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diff --git a/5500-0.txt b/5500-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..902f7bd --- /dev/null +++ b/5500-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8032 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Advancement of Learning, by Francis +Bacon, Edited by Henry Morley + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you +will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before +using this eBook. + +Title: The Advancement of Learning + +Author: Francis Bacon + +Editor: Henry Morley + +Release Date: April 1, 2004 [eBook #5500] +[Most recently updated: April 12, 2021] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF–8 + +Produced by: PP & DP.... and Richard Tonsing + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING *** + + +Transcribed from the 1893 Cassell & Company edition by David Price, email +ccx074@pglaf.org + + +Transcriber’s note: +Changed “considering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned +times have been most subject to tumults, seditious, and changes” to +“considering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have +been most subject to tumults, seditions, and changes”. + + + + + CASSELL’S NATIONAL LIBRARY. + + * * * * * + + + + + THE + ADVANCEMENT + OF + LEARNING. + + + BY + FRANCIS BACON. + + [Picture: Decorative graphic] + + CASSELL & COMPANY, Limited: + _LONDON_, _PARIS & MELBOURNE_. + 1893. + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + + +“THE TVVOO Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and aduancement +of Learning, divine and humane. To the King. At London. Printed for +Henrie Tomes, and are to be sould at his shop at Graies Inne Gate in +Holborne. 1605.” That was the original title-page of the book now in +the reader’s hand—a living book that led the way to a new world of +thought. It was the book in which Bacon, early in the reign of James the +First, prepared the way for a full setting forth of his New Organon, or +instrument of knowledge. + +The Organon of Aristotle was a set of treatises in which Aristotle had +written the doctrine of propositions. Study of these treatises was a +chief occupation of young men when they passed from school to college, +and proceeded from Grammar to Logic, the second of the Seven Sciences. +Francis Bacon as a youth of sixteen, at Trinity College, Cambridge, felt +the unfruitfulness of this method of search after truth. He was the son +of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Queen Elizabeth’s Lord Keeper, and was born at +York House, in the Strand, on the 22nd of January, 1561. His mother was +the Lord Keeper’s second wife, one of two sisters, of whom the other +married Sir William Cecil, afterwards Lord Burleigh. Sir Nicholas Bacon +had six children by his former marriage, and by his second wife two sons, +Antony and Francis, of whom Antony was about two years the elder. The +family home was at York Place, and at Gorhambury, near St. Albans, from +which town, in its ancient and its modern style, Bacon afterwards took +his titles of Verulam and St. Albans. + +Antony and Francis Bacon went together to Trinity College, Cambridge, +when Antony was fourteen years old and Francis twelve. Francis remained +at Cambridge only until his sixteenth year; and Dr. Rawley, his chaplain +in after-years, reports of him that “whilst he was commorant in the +University, about sixteen years of age (as his lordship hath been pleased +to impart unto myself), he first fell into dislike of the philosophy of +Aristotle; not for the worthlessness of the author, to whom he would +ascribe all high attributes, but for the unfruitfulness of the way, being +a philosophy (as his lordship used to say) only strong for disputatious +and contentions, but barren of the production of works for the benefit of +the life of man; in which mind he continued to his dying day.” Bacon was +sent as a youth of sixteen to Paris with the ambassador Sir Amyas Paulet, +to begin his training for the public service; but his father’s death, in +February, 1579, before he had completed the provision he was making for +his youngest children, obliged him to return to London, and, at the age +of eighteen, to settle down at Gray’s Inn to the study of law as a +profession. He was admitted to the outer bar in June, 1582, and about +that time, at the age of twenty-one, wrote a sketch of his conception of +a New Organon that should lead man to more fruitful knowledge, in a +little Latin tract, which he called “Temporis Partus Maximus” (“The +Greatest Birth of Time”). + +In November, 1584, Bacon took his seat in the House of Commons as member +for Melcombe Regis, in Dorsetshire. In October, 1586, he sat for +Taunton. He was member afterwards for Liverpool; and he was one of those +who petitioned for the speedy execution of Mary Queen of Scots. In +October, 1589, he obtained the reversion of the office of Clerk of the +Council in the Star Chamber, which was worth £1,600 or £2,000 a year; but +for the succession to this office he had to wait until 1608. It had not +yet fallen to him when he wrote his “Two Books of the Advancement of +Learning.” In the Parliament that met in February, 1593, Bacon sat as +member for Middlesex. He raised difficulties of procedure in the way of +the grant of a treble subsidy, by just objection to the joining of the +Lords with the Commons in a money grant, and a desire to extend the time +allowed for payment from three years to six; it was, in fact, extended to +four years. The Queen was offended. Francis Bacon and his brother +Antony had attached themselves to the young Earl of Essex, who was their +friend and patron. The office of Attorney-General became vacant. Essex +asked the Queen to appoint Francis Bacon. The Queen gave the office to +Sir Edward Coke, who was already Solicitor-General, and by nine years +Bacon’s senior. The office of Solicitor-General thus became vacant, and +that was sought for Francis Bacon. The Queen, after delay and +hesitation, gave it, in November, 1595, to Serjeant Fleming. The Earl of +Essex consoled his friend by giving him “a piece of land”—Twickenham +Park—which Bacon afterwards sold for £1,800—equal, say, to £12,000 in +present buying power. In 1597 Bacon was returned to Parliament as member +for Ipswich, and in that year he was hoping to marry the rich widow of +Sir William Hatton, Essex helping; but the lady married, in the next +year, Sir Edward Coke. It was in 1597 that Bacon published the First +Edition of his Essays. That was a little book containing only ten essays +in English, with twelve “Meditationes Sacræ,” which were essays in Latin +on religious subjects. From 1597 onward to the end of his life, Bacon’s +Essays were subject to continuous addition and revision. The author’s +Second Edition, in which the number of the Essays was increased from ten +to thirty-eight, did not appear until November or December, 1612, seven +years later than these two books on the “Advancement of Learning;” and +the final edition of the Essays, in which their number was increased from +thirty-eight to fifty-eight, appeared only in 1625; and Bacon died on the +9th of April, 1626. The edition of the Essays published in 1597, under +Elizabeth, marked only the beginning of a course of thought that +afterwards flowed in one stream with his teachings in philosophy. + +In February, 1601, there was the rebellion of Essex. Francis Bacon had +separated himself from his patron after giving him advice that was +disregarded. Bacon, now Queen’s Counsel, not only appeared against his +old friend, but with excess of zeal, by which, perhaps, he hoped to win +back the Queen’s favour, he twice obtruded violent attacks upon Essex +when he was not called upon to speak. On the 25th of February, 1601, +Essex was beheaded. The genius of Bacon was next employed to justify +that act by “A Declaration of the Practices and Treasons attempted and +committed by Robert late Earle of Essex and his Complices.” But James of +Scotland, on whose behalf Essex had intervened, came to the throne by the +death of Elizabeth on the 24th of March, 1603. Bacon was among the crowd +of men who were made knights by James I., and he had to justify himself +under the new order of things by writing “Sir Francis Bacon his Apologie +in certain Imputations concerning the late Earle of Essex.” He was +returned to the first Parliament of James I. by Ipswich and St. Albans, +and he was confirmed in his office of King’s Counsel in August, 1604; but +he was not appointed to the office of Solicitor-General when it became +vacant in that year. + +That was the position of Francis Bacon in 1605, when he published this +work, where in his First Book he pointed out the discredits of learning +from human defects of the learned, and emptiness of many of the studies +chosen, or the way of dealing with them. This came, he said, especially +by the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge, +as if there were sought in it “a couch whereupon to rest a searching and +restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk +up and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state for a proud mind to +raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground for strife and +contention; or a shop for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for +the glory of the Creator and the relief of man’s estate.” The rest of +the First Book was given to an argument upon the Dignity of Learning; and +the Second Book, on the Advancement of Learning, is, as Bacon himself +described it, “a general and faithful perambulation of learning, with an +inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and +converted by the industry of man; to the end that such a plot made and +recorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation and +also serve to excite voluntary endeavours.” Bacon makes, by a sort of +exhaustive analysis, a ground-plan of all subjects of study, as an +intellectual map, helping the right inquirer in his search for the right +path. The right path is that by which he has the best chance of adding +to the stock of knowledge in the world something worth labouring for; and +the true worth is in labour for “the glory of the Creator and the relief +of man’s estate.” + + H. M. + + + + +THE +FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON; +OF THE PROFICIENCE AND +ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, +DIVINE AND HUMAN. + + + _To the King_. + +THERE were under the law, excellent King, both daily sacrifices and +freewill offerings; the one proceeding upon ordinary observance, the +other upon a devout cheerfulness: in like manner there belongeth to kings +from their servants both tribute of duty and presents of affection. In +the former of these I hope I shall not live to be wanting, according to +my most humble duty and the good pleasure of your Majesty’s employments: +for the latter, I thought it more respective to make choice of some +oblation which might rather refer to the propriety and excellency of your +individual person, than to the business of your crown and state. + +Wherefore, representing your Majesty many times unto my mind, and +beholding you not with the inquisitive eye of presumption, to discover +that which the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable, but with the +observant eye of duty and admiration, leaving aside the other parts of +your virtue and fortune, I have been touched—yea, and possessed—with an +extreme wonder at those your virtues and faculties, which the +philosophers call intellectual; the largeness of your capacity, the +faithfulness of your memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, the +penetration of your judgment, and the facility and order of your +elocution: and I have often thought that of all the persons living that I +have known, your Majesty were the best instance to make a man of Plato’s +opinion, that all knowledge is but remembrance, and that the mind of man +by Nature knoweth all things, and hath but her own native and original +notions (which by the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the +body are sequestered) again revived and restored: such a light of Nature +I have observed in your Majesty, and such a readiness to take flame and +blaze from the least occasion presented, or the least spark of another’s +knowledge delivered. And as the Scripture saith of the wisest king, +“That his heart was as the sands of the sea;” which, though it be one of +the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest +portions; so hath God given your Majesty a composition of understanding +admirable, being able to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, and +nevertheless to touch and apprehend the least; whereas it should seem an +impossibility in Nature for the same instrument to make itself fit for +great and small works. And for your gift of speech, I call to mind what +Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Cæsar: _Augusto profluens_, _et quæ +principem deceret_, _eloquentia fuit_. For if we note it well, speech +that is uttered with labour and difficulty, or speech that savoureth of +the affectation of art and precepts, or speech that is framed after the +imitation of some pattern of eloquence, though never so excellent; all +this hath somewhat servile, and holding of the subject. But your +Majesty’s manner of speech is, indeed, prince-like, flowing as from a +fountain, and yet streaming and branching itself into Nature’s order, +full of facility and felicity, imitating none, and inimitable by any. +And as in your civil estate there appeareth to be an emulation and +contention of your Majesty’s virtue with your fortune; a virtuous +disposition with a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation (when time +was) of your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the +due time; a virtuous observation of the laws of marriage, with most +blessed and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and most Christian desire +of peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes +thereunto: so likewise in these intellectual matters there seemeth to be +no less contention between the excellency of your Majesty’s gifts of +Nature and the universality and perfection of your learning. For I am +well assured that this which I shall say is no amplification at all, but +a positive and measured truth; which is, that there hath not been since +Christ’s time any king or temporal monarch which hath been so learned in +all literature and erudition, divine and human. For let a man seriously +and diligently revolve and peruse the succession of the Emperors of Rome, +of which Cæsar the Dictator (who lived some years before Christ) and +Marcus Antoninus were the best learned, and so descend to the Emperors of +Græcia, or of the West, and then to the lines of France, Spain, England, +Scotland, and the rest, and he shall find this judgment is truly made. +For it seemeth much in a king if, by the compendious extractions of other +men’s wits and labours, he can take hold of any superficial ornaments and +shows of learning, or if he countenance and prefer learning and learned +men; but to drink, indeed, of the true fountains of learning—nay, to have +such a fountain of learning in himself, in a king, and in a king born—is +almost a miracle. And the more, because there is met in your Majesty a +rare conjunction, as well of divine and sacred literature as of profane +and human; so as your Majesty standeth invested of that triplicity, which +in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient Hermes: the power and +fortune of a king, the knowledge and illumination of a priest, and the +learning and universality of a philosopher. This propriety inherent and +individual attribute in your Majesty deserveth to be expressed not only +in the fame and admiration of the present time, nor in the history or +tradition of the ages succeeding, but also in some solid work, fixed +memorial, and immortal monument, bearing a character or signature both of +the power of a king and the difference and perfection of such a king. + +Therefore I did conclude with myself that I could not make unto your +Majesty a better oblation than of some treatise tending to that end, +whereof the sum will consist of these two parts: the former concerning +the excellency of learning and knowledge, and the excellency of the merit +and true glory in the augmentation and propagation thereof; the latter, +what the particular acts and works are which have been embraced and +undertaken for the advancement of learning; and again, what defects and +undervalues I find in such particular acts: to the end that though I +cannot positively or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound unto +you framed particulars, yet I may excite your princely cogitations to +visit the excellent treasure of your own mind, and thence to extract +particulars for this purpose agreeable to your magnanimity and wisdom. + +I. (1) In the entrance to the former of these—to clear the way and, as it +were, to make silence, to have the true testimonies concerning the +dignity of learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacit +objections—I think good to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces +which it hath received, all from ignorance, but ignorance severally +disguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines, +sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politics, and sometimes in the +errors and imperfections of learned men themselves. + +(2) I hear the former sort say that knowledge is of those things which +are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution; that the +aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original temptation and sin +whereupon ensued the fall of man; that knowledge hath in it somewhat of +the serpent, and, therefore, where it entereth into a man it makes him +swell; _Scientia inflat_; that Solomon gives a censure, “That there is no +end of making books, and that much reading is weariness of the flesh;” +and again in another place, “That in spacious knowledge there is much +contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety;” +that Saint Paul gives a caveat, “That we be not spoiled through vain +philosophy;” that experience demonstrates how learned men have been +arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to atheism, and how +the contemplation of second causes doth derogate from our dependence upon +God, who is the first cause. + +(3) To discover, then, the ignorance and error of this opinion, and the +misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appear these men do +not observe or consider that it was not the pure knowledge of Nature and +universality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto +other creatures in Paradise as they were brought before him according +unto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall; but it was +the proud knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give law +unto himself, and to depend no more upon God’s commandments, which was +the form of the temptation. Neither is it any quantity of knowledge, how +great soever, that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can +fill, much less extend the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of +God; and, therefore, Solomon, speaking of the two principal senses of +inquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that the eye is never +satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; and if there be no +fulness, then is the continent greater than the content: so of knowledge +itself and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but reporters, he +defineth likewise in these words, placed after that calendar or +ephemerides which he maketh of the diversities of times and seasons for +all actions and purposes, and concludeth thus: “God hath made all things +beautiful, or decent, in the true return of their seasons. Also He hath +placed the world in man’s heart, yet cannot man find out the work which +God worketh from the beginning to the end”—declaring not obscurely that +God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the +image of the universal world, and joyful to receive the impression +thereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in +beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but raised also +to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees which throughout all +those changes are infallibly observed. And although he doth insinuate +that the supreme or summary law of Nature (which he calleth “the work +which God worketh from the beginning to the end”) is not possible to be +found out by man, yet that doth not derogate from the capacity of the +mind; but may be referred to the impediments, as of shortness of life, +ill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to +hand, and many other inconveniences, whereunto the condition of man is +subject. For that nothing parcel of the world is denied to man’s inquiry +and invention, he doth in another place rule over, when he saith, “The +spirit of man is as the lamp of God, wherewith He searcheth the +inwardness of all secrets.” If, then, such be the capacity and receipt +of the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no danger at all in the +proportion or quantity of knowledge, how large soever, lest it should +make it swell or out-compass itself; no, but it is merely the quality of +knowledge, which, be it in quantity more or less, if it be taken without +the true corrective thereof, hath in it some nature of venom or +malignity, and some effects of that venom, which is ventosity or +swelling. This corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so +sovereign, is charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth to the former +clause; for so he saith, “Knowledge bloweth up, but charity buildeth up;” +not unlike unto that which he deilvereth in another place: “If I spake,” +saith he, “with the tongues of men and angels, and had not charity, it +were but as a tinkling cymbal.” Not but that it is an excellent thing to +speak with the tongues of men and angels, but because, if it be severed +from charity, and not referred to the good of men and mankind, it hath +rather a sounding and unworthy glory than a meriting and substantial +virtue. And as for that censure of Solomon concerning the excess of +writing and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth +from knowledge, and that admonition of St. Paul, “That we be not seduced +by vain philosophy,” let those places be rightly understood; and they do, +indeed, excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations whereby +human knowledge is confined and circumscribed, and yet without any such +contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal +nature of things; for these limitations are three: the first, “That we do +not so place our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our mortality;” the +second, “That we make application of our knowledge, to give ourselves +repose and contentment, and not distaste or repining;” the third, “That +we do not presume by the contemplation of Nature to attain to the +mysteries of God.” For as touching the first of these, Solomon doth +excellently expound himself in another place of the same book, where he +saith: “I saw well that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light +doth from darkness; and that the wise man’s eyes keep watch in his head, +whereas this fool roundeth about in darkness: but withal I learned that +the same mortality involveth them both.” And for the second, certain it +is there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth from knowledge +otherwise than merely by accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which is +the seed of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself; but when +men fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to +their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or +vast desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is +spoken of; for then knowledge is no more _Lumen siccum_, whereof +Heraclitus the profound said, _Lumen siccum optima anima_; but it +becometh _Lumen madidum_, or _maceratum_, being steeped and infused in +the humours of the affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth +to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly passed over; for if any +man shall think by view and inquiry into these sensible and material +things to attain that light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the +nature or will of God, then, indeed, is he spoiled by vain philosophy; +for the contemplation of God’s creatures and works produceth (having +regard to the works and creatures themselves) knowledge, but having +regard to God no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken +knowledge. And, therefore, it was most aptly said by one of Plato’s +school, “That the sense of man carrieth a resemblance with the sun, which +(as we see) openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial globe; but then, +again, it obscureth and concealeth the stars and celestial globe: so doth +the sense discover natural things, but it darkeneth and shutteth up +divine.” And hence it is true that it hath proceeded, that divers great +learned men have been heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the +secrets of the Deity by this waxen wings of the senses. And as for the +conceit that too much knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that +the ignorance of second causes should make a more devout dependence upon +God, which is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question +which Job asked of his friends: “Will you lie for God, as one man will +lie for another, to gratify him?” For certain it is that God worketh +nothing in Nature but by second causes; and if they would have it +otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards +God, and nothing else but to offer to the Author of truth the unclean +sacrifice of a lie. But further, it is an assured truth, and a +conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of +philosophy may incline the mind of men to atheism, but a further +proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion. For in +the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto +the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay +there it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man +passeth on further and seeth the dependence of causes and the works of +Providence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily +believe that the highest link of Nature’s chain must needs he tied to the +foot of Jupiter’s chair. To conclude, therefore, let no man upon a weak +conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation think or maintain that a +man can search too far, or be too well studied in the book of God’s word, +or in the book of God’s works, divinity or philosophy; but rather let men +endeavour an endless progress or proficience in both; only let men beware +that they apply both to charity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to +ostentation; and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound +these learnings together. + +II. (1) And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from politics, +they be of this nature: that learning doth soften men’s minds, and makes +them more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms; that it doth mar and +pervert men’s dispositions for matter of government and policy, in making +them too curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too peremptory +or positive by strictness of rules and axioms, or too immoderate and +overweening by reason of the greatness of examples, or too incompatible +and differing from the times by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; +or at least, that it doth divert men’s travails from action and business, +and bringeth them to a love of leisure and privateness; and that it doth +bring into states a relaxation of discipline, whilst every man is more +ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out of this conceit Cato, +surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed that ever lived, when +Carneades the philosopher came in embassage to Rome, and that the young +men of Rome began to flock about him, being allured with the sweetness +and majesty of his eloquence and learning, gave counsel in open senate +that they should give him his despatch with all speed, lest he should +infect and enchant the minds and affections of the youth, and at unawares +bring in an alteration of the manners and customs of the state. Out of +the same conceit or humour did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage +of his country and the disadvantage of his own profession, make a kind of +separation between policy and government, and between arts and sciences, +in the verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging the one to +the Romans, and leaving and yielding the other to the Grecians: _Tu +regere imperio popules_, _Romane_, _memento_, _Hæ tibi erunt artes_, &c. +So likewise we see that Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, laid it as an +article of charge and accusation against him, that he did, with the +variety and power of his discourses and disputatious, withdraw young men +from due reverence to the laws and customs of their country, and that he +did profess a dangerous and pernicious science, which was to make the +worse matter seem the better, and to suppress truth by force of eloquence +and speech. + +(2) But these and the like imputations have rather a countenance of +gravity than any ground of justice: for experience doth warrant that, +both in persons and in times, there hath been a meeting and concurrence +in learning and arms, flourishing and excelling in the same men and the +same ages. For as ‘for men, there cannot be a better nor the hike +instance as of that pair, Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar, the +Dictator; whereof the one was Aristotle’s scholar in philosophy, and the +other was Cicero’s rival in eloquence; or if any man had rather call for +scholars that were great generals, than generals that were great +scholars, let him take Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian; +whereof the one was the first that abated the power of Sparta, and the +other was the first that made way to the overthrow of the monarchy of +Persia. And this concurrence is yet more visible in times than in +persons, by how much an age is greater object than a man. For both in +Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Græcia, and Rome, the same times that are most +renowned for arms are, likewise, most admired for learning, so that the +greatest authors and philosophers, and the greatest captains and +governors, have lived in the same ages. Neither can it otherwise he: for +as in man the ripeness of strength of the body and mind cometh much about +an age, save that the strength of the body cometh somewhat the more +early, so in states, arms and learning, whereof the one correspondeth to +the body, the other to the soul of man, have a concurrence or near +sequence in times. + +(3) And for matter of policy and government, that learning, should rather +hurt, than enable thereunto, is a thing very improbable; we see it is +accounted an error to commit a natural body to empiric physicians, which +commonly have a few pleasing receipts whereupon they are confident and +adventurous, but know neither the causes of diseases, nor the complexions +of patients, nor peril of accidents, nor the true method of cures; we see +it is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers which are only men +of practice, and not grounded in their books, who are many times easily +surprised when matter falleth out besides their experience, to the +prejudice of the causes they handle: so by like reason it cannot be but a +matter of doubtful consequence if states be managed by empiric statesmen, +not well mingled with men grounded in learning. But contrariwise, it is +almost without instance contradictory that ever any government was +disastrous that was in the hands of learned governors. For howsoever it +hath been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and disable learned men +by the names of _pedantes_; yet in the records of time it appeareth in +many particulars that the governments of princes in minority +(notwithstanding the infinite disadvantage of that kind of state)—have +nevertheless excelled the government of princes of mature age, even for +that reason which they seek to traduce, which is that by that occasion +the state hath been in the hands of _pedantes_: for so was the state of +Rome for the first five years, which are so much magnified, during the +minority of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, a _pedenti_; so it was again, +for ten years’ space or more, during the minority of Gordianus the +younger, with great applause and contentation in the hands of Misitheus, +a _pedanti_: so was it before that, in the minority of Alexander Severus, +in like happiness, in hands not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the +women, who were aided by the teachers and preceptors. Nay, let a man +look into the government of the Bishops of Rome, as by name, into the +government of Pius Quintus and Sextus Quintus in our times, who were both +at their entrance esteemed but as pedantical friars, and he shall find +that such Popes do greater things, and proceed upon truer principles of +state, than those which have ascended to the papacy from an education and +breeding in affairs of state and courts of princes; for although men bred +in learning are perhaps to seek in points of convenience and +accommodating for the present, which the Italians call _ragioni di +stato_, whereof the same Pius Quintus could not hear spoken with +patience, terming them inventions against religion and the moral virtues; +yet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect in those same +plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, and moral virtue, which if +they be well and watchfully pursued, there will be seldom use of those +other, no more than of physic in a sound or well-dieted body. Neither +can the experience of one man’s life furnish examples and precedents for +the event of one man’s life. For as it happeneth sometimes that the +grandchild, or other descendant, resembleth the ancestor more than the +son; so many times occurrences of present times may sort better with +ancient examples than with those of the later or immediate times; and +lastly, the wit of one man can no more countervail learning than one +man’s means can hold way with a common purse. + +(4) And as for those particular seducements or indispositions of the mind +for policy and government, which learning is pretended to insinuate; if +it be granted that any such thing be, it must be remembered withal that +learning ministereth in every of them greater strength of medicine or +remedy than it offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity. For if by a +secret operation it make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other side +by plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what ground to resolve; +yea, and how to carry things in suspense, without prejudice, till they +resolve. If it make men positive and regular, it teacheth them what +things are in their nature demonstrative, and what are conjectural, and +as well the use of distinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of +principles and rules. If it mislead by disproportion or dissimilitude of +examples, it teacheth men the force of circumstances, the errors of +comparisons, and all the cautions of application; so that in all these it +doth rectify more effectually than it can pervert. And these medicines +it conveyeth into men’s minds much more forcibly by the quickness and +penetration of examples. For let a man look into the errors of Clement +VII., so lively described by Guicciardini, who served under him, or into +the errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in his Epistles to +Atticus, and he will fly apace from being irresolute. Let him look into +the errors of Phocion, and he will beware how he be obstinate or +inflexible. Let him but read the fable of Ixion, and it will hold him +from being vaporous or imaginative. Let him look into the errors of Cato +II., and he will never be one of the Antipodes, to tread opposite to the +present world. + +(5) And for the conceit that learning should dispose men to leisure and +privateness, and make men slothful: it were a strange thing if that which +accustometh the mind to a perpetual motion and agitation should induce +slothfulness, whereas, contrariwise, it may be truly affirmed that no +kind of men love business for itself but those that are learned; for +other persons love it for profit, as a hireling that loves the work for +the wages; or for honour, as because it beareth them up in the eyes of +men, and refresheth their reputation, which otherwise would wear; or +because it putteth them in mind of their fortune, and giveth them +occasion to pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth some +faculty wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in good-humour +and pleasing conceits towards themselves; or because it advanceth any +other their ends. So that as it is said of untrue valours, that some +men’s valours are in the eyes of them that look on, so such men’s +industries are in the eyes of others, or, at least, in regard of their +own designments; only learned men love business as an action according to +nature, as agreeable to health of mind as exercise is to health of body, +taking pleasure in the action itself, and not in the purchase, so that of +all men they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards any business +which can hold or detain their mind. + +(6) And if any man be laborious in reading and study, and yet idle in +business and action, it groweth from some weakness of body or softness of +spirit, such as Seneca speaketh of: _Quidam tam sunt umbratiles_, _ut +putent in turbido esse quicquid in luce est_; and not of learning: well +may it be that such a point of a man’s nature may make him give himself +to learning, but it is not learning that breedeth any such point in his +nature. + +(7) And that learning should take up too much time or leisure: I answer, +the most active or busy man that hath been or can be, hath (no question) +many vacant times of leisure while he expecteth the tides and returns of +business (except he be either tedious and of no despatch, or lightly and +unworthily ambitious to meddle in things that may be better done by +others), and then the question is but how those spaces and times of +leisure shall be filled and spent; whether in pleasure or in studies; as +was well answered by Demosthenes to his adversary Æschines, that was a +man given to pleasure, and told him “That his orations did smell of the +lamp.” “Indeed,” said Demosthenes, “there is a great difference between +the things that you and I do by lamp-light.” So as no man need doubt +that learning will expel business, but rather it will keep and defend the +possession of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which otherwise at +unawares may enter to the prejudice of both. + +(8) Again, for that other conceit that learning should undermine the +reverence of laws and government, it is assuredly a mere depravation and +calumny, without all shadow of truth. For to say that a blind custom of +obedience should be a surer obligation than duty taught and understood, +it is to affirm that a blind man may tread surer by a guide than a seeing +man can by a light. And it is without all controversy that learning doth +make the minds of men gentle, generous, manageable, and pliant to +government; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, and mutinous: +and the evidence of time doth clear this assertion, considering that the +most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have been most subject to +tumults, seditions, and changes. + +(9) And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was well punished for +his blasphemy against learning, in the same kind wherein he offended; for +when he was past threescore years old, he was taken with an extreme +desire to go to school again, and to learn the Greek tongue, to the end +to peruse the Greek authors; which doth well demonstrate that his former +censure of the Grecian learning was rather an affected gravity, than +according to the inward sense of his own opinion. And as for Virgil’s +verses, though it pleased him to brave the world in taking to the Romans +the art of empire, and leaving to others the arts of subjects, yet so +much is manifest—that the Romans never ascended to that height of empire +till the time they had ascended to the height of other arts. For in the +time of the two first Cæsars, which had the art of government in greatest +perfection, there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro; the best +historiographer, Titus Livius; the best antiquary, Marcus Varro; and the +best or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to the memory of man are +known. As for the accusation of Socrates, the time must be remembered +when it was prosecuted; which was under the Thirty Tyrants, the most +base, bloody, and envious persons that have governed; which revolution of +state was no sooner over but Socrates, whom they had made a person +criminal, was made a person heroical, and his memory accumulate with +honours divine and human; and those discourses of his which were then +termed corrupting of manners, were after acknowledged for sovereign +medicines of the mind and manners, and so have been received ever since +till this day. Let this, therefore, serve for answer to politiques, +which in their humorous severity, or in their feigned gravity, have +presumed to throw imputations upon learning; which redargution +nevertheless (save that we know not whether our labours may extend to +other ages) were not needful for the present, in regard of the love and +reverence towards learning which the example and countenance of two so +learned princes, Queen Elizabeth and your Majesty, being as Castor and +Pollux, _lucida sidera_, stars of excellent light and most benign +influence, hath wrought in all men of place and authority in our nation. + +III. (1) Now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit or +diminution of credit that groweth unto learning from learned men +themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest: it is either from their +fortune, or from their manners, or from the nature of their studies. For +the first, it is not in their power; and the second is accidental; the +third only is proper to be handled: but because we are not in hand with +true measure, but with popular estimation and conceit, it is not amiss to +speak somewhat of the two former. The derogations therefore which grow +to learning from the fortune or condition of learned men, are either in +respect of scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of life and +meanness of employments. + +(2) Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men usually to +begin with little, and not to grow rich so fast as other men, by reason +they convert not their labours chiefly to lucre and increase, it were +good to leave the commonplace in commendation of povery to some friar to +handle, to whom much was attributed by Machiavel in this point when he +said, “That the kingdom of the clergy had been long before at an end, if +the reputation and reverence towards the poverty of friars had not borne +out the scandal of the superfluities and excesses of bishops and +prelates.” So a man might say that the felicity and delicacy of princes +and great persons had long since turned to rudeness and barbarism, if the +poverty of learning had not kept up civility and honour of life; but +without any such advantages, it is worthy the observation what a reverent +and honoured thing poverty of fortune was for some ages in the Roman +state, which nevertheless was a state without paradoxes. For we see what +Titus Livius saith in his introduction: _Cæterum aut me amor negotii +suscepti fallit aut nulla unquam respublica nec major_, _nec sanctior_, +_nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit_; _nec in quam tam sero avaritia +luxuriaque immigraverint_; _nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac +parsimoniæ honos fuerit_. We see likewise, after that the state of Rome +was not itself, but did degenerate, how that person that took upon him to +be counsellor to Julius Cæsar after his victory where to begin his +restoration of the state, maketh it of all points the most summary to +take away the estimation of wealth: _Verum hæc et omnia mala pariter cum +honore pecuniæ desinent_; _si neque magistratus_, _neque alia vulgo +cupienda_, _venalia erunt_. To conclude this point: as it was truly said +that _Paupertas est virtutis fortuna_, though sometimes it come from +vice, so it may be fitly said that, though some times it may proceed from +misgovernment and accident. Surely Solomon hath pronounced it both in +censure, _Qui festinat ad divitias non erit insons_; and in precept, “Buy +the truth, and sell it not; and so of wisdom and knowledge;” judging that +means were to be spent upon learning, and not learning to be applied to +means. And as for the privateness or obscureness (as it may be in vulgar +estimation accounted) of life of contemplative men, it is a theme so +common to extol a private life, not taxed with sensuality and sloth, in +comparison and to the disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, liberty, +pleasure, and dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, as no man +handleth it but handleth it well; such a consonancy it hath to men’s +conceits in the expressing, and to men’s consents in the allowing. This +only I will add, that learned men forgotten in states and not living in +the eyes of men, are like the images of Cassius and Brutus in the funeral +of Junia, of which, not being represented as many others were, Tacitus +saith, _Eo ipso præfulgebant quod non visebantur_. + +(3) And for meanness of employment, that which is most traduced to +contempt is that the government of youth is commonly allotted to them; +which age, because it is the age of least authority, it is transferred to +the disesteeming of those employments wherein youth is conversant, and +which are conversant about youth. But how unjust this traducement is (if +you will reduce things from popularity of opinion to measure of reason) +may appear in that we see men are more curious what they put into a new +vessel than into a vessel seasoned; and what mould they lay about a young +plant than about a plant corroborate; so as this weakest terms and times +of all things use to have the best applications and helps. And will you +hearken to the Hebrew rabbins? “Your young men shall see visions, and +your old men shall dream dreams:” say they, youth is the worthier age, +for that visions are nearer apparitions of God than dreams? And let it +be noted that howsoever the condition of life of _pedantes_ hath been +scorned upon theatres, as the ape of tyranny; and that the modern +looseness or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of +schoolmasters and tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the best times did +always make a just complaint, that states were too busy with their laws +and too negligent in point of education: which excellent part of ancient +discipline hath been in some sort revived of late times by the colleges +of the Jesuits; of whom, although in regard of their superstition I may +say, _Quo meliores_, _eo deteriores_; yet in regard of this, and some +other points concerning human learning and moral matters, I may say, as +Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, _Talis quum sis_, _utunam noster +esses_. And that much touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of +learned men. + +(4) As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing personal and +individual: and no doubt there be amongst them, as in other professions, +of all temperatures: but yet so as it is not without truth which is said, +that _Abeunt studua in mores_, studies have an influence and operation +upon the manners of those that are conversant in them. + +(5) But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my part cannot +find any disgrace to learning can proceed from the manners of learned +men; not inherent to them as they are learned; except it be a fault +(which was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato II., Seneca, +and many more) that because the times they read of are commonly better +than the times they live in, and the duties taught better than the duties +practised, they contend sometimes too far to bring things to perfection, +and to reduce the corruption of manners to honesty of precepts or +examples of too great height. And yet hereof they have caveats enough in +their own walks. For Solon, when he was asked whether he had given his +citizens the best laws, answered wisely, “Yea, of such as they would +receive:” and Plato, finding that his own heart could not agree with the +corrupt manners of his country, refused to bear place or office, saying, +“That a man’s country was to be used as his parents were, that is, with +humble persuasions, and not with contestations.” And Cæsar’s counsellor +put in the same caveat, _Non ad vetera instituta revocans quæ jampridem +corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt_; and Cicero noteth this error directly +in Cato II. when he writes to his friend Atticus, _Cato optime sentit_, +_sed nocet interdum reipublicæ_; _loquitur enim tanquam in republicâ +Platonis_, _non tanquam in fæce Romuli_. And the same Cicero doth excuse +and expound the philosophers for going too far and being too exact in +their prescripts when he saith, _Isti ipse præceptores virtutis et +magistri videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet +protulisse_, _ut cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus_, _ibi tamen_, _ubi +oportet_, _consisteremus_: and yet himself might have said, _Monitis sum +minor ipse meis_; for it was his own fault, though not in so extreme a +degree. + +(6) Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been incident to +learned men, which is, that they have esteemed the preservation, good, +and honour of their countries or masters before their own fortunes or +safeties. For so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians: “If it please you +to note it, my counsels unto you are not such whereby I should grow great +amongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians; but they be of +that nature as they are sometimes not good for me to give, but are always +good for you to follow.” And so Seneca, after he had consecrated that +_Quinquennium Neronis_ to the eternal glory of learned governors, held on +his honest and loyal course of good and free counsel after his master +grew extremely corrupt in his government. Neither can this point +otherwise be, for learning endueth men’s minds with a true sense of the +frailty of their persons, the casualty of their fortunes, and the dignity +of their soul and vocation, so that it is impossible for them to esteem +that any greatness of their own fortune can be a true or worthy end of +their being and ordainment, and therefore are desirous to give their +account to God, and so likewise to their masters under God (as kings and +the states that they serve) in those words, _Ecce tibi lucrefeci_, and +not _Ecce mihi lucrefeci_; whereas the corrupter sort of mere politiques, +that have not their thoughts established by learning in the love and +apprehension of duty, nor never look abroad into universality, do refer +all things to themselves, and thrust themselves into the centre of the +world, as if all lines should meet in them and their fortunes, never +caring in all tempests what becomes of the ship of state, so they may +save themselves in the cockboat of their own fortune; whereas men that +feel the weight of duty and know the limits of self-love use to make good +their places and duties, though with peril; and if they stand in +seditious and violent alterations, it is rather the reverence which many +times both adverse parts do give to honesty, than any versatile advantage +of their own carriage. But for this point of tender sense and fast +obligation of duty which learning doth endue the mind withal, howsoever +fortune may tax it, and many in the depth of their corrupt principles may +despise it, yet it will receive an open allowance, and therefore needs +the less disproof or excuse. + +(7) Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may be more +properly defended than truly denied, is that they fail sometimes in +applying themselves to particular persons, which want of exact +application ariseth from two causes—the one, because the largeness of +their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the exquisite +observation or examination of the nature and customs of one person, for +it is a speech for a lover, and not for a wise man, _Satis magnum alter +alteri theatrum sumus_. Nevertheless I shall yield that he that cannot +contract the sight of his mind as well as disperse and dilate it, wanteth +a great faculty. But there is a second cause, which is no inability, but +a rejection upon choice and judgment. For the honest and just bounds of +observation by one person upon another extend no further but to +understand him sufficiently, whereby not to give him offence, or whereby +to be able to give him faithful counsel, or whereby to stand upon +reasonable guard and caution in respect of a man’s self. But to be +speculative into another man to the end to know how to work him, or wind +him, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven, +and not entire and ingenuous; which as in friendship it is want of +integrity, so towards princes or superiors is want of duty. For the +custom of the Levant, which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix +their eyes upon princes, is in the outward ceremony barbarous, but the +moral is good; for men ought not, by cunning and bent observations, to +pierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings, which the Scripture hath +declared to be inscrutable. + +(8) There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part) +which is often noted in learned men, that they do many times fail to +observe decency and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and +commit errors in small and ordinary points of action, so as the vulgar +sort of capacities do make a judgment of them in greater matters by that +which they find wanting in them in smaller. But this consequence doth +oft deceive men, for which I do refer them over to that which was said by +Themistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to himself out of +his own mouth, but, being applied to the general state of this question, +pertinently and justly, when, being invited to touch a lute, he said, “He +could not fiddle, but he could make a small town a great state.” So no +doubt many may be well seen in the passages of government and policy +which are to seek in little and punctual occasions. I refer them also to +that which Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he compared to the +gallipots of apothecaries, which on the outside had apes and owls and +antiques, but contained within sovereign and precious liquors and +confections; acknowledging that, to an external report, he was not +without superficial levities and deformities, but was inwardly +replenished with excellent virtues and powers. And so much touching the +point of manners of learned men. + +(9) But in the meantime I have no purpose to give allowance to some +conditions and courses base and unworthy, wherein divers professors of +learning have wronged themselves and gone too far; such as were those +trencher philosophers which in the later age of the Roman state were +usually in the houses of great persons, being little better than solemn +parasites, of which kind, Lucian maketh a merry description of the +philosopher that the great lady took to ride with her in her coach, and +would needs have him carry her little dog, which he doing officiously and +yet uncomely, the page scoffed and said, “That he doubted the philosopher +of a Stoic would turn to be a Cynic.” But, above all the rest, this +gross and palpable flattery whereunto many not unlearned have abased and +abused their wits and pens, turning (as Du Bartas saith) Hecuba into +Helena, and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and +estimation of learning. Neither is the modern dedication of books and +writings, as to patrons, to be commended, for that books (such as are +worthy the name of books) ought to have no patrons but truth and reason. +And the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to private and equal +friends, or to entitle the books with their names; or if to kings and +great persons, it was to some such as the argument of the book was fit +and proper for; but these and the like courses may deserve rather +reprehension than defence. + +(10) Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or application of +learned men to men in fortune. For the answer was good that Diogenes +made to one that asked him in mockery, “How it came to pass that +philosophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men of +philosophers?” He answered soberly, and yet sharply, “Because the one +sort knew what they had need of, and the other did not.” And of the like +nature was the answer which Aristippus made, when having a petition to +Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell down at his feet, whereupon +Dionysius stayed and gave him the hearing, and granted it; and afterwards +some person, tender on the behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus that +he would offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity as for a +private suit to fall at a tyrant’s feet; but he answered, “It was not his +fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that had his ears in his feet.” +Neither was it accounted weakness, but discretion, in him that would not +dispute his best with Adrianus Cæsar, excusing himself, “That it was +reason to yield to him that commanded thirty legions.” These and the +like, applications, and stooping to points of necessity and convenience, +cannot be disallowed; for though they may have some outward baseness, yet +in a judgment truly made they are to be accounted submissions to the +occasion and not to the person. + +IV. (1) Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which have intervened +amongst the studies themselves of the learned, which is that which is +principal and proper to the present argument; wherein my purpose is not +to make a justification of the errors, but by a censure and separation of +the errors to make a justification of that which is good and sound, and +to deliver that from the aspersion of the other. For we see that it is +the manner of men to scandalise and deprave that which retaineth the +state and virtue, by taking advantage upon that which is corrupt and +degenerate, as the heathens in the primitive Church used to blemish and +taint the Christians with the faults and corruptions of heretics. But +nevertheless I have no meaning at this time to make any exact +animadversion of the errors and impediments in matters of learning, which +are more secret and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto +such as do fall under or near unto a popular observation. + +(2) There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies, whereby +learning hath been most traduced. For those things we do esteem vain +which are either false or frivolous, those which either have no truth or +no use; and those persons we esteem vain which are either credulous or +curious; and curiosity is either in matter or words: so that in reason as +well as in experience there fall out to be these three distempers (as I +may term them) of learning—the first, fantastical learning; the second, +contentious learning; and the last, delicate learning; vain imaginations, +vain altercations, and vain affectations; and with the last I will begin. +Martin Luther, conducted, no doubt, by a higher Providence, but in +discourse of reason, finding what a province he had undertaken against +the Bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the Church, and +finding his own solitude, being in nowise aided by the opinions of his +own time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former times +to his succours to make a party against the present time. So that the +ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long time +slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved. This, by +consequence, did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the +languages original, wherein those authors did write, for the better +understanding of those authors, and the better advantage of pressing and +applying their words. And thereof grew, again, a delight in their manner +of style and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writing, which was +much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the +propounders of those primitive but seeming new opinions had against the +schoolmen, who were generally of the contrary part, and whose writings +were altogether in a differing style and form; taking liberty to coin and +frame new terms of art to express their own sense, and to avoid circuit +of speech, without regard to the pureness, pleasantness, and (as I may +call it) lawfulness of the phrase or word. And again, because the great +labour then was with the people (of whom the Pharisees were wont to say, +_Execrabilis ista turba_, _quæ non novit legem_), for the winning and +persuading of them, there grew of necessity in chief price and request +eloquence and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access +into the capacity of the vulgar sort; so that these four causes +concurring—the admiration of ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen, +the exact study of languages, and the efficacy of preaching—did bring in +an affectionate study of eloquence and copy of speech, which then began +to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess; for men began to hunt more +after words than matter—more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the +round and clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the +clauses, and the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and +figures, than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of +argument, life of invention, or depth of judgment. Then grew the flowing +and watery vein of Osorius, the Portugal bishop, to be in price. Then +did Sturmius spend such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero the Orator +and Hermogenes the Rhetorician, besides his own books of Periods and +Imitation, and the like. Then did Car of Cambridge and Ascham with their +lectures and writings almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure all +young men that were studious unto that delicate and polished kind of +learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion to make the scoffing echo, +_Decem annos consuumpsi in legendo Cicerone_; and the echo answered in +Greek, _One_, _Asine_. Then grew the learning of the schoolmen to be +utterly despised as barbarous. In sum, the whole inclination and bent of +those times was rather towards copy than weight. + +(3) Here therefore [is] the first distemper of learning, when men study +words and not matter; whereof, though I have represented an example of +late times, yet it hath been and will be _secundum majus et minus_ in all +time. And how is it possible but this should have an operation to +discredit learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned +men’s works like the first letter of a patent or limited book, which +though it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a letter? It seems to me +that Pygmalion’s frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture of this vanity; +for words are but the images of matter, and except they have life of +reason and invention, to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in +love with a picture. + +(4) But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be condemned, to +clothe and adorn the obscurity even of philosophy itself with sensible +and plausible elocution. For hereof we have great examples in Xenophon, +Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato also in some degree; and hereof +likewise there is great use, for surely, to the severe inquisition of +truth and the deep progress into philosophy, it is some hindrance because +it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire +of further search before we come to a just period. But then if a man be +to have any use of such knowledge in civil occasions, of conference, +counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like, then shall he find it +prepared to his hands in those authors which write in that manner. But +the excess of this is so justly contemptible, that as Hercules, when he +saw the image of Adonis, Venus’ minion, in a temple, said in disdain, +_Nil sacri es_; so there is none of Hercules’ followers in learning—that +is, the more severe and laborious sort of inquirers into truth—but will +despise those delicacies and affectations, as indeed capable of no +divineness. And thus much of the first disease or distemper of learning. + +(5) The second which followeth is in nature worse than the former: for as +substance of matter is better than beauty of words, so contrariwise vain +matter is worse than vain words: wherein it seemeth the reprehension of +St. Paul was not only proper for those times, but prophetical for the +times following; and not only respective to divinity, but extensive to +all knowledge: _Devita profanas vocum novitates_, _et oppositiones falsi +nominis scientiæ_. For he assigneth two marks and badges of suspected +and falsified science: the one, the novelty and strangeness of terms; the +other, the strictness of positions, which of necessity doth induce +oppositions, and so questions and altercations. Surely, like as many +substances in nature which are solid do putrefy and corrupt into +worms;—so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrefy and +dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term +them) vermiculate questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and +life of spirit, but no soundness of matter or goodness of quality. This +kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen, who +having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety +of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors +(chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the +cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of +nature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite +agitation of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs of learning which +are extant in their books. For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon +matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh +according to the stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon +itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings +forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread +and work, but of no substance or profit. + +(6) This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two sorts: either +in the subject itself that they handle, when it is a fruitless +speculation or controversy (whereof there are no small number both in +divinity and philosophy), or in the manner or method of handling of a +knowledge, which amongst them was this—upon every particular position or +assertion to frame objections, and to those objections, solutions; which +solutions were for the most part not confutations, but distinctions: +whereas indeed the strength of all sciences is, as the strength of the +old man’s faggot, in the bond. For the harmony of a science, supporting +each part the other, is and ought to be the true and brief confutation +and suppression of all the smaller sort of objections. But, on the other +side, if you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by +one, you may quarrel with them and bend them and break them at your +pleasure: so that, as was said of Seneca, _Verborum minutiis rerum +frangit pondera_, so a man may truly say of the schoolmen, _Quæstionum +minutiis scientiarum frangunt soliditatem_. For were it not better for a +man in fair room to set up one great light, or branching candlestick of +lights, than to go about with a small watch-candle into every corner? +And such is their method, that rests not so much upon evidence of truth +proved by arguments, authorities, similitudes, examples, as upon +particular confutations and solutions of every scruple, cavillation, and +objection; breeding for the most part one question as fast as it solveth +another; even as in the former resemblance, when you carry the light into +one corner, you darken the rest; so that the fable and fiction of Scylla +seemeth to be a lively image of this kind of philosophy or knowledge; +which was transformed into a comely virgin for the upper parts; but then +_Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris_: so the generalities of +the schoolmen are for a while good and proportionable; but then when you +descend into their distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb +for the use and benefit of man’s life, they end in monstrous altercations +and barking questions. So as it is not possible but this quality of +knowledge must fall under popular contempt, the people being apt to +contemn truths upon occasion of controversies and altercations, and to +think they are all out of their way which never meet; and when they see +such digladiation about subtleties, and matters of no use or moment, they +easily fall upon that judgment of Dionysius of Syracusa, _Verba ista sunt +senum otiosorum_. + +(7) Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those schoolmen to their great +thirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit had joined variety and +universality of reading and contemplation, they had proved excellent +lights, to the great advancement of all learning and knowledge; but as +they are, they are great undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark +keeping. But as in the inquiry of the divine truth, their pride inclined +to leave the oracle of God’s word, and to vanish in the mixture of their +own inventions; so in the inquisition of nature, they ever left the +oracle of God’s works, and adored the deceiving and deformed images which +the unequal mirror of their own minds, or a few received authors or +principles, did represent unto them. And thus much for the second +disease of learning. + +(8) For the third vice or disease of learning, which concerneth deceit or +untruth, it is of all the rest the foulest; as that which doth destroy +the essential form of knowledge, which is nothing but a representation of +truth: for the truth of being and the truth of knowing are one, differing +no more than the direct beam and the beam reflected. This vice therefore +brancheth itself into two sorts; delight in deceiving and aptness to be +deceived; imposture and credulity; which, although they appear to be of a +diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of cunning and the other of +simplicity, yet certainly they do for the most part concur: for, as the +verse noteth— + + “Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est,” + +an inquisitive man is a prattler; so upon the like reason a credulous man +is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he that will easily believe +rumours will as easily augment rumours and add somewhat to them of his +own; which Tacitus wisely noteth, when he saith, _Fingunt simul +creduntque_: so great an affinity hath fiction and belief. + +(9) This facility of credit and accepting or admitting things weakly +authorised or warranted is of two kinds according to the subject: for it +is either a belief of history, or, as the lawyers speak, matter of fact; +or else of matter of art and opinion. As to the former, we see the +experience and inconvenience of this error in ecclesiastical history; +which hath too easily received and registered reports and narrations of +miracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert, and other +holy men, and their relics, shrines, chapels and images: which though +they had a passage for a time by the ignorance of the people, the +superstitious simplicity of some and the politic toleration of others +holding them but as divine poesies, yet after a period of time, when the +mist began to clear up, they grew to be esteemed but as old wives’ +fables, impostures of the clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges of +Antichrist, to the great scandal and detriment of religion. + +(10) So in natural history, we see there hath not been that choice and +judgment used as ought to have been; as may appear in the writings of +Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and divers of the Arabians, being fraught +with much fabulous matter, a great part not only untried, but notoriously +untrue, to the great derogation of the credit of natural philosophy with +the grave and sober kind of wits: wherein the wisdom and integrity of +Aristotle is worthy to be observed, that, having made so diligent and +exquisite a history of living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with +any vain or feigned matter; and yet on the other side hath cast all +prodigious narrations, which he thought worthy the recording, into one +book, excellently discerning that matter of manifest truth, such +whereupon observation and rule was to be built, was not to be mingled or +weakened with matter of doubtful credit; and yet again, that rarities and +reports that seem uncredible are not to be suppressed or denied to the +memory of men. + +(11) And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to arts and +opinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when too much belief is +attributed to the arts themselves, or to certain authors in any art. The +sciences themselves, which have had better intelligence and confederacy +with the imagination of man than with his reason, are three in number: +astrology, natural magic, and alchemy; of which sciences, nevertheless, +the ends or pretences are noble. For astrology pretendeth to discover +that correspondence or concatenation which is between the superior globe +and the inferior; natural magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural +philosophy from variety of speculations to the magnitude of works; and +alchemy pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts of bodies +which in mixtures of natures are incorporate. But the derivations and +prosecutions to these ends, both in the theories and in the practices, +are full of error and vanity; which the great professors themselves have +sought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings, and referring +themselves to auricular traditions and such other devices, to save the +credit of impostures. And yet surely to alchemy this right is due, that +it may be compared to the husbandman whereof Æsop makes the fable; that, +when he died, told his sons that he had left unto them gold buried +underground in his vineyard; and they digged over all the ground, and +gold they found none; but by reason of their stirring and digging the +mould about the roots of their vines, they had a great vintage the year +following: so assuredly the search and stir to make gold hath brought to +light a great number of good and fruitful inventions and experiments, as +well for the disclosing of nature as for the use of man’s life. + +(12) And as for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto authors in +sciences, in making them dictators, that their words should stand, and +not consuls, to give advice; the damage is infinite that sciences have +received thereby, as the principal cause that hath kept them low at a +stay without growth or advancement. For hence it hath come, that in arts +mechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and time addeth and +perfecteth; but in sciences the first author goeth furthest, and time +leeseth and corrupteth. So we see artillery, sailing, printing, and the +like, were grossly managed at the first, and by time accommodated and +refined; but contrariwise, the philosophies and sciences of Aristotle, +Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour at +the first, and by time degenerate and imbased: whereof the reason is no +other, but that in the former many wits and industries have contributed +in one; and in the latter many wits and industries have been spent about +the wit of some one, whom many times they have rather depraved than +illustrated; for, as water will not ascend higher than the level of the +first spring-head from whence it descendeth, so knowledge derived from +Aristotle, and exempted from liberty of examination, will not rise again +higher than the knowledge of Aristotle. And, therefore, although the +position be good, _Oportet discentem credere_, yet it must be coupled +with this, _Oportet edoctum judicare_; for disciples do owe unto masters +only a temporary belief and a suspension of their own judgment till they +be fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation or perpetual +captivity; and therefore, to conclude this point, I will say no more, but +so let great authors have their due, as time, which is the author of +authors, be not deprived of his due—which is, further and further to +discover truth. Thus have I gone over these three diseases of learning; +besides the which there are some other rather peccant humours than formed +diseases, which, nevertheless, are not so secret and intrinsic, but that +they fall under a popular observation and traducement, and, therefore, +are not to be passed over. + +V. (1) The first of these is the extreme affecting of two extremities: +the one antiquity, the other novelty; wherein it seemeth the children of +time do take after the nature and malice of the father. For as he +devoureth his children, so one of them seeketh to devour and suppress the +other; while antiquity envieth there should be new additions, and novelty +cannot be content to add but it must deface; surely the advice of the +prophet is the true direction in this matter, _State super vias +antiquas_, _et videte quænam sit via recta et bona et ambulate in ea_. +Antiquity deserveth that reverence, that men should make a stand +thereupon and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is +well taken, then to make progression. And to speak truly, _Antiquitas +sæculi juventus mundi_. These times are the ancient times, when the +world is ancient, and not those which we account ancient _ordine +retrogrado_, by a computation backward from ourselves. + +(2) Another error induced by the former is a distrust that anything +should be now to be found out, which the world should have missed and +passed over so long time: as if the same objection were to be made to +time that Lucian maketh to Jupiter and other the heathen gods; of which +he wondereth that they begot so many children in old time, and begot none +in his time; and asketh whether they were become septuagenary, or whether +the law _Papia_, made against old men’s marriages, had restrained them. +So it seemeth men doubt lest time is become past children and generation; +wherein contrariwise we see commonly the levity and unconstancy of men’s +judgments, which, till a matter be done, wonder that it can be done; and +as soon as it is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done: as we see +in the expedition of Alexander into Asia, which at first was prejudged as +a vast and impossible enterprise; and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to +make no more of it than this, _Nil aliud quàm bene ausus vana +contemnere_. And the same happened to Columbus in the western +navigation. But in intellectual matters it is much more common, as may +be seen in most of the propositions of Euclid; which till they be +demonstrate, they seem strange to our assent; but being demonstrate, our +mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the lawyers speak), as +if we had known them before. + +(3) Another error, that hath also some affinity with the former, is a +conceit that of former opinions or sects after variety and examination +the best hath still prevailed and suppressed the rest; so as if a man +should begin the labour of a new search, he were but like to light upon +somewhat formerly rejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion; as if +the multitude, or the wisest for the multitude’s sake, were not ready to +give passage rather to that which is popular and superficial than to that +which is substantial and profound for the truth is, that time seemeth to +be of the nature of a river or stream, which carrieth down to us that +which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is +weighty and solid. + +(4) Another error, of a diverse nature from all the former, is the +over-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and methods; +from which time commonly sciences receive small or no augmentation. But +as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a +further stature, so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, +it is in growth; but when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it +may, perchance, be further polished, and illustrate and accommodated for +use and practice, but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance. + +(5) Another error which doth succeed that which we last mentioned is, +that after the distribution of particular arts and sciences, men have +abandoned universality, or _philosophia prima_, which cannot but cease +and stop all progression. For no perfect discovery can be made upon a +flat or a level; neither is it possible to discover the more remote and +deeper parts of any science if you stand but upon the level of the same +science, and ascend not to a higher science. + +(6) Another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence, and a kind +of adoration of the mind and understanding of man; by means whereof, men +have withdrawn themselves too much from the contemplation of nature, and +the observations of experience, and have tumbled up and down in their own +reason and conceits. Upon these intellectualists, which are +notwithstanding commonly taken for the most sublime and divine +philosophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying:—“Men sought truth +in their own little worlds, and not in the great and common world;” for +they disdain to spell, and so by degrees to read in the volume of God’s +works; and contrariwise by continual meditation and agitation of wit do +urge and, as it were, invocate their own spirits to divine and give +oracles unto them, whereby they are deservedly deluded. + +(7) Another error that hath some connection with this latter is, that men +have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines with some +conceits which they have most admired, or some sciences which they have +most applied, and given all things else a tincture according to them, +utterly untrue and improper. So hath Plato intermingled his philosophy +with theology, and Aristotle with logic; and the second school of Plato, +Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics; for these were the arts which +had a kind of primogeniture with them severally. So have the alchemists +made a philosophy out of a few experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus +our countryman hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a +loadstone. So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of the nature +of the soul, he found a musician that held the soul was but a harmony, +saith pleasantly, _Hic ab arte sua non recessit_, _&c._ But of these +conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely when he saith, _Qui +respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant_. + +(8) Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to assertion +without due and mature suspension of judgment. For the two ways of +contemplation are not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken of by +the ancients: the one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in the end +impassable; the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a +while fair and even. So it is in contemplation: if a man will begin with +certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin +with doubts, he shall end in certainties. + +(9) Another error is in the manner of the tradition and delivery of +knowledge, which is for the most part magistral and peremptory, and not +ingenuous and faithful; in a sort as may be soonest believed, and not +easiest examined. It is true, that in compendious treatises for practice +that form is not to be disallowed; but in the true handling of knowledge +men ought not to fall either on the one side into the vein of Velleius +the Epicurean, _Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de revideretur_: +nor, on the other side, into Socrates, his ironical doubting of all +things; but to propound things sincerely with more or less asseveration, +as they stand in a man’s own judgment proved more or less. + +(10) Other errors there are in the scope that men propound to themselves, +whereunto they bend their endeavours; for, whereas the more constant and +devote kind of professors of any science ought to propound to themselves +to make some additions to their science, they convert their labours to +aspire to certain second prizes: as to be a profound interpreter or +commentor, to be a sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical +compounder or abridger, and so the patrimony of knowledge cometh to be +sometimes improved, but seldom augmented. + +(11) But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or +misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge. For men have +entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes upon a natural +curiosity and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their minds +with variety and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and +sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction; and most +times for lucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true +account of their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men: as if +there were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and +restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk +up and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state, for a proud mind +to raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground, for strife and +contention; or a shop, for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for +the glory of the Creator and the relief of man’s estate. But this is +that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and +action may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and united together than +they have been: a conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets, +Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation; and Jupiter, the planet of +civil society and action, howbeit, I do not mean, when I speak of use and +action, that end before-mentioned of the applying of knowledge to lucre +and profession; for I am not ignorant how much that diverteth and +interrupteth the prosecution and advancement of knowledge, like unto the +golden ball thrown before Atalanta, which, while she goeth aside and +stoopeth to take up, the race is hindered, + + “Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit.” {39} + +Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call philosophy down +from heaven to converse upon the earth—that is, to leave natural +philosophy aside, and to apply knowledge only to manners and policy. But +as both heaven and earth do conspire and contribute to the use and +benefit of man, so the end ought to be, from both philosophies to +separate and reject vain speculations, and whatsoever is empty and void, +and to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful; that +knowledge may not be as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as +a bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master’s use; but as a spouse, +for generation, fruit, and comfort. + +(12) Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of dissection, those +peccant humours (the principal of them) which have not only given +impediment to the proficience of learning, but have given also occasion +to the traducement thereof: wherein, if I have been too plain, it must be +remembered, _fidelia vulnera amantis_, _sed dolosa oscula malignantis_. +This I think I have gained, that I ought to be the better believed in +that which I shall say pertaining to commendation; because I have +proceeded so freely in that which concerneth censure. And yet I have no +purpose to enter into a laudative of learning, or to make a hymn to the +Muses (though I am of opinion that it is long since their rites were duly +celebrated), but my intent is, without varnish or amplification justly to +weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other things, and to +take the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments, divine and +human. + +VI. (1) First, therefore, let us seek the dignity of knowledge in the +archetype or first platform, which is in the attributes and acts of God, +as far as they are revealed to man and may be observed with sobriety; +wherein we may not seek it by the name of learning, for all learning is +knowledge acquired, and all knowledge in God is original, and therefore +we must look for it by another name, that of wisdom or sapience, as the +Scriptures call it. + +(2) It is so, then, that in the work of the creation we see a double +emanation of virtue from God; the one referring more properly to power, +the other to wisdom; the one expressed in making the subsistence of the +matter, and the other in disposing the beauty of the form. This being +supposed, it is to be observed that for anything which appeareth in the +history of the creation, the confused mass and matter of heaven and earth +was made in a moment, and the order and disposition of that chaos or mass +was the work of six days; such a note of difference it pleased God to put +upon the works of power, and the works of wisdom; wherewith concurreth, +that in the former it is not set down that God said, “Let there be heaven +and earth,” as it is set down of the works following; but actually, that +God made heaven and earth: the one carrying the style of a manufacture, +and the other of a law, decree, or counsel. + +(3) To proceed, to that which is next in order from God, to spirits: we +find, as far as credit is to be given to the celestial hierarchy of that +supposed Dionysius, the senator of Athens, the first place or degree is +given to the angels of love, which are termed seraphim; the second to the +angels of light, which are termed cherubim; and the third, and so +following places, to thrones, principalities, and the rest, which are all +angels of power and ministry; so as this angels of knowledge and +illumination are placed before the angels of office and domination. + +(4) To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to sensible and +material forms, we read the first form that was created was light, which +hath a relation and correspondence in nature and corporal things to +knowledge in spirits and incorporal things. + +(5) So in the distribution of days we see the day wherein God did rest +and contemplate His own works was blessed above all the days wherein He +did effect and accomplish them. + +(6) After the creation was finished, it is set down unto us that man was +placed in the garden to work therein; which work, so appointed to him, +could be no other than work of contemplation; that is, when the end of +work is but for exercise and experiment, not for necessity; for there +being then no reluctation of the creature, nor sweat of the brow, man’s +employment must of consequence have been matter of delight in the +experiment, and not matter of labour for the use. Again, the first acts +which man performed in Paradise consisted of the two summary parts of +knowledge; the view of creatures, and the imposition of names. As for +the knowledge which induced the fall, it was, as was touched before, not +the natural knowledge of creatures, but the moral knowledge of good and +evil; wherein the supposition was, that God’s commandments or +prohibitions were not the originals of good and evil, but that they had +other beginnings, which man aspired to know, to the end to make a total +defection from God and to depend wholly upon himself. + +(7) To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after the fall of man, +we see (as the Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not violating at all +the truth of this story or letter) an image of the two estates, the +contemplative state and the active state, figured in the two persons of +Abel and Cain, and in the two simplest and most primitive trades of life; +that of the shepherd (who, by reason of his leisure, rest in a place, and +lying in view of heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative life), and +that of the husbandman, where we see again the favour and election of God +went to the shepherd, and not to the tiller of the ground. + +(8) So in the age before the flood, the holy records within those few +memorials which are there entered and registered have vouchsafed to +mention and honour the name of the inventors and authors of music and +works in metal. In the age after the flood, the first great judgment of +God upon the ambition of man was the confusion of tongues; whereby the +open trade and intercourse of learning and knowledge was chiefly +imbarred. + +(9) To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God’s first pen: he is adorned +by the Scriptures with this addition and commendation, “That he was seen +in all the learning of the Egyptians,” which nation we know was one of +the most ancient schools of the world: for so Plato brings in the +Egyptian priest saying unto Solon, “You Grecians are ever children; you +have no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of knowledge.” Take a view +of the ceremonial law of Moses; you shall find, besides the prefiguration +of Christ, the badge or difference of the people of God, the exercise and +impression of obedience, and other divine uses and fruits thereof, that +some of the most learned Rabbins have travailed profitably and profoundly +to observe, some of them a natural, some of them a moral sense, or +reduction of many of the ceremonies and ordinances. As in the law of the +leprosy, where it is said, “If the whiteness have overspread the flesh, +the patient may pass abroad for clean; but if there be any whole flesh +remaining, he is to be shut up for unclean;” one of them noteth a +principle of nature, that putrefaction is more contagious before maturity +than after; and another noteth a position of moral philosophy, that men +abandoned to vice do not so much corrupt manners, as those that are half +good and half evil. So in this and very many other places in that law, +there is to be found, besides the theological sense, much aspersion of +philosophy. + +(10) So likewise in that excellent hook of Job, if it be revolved with +diligence, it will be found pregnant and swelling with natural +philosophy; as for example, cosmography, and the roundness of the world, +_Qui extendit aquilonem super vacuum_, _et appendit terram super +nihilum_; wherein the pensileness of the earth, the pole of the north, +and the finiteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly touched. So +again, matter of astronomy: _Spiritus ejus ornavit cælos_, _et +obstetricante manu ejus eductus est Coluber tortuoses_. And in another +place, _Nunquid conjungere valebis micantes stellas Pleiadas_, _aut gyrum +Arcturi poteris dissipare_? Where the fixing of the stars, ever standing +at equal distance, is with great elegancy noted. And in another place, +_Qui facit Arcturum_, _et Oriona_, _et Hyadas_, _et interiora Austri_; +where again he takes knowledge of the depression of the southern pole, +calling it the secrets of the south, because the southern stars were in +that climate unseen. Matter of generation: _Annon sicut lac mulsisti +me_, _et sicut caseum coagulasti me_? &c. Matter of minerals: _Habet +argentum venarum suarum principia_; _et auro locus est in quo conflatur_, +_ferrum de terra tollitur_, _et lapis solutus calore in æs vertitur_; and +so forwards in that chapter. + +(11) So likewise in the person of Solomon the king, we see the gift or +endowment of wisdom and learning, both in Solomon’s petition and in God’s +assent thereunto, preferred before all other terrene and temporal +felicity. By virtue of which grant or donative of God Solomon became +enabled not only to write those excellent parables or aphorisms +concerning divine and moral philosophy, but also to compile a natural +history of all verdure, from the cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon +the wall (which is but a rudiment between putrefaction and an herb), and +also of all things that breathe or move. Nay, the same Solomon the king, +although he excelled in the glory of treasure and magnificent buildings, +of shipping and navigation, of service and attendance, of fame and +renown, and the like, yet he maketh no claim to any of those glories, but +only to the glory of inquisition of truth; for so he saith expressly, +“The glory of God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the king is to +find it out;” as if, according to the innocent play of children, the +Divine Majesty took delight to hide His works, to the end to have them +found out; and as if kings could not obtain a greater honour than to be +God’s playfellows in that game; considering the great commandment of wits +and means, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them. + +(12) Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times after our +Saviour came into the world; for our Saviour himself did first show His +power to subdue ignorance, by His conference with the priests and doctors +of the law, before He showed His power to subdue nature by His miracles. +And the coming of this Holy Spirit was chiefly figured and expressed in +the similitude and gift of tongues, which are but _vehicula scientiæ_. + +(13) So in the election of those instruments, which it pleased God to use +for the plantation of the faith, notwithstanding that at the first He did +employ persons altogether unlearned, otherwise than by inspiration, more +evidently to declare His immediate working, and to abase all human wisdom +or knowledge; yet nevertheless that counsel of His was no sooner +performed, but in the next vicissitude and succession He did send His +divine truth into the world, waited on with other learnings, as with +servants or handmaids: for so we see St. Paul, who was only learned +amongst the Apostles, had his pen most used in the Scriptures of the New +Testament. + +(14) So again we find that many of the ancient bishops and fathers of the +Church were excellently read and studied in all the learning of this +heathen; insomuch that the edict of the Emperor Julianus (whereby it was +interdicted unto Christians to be admitted into schools, lectures, or +exercises of learning) was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious +engine and machination against the Christian Faith than were all the +sanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors; neither could the emulation +and jealousy of Gregory, the first of that name, Bishop of Rome, ever +obtain the opinion of piety or devotion; but contrariwise received the +censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity, even amongst holy men; +in that he designed to obliterate and extinguish the memory of heathen +antiquity and authors. But contrariwise it was the Christian Church, +which, amidst the inundations of the Scythians on the one side from the +north-west, and the Saracens from the east, did preserve in the sacred +lap and bosom thereof the precious relics even of heathen learning, which +otherwise had been extinguished, as if no such thing had ever been. + +(15) And we see before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves and our +fathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of Rome to account for +their degenerate manners and ceremonies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious +and framed to uphold the same abuses; at one and the same time it was +ordained by the Divine Providence that there should attend withal a +renovation and new spring of all other knowledges. And on the other side +we see the Jesuits, who partly in themselves, and partly by the emulation +and provocation of their example, have much quickened and strengthened +the state of learning; we see (I say) what notable service and reparation +they have done to the Roman see. + +(16) Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed, that there be +two principal duties and services, besides ornament and illustration, +which philosophy and human learning do perform to faith and religion. +The one, because they are an effectual inducement to the exaltation of +the glory of God. For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite +us to consider and magnify the great and wonderful works of God, so if we +should rest only in the contemplation of the exterior of them as they +first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like injury unto the +majesty of God, as if we should judge or construe of the store of some +excellent jeweller by that only which is set out toward the street in his +shop. The other, because they minister a singular help and preservative +against unbelief and error. For our Saviour saith, “You err, not knowing +the Scriptures, nor the power of God;” laying before us two books or +volumes to study, if we will be secured from error: first the Scriptures, +revealing the will of God, and then the creatures expressing His power; +whereof the latter is a key unto the former: not only opening our +understanding to conceive the true sense of the Scriptures by the general +notions of reason and rules of speech, but chiefly opening our belief, in +drawing us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is +chiefly signed and engraven upon His works. Thus much therefore for +divine testimony and evidence concerning the true dignity and value of +learning. + +VII. (1) As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a discourse +of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to use choice of those things +which we shall produce, than to embrace the variety of them. First, +therefore, in the degrees of human honour amongst the heathen, it was the +highest to obtain to a veneration and adoration as a God. This unto the +Christians is as the forbidden fruit. But we speak now separately of +human testimony, according to which—that which the Grecians call +_apotheosis_, and the Latins _relatio inter divos_—was the supreme honour +which man could attribute unto man, specially when it was given, not by a +formal decree or act of state (as it was used among the Roman Emperors), +but by an inward assent and belief. Which honour, being so high, had +also a degree or middle term; for there were reckoned above human +honours, honours heroical and divine: in the attribution and distribution +of which honours we see antiquity made this difference; that whereas +founders and uniters of states and cities, lawgivers, extirpers of +tyrants, fathers of the people, and other eminent persons in civil merit, +were honoured but with the titles of worthies or demigods, such as were +Hercules, Theseus, Minus, Romulus, and the like; on the other side, such +as were inventors and authors of new arts, endowments, and commodities +towards man’s life, were ever consecrated amongst the gods themselves, as +was Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius, Apollo, and others. And justly; for the +merit of the former is confined within the circle of an age or a nation, +and is like fruitful showers, which though they be profitable and good, +yet serve but for that season, and for a latitude of ground where they +fall; but the other is, indeed, like the benefits of heaven, which are +permanent and universal. The former again is mixed with strife and +perturbation, but the latter hath the true character of Divine Presence, +coming in _aura leni_, without noise or agitation. + +(2) Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing the +inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former, +of relieving the necessities which arise from nature, which merit was +lively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus’ +theatre, where all beasts and birds assembled, and, forgetting their +several appetites—some of prey, some of game, some of quarrel—stood all +sociably together listening unto the airs and accords of the harp, the +sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, but +every beast returned to his own nature; wherein is aptly described the +nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed +desires, of profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give ear +to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and +persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is society and +peace maintained; but if these instruments be silent, or that sedition +and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and +confusion. + +(3) But this appeareth more manifestly when kings themselves, or persons +of authority under them, or other governors in commonwealths and popular +estates, are endued with learning. For although he might be thought +partial to his own profession that said “Then should people and estates +be happy when either kings were philosophers, or philosophers kings;” yet +so much is verified by experience, that under learned princes and +governors there have been ever the best times: for howsoever kings may +have their imperfections in their passions and customs, yet, if they be +illuminate by learning, they have those notions of religion, policy, and +morality, which do preserve them and refrain them from all ruinous and +peremptory errors and excesses, whispering evermore in their ears, when +counsellors and servants stand mute and silent. And senators or +counsellors, likewise, which be learned, to proceed upon more safe and +substantial principles, than counsellors which are only men of +experience; the one sort keeping dangers afar off, whereas the other +discover them not till they come near hand, and then trust to the agility +of their wit to ward or avoid them. + +(4) Which felicity of times under learned princes (to keep still the law +of brevity, by using the most eminent and selected examples) doth best +appear in the age which passed from the death of Domitianus the emperor +until the reign of Commodus; comprehending a succession of six princes, +all learned, or singular favourers and advancers of learning, which age +for temporal respects was the most happy and flourishing that ever the +Roman Empire (which then was a model of the world) enjoyed—a matter +revealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a dream the night before he was +slain: for he thought there was grown behind upon his shoulders a neck +and a head of gold, which came accordingly to pass in those golden times +which succeeded; of which princes we will make some commemoration; +wherein, although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter +for a declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded as this is, yet, +because it is pertinent to the point in hand—_Neque semper arcum tendit +Apollo_—and to name them only were too naked and cursory, I will not omit +it altogether. The first was Nerva, the excellent temper of whose +government is by a glance in Cornelius Tacitus touched to the life: +_Postquam divus Nerva res oluim insociabiles miscuisset_, _imperium et +libertatem_. And in token of his learning, the last act of his short +reign left to memory was a missive to his adopted son, Trajan, proceeding +upon some inward discontent at the ingratitude of the times, comprehended +in a verse of Homer’s— + + “Telis, Phœbe, tuis, lacrymas ulciscere nostras.” + +(5) Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not learned; but if we will +hearken to the speech of our Saviour, that saith, “He that receiveth a +prophet in the name of a prophet shall have a prophet’s reward,” he +deserveth to be placed amongst the most learned princes; for there was +not a greater admirer of learning or benefactor of learning, a founder of +famous libraries, a perpetual advancer of learned men to office, and +familiar converser with learned professors and preceptors who were noted +to have then most credit in court. On the other side how much Trajan’s +virtue and government was admired and renowned, surely no testimony of +grave and faithful history doth more lively set forth than that legend +tale of Gregorius Magnum, Bishop of Rome, who was noted for the extreme +envy he bare towards all heathen excellency; and yet he is reported, out +of the love and estimation of Trajan’s moral virtues, to have made unto +God passionate and fervent prayers for the delivery of his soul out of +hell, and to have obtained it, with a caveat that he should make no more +such petitions. In this prince’s time also the persecutions against the +Christians received intermission upon the certificate of Plinius +Secundus, a man of excellent learning and by Trajan advanced. + +(6) Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that lived, and the +most universal inquirer: insomuch as it was noted for an error in his +mind that he desired to comprehend all things, and not to reserve himself +for the worthiest things, falling into the like humour that was long +before noted in Philip of Macedon, who, when he would needs overrule and +put down an excellent musician in an argument touching music, was well +answered by him again—“God forbid, sir,” saith he, “that your fortune +should be so bad as to know these things better than I.” It pleased God +likewise to use the curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the +peace of His Church in those days; for having Christ in veneration, not +as a God or Saviour, but as a wonder or novelty, and having his picture +in his gallery matched with Apollonius (with whom in his vain imagination +he thought its had some conformity), yet it served the turn to allay the +bitter hatred of those times against the Christian name, so as the Church +had peace during his time. And for his government civil, although he did +not attain to that of Trajan’s in glory of arms or perfection of justice, +yet in deserving of the weal of the subject he did exceed him. For +Trajan erected many famous monuments and buildings, insomuch as +Constantine the Great in emulation was wont to call him _Parietaria_, +“wall-flower,” because his name was upon so many walls; but his buildings +and works were more of glory and triumph than use and necessity. But +Adrian spent his whole reign, which was peaceable, in a perambulation or +survey of the Roman Empire, giving order and making assignation where he +went for re-edifying of cities, towns, and forts decayed, and for cutting +of rivers and streams, and for making bridges and passages, and for +policing of cities and commonalties with new ordinances and +constitutions, and granting new franchises and incorporations; so that +his whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses and decays of +former times. + +(7) Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince excellently learned, +and had the patient and subtle wit of a schoolman, insomuch as in common +speech (which leaves no virtue untaxed) he was called _Cymini Sector_, a +carver or a divider of cummin seed, which is one of the least seeds. +Such a patience he had and settled spirit to enter into the least and +most exact differences of causes, a fruit no doubt of the exceeding +tranquillity and serenity of his mind, which being no ways charged or +encumbered, either with fears, remorses, or scruples, but having been +noted for a man of the purest goodness, without all fiction or +affectation, that hath reigned or lived, made his mind continually +present and entire. He likewise approached a degree nearer unto +Christianity, and became, as Agrippa said unto St. Paul, “half a +Christian,” holding their religion and law in good opinion, and not only +ceasing persecution, but giving way to the advancement of Christians. + +(5) There succeeded him the first _Divi fratres_, the two adoptive +brethren—Lucius Commodus Verus, son to Ælius Verus, who delighted much in +the softer kind of learning, and was wont to call the poet Martial his +Virgil; and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: whereof the latter, who obscured +his colleague and survived him long, was named the “Philosopher,” who, as +he excelled all the rest in learning, so he excelled them likewise in +perfection of all royal virtues; insomuch as Julianus the emperor, in his +book entitled _Cærsares_, being as a pasquil or satire to deride all his +predecessors, feigned that they were all invited to a banquet of the +gods, and Silenus the jester sat at the nether end of the table and +bestowed a scoff on everyone as they came in; but when Marcus Philosophus +came in, Silenus was gravelled and out of countenance, not knowing where +to carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance at his patience towards +his wife. And the virtue of this prince, continued with that of his +predecessor, made the name of Antoninus so sacred in the world, that +though it were extremely dishonoured in Commodus, Caracalla, and +Heliogabalus, who all bare the name, yet, when Alexander Severus refused +the name because he was a stranger to the family, the Senate with one +acclamation said, _Quomodo Augustus_, _sic et Antoninus_. In such renown +and veneration was the name of these two princes in those days, that they +would have had it as a perpetual addition in all the emperors’ style. In +this emperor’s time also the Church for the most part was in peace; so as +in this sequence of six princes we do see the blessed effects of learning +in sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest table of the world. + +(9) But for a tablet or picture of smaller volume (not presuming to speak +of your Majesty that liveth), in my judgment the most excellent is that +of Queen Elizabeth, your immediate predecessor in this part of Britain; a +prince that, if Plutarch were now alive to write lives by parallels, +would trouble him, I think, to find for her a parallel amongst women. +This lady was endued with learning in her sex singular, and rare even +amongst masculine princes—whether we speak of learning, of language, or +of science, modern or ancient, divinity or humanity—and unto the very +last year of her life she accustomed to appoint set hours for reading, +scarcely any young student in a university more daily or more duly. As +for her government, I assure myself (I shall not exceed if I do affirm) +that this part of the island never had forty-five years of better tines, +and yet not through the calmness of the season, but through the wisdom of +her regiment. For if there be considered, of the one side, the truth of +religion established, the constant peace and security, the good +administration of justice, the temperate use of the prerogative, not +slackened, nor much strained; the flourishing state of learning, sortable +to so excellent a patroness; the convenient estate of wealth and means, +both of crown and subject; the habit of obedience, and the moderation of +discontents; and there be considered, on the other side, the differences +of religion, the troubles of neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain, +and opposition of Rome, and then that she was solitary and of herself; +these things, I say, considered, as I could not have chosen an instance +so recent and so proper, so I suppose I could not have chosen one more +remarkable or eminent to the purpose now in hand, which is concerning the +conjunction of learning in the prince with felicity in the people. + +(10) Neither hath learning an influence and operation only upon civil +merit and moral virtue, and the arts or temperature of peace and +peaceable government; but likewise it hath no less power and efficacy in +enablement towards martial and military virtue and prowess, as may be +notably represented in the examples of Alexander the Great and Cæsar the +Dictator (mentioned before, but now in fit place to be resumed), of whose +virtues and acts in war there needs no note or recital, having been the +wonders of time in that kind; but of their affections towards learning +and perfections in learning it is pertinent to say somewhat. + +(11) Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle, the great +philosopher, who dedicated divers of his books of philosophy unto him; he +was attended with Callisthenes and divers other learned persons, that +followed him in camp, throughout his journeys and conquests. What price +and estimation he had learning in doth notably appear in these three +particulars: first, in the envy he used to express that he bare towards +Achilles, in this, that he had so good a trumpet of his praises as +Homer’s verses; secondly, in the judgment or solution he gave touching +that precious cabinet of Darius, which was found among his jewels +(whereof question was made what thing was worthy to be put into it, and +he gave his opinion for Homer’s works); thirdly, in his letter to +Aristotle, after he had set forth his books of nature, wherein he +expostulateth with him for publishing the secrets or mysteries of +philosophy; and gave him to understand that himself esteemed it more to +excel other men in learning and knowledge than in power and empire. And +what use he had of learning doth appear, or rather shine, in all his +speeches and answers, being full of science and use of science, and that +in all variety. + +(12) And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and somewhat idle +to recite things that every man knoweth; but yet, since the argument I +handle leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that men shall perceive I am as +willing to flatter (if they will so call it) an Alexander, or a Cæsar, or +an Antoninus, that are dead many hundred years since, as any that now +liveth; for it is the displaying of the glory of learning in sovereignty +that I propound to myself, and not a humour of declaiming in any man’s +praises. Observe, then, the speech he used of Diogenes, and see if it +tend not to the true state of one of the greatest questions of moral +philosophy: whether the enjoying of outward things, or the contemning of +them, be the greatest happiness; for when he saw Diogenes so perfectly +contented with so little, he said to those that mocked at his condition, +“were I not Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes.” But Seneca +inverteth it, and saith, “_Plus erat_, _quod hic nollet accipere_, _quàm +quod ille posset dare_.” There were more things which Diogenes would +have refused than those were which Alexander could have given or enjoyed. + +(13) Observe, again, that speech which was usual with him,—“That he felt +his mortality chiefly in two things, sleep and lust;” and see if it were +not a speech extracted out of the depth of natural philosophy, and liker +to have come out of the mouth of Aristotle or Democritus than from +Alexander. + +(14) See, again, that speech of humanity and poesy, when, upon the +bleeding of his wounds, he called unto him one of his flatterers, that +was wont to ascribe to him divine honour, and said, “Look, this is very +blood; this is not such a liquor as Homer speaketh of, which ran from +Venus’ hand when it was pierced by Diomedes.” + +(15) See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic in the speech he +used to Cassander, upon a complaint that was made against his father +Antipater; for when Alexander happened to say, “Do you think these men +would have come from so far to complain except they had just cause of +grief?” and Cassander answered, “Yea, that was the matter, because they +thought they should not be disproved;” said Alexander, laughing, “See the +subtleties of Aristotle, to take a matter both ways, _pro et contra_, +&c.” + +(16) But note, again, how well he could use the same art which he +reprehended to serve his own humour: when bearing a secret grudge to +Callisthenes, because he was against the new ceremony of his adoration, +feasting one night where the same Callisthenes was at the table, it was +moved by some after supper, for entertainment sake, that Callisthenes, +who was an eloquent man, might speak of some theme or purpose at his own +choice; which Callisthenes did, choosing the praise of the Macedonian +nation for his discourse, and performing the same with so good manner as +the hearers were much ravished; whereupon Alexander, nothing pleased, +said, “It was easy to be eloquent upon so good a subject; but,” saith he, +“turn your style, and let us hear what you can say against us;” which +Callisthenes presently undertook, and did with that sting and life that +Alexander interrupted him, and said, “The goodness of the cause made him +eloquent before, and despite made him eloquent then again.” + +(17) Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent use of a +metaphor or translation, wherewith he taxeth Antipater, who was an +imperious and tyrannous governor; for when one of Antipater’s friends +commended him to Alexander for his moderation, that he did not degenerate +as his other lieutenants did into the Persian pride, in uses of purple, +but kept the ancient habit of Macedon, of black. “True,” saith +Alexander; “but Antipater is all purple within.” Or that other, when +Parmenio came to him in the plain of Arbela and showed him the +innumerable multitude of his enemies, specially as they appeared by the +infinite number of lights as it had been a new firmament of stars, and +thereupon advised him to assail them by night; whereupon he answered, +“That he would not steal the victory.” + +(18) For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction, so much in +all ages embraced, that he made between his two friends Hephæstion and +Craterus, when he said, “That the one loved Alexander, and the other +loved the king:” describing the principal difference of princes’ best +servants, that some in affection love their person, and other in duty +love their crown. + +(19) Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary with +counsellors of princes, that they counsel their masters according to the +model of their own mind and fortune, and not of their masters. When upon +Darius’ great offers Parmenio had said, “Surely I would accept these +offers were I as Alexander;” saith Alexander, “So would I were I as +Parmenio.” + +(20) Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply which he made when he gave +so large gifts to his friends and servants, and was asked what he did +reserve for himself, and he answered, “Hope.” Weigh, I say, whether he +had not cast up his account aright, because _hope_ must be the portion of +all that resolve upon great enterprises; for this was Cæsar’s portion +when he went first into Gaul, his estate being then utterly overthrown +with largesses. And this was likewise the portion of that noble prince, +howsoever transported with ambition, Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it was +usually said that he was the greatest usurer in France, because he had +turned all his estate into obligations. + +(21) To conclude, therefore, as certain critics are used to say +hyperbolically, “That if all sciences were lost they might be found in +Virgil,” so certainly this may be said truly, there are the prints and +footsteps of learning in those few speeches which are reported of this +prince, the admiration of whom, when I consider him not as Alexander the +Great, but as Aristotle’s scholar, hath carried me too far. + +(22) As for Julius Cæsar, the excellency of his learning needeth not to +be argued from his education, or his company, or his speeches; but in a +further degree doth declare itself in his writings and works: whereof +some are extant and permanent, and some unfortunately perished. For +first, we see there is left unto us that excellent history of his own +wars, which he entitled only a Commentary, wherein all succeeding times +have admired the solid weight of matter, and the real passages and lively +images of actions and persons, expressed in the greatest propriety of +words and perspicuity of narration that ever was; which that it was not +the effect of a natural gift, but of learning and precept, is well +witnessed by that work of his entitled _De Analogia_, being a grammatical +philosophy, wherein he did labour to make this same _Vox ad placitum_ to +become _Vox ad licitum_, and to reduce custom of speech to congruity of +speech; and took as it were the pictures of words from the life of +reason. + +(23) So we receive from him, as a monument both of his power and +learning, the then reformed computation of the year; well expressing that +he took it to be as great a glory to himself to observe and know the law +of the heavens, as to give law to men upon the earth. + +(24) So likewise in that book of his, _Anti-Cato_, it may easily appear +that he did aspire as well to victory of wit as victory of war: +undertaking therein a conflict against the greatest champion with the pen +that then lived, Cicero the orator. + +(25) So, again, in his book of Apophthegms, which he collected, we see +that he esteemed it more honour to make himself but a pair of tables, to +take the wise and pithy words of others, than to have every word of his +own to be made an apophthegm or an oracle, as vain princes, by custom of +flattery, pretend to do. And yet if I should enumerate divers of his +speeches, as I did those of Alexander, they are truly such as Solomon +noteth, when he saith, _Verba sapientum tanquam aculei_, _et tanquam +clavi in altum defixi_: whereof I will only recite three, not so +delectable for elegancy, but admirable for vigour and efficacy. + +(26) As first, it is reason he be thought a master of words, that could +with one word appease a mutiny in his army, which was thus: The Romans, +when their generals did speak to their army, did use the word _Milites_, +but when the magistrates spake to the people they did use the word +_Quirites_. The soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously prayed to be +cashiered; not that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof to draw +Cæsar to other conditions; wherein he being resolute not to give way, +after some silence, he began his speech, _Ego Quirites_, which did admit +them already cashiered—wherewith they were so surprised, crossed, and +confused, as they would not suffer him to go on in his speech, but +relinquished their demands, and made it their suit to be again called by +the name of _Milites_. + +(27) The second speech was thus: Cæsar did extremely affect the name of +king; and some were set on as he passed by in popular acclamation to +salute him king. Whereupon, finding the cry weak and poor, he put it off +thus, in a kind of jest, as if they had mistaken his surname: _Non Rex +sum_, _sed Cæsar_; a speech that, if it be searched, the life and fulness +of it can scarce be expressed. For, first, it was a refusal of the name, +but yet not serious; again, it did signify an infinite confidence and +magnanimity, as if he presumed Cæsar was the greater title, as by his +worthiness it is come to pass till this day. But chiefly it was a speech +of great allurement toward his own purpose, as if the state did strive +with him but for a name, whereof mean families were vested; for _Rex_ was +a surname with the Romans, as well as _King_ is with us. + +(28) The last speech which I will mention was used to Metellus, when +Cæsar, after war declared, did possess himself of this city of Rome; at +which time, entering into the inner treasury to take the money there +accumulate, Metellus, being tribune, forbade him. Whereto Cæsar said, +“That if he did not desist, he would lay him dead in the place.” And +presently taking himself up, he added, “Young man, it is harder for me to +speak it than to do it—_Adolescens_, _durius est mihi hoc dicere quàm +facere_.” A speech compounded of the greatest terror and greatest +clemency that could proceed out of the mouth of man. + +(29) But to return and conclude with him, it is evident himself knew well +his own perfection in learning, and took it upon him, as appeared when +upon occasion that some spake what a strange resolution it was in Lucius +Sylla to resign his dictators, he, scoffing at him to his own advantage, +answered, “That Sylla could not skill of letters, and therefore knew not +how to dictate.” + +(30) And here it were fit to leave this point, touching the concurrence +of military virtue and learning (for what example should come with any +grace after those two of Alexander and Cæsar?), were it not in regard of +the rareness of circumstance, that I find in one other particular, as +that which did so suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder: and +it is of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from Socrates’ school into +Asia in the expedition of Cyrus the younger against King Artaxerxes. +This Xenophon at that time was very young, and never had seen the wars +before, neither had any command in the army, but only followed the war as +a voluntary, for the love and conversation of Proxenus, his friend. He +was present when Falinus came in message from the great king to the +Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they, a handful of +men, left to themselves in the midst of the king’s territories, cut off +from their country by many navigable rivers and many hundred miles. The +message imported that they should deliver up their arms and submit +themselves to the king’s mercy. To which message, before answer was +made, divers of the army conferred familiarly with Falinus; and amongst +the rest Xenophon happened to say, “Why, Falinus, we have now but these +two things left, our arms and our virtue; and if we yield up our arms, +how shall we make use of our virtue?” Whereto Falinus, smiling on him, +said, “If I be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an Athenian, and I +believe you study philosophy, and it is pretty that you say; but you are +much abused if you think your virtue can withstand the king’s power.” +Here was the scorn; the wonder followed: which was that this young +scholar or philosopher, after all the captains were murdered in parley by +treason, conducted those ten thousand foot, through the heart of all the +king’s high countries, from Babylon to Græcia in safety, in despite of +all the king’s forces, to the astonishment of the world, and the +encouragement of the Grecians in times succeeding to make invasion upon +the kings of Persia, as was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, +attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and achieved by Alexander the +Macedonian, all upon the ground of the act of that young scholar. + +VIII. (1) To proceed now from imperial and military virtue to moral and +private virtue; first, it is an assured truth, which is contained in the +verses:— + + “Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes + Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros.” + +It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men’s minds; +but indeed the accent had need be upon _fideliter_; for a little +superficial learning doth rather work a contrary effect. It taketh away +all levity, temerity, and insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts +and difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both +sides, and to turn back the first offers and conceits of the mind, and to +accept of nothing but examined and tried. It taketh away vain admiration +of anything, which is the root of all weakness. For all things are +admired, either because they are new, or because they are great. For +novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly but +will find that printed in his heart, _Nil novi super terram_. Neither +can any man marvel at the play of puppets, that goeth behind the curtain, +and adviseth well of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the +Great, after that he was used to great armies, and the great conquests of +the spacious provinces in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, +of some fights and services there, which were commonly for a passage or a +fort, or some walled town at the most, he said:—“It seemed to him that he +was advertised of the battles of the frogs and the mice, that the old +tales went of.” So certainly, if a man meditate much upon the universal +frame of nature, the earth with men upon it (the divineness of souls +except) will not seem much other than an ant-hill, whereas some ants +carry corn, and some carry their young, and some go empty, and all to and +fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of death or +adverse fortune, which is one of the greatest impediments of virtue and +imperfections of manners. For if a man’s mind be deeply seasoned with +the consideration of the mortality and corruptible nature of things, he +will easily concur with Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw a woman +weeping for her pitcher of earth that was broken, and went forth the next +day and saw a woman weeping for her son that was dead, and thereupon +said, “_Heri vidi fragilem frangi_, _hodie vidi mortalem mori_.” And, +therefore, Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of +causes and the conquest of all fears together, as _concomitantia_. + + “Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, + Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum + Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.” + +(2) It were too long to go over the particular remedies which learning +doth minister to all the diseases of the mind: sometimes purging the ill +humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, +sometimes increasing appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and +exulcerations thereof, and the like; and, therefore, I will conclude with +that which hath _rationem totius_—which is, that it disposeth the +constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects +thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of growth and +reformation. For the unlearned man knows not what it is to descend into +himself, or to call himself to account, nor the pleasure of that +_suavissima vita_, _indies sentire se fieri meliorem_. The good parts he +hath he will learn to show to the full, and use them dexterously, but not +much to increase them. The faults he hath he will learn how to hide and +colour them, but not much to amend them; like an ill mower, that mows on +still, and never whets his scythe. Whereas with the learned man it fares +otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment of his +mind with the use and employment thereof. Nay, further, in general and +in sum, certain it is that _Veritas_ and _Bonitas_ differ but as the seal +and the print; for truth prints goodness, and they be the clouds of error +which descend in the storms of passions and perturbations. + +(3) From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and commandment, +and consider whether in right reason there be any comparable with that +wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth man’s nature. We see the +dignity of the commandment is according to the dignity of the commanded; +to have commandment over beasts as herdmen have, is a thing contemptible; +to have commandment over children as schoolmasters have, is a matter of +small honour; to have commandment over galley-slaves is a disparagement +rather than an honour. Neither is the commandment of tyrants much +better, over people which have put off the generosity of their minds; +and, therefore, it was ever holden that honours in free monarchies and +commonwealths had a sweetness more than in tyrannies, because the +commandment extendeth more over the wills of men, and not only over their +deeds and services. And therefore, when Virgil putteth himself forth to +attribute to Augustus Cæsar the best of human honours, he doth it in +these words:— + + “Victorque volentes + Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.” + +But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment +over the will; for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and +understanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth +law to the will itself. For there is no power on earth which setteth up +a throne or chair of estate in the spirits and souls of men, and in their +cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and +learning. And therefore we see the detestable and extreme pleasure that +arch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors are transported with, +when they once find in themselves that they have a superiority in the +faith and conscience of men; so great as if they have once tasted of it, +it is seldom seen that any torture or persecution can make them +relinquish or abandon it. But as this is that which the author of the +Revelation calleth the depth or profoundness of Satan, so by argument of +contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men’s understanding, by +force of truth rightly interpreted, is that which approacheth nearest to +the similitude of the divine rule. + +(4) As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of learning is not so +confined to give fortune only to states and commonwealths, as it doth not +likewise give fortune to particular persons. For it was well noted long +ago, that Homer hath given more men their livings, than either Sylla, or +Cæsar, or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding their great largesses and +donatives, and distributions of lands to so many legions. And no doubt +it is hard to say whether arms or learning have advanced greater numbers. +And in case of sovereignty we see, that if arms or descent have carried +away the kingdom, yet learning hath carried the priesthood, which ever +hath been in some competition with empire. + +(5) Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning, it far +surpasseth all other in nature. For, shall the pleasures of the +affections so exceed the pleasure of the sense, as much as the obtaining +of desire or victory exceedeth a song or a dinner? and must not of +consequence the pleasures of the intellect or understanding exceed the +pleasures of the affections? We see in all other pleasures there is +satiety, and after they be used, their verdure departeth, which showeth +well they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that it was +the novelty which pleased, and not the quality. And, therefore, we see +that voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitions princes turn melancholy. +But of knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and appetite are +perpetually interchangeable; and, therefore, appeareth to be good in +itself simply, without fallacy or accident. Neither is that pleasure of +small efficacy and contentment to the mind of man, which the poet +Lucretius describeth elegantly:— + + “Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis, &c.” + +“It is a view of delight,” saith he, “to stand or walk upon the shore +side, and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon the sea; or to be in a +fortified tower, and to see two battles join upon a plain. But it is a +pleasure incomparable, for the mind of man to be settled, landed, and +fortified in the certainty of truth; and from thence to descry and behold +the errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up and down of other +men.” + +(6) Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning man excelleth +man in that wherein man excelleth beasts; that by learning man ascendeth +to the heavens and their motions, where in body he cannot come; and the +like: let us conclude with the dignity and excellency of knowledge and +learning in that whereunto man’s nature doth most aspire, which is +immortality, or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and raising +of houses and families; to this tend buildings, foundations, and +monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration; +and in effect the strength of all other human desires. We see then how +far the monuments of wit and learning are more durable than the monuments +of power or of the hands. For have not the verses of Homer continued +twenty-five hundred years, or more, without the loss of a syllable or +letter; during which the infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities, have +been decayed and demolished? It is not possible to have the true +pictures or statues of Cyrus, Alexander, Cæsar, no nor of the kings or +great personages of much later years; for the originals cannot last, and +the copies cannot but leese of the life and truth. But the images of +men’s wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted from the wrong of +time and capable of perpetual renovation. Neither are they fitly to be +called images, because they generate still, and cast their seeds in the +minds of others, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in +succeeding ages. So that if the invention of the ship was thought so +noble, which carrieth riches and commodities from place to place, and +consociateth the most remote regions in participation of their fruits, +how much more are letters to be magnified, which as ships pass through +the vast seas of time, and make ages so distant to participate of the +wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the one of the other? Nay, +further, we see some of the philosophers which were least divine, and +most immersed in the senses, and denied generally the immortality of the +soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the spirit of man +could act and perform without the organs of the body, they thought might +remain after death, which were only those of the understanding and not of +the affection; so immortal and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem +unto them to be. But we, that know by divine revelation that not only +the understanding but the affections purified, not only the spirit but +the body changed, shall be advanced to immortality, do disclaim in these +rudiments of the senses. But it must be remembered, both in this last +point, and so it may likewise be needful in other places, that in +probation of the dignity of knowledge or learning, I did in the beginning +separate divine testimony from human, which method I have pursued, and so +handled them both apart. + +(7) Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know it will be impossible for +me, by any pleading of mine, to reverse the judgment, either of Æsop’s +cock, that preferred the barleycorn before the gem; or of Midas, that +being chosen judge between Apollo, president of the Muses, and Pan, god +of the flocks, judged for plenty; or of Paris, that judged for beauty and +love against wisdom and power; or of Agrippina, _occidat matrem_, _modo +imperet_, that preferred empire with any condition never so detestable; +or of Ulysses, _qui vetulam prætulit immortalitati_, being a figure of +those which prefer custom and habit before all excellency, or of a number +of the like popular judgments. For these things must continue as they +have been; but so will that also continue whereupon learning hath ever +relied, and which faileth not: _Justificata est sapientia a filiis suis_. + + + + +THE SECOND BOOK. + + + _To the King_. + +1. IT might seem to have more convenience, though it come often +otherwise to pass (excellent King), that those which are fruitful in +their generations, and have in themselves the foresight of immortality in +their descendants, should likewise be more careful of the good estate of +future times, unto which they know they must transmit and commend over +their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was a sojourner in the world in +respect of her unmarried life, and was a blessing to her own times; and +yet so as the impression of her good government, besides her happy +memory, is not without some effect which doth survive her. But to your +Majesty, whom God hath already blessed with so much royal issue, worthy +to continue and represent you for ever, and whose youthful and fruitful +bed doth yet promise many the like renovations, it is proper and +agreeable to be conversant not only in the transitory parts of good +government, but in those acts also which are in their nature permanent +and perpetual. Amongst the which (if affection do not transport me) +there is not any more worthy than the further endowment of the world with +sound and fruitful knowledge. For why should a few received authors +stand up like Hercules’ columns, beyond which there should be no sailing +or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star as your Majesty +to conduct and prosper us? To return therefore where we left, it +remaineth to consider of what kind those acts are which have been +undertaken and performed by kings and others for the increase and +advancement of learning, wherein I purpose to speak actively, without +digressing or dilating. + +2. Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are over common by +amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the conjunction of +labours. The first multiplieth endeavour, the second preventeth error, +and the third supplieth the frailty of man. But the principal of these +is direction, for _claudus in via antevertit cursorem extra viam_; and +Solomon excellently setteth it down, “If the iron be not sharp, it +requireth more strength, but wisdom is that which prevaileth,” signifying +that the invention or election of the mean is more effectual than any +enforcement or accumulation of endeavours. This I am induced to speak, +for that (not derogating from the noble intention of any that have been +deservers towards the state of learning), I do observe nevertheless that +their works and acts are rather matters of magnificence and memory than +of progression and proficience, and tend rather to augment the mass of +learning in the multitude of learned men than to rectify or raise the +sciences themselves. + +3. The works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant about +three objects—the places of learning, the books of learning, and the +persons of the learned. For as water, whether it be the dew of heaven or +the springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese itself in the ground, +except it be collected into some receptacle where it may by union comfort +and sustain itself; and for that cause the industry of man hath made and +framed springheads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, which men have +accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with accomplishments of +magnificence and state, as well as of use and necessity; so this +excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from divine +inspiration, or spring from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to +oblivion, if it were not preserved in books, traditions, conferences, and +places appointed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for the receipt +and comforting of the same. + +4. The works which concern the seats and places of learning are +four—foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with +franchises and privileges, institutions and ordinances for government—all +tending to quietness and privateness of life, and discharge of cares and +troubles; much like the stations which Virgil prescribeth for the hiving +of bees: + + “Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda, + Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c.” + +5. The works touching books are two—first, libraries, which are as the +shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints, full of true virtue, +and that without delusion or imposture, are preserved and reposed; +secondly, new editions of authors, with more correct impressions, more +faithful translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent +annotations, and the like. + +6. The works pertaining to the persons of learned men (besides the +advancement and countenancing of them in general) are two—the reward and +designation of readers in sciences already extant and invented; and the +reward and designation of writers and inquirers concerning any parts of +learning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted. + +7. These are summarily the works and acts wherein the merits of many +excellent princes and other worthy personages, have been conversant. As +for any particular commemorations, I call to mind what Cicero said when +he gave general thanks, _Difficile non aliquem_, _ingratum quenquam +præterire_. Let us rather, according to the Scriptures, look unto that +part of the race which is before us, than look back to that which is +already attained. + +8. First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations of colleges in +Europe, I find strange that they are all dedicated to professions, and +none left free to arts and sciences at large. For if men judge that +learning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they +fall into the error described in the ancient fable, in which the other +parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it +neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as +the head doth; but yet notwithstanding it is the stomach that digesteth +and distributeth to all the rest. So if any man think philosophy and +universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all +professions are from thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a +great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because these +fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if you will +have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not anything +you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth and putting +new mould about thee roots that must work it. Neither is it to be +forgotten, that this dedicating of foundations and dotations to +professory learning hath not only had a malign aspect and influence upon +the growth of sciences, but hath also been prejudicial to states, and +governments. For hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in +regard of able men to serve them in causes of estate, because there is no +education collegiate which is free, where such as were so disposed might +give themselves in histories, modern languages, books of policy and civil +discourse, and other the like enablements unto service of estate. + +9. And because founders of colleges do plant, and founders of lectures +do water, it followeth well in order to speak of the defect which is in +public lectures; namely, in the smallness, and meanness of the salary or +reward which in most places is assigned unto them, whether they be +lectures of arts, or of professions. For it is necessary to the +progression of sciences that readers be of the most able and sufficient +men; as those which are ordained for generating and propagating of +sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot be, except their +condition and endowment be such as may content the ablest man to +appropriate his whole labour and continue his whole age in that function +and attendance; and therefore must have a proportion answerable to that +mediocrity or competency of advancement, which may be expected from a +profession or the practice of a profession. So as, if you will have +sciences flourish, you must observe David’s military law, which was, +“That those which stayed with the carriage should have equal part with +those which were in the action;” else will the carriages be ill attended. +So readers in sciences are indeed the guardians of the stores and +provisions of sciences, whence men in active courses are furnished, and +therefore ought to have equal entertainment with them; otherwise if the +fathers in sciences be of the weakest sort or be ill maintained, + + “Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati.” + +10. Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some alchemist to help +me, who call upon men to sell their books, and to build furnaces; +quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins, and +relying upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that unto the deep, fruitful, +and operative study of many sciences, specialty natural philosophy and +physic, books be not only the instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence +of men hath not been altogether wanting. For we see spheres, globes, +astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided as appurtenances to +astronomy and cosmography, as well as books. We see likewise that some +places instituted for physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for +simples of all sorts, and do likewise command the use of dead bodies for +anatomies. But these do respect but a few things. In general, there +will hardly be any main proficience in the disclosing of nature, except +there be some allowance for expenses about experiments; whether they be +experiments appertaining to Vulcanus or Dædalus, furnace or engine, or +any other kind. And therefore as secretaries and spials of princes and +states bring in bills for intelligence, so you must allow the spials and +intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills; or else you shall be +ill advertised. + +11. And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to Aristotle of +treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the like, +that he might compile a history of nature, much better do they deserve it +that travail in arts of nature. + +12. Another defect which I note is an intermission or neglect in those +which are governors in universities, of consultation, and in princes or +superior persons, of visitation: to enter into account and consideration, +whether the readings, exercises, and other customs appertaining unto +learning, anciently begun and since continued, be well instituted or no; +and thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation in that which shall +be found inconvenient. For it is one of your Majesty’s own most wise and +princely maxims, “That in all usages and precedents, the times be +considered wherein they first began; which if they were weak or ignorant, +it derogateth from the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for +suspect.” And therefore inasmuch as most of the usages and orders of the +universities were derived from more obscure times, it is the more +requisite they be re-examined. In this kind I will give an instance or +two, for example sake, of things that are the most obvious and familiar. +The one is a matter, which though it be ancient and general, yet I hold +to be an error; which is, that scholars in universities come too soon and +too unripe to logic and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children +and novices. For these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences, +being the arts of arts; the one for judgment, the other for ornament. +And they be the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose matter: +and therefore for minds empty and unfraught with matter, and which have +not gathered that which Cicero calleth _sylva_ and _supellex_, stuff and +variety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to weigh, or to +measure, or to paint the wind) doth work but this effect, that the wisdom +of those arts, which is great and universal, is almost made contemptible, +and is degenerate into childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. +And further, the untimely learning of them hath drawn on by consequence +the superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them, as fitteth +indeed to the capacity of children. Another is a lack I find in the +exercises used in the universities, which do snake too great a divorce +between invention and memory. For their speeches are either premeditate, +in _verbis conceptis_, where nothing is left to invention, or merely +extemporal, where little is left to memory. Whereas in life and action +there is least use of either of these, but rather of intermixtures of +premeditation and invention, notes and memory. So as the exercise +fitteth not the practice, nor the image the life; and it is ever a true +rule in exercises, that they be framed as near as may be to the life of +practice; for otherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of the +mind, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is not obscure, when +scholars come to the practices of professions, or other actions of civil +life; which when they set into, this want is soon found by themselves, +and sooner by others. But this part, touching the amendment of the +institutions and orders of universities, I will conclude with the clause +of Cæsar’s letter to Oppius and Balbes, _Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit_, +_nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt_, _et multa reperiri possunt_: _de iis +rebus rgo vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis_. + +13. Another defect which I note ascendeth a little higher than the +precedent. For as the proficience of learning consisteth much in the +orders and institutions of universities in the same states and kingdoms, +so it would be yet more advanced, if there were more intelligence mutual +between the universities of Europe than now there is. We see there be +many orders and foundations, which though they be divided under several +sovereignties and territories, yet they take themselves to have a kind of +contract, fraternity, and correspondence one with the other, insomuch as +they have provincials and generals. And surely as nature createth +brotherhood in families, and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in +communalties, and the anointment of God superinduceth a brotherhood in +kings and bishops, so in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in +learning and illumination, relating to that paternity which is attributed +to God, who is called the Father of illuminations or lights. + +14. The last defect which I will note is, that there hath not been, or +very rarely been, any public designation of writers or inquirers +concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been already +sufficiently laboured or undertaken; unto which point it is an inducement +to enter into a view and examination what parts of learning have been +prosecuted, and what omitted. For the opinion of plenty is amongst the +causes of want, and the great quantity of books maketh a show rather of +superfluity than lack; which surcharge nevertheless is not to be remedied +by making no more books, but by making more good books, which, as the +serpent of Moses, might devour the serpents of the enchanters. + +15. The removing of all the defects formerly enumerate, except the last, +and of the active part also of the last (which is the designation of +writers), are _opera basilica_; towards which the endeavours of a private +man may be but as an image in a crossway, that may point at the way, but +cannot go it. But the inducing part of the latter (which is the survey +of learning) may be set forward by private travail. Wherefore I will now +attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation of learning, with an +inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and +converted by the industry of man, to the end that such a plot made and +recorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation, +and, also serve to excite voluntary endeavours. Wherein, nevertheless, +my purpose is at this time to note only omissions and deficiences, and +not to make any redargution of errors or incomplete prosecutions. For it +is one thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanured, and another thing +to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured. + +In the handling and undertaking of which work I am not ignorant what it +is that I do now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine own weakness to +sustain my purpose. But my hope is, that if my extreme love to learning +carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of affection; for that “It is +not granted to man to love and to be wise.” But I know well I can use no +other liberty of judgment than I must leave to others; and I for my part +shall be indifferently glad either to perform myself, or accept from +another, that duty of humanity—_Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam_, +&c. I do foresee likewise that of those things which I shall enter and +register as deficiences and omissions, many will conceive and censure +that some of them are already done and extant; others to be but +curiosities, and things of no great use; and others to be of too great +difficulty, and almost impossibility to be compassed and effected. But +for the two first, I refer myself to the particulars. For the last, +touching impossibility, I take it those things are to be held possible +which may be done by some person, though not by every one; and which may +be done by many, though not by any one; and which may be done in the +succession of ages, though not within the hourglass of one man’s life; +and which may be done by public designation, though not by private +endeavour. But, notwithstanding, if any man will take to himself rather +that of Solomon, “_Dicit piger_, _Leo est in via_,” than that of Virgil, +“_Possunt quia posse videntur_,” I shall be content that my labours be +esteemed but as the better sort of wishes; for as it asketh some +knowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it requireth some +sense to make a wish not absurd. + +I. (1) The parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of +man’s understanding, which is the seat of learning: history to his +memory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason. Divine +learning receiveth the same distribution; for, the spirit of man is the +same, though the revelation of oracle and sense be diverse. So as +theology consisteth also of history of the Church; of parables, which is +divine poesy; and of holy doctrine or precept. For as for that part +which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy, it is but divine history, +which hath that prerogative over human, as the narration may be before +the fact as well as after. + +(2) History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary; whereof the +first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For no +man hath propounded to himself the general state of learning to be +described and represented from age to age, as many have done the works of +Nature, and the state, civil and ecclesiastical; without which the +history of the world seemeth to me to be as the statue of Polyphemus with +his eye out, that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and +life of the person. And yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular +sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, +the philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools, +authors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations touching the +invention of arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing +the antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects, their +inventions, their traditions, their diverse administrations and +managings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, +oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of them, and all other +events concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may truly +affirm to be wanting; the use and end of which work I do not so much +design for curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of +learning, but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is this +in few words, that it will make learned men wise in the use and +administration of learning. For it is not Saint Augustine’s nor Saint +Ambrose’s works that will make so wise a divine as ecclesiastical history +thoroughly read and observed, and the same reason is of learning. + +(3) History of Nature is of three sorts; of Nature in course, of Nature +erring or varying, and of Nature altered or wrought; that is, history of +creatures, history of marvels, and history of arts. The first of these +no doubt is extant, and that in good perfection; the two latter are +bandied so weakly and unprofitably as I am moved to note them as +deficient. For I find no sufficient or competent collection of the works +of Nature which have a digression and deflexion from the ordinary course +of generations, productions, and motions; whether they be singularities +of place and region, or the strange events of time and chance, or the +effects of yet unknown properties, or the instances of exception to +general kinds. It is true I find a number of books of fabulous +experiments and secrets, and frivolous impostures for pleasure and +strangeness; but a substantial and severe collection of the heteroclites +or irregulars of Nature, well examined and described, I find not, +specially not with due rejection of fables and popular errors. For as +things now are, if an untruth in Nature be once on foot, what by reason +of the neglect of examination, and countenance of antiquity, and what by +reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of speech, +it is never called down. + +(4) The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in Aristotle, is +nothing less than to give contentment to the appetite of curious and vain +wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries is to do; but for two reasons, both +of great weight: the one to correct the partiality of axioms and +opinions, which are commonly framed only upon common and familiar +examples; the other because from the wonders of Nature is the nearest +intelligence and passage towards the wonders of art, for it is no more +but by following and, as it were, hounding Nature in her wanderings, to +be able to lead her afterwards to the same place again. Neither am I of +opinion, in this history of marvels, that superstitious narrations of +sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and the like, where there is +an assurance and clear evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For +it is not yet known in what cases and how far effects attributed to +superstition do participate of natural causes; and, therefore, howsoever +the practice of such things is to be condemned, yet from the speculation +and consideration of them light may be taken, not only for the discerning +of the offences, but for the further disclosing of Nature. Neither ought +a man to make scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of +truth, as your Majesty hath showed in your own example, who, with the two +clear eyes of religion and natural philosophy, have looked deeply and +wisely into these shadows, and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of +the sun, which passeth through pollutions and itself remains as pure as +before. But this I hold fit, that these narrations, which have mixture +with superstition, be sorted by themselves, and not to be mingled with +the narrations which are merely and sincerely natural. But as for the +narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, they are +either not true or not natural; and, therefore, impertinent for the story +of Nature. + +(5) For history of Nature, wrought or mechanical, I find some collections +made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but commonly with a +rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar; for it is esteemed a kind +of dishonour unto learning to descend to inquiry or meditation upon +matters mechanical, except they be such as may be thought secrets, +rarities, and special subtleties; which humour of vain and supercilious +arrogancy is justly derided in Plato, where he brings in Hippias, a +vaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates, a true and unfeigned +inquisitor of truth; where, the subject being touching beauty, Socrates, +after his wandering manner of inductions, put first an example of a fair +virgin, and then of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot well glazed, +whereat Hippias was offended, and said, “More than for courtesy’s sake, +he did think much to dispute with any that did allege such base and +sordid instances.” Whereunto Socrates answereth, “You have reason, and +it becomes you well, being a man so trim in your vestments,” &c., and so +goeth on in an irony. But the truth is, they be not the highest +instances that give the securest information, as may be well expressed in +the tale so common of the philosopher that, while he gazed upwards to the +stars, fell into the water; for if he had looked down he might have seen +the stars in the water, but looking aloft he could not see the water in +the stars. So it cometh often to pass that mean and small things +discover great, better than great can discover the small; and therefore +Aristotle noteth well, “That the nature of everything is best seen in his +smallest portions.” And for that cause he inquireth the nature of a +commonwealth, first in a family, and the simple conjugations of man and +wife, parent and child, master and servant, which are in every cottage. +Even so likewise the nature of this great city of the world, and the +policy thereof, must be first sought in mean concordances and small +portions. So we see how that secret of Nature, of the turning of iron +touched with the loadstone towards the north, was found out in needles of +iron, not in bars of iron. + +(6) But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of history mechanical is +of all others the most radical and fundamental towards natural +philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of +subtle, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as shall be +operative to the endowment and benefit of man’s life. For it will not +only minister and suggest for the present many ingenious practices in all +trades, by a connection and transferring of the observations of one art +to the use of another, when the experiences of several mysteries shall +fall under the consideration of one man’s mind; but further, it will give +a more true and real illumination concerning causes and axioms than is +hitherto attained. For like as a man’s disposition is never well known +till he be crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes till he was +straitened and held fast; so the passages and variations of nature cannot +appear so fully in the liberty of nature as in the trials and vexations +of art. + +II. (1) For civil history, it is of three kinds; not unfitly to be +compared with the three kinds of pictures or images. For of pictures or +images we see some are unfinished, some are perfect, and some are +defaced. So of histories we may find three kinds: memorials, perfect +histories, and antiquities; for memorials are history unfinished, or the +first or rough drafts of history; and antiquities are history defaced, or +some remnants of history which have casually escaped the shipwreck of +time. + +(2) Memorials, or preparatory history, are of two sorts; whereof the one +may be termed commentaries, and the other registers. Commentaries are +they which set down a continuance of the naked events and actions, +without the motives or designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, +the occasions, and other passages of action. For this is the true nature +of a commentary (though Cæsar, in modesty mixed with greatness, did for +his pleasure apply the name of a commentary to the best history of the +world). Registers are collections of public acts, as decrees of council, +judicial proceedings, declarations and letters of estate, orations, and +the like, without a perfect continuance or contexture of the thread of +the narration. + +(3) Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said, _tanquam +tabula naufragii_: when industrious persons, by an exact and scrupulous +diligence and observation, out of monuments, names, words, proverbs, +traditions, private records and evidences, fragments of stories, passages +of books that concern not story, and the like, do save and recover +somewhat from the deluge of time. + +(4) In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no deficience, for +they are _tanquam imperfecte mista_; and therefore any deficience in them +is but their nature. As for the corruptions and moths of history, which +are epitomes, the use of them deserveth to be banished, as all men of +sound judgment have confessed, as those that have fretted and corroded +the sound bodies of many excellent histories, and wrought them into base +and unprofitable dregs. + +(5) History, which may be called just and perfect history, is of three +kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth, or pretendeth to +represent: for it either representeth a time, or a person, or an action. +The first we call chronicles, the second lives, and the third narrations +or relations. Of these, although the first be the most complete and +absolute kind of history, and hath most estimation and glory, yet the +second excelleth it in profit and use, and the third in verity and +sincerity. For history of times representeth the magnitude of actions, +and the public faces and deportments of persons, and passeth over in +silence the smaller passages and motions of men and matters. But such +being the workmanship of God, as He doth hang the greatest weight upon +the smallest wires, _maxima è minimis_, _suspendens_, it comes therefore +to pass, that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business +than the true and inward resorts thereof. But lives, if they be well +written, propounding to themselves a person to represent, in whom +actions, both greater and smaller, public and private, have a commixture, +must of necessity contain a more true, native, and lively representation. +So again narrations and relations of actions, as the war of Peloponnesus, +the expedition of Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of Catiline, cannot but be +more purely and exactly true than histories of times, because they may +choose an argument comprehensible within the notice and instructions of +the writer: whereas he that undertaketh the story of a time, specially of +any length, cannot but meet with many blanks and spaces, which he must be +forced to fill up out of his own wit and conjecture. + +(6) For the history of times, I mean of civil history, the providence of +God hath made the distribution. For it hath pleased God to ordain and +illustrate two exemplar states of the world for arms, learning, moral +virtue, policy, and laws; the state of Græcia and the state of Rome; the +histories whereof occupying the middle part of time, have more ancient to +them histories which may by one common name be termed the antiquities of +the world; and after them, histories which may be likewise called by the +name of modern history. + +(7) Now to speak of the deficiences. As to the heathen antiquities of +the world it is in vain to note them for deficient. Deficient they are +no doubt, consisting most of fables and fragments; but the deficience +cannot be holpen; for antiquity is like fame, _caput inter nubila +condit_, her head is muffled from our sight. For the history of the +exemplar states, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I could wish +there were a perfect course of history for Græcia, from Theseus to +Philopœmen (what time the affairs of Græcia drowned and extinguished in +the affairs of Rome), and for Rome from Romulus to Justinianus, who may +be truly said to be _ultimus Romanorum_. In which sequences of story the +text of Thucydides and Xenophon in the one, and the texts of Livius, +Polybius, Sallustius, Cæsar, Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, +to be kept entire, without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied +and continued. But this is a matter of magnificence, rather to be +commended than required; and we speak now of parts of learning +supplemental, and not of supererogation. + +(8) But for modern histories, whereof there are some few very worthy, but +the greater part beneath mediocrity, leaving the care of foreign stories +to foreign states, because I will not be _curiosus in aliena republica_, +I cannot fail to represent to your Majesty the unworthiness of the +history of England in the main continuance thereof, and the partiality +and obliquity of that of Scotland in the latest and largest author that I +have seen: supposing that it would be honour for your Majesty, and a work +very memorable, if this island of Great Britain, as it is now joined in +monarchy for the ages to come, so were joined in one history for the +times passed, after the manner of the sacred history, which draweth down +the story of the ten tribes and of the two tribes as twins together. And +if it shall seem that the greatness of this work may make it less exactly +performed, there is an excellent period of a much smaller compass of +time, as to the story of England; that is to say, from the uniting of the +Roses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion of time wherein, to my +understanding, there hath been the rarest varieties that in like number +of successions of any hereditary monarchy hath been known. For it +beginneth with the mixed adoption of a crown by arms and title; an entry +by battle, an establishment by marriage; and therefore times answerable, +like waters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though without +extremity of storm; but well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, +being one of the most sufficient kings of all the number. Then followeth +the reign of a king, whose actions, howsoever conducted, had much +intermixture with the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining them +variably; in whose time also began that great alteration in the state +ecclesiastical, an action which seldom cometh upon the stage. Then the +reign of a minor; then an offer of a usurpation (though it was but as +_febris ephemera_). Then the reign of a queen matched with a foreigner; +then of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet her government +so masculine, as it had greater impression and operation upon the states +abroad than it any ways received from thence. And now last, this most +happy and glorious event, that this island of Britain, divided from all +the world, should be united in itself, and that oracle of rest given to +ÆNeas, _antiquam exquirite matrem_, should now be performed and fulfilled +upon the nations of England and Scotland, being now reunited in the +ancient mother name of Britain, as a full period of all instability and +peregrinations. So that as it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that +they have certain trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle, +so it seemeth that by the providence of God this monarchy, before it was +to settle in your majesty and your generations (in which I hope it is now +established for ever), it had these prelusive changes and varieties. + +(9) For lives, I do find strange that these times have so little esteemed +the virtues of the times, as that the writings of lives should be no more +frequent. For although there be not many sovereign princes or absolute +commanders, and that states are most collected into monarchies, yet are +there many worthy personages that deserve better than dispersed report or +barren eulogies. For herein the invention of one of the late poets is +proper, and doth well enrich the ancient fiction. For he feigneth that +at the end of the thread or web of every man’s life there was a little +medal containing the person’s name, and that Time waited upon the shears, +and as soon as the thread was cut caught the medals, and carried them to +the river of Lathe; and about the bank there were many birds flying up +and down, that would get the medals and carry them in their beak a little +while, and then let them fall into the river. Only there were a few +swans, which if they got a name would carry it to a temple where it was +consecrate. And although many men, more mortal in their affections than +in their bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and +ventosity, + + “Animi nil magnæ laudis egentes;” + +which opinion cometh from that root, _Non prius laudes contempsimus_, +_quam laudanda facere desivimus_: yet that will not alter Solomon’s +judgment, _Memoria justi cum laudibus_, _at impiorum nomen putrescet_: +the one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion, or +turneth to an ill odour. And therefore in that style or addition, which +is and hath been long well received and brought in use, _felicis +memoriæ_, _piæ memoriæ_, _bonæ memoriæ_, we do acknowledge that which +Cicero saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes, that _bona fama propria +possessio defunctorum_; which possession I cannot but note that in our +times it lieth much waste, and that therein there is a deficience. + +(10) For narrations and relations of particular actions, there were also +to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is no great action +but hath some good pen which attends it. And because it is an ability +not common to write a good history, as may well appear by the small +number of them; yet if particularity of actions memorable were but +tolerably reported as they pass, the compiling of a complete history of +times might be the better expected, when a writer should arise that were +fit for it: for the collection of such relations might be as a nursery +garden, whereby to plant a fair and stately garden when time should +serve. + +(11) There is yet another partition of history which Cornelius Tacitus +maketh, which is not to be forgotten, specially with that application +which he accoupleth it withal, annals and journals: appropriating to the +former matters of estate, and to the latter acts and accidents of a +meaner nature. For giving but a touch of certain magnificent buildings, +he addeth, _Cum ex dignitate populi Romani repertum sit_, _res illustres +annalibus_, _talia diurnis urbis actis mandare_. So as there is a kind +of contemplative heraldry, as well as civil. And as nothing doth +derogate from the dignity of a state more than confusion of degrees, so +it doth not a little imbase the authority of a history to intermingle +matters of triumph, or matters of ceremony, or matters of novelty, with +matters of state. But the use of a journal hath not only been in the +history of time, but likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly of +actions; for princes in ancient time had, upon point of honour and policy +both, journals kept, what passed day by day. For we see the chronicle +which was read before Ahasuerus, when he could not take rest, contained +matter of affairs, indeed, but such as had passed in his own time and +very lately before. But the journal of Alexander’s house expressed every +small particularity, even concerning his person and court; and it is yet +a use well received in enterprises memorable, as expeditions of war, +navigations, and the like, to keep diaries of that which passeth +continually. + +(12) I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which some grave +and wise men have used, containing a scattered history of those actions +which they have thought worthy of memory, with politic discourse and +observation thereupon: not incorporate into the history, but separately, +and as the more principal in their intention; which kind of ruminated +history I think more fit to place amongst books of policy, whereof we +shall hereafter speak, than amongst books of history. For it is the true +office of history to represent the events themselves together with the +counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the +liberty and faculty of every man’s judgment. But mixtures are things +irregular, whereof no man can define. + +(13) So also is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed, and that +is history of cosmography: being compounded of natural history, in +respect of the regions themselves; of history civil, in respect of the +habitations, regiments, and manners of the people; and the mathematics, +in respect of the climates and configurations towards the heavens: which +part of learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained most +proficience. For it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these times, +and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great building of +the world had never through-lights made in it, till the age of us and our +fathers. For although they had knowledge of the antipodes, + + “Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis, + Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper,” + +yet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by travel, it +requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But to circle the earth, as +the heavenly bodies do, was not done nor enterprised till these later +times: and therefore these times may justly bear in their word, not only +_plus ultra_, in precedence of the ancient _non ultra_, and _imitabile +fulmen_, in precedence of the ancient _non imitabile fulmen_, + + “Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen,” &c. + +but likewise _imitabile cælum_; in respect of the many memorable voyages +after the manner of heaven about the globe of the earth. + +(14) And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant also an +expectation of the further proficience and augmentation of all sciences; +because it may seem they are ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to +meet in one age. For so the prophet Daniel speaking of the latter times +foretelleth, _Plurimi pertransibunt_, _et multiplex erit scientia_: as if +the openness and through-passage of the world and the increase of +knowledge were appointed to be in the same ages; as we see it is already +performed in great part: the learning of these later times not much +giving place to the former two periods or returns of learning, the one of +the Grecians, the other of the Romans. + +III. (1) History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with history +civil: but further in the propriety thereof may be divided into the +history of the Church, by a general name; history of prophecy; and +history of providence. The first describeth the times of the militant +Church, whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah, or movable, as the +ark in the wilderness, or at rest, as the ark in the Temple: that is, the +state of the Church in persecution, in remove, and in peace. This part I +ought in no sort to note as deficient; only I would that the virtue and +sincerity of it were according to the mass and quantity. But I am not +now in hand with censures, but with omissions. + +(2) The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of two +relatives—the prophecy and the accomplishment; and, therefore, the nature +of such a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the Scripture be +sorted with the event fulfilling the same throughout the ages of the +world, both for the better confirmation of faith and for the better +illumination of the Church touching those parts of prophecies which are +yet unfulfilled: allowing, nevertheless, that latitude which is agreeable +and familiar unto divine prophecies, being of the nature of their Author, +with whom a thousand years are but as one day, and therefore are not +fulfilled punctually at once, but have springing and germinant +accomplishment throughout many ages, though the height or fulness of them +may refer to some one age. This is a work which I find deficient, but is +to be done with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all. + +(3) The third, which is history of Providence, containeth that excellent +correspondence which is between God’s revealed will and His secret will; +which though it be so obscure, as for the most part it is not legible to +the natural man—no, nor many times to those that behold it from the +tabernacle—yet, at some times it pleaseth God, for our better +establishment and the confuting of those which are as without God in the +world, to write it in such text and capital letters, that, as the prophet +saith, “He that runneth by may read it”—that is, mere sensual persons, +which hasten by God’s judgments, and never bend or fix their cogitations +upon them, are nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern +it. Such are the notable events and examples of God’s judgments, +chastisements, deliverances, and blessings; and this is a work which has +passed through the labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as +omitted. + +(4) There are also other parts of learning which are appendices to +history. For all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words and +deeds, whereof history doth properly receive and retain in memory the +deeds; and if words, yet but as inducements and passages to deeds; so are +there other books and writings which are appropriate to the custody and +receipt of words only, which likewise are of three sorts—orations, +letters, and brief speeches or sayings. Orations are pleadings, speeches +of counsel, laudatives, invectives, apologies, reprehensions, orations of +formality or ceremony, and the like. Letters are according to all the +variety of occasions, advertisements, advises, directions, propositions, +petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of compliment, of +pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of action. And such as +are written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in my judgment, +the best; for they are more natural than orations and public speeches, +and more advised than conferences or present speeches. So again letters +of affairs from such as manage them, or are privy to them, are of all +others the best instructions for history, and to a diligent reader the +best histories in themselves. For apophthegms, it is a great loss of +that book of Cæsar’s; for as his history, and those few letters of his +which we have, and those apophthegms which were of his own, excel all +men’s else, so I suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done; +for as for those which are collected by others, either I have no taste in +such matters or else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these +three kinds of writings I do not insist, because I have no deficiences to +propound concerning them. + +(5) Thus much therefore concerning history, which is that part of +learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices of +the mind of man, which is that of the memory. + +IV. (1) Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words, for the most +part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth +truly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of +matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever +that which nature hath joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces +of things—_Pictoribus atque poetis_, &c. It is taken in two senses in +respect of words or matter. In the first sense, it is but a character of +style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the +present. In the latter, it is—as hath been said—one of the principal +portions of learning, and is nothing else but feigned history, which may +be styled as well in prose as in verse. + +(2) The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of +satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of +things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the soul; +by reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample +greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than can +be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events +of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, +poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical. Because true +history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable +to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just +in retribution, and more according to revealed Providence. Because true +history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less +interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and more +unexpected and alternative variations. So as it appeareth that poesy +serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality and to delectation. And +therefore, it was ever thought to have some participation of divineness, +because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of +things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the +mind unto the nature of things. And we see that by these insinuations +and congruities with man’s nature and pleasure, joined also with the +agreement and consort it hath with music, it hath had access and +estimation in rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning +stood excluded. + +(3) The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof +(besides those divisions which are common unto it with history, as +feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as +feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) is into poesy +narrative, representative, and allusive. The narrative is a mere +imitation of history, with the excesses before remembered, choosing for +subjects commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or +mirth. Representative is as a visible history, and is an image of +actions as if they were present, as history is of actions in nature as +they are (that is) past. Allusive, or parabolical, is a narration +applied only to express some special purpose or conceit; which latter +kind of parabolical wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times, as +by the fables of Æsop, and the brief sentences of the seven, and the use +of hieroglyphics may appear. And the cause was (for that it was then of +necessity to express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtle +than the vulgar in that manner) because men in those times wanted both +variety of examples and subtlety of conceit. And as hieroglyphics were +before letters, so parables were before arguments; and nevertheless now +and at all times they do retain much life and rigour, because reason +cannot be so sensible nor examples so fit. + +(4) But there remaineth yet another use of poesy parabolical, opposite to +that which we last mentioned; for that tendeth to demonstrate and +illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and this other to retire +and obscure it—that is, when the secrets and mysteries of religion, +policy, or philosophy, are involved in fables or parables. Of this in +divine poesy we see the use is authorised. In heathen poesy we see the +exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity: as in +the fable that the giants being overthrown in their war against the gods, +the earth their mother in revenge thereof brought forth Fame: + + “Illam terra parens, ira irritat Deorum, + Extremam, ut perhibent, Cœo Enceladoque soroem, + Progenuit.” + +Expounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and open +rebels, then the malignity of people (which is the mother of rebellion) +doth bring forth libels and slanders, and taxations of the states, which +is of the same kind with rebellion but more feminine. So in the fable +that the rest of the gods having conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called +Briareus with his hundred hands to his aid: expounded that monarchies +need not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, as +long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to +come in on their side. So in the fable that Achilles was brought up +under Chiron, the centaur, who was part a man and part a beast, expounded +ingeniously but corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the +education and discipline of princes to know as well how to play the part +of a lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the man in virtue and +justice. Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I do rather think +that the fable was first, and the exposition devised, than that the moral +was first, and thereupon the fable framed; for I find it was an ancient +vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself with great contention to +fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient +poets; but yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but +pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of these poets +which are now extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made a +kind of scripture by the later schools of the Grecians), yet I should +without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness +in his own meaning. But what they might have upon a more original +tradition is not easy to affirm, for he was not the inventor of many of +them. + +(5) In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no +deficience; for being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the earth, +without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any +other kind. But to ascribe unto it that which is due, for the expressing +of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are beholding to +poets more than to the philosophers’ works; and for wit and eloquence, +not much less than to orators’ harangues. But it is not good to stay too +long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial place or palace +of the mind, which we are to approach and view with more reverence and +attention. + +V. (1) The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from above, +and some springing from beneath: the one informed by the light of nature, +the other inspired by divine revelation. The light of nature consisteth +in the notions of the mind and the reports of the senses; for as for +knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not +original, as in a water that besides his own spring-head is fed with +other springs and streams. So then, according to these two differing +illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of all divided into +divinity and philosophy. + +(2) In philosophy the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, +or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself. +Out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges—divine +philosophy, natural philosophy, and human philosophy or humanity. For +all things are marked and stamped with this triple character—the power of +God, the difference of nature and the use of man. But because the +distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that +meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of +a tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of +entireness and continuance before it come to discontinue and break itself +into arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into the +former distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by +the name of _philosophia prima_, primitive or summary philosophy, as the +main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide +themselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or no, I +stand doubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody of natural theology, and +of divers parts of logic; and of that part of natural philosophy which +concerneth the principles, and of that other part of natural philosophy +which concerneth the soul or spirit—all these strangely commixed and +confused; but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of +other sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than +anything solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I cannot be +ignorant of the distinction which is current, that the same things are +handled but in several respects. As for example, that logic considereth +of many things as they are in notion, and this philosophy as they are in +nature—the one in appearance, the other in existence; but I find this +difference better made than pursued. For if they had considered +quantity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of those extern characters +of things, as philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of force +have been of a far other kind than they are. For doth any of them, in +handling quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far it +multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason why some things in nature +are so common, and in so great mass, and others so rare, and in so small +quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity, assign the +cause why iron should not move to iron, which is more like, but move to +the loadstone, which is less like? Why in all diversities of things +there should be certain participles in nature which are almost ambiguous +to which kind they should be referred? But there is a mere and deep +silence touching the nature and operation of those common adjuncts of +things, as in nature; and only a resuming and repeating of the force and +use of them in speech or argument. Therefore, because in a writing of +this nature I avoid all subtlety, my meaning touching this original or +universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by +negative: “That it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations +and axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of +philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage.” + +(3) Now that there are many of that kind need not be doubted. For +example: Is not the rule, _Si inœqualibus æqualia addas_, _omnia erunt +inæqualia_, an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics? and is +there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive +justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not that other +rule, _Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt_, _et inter se conveniunt_, a rule +taken from the mathematics, but so potent in logic as all syllogisms are +built upon it? Is not the observation, _Omnia mutantur_, _nil interit_, +a contemplation in philosophy thus, that the _quantum_ of nature is +eternal? in natural theology thus, that it requireth the same omnipotency +to make somewhat nothing, which at the first made nothing somewhat? +according to the Scripture, _Didici quod omnia opera_, _quœ fecit Deus_, +_perseverent in perpetuum_; _non possumus eis quicquam addere nec +auferre_. Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely +discourseth concerning governments, that the way to establish and +preserve them is to reduce them _ad principia_—a rule in religion and +nature, as well as in civil administration? Was not the Persian magic a +reduction or correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature +to the rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept of a +musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet +accord, alike true in affection? Is not the trope of music, to avoid or +slide from the close or cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric of +deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop +in music the same with the playing of light upon the water? + + “Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus.” + +Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of +reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait, +determined and bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as men of +narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of +nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters. This +science therefore (as I understand it) I may justly report as deficient; +for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits, in handling some +particular argument, will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this +well for their present use; but the spring-head thereof seemeth to me not +to have been visited, being of so excellent use both for the disclosing +of nature and the abridgment of art. + +VI. (1) This science being therefore first placed as a common parent like +unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, _omnes cœlicolas_, +_omnes supera alta tenetes_; we may return to the former distribution of +the three philosophies—divine, natural, and human. And as concerning +divine philosophy or natural theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment +of knowledge concerning God which may be obtained by the contemplation of +His creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine in respect of +the object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of this +knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform +religion; and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert +an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a +God; but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the +superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to declare the will +and true worship of God. For as all works do show forth the power and +skill of the workman, and not his image, so it is of the works of God, +which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, but not His image. +And therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred +truth: for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and man to be +an extract or compendious image of the world; but the Scriptures never +vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of +God, but only _the work of His hands_; neither do they speak of any other +image of God but man. Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce +and enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, +providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been +excellently handled by divers, but on the other side, out of the +contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce any +verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment +not safe; _Da fidei quæ fidei sunt_. For the heathen themselves conclude +as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain, “That men +and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but, +contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.” So as we +ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our +reason, but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine +truth. So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am +so far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excess; whereunto +I have digressed because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and +philosophy hath received and may receive by being commixed together; as +that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary +and fabulous philosophy. + +(2) Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an +appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable +nor interdicted. For although the Scripture saith, “Let no man deceive +you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into +that he knoweth not,” &c., yet notwithstanding if you observe well that +precept, it may appear thereby that there be two things only +forbidden—adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of them, either to +extol them further than appertaineth to the degree of a creature, or to +extol a man’s knowledge of them further than he hath ground. But the +sober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out of the passages of Holy +Scriptures, or out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So of +degenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the +employment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration towards them; +but the contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their +illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. +For so the apostle saith, “We are not ignorant of his stratagems.” And +it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to +inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in +morality. But this part touching angels and spirits I cannot note as +deficient, for many have occupied themselves in it; I may rather +challenge it, in many of the writers thereof, as fabulous and +fantastical. + +VII. (1) Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology (not +divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of all as +the haven and sabbath of all man’s contemplations) we will now proceed to +natural philosophy. If then it be true that Democritus said, “That the +truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves;” and if it be +true likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a +second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which +nature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good to divide +natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace, and to make two +professions or occupations of natural philosophers—some to be pioneers +and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer. And surely +I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and +scholastical terms: namely, that these be the two parts of natural +philosophy—the inquisition of causes, and the production of effects; +speculative and operative; natural science, and natural prudence. For as +in civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom of +direction; so is it in natural. And here I will make a request, that for +the latter (or at least for a part thereof) I may revive and reintegrate +the misapplied and abused name of natural magic, which in the true sense +is but natural wisdom, or natural prudence; taken according to the +ancient acception, purged from vanity and superstition. Now although it +be true, and I know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes +and effects, so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have +a great connection between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful +natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and +descendent, ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and +descending from causes to the invention of new experiments; therefore I +judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and +handled. + +(2) Natural science or theory is divided into physic and metaphysic; +wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysic in a +differing sense from that that is received. And in like manner, I doubt +not but it will easily appear to men of judgment, that in this and other +particulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may differ from the +ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms. For hoping well to +deliver myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous expressing of +that I do propound, I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as +little from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may stand with +truth and the proficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little +marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of +difference and contradiction towards all antiquity; undertaking not only +to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish +all ancient wisdom; insomuch as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient +author or opinion, but to confute and reprove; wherein for glory, and +drawing followers and disciples, he took the right course. For certainly +there cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that which was noted +and pronounced in the highest truth:—_Veni in nomine partis_, _nec +recipits me_; _si quis venerit in nomine suo eum recipietis_. But in +this divine aphorism (considering to whom it was applied, namely, to +antichrist, the highest deceiver), we may discern well that the coming in +a man’s own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good +sign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune and success of an +_eum recipietis_. But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will think +of him that he learned that humour of his scholar, with whom it seemeth +he did emulate; the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer +all nations. Wherein, nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men’s +hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his scholar +did:— + + “Felix terrarum prædo, non utile mundo + Editus exemplum, &c.” + +So, + + “Felix doctrinæ prædo.” + +But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my pen +to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience, it +seemeth best to keep way with antiquity _usque ad aras_; and, therefore, +to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and +definitions, according to the moderate proceeding in civil government; +where, although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus +wisely noteth, _eadem magistratuum vocabula_. + +(3) To return, therefore, to the use and acception of the term metaphysic +as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been +already said, that I intend _philosophia prima_, summary philosophy and +metaphysic, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two +distinct things. For the one I have made as a parent or common ancestor +to all knowledge; and the other I have now brought in as a branch or +descendant of natural science. It appeareth likewise that I have +assigned to summary philosophy the common principles and axioms which are +promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences; I have assigned unto it +likewise the inquiry touching the operation or the relative and adventive +characters of essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility, +and the rest, with this distinction and provision; that they be handled +as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth +likewise that natural theology, which heretofore hath been handled +confusedly with metaphysic, I have enclosed and bounded by itself. It is +therefore now a question what is left remaining for metaphysic; wherein I +may without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, +that physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and +therefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed. +And again, that physic should handle that which supposeth in nature only +a being and moving; and metaphysic should handle that which supposeth +further in nature a reason, understanding, and platform. But the +difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For +as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes +and productions of effects, so that part which concerneth the inquiry of +causes we do subdivide according to the received and sound division of +causes. The one part, which is physic, inquireth and handleth the +material and efficient causes; and the other, which is metaphysic, +handleth the formal and final causes. + +(4) Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and not according to +our idiom for medicine) is situate in a middle term or distance between +natural history and metaphysic. For natural history describeth the +variety of things; physic the causes, but variable or respective causes; +and metaphysic the fixed and constant causes. + + “Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit, + Uno eodemque igni.” + +Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is the +cause of colliquation, but respective to wax. But fire is no constant +cause either of induration or colliquation; so then the physical causes +are but the efficient and the matter. Physic hath three parts, whereof +two respect nature united or collected, the third contemplateth nature +diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one entire +total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as the first +doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of things, as _de +mundo_, _de universitate rerum_. The second is the doctrine concerning +the principles or originals of things. The third is the doctrine +concerning all variety and particularity of things; whether it be of the +differing substances, or their differing qualities and natures; whereof +there needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss or +paraphrase that attendeth upon the text of natural history. Of these +three I cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or perfection they +are handled, I make not now any judgment; but they are parts of knowledge +not deserted by the labour of man. + +(5) For metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal and +final causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may seem to be +nugatory and void, because of the received and inveterate opinion, that +the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or +true differences; of which opinion we will take this hold, that the +invention of forms is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be +sought, if it be possible to be found. As for the possibility, they are +ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing +but sea. But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of ideas, as one +that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry that +forms were the true object of knowledge; but lost the real fruit of his +opinion, by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, +and not confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion +upon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. But if +any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action, +operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what +are the forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the +state of man. For as to the forms of substances (man only except, of +whom it is said, _Formavit hominem de limo terræ_, _et spiravit in faciem +ejus spiraculum vitæ_, and not as of all other creatures, _Producant +aquæ_, _producat terra_), the forms of substances I say (as they are now +by compounding and transplanting multiplied) are so perplexed, as they +are not to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or to +purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words, +which by composition and transposition of letters are infinite. But, on +the other side, to inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make +simple letters is easily comprehensible; and being known induceth and +manifesteth the forms of all words, which consist and are compounded of +them. In the same manner to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of +gold; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms +of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and +levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures +and qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of which the +essences (upheld by matter) of all creatures do consist; to inquire, I +say, the true forms of these, is that part of metaphysic which we now +define of. Not but that physic doth make inquiry and take consideration +of the same natures; but how? Only as to the material and efficient +causes of them, and not as to the forms. For example, if the cause of +whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the +subtle intermixture of air and water is the cause, it is well rendered; +but, nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness? No; but it is the +efficient, which is ever but _vehiculum formæ_. This part of metaphysic +I do not find laboured and performed; whereat I marvel not; because I +hold it not possible to be invented by that course of invention which +hath been used; in regard that men (which is the root of all error) have +made too untimely a departure, and too remote a recess from particulars. + +(6) But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I report as deficient, +is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the one, because it is +the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of +individual experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, +and to remedy the complaint of _vita brevis_, _ars longa_; which is +performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences. For +knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis. So of natural +philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next the basis is +physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. As for the +vertical point, _opus quod operatur Deus à principio usque ad finem_, the +summary law of nature, we know not whether man’s inquiry can attain unto +it. But these three be the true stages of knowledge, and are to them +that are depraved no better than the giants’ hills:— + + “Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam, + Scilicet atque Ossæ frondsum involvere Olympum.” + +But to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they are as the +three acclamations, _Sante_, _sancte_, _sancte_! holy in the description +or dilatation of His works; holy in the connection or concatenation of +them; and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And, +therefore, the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, +although but a speculation in them, that all things by scale did ascend +to unity. So then always that knowledge is worthiest which is charged +with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be metaphysic; as that which +considereth the simple forms or differences of things, which are few in +number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety. +The second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysic, +is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty +and possibility of works and effects. For physic carrieth men in narrow +and restrained ways, subject to many accidents and impediments, imitating +the ordinary flexuous courses of nature. But _latæ undique sunt +sapientibus viæ_; to sapience (which was anciently defined to be _rerum +divinarum et humanarum scientia_) there is ever a choice of means. For +physical causes give light to new invention in _simili materia_. But +whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost possibility of +superinducing that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less +restrained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the +condition of the efficient; which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, +though in a more divine sense, elegantly describeth: _non arctabuntur +gressus tui_, _et currens non habebis offendiculum_. The ways of +sapience are not much liable either to particularity or chance. + +(7) The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of final causes, which I +am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced. And yet if it were +but a fault in order, I would not speak of it; for order is matter of +illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this +misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great improficience in +the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, mixed with +the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent +inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to +stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and +prejudice of further discovery. For this I find done not only by Plato, +who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others +which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. +For to say that “the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence +about the sight;” or that “the firmness of the skins and hides of living +creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold;” or +that “the bones are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames of the +bodies of living creatures are built;” or that “the leaves of trees are +for protecting of the fruit;” or that “the clouds are for watering of the +earth;” or that “the solidness of the earth is for the station and +mansion of living creatures;” and the like, is well inquired and +collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. Nay, they +are, indeed, but _remoras_ and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from +further sailing; and have brought this to pass, that the search of the +physical causes hath been neglected and passed in silence. And, +therefore, the natural philosophy of Democritus and some others, who did +not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the +form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of +Nature, which they term fortune, seemeth to me (as far as I can judge by +the recital and fragments which remain unto us) in particularities of +physical causes more real and better inquired than that of Aristotle and +Plato; whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of +theology, and the other as a part of logic, which were the favourite +studies respectively of both those persons; not because those final +causes are not true and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their +own province, but because their excursions into the limits of physical +causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that tract. For otherwise, +keeping their precincts and borders, men are extremely deceived if they +think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them. For the +cause rendered, that “the hairs about the eyelids are for the safeguard +of the sight,” doth not impugn the cause rendered, that “pilosity is +incident to orifices of moisture—_muscosi fontes_, &c.” Nor the cause +rendered, that “the firmness of hides is for the armour of the body +against extremities of heat or cold,” doth not impugn the cause rendered, +that “contraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard +of their adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies;” and so of the rest, both +causes being true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the +other a consequence only. Neither doth this call in question or derogate +from Divine Providence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil +actions he is the greater and deeper politique that can make other men +the instruments of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with +his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than +he that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of +God more admirable, when Nature intendeth one thing and Providence +draweth forth another, than if He had communicated to particular +creatures and motions the characters and impressions of His Providence. +And thus much for metaphysic; the latter part whereof I allow as extant, +but wish it confined to his proper place. + +VIII. (1) Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another part of natural +philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and holdeth rank +with physic special and metaphysic, which is mathematic; but I think it +more agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of order, to +place it as a branch of metaphysic. For the subject of it being +quantity, not quantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and belongeth +to _philosophia prima_ (as hath been said), but quantity determined or +proportionable, it appeareth to be one of the essential forms of things, +as that that is causative in Nature of a number of effects; insomuch as +we see in the schools both of Democritus and of Pythagoras that the one +did ascribe figure to the first seeds of things, and the other did +suppose numbers to be the principles and originals of things. And it is +true also that of all other forms (as we understand forms) it is the most +abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most proper to +metaphysic; which hath likewise been the cause why it hath been better +laboured and inquired than any of the other forms, which are more +immersed in matter. For it being the nature of the mind of man (to the +extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of +generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of +particularity, the mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest +fields to satisfy that appetite. But for the placing of this science, it +is not much material: only we have endeavoured in these our partitions to +observe a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light upon another. + +(2) The mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the pure mathematics +are those sciences belonging which handle quantity determinate, merely +severed from any axioms of natural philosophy; and these are two, +geometry and arithmetic, the one handling quantity continued, and the +other dissevered. Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural +philosophy, and considereth quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and +incident unto them. For many parts of Nature can neither be invented +with sufficient subtlety, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, +nor accommodated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and +intervening of the mathematics, of which sort are perspective, music, +astronomy, cosmography, architecture, engineery, and divers others. In +the mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that men do not +sufficiently understand this excellent use of the pure mathematics, in +that they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit and faculties +intellectual. For if the wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if too +wandering, they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. +So that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in +respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself into all +postures, so in the mathematics that use which is collateral and +intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended. +And as for the mixed mathematics, I may only make this prediction, that +there cannot fail to be more kinds of them as Nature grows further +disclosed. Thus much of natural science, or the part of Nature +speculative. + +(3) For natural prudence, or the part operative of natural philosophy, we +will divide it into three parts—experimental, philosophical, and magical; +which three parts active have a correspondence and analogy with the three +parts speculative, natural history, physic, and metaphysic. For many +operations have been invented, sometimes by a casual incidence and +occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment; and of those which have +been found by an intentional experiment, some have been found out by +varying or extending the same experiment, some by transferring and +compounding divers experiments the one into the other, which kind of +invention an empiric may manage. Again, by the knowledge of physical +causes there cannot fail to follow many indications and designations of +new particulars, if men in their speculation will keep one eye upon use +and practice. But these are but coastings along the shore, _premendo +littus iniquum_; for it seemeth to me there can hardly be discovered any +radical or fundamental alterations and innovations in Nature, either by +the fortune and essays of experiments, or by the light and direction of +physical causes. If, therefore, we have reported metaphysic deficient, +it must follow that we do the like of natural magic, which hath relation +thereunto. For as for the natural magic whereof now there is mention in +books, containing certain credulous and superstitious conceits and +observations of sympathies and antipathies, and hidden proprieties, and +some frivolous experiments, strange rather by disguisement than in +themselves, it is as far differing in truth of Nature from such a +knowledge as we require as the story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh +of Bourdeaux, differs from Cæsar’s Commentaries in truth of story; for it +is manifest that Cæsar did greater things _de vero_ than those imaginary +heroes were feigned to do. But he did them not in that fabulous manner. +Of this kind of learning the fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to +enjoy Juno, the goddess of power, and instead of her had copulation with +a cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras. So +whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations, instead of a +laborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of +strange and impossible shapes. And, therefore, we may note in these +sciences which hold so much of imagination and belief, as this degenerate +natural magic, alchemy, astrology, and the like, that in their +propositions the description of the means is ever more monstrous than the +pretence or end. For it is a thing more probable that he that knoweth +well the natures of weight, of colour, of pliant and fragile in respect +of the hammer, of volatile and fixed in respect of the fire, and the +rest, may superinduce upon some metal the nature and form of gold by such +mechanic as longeth to the production of the natures afore rehearsed, +than that some grains of the medicine projected should in a few moments +of time turn a sea of quicksilver or other material into gold. So it is +more probable that he that knoweth the nature of arefaction, the nature +of assimilation of nourishment to the thing nourished, the manner of +increase and clearing of spirits, the manner of the depredations which +spirits make upon the humours and solid parts, shall by ambages of diets, +bathings, anointings, medicines, motions, and the like, prolong life, or +restore some degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be done with +the use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receipt. To conclude, +therefore, the true natural magic, which is that great liberty and +latitude of operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of forms, I may +report deficient, as the relative thereof is. To which part, if we be +serious and incline not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the +deriving and deducing the operations themselves from metaphysic, there +are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of preparation, +the other by way of caution. The first is, that there be made a +calendar, resembling an inventory of the estate of man, containing all +the inventions (being the works or fruits of Nature or art) which are now +extant, and whereof man is already possessed; out of which doth naturally +result a note what things are yet held impossible, or not invented, which +calendar will be the more artificial and serviceable if to every reputed +impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the nearest in +degree to that impossibility; to the end that by these optatives and +potentials man’s inquiry may be the more awake in deducing direction of +works from the speculation of causes. And secondly, that these +experiments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and present use, +but those principally which are of most universal consequence for +invention of other experiments, and those which give most light to the +invention of causes; for the invention of the mariner’s needle, which +giveth the direction, is of no less benefit for navigation than the +invention of the sails which give the motion. + +(4) Thus have I passed through natural philosophy and the deficiences +thereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient and received +doctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction, for my part, as I affect +not to dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it be truth, + + “Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvæ,” + +the voice of Nature will consent, whether the voice of man do or no. And +as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the French for +Naples, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their +lodgings, and not with weapons to fight; so I like better that entry of +truth which cometh peaceably with chalk to mark up those minds which are +capable to lodge and harbour it, than that which cometh with pugnacity +and contention. + +(5) But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy according to the +report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning the matter or subject: and +that is positive and considerative, when the inquiry reporteth either an +assertion or a doubt. These doubts or _non liquets_ are of two sorts, +particular and total. For the first, we see a good example thereof in +Aristotle’s Problems which deserved to have had a better continuance; but +so nevertheless as there is one point whereof warning is to be given and +taken. The registering of doubts hath two excellent uses: the one, that +it saveth philosophy from errors and falsehoods; when that which is not +fully appearing is not collected into assertion, whereby error might draw +error, but reserved in doubt; the other, that the entry of doubts are as +so many suckers or sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as that +which if doubts had not preceded, a man should never have advised, but +passed it over without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts +is made to be attended and applied. But both these commodities do +scarcely countervail and inconvenience, which will intrude itself if it +be not debarred; which is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour +rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how to solve it, and +accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar example in +lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have once admitted a doubt, it +goeth ever after authorised for a doubt. But that use of wit and +knowledge is to be allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things +certain, and not those which labour to make certain things doubtful. +Therefore these calendars of doubts I commend as excellent things; so +that there he this caution used, that when they be thoroughly sifted and +brought to resolution, they be from thenceforth omitted, discarded, and +not continued to cherish and encourage men in doubting. To which +calendar of doubts or problems I advise be annexed another calendar, as +much or more material which is a calendar of popular errors: I mean +chiefly in natural history, such as pass in speech and conceit, and are +nevertheless apparently detected and convicted of untruth, that man’s +knowledge be not weakened nor embased by such dross and vanity. As for +the doubts or _non liquets_ general or in total, I understand those +differences of opinions touching the principles of nature, and the +fundamental points of the same, which have caused the diversity of sects, +schools, and philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, +Parmenides, and the rest. For although Aristotle, as though he had been +of the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not reign except the first +thing he did he killed all his brethren; yet to those that seek truth and +not magistrality, it cannot but seem a matter of great profit, to see +before them the several opinions touching the foundations of nature. Not +for any exact truth that can be expected in those theories; for as the +same phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by this received astronomy of +the diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the planets, with their +eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the theory of Copernicus, who +supposed the earth to move, and the calculations are indifferently +agreeable to both, so the ordinary face and view of experience is many +times satisfied by several theories and philosophies; whereas to find the +real truth requireth another manner of severity and attention. For as +Aristotle saith, that children at the first will call every woman mother, +but afterward they come to distinguish according to truth, so experience, +if it be in childhood, will call every philosophy mother, but when it +cometh to ripeness it will discern the true mother. So as in the +meantime it is good to see the several glosses and opinions upon Nature, +whereof it may be everyone in some one point hath seen clearer than his +fellows, therefore I wish some collection to be made painfully and +understandingly _de antiquis philosophiis_, out of all the possible light +which remaineth to us of them: which kind of work I find deficient. But +here I must give warning, that it be done distinctly and severedly; the +philosophies of everyone throughout by themselves, and not by titles +packed and faggoted up together, as hath been done by Plutarch. For it +is the harmony of a philosophy in itself, which giveth it light and +credence; whereas if it be singled and broken, it will seem more foreign +and dissonant. For as when I read in Tacitus the actions of Nero or +Claudius, with circumstances of times, inducements, and occasions, I find +them not so strange; but when I read them in Suetonius Tranquillus, +gathered into titles and bundles and not in order of time, they seem more +monstrous and incredible: so is it of any philosophy reported entire, and +dismembered by articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of latter times +to be likewise represented in this calendar of sects of philosophy, as +that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into an harmony by +the pen of Severinus the Dane; and that of Tilesius, and his scholar +Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of sense, but of no great +depth; and that of Fracastorius, who, though he pretended not to make any +new philosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense upon the +old; and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who revived, with some +alterations and demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes; and any other +worthy to be admitted. + +(6) Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of man’s +knowledge; that is _radius directus_, which is referred to nature, +_radius refractus_, which is referred to God, and cannot report truly +because of the inequality of the medium. There resteth _radius +reflexus_, whereby man beholdeth and contemplateth himself. + +IX. (1) We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient +oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth +the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This +knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the +intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural +philosophy in the continent of Nature. And generally let this be a rule, +that all partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for lines and veins +than for sections and separations; and that the continuance and +entireness of knowledge be preserved. For the contrary hereof hath made +particular sciences to become barren, shallow, and erroneous, while they +have not been nourished and maintained from the common fountain. So we +see Cicero, the orator, complained of Socrates and his school, that he +was the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric +became an empty and verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of +Copernicus, touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy itself +cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the _phenomena_, +yet natural philosophy may correct. So we see also that the science of +medicine if it be destituted and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is +not much better than an empirical practice. With this reservation, +therefore, we proceed to human philosophy or humanity, which hath two +parts: the one considereth man segregate or distributively, the other +congregate or in society; so as human philosophy is either simple and +particular, or conjugate and civil. Humanity particular consisteth of +the same parts whereof man consisteth: that is, of knowledges which +respect the body, and of knowledges that respect the mind. But before we +distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I do take the +consideration in general, and at large, of human nature to be fit to be +emancipate and made a knowledge by itself, not so much in regard of those +delightful and elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of +man, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his +common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge +concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and body, +which being mixed cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either. + +(2) This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and amities +consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so this league of mind +and body hath these two parts: how the one discloseth the other, and how +the one worketh upon the other; discovery and impression. The former of +these hath begotten two arts, both of prediction or prenotion; whereof +the one is honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of +Hippocrates. And although they have of later time been used to be +coupled with superstitions and fantastical arts, yet being purged and +restored to their true state, they have both of them a solid ground in +Nature, and a profitable use in life. The first is physiognomy, which +discovereth the disposition of the mind by the lineaments of the body. +The second is the exposition of natural dreams, which discovereth the +state of the body by the imaginations of the mind. In the former of +these I note a deficience. For Aristotle hath very ingeniously and +diligently handled the factures of the body, but not the gestures of the +body, which are no less comprehensible by art, and of greater use and +advantage. For the lineaments of the body do disclose the disposition +and inclination of the mind in general; but the motions of the +countenance and parts do not only so, but do further disclose the present +humour and state of the mind and will. For as your majesty saith most +aptly and elegantly, “As the tongue speaketh to the ear so the gesture +speaketh to the eye.” And, therefore, a number of subtle persons, whose +eyes do dwell upon the faces and fashions of men, do well know the +advantage of this observation, as being most part of their ability; +neither can it be denied, but that it is a great discovery of +dissimulations, and a great direction in business. + +(3) The latter branch, touching impression, hath not been collected into +art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it hath the same relation or +_antistrophe_ that the former hath. For the consideration is +double—either how and how far the humours and affects of the body do +alter or work upon the mind, or, again, how and how far the passions or +apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body. The former of +these hath been inquired and considered as a part and appendix of +medicine, but much more as a part of religion or superstition. For the +physician prescribeth cures of the mind in frenzies and melancholy +passions, and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the +mind, to control the courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the +memory, and the like; but the scruples and superstitions of diet and +other regiment of the body in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy +of the Manichees, and in the law of Mahomet, do exceed. So likewise the +ordinances in the ceremonial law, interdicting the eating of the blood +and the fat, distinguishing between beasts clean and unclean for meat, +are many and strict; nay, the faith itself being clear and serene from +all clouds of ceremony, yet retaineth the use of fastlings, abstinences, +and other macerations and humiliations of the body, as things real, and +not figurative. The root and life of all which prescripts is (besides +the ceremony) the consideration of that dependency which the affections +of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and disposition of the +body. And if any man of weak judgment do conceive that this suffering of +the mind from the body doth either question the immortality, or derogate +from the sovereignty of the soul, he may be taught, in easy instances, +that the infant in the mother’s womb is compatible with the mother, and +yet separable; and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his +servants, and yet without subjection. As for the reciprocal knowledge, +which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the mind upon the +body, we see all wise physicians, in the prescriptions of their regiments +to their patients, do ever consider _accidentia animi_, as of great force +to further or hinder remedies or recoveries: and more specially it is an +inquiry of great depth and worth concerning imagination, how and how far +it altereth the body proper of the imaginant; for although it hath a +manifest power to hurt, it followeth not it hath the same degree of power +to help. No more than a man can conclude, that because there be +pestilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man in health, therefore there +should be sovereign airs, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But +the inquisition of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as +Socrates said, “a Delian diver,” being difficult and profound. But unto +all this knowledge _de communi vinculo_, of the concordances between the +mind and the body, that part of inquiry is most necessary which +considereth of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of the +mind do take and occupate in the organs of the body; which knowledge hath +been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be much better +inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the understanding in the +brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, having a greater +mixture with pride) in the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality in the +liver, deserveth not to be despised, but much less to be allowed. So, +then, we have constituted (as in our own wish and advice) the inquiry +touching human nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be +handled apart. + +X. (1) The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is divided as the good of +man’s body is divided, unto which it referreth. The good of man’s body +is of four kinds—health, beauty, strength, and pleasure: so the +knowledges are medicine, or art of cure; art of decoration, which is +called cosmetic; art of activity, which is called athletic; and art +voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth _eruditus luxus_. This subject +of man’s body is, of all other things in nature, most susceptible of +remedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible of error; for the same +subtlety of the subject doth cause large possibility and easy failing, +and therefore the inquiry ought to be the more exact. + +(2) To speak, therefore, of medicine, and to resume that we have said, +ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that man was +_microcosmus_—an abstract or model of the world—hath been fantastically +strained by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as if there were to be found +in man’s body certain correspondences and parallels, which should have +respect to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals, which +are extant in the great world. But thus much is evidently true, that of +all substances which nature hath produced, man’s body is the most +extremely compounded. For we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth +and water; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits; man by the flesh +of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the manifold +alterations, dressings, and preparations of these several bodies before +they come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto that beasts have a +more simple order of life, and less change of affections to work upon +their bodies, whereas man in his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath +infinite variations: and it cannot be denied but that the body of man of +all other things is of the most compounded mass. The soul, on the other +side, is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed: + + “Purumque reliquit + Æthereum sensum atque auraï simplicis ignem.” + +So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if that +principle be true, that _Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum_, _placidus +in loco_. But to the purpose. This variable composition of man’s body +hath made it as an instrument easy to distemper; and, therefore, the +poets did well to conjoin music and medicine in Apollo, because the +office of medicine is but to tune this curious harp of man’s body and to +reduce it to harmony. So, then, the subject being so variable hath made +the art by consequent more conjectural; and the art being conjectural +hath made so much the more place to be left for imposture. For almost +all other arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may +term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by +the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause; this +master in this ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not +by the fortune of the voyage; but the physician, and perhaps this +politique, hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability, but is +judged most by the event, which is ever but as it is taken: for who can +tell, if a patient die or recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, +whether it be art or accident? And therefore many times the impostor is +prized, and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see [the] weakness and +credulity of men is such, as they will often refer a mountebank or witch +before a learned physician. And therefore the poets were clear-sighted +in discerning this extreme folly when they made Æsculapius and Circe, +brother and sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses— + + “Ipse repertorem medicinæ talis et artis + Fulmine Phœbigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas.” + +And again— + + “Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos,” &c. + +For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and old women +and impostors, have had a competition with physicians. And what +followeth? Even this, that physicians say to themselves, as Solomon +expresseth it upon a higher occasion, “If it befall to me as befalleth to +the fools, why should I labour to be more wise?” And therefore I cannot +much blame physicians that they use commonly to intend some other art or +practice, which they fancy more than their profession; for you shall have +of them antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and +in every of these better seen than in their profession; and no doubt upon +this ground that they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art +maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their fortune: for +the weakness of patients, and sweetness of life, and nature of hope, +maketh men depend upon physicians with all their defects. But, +nevertheless, these things which we have spoken of are courses begotten +between a little occasion and a great deal of sloth and default; for if +we will excite and awake our observation, we shall see in familiar +instances what a predominant faculty the subtlety of spirit hath over the +variety of matter or form. Nothing more variable than faces and +countenances, yet men can bear in memory the infinite distinctions of +them; nay, a painter, with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of +his eye, and habit of his imagination, can imitate them all that ever +have been, are, or may be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more +variable than voices, yet men can likewise discern them personally: nay, +you shall have a _buffon_ or _pantomimus_ will express as many as he +pleaseth. Nothing more variable than the differing sounds of words; yet +men have found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters. So that +it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man’s mind, but it is the +remote standing or placing thereof that breedeth these mazes and +incomprehensions; for as the sense afar off is full of mistaking, but is +exact at hand, so is it of the understanding, the remedy whereof is, not +to quicken or strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and +therefore there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the +true approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the +poet saith: + + “Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes; + Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.” + +Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth deserve: well +shadowed by the poets, in that they made Æsculapius to be the son of +[the] sun, the one being the fountain of life, the other as the +second-stream; but infinitely more honoured by the example of our +Saviour, who made the body of man the object of His miracles, as the soul +was the object of His doctrine. For we read not that ever He vouchsafed +to do any miracle about honour or money (except that one for giving +tribute to Cæsar), but only about the preserving, sustaining, and healing +the body of man. + +(3) Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have said) more +professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; the labour +having been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in progression. For I +find much iteration, but small addition. It considereth causes of +diseases, with the occasions or impulsions; the diseases themselves, with +the accidents; and the cures, with the preservations. The deficiences +which I think good to note, being a few of many, and those such as are of +a more open and manifest nature, I will enumerate and not place. + +(4) The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence +of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of the special cases +of his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they were judged by +recovery or death. Therefore having an example proper in the father of +the art, I shall not need to allege an example foreign, of the wisdom of +the lawyers, who are careful to report new cases and decisions, for the +direction of future judgments. This continuance of medicinal history I +find deficient; which I understand neither to be so infinite as to extend +to every common case, nor so reserved as to admit none but wonders: for +many things are new in this manner, which are not new in the kind; and if +men will intend to observe, they shall find much worthy to observe. + +(5) In the inquiry which is made by anatomy, I find much deficience: for +they inquire of the parts, and their substances, figures, and +collocations; but they inquire not of the diversities of the parts, the +secrecies of the passages, and the seats or nestling of the humours, nor +much of the footsteps and impressions of diseases. The reason of which +omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may be satisfied in +the view of one or a few anatomies; but the latter, being comparative and +casual, must arise from the view of many. And as to the diversity of +parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing of the inward parts +is as full of difference as the outward, and in that is the cause +continent of many diseases; which not being observed, they quarrel many +times with the humours, which are not in fault; the fault being in the +very frame and mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine +alterative, but must be accommodated and palliated by diets and medicines +familiar. And for the passages and pores, it is true which was anciently +noted, that the more subtle of them appear not in anatomies, because they +are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in +life: which being supposed, though the inhumanity of _anatomia vivorum_ +was by Celsus justly reproved; yet in regard of the great use of this +observation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been +relinquished altogether, or referred to the casual practices of surgery; +but might have been well diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive, +which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts may sufficiently +satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, they are commonly passed over +in anatomies as purgaments; whereas it is most necessary to observe, what +cavities, nests, and receptacles the humours do find in the parts, with +the differing kind of the humour so lodged and received. And as for the +footsteps of diseases, and their devastations of the inward parts, +impostumations, exulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, +consumptions, contractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, +obstructions, repletions, together with all preternatural substances, as +stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the like; they ought to +have been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and the +contribution of men’s several experiences, and carefully set down both +historically according to the appearances, and artificially with a +reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from them, in case +where the anatomy is of a defunct patient; whereas now upon opening of +bodies they are passed over slightly and in silence. + +(6) In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of many, some +as in their nature incurable, and others as past the period of cure; so +that Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed so many men to die, as they +do by their ignorant edicts: whereof numbers do escape with less +difficulty than they did in the Roman prescriptions. Therefore I will +not doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire not the perfect +cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases; but pronouncing them +incurable do enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from discredit. + +(7) Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician not only to +restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and not only when such +mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair +and easy passage. For it is no small felicity which Augustus Cæsar was +wont to wish to himself, that same _Euthanasia_; and which was specially +noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the fashion, +and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sheep. So it is written of +Epicurus, that after his disease was judged desperate, he drowned his +stomach and senses with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine; +whereupon the epigram was made, _Hinc Stygias ebrius hausit aquas_; he +was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of the Stygian water. But +the physicians contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to +stay with the patient after the disease is deplored; whereas in my +judgment they ought both to inquire the skill, and to give the +attendances, for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies +of death. + +(5) In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a deficience in +the receipts of propriety, respecting the particular cures of diseases: +for the physicians have frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience +by their magistralities, in adding and taking out and changing _quid pro +qua_ in their receipts, at their pleasures; commanding so over the +medicine, as the medicine cannot command over the disease. For except it +be treacle and _mithridatum_, and of late _diascordium_, and a few more, +they tie themselves to no receipts severely and religiously. For as to +the confections of sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness +and not for propriety. For they are upon general intentions of purging, +opening, comforting, altering, and not much appropriate to particular +diseases. And this is the cause why empirics and old women are more +happy many times in their cures than learned physicians, because they are +more religious in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the +deficience which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of their +own practice, partly out of the constant probations reported in books, +and partly out of the traditions of empirics, set down and delivered over +certain experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases, +besides their own conjectural and magistral descriptions. For as they +were the men of the best composition in the state of Rome, which either +being consuls inclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined to the +senate; so in the matter we now handle, they be the best physicians, +which being learned incline to the traditions of experience, or being +empirics incline to the methods of learning. + +(9) In preparation of medicines I do find strange, specially considering +how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they are safer for the +outward than inward parts, that no man hath sought to make an imitation +by art of natural baths and medicinable fountains: which nevertheless are +confessed to receive their virtues from minerals; and not so only, but +discerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they receive +tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like; which nature, if it +may be reduced to compositions of art, both the variety of them will be +increased, and the temper of them will be more commanded. + +(10) But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable either to my +intention or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the note of +one deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest consequence: which +is, that the prescripts in use are too compendious to attain their end; +for, to my understanding, it is a vain and flattering opinion to think +any medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, as that the receipt or miss +of it can work any great effect upon the body of man. It were a strange +speech which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to +which he were by nature subject. It is order, pursuit, sequence, and +interchange of application, which is mighty in nature; which although it +require more exact knowledge in prescribing, and more precise obedience +in observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects. And +although a man would think, by the daily visitations of the physicians, +that there were a pursuance in the cure, yet let a man look into their +prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them but inconstancies +and every day’s devices, without any settled providence or project. Not +that every scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual, no more +than every straight way is the way to heaven; but the truth of the +direction must precede severity of observance. + +(11) For cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: for +cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to +God, to society, and to ourselves. As for artificial decoration, it is +well worthy of the deficiences which it hath; being neither fine enough +to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor wholesome to please. + +(12) For athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is to say, for +any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought, whether it +be of activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two parts, strength +and swiftness; and patience likewise hath two parts, hardness against +wants and extremities, and endurance of pain or torment; whereof we see +the practices in tumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer +punishment. Nay, if there be any other faculty which falls not within +any of the former divisions, as in those that dive, that obtain a strange +power of containing respiration, and the like, I refer it to this part. +Of these things the practices are known, but the philosophy that +concerneth them is not much inquired; the rather, I think, because they +are supposed to be obtained, either by an aptness of nature, which cannot +be taught, or only by continual custom, which is soon prescribed which +though it be not true, yet I forbear to note any deficiences; for the +Olympian games are down long since, and the mediocrity of these things is +for use; as for the excellency of them it serveth for the most part but +for mercenary ostentation. + +(13) For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them is of +laws to repress them. For as it hath been well observed, that the arts +which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are military; and +while virtue is in state, are liberal; and while virtue is in +declination, are voluptuary: so I doubt that this age of the world is +somewhat upon the descent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple +practices joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the +pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to +belong to civil life and education. And thus much of that particular +human philosophy which concerns the body, which is but the tabernacle of +the mind. + +XI. (1) For human knowledge which concerns the mind, it hath two parts; +the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul or mind, +the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof. Unto +the first of these, the considerations of the original of the soul, +whether it be native or adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws +of matter, and of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do +appertain: which have been not more laboriously inquired than variously +reported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather in +a maze than in a way. But although I am of opinion that this knowledge +may be more really and soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath +been, yet I hold that in the end it must be hounded by religion, or else +it will be subject to deceit and delusion. For as the substance of the +soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and +earth by the benediction of a _producat_, but was immediately inspired +from God, so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by +accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject +of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state +of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance. +Unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two appendices; +which, as they have been handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than +kindled truth: divination and fascination. + +(2) Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial and +natural: whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction by +argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is, when the mind +hath a presention by an internal power, without the inducement of a sign. +Artificial is of two sorts: either when the argument is coupled with a +derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only grounded upon +a coincidence of the effect, which is experimental: whereof the latter +for the most part is superstitious, such as were the heathen observations +upon the inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of +bees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For +artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst +particular knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions, as of +conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician hath his +predictions, of death, of recovery, of the accidents and issues of +diseases. The politique hath his predictions; _O urbem venalem_, _et +cito perituram_, _si emptorem invenerit_! which stayed not long to be +performed, in Sylla first, and after in Cæsar: so as these predictions +are now impertinent, and to be referred over. But the divination which +springeth from the internal nature of the soul is that which we now speak +of; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by influxion. +Primitive is grounded upon the supposition that the mind, when it is +withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of +the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore +appeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in +waking apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences +and observances which make the mind most to consist in itself. By +influxion, is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or +glass, should take illumination from the foreknowledge of God and +spirits: unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce. For the +retiring of the mind within itself is the state which is most susceptible +of divine influxions; save that it is accompanied in this case with a +fervency and elevation (which the ancients noted by fury), and not with a +repose and quiet, as it is in the other. + +(3) Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive upon other +bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that we spake in the proper +place. Wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended +natural magic, have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power +of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working +faith. Others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to their view +the secret passages of things, and specially of the contagion that +passeth from body to body, do conceive it should likewise be agreeable to +nature that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit +to spirit without the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have +grown (now almost made civil) of the mastering spirit, and the force of +confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise +and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified have power, +then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And herein +comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part of +ceremonial magic. For it may be pretended that ceremonies, characters, +and charms do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil +spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth +it; as images are said by the Roman Church to fix the cogitations and +raise the devotions of them that pray before them. But for mine own +judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and that +ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and +intentionally for that purpose; yet I should hold them unlawful, as +opposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, _In sudore vultus +comedes panem tuum_. For they propound those noble effects, which God +hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, to be +attained by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiences in these +knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, that it +is not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity. + +XII. (1) The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man +is of two kinds—the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the +other his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth +position or decree, the latter action or execution. It is true that the +imagination is an agent or _nuncius_ in both provinces, both the judicial +and the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to imagination before reason +have judged, and reason sendeth over to imagination before the decree can +be acted. For imagination ever precedeth voluntary motion. Saving that +this Janus of imagination hath differing faces: for the face towards +reason hath the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the +print of good; which nevertheless are faces, + + “Quales decet esse sororum.” + +Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested +with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the +duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, “That the mind +hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; +but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a +magistrate hath over a free citizen,” who may come also to rule in his +turn. For we see that, in matters of faith and religion, we raise our +imagination above our reason, which is the cause why religion sought ever +access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And +again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other +impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true +appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the +imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth +properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to alter the +former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of +imagination than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak +not now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of +such sciences as handle and consider of the imagination. No more than we +shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth (for that +extendeth to all philosophy), but of such knowledges as do handle and +inquire of the faculty of reason: so as poesy had his true place. As for +the power of the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the +same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine _De Anima_, whereunto most +fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative reason, +which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the +arts of reason. So therefore we content ourselves with the former +division, that human philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the +mind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral. + +(2) The part of human philosophy which is rational is of all knowledges, +to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtlety +and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge is _pabulum +animi_; so in the nature of men’s appetite to this food most men are of +the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain +have returned _ad ollas carnium_, and were weary of manna; which, though +it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So +generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, +civil history, morality, policy, about the which men’s affections, +praises, fortunes do turn and are conversant. But this same _lumen +siccum_ doth parch and offend most men’s watery and soft natures. But to +speak truly of things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are the +keys of all other arts, for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, “That +the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of +forms;” so these be truly said to be the art of arts. Neither do they +only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the habit of +shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a +stronger bow. + +(3) The arts intellectual are four in number, divided according to the +ends whereunto they are referred—for man’s labour is to invent that which +is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain +that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as +the arts must be four—art of inquiry or invention; art of examination or +judgment; art of custody or memory; and art of elocution or tradition. + +XIII. (1) Invention is of two kinds much differing—the one of arts and +sciences, and the other of speech and arguments. The former of these I +do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if, +in the making of an inventory touching the state of a defunct, it should +be set down that there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all +other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all +the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been discovered if the +use of the mariner’s needle had not been first discovered, though the one +be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found +strange if sciences be no further discovered, if the art itself of +invention and discovery hath been passed over. + +(2) That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth +plainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, +or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a _cuique in sua arte +credendum_. And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the +empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, “That medicines and cures +were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes were +discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from them +the medicines and cures discovered.” And Plato in his “Theætetus” noteth +well, “That particulars are infinite, and the higher generalities give no +sufficient direction; and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the +artsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in +every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience.” And +therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and +originals of things refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather +to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to men. + + “Dictamnum genetrix Cretæa carpit ab Ida, + Puberibus caulem foliis et flore camantem + Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris + Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ.” + +So that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being to consecrate +inventors) that the Egyptians had so few human idols in their temples, +but almost all brute: + + “Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis, + Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c.” + +And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the +first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that Prometheus +first stroke the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he +first stroke the flints he expected the spark; and therefore we see the +West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of +the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occasion. So as it +should seem, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for +surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of +physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to +chance or anything else than to logic for the invention of arts and +sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much +other: + + “Ut varias usus meditande extunderet artes + Paulatim.” + +For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which +brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which is a perpetual +intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute +necessity of conservation of being. For so Cicero saith very truly, +_Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem sæpe vincit_. And therefore if +it be said of men, + + “Labor omnia vincit + Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas,” + +it is likewise said of beasts, _Quis psittaco docuit suum χαιρε_? Who +taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where +she spied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? +Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea or air, and to find +the way from a field in a flower a great way off to her hive? Who taught +the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it +should take root and grow? Add then the word _extundere_, which +importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word _paulatim_, which +importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even amongst +the Egyptians’ gods; there being little left to the faculty of reason, +and nothing to the duty or art, for matter of invention. + +(3) Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which +seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of sciences may be +pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation +from the principles; their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious +and incompetent; wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the +duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have +wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For he that shall attentively +observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like +unto that which the poet speaketh of, _Aërei mellis cælestia dona_, +distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial, +as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that the mind of +herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they +describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without +instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can +assure (in many subjects) upon those particulars which appear of a side, +that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not? As if +Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought +before him, and failed of David which was in the field. And this form +(to say truth), is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so +subtle as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but +that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious +and scornful toward particulars; which their manner was to use but as +_lictores_ and _viatores_, for sergeants and whifflers, _ad summovendam +turbam_, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in +their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with +a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very +same in divine and human truth; for, as in divine truth man cannot endure +to become as a child, so in human, they reputed the attending the +inductions (whereof we speak), as if it were a second infancy or +childhood. + +(4) Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet, +nevertheless, certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced +from them in subject of nature by syllogism—that is, by touch and +reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that in +sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity +(because it pleaseth God to apply Himself to the capacity of the +simplest), that form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by +way of argument or satisfactory reason, _Quæ assensum parit operis effæta +est_; but the subtlety of nature and operations will not be enchained in +those bonds. For arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of +words, and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions +of things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out +of particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of +consequences of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can ever +correct that error, being (as the physicians speak) in the first +digestion. And, therefore, it was not without cause, that so many +excellent philosophers became sceptics and academics, and denied any +certainty of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion that the +knowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is +true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, +_Scientiam dissimulando simulavit_; for he used to disable his knowledge, +to the end to enhance his knowledge; like the humour of Tiberius in his +beginnings, that would reign, but would not acknowledge so much. And in +the later academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of +_acatalepsia_ (I doubt) was not held sincerely; for that all those which +excelled in copy of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which +was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable discourses; +being rather like progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end. But +assuredly many scattered in both academies did hold it in subtlety and +integrity. But here was their chief error: they charged the deceit upon +the senses; which in my judgment (notwithstanding all their cavillations) +are very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always +immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing +and urging such things as are too subtle for the sense to some effect +comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought +to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, +and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the +senses. This I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up +to seek help; for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a +straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be +easily done by help of a ruler or compass. + +(5) This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I +purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound, having digested it +into two parts: whereof the one I term _experientia literata_, and the +other _interpretatio naturæ_; the former being but a degree and rudiment +of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a +promise. + +(6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention; for +to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon +that which we already know; and the use of this invention is no other +but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed to draw +forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which +we take into our consideration. So as to speak truly, it is no +invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which is +the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent and +not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase as well of +deer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath +already obtained the name, let it be called invention; so as it be +perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is +readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or +amplification thereof. + +(7) To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, +preparation and suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part +of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial +erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the +sophists near his time, saying, “They did as if one that professed the +art of shoemaking should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only +exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes.” But +yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his +shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But +our Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, “That the kingdom of +heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old +store;” and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, +that pleaders should have the places, whereof they have most continual +use, ready handled in all the variety that may be; as that, to speak for +the literal interpretation of the law against equity, and contrary; and +to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony, and contrary. +And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, delivereth +it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speak of (if he +will take the pains), he may have it in effect premeditate and handled +_in thesi_. So that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing +to do, but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other +circumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of +Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and +access into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a +number of prefaces for orations and speeches. All which authorities and +precedents may overweigh Aristotle’s opinion, that would have us change a +rich wardrobe for a pair of shears. + +(8) But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory +store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an +entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to +refer over the further handling of it to rhetoric. + +(9) The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign and +direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite our mind to +return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the +end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use (truly taken) only to +furnish argument to dispute, probably with others, but likewise to +minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither +may these places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also to direct +our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. +For as Plato saith, “Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for +in a general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it?” +And, therefore, the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and +compendious is your search. But the same places which will help us what +to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of +experience were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books +and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve; so as I +cannot report that this part of invention, which is that which the +schools call topics, is deficient. + +(10) Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and special. The +general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched by some, +but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the +humour which hath reigned too much in the schools (which is, to be vainly +subtle in a few things which are within their command, and to reject the +rest), I do receive particular topics; that is, places or directions of +invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, as things of great +use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences. For in these +it holdeth _ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis_; for as in going of a +way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we +gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth, so every +degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth; +which light, if we strengthen by drawing it forth into questions or +places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our pursuit. + +XIV. (1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle the natures +of proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction hath a coincidence +with invention; for all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the +same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth—all one as in the sense. +But otherwise it is in proof by syllogism, for the proof being not +immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the +judgment of the consequence is another; the one exciting only, the other +examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of judgment, we refer +ourselves to that which we have spoken of interpretation of Nature. + +(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable +to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently end excellently laboured. +For the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his +understanding fixed and unmovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. +And, therefore, as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion +there is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient +fable of Atlas (that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) to +be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is +accomplished, so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or +axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a +perpetual peril of falling. Therefore men did hasten to set down some +principles about which the variety of their disputatious might turn. + +(3) So, then, this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions +to principles in a middle term. The principles to be agreed by all and +exempted from argument; the middle term to be elected at the liberty of +every man’s invention; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and +inverted: the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which +they term a probation ostensive; the other, when the contradictory of the +proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is +that which they call _per incommodum_, or pressing an absurdity; the +number of middle terms to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or +less removed from the principle. + +(4) But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way of +direction, the other by way of caution: the former frameth and setteth +down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from +which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. Toward the +composition and structure of which form it is incident to handle the +parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, +which are simple words. And this is that part of logic which is +comprehended in the Analytics. + +(5) The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and +assurance sake, discovering the more subtle forms of sophisms and +illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed +_elenches_. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it +happeneth (as Seneca maketh the comparison well) as in juggling feats, +which, though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not +as it seemeth to be; yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a +man besides his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment. + +(6) This part concerning _elenches_ is excellently handled by Aristotle +in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example; not only in the +persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates himself, who, professing to +affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath +exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, and redargution. +And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for +redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for +caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no +doubt is of very great advantage, though the difference be good which was +made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, +which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which +hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker +creature. + +(7) But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more ample latitude +and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge, +whereof some are laboured and other omitted. For first, I conceive +(though it may seem at first somewhat strange) that that part which is +variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching +the common adjuncts of essences, is but an _elenche_; for the great +sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and +phrase, specially of such words as are most general and intervene in +every inquiry, it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use (leaving +vain subtleties and speculations) of the inquiry of majority, minority, +priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, +parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against +ambiguities of speech. So, again, the distribution of things into +certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments, are but +cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions. + +(8) Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the +impression, and not by the subtlety of the illaqueation—not so much +perplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the imagination. But +this part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric. + +(9) But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of +fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at +all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others +appertaineth most to rectify judgment, the force whereof is such as it +doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth +more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For +the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, +wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true +incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of +superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this +purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us +by the general nature of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; +as first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, +that to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the +affirmative or active to affect more than the negative or privative. So +that a few times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failing or +absence, as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in +Neptune’s temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped +shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, “Advise now, you +that think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest.” “Yea, but,” saith +Diagoras, “where are they painted that are drowned?” Let us behold it in +another instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an equal and +uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in nature a greater +equality and uniformity than is in truth. Hence it cometh that the +mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves except they reduce the motions +of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and +labouring to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh that whereas +there are many things in Nature as it were _monodica_, _sui juris_, yet +the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and +conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element of +fire to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like. Nay, it is +not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies +the similitude of human actions and arts, together with the making of man +_communis mensura_, have brought into natural philosophy; not much better +than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and +solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in +heathenism, who supposed the gods to be of human shape. And, therefore, +Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked why God should have +adorned the heavens with stars, as if He had been an _ædilis_, one that +should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if that great +Work-master had been of a human disposition, He would have cast the stars +into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders like the frets in the +roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or +triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number, so differing +a harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of Nature. + +(10) Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon us by every +man’s own individual nature and custom in that feigned supposition that +Plato maketh of the cave; for certainly if a child were continued in a +grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly +abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So, in like +manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits +are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which +minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions if they be not +recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one +of the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first +book. + +(11) And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed +upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit +and capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think we govern our +words, and prescribe it well _loquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut +sapientes_, yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar’s bow, do shoot +back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and +pervert the judgment. So as it is almost necessary in all controversies +and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting +down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that +others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they +concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we +are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in +questions and differences about words. To conclude, therefore, it must +be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these +fallacies and false appearances because they are inseparable from our +nature and condition of life; so yet, nevertheless, the caution of them +(for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions) doth extremely import +the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or cautions +against these three false appearances I find altogether deficient. + +(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency which to +mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also +deficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of proofs to +the differing kinds of subjects. For there being but four kinds of +demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, +by induction, by syllogism, and by congruity, which is that which +Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not _a notioribus_, +every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which +respectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which +respectively they ought to be excluded; and the rigour and curiosity in +requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility +in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been +amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to knowledge. The +distributions and assignations of demonstrations according to the analogy +of sciences I note as deficient. + +XV. (1) The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing or +memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character and +the order of the entry. For the art of characters, or other visible +notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar, and, +therefore, I refer it to the due place; for the disposition and +collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth +in a good digest of common-places, wherein I am not ignorant of the +prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a +retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But +because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and +pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of +common-places to be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as +that which assureth copy of invention, and contracteth judgment to a +strength. But this is true, that of the methods of common-places that I +have seen, there is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying +merely the face of a school and not of a world; and referring to vulgar +matters and pedantical divisions, without all life or respect to action. + +(2) For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which is +memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. An art +there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are better +precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than those +received. It is certain the art (as it is) may be raised to points of +ostentation prodigious; but in use (as is now managed) it is barren, not +burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren, +that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and +occasions. And, therefore, I make no more estimation of repeating a +great number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of +a number of verses or rhymes _extempore_, or the making of a satirical +simile of everything, or the turning of everything to a jest, or the +falsifying or contradicting of everything by cavil, or the like (whereof +in the faculties of the mind there is great copy, and such as by device +and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder), than I do of +the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines; the one being the same in +the mind that the other is in the body, matters of strangeness without +worthiness. + +(3) This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one +prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite +seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a narrow +compass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. +Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike +the memory more; out of which axioms may be drawn much better practice +than that in use; and besides which axioms, there are divers more +touching help of memory not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning +distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill +managed. + +XVI. (1) There remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge, which is +transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge to +others, which I will term by the general name of tradition or delivery. +Tradition hath three parts: the first concerning the organ of tradition; +the second concerning the method of tradition; and the third concerning +the illustration of tradition. + +(2) For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing; for +Aristotle saith well, “Words are the images of cogitations, and letters +are the images of words.” But yet it is not of necessity that +cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. For whatsoever is +capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, is +in nature competent to express cogitations. And, therefore, we see in +the commerce of barbarous people that understand not one another’s +language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that +men’s minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve +the turn. And we understand further, that it is the use of China and the +kingdoms of the High Levant to write in characters real, which express +neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as +countries and provinces which understand not one another’s language can +nevertheless read one another’s writings, because the characters are +accepted more generally than the languages do extend; and, therefore, +they have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical +words. + +(3) These notes of cogitations are of two sorts: the one when the note +hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the other _ad +placitum_, having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former +sort are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics (things of +ancient use and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most +ancient nations), they are but as continued impresses and emblems. And +as for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to +hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in that they abide +not; but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the +things signified. As Periander, being consulted with how to preserve a +tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw +him do; and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers, +signifying that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the +nobility and grandees. _Ad placitum_, are the characters real before +mentioned, and words: although some have been willing by curious inquiry, +or rather by apt feigning, to have derived imposition of names from +reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth +into antiquity, reverent, but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small +fruit. This portion of knowledge touching the notes of things and +cogitations in general, I find not inquired, but deficient. And although +it may seem of no great use, considering that words and writings by +letters do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part +concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge (for words are the tokens +current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it +is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold +and silver), I thought good to propound it to better inquiry. + +(4) Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath produced +the science of grammar. For man still striveth to reintegrate himself in +those benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as +he hath striven against the first general curse by the invention of all +other arts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse +(which was the confusion of tongues) by the art of grammar; whereof the +use in a mother tongue is small, in a foreign tongue more; but most in +such foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned +only to learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures: the one +popular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well +for intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; the other +philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they are the +footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and +reason is handled _sparsim_, brokenly though not entirely; and, +therefore, I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to +be reduced into a science by itself. + +(5) Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of the +accidents of words; which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, +and the sweetness and harshness of them: whence hath issued some curious +observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in +respect of the verse and not of the argument. Wherein though men in +learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern +languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of +dances; for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured speech. +In these things this sense is better judge than the art: + + “Cœnæ fercula nostræ + Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.” + +And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an unfit +subject, it is well said, “_Quod tempore antiquum videtur_, _id +incongruitate est maxime novum_.” + +(6) For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets, but may be in +words. The kinds of ciphers (besides the simple ciphers, with changes, +and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants) are many, according to +the nature or rule of the infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, +&c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are +three; that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be +impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be without +suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write _omnia per omnia_; +which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple at most of the +writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no other restraint +whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath for relative an art of +deciphering, by supposition unprofitable, but, as things are, of great +use. For suppose that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of +them which exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the rawness and +unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest matters +are many times carried in the weakest ciphers. + +(7) In the enumeration of these private and retired arts it may be +thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them for +show and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those, which +are skilful in them, judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, +or whether in that which I speak of them (though in few words) there be +not some seed of proficience. And this must be remembered, that as there +be many of great account in their countries and provinces, which, when +they come up to the seat of the estate, are but of mean rank and scarcely +regarded; so these arts, being here placed with the principal and supreme +sciences, seem petty things: yet to such as have chosen them to spend +their labours and studies in them, they seem great matters. + +XVII. (1) For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a controversy +in our time. But as in civil business, if there be a meeting, and men +fall at words, there is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and +no proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much controversy, +there is many times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of method +seemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report it deficient. + +(2) Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in logic, as a part of +judgment. For as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of +judgment upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of method +containeth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be delivered; for +judgment precedeth delivery, as it followeth invention. Neither is the +method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use of +knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the +labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the +wisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of +continuance and proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity of +method is of method referred to use, and method referred to progression: +whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other of probation. + +(3) The latter whereof seemeth to be _via deserta et interclusa_. For as +knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error +between the deliverer and the receiver. For he that delivereth knowledge +desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as +may be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge desireth rather +present satisfaction than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt, +than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, +and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength. + +(4) But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on ought to be +delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein +it was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this +same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to +the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet, nevertheless, _secundum +majus et minus_, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of +his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew +in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean +to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots—but if you mean to remove +it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the +delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair bodies of trees +without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter. But +if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body +of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots. Of which +kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath +some shadow: but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in +inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient. + +(5) Another diversity of method there is, which hath some affinity with +the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but +disgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons, who have made it +as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises; and that is +enigmatical and disclosed. The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar +capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to +reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can +pierce the veil. + +(6) Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great, is the +delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we may observe +that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or +observations upon any subject, to make a solemn and formal art, filling +it with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting +it into a sensible method. But the writing in aphorisms hath many +excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not approach. + +(7) For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: +for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of +the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off; +recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connection and order is +cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off. So there remaineth +nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation; and +therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to write +aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in methods, + + “Tantum series juncturaque pollet, + Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris,” + +as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were disjointed, +would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or +belief, but less fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of +demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and +therefore satisfy. But particulars being dispersed do best agree with +dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge +broken, do invite men to inquire further; whereas methods, carrying the +show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest. + +(8) Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, is +the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by questions +and their determinations. The latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately +followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning as it is to the +proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold. +For if the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those +smaller things will come in of themselves: indeed a man would not leave +some important piece enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of +confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to +serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to +minister and excite disputatious and doubts. + +(9) Another diversity of method is, according to the subject or matter +which is handled. For there is a great difference in delivery of the +mathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and policy, +which is the most immersed. And howsoever contention hath been moved, +touching a uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how +that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards +learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain +empty and barren generalities; being but the very husks and shells of +sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture +and press of the method. And, therefore, as I did allow well of +particular topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular +methods of tradition. + +(10) Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and teaching of +knowledge is, according unto the light and presuppositions of that which +is delivered. For that knowledge which is new, and foreign from opinions +received, is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable +and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, +doth in truth commend him, where he saith “If we shall indeed dispute, +and not follow after similitudes,” &c. For those whose conceits are +seated in popular opinions need only but to prove or dispute; but those +whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one +to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate. So +that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and +translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of +learning, and in rude times when those conceits which are now trivial +were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else +would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for +paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood or judged. +So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are, for +it is a rule, that whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions +must pray in aid of similitudes. + +(11) There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received: as +that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of +concealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though I have +stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I have +remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one +general inquiry (which seems to me deficient) touching the wisdom of +tradition. + +(12) But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, doth further +belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also +the several beams and columns thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to +their quantity and figure. And therefore method considereth not only the +disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the propositions: +not as to their truth or matter, but as to their limitation and manner. +For herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules +of propositions—Καθολον πρωτον, κυτα παντος &c.—than he did in +introducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the condition of +human things that, according to the ancient fables, “the most precious +things have the most pernicious keepers”) it was so, that the attempt of +the one made him fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted +that should design to make axioms convertible, if he make them not withal +circular, and non-promovent, or incurring into themselves; but yet the +intention was excellent. + +(13) The other considerations of method, concerning propositions, are +chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the dimensions of +sciences: for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity +(which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solid), to have a +longitude and a latitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, +and the longitude towards action; that is, from the greatest generality +to the most particular precept. The one giveth rule how far one +knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of another, which is +the rule they call Καθαυτο; the other giveth rule unto what degree of +particularity a knowledge should descend: which latter I find passed over +in silence, being in my judgment the more material. For certainty there +must be somewhat left to practice; but how much is worthy the inquiry? +We see remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to +scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to practice than an +Ortelius’ universal map is to direct the way between London and York. +The better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of +steel unpolished, where you may see the images of things, but first they +must be filed: so the rules will help if they be laboured and polished by +practice. But how crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far +forth they may be polished aforehand, is the question, the inquiry +whereof seemeth to me deficient. + +(14) There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, which is +not a lawful method, but a method of imposture: which is, to deliver +knowledges in such manner as men may speedily come to make a show of +learning, who have it not. Such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius in +making that art which bears his name; not unlike to some books of +typocosmy, which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words +of all arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms +might be thought to understand the art; which collections are much like a +fripper’s or broker’s shop, that hath ends of everything, but nothing of +worth. + +XVIII. (1) Now we descend to that part which concerneth the illustration +of tradition, comprehended in that science which we call rhetoric, or art +of eloquence, a science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For +although in true value it is inferior to wisdom (as it is said by God to +Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this faculty, “Aaron shall be +thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God”), yet with people it is the +more mighty; for so Solomon saith, _Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens_, +_sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet_, signifying that profoundness of +wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence +that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of it, the +emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the +experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of rhetoric exceed +themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the +orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the +precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and +therefore the deficiences which I shall note will rather be in some +collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or +use of the art itself. + +(2) Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this +science, as we have done of the rest, the duty and office of rhetoric is +to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will. For we +see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means—by +illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination or +impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or affection, +which pertains to morality. And as in negotiation with others, men are +wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by vehemency; so in this +negotiation within ourselves, men are undermined by inconsequences, +solicited and importuned by impressions or observations, and transported +by passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as +that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not +to establish and advance it. For the end of logic is to teach a form of +argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of morality is +to procure the affections to obey reason, and not to invade it; the end +of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to +oppress it; for these abuses of arts come in but _ex oblique_, for +caution. + +(3) And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing out +of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric +but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome +meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the +taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that +which is good than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man +but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; and it was +excellently noted by Thucydides, in Cleon, that because he used to hold +on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing +against eloquence and good speech, knowing that no man can speak fair of +courses sordid and base. And therefore, as Plato said elegantly, “That +virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection;” so +seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next +degree is to show her to the imagination in lively representation; for to +show her to reason only in subtlety of argument was a thing ever derided +in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon +men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with +the will of man. + +(4) Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to +reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions and +insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but +in regard of the continual mutinies and seditious of the affections— + + “Video meliora, proboque, + Deteriora sequor,” + +reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did +not practise and win the imagination from the affections’ part, and +contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the +affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, +as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely +the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And, +therefore, the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly +vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made +things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the +imagination reason prevaileth. + +(5) We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with the +colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with +vice; for we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the +use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, +not only as the fist from the palm—the one close, the other at large—but +much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and +rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. +And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on +the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating +of both; for the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men +indifferent and the same, but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric +ought to differ according to the auditors: + + “Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion.” + +Which application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far that if a +man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to +them all respectively and several ways; though this politic part of +eloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want: +whilst, by the observing their well-graced forms of speech, they leese +the volubility of application; and therefore it shall not be amiss to +recommend this to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it +here or in that part which concerneth policy. + +(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as I said, +are but attendances; and first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence of +Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular +signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which +are as the sophisms of rhetoric (as I touched before). For example— + + “Sophisma. + + Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum. + + Redargutio. + + Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.” + +_Malum est_, _malum est_ (_inquit emptor_): _sed cum recesserit_, _tum +gloriabitur_! The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three—one, that +there be but a few of many; another, that there elenches are not annexed; +and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their +use is not only in probation, but much more in impression. For many +forms are equal in signification which are differing in impression, as +the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that +which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same. For +there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, +“Your enemies will be glad of this”— + + “Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ.” + +than by hearing it said only, “This is evil for you.” + +(7) Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching +provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness +of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts: the one in resemblance +to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made +up; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request. +The former of these I will call _antitheta_, and the latter _formulæ_. + +(8) _Antitheta_ are theses argued _pro et contra_, wherein men may be +more large and laborious; but (in such as are able to do it) to avoid +prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast +up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as +skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be +used; supplying authorities and examples by reference. + + “_Pro verbis legis_. + Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit a litera: + Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem. + + _Pro sententia legis_. + Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula.” + +(9) _Formulæ_ are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech, +which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface, +conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. For as in buildings +there is great pleasure and use in the well casting of the staircases, +entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and +passages are of special ornament and effect. + + “_A conclusion in a deliberative_. + So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences + future.” + +XIX. (1) There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, +the one critical, the other pedantical. For all knowledge is either +delivered by teachers, or attained by men’s proper endeavours: and +therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth +chiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading +of books; whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. The first +is concerning the true correction and edition of authors; wherein +nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics +have often presumed that that which they understand not is false set +down: as the priest that, where he found it written of St. Paul _Demissus +est per sportam_, mended his book, and made it _Demissus est per portam_; +because _sporta_ was a hard word, and out of his reading: and surely +their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of +the same kind. And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the most +corrected copies are commonly the least correct. + +The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which +resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein it is over usual to +blanch the obscure places and discourse upon the plain. + +The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light +to true interpretations. + +The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors; +that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to +read. + +And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; that +men may know in what order or pursuit to read. + +(2) For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of tradition +which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers considerations of +great fruit. + +As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to +initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them. + +Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so +proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to press the more +difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy; for it is one method +to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with +heavy shoes. + +A third is the application of learning according unto the propriety of +the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, but +seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as, for example, +if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, +the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be +caught away but a moment, one is new to begin. And as sciences have a +propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or powers +have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: and +therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and +natures are most apt and proper for what sciences. + +Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to +hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their +faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults and get +ill habits as well as good; so as there is a great judgment to be had in +the continuance and intermission of exercises. It were too long to +particularise a number of other considerations of this nature, things but +of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wronging or +cherishing of seeds or young plants is that that is most important to +their thriving, and as it was noted that the first six kings being in +truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the infancy thereof was the +principal cause of the immense greatness of that state which followed, so +the culture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible (though +unseen) operation, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour +can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also how +small and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into +great men or great matters, do work great and important effects: whereof +we see a notable example in Tacitus of two stage players, Percennius and +Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies into +an extreme tumult and combustion. For there arising a mutiny amongst +them upon the death of Augustus Cæsar, Blæsus the lieutenant had +committed some of the mutineers, which were suddenly rescued; whereupon +Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner:—“These poor +innocent wretches appointed to cruel death, you have restored to behold +the light; but who shall restore my brother to me, or life unto my +brother, that was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to +treat of the common cause? and he hath murdered him this last night by +some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his +executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blæsus, what is done with his body? +The mortalest enemies do not deny burial. When I have performed my last +duties to the corpse with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain +besides him; so that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true +hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us.” With which speech he +put the army into an infinite fury and uproar: whereas truth was he had +no brother, neither was there any such matter; but he played it merely as +if he had been upon the stage. + +(3) But to return: we are now come to a period of rational knowledges; +wherein if I have made the divisions other than those that are received, +yet would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not +use. For there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering the +divisions. The one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort +together those things which are next in nature, and those things which +are next in use. For if a secretary of estate should sort his papers, it +is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort together things of +a nature, as treaties, instructions, &c. But in his boxes or particular +cabinet he would sort together those that he were like to use together, +though of several natures. So in this general cabinet of knowledge it +was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of things; +whereas if myself had been to handle any particular knowledge, I would +have respected the divisions fittest for use. The other, because the +bringing in of the deficiences did by consequence alter the partitions of +the rest. For let the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be +fifteen. Let the knowledge with the deficiences be twenty; the parts of +fifteen are not the parts of twenty; for the parts of fifteen are three +and five; the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as these +things are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be. + +XX. (1) We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the +appetite and will of man: whereof Solomon saith, _Ante omnia_, _fili_, +_custodi cor tuum_: _nam inde procedunt actiones vitæ_. In the handling +of this science, those which have written seem to me to have done as if a +man, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies of +alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions +for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So have they +made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and +portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well +described as the true objects and scopes of man’s will and desires. But +how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will +of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it +over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably. For it is not the +disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by +nature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines +and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and the +like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of this +part. + +(2) The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden rock +whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast +away; which is, that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary and +common matters, the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the +wisest doctrine (for life consisteth not in novelties nor subtleties), +but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain +resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give glory either to +the subtlety of disputatious, or to the eloquence of discourses. But +Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence, _Nocet illis eloquentia_, +_quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit_, _sed sui_. Doctrine should be such +as should make men in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher; +being directed to the auditor’s benefit, and not to the author’s +commendation. And therefore those are of the right kind which may be +concluded as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, _Quæ si feceritis_, _non +oratorem dumtaxat in præsentia laudabitis_, _sed vosmetipsos etiam non +ita multo post statu rerum vestraram meliore_. + +(3) Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of a +fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed obtained, who +got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of +the observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of Æneas: + + “Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum + Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.” + +And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at leisure +that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn +action and active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the +husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical +descriptions of virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore the main and +primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or +platform of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind: the one +describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, +apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto. + +(4) The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good considereth it +either simple or compared; either the kinds of good, or the degrees of +good; in the latter whereof those infinite disputatious which were +touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, +or the highest good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen +divinity, are by the Christian faith discharged. And as Aristotle saith, +“That young men may be happy, but not otherwise but by hope;” so we must +all acknowledge our minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope +of the future world. + +(5) Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the philosopher’s +heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of man’s nature than was +(for we see in what height of style Seneca writeth, _Vere magnum_, +_habere fragilitatem hominis_, _securitatem Dei_), we may with more +sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours. +Wherein for the nature of good positive or simple, they have set it down +excellently in describing the forms of virtue and duty, with their +situations and postures; in distributing them into their kinds, parts, +provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: nay further, they +have commended them to man’s nature and spirit with great quickness of +argument and beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and entrenched +them (as much as discourse can do) against corrupt and popular opinions. +Again, for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have also +excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the comparisons +between a contemplative and an active life, in the distinction between +virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, in their encounters between +honesty and profit, in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the +like; so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured. + +(6) Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular and received +notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had +stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and +evil, and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my opinion, a +great light to that which followed; and specially if they had consulted +with nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound: +which being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much +confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner. + +(7) There is formed in everything a double nature of good—the one, as +everything is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it is a +part or member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in degree the +greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a +more general form. Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy +moveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it +forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth +to the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies; so may we +go forward, and see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the +earth; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of +nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking +their duty to the earth in regard of their duty to the world. This +double nature of good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven +upon man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation of duty to the +public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and +being; according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being +in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded +with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him, that he +should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only +to them, _Necesse est ut eam_, _non ut vivam_. But it may be truly +affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other +discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is +communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as +the Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the same God that gave the +Christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate +creatures that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of +God have wished themselves anathematised and razed out of the book of +life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion. + +(8) This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine +most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant. For +first, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the +contemplative or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle. For all +the reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative are private, and +respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man’s self (in which respects no +question the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence), not much unlike +to that comparison which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying +of philosophy and contemplation, who being asked what he was, answered, +“That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that +some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as merchants +to utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer and meet +their friends, and some came to look on; and that he was one of them that +came to look on.” But men must know, that in this theatre of man’s life +it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on. Neither could +the like question ever have been received in the Church, notwithstanding +their _Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum ejus_, by which place +they would exalt their civil death and regular professions, but upon this +defence, that the monastical life is not simple contemplative, but +performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which +hath been truly esteemed as an office in the Church, or else of writing +or taking instructions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses +did when he abode so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch, the seventh +from Adam, who was the first contemplative and walked with God, yet did +also endow the Church with prophecy, which Saint Jude citeth. But for +contemplation which should be finished in itself, without casting beams +upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not. + +(9) It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and +their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed felicity in +virtue simply or attended, the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly +embrace and concern society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and +Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used in +some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits) +to be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and +attended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed it in +serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they would have +deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there +was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one air and +season; and Herillus, which placed felicity in extinguishment of the +disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming +things according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation; +which opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring +things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or +wavering of belief; all which are manifest to tend to private repose and +contentment, and not to point of society. + +(10) It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth +that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest +we be liable to fortune and disturbance; as if it were not a thing much +more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to +obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune: as +Consalvo said to his soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting he had +rather die one foot forwards, than to have his life secured for long by +one foot of retreat. Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath +signed, who hath affirmed that “a good conscience is a continual feast;” +showing plainly that the conscience of good intentions, howsoever +succeeding, is a more continual joy to nature than all the provision +which can be made for security and repose. + +(11) It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which grew general +about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an occupation or +profession; as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish +perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a +particular kind and course of life to that end; introducing such a health +of mind, as was that health of body of which Aristotle speaketh of +Herodicus, who did nothing all his life long but intend his health; +whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health of +body is best which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities, +so likewise that health of mind is most proper which can go through the +greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes’ opinion is to be +accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which +sustained, and could refrain their mind _in præcipitio_, and could give +unto the mind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn. + +(12) Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in some +of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men, that +did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities +and perturbations; whereas the resolution of men truly moral ought to be +such as the same Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, _e telâ +crassiore_, and not so fine as that everything should catch in it and +endanger it. + +XXI. (1) To resume private or particular good, it falleth into the +division of good active and passive; for this difference of good (not +unlike to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or +household terms of _promus_ and _condus_) is formed also in all things, +and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures; the one +to preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply +themselves, whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier; for in nature +the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent, and the earth, +which is the less worthy, is the patient. In the pleasures of living +creatures, that of generation is greater than that of food. In divine +doctrine, _beatius est dare quam accipere_. And in life, there is no +man’s spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he +hath fixed in his desire, more than sensuality, which priority of the +active good is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be +mortal and exposed to fortune. For if we might have a perpetuity and +certainty in our pleasures, the state of them would advance their price. +But when we see it is but _magni æstimamus mori tardius_, and _ne +glorieris de crastino_, _nescis partum diei_, it maketh us to desire to +have somewhat secured and exempted from time, which are only our deeds +and works; as it is said, _Opera eorum sequuntur eos_. The pre-eminence +likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural +in man towards variety and proceeding, which in the pleasures of the +sense, which is the principal part of passive good, can have no great +latitude. _Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris_; _cibus_, _somnus_, _ludus per +hunc circulum curritur_; _mori velle non tantum fortis_, _aut miser_, +_aut prudens_, _sed etiam fastidiosus potest_. But in enterprises, +pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much variety; whereof men are +sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils, +reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends. So as it was +well said, _Vita sine proposito languida et vaga est_. Neither hath this +active good an identity with the good of society, though in some cases it +hath an incidence into it. For although it do many times bring forth +acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man’s own +power, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it +findeth a contrary subject. For that gigantine state of mind which +possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius Sylla and +infinite other in smaller model, who would have all men happy or unhappy +as they were their friends or enemies, and would give form to the world, +according to their own humours (which is the true theomachy), pretendeth +and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth furthest from good of +society, which we have determined to be the greater. + +(2) To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of conservative +and effective. For let us take a brief review of that which we have +said: we have spoken first of the good of society, the intention whereof +embraceth the form of human nature, whereof we are members and portions, +and not our own proper and individual form; we have spoken of active +good, and supposed it as a part of private and particular good. And +rightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire or +appetite proceeding from love to themselves: one of preserving and +continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their form; +and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other things: +whereof the multiplying, or signature of it upon other things, is that +which we handled by the name of active good. So as there remaineth the +conserving of it, and perfecting or raising of it, which latter is the +highest degree of passive good. For to preserve in state is the less, to +preserve with advancement is the greater. So in man, + + “Igneus est ollis vigor, et cælestis origo.” + +His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the +perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is +that which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon the instinct of +an advancement, formal and essential, is carried to seek an advancement +local. For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and +down and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove +internal, so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the mean to +exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their +place. So then passive good is, as was said, either conservative or +perfective. + +(3) To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth in +the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth to be +most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and lowest. And +this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged of, +nor well inquired; for the good of fruition or contentment is placed +either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour +of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by vicissitude; the +one having less mixture of evil, the other more impression of good. +Whether of these is the greater good is a question controverted; but +whether man’s nature may not be capable of both is a question not +inquired. + +(4) The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist, +Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the +sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to +ill words: the sophist saying that Socrates’ felicity was the felicity of +a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist’s felicity was the +felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. +And both these opinions do not want their supports. For the opinion of +Socrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the epicures +themselves, that virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so, +certain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations then +in compassing desires. The sophist’s opinion is much favoured by the +assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is greater than good +of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of +advancement, as motion though in a circle hath a show of progression. + +(5) But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former +superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there are some who take +more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet, +nevertheless, are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them? So as +this same, _Non uti ut non appetas_, _non appetere ut non metuas_, _sunt +animi pusilli et diffidentis_. And it seemeth to me that most of the +doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautious than the +nature of things requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in +offering to cure it. For when they would have a man’s whole life to be +but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men think +that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. +Better saith the poet:— + + “Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponat + Naturæ.” + +So have they sought to make men’s minds too uniform and harmonical, by +not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions; the reasons whereof I +suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated to a private, +free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like +instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many changes, +yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and passages, as +a set song or voluntary; much after the same manner was the diversity +between a philosophical and civil life. And, therefore, men are to +imitate the wisdom of jewellers: who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or +an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone, +they help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much, they +will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity as they +destroy not magnanimity. + +(6) Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private and +particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that good of man +which respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because +the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed +towards others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed +and composed in itself; though neither can a man understand virtue +without some relation to society, nor duty without an inward disposition. +This part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic; but +not if it be well observed. For it concerneth the regiment and +government of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in +architecture the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts +of building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting +the building; and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an +instrument or engine is not the same with the manner of setting it on +work and employing it; and yet, nevertheless, in expressing of the one +you incidently express the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine of +conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity +thereunto. + +(7) This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common duty of +every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the respective or +special duty of every man in his profession, vocation, and place. The +first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The +second likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which +manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to be +best. For who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, +challenge, and right of every several vocation, profession, and place? +For although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester, and +there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, “That the vale best +discovereth the hill;” yet there is small doubt but that men can write +best and most really and materially in their own professions; and that +the writing of speculative men of active matter for the most part doth +seem to men of experience, as Phormio’s argument of the wars seemed to +Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which +accompanieth them that write in their own professions, that they magnify +them in excess. But generally it were to be wished (as that which would +make learning indeed solid and fruitful) that active men would or could +become writers. + +(8) In which kind I cannot but mention, _honoris causa_, your Majesty’s +excellent book touching the duty of a king; a work richly compounded of +divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts; +and being in some opinion one of the most sound and healthful writings +that I have read: not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the +coldness of negligence; not sick of dizziness, as those are who leese +themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in +matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do +who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; and chiefly well +disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for +action; and far removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted +those that write in their own professions to be subject—which is, that +they exalt it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly described, not +a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory, but a Moses or a +David, pastors of their people. Neither can I ever leese out of my +remembrance what I heard your Majesty in the same sacred spirit of +government deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, “That kings +ruled by their laws, as God did by the laws of nature; and ought as +rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative as God doth His power of +working miracles.” And yet notwithstanding in your book of a free +monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude +of the power and right of a king, as well as the circle of his office and +duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent writing of your +Majesty, as a prime or eminent example of tractates concerning special +and respective duties; wherein I should have said as much, if it had been +written a thousand years since. Neither am I moved with certain courtly +decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence. No, it is +flattery to praise in absence—that is, when either the virtue is absent, +or the occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced, +either in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration _pro +Marcello_, which is nothing but an excellent table of Cæsar’s virtue, and +made to his face; besides the example of many other excellent persons, +wiser a great deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, upon a +full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent. + +(9) But to return; there belongeth further to the handling of this part, +touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite, +touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, +which hath been likewise handled; but how? rather in a satire and +cynically, than seriously and wisely; for men have rather sought by wit +to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than +with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as +Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to +scorn and censure shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no +matter for his instruction: _Quærenti derisori scientiam ipsa se +abscondit_; _sed studioso fit obviam_. But the managing of this argument +with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be +one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be +planted. For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk—that if he see you +first, you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth—so is it with +deceits and evil arts, which, if they be first espied they leese their +life; but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden +to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought +to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the +columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the +serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and +lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest—that is, all forms and +natures of evil. For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, +an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, +without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of corrupted minds +presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and +believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and men’s exterior language. So +as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of +their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality. _Non recipit +stultus verba prudentiæ_, _nisi ea dixeris quæ_, _versantur in corde +ejus_. + +(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain the +duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant. +So likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of +companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other +proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society, +but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons. + +(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it +also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the +weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular +and public. As we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own +sons, which was so much extolled, yet what was said? + + “Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores.” + +So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, we see +when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions +they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates, +and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being a +usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding that servitude was +the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a civil +war: and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty. +Amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question +is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice. Which Jason of +Thessalia determined against the truth: _Aliqua sunt injuste facienda_, +_ut multa juste fieri possint_. But the reply is good: _Auctorem +præsentis justitiæ habes_, _sponsorem futuræ non habes_. Men must pursue +things which are just in present, and leave the future to the Divine +Providence. So then we pass on from this general part touching the +exemplar and description of good. + +XXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it +remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without +which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or +statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and +motion; whereunto Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: _Necesse +est scilicet de virtute dicere_, _et quid sit_, _et ex quibus gignatur_. +_Inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse_, _acquirendæ autem ejus +modos et vias ignorare_. _Non enum de virtute tantum_, _qua specie sit_, +_quærendum est_, _sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat_: _utrumque enum +volumeus_, _et rem ipsam nosse_, _et ejus compotes fieri_: _hoc autem ex +voto non succedet_, _nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo_. In such full +words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So saith +Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied +himself to philosophy, _Non ita disputandi causa_, _sed ita vivendi_. +And although the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold any +consultations touching the reformation of their life (as Seneca +excellently saith, _De partibus vitæ quisque deliberat_, _de summa +nemo_), may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with +that aphorism of Hippocrates, _Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non +sentiunt_, _iis mens ægrotat_. They need medicine, not only to assuage +the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said that the cure of +men’s minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral +philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble +handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, “That the eyes of the handmaid look +perpetually towards the mistress,” and yet no doubt many things are left +to the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress’ will; so +ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of +divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself (within due limits) many +sound and profitable directions. + +(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot but +find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry; the +rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and +action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men +(which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their +books. It is reasonable, therefore, that we propound it in the more +particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit +ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, +and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have +written. We will, therefore, enumerate some heads or points thereof, +that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant. + +(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical we +ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; for the +one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of +application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the nature of +the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the +constitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents. So in the +culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command: +points of Nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis of the one, +and the conditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these +things, therefore, it is left unto us to proceed by application:— + + “Vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:” + +and so likewise, + + “Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.” + +But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and +neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which +draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth +adverse and contrary; which is that properly which we call accommodating +or applying. Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the +exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto +which we do apply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take +measure of the body. + +(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound +and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and +tempers of men’s natures and dispositions, specially having regard to +those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and +causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture; +wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to +describe the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention. +For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are +proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle +handleth, or ought to have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it +not deserve as well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to +intend many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide +themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in +few things at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as +well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned to +that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time; +others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of +pursuit:— + + “Jam tum tenditqus fovetque.” + +So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly +also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be +considered by Aristotle, “That there is a disposition in conversation +(supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man’s +self) to soothe and please, and a disposition contrary to contradict and +cross;” and deserveth it not much better to be considered. “That there +is a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more +serious nature (and supposing it still in things merely indifferent), to +take pleasure in the good of another; and a disposition contrariwise, to +take distaste at the good of another?” which is that properly which we +call good nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity; and, therefore, I +cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the +several characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in +morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry and +suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the traditions of +astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men’s natures, according to +the predominances of the planets: lovers of quiet, lovers of action, +lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, +lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort of +these relations which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures +of the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth. A man +shall meet with in every day’s conference the denominations of sensitive, +dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, _huomo di prima impressione_, +_huomo di ultima impressione_, and the like; and yet, nevertheless, this +kind of observations wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. +For the distinctions are found (many of them), but we conclude no +precepts upon them: wherein our fault is the greater, because both +history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly fields where these +observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands, but +no man bringeth them to the confectionary that receipts might be made of +them for use of life. + +(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed +upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and +sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and +not extern; and again, those which are caused by extern fortune, as +sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, +privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, +rising _per saltum_, _per gradus_, and the like. And, therefore, we see +that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, _benignitas +hujis ut adolescentuli est_. Saint Paul concludeth that severity of +discipline was to be used to the Cretans, _increpa eos dure_, upon the +disposition of their country, _Cretensus semper mendaces_, _malæ bestiæ_, +_ventres_. Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire +contradictories: _Sed plerumque regiæ voluntates_, _ut vehementes sunt_, +_sic mobiles_, _sæpeque ipsæ sibi advers_. Tacitus observeth how rarely +raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition: _solus Vespasianus +mutatus in melius_. Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and +sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men _qui magnam felicitatem +concoquere non possunt_. So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a +measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune; +_Divitiæ si affluant_, _nolite cor apponere_. These observations and the +like I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in +his Rhetorics, and are handled in some scattered discourses; but they +were never incorporate into moral philosophy, to which they do +essentially appertain; as the knowledge of this diversity of grounds and +moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of +complexions and constitutions doth to the physician, except we mean to +follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines to +all patients. + +(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the +affections; for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to +know the divers complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; +and lastly, the cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of +the divers characters of men’s natures, it followeth in order to know the +diseases and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the +perturbations and distempars of the affections. For as the ancient +politiques in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea, +and the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm +and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would +be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in +working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in the +nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as +winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I +find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written divers +volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which is the +principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they are +considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be moved +by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the +quantity; but where their true place is he pretermitteth them. For it is +not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this +inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light +can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to +the particular affections as light is to particular colours. Better +travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I +can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet it is like it +was after their manner, rather in subtlety of definitions (which in a +subject of this nature are but curiosities), than in active and ample +descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular +writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections: as of +anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance, +and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors +of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth, with great life, how +affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and +how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose +themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify: +how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and +encounter one with another; and other the like particularities. Amongst +the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I +say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another; +even as we used to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which +otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which foundation +is erected that excellent use of _præmium_ and _pæna_, whereby civil +states consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, +for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of +states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so +it is in the government within. + +(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and +have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, +and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, +exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, +friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these +as they have determinate use in moralities, from these the mind +suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and +described, as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate +of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we +will insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it +were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and +habit to speak of. + +(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of +those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by custom; +using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it +will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing we do not +learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle be true in +things wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot now +stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein Nature admitteth +a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove will come more easily +on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and +that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of +enduring heat or cold we endure it the better, and the like: which latter +sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth, +than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, +that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to +have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many +precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of +ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite a few. + +(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either +too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you +discourage, in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and +so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can +hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the other +side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task. + +(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two several +times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst +disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may +work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the +more easy and pleasant. + +(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, which +is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by +nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, or making a +wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness. + +(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better, and +with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not +first in the intention, but _tanquam aliud agendo_, because of the +natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other +axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom, which +being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature; but, being governed +by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of Nature, and bringeth forth +that which is lame and counterfeit. + +(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and +operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great +caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers +in great indignation call poesy _vinum dæmonum_, because it increaseth +temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of +Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, “That young men are no +fit auditors of moral philosophy, because they are not settled from the +boiling heat of their affections, nor attempered with time and +experience”? And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and +discourses of the ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto +virtue most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and +popular opinions against virtue in their parasites’ coats fit to be +scorned and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty of life, +because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled +years, but confined almost to boys and beginners? But is it not true +also, that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy, +till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality; lest +their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no +true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune, as the +verse describes it, _Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur_; and +again, _Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit_, _hic diadema_: which the +poets do speak satirically and in indignation on virtue’s behalf; but +books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth +Machiavel to say, “That if Cæsar had been overthrown, he would have been +more odious than ever was Catiline;” as if there had been no difference, +but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most +excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is there +not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities +themselves (some kinds of them), lest they make men too precise, +arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, _In Marco Catone hæc +bona quæ videmus divina et egregia_, _ipsius scitote esse propria_; _quæ +nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura_, _sed a magistro_? Many +other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and +effects, which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And so, +likewise, is there touching the use of all those other points, of +company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in +the doctrine of morality. + +(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more +accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; that +the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at +other times in a state more depraved. The purpose, therefore, of this +practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to +obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been +practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and observances or +exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, as because +they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration of the evil +hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of +that which is past, and an inception or account _de novo_ for the time to +come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all +good moral philosophy (as was said) is but a handmaid to religion. + +(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all +other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most noble +and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; +which is, the electing and propounding unto a man’s self good and +virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his +compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set +before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, +constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself +into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work of nature; +whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a +carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh; as +if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude +stone still, till such times as he comes to it. But contrariwise when +nature makes a flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all +the parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man +practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like +but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends, look, what +virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend +unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself +thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express +himself, that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine. His words +are these: _Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam_, _quæ supra +humanitatem est_, _heroicam sive divinam virtutem_; and a little after, +_Nam ut feræ neque vitium neque virtus est_, _swic neque Dei_: _sed hic +quidem status altius quiddam virtute est_, _ille aluid quiddam a vitio_. +And therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus +attributeth to Trajan in his funeral oration, where he said, “That men +needed to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue +as good lords to them as Trajan had been;” as if he had not been only an +imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be heathen +and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state of mind, +which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting +upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of +perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. +And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a +false imitation of divine love, _Amor melior Sophista lœvo ad humanam +vitam_—that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist +or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, because, with all his rules +and preceptions, he cannot form a man so dexterously, nor with that +facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so +certainly, if a man’s mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work +him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality +can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay, further, +as Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though they raise +the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or +excesses; but only love doth exalt the mind, and nevertheless at the same +instant doth settle and compose it: so in all other excellences, though +they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only charity +admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power, +the angels transgressed and fell; _Ascendam_, _et ero similis altissimo_: +by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; +_Eritis sicut Dii_, _scientes bonum et malum_: but by aspiring to a +similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever +transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are +called: _Diligite inimicos vestros_, _benefacite eis qui oderunt vos_, +_et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos_, _ut sitis filii +Patris vestri qui in cœlis est_, _qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos +et malos_, _et pluit super justos et injustos_. So in the first platform +of the divine nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, _Optimus +Maximus_: and the sacred Scriptures thus, _Miscericordia ejus super omnia +opera ejus_. + +(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the +culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the +arts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to +collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by +others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But +as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, “You may not marvel (Athenians) +that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, and I drink +wine;” and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of +sleep— + + “Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum altera fertur + Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris: + Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, + Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:” + +so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in +knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“of wine”) is the more +vaporous, and the braver gate (“of ivory”) sendeth forth the falser +dreams. + +(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy, +which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and +spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation +or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For +as we divided the good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and +pleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral +knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without +perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong and agile +for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the mind, +seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that many +have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from +perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings; some again have +an elegancy and fineness of carriage which have neither soundness of +honesty nor substance of sufficiency; and some again have honest and +reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage business; +and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, +we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to +stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the subject of it, +than in the strength and vigour of it. + +XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all +others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. +Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, “That the Romans were like sheep, +for that a man were better drive a flock of them, than one of them; for +in a flock, if you could get but some few go right, the rest would +follow:” so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than +policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of +internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an external +goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh oft +to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in +the Holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, _Sed adhuc +poulus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum_. Again, +states, as great engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of +frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so +governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following; but +the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted. These +respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge. + +(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary +actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and government. +For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection; and they be +three wisdoms of divers natures which do often sever—wisdom of the +behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state. + +(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but +much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an +influence also into business and government. The poet saith, _Nec vultu +destrue verba tuo_: a man may destroy the force of his words with his +countenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his +brother affability and easy access; _Nil interest habere ostium apertum_, +_vultum clausum_: it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and +to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So we see Atticus, +before the first interview between Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending, +did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his +countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance be of +such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage +appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well +expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: _Ne aut arrogans +videar_, _aut obnoxius_; _quorum alterum est àlienæ libertatis obliti_, +_alterum suæ_: the sum of behaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity, +without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if +behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass +into affectation, and then _Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam +transferre_—to act a man’s life? But although it proceed not to that +extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And +therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by +saying, _Amici fures temporis_: so certainly the intending of the +discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as +are accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in it, and +seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do +seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything +becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by _puntos_ and +compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action than an +over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is +time and season. For as Solomon saith, _Qui respicit ad ventos_, _non +seminat_; _et qui respicit ad nubes_, _non metet_: a man must make his +opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as +a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it +ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to +be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any +deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait or restrained for +exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly +handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient. + +(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto +collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning and the +professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that note +or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there +is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three +wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of +behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an +inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government, +they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that +happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man’s life is +most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered +advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject. +For if books were written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned +men with mean experience would far excel men of long experience without +learning, and outshoot them in their own bow. + +(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should +be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less +infinite than science of government, which we see is laboured and in some +part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in +the saddest and wisest times were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that +it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general +wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at +certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that would use +their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them, +and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing +of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every +other occasion incident to man’s life. So as there is a wisdom of +counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal +insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon +particular causes propounded, but is gathered by general observation of +causes of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth +to his brother, _De petitione consulatus_ (being the only book of +business that I know written by the ancients), although it concerned a +particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of +many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a +perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may +see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed +by Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as +the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters, we +see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, +positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay +a while, offering to consideration some number of examples. + +(6) _Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam_, +_ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi_. Here is commended the +provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it +was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’ +papers unperused. + +_Vir sapiens_, _si cum stulto contenderit_, _sive irascatur_, _sive +rideat_, _non inveniet requiem_. Here is described the great +disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than +himself; which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to +jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways +quit himself well of it. + +_Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum_, _postea sentiet eum +contumacem_. Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in +his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness. + +_Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo_? _coram regibus stabit_, _nec erit +inter ignobiles_. Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to +honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love +not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and +diligent. + +_Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole_, _cum adolescente secundo +qui consurgit pro eo_. Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla +first, and after him by Tiberius. _Plures adorant solem orientem quam +occidentem vel meridianum_. + +_Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te_, _locum tuum ne +demiseris_; _quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima_. Here caution +is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the +unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of +means to make them better. + +_Erat civitas parva_, _et pauci in ea viri_: _venit contra eam rex +magnus_, _et vallavit eam_, _instruxitque munitones per gyrum_, _et +perfecta est obsidio_; _inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens_, _et +liberavit eam per sapientiam suam_; _et nullus deinceps recordatus est +huminis illius pauperis_. Here the corruption of states is set forth, +that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it. + +_Millis responsio frangit iram_. Here is noted that silence or rough +answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth. + +_Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum_. Here is lively represented how +laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred till the +last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a briar +or impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth. + +_Melior est finis orationis quam principium_. Here is taxed the vanity +of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than +upon the conclusions and issues of speech. + +_Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem_, _non bene facit_; _iste et pro +buccella panis deseret veritatem_. Here is noted, that a judge were +better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge +offendeth not so lightly as a facile. + +_Vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri vehementi_, _in quo +paratur fames_. Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous +extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry +horseleech. + +_Fons turbatus pede_, _et vena corrupta_, _est justus cadens coram +impio_. Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the +face of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many +particular injuries passed over by connivance. + +_Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre_, _et dicit hoc non esse +peccatum_, _particeps est homicidii_. Here is noted that, whereas men in +wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they +might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate +their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety. + +_Noli esse amicus homini iracundo_, _nec ambulato cum homine furioso_. +Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do +principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse +us to many factions and quarrels. + +_Qui conturbat domum suam_, _possidebit ventum_. Here is noted, that in +domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting +of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived of their +expectation, and it turneth to wind. + +_Filius sapiens lætificat patrem_: _filius vero stultus mæstitia est +matri suæ_. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the +good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill +proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune. + +_Qui celat delictum_, _quærit amicitiam_; _sed qui altero sermone +repetit_, _separat fæderatos_. Here caution is given, that reconcilement +is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past, +than by apologies and excuses. + +_In omni opere bono erit abundantia_; _ubi autem verba sunt plurima_, +_ibi frequenter egestas_. Here is noted, that words and discourse +aboundeth most where there is idleness and want. + +_Primus in sua causa justus_: _sed venit altera pars_, _et inquiret in +eum_. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth +much; in sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, +except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected. + +_Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia_, _et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora +ventris_. Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which +seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which +hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity. + +_Qui erudit derisorem_, _ipse sibi injuriam facit_; _et qui arguit +impium_, _sibi maculam generat_. Here caution is given how we tender +reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem +it for contumely, and accordingly to return it. + +_Da sapienti occasionem_, _et addetur ei sapientia_. Here is +distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal +and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is +quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused. + +_Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium_, _sic corda hominum +manifesta sunt prudentibus_. Here the mind of a wise man is compared to +a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are +represented; from which representation proceedeth that application, + + “Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.” + +(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of +Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a +desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as +deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with +brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the +sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use: but it is +allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, and some +writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them as +instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if I +would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples. + +(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally to +be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found out +any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it +and express it in parable or aphorism or fable. But for fables, they +were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times +abound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And +therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this +variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which Machiavel +chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories +or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of +particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it hath much +greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, +than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point +of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance. For when the example +is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with +all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon +made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the +examples alleged for the discourse’s sake are cited succinctly, and +without particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse +which they are brought in to make good. + +(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of +times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel +handleth, so histories of lives is the most popular for discourse of +business, because it is more conversant in private actions. Nay, there +is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is +discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many are of +Cicero _ad Atticum_, and others. For letters have a great and more +particular representation of business than either chronicles or lives. +Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil +knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient. + +(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much +from that whereof we have spoken as _sapere_ and _sibi sapere_, the one +moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. For +there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a +man’s own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often sever. For many +are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel; like +ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the +garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: _Nam pol +sapiens_ (saith the comical poet) _fingit fortunam sibi_; and it grew to +an adage, _Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ_; and Livy attributed it to Cato +the first, _In hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat_, _ut quocunque +loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur_. + +(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed, +hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in +Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the state +in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people as the +manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, “And in this +fortune had no part.” And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in +anything he took in hand afterwards. For this is too high and too +arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, _Dicis_, +_Fluvius est neus et ego feci memet ipsum_; or of that which another +prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and +that which the poet expresseth, + + “Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro, + Nunc adsint!” + +For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; and, +therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their +successes to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue. For so +Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus. So Cæsar said to the master of +the ship, _Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus_. + +(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, _Faber quisque fortunæ suæ_: +_Sapiens dominabitur astris_: _Invia virtuti null est via_, and the like, +being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to +insolency, rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward +declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are no question +imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion as +they can scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus Cæsar (who was +rather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue), how when he died +he desired his friends about him to give him a _plaudite_, as if he were +conscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage. +This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is +practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And, +therefore, lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by +axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some +heads or passages of it. + +(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument to +teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every +man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the +difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is +as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral. +But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and +in substance. In honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an +opinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount and sing, and please +herself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the +hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey. +In substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that +nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the +globe of crystal or form; that is, that there be not anything in being +and action which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and +doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of +fortune otherwise than as of an inferior work, for no man’s fortune can +be an end worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest men do +abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless +fortune as an organ of virtue and merit deserveth the consideration. + +(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary +towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus +did require; who seeing in the frame of man’s heart such angles and +recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; that is, +to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their +natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps +and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand, so again their weaknesses +and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious, their +friends, factions, dependences; and again their opposites, enviers, +competitors, their moods and times, _Sola viri molles aditus et tempora +noras_; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this +not only of persons but of actions; what are on foot from time to time, +and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and +the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in +itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous: +for men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are +one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These +informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the +minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency of +observations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground +a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors. + +(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who saith, +_Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda_; _sed vir prudens +exhauriet illud_. And although the knowledge itself falleth not under +precept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the +obtaining of it may. + +(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the +ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and +distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to +words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to +set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said, +_Fronti nulla fides_, which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and +not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and +gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is _Animi janua_, “the gate +of the mind.” None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of +Gallus, _Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat_. So again, noting the +differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in +the Senate, he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech +of Germanicus, thus: _Magis in speciem adornatis verbis_, _quam ut +penitus sentire crederetur_; but of Drusus thus: _Paucioribus sed +intentior_, _et fida oratione_; and in another place, speaking of his +character of speech when he did anything that was gracious and popular, +he saith, “That in other things he was _velut eluctantium verborum_;” but +then again, _solutius loquebatur quando subveniret_. So that there is no +such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance +(_vultus jussus_), that can sever from a feigned tale some of these +fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and +formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily +and hardly. + +(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be trusted +without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: _Fraus +sibi in parvis fidem præstruit ut majore emolumento fallat_; and the +Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is +better used than he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small +favours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and as to +industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, _Alimenta socordiæ_. So +again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular +which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and +unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus +advanced many of the friends of Antonius, _Simul amicis ejus præfecturas +et tribunatus largitur_: wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he +did desolate him, and won from him his dependents. + +(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of +flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially with +the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a +stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his +dissimulation when he said, “You are hurt because you do not reign;” of +which Tacitus saith, _Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere_: +_correptamque Græco versu admonuit_, _ideo lædi quia non regnaret_. And, +therefore, the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men +to confess their secrets:— + + “Vino torus et ira.” + +And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and so +settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes +upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open +themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, +according to the proverb of Spain, _Di mentira_, _y sacar as verdad_: +“Tell a lie and find a truth.” + +(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports: +men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their +virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from +their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends, +with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions +conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more +masked: _Verior fama e domesticis emanat_. + +(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their +natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by +their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly +and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio of the Pope, +returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger; whose opinion +being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished +that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very +wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do. +And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to +suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian +proverb being elegant, and for the most part true:— + + “Di danari, di senno, e di fede, + C’è ne manco che non credi.” + +“There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than men +do account upon.” + +(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their +natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being at the top +of human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto +they aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of +the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that +maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform +ourselves in men’s ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also +of the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is +principally sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself +outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures, +_metus ejus rimatur_, he wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he broke the +other’s neck. + +(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in +three things; the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with +those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and +specially according to the diversity of business, and the diversity of +persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at least +which is perfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind. The +second is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in +most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech +inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to +a man’s knowledge; and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and +inwardness. The last is the reducing of a man’s self to this watchful +and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and +action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a +philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, _Et hoc volo_, +_et etiam institutum servare_; so a politic man in everything should say +to himself, _Et hoc volo_, _ac etiam aliquid addiscere_. I have stayed +the longer upon this precept of obtaining good information because it is +a main part by itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all +things, caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of +themselves, and that this much knowing do not draw on much meddling; for +nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many +matters. So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but +only to this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which +may concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more +dexterity. + +(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take +good information touching their own person, and well to understand +themselves; knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a +glass, yet they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine +glass is the Word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the world, +or times wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves. + +(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities and +virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these with +the most, and those other with the least; and from this view and +examination to frame the considerations following. + +(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with +the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and fit, +then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but if +differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be +more close retired, and reserved; as we see in Tiberius, who was never +seen at a play, and came not into the senate in twelve of his last years; +whereas Augustus Cæsar lived ever in men’s eyes, which Tacitus observeth, +_alia Tiberio morum via_. + +(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions and +courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be free; and, +if engaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity; as we see was +done by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal +profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and +inclination; being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether +they were worse for a prince or for a priest. + +(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to +have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course wherein there +is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent; as Cæsar Julius +did, who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the +excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and +saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom +the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun towards a civil +and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial +greatness. + +(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents, to proceed +according to the composition of their own nature; as we may see in Cæsar, +all whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not +solemn, or of reputation. + +(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples, +in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their +natures and carriages are far differing. In which error it seemeth +Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith that he was wont often to say, _Sylla +potuit_, _ego non potero_? Wherein he was much abused, the natures and +proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the world; +the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn, +and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less effectual. + +But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath many +other branches, whereupon we cannot insist. + +(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man’s self, there +followeth the well opening and revealing a man’s self; wherein we see +nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less show. For +there is a great advantage in the well setting forth of a man’s virtues, +fortunes, merits; and again, in the artificial covering of a man’s +weaknesses, defects, disgraces; staying upon the one, sliding from the +other; cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the other by +exposition, and the like. Wherein we see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus, +who was the greatest politique of his time, _Omnium quæ dixerat +feceratque arte quadam ostentator_, which requireth indeed some art, lest +it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though it be to +the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than +in policy; for as it is said, _Audacter calumniare_, _semper aliquid +hæret_; so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, _Audacter +te vendita_, _semper aluquid hæret_. For it will stick with the more +ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do smile +at it and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth +countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and +government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at +times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in military +persons); or at times when others are most envied; or with easy and +careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being +too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a man’s self, as well as +gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others’ +injury or insolency; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely not a +few solid natures, that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height +of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their +moderation. + +(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are not +perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not +disvalued and embased under the just price, which is done in three +manners—by offering and obtruding a man’s self, wherein men think he is +rewarded when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that +which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and +by finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in commendation, +applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let +him hear what is truly said: _Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris_, +_si hæc te res parva sicuti magna delectat_. + +(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the +valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners—by +caution, by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do +ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which +they are not proper; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will +thrust themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and +proclaim all their wants. Colour is when men make a way for themselves +to have a construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding from +a better cause or intended for some other purpose. For of the one it is +well said, + + “Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni,” + +and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend the +virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a +coward, mildness; and so the rest. For the second, a man must frame some +probable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble +his abilities; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities +which are notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but +industries and dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last but the +surest remedy—namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man +cannot attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who +endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down +the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this other, +which is to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to conceive that he +is best in those things wherein he is failing; and, to help that again, +to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those +things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets, +that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will say, +“That that line cost them more labour than any of the rest;” and +presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which +they know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in +this righting and helping of a man’s self in his own carriage, he must +take heed he show not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury, +by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some +sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage, +with a ready rescussing of a man’s self from scorns, is sometimes of +necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune; but it +ever succeedeth with good felicity. + +(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour to +frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing +hindereth men’s fortunes so much as this: _Idem manebat_, _neque idem +decebat_—men are where they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to +Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he +had _versatile ingenium_. And thereof it cometh that these grave solemn +wits, which must be like themselves and cannot make departures, have more +dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to be somewhat vicious +and enwrapped, and not easy to turn. In some it is a conceit that is +almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves believe +that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it +in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely how Fabius Maximus +would have been temporising still, according to his old bias, when the +nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it +is want of point and penetration in their judgment, that they do not +discern when things have a period, but come in too late after the +occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country +fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then +they remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it +is a lothness to lose labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring +about occasions to their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other +remedy, then they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave +for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at +first have had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or +cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most +prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our +mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune. + +(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with +that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is well +expressed, _Fatis accede deisque_, that men do not only turn with the +occasions, but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit +or strength to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions +that which is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not +occupy them too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please +the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake: +which cannot but mightily increase reputation. + +(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with +the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which +Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: _Et quemadmodum receptum est_, _ut +exercitum ducat imperator_, _sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ ducendæ_; +_ut quæipsis videntur_, _ea gerantur_, _et non ipsi eventus persequi +cogantur_. For if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of +sufficiency in managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly +and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own +plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in; either of which is very +imperfect without the other. + +(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in +the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: for although depth of +secrecy, and making way (_qualis est via navis in mari_, which the French +calleth _sourdes menées_, when men set things in work without opening +themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many +times _dissimulatio errores parit_, _qui dissimulatorem ipsum +illaqueant_. And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a +natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been +reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a +kind of profession, “that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they +stood his friends or enemies.” So Cæsar, when he went first into Gaul, +made no scruple to profess “that he had rather be first in a village than +second at Rome.” So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what +Cicero saith of him, _Alter_ (meaning of Cæsar) _non recusat_, _sed +quodammodo postulat_, _ut_ (_ut est_) _sic appelletur tyrannus_. So we +may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar, in his +very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in +his harangues to the people would swear, _Ita parentis honores consequi +liceat_ (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, to help it, he +would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar’s that was erected +in the place: and men laughed and wondered, and said, “Is it possible?” +or, “Did you ever hear the like?” and yet thought he meant no hurt; he +did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: +whereas Pompey, who tended to the same ends, but in a more dark and +dissembling manner as Tacitus saith of him, _Occultior non melior_, +wherein Sallust concurreth, _Ore probo_, _animo inverecundo_, made it his +design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute +anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his arms for +necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and +he never seen in it: and when he had brought it (as he thought) to that +point when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could +make no great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain +in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by +colour of the doubt of Cæsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and +unfortunate are these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus +made this judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in +regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to +Tiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, _Et cum artibus mariti +simulatione filii bene compostia_: for surely the continual habit of +dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly +politic. + +(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom our +minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce and +are material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially and not +superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as I may term it) of +some men’s minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they +can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparison, +preferring things of show and sense before things of substance and +effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, others with popular +fame and applause, supposing they are things of great purchase, when in +many cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So some +measure things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which +are spent about them; and think, if they be ever moving, that they must +needs advance and proceed; as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato +the second, when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to +no great purpose, _Hæc omnia magno studio agebat_. So in most things men +are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best, +when it should be the fittest. + +(38) As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits towards their fortune, +as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus. First the +amendment of their own minds. For the removal of the impediments of the +mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune +will remove the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down +wealth and means; which I know most men would have placed first, because +of the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions. +But that opinion I may condemn with like reason as Machiavel doth that +other, that moneys were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the +true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a valiant, +populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of +Solon, who, when Crœsus showed him his treasury of gold, said to him, +that if another came that had better iron, he would be master of his +gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that +are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds, +wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In +the third place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides +and currents it hath; which, if they be not taken in their due time, are +seldom recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after-game of +reputation. And lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any +of the other three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased +by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in +matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of +the commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they should intend +their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come +on, but marshal them according to greatness and not according to +instance; not observing the good precept, _Quod nunc instat agamus_. + +(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters +which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding +in a man’s ears, _Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus_: and that +is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions +of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not +commonly so politic for their own fortune, otherwise than in their +ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait +occasions, and to devise plots. + +(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature, which doth +nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his +business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally +intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the +motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he +cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a +second, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which he +purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot +make anything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat +in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it, +yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact +an account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand +amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is +more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that doth +so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more +proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than +for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be +perfect in that rule, _Hæc oportet facere_, _et illa non imittere_. + +(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man’s self +peremptorily in anything, though it seem not liable to accident; but ever +to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: following the wisdom +in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash +was dry whither they should go; and the one moved to go down into a pit, +because it was not likely the water would dry there; but the other +answered, “True, but if it do, how shall we get out again?” + +(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias, +construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but to caution and +moderation, _Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam amaturus_. +For it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far +into unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and +humorous envies or emulations. + +(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, because I +would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought +things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much made of, +but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is more hardly made than a +beginning. It must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I +mention and set down, they are far from complete tractates of them, but +only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no man I suppose will +think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado; for I +know they come tumbling into some men’s laps; and a number obtain good +fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping +themselves from gross errors. + +(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator, +doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a +prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those +subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of +the art, and not according to common practice: so I understand it, that +it ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I mean politic +for his own fortune. + +(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which we +have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called _Bonæ +Artes_. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that +principle of Machiavel, “That a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but +the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue is a help, but +the use of it is cumber:” or that other of his principles, “That he +presuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear; +and therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious, low, and in +straits,” which the Italians call _seminar spine_, to sow thorns: or that +other principle, contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, _Cadant +amici_, _dummodo inimici intercidant_, as the triumvirs, which sold every +one to other the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies: +or that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble +states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their +fortunes, _Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium_, _id non +aqua sed ruina restinguam_: or that other principle of Lysander, “That +children are to be deceived with comfits, and men with oaths:” and the +like evil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in all things) there are +more in number than of the good: certainly with these dispensations from +the laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man’s fortune may be +more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways, the +shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely the fairer way is not +much about. + +(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain +themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of +ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before their +eyes not only that general map of the world, “That all things are vanity +and vexation of spirit,” but many other more particular cards and +directions: chiefly that, that being without well-being is a curse, and +the greater being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded +and all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the poet saith +excellently: + + “Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri pro laudibus istis + Præmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum + Dii _moresque_ dabunt vestri.” + +And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look up to the +Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often subverteth the wisdom +of evil plots and imaginations, according to that scripture, “He hath +conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing.” And although +men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this +incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man’s fortune leaveth not tribute +which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our +substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time: and it is to +small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, and a perpetual +grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the serpent, _Atque +affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ_. And if any man flatter himself +that he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as +was said concerning Augustus Cæsar, and after of Septimius Severus, “That +either they should never have been born, or else they should never have +died,” they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their +greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet these +compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be +purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in their race towards +their fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is +elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles V., in his instructions to the +king his son, “That fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that +if she he too much wooed she is the farther off.” But this last is but a +remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon +that foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy, +wherein they join close, namely that same _Primum quærite_. For divinity +saith, _Primum quærite regnum Dei_, _et ista omnia adjicientur vobis_: +and philosophy saith, _Primum quærite bona animi_; _cætera aut aderunt_, +_aut non oberunt_. And although the human foundation hath somewhat of +the sands, as we see in M. Brutus, when he broke forth into that speech, + + “Te colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es;” + +yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for a +taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient. + +(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired +in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things +are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not +fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible: + + “Totamque infusa per artus + Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.” + +Such is the description of governments. We see the government of God +over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much +irregularity and confusion. The government of the soul in moving the +body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be +reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows +whereof are in the poets) in the description of torments and pains, next +unto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants’ offence, doth detest +the offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant +of particulars: nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses +of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling. + +(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, all things +ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be manifest and +revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the +government of God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady +body, is in the view of God as crystal: _Et in conspectu sedis tanquam +mare vitreum simile crystallo_. So unto princes and states, and +specially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions +of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and +combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard +of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations, +and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part +clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a king +that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I think it +decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain the +certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; who being +silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by +speech, desired it might be certified for his part, “That there was one +that knew how to hold his peace.” + +(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is +laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those +which have written of laws have written either as philosophers or as +lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make +imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as +the stars, which give little light because they are so high. For the +lawyers, they write according to the states where they live what is +received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of a law-maker +is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are in nature certain +fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived but as streams; +and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through +which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and +governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same +fountains. Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a +platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking into +consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what are the +causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; by what +means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what are the +impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence laws +touching private right of _meum_ and _tuum_ have into the public state, +and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned and +delivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief or large, with preambles or +without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and +what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volume, or too +full of multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when +upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses +and conferences touching general points or questions; how they are to be +pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity +and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict law are to be +mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how +the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be censured and +governed; and many other points touching the administration and (as I may +term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, because I +purpose (if God give me leave), having begun a work of this nature in +aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for +deficient. + +(50) And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say much of their +dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but excel the +civil laws in fitness for the government, for the civil law was _nonhos +quæsitum munus in usus_; it was not made for the countries which it +governeth. Hereof I cease to speak because I will not intermingle matter +of action with matter of general learning. + +XXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil +knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and +with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at some +pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth +to me (_si nunquam fallit imago_), as far as a man can judge of his own +work, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while +they are in tuning their instruments, which is nothing pleasant to hear, +but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been +content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that +have better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition of +these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit +in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits +of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of +ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of +all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath +disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the +leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in +civil business, as the states of Græcia did, in respect of their +popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect of the greatness of their +monarchy; the present disposition of these times at this instant to +peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of +religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences; the +perfection of your Majesty’s learning, which as a phœnix may call whole +volleys of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time, +which is ever more and more to disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to +this persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that of +the Grecian and Roman learning; only if men will know their own strength +and their own weakness both; and take, one from the other, light of +invention, and not fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition +of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and +employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to +things vulgar and of popular estimation. As for my labours, if any man +shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them, they shall +make that ancient and patient request, _Verbera_, _sed audi_: let men +reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful +(though it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of +men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off. +Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not so +blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of +all men’s labours and peregrinations. + +XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the +will of man: so that as we are to obey His law, though we find a +reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find a +reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which is +agreeable to our sense we give consent to the matter, and not to the +author; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and +discredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for +righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein +was an image of natural reason. + +(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to +believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man’s mind +suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as +it holdeth for more authorised than itself and so suffereth from the +worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; for then +faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known. + +(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our idiom we +call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not +upon the light of nature: for it is written, _Cæli enarrant gloriam Dei_; +but it is not written, _Cæli enarrant voluntatem Dei_: but of that it is +said, _Ad legem et testimonium_: _si non fecerint secundum verbum istud_, +&c. This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the +great mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the redemption, but +likewise those which concern the law moral, truly interpreted: “Love your +enemies: do good to them that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father, +that suffereth His rain to fall upon the just and unjust.” To this it +ought to be applauded, _Nec vox hominem sonat_: it is a voice beyond the +light of nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a +libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, as if +they were opposite and malignant to nature: _Et quod natura remittit_, +_invida jura negant_. So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s +messengers, that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of +the wise men of Græcia, and that he held them for excellent men: but that +they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reverence and +veneration a thing they called law and manners. So it must be confessed +that a great part of the law moral is of that perfection whereunto the +light of nature cannot aspire: how then is it that man is said to have, +by the light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue and +vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because the light of +nature is used in two several senses: the one, that which springeth from +reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and +earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an +inward instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle +of the purity of his first estate: in which latter sense only he is +participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the +moral law; but how? sufficient to check the vice but not to inform the +duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is +not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from God. + +(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the +latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for nothing +that the apostle calleth religion “our reasonable service of God;” +insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of +reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and +magic, that are full of non-significants and surd characters. But most +specially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this, deserveth to +be highly magnified; holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in this +point between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have +embraced the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no +constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of agent; and +the religion of Mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument +altogether: the one having the very face of error, and the other of +imposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject disputation with +difference. + +(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, in +the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; +the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction +thereupon. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by +way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth +indeed of probation and argument. In the former we see God vouchsafeth +to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of His mysteries in sort as +may be sensible unto us; and doth graft His revelations and holy doctrine +upon the notions of our reason, and applieth His inspirations to open our +understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For the +latter there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and +respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles +and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of +reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences +from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In +nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by +induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those +principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which +draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not +in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller +nature, namely, wherein there are not only _posita_ but _placita_; for in +such there can be no use of absolute reason. We see it familiarly in +games of wit, as chess, or the like. The draughts and first laws of the +game are positive, but how? merely _ad placitum_, and not examinable by +reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to +win the game is artificial and rational. So in human laws there be many +grounds and maxims which are _placita juris_, positive upon authority, +and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most +just, not absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that +affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary +reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded upon the +_placets_ of God. + +(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, to +my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits and +use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which +for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of +true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that +which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and +contradictories, to examine that which is positive. The one sort falling +into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible +than it pleaseth God to reveal them, _Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit +senex_? The other sort into the error of the disciples, which were +scandalised at a show of contradiction, _Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis_? +_Modicum et non videbitis me_; _et iterum_, _modicum_, _et videbitis me_, +&c. + +(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and +blessed use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined of would in +my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of +curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of +controversies, wherewith the Church laboureth. For it cannot but open +men’s eyes to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which +is either not revealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon +weak and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men +would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles, +would be carried thus, _ego_, _non dominus_; and again, _secundum +consilium meum_, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and +oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, _non ego_, +_sed dominus_; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and +denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have +not sufficiently learned out of Solomon that “The causeless curse shall +not come.” + +(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or revealed, +and the nature of the information or revelation; and with the latter we +will begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have now +last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of three +branches: the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the +information, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the +limits of the information belong these considerations: how far forth +particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the Church is +inspired; and how far forth reason may be used; the last point whereof I +have noted as deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong +two considerations: what points of religion are fundamental, and what +perfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one and +the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light according to +the dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of belief. + +(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as deficient, +that the points fundamental, and the points of further perfection only, +ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; a subject tending to +much like end as that I noted before; for as that other were likely to +abate the number of controversies, so this is likely to abate the heat of +many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Egyptian +fight, he did not say, “Why strive you?” but drew his sword and slew the +Egyptian; but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, “You are +brethren, why strive you?” If the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it +must be slain by the sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it +be an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, “Why strive you?” We see of +the fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, “He that is +not with us is against us;” but of points not fundamental, thus, “He that +is not against us is with us.” So we see the coat of our Saviour was +entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself; +but the garment of the Church was of divers colours and yet not divided. +We see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear, +but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field. So as it +is a thing of great use well to define what, and of what latitude, those +points are which do make men mere aliens and disincorporate from the +Church of God. + +(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true and +sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains of the +water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts: +methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine water, which +excelleth so much that of Jacob’s well, is drawn forth much in the same +kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it +is first forced up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived +for use; or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels +immediately where it springeth. The former sort whereof, though it seem +to be the more ready, yet in my judgment is more subject to corrupt. +This is that method which hath exhibited unto us the scholastical +divinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced into an art, as into a +cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived +from thence. + +(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted +strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first they fail to +find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we see in +all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to +dilate. For the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure; the +obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced into large +commentaries, or into commonplaces and titles, which grow to be more vast +than the original writings, whence the sum was at first extracted. So we +see the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writings +of the fathers, whence the master of the sentences made his sum or +collection. So in like manner the volumes of the modern doctors of the +civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian +compiled the digest. So as this course of sums and commentaries is that +which doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity, +and more base in substance. + +(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact +methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and +sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial, like +unto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which are more +subject to ruin than those that are built more strong in their several +parts, though less compacted. But it is plain that the more you recede +from your grounds, the weaker do you conclude; and as in nature, the more +you remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of error you do +incur; so much more in divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures +by inferences and consequences, the more weak and dilute are your +positions. + +(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to be +sought, which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect. +For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art will make it round and +uniform; but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and concluded +with this: _O altitudo sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei_! _quam +incomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus_, _et non investigabiles viæ ejus_. +So again the apostle saith, _Ex parte scimus_: and to have the form of a +total, where there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies +by supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude that the true +use of these sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions +preparatory unto knowledge; but in them, or by deducement from them, to +handle the main body and substance of a knowledge is in all sciences +prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous. + +(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large, +there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather +curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much +must be confessed, that the Scriptures, being given by inspiration and +not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the Author, which +by consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor. +For the Inditer of them did know four things which no man attains to +know; which are—the mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of +the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future +succession of all ages. For as to the first it is said, “He that +presseth into the light shall be oppressed of the glory.” And again, “No +man shall see My face and live.” To the second, “When He prepared the +heavens I was present, when by law and compass He enclosed the deep.” To +the third, “Neither was it needful that any should bear witness to Him of +man, for He knew well what was in man.” And to the last, “From the +beginning are known to the Lord all His works.” + +(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain senses and +expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds +of sobriety—the one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as to +the former, man is not to prevent his time: _Videmus nunc per speculum in +ænigmate_, _tunc autem facie ad faciem_; wherein nevertheless there +seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this +glass, or some moderate explication of this enigma. But to press too far +into it cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of +man. For in the body there are three degrees of that we receive into +it—aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof aliment is that which the +nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome; medicine is that which is +partly converted by nature, and partly converteth nature; and poison is +that which worketh wholly upon nature, without that nature can in any +part work upon it. So in the mind, whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at +all work upon and convert is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a +dissolution of the mind and understanding. + +(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late time +by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended to find +the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalising and +traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there is +no such enmity between God’s Word and His works; neither do they give +honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much embase them. For to +seek heaven and earth in the Word of God, whereof it is said, “Heaven and +earth shall pass, but My word shall not pass,” is to seek temporary +things amongst eternal: and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek +the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek +the dead amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place +was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place +of all where the ark of the testimony was seated. And again, the scope +or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in +the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to man’s +capacity and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true rule, +_Auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas_. For it were a strange +conclusion, if a man should use a similitude for ornament or illustration +sake, borrowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of +a basilisk, a unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like, that +therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof +positively to be true. To conclude therefore these two interpretations, +the one by reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, +which have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and +cabalists, are to be confined with a _a noli akryn sapere_, _sed time_. + +(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to man, touching +the secrets of the heart and the successions of time, doth make a just +and sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the +Scriptures and all other books. For it is an excellent observation which +hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of the +questions which were propounded to Him, how that they are impertinent to +the state of the question demanded: the reason whereof is, because not +being like man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words, but knowing +man’s thoughts immediately, He never answered their words, but their +thoughts. Much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being +written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a +foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the +Church, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted +only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and +respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were +uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or +after, or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place; but have +in themselves, not only totally or collectively, but distributively in +clauses and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water the +Church in every part. And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were, +the main stream or river, so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the +allegorical or typical, are they whereof the Church hath most use; not +that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in +allusions: but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the +Scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a +profane book. + +(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can report +no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will add. In perusing +books of divinity I find many books of controversies, and many of +commonplaces and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an +art: a number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon +the Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances. But that form of +writing in divinity which in my judgment is of all others most rich and +precious is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of +Scriptures in brief observations; not dilated into commonplaces, not +chasing after controversies, not reduced into method of art; a thing +abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books which +will remain, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded, +and I may speak it with an _absit invidia verbo_, and nowise in +derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and +the olive, that if the choice and best of those observations upon texts +of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons within this +your Majesty’s Island of Brittany by the space of these forty years and +more (leaving out the largeness of exhortations and applications +thereupon) had been set down in a continuance, it had been the best work +in divinity which had been written since the Apostles’ times. + +(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter of belief +and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration; which is also +judged and directed by the former—the one being as the internal soul of +religion, and the other as the external body thereof. And, therefore, +the heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, but the whole +religion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul; that is, no certainty +of belief or confession: as a man may well think, considering the chief +doctors of their church were the poets; and the reason was because the +heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into +part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the pureness of +heart, so they might have external honour and rites. + +(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of +divinity: faith, manners, liturgy, and government. Faith containeth the +doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the works +of God. The nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of +Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to the Deity, or +respective to the persons. The works of God summary are two, that of the +creation and that of the redemption; and both these works, as in total +they appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer +to the three persons: that of the creation, in the mass of the matter, to +the Father; in the disposition of the form, to the Son; and in the +continuance and conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that +of the redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father; in the +whole act and consummation, to the Son; and in the application, to the +Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by +the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we +consider either effectually, in the elect; or privately, in the +reprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible Church. + +(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which +discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the edition +thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law positive; and +according to the style, into negative and affirmative, prohibitions and +commandments. Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided +according to the commandments; in the form thereof it referreth to the +three persons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the Father, whose more +special attribute is power; sins of ignorance against the Son, whose +attribute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, whose +attribute is grace or love. In the motions of it, it either moveth to +the right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion or to profane and +libertine transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth +liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the +degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or +act. And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of God to +cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not +exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which quickeneth both +these doctrines of faith and manners is the elevation and consent of the +heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation, +Christian resolution, and the like. + +(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal acts +between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the preaching of the +word, and the sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the +visible word; and on the part of man, invocation of the name of God; and +under the law, sacrifices; which were as visible prayers or confessions: +but now the adoration being _in spiritu et veritate_, there remaineth +only _vituli labiorum_; although the use of holy vows of thankfulness and +retribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions. + +(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of the patrimony +of the Church, the franchises of the Church, and the offices and +jurisdictions of the Church, and the laws of the Church directing the +whole; all which have two considerations, the one in themselves, the +other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate. + +(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of instruction of +truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The declinations from +religion, besides the privative, which is atheism and the branches +thereof, are three—heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft: heresies, when we +serve the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we worship false +gods, supposing them to be true; and witchcraft, when we adore false +gods, knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your Majesty doth +excellently well observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And +yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are +all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the Word of God; for +so he saith, _Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare_, _et quasi scelus +idololatriæ nolle acquiescere_. + +(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I can report no +deficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or ground that lieth +vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity, so diligent have men been +either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares. + + * * * * * + +Thus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world, as +truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and description of +those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well +converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in any point receded +from that which is commonly received, it hath been with a purpose of +proceeding in _melius_, and not _in aliud_; a mind of amendment and +proficiency, and not of change and difference. For I could not be true +and constant to the argument I handle if I were not willing to go beyond +others; but yet not more willing than to have others go beyond me again: +which may the better appear by this, that I have propounded my opinions +naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men’s +judgments by confutations. For in anything which is well set down, I am +in good hope that if the first reading move an objection, the second +reading will make an answer. And in those things wherein I have erred, I +am sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which +certainly have this contrary effect and operation, that they add +authority to error, and destroy the authority of that which is well +invented. For question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on +the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim and +challenge to myself as mine own. The good, it any be, is due _tanquam +adeps sacrificii_, to be incensed to the honour, first of the Divine +Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden. + + + + +FOOTNOTES. + + +{39} Stoops in the rice and takes the speeding gold. Ovid. Metam, x. +667. + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING *** + +***** This file should be named 5500–0.txt or 5500–0.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/5/5/0/5500/ + +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the +United States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part +of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +concept and trademark. 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