after that the state of Rome was not itself, but did +degenerate, how that person that took upon him to be counsellor +to Julius Cæsar after his victory where to begin his +restoration of the state, maketh it of all points the most +summary to take away the estimation of wealth: <i>Verum hæc +et omnia mala pariter cum honore pecuniæ desinent</i>; +<i>si neque magistratus</i>, <i>neque alia vulgo cupienda</i>, +<i>venalia erunt</i>. To conclude this point: as it was +truly said that <i>Paupertas est virtutis fortuna</i>, though +sometimes it come from vice, so it may be fitly said that, though +some times it may proceed from misgovernment and accident. +Surely Solomon hath pronounced it both in censure, <i>Qui +festinat ad divitias non erit insons</i>; and in precept, +“Buy the truth, and sell it not; and so of wisdom and +knowledge;” judging that means were to be spent upon +learning, and not learning to be applied to means. And as +for the privateness or obscureness (as it may be in vulgar +estimation accounted) of life of contemplative men, it is a theme +so common to extol a private life, not taxed with sensuality and +sloth, in comparison and to the disadvantage of a civil life, for +safety, liberty, pleasure, and dignity, or at least freedom from +indignity, as no man handleth it but handleth it well; such a +consonancy it hath to men’s conceits in the expressing, and +to men’s consents in the allowing. This only I will +add, that learned men forgotten in states and not living in the +eyes of men, are like the images of Cassius and Brutus in the +funeral of Junia, of which, not being represented as many others +were, Tacitus saith, <i>Eo ipso præfulgebant quod non +visebantur</i>.</p> +<p>(3) And for meanness of employment, that which is most +traduced to contempt is that the government of youth is commonly +allotted to them; which age, because it is the age of least +authority, it is transferred to the disesteeming of those +employments wherein youth is conversant, and which are conversant +about youth. But how unjust this traducement is (if you +will reduce things from popularity of opinion to measure of +reason) may appear in that we see men are more curious what they +put into a new vessel than into a vessel seasoned; and what mould +they lay about a young plant than about a plant corroborate; so +as this weakest terms and times of all things use to have the +best applications and helps. And will you hearken to the +Hebrew rabbins? “Your young men shall see visions, +and your old men shall dream dreams:” say they, youth is +the worthier age, for that visions are nearer apparitions of God +than dreams? And let it be noted that howsoever the +condition of life of <i>pedantes</i> hath been scorned upon +theatres, as the ape of tyranny; and that the modern looseness or +negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of +schoolmasters and tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the best +times did always make a just complaint, that states were too busy +with their laws and too negligent in point of education: which +excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort +revived of late times by the colleges of the Jesuits; of whom, +although in regard of their superstition I may say, <i>Quo +meliores</i>, <i>eo deteriores</i>; yet in regard of this, and +some other points concerning human learning and moral matters, I +may say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, <i>Talis +quum sis</i>, <i>utunam noster esses</i>. And that much +touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of learned +men.</p> +<p>(4) As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing +personal and individual: and no doubt there be amongst them, as +in other professions, of all temperatures: but yet so as it is +not without truth which is said, that <i>Abeunt studua in +mores</i>, studies have an influence and operation upon the +manners of those that are conversant in them.</p> +<p>(5) But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my +part cannot find any disgrace to learning can proceed from the +manners of learned men; not inherent to them as they are learned; +except it be a fault (which was the supposed fault of +Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato II., Seneca, and many more) that +because the times they read of are commonly better than the times +they live in, and the duties taught better than the duties +practised, they contend sometimes too far to bring things to +perfection, and to reduce the corruption of manners to honesty of +precepts or examples of too great height. And yet hereof +they have caveats enough in their own walks. For Solon, +when he was asked whether he had given his citizens the best +laws, answered wisely, “Yea, of such as they would +receive:” and Plato, finding that his own heart could not +agree with the corrupt manners of his country, refused to bear +place or office, saying, “That a man’s country was to +be used as his parents were, that is, with humble persuasions, +and not with contestations.” And Cæsar’s +counsellor put in the same caveat, <i>Non ad vetera instituta +revocans quæ jampridem corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt</i>; +and Cicero noteth this error directly in Cato II. when he writes +to his friend Atticus, <i>Cato optime sentit</i>, <i>sed nocet +interdum reipublicæ</i>; <i>loquitur enim tanquam in +republicâ Platonis</i>, <i>non tanquam in fæce +Romuli</i>. And the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the +philosophers for going too far and being too exact in their +prescripts when he saith, <i>Isti ipse præceptores virtutis +et magistri videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura +vellet protulisse</i>, <i>ut cum ad ultimum animo +contendissemus</i>, <i>ibi tamen</i>, <i>ubi oportet</i>, +<i>consisteremus</i>: and yet himself might have said, <i>Monitis +sum minor ipse meis</i>; for it was his own fault, though not in +so extreme a degree.</p> +<p>(6) Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been +incident to learned men, which is, that they have esteemed the +preservation, good, and honour of their countries or masters +before their own fortunes or safeties. For so saith +Demosthenes unto the Athenians: “If it please you to note +it, my counsels unto you are not such whereby I should grow great +amongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians; but they +be of that nature as they are sometimes not good for me to give, +but are always good for you to follow.” And so +Seneca, after he had consecrated that <i>Quinquennium Neronis</i> +to the eternal glory of learned governors, held on his honest and +loyal course of good and free counsel after his master grew +extremely corrupt in his government. Neither can this point +otherwise be, for learning endueth men’s minds with a true +sense of the frailty of their persons, the casualty of their +fortunes, and the dignity of their soul and vocation, so that it +is impossible for them to esteem that any greatness of their own +fortune can be a true or worthy end of their being and +ordainment, and therefore are desirous to give their account to +God, and so likewise to their masters under God (as kings and the +states that they serve) in those words, <i>Ecce tibi +lucrefeci</i>, and not <i>Ecce mihi lucrefeci</i>; whereas the +corrupter sort of mere politiques, that have not their thoughts +established by learning in the love and apprehension of duty, nor +never look abroad into universality, do refer all things to +themselves, and thrust themselves into the centre of the world, +as if all lines should meet in them and their fortunes, never +caring in all tempests what becomes of the ship of state, so they +may save themselves in the cockboat of their own fortune; whereas +men that feel the weight of duty and know the limits of self-love +use to make good their places and duties, though with peril; and +if they stand in seditious and violent alterations, it is rather +the reverence which many times both adverse parts do give to +honesty, than any versatile advantage of their own +carriage. But for this point of tender sense and fast +obligation of duty which learning doth endue the mind withal, +howsoever fortune may tax it, and many in the depth of their +corrupt principles may despise it, yet it will receive an open +allowance, and therefore needs the less disproof or excuse.</p> +<p>(7) Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may +be more properly defended than truly denied, is that they fail +sometimes in applying themselves to particular persons, which +want of exact application ariseth from two causes—the one, +because the largeness of their mind can hardly confine itself to +dwell in the exquisite observation or examination of the nature +and customs of one person, for it is a speech for a lover, and +not for a wise man, <i>Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum +sumus</i>. Nevertheless I shall yield that he that cannot +contract the sight of his mind as well as disperse and dilate it, +wanteth a great faculty. But there is a second cause, which +is no inability, but a rejection upon choice and judgment. +For the honest and just bounds of observation by one person upon +another extend no further but to understand him sufficiently, +whereby not to give him offence, or whereby to be able to give +him faithful counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard +and caution in respect of a man’s self. But to be +speculative into another man to the end to know how to work him, +or wind him, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is +double and cloven, and not entire and ingenuous; which as in +friendship it is want of integrity, so towards princes or +superiors is want of duty. For the custom of the Levant, +which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes upon +princes, is in the outward ceremony barbarous, but the moral is +good; for men ought not, by cunning and bent observations, to +pierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings, which the +Scripture hath declared to be inscrutable.</p> +<p>(8) There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude +this part) which is often noted in learned men, that they do many +times fail to observe decency and discretion in their behaviour +and carriage, and commit errors in small and ordinary points of +action, so as the vulgar sort of capacities do make a judgment of +them in greater matters by that which they find wanting in them +in smaller. But this consequence doth oft deceive men, for +which I do refer them over to that which was said by +Themistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to himself +out of his own mouth, but, being applied to the general state of +this question, pertinently and justly, when, being invited to +touch a lute, he said, “He could not fiddle, but he could +make a small town a great state.” So no doubt many +may be well seen in the passages of government and policy which +are to seek in little and punctual occasions. I refer them +also to that which Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he +compared to the gallipots of apothecaries, which on the outside +had apes and owls and antiques, but contained within sovereign +and precious liquors and confections; acknowledging that, to an +external report, he was not without superficial levities and +deformities, but was inwardly replenished with excellent virtues +and powers. And so much touching the point of manners of +learned men.</p> +<p>(9) But in the meantime I have no purpose to give allowance to +some conditions and courses base and unworthy, wherein divers +professors of learning have wronged themselves and gone too far; +such as were those trencher philosophers which in the later age +of the Roman state were usually in the houses of great persons, +being little better than solemn parasites, of which kind, Lucian +maketh a merry description of the philosopher that the great lady +took to ride with her in her coach, and would needs have him +carry her little dog, which he doing officiously and yet +uncomely, the page scoffed and said, “That he doubted the +philosopher of a Stoic would turn to be a Cynic.” +But, above all the rest, this gross and palpable flattery +whereunto many not unlearned have abased and abused their wits +and pens, turning (as Du Bartas saith) Hecuba into Helena, and +Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and +estimation of learning. Neither is the modern dedication of +books and writings, as to patrons, to be commended, for that +books (such as are worthy the name of books) ought to have no +patrons but truth and reason. And the ancient custom was to +dedicate them only to private and equal friends, or to entitle +the books with their names; or if to kings and great persons, it +was to some such as the argument of the book was fit and proper +for; but these and the like courses may deserve rather +reprehension than defence.</p> +<p>(10) Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or +application of learned men to men in fortune. For the +answer was good that Diogenes made to one that asked him in +mockery, “How it came to pass that philosophers were the +followers of rich men, and not rich men of +philosophers?” He answered soberly, and yet sharply, +“Because the one sort knew what they had need of, and the +other did not.” And of the like nature was the answer +which Aristippus made, when having a petition to Dionysius, and +no ear given to him, he fell down at his feet, whereupon +Dionysius stayed and gave him the hearing, and granted it; and +afterwards some person, tender on the behalf of philosophy, +reproved Aristippus that he would offer the profession of +philosophy such an indignity as for a private suit to fall at a +tyrant’s feet; but he answered, “It was not his +fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that had his ears in +his feet.” Neither was it accounted weakness, but +discretion, in him that would not dispute his best with Adrianus +Cæsar, excusing himself, “That it was reason to yield +to him that commanded thirty legions.” These and the +like, applications, and stooping to points of necessity and +convenience, cannot be disallowed; for though they may have some +outward baseness, yet in a judgment truly made they are to be +accounted submissions to the occasion and not to the person.</p> +<p>IV. (1) Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which have +intervened amongst the studies themselves of the learned, which +is that which is principal and proper to the present argument; +wherein my purpose is not to make a justification of the errors, +but by a censure and separation of the errors to make a +justification of that which is good and sound, and to deliver +that from the aspersion of the other. For we see that it is +the manner of men to scandalise and deprave that which retaineth +the state and virtue, by taking advantage upon that which is +corrupt and degenerate, as the heathens in the primitive Church +used to blemish and taint the Christians with the faults and +corruptions of heretics. But nevertheless I have no meaning +at this time to make any exact animadversion of the errors and +impediments in matters of learning, which are more secret and +remote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto such as do +fall under or near unto a popular observation.</p> +<p>(2) There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies, +whereby learning hath been most traduced. For those things +we do esteem vain which are either false or frivolous, those +which either have no truth or no use; and those persons we esteem +vain which are either credulous or curious; and curiosity is +either in matter or words: so that in reason as well as in +experience there fall out to be these three distempers (as I may +term them) of learning—the first, fantastical learning; the +second, contentious learning; and the last, delicate learning; +vain imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations; and +with the last I will begin. Martin Luther, conducted, no +doubt, by a higher Providence, but in discourse of reason, +finding what a province he had undertaken against the Bishop of +Rome and the degenerate traditions of the Church, and finding his +own solitude, being in nowise aided by the opinions of his own +time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former +times to his succours to make a party against the present +time. So that the ancient authors, both in divinity and in +humanity, which had long time slept in libraries, began generally +to be read and revolved. This, by consequence, did draw on +a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the languages +original, wherein those authors did write, for the better +understanding of those authors, and the better advantage of +pressing and applying their words. And thereof grew, again, +a delight in their manner of style and phrase, and an admiration +of that kind of writing, which was much furthered and +precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the propounders of +those primitive but seeming new opinions had against the +schoolmen, who were generally of the contrary part, and whose +writings were altogether in a differing style and form; taking +liberty to coin and frame new terms of art to express their own +sense, and to avoid circuit of speech, without regard to the +pureness, pleasantness, and (as I may call it) lawfulness of the +phrase or word. And again, because the great labour then +was with the people (of whom the Pharisees were wont to say, +<i>Execrabilis ista turba</i>, <i>quæ non novit legem</i>), +for the winning and persuading of them, there grew of necessity +in chief price and request eloquence and variety of discourse, as +the fittest and forciblest access into the capacity of the vulgar +sort; so that these four causes concurring—the admiration +of ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen, the exact study of +languages, and the efficacy of preaching—did bring in an +affectionate study of eloquence and copy of speech, which then +began to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess; for men +began to hunt more after words than matter—more after the +choiceness of the phrase, and the round and clean composition of +the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, and the +varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures, +than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of +argument, life of invention, or depth of judgment. Then +grew the flowing and watery vein of Osorius, the Portugal bishop, +to be in price. Then did Sturmius spend such infinite and +curious pains upon Cicero the Orator and Hermogenes the +Rhetorician, besides his own books of Periods and Imitation, and +the like. Then did Car of Cambridge and Ascham with their +lectures and writings almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and +allure all young men that were studious unto that delicate and +polished kind of learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion +to make the scoffing echo, <i>Decem annos consuumpsi in legendo +Cicerone</i>; and the echo answered in Greek, <i>One</i>, +<i>Asine</i>. Then grew the learning of the schoolmen to be +utterly despised as barbarous. In sum, the whole +inclination and bent of those times was rather towards copy than +weight.</p> +<p>(3) Here therefore [is] the first distemper of learning, when +men study words and not matter; whereof, though I have +represented an example of late times, yet it hath been and will +be <i>secundum majus et minus</i> in all time. And how is +it possible but this should have an operation to discredit +learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned +men’s works like the first letter of a patent or limited +book, which though it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a +letter? It seems to me that Pygmalion’s frenzy is a +good emblem or portraiture of this vanity; for words are but the +images of matter, and except they have life of reason and +invention, to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in +love with a picture.</p> +<p>(4) But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be +condemned, to clothe and adorn the obscurity even of philosophy +itself with sensible and plausible elocution. For hereof we +have great examples in Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of +Plato also in some degree; and hereof likewise there is great +use, for surely, to the severe inquisition of truth and the deep +progress into philosophy, it is some hindrance because it is too +early satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire +of further search before we come to a just period. But then +if a man be to have any use of such knowledge in civil occasions, +of conference, counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like, then +shall he find it prepared to his hands in those authors which +write in that manner. But the excess of this is so justly +contemptible, that as Hercules, when he saw the image of Adonis, +Venus’ minion, in a temple, said in disdain, <i>Nil sacri +es</i>; so there is none of Hercules’ followers in +learning—that is, the more severe and laborious sort of +inquirers into truth—but will despise those delicacies and +affectations, as indeed capable of no divineness. And thus +much of the first disease or distemper of learning.</p> +<p>(5) The second which followeth is in nature worse than the +former: for as substance of matter is better than beauty of +words, so contrariwise vain matter is worse than vain words: +wherein it seemeth the reprehension of St. Paul was not only +proper for those times, but prophetical for the times following; +and not only respective to divinity, but extensive to all +knowledge: <i>Devita profanas vocum novitates</i>, <i>et +oppositiones falsi nominis scientiæ</i>. For he +assigneth two marks and badges of suspected and falsified +science: the one, the novelty and strangeness of terms; the +other, the strictness of positions, which of necessity doth +induce oppositions, and so questions and altercations. +Surely, like as many substances in nature which are solid do +putrefy and corrupt into worms;—so it is the property of +good and sound knowledge to putrefy and dissolve into a number of +subtle, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them) vermiculate +questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of +spirit, but no soundness of matter or goodness of quality. +This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the +schoolmen, who having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of +leisure, and small variety of reading, but their wits being shut +up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their +dictator) as their persons were shut up in the cells of +monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of +nature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter and +infinite agitation of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs +of learning which are extant in their books. For the wit +and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the +contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the +stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the +spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth +indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread +and work, but of no substance or profit.</p> +<p>(6) This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two +sorts: either in the subject itself that they handle, when it is +a fruitless speculation or controversy (whereof there are no +small number both in divinity and philosophy), or in the manner +or method of handling of a knowledge, which amongst them was +this—upon every particular position or assertion to frame +objections, and to those objections, solutions; which solutions +were for the most part not confutations, but distinctions: +whereas indeed the strength of all sciences is, as the strength +of the old man’s faggot, in the bond. For the harmony +of a science, supporting each part the other, is and ought to be +the true and brief confutation and suppression of all the smaller +sort of objections. But, on the other side, if you take out +every axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by one, you may +quarrel with them and bend them and break them at your pleasure: +so that, as was said of Seneca, <i>Verborum minutiis rerum +frangit pondera</i>, so a man may truly say of the schoolmen, +<i>Quæstionum minutiis scientiarum frangunt +soliditatem</i>. For were it not better for a man in fair +room to set up one great light, or branching candlestick of +lights, than to go about with a small watch-candle into every +corner? And such is their method, that rests not so much +upon evidence of truth proved by arguments, authorities, +similitudes, examples, as upon particular confutations and +solutions of every scruple, cavillation, and objection; breeding +for the most part one question as fast as it solveth another; +even as in the former resemblance, when you carry the light into +one corner, you darken the rest; so that the fable and fiction of +Scylla seemeth to be a lively image of this kind of philosophy or +knowledge; which was transformed into a comely virgin for the +upper parts; but then <i>Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina +monstris</i>: so the generalities of the schoolmen are for a +while good and proportionable; but then when you descend into +their distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb for +the use and benefit of man’s life, they end in monstrous +altercations and barking questions. So as it is not +possible but this quality of knowledge must fall under popular +contempt, the people being apt to contemn truths upon occasion of +controversies and altercations, and to think they are all out of +their way which never meet; and when they see such digladiation +about subtleties, and matters of no use or moment, they easily +fall upon that judgment of Dionysius of Syracusa, <i>Verba ista +sunt senum otiosorum</i>.</p> +<p>(7) Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those schoolmen to +their great thirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit had +joined variety and universality of reading and contemplation, +they had proved excellent lights, to the great advancement of all +learning and knowledge; but as they are, they are great +undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark keeping. But as in +the inquiry of the divine truth, their pride inclined to leave +the oracle of God’s word, and to vanish in the mixture of +their own inventions; so in the inquisition of nature, they ever +left the oracle of God’s works, and adored the deceiving +and deformed images which the unequal mirror of their own minds, +or a few received authors or principles, did represent unto +them. And thus much for the second disease of learning.</p> +<p>(8) For the third vice or disease of learning, which +concerneth deceit or untruth, it is of all the rest the foulest; +as that which doth destroy the essential form of knowledge, which +is nothing but a representation of truth: for the truth of being +and the truth of knowing are one, differing no more than the +direct beam and the beam reflected. This vice therefore +brancheth itself into two sorts; delight in deceiving and aptness +to be deceived; imposture and credulity; which, although they +appear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of +cunning and the other of simplicity, yet certainly they do for +the most part concur: for, as the verse noteth—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem +est,”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>an inquisitive man is a prattler; so upon the like reason a +credulous man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he that +will easily believe rumours will as easily augment rumours and +add somewhat to them of his own; which Tacitus wisely noteth, +when he saith, <i>Fingunt simul creduntque</i>: so great an +affinity hath fiction and belief.</p> +<p>(9) This facility of credit and accepting or admitting things +weakly authorised or warranted is of two kinds according to the +subject: for it is either a belief of history, or, as the lawyers +speak, matter of fact; or else of matter of art and +opinion. As to the former, we see the experience and +inconvenience of this error in ecclesiastical history; which hath +too easily received and registered reports and narrations of +miracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert, and +other holy men, and their relics, shrines, chapels and images: +which though they had a passage for a time by the ignorance of +the people, the superstitious simplicity of some and the politic +toleration of others holding them but as divine poesies, yet +after a period of time, when the mist began to clear up, they +grew to be esteemed but as old wives’ fables, impostures of +the clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges of Antichrist, to +the great scandal and detriment of religion.</p> +<p>(10) So in natural history, we see there hath not been that +choice and judgment used as ought to have been; as may appear in +the writings of Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and divers of the +Arabians, being fraught with much fabulous matter, a great part +not only untried, but notoriously untrue, to the great derogation +of the credit of natural philosophy with the grave and sober kind +of wits: wherein the wisdom and integrity of Aristotle is worthy +to be observed, that, having made so diligent and exquisite a +history of living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any +vain or feigned matter; and yet on the other side hath cast all +prodigious narrations, which he thought worthy the recording, +into one book, excellently discerning that matter of manifest +truth, such whereupon observation and rule was to be built, was +not to be mingled or weakened with matter of doubtful credit; and +yet again, that rarities and reports that seem uncredible are not +to be suppressed or denied to the memory of men.</p> +<p>(11) And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to +arts and opinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when too +much belief is attributed to the arts themselves, or to certain +authors in any art. The sciences themselves, which have had +better intelligence and confederacy with the imagination of man +than with his reason, are three in number: astrology, natural +magic, and alchemy; of which sciences, nevertheless, the ends or +pretences are noble. For astrology pretendeth to discover +that correspondence or concatenation which is between the +superior globe and the inferior; natural magic pretendeth to call +and reduce natural philosophy from variety of speculations to the +magnitude of works; and alchemy pretendeth to make separation of +all the unlike parts of bodies which in mixtures of natures are +incorporate. But the derivations and prosecutions to these +ends, both in the theories and in the practices, are full of +error and vanity; which the great professors themselves have +sought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings, and +referring themselves to auricular traditions and such other +devices, to save the credit of impostures. And yet surely +to alchemy this right is due, that it may be compared to the +husbandman whereof Æsop makes the fable; that, when he +died, told his sons that he had left unto them gold buried +underground in his vineyard; and they digged over all the ground, +and gold they found none; but by reason of their stirring and +digging the mould about the roots of their vines, they had a +great vintage the year following: so assuredly the search and +stir to make gold hath brought to light a great number of good +and fruitful inventions and experiments, as well for the +disclosing of nature as for the use of man’s life.</p> +<p>(12) And as for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto +authors in sciences, in making them dictators, that their words +should stand, and not consuls, to give advice; the damage is +infinite that sciences have received thereby, as the principal +cause that hath kept them low at a stay without growth or +advancement. For hence it hath come, that in arts +mechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and time addeth and +perfecteth; but in sciences the first author goeth furthest, and +time leeseth and corrupteth. So we see artillery, sailing, +printing, and the like, were grossly managed at the first, and by +time accommodated and refined; but contrariwise, the philosophies +and sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, +Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour at the first, and by time +degenerate and imbased: whereof the reason is no other, but that +in the former many wits and industries have contributed in one; +and in the latter many wits and industries have been spent about +the wit of some one, whom many times they have rather depraved +than illustrated; for, as water will not ascend higher than the +level of the first spring-head from whence it descendeth, so +knowledge derived from Aristotle, and exempted from liberty of +examination, will not rise again higher than the knowledge of +Aristotle. And, therefore, although the position be good, +<i>Oportet discentem credere</i>, yet it must be coupled with +this, <i>Oportet edoctum judicare</i>; for disciples do owe unto +masters only a temporary belief and a suspension of their own +judgment till they be fully instructed, and not an absolute +resignation or perpetual captivity; and therefore, to conclude +this point, I will say no more, but so let great authors have +their due, as time, which is the author of authors, be not +deprived of his due—which is, further and further to +discover truth. Thus have I gone over these three diseases +of learning; besides the which there are some other rather +peccant humours than formed diseases, which, nevertheless, are +not so secret and intrinsic, but that they fall under a popular +observation and traducement, and, therefore, are not to be passed +over.</p> +<p>V. (1) The first of these is the extreme affecting of two +extremities: the one antiquity, the other novelty; wherein it +seemeth the children of time do take after the nature and malice +of the father. For as he devoureth his children, so one of +them seeketh to devour and suppress the other; while antiquity +envieth there should be new additions, and novelty cannot be +content to add but it must deface; surely the advice of the +prophet is the true direction in this matter, <i>State super vias +antiquas</i>, <i>et videte quænam sit via recta et bona et +ambulate in ea</i>. Antiquity deserveth that reverence, +that men should make a stand thereupon and discover what is the +best way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make +progression. And to speak truly, <i>Antiquitas sæculi +juventus mundi</i>. These times are the ancient times, when +the world is ancient, and not those which we account ancient +<i>ordine retrogrado</i>, by a computation backward from +ourselves.</p> +<p>(2) Another error induced by the former is a distrust that +anything should be now to be found out, which the world should +have missed and passed over so long time: as if the same +objection were to be made to time that Lucian maketh to Jupiter +and other the heathen gods; of which he wondereth that they begot +so many children in old time, and begot none in his time; and +asketh whether they were become septuagenary, or whether the law +<i>Papia</i>, made against old men’s marriages, had +restrained them. So it seemeth men doubt lest time is +become past children and generation; wherein contrariwise we see +commonly the levity and unconstancy of men’s judgments, +which, till a matter be done, wonder that it can be done; and as +soon as it is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done: as +we see in the expedition of Alexander into Asia, which at first +was prejudged as a vast and impossible enterprise; and yet +afterwards it pleaseth Livy to make no more of it than this, +<i>Nil aliud quàm bene ausus vana contemnere</i>. +And the same happened to Columbus in the western +navigation. But in intellectual matters it is much more +common, as may be seen in most of the propositions of Euclid; +which till they be demonstrate, they seem strange to our assent; +but being demonstrate, our mind accepteth of them by a kind of +relation (as the lawyers speak), as if we had known them +before.</p> +<p>(3) Another error, that hath also some affinity with the +former, is a conceit that of former opinions or sects after +variety and examination the best hath still prevailed and +suppressed the rest; so as if a man should begin the labour of a +new search, he were but like to light upon somewhat formerly +rejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion; as if the +multitude, or the wisest for the multitude’s sake, were not +ready to give passage rather to that which is popular and +superficial than to that which is substantial and profound for +the truth is, that time seemeth to be of the nature of a river or +stream, which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown +up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid.</p> +<p>(4) Another error, of a diverse nature from all the former, is +the over-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts +and methods; from which time commonly sciences receive small or +no augmentation. But as young men, when they knit and shape +perfectly, do seldom grow to a further stature, so knowledge, +while it is in aphorisms and observations, it is in growth; but +when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it may, perchance, +be further polished, and illustrate and accommodated for use and +practice, but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance.</p> +<p>(5) Another error which doth succeed that which we last +mentioned is, that after the distribution of particular arts and +sciences, men have abandoned universality, or <i>philosophia +prima</i>, which cannot but cease and stop all progression. +For no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level; +neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper +parts of any science if you stand but upon the level of the same +science, and ascend not to a higher science.</p> +<p>(6) Another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence, +and a kind of adoration of the mind and understanding of man; by +means whereof, men have withdrawn themselves too much from the +contemplation of nature, and the observations of experience, and +have tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceits. +Upon these intellectualists, which are notwithstanding commonly +taken for the most sublime and divine philosophers, Heraclitus +gave a just censure, saying:—“Men sought truth in +their own little worlds, and not in the great and common +world;” for they disdain to spell, and so by degrees to +read in the volume of God’s works; and contrariwise by +continual meditation and agitation of wit do urge and, as it +were, invocate their own spirits to divine and give oracles unto +them, whereby they are deservedly deluded.</p> +<p>(7) Another error that hath some connection with this latter +is, that men have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and +doctrines with some conceits which they have most admired, or +some sciences which they have most applied, and given all things +else a tincture according to them, utterly untrue and +improper. So hath Plato intermingled his philosophy with +theology, and Aristotle with logic; and the second school of +Plato, Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics; for these were +the arts which had a kind of primogeniture with them +severally. So have the alchemists made a philosophy out of +a few experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus our countryman +hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a +loadstone. So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of +the nature of the soul, he found a musician that held the soul +was but a harmony, saith pleasantly, <i>Hic ab arte sua non +recessit</i>, <i>&c.</i> But of these conceits +Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely when he saith, <i>Qui +respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant</i>.</p> +<p>(8) Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to +assertion without due and mature suspension of judgment. +For the two ways of contemplation are not unlike the two ways of +action commonly spoken of by the ancients: the one plain and +smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable; the other +rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while fair and +even. So it is in contemplation: if a man will begin with +certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to +begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.</p> +<p>(9) Another error is in the manner of the tradition and +delivery of knowledge, which is for the most part magistral and +peremptory, and not ingenuous and faithful; in a sort as may be +soonest believed, and not easiest examined. It is true, +that in compendious treatises for practice that form is not to be +disallowed; but in the true handling of knowledge men ought not +to fall either on the one side into the vein of Velleius the +Epicurean, <i>Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de +revideretur</i>: nor, on the other side, into Socrates, his +ironical doubting of all things; but to propound things sincerely +with more or less asseveration, as they stand in a man’s +own judgment proved more or less.</p> +<p>(10) Other errors there are in the scope that men propound to +themselves, whereunto they bend their endeavours; for, whereas +the more constant and devote kind of professors of any science +ought to propound to themselves to make some additions to their +science, they convert their labours to aspire to certain second +prizes: as to be a profound interpreter or commentor, to be a +sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical compounder or +abridger, and so the patrimony of knowledge cometh to be +sometimes improved, but seldom augmented.</p> +<p>(11) But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking +or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge. For +men have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, +sometimes upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite; +sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight; +sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to enable +them to victory of wit and contradiction; and most times for +lucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true account +of their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men: as if +there were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a +searching and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and +variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a +tower of state, for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort +or commanding ground, for strife and contention; or a shop, for +profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the +Creator and the relief of man’s estate. But this is +that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if +contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly +conjoined and united together than they have been: a conjunction +like unto that of the two highest planets, Saturn, the planet of +rest and contemplation; and Jupiter, the planet of civil society +and action, howbeit, I do not mean, when I speak of use and +action, that end before-mentioned of the applying of knowledge to +lucre and profession; for I am not ignorant how much that +diverteth and interrupteth the prosecution and advancement of +knowledge, like unto the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, +which, while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take up, the race is +hindered,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile +tollit.” <a name="citation39"></a><a href="#footnote39" class="citation">[39]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call +philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the earth—that +is, to leave natural philosophy aside, and to apply knowledge +only to manners and policy. But as both heaven and earth do +conspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man, so the end +ought to be, from both philosophies to separate and reject vain +speculations, and whatsoever is empty and void, and to preserve +and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful; that knowledge may +not be as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as a +bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master’s use; but as +a spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort.</p> +<p>(12) Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of +dissection, those peccant humours (the principal of them) which +have not only given impediment to the proficience of learning, +but have given also occasion to the traducement thereof: wherein, +if I have been too plain, it must be remembered, <i>fidelia +vulnera amantis</i>, <i>sed dolosa oscula malignantis</i>. +This I think I have gained, that I ought to be the better +believed in that which I shall say pertaining to commendation; +because I have proceeded so freely in that which concerneth +censure. And yet I have no purpose to enter into a +laudative of learning, or to make a hymn to the Muses (though I +am of opinion that it is long since their rites were duly +celebrated), but my intent is, without varnish or amplification +justly to weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with +other things, and to take the true value thereof by testimonies +and arguments, divine and human.</p> +<p>VI. (1) First, therefore, let us seek the dignity of knowledge +in the archetype or first platform, which is in the attributes +and acts of God, as far as they are revealed to man and may be +observed with sobriety; wherein we may not seek it by the name of +learning, for all learning is knowledge acquired, and all +knowledge in God is original, and therefore we must look for it +by another name, that of wisdom or sapience, as the Scriptures +call it.</p> +<p>(2) It is so, then, that in the work of the creation we see a +double emanation of virtue from God; the one referring more +properly to power, the other to wisdom; the one expressed in +making the subsistence of the matter, and the other in disposing +the beauty of the form. This being supposed, it is to be +observed that for anything which appeareth in the history of the +creation, the confused mass and matter of heaven and earth was +made in a moment, and the order and disposition of that chaos or +mass was the work of six days; such a note of difference it +pleased God to put upon the works of power, and the works of +wisdom; wherewith concurreth, that in the former it is not set +down that God said, “Let there be heaven and earth,” +as it is set down of the works following; but actually, that God +made heaven and earth: the one carrying the style of a +manufacture, and the other of a law, decree, or counsel.</p> +<p>(3) To proceed, to that which is next in order from God, to +spirits: we find, as far as credit is to be given to the +celestial hierarchy of that supposed Dionysius, the senator of +Athens, the first place or degree is given to the angels of love, +which are termed seraphim; the second to the angels of light, +which are termed cherubim; and the third, and so following +places, to thrones, principalities, and the rest, which are all +angels of power and ministry; so as this angels of knowledge and +illumination are placed before the angels of office and +domination.</p> +<p>(4) To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to sensible +and material forms, we read the first form that was created was +light, which hath a relation and correspondence in nature and +corporal things to knowledge in spirits and incorporal +things.</p> +<p>(5) So in the distribution of days we see the day wherein God +did rest and contemplate His own works was blessed above all the +days wherein He did effect and accomplish them.</p> +<p>(6) After the creation was finished, it is set down unto us +that man was placed in the garden to work therein; which work, so +appointed to him, could be no other than work of contemplation; +that is, when the end of work is but for exercise and experiment, +not for necessity; for there being then no reluctation of the +creature, nor sweat of the brow, man’s employment must of +consequence have been matter of delight in the experiment, and +not matter of labour for the use. Again, the first acts +which man performed in Paradise consisted of the two summary +parts of knowledge; the view of creatures, and the imposition of +names. As for the knowledge which induced the fall, it was, +as was touched before, not the natural knowledge of creatures, +but the moral knowledge of good and evil; wherein the supposition +was, that God’s commandments or prohibitions were not the +originals of good and evil, but that they had other beginnings, +which man aspired to know, to the end to make a total defection +from God and to depend wholly upon himself.</p> +<p>(7) To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after the +fall of man, we see (as the Scriptures have infinite mysteries, +not violating at all the truth of this story or letter) an image +of the two estates, the contemplative state and the active state, +figured in the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in the two +simplest and most primitive trades of life; that of the shepherd +(who, by reason of his leisure, rest in a place, and lying in +view of heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative life), and +that of the husbandman, where we see again the favour and +election of God went to the shepherd, and not to the tiller of +the ground.</p> +<p>(8) So in the age before the flood, the holy records within +those few memorials which are there entered and registered have +vouchsafed to mention and honour the name of the inventors and +authors of music and works in metal. In the age after the +flood, the first great judgment of God upon the ambition of man +was the confusion of tongues; whereby the open trade and +intercourse of learning and knowledge was chiefly imbarred.</p> +<p>(9) To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God’s first +pen: he is adorned by the Scriptures with this addition and +commendation, “That he was seen in all the learning of the +Egyptians,” which nation we know was one of the most +ancient schools of the world: for so Plato brings in the Egyptian +priest saying unto Solon, “You Grecians are ever children; +you have no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of +knowledge.” Take a view of the ceremonial law of +Moses; you shall find, besides the prefiguration of Christ, the +badge or difference of the people of God, the exercise and +impression of obedience, and other divine uses and fruits +thereof, that some of the most learned Rabbins have travailed +profitably and profoundly to observe, some of them a natural, +some of them a moral sense, or reduction of many of the +ceremonies and ordinances. As in the law of the leprosy, +where it is said, “If the whiteness have overspread the +flesh, the patient may pass abroad for clean; but if there be any +whole flesh remaining, he is to be shut up for unclean;” +one of them noteth a principle of nature, that putrefaction is +more contagious before maturity than after; and another noteth a +position of moral philosophy, that men abandoned to vice do not +so much corrupt manners, as those that are half good and half +evil. So in this and very many other places in that law, +there is to be found, besides the theological sense, much +aspersion of philosophy.</p> +<p>(10) So likewise in that excellent hook of Job, if it be +revolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant and swelling +with natural philosophy; as for example, cosmography, and the +roundness of the world, <i>Qui extendit aquilonem super +vacuum</i>, <i>et appendit terram super nihilum</i>; wherein the +pensileness of the earth, the pole of the north, and the +finiteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly touched. +So again, matter of astronomy: <i>Spiritus ejus ornavit +cælos</i>, <i>et obstetricante manu ejus eductus est +Coluber tortuoses</i>. And in another place, <i>Nunquid +conjungere valebis micantes stellas Pleiadas</i>, <i>aut gyrum +Arcturi poteris dissipare</i>? Where the fixing of the +stars, ever standing at equal distance, is with great elegancy +noted. And in another place, <i>Qui facit Arcturum</i>, +<i>et Oriona</i>, <i>et Hyadas</i>, <i>et interiora Austri</i>; +where again he takes knowledge of the depression of the southern +pole, calling it the secrets of the south, because the southern +stars were in that climate unseen. Matter of generation: +<i>Annon sicut lac mulsisti me</i>, <i>et sicut caseum coagulasti +me</i>? &c. Matter of minerals: <i>Habet argentum +venarum suarum principia</i>; <i>et auro locus est in quo +conflatur</i>, <i>ferrum de terra tollitur</i>, <i>et lapis +solutus calore in æs vertitur</i>; and so forwards in that +chapter.</p> +<p>(11) So likewise in the person of Solomon the king, we see the +gift or endowment of wisdom and learning, both in Solomon’s +petition and in God’s assent thereunto, preferred before +all other terrene and temporal felicity. By virtue of which +grant or donative of God Solomon became enabled not only to write +those excellent parables or aphorisms concerning divine and moral +philosophy, but also to compile a natural history of all verdure, +from the cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon the wall (which +is but a rudiment between putrefaction and an herb), and also of +all things that breathe or move. Nay, the same Solomon the +king, although he excelled in the glory of treasure and +magnificent buildings, of shipping and navigation, of service and +attendance, of fame and renown, and the like, yet he maketh no +claim to any of those glories, but only to the glory of +inquisition of truth; for so he saith expressly, “The glory +of God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the king is to +find it out;” as if, according to the innocent play of +children, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide His works, to +the end to have them found out; and as if kings could not obtain +a greater honour than to be God’s playfellows in that game; +considering the great commandment of wits and means, whereby +nothing needeth to be hidden from them.</p> +<p>(12) Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times +after our Saviour came into the world; for our Saviour himself +did first show His power to subdue ignorance, by His conference +with the priests and doctors of the law, before He showed His +power to subdue nature by His miracles. And the coming of +this Holy Spirit was chiefly figured and expressed in the +similitude and gift of tongues, which are but <i>vehicula +scientiæ</i>.</p> +<p>(13) So in the election of those instruments, which it pleased +God to use for the plantation of the faith, notwithstanding that +at the first He did employ persons altogether unlearned, +otherwise than by inspiration, more evidently to declare His +immediate working, and to abase all human wisdom or knowledge; +yet nevertheless that counsel of His was no sooner performed, but +in the next vicissitude and succession He did send His divine +truth into the world, waited on with other learnings, as with +servants or handmaids: for so we see St. Paul, who was only +learned amongst the Apostles, had his pen most used in the +Scriptures of the New Testament.</p> +<p>(14) So again we find that many of the ancient bishops and +fathers of the Church were excellently read and studied in all +the learning of this heathen; insomuch that the edict of the +Emperor Julianus (whereby it was interdicted unto Christians to +be admitted into schools, lectures, or exercises of learning) was +esteemed and accounted a more pernicious engine and machination +against the Christian Faith than were all the sanguinary +prosecutions of his predecessors; neither could the emulation and +jealousy of Gregory, the first of that name, Bishop of Rome, ever +obtain the opinion of piety or devotion; but contrariwise +received the censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity, +even amongst holy men; in that he designed to obliterate and +extinguish the memory of heathen antiquity and authors. But +contrariwise it was the Christian Church, which, amidst the +inundations of the Scythians on the one side from the north-west, +and the Saracens from the east, did preserve in the sacred lap +and bosom thereof the precious relics even of heathen learning, +which otherwise had been extinguished, as if no such thing had +ever been.</p> +<p>(15) And we see before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves +and our fathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of Rome +to account for their degenerate manners and ceremonies, and +sundry doctrines obnoxious and framed to uphold the same abuses; +at one and the same time it was ordained by the Divine Providence +that there should attend withal a renovation and new spring of +all other knowledges. And on the other side we see the +Jesuits, who partly in themselves, and partly by the emulation +and provocation of their example, have much quickened and +strengthened the state of learning; we see (I say) what notable +service and reparation they have done to the Roman see.</p> +<p>(16) Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed, +that there be two principal duties and services, besides ornament +and illustration, which philosophy and human learning do perform +to faith and religion. The one, because they are an +effectual inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God. +For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite us to +consider and magnify the great and wonderful works of God, so if +we should rest only in the contemplation of the exterior of them +as they first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like +injury unto the majesty of God, as if we should judge or construe +of the store of some excellent jeweller by that only which is set +out toward the street in his shop. The other, because they +minister a singular help and preservative against unbelief and +error. For our Saviour saith, “You err, not knowing +the Scriptures, nor the power of God;” laying before us two +books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error: +first the Scriptures, revealing the will of God, and then the +creatures expressing His power; whereof the latter is a key unto +the former: not only opening our understanding to conceive the +true sense of the Scriptures by the general notions of reason and +rules of speech, but chiefly opening our belief, in drawing us +into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is chiefly +signed and engraven upon His works. Thus much therefore for +divine testimony and evidence concerning the true dignity and +value of learning.</p> +<p>VII. (1) As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a +discourse of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to use +choice of those things which we shall produce, than to embrace +the variety of them. First, therefore, in the degrees of +human honour amongst the heathen, it was the highest to obtain to +a veneration and adoration as a God. This unto the +Christians is as the forbidden fruit. But we speak now +separately of human testimony, according to which—that +which the Grecians call <i>apotheosis</i>, and the Latins +<i>relatio inter divos</i>—was the supreme honour which man +could attribute unto man, specially when it was given, not by a +formal decree or act of state (as it was used among the Roman +Emperors), but by an inward assent and belief. Which +honour, being so high, had also a degree or middle term; for +there were reckoned above human honours, honours heroical and +divine: in the attribution and distribution of which honours we +see antiquity made this difference; that whereas founders and +uniters of states and cities, lawgivers, extirpers of tyrants, +fathers of the people, and other eminent persons in civil merit, +were honoured but with the titles of worthies or demigods, such +as were Hercules, Theseus, Minus, Romulus, and the like; on the +other side, such as were inventors and authors of new arts, +endowments, and commodities towards man’s life, were ever +consecrated amongst the gods themselves, as was Ceres, Bacchus, +Mercurius, Apollo, and others. And justly; for the merit of +the former is confined within the circle of an age or a nation, +and is like fruitful showers, which though they be profitable and +good, yet serve but for that season, and for a latitude of ground +where they fall; but the other is, indeed, like the benefits of +heaven, which are permanent and universal. The former again +is mixed with strife and perturbation, but the latter hath the +true character of Divine Presence, coming in <i>aura leni</i>, +without noise or agitation.</p> +<p>(2) Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in +repressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much +inferior to the former, of relieving the necessities which arise +from nature, which merit was lively set forth by the ancients in +that feigned relation of Orpheus’ theatre, where all beasts +and birds assembled, and, forgetting their several +appetites—some of prey, some of game, some of +quarrel—stood all sociably together listening unto the airs +and accords of the harp, the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or +was drowned by some louder noise, but every beast returned to his +own nature; wherein is aptly described the nature and condition +of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires, of +profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give ear to +precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence +and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is +society and peace maintained; but if these instruments be silent, +or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things +dissolve into anarchy and confusion.</p> +<p>(3) But this appeareth more manifestly when kings themselves, +or persons of authority under them, or other governors in +commonwealths and popular estates, are endued with +learning. For although he might be thought partial to his +own profession that said “Then should people and estates be +happy when either kings were philosophers, or philosophers +kings;” yet so much is verified by experience, that under +learned princes and governors there have been ever the best +times: for howsoever kings may have their imperfections in their +passions and customs, yet, if they be illuminate by learning, +they have those notions of religion, policy, and morality, which +do preserve them and refrain them from all ruinous and peremptory +errors and excesses, whispering evermore in their ears, when +counsellors and servants stand mute and silent. And +senators or counsellors, likewise, which be learned, to proceed +upon more safe and substantial principles, than counsellors which +are only men of experience; the one sort keeping dangers afar +off, whereas the other discover them not till they come near +hand, and then trust to the agility of their wit to ward or avoid +them.</p> +<p>(4) Which felicity of times under learned princes (to keep +still the law of brevity, by using the most eminent and selected +examples) doth best appear in the age which passed from the death +of Domitianus the emperor until the reign of Commodus; +comprehending a succession of six princes, all learned, or +singular favourers and advancers of learning, which age for +temporal respects was the most happy and flourishing that ever +the Roman Empire (which then was a model of the world) +enjoyed—a matter revealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a +dream the night before he was slain: for he thought there was +grown behind upon his shoulders a neck and a head of gold, which +came accordingly to pass in those golden times which succeeded; +of which princes we will make some commemoration; wherein, +although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter for +a declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded as this is, +yet, because it is pertinent to the point in hand—<i>Neque +semper arcum tendit Apollo</i>—and to name them only were +too naked and cursory, I will not omit it altogether. The +first was Nerva, the excellent temper of whose government is by a +glance in Cornelius Tacitus touched to the life: <i>Postquam +divus Nerva res oluim insociabiles miscuisset</i>, <i>imperium et +libertatem</i>. And in token of his learning, the last act +of his short reign left to memory was a missive to his adopted +son, Trajan, proceeding upon some inward discontent at the +ingratitude of the times, comprehended in a verse of +Homer’s—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Telis, Phœbe, tuis, lacrymas +ulciscere nostras.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>(5) Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not learned; but +if we will hearken to the speech of our Saviour, that saith, +“He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall +have a prophet’s reward,” he deserveth to be placed +amongst the most learned princes; for there was not a greater +admirer of learning or benefactor of learning, a founder of +famous libraries, a perpetual advancer of learned men to office, +and familiar converser with learned professors and preceptors who +were noted to have then most credit in court. On the other +side how much Trajan’s virtue and government was admired +and renowned, surely no testimony of grave and faithful history +doth more lively set forth than that legend tale of Gregorius +Magnum, Bishop of Rome, who was noted for the extreme envy he +bare towards all heathen excellency; and yet he is reported, out +of the love and estimation of Trajan’s moral virtues, to +have made unto God passionate and fervent prayers for the +delivery of his soul out of hell, and to have obtained it, with a +caveat that he should make no more such petitions. In this +prince’s time also the persecutions against the Christians +received intermission upon the certificate of Plinius Secundus, a +man of excellent learning and by Trajan advanced.</p> +<p>(6) Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that +lived, and the most universal inquirer: insomuch as it was noted +for an error in his mind that he desired to comprehend all +things, and not to reserve himself for the worthiest things, +falling into the like humour that was long before noted in Philip +of Macedon, who, when he would needs overrule and put down an +excellent musician in an argument touching music, was well +answered by him again—“God forbid, sir,” saith +he, “that your fortune should be so bad as to know these +things better than I.” It pleased God likewise to use +the curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the peace of +His Church in those days; for having Christ in veneration, not as +a God or Saviour, but as a wonder or novelty, and having his +picture in his gallery matched with Apollonius (with whom in his +vain imagination he thought its had some conformity), yet it +served the turn to allay the bitter hatred of those times against +the Christian name, so as the Church had peace during his +time. And for his government civil, although he did not +attain to that of Trajan’s in glory of arms or perfection +of justice, yet in deserving of the weal of the subject he did +exceed him. For Trajan erected many famous monuments and +buildings, insomuch as Constantine the Great in emulation was +wont to call him <i>Parietaria</i>, “wall-flower,” +because his name was upon so many walls; but his buildings and +works were more of glory and triumph than use and +necessity. But Adrian spent his whole reign, which was +peaceable, in a perambulation or survey of the Roman Empire, +giving order and making assignation where he went for re-edifying +of cities, towns, and forts decayed, and for cutting of rivers +and streams, and for making bridges and passages, and for +policing of cities and commonalties with new ordinances and +constitutions, and granting new franchises and incorporations; so +that his whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses and +decays of former times.</p> +<p>(7) Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince +excellently learned, and had the patient and subtle wit of a +schoolman, insomuch as in common speech (which leaves no virtue +untaxed) he was called <i>Cymini Sector</i>, a carver or a +divider of cummin seed, which is one of the least seeds. +Such a patience he had and settled spirit to enter into the least +and most exact differences of causes, a fruit no doubt of the +exceeding tranquillity and serenity of his mind, which being no +ways charged or encumbered, either with fears, remorses, or +scruples, but having been noted for a man of the purest goodness, +without all fiction or affectation, that hath reigned or lived, +made his mind continually present and entire. He likewise +approached a degree nearer unto Christianity, and became, as +Agrippa said unto St. Paul, “half a Christian,” +holding their religion and law in good opinion, and not only +ceasing persecution, but giving way to the advancement of +Christians.</p> +<p>(5) There succeeded him the first <i>Divi fratres</i>, the two +adoptive brethren—Lucius Commodus Verus, son to Ælius +Verus, who delighted much in the softer kind of learning, and was +wont to call the poet Martial his Virgil; and Marcus Aurelius +Antoninus: whereof the latter, who obscured his colleague and +survived him long, was named the “Philosopher,” who, +as he excelled all the rest in learning, so he excelled them +likewise in perfection of all royal virtues; insomuch as Julianus +the emperor, in his book entitled <i>Cærsares</i>, being as +a pasquil or satire to deride all his predecessors, feigned that +they were all invited to a banquet of the gods, and Silenus the +jester sat at the nether end of the table and bestowed a scoff on +everyone as they came in; but when Marcus Philosophus came in, +Silenus was gravelled and out of countenance, not knowing where +to carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance at his patience +towards his wife. And the virtue of this prince, continued +with that of his predecessor, made the name of Antoninus so +sacred in the world, that though it were extremely dishonoured in +Commodus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bare the name, +yet, when Alexander Severus refused the name because he was a +stranger to the family, the Senate with one acclamation said, +<i>Quomodo Augustus</i>, <i>sic et Antoninus</i>. In such +renown and veneration was the name of these two princes in those +days, that they would have had it as a perpetual addition in all +the emperors’ style. In this emperor’s time +also the Church for the most part was in peace; so as in this +sequence of six princes we do see the blessed effects of learning +in sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest table of the +world.</p> +<p>(9) But for a tablet or picture of smaller volume (not +presuming to speak of your Majesty that liveth), in my judgment +the most excellent is that of Queen Elizabeth, your immediate +predecessor in this part of Britain; a prince that, if Plutarch +were now alive to write lives by parallels, would trouble him, I +think, to find for her a parallel amongst women. This lady +was endued with learning in her sex singular, and rare even +amongst masculine princes—whether we speak of learning, of +language, or of science, modern or ancient, divinity or +humanity—and unto the very last year of her life she +accustomed to appoint set hours for reading, scarcely any young +student in a university more daily or more duly. As for her +government, I assure myself (I shall not exceed if I do affirm) +that this part of the island never had forty-five years of better +tines, and yet not through the calmness of the season, but +through the wisdom of her regiment. For if there be +considered, of the one side, the truth of religion established, +the constant peace and security, the good administration of +justice, the temperate use of the prerogative, not slackened, nor +much strained; the flourishing state of learning, sortable to so +excellent a patroness; the convenient estate of wealth and means, +both of crown and subject; the habit of obedience, and the +moderation of discontents; and there be considered, on the other +side, the differences of religion, the troubles of neighbour +countries, the ambition of Spain, and opposition of Rome, and +then that she was solitary and of herself; these things, I say, +considered, as I could not have chosen an instance so recent and +so proper, so I suppose I could not have chosen one more +remarkable or eminent to the purpose now in hand, which is +concerning the conjunction of learning in the prince with +felicity in the people.</p> +<p>(10) Neither hath learning an influence and operation only +upon civil merit and moral virtue, and the arts or temperature of +peace and peaceable government; but likewise it hath no less +power and efficacy in enablement towards martial and military +virtue and prowess, as may be notably represented in the examples +of Alexander the Great and Cæsar the Dictator (mentioned +before, but now in fit place to be resumed), of whose virtues and +acts in war there needs no note or recital, having been the +wonders of time in that kind; but of their affections towards +learning and perfections in learning it is pertinent to say +somewhat.</p> +<p>(11) Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle, the great +philosopher, who dedicated divers of his books of philosophy unto +him; he was attended with Callisthenes and divers other learned +persons, that followed him in camp, throughout his journeys and +conquests. What price and estimation he had learning in +doth notably appear in these three particulars: first, in the +envy he used to express that he bare towards Achilles, in this, +that he had so good a trumpet of his praises as Homer’s +verses; secondly, in the judgment or solution he gave touching +that precious cabinet of Darius, which was found among his jewels +(whereof question was made what thing was worthy to be put into +it, and he gave his opinion for Homer’s works); thirdly, in +his letter to Aristotle, after he had set forth his books of +nature, wherein he expostulateth with him for publishing the +secrets or mysteries of philosophy; and gave him to understand +that himself esteemed it more to excel other men in learning and +knowledge than in power and empire. And what use he had of +learning doth appear, or rather shine, in all his speeches and +answers, being full of science and use of science, and that in +all variety.</p> +<p>(12) And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and +somewhat idle to recite things that every man knoweth; but yet, +since the argument I handle leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that +men shall perceive I am as willing to flatter (if they will so +call it) an Alexander, or a Cæsar, or an Antoninus, that +are dead many hundred years since, as any that now liveth; for it +is the displaying of the glory of learning in sovereignty that I +propound to myself, and not a humour of declaiming in any +man’s praises. Observe, then, the speech he used of +Diogenes, and see if it tend not to the true state of one of the +greatest questions of moral philosophy: whether the enjoying of +outward things, or the contemning of them, be the greatest +happiness; for when he saw Diogenes so perfectly contented with +so little, he said to those that mocked at his condition, +“were I not Alexander, I would wish to be +Diogenes.” But Seneca inverteth it, and saith, +“<i>Plus erat</i>, <i>quod hic nollet accipere</i>, +<i>quàm quod ille posset dare</i>.” There were +more things which Diogenes would have refused than those were +which Alexander could have given or enjoyed.</p> +<p>(13) Observe, again, that speech which was usual with +him,—“That he felt his mortality chiefly in two +things, sleep and lust;” and see if it were not a speech +extracted out of the depth of natural philosophy, and liker to +have come out of the mouth of Aristotle or Democritus than from +Alexander.</p> +<p>(14) See, again, that speech of humanity and poesy, when, upon +the bleeding of his wounds, he called unto him one of his +flatterers, that was wont to ascribe to him divine honour, and +said, “Look, this is very blood; this is not such a liquor +as Homer speaketh of, which ran from Venus’ hand when it +was pierced by Diomedes.”</p> +<p>(15) See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic in +the speech he used to Cassander, upon a complaint that was made +against his father Antipater; for when Alexander happened to say, +“Do you think these men would have come from so far to +complain except they had just cause of grief?” and +Cassander answered, “Yea, that was the matter, because they +thought they should not be disproved;” said Alexander, +laughing, “See the subtleties of Aristotle, to take a +matter both ways, <i>pro et contra</i>, &c.”</p> +<p>(16) But note, again, how well he could use the same art which +he reprehended to serve his own humour: when bearing a secret +grudge to Callisthenes, because he was against the new ceremony +of his adoration, feasting one night where the same Callisthenes +was at the table, it was moved by some after supper, for +entertainment sake, that Callisthenes, who was an eloquent man, +might speak of some theme or purpose at his own choice; which +Callisthenes did, choosing the praise of the Macedonian nation +for his discourse, and performing the same with so good manner as +the hearers were much ravished; whereupon Alexander, nothing +pleased, said, “It was easy to be eloquent upon so good a +subject; but,” saith he, “turn your style, and let us +hear what you can say against us;” which Callisthenes +presently undertook, and did with that sting and life that +Alexander interrupted him, and said, “The goodness of the +cause made him eloquent before, and despite made him eloquent +then again.”</p> +<p>(17) Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent +use of a metaphor or translation, wherewith he taxeth Antipater, +who was an imperious and tyrannous governor; for when one of +Antipater’s friends commended him to Alexander for his +moderation, that he did not degenerate as his other lieutenants +did into the Persian pride, in uses of purple, but kept the +ancient habit of Macedon, of black. “True,” +saith Alexander; “but Antipater is all purple +within.” Or that other, when Parmenio came to him in +the plain of Arbela and showed him the innumerable multitude of +his enemies, specially as they appeared by the infinite number of +lights as it had been a new firmament of stars, and thereupon +advised him to assail them by night; whereupon he answered, +“That he would not steal the victory.”</p> +<p>(18) For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction, +so much in all ages embraced, that he made between his two +friends Hephæstion and Craterus, when he said, “That +the one loved Alexander, and the other loved the king:” +describing the principal difference of princes’ best +servants, that some in affection love their person, and other in +duty love their crown.</p> +<p>(19) Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary +with counsellors of princes, that they counsel their masters +according to the model of their own mind and fortune, and not of +their masters. When upon Darius’ great offers +Parmenio had said, “Surely I would accept these offers were +I as Alexander;” saith Alexander, “So would I were I +as Parmenio.”</p> +<p>(20) Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply which he made +when he gave so large gifts to his friends and servants, and was +asked what he did reserve for himself, and he answered, +“Hope.” Weigh, I say, whether he had not cast +up his account aright, because <i>hope</i> must be the portion of +all that resolve upon great enterprises; for this was +Cæsar’s portion when he went first into Gaul, his +estate being then utterly overthrown with largesses. And +this was likewise the portion of that noble prince, howsoever +transported with ambition, Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it was +usually said that he was the greatest usurer in France, because +he had turned all his estate into obligations.</p> +<p>(21) To conclude, therefore, as certain critics are used to +say hyperbolically, “That if all sciences were lost they +might be found in Virgil,” so certainly this may be said +truly, there are the prints and footsteps of learning in those +few speeches which are reported of this prince, the admiration of +whom, when I consider him not as Alexander the Great, but as +Aristotle’s scholar, hath carried me too far.</p> +<p>(22) As for Julius Cæsar, the excellency of his learning +needeth not to be argued from his education, or his company, or +his speeches; but in a further degree doth declare itself in his +writings and works: whereof some are extant and permanent, and +some unfortunately perished. For first, we see there is +left unto us that excellent history of his own wars, which he +entitled only a Commentary, wherein all succeeding times have +admired the solid weight of matter, and the real passages and +lively images of actions and persons, expressed in the greatest +propriety of words and perspicuity of narration that ever was; +which that it was not the effect of a natural gift, but of +learning and precept, is well witnessed by that work of his +entitled <i>De Analogia</i>, being a grammatical philosophy, +wherein he did labour to make this same <i>Vox ad placitum</i> to +become <i>Vox ad licitum</i>, and to reduce custom of speech to +congruity of speech; and took as it were the pictures of words +from the life of reason.</p> +<p>(23) So we receive from him, as a monument both of his power +and learning, the then reformed computation of the year; well +expressing that he took it to be as great a glory to himself to +observe and know the law of the heavens, as to give law to men +upon the earth.</p> +<p>(24) So likewise in that book of his, <i>Anti-Cato</i>, it may +easily appear that he did aspire as well to victory of wit as +victory of war: undertaking therein a conflict against the +greatest champion with the pen that then lived, Cicero the +orator.</p> +<p>(25) So, again, in his book of Apophthegms, which he +collected, we see that he esteemed it more honour to make himself +but a pair of tables, to take the wise and pithy words of others, +than to have every word of his own to be made an apophthegm or an +oracle, as vain princes, by custom of flattery, pretend to +do. And yet if I should enumerate divers of his speeches, +as I did those of Alexander, they are truly such as Solomon +noteth, when he saith, <i>Verba sapientum tanquam aculei</i>, +<i>et tanquam clavi in altum defixi</i>: whereof I will only +recite three, not so delectable for elegancy, but admirable for +vigour and efficacy.</p> +<p>(26) As first, it is reason he be thought a master of words, +that could with one word appease a mutiny in his army, which was +thus: The Romans, when their generals did speak to their army, +did use the word <i>Milites</i>, but when the magistrates spake +to the people they did use the word <i>Quirites</i>. The +soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously prayed to be cashiered; +not that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof to draw +Cæsar to other conditions; wherein he being resolute not to +give way, after some silence, he began his speech, <i>Ego +Quirites</i>, which did admit them already +cashiered—wherewith they were so surprised, crossed, and +confused, as they would not suffer him to go on in his speech, +but relinquished their demands, and made it their suit to be +again called by the name of <i>Milites</i>.</p> +<p>(27) The second speech was thus: Cæsar did extremely +affect the name of king; and some were set on as he passed by in +popular acclamation to salute him king. Whereupon, finding +the cry weak and poor, he put it off thus, in a kind of jest, as +if they had mistaken his surname: <i>Non Rex sum</i>, <i>sed +Cæsar</i>; a speech that, if it be searched, the life and +fulness of it can scarce be expressed. For, first, it was a +refusal of the name, but yet not serious; again, it did signify +an infinite confidence and magnanimity, as if he presumed +Cæsar was the greater title, as by his worthiness it is +come to pass till this day. But chiefly it was a speech of +great allurement toward his own purpose, as if the state did +strive with him but for a name, whereof mean families were +vested; for <i>Rex</i> was a surname with the Romans, as well as +<i>King</i> is with us.</p> +<p>(28) The last speech which I will mention was used to +Metellus, when Cæsar, after war declared, did possess +himself of this city of Rome; at which time, entering into the +inner treasury to take the money there accumulate, Metellus, +being tribune, forbade him. Whereto Cæsar said, +“That if he did not desist, he would lay him dead in the +place.” And presently taking himself up, he added, +“Young man, it is harder for me to speak it than to do +it—<i>Adolescens</i>, <i>durius est mihi hoc dicere +quàm facere</i>.” A speech compounded of the +greatest terror and greatest clemency that could proceed out of +the mouth of man.</p> +<p>(29) But to return and conclude with him, it is evident +himself knew well his own perfection in learning, and took it +upon him, as appeared when upon occasion that some spake what a +strange resolution it was in Lucius Sylla to resign his +dictators, he, scoffing at him to his own advantage, answered, +“That Sylla could not skill of letters, and therefore knew +not how to dictate.”</p> +<p>(30) And here it were fit to leave this point, touching the +concurrence of military virtue and learning (for what example +should come with any grace after those two of Alexander and +Cæsar?), were it not in regard of the rareness of +circumstance, that I find in one other particular, as that which +did so suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder: and it +is of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from Socrates’ +school into Asia in the expedition of Cyrus the younger against +King Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that time was very young, +and never had seen the wars before, neither had any command in +the army, but only followed the war as a voluntary, for the love +and conversation of Proxenus, his friend. He was present +when Falinus came in message from the great king to the Grecians, +after that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they, a handful of +men, left to themselves in the midst of the king’s +territories, cut off from their country by many navigable rivers +and many hundred miles. The message imported that they +should deliver up their arms and submit themselves to the +king’s mercy. To which message, before answer was +made, divers of the army conferred familiarly with Falinus; and +amongst the rest Xenophon happened to say, “Why, Falinus, +we have now but these two things left, our arms and our virtue; +and if we yield up our arms, how shall we make use of our +virtue?” Whereto Falinus, smiling on him, said, +“If I be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an +Athenian, and I believe you study philosophy, and it is pretty +that you say; but you are much abused if you think your virtue +can withstand the king’s power.” Here was the +scorn; the wonder followed: which was that this young scholar or +philosopher, after all the captains were murdered in parley by +treason, conducted those ten thousand foot, through the heart of +all the king’s high countries, from Babylon to Græcia +in safety, in despite of all the king’s forces, to the +astonishment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians +in times succeeding to make invasion upon the kings of Persia, as +was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, attempted by +Agesilaus the Spartan, and achieved by Alexander the Macedonian, +all upon the ground of the act of that young scholar.</p> +<p>VIII. (1) To proceed now from imperial and military virtue to +moral and private virtue; first, it is an assured truth, which is +contained in the verses:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter +artes<br /> +Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of +men’s minds; but indeed the accent had need be upon +<i>fideliter</i>; for a little superficial learning doth rather +work a contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, +temerity, and insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts and +difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both +sides, and to turn back the first offers and conceits of the +mind, and to accept of nothing but examined and tried. It +taketh away vain admiration of anything, which is the root of all +weakness. For all things are admired, either because they +are new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man +that wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly but will find +that printed in his heart, <i>Nil novi super terram</i>. +Neither can any man marvel at the play of puppets, that goeth +behind the curtain, and adviseth well of the motion. And +for magnitude, as Alexander the Great, after that he was used to +great armies, and the great conquests of the spacious provinces +in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, of some fights +and services there, which were commonly for a passage or a fort, +or some walled town at the most, he said:—“It seemed +to him that he was advertised of the battles of the frogs and the +mice, that the old tales went of.” So certainly, if a +man meditate much upon the universal frame of nature, the earth +with men upon it (the divineness of souls except) will not seem +much other than an ant-hill, whereas some ants carry corn, and +some carry their young, and some go empty, and all to and fro a +little heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of +death or adverse fortune, which is one of the greatest +impediments of virtue and imperfections of manners. For if +a man’s mind be deeply seasoned with the consideration of +the mortality and corruptible nature of things, he will easily +concur with Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw a woman +weeping for her pitcher of earth that was broken, and went forth +the next day and saw a woman weeping for her son that was dead, +and thereupon said, “<i>Heri vidi fragilem frangi</i>, +<i>hodie vidi mortalem mori</i>.” And, therefore, +Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of +causes and the conquest of all fears together, as +<i>concomitantia</i>.</p> +<blockquote><p>“Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere +causas,<br /> +Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum<br /> +Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>(2) It were too long to go over the particular remedies which +learning doth minister to all the diseases of the mind: sometimes +purging the ill humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, +sometimes helping digestion, sometimes increasing appetite, +sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the +like; and, therefore, I will conclude with that which hath +<i>rationem totius</i>—which is, that it disposeth the +constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the +defects thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of +growth and reformation. For the unlearned man knows not +what it is to descend into himself, or to call himself to +account, nor the pleasure of that <i>suavissima vita</i>, +<i>indies sentire se fieri meliorem</i>. The good parts he +hath he will learn to show to the full, and use them dexterously, +but not much to increase them. The faults he hath he will +learn how to hide and colour them, but not much to amend them; +like an ill mower, that mows on still, and never whets his +scythe. Whereas with the learned man it fares otherwise, +that he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment of his +mind with the use and employment thereof. Nay, further, in +general and in sum, certain it is that <i>Veritas</i> and +<i>Bonitas</i> differ but as the seal and the print; for truth +prints goodness, and they be the clouds of error which descend in +the storms of passions and perturbations.</p> +<p>(3) From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and +commandment, and consider whether in right reason there be any +comparable with that wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth +man’s nature. We see the dignity of the commandment +is according to the dignity of the commanded; to have commandment +over beasts as herdmen have, is a thing contemptible; to have +commandment over children as schoolmasters have, is a matter of +small honour; to have commandment over galley-slaves is a +disparagement rather than an honour. Neither is the +commandment of tyrants much better, over people which have put +off the generosity of their minds; and, therefore, it was ever +holden that honours in free monarchies and commonwealths had a +sweetness more than in tyrannies, because the commandment +extendeth more over the wills of men, and not only over their +deeds and services. And therefore, when Virgil putteth +himself forth to attribute to Augustus Cæsar the best of +human honours, he doth it in these words:—</p> + +<blockquote><p> “Victorque +volentes<br /> +Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the +commandment over the will; for it is a commandment over the +reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest +part of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself. For +there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of +estate in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, +imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and +learning. And therefore we see the detestable and extreme +pleasure that arch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors +are transported with, when they once find in themselves that they +have a superiority in the faith and conscience of men; so great +as if they have once tasted of it, it is seldom seen that any +torture or persecution can make them relinquish or abandon +it. But as this is that which the author of the Revelation +calleth the depth or profoundness of Satan, so by argument of +contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men’s +understanding, by force of truth rightly interpreted, is that +which approacheth nearest to the similitude of the divine +rule.</p> +<p>(4) As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of +learning is not so confined to give fortune only to states and +commonwealths, as it doth not likewise give fortune to particular +persons. For it was well noted long ago, that Homer hath +given more men their livings, than either Sylla, or Cæsar, +or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding their great largesses and +donatives, and distributions of lands to so many legions. +And no doubt it is hard to say whether arms or learning have +advanced greater numbers. And in case of sovereignty we +see, that if arms or descent have carried away the kingdom, yet +learning hath carried the priesthood, which ever hath been in +some competition with empire.</p> +<p>(5) Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and +learning, it far surpasseth all other in nature. For, shall +the pleasures of the affections so exceed the pleasure of the +sense, as much as the obtaining of desire or victory exceedeth a +song or a dinner? and must not of consequence the pleasures of +the intellect or understanding exceed the pleasures of the +affections? We see in all other pleasures there is satiety, +and after they be used, their verdure departeth, which showeth +well they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that +it was the novelty which pleased, and not the quality. And, +therefore, we see that voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitions +princes turn melancholy. But of knowledge there is no +satiety, but satisfaction and appetite are perpetually +interchangeable; and, therefore, appeareth to be good in itself +simply, without fallacy or accident. Neither is that +pleasure of small efficacy and contentment to the mind of man, +which the poet Lucretius describeth elegantly:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora +ventis, &c.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>“It is a view of delight,” saith he, “to +stand or walk upon the shore side, and to see a ship tossed with +tempest upon the sea; or to be in a fortified tower, and to see +two battles join upon a plain. But it is a pleasure +incomparable, for the mind of man to be settled, landed, and +fortified in the certainty of truth; and from thence to descry +and behold the errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up +and down of other men.”</p> +<p>(6) Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning man +excelleth man in that wherein man excelleth beasts; that by +learning man ascendeth to the heavens and their motions, where in +body he cannot come; and the like: let us conclude with the +dignity and excellency of knowledge and learning in that +whereunto man’s nature doth most aspire, which is +immortality, or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and +raising of houses and families; to this tend buildings, +foundations, and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, +fame, and celebration; and in effect the strength of all other +human desires. We see then how far the monuments of wit and +learning are more durable than the monuments of power or of the +hands. For have not the verses of Homer continued +twenty-five hundred years, or more, without the loss of a +syllable or letter; during which the infinite palaces, temples, +castles, cities, have been decayed and demolished? It is +not possible to have the true pictures or statues of Cyrus, +Alexander, Cæsar, no nor of the kings or great personages +of much later years; for the originals cannot last, and the +copies cannot but leese of the life and truth. But the +images of men’s wits and knowledges remain in books, +exempted from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual +renovation. Neither are they fitly to be called images, +because they generate still, and cast their seeds in the minds of +others, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in +succeeding ages. So that if the invention of the ship was +thought so noble, which carrieth riches and commodities from +place to place, and consociateth the most remote regions in +participation of their fruits, how much more are letters to be +magnified, which as ships pass through the vast seas of time, and +make ages so distant to participate of the wisdom, illuminations, +and inventions, the one of the other? Nay, further, we see +some of the philosophers which were least divine, and most +immersed in the senses, and denied generally the immortality of +the soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the +spirit of man could act and perform without the organs of the +body, they thought might remain after death, which were only +those of the understanding and not of the affection; so immortal +and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto them to +be. But we, that know by divine revelation that not only +the understanding but the affections purified, not only the +spirit but the body changed, shall be advanced to immortality, do +disclaim in these rudiments of the senses. But it must be +remembered, both in this last point, and so it may likewise be +needful in other places, that in probation of the dignity of +knowledge or learning, I did in the beginning separate divine +testimony from human, which method I have pursued, and so handled +them both apart.</p> +<p>(7) Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know it will be +impossible for me, by any pleading of mine, to reverse the +judgment, either of Æsop’s cock, that preferred the +barleycorn before the gem; or of Midas, that being chosen judge +between Apollo, president of the Muses, and Pan, god of the +flocks, judged for plenty; or of Paris, that judged for beauty +and love against wisdom and power; or of Agrippina, <i>occidat +matrem</i>, <i>modo imperet</i>, that preferred empire with any +condition never so detestable; or of Ulysses, <i>qui vetulam +prætulit immortalitati</i>, being a figure of those which +prefer custom and habit before all excellency, or of a number of +the like popular judgments. For these things must continue +as they have been; but so will that also continue whereupon +learning hath ever relied, and which faileth not: <i>Justificata +est sapientia a filiis suis</i>.</p> +<div class='chapter' /><h2>THE SECOND BOOK.</h2> +<p style="text-align: center"><i>To the King</i>.</p> +<p>1. <span class="smcap">It</span> might seem to have more +convenience, though it come often otherwise to pass (excellent +King), that those which are fruitful in their generations, and +have in themselves the foresight of immortality in their +descendants, should likewise be more careful of the good estate +of future times, unto which they know they must transmit and +commend over their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was a +sojourner in the world in respect of her unmarried life, and was +a blessing to her own times; and yet so as the impression of her +good government, besides her happy memory, is not without some +effect which doth survive her. But to your Majesty, whom +God hath already blessed with so much royal issue, worthy to +continue and represent you for ever, and whose youthful and +fruitful bed doth yet promise many the like renovations, it is +proper and agreeable to be conversant not only in the transitory +parts of good government, but in those acts also which are in +their nature permanent and perpetual. Amongst the which (if +affection do not transport me) there is not any more worthy than +the further endowment of the world with sound and fruitful +knowledge. For why should a few received authors stand up +like Hercules’ columns, beyond which there should be no +sailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star +as your Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return +therefore where we left, it remaineth to consider of what kind +those acts are which have been undertaken and performed by kings +and others for the increase and advancement of learning, wherein +I purpose to speak actively, without digressing or dilating.</p> +<p>2. Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are +over common by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, +and by the conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth +endeavour, the second preventeth error, and the third supplieth +the frailty of man. But the principal of these is +direction, for <i>claudus in via antevertit cursorem extra +viam</i>; and Solomon excellently setteth it down, “If the +iron be not sharp, it requireth more strength, but wisdom is that +which prevaileth,” signifying that the invention or +election of the mean is more effectual than any enforcement or +accumulation of endeavours. This I am induced to speak, for +that (not derogating from the noble intention of any that have +been deservers towards the state of learning), I do observe +nevertheless that their works and acts are rather matters of +magnificence and memory than of progression and proficience, and +tend rather to augment the mass of learning in the multitude of +learned men than to rectify or raise the sciences themselves.</p> +<p>3. The works or acts of merit towards learning are +conversant about three objects—the places of learning, the +books of learning, and the persons of the learned. For as +water, whether it be the dew of heaven or the springs of the +earth, doth scatter and leese itself in the ground, except it be +collected into some receptacle where it may by union comfort and +sustain itself; and for that cause the industry of man hath made +and framed springheads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, which men +have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with +accomplishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use and +necessity; so this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it +descend from divine inspiration, or spring from human sense, +would soon perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not +preserved in books, traditions, conferences, and places +appointed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for the +receipt and comforting of the same.</p> +<p>4. The works which concern the seats and places of +learning are four—foundations and buildings, endowments +with revenues, endowments with franchises and privileges, +institutions and ordinances for government—all tending to +quietness and privateness of life, and discharge of cares and +troubles; much like the stations which Virgil prescribeth for the +hiving of bees:</p> +<blockquote><p>“Principio sedes apibus statioque +petenda,<br /> +Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>5. The works touching books are two—first, +libraries, which are as the shrines where all the relics of the +ancient saints, full of true virtue, and that without delusion or +imposture, are preserved and reposed; secondly, new editions of +authors, with more correct impressions, more faithful +translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent annotations, +and the like.</p> +<p>6. The works pertaining to the persons of learned men +(besides the advancement and countenancing of them in general) +are two—the reward and designation of readers in sciences +already extant and invented; and the reward and designation of +writers and inquirers concerning any parts of learning not +sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.</p> +<p>7. These are summarily the works and acts wherein the +merits of many excellent princes and other worthy personages, +have been conversant. As for any particular commemorations, +I call to mind what Cicero said when he gave general thanks, +<i>Difficile non aliquem</i>, <i>ingratum quenquam +præterire</i>. Let us rather, according to the +Scriptures, look unto that part of the race which is before us, +than look back to that which is already attained.</p> +<p>8. First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations +of colleges in Europe, I find strange that they are all dedicated +to professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at +large. For if men judge that learning should be referred to +action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error +described in the ancient fable, in which the other parts of the +body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither +performed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as +the head doth; but yet notwithstanding it is the stomach that +digesteth and distributeth to all the rest. So if any man +think philosophy and universality to be idle studies, he doth not +consider that all professions are from thence served and +supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath +hindered the progression of learning, because these fundamental +knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if you +will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is +not anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of +the earth and putting new mould about thee roots that must work +it. Neither is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating of +foundations and dotations to professory learning hath not only +had a malign aspect and influence upon the growth of sciences, +but hath also been prejudicial to states, and governments. +For hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in regard of +able men to serve them in causes of estate, because there is no +education collegiate which is free, where such as were so +disposed might give themselves in histories, modern languages, +books of policy and civil discourse, and other the like +enablements unto service of estate.</p> +<p>9. And because founders of colleges do plant, and +founders of lectures do water, it followeth well in order to +speak of the defect which is in public lectures; namely, in the +smallness, and meanness of the salary or reward which in most +places is assigned unto them, whether they be lectures of arts, +or of professions. For it is necessary to the progression +of sciences that readers be of the most able and sufficient men; +as those which are ordained for generating and propagating of +sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot be, +except their condition and endowment be such as may content the +ablest man to appropriate his whole labour and continue his whole +age in that function and attendance; and therefore must have a +proportion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of +advancement, which may be expected from a profession or the +practice of a profession. So as, if you will have sciences +flourish, you must observe David’s military law, which was, +“That those which stayed with the carriage should have +equal part with those which were in the action;” else will +the carriages be ill attended. So readers in sciences are +indeed the guardians of the stores and provisions of sciences, +whence men in active courses are furnished, and therefore ought +to have equal entertainment with them; otherwise if the fathers +in sciences be of the weakest sort or be ill maintained,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia +nati.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>10. Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some +alchemist to help me, who call upon men to sell their books, and +to build furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses +as barren virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it +is, that unto the deep, fruitful, and operative study of many +sciences, specialty natural philosophy and physic, books be not +only the instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence of men hath +not been altogether wanting. For we see spheres, globes, +astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided as +appurtenances to astronomy and cosmography, as well as +books. We see likewise that some places instituted for +physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for simples of all +sorts, and do likewise command the use of dead bodies for +anatomies. But these do respect but a few things. In +general, there will hardly be any main proficience in the +disclosing of nature, except there be some allowance for expenses +about experiments; whether they be experiments appertaining to +Vulcanus or Dædalus, furnace or engine, or any other +kind. And therefore as secretaries and spials of princes +and states bring in bills for intelligence, so you must allow the +spials and intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills; or +else you shall be ill advertised.</p> +<p>11. And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to +Aristotle of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, +fishers, and the like, that he might compile a history of nature, +much better do they deserve it that travail in arts of +nature.</p> +<p>12. Another defect which I note is an intermission or +neglect in those which are governors in universities, of +consultation, and in princes or superior persons, of visitation: +to enter into account and consideration, whether the readings, +exercises, and other customs appertaining unto learning, +anciently begun and since continued, be well instituted or no; +and thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation in that which +shall be found inconvenient. For it is one of your +Majesty’s own most wise and princely maxims, “That in +all usages and precedents, the times be considered wherein they +first began; which if they were weak or ignorant, it derogateth +from the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for +suspect.” And therefore inasmuch as most of the +usages and orders of the universities were derived from more +obscure times, it is the more requisite they be +re-examined. In this kind I will give an instance or two, +for example sake, of things that are the most obvious and +familiar. The one is a matter, which though it be ancient +and general, yet I hold to be an error; which is, that scholars +in universities come too soon and too unripe to logic and +rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children and +novices. For these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of +sciences, being the arts of arts; the one for judgment, the other +for ornament. And they be the rules and directions how to +set forth and dispose matter: and therefore for minds empty and +unfraught with matter, and which have not gathered that which +Cicero calleth <i>sylva</i> and <i>supellex</i>, stuff and +variety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to +weigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind) doth work but this +effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and +universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerate into +childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And further, +the untimely learning of them hath drawn on by consequence the +superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them, as +fitteth indeed to the capacity of children. Another is a +lack I find in the exercises used in the universities, which do +snake too great a divorce between invention and memory. For +their speeches are either premeditate, in <i>verbis +conceptis</i>, where nothing is left to invention, or merely +extemporal, where little is left to memory. Whereas in life +and action there is least use of either of these, but rather of +intermixtures of premeditation and invention, notes and +memory. So as the exercise fitteth not the practice, nor +the image the life; and it is ever a true rule in exercises, that +they be framed as near as may be to the life of practice; for +otherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of the mind, +and not prepare them. The truth whereof is not obscure, +when scholars come to the practices of professions, or other +actions of civil life; which when they set into, this want is +soon found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this +part, touching the amendment of the institutions and orders of +universities, I will conclude with the clause of +Cæsar’s letter to Oppius and Balbes, <i>Hoc +quemadmodum fieri possit</i>, <i>nonnulla mihi in mentem +veniunt</i>, <i>et multa reperiri possunt</i>: <i>de iis rebus +rgo vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis</i>.</p> +<p>13. Another defect which I note ascendeth a little +higher than the precedent. For as the proficience of +learning consisteth much in the orders and institutions of +universities in the same states and kingdoms, so it would be yet +more advanced, if there were more intelligence mutual between the +universities of Europe than now there is. We see there be +many orders and foundations, which though they be divided under +several sovereignties and territories, yet they take themselves +to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and correspondence one +with the other, insomuch as they have provincials and +generals. And surely as nature createth brotherhood in +families, and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in +communalties, and the anointment of God superinduceth a +brotherhood in kings and bishops, so in like manner there cannot +but be a fraternity in learning and illumination, relating to +that paternity which is attributed to God, who is called the +Father of illuminations or lights.</p> +<p>14. The last defect which I will note is, that there +hath not been, or very rarely been, any public designation of +writers or inquirers concerning such parts of knowledge as may +appear not to have been already sufficiently laboured or +undertaken; unto which point it is an inducement to enter into a +view and examination what parts of learning have been prosecuted, +and what omitted. For the opinion of plenty is amongst the +causes of want, and the great quantity of books maketh a show +rather of superfluity than lack; which surcharge nevertheless is +not to be remedied by making no more books, but by making more +good books, which, as the serpent of Moses, might devour the +serpents of the enchanters.</p> +<p>15. The removing of all the defects formerly enumerate, +except the last, and of the active part also of the last (which +is the designation of writers), are <i>opera basilica</i>; +towards which the endeavours of a private man may be but as an +image in a crossway, that may point at the way, but cannot go +it. But the inducing part of the latter (which is the +survey of learning) may be set forward by private travail. +Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and faithful +perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie +fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the industry +of man, to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory +may both minister light to any public designation, and, also +serve to excite voluntary endeavours. Wherein, +nevertheless, my purpose is at this time to note only omissions +and deficiences, and not to make any redargution of errors or +incomplete prosecutions. For it is one thing to set forth +what ground lieth unmanured, and another thing to correct ill +husbandry in that which is manured.</p> +<p>In the handling and undertaking of which work I am not +ignorant what it is that I do now move and attempt, nor +insensible of mine own weakness to sustain my purpose. But +my hope is, that if my extreme love to learning carry me too far, +I may obtain the excuse of affection; for that “It is not +granted to man to love and to be wise.” But I know +well I can use no other liberty of judgment than I must leave to +others; and I for my part shall be indifferently glad either to +perform myself, or accept from another, that duty of +humanity—<i>Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam</i>, +&c. I do foresee likewise that of those things which I +shall enter and register as deficiences and omissions, many will +conceive and censure that some of them are already done and +extant; others to be but curiosities, and things of no great use; +and others to be of too great difficulty, and almost +impossibility to be compassed and effected. But for the two +first, I refer myself to the particulars. For the last, +touching impossibility, I take it those things are to be held +possible which may be done by some person, though not by every +one; and which may be done by many, though not by any one; and +which may be done in the succession of ages, though not within +the hourglass of one man’s life; and which may be done by +public designation, though not by private endeavour. But, +notwithstanding, if any man will take to himself rather that of +Solomon, “<i>Dicit piger</i>, <i>Leo est in via</i>,” +than that of Virgil, “<i>Possunt quia posse +videntur</i>,” I shall be content that my labours be +esteemed but as the better sort of wishes; for as it asketh some +knowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it requireth +some sense to make a wish not absurd.</p> +<p>I. (1) The parts of human learning have reference to the three +parts of man’s understanding, which is the seat of +learning: history to his memory, poesy to his imagination, and +philosophy to his reason. Divine learning receiveth the +same distribution; for, the spirit of man is the same, though the +revelation of oracle and sense be diverse. So as theology +consisteth also of history of the Church; of parables, which is +divine poesy; and of holy doctrine or precept. For as for +that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy, it is +but divine history, which hath that prerogative over human, as +the narration may be before the fact as well as after.</p> +<p>(2) History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary; +whereof the first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as +deficient. For no man hath propounded to himself the +general state of learning to be described and represented from +age to age, as many have done the works of Nature, and the state, +civil and ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world +seemeth to me to be as the statue of Polyphemus with his eye out, +that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and life +of the person. And yet I am not ignorant that in divers +particular sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, +the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some small +memorials of the schools, authors, and books; and so likewise +some barren relations touching the invention of arts or +usages. But a just story of learning, containing the +antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects, their +inventions, their traditions, their diverse administrations and +managings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, +depressions, oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of +them, and all other events concerning learning, throughout the +ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be wanting; the use and +end of which work I do not so much design for curiosity or +satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning, but +chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is this in +few words, that it will make learned men wise in the use and +administration of learning. For it is not Saint +Augustine’s nor Saint Ambrose’s works that will make +so wise a divine as ecclesiastical history thoroughly read and +observed, and the same reason is of learning.</p> +<p>(3) History of Nature is of three sorts; of Nature in course, +of Nature erring or varying, and of Nature altered or wrought; +that is, history of creatures, history of marvels, and history of +arts. The first of these no doubt is extant, and that in +good perfection; the two latter are bandied so weakly and +unprofitably as I am moved to note them as deficient. For I +find no sufficient or competent collection of the works of Nature +which have a digression and deflexion from the ordinary course of +generations, productions, and motions; whether they be +singularities of place and region, or the strange events of time +and chance, or the effects of yet unknown properties, or the +instances of exception to general kinds. It is true I find +a number of books of fabulous experiments and secrets, and +frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness; but a +substantial and severe collection of the heteroclites or +irregulars of Nature, well examined and described, I find not, +specially not with due rejection of fables and popular +errors. For as things now are, if an untruth in Nature be +once on foot, what by reason of the neglect of examination, and +countenance of antiquity, and what by reason of the use of the +opinion in similitudes and ornaments of speech, it is never +called down.</p> +<p>(4) The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in +Aristotle, is nothing less than to give contentment to the +appetite of curious and vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries +is to do; but for two reasons, both of great weight: the one to +correct the partiality of axioms and opinions, which are commonly +framed only upon common and familiar examples; the other because +from the wonders of Nature is the nearest intelligence and +passage towards the wonders of art, for it is no more but by +following and, as it were, hounding Nature in her wanderings, to +be able to lead her afterwards to the same place again. +Neither am I of opinion, in this history of marvels, that +superstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams, +divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance and clear +evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not +yet known in what cases and how far effects attributed to +superstition do participate of natural causes; and, therefore, +howsoever the practice of such things is to be condemned, yet +from the speculation and consideration of them light may be +taken, not only for the discerning of the offences, but for the +further disclosing of Nature. Neither ought a man to make +scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of truth, +as your Majesty hath showed in your own example, who, with the +two clear eyes of religion and natural philosophy, have looked +deeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet proved yourself to +be of the nature of the sun, which passeth through pollutions and +itself remains as pure as before. But this I hold fit, that +these narrations, which have mixture with superstition, be sorted +by themselves, and not to be mingled with the narrations which +are merely and sincerely natural. But as for the narrations +touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, they are either +not true or not natural; and, therefore, impertinent for the +story of Nature.</p> +<p>(5) For history of Nature, wrought or mechanical, I find some +collections made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but +commonly with a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar; for +it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to descend to +inquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical, except they be +such as may be thought secrets, rarities, and special subtleties; +which humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided +in Plato, where he brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist, +disputing with Socrates, a true and unfeigned inquisitor of +truth; where, the subject being touching beauty, Socrates, after +his wandering manner of inductions, put first an example of a +fair virgin, and then of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot +well glazed, whereat Hippias was offended, and said, “More +than for courtesy’s sake, he did think much to dispute with +any that did allege such base and sordid instances.” +Whereunto Socrates answereth, “You have reason, and it +becomes you well, being a man so trim in your vestments,” +&c., and so goeth on in an irony. But the truth is, +they be not the highest instances that give the securest +information, as may be well expressed in the tale so common of +the philosopher that, while he gazed upwards to the stars, fell +into the water; for if he had looked down he might have seen the +stars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water +in the stars. So it cometh often to pass that mean and +small things discover great, better than great can discover the +small; and therefore Aristotle noteth well, “That the +nature of everything is best seen in his smallest +portions.” And for that cause he inquireth the nature +of a commonwealth, first in a family, and the simple conjugations +of man and wife, parent and child, master and servant, which are +in every cottage. Even so likewise the nature of this great +city of the world, and the policy thereof, must be first sought +in mean concordances and small portions. So we see how that +secret of Nature, of the turning of iron touched with the +loadstone towards the north, was found out in needles of iron, +not in bars of iron.</p> +<p>(6) But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of history +mechanical is of all others the most radical and fundamental +towards natural philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not +vanish in the fume of subtle, sublime, or delectable speculation, +but such as shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of +man’s life. For it will not only minister and suggest +for the present many ingenious practices in all trades, by a +connection and transferring of the observations of one art to the +use of another, when the experiences of several mysteries shall +fall under the consideration of one man’s mind; but +further, it will give a more true and real illumination +concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. For +like as a man’s disposition is never well known till he be +crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened +and held fast; so the passages and variations of nature cannot +appear so fully in the liberty of nature as in the trials and +vexations of art.</p> +<p>II. (1) For civil history, it is of three kinds; not unfitly +to be compared with the three kinds of pictures or images. +For of pictures or images we see some are unfinished, some are +perfect, and some are defaced. So of histories we may find +three kinds: memorials, perfect histories, and antiquities; for +memorials are history unfinished, or the first or rough drafts of +history; and antiquities are history defaced, or some remnants of +history which have casually escaped the shipwreck of time.</p> +<p>(2) Memorials, or preparatory history, are of two sorts; +whereof the one may be termed commentaries, and the other +registers. Commentaries are they which set down a +continuance of the naked events and actions, without the motives +or designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, the +occasions, and other passages of action. For this is the +true nature of a commentary (though Cæsar, in modesty mixed +with greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name of a +commentary to the best history of the world). Registers are +collections of public acts, as decrees of council, judicial +proceedings, declarations and letters of estate, orations, and +the like, without a perfect continuance or contexture of the +thread of the narration.</p> +<p>(3) Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said, +<i>tanquam tabula naufragii</i>: when industrious persons, by an +exact and scrupulous diligence and observation, out of monuments, +names, words, proverbs, traditions, private records and +evidences, fragments of stories, passages of books that concern +not story, and the like, do save and recover somewhat from the +deluge of time.</p> +<p>(4) In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no +deficience, for they are <i>tanquam imperfecte mista</i>; and +therefore any deficience in them is but their nature. As +for the corruptions and moths of history, which are epitomes, the +use of them deserveth to be banished, as all men of sound +judgment have confessed, as those that have fretted and corroded +the sound bodies of many excellent histories, and wrought them +into base and unprofitable dregs.</p> +<p>(5) History, which may be called just and perfect history, is +of three kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth, or +pretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a time, or a +person, or an action. The first we call chronicles, the +second lives, and the third narrations or relations. Of +these, although the first be the most complete and absolute kind +of history, and hath most estimation and glory, yet the second +excelleth it in profit and use, and the third in verity and +sincerity. For history of times representeth the magnitude +of actions, and the public faces and deportments of persons, and +passeth over in silence the smaller passages and motions of men +and matters. But such being the workmanship of God, as He +doth hang the greatest weight upon the smallest wires, <i>maxima +è minimis</i>, <i>suspendens</i>, it comes therefore to +pass, that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of +business than the true and inward resorts thereof. But +lives, if they be well written, propounding to themselves a +person to represent, in whom actions, both greater and smaller, +public and private, have a commixture, must of necessity contain +a more true, native, and lively representation. So again +narrations and relations of actions, as the war of Peloponnesus, +the expedition of Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of Catiline, cannot +but be more purely and exactly true than histories of times, +because they may choose an argument comprehensible within the +notice and instructions of the writer: whereas he that +undertaketh the story of a time, specially of any length, cannot +but meet with many blanks and spaces, which he must be forced to +fill up out of his own wit and conjecture.</p> +<p>(6) For the history of times, I mean of civil history, the +providence of God hath made the distribution. For it hath +pleased God to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the +world for arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the +state of Græcia and the state of Rome; the histories +whereof occupying the middle part of time, have more ancient to +them histories which may by one common name be termed the +antiquities of the world; and after them, histories which may be +likewise called by the name of modern history.</p> +<p>(7) Now to speak of the deficiences. As to the heathen +antiquities of the world it is in vain to note them for +deficient. Deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of +fables and fragments; but the deficience cannot be holpen; for +antiquity is like fame, <i>caput inter nubila condit</i>, her +head is muffled from our sight. For the history of the +exemplar states, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I +could wish there were a perfect course of history for +Græcia, from Theseus to Philopœmen (what time the +affairs of Græcia drowned and extinguished in the affairs +of Rome), and for Rome from Romulus to Justinianus, who may be +truly said to be <i>ultimus Romanorum</i>. In which +sequences of story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon in the +one, and the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Cæsar, +Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire, +without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and +continued. But this is a matter of magnificence, rather to +be commended than required; and we speak now of parts of learning +supplemental, and not of supererogation.</p> +<p>(8) But for modern histories, whereof there are some few very +worthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, leaving the care +of foreign stories to foreign states, because I will not be +<i>curiosus in aliena republica</i>, I cannot fail to represent +to your Majesty the unworthiness of the history of England in the +main continuance thereof, and the partiality and obliquity of +that of Scotland in the latest and largest author that I have +seen: supposing that it would be honour for your Majesty, and a +work very memorable, if this island of Great Britain, as it is +now joined in monarchy for the ages to come, so were joined in +one history for the times passed, after the manner of the sacred +history, which draweth down the story of the ten tribes and of +the two tribes as twins together. And if it shall seem that +the greatness of this work may make it less exactly performed, +there is an excellent period of a much smaller compass of time, +as to the story of England; that is to say, from the uniting of +the Roses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion of time +wherein, to my understanding, there hath been the rarest +varieties that in like number of successions of any hereditary +monarchy hath been known. For it beginneth with the mixed +adoption of a crown by arms and title; an entry by battle, an +establishment by marriage; and therefore times answerable, like +waters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though +without extremity of storm; but well passed through by the wisdom +of the pilot, being one of the most sufficient kings of all the +number. Then followeth the reign of a king, whose actions, +howsoever conducted, had much intermixture with the affairs of +Europe, balancing and inclining them variably; in whose time also +began that great alteration in the state ecclesiastical, an +action which seldom cometh upon the stage. Then the reign +of a minor; then an offer of a usurpation (though it was but as +<i>febris ephemera</i>). Then the reign of a queen matched +with a foreigner; then of a queen that lived solitary and +unmarried, and yet her government so masculine, as it had greater +impression and operation upon the states abroad than it any ways +received from thence. And now last, this most happy and +glorious event, that this island of Britain, divided from all the +world, should be united in itself, and that oracle of rest given +to ÆNeas, <i>antiquam exquirite matrem</i>, should now be +performed and fulfilled upon the nations of England and Scotland, +being now reunited in the ancient mother name of Britain, as a +full period of all instability and peregrinations. So that +as it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that they have certain +trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle, so it +seemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy, before it +was to settle in your majesty and your generations (in which I +hope it is now established for ever), it had these prelusive +changes and varieties.</p> +<p>(9) For lives, I do find strange that these times have so +little esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writings of +lives should be no more frequent. For although there be not +many sovereign princes or absolute commanders, and that states +are most collected into monarchies, yet are there many worthy +personages that deserve better than dispersed report or barren +eulogies. For herein the invention of one of the late poets +is proper, and doth well enrich the ancient fiction. For he +feigneth that at the end of the thread or web of every +man’s life there was a little medal containing the +person’s name, and that Time waited upon the shears, and as +soon as the thread was cut caught the medals, and carried them to +the river of Lathe; and about the bank there were many birds +flying up and down, that would get the medals and carry them in +their beak a little while, and then let them fall into the +river. Only there were a few swans, which if they got a +name would carry it to a temple where it was consecrate. +And although many men, more mortal in their affections than in +their bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity +and ventosity,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Animi nil magnæ laudis +egentes;”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>which opinion cometh from that root, <i>Non prius laudes +contempsimus</i>, <i>quam laudanda facere desivimus</i>: yet that +will not alter Solomon’s judgment, <i>Memoria justi cum +laudibus</i>, <i>at impiorum nomen putrescet</i>: the one +flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion, or +turneth to an ill odour. And therefore in that style or +addition, which is and hath been long well received and brought +in use, <i>felicis memoriæ</i>, <i>piæ +memoriæ</i>, <i>bonæ memoriæ</i>, we do +acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from +Demosthenes, that <i>bona fama propria possessio defunctorum</i>; +which possession I cannot but note that in our times it lieth +much waste, and that therein there is a deficience.</p> +<p>(10) For narrations and relations of particular actions, there +were also to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is +no great action but hath some good pen which attends it. +And because it is an ability not common to write a good history, +as may well appear by the small number of them; yet if +particularity of actions memorable were but tolerably reported as +they pass, the compiling of a complete history of times might be +the better expected, when a writer should arise that were fit for +it: for the collection of such relations might be as a nursery +garden, whereby to plant a fair and stately garden when time +should serve.</p> +<p>(11) There is yet another partition of history which Cornelius +Tacitus maketh, which is not to be forgotten, specially with that +application which he accoupleth it withal, annals and journals: +appropriating to the former matters of estate, and to the latter +acts and accidents of a meaner nature. For giving but a +touch of certain magnificent buildings, he addeth, <i>Cum ex +dignitate populi Romani repertum sit</i>, <i>res illustres +annalibus</i>, <i>talia diurnis urbis actis mandare</i>. So +as there is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well as +civil. And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a +state more than confusion of degrees, so it doth not a little +imbase the authority of a history to intermingle matters of +triumph, or matters of ceremony, or matters of novelty, with +matters of state. But the use of a journal hath not only +been in the history of time, but likewise in the history of +persons, and chiefly of actions; for princes in ancient time had, +upon point of honour and policy both, journals kept, what passed +day by day. For we see the chronicle which was read before +Ahasuerus, when he could not take rest, contained matter of +affairs, indeed, but such as had passed in his own time and very +lately before. But the journal of Alexander’s house +expressed every small particularity, even concerning his person +and court; and it is yet a use well received in enterprises +memorable, as expeditions of war, navigations, and the like, to +keep diaries of that which passeth continually.</p> +<p>(12) I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which +some grave and wise men have used, containing a scattered history +of those actions which they have thought worthy of memory, with +politic discourse and observation thereupon: not incorporate into +the history, but separately, and as the more principal in their +intention; which kind of ruminated history I think more fit to +place amongst books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak, +than amongst books of history. For it is the true office of +history to represent the events themselves together with the +counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon +to the liberty and faculty of every man’s judgment. +But mixtures are things irregular, whereof no man can define.</p> +<p>(13) So also is there another kind of history manifoldly +mixed, and that is history of cosmography: being compounded of +natural history, in respect of the regions themselves; of history +civil, in respect of the habitations, regiments, and manners of +the people; and the mathematics, in respect of the climates and +configurations towards the heavens: which part of learning of all +others in this latter time hath obtained most proficience. +For it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these times, and in +a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great building of +the world had never through-lights made in it, till the age of us +and our fathers. For although they had knowledge of the +antipodes,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit +anhelis,<br /> +Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper,”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>yet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by +travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But +to circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not done nor +enterprised till these later times: and therefore these times may +justly bear in their word, not only <i>plus ultra</i>, in +precedence of the ancient <i>non ultra</i>, and <i>imitabile +fulmen</i>, in precedence of the ancient <i>non imitabile +fulmen</i>,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile +fulmen,” &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>but likewise <i>imitabile cælum</i>; in respect of the +many memorable voyages after the manner of heaven about the globe +of the earth.</p> +<p>(14) And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may +plant also an expectation of the further proficience and +augmentation of all sciences; because it may seem they are +ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet in one age. +For so the prophet Daniel speaking of the latter times +foretelleth, <i>Plurimi pertransibunt</i>, <i>et multiplex erit +scientia</i>: as if the openness and through-passage of the world +and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same +ages; as we see it is already performed in great part: the +learning of these later times not much giving place to the former +two periods or returns of learning, the one of the Grecians, the +other of the Romans.</p> +<p>III. (1) History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions +with history civil: but further in the propriety thereof may be +divided into the history of the Church, by a general name; +history of prophecy; and history of providence. The first +describeth the times of the militant Church, whether it be +fluctuant, as the ark of Noah, or movable, as the ark in the +wilderness, or at rest, as the ark in the Temple: that is, the +state of the Church in persecution, in remove, and in +peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient; +only I would that the virtue and sincerity of it were according +to the mass and quantity. But I am not now in hand with +censures, but with omissions.</p> +<p>(2) The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of +two relatives—the prophecy and the accomplishment; and, +therefore, the nature of such a work ought to be, that every +prophecy of the Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the +same throughout the ages of the world, both for the better +confirmation of faith and for the better illumination of the +Church touching those parts of prophecies which are yet +unfulfilled: allowing, nevertheless, that latitude which is +agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies, being of the +nature of their Author, with whom a thousand years are but as one +day, and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once, but have +springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages, +though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one +age. This is a work which I find deficient, but is to be +done with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.</p> +<p>(3) The third, which is history of Providence, containeth that +excellent correspondence which is between God’s revealed +will and His secret will; which though it be so obscure, as for +the most part it is not legible to the natural man—no, nor +many times to those that behold it from the tabernacle—yet, +at some times it pleaseth God, for our better establishment and +the confuting of those which are as without God in the world, to +write it in such text and capital letters, that, as the prophet +saith, “He that runneth by may read it”—that +is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God’s judgments, +and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are +nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it. +Such are the notable events and examples of God’s +judgments, chastisements, deliverances, and blessings; and this +is a work which has passed through the labour of many, and +therefore I cannot present as omitted.</p> +<p>(4) There are also other parts of learning which are +appendices to history. For all the exterior proceedings of +man consist of words and deeds, whereof history doth properly +receive and retain in memory the deeds; and if words, yet but as +inducements and passages to deeds; so are there other books and +writings which are appropriate to the custody and receipt of +words only, which likewise are of three sorts—orations, +letters, and brief speeches or sayings. Orations are +pleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives, invectives, +apologies, reprehensions, orations of formality or ceremony, and +the like. Letters are according to all the variety of +occasions, advertisements, advises, directions, propositions, +petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of +compliment, of pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of +action. And such as are written from wise men, are of all +the words of man, in my judgment, the best; for they are more +natural than orations and public speeches, and more advised than +conferences or present speeches. So again letters of +affairs from such as manage them, or are privy to them, are of +all others the best instructions for history, and to a diligent +reader the best histories in themselves. For apophthegms, +it is a great loss of that book of Cæsar’s; for as +his history, and those few letters of his which we have, and +those apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men’s +else, so I suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done; +for as for those which are collected by others, either I have no +taste in such matters or else their choice hath not been +happy. But upon these three kinds of writings I do not +insist, because I have no deficiences to propound concerning +them.</p> +<p>(5) Thus much therefore concerning history, which is that part +of learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or +offices of the mind of man, which is that of the memory.</p> +<p>IV. (1) Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words, for +the most part restrained, but in all other points extremely +licensed, and doth truly refer to the imagination; which, being +not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which +nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined, and +so make unlawful matches and divorces of +things—<i>Pictoribus atque poetis</i>, &c. It is +taken in two senses in respect of words or matter. In the +first sense, it is but a character of style, and belongeth to +arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present. In +the latter, it is—as hath been said—one of the +principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but feigned +history, which may be styled as well in prose as in verse.</p> +<p>(2) The use of this feigned history hath been to give some +shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein +the nature of things doth deny it, the world being in proportion +inferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is, agreeable to +the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, +and a more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of +things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true +history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, +poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical. +Because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of +actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, +therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more +according to revealed Providence. Because true history +representeth actions and events more ordinary and less +interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and +more unexpected and alternative variations. So as it +appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, +morality and to delectation. And therefore, it was ever +thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth +raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of things to +the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the +mind unto the nature of things. And we see that by these +insinuations and congruities with man’s nature and +pleasure, joined also with the agreement and consort it hath with +music, it hath had access and estimation in rude times and +barbarous regions, where other learning stood excluded.</p> +<p>(3) The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety +thereof (besides those divisions which are common unto it with +history, as feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices +of history, as feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) +is into poesy narrative, representative, and allusive. The +narrative is a mere imitation of history, with the excesses +before remembered, choosing for subjects commonly wars and love, +rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or mirth. +Representative is as a visible history, and is an image of +actions as if they were present, as history is of actions in +nature as they are (that is) past. Allusive, or +parabolical, is a narration applied only to express some special +purpose or conceit; which latter kind of parabolical wisdom was +much more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of +Æsop, and the brief sentences of the seven, and the use of +hieroglyphics may appear. And the cause was (for that it +was then of necessity to express any point of reason which was +more sharp or subtle than the vulgar in that manner) because men +in those times wanted both variety of examples and subtlety of +conceit. And as hieroglyphics were before letters, so +parables were before arguments; and nevertheless now and at all +times they do retain much life and rigour, because reason cannot +be so sensible nor examples so fit.</p> +<p>(4) But there remaineth yet another use of poesy parabolical, +opposite to that which we last mentioned; for that tendeth to +demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and +this other to retire and obscure it—that is, when the +secrets and mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are +involved in fables or parables. Of this in divine poesy we +see the use is authorised. In heathen poesy we see the +exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity: +as in the fable that the giants being overthrown in their war +against the gods, the earth their mother in revenge thereof +brought forth Fame:</p> +<blockquote><p>“Illam terra parens, ira irritat Deorum,<br /> +Extremam, ut perhibent, Cœo Enceladoque soroem,<br /> +Progenuit.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Expounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed +actual and open rebels, then the malignity of people (which is +the mother of rebellion) doth bring forth libels and slanders, +and taxations of the states, which is of the same kind with +rebellion but more feminine. So in the fable that the rest +of the gods having conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called +Briareus with his hundred hands to his aid: expounded that +monarchies need not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by +mighty subjects, as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the +people, who will be sure to come in on their side. So in +the fable that Achilles was brought up under Chiron, the centaur, +who was part a man and part a beast, expounded ingeniously but +corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the education and +discipline of princes to know as well how to play the part of a +lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the man in virtue +and justice. Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I +do rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition +devised, than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable +framed; for I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that +troubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions +of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient poets; but yet +that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure +and not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of these +poets which are now extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding +he was made a kind of scripture by the later schools of the +Grecians), yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his +fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning. But what +they might have upon a more original tradition is not easy to +affirm, for he was not the inventor of many of them.</p> +<p>(5) In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can +report no deficience; for being as a plant that cometh of the +lust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and +spread abroad more than any other kind. But to ascribe unto +it that which is due, for the expressing of affections, passions, +corruptions, and customs, we are beholding to poets more than to +the philosophers’ works; and for wit and eloquence, not +much less than to orators’ harangues. But it is not +good to stay too long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to +the judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to +approach and view with more reverence and attention.</p> +<p>V. (1) The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending +from above, and some springing from beneath: the one informed by +the light of nature, the other inspired by divine +revelation. The light of nature consisteth in the notions +of the mind and the reports of the senses; for as for knowledge +which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not +original, as in a water that besides his own spring-head is fed +with other springs and streams. So then, according to these +two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of +all divided into divinity and philosophy.</p> +<p>(2) In philosophy the contemplations of man do either +penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are +reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of which several +inquiries there do arise three knowledges—divine +philosophy, natural philosophy, and human philosophy or +humanity. For all things are marked and stamped with this +triple character—the power of God, the difference of nature +and the use of man. But because the distributions and +partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in +one angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of +a tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity +of entireness and continuance before it come to discontinue and +break itself into arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before +we enter into the former distribution, to erect and constitute +one universal science, by the name of <i>philosophia prima</i>, +primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common way, +before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which +science whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand +doubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody of natural +theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that part of +natural philosophy which concerneth the principles, and of that +other part of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or +spirit—all these strangely commixed and confused; but being +examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other +sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than +anything solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I +cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, that the +same things are handled but in several respects. As for +example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in +notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature—the one +in appearance, the other in existence; but I find this difference +better made than pursued. For if they had considered +quantity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of those extern +characters of things, as philosophers, and in nature, their +inquiries must of force have been of a far other kind than they +are. For doth any of them, in handling quantity, speak of +the force of union, how and how far it multiplieth virtue? +Doth any give the reason why some things in nature are so common, +and in so great mass, and others so rare, and in so small +quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity, +assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which is more +like, but move to the loadstone, which is less like? Why in +all diversities of things there should be certain participles in +nature which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be +referred? But there is a mere and deep silence touching the +nature and operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in +nature; and only a resuming and repeating of the force and use of +them in speech or argument. Therefore, because in a writing +of this nature I avoid all subtlety, my meaning touching this +original or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross +description by negative: “That it be a receptacle for all +such profitable observations and axioms as fall not within the +compass of any of the special parts of philosophy or sciences, +but are more common and of a higher stage.”</p> +<p>(3) Now that there are many of that kind need not be +doubted. For example: Is not the rule, <i>Si +inœqualibus æqualia addas</i>, <i>omnia erunt +inæqualia</i>, an axiom as well of justice as of the +mathematics? and is there not a true coincidence between +commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and +geometrical proportion? Is not that other rule, +<i>Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt</i>, <i>et inter se +conveniunt</i>, a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent +in logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the +observation, <i>Omnia mutantur</i>, <i>nil interit</i>, a +contemplation in philosophy thus, that the <i>quantum</i> of +nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, that it requireth +the same omnipotency to make somewhat nothing, which at the first +made nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, <i>Didici quod +omnia opera</i>, <i>quœ fecit Deus</i>, <i>perseverent in +perpetuum</i>; <i>non possumus eis quicquam addere nec +auferre</i>. Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and +largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way to +establish and preserve them is to reduce them <i>ad +principia</i>—a rule in religion and nature, as well as in +civil administration? Was not the Persian magic a reduction +or correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature +to the rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept +of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a +concord or sweet accord, alike true in affection? Is not +the trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence, +common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? +Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same +with the playing of light upon the water?</p> +<blockquote><p>“Splendet tremulo sub lumine +pontus.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs +of reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or +strait, determined and bounded? Neither are these only +similitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to +be, but the same footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon +several subjects or matters. This science therefore (as I +understand it) I may justly report as deficient; for I see +sometimes the profounder sort of wits, in handling some +particular argument, will now and then draw a bucket of water out +of this well for their present use; but the spring-head thereof +seemeth to me not to have been visited, being of so excellent use +both for the disclosing of nature and the abridgment of art.</p> +<p>VI. (1) This science being therefore first placed as a common +parent like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, +<i>omnes cœlicolas</i>, <i>omnes supera alta tenetes</i>; +we may return to the former distribution of the three +philosophies—divine, natural, and human. And as +concerning divine philosophy or natural theology, it is that +knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God which may be +obtained by the contemplation of His creatures; which knowledge +may be truly termed divine in respect of the object, and natural +in respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, +that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform +religion; and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to +convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led +him to confess a God; but miracles have been wrought to convert +idolaters and the superstitious, because no light of nature +extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. For +as all works do show forth the power and skill of the workman, +and not his image, so it is of the works of God, which do show +the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, but not His image. +And therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the +sacred truth: for they supposed the world to be the image of God, +and man to be an extract or compendious image of the world; but +the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that +honour, as to be the image of God, but only <i>the work of His +hands</i>; neither do they speak of any other image of God but +man. Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and +enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, +providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been +excellently handled by divers, but on the other side, out of the +contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce +any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my +judgment not safe; <i>Da fidei quæ fidei sunt</i>. +For the heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and +divine fable of the golden chain, “That men and gods were +not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but, contrariwise, +Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.” So as we +ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God +to our reason, but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason +to the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, +touching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any +deficience, as I rather note an excess; whereunto I have +digressed because of the extreme prejudice which both religion +and philosophy hath received and may receive by being commixed +together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical +religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy.</p> +<p>(2) Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which +is an appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is +neither inscrutable nor interdicted. For although the +Scripture saith, “Let no man deceive you in sublime +discourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he +knoweth not,” &c., yet notwithstanding if you observe +well that precept, it may appear thereby that there be two things +only forbidden—adoration of them, and opinion fantastical +of them, either to extol them further than appertaineth to the +degree of a creature, or to extol a man’s knowledge of them +further than he hath ground. But the sober and grounded +inquiry, which may arise out of the passages of Holy Scriptures, +or out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So +of degenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them or +the employment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration +towards them; but the contemplation or science of their nature, +their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a +part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith, +“We are not ignorant of his stratagems.” And it +is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than +to inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin +and vice in morality. But this part touching angels and +spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied +themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many of the +writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.</p> +<p>VII. (1) Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural +theology (not divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for +the last of all as the haven and sabbath of all man’s +contemplations) we will now proceed to natural philosophy. +If then it be true that Democritus said, “That the truth of +nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves;” and if +it be true likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate, +that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously +and compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages and length of +time, it were good to divide natural philosophy into the mine and +the furnace, and to make two professions or occupations of +natural philosophers—some to be pioneers and some smiths; +some to dig, and some to refine and hammer. And surely I do +best allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar +and scholastical terms: namely, that these be the two parts of +natural philosophy—the inquisition of causes, and the +production of effects; speculative and operative; natural +science, and natural prudence. For as in civil matters +there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom of direction; so is +it in natural. And here I will make a request, that for the +latter (or at least for a part thereof) I may revive and +reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of natural magic, +which in the true sense is but natural wisdom, or natural +prudence; taken according to the ancient acception, purged from +vanity and superstition. Now although it be true, and I +know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes and +effects, so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, +have a great connection between themselves; yet because all true +and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, +ascendent and descendent, ascending from experiments to the +invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention +of new experiments; therefore I judge it most requisite that +these two parts be severally considered and handled.</p> +<p>(2) Natural science or theory is divided into physic and +metaphysic; wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the +word metaphysic in a differing sense from that that is +received. And in like manner, I doubt not but it will +easily appear to men of judgment, that in this and other +particulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may differ from +the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms. +For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by the order +and perspicuous expressing of that I do propound, I am otherwise +zealous and affectionate to recede as little from antiquity, +either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and the +proficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little +marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a +spirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity; +undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure, +but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom; insomuch as he +never nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to +confute and reprove; wherein for glory, and drawing followers and +disciples, he took the right course. For certainly there +cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that which was +noted and pronounced in the highest truth:—<i>Veni in +nomine partis</i>, <i>nec recipits me</i>; <i>si quis venerit in +nomine suo eum recipietis</i>. But in this divine aphorism +(considering to whom it was applied, namely, to antichrist, the +highest deceiver), we may discern well that the coming in a +man’s own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, +is no good sign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune +and success of an <i>eum recipietis</i>. But for this +excellent person Aristotle, I will think of him that he learned +that humour of his scholar, with whom it seemeth he did emulate; +the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer all +nations. Wherein, nevertheless, it may be, he may at some +men’s hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like +title as his scholar did:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Felix terrarum prædo, non utile +mundo<br /> +Editus exemplum, &c.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>So,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Felix doctrinæ +prædo.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth +in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and +proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity <i>usque +ad aras</i>; and, therefore, to retain the ancient terms, though +I sometimes alter the uses and definitions, according to the +moderate proceeding in civil government; where, although there be +some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, +<i>eadem magistratuum vocabula</i>.</p> +<p>(3) To return, therefore, to the use and acception of the term +metaphysic as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that +which hath been already said, that I intend <i>philosophia +prima</i>, summary philosophy and metaphysic, which heretofore +have been confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For +the one I have made as a parent or common ancestor to all +knowledge; and the other I have now brought in as a branch or +descendant of natural science. It appeareth likewise that I +have assigned to summary philosophy the common principles and +axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences; +I have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the +operation or the relative and adventive characters of essences, +as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility, and the rest, +with this distinction and provision; that they be handled as they +have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth +likewise that natural theology, which heretofore hath been +handled confusedly with metaphysic, I have enclosed and bounded +by itself. It is therefore now a question what is left +remaining for metaphysic; wherein I may without prejudice +preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, that physic +should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and +therefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and +fixed. And again, that physic should handle that which +supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and metaphysic +should handle that which supposeth further in nature a reason, +understanding, and platform. But the difference, +perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For +as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of +causes and productions of effects, so that part which concerneth +the inquiry of causes we do subdivide according to the received +and sound division of causes. The one part, which is +physic, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; +and the other, which is metaphysic, handleth the formal and final +causes.</p> +<p>(4) Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and not +according to our idiom for medicine) is situate in a middle term +or distance between natural history and metaphysic. For +natural history describeth the variety of things; physic the +causes, but variable or respective causes; and metaphysic the +fixed and constant causes.</p> +<blockquote><p>“Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera +liquescit,<br /> +Uno eodemque igni.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire +is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax. But +fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation; +so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the +matter. Physic hath three parts, whereof two respect nature +united or collected, the third contemplateth nature diffused or +distributed. Nature is collected either into one entire +total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as the +first doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of +things, as <i>de mundo</i>, <i>de universitate rerum</i>. +The second is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals +of things. The third is the doctrine concerning all variety +and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing +substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof +there needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss or +paraphrase that attendeth upon the text of natural history. +Of these three I cannot report any as deficient. In what +truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any +judgment; but they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the +labour of man.</p> +<p>(5) For metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of +formal and final causes; which assignation, as to the former of +them, may seem to be nugatory and void, because of the received +and inveterate opinion, that the inquisition of man is not +competent to find out essential forms or true differences; of +which opinion we will take this hold, that the invention of forms +is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if +it be possible to be found. As for the possibility, they +are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can +see nothing but sea. But it is manifest that Plato, in his +opinion of ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as +upon a cliff, did descry that forms were the true object of +knowledge; but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering +of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined +and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon +theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. +But if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye +upon action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise +and take notice what are the forms, the disclosures whereof are +fruitful and important to the state of man. For as to the +forms of substances (man only except, of whom it is said, +<i>Formavit hominem de limo terræ</i>, <i>et spiravit in +faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ</i>, and not as of all other +creatures, <i>Producant aquæ</i>, <i>producat terra</i>), +the forms of substances I say (as they are now by compounding and +transplanting multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to be +inquired; no more than it were either possible or to purpose to +seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words, which +by composition and transposition of letters are infinite. +But, on the other side, to inquire the form of those sounds or +voices which make simple letters is easily comprehensible; and +being known induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words, +which consist and are compounded of them. In the same +manner to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of +water, of air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms of +sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity +and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all +other natures and qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not +many, and of which the essences (upheld by matter) of all +creatures do consist; to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, +is that part of metaphysic which we now define of. Not but +that physic doth make inquiry and take consideration of the same +natures; but how? Only as to the material and efficient +causes of them, and not as to the forms. For example, if +the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be +rendered thus, that the subtle intermixture of air and water is +the cause, it is well rendered; but, nevertheless, is this the +form of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is +ever but <i>vehiculum formæ</i>. This part of +metaphysic I do not find laboured and performed; whereat I marvel +not; because I hold it not possible to be invented by that course +of invention which hath been used; in regard that men (which is +the root of all error) have made too untimely a departure, and +too remote a recess from particulars.</p> +<p>(6) But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I report as +deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the +one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to +abridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as the +conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of +<i>vita brevis</i>, <i>ars longa</i>; which is performed by +uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences. For +knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis. +So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage +next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is +metaphysic. As for the vertical point, <i>opus quod +operatur Deus à principio usque ad finem</i>, the summary +law of nature, we know not whether man’s inquiry can attain +unto it. But these three be the true stages of knowledge, +and are to them that are depraved no better than the +giants’ hills:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,<br /> +Scilicet atque Ossæ frondsum involvere Olympum.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>But to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they +are as the three acclamations, <i>Sante</i>, <i>sancte</i>, +<i>sancte</i>! holy in the description or dilatation of His +works; holy in the connection or concatenation of them; and holy +in the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And, +therefore, the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, +although but a speculation in them, that all things by scale did +ascend to unity. So then always that knowledge is worthiest +which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be +metaphysic; as that which considereth the simple forms or +differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees +and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety. The +second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of +metaphysic, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the +greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For +physic carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to +many accidents and impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous +courses of nature. But <i>latæ undique sunt +sapientibus viæ</i>; to sapience (which was anciently +defined to be <i>rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia</i>) there +is ever a choice of means. For physical causes give light +to new invention in <i>simili materia</i>. But whosoever +knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing +that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less restrained +in operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the condition +of the efficient; which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, +though in a more divine sense, elegantly describeth: <i>non +arctabuntur gressus tui</i>, <i>et currens non habebis +offendiculum</i>. The ways of sapience are not much liable +either to particularity or chance.</p> +<p>(7) The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of final +causes, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as +misplaced. And yet if it were but a fault in order, I would +not speak of it; for order is matter of illustration, but +pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this +misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great +improficience in the sciences themselves. For the handling +of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath +intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and +physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these +satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and +prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not +only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by +Aristotle, Galen, and others which do usually likewise fall upon +these flats of discoursing causes. For to say that +“the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence +about the sight;” or that “the firmness of the skins +and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the +extremities of heat or cold;” or that “the bones are +for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of +living creatures are built;” or that “the leaves of +trees are for protecting of the fruit;” or that “the +clouds are for watering of the earth;” or that “the +solidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of living +creatures;” and the like, is well inquired and collected in +metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. Nay, they +are, indeed, but <i>remoras</i> and hindrances to stay and slug +the ship from further sailing; and have brought this to pass, +that the search of the physical causes hath been neglected and +passed in silence. And, therefore, the natural philosophy +of Democritus and some others, who did not suppose a mind or +reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof +able to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of Nature, +which they term fortune, seemeth to me (as far as I can judge by +the recital and fragments which remain unto us) in +particularities of physical causes more real and better inquired +than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled final +causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part of +logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both +those persons; not because those final causes are not true and +worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province, but +because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath +bred a vastness and solitude in that tract. For otherwise, +keeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived +if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between +them. For the cause rendered, that “the hairs about +the eyelids are for the safeguard of the sight,” doth not +impugn the cause rendered, that “pilosity is incident to +orifices of moisture—<i>muscosi fontes</i>, +&c.” Nor the cause rendered, that “the +firmness of hides is for the armour of the body against +extremities of heat or cold,” doth not impugn the cause +rendered, that “contraction of pores is incident to the +outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or +unlike bodies;” and so of the rest, both causes being true +and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the other a +consequence only. Neither doth this call in question or +derogate from Divine Providence, but highly confirm and exalt +it. For as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper +politique that can make other men the instruments of his will and +ends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, so as they +shall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that imparteth +his meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of God more +admirable, when Nature intendeth one thing and Providence draweth +forth another, than if He had communicated to particular +creatures and motions the characters and impressions of His +Providence. And thus much for metaphysic; the latter part +whereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his proper +place.</p> +<p>VIII. (1) Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another part of +natural philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and +holdeth rank with physic special and metaphysic, which is +mathematic; but I think it more agreeable to the nature of +things, and to the light of order, to place it as a branch of +metaphysic. For the subject of it being quantity, not +quantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and belongeth to +<i>philosophia prima</i> (as hath been said), but quantity +determined or proportionable, it appeareth to be one of the +essential forms of things, as that that is causative in Nature of +a number of effects; insomuch as we see in the schools both of +Democritus and of Pythagoras that the one did ascribe figure to +the first seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to +be the principles and originals of things. And it is true +also that of all other forms (as we understand forms) it is the +most abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most +proper to metaphysic; which hath likewise been the cause why it +hath been better laboured and inquired than any of the other +forms, which are more immersed in matter. For it being the +nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) +to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a +champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity, the +mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to +satisfy that appetite. But for the placing of this science, +it is not much material: only we have endeavoured in these our +partitions to observe a kind of perspective, that one part may +cast light upon another.</p> +<p>(2) The mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the +pure mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle +quantity determinate, merely severed from any axioms of natural +philosophy; and these are two, geometry and arithmetic, the one +handling quantity continued, and the other dissevered. +Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural +philosophy, and considereth quantity determined, as it is +auxiliary and incident unto them. For many parts of Nature +can neither be invented with sufficient subtlety, nor +demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated unto +use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and intervening of +the mathematics, of which sort are perspective, music, astronomy, +cosmography, architecture, engineery, and divers others. In +the mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that men +do not sufficiently understand this excellent use of the pure +mathematics, in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the +wit and faculties intellectual. For if the wit be too dull, +they sharpen it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent +in the sense, they abstract it. So that as tennis is a game +of no use in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a +quick eye and a body ready to put itself into all postures, so in +the mathematics that use which is collateral and intervenient is +no less worthy than that which is principal and intended. +And as for the mixed mathematics, I may only make this +prediction, that there cannot fail to be more kinds of them as +Nature grows further disclosed. Thus much of natural +science, or the part of Nature speculative.</p> +<p>(3) For natural prudence, or the part operative of natural +philosophy, we will divide it into three +parts—experimental, philosophical, and magical; which three +parts active have a correspondence and analogy with the three +parts speculative, natural history, physic, and metaphysic. +For many operations have been invented, sometimes by a casual +incidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment; and +of those which have been found by an intentional experiment, some +have been found out by varying or extending the same experiment, +some by transferring and compounding divers experiments the one +into the other, which kind of invention an empiric may +manage. Again, by the knowledge of physical causes there +cannot fail to follow many indications and designations of new +particulars, if men in their speculation will keep one eye upon +use and practice. But these are but coastings along the +shore, <i>premendo littus iniquum</i>; for it seemeth to me there +can hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental alterations +and innovations in Nature, either by the fortune and essays of +experiments, or by the light and direction of physical +causes. If, therefore, we have reported metaphysic +deficient, it must follow that we do the like of natural magic, +which hath relation thereunto. For as for the natural magic +whereof now there is mention in books, containing certain +credulous and superstitious conceits and observations of +sympathies and antipathies, and hidden proprieties, and some +frivolous experiments, strange rather by disguisement than in +themselves, it is as far differing in truth of Nature from such a +knowledge as we require as the story of King Arthur of Britain, +or Hugh of Bourdeaux, differs from Cæsar’s +Commentaries in truth of story; for it is manifest that +Cæsar did greater things <i>de vero</i> than those +imaginary heroes were feigned to do. But he did them not in +that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning the fable of +Ixion was a figure, who designed to enjoy Juno, the goddess of +power, and instead of her had copulation with a cloud, of which +mixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras. So whosoever +shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations, instead of a +laborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and +beliefs of strange and impossible shapes. And, therefore, +we may note in these sciences which hold so much of imagination +and belief, as this degenerate natural magic, alchemy, astrology, +and the like, that in their propositions the description of the +means is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end. For +it is a thing more probable that he that knoweth well the natures +of weight, of colour, of pliant and fragile in respect of the +hammer, of volatile and fixed in respect of the fire, and the +rest, may superinduce upon some metal the nature and form of gold +by such mechanic as longeth to the production of the natures +afore rehearsed, than that some grains of the medicine projected +should in a few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver or +other material into gold. So it is more probable that he +that knoweth the nature of arefaction, the nature of assimilation +of nourishment to the thing nourished, the manner of increase and +clearing of spirits, the manner of the depredations which spirits +make upon the humours and solid parts, shall by ambages of diets, +bathings, anointings, medicines, motions, and the like, prolong +life, or restore some degree of youth or vivacity, than that it +can be done with the use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor +or receipt. To conclude, therefore, the true natural magic, +which is that great liberty and latitude of operation which +dependeth upon the knowledge of forms, I may report deficient, as +the relative thereof is. To which part, if we be serious +and incline not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the +deriving and deducing the operations themselves from metaphysic, +there are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of +preparation, the other by way of caution. The first is, +that there be made a calendar, resembling an inventory of the +estate of man, containing all the inventions (being the works or +fruits of Nature or art) which are now extant, and whereof man is +already possessed; out of which doth naturally result a note what +things are yet held impossible, or not invented, which calendar +will be the more artificial and serviceable if to every reputed +impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the +nearest in degree to that impossibility; to the end that by these +optatives and potentials man’s inquiry may be the more +awake in deducing direction of works from the speculation of +causes. And secondly, that these experiments be not only +esteemed which have an immediate and present use, but those +principally which are of most universal consequence for invention +of other experiments, and those which give most light to the +invention of causes; for the invention of the mariner’s +needle, which giveth the direction, is of no less benefit for +navigation than the invention of the sails which give the +motion.</p> +<p>(4) Thus have I passed through natural philosophy and the +deficiences thereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient +and received doctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction, for +my part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to +contend. If it be truth,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia +sylvæ,”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>the voice of Nature will consent, whether the voice of man do +or no. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the +expedition of the French for Naples, that they came with chalk in +their hands to mark up their lodgings, and not with weapons to +fight; so I like better that entry of truth which cometh +peaceably with chalk to mark up those minds which are capable to +lodge and harbour it, than that which cometh with pugnacity and +contention.</p> +<p>(5) But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy +according to the report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning +the matter or subject: and that is positive and considerative, +when the inquiry reporteth either an assertion or a doubt. +These doubts or <i>non liquets</i> are of two sorts, particular +and total. For the first, we see a good example thereof in +Aristotle’s Problems which deserved to have had a better +continuance; but so nevertheless as there is one point whereof +warning is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts +hath two excellent uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy from +errors and falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is +not collected into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but +reserved in doubt; the other, that the entry of doubts are as so +many suckers or sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as +that which if doubts had not preceded, a man should never have +advised, but passed it over without note, by the suggestion and +solicitation of doubts is made to be attended and applied. +But both these commodities do scarcely countervail and +inconvenience, which will intrude itself if it be not debarred; +which is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour rather +how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it, and +accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar +example in lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have once +admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for a +doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be allowed, +which laboureth to make doubtful things certain, and not those +which labour to make certain things doubtful. Therefore +these calendars of doubts I commend as excellent things; so that +there he this caution used, that when they be thoroughly sifted +and brought to resolution, they be from thenceforth omitted, +discarded, and not continued to cherish and encourage men in +doubting. To which calendar of doubts or problems I advise +be annexed another calendar, as much or more material which is a +calendar of popular errors: I mean chiefly in natural history, +such as pass in speech and conceit, and are nevertheless +apparently detected and convicted of untruth, that man’s +knowledge be not weakened nor embased by such dross and +vanity. As for the doubts or <i>non liquets</i> general or +in total, I understand those differences of opinions touching the +principles of nature, and the fundamental points of the same, +which have caused the diversity of sects, schools, and +philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, +Parmenides, and the rest. For although Aristotle, as though +he had been of the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not +reign except the first thing he did he killed all his brethren; +yet to those that seek truth and not magistrality, it cannot but +seem a matter of great profit, to see before them the several +opinions touching the foundations of nature. Not for any +exact truth that can be expected in those theories; for as the +same phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by this received +astronomy of the diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the +planets, with their eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the +theory of Copernicus, who supposed the earth to move, and the +calculations are indifferently agreeable to both, so the ordinary +face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several +theories and philosophies; whereas to find the real truth +requireth another manner of severity and attention. For as +Aristotle saith, that children at the first will call every woman +mother, but afterward they come to distinguish according to +truth, so experience, if it be in childhood, will call every +philosophy mother, but when it cometh to ripeness it will discern +the true mother. So as in the meantime it is good to see +the several glosses and opinions upon Nature, whereof it may be +everyone in some one point hath seen clearer than his fellows, +therefore I wish some collection to be made painfully and +understandingly <i>de antiquis philosophiis</i>, out of all the +possible light which remaineth to us of them: which kind of work +I find deficient. But here I must give warning, that it be +done distinctly and severedly; the philosophies of everyone +throughout by themselves, and not by titles packed and faggoted +up together, as hath been done by Plutarch. For it is the +harmony of a philosophy in itself, which giveth it light and +credence; whereas if it be singled and broken, it will seem more +foreign and dissonant. For as when I read in Tacitus the +actions of Nero or Claudius, with circumstances of times, +inducements, and occasions, I find them not so strange; but when +I read them in Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and +bundles and not in order of time, they seem more monstrous and +incredible: so is it of any philosophy reported entire, and +dismembered by articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of +latter times to be likewise represented in this calendar of sects +of philosophy, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently +reduced into an harmony by the pen of Severinus the Dane; and +that of Tilesius, and his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral +philosophy, full of sense, but of no great depth; and that of +Fracastorius, who, though he pretended not to make any new +philosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense upon +the old; and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who revived, with +some alterations and demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes; +and any other worthy to be admitted.</p> +<p>(6) Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of +man’s knowledge; that is <i>radius directus</i>, which is +referred to nature, <i>radius refractus</i>, which is referred to +God, and cannot report truly because of the inequality of the +medium. There resteth <i>radius reflexus</i>, whereby man +beholdeth and contemplateth himself.</p> +<p>IX. (1) We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the +ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; +which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it +toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end +and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so +notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the +continent of Nature. And generally let this be a rule, that +all partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for lines and +veins than for sections and separations; and that the continuance +and entireness of knowledge be preserved. For the contrary +hereof hath made particular sciences to become barren, shallow, +and erroneous, while they have not been nourished and maintained +from the common fountain. So we see Cicero, the orator, +complained of Socrates and his school, that he was the first that +separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric became an +empty and verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of +Copernicus, touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy +itself cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the +<i>phenomena</i>, yet natural philosophy may correct. So we +see also that the science of medicine if it be destituted and +forsaken by natural philosophy, it is not much better than an +empirical practice. With this reservation, therefore, we +proceed to human philosophy or humanity, which hath two parts: +the one considereth man segregate or distributively, the other +congregate or in society; so as human philosophy is either simple +and particular, or conjugate and civil. Humanity particular +consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth: that is, of +knowledges which respect the body, and of knowledges that respect +the mind. But before we distribute so far, it is good to +constitute. For I do take the consideration in general, and +at large, of human nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a +knowledge by itself, not so much in regard of those delightful +and elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of +man, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like +adjuncts of his common and undivided nature; but chiefly in +regard of the knowledge concerning the sympathies and +concordances between the mind and body, which being mixed cannot +be properly assigned to the sciences of either.</p> +<p>(2) This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and +amities consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so +this league of mind and body hath these two parts: how the one +discloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon the other; +discovery and impression. The former of these hath begotten +two arts, both of prediction or prenotion; whereof the one is +honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of +Hippocrates. And although they have of later time been used +to be coupled with superstitions and fantastical arts, yet being +purged and restored to their true state, they have both of them a +solid ground in Nature, and a profitable use in life. The +first is physiognomy, which discovereth the disposition of the +mind by the lineaments of the body. The second is the +exposition of natural dreams, which discovereth the state of the +body by the imaginations of the mind. In the former of +these I note a deficience. For Aristotle hath very +ingeniously and diligently handled the factures of the body, but +not the gestures of the body, which are no less comprehensible by +art, and of greater use and advantage. For the lineaments +of the body do disclose the disposition and inclination of the +mind in general; but the motions of the countenance and parts do +not only so, but do further disclose the present humour and state +of the mind and will. For as your majesty saith most aptly +and elegantly, “As the tongue speaketh to the ear so the +gesture speaketh to the eye.” And, therefore, a +number of subtle persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the faces and +fashions of men, do well know the advantage of this observation, +as being most part of their ability; neither can it be denied, +but that it is a great discovery of dissimulations, and a great +direction in business.</p> +<p>(3) The latter branch, touching impression, hath not been +collected into art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it +hath the same relation or <i>antistrophe</i> that the former +hath. For the consideration is double—either how and +how far the humours and affects of the body do alter or work upon +the mind, or, again, how and how far the passions or +apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body. +The former of these hath been inquired and considered as a part +and appendix of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or +superstition. For the physician prescribeth cures of the +mind in frenzies and melancholy passions, and pretendeth also to +exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to control the courage, +to clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like; but +the scruples and superstitions of diet and other regiment of the +body in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the +Manichees, and in the law of Mahomet, do exceed. So +likewise the ordinances in the ceremonial law, interdicting the +eating of the blood and the fat, distinguishing between beasts +clean and unclean for meat, are many and strict; nay, the faith +itself being clear and serene from all clouds of ceremony, yet +retaineth the use of fastlings, abstinences, and other +macerations and humiliations of the body, as things real, and not +figurative. The root and life of all which prescripts is +(besides the ceremony) the consideration of that dependency which +the affections of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and +disposition of the body. And if any man of weak judgment do +conceive that this suffering of the mind from the body doth +either question the immortality, or derogate from the sovereignty +of the soul, he may be taught, in easy instances, that the infant +in the mother’s womb is compatible with the mother, and yet +separable; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his +servants, and yet without subjection. As for the reciprocal +knowledge, which is the operation of the conceits and passions of +the mind upon the body, we see all wise physicians, in the +prescriptions of their regiments to their patients, do ever +consider <i>accidentia animi</i>, as of great force to further or +hinder remedies or recoveries: and more specially it is an +inquiry of great depth and worth concerning imagination, how and +how far it altereth the body proper of the imaginant; for +although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not it +hath the same degree of power to help. No more than a man +can conclude, that because there be pestilent airs, able suddenly +to kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign +airs, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the +inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as +Socrates said, “a Delian diver,” being difficult and +profound. But unto all this knowledge <i>de communi +vinculo</i>, of the concordances between the mind and the body, +that part of inquiry is most necessary which considereth of the +seats and domiciles which the several faculties of the mind do +take and occupate in the organs of the body; which knowledge hath +been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be much +better inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the +understanding in the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call +anger, having a greater mixture with pride) in the heart, and +concupiscence or sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to be +despised, but much less to be allowed. So, then, we have +constituted (as in our own wish and advice) the inquiry touching +human nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be handled +apart.</p> +<p>X. (1) The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is +divided as the good of man’s body is divided, unto which it +referreth. The good of man’s body is of four +kinds—health, beauty, strength, and pleasure: so the +knowledges are medicine, or art of cure; art of decoration, which +is called cosmetic; art of activity, which is called athletic; +and art voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth <i>eruditus +luxus</i>. This subject of man’s body is, of all +other things in nature, most susceptible of remedy; but then that +remedy is most susceptible of error; for the same subtlety of the +subject doth cause large possibility and easy failing, and +therefore the inquiry ought to be the more exact.</p> +<p>(2) To speak, therefore, of medicine, and to resume that we +have said, ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that +man was <i>microcosmus</i>—an abstract or model of the +world—hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus and +the alchemists, as if there were to be found in man’s body +certain correspondences and parallels, which should have respect +to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals, which +are extant in the great world. But thus much is evidently +true, that of all substances which nature hath produced, +man’s body is the most extremely compounded. For we +see herbs and plants are nourished by earth and water; beasts for +the most part by herbs and fruits; man by the flesh of beasts, +birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the manifold +alterations, dressings, and preparations of these several bodies +before they come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto +that beasts have a more simple order of life, and less change of +affections to work upon their bodies, whereas man in his mansion, +sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite variations: and it +cannot be denied but that the body of man of all other things is +of the most compounded mass. The soul, on the other side, +is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed:</p> + +<blockquote><p> “Purumque +reliquit<br /> +Æthereum sensum atque auraï simplicis +ignem.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no +rest, if that principle be true, that <i>Motus rerum est rapidus +extra locum</i>, <i>placidus in loco</i>. But to the +purpose. This variable composition of man’s body hath +made it as an instrument easy to distemper; and, therefore, the +poets did well to conjoin music and medicine in Apollo, because +the office of medicine is but to tune this curious harp of +man’s body and to reduce it to harmony. So, then, the +subject being so variable hath made the art by consequent more +conjectural; and the art being conjectural hath made so much the +more place to be left for imposture. For almost all other +arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may +term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer +is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of +the cause; this master in this ship is judged by the directing +his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage; but the +physician, and perhaps this politique, hath no particular acts +demonstrative of his ability, but is judged most by the event, +which is ever but as it is taken: for who can tell, if a patient +die or recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it +be art or accident? And therefore many times the impostor +is prized, and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see [the] +weakness and credulity of men is such, as they will often refer a +mountebank or witch before a learned physician. And +therefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this extreme +folly when they made Æsculapius and Circe, brother and +sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Ipse repertorem medicinæ talis et +artis<br /> +Fulmine Phœbigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>And again—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia +lucos,” &c.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and +old women and impostors, have had a competition with +physicians. And what followeth? Even this, that +physicians say to themselves, as Solomon expresseth it upon a +higher occasion, “If it befall to me as befalleth to the +fools, why should I labour to be more wise?” And +therefore I cannot much blame physicians that they use commonly +to intend some other art or practice, which they fancy more than +their profession; for you shall have of them antiquaries, poets, +humanists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and in every of these +better seen than in their profession; and no doubt upon this +ground that they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art +maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their +fortune: for the weakness of patients, and sweetness of life, and +nature of hope, maketh men depend upon physicians with all their +defects. But, nevertheless, these things which we have +spoken of are courses begotten between a little occasion and a +great deal of sloth and default; for if we will excite and awake +our observation, we shall see in familiar instances what a +predominant faculty the subtlety of spirit hath over the variety +of matter or form. Nothing more variable than faces and +countenances, yet men can bear in memory the infinite +distinctions of them; nay, a painter, with a few shells of +colours, and the benefit of his eye, and habit of his +imagination, can imitate them all that ever have been, are, or +may be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more +variable than voices, yet men can likewise discern them +personally: nay, you shall have a <i>buffon</i> or +<i>pantomimus</i> will express as many as he pleaseth. +Nothing more variable than the differing sounds of words; yet men +have found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters. +So that it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man’s +mind, but it is the remote standing or placing thereof that +breedeth these mazes and incomprehensions; for as the sense afar +off is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so is it of the +understanding, the remedy whereof is, not to quicken or +strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and +therefore there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and +use the true approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as +much as the poet saith:</p> +<blockquote><p>“Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus +artes;<br /> +Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth +deserve: well shadowed by the poets, in that they made +Æsculapius to be the son of [the] sun, the one being the +fountain of life, the other as the second-stream; but infinitely +more honoured by the example of our Saviour, who made the body of +man the object of His miracles, as the soul was the object of His +doctrine. For we read not that ever He vouchsafed to do any +miracle about honour or money (except that one for giving tribute +to Cæsar), but only about the preserving, sustaining, and +healing the body of man.</p> +<p>(3) Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have said) +more professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than +advanced; the labour having been, in my judgment, rather in +circle than in progression. For I find much iteration, but +small addition. It considereth causes of diseases, with the +occasions or impulsions; the diseases themselves, with the +accidents; and the cures, with the preservations. The +deficiences which I think good to note, being a few of many, and +those such as are of a more open and manifest nature, I will +enumerate and not place.</p> +<p>(4) The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious +diligence of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of +the special cases of his patients, and how they proceeded, and +how they were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having +an example proper in the father of the art, I shall not need to +allege an example foreign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who are +careful to report new cases and decisions, for the direction of +future judgments. This continuance of medicinal history I +find deficient; which I understand neither to be so infinite as +to extend to every common case, nor so reserved as to admit none +but wonders: for many things are new in this manner, which are +not new in the kind; and if men will intend to observe, they +shall find much worthy to observe.</p> +<p>(5) In the inquiry which is made by anatomy, I find much +deficience: for they inquire of the parts, and their substances, +figures, and collocations; but they inquire not of the +diversities of the parts, the secrecies of the passages, and the +seats or nestling of the humours, nor much of the footsteps and +impressions of diseases. The reason of which omission I +suppose to be, because the first inquiry may be satisfied in the +view of one or a few anatomies; but the latter, being comparative +and casual, must arise from the view of many. And as to the +diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing +of the inward parts is as full of difference as the outward, and +in that is the cause continent of many diseases; which not being +observed, they quarrel many times with the humours, which are not +in fault; the fault being in the very frame and mechanic of the +part, which cannot be removed by medicine alterative, but must be +accommodated and palliated by diets and medicines familiar. +And for the passages and pores, it is true which was anciently +noted, that the more subtle of them appear not in anatomies, +because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be +open and manifest in life: which being supposed, though the +inhumanity of <i>anatomia vivorum</i> was by Celsus justly +reproved; yet in regard of the great use of this observation, the +inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been relinquished +altogether, or referred to the casual practices of surgery; but +might have been well diverted upon the dissection of beasts +alive, which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts may +sufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, +they are commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments; whereas +it is most necessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and +receptacles the humours do find in the parts, with the differing +kind of the humour so lodged and received. And as for the +footsteps of diseases, and their devastations of the inward +parts, impostumations, exulcerations, discontinuations, +putrefactions, consumptions, contractions, extensions, +convulsions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, together +with all preternatural substances, as stones, carnosities, +excrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to have been +exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and the contribution +of men’s several experiences, and carefully set down both +historically according to the appearances, and artificially with +a reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from +them, in case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas +now upon opening of bodies they are passed over slightly and in +silence.</p> +<p>(6) In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of +many, some as in their nature incurable, and others as past the +period of cure; so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed +so many men to die, as they do by their ignorant edicts: whereof +numbers do escape with less difficulty than they did in the Roman +prescriptions. Therefore I will not doubt to note as a +deficience, that they inquire not the perfect cures of many +diseases, or extremities of diseases; but pronouncing them +incurable do enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from +discredit.</p> +<p>(7) Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician not +only to restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and not +only when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it +may serve to make a fair and easy passage. For it is no +small felicity which Augustus Cæsar was wont to wish to +himself, that same <i>Euthanasia</i>; and which was specially +noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the +fashion, and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sheep. So +it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was judged +desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught +and ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made, +<i>Hinc Stygias ebrius hausit aquas</i>; he was not sober enough +to taste any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the +physicians contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to +stay with the patient after the disease is deplored; whereas in +my judgment they ought both to inquire the skill, and to give the +attendances, for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and +agonies of death.</p> +<p>(5) In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a +deficience in the receipts of propriety, respecting the +particular cures of diseases: for the physicians have frustrated +the fruit of tradition and experience by their magistralities, in +adding and taking out and changing <i>quid pro qua</i> in their +receipts, at their pleasures; commanding so over the medicine, as +the medicine cannot command over the disease. For except it +be treacle and <i>mithridatum</i>, and of late +<i>diascordium</i>, and a few more, they tie themselves to no +receipts severely and religiously. For as to the +confections of sale which are in the shops, they are for +readiness and not for propriety. For they are upon general +intentions of purging, opening, comforting, altering, and not +much appropriate to particular diseases. And this is the +cause why empirics and old women are more happy many times in +their cures than learned physicians, because they are more +religious in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the +deficience which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of +their own practice, partly out of the constant probations +reported in books, and partly out of the traditions of empirics, +set down and delivered over certain experimental medicines for +the cure of particular diseases, besides their own conjectural +and magistral descriptions. For as they were the men of the +best composition in the state of Rome, which either being consuls +inclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined to the senate; +so in the matter we now handle, they be the best physicians, +which being learned incline to the traditions of experience, or +being empirics incline to the methods of learning.</p> +<p>(9) In preparation of medicines I do find strange, specially +considering how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that +they are safer for the outward than inward parts, that no man +hath sought to make an imitation by art of natural baths and +medicinable fountains: which nevertheless are confessed to +receive their virtues from minerals; and not so only, but +discerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they +receive tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like; which +nature, if it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the +variety of them will be increased, and the temper of them will be +more commanded.</p> +<p>(10) But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable +either to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this +part with the note of one deficience more, which seemeth to me of +greatest consequence: which is, that the prescripts in use are +too compendious to attain their end; for, to my understanding, it +is a vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so +sovereign or so happy, as that the receipt or miss of it can work +any great effect upon the body of man. It were a strange +speech which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a +vice to which he were by nature subject. It is order, +pursuit, sequence, and interchange of application, which is +mighty in nature; which although it require more exact knowledge +in prescribing, and more precise obedience in observing, yet is +recompensed with the magnitude of effects. And although a +man would think, by the daily visitations of the physicians, that +there were a pursuance in the cure, yet let a man look into their +prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them but +inconstancies and every day’s devices, without any settled +providence or project. Not that every scrupulous or +superstitious prescript is effectual, no more than every straight +way is the way to heaven; but the truth of the direction must +precede severity of observance.</p> +<p>(11) For cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: +for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due +reverence to God, to society, and to ourselves. As for +artificial decoration, it is well worthy of the deficiences which +it hath; being neither fine enough to deceive, nor handsome to +use, nor wholesome to please.</p> +<p>(12) For athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is +to say, for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be +brought, whether it be of activity, or of patience; whereof +activity hath two parts, strength and swiftness; and patience +likewise hath two parts, hardness against wants and extremities, +and endurance of pain or torment; whereof we see the practices in +tumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer punishment. +Nay, if there be any other faculty which falls not within any of +the former divisions, as in those that dive, that obtain a +strange power of containing respiration, and the like, I refer it +to this part. Of these things the practices are known, but +the philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired; the +rather, I think, because they are supposed to be obtained, either +by an aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, or only by +continual custom, which is soon prescribed which though it be not +true, yet I forbear to note any deficiences; for the Olympian +games are down long since, and the mediocrity of these things is +for use; as for the excellency of them it serveth for the most +part but for mercenary ostentation.</p> +<p>(13) For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in +them is of laws to repress them. For as it hath been well +observed, that the arts which flourish in times while virtue is +in growth, are military; and while virtue is in state, are +liberal; and while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary: so I +doubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon the descent of +the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple practices +joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the pleasures +of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to +belong to civil life and education. And thus much of that +particular human philosophy which concerns the body, which is but +the tabernacle of the mind.</p> +<p>XI. (1) For human knowledge which concerns the mind, it hath +two parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of +the soul or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or +functions thereof. Unto the first of these, the +considerations of the original of the soul, whether it be native +or adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws of matter, and +of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do appertain: +which have been not more laboriously inquired than variously +reported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been +rather in a maze than in a way. But although I am of +opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly +inquired, even in nature, than it hath been, yet I hold that in +the end it must be hounded by religion, or else it will be +subject to deceit and delusion. For as the substance of the +soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven +and earth by the benediction of a <i>producat</i>, but was +immediately inspired from God, so it is not possible that it +should be (otherwise than by accident) subject to the laws of +heaven and earth, which are the subject of philosophy; and +therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul +must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance. +Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two +appendices; which, as they have been handled, have rather +vapoured forth fables than kindled truth: divination and +fascination.</p> +<p>(2) Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into +artificial and natural: whereof artificial is, when the mind +maketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and +tokens; natural is, when the mind hath a presention by an +internal power, without the inducement of a sign. +Artificial is of two sorts: either when the argument is coupled +with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is +only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is +experimental: whereof the latter for the most part is +superstitious, such as were the heathen observations upon the +inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of +bees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. +For artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are +distributed amongst particular knowledges. The astronomer +hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and +the like. The physician hath his predictions, of death, of +recovery, of the accidents and issues of diseases. The +politique hath his predictions; <i>O urbem venalem</i>, <i>et +cito perituram</i>, <i>si emptorem invenerit</i>! which stayed +not long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in +Cæsar: so as these predictions are now impertinent, and to +be referred over. But the divination which springeth from +the internal nature of the soul is that which we now speak of; +which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by +influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition that +the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not +diffused into the organs of the body, hath some extent and +latitude of prenotion; which therefore appeareth most in sleep, +in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in waking +apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences +and observances which make the mind most to consist in +itself. By influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the +mind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination from the +foreknowledge of God and spirits: unto which the same regiment +doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within +itself is the state which is most susceptible of divine +influxions; save that it is accompanied in this case with a +fervency and elevation (which the ancients noted by fury), and +not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.</p> +<p>(3) Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive +upon other bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that we +spake in the proper place. Wherein the school of +Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended natural magic, have +been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of the +imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working +faith. Others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to +their view the secret passages of things, and specially of the +contagion that passeth from body to body, do conceive it should +likewise be agreeable to nature that there should be some +transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without the +mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown (now +almost made civil) of the mastering spirit, and the force of +confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry +how to raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination +fortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify +and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously +a palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it +may be pretended that ceremonies, characters, and charms do work, +not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, but +serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth it; as +images are said by the Roman Church to fix the cogitations and +raise the devotions of them that pray before them. But for +mine own judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, +and that ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used +sincerely and intentionally for that purpose; yet I should hold +them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God gave +unto man, <i>In sudore vultus comedes panem tuum</i>. For +they propound those noble effects, which God hath set forth unto +man to be bought at the price of labour, to be attained by a few +easy and slothful observances. Deficiences in these +knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, +that it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much +vanity.</p> +<p>XII. (1) The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the +mind of man is of two kinds—the one respecting his +understanding and reason, and the other his will, appetite, and +affection; whereof the former produceth position or decree, the +latter action or execution. It is true that the imagination +is an agent or <i>nuncius</i> in both provinces, both the +judicial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to +imagination before reason have judged, and reason sendeth over to +imagination before the decree can be acted. For imagination +ever precedeth voluntary motion. Saving that this Janus of +imagination hath differing faces: for the face towards reason +hath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the +print of good; which nevertheless are faces,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Quales decet esse sororum.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is +invested with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in +itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well +said by Aristotle, “That the mind hath over the body that +commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that reason +hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate +hath over a free citizen,” who may come also to rule in his +turn. For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we +raise our imagination above our reason, which is the cause why +religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, +parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions +that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions of like +nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of +things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the +imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science +that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no +cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is +rather a pleasure or play of imagination than a work or duty +thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such +parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of such +sciences as handle and consider of the imagination. No more +than we shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth +(for that extendeth to all philosophy), but of such knowledges as +do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason: so as poesy had +his true place. As for the power of the imagination in +nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned +it in the doctrine <i>De Anima</i>, whereunto most fitly it +belongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative +reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to +refer it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content +ourselves with the former division, that human philosophy, which +respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts, +rational and moral.</p> +<p>(2) The part of human philosophy which is rational is of all +knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth +but a net of subtlety and spinosity. For as it was truly +said, that knowledge is <i>pabulum animi</i>; so in the nature of +men’s appetite to this food most men are of the taste and +stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have +returned <i>ad ollas carnium</i>, and were weary of manna; which, +though it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and +comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that +are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, +about the which men’s affections, praises, fortunes do turn +and are conversant. But this same <i>lumen siccum</i> doth +parch and offend most men’s watery and soft natures. +But to speak truly of things as they are in worth, rational +knowledges are the keys of all other arts, for as Aristotle saith +aptly and elegantly, “That the hand is the instrument of +instruments, and the mind is the form of forms;” so these +be truly said to be the art of arts. Neither do they only +direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the habit of +shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also +to draw a stronger bow.</p> +<p>(3) The arts intellectual are four in number, divided +according to the ends whereunto they are referred—for +man’s labour is to invent that which is sought or +propounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that +which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. +So as the arts must be four—art of inquiry or invention; +art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art +of elocution or tradition.</p> +<p>XIII. (1) Invention is of two kinds much differing—the +one of arts and sciences, and the other of speech and +arguments. The former of these I do report deficient; which +seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if, in the making of an +inventory touching the state of a defunct, it should be set down +that there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all +other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should +purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had +never been discovered if the use of the mariner’s needle +had not been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, +and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if +sciences be no further discovered, if the art itself of invention +and discovery hath been passed over.</p> +<p>(2) That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment +standeth plainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to +invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over +with a <i>cuique in sua arte credendum</i>. And Celsus +acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the empirical and +dogmatical sects of physicians, “That medicines and cures +were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were +discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from +them the medicines and cures discovered.” And Plato +in his “Theætetus” noteth well, “That +particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no +sufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which +maketh the artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle +propositions, which in every particular knowledge are taken from +tradition and experience.” And therefore we see, that +they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things +refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, +birds, fishes, serpents, than to men.</p> +<blockquote><p>“Dictamnum genetrix Cretæa carpit ab +Ida,<br /> +Puberibus caulem foliis et flore camantem<br /> +Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris<br /> +Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæsere +sagittæ.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>So that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being to +consecrate inventors) that the Egyptians had so few human idols +in their temples, but almost all brute:</p> +<blockquote><p>“Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator +Anubis,<br /> +Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, +&c.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and +ascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe +that Prometheus first stroke the flints, and marvelled at the +spark, than that when he first stroke the flints he expected the +spark; and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no +intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them +of flint, that gave the first occasion. So as it should +seem, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for +surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some +part of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, +or generally to chance or anything else than to logic for the +invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of +invention which Virgil describeth much other:</p> +<blockquote><p>“Ut varias usus meditande extunderet +artes<br /> +Paulatim.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than +that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which +is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and +imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being. +For so Cicero saith very truly, <i>Usus uni rei deditus et +naturam et artem sæpe vincit</i>. And therefore if it +be said of men,</p> +<blockquote><p> “Labor +omnia vincit<br /> +Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas,”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>it is likewise said of beasts, <i>Quis psittaco docuit suum +χαιρε</i>? Who taught the raven +in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she spied +water, that the water might rise so as she might come to +it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea or +air, and to find the way from a field in a flower a great way off +to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn +that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and +grow? Add then the word <i>extundere</i>, which importeth +the extreme difficulty, and the word <i>paulatim</i>, which +importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even +amongst the Egyptians’ gods; there being little left to the +faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty or art, for matter of +invention.</p> +<p>(3) Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and +which seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of +sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle +propositions by derivation from the principles; their form of +induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent; wherein +their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of art to +perfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, +abused, and traduced nature. For he that shall attentively +observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, +like unto that which the poet speaketh of, <i>Aërei mellis +cælestia dona</i>, distilling and contriving it out of +particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field +and garden, shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth +manage and act an induction much better than they describe +it. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, +without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a +conjecture; for who can assure (in many subjects) upon those +particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on +the contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should +have rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought before +him, and failed of David which was in the field. And this +form (to say truth), is so gross, as it had not been possible for +wits so subtle as have managed these things to have offered it to +the world, but that they hasted to their theories and +dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars; +which their manner was to use but as <i>lictores</i> and +<i>viatores</i>, for sergeants and whifflers, <i>ad summovendam +turbam</i>, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather +than in their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing +may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps +of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth; for, +as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child, so in +human, they reputed the attending the inductions (whereof we +speak), as if it were a second infancy or childhood.</p> +<p>(4) Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly +induced, yet, nevertheless, certain it is that middle +propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by +syllogism—that is, by touch and reduction of them to +principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences +popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity +(because it pleaseth God to apply Himself to the capacity of the +simplest), that form may have use; and in natural philosophy +likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, <i>Quæ +assensum parit operis effæta est</i>; but the subtlety of +nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds. +For arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of words, +and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions +of things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably +collected out of particulars, it is not the laborious examination +either of consequences of arguments, or of the truth of +propositions, that can ever correct that error, being (as the +physicians speak) in the first digestion. And, therefore, +it was not without cause, that so many excellent philosophers +became sceptics and academics, and denied any certainty of +knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion that the knowledge +of man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It +is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of +irony, <i>Scientiam dissimulando simulavit</i>; for he used to +disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge; like +the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but +would not acknowledge so much. And in the later academy, +which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of <i>acatalepsia</i> (I +doubt) was not held sincerely; for that all those which excelled +in copy of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which +was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable +discourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure than +journeys to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both +academies did hold it in subtlety and integrity. But here +was their chief error: they charged the deceit upon the senses; +which in my judgment (notwithstanding all their cavillations) are +very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always +immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by +producing and urging such things as are too subtle for the sense +to some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like +assistance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon +the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of +collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses. +This I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up +to seek help; for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, +can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, +which may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.</p> +<p>(5) This part of invention, concerning the invention of +sciences, I purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound, +having digested it into two parts: whereof the one I term +<i>experientia literata</i>, and the other <i>interpretatio +naturæ</i>; the former being but a degree and rudiment of +the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too +great upon a promise.</p> +<p>(6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an +invention; for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not +to recover or resummon that which we already know; and the use of +this invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our +mind is already possessed to draw forth or call before us that +which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our +consideration. So as to speak truly, it is no invention, +but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which is +the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as +subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do +account it a chase as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a +forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let +it be called invention; so as it be perceived and discerned, that +the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use +of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.</p> +<p>(7) To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two +courses, preparation and suggestion. The former of these +seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of +diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein +Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near +his time, saying, “They did as if one that professed the +art of shoemaking should not teach how to make up a shoe, but +only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and +sizes.” But yet a man might reply, that if a +shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he +is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, +speaking of divine knowledge, saith, “That the kingdom of +heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new +and old store;” and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric +do give it in precept, that pleaders should have the places, +whereof they have most continual use, ready handled in all the +variety that may be; as that, to speak for the literal +interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and to +speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and +contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great +experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall +have occasion to speak of (if he will take the pains), he may +have it in effect premeditate and handled <i>in thesi</i>. +So that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to +do, but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other +circumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact +diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that +the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good +impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations +and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may +overweigh Aristotle’s opinion, that would have us change a +rich wardrobe for a pair of shears.</p> +<p>(8) But the nature of the collection of this provision or +preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and +rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came +first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further +handling of it to rhetoric.</p> +<p>(9) The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth +assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may +excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath +formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof. +Neither is this use (truly taken) only to furnish argument to +dispute, probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our +judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may +these places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also to +direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is +half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, “Whosoever +seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion; +else how shall he know it when he hath found it?” +And, therefore, the larger your anticipation is, the more direct +and compendious is your search. But the same places which +will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will +also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what +questions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to instruct +us, what points to search and revolve; so as I cannot report that +this part of invention, which is that which the schools call +topics, is deficient.</p> +<p>(10) Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and +special. The general we have spoken to; but the particular +hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial +and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too +much in the schools (which is, to be vainly subtle in a few +things which are within their command, and to reject the rest), I +do receive particular topics; that is, places or directions of +invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of +great use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of +sciences. For in these it holdeth <i>ars inveniendi +adolescit cum inventis</i>; for as in going of a way, we do not +only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the +better sight of that part of the way which remaineth, so every +degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which +followeth; which light, if we strengthen by drawing it forth into +questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our +pursuit.</p> +<p>XIV. (1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle +the natures of proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction +hath a coincidence with invention; for all inductions, whether in +good or vicious form, the same action of the mind which +inventeth, judgeth—all one as in the sense. But +otherwise it is in proof by syllogism, for the proof being not +immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, +and the judgment of the consequence is another; the one exciting +only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and +exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have +spoken of interpretation of Nature.</p> +<p>(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most +agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently end +excellently laboured. For the nature of man doth extremely +covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and unmovable, +and as a rest and support of the mind. And, therefore, as +Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some +point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable +of Atlas (that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) +to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the +conversion is accomplished, so assuredly men have a desire to +have an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation, +which is like to a perpetual peril of falling. Therefore +men did hasten to set down some principles about which the +variety of their disputatious might turn.</p> +<p>(3) So, then, this art of judgment is but the reduction of +propositions to principles in a middle term. The principles +to be agreed by all and exempted from argument; the middle term +to be elected at the liberty of every man’s invention; the +reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted: the one when +the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a +probation ostensive; the other, when the contradictory of the +proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, +which is that which they call <i>per incommodum</i>, or pressing +an absurdity; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition +standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle.</p> +<p>(4) But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one +by way of direction, the other by way of caution: the former +frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the +variations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences +may be exactly judged. Toward the composition and structure +of which form it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which +are propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple +words. And this is that part of logic which is comprehended +in the Analytics.</p> +<p>(5) The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite +use and assurance sake, discovering the more subtle forms of +sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that +which is termed <i>elenches</i>. For although in the more +gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca maketh the +comparison well) as in juggling feats, which, though we know not +how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to +be; yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a man +besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.</p> +<p>(6) This part concerning <i>elenches</i> is excellently +handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in +example; not only in the persons of the sophists, but even in +Socrates himself, who, professing to affirm nothing, but to +infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed +all the forms of objection, fallace, and redargution. And +although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for +redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is +for caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, +and no doubt is of very great advantage, though the difference be +good which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one +is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and +the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so +as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.</p> +<p>(7) But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more +ample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers +parts of knowledge, whereof some are laboured and other +omitted. For first, I conceive (though it may seem at first +somewhat strange) that that part which is variably referred, +sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching the common +adjuncts of essences, is but an <i>elenche</i>; for the great +sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words +and phrase, specially of such words as are most general and +intervene in every inquiry, it seemeth to me that the true and +fruitful use (leaving vain subtleties and speculations) of the +inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, +diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, +privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against +ambiguities of speech. So, again, the distribution of +things into certain tribes, which we call categories or +predicaments, are but cautions against the confusion of +definitions and divisions.</p> +<p>(8) Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the +strength of the impression, and not by the subtlety of the +illaqueation—not so much perplexing the reason, as +overruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I +think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric.</p> +<p>(9) But lastly, there is yet a much more important and +profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not +observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as +that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment, +the force whereof is such as it doth not dazzle or snare the +understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and +inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind +of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein +the beams of things should reflect according to their true +incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of +superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and +reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false +appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the +mind, beholding them in an example or two; as first, in that +instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, that to +the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the +affirmative or active to affect more than the negative or +privative. So that a few times hitting or presence +countervails ofttimes failing or absence, as was well answered by +Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune’s temple the +great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck, and +had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, “Advise now, you +that think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest.” +“Yea, but,” saith Diagoras, “where are they +painted that are drowned?” Let us behold it in +another instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an +equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in +nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. +Hence it cometh that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves +except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect +circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged +of eccentrics. Hence it cometh that whereas there are many +things in Nature as it were <i>monodica</i>, <i>sui juris</i>, +yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, +parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have +feigned an element of fire to keep square with earth, water, and +air, and the like. Nay, it is not credible, till it be +opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies the similitude of +human actions and arts, together with the making of man +<i>communis mensura</i>, have brought into natural philosophy; +not much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in +the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of +Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the +gods to be of human shape. And, therefore, Velleius the +Epicurean needed not to have asked why God should have adorned +the heavens with stars, as if He had been an <i>ædilis</i>, +one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or +plays. For if that great Work-master had been of a human +disposition, He would have cast the stars into some pleasant and +beautiful works and orders like the frets in the roofs of houses; +whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or +straight line, amongst such an infinite number, so differing a +harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of +Nature.</p> +<p>(10) Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon +us by every man’s own individual nature and custom in that +feigned supposition that Plato maketh of the cave; for certainly +if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until +maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange +and absurd imaginations. So, in like manner, although our +persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included +in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister +unto us infinite errors and vain opinions if they be not recalled +to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in +one of the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over +in our first book.</p> +<p>(11) And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that +are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied +according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort; and +although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well +<i>loquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut sapientes</i>, yet certain +it is that words, as a Tartar’s bow, do shoot back upon the +understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert +the judgment. So as it is almost necessary in all +controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the +mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the +definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we +accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or +no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are +sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in +questions and differences about words. To conclude, +therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to +divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances +because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of +life; so yet, nevertheless, the caution of them (for all +elenches, as was said, are but cautions) doth extremely import +the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches +or cautions against these three false appearances I find +altogether deficient.</p> +<p>(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency +which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may +report that also deficient; which is the application of the +differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of +subjects. For there being but four kinds of demonstrations, +that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by +induction, by syllogism, and by congruity, which is that which +Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not <i>a +notioribus</i>, every of these hath certain subjects in the +matter of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; +and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be +excluded; and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more +severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in +contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath +been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to +knowledge. The distributions and assignations of +demonstrations according to the analogy of sciences I note as +deficient.</p> +<p>XV. (1) The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in +writing or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of +the character and the order of the entry. For the art of +characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it hath +nearest conjugation with grammar, and, therefore, I refer it to +the due place; for the disposition and collocation of that +knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good +digest of common-places, wherein I am not ignorant of the +prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a +retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of +memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in +knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and +full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of great +use and essence in studying, as that which assureth copy of +invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this +is true, that of the methods of common-places that I have seen, +there is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying +merely the face of a school and not of a world; and referring to +vulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without all life or +respect to action.</p> +<p>(2) For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, +which is memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly +inquired of. An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth +to me that there are better precepts than that art, and better +practices of that art than those received. It is certain +the art (as it is) may be raised to points of ostentation +prodigious; but in use (as is now managed) it is barren, not +burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but +barren, that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use +of business and occasions. And, therefore, I make no more +estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon +once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or +rhymes <i>extempore</i>, or the making of a satirical simile of +everything, or the turning of everything to a jest, or the +falsifying or contradicting of everything by cavil, or the like +(whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copy, and +such as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme +degree of wonder), than I do of the tricks of tumblers, +funambuloes, baladines; the one being the same in the mind that +the other is in the body, matters of strangeness without +worthiness.</p> +<p>(3) This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the +one prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the +indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to +seek in a narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity +with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits +intellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory more; +out of which axioms may be drawn much better practice than that +in use; and besides which axioms, there are divers more touching +help of memory not inferior to them. But I did in the +beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, +which are but only ill managed.</p> +<p>XVI. (1) There remaineth the fourth kind of rational +knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing or +transferring our knowledge to others, which I will term by the +general name of tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three +parts: the first concerning the organ of tradition; the second +concerning the method of tradition; and the third concerning the +illustration of tradition.</p> +<p>(2) For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or +writing; for Aristotle saith well, “Words are the images of +cogitations, and letters are the images of words.” +But yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by +the medium of words. For whatsoever is capable of +sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, is in +nature competent to express cogitations. And, therefore, we +see in the commerce of barbarous people that understand not one +another’s language, and in the practice of divers that are +dumb and deaf, that men’s minds are expressed in gestures, +though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we +understand further, that it is the use of China and the kingdoms +of the High Levant to write in characters real, which express +neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; +insomuch as countries and provinces which understand not one +another’s language can nevertheless read one +another’s writings, because the characters are accepted +more generally than the languages do extend; and, therefore, they +have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as +radical words.</p> +<p>(3) These notes of cogitations are of two sorts: the one when +the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the +other <i>ad placitum</i>, having force only by contract or +acceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and +gestures. For as to hieroglyphics (things of ancient use +and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most ancient +nations), they are but as continued impresses and emblems. +And as for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and +are to hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in +that they abide not; but they have evermore, as well as the +other, an affinity with the things signified. As Periander, +being consulted with how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid +the messenger attend and report what he saw him do; and went into +his garden and topped all the highest flowers, signifying that it +consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility and +grandees. <i>Ad placitum</i>, are the characters real +before mentioned, and words: although some have been willing by +curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to have derived +imposition of names from reason and intendment; a speculation +elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent, +but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This +portion of knowledge touching the notes of things and cogitations +in general, I find not inquired, but deficient. And +although it may seem of no great use, considering that words and +writings by letters do far excel all the other ways; yet because +this part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge (for +words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys +are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that +moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver), I thought +good to propound it to better inquiry.</p> +<p>(4) Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them +hath produced the science of grammar. For man still +striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which +by his fault he hath been deprived; and as he hath striven +against the first general curse by the invention of all other +arts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse +(which was the confusion of tongues) by the art of grammar; +whereof the use in a mother tongue is small, in a foreign tongue +more; but most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be +vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The +duty of it is of two natures: the one popular, which is for the +speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for intercourse +of speech as for understanding of authors; the other +philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they +are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy +between words and reason is handled <i>sparsim</i>, brokenly +though not entirely; and, therefore, I cannot report it +deficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a +science by itself.</p> +<p>(5) Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the +consideration of the accidents of words; which are measure, +sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harshness +of them: whence hath issued some curious observations in +rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the +verse and not of the argument. Wherein though men in +learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in +modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of +verses as of dances; for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse +is a measured speech. In these things this sense is better +judge than the art:</p> +<blockquote><p> “Cœnæ fercula +nostræ<br /> +Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an +unfit subject, it is well said, “<i>Quod tempore antiquum +videtur</i>, <i>id incongruitate est maxime novum</i>.”</p> +<p>(6) For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets, +but may be in words. The kinds of ciphers (besides the +simple ciphers, with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and +non-significants) are many, according to the nature or rule of +the infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, &c. +But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are +three; that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be +impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be without +suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write <i>omnia +per omnia</i>; which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion +quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing +infolded, and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of +ciphering hath for relative an art of deciphering, by supposition +unprofitable, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose +that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them which +exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the rawness and +unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest +matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers.</p> +<p>(7) In the enumeration of these private and retired arts it +may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, +naming them for show and ostentation, and to little other +purpose. But let those, which are skilful in them, judge +whether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in that +which I speak of them (though in few words) there be not some +seed of proficience. And this must be remembered, that as +there be many of great account in their countries and provinces, +which, when they come up to the seat of the estate, are but of +mean rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here placed +with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things: yet +to such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in +them, they seem great matters.</p> +<p>XVII. (1) For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a +controversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there +be a meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of +the matter for that time, and no proceeding at all; so in +learning, where there is much controversy, there is many times +little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of method +seemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report it +deficient.</p> +<p>(2) Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in logic, as +a part of judgment. For as the doctrine of syllogisms +comprehendeth the rules of judgment upon that which is invented, +so the doctrine of method containeth the rules of judgment upon +that which is to be delivered; for judgment precedeth delivery, +as it followeth invention. Neither is the method or the +nature of the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, +but likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the +labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of +knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth +the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore +the most real diversity of method is of method referred to use, +and method referred to progression: whereof the one may be termed +magistral, and the other of probation.</p> +<p>(3) The latter whereof seemeth to be <i>via deserta et +interclusa</i>. For as knowledges are now delivered, there +is a kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the +receiver. For he that delivereth knowledge desireth to +deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may +be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge desireth rather +present satisfaction than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to +doubt, than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open +his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his +strength.</p> +<p>(4) But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on +ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the +same method wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of +knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and +prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge +which he hath obtained. But yet, nevertheless, <i>secundum +majus et minus</i>, a man may revisit and descend unto the +foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it +into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in +knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it +is no matter for the roots—but if you mean to remove it to +grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so +the delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair +bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but +not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it +is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look +well to the taking up of the roots. Of which kind of +delivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath +some shadow: but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in +inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.</p> +<p>(5) Another diversity of method there is, which hath some +affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of +the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain +persons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit +merchandises; and that is enigmatical and disclosed. The +pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being +admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to +selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the +veil.</p> +<p>(6) Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is +great, is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; +wherein we may observe that it hath been too much taken into +custom, out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject, to +make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses, +and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a +sensible method. But the writing in aphorisms hath many +excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not +approach.</p> +<p>(7) For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial +or solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot +be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of +illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; +discourse of connection and order is cut off; descriptions of +practice are cut off. So there remaineth nothing to fill +the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation; and +therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to +write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in +methods,</p> +<blockquote><p> “Tantum series juncturaque +pollet,<br /> +Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris,”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were +disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are +more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to +action; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, +one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy. But +particulars being dispersed do best agree with dispersed +directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge +broken, do invite men to inquire further; whereas methods, +carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at +furthest.</p> +<p>(8) Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great +weight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their +proofs, or by questions and their determinations. The +latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as +prejudicial to the proceeding of learning as it is to the +proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or +hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the +enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of +themselves: indeed a man would not leave some important piece +enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation +in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to +serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not +to minister and excite disputatious and doubts.</p> +<p>(9) Another diversity of method is, according to the subject +or matter which is handled. For there is a great difference +in delivery of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of +knowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed. And +howsoever contention hath been moved, touching a uniformity of +method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, +besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards +learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to +certain empty and barren generalities; being but the very husks +and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and +expulsed with the torture and press of the method. And, +therefore, as I did allow well of particular topics for +invention, so I do allow likewise of particular methods of +tradition.</p> +<p>(10) Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and +teaching of knowledge is, according unto the light and +presuppositions of that which is delivered. For that +knowledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received, is to +be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable and +familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax +Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith “If +we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes,” +&c. For those whose conceits are seated in popular +opinions need only but to prove or dispute; but those whose +conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the +one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and +demonstrate. So that it is of necessity with them to have +recourse to similitudes and translations to express +themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and +in rude times when those conceits which are now trivial were then +new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else +would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected +for paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood +or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent +parables and tropes are, for it is a rule, that whatsoever +science is not consonant to presuppositions must pray in aid of +similitudes.</p> +<p>(11) There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and +received: as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or +systasis, of concealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow +well of, though I have stood upon those which are least handled +and observed. All which I have remembered to this purpose, +because I would erect and constitute one general inquiry (which +seems to me deficient) touching the wisdom of tradition.</p> +<p>(12) But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, doth +further belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a +work, but also the several beams and columns thereof; not as to +their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure. And +therefore method considereth not only the disposition of the +argument or subject, but likewise the propositions: not as to +their truth or matter, but as to their limitation and +manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deal in +reviving the good rules of +propositions—Καθολον +πρωτον, κυτα +παντος &c.—than he did +in introducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the +condition of human things that, according to the ancient fables, +“the most precious things have the most pernicious +keepers”) it was so, that the attempt of the one made him +fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted that +should design to make axioms convertible, if he make them not +withal circular, and non-promovent, or incurring into themselves; +but yet the intention was excellent.</p> +<p>(13) The other considerations of method, concerning +propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which +limit the dimensions of sciences: for every knowledge may be +fitly said, besides the profundity (which is the truth and +substance of it, that makes it solid), to have a longitude and a +latitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and the +longitude towards action; that is, from the greatest generality +to the most particular precept. The one giveth rule how far +one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of +another, which is the rule they call +Καθαυτο; the other +giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge should +descend: which latter I find passed over in silence, being in my +judgment the more material. For certainty there must be +somewhat left to practice; but how much is worthy the +inquiry? We see remote and superficial generalities do but +offer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding +to practice than an Ortelius’ universal map is to direct +the way between London and York. The better sort of rules +have been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, +where you may see the images of things, but first they must be +filed: so the rules will help if they be laboured and polished by +practice. But how crystalline they may be made at the +first, and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the +question, the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient.</p> +<p>(14) There hath been also laboured and put in practice a +method, which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture: +which is, to deliver knowledges in such manner as men may +speedily come to make a show of learning, who have it not. +Such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius in making that art +which bears his name; not unlike to some books of typocosmy, +which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words of +all arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms +might be thought to understand the art; which collections are +much like a fripper’s or broker’s shop, that hath +ends of everything, but nothing of worth.</p> +<p>XVIII. (1) Now we descend to that part which concerneth the +illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we +call rhetoric, or art of eloquence, a science excellent, and +excellently well laboured. For although in true value it is +inferior to wisdom (as it is said by God to Moses, when he +disabled himself for want of this faculty, “Aaron shall be +thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God”), yet with +people it is the more mighty; for so Solomon saith, <i>Sapiens +corde appellabitur prudens</i>, <i>sed dulcis eloquio majora +reperiet</i>, signifying that profoundness of wisdom will help a +man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that +prevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of +it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, +and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of +rhetoric exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of +examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, +added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath +doubled the progression in this art; and therefore the +deficiences which I shall note will rather be in some +collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the +rules or use of the art itself.</p> +<p>(2) Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about +the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest, the duty +and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the +better moving of the will. For we see reason is disturbed +in the administration thereof by three means—by +illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination +or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or +affection, which pertains to morality. And as in +negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by +importunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within +ourselves, men are undermined by inconsequences, solicited and +importuned by impressions or observations, and transported by +passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately +built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb +reason, and not to establish and advance it. For the end of +logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to +entrap it; the end of morality is to procure the affections to +obey reason, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is to fill +the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it; for +these abuses of arts come in but <i>ex oblique</i>, for +caution.</p> +<p>(3) And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though +springing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, +to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to +cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by +variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. For we see +that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is +good than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man +but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; and it was +excellently noted by Thucydides, in Cleon, that because he used +to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was +ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech, knowing that +no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And +therefore, as Plato said elegantly, “That virtue, if she +could be seen, would move great love and affection;” so +seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, +the next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively +representation; for to show her to reason only in subtlety of +argument was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the +Stoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp +disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the +will of man.</p> +<p>(4) Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and +obedient to reason, it were true there should be no great use of +persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked +proposition and proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies +and seditious of the affections—</p> +<blockquote><p> “Video meliora, +proboque,<br /> +Deteriora sequor,”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of +persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the +affections’ part, and contract a confederacy between the +reason and imagination against the affections; for the affections +themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. +The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the +present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And, +therefore, the present filling the imagination more, reason is +commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and +persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, +then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.</p> +<p>(5) We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more +charged with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with +sophistry, or morality with vice; for we know the doctrines of +contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It +appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as +the fist from the palm—the one close, the other at +large—but much more in this, that logic handleth reason +exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in +popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth +wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral +or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both; for +the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men +indifferent and the same, but the proofs and persuasions of +rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:</p> +<blockquote><p>“Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas +Arion.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Which application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far +that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, +he should speak to them all respectively and several ways; though +this politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for +the greatest orators to want: whilst, by the observing their +well-graced forms of speech, they leese the volubility of +application; and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend +this to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it +here or in that part which concerneth policy.</p> +<p>(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as +I said, are but attendances; and first, I do not find the wisdom +and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a +collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, +both simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of +rhetoric (as I touched before). For example—</p> +<blockquote><p> “Sophisma.</p> +<p>Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.</p> +<p> Redargutio.</p> +<p>Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p><i>Malum est</i>, <i>malum est</i> (<i>inquit emptor</i>): +<i>sed cum recesserit</i>, <i>tum gloriabitur</i>! The +defects in the labour of Aristotle are three—one, that +there be but a few of many; another, that there elenches are not +annexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use +of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in +impression. For many forms are equal in signification which +are differing in impression, as the difference is great in the +piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though +the strength of the percussion be the same. For there is no +man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, +“Your enemies will be glad of this”—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur +Atridæ.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>than by hearing it said only, “This is evil for +you.”</p> +<p>(7) Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, +touching provision or preparatory store for the furniture of +speech and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two +sorts: the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the +other to a shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to +that which is frequent and most in request. The former of +these I will call <i>antitheta</i>, and the latter +<i>formulæ</i>.</p> +<p>(8) <i>Antitheta</i> are theses argued <i>pro et contra</i>, +wherein men may be more large and laborious; but (in such as are +able to do it) to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of +the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute +sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of +thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; +supplying authorities and examples by reference.</p> +<blockquote><p> “<i>Pro verbis +legis</i>.<br /> +Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit a +litera:<br /> +Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.</p> +<p> <i>Pro sententia legis</i>.<br /> +Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur +singula.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>(9) <i>Formulæ</i> are but decent and apt passages or +conveyances of speech, which may serve indifferently for +differing subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression, +transition, excusation, &c. For as in buildings there +is great pleasure and use in the well casting of the staircases, +entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the +conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect.</p> +<blockquote><p>“<i>A conclusion in a deliberative</i>.<br /> +So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the +inconveniences future.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>XIX. (1) There remain two appendices touching the tradition of +knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical. For all +knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by +men’s proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal +part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of +books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books; +whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The +first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors; +wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great +prejudice. For these critics have often presumed that that +which they understand not is false set down: as the priest that, +where he found it written of St. Paul <i>Demissus est per +sportam</i>, mended his book, and made it <i>Demissus est per +portam</i>; because <i>sporta</i> was a hard word, and out of his +reading: and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable +and ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And therefore, as +it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly +the least correct.</p> +<p>The second is concerning the exposition and explication of +authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein +it is over usual to blanch the obscure places and discourse upon +the plain.</p> +<p>The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give +great light to true interpretations.</p> +<p>The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of +the authors; that men thereby may make some election unto +themselves what books to read.</p> +<p>And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of +studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.</p> +<p>(2) For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of +tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers +considerations of great fruit.</p> +<p>As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what +to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.</p> +<p>Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, +and so proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to +press the more difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy; +for it is one method to practise swimming with bladders, and +another to practise dancing with heavy shoes.</p> +<p>A third is the application of learning according unto the +propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties +intellectual, but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some +studies: as, for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, +hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a +remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a +moment, one is new to begin. And as sciences have a +propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or +powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy +profiting: and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what +kinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper for what +sciences.</p> +<p>Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great +consequence to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, +men in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised, +do exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good; so +as there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and +intermission of exercises. It were too long to +particularise a number of other considerations of this nature, +things but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy. +For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants is +that that is most important to their thriving, and as it was +noted that the first six kings being in truth as tutors of the +state of Rome in the infancy thereof was the principal cause of +the immense greatness of that state which followed, so the +culture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible +(though unseen) operation, as hardly any length of time or +contention of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it +is not amiss to observe also how small and mean faculties gotten +by education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, +do work great and important effects: whereof we see a notable +example in Tacitus of two stage players, Percennius and +Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian +armies into an extreme tumult and combustion. For there +arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus +Cæsar, Blæsus the lieutenant had committed some of +the mutineers, which were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus +got to be heard speak, which he did in this +manner:—“These poor innocent wretches appointed to +cruel death, you have restored to behold the light; but who shall +restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that was sent +hither in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the +common cause? and he hath murdered him this last night by some of +his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his +executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blæsus, what is +done with his body? The mortalest enemies do not deny +burial. When I have performed my last duties to the corpse +with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain besides him; so +that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true hearts +to the legions, may have leave to bury us.” With +which speech he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar: +whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was there any such +matter; but he played it merely as if he had been upon the +stage.</p> +<p>(3) But to return: we are now come to a period of rational +knowledges; wherein if I have made the divisions other than those +that are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow all +those divisions which I do not use. For there is a double +necessity imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The +one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together +those things which are next in nature, and those things which are +next in use. For if a secretary of estate should sort his +papers, it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort +together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, +&c. But in his boxes or particular cabinet he would +sort together those that he were like to use together, though of +several natures. So in this general cabinet of knowledge it +was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of +things; whereas if myself had been to handle any particular +knowledge, I would have respected the divisions fittest for +use. The other, because the bringing in of the deficiences +did by consequence alter the partitions of the rest. For +let the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be +fifteen. Let the knowledge with the deficiences be twenty; +the parts of fifteen are not the parts of twenty; for the parts +of fifteen are three and five; the parts of twenty are two, four, +five, and ten. So as these things are without +contradiction, and could not otherwise be.</p> +<p>XX. (1) We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of +the appetite and will of man: whereof Solomon saith, <i>Ante +omnia</i>, <i>fili</i>, <i>custodi cor tuum</i>: <i>nam inde +procedunt actiones vitæ</i>. In the handling of this +science, those which have written seem to me to have done as if a +man, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair +copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any +precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing +of the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars +and copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, +virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well described as the +true objects and scopes of man’s will and desires. +But how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and +subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these +pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and +unprofitably. For it is not the disputing that moral +virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, or the +distinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and +persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and +the like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the +absence of this part.</p> +<p>(2) The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden +rock whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have +been cast away; which is, that men have despised to be conversant +in ordinary and common matters, the judicious direction whereof +nevertheless is the wisest doctrine (for life consisteth not in +novelties nor subtleties), but contrariwise they have compounded +sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of +matter, chosen to give glory either to the subtlety of +disputatious, or to the eloquence of discourses. But Seneca +giveth an excellent check to eloquence, <i>Nocet illis +eloquentia</i>, <i>quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit</i>, <i>sed +sui</i>. Doctrine should be such as should make men in love +with the lesson, and not with the teacher; being directed to the +auditor’s benefit, and not to the author’s +commendation. And therefore those are of the right kind +which may be concluded as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, +<i>Quæ si feceritis</i>, <i>non oratorem dumtaxat in +præsentia laudabitis</i>, <i>sed vosmetipsos etiam non ita +multo post statu rerum vestraram meliore</i>.</p> +<p>(3) Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired +of a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed +obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning +in the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the +heroical acts of Æneas:</p> +<blockquote><p>“Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere +magnum<br /> +Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at +leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to +instruct and suborn action and active life, these Georgics of the +mind, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less +worthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty, and +felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of +moral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of +good, and the regiment or culture of the mind: the one describing +the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, +apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.</p> +<p>(4) The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good +considereth it either simple or compared; either the kinds of +good, or the degrees of good; in the latter whereof those +infinite disputatious which were touching the supreme degree +thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest +good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen +divinity, are by the Christian faith discharged. And as +Aristotle saith, “That young men may be happy, but not +otherwise but by hope;” so we must all acknowledge our +minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future +world.</p> +<p>(5) Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the +philosopher’s heaven, whereby they feigned a higher +elevation of man’s nature than was (for we see in what +height of style Seneca writeth, <i>Vere magnum</i>, <i>habere +fragilitatem hominis</i>, <i>securitatem Dei</i>), we may with +more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and +labours. Wherein for the nature of good positive or simple, +they have set it down excellently in describing the forms of +virtue and duty, with their situations and postures; in +distributing them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, +and administrations, and the like: nay further, they have +commended them to man’s nature and spirit with great +quickness of argument and beauty of persuasions; yea, and +fortified and entrenched them (as much as discourse can do) +against corrupt and popular opinions. Again, for the +degrees and comparative nature of good, they have also +excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the +comparisons between a contemplative and an active life, in the +distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, +in their encounters between honesty and profit, in their +balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like; so as this part +deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured.</p> +<p>(6) Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular +and received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and +the rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry +concerning the roots of good and evil, and the strings of those +roots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that which +followed; and specially if they had consulted with nature, they +had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound: which +being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much +confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear +manner.</p> +<p>(7) There is formed in everything a double nature of +good—the one, as everything is a total or substantive in +itself; the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body; +whereof the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier, +because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general +form. Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy +moveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, +it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good +patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and country of +massy bodies; so may we go forward, and see that water and massy +bodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer +a divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards +from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth +in regard of their duty to the world. This double nature of +good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven upon +man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation of duty to +the public ought to be much more precious than the conservation +of life and being; according to that memorable speech of Pompeius +Magnus, when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at +Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by +his friends about him, that he should not hazard himself to sea +in an extremity of weather, he said only to them, <i>Necesse est +ut eam</i>, <i>non ut vivam</i>. But it may be truly +affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other +discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which +is communicative, and depress the good which is private and +particular, as the Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the +same God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws +of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before; for we +read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves +anathematised and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of +charity and infinite feeling of communion.</p> +<p>(8) This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and +determine most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is +conversant. For first, it decideth the question touching +the preferment of the contemplative or active life, and decideth +it against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he bringeth +for the contemplative are private, and respecting the pleasure +and dignity of a man’s self (in which respects no question +the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence), not much unlike to +that comparison which Pythagoras made for the gracing and +magnifying of philosophy and contemplation, who being asked what +he was, answered, “That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian +games, he knew the manner, that some came to try their fortune +for the prizes, and some came as merchants to utter their +commodities, and some came to make good cheer and meet their +friends, and some came to look on; and that he was one of them +that came to look on.” But men must know, that in +this theatre of man’s life it is reserved only for God and +angels to be lookers on. Neither could the like question +ever have been received in the Church, notwithstanding their +<i>Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus</i>, by which +place they would exalt their civil death and regular professions, +but upon this defence, that the monastical life is not simple +contemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant +prayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an +office in the Church, or else of writing or taking instructions +for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did when he abode +so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch, the seventh from +Adam, who was the first contemplative and walked with God, yet +did also endow the Church with prophecy, which Saint Jude +citeth. But for contemplation which should be finished in +itself, without casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity +knoweth it not.</p> +<p>(9) It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and +Socrates, and their schools and successions, on the one side, who +placed felicity in virtue simply or attended, the actions and +exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society; and on +the other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed it in +pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used in some comedies of +errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits) to be +but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and +attended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed +it in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they +would have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the +first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor +autumn, but all after one air and season; and Herillus, which +placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the mind, +making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things +according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation; +which opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, +measuring things according to the motions of the spirit, and the +constancy or wavering of belief; all which are manifest to tend +to private repose and contentment, and not to point of +society.</p> +<p>(10) It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which +presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which +are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance; +as if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and +virtuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can wish +to ourselves in our proper fortune: as Consalvo said to his +soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting he had rather die +one foot forwards, than to have his life secured for long by one +foot of retreat. Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly +leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that “a good +conscience is a continual feast;” showing plainly that the +conscience of good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more +continual joy to nature than all the provision which can be made +for security and repose.</p> +<p>(11) It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which grew +general about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an +occupation or profession; as if the purpose had been, not to +resist and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the +causes of them, and to shape a particular kind and course of life +to that end; introducing such a health of mind, as was that +health of body of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did +nothing all his life long but intend his health; whereas if men +refer themselves to duties of society, as that health of body is +best which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities, +so likewise that health of mind is most proper which can go +through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as +Diogenes’ opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them +which abstained, but them which sustained, and could refrain +their mind <i>in præcipitio</i>, and could give unto the +mind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn.</p> +<p>(12) Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of +application in some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers +and philosophical men, that did retire too easily from civil +business, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations; whereas +the resolution of men truly moral ought to be such as the same +Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, <i>e telâ +crassiore</i>, and not so fine as that everything should catch in +it and endanger it.</p> +<p>XXI. (1) To resume private or particular good, it falleth into +the division of good active and passive; for this difference of +good (not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed +in the familiar or household terms of <i>promus</i> and +<i>condus</i>) is formed also in all things, and is best +disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures; the one to +preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or +multiply themselves, whereof the latter seemeth to be the +worthier; for in nature the heavens, which are the more worthy, +are the agent, and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the +patient. In the pleasures of living creatures, that of +generation is greater than that of food. In divine +doctrine, <i>beatius est dare quam accipere</i>. And in +life, there is no man’s spirit so soft, but esteemeth the +effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, more than +sensuality, which priority of the active good is much upheld by +the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to +fortune. For if we might have a perpetuity and certainty in +our pleasures, the state of them would advance their price. +But when we see it is but <i>magni æstimamus mori +tardius</i>, and <i>ne glorieris de crastino</i>, <i>nescis +partum diei</i>, it maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured +and exempted from time, which are only our deeds and works; as it +is said, <i>Opera eorum sequuntur eos</i>. The pre-eminence +likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is +natural in man towards variety and proceeding, which in the +pleasures of the sense, which is the principal part of passive +good, can have no great latitude. <i>Cogita quamdiu eadem +feceris</i>; <i>cibus</i>, <i>somnus</i>, <i>ludus per hunc +circulum curritur</i>; <i>mori velle non tantum fortis</i>, +<i>aut miser</i>, <i>aut prudens</i>, <i>sed etiam fastidiosus +potest</i>. But in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of +life, there is much variety; whereof men are sensible with +pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils, +reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends. So +as it was well said, <i>Vita sine proposito languida et vaga +est</i>. Neither hath this active good an identity with the +good of society, though in some cases it hath an incidence into +it. For although it do many times bring forth acts of +beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man’s +own power, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth +plainly, when it findeth a contrary subject. For that +gigantine state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the +world, such as was Lucius Sylla and infinite other in smaller +model, who would have all men happy or unhappy as they were their +friends or enemies, and would give form to the world, according +to their own humours (which is the true theomachy), pretendeth +and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth furthest from +good of society, which we have determined to be the greater.</p> +<p>(2) To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of +conservative and effective. For let us take a brief review +of that which we have said: we have spoken first of the good of +society, the intention whereof embraceth the form of human +nature, whereof we are members and portions, and not our own +proper and individual form; we have spoken of active good, and +supposed it as a part of private and particular good. And +rightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire +or appetite proceeding from love to themselves: one of preserving +and continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting +their form; and a third of multiplying and extending their form +upon other things: whereof the multiplying, or signature of it +upon other things, is that which we handled by the name of active +good. So as there remaineth the conserving of it, and +perfecting or raising of it, which latter is the highest degree +of passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, to +preserve with advancement is the greater. So in man,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Igneus est ollis vigor, et cælestis +origo.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is +the perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which +good is that which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon +the instinct of an advancement, formal and essential, is carried +to seek an advancement local. For as those which are sick, +and find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if +by a remove local they could obtain a remove internal, so is it +with men in ambition, when failing of the mean to exalt their +nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their +place. So then passive good is, as was said, either +conservative or perfective.</p> +<p>(3) To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which +consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our +natures; it seemeth to be most pure and natural of pleasures, but +yet the softest and lowest. And this also receiveth a +difference, which hath neither been well judged of, nor well +inquired; for the good of fruition or contentment is placed +either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness +and vigour of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by +vicissitude; the one having less mixture of evil, the other more +impression of good. Whether of these is the greater good is +a question controverted; but whether man’s nature may not +be capable of both is a question not inquired.</p> +<p>(4) The former question being debated between Socrates and a +sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace +of mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they +fell from argument to ill words: the sophist saying that +Socrates’ felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; +and Socrates saying that the sophist’s felicity was the +felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and +scratch. And both these opinions do not want their +supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the +general consent even of the epicures themselves, that virtue +beareth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that +virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations then in compassing +desires. The sophist’s opinion is much favoured by +the assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is +greater than good of simple preservation; because every obtaining +a desire hath a show of advancement, as motion though in a circle +hath a show of progression.</p> +<p>(5) But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the +former superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there +are some who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some +other, and yet, nevertheless, are less troubled with the loss or +leaving of them? So as this same, <i>Non uti ut non +appetas</i>, <i>non appetere ut non metuas</i>, <i>sunt animi +pusilli et diffidentis</i>. And it seemeth to me that most +of the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and +cautious than the nature of things requireth. So have they +increased the fear of death in offering to cure it. For +when they would have a man’s whole life to be but a +discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men think +that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of +preparing. Better saith the poet:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera +ponat<br /> +Naturæ.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>So have they sought to make men’s minds too uniform and +harmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary +motions; the reasons whereof I suppose to be, because they +themselves were men dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied +course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like +instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many +changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops +and passages, as a set song or voluntary; much after the same +manner was the diversity between a philosophical and civil +life. And, therefore, men are to imitate the wisdom of +jewellers: who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice which +may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone, they +help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, +they will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity +as they destroy not magnanimity.</p> +<p>(6) Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private +and particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that +good of man which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may +term duty; because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well +framed and disposed towards others, as the term of virtue is +applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself; though +neither can a man understand virtue without some relation to +society, nor duty without an inward disposition. This part +may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic; but +not if it be well observed. For it concerneth the regiment +and government of every man over himself, and not over +others. And as in architecture the direction of framing the +posts, beams, and other parts of building, is not the same with +the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in +mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or engine +is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and +employing it; and yet, nevertheless, in expressing of the one you +incidently express the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine +of conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their +conformity thereunto.</p> +<p>(7) This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common +duty of every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the +respective or special duty of every man in his profession, +vocation, and place. The first of these is extant and well +laboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may +report rather dispersed than deficient; which manner of dispersed +writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best. +For who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, +challenge, and right of every several vocation, profession, and +place? For although sometimes a looker on may see more than +a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, +“That the vale best discovereth the hill;” yet there +is small doubt but that men can write best and most really and +materially in their own professions; and that the writing of +speculative men of active matter for the most part doth seem to +men of experience, as Phormio’s argument of the wars seemed +to Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one +vice which accompanieth them that write in their own professions, +that they magnify them in excess. But generally it were to +be wished (as that which would make learning indeed solid and +fruitful) that active men would or could become writers.</p> +<p>(8) In which kind I cannot but mention, <i>honoris causa</i>, +your Majesty’s excellent book touching the duty of a king; +a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with +great aspersion of all other arts; and being in some opinion one +of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read: not +distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the coldness of +negligence; not sick of dizziness, as those are who leese +themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which +cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and +paintings, as those do who seek to please the reader more than +nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, +being agreeable to truth and apt for action; and far removed from +that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in +their own professions to be subject—which is, that they +exalt it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly +described, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory, +but a Moses or a David, pastors of their people. Neither +can I ever leese out of my remembrance what I heard your Majesty +in the same sacred spirit of government deliver in a great cause +of judicature, which was, “That kings ruled by their laws, +as God did by the laws of nature; and ought as rarely to put in +use their supreme prerogative as God doth His power of working +miracles.” And yet notwithstanding in your book of a +free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know +the plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well as the +circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to +allege this excellent writing of your Majesty, as a prime or +eminent example of tractates concerning special and respective +duties; wherein I should have said as much, if it had been +written a thousand years since. Neither am I moved with +certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in +presence. No, it is flattery to praise in +absence—that is, when either the virtue is absent, or the +occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced, +either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his +oration <i>pro Marcello</i>, which is nothing but an excellent +table of Cæsar’s virtue, and made to his face; +besides the example of many other excellent persons, wiser a +great deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a +full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.</p> +<p>(9) But to return; there belongeth further to the handling of +this part, touching the duties of professions and vocations, a +relative or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, +and vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled; +but how? rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously and +wisely; for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce +much of that which is good in professions, than with judgment to +discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Solomon +saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to +scorn and censure shall be sure to find matter for his humour, +but no matter for his instruction: <i>Quærenti derisori +scientiam ipsa se abscondit</i>; <i>sed studioso fit +obviam</i>. But the managing of this argument with +integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to +be one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can +be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the +basilisk—that if he see you first, you die for it; but if +you see him first, he dieth—so is it with deceits and evil +arts, which, if they be first espied they leese their life; but +if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much +beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not +what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join +serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know +exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his baseness and going +upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and sting, +and the rest—that is, all forms and natures of evil. +For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an +honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim +them, without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of +corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity +of manners, and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and +men’s exterior language. So as, except you can make +them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own +corrupt opinions, they despise all morality. <i>Non recipit +stultus verba prudentiæ</i>, <i>nisi ea dixeris +quæ</i>, <i>versantur in corde ejus</i>.</p> +<p>(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also +appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, +master and servant. So likewise the laws of friendship and +gratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic +bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties; not +as they are parts of government and society, but as to the +framing of the mind of particular persons.</p> +<p>(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth +handle it also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto +belongeth the weighing of duties between person and person, case +and case, particular and public. As we see in the +proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so +much extolled, yet what was said?</p> +<blockquote><p>“Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata +minores.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. +Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper +certain whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit +to be made their associates, and cast forth the question touching +the killing of a tyrant being a usurper, they were divided in +opinion; some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, +and others that tyranny was better than a civil war: and a number +of the like cases there are of comparative duty. Amongst +which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question +is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice. +Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: <i>Aliqua +sunt injuste facienda</i>, <i>ut multa juste fieri +possint</i>. But the reply is good: <i>Auctorem +præsentis justitiæ habes</i>, <i>sponsorem +futuræ non habes</i>. Men must pursue things which +are just in present, and leave the future to the Divine +Providence. So then we pass on from this general part +touching the exemplar and description of good.</p> +<p>XXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of +life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth +thereunto, without which part the former seemeth to be no better +than a fair image or statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, +but is without life and motion; whereunto Aristotle himself +subscribeth in these words: <i>Necesse est scilicet de virtute +dicere</i>, <i>et quid sit</i>, <i>et ex quibus +gignatur</i>. <i>Inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem +nosse</i>, <i>acquirendæ autem ejus modos et vias +ignorare</i>. <i>Non enum de virtute tantum</i>, <i>qua +specie sit</i>, <i>quærendum est</i>, <i>sed et quomodo sui +copiam faciat</i>: <i>utrumque enum volumeus</i>, <i>et rem ipsam +nosse</i>, <i>et ejus compotes fieri</i>: <i>hoc autem ex voto +non succedet</i>, <i>nisi sciamus et ex quibus et +quomodo</i>. In such full words and with such iteration +doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great +commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied himself to +philosophy, <i>Non ita disputandi causa</i>, <i>sed ita +vivendi</i>. And although the neglect of our times, wherein +few men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of +their life (as Seneca excellently saith, <i>De partibus +vitæ quisque deliberat</i>, <i>de summa nemo</i>), may make +this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with that +aphorism of Hippocrates, <i>Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non +sentiunt</i>, <i>iis mens ægrotat</i>. They need +medicine, not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the +sense. And if it be said that the cure of men’s minds +belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral +philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble +handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, “That the eyes of +the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress,” and +yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the +handmaid to discern of the mistress’ will; so ought moral +philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of +divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due +limits) many sound and profitable directions.</p> +<p>(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I +cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to +written inquiry; the rather, because it consisteth of much +matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant; and +such wherein the common talk of men (which is rare, but yet +cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their books. It is +reasonable, therefore, that we propound it in the more +particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit +ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost +incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those +themselves that have written. We will, therefore, enumerate +some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better what +it is, and whether it be extant.</p> +<p>(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are +practical we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, +and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, +but the other by way of application only. The husbandman +cannot command neither the nature of the earth nor the seasons of +the weather; no more can the physician the constitution of the +patient nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture and +cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command: +points of Nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis +of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited +and tied. In these things, therefore, it is left unto us to +proceed by application:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Vincenda est omnis fertuna +ferendo:”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>and so likewise,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Vincenda est omnis Natura +ferendo.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull +and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, +which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which +seemeth adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we +call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom of +application resteth principally in the exact and distinct +knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we do +apply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take measure +of the body.</p> +<p>(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set +down sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several +characters and tempers of men’s natures and dispositions, +specially having regard to those differences which are most +radical in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most +frequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the +handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the +mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention. +For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which +are proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which +Aristotle handleth, or ought to have bandied, by the name of +magnanimity), doth it not deserve as well to be considered that +there are minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others +to few? So that some can divide themselves: others can +perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things at +once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as +a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are +proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or within a +short return of time; others to that which begins afar off, and +is to be won with length of pursuit:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Jam tum tenditqus fovetque.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is +commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further +deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, “That there is a +disposition in conversation (supposing it in things which do in +no sort touch or concern a man’s self) to soothe and +please, and a disposition contrary to contradict and +cross;” and deserveth it not much better to be +considered. “That there is a disposition, not in +conversation or talk, but in matter of more serious nature (and +supposing it still in things merely indifferent), to take +pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, +to take distaste at the good of another?” which is that +properly which we call good nature or ill nature, benignity or +malignity; and, therefore, I cannot sufficiently marvel that this +part of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures and +dispositions, should be omitted both in morality and policy, +considering it is of so great ministry and suppeditation to them +both. A man shall find in the traditions of astrology some +pretty and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to the +predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, lovers of action, +lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers +of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find +in the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians make +touching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals +handsomely and lively painted forth. A man shall meet with +in every day’s conference the denominations of sensitive, +dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, <i>huomo di prima +impressione</i>, <i>huomo di ultima impressione</i>, and the +like; and yet, nevertheless, this kind of observations wandereth +in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions +are found (many of them), but we conclude no precepts upon them: +wherein our fault is the greater, because both history, poesy, +and daily experience are as goodly fields where these +observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our +hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary that +receipts might be made of them for use of life.</p> +<p>(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which +are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, +by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, +which are inherent and not extern; and again, those which are +caused by extern fortune, as sovereignty, nobility, obscure +birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, +adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising <i>per +saltum</i>, <i>per gradus</i>, and the like. And, +therefore, we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old +man beneficent, <i>benignitas hujis ut adolescentuli +est</i>. Saint Paul concludeth that severity of discipline +was to be used to the Cretans, <i>increpa eos dure</i>, upon the +disposition of their country, <i>Cretensus semper mendaces</i>, +<i>malæ bestiæ</i>, <i>ventres</i>. Sallust +noteth that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories: +<i>Sed plerumque regiæ voluntates</i>, <i>ut vehementes +sunt</i>, <i>sic mobiles</i>, <i>sæpeque ipsæ sibi +advers</i>. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the +fortune mendeth the disposition: <i>solus Vespasianus mutatus in +melius</i>. Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and +sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men <i>qui magnam +felicitatem concoquere non possunt</i>. So the Psalm +showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of +fortune, than in the increase of fortune; <i>Divitiæ si +affluant</i>, <i>nolite cor apponere</i>. These +observations and the like I deny not but are touched a little by +Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some +scattered discourses; but they were never incorporate into moral +philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the +knowledge of this diversity of grounds and moulds doth to +agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions +and constitutions doth to the physician, except we mean to follow +the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines +to all patients.</p> +<p>(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching +the affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order +first to know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, +the diseases; and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the +mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men’s +natures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and +infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the +perturbations and distempars of the affections. For as the +ancient politiques in popular estates were wont to compare the +people to the sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the +sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move +and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable if +the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation: +so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof +would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did +not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I +find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written +divers volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which +is the principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where +they are considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as +they may be moved by speech), he findeth place for them, and +handleth them well for the quantity; but where their true place +is he pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations +about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, no more +than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be +said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are +to the particular affections as light is to particular +colours. Better travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken +in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have at +second hand. But yet it is like it was after their manner, +rather in subtlety of definitions (which in a subject of this +nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample +descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some +particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the +affections: as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of +tenderness of countenance, and other. But the poets and +writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge; +where we may find painted forth, with great life, how affections +are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how +again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose +themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and +fortify: how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they +do fight and encounter one with another; and other the like +particularities. Amongst the which this last is of special +use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection +against affection, and to master one by another; even as we used +to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise +percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is +erected that excellent use of <i>præmium</i> and +<i>pæna</i>, whereby civil states consist: employing the +predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and +bridling the rest. For as in the government of states it is +sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is +in the government within.</p> +<p>(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own +command, and have force and operation upon the mind, to affect +the will and appetite, and to alter manners: wherein they ought +to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, example, +imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, +exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these as they have +determinate use in moralities, from these the mind suffereth, and +of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and +described, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and +good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: +of which number we will insist upon some one or two, as an +example of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; +and therefore we do resume custom and habit to speak of.</p> +<p>(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent +opinion, that of those things which consist by Nature, nothing +can be changed by custom; using for example, that if a stone be +thrown ten thousand times up it will not learn to ascend; and +that by often seeing or hearing we do not learn to see or hear +the better. For though this principle be true in things +wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot now +stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature +admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove +will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use +bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we +speak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or +cold we endure it the better, and the like: which latter sort +have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he +handleth, than those instances which he allegeth. But +allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, +he ought so much the more to have taught the manner of +superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts of the wise +ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the +exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few.</p> +<p>(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the +first either too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a +diffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature you breed +an opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures you +breed a further expectation than can hold out, and so an +insatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the other side, you +may not look to perform and overcome any great task.</p> +<p>(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two +several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other +when it is worst disposed; that by the one you may gain a great +step, by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the +mind, and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant.</p> +<p>(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the +way, which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that +whereunto we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against +the stream, or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to +his natural crookedness.</p> +<p>(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything +better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto +you pretend be not first in the intention, but <i>tanquam aliud +agendo</i>, because of the natural hatred of the mind against +necessity and constraint. Many other axioms there are +touching the managing of exercise and custom, which being so +conducted doth prove indeed another nature; but, being governed +by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of Nature, and bringeth +forth that which is lame and counterfeit.</p> +<p>(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what +influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not +divers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining +thereunto? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation +call poesy <i>vinum dæmonum</i>, because it increaseth +temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the +opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, +“That young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, +because they are not settled from the boiling heat of their +affections, nor attempered with time and experience”? +And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and +discourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded +unto virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and +majesty, and popular opinions against virtue in their +parasites’ coats fit to be scorned and derided), are of so +little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read +and revolved by men in their mature and settled years, but +confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true +also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of +policy, till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and +morality; lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to +think that there are no true differences of things, but according +to utility and fortune, as the verse describes it, <i>Prosperum +et felix scelus virtus vocatur</i>; and again, <i>Ille crucem +pretium sceleris tulit</i>, <i>hic diadema</i>: which the poets +do speak satirically and in indignation on virtue’s behalf; +but books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so +it pleaseth Machiavel to say, “That if Cæsar had been +overthrown, he would have been more odious than ever was +Catiline;” as if there had been no difference, but in +fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most +excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? +Again, is there not a caution likewise to be given of the +doctrines of moralities themselves (some kinds of them), lest +they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero +saith of Cato, <i>In Marco Catone hæc bona quæ +videmus divina et egregia</i>, <i>ipsius scitote esse +propria</i>; <i>quæ nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non +a natura</i>, <i>sed a magistro</i>? Many other axioms and +advices there are touching those proprieties and effects, which +studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so, +likewise, is there touching the use of all those other points, of +company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the +beginning in the doctrine of morality.</p> +<p>(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth +yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon +this ground; that the minds of all men are at some times in a +state more perfect, and at other times in a state more +depraved. The purpose, therefore, of this practice is to +fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate and +take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been +practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and +observances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in +themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual +obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been practised +by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that which +is past, and an inception or account <i>de novo</i> for the time +to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and +justly; for all good moral philosophy (as was said) is but a +handmaid to religion.</p> +<p>(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is +of all other means the most compendious and summary, and again, +the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto +virtue and good estate; which is, the electing and propounding +unto a man’s self good and virtuous ends of his life, such +as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to +attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set +before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, +constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould +himself into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like +the work of nature; whereas the other course is like the work of +the hand. For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes +only that part whereupon he worketh; as if he be upon the face, +that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till +such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when nature +makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all +the parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, +while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to +fortitude, nor the like but when he dedicateth and applieth +himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and +passage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested +of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto. +Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, +that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine. His +words are these: <i>Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere +eam</i>, <i>quæ supra humanitatem est</i>, <i>heroicam sive +divinam virtutem</i>; and a little after, <i>Nam ut feræ +neque vitium neque virtus est</i>, <i>swic neque Dei</i>: <i>sed +hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est</i>, <i>ille aluid +quiddam a vitio</i>. And therefore we may see what +celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in his +funeral oration, where he said, “That men needed to make no +other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good +lords to them as Trajan had been;” as if he had not been +only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. +But these be heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of +that divine state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth +conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity, which +is excellently called the bond of perfection, because it +comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. And as it +is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false +imitation of divine love, <i>Amor melior Sophista lœvo ad +humanam vitam</i>—that love teacheth a man to carry himself +better than the sophist or preceptor; which he calleth +left-handed, because, with all his rules and preceptions, he +cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility to prize +himself and govern himself, as love can do: so certainly, if a +man’s mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him +suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of +morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the +other. Nay, further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all +other affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by +distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only +love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant +doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though +they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only +charity admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be +like God in power, the angels transgressed and fell; +<i>Ascendam</i>, <i>et ero similis altissimo</i>: by aspiring to +be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; <i>Eritis +sicut Dii</i>, <i>scientes bonum et malum</i>: but by aspiring to +a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel +ever transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that +imitation we are called: <i>Diligite inimicos vestros</i>, +<i>benefacite eis qui oderunt vos</i>, <i>et orate pro +persequentibus et calumniantibus vos</i>, <i>ut sitis filii +Patris vestri qui in cœlis est</i>, <i>qui solem suum oriri +facit super bonos et malos</i>, <i>et pluit super justos et +injustos</i>. So in the first platform of the divine nature +itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, <i>Optimus +Maximus</i>: and the sacred Scriptures thus, <i>Miscericordia +ejus super omnia opera ejus</i>.</p> +<p>(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, +concerning the culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any +man, considering the arts thereof which I have enumerated, do +judge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science +that which hath been pretermitted by others, as matter of common +sense and experience, he judgeth well. But as Philocrates +sported with Demosthenes, “You may not marvel (Athenians) +that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I +drink wine;” and like as we read of an ancient parable of +the two gates of sleep—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum +altera fertur<br /> +Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:<br /> +Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,<br /> +Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a +sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“of +wine”) is the more vaporous, and the braver gate (“of +ivory”) sendeth forth the falser dreams.</p> +<p>(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human +philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he +consisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, +that there seemeth to be a relation or conformity between the +good of the mind and the good of the body. For as we +divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and +pleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral +knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without +perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and +agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, +so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is +easy to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but +have neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or decency +in their doings; some again have an elegancy and fineness of +carriage which have neither soundness of honesty nor substance of +sufficiency; and some again have honest and reformed minds, that +can neither become themselves nor manage business; and sometimes +two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, we +have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to +stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of +it, than in the strength and vigour of it.</p> +<p>XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which +of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced +to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, +“That the Romans were like sheep, for that a man were +better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, +if you could get but some few go right, the rest would +follow:” so in that respect moral philosophy is more +difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth +to itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge +requireth only an external goodness; for that as to society +sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft to pass that there +be evil times in good governments: for so we find in the Holy +story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, <i>Sed adhuc +poulus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum +suorum</i>. Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, +and are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven +good years sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time +well grounded do bear out errors following; but the resolution of +particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These +respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil +knowledge.</p> +<p>(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three +summary actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, +and government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, +and protection; and they be three wisdoms of divers natures which +do often sever—wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of business, +and wisdom of state.</p> +<p>(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much +affected, but much less despised; for it hath not only an honour +in itself, but an influence also into business and +government. The poet saith, <i>Nec vultu destrue verba +tuo</i>: a man may destroy the force of his words with his +countenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending +to his brother affability and easy access; <i>Nil interest habere +ostium apertum</i>, <i>vultum clausum</i>: it is nothing won to +admit men with an open door, and to receive them with a shut and +reserved countenance. So we see Atticus, before the first +interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending, did +seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of +his countenance and gesture. And if the government of the +countenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech, +and other carriage appertaining to conversation; the true model +whereof seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, though not meant +for this purpose: <i>Ne aut arrogans videar</i>, <i>aut +obnoxius</i>; <i>quorum alterum est àlienæ +libertatis obliti</i>, <i>alterum suæ</i>: the sum of +behaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity, without +intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if +behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may +pass into affectation, and then <i>Quid deformius quam scenam in +vitam transferre</i>—to act a man’s life? But +although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time, +and employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to +advise young students from company keeping, by saying, <i>Amici +fures temporis</i>: so certainly the intending of the discretion +of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as +are accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in +it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have +defect in it do seek comeliness by reputation; for where +reputation is, almost everything becometh; but where that is not, +it must be supplied by <i>puntos</i> and compliments. +Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an +over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, +which is time and season. For as Solomon saith, <i>Qui +respicit ad ventos</i>, <i>non seminat</i>; <i>et qui respicit ad +nubes</i>, <i>non metet</i>: a man must make his opportunity, as +oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as a +garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a +garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not +to be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any +good making of the mind and hide any deformity; and above all, it +ought not to be too strait or restrained for exercise or +motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been +elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for +deficient.</p> +<p>(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been +hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation of +learning and the professors of learning. For from this root +springeth chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed +in adage to this effect, that there is no great concurrence +between learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which +we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of +behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an +inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of +government, they acquit themselves well when they are called to +it, but that happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, +wherein man’s life is most conversant, there be no books of +it, except some few scattered advertisements, that have no +proportion to the magnitude of this subject. For if books +were written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned men +with mean experience would far excel men of long experience +without learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.</p> +<p>(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this +knowledge should be so variable as it falleth not under precept; +for it is much less infinite than science of government, which we +see is laboured and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom it +seemeth some of the ancient Romans in the saddest and wisest +times were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in +use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, +as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at +certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that +would use their advice; and that the particular citizens would +resort unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a +daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase or +bargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion incident +to man’s life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel and +advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal insight +into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon +particular causes propounded, but is gathered by general +observation of causes of like nature. For so we see in the +book which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother, <i>De petitione +consulatus</i> (being the only book of business that I know +written by the ancients), although it concerned a particular +action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many +wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a +perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But +chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place amongst +divine writings, composed by Solomon the king, of whom the +Scriptures testify that his heart was as the sands of the sea, +encompassing the world and all worldly matters, we see, I say, +not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, +extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay a +while, offering to consideration some number of examples.</p> +<p>(6) <i>Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes +aurem tuam</i>, <i>ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem +tibi</i>. Here is commended the provident stay of inquiry +of that which we would be loth to find: as it was judged great +wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’ papers +unperused.</p> +<p><i>Vir sapiens</i>, <i>si cum stulto contenderit</i>, <i>sive +irascatur</i>, <i>sive rideat</i>, <i>non inveniet +requiem</i>. Here is described the great disadvantage which +a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself; +which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to +jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no +ways quit himself well of it.</p> +<p><i>Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum</i>, <i>postea +sentiet eum contumacem</i>. Here is signified, that if a +man begin too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end +in unkindness and unthankfulness.</p> +<p><i>Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo</i>? <i>coram regibus +stabit</i>, <i>nec erit inter ignobiles</i>. Here is +observed, that of all virtues for rising to honour, quickness of +despatch is the best; for superiors many times love not to have +those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and +diligent.</p> +<p><i>Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole</i>, <i>cum +adolescente secundo qui consurgit pro eo</i>. Here is +expressed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by +Tiberius. <i>Plures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem +vel meridianum</i>.</p> +<p><i>Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te</i>, +<i>locum tuum ne demiseris</i>; <i>quia curatio faciet cessare +peccata maxima</i>. Here caution is given, that upon +displeasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man +leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make +them better.</p> +<p><i>Erat civitas parva</i>, <i>et pauci in ea viri</i>: +<i>venit contra eam rex magnus</i>, <i>et vallavit eam</i>, +<i>instruxitque munitones per gyrum</i>, <i>et perfecta est +obsidio</i>; <i>inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens</i>, +<i>et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam</i>; <i>et nullus +deinceps recordatus est huminis illius pauperis</i>. Here +the corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue or +merit longer than they have use of it.</p> +<p><i>Millis responsio frangit iram</i>. Here is noted that +silence or rough answer exasperateth; but an answer present and +temperate pacifieth.</p> +<p><i>Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum</i>. Here is +lively represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end; for +when things are deferred till the last instant, and nothing +prepared beforehand, every step findeth a briar or impediment, +which catcheth or stoppeth.</p> +<p><i>Melior est finis orationis quam principium</i>. Here +is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about +prefaces and inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of +speech.</p> +<p><i>Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem</i>, <i>non bene facit</i>; +<i>iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem</i>. Here +is noted, that a judge were better be a briber than a respecter +of persons; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a +facile.</p> +<p><i>Vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri +vehementi</i>, <i>in quo paratur fames</i>. Here is +expressed the extremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the +ancient fable of the full and the hungry horseleech.</p> +<p><i>Fons turbatus pede</i>, <i>et vena corrupta</i>, <i>est +justus cadens coram impio</i>. Here is noted, that one +judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world doth +trouble the fountains of justice more than many particular +injuries passed over by connivance.</p> +<p><i>Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre</i>, <i>et dicit +hoc non esse peccatum</i>, <i>particeps est homicidii</i>. +Here is noted that, whereas men in wronging their best friends +use to extenuate their fault, as if they might presume or be bold +upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and +turneth it from injury to impiety.</p> +<p><i>Noli esse amicus homini iracundo</i>, <i>nec ambulato cum +homine furioso</i>. Here caution is given, that in the +election of our friends we do principally avoid those which are +impatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions and +quarrels.</p> +<p><i>Qui conturbat domum suam</i>, <i>possidebit +ventum</i>. Here is noted, that in domestical separations +and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting of their mind +and contentment; but still they are deceived of their +expectation, and it turneth to wind.</p> +<p><i>Filius sapiens lætificat patrem</i>: <i>filius vero +stultus mæstitia est matri suæ</i>. Here is +distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the good proof +of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill +proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of +fortune.</p> +<p><i>Qui celat delictum</i>, <i>quærit amicitiam</i>; +<i>sed qui altero sermone repetit</i>, <i>separat +fæderatos</i>. Here caution is given, that +reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over +that which is past, than by apologies and excuses.</p> +<p><i>In omni opere bono erit abundantia</i>; <i>ubi autem verba +sunt plurima</i>, <i>ibi frequenter egestas</i>. Here is +noted, that words and discourse aboundeth most where there is +idleness and want.</p> +<p><i>Primus in sua causa justus</i>: <i>sed venit altera +pars</i>, <i>et inquiret in eum</i>. Here is observed, that +in all causes the first tale possesseth much; in sort, that the +prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some +abuse or falsity in the information be detected.</p> +<p><i>Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia</i>, <i>et ipsa perveniunt +ad interiora ventris</i>. Here is distinguished, that +flattery and insinuation, which seemeth set and artificial, +sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which hath show of +nature, liberty, and simplicity.</p> +<p><i>Qui erudit derisorem</i>, <i>ipse sibi injuriam facit</i>; +<i>et qui arguit impium</i>, <i>sibi maculam generat</i>. +Here caution is given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and +scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, and +accordingly to return it.</p> +<p><i>Da sapienti occasionem</i>, <i>et addetur ei +sapientia</i>. Here is distinguished the wisdom brought +into habit, and that which is but verbal and swimming only in +conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is quickened and +redoubled, the other is amazed and confused.</p> +<p><i>Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium</i>, +<i>sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus</i>. Here +the mind of a wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the images +of all diversity of natures and customs are represented; from +which representation proceedeth that application,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus +erit.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences +politic of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an +example; led with a desire to give authority to this part of +knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excellent a +precedent; and have also attended them with brief observations, +such as to my understanding offer no violence to the sense, +though I know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is +allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, and +some writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking +them as instructions for life, they might have received large +discourse, if I would have broken them and illustrated them by +deducements and examples.</p> +<p>(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is +generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; +that as men found out any observation that they thought was good +for life, they would gather it and express it in parable or +aphorism or fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents +and supplies where examples failed: now that the times abound +with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And +therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for +this variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which +Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, +discourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge drawn +freshly and in our view out of particulars, knoweth the way best +to particulars again. And it hath much greater life for +practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when +the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no +point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. +For when the example is the ground, being set down in a history +at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may +sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes +supply it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples +alleged for the discourse’s sake are cited succinctly, and +without particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the +discourse which they are brought in to make good.</p> +<p>(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as +history of times is the best ground for discourse of government, +such as Machiavel handleth, so histories of lives is the most +popular for discourse of business, because it is more conversant +in private actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for +this purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon +letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero +<i>ad Atticum</i>, and others. For letters have a great and +more particular representation of business than either chronicles +or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form +of this part of civil knowledge, touching negotiation, which we +note to be deficient.</p> +<p>(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which +differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken as +<i>sapere</i> and <i>sibi sapere</i>, the one moving as it were +to the circumference, the other to the centre. For there is +a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a +man’s own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often +sever. For many are wise in their own ways that are weak +for government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature +for itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom +the Romans did take much knowledge of: <i>Nam pol sapiens</i> +(saith the comical poet) <i>fingit fortunam sibi</i>; and it grew +to an adage, <i>Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ</i>; +and Livy attributed it to Cato the first, <i>In hoc viro tanta +vis animi et ingenii inerat</i>, <i>ut quocunque loco natus esset +sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur</i>.</p> +<p>(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and +professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as +was observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many +great services to the state in his government, and giving an +account thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude +every particular with this clause, “And in this fortune had +no part.” And it came so to pass, that he never +prospered in anything he took in hand afterwards. For this +is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel +saith of Pharaoh, <i>Dicis</i>, <i>Fluvius est neus et ego feci +memet ipsum</i>; or of that which another prophet speaketh, that +men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and that which the +poet expresseth,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile +libro,<br /> +Nunc adsint!”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; +and, therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever +ascribed their successes to their felicity and not to their skill +or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not +Magnus. So Cæsar said to the master of the ship, +<i>Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus</i>.</p> +<p>(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, <i>Faber quisque +fortunæ suæ</i>: <i>Sapiens dominabitur astris</i>: +<i>Invia virtuti null est via</i>, and the like, being taken and +used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to insolency, +rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward +declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are no +question imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of +this opinion as they can scarce contain it within. As we +see in Augustus Cæsar (who was rather diverse from his +uncle than inferior in virtue), how when he died he desired his +friends about him to give him a <i>plaudite</i>, as if he were +conscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the +stage. This part of knowledge we do report also as +deficient; not but that it is practised too much, but it hath not +been reduced to writing. And, therefore, lest it should +seem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is +requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some heads +or passages of it.</p> +<p>(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted +argument to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a +doctrine wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield +himself a disciple, till he see the difficulty: for fortune +layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is as hard and +severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly +moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, +both in honour and in substance. In honour, because +pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is +like a lark, that can mount and sing, and please herself, and +nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, +that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the +prey. In substance, because it is the perfect law of +inquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of matter, which +should not be likewise in the globe of crystal or form; that is, +that there be not anything in being and action which should not +be drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine. +Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of +fortune otherwise than as of an inferior work, for no man’s +fortune can be an end worthy of his being, and many times the +worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better +respects: but nevertheless fortune as an organ of virtue and +merit deserveth the consideration.</p> +<p>(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most +summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that +window which Momus did require; who seeing in the frame of +man’s heart such angles and recesses, found fault there was +not a window to look into them; that is, to procure good +informations of particulars touching persons, their natures, +their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps +and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand, so again their +weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and +obnoxious, their friends, factions, dependences; and again their +opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times, <i>Sola +viri molles aditus et tempora noras</i>; their principles, rules, +and observations, and the like: and this not only of persons but +of actions; what are on foot from time to time, and how they are +conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the +like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only +material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons +is very erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whilst +they are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their +nature they are another. These informations of particulars, +touching persons and actions, are as the minor propositions in +every active syllogism; for no excellency of observations (which +are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground a +conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.</p> +<p>(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, +who saith, <i>Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda</i>; +<i>sed vir prudens exhauriet illud</i>. And although the +knowledge itself falleth not under precept because it is of +individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it +may.</p> +<p>(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to +the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of +belief and distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and +deeds than to words; and in words rather to sudden passages and +surprised words than to set and purposed words. Neither let +that be feared which is said, <i>Fronti nulla fides</i>, which is +meant of a general outward behaviour, and not of the private and +subtle motions and labours of the countenance and gesture; which, +as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is <i>Animi janua</i>, “the +gate of the mind.” None more close than Tiberius, and +yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, <i>Etenim vultu offensionem +conjectaverat</i>. So again, noting the differing character +and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the Senate, +he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of +Germanicus, thus: <i>Magis in speciem adornatis verbis</i>, +<i>quam ut penitus sentire crederetur</i>; but of Drusus thus: +<i>Paucioribus sed intentior</i>, <i>et fida oratione</i>; and in +another place, speaking of his character of speech when he did +anything that was gracious and popular, he saith, “That in +other things he was <i>velut eluctantium verborum</i>;” but +then again, <i>solutius loquebatur quando subveniret</i>. +So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such +commanded countenance (<i>vultus jussus</i>), that can sever from +a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more slight and +careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and +wandering, or coming from a man more drily and hardly.</p> +<p>(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may +be trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude +and nature: <i>Fraus sibi in parvis fidem præstruit ut +majore emolumento fallat</i>; and the Italian thinketh himself +upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better used than +he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small +favours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and as +to industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, <i>Alimenta +socordiæ</i>. So again we see how false the nature of +some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon +Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement +which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of +the friends of Antonius, <i>Simul amicis ejus præfecturas +et tribunatus largitur</i>: wherein, under pretence to strengthen +him, he did desolate him, and won from him his dependents.</p> +<p>(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, +full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised +specially with the advantage of passion and affection. For +so we see Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing speech of +Agrippina, came a step forth of his dissimulation when he said, +“You are hurt because you do not reign;” of which +Tacitus saith, <i>Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem +elicuere</i>: <i>correptamque Græco versu admonuit</i>, +<i>ideo lædi quia non regnaret</i>. And, therefore, +the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men to +confess their secrets:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Vino torus et ira.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves +and so settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon +bravery, sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind +and weakness, they open themselves; specially if they be put to +it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of +Spain, <i>Di mentira</i>, <i>y sacar as verdad</i>: “Tell a +lie and find a truth.”</p> +<p>(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from +reports: men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from +their enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends, +their customs and times from their servants, their conceits and +opinions from their familiar friends, with whom they discourse +most. General fame is light, and the opinions conceived by +superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more +masked: <i>Verior fama e domesticis emanat</i>.</p> +<p>(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by +their natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best +interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. +For it was both pleasantly and wisely said (though I think very +untruly) by a nuncio of the Pope, returning from a certain nation +where he served as lidger; whose opinion being asked touching the +appointment of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case +they did not send one that was too wise; because no very wise man +would ever imagine what they in that country were like to +do. And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot +over, and to suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than +are: the Italian proverb being elegant, and for the most part +true:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Di danari, di senno, e di fede,<br /> +C’è ne manco che non credi.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>“There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less +good faith than men do account upon.”</p> +<p>(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best +interpreted by their natures, and private persons by their +ends. For princes being at the top of human desires, they +have for the most part no particular ends whereto they aspire, by +distance from which a man might take measure and scale of the +rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes +that maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it +sufficient to inform ourselves in men’s ends and natures of +the variety of them only, but also of the predominancy, what +humour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. +For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by +Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures, +<i>metus ejus rimatur</i>, he wrought upon Nero’s fears, +whereby he broke the other’s neck.</p> +<p>(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way +resteth in three things; the first, to have general acquaintance +and inwardness with those which have general acquaintance and +look most into the world; and specially according to the +diversity of business, and the diversity of persons, to have +privacy and conversation with some one friend at least which is +perfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind. The +second is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and +secrecy; in most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for +liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used +again, and so bringeth much to a man’s knowledge; and +secrecy on the other side induceth trust and inwardness. +The last is the reducing of a man’s self to this watchful +and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every +conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as +Epictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to +say to himself, <i>Et hoc volo</i>, <i>et etiam institutum +servare</i>; so a politic man in everything should say to +himself, <i>Et hoc volo</i>, <i>ac etiam aliquid +addiscere</i>. I have stayed the longer upon this precept +of obtaining good information because it is a main part by +itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all +things, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold +of themselves, and that this much knowing do not draw on much +meddling; for nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash +intermeddling in many matters. So that this variety of +knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to this, to make a +better and freer choice of those actions which may concern us, +and to conduct them with the less error and the more +dexterity.</p> +<p>(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men +to take good information touching their own person, and well to +understand themselves; knowing that, as St. James saith, though +men look oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; +wherein as the divine glass is the Word of God, so the politic +glass is the state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the +which we are to behold ourselves.</p> +<p>(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own +abilities and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; +accounting these with the most, and those other with the least; +and from this view and examination to frame the considerations +following.</p> +<p>(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature +sorteth with the general state of the times; which if they find +agreeable and fit, then in all things to give themselves more +scope and liberty; but if differing and dissonant, then in the +whole course of their life to be more close retired, and +reserved; as we see in Tiberius, who was never seen at a play, +and came not into the senate in twelve of his last years; whereas +Augustus Cæsar lived ever in men’s eyes, which +Tacitus observeth, <i>alia Tiberio morum via</i>.</p> +<p>(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with +professions and courses of life, and accordingly to make +election, if they be free; and, if engaged, to make the departure +at the first opportunity; as we see was done by Duke Valentine, +that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but +quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and inclination; +being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether they +were worse for a prince or for a priest.</p> +<p>(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they +are like to have competitors and concurrents; and to take that +course wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like to be +most eminent; as Cæsar Julius did, who at first was an +orator or pleader; but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, +Hortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and saw there was +no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the +state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun towards a +civil and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a +martial greatness.</p> +<p>(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents, +to proceed according to the composition of their own nature; as +we may see in Cæsar, all whose friends and followers were +men active and effectual, but not solemn, or of reputation.</p> +<p>(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves +by examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do; +whereas perhaps their natures and carriages are far +differing. In which error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom +Cicero saith that he was wont often to say, <i>Sylla potuit</i>, +<i>ego non potero</i>? Wherein he was much abused, the +natures and proceedings of himself and his example being the +unlikest in the world; the one being fierce, violent, and +pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of majesty and +circumstance, and therefore the less effectual.</p> +<p>But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves +hath many other branches, whereupon we cannot insist.</p> +<p>(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a +man’s self, there followeth the well opening and revealing +a man’s self; wherein we see nothing more usual than for +the more able man to make the less show. For there is a +great advantage in the well setting forth of a man’s +virtues, fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial covering +of a man’s weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the +one, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by circumstances, +gracing the other by exposition, and the like. Wherein we +see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest +politique of his time, <i>Omnium quæ dixerat feceratque +arte quadam ostentator</i>, which requireth indeed some art, lest +it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though +it be to the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice +in manners than in policy; for as it is said, <i>Audacter +calumniare</i>, <i>semper aliquid hæret</i>; so, except it +be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, <i>Audacter te +vendita</i>, <i>semper aluquid hæret</i>. For it will +stick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men +of wisdom and rank do smile at it and despise it; and yet the +authority won with many doth countervail the disdain of a +few. But if it be carried with decency and government, as +with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at times when +it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in military +persons); or at times when others are most envied; or with easy +and careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too +long, or being too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a +man’s self, as well as gracing himself; or by occasion of +repelling or putting down others’ injury or insolency; it +doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a few solid +natures, that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height +of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by +their moderation.</p> +<p>(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as +they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary +that virtue be not disvalued and embased under the just price, +which is done in three manners—by offering and obtruding a +man’s self, wherein men think he is rewarded when he is +accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that which is +well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and +by finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in +commendation, applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be +pleased with a little, let him hear what is truly said: <i>Cave +ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris</i>, <i>si hæc te res +parva sicuti magna delectat</i>.</p> +<p>(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than +the valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three +manners—by caution, by colour, and by confidence. +Caution is when men do ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put +into those things for which they are not proper; whereas +contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves into +matters without difference, and so publish and proclaim all their +wants. Colour is when men make a way for themselves to have +a construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from +a better cause or intended for some other purpose. For of +the one it is well said,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Sæpe latet vitium proximitate +boni,”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he +pretend the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must +affect gravity; if a coward, mildness; and so the rest. For +the second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should +not do his best, and why he should dissemble his abilities; and +for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities which are +notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but +industries and dissimulations. For confidence, it is the +last but the surest remedy—namely, to depress and seem to +despise whatsoever a man cannot attain; observing the good +principle of the merchants, who endeavour to raise the price of +their own commodities, and to beat down the price of +others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other, +which is to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to +conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing; +and, to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath +least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best: like +as we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show their +verses, and you except to any, they will say, “That that +line cost them more labour than any of the rest;” and +presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other +line, which they know well enough to be the best in the +number. But above all, in this righting and helping of a +man’s self in his own carriage, he must take heed he show +not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury, by too +much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some +sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of +fortified carriage, with a ready rescussing of a man’s self +from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by +somewhat in their person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth with +good felicity.</p> +<p>(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible +endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to +occasion; for nothing hindereth men’s fortunes so much as +this: <i>Idem manebat</i>, <i>neque idem decebat</i>—men +are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to Cato, +whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he +had <i>versatile ingenium</i>. And thereof it cometh that +these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves and cannot +make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in +some it is nature to be somewhat vicious and enwrapped, and not +easy to turn. In some it is a conceit that is almost a +nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe +that they ought to change their course, when they have found good +by it in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely how +Fabius Maximus would have been temporising still, according to +his old bias, when the nature of the war was altered and required +hot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and +penetration in their judgment, that they do not discern when +things have a period, but come in too late after the occasion; as +Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows, +when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then +they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In +some other it is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit +that they can bring about occasions to their ply; and yet in the +end, when they see no other remedy, then they come to it with +disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of +Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at first +have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root +or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most +prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels +of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of +fortune.</p> +<p>(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some +affinity with that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that +which is well expressed, <i>Fatis accede deisque</i>, that men do +not only turn with the occasions, but also run with the +occasions, and not strain their credit or strength to over-hard +or extreme points; but choose in their actions that which is most +passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not occupy them +too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the +most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they +undertake: which cannot but mightily increase reputation.</p> +<p>(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some +repugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand it; and +it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: <i>Et +quemadmodum receptum est</i>, <i>ut exercitum ducat +imperator</i>, <i>sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ +ducendæ</i>; <i>ut quæipsis videntur</i>, <i>ea +gerantur</i>, <i>et non ipsi eventus persequi cogantur</i>. +For if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of +sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of +occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge +and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take +in; either of which is very imperfect without the other.</p> +<p>(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good +mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: +for although depth of secrecy, and making way (<i>qualis est via +navis in mari</i>, which the French calleth <i>sourdes +menées</i>, when men set things in work without opening +themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; +yet many times <i>dissimulatio errores parit</i>, <i>qui +dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant</i>. And therefore we see +the greatest politiques have in a natural and free manner +professed their desires, rather than been reserved and disguised +in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of +profession, “that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as +they stood his friends or enemies.” So Cæsar, +when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess +“that he had rather be first in a village than second at +Rome.” So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we +see what Cicero saith of him, <i>Alter</i> (meaning of +Cæsar) <i>non recusat</i>, <i>sed quodammodo postulat</i>, +<i>ut</i> (<i>ut est</i>) <i>sic appelletur tyrannus</i>. +So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus +Cæsar, in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a +darling of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would +swear, <i>Ita parentis honores consequi liceat</i> (which was no +less than the tyranny), save that, to help it, he would stretch +forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar’s that was +erected in the place: and men laughed and wondered, and said, +“Is it possible?” or, “Did you ever hear the +like?” and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so +handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: +whereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark +and dissembling manner as Tacitus saith of him, <i>Occultior non +melior</i>, wherein Sallust concurreth, <i>Ore probo</i>, +<i>animo inverecundo</i>, made it his design, by infinite secret +engines, to cast the state into an absolute anarchy and +confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for +necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon +him, and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he +thought) to that point when he was chosen consul alone, as never +any was, yet he could make no great matter of it, because men +understood him not; but was fain in the end to go the beaten +track of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt of +Cæsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate +are these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus made +this judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in +regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other +to Tiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, <i>Et cum +artibus mariti simulatione filii bene compostia</i>: for surely +the continual habit of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish +cunning, and not greatly politic.</p> +<p>(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to +accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, +as they conduce and are material to our particular ends; and that +to do substantially and not superficially. For we shall +find the logical part (as I may term it) of some men’s +minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they +can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and +comparison, preferring things of show and sense before things of +substance and effect. So some fall in love with access to +princes, others with popular fame and applause, supposing they +are things of great purchase, when in many cases they are but +matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some measure +things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which +are spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that +they must needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar saith in a +despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how +laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose, +<i>Hæc omnia magno studio agebat</i>. So in most +things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest +means to be best, when it should be the fittest.</p> +<p>(38) As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits +towards their fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold +them to stand thus. First the amendment of their own +minds. For the removal of the impediments of the mind will +sooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune +will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second +place I set down wealth and means; which I know most men would +have placed first, because of the general use which it beareth +towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion I may +condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that +moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the true +sinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a +valiant, populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the +authority of Solon, who, when Crœsus showed him his +treasury of gold, said to him, that if another came that had +better iron, he would be master of his gold. In like manner +it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that are the +sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s +minds, wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and +the like. In the third place I set down reputation, because +of the peremptory tides and currents it hath; which, if they be +not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being +extreme hard to play an after-game of reputation. And +lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any of the +other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased +by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and +priority in matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing +whereof is one of the commonest errors: while men fly to their +ends when they should intend their beginnings, and do not take +things in order of time as they come on, but marshal them +according to greatness and not according to instance; not +observing the good precept, <i>Quod nunc instat agamus</i>.</p> +<p>(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any +matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have +that sounding in a man’s ears, <i>Sed fugit interea fugit +irreparabile tempus</i>: and that is the cause why those which +take their course of rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, +orators, painful divines, and the like, are not commonly so +politic for their own fortune, otherwise than in their ordinary +way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait +occasions, and to devise plots.</p> +<p>(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature, +which doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do +well interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much upon +that which he principally intendeth. For a man ought in +every particular action so to carry the motions of his mind, and +so to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that he +seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in +a third; and if he can have no part of that which he purposed, +yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot make +anything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of +somewhat in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or +substance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the +like. So that he should exact an account of himself of +every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and +confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more +impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he +that doth so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are +many times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall +need afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present; +and therefore men must be perfect in that rule, <i>Hæc +oportet facere</i>, <i>et illa non imittere</i>.</p> +<p>(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a +man’s self peremptorily in anything, though it seem not +liable to accident; but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a +way to retire: following the wisdom in the ancient fable of the +two frogs, which consulted when their plash was dry whither they +should go; and the one moved to go down into a pit, because it +was not likely the water would dry there; but the other answered, +“True, but if it do, how shall we get out again?”</p> +<p>(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept +of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but to +caution and moderation, <i>Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi +tanquam amaturus</i>. For it utterly betrayeth all utility +for men to embark themselves too far into unfortunate +friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and humorous +envies or emulations.</p> +<p>(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; +led, because I would not have such knowledges, which I note as +deficient, to be thought things imaginative or in the air, or an +observation or two much made of, but things of bulk and mass, +whereof an end is more hardly made than a beginning. It +must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I mention +and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but +only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man I +suppose will think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without +all this ado; for I know they come tumbling into some men’s +laps; and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain +way, little intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross +errors.</p> +<p>(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect +orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so +likewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been described by such +as have handled those subjects, the mould hath used to be made +according to the perfection of the art, and not according to +common practice: so I understand it, that it ought to be done in +the description of a politic man, I mean politic for his own +fortune.</p> +<p>(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the +precepts which we have set down are of that kind which may be +counted and called <i>Bonæ Artes</i>. As for evil +arts, if a man would set down for himself that principle of +Machiavel, “That a man seek not to attain virtue itself, +but the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is +a help, but the use of it is cumber:” or that other of his +principles, “That he presuppose that men are not fitly to +be wrought otherwise but by fear; and therefore that he seek to +have every man obnoxious, low, and in straits,” which the +Italians call <i>seminar spine</i>, to sow thorns: or that other +principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, <i>Cadant +amici</i>, <i>dummodo inimici intercidant</i>, as the triumvirs, +which sold every one to other the lives of their friends for the +deaths of their enemies: or that other protestation of L. +Catilina, to set on fire and trouble states, to the end to fish +in droumy waters, and to unwrap their fortunes, <i>Ego si quid in +fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium</i>, <i>id non aqua sed +ruina restinguam</i>: or that other principle of Lysander, +“That children are to be deceived with comfits, and men +with oaths:” and the like evil and corrupt positions, +whereof (as in all things) there are more in number than of the +good: certainly with these dispensations from the laws of charity +and integrity, the pressing of a man’s fortune may be more +hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways, +the shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer +way is not much about.</p> +<p>(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and +sustain themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or +tempest of ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to +set before their eyes not only that general map of the world, +“That all things are vanity and vexation of spirit,” +but many other more particular cards and directions: chiefly +that, that being without well-being is a curse, and the greater +being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded and +all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet +saith excellently:</p> +<blockquote><p>“Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri pro +laudibus istis<br /> +Præmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum<br /> +Dii <i>moresque</i> dabunt vestri.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look +up to the Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often +subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according +to that scripture, “He hath conceived mischief, and shall +bring forth a vain thing.” And although men should +refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant +and Sabbathless pursuit of a man’s fortune leaveth not +tribute which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a +tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of +our time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected face +towards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth, +eating dust as doth the serpent, <i>Atque affigit humo +divinæ particulam auræ</i>. And if any man +flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well, though he +should obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus +Cæsar, and after of Septimius Severus, “That either +they should never have been born, or else they should never have +died,” they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent +of their greatness, and so much good when they were established; +yet these compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, +but never good to be purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss +for men, in their race towards their fortune, to cool themselves +a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the +Emperor Charles V., in his instructions to the king his son, +“That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that +if she he too much wooed she is the farther off.” But +this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: +let men rather build upon that foundation which is as a +corner-stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, +namely that same <i>Primum quærite</i>. For divinity +saith, <i>Primum quærite regnum Dei</i>, <i>et ista omnia +adjicientur vobis</i>: and philosophy saith, <i>Primum +quærite bona animi</i>; <i>cætera aut aderunt</i>, +<i>aut non oberunt</i>. And although the human foundation +hath somewhat of the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he broke +forth into that speech,</p> +<blockquote><p>“Te colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen +inane es;”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may +serve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as +deficient.</p> +<p>(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret +and retired in both these respects in which things are deemed +secret; for some things are secret because they are hard to know, +and some because they are not fit to utter. We see all +governments are obscure and invisible:</p> +<blockquote><p> “Totamque infusa per +artus<br /> +Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Such is the description of governments. We see the +government of God over the world is hidden, insomuch as it +seemeth to participate of much irregularity and confusion. +The government of the soul in moving the body is inward and +profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to +demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows +whereof are in the poets) in the description of torments and +pains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which was the +giants’ offence, doth detest the offence of futility, as in +Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars: +nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses of policy +and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling.</p> +<p>(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, +all things ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be +manifest and revealed. For so it is expressed in the +Scriptures touching the government of God, that this globe, which +seemeth to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as +crystal: <i>Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile +crystallo</i>. So unto princes and states, and specially +towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions +of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions +and combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, +in regard of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of +their observations, and the height of their station where they +keep sentinel, in great part clear and transparent. +Wherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a master of +this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass +over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate +which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being +silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their +abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part, +“That there was one that knew how to hold his +peace.”</p> +<p>(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, +which is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which +is, that all those which have written of laws have written either +as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As +for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary +commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which give +little light because they are so high. For the lawyers, +they write according to the states where they live what is +received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a +law-maker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are +in nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are +derived but as streams; and like as waters do take tinctures and +tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws +vary according to the regions and governments where they are +planted, though they proceed from the same fountains. +Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a +platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into +consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what +are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty +of law; by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be +executed, and what are the impediments and remedies in the +execution of laws; what influence laws touching private right of +<i>meum</i> and <i>tuum</i> have into the public state, and how +they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and +delivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief or large, with +preambles or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from +time to time, and what is the best means to keep them from being +too vast in volume, or too full of multiplicity and crossness; +how they are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent and +judicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences +touching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed, +rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity +and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to +be mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; +again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to +be censured and governed; and many other points touching the +administration and (as I may term it) animation of laws. +Upon which I insist the less, because I purpose (if God give me +leave), having begun a work of this nature in aphorisms, to +propound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for +deficient.</p> +<p>(50) And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say +much of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they +cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the government, +for the civil law was <i>nonhos quæsitum munus in usus</i>; +it was not made for the countries which it governeth. +Hereof I cease to speak because I will not intermingle matter of +action with matter of general learning.</p> +<p>XXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning +touching civil knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded +human philosophy; and with human philosophy, philosophy in +general. And being now at some pause, looking back into +that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me (<i>si +nunquam fallit imago</i>), as far as a man can judge of his own +work, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians +make while they are in tuning their instruments, which is nothing +pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter +afterwards. So have I been content to tune the instruments +of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. +And surely, when I set before me the condition of these times, in +which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all +the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits +of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the +travails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which +communicateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness of the +world by navigation, which hath disclosed multitudes of +experiments, and a mass of natural history; the leisure wherewith +these times abound, not employing men so generally in civil +business, as the states of Græcia did, in respect of their +popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of +their monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this +instant to peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in +controversies of religion, which have so much diverted men from +other sciences; the perfection of your Majesty’s learning, +which as a phœnix may call whole volleys of wits to follow +you; and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more +and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to this +persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that +of the Grecian and Roman learning; only if men will know their +own strength and their own weakness both; and take, one from the +other, light of invention, and not fire of contradiction; and +esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and not +as of a quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence to +things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of +popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall +please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall +make that ancient and patient request, <i>Verbera</i>, <i>sed +audi</i>: let men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh +them. For the appeal is lawful (though it may be it shall +not be needful) from the first cogitations of men to their +second, and from the nearer times to the times further off. +Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times +were not so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the +Sabbath and port of all men’s labours and +peregrinations.</p> +<p>XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the +reason as to the will of man: so that as we are to obey His law, +though we find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe +His word, though we find a reluctation in our reason. For +if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense we give +consent to the matter, and not to the author; which is no more +than we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness; but +that faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteousness was +of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an +image of natural reason.</p> +<p>(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it +is to believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge +man’s mind suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth +from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorised than +itself and so suffereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise +it is of the state of man glorified; for then faith shall cease, +and we shall know as we are known.</p> +<p>(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our +idiom we call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle +of God, and not upon the light of nature: for it is written, +<i>Cæli enarrant gloriam Dei</i>; but it is not written, +<i>Cæli enarrant voluntatem Dei</i>: but of that it is +said, <i>Ad legem et testimonium</i>: <i>si non fecerint secundum +verbum istud</i>, &c. This holdeth not only in those +points of faith which concern the great mysteries of the Deity, +of the creation, of the redemption, but likewise those which +concern the law moral, truly interpreted: “Love your +enemies: do good to them that hate you; be like to your heavenly +Father, that suffereth His rain to fall upon the just and +unjust.” To this it ought to be applauded, <i>Nec vox +hominem sonat</i>: it is a voice beyond the light of +nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a +libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, +as if they were opposite and malignant to nature: <i>Et quod +natura remittit</i>, <i>invida jura negant</i>. So said +Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s messengers, that he +had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of the wise men +of Græcia, and that he held them for excellent men: but +that they had a fault, which was that they had in too great +reverence and veneration a thing they called law and +manners. So it must be confessed that a great part of the +law moral is of that perfection whereunto the light of nature +cannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to have, by the +light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and +vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the +light of nature is used in two several senses: the one, that +which springeth from reason, sense, induction, argument, +according to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, that which +is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct, +according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the +purity of his first estate: in which latter sense only he is +participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection +of the moral law; but how? sufficient to check the vice but not +to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as +well moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration +and revelation from God.</p> +<p>(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and +the latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not +for nothing that the apostle calleth religion “our +reasonable service of God;” insomuch as the very ceremonies +and figures of the old law were full of reason and signification, +much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, that are +full of non-significants and surd characters. But most +specially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this, +deserveth to be highly magnified; holding and preserving the +golden mediocrity in this point between the law of the heathen +and the law of Mahomet, which have embraced the two +extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no constant +belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of agent; and +the religion of Mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument +altogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other +of imposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject +disputation with difference.</p> +<p>(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the +former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of +God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of +doctrine and direction thereupon. The former extendeth to +the mysteries themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and +not by way of argument. The latter consisteth indeed of +probation and argument. In the former we see God +vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of His +mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and doth graft His +revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and +applieth His inspirations to open our understanding, as the form +of the key to the ward of the lock. For the latter there is +allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and +respective, although not original and absolute. For after +the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted +from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make +derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of +them, for our better direction. In nature this holdeth not; +for both the principles are examinable by induction, though not +by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles or first +positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down +and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not +in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and +smaller nature, namely, wherein there are not only <i>posita</i> +but <i>placita</i>; for in such there can be no use of absolute +reason. We see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or +the like. The draughts and first laws of the game are +positive, but how? merely <i>ad placitum</i>, and not examinable +by reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best +advantage to win the game is artificial and rational. So in +human laws there be many grounds and maxims which are <i>placita +juris</i>, positive upon authority, and not upon reason, and +therefore not to be disputed: but what is most just, not +absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that +affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is +that secondary reason, which hath place in divinity, which is +grounded upon the <i>placets</i> of God.</p> +<p>(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not +been, to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the +true limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of +divine dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me +a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which is +revealed, to search and mine into that which is not revealed; and +by pretext of enucleating inferences and contradictories, to +examine that which is positive. The one sort falling into +the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more +sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them, <i>Quomodo possit +homo nasci cum sit senex</i>? The other sort into the error +of the disciples, which were scandalised at a show of +contradiction, <i>Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis</i>? +<i>Modicum et non videbitis me</i>; <i>et iterum</i>, +<i>modicum</i>, <i>et videbitis me</i>, &c.</p> +<p>(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great +and blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined +of would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only +the vanity of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, +but the fury of controversies, wherewith the Church +laboureth. For it cannot but open men’s eyes to see +that many controversies do merely pertain to that which is either +not revealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon weak +and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men +would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the +Gentiles, would be carried thus, <i>ego</i>, <i>non dominus</i>; +and again, <i>secundum consilium meum</i>, in opinions and +counsels, and not in positions and oppositions. But men are +now over-ready to usurp the style, <i>non ego</i>, <i>sed +dominus</i>; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and +denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those +which have not sufficiently learned out of Solomon that +“The causeless curse shall not come.”</p> +<p>(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or +revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation; and +with the latter we will begin, because it hath most coherence +with that which we have now last handled. The nature of the +information consisteth of three branches: the limits of the +information, the sufficiency of the information, and the +acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the limits of +the information belong these considerations: how far forth +particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the +Church is inspired; and how far forth reason may be used; the +last point whereof I have noted as deficient. Unto the +sufficiency of the information belong two considerations: what +points of religion are fundamental, and what perfective, being +matter of further building and perfection upon one and the same +foundation; and again, how the gradations of light according to +the dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of +belief.</p> +<p>(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as +deficient, that the points fundamental, and the points of further +perfection only, ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; +a subject tending to much like end as that I noted before; for as +that other were likely to abate the number of controversies, so +this is likely to abate the heat of many of them. We see +Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Egyptian fight, he did +not say, “Why strive you?” but drew his sword and +slew the Egyptian; but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he +said, “You are brethren, why strive you?” If +the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be slain by the +sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it be an +Israelite, though in the wrong, then, “Why strive +you?” We see of the fundamental points, our Saviour +penneth the league thus, “He that is not with us is against +us;” but of points not fundamental, thus, “He that is +not against us is with us.” So we see the coat of our +Saviour was entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the +Scriptures in itself; but the garment of the Church was of divers +colours and yet not divided. We see the chaff may and ought +to be severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may not be +pulled up from the corn in the field. So as it is a thing +of great use well to define what, and of what latitude, those +points are which do make men mere aliens and disincorporate from +the Church of God.</p> +<p>(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the +true and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the +fountains of the water of life. The interpretations of the +Scriptures are of two sorts: methodical, and solute or at +large. For this divine water, which excelleth so much that +of Jacob’s well, is drawn forth much in the same kind as +natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it +is first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and +derived for use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and +vessels immediately where it springeth. The former sort +whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgment +is more subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath +exhibited unto us the scholastical divinity; whereby divinity +hath been reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams +of doctrine or positions fetched and derived from thence.</p> +<p>(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, +a compacted strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two +first they fail to find, and the last they ought not to +seek. For as to brevity, we see in all summary methods, +while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate. +For the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure; the +obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced +into large commentaries, or into commonplaces and titles, which +grow to be more vast than the original writings, whence the sum +was at first extracted. So we see the volumes of the +schoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the +fathers, whence the master of the sentences made his sum or +collection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern +doctors of the civil law exceed those of the ancient +jurisconsults, of which Tribonian compiled the digest. So +as this course of sums and commentaries is that which doth +infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity, +and more base in substance.</p> +<p>(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into +exact methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth +to support and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory +than substantial, like unto buildings which stand by architecture +and compaction, which are more subject to ruin than those that +are built more strong in their several parts, though less +compacted. But it is plain that the more you recede from +your grounds, the weaker do you conclude; and as in nature, the +more you remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of +error you do incur; so much more in divinity, the more you recede +from the Scriptures by inferences and consequences, the more weak +and dilute are your positions.</p> +<p>(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is +not to be sought, which makes this course of artificial divinity +the more suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into +an art will make it round and uniform; but in divinity many +things must be left abrupt, and concluded with this: <i>O +altitudo sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei</i>! <i>quam +incomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus</i>, <i>et non +investigabiles viæ ejus</i>. So again the apostle +saith, <i>Ex parte scimus</i>: and to have the form of a total, +where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies +by supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude +that the true use of these sums and methods hath place in +institutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge; but in +them, or by deducement from them, to handle the main body and +substance of a knowledge is in all sciences prejudicial, and in +divinity dangerous.</p> +<p>(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at +large, there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some +of them rather curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. +Notwithstanding, thus much must be confessed, that the +Scriptures, being given by inspiration and not by human reason, +do differ from all other books in the Author, which by +consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the +expositor. For the Inditer of them did know four things +which no man attains to know; which are—the mysteries of +the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the +secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all +ages. For as to the first it is said, “He that +presseth into the light shall be oppressed of the +glory.” And again, “No man shall see My face +and live.” To the second, “When He prepared the +heavens I was present, when by law and compass He enclosed the +deep.” To the third, “Neither was it needful +that any should bear witness to Him of man, for He knew well what +was in man.” And to the last, “From the +beginning are known to the Lord all His works.”</p> +<p>(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain +senses and expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained +within the bounds of sobriety—the one anagogical, and the +other philosophical. But as to the former, man is not to +prevent his time: <i>Videmus nunc per speculum in +ænigmate</i>, <i>tunc autem facie ad faciem</i>; wherein +nevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth +as the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication of +this enigma. But to press too far into it cannot but cause +a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in +the body there are three degrees of that we receive into +it—aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof aliment is that +which the nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome; +medicine is that which is partly converted by nature, and partly +converteth nature; and poison is that which worketh wholly upon +nature, without that nature can in any part work upon it. +So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work +upon and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a +dissolution of the mind and understanding.</p> +<p>(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of +late time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have +pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the +Scriptures; scandalising and traducing all other philosophy as +heathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity between +God’s Word and His works; neither do they give honour to +the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much embase them. For +to seek heaven and earth in the Word of God, whereof it is said, +“Heaven and earth shall pass, but My word shall not +pass,” is to seek temporary things amongst eternal: and as +to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the +dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead +amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place +was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the +holiest place of all where the ark of the testimony was +seated. And again, the scope or purpose of the Spirit of +God is not to express matters of nature in the Scriptures, +otherwise than in passage, and for application to man’s +capacity and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true +rule, <i>Auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas</i>. For +it were a strange conclusion, if a man should use a similitude +for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature or +history according to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, a unicorn, +a centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like, that therefore he +must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof positively to +be true. To conclude therefore these two interpretations, +the one by reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or +physical, which have been received and pursued in imitation of +the rabbins and cabalists, are to be confined with a <i>a noli +akryn sapere</i>, <i>sed time</i>.</p> +<p>(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to +man, touching the secrets of the heart and the successions of +time, doth make a just and sound difference between the manner of +the exposition of the Scriptures and all other books. For +it is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the +answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were +propounded to Him, how that they are impertinent to the state of +the question demanded: the reason whereof is, because not being +like man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words, but +knowing man’s thoughts immediately, He never answered their +words, but their thoughts. Much in the like manner it is +with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, +and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all +heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the Church, yea, +and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only +according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and +respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words +were uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the +words before or after, or in contemplation of the principal scope +of the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or +collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite +springs and streams of doctrine to water the Church in every +part. And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were, +the main stream or river, so the moral sense chiefly, and +sometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof the Church +hath most use; not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or +indulgent or light in allusions: but that I do much condemn that +interpretation of the Scripture which is only after the manner as +men use to interpret a profane book.</p> +<p>(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I +can report no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will +add. In perusing books of divinity I find many books of +controversies, and many of commonplaces and treatises, a mass of +positive divinity, as it is made an art: a number of sermons and +lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon the Scriptures, with +harmonies and concordances. But that form of writing in +divinity which in my judgment is of all others most rich and +precious is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of +Scriptures in brief observations; not dilated into commonplaces, +not chasing after controversies, not reduced into method of art; +a thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in +books which will remain, and a thing wherein this age +excelleth. For I am persuaded, and I may speak it with an +<i>absit invidia verbo</i>, and nowise in derogation of +antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and the +olive, that if the choice and best of those observations upon +texts of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons +within this your Majesty’s Island of Brittany by the space +of these forty years and more (leaving out the largeness of +exhortations and applications thereupon) had been set down in a +continuance, it had been the best work in divinity which had been +written since the Apostles’ times.</p> +<p>(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter +of belief and truth of opinion, and matter of service and +adoration; which is also judged and directed by the +former—the one being as the internal soul of religion, and +the other as the external body thereof. And, therefore, the +heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole +religion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul; that is, no +certainty of belief or confession: as a man may well think, +considering the chief doctors of their church were the poets; and +the reason was because the heathen gods were no jealous gods, but +were glad to be admitted into part, as they had reason. +Neither did they respect the pureness of heart, so they might +have external honour and rites.</p> +<p>(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main +branches of divinity: faith, manners, liturgy, and +government. Faith containeth the doctrine of the nature of +God, of the attributes of God, and of the works of God. The +nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of +Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to the +Deity, or respective to the persons. The works of God +summary are two, that of the creation and that of the redemption; +and both these works, as in total they appertain to the unity of +the Godhead, so in their parts they refer to the three persons: +that of the creation, in the mass of the matter, to the Father; +in the disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the +continuance and conservation of the being, to the Holy +Spirit. So that of the redemption, in the election and +counsel, to the Father; in the whole act and consummation, to the +Son; and in the application, to the Holy Spirit; for by the Holy +Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are +the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we +consider either effectually, in the elect; or privately, in the +reprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible Church.</p> +<p>(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the +law, which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, +according to the edition thereof, into the law of nature, the law +moral, and the law positive; and according to the style, into +negative and affirmative, prohibitions and commandments. +Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided according to +the commandments; in the form thereof it referreth to the three +persons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the Father, whose +more special attribute is power; sins of ignorance against the +Son, whose attribute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the +Holy Ghost, whose attribute is grace or love. In the +motions of it, it either moveth to the right hand or to the left; +either to blind devotion or to profane and libertine +transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth +liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. +In the degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into +thought, word, or act. And in this part I commend much the +deducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for that I +take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the +bread of life. But that which quickeneth both these +doctrines of faith and manners is the elevation and consent of +the heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy +meditation, Christian resolution, and the like.</p> +<p>(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the +reciprocal acts between God and man; which, on the part of God, +are the preaching of the word, and the sacraments, which are +seals to the covenant, or as the visible word; and on the part of +man, invocation of the name of God; and under the law, +sacrifices; which were as visible prayers or confessions: but now +the adoration being <i>in spiritu et veritate</i>, there +remaineth only <i>vituli labiorum</i>; although the use of holy +vows of thankfulness and retribution may be accounted also as +sealed petitions.</p> +<p>(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of +the patrimony of the Church, the franchises of the Church, and +the offices and jurisdictions of the Church, and the laws of the +Church directing the whole; all which have two considerations, +the one in themselves, the other how they stand compatible and +agreeable to the civil estate.</p> +<p>(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of +instruction of truth, or in form of confutation of +falsehood. The declinations from religion, besides the +privative, which is atheism and the branches thereof, are +three—heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft: heresies, when we +serve the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we +worship false gods, supposing them to be true; and witchcraft, +when we adore false gods, knowing them to be wicked and +false. For so your Majesty doth excellently well observe, +that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And yet we see +though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are +all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the Word of +God; for so he saith, <i>Quasi peccatum ariolandi est +repugnare</i>, <i>et quasi scelus idololatriæ nolle +acquiescere</i>.</p> +<p>(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I can +report no deficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or +ground that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity, so +diligent have men been either in sowing of good seed, or in +sowing of tares.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>Thus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual +world, as truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note +and description of those parts which seem to me not constantly +occupate, or not well converted by the labour of man. In +which, if I have in any point receded from that which is commonly +received, it hath been with a purpose of proceeding in +<i>melius</i>, and not <i>in aliud</i>; a mind of amendment and +proficiency, and not of change and difference. For I could +not be true and constant to the argument I handle if I were not +willing to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to +have others go beyond me again: which may the better appear by +this, that I have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not +seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men’s judgments by +confutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am +in good hope that if the first reading move an objection, the +second reading will make an answer. And in those things +wherein I have erred, I am sure I have not prejudiced the right +by litigious arguments; which certainly have this contrary effect +and operation, that they add authority to error, and destroy the +authority of that which is well invented. For question is +an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on the other side it is +a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and challenge to +myself as mine own. The good, it any be, is due <i>tanquam +adeps sacrificii</i>, to be incensed to the honour, first of the +Divine Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am +most bounden.</p> +<div class='chapter' /><h2>FOOTNOTES.</h2> +<p><a name="footnote39"></a><a href="#citation39" class="footnote">[39]</a> Stoops in the rice and takes the +speeding gold. Ovid. Metam, x. 667.</p> + + + + +<div style='display:block;margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING ***</div> +<div style='display:block;margin:1em 0;'>This file should be named 5500-h.htm or 5500-h.zip</div> +<div style='display:block;margin:1em 0;'>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in https://www.gutenberg.org/5/5/0/5500/</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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