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diff --git a/old/adlr10h.htm b/old/adlr10h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e13413c --- /dev/null +++ b/old/adlr10h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,8267 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=US-ASCII"> +<title>The Advancement of Learning</title> +</head> +<body> +<h2> +<a href="#startoftext">The Advancement of Learning, by Francis Bacon</a> +</h2> +<pre> +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Advancement of Learning, by Francis Bacon +(#4 in our series by Francis Bacon) + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: The Advancement of Learning + +Author: Francis Bacon + +Release Date: April, 2004 [EBook #5500] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on July 16, 2002] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII +</pre> +<p> +<a name="startoftext"></a> +Transcribed from the 1893 Cassell & Company edition by David Price, +email ccx074@coventry.ac.uk<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +INTRODUCTION.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +“The TVVOO Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and +aduancement of Learning, divine and humane. To the King. +At London. Printed for Henrie Tomes, and are to be sould at his +shop at Graies Inne Gate in Holborne. 1605.” That was the +original title-page of the book now in the reader’s hand - a living +book that led the way to a new world of thought. It was the book +in which Bacon, early in the reign of James the First, prepared the +way for a full setting forth of his New Organon, or instrument of knowledge.<br> +<br> +The Organon of Aristotle was a set of treatises in which Aristotle had +written the doctrine of propositions. Study of these treatises +was a chief occupation of young men when they passed from school to +college, and proceeded from Grammar to Logic, the second of the Seven +Sciences. Francis Bacon as a youth of sixteen, at Trinity College, +Cambridge, felt the unfruitfulness of this method of search after truth. +He was the son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Queen Elizabeth’s Lord Keeper, +and was born at York House, in the Strand, on the 22nd of January, 1561. +His mother was the Lord Keeper’s second wife, one of two sisters, +of whom the other married Sir William Cecil, afterwards Lord Burleigh. +Sir Nicholas Bacon had six children by his former marriage, and by his +second wife two sons, Antony and Francis, of whom Antony was about two +years the elder. The family home was at York Place, and at Gorhambury, +near St. Albans, from which town, in its ancient and its modern style, +Bacon afterwards took his titles of Verulam and St. Albans.<br> +<br> +Antony and Francis Bacon went together to Trinity College, Cambridge, +when Antony was fourteen years old and Francis twelve. Francis +remained at Cambridge only until his sixteenth year; and Dr. Rawley, +his chaplain in after-years, reports of him that “whilst he was +commorant in the University, about sixteen years of age (as his lordship +hath been pleased to impart unto myself), he first fell into dislike +of the philosophy of Aristotle; not for the worthlessness of the author, +to whom he would ascribe all high attributes, but for the unfruitfulness +of the way, being a philosophy (as his lordship used to say) only strong +for disputatious and contentions, but barren of the production of works +for the benefit of the life of man; in which mind he continued to his +dying day.” Bacon was sent as a youth of sixteen to Paris +with the ambassador Sir Amyas Paulet, to begin his training for the +public service; but his father’s death, in February, 1579, before +he had completed the provision he was making for his youngest children, +obliged him to return to London, and, at the age of eighteen, to settle +down at Gray’s Inn to the study of law as a profession. +He was admitted to the outer bar in June, 1582, and about that time, +at the age of twenty-one, wrote a sketch of his conception of a New +Organon that should lead man to more fruitful knowledge, in a little +Latin tract, which he called “Temporis Partus Maximus” (“The +Greatest Birth of Time”).<br> +<br> +In November, 1584, Bacon took his seat in the House of Commons as member +for Melcombe Regis, in Dorsetshire. In October, 1586, he sat for +Taunton. He was member afterwards for Liverpool; and he was one +of those who petitioned for the speedy execution of Mary Queen of Scots. +In October, 1589, he obtained the reversion of the office of Clerk of +the Council in the Star Chamber, which was worth £1,600 or £2,000 +a year; but for the succession to this office he had to wait until 1608. +It had not yet fallen to him when he wrote his “Two Books of the +Advancement of Learning.” In the Parliament that met in +February, 1593, Bacon sat as member for Middlesex. He raised difficulties +of procedure in the way of the grant of a treble subsidy, by just objection +to the joining of the Lords with the Commons in a money grant, and a +desire to extend the time allowed for payment from three years to six; +it was, in fact, extended to four years. The Queen was offended. +Francis Bacon and his brother Antony had attached themselves to the +young Earl of Essex, who was their friend and patron. The office +of Attorney-General became vacant. Essex asked the Queen to appoint +Francis Bacon. The Queen gave the office to Sir Edward Coke, who +was already Solicitor-General, and by nine years Bacon’s senior. +The office of Solicitor-General thus became vacant, and that was sought +for Francis Bacon. The Queen, after delay and hesitation, gave +it, in November, 1595, to Serjeant Fleming. The Earl of Essex +consoled his friend by giving him “a piece of land” - Twickenham +Park - which Bacon afterwards sold for £1,800 - equal, say, to +£12,000 in present buying power. In 1597 Bacon was returned +to Parliament as member for Ipswich, and in that year he was hoping +to marry the rich widow of Sir William Hatton, Essex helping; but the +lady married, in the next year, Sir Edward Coke. It was in 1597 +that Bacon published the First Edition of his Essays. That was +a little book containing only ten essays in English, with twelve “Meditationes +Sacræ,” which were essays in Latin on religious subjects. +From 1597 onward to the end of his life, Bacon’s Essays were subject +to continuous addition and revision. The author’s Second +Edition, in which the number of the Essays was increased from ten to +thirty-eight, did not appear until November or December, 1612, seven +years later than these two books on the “Advancement of Learning;” +and the final edition of the Essays, in which their number was increased +from thirty-eight to fifty-eight, appeared only in 1625; and Bacon died +on the 9th of April, 1626. The edition of the Essays published +in 1597, under Elizabeth, marked only the beginning of a course of thought +that afterwards flowed in one stream with his teachings in philosophy.<br> +<br> +In February, 1601, there was the rebellion of Essex. Francis Bacon +had separated himself from his patron after giving him advice that was +disregarded. Bacon, now Queen’s Counsel, not only appeared +against his old friend, but with excess of zeal, by which, perhaps, +he hoped to win back the Queen’s favour, he twice obtruded violent +attacks upon Essex when he was not called upon to speak. On the +25th of February, 1601, Essex was beheaded. The genius of Bacon +was next employed to justify that act by “A Declaration of the +Practices and Treasons attempted and committed by Robert late Earle +of Essex and his Complices.” But James of Scotland, on whose +behalf Essex had intervened, came to the throne by the death of Elizabeth +on the 24th of March, 1603. Bacon was among the crowd of men who +were made knights by James I., and he had to justify himself under the +new order of things by writing “Sir Francis Bacon his Apologie +in certain Imputations concerning the late Earle of Essex.” +He was returned to the first Parliament of James I. by Ipswich and St. +Albans, and he was confirmed in his office of King’s Counsel in +August, 1604; but he was not appointed to the office of Solicitor-General +when it became vacant in that year.<br> +<br> +That was the position of Francis Bacon in 1605, when he published this +work, where in his First Book he pointed out the discredits of learning +from human defects of the learned, and emptiness of many of the studies +chosen, or the way of dealing with them. This came, he said, especially +by the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge, +as if there were sought in it “a couch whereupon to rest a searching +and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind +to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state for a +proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground for +strife and contention; or a shop for profit or sale; and not a rich +storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man’s +estate.” The rest of the First Book was given to an argument +upon the Dignity of Learning; and the Second Book, on the Advancement +of Learning, is, as Bacon himself described it, “a general and +faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof +lie fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the industry +of man; to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory may +both minister light to any public designation and also serve to excite +voluntary endeavours.” Bacon makes, by a sort of exhaustive +analysis, a ground-plan of all subjects of study, as an intellectual +map, helping the right inquirer in his search for the right path. +The right path is that by which he has the best chance of adding to +the stock of knowledge in the world something worth labouring for; and +the true worth is in labour for “the glory of the Creator and +the relief of man’s estate.”<br> +<br> +H. M.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +THE FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON; OF THE PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT +OF LEARNING, DIVINE AND HUMAN.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<i>To the King.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +</i>There were under the law, excellent King, both daily sacrifices +and freewill offerings; the one proceeding upon ordinary observance, +the other upon a devout cheerfulness: in like manner there belongeth +to kings from their servants both tribute of duty and presents of affection. +In the former of these I hope I shall not live to be wanting, according +to my most humble duty and the good pleasure of your Majesty’s +employments: for the latter, I thought it more respective to make choice +of some oblation which might rather refer to the propriety and excellency +of your individual person, than to the business of your crown and state.<br> +<br> +Wherefore, representing your Majesty many times unto my mind, and beholding +you not with the inquisitive eye of presumption, to discover that which +the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable, but with the observant eye +of duty and admiration, leaving aside the other parts of your virtue +and fortune, I have been touched - yea, and possessed - with an extreme +wonder at those your virtues and faculties, which the philosophers call +intellectual; the largeness of your capacity, the faithfulness of your +memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, the penetration of your +judgment, and the facility and order of your elocution: and I have often +thought that of all the persons living that I have known, your Majesty +were the best instance to make a man of Plato’s opinion, that +all knowledge is but remembrance, and that the mind of man by Nature +knoweth all things, and hath but her own native and original notions +(which by the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the body +are sequestered) again revived and restored: such a light of Nature +I have observed in your Majesty, and such a readiness to take flame +and blaze from the least occasion presented, or the least spark of another’s +knowledge delivered. And as the Scripture saith of the wisest +king, “That his heart was as the sands of the sea;” which, +though it be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest +and finest portions; so hath God given your Majesty a composition of +understanding admirable, being able to compass and comprehend the greatest +matters, and nevertheless to touch and apprehend the least; whereas +it should seem an impossibility in Nature for the same instrument to +make itself fit for great and small works. And for your gift of +speech, I call to mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Cæsar: +<i>Augusto</i> <i>profluens</i>,<i> et quæ principem deceret</i>,<i> +eloquentia fuit</i>. For if we note it well, speech that is uttered +with labour and difficulty, or speech that savoureth of the affectation +of art and precepts, or speech that is framed after the imitation of +some pattern of eloquence, though never so excellent; all this hath +somewhat servile, and holding of the subject. But your Majesty’s +manner of speech is, indeed, prince-like, flowing as from a fountain, +and yet streaming and branching itself into Nature’s order, full +of facility and felicity, imitating none, and inimitable by any. +And as in your civil estate there appeareth to be an emulation and contention +of your Majesty’s virtue with your fortune; a virtuous disposition +with a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation (when time was) of +your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the due +time; a virtuous observation of the laws of marriage, with most blessed +and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and most Christian desire of +peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes thereunto: +so likewise in these intellectual matters there seemeth to be no less +contention between the excellency of your Majesty’s gifts of Nature +and the universality and perfection of your learning. For I am +well assured that this which I shall say is no amplification at all, +but a positive and measured truth; which is, that there hath not been +since Christ’s time any king or temporal monarch which hath been +so learned in all literature and erudition, divine and human. +For let a man seriously and diligently revolve and peruse the succession +of the Emperors of Rome, of which Cæsar the Dictator (who lived +some years before Christ) and Marcus Antoninus were the best learned, +and so descend to the Emperors of Græcia, or of the West, and +then to the lines of France, Spain, England, Scotland, and the rest, +and he shall find this judgment is truly made. For it seemeth +much in a king if, by the compendious extractions of other men’s +wits and labours, he can take hold of any superficial ornaments and +shows of learning, or if he countenance and prefer learning and learned +men; but to drink, indeed, of the true fountains of learning - nay, +to have such a fountain of learning in himself, in a king, and in a +king born - is almost a miracle. And the more, because there is +met in your Majesty a rare conjunction, as well of divine and sacred +literature as of profane and human; so as your Majesty standeth invested +of that triplicity, which in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient +Hermes: the power and fortune of a king, the knowledge and illumination +of a priest, and the learning and universality of a philosopher. +This propriety inherent and individual attribute in your Majesty deserveth +to be expressed not only in the fame and admiration of the present time, +nor in the history or tradition of the ages succeeding, but also in +some solid work, fixed memorial, and immortal monument, bearing a character +or signature both of the power of a king and the difference and perfection +of such a king.<br> +<br> +Therefore I did conclude with myself that I could not make unto your +Majesty a better oblation than of some treatise tending to that end, +whereof the sum will consist of these two parts: the former concerning +the excellency of learning and knowledge, and the excellency of the +merit and true glory in the augmentation and propagation thereof; the +latter, what the particular acts and works are which have been embraced +and undertaken for the advancement of learning; and again, what defects +and undervalues I find in such particular acts: to the end that though +I cannot positively or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound +unto you framed particulars, yet I may excite your princely cogitations +to visit the excellent treasure of your own mind, and thence to extract +particulars for this purpose agreeable to your magnanimity and wisdom.<br> +<br> +I. (1) In the entrance to the former of these - to clear the way and, +as it were, to make silence, to have the true testimonies concerning +the dignity of learning to be better heard, without the interruption +of tacit objections - I think good to deliver it from the discredits +and disgraces which it hath received, all from ignorance, but ignorance +severally disguised; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of +divines, sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politics, and sometimes +in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves.<br> +<br> +(2) I hear the former sort say that knowledge is of those things which +are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution; that the aspiring +to overmuch knowledge was the original temptation and sin whereupon +ensued the fall of man; that knowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent, +and, therefore, where it entereth into a man it makes him swell; <i>Scientia +inflat</i>; that Solomon gives a censure, “That there is no end +of making books, and that much reading is weariness of the flesh;” +and again in another place, “That in spacious knowledge there +is much contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth +anxiety;” that Saint Paul gives a caveat, “That we be not +spoiled through vain philosophy;” that experience demonstrates +how learned men have been arch-heretics, how learned times have been +inclined to atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes doth +derogate from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause.<br> +<br> +(3) To discover, then, the ignorance and error of this opinion, and +the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appear these +men do not observe or consider that it was not the pure knowledge of +Nature and universality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did give +names unto other creatures in Paradise as they were brought before him +according unto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall; +but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man +to give law unto himself, and to depend no more upon God’s commandments, +which was the form of the temptation. Neither is it any quantity +of knowledge, how great soever, that can make the mind of man to swell; +for nothing can fill, much less extend the soul of man, but God and +the contemplation of God; and, therefore, Solomon, speaking of the two +principal senses of inquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that +the eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; and +if there be no fulness, then is the continent greater than the content: +so of knowledge itself and the mind of man, whereto the senses are but +reporters, he defineth likewise in these words, placed after that calendar +or ephemerides which he maketh of the diversities of times and seasons +for all actions and purposes, and concludeth thus: “God hath made +all things beautiful, or decent, in the true return of their seasons. +Also He hath placed the world in man’s heart, yet cannot man find +out the work which God worketh from the beginning to the end” +- declaring not obscurely that God hath framed the mind of man as a +mirror or glass, capable of the image of the universal world, and joyful +to receive the impression thereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; +and not only delighted in beholding the variety of things and vicissitude +of times, but raised also to find out and discern the ordinances and +decrees which throughout all those changes are infallibly observed. +And although he doth insinuate that the supreme or summary law of Nature +(which he calleth “the work which God worketh from the beginning +to the end”) is not possible to be found out by man, yet that +doth not derogate from the capacity of the mind; but may be referred +to the impediments, as of shortness of life, ill conjunction of labours, +ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand, and many other inconveniences, +whereunto the condition of man is subject. For that nothing parcel +of the world is denied to man’s inquiry and invention, he doth +in another place rule over, when he saith, “The spirit of man +is as the lamp of God, wherewith He searcheth the inwardness of all +secrets.” If, then, such be the capacity and receipt of +the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no danger at all in the +proportion or quantity of knowledge, how large soever, lest it should +make it swell or out-compass itself; no, but it is merely the quality +of knowledge, which, be it in quantity more or less, if it be taken +without the true corrective thereof, hath in it some nature of venom +or malignity, and some effects of that venom, which is ventosity or +swelling. This corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge +so sovereign, is charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth to the +former clause; for so he saith, “Knowledge bloweth up, but charity +buildeth up;” not unlike unto that which he deilvereth in another +place: “If I spake,” saith he, “with the tongues of +men and angels, and had not charity, it were but as a tinkling cymbal.” +Not but that it is an excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men +and angels, but because, if it be severed from charity, and not referred +to the good of men and mankind, it hath rather a sounding and unworthy +glory than a meriting and substantial virtue. And as for that +censure of Solomon concerning the excess of writing and reading books, +and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth from knowledge, and that +admonition of St. Paul, “That we be not seduced by vain philosophy,” +let those places be rightly understood; and they do, indeed, excellently +set forth the true bounds and limitations whereby human knowledge is +confined and circumscribed, and yet without any such contracting or +coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal nature of +things; for these limitations are three: the first, “That we do +not so place our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our mortality;” +the second, “That we make application of our knowledge, to give +ourselves repose and contentment, and not distaste or repining;” +the third, “That we do not presume by the contemplation of Nature +to attain to the mysteries of God.” For as touching the +first of these, Solomon doth excellently expound himself in another +place of the same book, where he saith: “I saw well that knowledge +recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth from darkness; and that +the wise man’s eyes keep watch in his head, whereas this fool +roundeth about in darkness: but withal I learned that the same mortality +involveth them both.” And for the second, certain it is +there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth from knowledge +otherwise than merely by accident; for all knowledge and wonder (which +is the seed of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself; but +when men fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying +it to their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears +or vast desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind +which is spoken of; for then knowledge is no more <i>Lumen siccum</i>, +whereof Heraclitus the profound said, <i>Lumen siccum optima anima</i>; +but it becometh <i>Lumen madidum</i>, or <i>maceratum</i>, being steeped +and infused in the humours of the affections. And as for the third +point, it deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly +passed over; for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into these +sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby he may reveal +unto himself the nature or will of God, then, indeed, is he spoiled +by vain philosophy; for the contemplation of God’s creatures and +works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures themselves) +knowledge, but having regard to God no perfect knowledge, but wonder, +which is broken knowledge. And, therefore, it was most aptly said +by one of Plato’s school, “That the sense of man carrieth +a resemblance with the sun, which (as we see) openeth and revealeth +all the terrestrial globe; but then, again, it obscureth and concealeth +the stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense discover natural things, +but it darkeneth and shutteth up divine.” And hence it is +true that it hath proceeded, that divers great learned men have been +heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity +by this waxen wings of the senses. And as for the conceit that +too much knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance +of second causes should make a more devout dependence upon God, which +is the first cause; first, it is good to ask the question which Job +asked of his friends: “Will you lie for God, as one man will lie +for another, to gratify him?” For certain it is that God +worketh nothing in Nature but by second causes; and if they would have +it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards +God, and nothing else but to offer to the Author of truth the unclean +sacrifice of a lie. But further, it is an assured truth, and a +conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of +philosophy may incline the mind of men to atheism, but a further proceeding +therein doth bring the mind back again to religion. For in the +entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto +the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and +stay there it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when +a man passeth on further and seeth the dependence of causes and the +works of Providence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he +will easily believe that the highest link of Nature’s chain must +needs he tied to the foot of Jupiter’s chair. To conclude, +therefore, let no man upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied +moderation think or maintain that a man can search too far, or be too +well studied in the book of God’s word, or in the book of God’s +works, divinity or philosophy; but rather let men endeavour an endless +progress or proficience in both; only let men beware that they apply +both to charity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to ostentation; +and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these learnings +together.<br> +<br> +II. (1) And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from politics, +they be of this nature: that learning doth soften men’s minds, +and makes them more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms; that +it doth mar and pervert men’s dispositions for matter of government +and policy, in making them too curious and irresolute by variety of +reading, or too peremptory or positive by strictness of rules and axioms, +or too immoderate and overweening by reason of the greatness of examples, +or too incompatible and differing from the times by reason of the dissimilitude +of examples; or at least, that it doth divert men’s travails from +action and business, and bringeth them to a love of leisure and privateness; +and that it doth bring into states a relaxation of discipline, whilst +every man is more ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out +of this conceit Cato, surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed +that ever lived, when Carneades the philosopher came in embassage to +Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flock about him, being +allured with the sweetness and majesty of his eloquence and learning, +gave counsel in open senate that they should give him his despatch with +all speed, lest he should infect and enchant the minds and affections +of the youth, and at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners +and customs of the state. Out of the same conceit or humour did +Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage of his country and the disadvantage +of his own profession, make a kind of separation between policy and +government, and between arts and sciences, in the verses so much renowned, +attributing and challenging the one to the Romans, and leaving and yielding +the other to the Grecians: <i>Tu regere imperio popules</i>, <i>Romane</i>, +<i>memento</i>, <i>Hæ tibi erunt artes</i>, &c. So likewise +we see that Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, laid it as an article of +charge and accusation against him, that he did, with the variety and +power of his discourses and disputatious, withdraw young men from due +reverence to the laws and customs of their country, and that he did +profess a dangerous and pernicious science, which was to make the worse +matter seem the better, and to suppress truth by force of eloquence +and speech.<br> +<br> +(2) But these and the like imputations have rather a countenance of +gravity than any ground of justice: for experience doth warrant that, +both in persons and in times, there hath been a meeting and concurrence +in learning and arms, flourishing and excelling in the same men and +the same ages. For as ‘for men, there cannot be a better +nor the hike instance as of that pair, Alexander the Great and Julius +Cæsar, the Dictator; whereof the one was Aristotle’s scholar +in philosophy, and the other was Cicero’s rival in eloquence; +or if any man had rather call for scholars that were great generals, +than generals that were great scholars, let him take Epaminondas the +Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian; whereof the one was the first that +abated the power of Sparta, and the other was the first that made way +to the overthrow of the monarchy of Persia. And this concurrence +is yet more visible in times than in persons, by how much an age is +greater object than a man. For both in Egypt, Assyria, Persia, +Græcia, and Rome, the same times that are most renowned for arms +are, likewise, most admired for learning, so that the greatest authors +and philosophers, and the greatest captains and governors, have lived +in the same ages. Neither can it otherwise he: for as in man the +ripeness of strength of the body and mind cometh much about an age, +save that the strength of the body cometh somewhat the more early, so +in states, arms and learning, whereof the one correspondeth to the body, +the other to the soul of man, have a concurrence or near sequence in +times.<br> +<br> +(3) And for matter of policy and government, that learning, should rather +hurt, than enable thereunto, is a thing very improbable; we see it is +accounted an error to commit a natural body to empiric physicians, which +commonly have a few pleasing receipts whereupon they are confident and +adventurous, but know neither the causes of diseases, nor the complexions +of patients, nor peril of accidents, nor the true method of cures; we +see it is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers which are only +men of practice, and not grounded in their books, who are many times +easily surprised when matter falleth out besides their experience, to +the prejudice of the causes they handle: so by like reason it cannot +be but a matter of doubtful consequence if states be managed by empiric +statesmen, not well mingled with men grounded in learning. But +contrariwise, it is almost without instance contradictory that ever +any government was disastrous that was in the hands of learned governors. +For howsoever it hath been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and +disable learned men by the names of <i>pedantes</i>; yet in the records +of time it appeareth in many particulars that the governments of princes +in minority (notwithstanding the infinite disadvantage of that kind +of state) - have nevertheless excelled the government of princes of +mature age, even for that reason which they seek to traduce, which is +that by that occasion the state hath been in the hands of <i>pedantes</i>: +for so was the state of Rome for the first five years, which are so +much magnified, during the minority of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, +a <i>pedenti</i>; so it was again, for ten years’ space or more, +during the minority of Gordianus the younger, with great applause and +contentation in the hands of Misitheus, a <i>pedanti</i>: so was it +before that, in the minority of Alexander Severus, in like happiness, +in hands not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the women, who were +aided by the teachers and preceptors. Nay, let a man look into +the government of the Bishops of Rome, as by name, into the government +of Pius Quintus and Sextus Quintus in our times, who were both at their +entrance esteemed but as pedantical friars, and he shall find that such +Popes do greater things, and proceed upon truer principles of state, +than those which have ascended to the papacy from an education and breeding +in affairs of state and courts of princes; for although men bred in +learning are perhaps to seek in points of convenience and accommodating +for the present, which the Italians call <i>ragioni di stato</i>, whereof +the same Pius Quintus could not hear spoken with patience, terming them +inventions against religion and the moral virtues; yet on the other +side, to recompense that, they are perfect in those same plain grounds +of religion, justice, honour, and moral virtue, which if they be well +and watchfully pursued, there will be seldom use of those other, no +more than of physic in a sound or well-dieted body. Neither can +the experience of one man’s life furnish examples and precedents +for the event of one man’s life. For as it happeneth sometimes +that the grandchild, or other descendant, resembleth the ancestor more +than the son; so many times occurrences of present times may sort better +with ancient examples than with those of the later or immediate times; +and lastly, the wit of one man can no more countervail learning than +one man’s means can hold way with a common purse.<br> +<br> +(4) And as for those particular seducements or indispositions of the +mind for policy and government, which learning is pretended to insinuate; +if it be granted that any such thing be, it must be remembered withal +that learning ministereth in every of them greater strength of medicine +or remedy than it offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity. +For if by a secret operation it make men perplexed and irresolute, on +the other side by plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what +ground to resolve; yea, and how to carry things in suspense, without +prejudice, till they resolve. If it make men positive and regular, +it teacheth them what things are in their nature demonstrative, and +what are conjectural, and as well the use of distinctions and exceptions, +as the latitude of principles and rules. If it mislead by disproportion +or dissimilitude of examples, it teacheth men the force of circumstances, +the errors of comparisons, and all the cautions of application; so that +in all these it doth rectify more effectually than it can pervert. +And these medicines it conveyeth into men’s minds much more forcibly +by the quickness and penetration of examples. For let a man look +into the errors of Clement VII., so lively described by Guicciardini, +who served under him, or into the errors of Cicero, painted out by his +own pencil in his Epistles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from being +irresolute. Let him look into the errors of Phocion, and he will +beware how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but read the +fable of Ixion, and it will hold him from being vaporous or imaginative. +Let him look into the errors of Cato II., and he will never be one of +the Antipodes, to tread opposite to the present world.<br> +<br> +(5) And for the conceit that learning should dispose men to leisure +and privateness, and make men slothful: it were a strange thing if that +which accustometh the mind to a perpetual motion and agitation should +induce slothfulness, whereas, contrariwise, it may be truly affirmed +that no kind of men love business for itself but those that are learned; +for other persons love it for profit, as a hireling that loves the work +for the wages; or for honour, as because it beareth them up in the eyes +of men, and refresheth their reputation, which otherwise would wear; +or because it putteth them in mind of their fortune, and giveth them +occasion to pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth some +faculty wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in good-humour +and pleasing conceits towards themselves; or because it advanceth any +other their ends. So that as it is said of untrue valours, that +some men’s valours are in the eyes of them that look on, so such +men’s industries are in the eyes of others, or, at least, in regard +of their own designments; only learned men love business as an action +according to nature, as agreeable to health of mind as exercise is to +health of body, taking pleasure in the action itself, and not in the +purchase, so that of all men they are the most indefatigable, if it +be towards any business which can hold or detain their mind.<br> +<br> +(6) And if any man be laborious in reading and study, and yet idle in +business and action, it groweth from some weakness of body or softness +of spirit, such as Seneca speaketh of: <i>Quidam tam sunt umbratiles</i>,<i> +ut putent in turbido esse quicquid in luce est</i>; and not of learning: +well may it be that such a point of a man’s nature may make him +give himself to learning, but it is not learning that breedeth any such +point in his nature.<br> +<br> +(7) And that learning should take up too much time or leisure: I answer, +the most active or busy man that hath been or can be, hath (no question) +many vacant times of leisure while he expecteth the tides and returns +of business (except he be either tedious and of no despatch, or lightly +and unworthily ambitious to meddle in things that may be better done +by others), and then the question is but how those spaces and times +of leisure shall be filled and spent; whether in pleasure or in studies; +as was well answered by Demosthenes to his adversary Æschines, +that was a man given to pleasure, and told him “That his orations +did smell of the lamp.” “Indeed,” said Demosthenes, +“there is a great difference between the things that you and I +do by lamp-light.” So as no man need doubt that learning +will expel business, but rather it will keep and defend the possession +of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which otherwise at unawares +may enter to the prejudice of both.<br> +<br> +(8) Again, for that other conceit that learning should undermine the +reverence of laws and government, it is assuredly a mere depravation +and calumny, without all shadow of truth. For to say that a blind +custom of obedience should be a surer obligation than duty taught and +understood, it is to affirm that a blind man may tread surer by a guide +than a seeing man can by a light. And it is without all controversy +that learning doth make the minds of men gentle, generous, manageable, +and pliant to government; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwart, +and mutinous: and the evidence of time doth clear this assertion, considering +that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have been most subject +to tumults, seditious, and changes.<br> +<br> +(9) And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was well punished +for his blasphemy against learning, in the same kind wherein he offended; +for when he was past threescore years old, he was taken with an extreme +desire to go to school again, and to learn the Greek tongue, to the +end to peruse the Greek authors; which doth well demonstrate that his +former censure of the Grecian learning was rather an affected gravity, +than according to the inward sense of his own opinion. And as +for Virgil’s verses, though it pleased him to brave the world +in taking to the Romans the art of empire, and leaving to others the +arts of subjects, yet so much is manifest - that the Romans never ascended +to that height of empire till the time they had ascended to the height +of other arts. For in the time of the two first Cæsars, +which had the art of government in greatest perfection, there lived +the best poet, Virgilius Maro; the best historiographer, Titus Livius; +the best antiquary, Marcus Varro; and the best or second orator, Marcus +Cicero, that to the memory of man are known. As for the accusation +of Socrates, the time must be remembered when it was prosecuted; which +was under the Thirty Tyrants, the most base, bloody, and envious persons +that have governed; which revolution of state was no sooner over but +Socrates, whom they had made a person criminal, was made a person heroical, +and his memory accumulate with honours divine and human; and those discourses +of his which were then termed corrupting of manners, were after acknowledged +for sovereign medicines of the mind and manners, and so have been received +ever since till this day. Let this, therefore, serve for answer +to politiques, which in their humorous severity, or in their feigned +gravity, have presumed to throw imputations upon learning; which redargution +nevertheless (save that we know not whether our labours may extend to +other ages) were not needful for the present, in regard of the love +and reverence towards learning which the example and countenance of +two so learned princes, Queen Elizabeth and your Majesty, being as Castor +and Pollux, <i>lucida sidera</i>, stars of excellent light and most +benign influence, hath wrought in all men of place and authority in +our nation.<br> +<br> +III. (1) Now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit or diminution +of credit that groweth unto learning from learned men themselves, which +commonly cleaveth fastest: it is either from their fortune, or from +their manners, or from the nature of their studies. For the first, +it is not in their power; and the second is accidental; the third only +is proper to be handled: but because we are not in hand with true measure, +but with popular estimation and conceit, it is not amiss to speak somewhat +of the two former. The derogations therefore which grow to learning +from the fortune or condition of learned men, are either in respect +of scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of life and meanness +of employments.<br> +<br> +(2) Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men usually +to begin with little, and not to grow rich so fast as other men, by +reason they convert not their labours chiefly to lucre and increase, +it were good to leave the commonplace in commendation of povery to some +friar to handle, to whom much was attributed by Machiavel in this point +when he said, “That the kingdom of the clergy had been long before +at an end, if the reputation and reverence towards the poverty of friars +had not borne out the scandal of the superfluities and excesses of bishops +and prelates.” So a man might say that the felicity and +delicacy of princes and great persons had long since turned to rudeness +and barbarism, if the poverty of learning had not kept up civility and +honour of life; but without any such advantages, it is worthy the observation +what a reverent and honoured thing poverty of fortune was for some ages +in the Roman state, which nevertheless was a state without paradoxes. +For we see what Titus Livius saith in his introduction:<i> Cæterum +aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit aut nulla unquam respublica nec +major</i>,<i> nec sanctior</i>,<i> nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit; nec +in quam tam sero avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint; nec ubi tantus ac +tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniæ honos fuerit</i>. We see +likewise, after that the state of Rome was not itself, but did degenerate, +how that person that took upon him to be counsellor to Julius Cæsar +after his victory where to begin his restoration of the state, maketh +it of all points the most summary to take away the estimation of wealth: +<i>Verum hæc et omnia mala pariter cum honore pecuniæ desinent; +si neque magistratus</i>,<i> neque alia vulgo cupienda</i>,<i> venalia +erunt</i>. To conclude this point: as it was truly said that <i>Paupertas +est virtutis fortuna</i>, though sometimes it come from vice, so it +may be fitly said that, though some times it may proceed from misgovernment +and accident. Surely Solomon hath pronounced it both in censure, +<i>Qui festinat ad divitias non erit insons</i>; and in precept, “Buy +the truth, and sell it not; and so of wisdom and knowledge;” judging +that means were to be spent upon learning, and not learning to be applied +to means. And as for the privateness or obscureness (as it may +be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life of contemplative men, it +is a theme so common to extol a private life, not taxed with sensuality +and sloth, in comparison and to the disadvantage of a civil life, for +safety, liberty, pleasure, and dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, +as no man handleth it but handleth it well; such a consonancy it hath +to men’s conceits in the expressing, and to men’s consents +in the allowing. This only I will add, that learned men forgotten +in states and not living in the eyes of men, are like the images of +Cassius and Brutus in the funeral of Junia, of which, not being represented +as many others were, Tacitus saith, <i>Eo ipso præfulgebant quod +non visebantur</i>.<br> +<br> +(3) And for meanness of employment, that which is most traduced to contempt +is that the government of youth is commonly allotted to them; which +age, because it is the age of least authority, it is transferred to +the disesteeming of those employments wherein youth is conversant, and +which are conversant about youth. But how unjust this traducement +is (if you will reduce things from popularity of opinion to measure +of reason) may appear in that we see men are more curious what they +put into a new vessel than into a vessel seasoned; and what mould they +lay about a young plant than about a plant corroborate; so as this weakest +terms and times of all things use to have the best applications and +helps. And will you hearken to the Hebrew rabbins? “Your +young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams:” +say they, youth is the worthier age, for that visions are nearer apparitions +of God than dreams? And let it be noted that howsoever the condition +of life of <i>pedantes</i> hath been scorned upon theatres, as the ape +of tyranny; and that the modern looseness or negligence hath taken no +due regard to the choice of schoolmasters and tutors; yet the ancient +wisdom of the best times did always make a just complaint, that states +were too busy with their laws and too negligent in point of education: +which excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort revived +of late times by the colleges of the Jesuits; of whom, although in regard +of their superstition I may say, <i>Quo meliores</i>,<i> eo deteriores</i>; +yet in regard of this, and some other points concerning human learning +and moral matters, I may say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, +<i>Talis quum sis</i>,<i> utunam noster esses</i>. And that much +touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of learned men.<br> +<br> +(4) As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing personal and +individual: and no doubt there be amongst them, as in other professions, +of all temperatures: but yet so as it is not without truth which is +said, that <i>Abeunt studua in mores</i>, studies have an influence +and operation upon the manners of those that are conversant in them.<br> +<br> +(5) But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my part cannot +find any disgrace to learning can proceed from the manners of learned +men; not inherent to them as they are learned; except it be a fault +(which was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato II., Seneca, +and many more) that because the times they read of are commonly better +than the times they live in, and the duties taught better than the duties +practised, they contend sometimes too far to bring things to perfection, +and to reduce the corruption of manners to honesty of precepts or examples +of too great height. And yet hereof they have caveats enough in +their own walks. For Solon, when he was asked whether he had given +his citizens the best laws, answered wisely, “Yea, of such as +they would receive:” and Plato, finding that his own heart could +not agree with the corrupt manners of his country, refused to bear place +or office, saying, “That a man’s country was to be used +as his parents were, that is, with humble persuasions, and not with +contestations.” And Cæsar’s counsellor put in +the same caveat, <i>Non ad vetera instituta revocans quæ jampridem +corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt</i>; and Cicero noteth this error directly +in Cato II. when he writes to his friend Atticus, <i>Cato optime sentit</i>,<i> +sed nocet interdum reipublicæ; loquitur enim tanquam in republicâ +Platonis</i>,<i> non tanquam in fæce Romuli</i>. And the +same Cicero doth excuse and expound the philosophers for going too far +and being too exact in their prescripts when he saith, <i>Isti ipse +præceptores virtutis et magistri videntur fines officiorum paulo +longius quam natura vellet protulisse</i>,<i> ut cum ad ultimum animo +contendissemus</i>,<i> ibi tamen</i>,<i> ubi oportet</i>,<i> consisteremus</i>: +and yet himself might have said, <i>Monitis sum minor ipse meis</i>; +for it was his own fault, though not in so extreme a degree.<br> +<br> +(6) Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been incident to learned +men, which is, that they have esteemed the preservation, good, and honour +of their countries or masters before their own fortunes or safeties. +For so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians: “If it please you +to note it, my counsels unto you are not such whereby I should grow +great amongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians; but they +be of that nature as they are sometimes not good for me to give, but +are always good for you to follow.” And so Seneca, after +he had consecrated that <i>Quinquennium Neronis</i> to the eternal glory +of learned governors, held on his honest and loyal course of good and +free counsel after his master grew extremely corrupt in his government. +Neither can this point otherwise be, for learning endueth men’s +minds with a true sense of the frailty of their persons, the casualty +of their fortunes, and the dignity of their soul and vocation, so that +it is impossible for them to esteem that any greatness of their own +fortune can be a true or worthy end of their being and ordainment, and +therefore are desirous to give their account to God, and so likewise +to their masters under God (as kings and the states that they serve) +in those words, <i>Ecce tibi lucrefeci</i>, and not <i>Ecce mihi lucrefeci</i>; +whereas the corrupter sort of mere politiques, that have not their thoughts +established by learning in the love and apprehension of duty, nor never +look abroad into universality, do refer all things to themselves, and +thrust themselves into the centre of the world, as if all lines should +meet in them and their fortunes, never caring in all tempests what becomes +of the ship of state, so they may save themselves in the cockboat of +their own fortune; whereas men that feel the weight of duty and know +the limits of self-love use to make good their places and duties, though +with peril; and if they stand in seditious and violent alterations, +it is rather the reverence which many times both adverse parts do give +to honesty, than any versatile advantage of their own carriage. +But for this point of tender sense and fast obligation of duty which +learning doth endue the mind withal, howsoever fortune may tax it, and +many in the depth of their corrupt principles may despise it, yet it +will receive an open allowance, and therefore needs the less disproof +or excuse.<br> +<br> +(7) Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which may be more +properly defended than truly denied, is that they fail sometimes in +applying themselves to particular persons, which want of exact application +ariseth from two causes - the one, because the largeness of their mind +can hardly confine itself to dwell in the exquisite observation or examination +of the nature and customs of one person, for it is a speech for a lover, +and not for a wise man, <i>Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus</i>. +Nevertheless I shall yield that he that cannot contract the sight of +his mind as well as disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. +But there is a second cause, which is no inability, but a rejection +upon choice and judgment. For the honest and just bounds of observation +by one person upon another extend no further but to understand him sufficiently, +whereby not to give him offence, or whereby to be able to give him faithful +counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and caution in respect +of a man’s self. But to be speculative into another man +to the end to know how to work him, or wind him, or govern him, proceedeth +from a heart that is double and cloven, and not entire and ingenuous; +which as in friendship it is want of integrity, so towards princes or +superiors is want of duty. For the custom of the Levant, which +is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes upon princes, +is in the outward ceremony barbarous, but the moral is good; for men +ought not, by cunning and bent observations, to pierce and penetrate +into the hearts of kings, which the Scripture hath declared to be inscrutable.<br> +<br> +(8) There is yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part) +which is often noted in learned men, that they do many times fail to +observe decency and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and +commit errors in small and ordinary points of action, so as the vulgar +sort of capacities do make a judgment of them in greater matters by +that which they find wanting in them in smaller. But this consequence +doth oft deceive men, for which I do refer them over to that which was +said by Themistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to himself +out of his own mouth, but, being applied to the general state of this +question, pertinently and justly, when, being invited to touch a lute, +he said, “He could not fiddle, but he could make a small town +a great state.” So no doubt many may be well seen in the +passages of government and policy which are to seek in little and punctual +occasions. I refer them also to that which Plato said of his master +Socrates, whom he compared to the gallipots of apothecaries, which on +the outside had apes and owls and antiques, but contained within sovereign +and precious liquors and confections; acknowledging that, to an external +report, he was not without superficial levities and deformities, but +was inwardly replenished with excellent virtues and powers. And +so much touching the point of manners of learned men.<br> +<br> +(9) But in the meantime I have no purpose to give allowance to some +conditions and courses base and unworthy, wherein divers professors +of learning have wronged themselves and gone too far; such as were those +trencher philosophers which in the later age of the Roman state were +usually in the houses of great persons, being little better than solemn +parasites, of which kind, Lucian maketh a merry description of the philosopher +that the great lady took to ride with her in her coach, and would needs +have him carry her little dog, which he doing officiously and yet uncomely, +the page scoffed and said, “That he doubted the philosopher of +a Stoic would turn to be a Cynic.” But, above all the rest, +this gross and palpable flattery whereunto many not unlearned have abased +and abused their wits and pens, turning (as Du Bartas saith) Hecuba +into Helena, and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price +and estimation of learning. Neither is the modern dedication of +books and writings, as to patrons, to be commended, for that books (such +as are worthy the name of books) ought to have no patrons but truth +and reason. And the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to +private and equal friends, or to entitle the books with their names; +or if to kings and great persons, it was to some such as the argument +of the book was fit and proper for; but these and the like courses may +deserve rather reprehension than defence.<br> +<br> +(10) Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or application of +learned men to men in fortune. For the answer was good that Diogenes +made to one that asked him in mockery, “How it came to pass that +philosophers were the followers of rich men, and not rich men of philosophers?” +He answered soberly, and yet sharply, “Because the one sort knew +what they had need of, and the other did not.” And of the +like nature was the answer which Aristippus made, when having a petition +to Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell down at his feet, whereupon +Dionysius stayed and gave him the hearing, and granted it; and afterwards +some person, tender on the behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus +that he would offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity as +for a private suit to fall at a tyrant’s feet; but he answered, +“It was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that +had his ears in his feet.” Neither was it accounted weakness, +but discretion, in him that would not dispute his best with Adrianus +Cæsar, excusing himself, “That it was reason to yield to +him that commanded thirty legions.” These and the like, +applications, and stooping to points of necessity and convenience, cannot +be disallowed; for though they may have some outward baseness, yet in +a judgment truly made they are to be accounted submissions to the occasion +and not to the person.<br> +<br> +IV. (1) Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which have intervened +amongst the studies themselves of the learned, which is that which is +principal and proper to the present argument; wherein my purpose is +not to make a justification of the errors, but by a censure and separation +of the errors to make a justification of that which is good and sound, +and to deliver that from the aspersion of the other. For we see +that it is the manner of men to scandalise and deprave that which retaineth +the state and virtue, by taking advantage upon that which is corrupt +and degenerate, as the heathens in the primitive Church used to blemish +and taint the Christians with the faults and corruptions of heretics. +But nevertheless I have no meaning at this time to make any exact animadversion +of the errors and impediments in matters of learning, which are more +secret and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto such as +do fall under or near unto a popular observation.<br> +<br> +(2) There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies, whereby learning +hath been most traduced. For those things we do esteem vain which +are either false or frivolous, those which either have no truth or no +use; and those persons we esteem vain which are either credulous or +curious; and curiosity is either in matter or words: so that in reason +as well as in experience there fall out to be these three distempers +(as I may term them) of learning - the first, fantastical learning; +the second, contentious learning; and the last, delicate learning; vain +imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations; and with the +last I will begin. Martin Luther, conducted, no doubt, by a higher +Providence, but in discourse of reason, finding what a province he had +undertaken against the Bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions +of the Church, and finding his own solitude, being in nowise aided by +the opinions of his own time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and +to call former times to his succours to make a party against the present +time. So that the ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, +which had long time slept in libraries, began generally to be read and +revolved. This, by consequence, did draw on a necessity of a more +exquisite travail in the languages original, wherein those authors did +write, for the better understanding of those authors, and the better +advantage of pressing and applying their words. And thereof grew, +again, a delight in their manner of style and phrase, and an admiration +of that kind of writing, which was much furthered and precipitated by +the enmity and opposition that the propounders of those primitive but +seeming new opinions had against the schoolmen, who were generally of +the contrary part, and whose writings were altogether in a differing +style and form; taking liberty to coin and frame new terms of art to +express their own sense, and to avoid circuit of speech, without regard +to the pureness, pleasantness, and (as I may call it) lawfulness of +the phrase or word. And again, because the great labour then was +with the people (of whom the Pharisees were wont to say, <i>Execrabilis +ista turba</i>,<i> quæ non novit legem</i>), for the winning and +persuading of them, there grew of necessity in chief price and request +eloquence and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access +into the capacity of the vulgar sort; so that these four causes concurring +- the admiration of ancient authors, the hate of the schoolmen, the +exact study of languages, and the efficacy of preaching - did bring +in an affectionate study of eloquence and copy of speech, which then +began to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess; for men began +to hunt more after words than matter - more after the choiceness of +the phrase, and the round and clean composition of the sentence, and +the sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of +their works with tropes and figures, than after the weight of matter, +worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, or depth +of judgment. Then grew the flowing and watery vein of Osorius, +the Portugal bishop, to be in price. Then did Sturmius spend such +infinite and curious pains upon Cicero the Orator and Hermogenes the +Rhetorician, besides his own books of Periods and Imitation, and the +like. Then did Car of Cambridge and Ascham with their lectures +and writings almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure all young +men that were studious unto that delicate and polished kind of learning. +Then did Erasmus take occasion to make the scoffing echo, <i>Decem annos +consuumpsi in legendo Cicerone</i>; and the echo answered in Greek, +<i>One</i>, <i>Asine</i>. Then grew the learning of the schoolmen +to be utterly despised as barbarous. In sum, the whole inclination +and bent of those times was rather towards copy than weight.<br> +<br> +(3) Here therefore [is] the first distemper of learning, when men study +words and not matter; whereof, though I have represented an example +of late times, yet it hath been and will be <i>secundum majus et minus</i> +in all time. And how is it possible but this should have an operation +to discredit learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned +men’s works like the first letter of a patent or limited book, +which though it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a letter? +It seems to me that Pygmalion’s frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture +of this vanity; for words are but the images of matter, and except they +have life of reason and invention, to fall in love with them is all +one as to fall in love with a picture.<br> +<br> +(4) But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be condemned, +to clothe and adorn the obscurity even of philosophy itself with sensible +and plausible elocution. For hereof we have great examples in +Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato also in some degree; +and hereof likewise there is great use, for surely, to the severe inquisition +of truth and the deep progress into philosophy, it is some hindrance +because it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth +the desire of further search before we come to a just period. +But then if a man be to have any use of such knowledge in civil occasions, +of conference, counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like, then shall +he find it prepared to his hands in those authors which write in that +manner. But the excess of this is so justly contemptible, that +as Hercules, when he saw the image of Adonis, Venus’ minion, in +a temple, said in disdain, <i>Nil sacri es</i>; so there is none of +Hercules’ followers in learning - that is, the more severe and +laborious sort of inquirers into truth - but will despise those delicacies +and affectations, as indeed capable of no divineness. And thus +much of the first disease or distemper of learning.<br> +<br> +(5) The second which followeth is in nature worse than the former: for +as substance of matter is better than beauty of words, so contrariwise +vain matter is worse than vain words: wherein it seemeth the reprehension +of St. Paul was not only proper for those times, but prophetical for +the times following; and not only respective to divinity, but extensive +to all knowledge: <i>Devita profanas vocum novitates</i>,<i> et oppositiones +falsi nominis scientiæ</i>. For he assigneth two marks and +badges of suspected and falsified science: the one, the novelty and +strangeness of terms; the other, the strictness of positions, which +of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so questions and altercations. +Surely, like as many substances in nature which are solid do putrefy +and corrupt into worms; - so it is the property of good and sound knowledge +to putrefy and dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, +and (as I may term them) vermiculate questions, which have indeed a +kind of quickness and life of spirit, but no soundness of matter or +goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly +reign amongst the schoolmen, who having sharp and strong wits, and abundance +of leisure, and small variety of reading, but their wits being shut +up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator) +as their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges, +and knowing little history, either of nature or time, did out of no +great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto +us those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books. +For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the contemplation +of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff and is limited +thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, +then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable +for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit.<br> +<br> +(6) This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two sorts: either +in the subject itself that they handle, when it is a fruitless speculation +or controversy (whereof there are no small number both in divinity and +philosophy), or in the manner or method of handling of a knowledge, +which amongst them was this - upon every particular position or assertion +to frame objections, and to those objections, solutions; which solutions +were for the most part not confutations, but distinctions: whereas indeed +the strength of all sciences is, as the strength of the old man’s +faggot, in the bond. For the harmony of a science, supporting +each part the other, is and ought to be the true and brief confutation +and suppression of all the smaller sort of objections. But, on +the other side, if you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, +one by one, you may quarrel with them and bend them and break them at +your pleasure: so that, as was said of Seneca, <i>Verborum minutiis +rerum frangit pondera</i>, so a man may truly say of the schoolmen, +<i>Quæstionum minutiis scientiarum frangunt soliditatem</i>. +For were it not better for a man in fair room to set up one great light, +or branching candlestick of lights, than to go about with a small watch-candle +into every corner? And such is their method, that rests not so +much upon evidence of truth proved by arguments, authorities, similitudes, +examples, as upon particular confutations and solutions of every scruple, +cavillation, and objection; breeding for the most part one question +as fast as it solveth another; even as in the former resemblance, when +you carry the light into one corner, you darken the rest; so that the +fable and fiction of Scylla seemeth to be a lively image of this kind +of philosophy or knowledge; which was transformed into a comely virgin +for the upper parts; but then <i>Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina +monstris: </i>so the generalities of the schoolmen are for a while good +and proportionable; but then when you descend into their distinctions +and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb for the use and benefit of +man’s life, they end in monstrous altercations and barking questions. +So as it is not possible but this quality of knowledge must fall under +popular contempt, the people being apt to contemn truths upon occasion +of controversies and altercations, and to think they are all out of +their way which never meet; and when they see such digladiation about +subtleties, and matters of no use or moment, they easily fall upon that +judgment of Dionysius of Syracusa, <i>Verba ista sunt senum otiosorum</i>.<br> +<br> +(7) Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those schoolmen to their +great thirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit had joined variety +and universality of reading and contemplation, they had proved excellent +lights, to the great advancement of all learning and knowledge; but +as they are, they are great undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark +keeping. But as in the inquiry of the divine truth, their pride +inclined to leave the oracle of God’s word, and to vanish in the +mixture of their own inventions; so in the inquisition of nature, they +ever left the oracle of God’s works, and adored the deceiving +and deformed images which the unequal mirror of their own minds, or +a few received authors or principles, did represent unto them. +And thus much for the second disease of learning.<br> +<br> +(8) For the third vice or disease of learning, which concerneth deceit +or untruth, it is of all the rest the foulest; as that which doth destroy +the essential form of knowledge, which is nothing but a representation +of truth: for the truth of being and the truth of knowing are one, differing +no more than the direct beam and the beam reflected. This vice +therefore brancheth itself into two sorts; delight in deceiving and +aptness to be deceived; imposture and credulity; which, although they +appear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of cunning +and the other of simplicity, yet certainly they do for the most part +concur: for, as the verse noteth -<br> +<br> +<br> +“Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est,”<br> +<br> +<br> +an inquisitive man is a prattler; so upon the like reason a credulous +man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he that will easily believe +rumours will as easily augment rumours and add somewhat to them of his +own; which Tacitus wisely noteth, when he saith, <i>Fingunt simul creduntque</i>: +so great an affinity hath fiction and belief.<br> +<br> +(9) This facility of credit and accepting or admitting things weakly +authorised or warranted is of two kinds according to the subject: for +it is either a belief of history, or, as the lawyers speak, matter of +fact; or else of matter of art and opinion. As to the former, +we see the experience and inconvenience of this error in ecclesiastical +history; which hath too easily received and registered reports and narrations +of miracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert, and +other holy men, and their relics, shrines, chapels and images: which +though they had a passage for a time by the ignorance of the people, +the superstitious simplicity of some and the politic toleration of others +holding them but as divine poesies, yet after a period of time, when +the mist began to clear up, they grew to be esteemed but as old wives’ +fables, impostures of the clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges of +Antichrist, to the great scandal and detriment of religion.<br> +<br> +(10) So in natural history, we see there hath not been that choice and +judgment used as ought to have been; as may appear in the writings of +Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and divers of the Arabians, being fraught +with much fabulous matter, a great part not only untried, but notoriously +untrue, to the great derogation of the credit of natural philosophy +with the grave and sober kind of wits: wherein the wisdom and integrity +of Aristotle is worthy to be observed, that, having made so diligent +and exquisite a history of living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly +with any vain or feigned matter; and yet on the other side hath cast +all prodigious narrations, which he thought worthy the recording, into +one book, excellently discerning that matter of manifest truth, such +whereupon observation and rule was to be built, was not to be mingled +or weakened with matter of doubtful credit; and yet again, that rarities +and reports that seem uncredible are not to be suppressed or denied +to the memory of men.<br> +<br> +(11) And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to arts and +opinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when too much belief is +attributed to the arts themselves, or to certain authors in any art. +The sciences themselves, which have had better intelligence and confederacy +with the imagination of man than with his reason, are three in number: +astrology, natural magic, and alchemy; of which sciences, nevertheless, +the ends or pretences are noble. For astrology pretendeth to discover +that correspondence or concatenation which is between the superior globe +and the inferior; natural magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural +philosophy from variety of speculations to the magnitude of works; and +alchemy pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts of bodies +which in mixtures of natures are incorporate. But the derivations +and prosecutions to these ends, both in the theories and in the practices, +are full of error and vanity; which the great professors themselves +have sought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings, and referring +themselves to auricular traditions and such other devices, to save the +credit of impostures. And yet surely to alchemy this right is +due, that it may be compared to the husbandman whereof Æsop makes +the fable; that, when he died, told his sons that he had left unto them +gold buried underground in his vineyard; and they digged over all the +ground, and gold they found none; but by reason of their stirring and +digging the mould about the roots of their vines, they had a great vintage +the year following: so assuredly the search and stir to make gold hath +brought to light a great number of good and fruitful inventions and +experiments, as well for the disclosing of nature as for the use of +man’s life.<br> +<br> +(12) And as for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto authors +in sciences, in making them dictators, that their words should stand, +and not consuls, to give advice; the damage is infinite that sciences +have received thereby, as the principal cause that hath kept them low +at a stay without growth or advancement. For hence it hath come, +that in arts mechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and time addeth +and perfecteth; but in sciences the first author goeth furthest, and +time leeseth and corrupteth. So we see artillery, sailing, printing, +and the like, were grossly managed at the first, and by time accommodated +and refined; but contrariwise, the philosophies and sciences of Aristotle, +Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour +at the first, and by time degenerate and imbased: whereof the reason +is no other, but that in the former many wits and industries have contributed +in one; and in the latter many wits and industries have been spent about +the wit of some one, whom many times they have rather depraved than +illustrated; for, as water will not ascend higher than the level of +the first spring-head from whence it descendeth, so knowledge derived +from Aristotle, and exempted from liberty of examination, will not rise +again higher than the knowledge of Aristotle. And, therefore, +although the position be good, <i>Oportet discentem credere</i>, yet +it must be coupled with this, <i>Oportet edoctum judicare</i>; for disciples +do owe unto masters only a temporary belief and a suspension of their +own judgment till they be fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation +or perpetual captivity; and therefore, to conclude this point, I will +say no more, but so let great authors have their due, as time, which +is the author of authors, be not deprived of his due - which is, further +and further to discover truth. Thus have I gone over these three +diseases of learning; besides the which there are some other rather +peccant humours than formed diseases, which, nevertheless, are not so +secret and intrinsic, but that they fall under a popular observation +and traducement, and, therefore, are not to be passed over.<br> +<br> +V. (1) The first of these is the extreme affecting of two extremities: +the one antiquity, the other novelty; wherein it seemeth the children +of time do take after the nature and malice of the father. For +as he devoureth his children, so one of them seeketh to devour and suppress +the other; while antiquity envieth there should be new additions, and +novelty cannot be content to add but it must deface; surely the advice +of the prophet is the true direction in this matter, <i>State super +vias antiquas</i>,<i> et videte quænam sit via recta et bona et +ambulate in ea</i>. Antiquity deserveth that reverence, that men +should make a stand thereupon and discover what is the best way; but +when the discovery is well taken, then to make progression. And +to speak truly, <i>Antiquitas sæculi juventus mundi</i>. +These times are the ancient times, when the world is ancient, and not +those which we account ancient <i>ordine retrogrado</i>, by a computation +backward from ourselves.<br> +<br> +(2) Another error induced by the former is a distrust that anything +should be now to be found out, which the world should have missed and +passed over so long time: as if the same objection were to be made to +time that Lucian maketh to Jupiter and other the heathen gods; of which +he wondereth that they begot so many children in old time, and begot +none in his time; and asketh whether they were become septuagenary, +or whether the law <i>Papia</i>,<i> </i>made against old men’s +marriages, had restrained them. So it seemeth men doubt lest time +is become past children and generation; wherein contrariwise we see +commonly the levity and unconstancy of men’s judgments, which, +till a matter be done, wonder that it can be done; and as soon as it +is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done: as we see in the expedition +of Alexander into Asia, which at first was prejudged as a vast and impossible +enterprise; and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to make no more of it +than this, <i>Nil aliud quàm bene ausus vana contemnere</i>. +And the same happened to Columbus in the western navigation. But +in intellectual matters it is much more common, as may be seen in most +of the propositions of Euclid; which till they be demonstrate, they +seem strange to our assent; but being demonstrate, our mind accepteth +of them by a kind of relation (as the lawyers speak), as if we had known +them before.<br> +<br> +(3) Another error, that hath also some affinity with the former, is +a conceit that of former opinions or sects after variety and examination +the best hath still prevailed and suppressed the rest; so as if a man +should begin the labour of a new search, he were but like to light upon +somewhat formerly rejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion; +as if the multitude, or the wisest for the multitude’s sake, were +not ready to give passage rather to that which is popular and superficial +than to that which is substantial and profound for the truth is, that +time seemeth to be of the nature of a river or stream, which carrieth +down to us that which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth +that which is weighty and solid.<br> +<br> +(4) Another error, of a diverse nature from all the former, is the over-early +and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and methods; from which +time commonly sciences receive small or no augmentation. But as +young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a further +stature, so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, it +is in growth; but when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it +may, perchance, be further polished, and illustrate and accommodated +for use and practice, but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance.<br> +<br> +(5) Another error which doth succeed that which we last mentioned is, +that after the distribution of particular arts and sciences, men have +abandoned universality, or <i>philosophia prima</i>, which cannot but +cease and stop all progression. For no perfect discovery can be +made upon a flat or a level; neither is it possible to discover the +more remote and deeper parts of any science if you stand but upon the +level of the same science, and ascend not to a higher science.<br> +<br> +(6) Another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence, and a kind +of adoration of the mind and understanding of man; by means whereof, +men have withdrawn themselves too much from the contemplation of nature, +and the observations of experience, and have tumbled up and down in +their own reason and conceits. Upon these intellectualists, which +are notwithstanding commonly taken for the most sublime and divine philosophers, +Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying: - “Men sought truth in +their own little worlds, and not in the great and common world;” +for they disdain to spell, and so by degrees to read in the volume of +God’s works; and contrariwise by continual meditation and agitation +of wit do urge and, as it were, invocate their own spirits to divine +and give oracles unto them, whereby they are deservedly deluded.<br> +<br> +(7) Another error that hath some connection with this latter is, that +men have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines with +some conceits which they have most admired, or some sciences which they +have most applied, and given all things else a tincture according to +them, utterly untrue and improper. So hath Plato intermingled +his philosophy with theology, and Aristotle with logic; and the second +school of Plato, Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics; for these +were the arts which had a kind of primogeniture with them severally. +So have the alchemists made a philosophy out of a few experiments of +the furnace; and Gilbertus our countryman hath made a philosophy out +of the observations of a loadstone. So Cicero, when reciting the +several opinions of the nature of the soul, he found a musician that +held the soul was but a harmony, saith pleasantly, <i>Hic ab arte sua +non recessit</i>,<i> &c</i>. But of these conceits Aristotle +speaketh seriously and wisely when he saith, <i>Qui respiciunt ad pauca +de facili pronunciant</i>.<br> +<br> +(8) Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to assertion +without due and mature suspension of judgment. For the two ways +of contemplation are not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken +of by the ancients: the one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in +the end impassable; the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, +but after a while fair and even. So it is in contemplation: if +a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he +will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.<br> +<br> +(9) Another error is in the manner of the tradition and delivery of +knowledge, which is for the most part magistral and peremptory, and +not ingenuous and faithful; in a sort as may be soonest believed, and +not easiest examined. It is true, that in compendious treatises +for practice that form is not to be disallowed; but in the true handling +of knowledge men ought not to fall either on the one side into the vein +of Velleius the Epicurean, <i>Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua +de revideretur</i>: nor, on the other side, into Socrates, his ironical +doubting of all things; but to propound things sincerely with more or +less asseveration, as they stand in a man’s own judgment proved +more or less.<br> +<br> +(10) Other errors there are in the scope that men propound to themselves, +whereunto they bend their endeavours; for, whereas the more constant +and devote kind of professors of any science ought to propound to themselves +to make some additions to their science, they convert their labours +to aspire to certain second prizes: as to be a profound interpreter +or commentor, to be a sharp champion or defender, to be a methodical +compounder or abridger, and so the patrimony of knowledge cometh to +be sometimes improved, but seldom augmented.<br> +<br> +(11) But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or misplacing +of the last or furthest end of knowledge. For men have entered +into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes upon a natural curiosity +and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their minds with variety +and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to +enable them to victory of wit and contradiction; and most times for +lucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true account of +their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men: as if there were +sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless +spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and +down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state, for a proud mind to +raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground, for strife and contention; +or a shop, for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory +of the Creator and the relief of man’s estate. But this +is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation +and action may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and united together +than they have been: a conjunction like unto that of the two highest +planets, Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation; and Jupiter, +the planet of civil society and action, howbeit, I do not mean, when +I speak of use and action, that end before-mentioned of the applying +of knowledge to lucre and profession; for I am not ignorant how much +that diverteth and interrupteth the prosecution and advancement of knowledge, +like unto the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, which, while she goeth +aside and stoopeth to take up, the race is hindered,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit.” <a name="citation1"></a><a href="#footnote1">{1}</a><br> +<br> +<br> +Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call philosophy +down from heaven to converse upon the earth - that is, to leave natural +philosophy aside, and to apply knowledge only to manners and policy. +But as both heaven and earth do conspire and contribute to the use and +benefit of man, so the end ought to be, from both philosophies to separate +and reject vain speculations, and whatsoever is empty and void, and +to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful; that knowledge +may not be as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, +to acquire and gain to her master’s use; but as a spouse, for +generation, fruit, and comfort.<br> +<br> +(12) Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of dissection, those +peccant humours (the principal of them) which have not only given impediment +to the proficience of learning, but have given also occasion to the +traducement thereof: wherein, if I have been too plain, it must be remembered, +<i>fidelia vulnera amantis</i>,<i> sed dolosa oscula malignantis</i>. +This I think I have gained, that I ought to be the better believed in +that which I shall say pertaining to commendation; because I have proceeded +so freely in that which concerneth censure. And yet I have no +purpose to enter into a laudative of learning, or to make a hymn to +the Muses (though I am of opinion that it is long since their rites +were duly celebrated), but my intent is, without varnish or amplification +justly to weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other things, +and to take the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments, divine +and human.<br> +<br> +VI. (1) First, therefore, let us seek the dignity of knowledge in the +archetype or first platform, which is in the attributes and acts of +God, as far as they are revealed to man and may be observed with sobriety; +wherein we may not seek it by the name of learning, for all learning +is knowledge acquired, and all knowledge in God is original, and therefore +we must look for it by another name, that of wisdom or sapience, as +the Scriptures call it.<br> +<br> +(2) It is so, then, that in the work of the creation we see a double +emanation of virtue from God; the one referring more properly to power, +the other to wisdom; the one expressed in making the subsistence of +the matter, and the other in disposing the beauty of the form. +This being supposed, it is to be observed that for anything which appeareth +in the history of the creation, the confused mass and matter of heaven +and earth was made in a moment, and the order and disposition of that +chaos or mass was the work of six days; such a note of difference it +pleased God to put upon the works of power, and the works of wisdom; +wherewith concurreth, that in the former it is not set down that God +said, “Let there be heaven and earth,” as it is set down +of the works following; but actually, that God made heaven and earth: +the one carrying the style of a manufacture, and the other of a law, +decree, or counsel.<br> +<br> +(3) To proceed, to that which is next in order from God, to spirits: +we find, as far as credit is to be given to the celestial hierarchy +of that supposed Dionysius, the senator of Athens, the first place or +degree is given to the angels of love, which are termed seraphim; the +second to the angels of light, which are termed cherubim; and the third, +and so following places, to thrones, principalities, and the rest, which +are all angels of power and ministry; so as this angels of knowledge +and illumination are placed before the angels of office and domination.<br> +<br> +(4) To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to sensible and material +forms, we read the first form that was created was light, which hath +a relation and correspondence in nature and corporal things to knowledge +in spirits and incorporal things.<br> +<br> +(5) So in the distribution of days we see the day wherein God did rest +and contemplate His own works was blessed above all the days wherein +He did effect and accomplish them.<br> +<br> +(6) After the creation was finished, it is set down unto us that man +was placed in the garden to work therein; which work, so appointed to +him, could be no other than work of contemplation; that is, when the +end of work is but for exercise and experiment, not for necessity; for +there being then no reluctation of the creature, nor sweat of the brow, +man’s employment must of consequence have been matter of delight +in the experiment, and not matter of labour for the use. Again, +the first acts which man performed in Paradise consisted of the two +summary parts of knowledge; the view of creatures, and the imposition +of names. As for the knowledge which induced the fall, it was, +as was touched before, not the natural knowledge of creatures, but the +moral knowledge of good and evil; wherein the supposition was, that +God’s commandments or prohibitions were not the originals of good +and evil, but that they had other beginnings, which man aspired to know, +to the end to make a total defection from God and to depend wholly upon +himself.<br> +<br> +(7) To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after the fall of man, +we see (as the Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not violating at +all the truth of this story or letter) an image of the two estates, +the contemplative state and the active state, figured in the two persons +of Abel and Cain, and in the two simplest and most primitive trades +of life; that of the shepherd (who, by reason of his leisure, rest in +a place, and lying in view of heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative +life), and that of the husbandman, where we see again the favour and +election of God went to the shepherd, and not to the tiller of the ground.<br> +<br> +(8) So in the age before the flood, the holy records within those few +memorials which are there entered and registered have vouchsafed to +mention and honour the name of the inventors and authors of music and +works in metal. In the age after the flood, the first great judgment +of God upon the ambition of man was the confusion of tongues; whereby +the open trade and intercourse of learning and knowledge was chiefly +imbarred.<br> +<br> +(9) To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God’s first pen: he +is adorned by the Scriptures with this addition and commendation, “That +he was seen in all the learning of the Egyptians,” which nation +we know was one of the most ancient schools of the world: for so Plato +brings in the Egyptian priest saying unto Solon, “You Grecians +are ever children; you have no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity +of knowledge.” Take a view of the ceremonial law of Moses; +you shall find, besides the prefiguration of Christ, the badge or difference +of the people of God, the exercise and impression of obedience, and +other divine uses and fruits thereof, that some of the most learned +Rabbins have travailed profitably and profoundly to observe, some of +them a natural, some of them a moral sense, or reduction of many of +the ceremonies and ordinances. As in the law of the leprosy, where +it is said, “If the whiteness have overspread the flesh, the patient +may pass abroad for clean; but if there be any whole flesh remaining, +he is to be shut up for unclean;” one of them noteth a principle +of nature, that putrefaction is more contagious before maturity than +after; and another noteth a position of moral philosophy, that men abandoned +to vice do not so much corrupt manners, as those that are half good +and half evil. So in this and very many other places in that law, +there is to be found, besides the theological sense, much aspersion +of philosophy.<br> +<br> +(10) So likewise in that excellent hook of Job, if it be revolved +with diligence, it will be found pregnant and swelling with natural +philosophy; as for example, cosmography, and the roundness of the world, +<i>Qui extendit aquilonem super vacuum</i>,<i> et appendit terram super +nihilum</i>; wherein the pensileness of the earth, the pole of the north, +and the finiteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly touched. +So again, matter of astronomy: <i>Spiritus ejus ornavit cælos</i>,<i> +et obstetricante manu ejus eductus est Coluber tortuoses</i>. +And in another place, <i>Nunquid conjungere valebis micantes stellas +Pleiadas</i>,<i> aut gyrum Arcturi poteris dissipare</i>? Where +the fixing of the stars, ever standing at equal distance, is with great +elegancy noted. And in another place, <i>Qui facit Arcturum</i>,<i> +et Oriona</i>,<i> et Hyadas</i>,<i> et interiora Austri</i>; where again +he takes knowledge of the depression of the southern pole, calling it +the secrets of the south, because the southern stars were in that climate +unseen. Matter of generation: <i>Annon sicut lac mulsisti me</i>,<i> +et sicut caseum coagulasti me</i>? &c. Matter of minerals: +<i>Habet argentum venarum suarum principia; et auro locus est in quo +conflatur</i>,<i> ferrum de terra tollitur</i>,<i> et lapis solutus +calore in æs vertitur</i>; and so forwards in that chapter.<br> +<br> +(11) So likewise in the person of Solomon the king, we see the gift +or endowment of wisdom and learning, both in Solomon’s petition +and in God’s assent thereunto, preferred before all other terrene +and temporal felicity. By virtue of which grant or donative of +God Solomon became enabled not only to write those excellent parables +or aphorisms concerning divine and moral philosophy, but also to compile +a natural history of all verdure, from the cedar upon the mountain to +the moss upon the wall (which is but a rudiment between putrefaction +and an herb), and also of all things that breathe or move. Nay, +the same Solomon the king, although he excelled in the glory of treasure +and magnificent buildings, of shipping and navigation, of service and +attendance, of fame and renown, and the like, yet he maketh no claim +to any of those glories, but only to the glory of inquisition of truth; +for so he saith expressly, “The glory of God is to conceal a thing, +but the glory of the king is to find it out;” as if, according +to the innocent play of children, the Divine Majesty took delight to +hide His works, to the end to have them found out; and as if kings could +not obtain a greater honour than to be God’s playfellows in that +game; considering the great commandment of wits and means, whereby nothing +needeth to be hidden from them.<br> +<br> +(12) Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times after our +Saviour came into the world; for our Saviour himself did first show +His power to subdue ignorance, by His conference with the priests and +doctors of the law, before He showed His power to subdue nature by His +miracles. And the coming of this Holy Spirit was chiefly figured +and expressed in the similitude and gift of tongues, which are but <i>vehicula +scientiæ</i>.<br> +<br> +(13) So in the election of those instruments, which it pleased God to +use for the plantation of the faith, notwithstanding that at the first +He did employ persons altogether unlearned, otherwise than by inspiration, +more evidently to declare His immediate working, and to abase all human +wisdom or knowledge; yet nevertheless that counsel of His was no sooner +performed, but in the next vicissitude and succession He did send His +divine truth into the world, waited on with other learnings, as with +servants or handmaids: for so we see St. Paul, who was only learned +amongst the Apostles, had his pen most used in the Scriptures of the +New Testament.<br> +<br> +(14) So again we find that many of the ancient bishops and fathers of +the Church were excellently read and studied in all the learning of +this heathen; insomuch that the edict of the Emperor Julianus (whereby +it was interdicted unto Christians to be admitted into schools, lectures, +or exercises of learning) was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious +engine and machination against the Christian Faith than were all the +sanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors; neither could the emulation +and jealousy of Gregory, the first of that name, Bishop of Rome, ever +obtain the opinion of piety or devotion; but contrariwise received the +censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity, even amongst holy men; +in that he designed to obliterate and extinguish the memory of heathen +antiquity and authors. But contrariwise it was the Christian Church, +which, amidst the inundations of the Scythians on the one side from +the north-west, and the Saracens from the east, did preserve in the +sacred lap and bosom thereof the precious relics even of heathen learning, +which otherwise had been extinguished, as if no such thing had ever +been.<br> +<br> +(15) And we see before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves and our +fathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of Rome to account for +their degenerate manners and ceremonies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious +and framed to uphold the same abuses; at one and the same time it was +ordained by the Divine Providence that there should attend withal a +renovation and new spring of all other knowledges. And on the +other side we see the Jesuits, who partly in themselves, and partly +by the emulation and provocation of their example, have much quickened +and strengthened the state of learning; we see (I say) what notable +service and reparation they have done to the Roman see.<br> +<br> +(16) Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed, that there +be two principal duties and services, besides ornament and illustration, +which philosophy and human learning do perform to faith and religion. +The one, because they are an effectual inducement to the exaltation +of the glory of God. For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do +often invite us to consider and magnify the great and wonderful works +of God, so if we should rest only in the contemplation of the exterior +of them as they first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a +like injury unto the majesty of God, as if we should judge or construe +of the store of some excellent jeweller by that only which is set out +toward the street in his shop. The other, because they minister +a singular help and preservative against unbelief and error. For +our Saviour saith, “You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the +power of God;” laying before us two books or volumes to study, +if we will be secured from error: first the Scriptures, revealing the +will of God, and then the creatures expressing His power; whereof the +latter is a key unto the former: not only opening our understanding +to conceive the true sense of the Scriptures by the general notions +of reason and rules of speech, but chiefly opening our belief, in drawing +us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is chiefly +signed and engraven upon His works. Thus much therefore for divine +testimony and evidence concerning the true dignity and value of learning.<br> +<br> +VII. (1) As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a discourse +of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to use choice of those things +which we shall produce, than to embrace the variety of them. First, +therefore, in the degrees of human honour amongst the heathen, it was +the highest to obtain to a veneration and adoration as a God. +This unto the Christians is as the forbidden fruit. But we speak +now separately of human testimony, according to which - that which the +Grecians call <i>apotheosis</i>, and the Latins <i>relatio inter divos</i> +- was the supreme honour which man could attribute unto man, specially +when it was given, not by a formal decree or act of state (as it was +used among the Roman Emperors), but by an inward assent and belief. +Which honour, being so high, had also a degree or middle term; for there +were reckoned above human honours, honours heroical and divine: in the +attribution and distribution of which honours we see antiquity made +this difference; that whereas founders and uniters of states and cities, +lawgivers, extirpers of tyrants, fathers of the people, and other eminent +persons in civil merit, were honoured but with the titles of worthies +or demigods, such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minus, Romulus, and the +like; on the other side, such as were inventors and authors of new arts, +endowments, and commodities towards man’s life, were ever consecrated +amongst the gods themselves, as was Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius, Apollo, +and others. And justly; for the merit of the former is confined +within the circle of an age or a nation, and is like fruitful showers, +which though they be profitable and good, yet serve but for that season, +and for a latitude of ground where they fall; but the other is, indeed, +like the benefits of heaven, which are permanent and universal. +The former again is mixed with strife and perturbation, but the latter +hath the true character of Divine Presence, coming in <i>aura leni</i>, +without noise or agitation.<br> +<br> +(2) Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing +the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the +former, of relieving the necessities which arise from nature, which +merit was lively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation +of Orpheus’ theatre, where all beasts and birds assembled, and, +forgetting their several appetites - some of prey, some of game, some +of quarrel - stood all sociably together listening unto the airs and +accords of the harp, the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned +by some louder noise, but every beast returned to his own nature; wherein +is aptly described the nature and condition of men, who are full of +savage and unreclaimed desires, of profit, of lust, of revenge; which +as long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly +touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, +so long is society and peace maintained; but if these instruments be +silent, or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things +dissolve into anarchy and confusion.<br> +<br> +(3) But this appeareth more manifestly when kings themselves, or persons +of authority under them, or other governors in commonwealths and popular +estates, are endued with learning. For although he might be thought +partial to his own profession that said “Then should people and +estates be happy when either kings were philosophers, or philosophers +kings;” yet so much is verified by experience, that under learned +princes and governors there have been ever the best times: for howsoever +kings may have their imperfections in their passions and customs, yet, +if they be illuminate by learning, they have those notions of religion, +policy, and morality, which do preserve them and refrain them from all +ruinous and peremptory errors and excesses, whispering evermore in their +ears, when counsellors and servants stand mute and silent. And +senators or counsellors, likewise, which be learned, to proceed upon +more safe and substantial principles, than counsellors which are only +men of experience; the one sort keeping dangers afar off, whereas the +other discover them not till they come near hand, and then trust to +the agility of their wit to ward or avoid them.<br> +<br> + (4) Which felicity of times under learned princes (to keep still +the law of brevity, by using the most eminent and selected examples) +doth best appear in the age which passed from the death of Domitianus +the emperor until the reign of Commodus; comprehending a succession +of six princes, all learned, or singular favourers and advancers of +learning, which age for temporal respects was the most happy and flourishing +that ever the Roman Empire (which then was a model of the world) enjoyed +- a matter revealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a dream the night +before he was slain: for he thought there was grown behind upon his +shoulders a neck and a head of gold, which came accordingly to pass +in those golden times which succeeded; of which princes we will make +some commemoration; wherein, although the matter will be vulgar, and +may be thought fitter for a declamation than agreeable to a treatise +infolded as this is, yet, because it is pertinent to the point in hand +- <i>Neque semper arcum tendit Apollo</i> - and to name them only were +too naked and cursory, I will not omit it altogether. The first +was Nerva, the excellent temper of whose government is by a glance in +Cornelius Tacitus touched to the life: <i>Postquam divus Nerva res oluim +insociabiles miscuisset</i>,<i> imperium et libertatem</i>. And +in token of his learning, the last act of his short reign left to memory +was a missive to his adopted son, Trajan, proceeding upon some inward +discontent at the ingratitude of the times, comprehended in a verse +of Homer’s -<br> +<br> +<br> +“Telis, Phœbe, tuis, lacrymas ulciscere nostras.”<br> +<br> +<br> +(5) Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not learned; but if we +will hearken to the speech of our Saviour, that saith, “He that +receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall have a prophet’s +reward,” he deserveth to be placed amongst the most learned princes; +for there was not a greater admirer of learning or benefactor of learning, +a founder of famous libraries, a perpetual advancer of learned men to +office, and familiar converser with learned professors and preceptors +who were noted to have then most credit in court. On the other +side how much Trajan’s virtue and government was admired and renowned, +surely no testimony of grave and faithful history doth more lively set +forth than that legend tale of Gregorius Magnum, Bishop of Rome, who +was noted for the extreme envy he bare towards all heathen excellency; +and yet he is reported, out of the love and estimation of Trajan’s +moral virtues, to have made unto God passionate and fervent prayers +for the delivery of his soul out of hell, and to have obtained it, with +a caveat that he should make no more such petitions. In this prince’s +time also the persecutions against the Christians received intermission +upon the certificate of Plinius Secundus, a man of excellent learning +and by Trajan advanced.<br> +<br> +(6) Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that lived, and +the most universal inquirer: insomuch as it was noted for an error in +his mind that he desired to comprehend all things, and not to reserve +himself for the worthiest things, falling into the like humour that +was long before noted in Philip of Macedon, who, when he would needs +overrule and put down an excellent musician in an argument touching +music, was well answered by him again - “God forbid, sir,” +saith he, “that your fortune should be so bad as to know these +things better than I.” It pleased God likewise to use the +curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the peace of His Church +in those days; for having Christ in veneration, not as a God or Saviour, +but as a wonder or novelty, and having his picture in his gallery matched +with Apollonius (with whom in his vain imagination he thought its had +some conformity), yet it served the turn to allay the bitter hatred +of those times against the Christian name, so as the Church had peace +during his time. And for his government civil, although he did +not attain to that of Trajan’s in glory of arms or perfection +of justice, yet in deserving of the weal of the subject he did exceed +him. For Trajan erected many famous monuments and buildings, insomuch +as Constantine the Great in emulation was wont to call him <i>Parietaria</i>, +“wall-flower,” because his name was upon so many walls; +but his buildings and works were more of glory and triumph than use +and necessity. But Adrian spent his whole reign, which was peaceable, +in a perambulation or survey of the Roman Empire, giving order and making +assignation where he went for re-edifying of cities, towns, and forts +decayed, and for cutting of rivers and streams, and for making bridges +and passages, and for policing of cities and commonalties with new ordinances +and constitutions, and granting new franchises and incorporations; so +that his whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses and decays +of former times.<br> +<br> +(7) Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince excellently learned, +and had the patient and subtle wit of a schoolman, insomuch as in common +speech (which leaves no virtue untaxed) he was called <i>Cymini</i> +<i>Sector</i>,<i> </i>a carver or a divider of cummin seed, which is +one of the least seeds. Such a patience he had and settled spirit +to enter into the least and most exact differences of causes, a fruit +no doubt of the exceeding tranquillity and serenity of his mind, which +being no ways charged or encumbered, either with fears, remorses, or +scruples, but having been noted for a man of the purest goodness, without +all fiction or affectation, that hath reigned or lived, made his mind +continually present and entire. He likewise approached a degree +nearer unto Christianity, and became, as Agrippa said unto St. Paul, +“half a Christian,” holding their religion and law in good +opinion, and not only ceasing persecution, but giving way to the advancement +of Christians.<br> +<br> +(5) There succeeded him the first <i>Divi fratres</i>, the two adoptive +brethren - Lucius Commodus Verus, son to Ælius Verus, who delighted +much in the softer kind of learning, and was wont to call the poet Martial +his Virgil; and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: whereof the latter, who obscured +his colleague and survived him long, was named the “Philosopher,” +who, as he excelled all the rest in learning, so he excelled them likewise +in perfection of all royal virtues; insomuch as Julianus the emperor, +in his book entitled <i>Cærsares</i>, being as a pasquil or satire +to deride all his predecessors, feigned that they were all invited to +a banquet of the gods, and Silenus the jester sat at the nether end +of the table and bestowed a scoff on everyone as they came in; but when +Marcus Philosophus came in, Silenus was gravelled and out of countenance, +not knowing where to carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance +at his patience towards his wife. And the virtue of this prince, +continued with that of his predecessor, made the name of Antoninus so +sacred in the world, that though it were extremely dishonoured in Commodus, +Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bare the name, yet, when Alexander +Severus refused the name because he was a stranger to the family, the +Senate with one acclamation said, <i>Quomodo Augustus, sic et Antoninus</i>. +In such renown and veneration was the name of these two princes in those +days, that they would have had it as a perpetual addition in all the +emperors’ style. In this emperor’s time also the Church +for the most part was in peace; so as in this sequence of six princes +we do see the blessed effects of learning in sovereignty, painted forth +in the greatest table of the world.<br> +<br> +(9) But for a tablet or picture of smaller volume (not presuming to +speak of your Majesty that liveth), in my judgment the most excellent +is that of Queen Elizabeth, your immediate predecessor in this part +of Britain; a prince that, if Plutarch were now alive to write lives +by parallels, would trouble him, I think, to find for her a parallel +amongst women. This lady was endued with learning in her sex singular, +and rare even amongst masculine princes - whether we speak of learning, +of language, or of science, modern or ancient, divinity or humanity +- and unto the very last year of her life she accustomed to appoint +set hours for reading, scarcely any young student in a university more +daily or more duly. As for her government, I assure myself (I +shall not exceed if I do affirm) that this part of the island never +had forty-five years of better tines, and yet not through the calmness +of the season, but through the wisdom of her regiment. For if +there be considered, of the one side, the truth of religion established, +the constant peace and security, the good administration of justice, +the temperate use of the prerogative, not slackened, nor much strained; +the flourishing state of learning, sortable to so excellent a patroness; +the convenient estate of wealth and means, both of crown and subject; +the habit of obedience, and the moderation of discontents; and there +be considered, on the other side, the differences of religion, the troubles +of neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain, and opposition of Rome, +and then that she was solitary and of herself; these things, I say, +considered, as I could not have chosen an instance so recent and so +proper, so I suppose I could not have chosen one more remarkable or +eminent to the purpose now in hand, which is concerning the conjunction +of learning in the prince with felicity in the people.<br> +<br> +(10) Neither hath learning an influence and operation only upon civil +merit and moral virtue, and the arts or temperature of peace and peaceable +government; but likewise it hath no less power and efficacy in enablement +towards martial and military virtue and prowess, as may be notably represented +in the examples of Alexander the Great and Cæsar the Dictator +(mentioned before, but now in fit place to be resumed), of whose virtues +and acts in war there needs no note or recital, having been the wonders +of time in that kind; but of their affections towards learning and perfections +in learning it is pertinent to say somewhat.<br> +<br> +(11) Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle, the great philosopher, +who dedicated divers of his books of philosophy unto him; he was attended +with Callisthenes and divers other learned persons, that followed him +in camp, throughout his journeys and conquests. What price and +estimation he had learning in doth notably appear in these three particulars: +first, in the envy he used to express that he bare towards Achilles, +in this, that he had so good a trumpet of his praises as Homer’s +verses; secondly, in the judgment or solution he gave touching that +precious cabinet of Darius, which was found among his jewels (whereof +question was made what thing was worthy to be put into it, and he gave +his opinion for Homer’s works); thirdly, in his letter to Aristotle, +after he had set forth his books of nature, wherein he expostulateth +with him for publishing the secrets or mysteries of philosophy; and +gave him to understand that himself esteemed it more to excel other +men in learning and knowledge than in power and empire. And what +use he had of learning doth appear, or rather shine, in all his speeches +and answers, being full of science and use of science, and that in all +variety.<br> +<br> +(12) And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and somewhat +idle to recite things that every man knoweth; but yet, since the argument +I handle leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that men shall perceive I am +as willing to flatter (if they will so call it) an Alexander, or a Cæsar, +or an Antoninus, that are dead many hundred years since, as any that +now liveth; for it is the displaying of the glory of learning in sovereignty +that I propound to myself, and not a humour of declaiming in any man’s +praises. Observe, then, the speech he used of Diogenes, and see +if it tend not to the true state of one of the greatest questions of +moral philosophy: whether the enjoying of outward things, or the contemning +of them, be the greatest happiness; for when he saw Diogenes so perfectly +contented with so little, he said to those that mocked at his condition, +“were I not Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes.” +But Seneca inverteth it, and saith, “<i>Plus erat, quod hic nollet +accipere, quàm quod ille posset dare</i>.” There +were more things which Diogenes would have refused than those were which +Alexander could have given or enjoyed.<br> +<br> +(13) Observe, again, that speech which was usual with him, - “That +he felt his mortality chiefly in two things, sleep and lust;” +and see if it were not a speech extracted out of the depth of natural +philosophy, and liker to have come out of the mouth of Aristotle or +Democritus than from Alexander.<br> +<br> +(14) See, again, that speech of humanity and poesy, when, upon the bleeding +of his wounds, he called unto him one of his flatterers, that was wont +to ascribe to him divine honour, and said, “Look, this is very +blood; this is not such a liquor as Homer speaketh of, which ran from +Venus’ hand when it was pierced by Diomedes.”<br> +<br> +(15) See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic in the speech +he used to Cassander, upon a complaint that was made against his father +Antipater; for when Alexander happened to say, “Do you think these +men would have come from so far to complain except they had just cause +of grief?” and Cassander answered, “Yea, that was the matter, +because they thought they should not be disproved;” said Alexander, +laughing, “See the subtleties of Aristotle, to take a matter both +ways, <i>pro et contra</i>,<i> </i>&c.”<br> +<br> +(16) But note, again, how well he could use the same art which he reprehended +to serve his own humour: when bearing a secret grudge to Callisthenes, +because he was against the new ceremony of his adoration, feasting one +night where the same Callisthenes was at the table, it was moved by +some after supper, for entertainment sake, that Callisthenes, who was +an eloquent man, might speak of some theme or purpose at his own choice; +which Callisthenes did, choosing the praise of the Macedonian nation +for his discourse, and performing the same with so good manner as the +hearers were much ravished; whereupon Alexander, nothing pleased, said, +“It was easy to be eloquent upon so good a subject; but,” +saith he, “turn your style, and let us hear what you can say against +us;” which Callisthenes presently undertook, and did with that +sting and life that Alexander interrupted him, and said, “The +goodness of the cause made him eloquent before, and despite made him +eloquent then again.”<br> +<br> +(17) Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent use of +a metaphor or translation, wherewith he taxeth Antipater, who was an +imperious and tyrannous governor; for when one of Antipater’s +friends commended him to Alexander for his moderation, that he did not +degenerate as his other lieutenants did into the Persian pride, in uses +of purple, but kept the ancient habit of Macedon, of black. “True,” +saith Alexander; “but Antipater is all purple within.” +Or that other, when Parmenio came to him in the plain of Arbela and +showed him the innumerable multitude of his enemies, specially as they +appeared by the infinite number of lights as it had been a new firmament +of stars, and thereupon advised him to assail them by night; whereupon +he answered, “That he would not steal the victory.”<br> +<br> +(18) For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction, so much +in all ages embraced, that he made between his two friends Hephæstion +and Craterus, when he said, “That the one loved Alexander, and +the other loved the king:” describing the principal difference +of princes’ best servants, that some in affection love their person, +and other in duty love their crown.<br> +<br> +(19) Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary with counsellors +of princes, that they counsel their masters according to the model of +their own mind and fortune, and not of their masters. When upon +Darius’ great offers Parmenio had said, “Surely I would +accept these offers were I as Alexander;” saith Alexander, “So +would I were I as Parmenio.”<br> +<br> +(20) Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply which he made when he +gave so large gifts to his friends and servants, and was asked what +he did reserve for himself, and he answered, “Hope.” +Weigh, I say, whether he had not cast up his account aright, because +<i>hope</i> must be the portion of all that resolve upon great enterprises; +for this was Cæsar’s portion when he went first into Gaul, +his estate being then utterly overthrown with largesses. And this +was likewise the portion of that noble prince, howsoever transported +with ambition, Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it was usually said that +he was the greatest usurer in France, because he had turned all his +estate into obligations.<br> +<br> +(21) To conclude, therefore, as certain critics are used to say hyperbolically, +“That if all sciences were lost they might be found in Virgil,” +so certainly this may be said truly, there are the prints and footsteps +of learning in those few speeches which are reported of this prince, +the admiration of whom, when I consider him not as Alexander the Great, +but as Aristotle’s scholar, hath carried me too far.<br> +<br> +(22) As for Julius Cæsar, the excellency of his learning needeth +not to be argued from his education, or his company, or his speeches; +but in a further degree doth declare itself in his writings and works: +whereof some are extant and permanent, and some unfortunately perished. +For first, we see there is left unto us that excellent history of his +own wars, which he entitled only a Commentary, wherein all succeeding +times have admired the solid weight of matter, and the real passages +and lively images of actions and persons, expressed in the greatest +propriety of words and perspicuity of narration that ever was; which +that it was not the effect of a natural gift, but of learning and precept, +is well witnessed by that work of his entitled <i>De Analogia</i>, being +a grammatical philosophy, wherein he did labour to make this same <i>Vox +ad placitum </i>to become <i>Vox ad licitum</i>, and to reduce custom +of speech to congruity of speech; and took as it were the pictures of +words from the life of reason.<br> +<br> +(23) So we receive from him, as a monument both of his power and learning, +the then reformed computation of the year; well expressing that he took +it to be as great a glory to himself to observe and know the law of +the heavens, as to give law to men upon the earth.<br> +<br> +(24) So likewise in that book of his, <i>Anti-Cato</i>,<i> </i>it may +easily appear that he did aspire as well to victory of wit as victory +of war: undertaking therein a conflict against the greatest champion +with the pen that then lived, Cicero the orator.<br> +<br> +(25) So, again, in his book of Apophthegms, which he collected, we see +that he esteemed it more honour to make himself but a pair of tables, +to take the wise and pithy words of others, than to have every word +of his own to be made an apophthegm or an oracle, as vain princes, by +custom of flattery, pretend to do. And yet if I should enumerate +divers of his speeches, as I did those of Alexander, they are truly +such as Solomon noteth, when he saith, <i>Verba sapientum tanquam aculei, +et tanquam clavi in altum defixi</i>: whereof I will only recite three, +not so delectable for elegancy, but admirable for vigour and efficacy.<br> +<br> +(26) As first, it is reason he be thought a master of words, that could +with one word appease a mutiny in his army, which was thus: The Romans, +when their generals did speak to their army, did use the word <i>Milites</i>,<i> +</i>but when the magistrates spake to the people they did use the word +<i>Quirites</i>. The soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously +prayed to be cashiered; not that they so meant, but by expostulation +thereof to draw Cæsar to other conditions; wherein he being resolute +not to give way, after some silence, he began his speech, <i>Ego Quirites</i>,<i> +</i>which did admit them already cashiered - wherewith they were so +surprised, crossed, and confused, as they would not suffer him to go +on in his speech, but relinquished their demands, and made it their +suit to be again called by the name of <i>Milites</i>.<br> +<br> +(27) The second speech was thus: Cæsar did extremely affect the +name of king; and some were set on as he passed by in popular acclamation +to salute him king. Whereupon, finding the cry weak and poor, +he put it off thus, in a kind of jest, as if they had mistaken his surname: +<i>Non Rex sum</i>,<i> sed Cæsar</i>; a speech that, if it be +searched, the life and fulness of it can scarce be expressed. +For, first, it was a refusal of the name, but yet not serious; again, +it did signify an infinite confidence and magnanimity, as if he presumed +Cæsar was the greater title, as by his worthiness it is come to +pass till this day. But chiefly it was a speech of great allurement +toward his own purpose, as if the state did strive with him but for +a name, whereof mean families were vested; for <i>Rex</i> was a surname +with the Romans, as well as <i>King </i>is with us.<br> +<br> +(28) The last speech which I will mention was used to Metellus, when +Cæsar, after war declared, did possess himself of this city of +Rome; at which time, entering into the inner treasury to take the money +there accumulate, Metellus, being tribune, forbade him. Whereto +Cæsar said, “That if he did not desist, he would lay him +dead in the place.” And presently taking himself up, he +added, “Young man, it is harder for me to speak it than to do +it - <i>Adolescens, durius est mihi hoc dicere quàm facere</i>.” +A speech compounded of the greatest terror and greatest clemency that +could proceed out of the mouth of man.<br> +<br> +(29) But to return and conclude with him, it is evident himself knew +well his own perfection in learning, and took it upon him, as appeared +when upon occasion that some spake what a strange resolution it was +in Lucius Sylla to resign his dictators, he, scoffing at him to his +own advantage, answered, “That Sylla could not skill of letters, +and therefore knew not how to dictate.”<br> +<br> +(30) And here it were fit to leave this point, touching the concurrence +of military virtue and learning (for what example should come with any +grace after those two of Alexander and Cæsar?), were it not in +regard of the rareness of circumstance, that I find in one other particular, +as that which did so suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder: +and it is of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from Socrates’ +school into Asia in the expedition of Cyrus the younger against King +Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that time was very young, and never +had seen the wars before, neither had any command in the army, but only +followed the war as a voluntary, for the love and conversation of Proxenus, +his friend. He was present when Falinus came in message from the +great king to the Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in the field, +and they, a handful of men, left to themselves in the midst of the king’s +territories, cut off from their country by many navigable rivers and +many hundred miles. The message imported that they should deliver +up their arms and submit themselves to the king’s mercy. +To which message, before answer was made, divers of the army conferred +familiarly with Falinus; and amongst the rest Xenophon happened to say, +“Why, Falinus, we have now but these two things left, our arms +and our virtue; and if we yield up our arms, how shall we make use of +our virtue?” Whereto Falinus, smiling on him, said, “If +I be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an Athenian, and I believe +you study philosophy, and it is pretty that you say; but you are much +abused if you think your virtue can withstand the king’s power.” +Here was the scorn; the wonder followed: which was that this young scholar +or philosopher, after all the captains were murdered in parley by treason, +conducted those ten thousand foot, through the heart of all the king’s +high countries, from Babylon to Græcia in safety, in despite of +all the king’s forces, to the astonishment of the world, and the +encouragement of the Grecians in times succeeding to make invasion upon +the kings of Persia, as was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, +attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and achieved by Alexander the Macedonian, +all upon the ground of the act of that young scholar.<br> +<br> +VIII. (1) To proceed now from imperial and military virtue to moral +and private virtue; first, it is an assured truth, which is contained +in the verses:-<br> +<br> +<br> +“Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes<br> +Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros.”<br> +<br> +<br> +It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men’s +minds; but indeed the accent had need be upon <i>fideliter</i>; for +a little superficial learning doth rather work a contrary effect. +It taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolency, by copious suggestion +of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance +reasons on both sides, and to turn back the first offers and conceits +of the mind, and to accept of nothing but examined and tried. +It taketh away vain admiration of anything, which is the root of all +weakness. For all things are admired, either because they are +new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man that wadeth +in learning or contemplation thoroughly but will find that printed in +his heart, <i>Nil novi super terram</i>. Neither can any man marvel +at the play of puppets, that goeth behind the curtain, and adviseth +well of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the Great, +after that he was used to great armies, and the great conquests of the +spacious provinces in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, +of some fights and services there, which were commonly for a passage +or a fort, or some walled town at the most, he said: - “It seemed +to him that he was advertised of the battles of the frogs and the mice, +that the old tales went of.” So certainly, if a man meditate +much upon the universal frame of nature, the earth with men upon it +(the divineness of souls except) will not seem much other than an ant-hill, +whereas some ants carry corn, and some carry their young, and some go +empty, and all to and fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away +or mitigateth fear of death or adverse fortune, which is one of the +greatest impediments of virtue and imperfections of manners. For +if a man’s mind be deeply seasoned with the consideration of the +mortality and corruptible nature of things, he will easily concur with +Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw a woman weeping for her pitcher +of earth that was broken, and went forth the next day and saw a woman +weeping for her son that was dead, and thereupon said, “<i>Heri +vidi fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori</i>.” And, +therefore, Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge +of causes and the conquest of all fears together, as <i>concomitantia.<br> +<br> +<br> +</i>“Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,<br> +Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum<br> +Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.”<br> +<br> +<br> +(2) It were too long to go over the particular remedies which learning +doth minister to all the diseases of the mind: sometimes purging the +ill humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, +sometimes increasing appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations +thereof, and the like; and, therefore, I will conclude with that which +hath <i>rationem totius</i> - which is, that it disposeth the constitution +of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof, but still +to be capable and susceptible of growth and reformation. For the +unlearned man knows not what it is to descend into himself, or to call +himself to account, nor the pleasure of that <i>suavissima vita, indies +sentire se fieri meliorem</i>. The good parts he hath he will +learn to show to the full, and use them dexterously, but not much to +increase them. The faults he hath he will learn how to hide and +colour them, but not much to amend them; like an ill mower, that mows +on still, and never whets his scythe. Whereas with the learned +man it fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction and +amendment of his mind with the use and employment thereof. Nay, +further, in general and in sum, certain it is that <i>Veritas </i>and +<i>Bonitas </i>differ but as the seal and the print; for truth prints +goodness, and they be the clouds of error which descend in the storms +of passions and perturbations.<br> +<br> +(3) From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and commandment, +and consider whether in right reason there be any comparable with that +wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth man’s nature. +We see the dignity of the commandment is according to the dignity of +the commanded; to have commandment over beasts as herdmen have, is a +thing contemptible; to have commandment over children as schoolmasters +have, is a matter of small honour; to have commandment over galley-slaves +is a disparagement rather than an honour. Neither is the commandment +of tyrants much better, over people which have put off the generosity +of their minds; and, therefore, it was ever holden that honours in free +monarchies and commonwealths had a sweetness more than in tyrannies, +because the commandment extendeth more over the wills of men, and not +only over their deeds and services. And therefore, when Virgil +putteth himself forth to attribute to Augustus Cæsar the best +of human honours, he doth it in these words:-<br> +<br> +<br> + “Victorque volentes<br> +Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.”<br> +<br> +<br> +But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment +over the will; for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and +understanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth +law to the will itself. For there is no power on earth which setteth +up a throne or chair of estate in the spirits and souls of men, and +in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge +and learning. And therefore we see the detestable and extreme +pleasure that arch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors are transported +with, when they once find in themselves that they have a superiority +in the faith and conscience of men; so great as if they have once tasted +of it, it is seldom seen that any torture or persecution can make them +relinquish or abandon it. But as this is that which the author +of the Revelation calleth the depth or profoundness of Satan, so by +argument of contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men’s +understanding, by force of truth rightly interpreted, is that which +approacheth nearest to the similitude of the divine rule.<br> +<br> +(4) As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of learning is not +so confined to give fortune only to states and commonwealths, as it +doth not likewise give fortune to particular persons. For it was +well noted long ago, that Homer hath given more men their livings, than +either Sylla, or Cæsar, or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding +their great largesses and donatives, and distributions of lands to so +many legions. And no doubt it is hard to say whether arms or learning +have advanced greater numbers. And in case of sovereignty we see, +that if arms or descent have carried away the kingdom, yet learning +hath carried the priesthood, which ever hath been in some competition +with empire.<br> +<br> +(5) Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning, it +far surpasseth all other in nature. For, shall the pleasures of +the affections so exceed the pleasure of the sense, as much as the obtaining +of desire or victory exceedeth a song or a dinner? and must not of consequence +the pleasures of the intellect or understanding exceed the pleasures +of the affections? We see in all other pleasures there is satiety, +and after they be used, their verdure departeth, which showeth well +they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that it was +the novelty which pleased, and not the quality. And, therefore, +we see that voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitions princes turn melancholy. +But of knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and appetite +are perpetually interchangeable; and, therefore, appeareth to be good +in itself simply, without fallacy or accident. Neither is that +pleasure of small efficacy and contentment to the mind of man, which +the poet Lucretius describeth elegantly:-<br> +<br> +<br> +“Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis, &c.”<br> +<br> +<br> +“It is a view of delight,” saith he, “to stand or +walk upon the shore side, and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon +the sea; or to be in a fortified tower, and to see two battles join +upon a plain. But it is a pleasure incomparable, for the mind +of man to be settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth; +and from thence to descry and behold the errors, perturbations, labours, +and wanderings up and down of other men.<br> +<br> +(6) Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning man excelleth +man in that wherein man excelleth beasts; that by learning man ascendeth +to the heavens and their motions, where in body he cannot come; and +the like: let us conclude with the dignity and excellency of knowledge +and learning in that whereunto man’s nature doth most aspire, +which is immortality, or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, +and raising of houses and families; to this tend buildings, foundations, +and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration; +and in effect the strength of all other human desires. We see +then how far the monuments of wit and learning are more durable than +the monuments of power or of the hands. For have not the verses +of Homer continued twenty-five hundred years, or more, without the loss +of a syllable or letter; during which the infinite palaces, temples, +castles, cities, have been decayed and demolished? It is not possible +to have the true pictures or statues of Cyrus, Alexander, Cæsar, +no nor of the kings or great personages of much later years; for the +originals cannot last, and the copies cannot but leese of the life and +truth. But the images of men’s wits and knowledges remain +in books, exempted from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual renovation. +Neither are they fitly to be called images, because they generate still, +and cast their seeds in the minds of others, provoking and causing infinite +actions and opinions in succeeding ages. So that if the invention +of the ship was thought so noble, which carrieth riches and commodities +from place to place, and consociateth the most remote regions in participation +of their fruits, how much more are letters to be magnified, which as +ships pass through the vast seas of time, and make ages so distant to +participate of the wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the one of +the other? Nay, further, we see some of the philosophers which +were least divine, and most immersed in the senses, and denied generally +the immortality of the soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever +motions the spirit of man could act and perform without the organs of +the body, they thought might remain after death, which were only those +of the understanding and not of the affection; so immortal and incorruptible +a thing did knowledge seem unto them to be. But we, that know +by divine revelation that not only the understanding but the affections +purified, not only the spirit but the body changed, shall be advanced +to immortality, do disclaim in these rudiments of the senses. +But it must be remembered, both in this last point, and so it may likewise +be needful in other places, that in probation of the dignity of knowledge +or learning, I did in the beginning separate divine testimony from human, +which method I have pursued, and so handled them both apart.<br> +<br> +(7) Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know it will be impossible +for me, by any pleading of mine, to reverse the judgment, either of +Æsop’s cock, that preferred the barleycorn before the gem; +or of Midas, that being chosen judge between Apollo, president of the +Muses, and Pan, god of the flocks, judged for plenty; or of Paris, that +judged for beauty and love against wisdom and power; or of Agrippina, +<i>occidat matrem, modo imperet</i>, that preferred empire with any +condition never so detestable; or of Ulysses, <i>qui vetulam prætulit +immortalitati</i>,<i> </i>being a figure of those which prefer custom +and habit before all excellency, or of a number of the like popular +judgments. For these things must continue as they have been; but +so will that also continue whereupon learning hath ever relied, and +which faileth not: <i>Justificata est sapientia a filiis suis</i>.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +THE SECOND BOOK.<br> +<i>To the King.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +</i>1. It might seem to have more convenience, though it come +often otherwise to pass (excellent King), that those which are fruitful +in their generations, and have in themselves the foresight of immortality +in their descendants, should likewise be more careful of the good estate +of future times, unto which they know they must transmit and commend +over their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was a sojourner in +the world in respect of her unmarried life, and was a blessing to her +own times; and yet so as the impression of her good government, besides +her happy memory, is not without some effect which doth survive her. +But to your Majesty, whom God hath already blessed with so much royal +issue, worthy to continue and represent you for ever, and whose youthful +and fruitful bed doth yet promise many the like renovations, it is proper +and agreeable to be conversant not only in the transitory parts of good +government, but in those acts also which are in their nature permanent +and perpetual. Amongst the which (if affection do not transport +me) there is not any more worthy than the further endowment of the world +with sound and fruitful knowledge. For why should a few received +authors stand up like Hercules’ columns, beyond which there should +be no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star +as your Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return therefore +where we left, it remaineth to consider of what kind those acts are +which have been undertaken and performed by kings and others for the +increase and advancement of learning, wherein I purpose to speak actively, +without digressing or dilating.<br> +<br> +2. Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are over +common by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the +conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth endeavour, the second +preventeth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man. +But the principal of these is direction, for <i>claudus in via antevertit +cursorem extra viam</i>;<i> </i>and Solomon excellently setteth it down, +“If the iron be not sharp, it requireth more strength, but wisdom +is that which prevaileth,” signifying that the invention or election +of the mean is more effectual than any enforcement or accumulation of +endeavours. This I am induced to speak, for that (not derogating +from the noble intention of any that have been deservers towards the +state of learning), I do observe nevertheless that their works and acts +are rather matters of magnificence and memory than of progression and +proficience, and tend rather to augment the mass of learning in the +multitude of learned men than to rectify or raise the sciences themselves.<br> +<br> +3. The works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant +about three objects - the places of learning, the books of learning, +and the persons of the learned. For as water, whether it be the +dew of heaven or the springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese itself +in the ground, except it be collected into some receptacle where it +may by union comfort and sustain itself; and for that cause the industry +of man hath made and framed springheads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, +which men have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with accomplishments +of magnificence and state, as well as of use and necessity; so this +excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from divine inspiration, +or spring from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to oblivion, +if it were not preserved in books, traditions, conferences, and places +appointed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for the receipt and +comforting of the same.<br> +<br> +4. The works which concern the seats and places of learning are +four - foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments +with franchises and privileges, institutions and ordinances for government +- all tending to quietness and privateness of life, and discharge of +cares and troubles; much like the stations which Virgil prescribeth +for the hiving of bees:<br> +<br> +<br> +“Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda,<br> +Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c.”<br> +<br> +<br> +5. The works touching books are two - first, libraries, which +are as the shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints, full +of true virtue, and that without delusion or imposture, are preserved +and reposed; secondly, new editions of authors, with more correct impressions, +more faithful translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent annotations, +and the like.<br> +<br> +6. The works pertaining to the persons of learned men (besides +the advancement and countenancing of them in general) are two - the +reward and designation of readers in sciences already extant and invented; +and the reward and designation of writers and inquirers concerning any +parts of learning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.<br> +<br> +7. These are summarily the works and acts wherein the merits of +many excellent princes and other worthy personages, have been conversant. +As for any particular commemorations, I call to mind what Cicero said +when he gave general thanks, <i>Difficile non aliquem, ingratum quenquam +præterire</i>. Let us rather, according to the Scriptures, +look unto that part of the race which is before us, than look back to +that which is already attained.<br> +<br> +8. First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations of colleges +in Europe, I find strange that they are all dedicated to professions, +and none left free to arts and sciences at large. For if men judge +that learning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in +this they fall into the error described in the ancient fable, in which +the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because +it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, +as the head doth; but yet notwithstanding it is the stomach that digesteth +and distributeth to all the rest. So if any man think philosophy +and universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions +are from thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a great +cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because these +fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if +you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is +not anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the +earth and putting new mould about thee roots that must work it. +Neither is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating of foundations and +dotations to professory learning hath not only had a malign aspect and +influence upon the growth of sciences, but hath also been prejudicial +to states, and governments. For hence it proceedeth that princes +find a solitude in regard of able men to serve them in causes of estate, +because there is no education collegiate which is free, where such as +were so disposed might give themselves in histories, modern languages, +books of policy and civil discourse, and other the like enablements +unto service of estate.<br> +<br> +9. And because founders of colleges do plant, and founders of +lectures do water, it followeth well in order to speak of the defect +which is in public lectures; namely, in the smallness, and meanness +of the salary or reward which in most places is assigned unto them, +whether they be lectures of arts, or of professions. For it is +necessary to the progression of sciences that readers be of the most +able and sufficient men; as those which are ordained for generating +and propagating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This +cannot be, except their condition and endowment be such as may content +the ablest man to appropriate his whole labour and continue his whole +age in that function and attendance; and therefore must have a proportion +answerable to that mediocrity or competency of advancement, which may +be expected from a profession or the practice of a profession. +So as, if you will have sciences flourish, you must observe David’s +military law, which was, “That those which stayed with the carriage +should have equal part with those which were in the action;” else +will the carriages be ill attended. So readers in sciences are +indeed the guardians of the stores and provisions of sciences, whence +men in active courses are furnished, and therefore ought to have equal +entertainment with them; otherwise if the fathers in sciences be of +the weakest sort or be ill maintained,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati.”<br> +<br> +<br> +10. Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some alchemist +to help me, who call upon men to sell their books, and to build furnaces; +quitting and forsaking Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins, and +relying upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that unto the deep, fruitful, +and operative study of many sciences, specialty natural philosophy and +physic, books be not only the instrumentals; wherein also the beneficence +of men hath not been altogether wanting. For we see spheres, globes, +astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided as appurtenances +to astronomy and cosmography, as well as books. We see likewise +that some places instituted for physic have annexed the commodity of +gardens for simples of all sorts, and do likewise command the use of +dead bodies for anatomies. But these do respect but a few things. +In general, there will hardly be any main proficience in the disclosing +of nature, except there be some allowance for expenses about experiments; +whether they be experiments appertaining to Vulcanus or Dædalus, +furnace or engine, or any other kind. And therefore as secretaries +and spials of princes and states bring in bills for intelligence, so +you must allow the spials and intelligencers of nature to bring in their +bills; or else you shall be ill advertised.<br> +<br> +11. And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to Aristotle +of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the +like, that he might compile a history of nature, much better do they +deserve it that travail in arts of nature.<br> +<br> +12. Another defect which I note is an intermission or neglect +in those which are governors in universities, of consultation, and in +princes or superior persons, of visitation: to enter into account and +consideration, whether the readings, exercises, and other customs appertaining +unto learning, anciently begun and since continued, be well instituted +or no; and thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation in that which +shall be found inconvenient. For it is one of your Majesty’s +own most wise and princely maxims, “That in all usages and precedents, +the times be considered wherein they first began; which if they were +weak or ignorant, it derogateth from the authority of the usage, and +leaveth it for suspect.” And therefore inasmuch as most +of the usages and orders of the universities were derived from more +obscure times, it is the more requisite they be re-examined. In +this kind I will give an instance or two, for example sake, of things +that are the most obvious and familiar. The one is a matter, which +though it be ancient and general, yet I hold to be an error; which is, +that scholars in universities come too soon and too unripe to logic +and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children and novices. +For these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences, being the +arts of arts; the one for judgment, the other for ornament. And +they be the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose matter: +and therefore for minds empty and unfraught with matter, and which have +not gathered that which Cicero calleth <i>sylva</i> and <i>supellex</i>, +stuff and variety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn +to weigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind) doth work but this effect, +that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and universal, is almost +made contemptible, and is degenerate into childish sophistry and ridiculous +affectation. And further, the untimely learning of them hath drawn +on by consequence the superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing +of them, as fitteth indeed to the capacity of children. Another +is a lack I find in the exercises used in the universities, which do +snake too great a divorce between invention and memory. For their +speeches are either premeditate, in <i>verbis conceptis</i>, where nothing +is left to invention, or merely extemporal, where little is left to +memory. Whereas in life and action there is least use of either +of these, but rather of intermixtures of premeditation and invention, +notes and memory. So as the exercise fitteth not the practice, +nor the image the life; and it is ever a true rule in exercises, that +they be framed as near as may be to the life of practice; for otherwise +they do pervert the motions and faculties of the mind, and not prepare +them. The truth whereof is not obscure, when scholars come to +the practices of professions, or other actions of civil life; which +when they set into, this want is soon found by themselves, and sooner +by others. But this part, touching the amendment of the institutions +and orders of universities, I will conclude with the clause of Cæsar’s +letter to Oppius and Balbes, <i>Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit, nonnulla +mihi in mentem veniunt, et multa reperiri possunt: de iis rebus rgo +vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis</i>.<br> +<br> +13. Another defect which I note ascendeth a little higher than +the precedent. For as the proficience of learning consisteth much +in the orders and institutions of universities in the same states and +kingdoms, so it would be yet more advanced, if there were more intelligence +mutual between the universities of Europe than now there is. We +see there be many orders and foundations, which though they be divided +under several sovereignties and territories, yet they take themselves +to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and correspondence one with +the other, insomuch as they have provincials and generals. And +surely as nature createth brotherhood in families, and arts mechanical +contract brotherhoods in communalties, and the anointment of God superinduceth +a brotherhood in kings and bishops, so in like manner there cannot but +be a fraternity in learning and illumination, relating to that paternity +which is attributed to God, who is called the Father of illuminations +or lights.<br> +<br> +14. The last defect which I will note is, that there hath not +been, or very rarely been, any public designation of writers or inquirers +concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been already +sufficiently laboured or undertaken; unto which point it is an inducement +to enter into a view and examination what parts of learning have been +prosecuted, and what omitted. For the opinion of plenty is amongst +the causes of want, and the great quantity of books maketh a show rather +of superfluity than lack; which surcharge nevertheless is not to be +remedied by making no more books, but by making more good books, which, +as the serpent of Moses, might devour the serpents of the enchanters.<br> +<br> +15. The removing of all the defects formerly enumerate, except +the last, and of the active part also of the last (which is the designation +of writers), are <i>opera basilica</i>;<i> </i>towards which the endeavours +of a private man may be but as an image in a crossway, that may point +at the way, but cannot go it. But the inducing part of the latter +(which is the survey of learning) may be set forward by private travail. +Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation +of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, +and not improved and converted by the industry of man, to the end that +such a plot made and recorded to memory may both minister light to any +public designation, and, also serve to excite voluntary endeavours. +Wherein, nevertheless, my purpose is at this time to note only omissions +and deficiences, and not to make any redargution of errors or incomplete +prosecutions. For it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth +unmanured, and another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which +is manured.<br> +<br> +In the handling and undertaking of which work I am not ignorant what +it is that I do now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine own weakness +to sustain my purpose. But my hope is, that if my extreme love +to learning carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of affection; +for that “It is not granted to man to love and to be wise.” +But I know well I can use no other liberty of judgment than I must leave +to others; and I for my part shall be indifferently glad either to perform +myself, or accept from another, that duty of humanity - <i>Nam qui erranti +comiter monstrat viam</i>, &c. I do foresee likewise that +of those things which I shall enter and register as deficiences and +omissions, many will conceive and censure that some of them are already +done and extant; others to be but curiosities, and things of no great +use; and others to be of too great difficulty, and almost impossibility +to be compassed and effected. But for the two first, I refer myself +to the particulars. For the last, touching impossibility, I take +it those things are to be held possible which may be done by some person, +though not by every one; and which may be done by many, though not by +any one; and which may be done in the succession of ages, though not +within the hourglass of one man’s life; and which may be done +by public designation, though not by private endeavour. But, notwithstanding, +if any man will take to himself rather that of Solomon, “<i>Dicit +piger, Leo est in via</i>,” than that of Virgil, “<i>Possunt +quia posse videntur</i>,”<i> </i>I shall be content that my labours +be esteemed but as the better sort of wishes; for as it asketh some +knowledge to demand a question not impertinent, so it requireth some +sense to make a wish not absurd.<br> +<br> +I. (1) The parts of human learning have reference to the three parts +of man’s understanding, which is the seat of learning: history +to his memory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason. +Divine learning receiveth the same distribution; for, the spirit of +man is the same, though the revelation of oracle and sense be diverse. +So as theology consisteth also of history of the Church; of parables, +which is divine poesy; and of holy doctrine or precept. For as +for that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy, it is +but divine history, which hath that prerogative over human, as the narration +may be before the fact as well as after.<br> +<br> +(2) History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary; whereof +the first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. +For no man hath propounded to himself the general state of learning +to be described and represented from age to age, as many have done the +works of Nature, and the state, civil and ecclesiastical; without which +the history of the world seemeth to me to be as the statue of Polyphemus +with his eye out, that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit +and life of the person. And yet I am not ignorant that in divers +particular sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, the +rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some small memorials +of the schools, authors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations +touching the invention of arts or usages. But a just story of +learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges and +their sects, their inventions, their traditions, their diverse administrations +and managings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, +oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of them, and all other +events concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may +truly affirm to be wanting; the use and end of which work I do not so +much design for curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the lovers +of learning, but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which +is this in few words, that it will make learned men wise in the use +and administration of learning. For it is not Saint Augustine’s +nor Saint Ambrose’s works that will make so wise a divine as ecclesiastical +history thoroughly read and observed, and the same reason is of learning.<br> +<br> +(3) History of Nature is of three sorts; of Nature in course, of Nature +erring or varying, and of Nature altered or wrought; that is, history +of creatures, history of marvels, and history of arts. The first +of these no doubt is extant, and that in good perfection; the two latter +are bandied so weakly and unprofitably as I am moved to note them as +deficient. For I find no sufficient or competent collection of +the works of Nature which have a digression and deflexion from the ordinary +course of generations, productions, and motions; whether they be singularities +of place and region, or the strange events of time and chance, or the +effects of yet unknown properties, or the instances of exception to +general kinds. It is true I find a number of books of fabulous +experiments and secrets, and frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness; +but a substantial and severe collection of the heteroclites or irregulars +of Nature, well examined and described, I find not, specially not with +due rejection of fables and popular errors. For as things now +are, if an untruth in Nature be once on foot, what by reason of the +neglect of examination, and countenance of antiquity, and what by reason +of the use of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of speech, it +is never called down.<br> +<br> +(4) The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in Aristotle, is +nothing less than to give contentment to the appetite of curious and +vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries is to do; but for two reasons, +both of great weight: the one to correct the partiality of axioms and +opinions, which are commonly framed only upon common and familiar examples; +the other because from the wonders of Nature is the nearest intelligence +and passage towards the wonders of art, for it is no more but by following +and, as it were, hounding Nature in her wanderings, to be able to lead +her afterwards to the same place again. Neither am I of opinion, +in this history of marvels, that superstitious narrations of sorceries, +witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance +and clear evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it +is not yet known in what cases and how far effects attributed to superstition +do participate of natural causes; and, therefore, howsoever the practice +of such things is to be condemned, yet from the speculation and consideration +of them light may be taken, not only for the discerning of the offences, +but for the further disclosing of Nature. Neither ought a man +to make scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of truth, +as your Majesty hath showed in your own example, who, with the two clear +eyes of religion and natural philosophy, have looked deeply and wisely +into these shadows, and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of the +sun, which passeth through pollutions and itself remains as pure as +before. But this I hold fit, that these narrations, which have +mixture with superstition, be sorted by themselves, and not to be mingled +with the narrations which are merely and sincerely natural. But +as for the narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, +they are either not true or not natural; and, therefore, impertinent +for the story of Nature.<br> +<br> +(5) For history of Nature, wrought or mechanical, I find some collections +made of agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but commonly with +a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar; for it is esteemed a +kind of dishonour unto learning to descend to inquiry or meditation +upon matters mechanical, except they be such as may be thought secrets, +rarities, and special subtleties; which humour of vain and supercilious +arrogancy is justly derided in Plato, where he brings in Hippias, a +vaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates, a true and unfeigned inquisitor +of truth; where, the subject being touching beauty, Socrates, after +his wandering manner of inductions, put first an example of a fair virgin, +and then of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat +Hippias was offended, and said, “More than for courtesy’s +sake, he did think much to dispute with any that did allege such base +and sordid instances.” Whereunto Socrates answereth, “You +have reason, and it becomes you well, being a man so trim in your vestments,” +&c., and so goeth on in an irony. But the truth is, they be +not the highest instances that give the securest information, as may +be well expressed in the tale so common of the philosopher that, while +he gazed upwards to the stars, fell into the water; for if he had looked +down he might have seen the stars in the water, but looking aloft he +could not see the water in the stars. So it cometh often to pass +that mean and small things discover great, better than great can discover +the small; and therefore Aristotle noteth well, “That the nature +of everything is best seen in his smallest portions.” And +for that cause he inquireth the nature of a commonwealth, first in a +family, and the simple conjugations of man and wife, parent and child, +master and servant, which are in every cottage. Even so likewise +the nature of this great city of the world, and the policy thereof, +must be first sought in mean concordances and small portions. +So we see how that secret of Nature, of the turning of iron touched +with the loadstone towards the north, was found out in needles of iron, +not in bars of iron.<br> +<br> +(6) But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of history mechanical +is of all others the most radical and fundamental towards natural philosophy; +such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of subtle, sublime, +or delectable speculation, but such as shall be operative to the endowment +and benefit of man’s life. For it will not only minister +and suggest for the present many ingenious practices in all trades, +by a connection and transferring of the observations of one art to the +use of another, when the experiences of several mysteries shall fall +under the consideration of one man’s mind; but further, it will +give a more true and real illumination concerning causes and axioms +than is hitherto attained. For like as a man’s disposition +is never well known till he be crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes +till he was straitened and held fast; so the passages and variations +of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty of nature as in the +trials and vexations of art.<br> +<br> +II. (1) For civil history, it is of three kinds; not unfitly to be compared +with the three kinds of pictures or images. For of pictures or +images we see some are unfinished, some are perfect, and some are defaced. +So of histories we may find three kinds: memorials, perfect histories, +and antiquities; for memorials are history unfinished, or the first +or rough drafts of history; and antiquities are history defaced, or +some remnants of history which have casually escaped the shipwreck of +time.<br> +<br> +(2) Memorials, or preparatory history, are of two sorts; whereof the +one may be termed commentaries, and the other registers. Commentaries +are they which set down a continuance of the naked events and actions, +without the motives or designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, +the occasions, and other passages of action. For this is the true +nature of a commentary (though Cæsar, in modesty mixed with greatness, +did for his pleasure apply the name of a commentary to the best history +of the world). Registers are collections of public acts, as decrees +of council, judicial proceedings, declarations and letters of estate, +orations, and the like, without a perfect continuance or contexture +of the thread of the narration.<br> +<br> +(3) Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said, <i>tanquam +tabula naufragii</i>: when industrious persons, by an exact and scrupulous +diligence and observation, out of monuments, names, words, proverbs, +traditions, private records and evidences, fragments of stories, passages +of books that concern not story, and the like, do save and recover somewhat +from the deluge of time.<br> +<br> +(4) In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no deficience, +for they are <i>tanquam imperfecte mista</i>; and therefore any deficience +in them is but their nature. As for the corruptions and moths +of history, which are epitomes, the use of them deserveth to be banished, +as all men of sound judgment have confessed, as those that have fretted +and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent histories, and wrought +them into base and unprofitable dregs.<br> +<br> +(5) History, which may be called just and perfect history, is of three +kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth, or pretendeth to +represent: for it either representeth a time, or a person, or an action. +The first we call chronicles, the second lives, and the third narrations +or relations. Of these, although the first be the most complete +and absolute kind of history, and hath most estimation and glory, yet +the second excelleth it in profit and use, and the third in verity and +sincerity. For history of times representeth the magnitude of +actions, and the public faces and deportments of persons, and passeth +over in silence the smaller passages and motions of men and matters. +But such being the workmanship of God, as He doth hang the greatest +weight upon the smallest wires, <i>maxima è minimis, suspendens</i>, +it comes therefore to pass, that such histories do rather set forth +the pomp of business than the true and inward resorts thereof. +But lives, if they be well written, propounding to themselves a person +to represent, in whom actions, both greater and smaller, public and +private, have a commixture, must of necessity contain a more true, native, +and lively representation. So again narrations and relations of +actions, as the war of Peloponnesus, the expedition of Cyrus Minor, +the conspiracy of Catiline, cannot but be more purely and exactly true +than histories of times, because they may choose an argument comprehensible +within the notice and instructions of the writer: whereas he that undertaketh +the story of a time, specially of any length, cannot but meet with many +blanks and spaces, which he must be forced to fill up out of his own +wit and conjecture.<br> +<br> +(6) For the history of times, I mean of civil history, the providence +of God hath made the distribution. For it hath pleased God to +ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the world for arms, learning, +moral virtue, policy, and laws; the state of Græcia and the state +of Rome; the histories whereof occupying the middle part of time, have +more ancient to them histories which may by one common name be termed +the antiquities of the world; and after them, histories which may be +likewise called by the name of modern history.<br> +<br> +(7) Now to speak of the deficiences. As to the heathen antiquities +of the world it is in vain to note them for deficient. Deficient +they are no doubt, consisting most of fables and fragments; but the +deficience cannot be holpen; for antiquity is like fame, <i>caput inter +nubila condit</i>,<i> </i>her head is muffled from our sight. +For the history of the exemplar states, it is extant in good perfection. +Not but I could wish there were a perfect course of history for Græcia, +from Theseus to Philopœmen (what time the affairs of Græcia +drowned and extinguished in the affairs of Rome), and for Rome from +Romulus to Justinianus, who may be truly said to be <i>ultimus Romanorum</i>. +In which sequences of story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon in the +one, and the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Cæsar, Appianus, +Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire, without any diminution +at all, and only to be supplied and continued. But this is a matter +of magnificence, rather to be commended than required; and we speak +now of parts of learning supplemental, and not of supererogation.<br> +<br> +(8) But for modern histories, whereof there are some few very worthy, +but the greater part beneath mediocrity, leaving the care of foreign +stories to foreign states, because I will not be <i>curiosus in aliena +republica</i>,<i> </i>I cannot fail to represent to your Majesty the +unworthiness of the history of England in the main continuance thereof, +and the partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland in the latest and +largest author that I have seen: supposing that it would be honour for +your Majesty, and a work very memorable, if this island of Great Britain, +as it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to come, so were joined +in one history for the times passed, after the manner of the sacred +history, which draweth down the story of the ten tribes and of the two +tribes as twins together. And if it shall seem that the greatness +of this work may make it less exactly performed, there is an excellent +period of a much smaller compass of time, as to the story of England; +that is to say, from the uniting of the Roses to the uniting of the +kingdoms; a portion of time wherein, to my understanding, there hath +been the rarest varieties that in like number of successions of any +hereditary monarchy hath been known. For it beginneth with the +mixed adoption of a crown by arms and title; an entry by battle, an +establishment by marriage; and therefore times answerable, like waters +after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though without extremity +of storm; but well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, being +one of the most sufficient kings of all the number. Then followeth +the reign of a king, whose actions, howsoever conducted, had much intermixture +with the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining them variably; in +whose time also began that great alteration in the state ecclesiastical, +an action which seldom cometh upon the stage. Then the reign of +a minor; then an offer of a usurpation (though it was but as <i>febris</i> +<i>ephemera</i>). Then the reign of a queen matched with a foreigner; +then of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet her government +so masculine, as it had greater impression and operation upon the states +abroad than it any ways received from thence. And now last, this +most happy and glorious event, that this island of Britain, divided +from all the world, should be united in itself, and that oracle of rest +given to ÆNeas, <i>antiquam exquirite matrem</i>,<i> </i>should +now be performed and fulfilled upon the nations of England and Scotland, +being now reunited in the ancient mother name of Britain, as a full +period of all instability and peregrinations. So that as it cometh +to pass in massive bodies, that they have certain trepidations and waverings +before they fix and settle, so it seemeth that by the providence of +God this monarchy, before it was to settle in your majesty and your +generations (in which I hope it is now established for ever), it had +these prelusive changes and varieties.<br> +<br> +(9) For lives, I do find strange that these times have so little esteemed +the virtues of the times, as that the writings of lives should be no +more frequent. For although there be not many sovereign princes +or absolute commanders, and that states are most collected into monarchies, +yet are there many worthy personages that deserve better than dispersed +report or barren eulogies. For herein the invention of one of +the late poets is proper, and doth well enrich the ancient fiction. +For he feigneth that at the end of the thread or web of every man’s +life there was a little medal containing the person’s name, and +that Time waited upon the shears, and as soon as the thread was cut +caught the medals, and carried them to the river of Lathe; and about +the bank there were many birds flying up and down, that would get the +medals and carry them in their beak a little while, and then let them +fall into the river. Only there were a few swans, which if they +got a name would carry it to a temple where it was consecrate. +And although many men, more mortal in their affections than in their +bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and ventosity,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Animi nil magnæ laudis egentes;”<br> +<br> +<br> +which opinion cometh from that root, <i>Non prius laudes contempsimus, +quam laudanda facere desivimus</i>: yet that will not alter Solomon’s +judgment, <i>Memoria justi cum laudibus, at impiorum nomen putrescet</i>: +the one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion, +or turneth to an ill odour. And therefore in that style or addition, +which is and hath been long well received and brought in use, <i>felicis +memoriæ, piæ memoriæ, bonæ memoriæ</i>,<i> +</i>we do acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes, +that <i>bona fama propria possessio defunctorum</i>; which possession +I cannot but note that in our times it lieth much waste, and that therein +there is a deficience.<br> +<br> +(10) For narrations and relations of particular actions, there were +also to be wished a greater diligence therein; for there is no great +action but hath some good pen which attends it. And because it +is an ability not common to write a good history, as may well appear +by the small number of them; yet if particularity of actions memorable +were but tolerably reported as they pass, the compiling of a complete +history of times might be the better expected, when a writer should +arise that were fit for it: for the collection of such relations might +be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant a fair and stately garden when +time should serve.<br> +<br> +(11) There is yet another partition of history which Cornelius Tacitus +maketh, which is not to be forgotten, specially with that application +which he accoupleth it withal, annals and journals: appropriating to +the former matters of estate, and to the latter acts and accidents of +a meaner nature. For giving but a touch of certain magnificent +buildings, he addeth, <i>Cum ex dignitate populi Romani repertum sit, +res illustres annalibus, talia diurnis urbis actis mandare</i>. +So as there is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well as civil. +And as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state more than confusion +of degrees, so it doth not a little imbase the authority of a history +to intermingle matters of triumph, or matters of ceremony, or matters +of novelty, with matters of state. But the use of a journal hath +not only been in the history of time, but likewise in the history of +persons, and chiefly of actions; for princes in ancient time had, upon +point of honour and policy both, journals kept, what passed day by day. +For we see the chronicle which was read before Ahasuerus, when he could +not take rest, contained matter of affairs, indeed, but such as had +passed in his own time and very lately before. But the journal +of Alexander’s house expressed every small particularity, even +concerning his person and court; and it is yet a use well received in +enterprises memorable, as expeditions of war, navigations, and the like, +to keep diaries of that which passeth continually.<br> +<br> +(12) I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which some grave +and wise men have used, containing a scattered history of those actions +which they have thought worthy of memory, with politic discourse and +observation thereupon: not incorporate into the history, but separately, +and as the more principal in their intention; which kind of ruminated +history I think more fit to place amongst books of policy, whereof we +shall hereafter speak, than amongst books of history. For it is +the true office of history to represent the events themselves together +with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon +to the liberty and faculty of every man’s judgment. But +mixtures are things irregular, whereof no man can define.<br> +<br> +(13) So also is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed, and +that is history of cosmography: being compounded of natural history, +in respect of the regions themselves; of history civil, in respect of +the habitations, regiments, and manners of the people; and the mathematics, +in respect of the climates and configurations towards the heavens: which +part of learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained most +proficience. For it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these +times, and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great building +of the world had never through-lights made in it, till the age of us +and our fathers. For although they had knowledge of the antipodes,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis,<br> +Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper,”<br> +<br> +<br> +yet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by travel, +it requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But to circle the +earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not done nor enterprised till +these later times: and therefore these times may justly bear in their +word, not only <i>plus ultra</i>, in precedence of the ancient <i>non +ultra</i>,<i> </i>and <i>imitabile fulmen</i>,<i> </i>in precedence +of the ancient <i>non imitabile fulmen</i>,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen,” &c.<br> +<br> +<br> +but likewise <i>imitabile cælum</i>; in respect of the many memorable +voyages after the manner of heaven about the globe of the earth.<br> +<br> +(14) And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant also +an expectation of the further proficience and augmentation of all sciences; +because it may seem they are ordained by God to be coevals, that is, +to meet in one age. For so the prophet Daniel speaking of the +latter times foretelleth, <i>Plurimi pertransibunt, et multiplex erit +scientia</i>:<i> </i>as if the openness and through-passage of the world +and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same ages; +as we see it is already performed in great part: the learning of these +later times not much giving place to the former two periods or returns +of learning, the one of the Grecians, the other of the Romans.<br> +<br> +III. (1) History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with history +civil: but further in the propriety thereof may be divided into the +history of the Church, by a general name; history of prophecy; and history +of providence. The first describeth the times of the militant +Church, whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah, or movable, as +the ark in the wilderness, or at rest, as the ark in the Temple: that +is, the state of the Church in persecution, in remove, and in peace. +This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient; only I would that +the virtue and sincerity of it were according to the mass and quantity. +But I am not now in hand with censures, but with omissions.<br> +<br> +(2) The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of two relatives +- the prophecy and the accomplishment; and, therefore, the nature of +such a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the Scripture be sorted +with the event fulfilling the same throughout the ages of the world, +both for the better confirmation of faith and for the better illumination +of the Church touching those parts of prophecies which are yet unfulfilled: +allowing, nevertheless, that latitude which is agreeable and familiar +unto divine prophecies, being of the nature of their Author, with whom +a thousand years are but as one day, and therefore are not fulfilled +punctually at once, but have springing and germinant accomplishment +throughout many ages, though the height or fulness of them may refer +to some one age. This is a work which I find deficient, but is +to be done with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.<br> +<br> +(3) The third, which is history of Providence, containeth that excellent +correspondence which is between God’s revealed will and His secret +will; which though it be so obscure, as for the most part it is not +legible to the natural man - no, nor many times to those that behold +it from the tabernacle - yet, at some times it pleaseth God, for our +better establishment and the confuting of those which are as without +God in the world, to write it in such text and capital letters, that, +as the prophet saith, “He that runneth by may read it” - +that is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God’s judgments, +and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are nevertheless +in their passage and race urged to discern it. Such are the notable +events and examples of God’s judgments, chastisements, deliverances, +and blessings; and this is a work which has passed through the labour +of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted.<br> +<br> +(4) There are also other parts of learning which are appendices to history. +For all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words and deeds, +whereof history doth properly receive and retain in memory the deeds; +and if words, yet but as inducements and passages to deeds; so are there +other books and writings which are appropriate to the custody and receipt +of words only, which likewise are of three sorts - orations, letters, +and brief speeches or sayings. Orations are pleadings, speeches +of counsel, laudatives, invectives, apologies, reprehensions, orations +of formality or ceremony, and the like. Letters are according +to all the variety of occasions, advertisements, advises, directions, +propositions, petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, +of compliment, of pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of +action. And such as are written from wise men, are of all the +words of man, in my judgment, the best; for they are more natural than +orations and public speeches, and more advised than conferences or present +speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as manage them, +or are privy to them, are of all others the best instructions for history, +and to a diligent reader the best histories in themselves. For +apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book of Cæsar’s; +for as his history, and those few letters of his which we have, and +those apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men’s else, +so I suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done; for as for +those which are collected by others, either I have no taste in such +matters or else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these +three kinds of writings I do not insist, because I have no deficiences +to propound concerning them.<br> +<br> +(5) Thus much therefore concerning history, which is that part of learning +which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices of the mind +of man, which is that of the memory.<br> +<br> +IV. (1) Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words, for the most +part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth +truly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of +matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever +that which nature hath joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces +of things - <i>Pictoribus atque poetis</i>, &c. It is taken +in two senses in respect of words or matter. In the first sense, +it is but a character of style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and +is not pertinent for the present. In the latter, it is - as hath +been said - one of the principal portions of learning, and is nothing +else but feigned history, which may be styled as well in prose as in +verse.<br> +<br> +(2) The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of +satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of +things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the soul; +by reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample +greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than +can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts +or events of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the +mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical. +Because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions +not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns +them more just in retribution, and more according to revealed Providence. +Because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and +less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and +more unexpected and alternative variations. So as it appeareth +that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality and to delectation. +And therefore, it was ever thought to have some participation of divineness, +because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of +things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow +the mind unto the nature of things. And we see that by these insinuations +and congruities with man’s nature and pleasure, joined also with +the agreement and consort it hath with music, it hath had access and +estimation in rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning +stood excluded.<br> +<br> +(3) The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof (besides +those divisions which are common unto it with history, as feigned chronicles, +feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as feigned epistles, feigned +orations, and the rest) is into poesy narrative, representative, and +allusive. The narrative is a mere imitation of history, with the +excesses before remembered, choosing for subjects commonly wars and +love, rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or mirth. Representative +is as a visible history, and is an image of actions as if they were +present, as history is of actions in nature as they are (that is) past. +Allusive, or parabolical, is a narration applied only to express some +special purpose or conceit; which latter kind of parabolical wisdom +was much more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of Æsop, +and the brief sentences of the seven, and the use of hieroglyphics may +appear. And the cause was (for that it was then of necessity to +express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtle than the +vulgar in that manner) because men in those times wanted both variety +of examples and subtlety of conceit. And as hieroglyphics were +before letters, so parables were before arguments; and nevertheless +now and at all times they do retain much life and rigour, because reason +cannot be so sensible nor examples so fit.<br> +<br> +(4) But there remaineth yet another use of poesy parabolical, opposite +to that which we last mentioned; for that tendeth to demonstrate and +illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and this other to retire +and obscure it - that is, when the secrets and mysteries of religion, +policy, or philosophy, are involved in fables or parables. Of +this in divine poesy we see the use is authorised. In heathen +poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great +felicity: as in the fable that the giants being overthrown in their +war against the gods, the earth their mother in revenge thereof brought +forth Fame:<br> +<br> +<br> +“Illam terra parens, ira irritat Deorum,<br> +Extremam, ut perhibent, Cœo Enceladoque soroem,<br> +Progenuit.”<br> +<br> +<br> +Expounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and +open rebels, then the malignity of people (which is the mother of rebellion) +doth bring forth libels and slanders, and taxations of the states, which +is of the same kind with rebellion but more feminine. So in the +fable that the rest of the gods having conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas +called Briareus with his hundred hands to his aid: expounded that monarchies +need not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, +as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the people, who will be +sure to come in on their side. So in the fable that Achilles was +brought up under Chiron, the centaur, who was part a man and part a +beast, expounded ingeniously but corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth +to the education and discipline of princes to know as well how to play +the part of a lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the man +in virtue and justice. Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, +I do rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition devised, +than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed; for I +find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself with +great contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions +of the ancient poets; but yet that all the fables and fictions of the +poets were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. +Surely of these poets which are now extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding +he was made a kind of scripture by the later schools of the Grecians), +yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no +such inwardness in his own meaning. But what they might have upon +a more original tradition is not easy to affirm, for he was not the +inventor of many of them.<br> +<br> +(5) In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no +deficience; for being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the earth, +without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than +any other kind. But to ascribe unto it that which is due, for +the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we +are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers’ works; and +for wit and eloquence, not much less than to orators’ harangues. +But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let us now +pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to +approach and view with more reverence and attention.<br> +<br> +V. (1) The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from above, +and some springing from beneath: the one informed by the light of nature, +the other inspired by divine revelation. The light of nature consisteth +in the notions of the mind and the reports of the senses; for as for +knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not +original, as in a water that besides his own spring-head is fed with +other springs and streams. So then, according to these two differing +illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of all divided into divinity +and philosophy.<br> +<br> +(2) In philosophy the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto +God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon +himself. Out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges +- divine philosophy, natural philosophy, and human philosophy or humanity. +For all things are marked and stamped with this triple character - the +power of God, the difference of nature and the use of man. But +because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several +lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like +branches of a tree that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity +of entireness and continuance before it come to discontinue and break +itself into arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into +the former distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, +by the name of <i>philosophia prima</i>,<i> </i>primitive or summary +philosophy, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways +part and divide themselves; which science whether I should report as +deficient or no, I stand doubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody +of natural theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that part +of natural philosophy which concerneth the principles, and of that other +part of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit - all +these strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth +to me rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto +some height of terms, than anything solid or substantive of itself. +Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, +that the same things are handled but in several respects. As for +example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in notion, +and this philosophy as they are in nature - the one in appearance, the +other in existence; but I find this difference better made than pursued. +For if they had considered quantity, similitude, diversity, and the +rest of those extern characters of things, as philosophers, and in nature, +their inquiries must of force have been of a far other kind than they +are. For doth any of them, in handling quantity, speak of the +force of union, how and how far it multiplieth virtue? Doth any +give the reason why some things in nature are so common, and in so great +mass, and others so rare, and in so small quantity? Doth any, +in handling similitude and diversity, assign the cause why iron should +not move to iron, which is more like, but move to the loadstone, which +is less like? Why in all diversities of things there should be +certain participles in nature which are almost ambiguous to which kind +they should be referred? But there is a mere and deep silence +touching the nature and operation of those common adjuncts of things, +as in nature; and only a resuming and repeating of the force and use +of them in speech or argument. Therefore, because in a writing +of this nature I avoid all subtlety, my meaning touching this original +or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by +negative: “That it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations +and axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts +of philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage.”<br> +<br> +(3) Now that there are many of that kind need not be doubted. +For example: Is not the rule, <i>Si inœqualibus æqualia +addas, omnia erunt inæqualia</i>,<i> </i>an axiom as well of justice +as of the mathematics? and is there not a true coincidence between commutative +and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? +Is not that other rule, <i>Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, et +inter se conveniunt</i>, a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent +in logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the observation, +<i>Omnia mutantur, nil interit</i>, a contemplation in philosophy thus, +that the <i>quantum </i>of nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, +that it requireth the same omnipotency to make somewhat nothing, which +at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, <i>Didici +quod omnia opera, quœ fecit Deus, perseverent in perpetuum; non +possumus eis quicquam addere nec auferre</i>. Is not the ground, +which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth concerning governments, +that the way to establish and preserve them is to reduce them <i>ad +principia</i> - a rule in religion and nature, as well as in civil administration? +Was not the Persian magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles +and architectures of nature to the rules and policy of governments? +Is not the precept of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord +upon a concord or sweet accord, alike true in affection? Is not +the trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common +with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the +delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same with the playing +of light upon the water?<br> +<br> +<br> +“Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus.”<br> +<br> +<br> +Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of reflection, +the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait, determined and +bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as men of narrow +observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of nature, +treading or printing upon several subjects or matters. This science +therefore (as I understand it) I may justly report as deficient; for +I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits, in handling some particular +argument, will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this well +for their present use; but the spring-head thereof seemeth to me not +to have been visited, being of so excellent use both for the disclosing +of nature and the abridgment of art.<br> +<br> +VI. (1) This science being therefore first placed as a common parent +like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, <i>omnes cœlicolas, +omnes supera alta tenetes</i>;<i> </i>we may return to the former distribution +of the three philosophies - divine, natural, and human. And as +concerning divine philosophy or natural theology, it is that knowledge +or rudiment of knowledge concerning God which may be obtained by the +contemplation of His creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed +divine in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. +The bounds of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, +but not to inform religion; and therefore there was never miracle wrought +by God to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have +led him to confess a God; but miracles have been wrought to convert +idolaters and the superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth +to declare the will and true worship of God. For as all works +do show forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image, +so it is of the works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom +of the Maker, but not His image. And therefore therein the heathen +opinion differeth from the sacred truth: for they supposed the world +to be the image of God, and man to be an extract or compendious image +of the world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the +world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only <i>the work of +His hands</i>;<i> </i>neither do they speak of any other image of God +but man. Wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and +enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, providence, +and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently handled +by divers, but on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, +or ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning +the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe; <i>Da fidei quæ +fidei sunt</i>. For the heathen themselves conclude as much in +that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain, “That men +and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but, contrariwise, +Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.” So as we ought +not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason, +but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth. +So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am so +far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excess; whereunto +I have digressed because of the extreme prejudice which both religion +and philosophy hath received and may receive by being commixed together; +as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary +and fabulous philosophy.<br> +<br> +(2) Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an +appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable +nor interdicted. For although the Scripture saith, “Let +no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels, +pressing into that he knoweth not,” &c., yet notwithstanding +if you observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that there be +two things only forbidden - adoration of them, and opinion fantastical +of them, either to extol them further than appertaineth to the degree +of a creature, or to extol a man’s knowledge of them further than +he hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry, which may +arise out of the passages of Holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations +of nature, is not restrained. So of degenerate and revolted spirits, +the conversing with them or the employment of them is prohibited, much +more any veneration towards them; but the contemplation or science of +their nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or reason, +is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith, “We +are not ignorant of his stratagems.” And it is no more unlawful +to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to inquire the force of +poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in morality. +But this part touching angels and spirits I cannot note as deficient, +for many have occupied themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, +in many of the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.<br> +<br> +VII. (1) Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology (not +divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of all +as the haven and sabbath of all man’s contemplations) we will +now proceed to natural philosophy. If then it be true that Democritus +said, “That the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines +and caves;” and if it be true likewise that the alchemists do +so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that +dexterously and compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages and length +of time, it were good to divide natural philosophy into the mine and +the furnace, and to make two professions or occupations of natural philosophers +- some to be pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine +and hammer. And surely I do best allow of a division of that kind, +though in more familiar and scholastical terms: namely, that these be +the two parts of natural philosophy - the inquisition of causes, and +the production of effects; speculative and operative; natural science, +and natural prudence. For as in civil matters there is a wisdom +of discourse, and a wisdom of direction; so is it in natural. +And here I will make a request, that for the latter (or at least for +a part thereof) I may revive and reintegrate the misapplied and abused +name of natural magic, which in the true sense is but natural wisdom, +or natural prudence; taken according to the ancient acception, purged +from vanity and superstition. Now although it be true, and I know +it well, that there is an intercourse between causes and effects, so +as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have a great connection +between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful natural philosophy +hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent, ascending from +experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to +the invention of new experiments; therefore I judge it most requisite +that these two parts be severally considered and handled.<br> +<br> +(2) Natural science or theory is divided into physic and metaphysic; +wherein I desire it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysic +in a differing sense from that that is received. And in like manner, +I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of judgment, that in this +and other particulars, wheresoever my conception and notion may differ +from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms. +For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by the order and perspicuous +expressing of that I do propound, I am otherwise zealous and affectionate +to recede as little from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as +may stand with truth and the proficience of knowledge. And herein +I cannot a little marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed +in such a spirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity; +undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but +to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom; insomuch as he never +nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to confute and +reprove; wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he +took the right course. For certainly there cometh to pass, and +hath place in human truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the +highest truth:- <i>Veni in nomine partis, nec recipits me; si quis venerit +in nomine suo eum recipietis</i>. But in this divine aphorism +(considering to whom it was applied, namely, to antichrist, the highest +deceiver), we may discern well that the coming in a man’s own +name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth, +although it be joined with the fortune and success of an <i>eum recipietis</i>. +But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will think of him that he +learned that humour of his scholar, with whom it seemeth he did emulate; +the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer all nations. +Wherein, nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men’s hands, +that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his scholar did:-<br> +<br> +<br> +“Felix terrarum prædo, non utile mundo<br> +Editus exemplum, &c.”<br> +<br> +<br> +So,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Felix doctrinæ prædo.”<br> +<br> +<br> +But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my +pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience, +it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity <i>usque ad aras</i>;<i> +</i>and, therefore, to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes +alter the uses and definitions, according to the moderate proceeding +in civil government; where, although there be some alteration, yet that +holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, <i>eadem magistratuum vocabula.<br> +<br> +</i>(3) To return, therefore, to the use and acception of the term metaphysic +as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been +already said, that I intend <i>philosophia prima</i>, summary philosophy +and metaphysic, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be +two distinct things. For the one I have made as a parent or common +ancestor to all knowledge; and the other I have now brought in as a +branch or descendant of natural science. It appeareth likewise +that I have assigned to summary philosophy the common principles and +axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences; I +have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the operation or +the relative and adventive characters of essences, as quantity, similitude, +diversity, possibility, and the rest, with this distinction and provision; +that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. +It appeareth likewise that natural theology, which heretofore hath been +handled confusedly with metaphysic, I have enclosed and bounded by itself. +It is therefore now a question what is left remaining for metaphysic; +wherein I may without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of +antiquity, that physic should contemplate that which is inherent in +matter, and therefore transitory; and metaphysic that which is abstracted +and fixed. And again, that physic should handle that which supposeth +in nature only a being and moving; and metaphysic should handle that +which supposeth further in nature a reason, understanding, and platform. +But the difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. +For as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of +causes and productions of effects, so that part which concerneth the +inquiry of causes we do subdivide according to the received and sound +division of causes. The one part, which is physic, inquireth and +handleth the material and efficient causes; and the other, which is +metaphysic, handleth the formal and final causes.<br> +<br> +(4) Physic (taking it according to the derivation, and not according +to our idiom for medicine) is situate in a middle term or distance between +natural history and metaphysic. For natural history describeth +the variety of things; physic the causes, but variable or respective +causes; and metaphysic the fixed and constant causes.<br> +<br> +<br> +“Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit,<br> +Uno eodemque igni.”<br> +<br> +<br> +Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is the +cause of colliquation, but respective to wax. But fire is no constant +cause either of induration or colliquation; so then the physical causes +are but the efficient and the matter. Physic hath three parts, +whereof two respect nature united or collected, the third contemplateth +nature diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into +one entire total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So +as the first doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of +things, as <i>de mundo, de universitate rerum. </i>The second +is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals of things. +The third is the doctrine concerning all variety and particularity of +things; whether it be of the differing substances, or their differing +qualities and natures; whereof there needeth no enumeration, this part +being but as a gloss or paraphrase that attendeth upon the text of natural +history. Of these three I cannot report any as deficient. +In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any judgment; +but they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.<br> +<br> +(5) For metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal and +final causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may seem +to be nugatory and void, because of the received and inveterate opinion, +that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms +or true differences; of which opinion we will take this hold, that the +invention of forms is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest +to be sought, if it be possible to be found. As for the possibility, +they are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can +see nothing but sea. But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion +of ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, +did descry that forms were the true object of knowledge; but lost the +real fruit of his opinion, by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted +from matter, and not confined and determined by matter; and so turning +his opinion upon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. +But if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action, +operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what +are the forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to +the state of man. For as to the forms of substances (man only +except, of whom it is said, <i>Formavit hominem de limo terræ, +et spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ, </i>and not as of +all other creatures, <i>Producant aquæ, producat terra</i>), the +forms of substances I say (as they are now by compounding and transplanting +multiplied) are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired; no more +than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms +of those sounds which make words, which by composition and transposition +of letters are infinite. But, on the other side, to inquire the +form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters is easily comprehensible; +and being known induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words, which +consist and are compounded of them. In the same manner to inquire +the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of water, of air, is a +vain pursuit; but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, +of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, +of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which, like an +alphabet, are not many, and of which the essences (upheld by matter) +of all creatures do consist; to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, +is that part of metaphysic which we now define of. Not but that +physic doth make inquiry and take consideration of the same natures; +but how? Only as to the material and efficient causes of them, +and not as to the forms. For example, if the cause of whiteness +in snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the subtle +intermixture of air and water is the cause, it is well rendered; but, +nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness? No; but it is the +efficient, which is ever but <i>vehiculum formæ</i>. This +part of metaphysic I do not find laboured and performed; whereat I marvel +not; because I hold it not possible to be invented by that course of +invention which hath been used; in regard that men (which is the root +of all error) have made too untimely a departure, and too remote a recess +from particulars.<br> +<br> +(6) But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I report as deficient, +is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the one, because +it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of +individual experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, +and to remedy the complaint of <i>vita brevis, ars longa</i>; which +is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences. +For knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis. +So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next +the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. +As for the vertical point, <i>opus quod operatur Deus à principio +usque ad finem</i>, the summary law of nature, we know not whether man’s +inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the true stages +of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no better than the giants’ +hills:-<br> +<br> +<br> +“Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,<br> +Scilicet atque Ossæ frondsum involvere Olympum.”<br> +<br> +<br> +But to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they are as +the three acclamations, <i>Sante</i>, <i>sancte</i>, <i>sancte</i>! +holy in the description or dilatation of His works; holy in the connection +or concatenation of them; and holy in the union of them in a perpetual +and uniform law. And, therefore, the speculation was excellent +in Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all +things by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that knowledge +is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth +to be metaphysic; as that which considereth the simple forms or differences +of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations +whereof make all this variety. The second respect, which valueth +and commendeth this part of metaphysic, is that it doth enfranchise +the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works +and effects. For physic carrieth men in narrow and restrained +ways, subject to many accidents and impediments, imitating the ordinary +flexuous courses of nature. But <i>latæ undique sunt sapientibus +viæ</i>; to sapience (which was anciently defined to be <i>rerum +divinarum et humanarum scientia</i>) there is ever a choice of means. +For physical causes give light to new invention in <i>simili materia</i>. +But whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing +that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less restrained in +operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the condition of the +efficient; which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, though in a more +divine sense, elegantly describeth: <i>non arctabuntur gressus tui, +et currens non habebis offendiculum</i>. The ways of sapience +are not much liable either to particularity or chance.<br> +<br> +(7) The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of final causes, which +I am moved to report not as omitted, but as misplaced. And yet +if it were but a fault in order, I would not speak of it; for order +is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. +But this misplacing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great improficience +in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, +mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe +and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men +the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to +the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. For this +I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but +by Aristotle, Galen, and others which do usually likewise fall upon +these flats of discoursing causes. For to say that “the +hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence about the sight;” +or that “the firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures +is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold;” or that +“the bones are for the columns or beams, whereupon the frames +of the bodies of living creatures are built;” or that “the +leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit;” or that “the +clouds are for watering of the earth;” or that “the solidness +of the earth is for the station and mansion of living creatures;” +and the like, is well inquired and collected in metaphysic, but in physic +they are impertinent. Nay, they are, indeed, but <i>remoras</i> +and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing; and have +brought this to pass, that the search of the physical causes hath been +neglected and passed in silence. And, therefore, the natural philosophy +of Democritus and some others, who did not suppose a mind or reason +in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintain +itself to infinite essays or proofs of Nature, which they term fortune, +seemeth to me (as far as I can judge by the recital and fragments which +remain unto us) in particularities of physical causes more real and +better inquired than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled +final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a part +of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of both those +persons; not because those final causes are not true and worthy to be +inquired, being kept within their own province, but because their excursions +into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude +in that tract. For otherwise, keeping their precincts and borders, +men are extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy +at all between them. For the cause rendered, that “the hairs +about the eyelids are for the safeguard of the sight,” doth not +impugn the cause rendered, that “pilosity is incident to orifices +of moisture - <i>muscosi fontes</i>, &c.” Nor the cause +rendered, that “the firmness of hides is for the armour of the +body against extremities of heat or cold,” doth not impugn the +cause rendered, that “contraction of pores is incident to the +outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or unlike +bodies;” and so of the rest, both causes being true and compatible, +the one declaring an intention, the other a consequence only. +Neither doth this call in question or derogate from Divine Providence, +but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is +the greater and deeper politique that can make other men the instruments +of his will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, +so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do, than he that imparteth +his meaning to those he employeth; so is the wisdom of God more admirable, +when Nature intendeth one thing and Providence draweth forth another, +than if He had communicated to particular creatures and motions the +characters and impressions of His Providence. And thus much for +metaphysic; the latter part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined +to his proper place.<br> +<br> +VIII. (1) Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another part of natural +philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part, and holdeth rank +with physic special and metaphysic, which is mathematic; but I think +it more agreeable to the nature of things, and to the light of order, +to place it as a branch of metaphysic. For the subject of it being +quantity, not quantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and belongeth +to <i>philosophia prima</i> (as hath been said), but quantity determined +or proportionable, it appeareth to be one of the essential forms of +things, as that that is causative in Nature of a number of effects; +insomuch as we see in the schools both of Democritus and of Pythagoras +that the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of things, and the +other did suppose numbers to be the principles and originals of things. +And it is true also that of all other forms (as we understand forms) +it is the most abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most +proper to metaphysic; which hath likewise been the cause why it hath +been better laboured and inquired than any of the other forms, which +are more immersed in matter. For it being the nature of the mind +of man (to the extreme prejudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious +liberty of generalities, as in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures +of particularity, the mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest +fields to satisfy that appetite. But for the placing of this science, +it is not much material: only we have endeavoured in these our partitions +to observe a kind of perspective, that one part may cast light upon +another.<br> +<br> +(2) The mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the pure mathematics +are those sciences belonging which handle quantity determinate, merely +severed from any axioms of natural philosophy; and these are two, geometry +and arithmetic, the one handling quantity continued, and the other dissevered. +Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural philosophy, and +considereth quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto +them. For many parts of Nature can neither be invented with sufficient +subtlety, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated +unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and intervening +of the mathematics, of which sort are perspective, music, astronomy, +cosmography, architecture, engineery, and divers others. In the +mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that men do not +sufficiently understand this excellent use of the pure mathematics, +in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit and faculties +intellectual. For if the wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if +too wandering, they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract +it. So that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great +use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself +into all postures, so in the mathematics that use which is collateral +and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and +intended. And as for the mixed mathematics, I may only make this +prediction, that there cannot fail to be more kinds of them as Nature +grows further disclosed. Thus much of natural science, or the +part of Nature speculative.<br> +<br> +(3) For natural prudence, or the part operative of natural philosophy, +we will divide it into three parts - experimental, philosophical, and +magical; which three parts active have a correspondence and analogy +with the three parts speculative, natural history, physic, and metaphysic. +For many operations have been invented, sometimes by a casual incidence +and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment; and of those which +have been found by an intentional experiment, some have been found out +by varying or extending the same experiment, some by transferring and +compounding divers experiments the one into the other, which kind of +invention an empiric may manage. Again, by the knowledge of physical +causes there cannot fail to follow many indications and designations +of new particulars, if men in their speculation will keep one eye upon +use and practice. But these are but coastings along the shore, +<i>premendo littus iniquum</i>;<i> </i>for it seemeth to me there can +hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental alterations and innovations +in Nature, either by the fortune and essays of experiments, or by the +light and direction of physical causes. If, therefore, we have +reported metaphysic deficient, it must follow that we do the like of +natural magic, which hath relation thereunto. For as for the natural +magic whereof now there is mention in books, containing certain credulous +and superstitious conceits and observations of sympathies and antipathies, +and hidden proprieties, and some frivolous experiments, strange rather +by disguisement than in themselves, it is as far differing in truth +of Nature from such a knowledge as we require as the story of King Arthur +of Britain, or Hugh of Bourdeaux, differs from Cæsar’s Commentaries +in truth of story; for it is manifest that Cæsar did greater things +<i>de vero </i>than those imaginary heroes were feigned to do. +But he did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning +the fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to enjoy Juno, the goddess +of power, and instead of her had copulation with a cloud, of which mixture +were begotten centaurs and chimeras. So whosoever shall entertain +high and vaporous imaginations, instead of a laborious and sober inquiry +of truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes. +And, therefore, we may note in these sciences which hold so much of +imagination and belief, as this degenerate natural magic, alchemy, astrology, +and the like, that in their propositions the description of the means +is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end. For it is a thing +more probable that he that knoweth well the natures of weight, of colour, +of pliant and fragile in respect of the hammer, of volatile and fixed +in respect of the fire, and the rest, may superinduce upon some metal +the nature and form of gold by such mechanic as longeth to the production +of the natures afore rehearsed, than that some grains of the medicine +projected should in a few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver +or other material into gold. So it is more probable that he that +knoweth the nature of arefaction, the nature of assimilation of nourishment +to the thing nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of spirits, +the manner of the depredations which spirits make upon the humours and +solid parts, shall by ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, medicines, +motions, and the like, prolong life, or restore some degree of youth +or vivacity, than that it can be done with the use of a few drops or +scruples of a liquor or receipt. To conclude, therefore, the true +natural magic, which is that great liberty and latitude of operation +which dependeth upon the knowledge of forms, I may report deficient, +as the relative thereof is. To which part, if we be serious and +incline not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the deriving +and deducing the operations themselves from metaphysic, there are pertinent +two points of much purpose, the one by way of preparation, the other +by way of caution. The first is, that there be made a calendar, +resembling an inventory of the estate of man, containing all the inventions +(being the works or fruits of Nature or art) which are now extant, and +whereof man is already possessed; out of which doth naturally result +a note what things are yet held impossible, or not invented, which calendar +will be the more artificial and serviceable if to every reputed impossibility +you add what thing is extant which cometh the nearest in degree to that +impossibility; to the end that by these optatives and potentials man’s +inquiry may be the more awake in deducing direction of works from the +speculation of causes. And secondly, that these experiments be +not only esteemed which have an immediate and present use, but those +principally which are of most universal consequence for invention of +other experiments, and those which give most light to the invention +of causes; for the invention of the mariner’s needle, which giveth +the direction, is of no less benefit for navigation than the invention +of the sails which give the motion.<br> +<br> +(4) Thus have I passed through natural philosophy and the deficiences +thereof; wherein if I have differed from the ancient and received doctrines, +and thereby shall move contradiction, for my part, as I affect not to +dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it be truth,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvæ,”<br> +<br> +<br> +the voice of Nature will consent, whether the voice of man do or no. +And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the French +for Naples, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their +lodgings, and not with weapons to fight; so I like better that entry +of truth which cometh peaceably with chalk to mark up those minds which +are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that which cometh with pugnacity +and contention.<br> +<br> +(5) But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy according to +the report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning the matter or subject: +and that is positive and considerative, when the inquiry reporteth either +an assertion or a doubt. These doubts or <i>non liquets </i>are +of two sorts, particular and total. For the first, we see a good +example thereof in Aristotle’s Problems which deserved to have +had a better continuance; but so nevertheless as there is one point +whereof warning is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts +hath two excellent uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy from errors +and falsehoods; when that which is not fully appearing is not collected +into assertion, whereby error might draw error, but reserved in doubt; +the other, that the entry of doubts are as so many suckers or sponges +to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as that which if doubts had not preceded, +a man should never have advised, but passed it over without note, by +the suggestion and solicitation of doubts is made to be attended and +applied. But both these commodities do scarcely countervail and +inconvenience, which will intrude itself if it be not debarred; which +is, that when a doubt is once received, men labour rather how to keep +it a doubt still, than how to solve it, and accordingly bend their wits. +Of this we see the familiar example in lawyers and scholars, both which, +if they have once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for +a doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be allowed, which +laboureth to make doubtful things certain, and not those which labour +to make certain things doubtful. Therefore these calendars of +doubts I commend as excellent things; so that there he this caution +used, that when they be thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution, +they be from thenceforth omitted, discarded, and not continued to cherish +and encourage men in doubting. To which calendar of doubts or +problems I advise be annexed another calendar, as much or more material +which is a calendar of popular errors: I mean chiefly in natural history, +such as pass in speech and conceit, and are nevertheless apparently +detected and convicted of untruth, that man’s knowledge be not +weakened nor embased by such dross and vanity. As for the doubts +or <i>non liquets </i>general or in total, I understand those differences +of opinions touching the principles of nature, and the fundamental points +of the same, which have caused the diversity of sects, schools, and +philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, +and the rest. For although Aristotle, as though he had been of +the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not reign except the first +thing he did he killed all his brethren; yet to those that seek truth +and not magistrality, it cannot but seem a matter of great profit, to +see before them the several opinions touching the foundations of nature. +Not for any exact truth that can be expected in those theories; for +as the same phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by this received astronomy +of the diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the planets, with their +eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise by the theory of Copernicus, +who supposed the earth to move, and the calculations are indifferently +agreeable to both, so the ordinary face and view of experience is many +times satisfied by several theories and philosophies; whereas to find +the real truth requireth another manner of severity and attention. +For as Aristotle saith, that children at the first will call every woman +mother, but afterward they come to distinguish according to truth, so +experience, if it be in childhood, will call every philosophy mother, +but when it cometh to ripeness it will discern the true mother. +So as in the meantime it is good to see the several glosses and opinions +upon Nature, whereof it may be everyone in some one point hath seen +clearer than his fellows, therefore I wish some collection to be made +painfully and understandingly <i>de antiquis philosophiis</i>,<i> </i>out +of all the possible light which remaineth to us of them: which kind +of work I find deficient. But here I must give warning, that it +be done distinctly and severedly; the philosophies of everyone throughout +by themselves, and not by titles packed and faggoted up together, as +hath been done by Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philosophy +in itself, which giveth it light and credence; whereas if it be singled +and broken, it will seem more foreign and dissonant. For as when +I read in Tacitus the actions of Nero or Claudius, with circumstances +of times, inducements, and occasions, I find them not so strange; but +when I read them in Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and +bundles and not in order of time, they seem more monstrous and incredible: +so is it of any philosophy reported entire, and dismembered by articles. +Neither do I exclude opinions of latter times to be likewise represented +in this calendar of sects of philosophy, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, +eloquently reduced into an harmony by the pen of Severinus the Dane; +and that of Tilesius, and his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, +full of sense, but of no great depth; and that of Fracastorius, who, +though he pretended not to make any new philosophy, yet did use the +absoluteness of his own sense upon the old; and that of Gilbertus our +countryman, who revived, with some alterations and demonstrations, the +opinions of Xenophanes; and any other worthy to be admitted.<br> +<br> +(6) Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of man’s +knowledge; that is <i>radius directus</i>, which is referred to nature, +<i>radius refractus</i>,<i> </i>which is referred to God, and cannot +report truly because of the inequality of the medium. There resteth +<i>radius reflexus</i>,<i> </i>whereby man beholdeth and contemplateth +himself.<br> +<br> +IX. (1) We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient +oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth +the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. +This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the +intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural +philosophy in the continent of Nature. And generally let this +be a rule, that all partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for +lines and veins than for sections and separations; and that the continuance +and entireness of knowledge be preserved. For the contrary hereof +hath made particular sciences to become barren, shallow, and erroneous, +while they have not been nourished and maintained from the common fountain. +So we see Cicero, the orator, complained of Socrates and his school, +that he was the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon +rhetoric became an empty and verbal art. So we may see that the +opinion of Copernicus, touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy +itself cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to any of the <i>phenomena</i>, +yet natural philosophy may correct. So we see also that the science +of medicine if it be destituted and forsaken by natural philosophy, +it is not much better than an empirical practice. With this reservation, +therefore, we proceed to human philosophy or humanity, which hath two +parts: the one considereth man segregate or distributively, the other +congregate or in society; so as human philosophy is either simple and +particular, or conjugate and civil. Humanity particular consisteth +of the same parts whereof man consisteth: that is, of knowledges which +respect the body, and of knowledges that respect the mind. But +before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I do +take the consideration in general, and at large, of human nature to +be fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by itself, not so much +in regard of those delightful and elegant discourses which have been +made of the dignity of man, of his miseries, of his state and life, +and the like adjuncts of his common and undivided nature; but chiefly +in regard of the knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances +between the mind and body, which being mixed cannot be properly assigned +to the sciences of either.<br> +<br> +(2) This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and amities +consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices, so this league of +mind and body hath these two parts: how the one discloseth the other, +and how the one worketh upon the other; discovery and impression. +The former of these hath begotten two arts, both of prediction or prenotion; +whereof the one is honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other +of Hippocrates. And although they have of later time been used +to be coupled with superstitions and fantastical arts, yet being purged +and restored to their true state, they have both of them a solid ground +in Nature, and a profitable use in life. The first is physiognomy, +which discovereth the disposition of the mind by the lineaments of the +body. The second is the exposition of natural dreams, which discovereth +the state of the body by the imaginations of the mind. In the +former of these I note a deficience. For Aristotle hath very ingeniously +and diligently handled the factures of the body, but not the gestures +of the body, which are no less comprehensible by art, and of greater +use and advantage. For the lineaments of the body do disclose +the disposition and inclination of the mind in general; but the motions +of the countenance and parts do not only so, but do further disclose +the present humour and state of the mind and will. For as your +majesty saith most aptly and elegantly, “As the tongue speaketh +to the ear so the gesture speaketh to the eye.” And, therefore, +a number of subtle persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the faces and fashions +of men, do well know the advantage of this observation, as being most +part of their ability; neither can it be denied, but that it is a great +discovery of dissimulations, and a great direction in business.<br> +<br> +(3) The latter branch, touching impression, hath not been collected +into art, but hath been handled dispersedly; and it hath the same relation +or <i>antistrophe </i>that the former hath. For the consideration +is double - either how and how far the humours and affects of the body +do alter or work upon the mind, or, again, how and how far the passions +or apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body. The +former of these hath been inquired and considered as a part and appendix +of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or superstition. +For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in frenzies and melancholy +passions, and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the +mind, to control the courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the +memory, and the like; but the scruples and superstitions of diet and +other regiment of the body in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy +of the Manichees, and in the law of Mahomet, do exceed. So likewise +the ordinances in the ceremonial law, interdicting the eating of the +blood and the fat, distinguishing between beasts clean and unclean for +meat, are many and strict; nay, the faith itself being clear and serene +from all clouds of ceremony, yet retaineth the use of fastlings, abstinences, +and other macerations and humiliations of the body, as things real, +and not figurative. The root and life of all which prescripts +is (besides the ceremony) the consideration of that dependency which +the affections of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and disposition +of the body. And if any man of weak judgment do conceive that +this suffering of the mind from the body doth either question the immortality, +or derogate from the sovereignty of the soul, he may be taught, in easy +instances, that the infant in the mother’s womb is compatible +with the mother, and yet separable; and the most absolute monarch is +sometimes led by his servants, and yet without subjection. As +for the reciprocal knowledge, which is the operation of the conceits +and passions of the mind upon the body, we see all wise physicians, +in the prescriptions of their regiments to their patients, do ever consider +<i>accidentia animi</i>, as of great force to further or hinder remedies +or recoveries: and more specially it is an inquiry of great depth and +worth concerning imagination, how and how far it altereth the body proper +of the imaginant; for although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it +followeth not it hath the same degree of power to help. No more +than a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent airs, able +suddenly to kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign +airs, able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the inquisition +of this part is of great use, though it needeth, as Socrates said, “a +Delian diver,” being difficult and profound. But unto all +this knowledge <i>de communi vinculo</i>, of the concordances between +the mind and the body, that part of inquiry is most necessary which +considereth of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of +the mind do take and occupate in the organs of the body; which knowledge +hath been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be much better +inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the understanding +in the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, having a greater +mixture with pride) in the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality in +the liver, deserveth not to be despised, but much less to be allowed. +So, then, we have constituted (as in our own wish and advice) the inquiry +touching human nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be handled +apart.<br> +<br> +X. (1) The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is divided as +the good of man’s body is divided, unto which it referreth. +The good of man’s body is of four kinds - health, beauty, strength, +and pleasure: so the knowledges are medicine, or art of cure; art of +decoration, which is called cosmetic; art of activity, which is called +athletic; and art voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth <i>eruditus +luxus</i>. This subject of man’s body is, of all other things +in nature, most susceptible of remedy; but then that remedy is most +susceptible of error; for the same subtlety of the subject doth cause +large possibility and easy failing, and therefore the inquiry ought +to be the more exact.<br> +<br> +(2) To speak, therefore, of medicine, and to resume that we have said, +ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that man was <i>microcosmus</i> +- an abstract or model of the world - hath been fantastically strained +by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as if there were to be found in man’s +body certain correspondences and parallels, which should have respect +to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals, which are extant +in the great world. But thus much is evidently true, that of all +substances which nature hath produced, man’s body is the most +extremely compounded. For we see herbs and plants are nourished +by earth and water; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits; man +by the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, +and the manifold alterations, dressings, and preparations of these several +bodies before they come to be his food and aliment. Add hereunto +that beasts have a more simple order of life, and less change of affections +to work upon their bodies, whereas man in his mansion, sleep, exercise, +passions, hath infinite variations: and it cannot be denied but that +the body of man of all other things is of the most compounded mass. +The soul, on the other side, is the simplest of substances, as is well +expressed:<br> +<br> +<br> + “Purumque reliquit<br> +Æthereum sensum atque auraï simplicis ignem.”<br> +<br> +<br> +So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if +that principle be true, that <i>Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum, +placidus in loco</i>. But to the purpose. This variable +composition of man’s body hath made it as an instrument easy to +distemper; and, therefore, the poets did well to conjoin music and medicine +in Apollo, because the office of medicine is but to tune this curious +harp of man’s body and to reduce it to harmony. So, then, +the subject being so variable hath made the art by consequent more conjectural; +and the art being conjectural hath made so much the more place to be +left for imposture. For almost all other arts and sciences are +judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes +and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, +and not by the issue of the cause; this master in this ship is judged +by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage; +but the physician, and perhaps this politique, hath no particular acts +demonstrative of his ability, but is judged most by the event, which +is ever but as it is taken: for who can tell, if a patient die or recover, +or if a state be preserved or ruined, whether it be art or accident? +And therefore many times the impostor is prized, and the man of virtue +taxed. Nay, we see [the] weakness and credulity of men is such, +as they will often refer a mountebank or witch before a learned physician. +And therefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this extreme +folly when they made Æsculapius and Circe, brother and sister, +both children of the sun, as in the verses -<br> +<br> +<br> +“Ipse repertorem medicinæ talis et artis<br> +Fulmine Phœbigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas.”<br> +<br> +<br> +And again -<br> +<br> +<br> +“Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos,” &c.<br> +<br> +<br> +For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and old women +and impostors, have had a competition with physicians. And what +followeth? Even this, that physicians say to themselves, as Solomon +expresseth it upon a higher occasion, “If it befall to me as befalleth +to the fools, why should I labour to be more wise?” And +therefore I cannot much blame physicians that they use commonly to intend +some other art or practice, which they fancy more than their profession; +for you shall have of them antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen, +merchants, divines, and in every of these better seen than in their +profession; and no doubt upon this ground that they find that mediocrity +and excellency in their art maketh no difference in profit or reputation +towards their fortune: for the weakness of patients, and sweetness of +life, and nature of hope, maketh men depend upon physicians with all +their defects. But, nevertheless, these things which we have spoken +of are courses begotten between a little occasion and a great deal of +sloth and default; for if we will excite and awake our observation, +we shall see in familiar instances what a predominant faculty the subtlety +of spirit hath over the variety of matter or form. Nothing more +variable than faces and countenances, yet men can bear in memory the +infinite distinctions of them; nay, a painter, with a few shells of +colours, and the benefit of his eye, and habit of his imagination, can +imitate them all that ever have been, are, or may be, if they were brought +before him. Nothing more variable than voices, yet men can likewise +discern them personally: nay, you shall have a <i>buffon </i>or <i>pantomimus</i> +will express as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable than +the differing sounds of words; yet men have found the way to reduce +them to a few simple letters. So that it is not the insufficiency +or incapacity of man’s mind, but it is the remote standing or +placing thereof that breedeth these mazes and incomprehensions; for +as the sense afar off is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so +is it of the understanding, the remedy whereof is, not to quicken or +strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and therefore +there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the true +approaches and avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the poet +saith:<br> +<br> +<br> +“Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes;<br> +Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.”<br> +<br> +<br> +Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth deserve: +well shadowed by the poets, in that they made Æsculapius to be +the son of [the] sun, the one being the fountain of life, the other +as the second-stream; but infinitely more honoured by the example of +our Saviour, who made the body of man the object of His miracles, as +the soul was the object of His doctrine. For we read not that +ever He vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or money (except that +one for giving tribute to Cæsar), but only about the preserving, +sustaining, and healing the body of man.<br> +<br> +(3) Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have said) more professed +than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced; the labour having +been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in progression. For +I find much iteration, but small addition. It considereth causes +of diseases, with the occasions or impulsions; the diseases themselves, +with the accidents; and the cures, with the preservations. The +deficiences which I think good to note, being a few of many, and those +such as are of a more open and manifest nature, I will enumerate and +not place.<br> +<br> +(4) The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence +of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of the special cases +of his patients, and how they proceeded, and how they were judged by +recovery or death. Therefore having an example proper in the father +of the art, I shall not need to allege an example foreign, of the wisdom +of the lawyers, who are careful to report new cases and decisions, for +the direction of future judgments. This continuance of medicinal +history I find deficient; which I understand neither to be so infinite +as to extend to every common case, nor so reserved as to admit none +but wonders: for many things are new in this manner, which are not new +in the kind; and if men will intend to observe, they shall find much +worthy to observe.<br> +<br> +(5) In the inquiry which is made by anatomy, I find much deficience: +for they inquire of the parts, and their substances, figures, and collocations; +but they inquire not of the diversities of the parts, the secrecies +of the passages, and the seats or nestling of the humours, nor much +of the footsteps and impressions of diseases. The reason of which +omission I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may be satisfied +in the view of one or a few anatomies; but the latter, being comparative +and casual, must arise from the view of many. And as to the diversity +of parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing of the inward +parts is as full of difference as the outward, and in that is the cause +continent of many diseases; which not being observed, they quarrel many +times with the humours, which are not in fault; the fault being in the +very frame and mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine +alterative, but must be accommodated and palliated by diets and medicines +familiar. And for the passages and pores, it is true which was +anciently noted, that the more subtle of them appear not in anatomies, +because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be open +and manifest in life: which being supposed, though the inhumanity of +<i>anatomia vivorum </i>was by Celsus justly reproved; yet in regard +of the great use of this observation, the inquiry needed not by him +so slightly to have been relinquished altogether, or referred to the +casual practices of surgery; but might have been well diverted upon +the dissection of beasts alive, which notwithstanding the dissimilitude +of their parts may sufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And for +the humours, they are commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments; +whereas it is most necessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and receptacles +the humours do find in the parts, with the differing kind of the humour +so lodged and received. And as for the footsteps of diseases, +and their devastations of the inward parts, impostumations, exulcerations, +discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, contractions, extensions, +convulsions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, together with all +preternatural substances, as stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, +and the like; they ought to have been exactly observed by multitude +of anatomies, and the contribution of men’s several experiences, +and carefully set down both historically according to the appearances, +and artificially with a reference to the diseases and symptoms which +resulted from them, in case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient; +whereas now upon opening of bodies they are passed over slightly and +in silence.<br> +<br> +(6) In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of many, some +as in their nature incurable, and others as past the period of cure; +so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed so many men to die, +as they do by their ignorant edicts: whereof numbers do escape with +less difficulty than they did in the Roman prescriptions. Therefore +I will not doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire not the +perfect cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases; but pronouncing +them incurable do enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from +discredit.<br> +<br> +(7) Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician not only to restore +health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and not only when such mitigation +may conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and easy +passage. For it is no small felicity which Augustus Cæsar +was wont to wish to himself, that same <i>Euthanasia</i>;<i> </i>and +which was specially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death +was after the fashion, and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sheep. +So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was judged desperate, +he drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught and ingurgitation +of wine; whereupon the epigram was made, <i>Hinc Stygias ebrius hausit +aquas</i>;<i> </i>he was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of +the Stygian water. But the physicians contrariwise do make a kind +of scruple and religion to stay with the patient after the disease is +deplored; whereas in my judgment they ought both to inquire the skill, +and to give the attendances, for the facilitating and assuaging of the +pains and agonies of death.<br> +<br> +(5) In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a deficience +in the receipts of propriety, respecting the particular cures of diseases: +for the physicians have frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience +by their magistralities, in adding and taking out and changing <i>quid +pro qua </i>in their receipts, at their pleasures; commanding so over +the medicine, as the medicine cannot command over the disease. +For except it be treacle and <i>mithridatum</i>,<i> </i>and of late +<i>diascordium</i>,<i> </i>and a few more, they tie themselves to no +receipts severely and religiously. For as to the confections of +sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness and not for propriety. +For they are upon general intentions of purging, opening, comforting, +altering, and not much appropriate to particular diseases. And +this is the cause why empirics and old women are more happy many times +in their cures than learned physicians, because they are more religious +in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the deficience which +I find, that physicians have not, partly out of their own practice, +partly out of the constant probations reported in books, and partly +out of the traditions of empirics, set down and delivered over certain +experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases, besides +their own conjectural and magistral descriptions. For as they +were the men of the best composition in the state of Rome, which either +being consuls inclined to the people, or being tribunes inclined to +the senate; so in the matter we now handle, they be the best physicians, +which being learned incline to the traditions of experience, or being +empirics incline to the methods of learning.<br> +<br> +(9) In preparation of medicines I do find strange, specially considering +how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they are safer for +the outward than inward parts, that no man hath sought to make an imitation +by art of natural baths and medicinable fountains: which nevertheless +are confessed to receive their virtues from minerals; and not so only, +but discerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they receive +tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like; which nature, if +it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the variety of them will +be increased, and the temper of them will be more commanded.<br> +<br> +(10) But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable either +to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the +note of one deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest consequence: +which is, that the prescripts in use are too compendious to attain their +end; for, to my understanding, it is a vain and flattering opinion to +think any medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, as that the receipt +or miss of it can work any great effect upon the body of man. +It were a strange speech which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaim +a man from a vice to which he were by nature subject. It is order, +pursuit, sequence, and interchange of application, which is mighty in +nature; which although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing, +and more precise obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with the +magnitude of effects. And although a man would think, by the daily +visitations of the physicians, that there were a pursuance in the cure, +yet let a man look into their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall +find them but inconstancies and every day’s devices, without any +settled providence or project. Not that every scrupulous or superstitious +prescript is effectual, no more than every straight way is the way to +heaven; but the truth of the direction must precede severity of observance.<br> +<br> +(11) For cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: for cleanness +of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to God, to +society, and to ourselves. As for artificial decoration, it is +well worthy of the deficiences which it hath; being neither fine enough +to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor wholesome to please.<br> +<br> +(12) For athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is to say, +for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought, whether +it be of activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two parts, +strength and swiftness; and patience likewise hath two parts, hardness +against wants and extremities, and endurance of pain or torment; whereof +we see the practices in tumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer +punishment. Nay, if there be any other faculty which falls not +within any of the former divisions, as in those that dive, that obtain +a strange power of containing respiration, and the like, I refer it +to this part. Of these things the practices are known, but the +philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired; the rather, I +think, because they are supposed to be obtained, either by an aptness +of nature, which cannot be taught, or only by continual custom, which +is soon prescribed which though it be not true, yet I forbear to note +any deficiences; for the Olympian games are down long since, and the +mediocrity of these things is for use; as for the excellency of them +it serveth for the most part but for mercenary ostentation.<br> +<br> +(13) For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them is of +laws to repress them. For as it hath been well observed, that +the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are military; +and while virtue is in state, are liberal; and while virtue is in declination, +are voluptuary: so I doubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon +the descent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple practices +joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is one of the pleasures of +the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to belong +to civil life and education. And thus much of that particular +human philosophy which concerns the body, which is but the tabernacle +of the mind.<br> +<br> +XI. (1) For human knowledge which concerns the mind, it hath two parts; +the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul or mind, +the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof. + Unto the first of these, the considerations of the original of the +soul, whether it be native or adventive, and how far it is exempted +from laws of matter, and of the immortality thereof, and many other +points, do appertain: which have been not more laboriously inquired +than variously reported; so as the travail therein taken seemeth to +have been rather in a maze than in a way. But although I am of +opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly inquired, +even in nature, than it hath been, yet I hold that in the end it must +be hounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion. +For as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out +of the mass of heaven and earth by the benediction of a <i>producat</i>,<i> +</i>but was immediately inspired from God, so it is not possible that +it should be (otherwise than by accident) subject to the laws of heaven +and earth, which are the subject of philosophy; and therefore the true +knowledge of the nature and state of the soul must come by the same +inspiration that gave the substance. Unto this part of knowledge +touching the soul there be two appendices; which, as they have been +handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth: divination +and fascination.<br> +<br> +(2) Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial +and natural: whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a prediction +by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is, when the +mind hath a presention by an internal power, without the inducement +of a sign. Artificial is of two sorts: either when the argument +is coupled with a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it +is only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is experimental: +whereof the latter for the most part is superstitious, such as were +the heathen observations upon the inspection of sacrifices, the flights +of birds, the swarming of bees; and such as was the Chaldean astrology, +and the like. For artificial divination, the several kinds thereof +are distributed amongst particular knowledges. The astronomer +hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the +like. The physician hath his predictions, of death, of recovery, +of the accidents and issues of diseases. The politique hath his +predictions; <i>O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit</i>! +which stayed not long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after in +Cæsar: so as these predictions are now impertinent, and to be +referred over. But the divination which springeth from the internal +nature of the soul is that which we now speak of; which hath been made +to be of two sorts, primitive and by influxion. Primitive is grounded +upon the supposition that the mind, when it is withdrawn and collected +into itself, and not diffused into the organs of the body, hath some +extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore appeareth most in +sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in waking apprehensions; +and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and observances which +make the mind most to consist in itself. By influxion, is grounded +upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take illumination +from the foreknowledge of God and spirits: unto which the same regiment +doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself +is the state which is most susceptible of divine influxions; save that +it is accompanied in this case with a fervency and elevation (which +the ancients noted by fury), and not with a repose and quiet, as it +is in the other.<br> +<br> +(3) Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive upon other +bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that we spake in the proper +place. Wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of +pretended natural magic, have been so intemperate, as they have exalted +the power of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working +faith. Others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to their +view the secret passages of things, and specially of the contagion that +passeth from body to body, do conceive it should likewise be agreeable +to nature that there should be some transmissions and operations from +spirit to spirit without the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits +have grown (now almost made civil) of the mastering spirit, and the +force of confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry +how to raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified +have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. +And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great +part of ceremonial magic. For it may be pretended that ceremonies, +characters, and charms do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract +with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him +that useth it; as images are said by the Roman Church to fix the cogitations +and raise the devotions of them that pray before them. But for +mine own judgment, if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and +that ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely +and intentionally for that purpose; yet I should hold them unlawful, +as opposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, <i>In sudore +vultus comedes panem tuum</i>. For they propound those noble effects, +which God hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour, +to be attained by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiences +in these knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, +that it is not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity.<br> +<br> +XII. (1) The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of +man is of two kinds - the one respecting his understanding and reason, +and the other his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former +produceth position or decree, the latter action or execution. +It is true that the imagination is an agent or <i>nuncius </i>in both +provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth +over to imagination before reason have judged, and reason sendeth over +to imagination before the decree can be acted. For imagination +ever precedeth voluntary motion. Saving that this Janus of imagination +hath differing faces: for the face towards reason hath the print of +truth, but the face towards action hath the print of good; which nevertheless +are faces,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Quales decet esse sororum.”<br> +<br> +<br> +Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested +with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides +the duty of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, “That +the mind hath over the body that commandment, which the lord hath over +a bondman; but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment +which a magistrate hath over a free citizen,” who may come also +to rule in his turn. For we see that, in matters of faith and +religion, we raise our imagination above our reason, which is the cause +why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, +visions, dreams. And again, in all persuasions that are wrought +by eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, which do paint and +disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto +reason is from the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not +any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, +I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, +it is rather a pleasure or play of imagination than a work or duty thereof. +And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the +imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and consider of +the imagination. No more than we shall speak now of such knowledges +as reason produceth (for that extendeth to all philosophy), but of such +knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason: so as +poesy had his true place. As for the power of the imagination +in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned +it in the doctrine <i>De Anima</i>,<i> </i>whereunto most fitly it belongeth. +And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative reason, which is the subject +of rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason. +So therefore we content ourselves with the former division, that human +philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath +two parts, rational and moral.<br> +<br> +(2) The part of human philosophy which is rational is of all knowledges, +to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtlety +and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge is <i>pabulum +animi</i>; so in the nature of men’s appetite to this food most +men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that +would fain have returned <i>ad ollas carnium</i>,<i> </i>and were weary +of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive +and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that are +drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, about +the which men’s affections, praises, fortunes do turn and are +conversant. But this same <i>lumen siccum </i>doth parch and offend +most men’s watery and soft natures. But to speak truly of +things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are the keys of all +other arts, for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, “That +the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form +of forms;” so these be truly said to be the art of arts. +Neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even +as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, +but also to draw a stronger bow.<br> +<br> +(3) The arts intellectual are four in number, divided according to the +ends whereunto they are referred - for man’s labour is to invent +that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is invented; +or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is +retained. So as the arts must be four - art of inquiry or invention; +art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art of +elocution or tradition.<br> +<br> +XIII. (1) Invention is of two kinds much differing - the one of arts +and sciences, and the other of speech and arguments. The former +of these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience +as if, in the making of an inventory touching the state of a defunct, +it should be set down that there is no ready money. For as money +will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should +purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been +discovered if the use of the mariner’s needle had not been first +discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; +so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no further discovered, +if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.<br> +<br> +(2) That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth +plainly confessed; for first, logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, +or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a <i>cuique in sua +arte credendum</i>. And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking +of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, “That medicines +and cures were first found out, and then after the reasons and causes +were discoursed; and not the causes first found out, and by light from +them the medicines and cures discovered.” And Plato in his +“Theætetus” noteth well, “That particulars are +infinite, and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction; +and that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from +the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every particular +knowledge are taken from tradition and experience.” And +therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions and originals +of things refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, +birds, fishes, serpents, than to men.<br> +<br> +<br> +“Dictamnum genetrix Cretæa carpit ab Ida,<br> +Puberibus caulem foliis et flore camantem<br> +Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris<br> +Gramina, cum tergo volucres hæsere sagittæ.”<br> +<br> +<br> +So that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being to consecrate +inventors) that the Egyptians had so few human idols in their temples, +but almost all brute:<br> +<br> +<br> +“Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis,<br> +Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c.”<br> +<br> +<br> +And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the +first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe that Prometheus +first stroke the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when +he first stroke the flints he expected the spark; and therefore we see +the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because +of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occasion. +So as it should seem, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild +goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for +some part of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, +or generally to chance or anything else than to logic for the invention +of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil +describeth much other:<br> +<br> +<br> +“Ut varias usus meditande extunderet artes<br> +Paulatim.”<br> +<br> +<br> +For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that which +brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which is a perpetual +intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute +necessity of conservation of being. For so Cicero saith very truly, +<i>Usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem sæpe vincit</i>. +And therefore if it be said of men,<br> +<br> +<br> + “Labor omnia vincit<br> +Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas,”<br> +<br> +<br> +it is likewise said of beasts, <i>Quis psittaco docuit suum χαιρε</i>? +Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, +where she spied water, that the water might rise so as she might come +to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea or air, +and to find the way from a field in a flower a great way off to her +hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she +burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then +the word <i>extundere</i>,<i> </i>which importeth the extreme difficulty, +and the word <i>paulatim</i>, which importeth the extreme slowness, +and we are where we were, even amongst the Egyptians’ gods; there +being little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty +or art, for matter of invention.<br> +<br> +(3) Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of, and which +seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles of sciences may +be pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation +from the principles; their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious +and incompetent; wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the +duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have +wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For he that shall attentively +observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like +unto that which the poet speaketh of, <i>Aërei mellis cælestia +dona</i>, distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and +artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that +the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much +better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration +of particulars, without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but +a conjecture; for who can assure (in many subjects) upon those particulars +which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side +which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons +of Jesse which were brought before him, and failed of David which was +in the field. And this form (to say truth), is so gross, as it +had not been possible for wits so subtle as have managed these things +to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories +and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars; +which their manner was to use but as <i>lictores </i>and <i>viatores</i>,<i> +</i>for sergeants and whifflers, <i>ad summovendam turbam</i>,<i> </i>to +make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true +use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with +a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very +same in divine and human truth; for, as in divine truth man cannot endure +to become as a child, so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions +(whereof we speak), as if it were a second infancy or childhood.<br> +<br> +(4) Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet, +nevertheless, certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced +from them in subject of nature by syllogism - that is, by touch and +reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that +in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity +(because it pleaseth God to apply Himself to the capacity of the simplest), +that form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of +argument or satisfactory reason, <i>Quæ assensum parit operis +effæta est</i>;<i> </i>but the subtlety of nature and operations +will not be enchained in those bonds. For arguments consist of +propositions, and propositions of words, and words are but the current +tokens or marks of popular notions of things; which notions, if they +be grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the +laborious examination either of consequences of arguments, or of the +truth of propositions, that can ever correct that error, being (as the +physicians speak) in the first digestion. And, therefore, it was +not without cause, that so many excellent philosophers became sceptics +and academics, and denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension; +and held opinion that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances +and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed +to be but a form of irony, <i>Scientiam dissimulando simulavit</i>;<i> +</i>for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his +knowledge; like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would +reign, but would not acknowledge so much. And in the later academy, +which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of <i>acatalepsia </i>(I doubt) +was not held sincerely; for that all those which excelled in copy of +speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give +glory to their eloquence and variable discourses; being rather like +progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end. But assuredly +many scattered in both academies did hold it in subtlety and integrity. +But here was their chief error: they charged the deceit upon the senses; +which in my judgment (notwithstanding all their cavillations) are very +sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, +yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing and urging +such things as are too subtle for the sense to some effect comprehensible +by the sense, and other like assistance. But they ought to have +charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and +upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the +senses. This I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir +it up to seek help; for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, +can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which +may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.<br> +<br> +(5) This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I +purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound, having digested +it into two parts: whereof the one I term <i>experientia literata</i>,<i> +</i>and the other <i>interpretatio naturæ</i>;<i> </i>the former +being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not +dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise.<br> +<br> +(6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention; +for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or +resummon that which we already know; and the use of this invention is +no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed +to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose +which we take into our consideration. So as to speak truly, it +is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; +which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent +and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase +as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large, and that +it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention; so as +it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention +is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification +thereof.<br> +<br> +(7) To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, preparation +and suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of +knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. +And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists +near his time, saying, “They did as if one that professed the +art of shoemaking should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only exhibit +in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes.” +But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes +in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. +But our Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, “That the +kingdom of heaven is like a good householder, that bringeth forth both +new and old store;”<i> </i>and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric +do give it in precept, that pleaders should have the places, whereof +they have most continual use, ready handled in all the variety that +may be; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of the law +against equity, and contrary; and to speak for presumptions and inferences +against testimony, and contrary. And Cicero himself, being broken +unto it by great experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever +a man shall have occasion to speak of (if he will take the pains), he +may have it in effect premeditate and handled <i>in thesi</i>. +So that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to do, +but to put to names, and times, and places, and such other circumstances +of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; +who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into +causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a number of +prefaces for orations and speeches. All which authorities and +precedents may overweigh Aristotle’s opinion, that would have +us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears.<br> +<br> +(8) But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory +store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made +an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit +to refer over the further handling of it to rhetoric.<br> +<br> +(9) The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign +and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite our mind +to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, +to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use (truly +taken) only to furnish argument to dispute, probably with others, but +likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. +Neither may these places serve only to apprompt our invention, but also +to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is +half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, “Whosoever seeketh, +knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion; else how shall +he know it when he hath found it?” And, therefore, the larger +your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. +But the same places which will help us what to produce of that which +we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before +us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to instruct +us, what points to search and revolve; so as I cannot report that this +part of invention, which is that which the schools call topics, is deficient.<br> +<br> +(10) Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and special. +The general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched +by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. +But leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools (which +is, to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their command, +and to reject the rest), I do receive particular topics; that is, places +or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge, +as things of great use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences. +For in these it holdeth <i>ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis</i>; +for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which +is passed, but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which +remaineth, so every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light +to that which followeth; which light, if we strengthen by drawing it +forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance our +pursuit.<br> +<br> +XIV. (1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle the natures +of proofs and demonstrations, which as to induction hath a coincidence +with invention; for all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, +the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth - all one as in +the sense. But otherwise it is in proof by syllogism, for the +proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is +one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another; the one exciting +only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form +of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of interpretation +of Nature.<br> +<br> +(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable +to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently end excellently laboured. +For the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding +fixed and unmovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And, +therefore, as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there +is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient +fable of Atlas (that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling) +to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion +is accomplished, so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or +axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual +peril of falling. Therefore men did hasten to set down some principles +about which the variety of their disputatious might turn.<br> +<br> +(3) So, then, this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions +to principles in a middle term. The principles to be agreed by +all and exempted from argument; the middle term to be elected at the +liberty of every man’s invention; the reduction to be of two kinds, +direct and inverted: the one when the proposition is reduced to the +principle, which they term a probation ostensive; the other, when the +contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of +the principle, which is that which they call <i>per incommodum</i>, +or pressing an absurdity; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition +standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle.<br> +<br> +(4) But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way +of direction, the other by way of caution: the former frameth and setteth +down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from +which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged. Toward +the composition and structure of which form it is incident to handle +the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, +which are simple words. And this is that part of logic which is +comprehended in the Analytics.<br> +<br> +(5) The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and +assurance sake, discovering the more subtle forms of sophisms and illaqueations +with their redargutions, which is that which is termed <i>elenches</i>. +For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca +maketh the comparison well) as in juggling feats, which, though we know +not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be; +yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a man besides his +answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.<br> +<br> +(6) This part concerning <i>elenches </i>is excellently handled by Aristotle +in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example; not only in the +persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates himself, who, professing +to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, +hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallace, and redargution. +And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, +yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and +contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of +very great advantage, though the difference be good which was made between +orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath +his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her +advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.<br> +<br> +(7) But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more ample latitude +and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge, +whereof some are laboured and other omitted. For first, I conceive +(though it may seem at first somewhat strange) that that part which +is variably referred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching +the common adjuncts of essences, is but an <i>elenche</i>; for the great +sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and +phrase, specially of such words as are most general and intervene in +every inquiry, it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use (leaving +vain subtleties and speculations) of the inquiry of majority, minority, +priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, +parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against +ambiguities of speech. So, again, the distribution of things into +certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions +against the confusion of definitions and divisions.<br> +<br> +(8) Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of +the impression, and not by the subtlety of the illaqueation - not so +much perplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the imagination. +But this part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric.<br> +<br> +(9) But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind +of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired +at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth +most to rectify judgment, the force whereof is such as it doth not dazzle +or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally +and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind +of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the +beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay, +it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, +if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider +the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature +of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; as first, in that +instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, that to the +nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or +active to affect more than the negative or privative. So that +a few times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failing or absence, +as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune’s +temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck, +and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, “Advise now, you that +think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest.” “Yea, +but,” saith Diagoras, “where are they painted that are drowned?” +Let us behold it in another instance, namely, that the spirit of man, +being of an equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign +in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. +Hence it cometh that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves except +they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, +rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics. +Hence it cometh that whereas there are many things in Nature as it were +<i>monodica</i>, <i>sui juris</i>, yet the cogitations of man do feign +unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing +is; as they have feigned an element of fire to keep square with earth, +water, and air, and the like. Nay, it is not credible, till it +be opened, what a number of fictions and fantasies the similitude of +human actions and arts, together with the making of man <i>communis +mensura</i>, have brought into natural philosophy; not much better than +the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and +solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same +in heathenism, who supposed the gods to be of human shape. And, +therefore, Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked why God should +have adorned the heavens with stars, as if He had been an <i>ædilis</i>, +one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. +For if that great Work-master had been of a human disposition, He would +have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders +like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a +posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite +number, so differing a harmony there is between the spirit of man and +the spirit of Nature.<br> +<br> +(10) Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon us by +every man’s own individual nature and custom in that feigned supposition +that Plato maketh of the cave; for certainly if a child were continued +in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly +abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So, in +like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our +spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, +which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions if they be +not recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples +in one of the errors, or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over +in our first book.<br> +<br> +(11) And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed +upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit +and capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think we govern our +words, and prescribe it well <i>loquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut sapientes</i>, +yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar’s bow, do shoot back +upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert +the judgment. So as it is almost necessary in all controversies +and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting +down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that +others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they +concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, +that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, +in questions and differences about words. To conclude, therefore, +it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from +these fallacies and false appearances because they are inseparable from +our nature and condition of life; so yet, nevertheless, the caution +of them (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions) doth extremely +import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches +or cautions against these three false appearances I find altogether +deficient.<br> +<br> +(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency which +to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also +deficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of proofs +to the differing kinds of subjects. For there being but four kinds +of demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or +sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by congruity, which is that which +Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not <i>a notioribus</i>, +every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which +respectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which +respectively they ought to be excluded; and the rigour and curiosity +in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the +facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, +hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to +knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations +according to the analogy of sciences I note as deficient.<br> +<br> +XV. (1) The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing or +memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character +and the order of the entry. For the art of characters, or other +visible notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar, +and, therefore, I refer it to the due place; for the disposition and +collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth +in a good digest of common-places, wherein I am not ignorant of the +prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books, as causing a retardation +of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But because +it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, +except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of common-places to +be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as that which assureth +copy of invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But +this is true, that of the methods of common-places that I have seen, +there is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying merely the +face of a school and not of a world; and referring to vulgar matters +and pedantical divisions, without all life or respect to action.<br> +<br> +(2) For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which +is memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. +An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me that there are better +precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than those +received. It is certain the art (as it is) may be raised to points +of ostentation prodigious; but in use (as is now managed) it is barren, +not burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but +barren, that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business +and occasions. And, therefore, I make no more estimation of repeating +a great number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth +of a number of verses or rhymes <i>extempore</i>, or the making of a +satirical simile of everything, or the turning of everything to a jest, +or the falsifying or contradicting of everything by cavil, or the like +(whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copy, and such +as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder), +than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines; the one +being the same in the mind that the other is in the body, matters of +strangeness without worthiness.<br> +<br> +(3) This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one prenotion, +the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite seeking +of that we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass, +that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. +Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike +the memory more; out of which axioms may be drawn much better practice +than that in use; and besides which axioms, there are divers more touching +help of memory not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning +distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only +ill managed.<br> +<br> +XVI. (1) There remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge, which +is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge +to others, which I will term by the general name of tradition or delivery. +Tradition hath three parts: the first concerning the organ of tradition; +the second concerning the method of tradition; and the third concerning +the illustration of tradition.<br> +<br> +(2) For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing; for +Aristotle saith well, “Words are the images of cogitations, and +letters are the images of words.” But yet it is not of necessity +that cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. For whatsoever +is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, +is in nature competent to express cogitations. And, therefore, +we see in the commerce of barbarous people that understand not one another’s +language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that +men’s minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet +to serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is the use +of China and the kingdoms of the High Levant to write in characters +real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but things or +notions; insomuch as countries and provinces which understand not one +another’s language can nevertheless read one another’s writings, +because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages +do extend; and, therefore, they have a vast multitude of characters, +as many, I suppose, as radical words.<br> +<br> +(3) These notes of cogitations are of two sorts: the one when the note +hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the other <i>ad placitum</i>, +having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former sort +are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics (things +of ancient use and embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most +ancient nations), they are but as continued impresses and emblems. +And as for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to +hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in that they abide +not; but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with +the things signified. As Periander, being consulted with how to +preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report +what he saw him do; and went into his garden and topped all the highest +flowers, signifying that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping +low of the nobility and grandees. <i>Ad placitum</i>, are the +characters real before mentioned, and words: although some have been +willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to have derived +imposition of names from reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, +and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent, but sparingly +mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This portion of knowledge +touching the notes of things and cogitations in general, I find not +inquired, but deficient. And although it may seem of no great +use, considering that words and writings by letters do far excel all +the other ways; yet because this part concerneth, as it were, the mint +of knowledge (for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, +as moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that +moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver), I thought good +to propound it to better inquiry.<br> +<br> +(4) Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath produced +the science of grammar. For man still striveth to reintegrate +himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been +deprived; and as he hath striven against the first general curse by +the invention of all other arts, so hath he sought to come forth of +the second general curse (which was the confusion of tongues) by the +art of grammar; whereof the use in a mother tongue is small, in a foreign +tongue more; but most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar +tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty of it +is of two natures: the one popular, which is for the speedy and perfect +attaining languages, as well for intercourse of speech as for understanding +of authors; the other philosophical, examining the power and nature +of words, as they are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind +of analogy between words and reason is handled <i>sparsim</i>, brokenly +though not entirely; and, therefore, I cannot report it deficient, though +I think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself.<br> +<br> +(5) Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of +the accidents of words; which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, +and the sweetness and harshness of them: whence hath issued some curious +observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect +of the verse and not of the argument. Wherein though men in learned +tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages +it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances; +for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured speech. +In these things this sense is better judge than the art:<br> +<br> +<br> + “Cœnæ fercula nostræ<br> +Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.”<br> +<br> +<br> +And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an unfit subject, +it is well said, “<i>Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate +est maxime novum</i>.”<br> +<br> +(6) For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets, but may +be in words. The kinds of ciphers (besides the simple ciphers, +with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants) are many, +according to the nature or rule of the infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, +doubles, &c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are to +be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write and read; +that they be impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be +without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write <i>omnia +per omnia</i>; which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple +at most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no other +restraint whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath for relative +an art of deciphering, by supposition unprofitable, but, as things are, +of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well managed, there +be multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer. But in regard +of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, +the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers.<br> +<br> +(7) In the enumeration of these private and retired arts it may be thought +I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them for show +and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those, which +are skilful in them, judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, +or whether in that which I speak of them (though in few words) there +be not some seed of proficience. And this must be remembered, +that as there be many of great account in their countries and provinces, +which, when they come up to the seat of the estate, are but of mean +rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here placed with the +principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things: yet to such as have +chosen them to spend their labours and studies in them, they seem great +matters.<br> +<br> +XVII. (1) For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a controversy +in our time. But as in civil business, if there be a meeting, +and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of the matter for that +time, and no proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much +controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For this part +of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report +it deficient.<br> +<br> +(2) Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in logic, as a part +of judgment. For as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the +rules of judgment upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of method +containeth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be delivered; +for judgment precedeth delivery, as it followeth invention. Neither +is the method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use +of knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since +the labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, +the wisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of +continuance and proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity +of method is of method referred to use, and method referred to progression: +whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other of probation.<br> +<br> +(3) The latter whereof seemeth to be <i>via deserta et interclusa</i>. +For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of +error between the deliverer and the receiver. For he that delivereth +knowledge desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, +and not as may be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge desireth +rather present satisfaction than expectant inquiry; and so rather not +to doubt, than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open his +weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength.<br> +<br> +(4) But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on ought +to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method +wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge induced. +But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth +how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet, +nevertheless, <i>secundum majus et minus</i>, a man may revisit and +descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant +it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges +as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for +the roots - but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured +to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges (as it +is now used) is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for +the carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences +grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look +well to the taking up of the roots. Of which kind of delivery +the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath some shadow: but +generally I see it neither put in use nor put in inquisition, and therefore +note it for deficient.<br> +<br> +(5) Another diversity of method there is, which hath some affinity with +the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but +disgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons, who have made +it as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises; and that is +enigmatical and disclosed. The pretence whereof is, to remove +the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, +and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness +as can pierce the veil.<br> +<br> +(6) Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great, is +the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we may +observe that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms +or observations upon any subject, to make a solemn and formal art, filling +it with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting +it into a sensible method. But the writing in aphorisms hath many +excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not approach.<br> +<br> +(7) For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: +for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but +of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is +cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connection and +order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off. So there +remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation; +and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to write +aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in methods,<br> +<br> +<br> + “Tantum series juncturaque pollet,<br> +Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris,”<br> +<br> +<br> +as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were disjointed, +would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent +or belief, but less fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of +demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore +satisfy. But particulars being dispersed do best agree with dispersed +directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, +do invite men to inquire further; whereas methods, carrying the show +of a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest.<br> +<br> +(8) Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, +is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by questions +and their determinations. The latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately +followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning as it is to +the proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or +hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise +pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselves: indeed a man +would not leave some important piece enemy at his back. In like +manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to +be very sparing; and to serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, +and not to minister and excite disputatious and doubts.<br> +<br> +(9) Another diversity of method is, according to the subject or matter +which is handled. For there is a great difference in delivery +of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and +policy, which is the most immersed. And howsoever contention hath +been moved, touching a uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, +yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of +ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce +learning to certain empty and barren generalities; being but the very +husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed +with the torture and press of the method. And, therefore, as I +did allow well of particular topics for invention, so I do allow likewise +of particular methods of tradition.<br> +<br> +(10) Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and teaching of knowledge +is, according unto the light and presuppositions of that which is delivered. +For that knowledge which is new, and foreign from opinions received, +is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable and familiar; +and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth +commend him, where he saith “If we shall indeed dispute, and not +follow after similitudes,” &c. For those whose conceits +are seated in popular opinions need only but to prove or dispute; but +those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; +the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate. +So that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes +and translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy +of learning, and in rude times when those conceits which are now trivial +were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else +would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for +paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood or judged. +So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are, +for it is a rule, that whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions +must pray in aid of similitudes.<br> +<br> +(11) There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received: +as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of concealment +or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though I have stood upon +those which are least handled and observed. All which I have remembered +to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one general inquiry +(which seems to me deficient) touching the wisdom of tradition.<br> +<br> +(12) But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method, doth further +belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also +the several beams and columns thereof; not as to their stuff, but as +to their quantity and figure. And therefore method considereth +not only the disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the +propositions: not as to their truth or matter, but as to their limitation +and manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving +the good rules of propositions - Καθολον +πρωτον, κυτα παντος +&c. - than he did in introducing the canker of epitomes; and yet +(as it is the condition of human things that, according to the ancient +fables, “the most precious things have the most pernicious keepers”) +it was so, that the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. +For he had need be well conducted that should design to make axioms +convertible, if he make them not withal circular, and non-promovent, +or incurring into themselves; but yet the intention was excellent.<br> +<br> +(13) The other considerations of method, concerning propositions, are +chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the dimensions +of sciences: for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity +(which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solid), to have +a longitude and a latitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, +and the longitude towards action; that is, from the greatest generality +to the most particular precept. The one giveth rule how far one +knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of another, which +is the rule they call Καθαυτο; +the other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge +should descend: which latter I find passed over in silence, being in +my judgment the more material. For certainty there must be somewhat +left to practice; but how much is worthy the inquiry? We see remote +and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical +men; and are no more aiding to practice than an Ortelius’ universal +map is to direct the way between London and York. The better sort +of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, +where you may see the images of things, but first they must be filed: +so the rules will help if they be laboured and polished by practice. +But how crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far forth +they may be polished aforehand, is the question, the inquiry whereof +seemeth to me deficient.<br> +<br> +(14) There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, which +is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture: which is, to deliver +knowledges in such manner as men may speedily come to make a show of +learning, who have it not. Such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius +in making that art which bears his name; not unlike to some books of +typocosmy, which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words +of all arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms +might be thought to understand the art; which collections are much like +a fripper’s or broker’s shop, that hath ends of everything, +but nothing of worth.<br> +<br> +XVIII. (1) Now we descend to that part which concerneth the illustration +of tradition, comprehended in that science which we call rhetoric, or +art of eloquence, a science excellent, and excellently well laboured. +For although in true value it is inferior to wisdom (as it is said by +God to Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this faculty, “Aaron +shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God”), yet with +people it is the more mighty; for so Solomon saith, <i>Sapiens corde +appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet</i>, signifying +that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, +but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And +as to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians +of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works +of rhetoric exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples +of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the +perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression +in this art; and therefore the deficiences which I shall note will rather +be in some collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than +in the rules or use of the art itself.<br> +<br> +(2) Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots +of this science, as we have done of the rest, the duty and office of +rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of +the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the administration +thereof by three means - by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains +to logic; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; +and by passion or affection, which pertains to morality. And as +in negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by importunity, +and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are undermined +by inconsequences, solicited and importuned by impressions or observations, +and transported by passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately +built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, +and not to establish and advance it. For the end of logic is to +teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the +end of morality is to procure the affections to obey reason, and not +to invade it; the end of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second +reason, and not to oppress it; for these abuses of arts come in but +<i>ex oblique</i>, for caution.<br> +<br> +(3) And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing +out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric +but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome +meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of +the taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning +that which is good than in colouring that which is evil; for there is +no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; and it was +excellently noted by Thucydides, in Cleon, that because he used to hold +on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing +against eloquence and good speech, knowing that no man can speak fair +of courses sordid and base. And therefore, as Plato said elegantly, +“That virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and +affection;” so seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by +corporal shape, the next degree is to show her to the imagination in +lively representation; for to show her to reason only in subtlety of +argument was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics, +who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, +which have no sympathy with the will of man.<br> +<br> +(4) Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient +to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions +and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; +but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditious of the affections +-<br> +<br> +<br> + “Video meliora, proboque,<br> +Deteriora sequor,”<br> +<br> +<br> +reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions +did not practise and win the imagination from the affections’ +part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination +against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an +appetite to good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the +affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future +and sum of time. And, therefore, the present filling the imagination +more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence +and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, +then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.<br> +<br> +(5) We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with +the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or morality +with vice; for we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though +the use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from +rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm - the one close, the other +at large - but much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and +in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions +and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric +as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the +other, as participating of both; for the proofs and demonstrations of +logic are toward all men indifferent and the same, but the proofs and +persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:<br> +<br> +<br> +“Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion.”<br> +<br> +<br> +Which application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far that +if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should +speak to them all respectively and several ways; though this politic +part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators +to want: whilst, by the observing their well-graced forms of speech, +they leese the volubility of application; and therefore it shall not +be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry, not being curious whether +we place it here or in that part which concerneth policy.<br> +<br> +(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as I said, +are but attendances; and first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence +of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular +signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which +are as the sophisms of rhetoric (as I touched before). For example +-<br> +<br> +<br> + “<i>Sophisma</i>.<br> +Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.<br> + <i>Redargutio</i>.<br> +Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.”<br> +<br> +<br> +<i>Malum est</i>, <i>malum est (inquit emptor): sed cum recesserit, +tum gloriabitur</i>! The defects in the labour of Aristotle are +three - one, that there be but a few of many; another, that there elenches +are not annexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the +use of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in +impression. For many forms are equal in signification which are +differing in impression, as the difference is great in the piercing +of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of +the percussion be the same. For there is no man but will be a +little more raised by hearing it said, “Your enemies will be glad +of this” -<br> +<br> +<br> +“Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ.”<br> +<br> +<br> +than by hearing it said only, “This is evil for you.”<br> +<br> +(7) Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching +provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness +of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts: the one in resemblance +to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made +up; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request. +The former of these I will call <i>antitheta</i>, and the latter <i>formulæ.<br> +<br> +</i>(8) <i>Antitheta </i>are theses argued <i>pro et contra</i>, wherein +men may be more large and laborious; but (in such as are able to do +it) to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments +to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, +but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when +they come to be used; supplying authorities and examples by reference.<br> +<br> +<br> + “<i>Pro verbis legis.<br> +</i>Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit a litera:<br> +Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.<br> +<br> + <i>Pro sententia legis</i>.<br> +Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula.”<br> +<br> +<br> +(9) <i>Formulæ</i> are but decent and apt passages or conveyances +of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as +of preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. +For as in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well casting +of the staircases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, +the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect.<br> +<br> +<br> +“<i>A conclusion in a deliberative.<br> +</i>So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences +future.”<br> +<br> +<br> +XIX. (1) There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, +the one critical, the other pedantical. For all knowledge is either +delivered by teachers, or attained by men’s proper endeavours: +and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth +chiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading +of books; whereunto appertain incidently these considerations. +The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors; +wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. +For these critics have often presumed that that which they understand +not is false set down: as the priest that, where he found it written +of St. Paul <i>Demissus est per sportam</i>, mended his book, and made +it <i>Demissus est per portam</i>; because <i>sporta </i>was a hard +word, and out of his reading: and surely their errors, though they be +not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And +therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are +commonly the least correct.<br> +<br> +The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, +which resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein it is over usual +to blanch the obscure places and discourse upon the plain.<br> +<br> +The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light +to true interpretations.<br> +<br> +The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors; +that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to +read.<br> +<br> +And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; that +men may know in what order or pursuit to read.<br> +<br> +(2) For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of tradition +which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers considerations +of great fruit.<br> +<br> +As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with what to initiate +them, and from what for a time to refrain them.<br> +<br> +Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so +proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to press the more +difficult, and then to turn them to the more easy; for it is one method +to practise swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing +with heavy shoes.<br> +<br> +A third is the application of learning according unto the propriety +of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, but +seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as, for example, +if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, +the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be +caught away but a moment, one is new to begin. And as sciences +have a propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or +powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: +and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what kinds of wits and +natures are most apt and proper for what sciences.<br> +<br> +Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to +hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising +their faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults +and get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a great judgment +to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises. It +were too long to particularise a number of other considerations of this +nature, things but of mean appearance, but of singular efficacy. +For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants is that that +is most important to their thriving, and as it was noted that the first +six kings being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the infancy +thereof was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that state +which followed, so the culture and manurance of minds in youth hath +such a forcible (though unseen) operation, as hardly any length of time +or contention of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it +is not amiss to observe also how small and mean faculties gotten by +education, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, do work +great and important effects: whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus +of two stage players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty +of playing put the Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combustion. +For there arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus Cæsar, +Blæsus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutineers, which +were suddenly rescued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which +he did in this manner:- “These poor innocent wretches appointed +to cruel death, you have restored to behold the light; but who shall +restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that was sent hither +in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the common cause? +and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his fencers and +ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners upon soldiers. +Answer, Blæsus, what is done with his body? The mortalest +enemies do not deny burial. When I have performed my last duties +to the corpse with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain besides +him; so that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true hearts +to the legions, may have leave to bury us.” With which speech +he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar: whereas truth was +he had no brother, neither was there any such matter; but he played +it merely as if he had been upon the stage.<br> +<br> +(3) But to return: we are now come to a period of rational knowledges; +wherein if I have made the divisions other than those that are received, +yet would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do +not use. For there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering +the divisions. The one, because it differeth in end and purpose, +to sort together those things which are next in nature, and those things +which are next in use. For if a secretary of estate should sort +his papers, it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort +together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, &c. +But in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort together those +that he were like to use together, though of several natures. +So in this general cabinet of knowledge it was necessary for me to follow +the divisions of the nature of things; whereas if myself had been to +handle any particular knowledge, I would have respected the divisions +fittest for use. The other, because the bringing in of the deficiences +did by consequence alter the partitions of the rest. For let the +knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be fifteen. Let the +knowledge with the deficiences be twenty; the parts of fifteen are not +the parts of twenty; for the parts of fifteen are three and five; the +parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as these things +are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be.<br> +<br> +XX. (1) We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the appetite +and will of man: whereof Solomon saith, <i>Ante omnia, fili, custodi +cor tuum: nam inde procedunt actiones vitæ</i>. In the handling +of this science, those which have written seem to me to have done as +if a man, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies +of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions +for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So have +they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts +and portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well +described as the true objects and scopes of man’s will and desires. +But how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue +the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they +pass it over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably. For it +is not the disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit +and not by nature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won +by doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, +and the like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence +of this part.<br> +<br> +(2) The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden rock whereupon +both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast away; which +is, that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary and common matters, +the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine +(for life consisteth not in novelties nor subtleties), but contrariwise +they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous +mass of matter, chosen to give glory either to the subtlety of disputatious, +or to the eloquence of discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent +check to eloquence, <i>Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem +facit, sed sui</i>. Doctrine should be such as should make men +in love with the lesson, and not with the teacher; being directed to +the auditor’s benefit, and not to the author’s commendation. +And therefore those are of the right kind which may be concluded as +Demosthenes concludes his counsel, <i>Quæ si feceritis, non oratorem +dumtaxat in præsentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam non ita +multo post statu rerum vestraram meliore.<br> +<br> +</i>(3) Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of +a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself, and indeed obtained, +who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing +of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroical acts of Æneas:<br> +<br> +<br> +“Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum<br> +Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem.”<br> +<br> +<br> +And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at leisure +that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn +action and active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry +and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions +of virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive +division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform +of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind: the one describing +the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, +and accommodate the will of man thereunto.<br> +<br> +(4) The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good considereth +it either simple or compared; either the kinds of good, or the degrees +of good; in the latter whereof those infinite disputatious which were +touching the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, +or the highest good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen +divinity, are by the Christian faith discharged. And as Aristotle +saith, “That young men may be happy, but not otherwise but by +hope;” so we must all acknowledge our minority, and embrace the +felicity which is by hope of the future world.<br> +<br> +(5) Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the philosopher’s +heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of man’s nature +than was (for we see in what height of style Seneca writeth, <i>Vere +magnum</i>, <i>habere fragilitatem hominis</i>, <i>securitatem Dei</i>), +we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries +and labours. Wherein for the nature of good positive or simple, +they have set it down excellently in describing the forms of virtue +and duty, with their situations and postures; in distributing them into +their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administrations, and the +like: nay further, they have commended them to man’s nature and +spirit with great quickness of argument and beauty of persuasions; yea, +and fortified and entrenched them (as much as discourse can do) against +corrupt and popular opinions. Again, for the degrees and comparative +nature of good, they have also excellently handled it in their triplicity +of good, in the comparisons between a contemplative and an active life, +in the distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, +in their encounters between honesty and profit, in their balancing of +virtue with virtue, and the like; so as this part deserveth to be reported +for excellently laboured.<br> +<br> +(6) Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular and received +notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had +stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good +and evil, and the strings of those roots, they had given, in my opinion, +a great light to that which followed; and specially if they had consulted +with nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound: +which being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much confusion, +we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner.<br> +<br> +(7) There is formed in everything a double nature of good - the one, +as everything is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it +is a part or member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in degree +the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation +of a more general form. Therefore we see the iron in particular +sympathy moveth to the loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, +it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot +moveth to the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies; +so may we go forward, and see that water and massy bodies move to the +centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance +of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the earth, forsaking +their duty to the earth in regard of their duty to the world. +This double nature of good, and the comparative thereof, is much more +engraven upon man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation +of duty to the public ought to be much more precious than the conservation +of life and being; according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, +when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being +dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him, +that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, +he said only to them, <i>Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam</i>. +But it may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, +or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good +which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, +as the Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the same God that gave +the Christian law to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate +creatures that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints +of God have wished themselves anathematised and razed out of the book +of life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion.<br> +<br> +(8) This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine +most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant. +For first, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the contemplative +or active life, and decideth it against Aristotle. For all the +reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative are private, and respecting +the pleasure and dignity of a man’s self (in which respects no +question the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence), not much unlike +to that comparison which Pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying +of philosophy and contemplation, who being asked what he was, answered, +“That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, +that some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as +merchants to utter their commodities, and some came to make good cheer +and meet their friends, and some came to look on; and that he was one +of them that came to look on.” But men must know, that in +this theatre of man’s life it is reserved only for God and angels +to be lookers on. Neither could the like question ever have been +received in the Church, notwithstanding their <i>Pretiosa in oculis +Domini mors sanctorum ejus</i>, by which place they would exalt their +civil death and regular professions, but upon this defence, that the +monastical life is not simple contemplative, but performeth the duty +either of incessant prayers and supplications, which hath been truly +esteemed as an office in the Church, or else of writing or taking instructions +for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did when he abode so +long in the mount. And so we see Enoch, the seventh from Adam, +who was the first contemplative and walked with God, yet did also endow +the Church with prophecy, which Saint Jude citeth. But for contemplation +which should be finished in itself, without casting beams upon society, +assuredly divinity knoweth it not.<br> +<br> +(9) It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and +their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed felicity +in virtue simply or attended, the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly +embrace and concern society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and +Epicureans, who placed it in pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used +in some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change +habits) to be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot be served +and attended; and the reformed school of the Epicureans, which placed +it in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation; as if they would +have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when +there was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one +air and season; and Herillus, which placed felicity in extinguishment +of the disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, +esteeming things according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation; +which opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring +things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or +wavering of belief; all which are manifest to tend to private repose +and contentment, and not to point of society.<br> +<br> +(10) It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth +that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, +lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance; as if it were not a thing +much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than +to obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune: as +Consalvo said to his soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting he +had rather die one foot forwards, than to have his life secured for +long by one foot of retreat. Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly +leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that “a good conscience +is a continual feast;” showing plainly that the conscience of +good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more continual joy to nature +than all the provision which can be made for security and repose.<br> +<br> +(11) It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which grew general +about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an occupation or +profession; as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish +perturbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape +a particular kind and course of life to that end; introducing such a +health of mind, as was that health of body of which Aristotle speaketh +of Herodicus, who did nothing all his life long but intend his health; +whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that health +of body is best which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities, +so likewise that health of mind is most proper which can go through +the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes’ +opinion is to be accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but +them which sustained, and could refrain their mind <i>in præcipitio</i>, +and could give unto the mind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest +stop or turn.<br> +<br> +(12) Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in +some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical +men, that did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of +indignities and perturbations; whereas the resolution of men truly moral +ought to be such as the same Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should +be, <i>e telâ crassiore</i>, and not so fine as that everything +should catch in it and endanger it.<br> +<br> +XXI. (1) To resume private or particular good, it falleth into the division +of good active and passive; for this difference of good (not unlike +to that which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household +terms of <i>promus </i>and <i>condus</i>) is formed also in all things, +and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures; the +one to preserve or continue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply +themselves, whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier; for in nature +the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent, and the earth, +which is the less worthy, is the patient. In the pleasures of +living creatures, that of generation is greater than that of food. +In divine doctrine, <i>beatius est dare quam accipere</i>. And +in life, there is no man’s spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting +of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, more than sensuality, +which priority of the active good is much upheld by the consideration +of our estate to be mortal and exposed to fortune. For if we might +have a perpetuity and certainty in our pleasures, the state of them +would advance their price. But when we see it is but <i>magni +æstimamus mori tardius</i>, and <i>ne glorieris de crastino, nescis +partum diei</i>, it maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured and +exempted from time, which are only our deeds and works; as it is said, +<i>Opera eorum sequuntur eos</i>. The pre-eminence likewise of +this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural in man +towards variety and proceeding, which in the pleasures of the sense, +which is the principal part of passive good, can have no great latitude. +<i>Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris; cibus, somnus, ludus per hunc circulum +curritur; mori velle non tantum fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, sed +etiam fastidiosus potest</i>. But in enterprises, pursuits, and +purposes of life, there is much variety; whereof men are sensible with +pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils, reintegrations, +approaches and attainings to their ends. So as it was well said, +<i>Vita sine proposito languida et vaga est</i>. Neither hath +this active good an identity with the good of society, though in some +cases it hath an incidence into it. For although it do many times +bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to +a man’s own power, glory, amplification, continuance; as appeareth +plainly, when it findeth a contrary subject. For that gigantine +state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was +Lucius Sylla and infinite other in smaller model, who would have all +men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or enemies, and would +give form to the world, according to their own humours (which is the +true theomachy), pretendeth and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth +furthest from good of society, which we have determined to be the greater.<br> +<br> +(2) To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of conservative +and effective. For let us take a brief review of that which we +have said: we have spoken first of the good of society, the intention +whereof embraceth the form of human nature, whereof we are members and +portions, and not our own proper and individual form; we have spoken +of active good, and supposed it as a part of private and particular +good. And rightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple +desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves: one of preserving +and continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their +form; and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other +things: whereof the multiplying, or signature of it upon other things, +is that which we handled by the name of active good. So as there +remaineth the conserving of it, and perfecting or raising of it, which +latter is the highest degree of passive good. For to preserve +in state is the less, to preserve with advancement is the greater. +So in man,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Igneus est ollis vigor, et cælestis origo.”<br> +<br> +<br> +His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the perfection +of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is that which +is the tempest of human life; while man, upon the instinct of an advancement, +formal and essential, is carried to seek an advancement local. +For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and down +and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove +internal, so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the mean to +exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their +place. So then passive good is, as was said, either conservative +or perfective.<br> +<br> +(3) To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth +in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth +to be most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and lowest. +And this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged +of, nor well inquired; for the good of fruition or contentment is placed +either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour +of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other by vicissitude; the +one having less mixture of evil, the other more impression of good. +Whether of these is the greater good is a question controverted; but +whether man’s nature may not be capable of both is a question +not inquired.<br> +<br> +(4) The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist, +Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and +the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument +to ill words: the sophist saying that Socrates’ felicity was the +felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist’s +felicity was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing +but itch and scratch. And both these opinions do not want their +supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general +consent even of the epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a great +part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more use +in clearing perturbations then in compassing desires. The sophist’s +opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good +of advancement is greater than good of simple preservation; because +every obtaining a desire hath a show of advancement, as motion though +in a circle hath a show of progression.<br> +<br> +(5) But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the former +superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there are some who +take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet, nevertheless, +are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them? So as this +same, <i>Non uti ut non appetas, non appetere ut non metuas, sunt animi +pusilli et diffidentis</i>. And it seemeth to me that most of +the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautious than +the nature of things requireth. So have they increased the fear +of death in offering to cure it. For when they would have a man’s +whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs +make men think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no +end of preparing. Better saith the poet:-<br> +<br> +<br> +“Qui finem vitæ extremum inter munera ponat<br> +Naturæ.”<br> +<br> +<br> +So have they sought to make men’s minds too uniform and harmonical, +by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions; the reasons whereof +I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated to a private, +free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute +or like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many +changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and +passages, as a set song or voluntary; much after the same manner was +the diversity between a philosophical and civil life. And, therefore, +men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers: who, if there be a grain, +or a cloud, or an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much +of the stone, they help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone +too much, they will not meddle with it: so ought men so to procure serenity +as they destroy not magnanimity.<br> +<br> +(6) Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private and particular, +as far as seemeth fit, we will now return to that good of man which +respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because the +term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards +others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed and composed +in itself; though neither can a man understand virtue without some relation +to society, nor duty without an inward disposition. This part +may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic; but not if +it be well observed. For it concerneth the regiment and government +of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in architecture +the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts of building, +is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; +and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or engine +is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing +it; and yet, nevertheless, in expressing of the one you incidently express +the aptness towards the other; so the doctrine of conjugation of men +in society differeth from that of their conformity thereunto.<br> +<br> +(7) This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common duty +of every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the respective +or special duty of every man in his profession, vocation, and place. +The first of these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. +The second likewise I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which +manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I acknowledge to +be best. For who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, +virtue, challenge, and right of every several vocation, profession, +and place? For although sometimes a looker on may see more than +a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, “That +the vale best discovereth the hill;” yet there is small doubt +but that men can write best and most really and materially in their +own professions; and that the writing of speculative men of active matter +for the most part doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio’s +argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage. +Only there is one vice which accompanieth them that write in their own +professions, that they magnify them in excess. But generally it +were to be wished (as that which would make learning indeed solid and +fruitful) that active men would or could become writers.<br> +<br> +(8) In which kind I cannot but mention, <i>honoris causa</i>, your Majesty’s +excellent book touching the duty of a king; a work richly compounded +of divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other +arts; and being in some opinion one of the most sound and healthful +writings that I have read: not distempered in the heat of invention, +nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of dizziness, as those are +who leese themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which +cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, +as those do who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; +and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to +truth and apt for action; and far removed from that natural infirmity, +whereunto I noted those that write in their own professions to be subject +- which is, that they exalt it above measure. For your Majesty +hath truly described, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern +glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of their people. Neither +can I ever leese out of my remembrance what I heard your Majesty in +the same sacred spirit of government deliver in a great cause of judicature, +which was, “That kings ruled by their laws, as God did by the +laws of nature; and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative +as God doth His power of working miracles.” And yet notwithstanding +in your book of a free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, +that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well +as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to +allege this excellent writing of your Majesty, as a prime or eminent +example of tractates concerning special and respective duties; wherein +I should have said as much, if it had been written a thousand years +since. Neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which +esteem it flattery to praise in presence. No, it is flattery to +praise in absence - that is, when either the virtue is absent, or the +occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced, either +in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration <i>pro +Marcello</i>, which is nothing but an excellent table of Cæsar’s +virtue, and made to his face; besides the example of many other excellent +persons, wiser a great deal than such observers; and we will never doubt, +upon a full occasion, to give just praises to present or absent.<br> +<br> +(9) But to return; there belongeth further to the handling of this part, +touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite, +touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, +which hath been likewise handled; but how? rather in a satire and cynically, +than seriously and wisely; for men have rather sought by wit to deride +and traduce much of that which is good in professions, than with judgment +to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For, as Solomon saith, +he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure +shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: +<i>Quærenti derisori scientiam ipsa se abscondit; sed studioso +fit obviam</i>. But the managing of this argument with integrity +and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the +best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. +For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk - that if he see you first, +you die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth - so is it with deceits +and evil arts, which, if they be first espied they leese their life; +but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we are much beholden +to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought +to do. For it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the +columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the +serpent; his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, +his envy and sting, and the rest - that is, all forms and natures of +evil. For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. +Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim +them, without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men of corrupted +minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, +and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and men’s exterior +language. So as, except you can make them perceive that you know +the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality. +<i>Non recipit stultus verba prudentiæ, nisi ea dixeris quæ, +versantur in corde ejus.<br> +<br> +</i>(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also appertain +the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant. +So likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of +companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other +proportionate duties; not as they are parts of government and society, +but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons.<br> +<br> +(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it +also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the weighing +of duties between person and person, case and case, particular and public. +As we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which +was so much extolled, yet what was said?<br> +<br> +<br> +“Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores.”<br> +<br> +<br> +So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again, +we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose +opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their +associates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant +being a usurper, they were divided in opinion; some holding that servitude +was the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was better than a +civil war: and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty. +Amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where the question +is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice. Which +Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: <i>Aliqua sunt injuste +facienda, ut multa juste fieri possint</i>. But the reply is good: +<i>Auctorem præsentis justitiæ habes, sponsorem futuræ +non habes</i>. Men must pursue things which are just in present, +and leave the future to the Divine Providence. So then we pass +on from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good.<br> +<br> +XXII. (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit of life, +it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without +which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or statue, +which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion; whereunto +Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words: <i>Necesse est scilicet +de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile +enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, acquirendæ autem ejus +modos et vias ignorare. Non enum de virtute tantum, qua specie +sit, quærendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat: utrumque +enum volumeus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri: hoc autem +ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo</i>. +In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part. +So saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the second, that he had +applied himself to philosophy, <i>Non ita disputandi causa, sed ita +vivendi</i>. And although the neglect of our times, wherein few +men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their life +(as Seneca excellently saith, <i>De partibus vitæ quisque deliberat, +de summa nemo</i>), may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must +conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, <i>Qui gravi morbo correpti +dolores non sentiunt, iis mens ægrotat</i>. They need medicine, +not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if +it be said that the cure of men’s minds belongeth to sacred divinity, +it is most true; but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her +as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, +“That the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress,” +and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid +to discern of the mistress’ will; so ought moral philosophy to +give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet so as +it may yield of herself (within due limits) many sound and profitable +directions.<br> +<br> +(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I cannot +but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry; +the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech +and action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of +men (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than +their books. It is reasonable, therefore, that we propound it +in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may +acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost incredible, +and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that +have written. We will, therefore, enumerate some heads or points +thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be +extant.<br> +<br> +(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical +we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not; +for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by +way of application only. The husbandman cannot command neither +the nature of the earth nor the seasons of the weather; no more can +the physician the constitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents. +So in the culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without +our command: points of Nature, and points of fortune. For to the +basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is limited +and tied. In these things, therefore, it is left unto us to proceed +by application<br> +<br> +<br> +“Vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo:”<br> +<br> +<br> +and so likewise,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.”<br> +<br> +<br> +But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and neglected +suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth and +contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary; +which is that properly which we call accommodating or applying. +Now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct +knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we do apply; +for we cannot fit a garment except we first take measure of the body.<br> +<br> +(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound +and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and +tempers of men’s natures and dispositions, specially having regard +to those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and +causes of the rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein +it is not the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe +the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention. +For if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are proportioned +to great matters, and others to small (which Aristotle handleth, or +ought to have bandied, by the name of magnanimity), doth it not deserve +as well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to intend +many matters, and others to few? So that some can divide themselves: +others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in few things +at once; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as +a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned to +that which may be dispatched at once, or within a short return of time; +others to that which begins afar off, and is to be won with length of +pursuit:-<br> +<br> +<br> +“Jam tum tenditqus fovetque.”<br> +<br> +<br> +So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly +also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it +to be considered by Aristotle, “That there is a disposition in +conversation (supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern +a man’s self) to soothe and please, and a disposition contrary +to contradict and cross;” and deserveth it not much better to +be considered. “That there is a disposition, not in conversation +or talk, but in matter of more serious nature (and supposing it still +in things merely indifferent), to take pleasure in the good of another; +and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another?” +which is that properly which we call good nature or ill nature, benignity +or malignity; and, therefore, I cannot sufficiently marvel that this +part of knowledge, touching the several characters of natures and dispositions, +should be omitted both in morality and policy, considering it is of +so great ministry and suppeditation to them both. A man shall +find in the traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of +men’s natures, according to the predominances of the planets: +lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, +lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. +A man shall find in the wisest sort of these relations which the Italians +make touching conclaves, the natures of the several cardinals handsomely +and lively painted forth. A man shall meet with in every day’s +conference the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, +certain, <i>huomo di prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione</i>, +and the like; and yet, nevertheless, this kind of observations wandereth +in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are +found (many of them), but we conclude no precepts upon them: wherein +our fault is the greater, because both history, poesy, and daily experience +are as goodly fields where these observations grow; whereof we make +a few posies to hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary +that receipts might be made of them for use of life.<br> +<br> +(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed +upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sickness, +by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not extern; +and again, those which are caused by extern fortune, as sovereignty, +nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, +adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising <i>per saltum, +per gradus</i>, and the like. And, therefore, we see that Plautus +maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, <i>benignitas hujis +ut adolescentuli est</i>. Saint Paul concludeth that severity +of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, <i>increpa eos dure</i>, +upon the disposition of their country, <i>Cretensus semper mendaces, +malæ bestiæ, ventres</i>. Sallust noteth that it is +usual with kings to desire contradictories: <i>Sed plerumque regiæ +voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, sæpeque ipsæ +sibi advers</i>. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune +mendeth the disposition: <i>solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius</i>. +Pindarus maketh an observation, that great and sudden fortune for the +most part defeateth men <i>qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt</i>. +So the Psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying +of fortune, than in the increase of fortune; <i>Divitiæ si affluant, +nolite cor apponere</i>. These observations and the like I deny +not but are touched a little by Aristotle as in passage in his Rhetorics, +and are handled in some scattered discourses; but they were never incorporate +into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the +knowledge of this diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, +and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions +doth to the physician, except we mean to follow the indiscretion of +empirics, which minister the same medicines to all patients.<br> +<br> +(6) Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the affections; +for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to know the divers +complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; and lastly, the +cures: so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters +of men’s natures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and +infirmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and +distempars of the affections. For as the ancient politiques in +popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the +orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm and +quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would +be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them +in working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in +the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, +as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here +again I find strange, as before, that Aristotle should have written +divers volumes of Ethics, and never handled the affections which is +the principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, where they +are considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may +be moved by speech), he findeth place for them, and handleth them well +for the quantity; but where their true place is he pretermitteth them. +For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy +this inquiry, no more than he that should generally handle the nature +of light can be said to handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and +pain are to the particular affections as light is to particular colours. +Better travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as +far as I can gather by that which we have at second hand. But +yet it is like it was after their manner, rather in subtlety of definitions +(which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities), than in active +and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some +particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections: +as of anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance, +and other. But the poets and writers of histories are the best +doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth, with great +life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; +and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose +themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify: +how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and +encounter one with another; and other the like particularities. +Amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; +how, I say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by +another; even as we used to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with +bird, which otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which +foundation is erected that excellent use of <i>præmium </i>and +<i>pæna</i>, whereby civil states consist: employing the predominant +affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. +For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle +one faction with another, so it is in the government within.<br> +<br> +(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and +have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, +and to alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise, +habit, education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, +reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these as they have +determinate use in moralities, from these the mind suffereth, and of +these are such receipts and regiments compounded and described, as may +serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind, +as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of which number we will insist +upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too +long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and habit to +speak of.<br> +<br> +(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that +of those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by custom; +using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it +will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing we do +not learn to see or hear the better. For though this principle +be true in things wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we +cannot now stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein +Nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a strait glove +will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use bend +otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we speak louder +and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold we endure it +the better, and the like: which latter sort have a nearer resemblance +unto that subject of manners he handleth, than those instances which +he allegeth. But allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices +consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner +of superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts of the wise +ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the exercises +of the body, whereof we will recite a few.<br> +<br> +(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either +too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature +you discourage, in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, +and so a sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than +can hold out, and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the +other side, you may not look to perform and overcome any great task.<br> +<br> +(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two several +times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is +worst disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other +you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle +times the more easy and pleasant.<br> +<br> +(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneth by the way, +which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto +we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream, +or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness.<br> +<br> +(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better, +and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend +be not first in the intention, but <i>tanquam aliud agendo</i>, because +of the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. +Many other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom, +which being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature; but, being +governed by chance, doth commonly prove but an ape of Nature, and bringeth +forth that which is lame and counterfeit.<br> +<br> +(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and +operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great +caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the +fathers in great indignation call poesy <i>vinum dæmonum</i>, +because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions? +Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, +“That young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, because +they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor +attempered with time and experience”? And doth it not hereof +come, that those excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers +(whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, by representing +her in state and majesty, and popular opinions against virtue in their +parasites’ coats fit to be scorned and derided), are of so little +effect towards honesty of life, because they are not read and revolved +by men in their mature and settled years, but confined almost to boys +and beginners? But is it not true also, that much less young men +are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been thoroughly +seasoned in religion and morality; lest their judgments be corrupted, +and made apt to think that there are no true differences of things, +but according to utility and fortune, as the verse describes it, <i>Prosperum +et felix scelus virtus vocatur</i>; and again, <i>Ille crucem pretium +sceleris tulit, hic diadema</i>: which the poets do speak satirically +and in indignation on virtue’s behalf; but books of policy do +speak it seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say, +“That if Cæsar had been overthrown, he would have been more +odious than ever was Catiline;” as if there had been no difference, +but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most +excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, +is there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities +themselves (some kinds of them), lest they make men too precise, arrogant, +incompatible; as Cicero saith of Cato, <i>In Marco Catone hæc +bona quæ videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria; +quæ nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura, sed a magistro</i>? +Many other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and +effects, which studies do infuse and instil into manners. And +so, likewise, is there touching the use of all those other points, of +company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the beginning +in the doctrine of morality.<br> +<br> +(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more +accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; +that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, +and at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose, therefore, +of this practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and +to obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good +hath been practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and +observances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in themselves, +as because they keep the mind in continual obedience. The obliteration +of the evil hath been practised by two means, some kind of redemption +or expiation of that which is past, and an inception or account <i>de +novo </i>for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and +religious, and justly; for all good moral philosophy (as was said) is +but a handmaid to religion.<br> +<br> +(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all +other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most noble +and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; +which is, the electing and propounding unto a man’s self good +and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within +his compass to attain. For if these two things be supposed, that +a man set before him honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, +constant, and true unto them; it will follow that he shall mould himself +into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work of nature; +whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as +when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he +worketh; as if he be upon the face, that part which shall be the body +is but a rude stone still, till such times as he comes to it. +But contrariwise when nature makes a flower or living creature, she +formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time. So in obtaining +virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit +much to fortitude, nor the like but when he dedicateth and applieth +himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and passage +towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent +disposition to conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind +Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that it ought not to be +called virtuous, but divine. His words are these: <i>Immanitati +autem consentaneum est opponere eam, quæ supra humanitatem est, +heroicam sive divinam virtutem</i>; and a little after, <i>Nam ut feræ +neque vitium neque virtus est, swic neque Dei: sed hic quidem status +altius quiddam virtute est, ille aluid quiddam a vitio</i>. And +therefore we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth +to Trajan in his funeral oration, where he said, “That men needed +to make no other prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as +good lords to them as Trajan had been;” as if he had not been +only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these +be heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine +state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, +by imprinting upon their souls charity, which is excellently called +the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues +together. And as it is elegantly said by Menander of vain love, +which is but a false imitation of divine love, <i>Amor melior Sophista +lœvo ad humanam vitam </i>- that love teacheth a man to carry +himself better than the sophist or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed, +because, with all his rules and preceptions, he cannot form a man so +dexterously, nor with that facility to prize himself and govern himself, +as love can do: so certainly, if a man’s mind be truly inflamed +with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than +all the doctrine of morality can do, which is but a sophist in comparison +of the other. Nay, further, as Xenophon observed truly, that all +other affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting +and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt +the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose +it: so in all other excellences, though they advance nature, yet they +are subject to excess. Only charity admitteth no excess. +For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the angels transgressed +and fell; <i>Ascendam, et ero similis altissimo</i>: by aspiring to +be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; <i>Eritis sicut +Dii, scientes bonum et malum</i>: but by aspiring to a similitude of +God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or +shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are called: <i>Diligite +inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro persequentibus +et calumniantibus vos, ut sitis filii Patris vestri qui in cœlis +est, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super +justos et injustos</i>. So in the first platform of the divine +nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, <i>Optimus Maximus: +</i>and the sacred Scriptures thus, <i>Miscericordia ejus super omnia +opera ejus.<br> +<br> +</i>(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning +the culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, considering +the arts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is +but to collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted +by others, as matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. +But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, “You may not marvel +(Athenians) that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh water, +and I drink wine;” and like as we read of an ancient parable of +the two gates of sleep -<br> +<br> +<br> +“Sunt geminæ somni portæ: quarum altera fertur<br> +Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris:<br> +Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,<br> +Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes:”<br> +<br> +<br> +so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim +in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“of wine”) +is the more vaporous, and the braver gate (“of ivory”) sendeth +forth the falser dreams.<br> +<br> +(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy, +which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and +spirit. Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be +a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of +the body. For as we divided the good of the body into health, +beauty, strength, and pleasure, so the good of the mind, inquired in +rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, +and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and strong +and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, +so in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy +to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but have neither +health from perturbations, nor any beauty or decency in their doings; +some again have an elegancy and fineness of carriage which have neither +soundness of honesty nor substance of sufficiency; and some again have +honest and reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor manage +business; and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely all three. +As for pleasure, we have likewise determined that the mind ought not +to be reduced to stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in +the subject of it, than in the strength and vigour of it.<br> +<br> +XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all +others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. +Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said, “That the Romans were like +sheep, for that a man were better drive a flock of them, than one of +them; for in a flock, if you could get but some few go right, the rest +would follow:” so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile +than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the +framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an +external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore +it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments: +for so we find in the Holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is +added, <i>Sed adhuc poulus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum patrum +suorum</i>. Again, states, as great engines, move slowly, and +are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the seven good years +sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time well grounded do +bear out errors following; but the resolution of particular persons +is more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify +the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge.<br> +<br> +(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary +actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and government. +For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection; and they be +three wisdoms of divers natures which do often sever - wisdom of the +behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.<br> +<br> +(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but +much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an +influence also into business and government. The poet saith, <i>Nec +vultu destrue verba tuo</i>: a man may destroy the force of his words +with his countenance; so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending +to his brother affability and easy access; <i>Nil interest habere ostium +apertum, vultum clausum: </i>it is nothing won to admit men with an +open door, and to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. +So we see Atticus, before the first interview between Cæsar and +Cicero, the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching the +composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if +the government of the countenance be of such effect, much more is that +of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to conversation; the +true model whereof seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, though not +meant for this purpose: <i>Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius; quorum +alterum est àlienæ libertatis obliti, alterum suæ</i>: +the sum of behaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity, without +intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other side, if behaviour +and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass into affectation, +and then <i>Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre </i>- to +act a man’s life? But although it proceed not to that extreme, +yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And therefore +as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by saying, +<i>Amici fures temporis</i>: so certainly the intending of the discretion +of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as are +accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in it, and seldom +aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do seek +comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything +becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by <i>puntos </i>and +compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action than +an over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which +is time and season. For as Solomon saith, <i>Qui respicit ad ventos, +non seminat; et qui respicit ad nubes, non metet</i>: a man must make +his opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth +to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. +For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; +it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind +and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait +or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge +hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.<br> +<br> +(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto +collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning and the +professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that +note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that +there is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For +of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, +for wisdom of behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, +as an inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government, +they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth +to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man’s life is +most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered +advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject. +For if books were written of this as the other, I doubt not but learned +men with mean experience would far excel men of long experience without +learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.<br> +<br> +(5) Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should +be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less +infinite than science of government, which we see is laboured and in +some part reduced. Of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient +Romans in the saddest and wisest times were professors; for Cicero reporteth, +that it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general +wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to +walk at certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to those that +would use their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort +unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of +the employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, +and every other occasion incident to man’s life. So as there +is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out +of a universal insight into the affairs of the world; which is used +indeed upon particular causes propounded, but is gathered by general +observation of causes of like nature. For so we see in the book +which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother, <i>De petitione consulatus </i>(being +the only book of business that I know written by the ancients), although +it concerned a particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof +consisteth of many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, +but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But +chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine +writings, composed by Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify +that his heart was as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and +all worldly matters, we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent +cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions; +whereupon we will stay a while, offering to consideration some number +of examples.<br> +<br> +(6) <i>Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam, +ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi</i>. Here is commended +the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: +as it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’ +papers unperused.<br> +<br> +<i>Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur, sive rideat, +non inveniet requiem. </i>Here is described the great disadvantage +which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself; +which is such an engagement as, whether a man turn the matter to jest, +or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways quit +himself well of it.<br> +<br> +<i>Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet eum contumacem</i>. +Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in his favours, +it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness.<br> +<br> +<i>Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo? coram regibus stabit, nec erit +inter ignobiles</i>. Here is observed, that of all virtues for +rising to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many +times love not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, +but ready and diligent.<br> +<br> +<i>Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, cum adolescente secundo +qui consurgit pro eo</i>. Here is expressed that which was noted +by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius. <i>Plures adorant solem +orientem quam occidentem vel meridianum.<br> +<br> +Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne demiseris; +quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima</i>. Here caution is +given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest; +for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to +make them better.<br> +<br> +<i>Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri: venit contra eam rex magnus, +et vallavit eam, instruxitque munitones per gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio; +inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens, et liberavit eam per sapientiam +suam; et nullus deinceps recordatus est huminis illius pauperis. +</i>Here the corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue +or merit longer than they have use of it.<br> +<br> +<i>Millis responsio frangit iram</i>. Here is noted that silence +or rough answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.<br> +<br> +<i>Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum</i>. Here is lively represented +how laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred +till the last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth +a briar or impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.<br> +<br> +<i>Melior est finis orationis quam principium</i>. Here is taxed +the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, +than upon the conclusions and issues of speech.<br> +<br> +<i>Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non bene facit; iste et pro buccella +panis deseret veritatem</i>. Here is noted, that a judge were +better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge +offendeth not so lightly as a facile.<br> +<br> +<i>Vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri vehementi, in quo +paratur fames</i>. Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous +extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry +horseleech.<br> +<br> +<i>Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens coram impio</i>. +Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of +the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many particular +injuries passed over by connivance.<br> +<br> +<i>Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc non esse peccatum, +particeps est homicidii</i>. Here is noted that, whereas men in +wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they +might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate +their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety.<br> +<br> +<i>Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso</i>. +Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do principally +avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse us to many +factions and quarrels.<br> +<br> +<i>Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum</i>. Here is noted, +that in domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves +quieting of their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived +of their expectation, and it turneth to wind.<br> +<br> +<i>Filius sapiens lætificat patrem: filius vero stultus mæstitia +est matri suæ</i>. Here is distinguished, that fathers have +most comfort of the good proof of their sons; but mothers have most +discomfort of their ill proof, because women have little discerning +of virtue, but of fortune.<br> +<br> +<i>Qui celat delictum, quærit amicitiam; sed qui altero sermone +repetit, separat fæderatos</i>. Here caution is given, that +reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that +which is past, than by apologies and excuses.<br> +<br> +<i>In omni opere bono erit abundantia; ubi autem verba sunt plurima, +ibi frequenter egestas</i>. Here is noted, that words and discourse +aboundeth most where there is idleness and want.<br> +<br> +<i>Primus in sua causa justus: sed venit altera pars, et inquiret in +eum</i>. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth +much; in sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, +except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected.<br> +<br> +<i>Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora +ventris</i>. Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, +which seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth +deep which hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.<br> +<br> +<i>Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi injuriam facit; et qui arguit impium, +sibi maculam generat</i>. Here caution is given how we tender +reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem +it for contumely, and accordingly to return it.<br> +<br> +<i>Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia</i>. Here is +distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal +and swimming only in conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented +is quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused.<br> +<br> +<i>Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum +manifesta sunt prudentibus</i>. Here the mind of a wise man is +compared to a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures +and customs are represented; from which representation proceedeth that +application,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.”<br> +<br> +<br> +(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic +of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with +a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted +as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them +with brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence +to the sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use: +but it is allowed, even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea, +and some writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them +as instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, +if I would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and +examples.<br> +<br> +(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally +to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found +out any observation that they thought was good for life, they would +gather it and express it in parable or aphorism or fable. But +for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: +now that the times abound with history, the aim is better when the mark +is alive. And therefore the form of writing which of all others +is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occasions is +that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, +discourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly +and in our view out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars +again. And it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse +attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the +discourse. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth at first, +but of substance. For when the example is the ground, being set +down in a history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which +may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply +it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples alleged for the +discourse’s sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, +and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse which they are brought +in to make good.<br> +<br> +(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history +of times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel +handleth, so histories of lives is the most popular for discourse of +business, because it is more conversant in private actions. Nay, +there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, +which is discourse upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many +are of Cicero <i>ad Atticum</i>, and others. For letters have +a great and more particular representation of business than either chronicles +or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this +part of civil knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient.<br> +<br> +(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as +much from that whereof we have spoken as <i>sapere </i>and <i>sibi sapere</i>, +the one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. +For there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing +a man’s own fortune; and they do sometimes meet, and often sever. +For many are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or +counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful +for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge +of: <i>Nam pol sapiens </i>(saith the comical poet) <i>fingit fortunam +sibi</i>; and it grew to an adage, <i>Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ</i>; +and Livy attributed it to Cato the first, <i>In hoc viro tanta vis animi +et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam +facturus videretur.<br> +<br> +</i>(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed, +hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in +Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the +state in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people +as the manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, “And +in this fortune had no part.” And it came so to pass, that +he never prospered in anything he took in hand afterwards. For +this is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith +of Pharaoh, <i>Dicis, Fluvius est neus et ego feci memet ipsum</i>; +or of that which another prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices +to their nets and snares; and that which the poet expresseth,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,<br> +Nunc adsint!”<br> +<br> +<br> +For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; and, therefore, +those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their successes +to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue. For so Sylla +surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus. So Cæsar said to the +master of the ship, <i>Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus.<br> +<br> +</i>(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, <i>Faber quisque fortunæ +suæ: Sapiens dominabitur astris: Invia virtuti null est via</i>, +and the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as +stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for the presumption +or outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are +no question imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of +this opinion as they can scarce contain it within. As we see in +Augustus Cæsar (who was rather diverse from his uncle than inferior +in virtue), how when he died he desired his friends about him to give +him a <i>plaudite</i>, as if he were conscious to himself that he had +played his part well upon the stage. This part of knowledge we +do report also as deficient; not but that it is practised too much, +but it hath not been reduced to writing. And, therefore, lest +it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is +requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some heads or passages +of it.<br> +<br> +(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument +to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein +every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till +he see the difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; +and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be +truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, +both in honour and in substance. In honour, because pragmatical +men may not go away with an opinion that learning is like a lark, that +can mount and sing, and please herself, and nothing else; but may know +that she holdeth as well of the hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also +descend and strike upon the prey. In substance, because it is +the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of +matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal or form; +that is, that there be not anything in being and action which should +not be drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine. Neither +doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of fortune otherwise +than as of an inferior work, for no man’s fortune can be an end +worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest men do abandon their +fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless fortune as an +organ of virtue and merit deserveth the consideration.<br> +<br> +(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary +towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus +did require; who seeing in the frame of man’s heart such angles +and recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; +that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, +their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their +helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand, so again their +weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious, +their friends, factions, dependences; and again their opposites, enviers, +competitors, their moods and times, <i>Sola viri molles aditus et tempora +noras</i>; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: +and this not only of persons but of actions; what are on foot from time +to time, and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they +import, and the like. For the knowledge of present actions is +not only material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons +is very erroneous: for men change with the actions; and whilst they +are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their nature they +are another. These informations of particulars, touching persons +and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism; +for no excellency of observations (which are as the major propositions) +can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking +in the minors.<br> +<br> +(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who saith, +<i>Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda; sed vir prudens exhauriet +illud</i>. And although the knowledge itself falleth not under +precept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining +of it may.<br> +<br> +(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the ancient +opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and distrust; +that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to words; and +in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to set and +purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said, <i>Fronti +nulla fides</i>, which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and +not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance +and gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is <i>Animi janua</i>, +“the gate of the mind.” None more close than Tiberius, +and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, <i>Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat</i>. +So again, noting the differing character and manner of his commending +Germanicus and Drusus in the Senate, he saith, touching his fashion +wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus, thus: <i>Magis in speciem +adornatis verbis, quam ut penitus sentire crederetur</i>; but of Drusus +thus: <i>Paucioribus sed intentior, et fida oratione</i>;<i> </i>and +in another place, speaking of his character of speech when he did anything +that was gracious and popular, he saith, “That in other things +he was <i>velut eluctantium verborum</i>;” but then again, <i>solutius +loquebatur quando subveniret</i>. So that there is no such artificer +of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance (<i>vultus jussus</i>), +that can sever from a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a +more slight and careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious +and wandering, or coming from a man more drily and hardly.<br> +<br> +(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be trusted +without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: <i>Fraus +sibi in parvis fidem præstruit ut majore emolumento fallat</i>; +and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, +when he is better used than he was wont to be without manifest cause. +For small favours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution +and as to industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, <i>Alimenta +socordiæ</i>. So again we see how false the nature of some +deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon Antonius +Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement which was made +between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the friends of Antonius, +<i>Simul amicis ejus præfecturas et tribunatus largitur</i>: wherein, +under pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from +him his dependents.<br> +<br> +(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of +flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially +with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, +upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth +of his dissimulation when he said, “You are hurt because you do +not reign;” of which Tacitus saith, <i>Audita hæc raram +occulti pectoris vocem elicuere: correptamque Græco versu admonuit, +ideo lædi quia non regnaret</i>. And, therefore, the poet +doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men to confess their +secrets:-<br> +<br> +<br> +“Vino torus et ira.”<br> +<br> +<br> +And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and so +settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes +upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open +themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, +according to the proverb of Spain, <i>Di mentira, y sacar as verdad</i>: +“Tell a lie and find a truth.”<br> +<br> +(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports: +men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, +their virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times +from their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar +friends, with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, +and the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for +to such men are more masked: <i>Verior fama e domesticis emanat.<br> +<br> +</i>(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their +natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted +by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both +pleasantly and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio +of the Pope, returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger; +whose opinion being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his +place, he wished that in any case they did not send one that was too +wise; because no very wise man would ever imagine what they in that +country were like to do. And certainly it is an error frequent +for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches +than are: the Italian proverb being elegant, and for the most part true:-<br> +<br> +<br> +“Di danari, di senno, e di fede,<br> +C’è ne manco che non credi.”<br> +<br> +<br> +“There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith +than men do account upon.”<br> +<br> +(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their +natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being +at the top of human desires, they have for the most part no particular +ends whereto they aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure +and scale of the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of +the causes that maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither +is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men’s ends and natures +of the variety of them only, but also of the predominancy, what humour +reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. For so we see, +when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in +Nero’s humours of pleasures, <i>metus ejus rimatur</i>, he wrought +upon Nero’s fears, whereby he broke the other’s neck.<br> +<br> +(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth +in three things; the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness +with those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; +and specially according to the diversity of business, and the diversity +of persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at +least which is perfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind. +The second is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; +in most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech +inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much +to a man’s knowledge; and secrecy on the other side induceth trust +and inwardness. The last is the reducing of a man’s self +to this watchful and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in +every conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For +as Epictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to +say to himself, <i>Et hoc volo, et etiam institutum servare</i>; so +a politic man in everything should say to himself, <i>Et hoc volo, ac +etiam aliquid addiscere</i>. I have stayed the longer upon this +precept of obtaining good information because it is a main part by itself, +which answereth to all the rest. But, above all things, caution +must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of themselves, and +that this much knowing do not draw on much meddling; for nothing is +more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many matters. +So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to +this, to make a better and freer choice of those actions which may concern +us, and to conduct them with the less error and the more dexterity.<br> +<br> +(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take +good information touching their own person, and well to understand themselves; +knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a glass, yet +they do suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine glass is the +Word of God, so the politic glass is the state of the world, or times +wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves.<br> +<br> +(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities +and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these +with the most, and those other with the least; and from this view and +examination to frame the considerations following.<br> +<br> +(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth +with the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and +fit, then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but +if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to +be more close retired, and reserved; as we see in Tiberius, who was +never seen at a play, and came not into the senate in twelve of his +last years; whereas Augustus Cæsar lived ever in men’s eyes, +which Tacitus observeth, <i>alia Tiberio morum via.<br> +<br> +</i>(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with professions +and courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be free; +and, if engaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity; as +we see was done by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to +a sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his +parts and inclination; being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell +well whether they were worse for a prince or for a priest.<br> +<br> +(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like +to have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course wherein +there is most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent; as Cæsar +Julius did, who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the +excellency of Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, +and saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon +whom the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun towards +a civil and popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a martial +greatness.<br> +<br> +(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents, to proceed +according to the composition of their own nature; as we may see in Cæsar, +all whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not +solemn, or of reputation.<br> +<br> +(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples, +in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their +natures and carriages are far differing. In which error it seemeth +Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith that he was wont often to say, <i>Sylla +potuit, ego non potero</i>? Wherein he was much abused, the natures +and proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the +world; the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other +solemn, and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less +effectual.<br> +<br> +But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath many +other branches, whereupon we cannot insist.<br> +<br> +(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man’s +self, there followeth the well opening and revealing a man’s self; +wherein we see nothing more usual than for the more able man to make +the less show. For there is a great advantage in the well setting +forth of a man’s virtues, fortunes, merits; and again, in the +artificial covering of a man’s weaknesses, defects, disgraces; +staying upon the one, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by +circumstances, gracing the other by exposition, and the like. +Wherein we see what Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest +politique of his time, <i>Omnium quæ dixerat feceratque arte quadam +ostentator</i>, which requireth indeed some art, lest it turn tedious +and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though it be to the first +degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than in policy; +for as it is said, <i>Audacter calumniare, semper aliquid hæret</i>; +so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity, <i>Audacter te +vendita, semper aluquid hæret</i>. For it will stick with +the more ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and +rank do smile at it and despise it; and yet the authority won with many +doth countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with +decency and government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; +or at times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety (as in military +persons); or at times when others are most envied; or with easy and +careless passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being +too serious; or with an equal freedom of taxing a man’s self, +as well as gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling or putting down +others’ injury or insolency; it doth greatly add to reputation: +and surely not a few solid natures, that want this ventosity and cannot +sail in the height of the winds, are not without some prejudice and +disadvantage by their moderation.<br> +<br> +(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are +not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be +not disvalued and embased under the just price, which is done in three +manners - by offering and obtruding a man’s self, wherein men +think he is rewarded when he is accepted; by doing too much, which will +not give that which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth +satiety; and by finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, +in commendation, applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be pleased +with a little, let him hear what is truly said: <i>Cave ne insuetus +rebus majoribus videaris, si hæc te res parva sicuti magna delectat</i>.<br> +<br> +(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the valuing +of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners - by caution, +by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do ingeniously +and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which they are +not proper; whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will thrust +themselves into matters without difference, and so publish and proclaim +all their wants. Colour is when men make a way for themselves +to have a construction made of their faults or wants, as proceeding +from a better cause or intended for some other purpose. For of +the one it is well said,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni,”<br> +<br> +<br> +and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend +the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; +if a coward, mildness; and so the rest. For the second, a man +must frame some probable cause why he should not do his best, and why +he should dissemble his abilities; and for that purpose must use to +dissemble those abilities which are notorious in him, to give colour +that his true wants are but industries and dissimulations. For +confidence, it is the last but the surest remedy - namely, to depress +and seem to despise whatsoever a man cannot attain; observing the good +principle of the merchants, who endeavour to raise the price of their +own commodities, and to beat down the price of others. But there +is a confidence that passeth this other, which is to face out a man’s +own defects, in seeming to conceive that he is best in those things +wherein he is failing; and, to help that again, to seem on the other +side that he hath least opinion of himself in those things wherein he +is best: like as we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show +their verses, and you except to any, they will say, “That that +line cost them more labour than any of the rest;” and presently +will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which they +know well enough to be the best in the number. But above all, +in this righting and helping of a man’s self in his own carriage, +he must take heed he show not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn +and injury, by too much dulceness, goodness, and facility of nature; +but show some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind +of fortified carriage, with a ready rescussing of a man’s self +from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat +in their person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth with good felicity.<br> +<br> +(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour +to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing +hindereth men’s fortunes so much as this: <i>Idem manebat, neque +idem decebat </i>- men are where they were, when occasions turn: and +therefore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an architect of fortune, he +addeth that he had <i>versatile ingenium</i>. And thereof it cometh +that these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves and cannot +make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some +it is nature to be somewhat vicious and enwrapped, and not easy to turn. +In some it is a conceit that is almost a nature, which is, that men +can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their course, +when they have found good by it in former experience. For Machiavel +noted wisely how Fabius Maximus would have been temporising still, according +to his old bias, when the nature of the war was altered and required +hot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and penetration +in their judgment, that they do not discern when things have a period, +but come in too late after the occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the +people of Athens to country fellows, when they play in a fence school, +that if they have a blow, then they remove their weapon to that ward, +and not before. In some other it is a lothness to lose labours +passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply; +and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then they come to +it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of +Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he might at first have +had all three for the simple. But from whatsoever root or cause +this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial; +and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric +and voluble with the wheels of fortune.<br> +<br> +(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with +that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that which is well expressed, +<i>Fatis accede deisque</i>, that men do not only turn with the occasions, +but also run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or strength +to over-hard or extreme points; but choose in their actions that which +is most passable: for this will preserve men from foil, not occupy them +too much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the most, +and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake: which +cannot but mightily increase reputation.<br> +<br> +(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy +with the former two, but not as I understand it; and it is that which +Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: <i>Et quemadmodum receptum est, +ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsæ +ducendæ; ut quæipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et non ipsi +eventus persequi cogantur</i>. For if we observe we shall find +two differing kinds of sufficiency in managing of business: some can +make use of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plot little; some can +urge and pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take +in; either of which is very imperfect without the other.<br> +<br> +(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity +in the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: for although depth +of secrecy, and making way (<i>qualis est via navis in mari</i>, which +the French calleth <i>sourdes menées</i>, when men set things +in work without opening themselves at all), be sometimes both prosperous +and admirable; yet many times <i>dissimulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem +ipsum illaqueant</i>. And therefore we see the greatest politiques +have in a natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than +been reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius +Sylla made a kind of profession, “that he wished all men happy +or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies.” So Cæsar, +when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess “that +he had rather be first in a village than second at Rome.” +So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see what Cicero saith +of him, <i>Alter </i>(meaning of Cæsar) <i>non recusat, sed quodammodo +postulat, ut (ut est) sic appelletur tyrannus</i>. So we may see +in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Cæsar, in his +very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet +in his harangues to the people would swear, <i>Ita parentis honores +consequi liceat</i> (which was no less than the tyranny), save that, +to help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of Cæsar’s +that was erected in the place: and men laughed and wondered, and said, +“Is it possible?” or, “Did you ever hear the like?” +and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so handsomely and ingenuously. +And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended to the same +ends, but in a more dark and dissembling manner as Tacitus saith of +him, <i>Occultior non melior</i>, wherein Sallust concurreth, <i>Ore +probo, animo inverecundo</i>, made it his design, by infinite secret +engines, to cast the state into an absolute anarchy and confusion, that +the state might cast itself into his arms for necessity and protection, +and so the sovereign power be put upon him, and he never seen in it: +and when he had brought it (as he thought) to that point when he was +chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could make no great matter +of it, because men understood him not; but was fain in the end to go +the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt +of Cæsar’s designs: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate +are these deep dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus made this +judgment, that they were a cunning of an inferior form in regard of +true policy; attributing the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius; +where, speaking of Livia, he saith, <i>Et cum artibus mariti simulatione +filii bene compostia</i>: for surely the continual habit of dissimulation +is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic.<br> +<br> +(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom +our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce +and are material to our particular ends; and that to do substantially +and not superficially. For we shall find the logical part (as +I may term it) of some men’s minds good, but the mathematical +part erroneous; that is, they can well judge of consequences, but not +of proportions and comparison, preferring things of show and sense before +things of substance and effect. So some fall in love with access +to princes, others with popular fame and applause, supposing they are +things of great purchase, when in many cases they are but matters of +envy, peril, and impediment. So some measure things according +to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which are spent about them; +and think, if they be ever moving, that they must needs advance and +proceed; as Cæsar saith in a despising manner of Cato the second, +when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great +purpose, <i>Hæc omnia magno studio agebat</i>. So in most +things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means +to be best, when it should be the fittest.<br> +<br> +(38) As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits towards their +fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus. +First the amendment of their own minds. For the removal of the +impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune than +the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of the mind. +In the second place I set down wealth and means; which I know most men +would have placed first, because of the general use which it beareth +towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn +with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that moneys were the +sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the true sinews of the wars are +the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a valiant, populous, and military +nation: and he voucheth aptly the authority of Solon, who, when Crœsus +showed him his treasury of gold, said to him, that if another came that +had better iron, he would be master of his gold. In like manner +it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that are the sinews of +fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds, wit, courage, +audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In the third +place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides and currents +it hath; which, if they be not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, +it being extreme hard to play an after-game of reputation. And +lastly I place honour, which is more easily won by any of the other +three, much more by all, than any of them can be purchased by honour. +To conclude this precept, as there is order and priority in matter, +so is there in time, the preposterous placing whereof is one of the +commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they should intend +their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they come +on, but marshal them according to greatness and not according to instance; +not observing the good precept, <i>Quod nunc instat agamus.<br> +<br> +</i>(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters +which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding +in a man’s ears, <i>Sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus</i>: +and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by +professions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the +like, are not commonly so politic for their own fortune, otherwise than +in their ordinary way, because they want time to learn particulars, +to wait occasions, and to devise plots.<br> +<br> +(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature, which doth +nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his +business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally +intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry +the motions of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as +if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it +in a second, or so in a third; and if he can have no part of that which +he purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if he cannot +make anything of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somewhat +in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect or substance from +it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that he +should exact an account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, +and not to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: +for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. +For he that doth so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are +many times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need +afterwards, than for that which he urgeth for the present; and therefore +men must be perfect in that rule, <i>Hæc oportet facere, et illa +non imittere.<br> +<br> +</i>(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man’s +self peremptorily in anything, though it seem not liable to accident; +but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: following +the wisdom in the ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when +their plash was dry whither they should go; and the one moved to go +down into a pit, because it was not likely the water would dry there; +but the other answered, “True, but if it do, how shall we get +out again?”<br> +<br> +(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias, +construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but to caution and moderation, +<i>Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam amaturus</i>. +For it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too +far into unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish +and humorous envies or emulations.<br> +<br> +(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, because +I would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought +things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much made +of, but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is more hardly made +than a beginning. It must be likewise conceived, that in these +points which I mention and set down, they are far from complete tractates +of them, but only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no +man I suppose will think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without +all this ado; for I know they come tumbling into some men’s laps; +and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little +intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross errors.<br> +<br> +(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator, +doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when +a prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those +subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection +of the art, and not according to common practice: so I understand it, +that it ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I mean +politic for his own fortune.<br> +<br> +(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which +we have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called <i>Bonæ +Artes</i>. As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself +that principle of Machiavel, “That a man seek not to attain virtue +itself, but the appearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue +is a help, but the use of it is cumber:” or that other of his +principles, “That he presuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought +otherwise but by fear; and therefore that he seek to have every man +obnoxious, low, and in straits,” which the Italians call <i>seminar +spine</i>, to sow thorns: or that other principle, contained in the +verse which Cicero citeth, <i>Cadant amici, dummodo inimici intercidant</i>, +as the triumvirs, which sold every one to other the lives of their friends +for the deaths of their enemies: or that other protestation of L. Catilina, +to set on fire and trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, +and to unwrap their fortunes, <i>Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum +sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam</i>: or that other principle +of Lysander, “That children are to be deceived with comfits, and +men with oaths:” and the like evil and corrupt positions, whereof +(as in all things) there are more in number than of the good: certainly +with these dispensations from the laws of charity and integrity, the +pressing of a man’s fortune may be more hasty and compendious. +But it is in life as it is in ways, the shortest way is commonly the +foulest, and surely the fairer way is not much about.<br> +<br> +(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and sustain +themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of ambition, +ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before their eyes not +only that general map of the world, “That all things are vanity +and vexation of spirit,” but many other more particular cards +and directions: chiefly that, that being without well-being is a curse, +and the greater being the greater curse; and that all virtue is most +rewarded and all wickedness most punished in itself: according as the +poet saith excellently:<br> +<br> +<br> +“Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri pro laudibus istis<br> +Præmia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum<br> +Dii <i>moresque</i> dabunt vestri.”<br> +<br> +<br> +And so of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look up to +the Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often subverteth the +wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according to that scripture, +“He hath conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain thing.” +And although men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, +yet this incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man’s fortune +leaveth not tribute which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth +a tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of our +time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven, +and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust as doth the +serpent, <i>Atque affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ</i>. +And if any man flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well, +though he should obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus Cæsar, +and after of Septimius Severus, “That either they should never +have been born, or else they should never have died,” they did +so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and so +much good when they were established; yet these compensations and satisfactions +are good to be used, but never good to be purposed. And lastly, +it is not amiss for men, in their race towards their fortune, to cool +themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by +the Emperor Charles V., in his instructions to the king his son, “That +fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman, that if she he too much +wooed she is the farther off.” But this last is but a remedy +for those whose tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon that +foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein +they join close, namely that same <i>Primum quærite</i>. +For divinity saith, <i>Primum quærite regnum Dei, et ista omnia +adjicientur vobis: </i>and philosophy saith, <i>Primum quærite +bona animi; cætera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt</i>. And +although the human foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as we see +in M. Brutus, when he broke forth into that speech,<br> +<br> +<br> +“Te colui (Virtus) ut rem; ast tu nomen inane es;”<br> +<br> +<br> +yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve +for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.<br> +<br> +(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired +in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things +are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are +not fit to utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible:<br> +<br> +<br> + “Totamque infusa per artus<br> +Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.”<br> +<br> +<br> +Such is the description of governments. We see the government +of God over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to participate +of much irregularity and confusion. The government of the soul +in moving the body is inward and profound, and the passages thereof +hardly to be reduced to demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity +(the shadows whereof are in the poets) in the description of torments +and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which was the giants’ +offence, doth detest the offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. +But this was meant of particulars: nevertheless even unto the general +rules and discourses of policy and government there is due a reverent +and reserved handling.<br> +<br> +(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed, all things +ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be manifest and revealed. +For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the government of +God, that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady body, is +in the view of God as crystal: <i>Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare +vitreum simile crystallo</i>. So unto princes and states, and +specially towards wise senates and councils, the natures and dispositions +of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions and +combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard +of the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations, +and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part +clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to +a king that is a master of this science, and is so well assisted, I +think it decent to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain +the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto; +who being silent, when others contended to make demonstration of their +abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for his part, “That +there was one that knew how to hold his peace.”<br> +<br> +(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which +is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all +those which have written of laws have written either as philosophers +or as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, +they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses +are as the stars, which give little light because they are so high. +For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live +what is received law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom of +a law-maker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there are +in nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived +but as streams; and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from +the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to +the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed +from the same fountains. Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth +not only in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof; taking +into consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and what +are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law; +by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed, and what +are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws; what influence +laws touching private right of <i>meum</i> and <i>tuum</i> have into +the public state, and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws +are to be penned and delivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief or +large, with preambles or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed +from time to time, and what is the best means to keep them from being +too vast in volume, or too full of multiplicity and crossness; how they +are to be expounded, when upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, +and when upon responses and conferences touching general points or questions; +how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly; how they are to +be mitigated by equity and good conscience, and whether discretion and +strict law are to be mingled in the same courts, or kept apart in several +courts; again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of law is +to be censured and governed; and many other points touching the administration +and (as I may term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist +the less, because I purpose (if God give me leave), having begun a work +of this nature in aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it in +the meantime for deficient.<br> +<br> +(50) And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say much +of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but +excel the civil laws in fitness for the government, for the civil law +was <i>nonhos quæsitum munus in usus</i>; it was not made for +the countries which it governeth. Hereof I cease to speak because +I will not intermingle matter of action with matter of general learning.<br> +<br> +XXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching +civil knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; +and with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now +at some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing +seemeth to me (<i>si nunquam fallit imago</i>), as far as a man can +judge of his own work, not much better than that noise or sound which +musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments, which is +nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter +afterwards. So have I been content to tune the instruments of +the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. And surely, +when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning +hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities thereof; +as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this age; the noble helps +and lights which we have by the travails of ancient writers; the art +of printing, which communicateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness +of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, +and a mass of natural history; the leisure wherewith these times abound, +not employing men so generally in civil business, as the states of Græcia +did, in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect +of the greatness of their monarchy; the present disposition of these +times at this instant to peace; the consumption of all that ever can +be said in controversies of religion, which have so much diverted men +from other sciences; the perfection of your Majesty’s learning, +which as a phœnix may call whole volleys of wits to follow you; +and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more and more to +disclose truth; I cannot but be raised to this persuasion, that this +third period of time will far surpass that of the Grecian and Roman +learning; only if men will know their own strength and their own weakness +both; and take, one from the other, light of invention, and not fire +of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, +and not as of a quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence +to things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular +estimation. As for my labours, if any man shall please himself +or others in the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient +and patient request, <i>Verbera, sed audi</i>: let men reprehend them, +so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful (though +it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogitations of men +to their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off. +Now let us come to that learning, which both the former times were not +so blessed as to know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and +port of all men’s labours and peregrinations.<br> +<br> +XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to +the will of man: so that as we are to obey His law, though we find a +reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find +a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that which +is agreeable to our sense we give consent to the matter, and not to +the author; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and +discredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for +righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein +was an image of natural reason.<br> +<br> +(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to believe +than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man’s mind +suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one +as it holdeth for more authorised than itself and so suffereth from +the worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the state of man glorified; +for then faith shall cease, and we shall know as we are known.<br> +<br> +(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in our idiom we +call divinity) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and +not upon the light of nature: for it is written, <i>Cæli enarrant +gloriam Dei</i>; but it is not written, <i>Cæli enarrant voluntatem +Dei</i>: but of that it is said, <i>Ad legem et testimonium: si non +fecerint secundum verbum istud</i>, &c. This holdeth not only +in those points of faith which concern the great mysteries of the Deity, +of the creation, of the redemption, but likewise those which concern +the law moral, truly interpreted: “Love your enemies: do good +to them that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father, that suffereth +His rain to fall upon the just and unjust.” To this it ought +to be applauded, <i>Nec vox hominem sonat</i>: it is a voice beyond +the light of nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they fall +upon a libertine passion, do still expostulate with laws and moralities, +as if they were opposite and malignant to nature: <i>Et quod natura +remittit, invida jura negant</i>. So said Dendamis the Indian +unto Alexander’s messengers, that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, +and some other of the wise men of Græcia, and that he held them +for excellent men: but that they had a fault, which was that they had +in too great reverence and veneration a thing they called law and manners. +So it must be confessed that a great part of the law moral is of that +perfection whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire: how then is +it that man is said to have, by the light and law of nature, some notions +and conceits of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? +Thus, because the light of nature is used in two several senses: the +one, that which springeth from reason, sense, induction, argument, according +to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, that which is imprinted +upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct, according to the law of +conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate: in +which latter sense only he is participant of some light and discerning +touching the perfection of the moral law; but how? sufficient to check +the vice but not to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion, +as well moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration +and revelation from God.<br> +<br> +(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things, and the latitude +thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for nothing that the +apostle calleth religion “our reasonable service of God;” +insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full +of reason and signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry +and magic, that are full of non-significants and surd characters. +But most specially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this, +deserveth to be highly magnified; holding and preserving the golden +mediocrity in this point between the law of the heathen and the law +of Mahomet, which have embraced the two extremes. For the religion +of the heathen had no constant belief or confession, but left all to +the liberty of agent; and the religion of Mahomet on the other side +interdicteth argument altogether: the one having the very face of error, +and the other of imposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reject +disputation with difference.<br> +<br> +(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the former, +in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; +the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. +The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way of +illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth +indeed of probation and argument. In the former we see God vouchsafeth +to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of His mysteries in sort +as may be sensible unto us; and doth graft His revelations and holy +doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth His inspirations +to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the +lock. For the latter there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, +secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. +For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted +from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations +and inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better +direction. In nature this holdeth not; for both the principles +are examinable by induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and +besides, those principles or first positions have no discordance with +that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions. +But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both +of greater and smaller nature, namely, wherein there are not only <i>posita +</i>but <i>placita</i>; for in such there can be no use of absolute +reason. We see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the +like. The draughts and first laws of the game are positive, but +how? merely <i>ad placitum</i>, and not examinable by reason; but then +how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to win the game +is artificial and rational. So in human laws there be many grounds +and maxims which are <i>placita juris</i>, positive upon authority, +and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most +just, not absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, +that affordeth a long field of disputation. Such therefore is +that secondary reason, which hath place in divinity, which is grounded +upon the <i>placets </i>of God.<br> +<br> +(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, +to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits +and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: +which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext +of true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that +which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and +contradictories, to examine that which is positive. The one sort +falling into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more +sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them, <i>Quomodo possit homo +nasci cum sit senex</i>? The other sort into the error of the +disciples, which were scandalised at a show of contradiction, <i>Quid +est hoc quod dicit nobis? Modicum et non videbitis me; et iterum, +modicum, et videbitis me</i>, &c.<br> +<br> +(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and blessed +use thereof; for this point well laboured and defined of would in my +judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious +speculations, wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of controversies, +wherewith the Church laboureth. For it cannot but open men’s +eyes to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which +is either not revealed or positive; and that many others do grow upon +weak and obscure inferences or derivations: which latter sort, if men +would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles, +would be carried thus, <i>ego, non dominus</i>; and again, <i>secundum +consilium meum</i>, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and +oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, <i>non +ego</i>, <i>sed dominus</i>; and not so only, but to bind it with the +thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those +which have not sufficiently learned out of Solomon that “The causeless +curse shall not come.”<br> +<br> +(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed or revealed, +and the nature of the information or revelation; and with the latter +we will begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have +now last handled. The nature of the information consisteth of +three branches: the limits of the information, the sufficiency of the +information, and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto +the limits of the information belong these considerations: how far forth +particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the Church +is inspired; and how far forth reason may be used; the last point whereof +I have noted as deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information +belong two considerations: what points of religion are fundamental, +and what perfective, being matter of further building and perfection +upon one and the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light +according to the dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency +of belief.<br> +<br> +(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it as deficient, +that the points fundamental, and the points of further perfection only, +ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished; a subject tending to +much like end as that I noted before; for as that other were likely +to abate the number of controversies, so this is likely to abate the +heat of many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite and +the Egyptian fight, he did not say, “Why strive you?” but +drew his sword and slew the Egyptian; but when he saw the two Israelites +fight, he said, “You are brethren, why strive you?” +If the point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be slain by the sword +of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it be an Israelite, though +in the wrong, then, “Why strive you?” We see of the +fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league thus, “He that +is not with us is against us;” but of points not fundamental, +thus, “He that is not against us is with us.” So we +see the coat of our Saviour was entire without seam, and so is the doctrine +of the Scriptures in itself; but the garment of the Church was of divers +colours and yet not divided. We see the chaff may and ought to +be severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may not be pulled +up from the corn in the field. So as it is a thing of great use +well to define what, and of what latitude, those points are which do +make men mere aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God.<br> +<br> +(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true +and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains +of the water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are +of two sorts: methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine +water, which excelleth so much that of Jacob’s well, is drawn +forth much in the same kind as natural water useth to be out of wells +and fountains; either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from +thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and received +in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth. The former +sort whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgment +is more subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath exhibited +unto us the scholastical divinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced +into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions +fetched and derived from thence.<br> +<br> +(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted +strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first they fail +to find, and the last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity, +we see in all summary methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give +cause to dilate. For the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh +obscure; the obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced +into large commentaries, or into commonplaces and titles, which grow +to be more vast than the original writings, whence the sum was at first +extracted. So we see the volumes of the schoolmen are greater +much than the first writings of the fathers, whence the master of the +sentences made his sum or collection. So in like manner the volumes +of the modern doctors of the civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, +of which Tribonian compiled the digest. So as this course of sums +and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of sciences +more immense in quantity, and more base in substance.<br> +<br> +(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into exact +methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support +and sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial, +like unto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which +are more subject to ruin than those that are built more strong in their +several parts, though less compacted. But it is plain that the +more you recede from your grounds, the weaker do you conclude; and as +in nature, the more you remove yourself from particulars, the greater +peril of error you do incur; so much more in divinity, the more you +recede from the Scriptures by inferences and consequences, the more +weak and dilute are your positions.<br> +<br> +(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not to +be sought, which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect. +For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art will make it round and +uniform; but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and concluded +with this: <i>O altitudo sapientiæ et scientiæ Dei</i>! +<i>quam incomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus, et non investigabiles +viæ ejus</i>. So again the apostle saith, <i>Ex parte scimus</i>: +and to have the form of a total, where there is but matter for a part, +cannot be without supplies by supposition and presumption. And +therefore I conclude that the true use of these sums and methods hath +place in institutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge; but +in them, or by deducement from them, to handle the main body and substance +of a knowledge is in all sciences prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.<br> +<br> +(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at large, +there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather +curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding, +thus much must be confessed, that the Scriptures, being given by inspiration +and not by human reason, do differ from all other books in the Author, +which by consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the +expositor. For the Inditer of them did know four things which +no man attains to know; which are - the mysteries of the kingdom of +glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the secrets of the heart +of man, and the future succession of all ages. For as to the first +it is said, “He that presseth into the light shall be oppressed +of the glory.” And again, “No man shall see My face +and live.” To the second, “When He prepared the heavens +I was present, when by law and compass He enclosed the deep.” +To the third, “Neither was it needful that any should bear witness +to Him of man, for He knew well what was in man.” And to +the last, “From the beginning are known to the Lord all His works.”<br> +<br> +(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain senses and +expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds +of sobriety - the one anagogical, and the other philosophical. +But as to the former, man is not to prevent his time: <i>Videmus nunc +per speculum in ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem</i>; wherein +nevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as +the polishing of this glass, or some moderate explication of this enigma. +But to press too far into it cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow +of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three degrees +of that we receive into it - aliment, medicine, and poison; whereof +aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome; +medicine is that which is partly converted by nature, and partly converteth +nature; and poison is that which worketh wholly upon nature, without +that nature can in any part work upon it. So in the mind, whatsoever +knowledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert is a mere intoxication, +and endangereth a dissolution of the mind and understanding.<br> +<br> +(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late +time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended +to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalising +and traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. +But there is no such enmity between God’s Word and His works; +neither do they give honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but +much embase them. For to seek heaven and earth in the Word of +God, whereof it is said, “Heaven and earth shall pass, but My +word shall not pass,” is to seek temporary things amongst eternal: +and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst +the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst +the living: neither are the pots or lavers, whose place was in the outward +part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place of all where the +ark of the testimony was seated. And again, the scope or purpose +of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in the Scriptures, +otherwise than in passage, and for application to man’s capacity +and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true rule, <i>Auctoris +aliud agentis parva auctoritas</i>. For it were a strange conclusion, +if a man should use a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, +borrowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of a +basilisk, a unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like, that +therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof positively +to be true. To conclude therefore these two interpretations, the +one by reduction or enigmatical, the other philosophical or physical, +which have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and +cabalists, are to be confined with a <i>a noli akryn sapere, sed time.<br> +<br> +</i>(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to man, +touching the secrets of the heart and the successions of time, doth +make a just and sound difference between the manner of the exposition +of the Scriptures and all other books. For it is an excellent +observation which hath been made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ +to many of the questions which were propounded to Him, how that they +are impertinent to the state of the question demanded: the reason whereof +is, because not being like man, which knows man’s thoughts by +his words, but knowing man’s thoughts immediately, He never answered +their words, but their thoughts. Much in the like manner it is +with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, and +to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all heresies, contradictions, +differing estates of the Church, yea, and particularly of the elect, +are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper +sense of the place, and respectively towards that present occasion whereupon +the words were uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the +words before or after, or in contemplation of the principal scope of +the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or collectively, +but distributively in clauses and words, infinite springs and streams +of doctrine to water the Church in every part. And therefore as +the literal sense is, as it were, the main stream or river, so the moral +sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof +the Church hath most use; not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, +or indulgent or light in allusions: but that I do much condemn that +interpretation of the Scripture which is only after the manner as men +use to interpret a profane book.<br> +<br> +(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can report +no deficiency; but by way of remembrance this I will add. In perusing +books of divinity I find many books of controversies, and many of commonplaces +and treatises, a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an art: a +number of sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon the +Scriptures, with harmonies and concordances. But that form of +writing in divinity which in my judgment is of all others most rich +and precious is positive divinity, collected upon particular texts of +Scriptures in brief observations; not dilated into commonplaces, not +chasing after controversies, not reduced into method of art; a thing +abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books which +will remain, and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am +persuaded, and I may speak it with an <i>absit invidia verbo</i>, and +nowise in derogation of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between +the vine and the olive, that if the choice and best of those observations +upon texts of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons +within this your Majesty’s Island of Brittany by the space of +these forty years and more (leaving out the largeness of exhortations +and applications thereupon) had been set down in a continuance, it had +been the best work in divinity which had been written since the Apostles’ +times.<br> +<br> +(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds: matter of belief +and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration; which is +also judged and directed by the former - the one being as the internal +soul of religion, and the other as the external body thereof. +And, therefore, the heathen religion was not only a worship of idols, +but the whole religion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul; that +is, no certainty of belief or confession: as a man may well think, considering +the chief doctors of their church were the poets; and the reason was +because the heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted +into part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the pureness +of heart, so they might have external honour and rites.<br> +<br> +(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of +divinity: faith, manners, liturgy, and government. Faith containeth +the doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of +the works of God. The nature of God consisteth of three persons +in unity of Godhead. The attributes of God are either common to +the Deity, or respective to the persons. The works of God summary +are two, that of the creation and that of the redemption; and both these +works, as in total they appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in +their parts they refer to the three persons: that of the creation, in +the mass of the matter, to the Father; in the disposition of the form, +to the Son; and in the continuance and conservation of the being, to +the Holy Spirit. So that of the redemption, in the election and +counsel, to the Father; in the whole act and consummation, to the Son; +and in the application, to the Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was +Christ conceived in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate +in spirit. This work likewise we consider either effectually, +in the elect; or privately, in the reprobate; or according to appearance, +in the visible Church.<br> +<br> +(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which +discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the edition +thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law positive; +and according to the style, into negative and affirmative, prohibitions +and commandments. Sin, in the matter and subject thereof, is divided +according to the commandments; in the form thereof it referreth to the +three persons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the Father, whose +more special attribute is power; sins of ignorance against the Son, +whose attribute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, +whose attribute is grace or love. In the motions of it, it either +moveth to the right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion or +to profane and libertine transgression; either in imposing restraint +where God granteth liberty, or in taking liberty where God imposeth +restraint. In the degrees and progress of it, it divideth itself +into thought, word, or act. And in this part I commend much the +deducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed +to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life. +But that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners +is the elevation and consent of the heart; whereunto appertain books +of exhortation, holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like.<br> +<br> +(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal acts +between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the preaching of +the word, and the sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or as +the visible word; and on the part of man, invocation of the name of +God; and under the law, sacrifices; which were as visible prayers or +confessions: but now the adoration being <i>in spiritu et veritate</i>, +there remaineth only <i>vituli labiorum</i>; although the use of holy +vows of thankfulness and retribution may be accounted also as sealed +petitions.<br> +<br> +(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of the patrimony +of the Church, the franchises of the Church, and the offices and jurisdictions +of the Church, and the laws of the Church directing the whole; all which +have two considerations, the one in themselves, the other how they stand +compatible and agreeable to the civil estate.<br> +<br> +(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of instruction +of truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The declinations +from religion, besides the privative, which is atheism and the branches +thereof, are three - heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft: heresies, when +we serve the true God with a false worship; idolatry, when we worship +false gods, supposing them to be true; and witchcraft, when we adore +false gods, knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your Majesty +doth excellently well observe, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. +And yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that +they are all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the Word +of God; for so he saith, <i>Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, +et quasi scelus idololatriæ nolle acquiescere.<br> +<br> +</i>(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I can report +no deficiency concerning them: for I can find no space or ground that +lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity, so diligent have +men been either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing of tares.<br> +<br> +<br> +Thus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world, +as truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note and description +of those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well +converted by the labour of man. In which, if I have in any point +receded from that which is commonly received, it hath been with a purpose +of proceeding in <i>melius</i>, and not <i>in aliud</i>; a mind of amendment +and proficiency, and not of change and difference. For I could +not be true and constant to the argument I handle if I were not willing +to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to have others go +beyond me again: which may the better appear by this, that I have propounded +my opinions naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the liberty +of men’s judgments by confutations. For in anything which +is well set down, I am in good hope that if the first reading move an +objection, the second reading will make an answer. And in those +things wherein I have erred, I am sure I have not prejudiced the right +by litigious arguments; which certainly have this contrary effect and +operation, that they add authority to error, and destroy the authority +of that which is well invented. For question is an honour and +preferment to falsehood, as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. +But the errors I claim and challenge to myself as mine own. The +good, it any be, is due <i>tanquam adeps sacrificii</i>, to be incensed +to the honour, first of the Divine Majesty, and next of your Majesty, +to whom on earth I am most bounden.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +Footnotes:<br> +<br> +<a name="footnote1"></a><a href="#citation1">{1}</a> Stoops in +the rice and takes the speeding gold. Ovid. Metam, x. 667.<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +<br> +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING ***<br> +<pre> + +******This file should be named adlr10h.htm or adlr10h.zip****** +Corrected EDITIONS of our EBooks get a new NUMBER, adlr11h.htm +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, adlr10ah.htm + +Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US +unless a copyright notice is included. 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