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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1813e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #54992 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/54992) diff --git a/old/54992-0.txt b/old/54992-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 4811190..0000000 --- a/old/54992-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14439 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's -Philosophy, by William Wallace and G. W. F. Hegel - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy - and Especially of his Logic - -Author: William Wallace - G. W. F. Hegel - -Release Date: June 27, 2017 [EBook #54992] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROLEGOMENA--STUDY OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY *** - - - - -Produced by Produced and Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature -(online soon in an extended version, also linking to free -sources for education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational -materials,...) Images generously made available by the -Internet Archive. - - - - - -PROLEGOMENA - -TO THE STUDY OF - -HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY - -AND - -_ESPECIALLY OF HIS LOGIC_ - -BY - -WILLIAM WALLACE, M.A., LL.D. - -FELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE - -AND WHYTE'S PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD - -SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND AUGMENTED - -OXFORD - -AT THE CLARENDON PRESS - -1894 - - - - -IN REMEMBRANCE OF - -B. JOWETT - -LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK - -AND - -MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE - -OXFORD - - - - -PREFACE - - -The present volume of Prolegomena completes the second edition of my -LOGIC OF HEGEL which originally appeared in 1874. The translation, -which was issued as a separate volume in the autumn of 1892, had been -subjected to revision throughout: such faults as I could detect had -been amended, and many changes made in the form of expression with the -hope of rendering the interpretation clearer and more adequate. But, -with a subject so abstruse and complicated as Hegel's Logic, and a -style so abrupt and condensed as that adopted in his _Encyclopaedia_, -a satisfactory translation can hardly fall within the range of -possibilities. Only the enthusiasm of youth could have thrown itself -upon such an enterprise; and later years have but to do what they may -to fulfil the obligations of a task whose difficulties have come to -seem nearly insuperable. The translation volume was introduced by a -sketch of the growth of the _Encyclopaedia_ through the three editions -published in its author's lifetime: and an appendix of notes supplied -some literary and historical elucidations of the text, with quotations -bearing on the philosophical development between Kant and Hegel. - -The Prolegomena, which have grown to more than twice their original -extent, are two-thirds of them new matter. The lapse of twenty years -could not but involve a change in the writer's attitude, at least in -details, towards both facts and problems. The general purpose of the -work, however, still remains the same, to supply an introduction to the -study of Hegel, especially his _Logic,_ and to philosophy in general. -But, in the work of altering and inserting, I can hardly imagine that -I have succeeded in adjusting the additions to the older work with -that artful juncture which would simulate the continuity of organic -growth. To perform that feat would require a master who surveyed from -an imperial outlook the whole system of Hegelianism in its history -and meaning; and I at least do not profess such a mastery. Probably -therefore a critical review will discern inequalities in the ground, -and even discrepancies in the statement, of the several chapters. To -remove these strains of inconsistency would in any case have been a -work of time and trouble: and, after all, mere differences in depth -or breadth of view may have their uses. The writer cannot always -compel the reader to understand him, as he himself has not always -the same faculty to penetrate and comprehend the problems he deals -with. In these arduous paths of research it may well happen that the -clearest and truest perceptions are not always those which communicate -themselves with fullest persuasion and gift of insight. Schopenhauer -has somewhere compared the structure of his philosophical work to the -hundred-gated Thebes: so many, he says, are the points of access it -offers for the pilgrims after truth to reach its central dogma. So--if -one may parallel little things with his adventurous quest--even the -less speculative chapters, and the less consecutive discourse, of -these Prolegomena may prove helpful to some individual mood or phase -of mind. If--as I suspect--the Second Book should elicit the complaint -that the reader has been kept wandering too long and too deviously in -the _Porches of Philosophy_, I will hope that sometimes in the course -of these rovings he may come across a wicket-gate where he can enter, -and--which is the main thing--gather truth fresh and fruitful for -himself. - -Fourteen chapters, viz. II, XXIV, and the group from VII to XVIII -inclusive, are in this edition almost entirely new. Three chapters of -the first edition, numbered XIX, XXII, XXIII, have been dropped. For -the rest, Chaps. III-VI in the present correspond to Chaps. II-V in -the first edition: Chap. XIX to parts of VII, VIII: Chaps. XX-XXIII to -Chaps. IX-XII: Chaps. XXV-XXX to Chaps. XIII-XVIII: and Chaps. XXXI, -XXXII to Chaps. XX, XXI. But some of those nominally retained have been -largely rewritten. - -The new chapters present, amongst other things, a synopsis of the -progress of thought in Germany during the half-century which is -bisected by the year 1800, with some indication of the general -conditions of the intellectual world, and with some reference to the -interconnexion of speculation and actuality. Jacobi and Herder, Kant, -Fichte, and Schelling have been especially brought under succinct -review. In the first edition I did Kant less than justice. I have now, -so far as my limits allowed, tried to rectify the impression; and even -more perhaps, by a clear palinode, to tender my apology for the meagre -and somewhat inappreciative notice I gave to the great names of Fichte -and Schelling. For like reasons, and from a growing perception how -much post-Kantian thought owed to the pre-Kantian thinkers, Spinoza -and Leibniz have been partly brought within my range. If, furthermore, -I may seem to have transgressed the due amount of allusions and -comparisons drawn from Plato and Aristotle, Bacon and Mill, the excuse -must be sought in that fixture of philosophical horizon which can -hardly but creep on after a quarter of a century spent in teaching -philosophy under the customs and ordinances of the Oxford School of -Classical Philology. - -It would be to mistake the scope of this survey to seek in it a -history of the philosophers of the period I have named. They have -been presented, not in and for themselves, but as _momenta_ or -constituent! factors in producing Hegel's conception of the aim and -method of philosophy. To do this it was necessary to lay stress on -their inner purport and implications: to treat the individual thinker -in subordination to the general movement of ideas: to give, as far as -was possible, a constructive conception of them rather than an analysis -and chronicle. Yet as the picture had to be done, so to say, with a few -vigorous touches, and made characteristic rather than descriptive, it -cannot have that fairness and completeness which only patient study of -every feature and untiring experiment in reconstruction can enable even -the artist to produce. I may have seemed to confine the environment -too exclusively to continental thinkers: but this is not, I think, -due to any anti-patriotic bias. English (by which term, I may explain -to my countrymen, I mean English-writing) thought, if it has its own -intrinsic value, has after all been only an occasional influence, -of suggestion and modification, in Germany. It is not therefore an -integral portion of my theme. Even in Kant's case, too much may be made -of the stimulus he received from Hume. - -Even twenty years ago, my translation could hardly be described -literally as a voice crying in the wilderness. But since that time -there has been a considerable out-put of history, translation, and -criticism referring to the great age of German philosophy, and a -comparatively numerous group of writers, more or less familiar with -the aims and principles of that period, have treated various parts -of philosophy with notable independence and originality. To these -writers it has sometimes been found convenient to give the title -of Neo-Kantians, or Neo-Hegelians. The prefix suggests that they -do not in all points reproduce the ideal or the caricature which -vulgar tradition fancied, and perhaps still fancies, to be implied -in German 'transcendentalism.' And that for the good reason that the -springs of the movement lie in the natural and national revulsion of -English habits of mind. Slowly, but at length, the storms of the great -European revolution found their way to our intellectual world, and -shook church and state, society and literature. The homeless spirit -of the age had to reconsider the task of rebuilding its house of -life. It may have been that some of the seekers, in the fervour of a -first impression, spoke unadvisedly, as if salvation could and would -come to English philosophy only by Kant and Hegel. Yet, there was a -real foundation for the belief that the insularity--however necessary -in its season, and however admirable in some of its results--which -had secluded and narrowed the British mind since the middle of the -eighteenth century, needed something deeper and stronger than French -'ideology' to bring it abreast of the requirements of the age. Whatever -may be the drawbacks of transcendentalism, they are virtues when set -beside the vulgar ideals of enlightenment by superficialisation. Mill -has well pointed out how the spirit of Coleridge was for the higher -intellectual life a needful complement to the spirit of Bentham. Yet -the spirit of Coleridge had but caught some of the side-lights and -romantic illuminations: it had not dared to face the central sun either -in literature or philosophy. The scholar who has given us excellent -versions of Fichte's lighter works, those who have translated and -expounded Kant, and the great author who opened German literature -to the British public, have brought us nearer the higher teaching -of Germany. In Germany itself it has always been the possession -only of the few. Even at the height of the classical period there -were litterateurs who vended thousands of their books for Goethe's -hundreds, and the great philosophers had ten opponents to one follower -even amongst the teachers of their day. Yet Goethe and not Kotzebue -gave the permanent law to literature; Hegel, and not Krug or Fries, -has influenced philosophy. To have had the resolution to learn in -this school is the merit of 'Neo-Hegelianism.' It has probably not -found Kant free from puzzles and contradictions, or Hegel always -intelligible. But the example of the Germans has served to widen and -deepen our ideas of philosophy: to make us think more highly of its -function, and to realise that it is essentially science, and the -science of supreme reality. And it has at least familiarised many with -the heresy that dilettantism and occasional fits of speculativeness are -worth as little in philosophy as elsewhere. To have striven for dignity -in its scope, and scientific security in its method, is something. If -the Neo-Hegelian has not given philosophy a settled language, it may -be urged that a philosophical language cannot be created by the easy -device of inventing a few Hellenistic-seeming vocables. - -I could have wished to make these volumes a worthier contribution -to the work whereby these and other writers have recently enriched -our island philosophy. Not least because of the honoured name I have -ventured to write on the dedication-page. If, as Epicurus said, we -should above all be grateful to the past, the first meed is from the -scholar due to the teachers of earlier years, and not least those who -have now entered into their rest. I do not forget what I, and others, -owed to T. H. Green, my predecessor in the Chair of Moral Philosophy; -that example of high-souled devotion to truth, and of earnest and -intrepid thinking on the deep things of eternity. But at this season -the memory of my Oxford tutor and friend is naturally most prominent. -The late Master of Balliol College was more than a mere scholar or -a mere philosopher. He seemed so idealist and yet so practical: so -realist and yet so full of high ideals: so delicately kind and yet -so severely reasonable. You felt he saw life more steadily and saw -it more whole than others: as one reality in which religion and -philosophy, art and business, the sciences and theology, were severally -but elements and aspects. To the amateurs of novelty, to the slaves -of specialisation, to the devotees of any narrow way, such largeness -might, with the impatience natural to limited minds, have seemed -indifference. So must appear those who on higher planes hear all the -parts in the harmony of humanity, and with the justice of a wise love -maintain an intellectual _Sôprosyné_. On his pupils this secret power -of an other-world serenity laid an irresistible spell, and bore in upon -them the conviction that beyond scholarship and logic there was the -fuller truth of life and the all-embracing duty of doing their best to -fulfil the amplest requirements of their place. - -In earlier days Jowett had been keenly interested in German philosophy, -and had made a version (most of which was still extant in 1868) of the -Logic I have translated. But Greek literature, and above all Plato, -drew him to more congenial fields. It was on his suggestion,--or shall -I say injunction--at that date, that the work I had casually begun was -some years later prosecuted to completion. It was his words, again, two -years ago, that bade me spare no labour in the work of revision. - -OXFORD, - -_December_, 1893. - - - - -FROM THE PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION - - -The 'Logic of Hegel' is a name which may be given to two separate -books. One of these is the 'Science of Logic' (Wissenschaft der Logik), -first published in three volumes (1812-1816), while its author was -schoolmaster at Nüremberg. A second edition was on its way, when Hegel -was suddenly cut off, after revising the first volume only. In the -'Secret of Hegel,' the earlier part of this Logic has been translated -by Dr. Hutchison Stirling, with whose name German philosophy is chiefly -associated in this country. - -The other Logic, of which the present work is a translation, forms the -First Part in the 'Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences.' The -first edition of the Encyclopaedia appeared at Heidelberg in 1817; the -second in 1827; and the third in 1830. It is well to bear in mind that -these dates take us back forty or fifty years, to a time when modern -science and Inductive Logic had yet to win their laurels, and when the -world was in many ways different from what it is now. The earliest -edition of the Encyclopaedia contained the pith of the system. The -subsequent editions brought some new materials, mainly intended to -smooth over and explain the transitions between the various sections, -and to answer the objections of critics. The work contained a synopsis -of philosophy in the form of paragraphs, and was to be supplemented by -the _viva voce_ remarks of the lecturer. - -The present volume is translated from the edition of 1843, forming the -Sixth Volume in Hegel's Collected Works. It consists of two nearly -equal portions. One halt here printed in more open type, contains -Hegel's Encyclopaedia, with all the author's own additions. The first -paragraph under each number marks the earliest and simplest statement -of the first edition. The other half, here printed in closer type, is -made up of the notes taken in lecture by the editor (Henning) and by -Professors Hotho and Michelet. These notes for the most part connect -the several sections, rather than explain their statements. Their -genuineness is vouched for by their being almost verbally the same with -other parts of Hegel's own writings. - -The translation has tried to keep as closely as possible to the -meaning, without always adhering very rigorously to the words of the -original. It is, however, much more literal in the later and systematic -part, than in the earlier chapters. - -The Prolegomena which precede the translation have not been given in -the hope or with the intention of expounding the Hegelian system. They -merely seek to remove certain obstacles, and to render Hegel less -tantalizingly hard to those who approach him for the first time. How -far they will accomplish this, remains to be seen. - -OXFORD, _September,_ 1873. - - - - -CONTENTS - -BOOK I. - -OUTLOOKS AND APPROACHES TO HEGEL. - -CHAPTER I. - -WHY HEGEL IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND 3 - -CHAPTER II. - -WHY TRANSLATE HEGEL? 14 - -CHAPTER III. - -ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY AND HEGEL 21 - -CHAPTER IV. - -HEGEL AND THEOLOGY 30 - -CHAPTER V. - -PSEUDO-IDEALISM: JACOBI 37 - -CHAPTER VI. - -THE SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY 57 - -CHAPTER VII. - -ANTICIPATORY SKETCH OF THE SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY 72 - -CHAPTER VIII. - -THE SCEPTICAL DOUBT: HUME 88 - -CHAPTER IX. - -THE ATTEMPT AT A CRITICAL SOLUTION: KANT 98 - -CHAPTER X. - -THE CRITICAL SOLUTION (_continued_): KANT 112 - -CHAPTER XI. - -SYNTHESIS AND RECONSTRUCTION: FICHTE 124 - -CHAPTER XII. - -THE BEGINNINGS OF SCHELLING 136 - -CHAPTER XIII. - -THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND IDEALISM 147 - -CHAPTER XIV. - -TRANSITION TO HEGEL 163 - -BOOK II. - -IN THE PORCHES OF PHILOSOPHY. - -CHAPTER XV. - -THE TWO AGES OF REASON 175 - -CHAPTER XVI. - -THE NEW IDEALISM 189 - -CHAPTER XVII. - -METHODS, ARTIFICIAL AND NATURAL 202 - -CHAPTER XVIII. - -THE RANGE OF PERSONALITY 230 - -CHAPTER XIX. - -GENESIS IN MENTAL LIFE 261 - -CHAPTER XX. - -GENERAL LAW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 277 - -CHAPTER XXI. - -ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE: AND THE ORDINARY LOGIC 292 - -CHAPTER XXII. - -FROM SENSE TO THOUGHT 307 - -CHAPTER XXIII. - -FIGURATE OR REPRESENTATIVE THOUGHT 323 - -CHAPTER XXIV. - -FROM SUBSTANCE TO SUBJECT 335 - -CHAPTER XXV. - -REASON AND THE DIALECTIC OF UNDERSTANDING 348 - -BOOK III. - -LOGICAL OUTLINES. - -CHAPTER XXVI. - -THOUGHT PURE AND ENTIRE 365 - -CHAPTER XXVII. - -ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE: OR THE CATEGORIES 383 - -CHAPTER XXVIII. - -THE THREE PARTS OF LOGIC 394 - -CHAPTER XXIX. - -THE SEARCH FOR A FIRST PRINCIPLE 404 - -CHAPTER XXX. - -THE LOGIC OF DESCRIPTION: NATURAL REALISM: BEING 415 - -CHAPTER XXXI. - -THE LOGIC OF EXPLANATION AND REALISTIC METAPHYSICS: - -ESSENCE 440 - -CHAPTER XXXII. - -THE LOGIC OF COMPREHENSION AND IDEALISM: THE NOTION 459 - - - - -PROLEGOMENA - -Book I - -_OUTLOOKS AND APPROACHES TO HEGEL_ - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -WHY HEGEL IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND. - - -'The condemnation,' says Hegel, 'which a great man lays upon the -world, is to force it to explain him[1].' The greatness of Hegel, if -it be measured by this standard, must be something far above common. -Interpreters of his system have contradicted each other, almost as -variously as the several commentators on the Bible. He is claimed -as their head by widely different schools of thought, all of which -appeal to him as the original source of their line of argument. The -Right wing, and the Left, as well as the Centre, profess to be the -genuine descendants of the prophet, and to inherit the mantle of his -inspiration. If we believe one side, Hegel is only to be rightly -appreciated when we divest his teaching of every shred of religion and -orthodoxy which it retains. If we believe another class of expositors, -he was the champion of Christianity. - -These contradictory views may be safely left to abolish each other. But -diversity of opinion on such topics is neither unnatural, nor unusual. -The meaning and the bearings of a great event, or a great character, -or a great work of reasoned thought, will be estimated and explained -in different ways, according to the effect they produce on different -minds and different levels of life and society. Those effects, perhaps, -will not present themselves in their true character, until long after -the original excitement has passed away. To some minds, the chief value -of the Hegelian system will lie in its vindication of the truths of -natural and revealed religion, and in the agreement of the elaborate -reasonings of the philosopher with the simple aspirations of mankind -towards higher things. To others that system will have most interest -as a philosophical history of thought,--an exposition of that organic -development of reason, which underlies and constitutes all the varied -and complex movement of the world. To a third class, again, it may seem -at best an instrument or method of investigation, stating the true -law by which knowledge proceeds in its endeavour to comprehend and -assimilate existing nature. - -While these various meanings may be given to the Hegelian scheme -of thought, the majority of the world either pronounce Hegel to be -altogether unintelligible, or banish him to the limbo of _a priori_ -thinkers,--that bourne from which no philosopher returns. To argue with -those who start from the latter conviction would be an ungrateful, -and probably a superfluous task. Wisdom is justified, we may be sure, -of all her children. But it may be possible to admit the existence of -difficulties, and agree to some extent with those who complain that -Hegel is impenetrable and hard as adamant. There can be no doubt of -the forbidding aspect of the most prominent features in his system. -He is hard in himself, and his readers find him hard. His style is -not of the best, and to foreign eyes seems unequal. At times he is -eloquent, stirring, and striking: again his turns are harsh, and his -clauses tiresome to disentangle: and we are always coming upon that -childlikeness of literary manner, which English taste fancies it can -detect in some of the greatest works of German genius; There are faults -in Hegel, which obscure his meaning: but more obstacles are due to the -nature of the work, and the pre-occupations of our minds. There is -something in him which fascinates __ the thinker, and which inspires -a sympathetic student with the vigour and the hopefulness of the -spring-time. - -Perhaps the main hindrance in the way of a clear vision is the contrast -which Hegelian philosophy offers to our ordinary habits of mind. -Generally speaking, we rest contented if we can get tolerably near our -object, and form a general picture of it to set before ourselves. - -It might almost be said that we have never thought of such a thing as -being in earnest either with our words or with our thoughts. We get -into a way of speaking with an uncertain latitude of meaning, and leave -a good deal to the fellow-feeling of our hearers, who are expected to -mend what is defective in our utterances. For most of us the place of -exact thought is supplied by metaphors and pictures, by mental images, -and figures generalised from the senses. And thus it happens that, when -we come upon a single precise and definite statement, neither exceeding -nor falling short in its meaning, we are thrown out of our reckoning. -Our fancy and memory have nothing left for them to do: and, as fancy -and memory make up the greater part of what we loosely call thinking, -our powers of thought seem to be brought to a standstill. Those who -crave for fluent reading, or prefer easy writing, something within -the pale of our usual mental lines, are more likely to find what they -seek in the ten partially correct and approximate ways commonly used -to give expression to a truth, than in the one simple and accurate -statement of the thought. We prefer a familiar name, and an accustomed -image, on which our faculties may work. But in the atmosphere of -Hegelian thought, we feel very much as if we had been lifted into a -vacuum, where we cannot breathe, and which is a fit habitation for -unrecognisable ghosts only. - -Nor is this all. The traveller, as his train climbs the heights of -Alps or Apennines, occasionally, after circling in grand curve upon -the mountain-side, and perhaps after having been dragged mysterious -distances through the gloom of a tunnel, finds himself as it would seem -back at the same place as he looked forth from some minutes before; and -it is only after a brief comparison that he realises he now commands a -wider view from a point some hundreds of feet higher. So the student -of Hegel--(and it might be the case with Fichte also) as the machinery -of the dialectical method, with its thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, -carries him round and round from term to term of thought--like the -_Logos_ and the Spirit, which blow us whithersoever they list--begins -to suffer from dizziness at the apprehension that he has been the -victim of phantasmagoria and has not really moved at all. It is only -later--if ever--that he recognises that the scene, though similar, -is yet not altogether the same. It is only later--if ever--that he -understands that the path of philosophy is no wandering from land to -land more remote in search of a lost Absolute, a vanished God; no -setting forth of new and strange facts, of new Gods, but the revelation -in fuller and fuller truth of the immanent reality in whom we live, and -move, and have our being,--the manifestation in more closely-knit unity -and more amply-detailed significance of that Infinite and Eternal, -which was always present among us, though we saw but few, perhaps even -no, traces of its power and glory. - -To read Hegel often reminds us of the process we have to go through -in trying to answer a riddle. The terms of the problem to be solved -are all given to us: the features of the object are, it may be, fully -described: and yet somehow we cannot at once tell what it is all about, -or add up the sum of which we have the several items. We are waiting -to learn the subject of the proposition, of which all these statements -may be regarded as the predicates. Something, we feel, has undoubtedly -been said: but we are at a loss to see what it has been said about. -Our mind wanders round from one familiar object to another, and tries -them in succession to see whether any one satisfies the several points -in the statement and includes them all. We grope here and there for -something we are acquainted with, in which the bits of the description -may cohere, and get a unity which they cannot give themselves. When -once we have hit upon the right object, our troubles are at an end: and -the empty medium is now peopled with a creature of our imagination. We -have reached a fixed point in the range of our conception, around which -the given features may cluster. - -All this trouble caused by the Hegelian theory of what philosophy -involves--viz. really beginning at the beginning, is saved by a device -well known to the several branches of Science. It is the way with them -to assume that the student has a rough general image of the objects -which they examine; and under the guidance, or with the help of this -generalised image, they go on to explain and describe its outlines more -completely. They start with an approximate conception, such as anybody -may be supposed to have; and this they seek to render more definite. -The geologist, for example, could scarcely teach geology', unless he -could pre-suppose or produce some acquaintance on the part of his -pupils with what Hume would have called an 'impression' or an 'idea' of -the rocks and formations of which he has to treat. The geometer gives -a short, and, as it were, popular explanation of the sense in which -angles, circles, triangles, &c. are to be understood : and then by -the aid of these provisional definitions we come to a more scientific -notion of the same terms. The third book of Euclid, for example, brings -before us a clearer notion of what a circle is, than the nominal -explanation in the list of definitions. By means of these temporary -aids, or, as we may call them, leading-strings for the intellect, the -progress of the ordinary scientific student is made tolerably easy. -But v in philosophy, as it is found in Hegel, there is quite another -way of working. The helps in question are absent: and until it be seen -that they are not even needed, the Hegelian theory will remain a sealed -mystery. For that which the first glance seemed to show as an enigma, -is only the plain and unambiguous statement of thought. Instead of -casting around for images and accustomed names, we have only to accept -the several terms and articles in the development of thought as they -present themselves. These terms merely require to be apprehended. They -stand in no immediate need of illustration from our experience. What we -have to bring to the work, is patience, self-restraint, the sacrifice -of our cherished habits of mind, the surrender of the natural wish to -see at once what it all comes to, what it is good for, how it squares -with other convictions. As Bacon reminded his age, Into the kingdom -of philosophy, as into the kingdom of heaven, none can enter, _nisi -sub persona infantis_: i. e. unless he at least steadfastly resolve to -renounce that world which lieth in the Evil. - -Ordinary knowledge consists in referring a new object to a class of -objects, that is to say, to a generalised image with which we are -already acquainted. It is not so much cognition as re-cognition. -'"What is the truth?"' asked Lady Chettam of Mrs. Cadwallader in -_Middle-march_. "The truth" he is as bad as the wrong physic--nasty to -take, and sure to disagree." "There could not be anything worse than -that," said Lady Chettam, with so vivid a conception of the physic -that she seemed to have learned something exact about Mr. Casaubon's -'disadvantages.' Once we have referred the new individual to a familiar -category or a convenient metaphor, once we have given it a name, and -introduced it into the society of our mental drawing-room, we are -satisfied. We have put a fresh object in its appropriate drawer in -the cabinet of our ideas: and hence, with the pride of a collector, -we can calmly call it our own. But such acquaintance, proceeding from -a mingling of memory and naming, is not the same thing as knowledge -in the strict sense of the term.[2] 'What is he?' 'Do you know him?' -These are our questions: and we are satisfied when we learn his name -and his calling. We may never have penetrated into the inner nature of -those objects, with whose _tout ensemble,_ or rough outlines, we are -so much at home, that we fancy ourselves thoroughly cognisant of them. -Classifications are only the first steps in science: and we do not -understand a thought because we can view it under the guise of some of -its illustrations. - -In the case of the English reader of Hegel some peculiar hindrances -spring from the foreign language. In strong contrast to most of the -well-known German philosophers, he may be said to write in the popular -and national dialect of his country. Of course there are tones and -shades of meaning given to his words by the general context of his -system. But upon the whole he did what he promised to J. H. Voss--the -translator of Homer, and the poet of the _Luise,_ in a letter written -from Jena in 1805. He there says of his projects: 'Luther has made the -Bible, and you have made Homer speak German. No greater gift than this -could be given to the nation. So long as a nation is not acquainted -with a noble work in its own language, it is still barbarian, and does -not regard the work as its own. Forget these two examples, and I may -describe my own efforts as an attempt to teach philosophy to speak in -German.[3] - -Yet, in this matter of nationalising or Germanising philosophy, he only -carried a step further what Wolff and even Kant had begun; just as, on -the other hand, he falls a long way short of what K. C. F. Krause, his -contemporary, attempted in the same direction. Such an attempt, by its -very nature, could never command a popular success. It runs directly -counter to that tendency already noted, to escape the requirement to -think and think for ourselves, by taking refuge under the shadow of -a familiar term, which conceals in its apparent simplicity a great -complex of ill-apprehended elements. The ordinary mind--and the more -readily perhaps the more vulgar it is--flees for ease and safety to a -cosmopolitan term, to the denationalised vocable of learned origin, to -the language of general European culture. To such an ordinary mind--and -up at least to a certain extent we all at times come under that -heading--the effort to remain in the pellucid air of our unadulterated -mother-tongue is too embarrassing to be long continued. Nor, after all, -is it more than partially practicable. The well of German undefiled -is apt to run dry. Hegel himself never shrinks when it is needful to -appropriate non-Teutonic words, and is in the habit of employing the -synonymous terms of native and of classical origin with a systematic -difference of meaning [4] - -Hegel is unquestionably par _excellence the_ philosopher of -Germany,--German through and through. For philosophy, though the -common birthright of full-grown reason in all ages and countries, -must like other universal and cosmopolitan interests, such as the -State, the Arts, or the Church, submit to the limits and peculiarities -imposed upon it by the natural divisions of race and language. The -subtler _nuances_, as well as the coarser differences of national -speech, make themselves vividly felt in the systems of philosophy, -and defy translation. If Greek philosophy cannot, no more can German -philosophy be turned into a body of English thought by a stroke of the -translator's pen. There is a difference in this matter, a difference -at least in degree, between the special sciences and philosophy. The -several sciences have a de-nationalised and cosmopolitan character, -like the trades and industries of various nations; they are pretty much -the same in one country and another, especially when we consider the -details, and neglect the general subdivisions. But in the political -body, in the works of high art, and in the systems of philosophy, the -whole of the character and temperament of the several peoples finds -its expression, and stands distinctly marked, in a shape of its own. -If the form of German polity be not transferable to this side of the -Channel, no more will German philosophy. Direct utilisation for English -purposes is out of the question: the circumstances are too different. -But the study of the great works of foreign thought is not on that -account useless, any more than the study of the great works of foreign -statesmanship. - -Hegel did good service, at least, by freeing philosophy from that -aspect of an imported luxury, which it usually had,--as if it were an -exotic plant removed from the bright air of Greece into the melancholy -mists of Western Europe. 'We have still,' he says, 'to break down the -partition between the language of philosophy, and that of ordinary -consciousness: we have to overcome the reluctance against thinking what -we are familiar with[5].' Philosophy must be brought face to face with -ordinary life, so as to draw its strength from the actual and living -present, and not from the memories or traditions of the past. It has -to become the organised and completed thinking of what is contained -blindly and vaguely in the various levels of popular intelligence, as -these are more or less educated and ordered. It must grow naturally, as -in ancient Greece, from the necessities of the social situation, and -not be a product of artificial introduction and nurture: the revelation -by the mind's own energy of an implicit truth, not the communication -of a mystery sacramentally received. To suppose that a mere change of -words can give this grace, would be absurd. Yet where the national life -pulses strong, as that of Germany in those days did at first in letters -and then in social reform, the dominant note will make itself felt -even in the neutral regions of speculation. It was a step on the right -road to banish a pompous and aristocratic dialect from philosophy, and -to lead it back to those words and forms of speech, which are at least -in silent harmony with the national feeling. - - -[Footnote 1: Hegel's _Leben_ (Rosenkranz), p. 555.] - -[Footnote 2: 'Das Bekannte überhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist, -nicht erkannt.' _Phenomenologie des Geistes,_ p. 24.] - -[Footnote 3: _Vermischte Schriften,_ vol. ii. p. 474.] - -[Footnote 4: e. g. _Dasein_ and _Existenz: Wirklichkeit_ and -_Realität_: _Wesen_ and _Substanz._ It is the same habit of curiously -pondering over the tones and shades of language which leads him to -something very like playing on words, and to etymologising, as one may -call it, on unetymological principles: e. g. the play on _Mein_ and -_Meinung_ (vol. ii. 32: cf. _Werke_, ii. 75): the literal rendering of -_Erinnerung_ (_Encycl._ §§ 234 and 450); and the abrupt transitions, -as it would seem, from literal to figurative use of such a term as -_Grund._ At the same time it is well not to be prosaically certain -that a free play of thought does not follow the apparently fortuitous -assonance of words.] - -[Footnote 5: Hegel's _Leben_ (Rosenkranz), p. 553.] - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -WHY TRANSLATE HEGEL? - - -'But,' it is urged, 'though it be well to let the stream of foreign -thought irrigate some of our philosophical pastures, though we should -not for ever entrench ourselves in our insularity--why try to introduce -Hegel, of all philosophers confessedly the most obscure? Why not be -content with the study and the "exploitation" of Kant, whom Germans -themselves still think so important as to expound him with endless -comment and criticism, and who has at length found, after some -skirmishes, a recognised place in the English philosophical curriculum? -Why seek for more Teutonic thinking that can be found in Schopenhauer, -and found there in a clear and noble style, luminous in the highest -degree, and touching with no merely academic abstruseness the problems -of life and death? Or--as that song is sweetest to men which is the -newest to ring in their ears--why not render accessible to English -readers the numerous and suggestive works of Eduard von Hartmann, -and of Friedrich Nietzsche--not to mention Robert Hamerling[1]? Or, -finally, why not give us more and ever more translations of the works -in logic, ethics, psychology, or metaphysics, of those many admirable -teachers in the German universities, whom it would be invidious to -try to single out by name? As for Hegel, his system, in the native -land of the philosopher, is utterly discredited; its influence is -extinct; it is dead as a door-nail. It is a pity to waste labour and -distract attention, and that in English lands, where there are plenty -of problems of our own to solve, by an attempt, which must perforce be -futile, to resuscitate these defunctitudes?' - -That Hegelianism has been utterly discredited, in certain quarters, is -no discovery reserved for these later days. But on this matter perhaps -we may borrow an analogy. If the reader will be at the trouble to take -up two English newspapers of opposite partisanship and compare the -reports from their foreign correspondents on some question of home -politics, he may, if a novice, be surprised to learn that according -to one, the opinion e. g. of Vienna is wholly adverse to the measure, -while, according to the other, that opinion entirely approves. - -It is no new thing to find Hegelianism in general obloquy. Even in 1830 -the Catholic philosopher and theologian Günther[2]--an admirer, but by -no means a follower of Hegel--wrote that, 'for some years it had been -the fashion in learned Germany to look upon philosophy, and above all -Hegelian philosophy, as a door-mat on which everybody cleaned his muddy -boots before entering the sanctuary of politics and religion.' What -is true as regards the alleged surcease of Hegelianism is that in the -reaction which from various causes turned itself against philosophy in -the two decennia after 1848, that system, as the most deeply committed -part of the 'metaphysical' host, suffered most severely. History and -science seemed to triumph along the whole line. But it may be perhaps -permissible to remark that Hegelianism had predicted for itself the -fate that it proved had fallen on all other philosophies. After the -age of Idealism comes the turn of Realism. The Idea had to die--had to -sink as a germ in the fields of nature and history before it could bear -its fruit. Above all it is not to be expected that such a system, so -ambitious in aim and concentrated in expression, could find immediate -response and at once disclose all its meaning. His first disciples -are not the--truest interpreters of any great teacher. What he saw -in the one comprehensive glance of genius, his successors must often -be content to gather by the slow accumulation of years, and perhaps -centuries, of experience. It is not to Theophrastus that we go for -the truest and fullest conception of Aristotelianism; nor is Plato to -be measured by what his immediate successors in the Academy managed -to make out of him. It is now more than a century since Kant gave his -lesson to the public, and we are still trying to get him focussed in a -single view: it may be even longer till Hegel comes fully within the -range of our historians of thought. Aristotelianism too had to wait -centuries till it fully entered the consciousness even of the thinking -world. - -It is to be said too that without Hegel it would be difficult to -imagine what even teachers, like Lotze, who were very unlike him, would -have had to say. It does not need a very wide soul, nor need one be a -mere dilettantist eclectic, to find much of Schopenhauer's work far -from incompatible with his great, and as some have said, complementary -opposite. It is not indeed prudent as yet for a writer in Germany who -wishes to catch the general ear to affix too openly a profession of -Hegelian principles, and he will do well to ward off suspicion by some -disparaging remarks on the fantastic methods, the overfondness for -system, the contempt for common sense and scientific results which, -as he declares, vitiate all the speculations of the period from 1794 -to 1830. But under the names of Spinoza and of Leibniz the leaven of -Hegelian principles has been at work: and if the Philistines solve the -riddle of the intellectual Samson, it is because they have ploughed -with his heifer,--because his ideas are part of the modern stock of -thought,--not from what they literally read in the great thinkers at -the close of the seventeenth century. Last year saw appear in Germany -two excellent treatises describable as popular introductions to -philosophy[3], one by a thinker who has never disguised his obligations -to Hegel, the other by a teacher in the University of Berlin who may in -many ways be considered as essentially kindred with our general English -style of thought. But both treatises are more allied in character to -the spirit of the Hegelian attempts to comprehend man and God than to -the formalistic and philological disquisitions which have for some -years formed the staple of German professorial activity. And, lastly, -the vigorous thinker, who a quarter of a century ago startled the -reading public by the portent of a new metaphysic which should be the -synthesis of Schelling and Schopenhauer, has lately informed us[4] that -his affinity to Hegel is, taken all in all, greater than his affinity -to any other philosopher'; and that that affinity extends to all that -in Hegel has essential and permanent value. - -But it is not on Eduard von Hartmann's commendation that we need rest -our estimate of Hegelianism. We shall rather say that, till more of -Hegel has been assimilated, he must still block the way. Things have -altered greatly in the last twenty years, it is true; and ideas of -more or less Hegelian origin have taken their place in the common -stock of philosophic commodities. But it will probably be admitted by -those best qualified to speak on the subject, that the shower has not -as yet penetrated very deeply into the case-hardened soil, still less -saturated it in the measure most likely to cause fruitful shoots to -grow forth. We have to go back to Hegel in the same spirit as we go to -Kant, and, for that matter, to Plato or Descartes: or, as the moderns -may go back--to borrow from another sphere--to Dante or Shakespeare. -We do not want the modern poet to resuscitate the style and matter of -_King Lear_ or of the _Inferno._ Yet as the Greek tragedian steeped his -soul in the language and the legend of Homeric epic, as Dante nurtured -his spirit on the noble melodies of Mantua's poet; so philosophy, if it -is to go forth strong and effective, must mould into its own substance -the living thought of former times. It would be as absurd, and as -impossible to be literally and simply a Hegelian,--if that means one -for whom Hegel sums up all philosophy and all truth--as it is to be at -the present day in the literal sense a Platonist or an Aristotelian. -The world may be slow, the world of opinion and thought may linger: _e -pur si muove._ We too have our own problems--the same, no doubt, in a -sense, from age to age, and yet infinitely varying and never in two -ages alike. New stars have appeared on the spiritual sky; and whether -they have in them the eternal light or only the flash and glare of a -passing meteor, they alter the aspects of the night in which we are -still waiting for the dawn. - -A new language, born of new relations of ideas, or of new ideas, is -perforce for our generation the vehicle of all utterances, and we -cannot again speak the dialect, however imposing or however quaint, of -a vanished day. - -And for that reason there must always be a new philosophy, couched -in the language of the age, sympathetic with its hopes and fears, -conscious of its beliefs, more or less sensible of its problems--as -indeed we may be confident there always will be. But, perhaps, the -warrior in that battle against illusion and prejudice, against the -sloth which takes things as they are and the poorness of spirit -which is satisfied with first appearances, will not do wisely to -disdain the past. He will not indeed equip himself with rusty swords -and clumsy artillery from the old arsenals. But he will not disdain -the lessons of the past,--its methods and principles of tactics and -strategy. Recognising perhaps some defects and inequalities in the -methods and aims of thought most familiar to him and current in his -vicinity, he may go abroad for other samples, even though they be not -in all respects worth his adoption. And so without taking Hegel as -omniscient, or pledging himself to every word of the master, he may -think from his own experience that there is much in the system that -will be helpful, when duly estimated and assimilated, to others. There -is--and few can be so bigoted__ or so positive-minded as to regret -it--there is unquestionably a growing interest in English-speaking -countries in what may be roughly called philosophy--the attempt, -unprejudiced by political, scientific, or ecclesiastical dogma, to -solve the questions as to what the world really is, and what man's -place and function is. 'The burthen of the mystery, the heavy and the -weary weight of all this unintelligible world' is felt--felt widely -and sometimes felt deeply. To the direct lightening of that burthen -and that mystery it is the privilege of our profoundest thinkers and -our far-seeing poets and artists to contribute. To the translator of -Hegel there falls the humbler task of making accessible, if it may be, -something of one of the later attempts at a solution of the enigma of -life and existence,--an attempt which for a time dazzled some of the -keenest intellects of its age, and which has at least impressed many -others with the conviction, born of momentary flashes from it of vast -illuminant power, that--_si sic omnia_--there was here concealed a key -to many puzzles, and a guard against many illusions likely to beset the -inquirer after truth. - - -[Footnote 1: A book by V. Knauer published last year (_Hauptprobleme -der Philosophie_), a series of popular lectures, gives one-sixth of its -space to the 'Atomistic of Will' by the Austrian poet Hamerling.] - -[Footnote 2: Hegel's _Briefe_, ii. 349.] - -[Footnote 3: J. Volkelt, _Vorträge zur Einführung in die Philosophie -der Gegenwart_ (München 1892): F. Paulsen, _Einleitung in die -Philosophie_ (Berlin 1892).] - -[Footnote 4: E. v. Hartmann, _Kritische Wanderungen_, p. 74.] - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY AND HEGEL. - - -Although we need not take too seriously Hegel's remark (vol. ii. p. -13) on the English conception of philosophy, it may be admitted that, -by the dominant school of English thought, philosophy, taken in the -wide sense it has predominantly born abroad, was, not so very long -ago, all but entirely ignored. Causes of various kinds had turned the -energy of the English mind into other directions, not less essential to -the common welfare. Practical needs and an established social system -helped--to bind down studies to definite and particular objects, and to -exclude what seemed vague and general investigations with no immediate -bearing on the business of life. Hence philosophy in England could -hardly exist except when it was reduced to the level of a special -branch of science, or when it could be used as a receptacle for the -principles and methods common to all the sciences. The general term -was often used to denote the wisdom of this world, or the practical -exhibition of self-control in life and action. For those researches, -which are directed to the objects once considered proper to philosophy, -the more definite and characteristic term came to be Mental and Moral -Science. - -The old name was in certain circles restricted to denote the vague and -irregular speculations of those thinkers, who either lived before the -rise of exact science, or who acted in defiance of its precepts and its -example. One large and influential class of English thinkers inclined -to sweep philosophy altogether away, as equivalent to metaphysics and -obsolete forms of error; and upon the empty site thus obtained they -sought to construct a psychological theory of mind, or they tried to -arrange and codify those general remarks upon the general procedure -of the sciences which are known under the name of Inductive Logic. A -smaller, but not less vigorous, school of philosophy looked upon their -business as an extension and rounding off of science into a complete -unification of knowledge. The first is illustrated by the names of J. -S. Mill and Mr. Bain: the second is the doctrine of Mr. Herbert Spencer. - -The encyclopaedic aggregate of biological, psychological, ethical -and social investigation which Mr. Spencer pursues, under the -general guidance of the formula of evolution by differentiation -and integration, still proceeds on its course: but though its -popularity--as such popularity goes--is vast and more than national, -it does not and probably cannot find many imitators. Very differently -stand matters with the movement in psychology and logic. Here -the initiative has led to divergent and unexpected developments. -Psychology, which at first was partly an ampler and a more progressive -logic, a theory of the origin and nature of knowledge, partly a -propaedeutic to the more technical logic and ethics, and pursued in -a loosely introspective way, has gravitated more and more towards -its experimental and physiological side, with occasional velleities -to assume the abstractly-mathematical character of a psycho-physical -science. Logic, on the other hand, has also changed its scope. Not -content to be a mere tool of the sciences or a mere criterion for the -estimation of evidence, it has in one direction grown into a systematic -effort to become an epistemology--a system of the first principles of -knowledge and reality--a metaphysic of science; and in another it has -sought to realise the meaning of those old forms of inference which -the logicians of half a century ago were inclined to pooh-pooh as -obsolete. Most remarkable--and most novel of all--is the vast increase -of interest and research in the problems of ethics and v of what is -called the philosophy of religion--subjects which at that date were -literally burning questions, apt to scorch the fingers of those who -touched them. In all of this, but especially marked in some leading -thinkers, the ruling feature is the critical--the sceptical, i. e. the -eager, watchful, but self-restrained--attitude towards its themes. Ever -driving on to find a deeper unity than shows on the surface, and to get -at principles, the modern thinker--and in this we see the permanent -and almost overwhelming influence of Kant upon him--recoils from the -dogmatism of system, at the very moment it seems to be within his grasp. - -Thus the recent products of English thought have been, as Mr. Spencer -has taught us to say, partly in the line of differentiation, partly -of integration. At one moment it seems as if the ancient queen of the -sciences sat like Hecuba, _exul, inops,_ while her younger daughters -enjoyed the freedom and progress of specialisation. The wood seems lost -behind the trees. And at another, again, the centripetal force seems to -preponderate: every department, logic, ethics, psychology, sociology, -rapidly carries its students on and up to fundamental questions, if -not to fundamental principles. Philosophy--the one and undivided -truth and quest of truths--emerges fresh, vigorous, and as yet rather -indeterminate, from the mass of detailed investigations. That the -position is now altered from what it was in times when knowledge had -fewer departments, is obvious. The task of the 'synoptic' mind--which -Plato claims for the philosopher--grows increasingly difficult: but -that is hardly a reason for performing it in a more perfunctory way. -It seems rather as if in such a crisis one of the great reconstructive -systems of a preceding age might be in some measure helpful. - -If we consult history, it is at once clear that philosophy, or the -pursuit of ultimate reality and permanent truth, went hand in hand with -scientific researches into facts and their particular explanations. - -In their earlier stages the two tendencies of thought were scarcely -distinguishable. The philosophers of Ionia and Magna Graecia were also -the scientific pioneers of their time. Their fragmentary remains remind -us at times of the modern theories of geology and biology,--at other -times of the teachings of idealism. The same thing is comparatively -true of the earlier philosophers of Modern Europe. The seventeenth -and eighteenth centuries, in spite of Bacon and Newton, endeavoured -to study the mental and moral life by a method which was a strange -mixture of empiricism and metaphysics. In words, indeed, the thinkers -from Descartes to Wolff duly emphasise, perhaps over-emphasise, the -antithesis between the extended and the intellectual. But in practice -their course is not so clear. Their mental philosophy is often only a -preliminary _medicina mentis_ to set the individual mind in good order -for undertaking the various tasks awaiting a special research. They are -really eager to get on to business, and only, as it were, with regret -spend time in this clearance of mental faculty. And when they do deal -with objects, the material and extended tends to become the dominant -conception, the basis of reality. The human mind, that _nobilissima -substantia_, is treated only as an aggregate, or a receptacle, of -ideas, and the _mens_,--with them all nearly as with Spinoza,--is only -an _idea corporis,_ and that phrase not taken so highly as Spinoza's -perhaps should be taken. In the works of these thinkers, as of the -pre-Socratics, there is one element which may be styled philosophical, -and another element which maybe styled scientific,--if we use both -words vaguely. But with Socrates in the ancient, and with Kant in the -modern epoch of philosophy, an attempt was made to get the boundary -between the two regions definitively drawn. The distinction was in the -first place accompanied by something like turning the back upon science -and popular conceptions. Socrates withdrew thought from disquisitions -concerning the nature of all things, and fixed it upon man and -the state of man. Kant left the broad fields of actually-attained -knowledge, and inquired into the central principle on which the -acquisition of science, the laws of human life, and the ideals of art -and religion, were founded. - -The change thus begun was not unlike that which Copernicus effected in -the theory of Astronomy. Human personality, either in the actualised -forms of the State, or in the abstract shape of the Reason,--that -intellectual liberty, which is a man's true world,--was, at least by -implication, made the pivot around which the system of the sciences -might turn. In the contest, which according to Reid prevails between -Common Sense and Philosophy, the presumptions of the former have -been distinctly reversed, and Kant, like Socrates, has shown that it -is not the several items of fact, but the humanity, the moral law, -the thought, which underlies these doctrines, which give the real -resting-point and true centre of movement. But this negative attitude -of philosophy to the sciences is only the beginning, needed to secure -a standing-ground. In the ancient world Aristotle, and in the modern -Hegel (as the inheritor of the labours of Fichte and Schelling), -exhibit the movement outwards to reconquer the universe, proceeding -from that principle which Socrates and Kant had emphasised in its -fundamental worth. - -Mr. Mill, in the closing chapter of his Logic, has briefly sketched -the ideal of a science to which he gives the name of Teleology, -corresponding in the ethical and practical sphere to a _Philosophia -Prima_, or Metaphysics, in the theoretical. This ideal and ultimate -court of appeal is to be valid in Morality, and also in Prudence, -Policy and Taste. But the conception, although a desirable one, falls -short of the work which Hegel assigns to philosophy. What he intended -to accomplish with detail and regular evolution was not a system of -principles in these departments of action only, but a theory which -would give its proper place in our total Idea of reality to Art, -Science, and Religion, to all the consciousness of ordinary life, and -to the evolution of the physical universe. Philosophy ranges over -the--whole field of actuality, or existing fact. Abstract principles -are all very well in their way; but they are not philosophy. If the -world in its historical and its present life develops into endless -detail in regular lines, philosophy must equally develop the narrowness -of its first principles into the plenitude of a System,--into what -Hegel calls, the Idea. His point of view may be gathered from the -following remarks in a review of Hamann, an erratic friend and -fellow-citizen of Kant's. - -Hamann would not put himself to the trouble, which in an higher sense -God undertook. The ancient philosophers have described God under the -image of a round ball. But if that be His nature, God has unfolded it; -and in the actual world He has opened the closed shell of truth into a -system of Nature, into a State-system, a system of Law and Morality, -into the system of the world's History. The shut fist has become -an open hand, the fingers of which reach out to lay hold of man's -mind, and draw it to Himself. Nor is the human mind a self-involved -intelligence, blindly moving within its own secret recesses. It is no -mere feeling and groping about in a vacuum, but an intelligent system -of rational organisation. Of that system Thought is the summit in point -of form: and Thought maybe described as the capability of going beyond -the mere surface of God's self-expansion,--or rather as the capability, -by means of reflection upon it, of entering into it, and then when the -entrance has been secured, of retracing in thought God's expansion of -Himself. To take this trouble is the express duty and end of ends set -before the thinking mind, ever since God laid aside His rolled-up form, -and revealed Himself[1].' - -Enthusiastic admirers have often spoken as if the salvation of the time -could only come from the Hegelian philosophy. 'Grasp the secret of -Hegel,' they say, 'and you will find a cure for the delusions of your -own mind, and the remedy which will set right the wrongs of the world.' -These high claims to be a panacea were never made by Hegel himself. -According to him, as according to Aristotle, philosophy _as such_ can -produce nothing new. Practical statesmen, and theoretical reformers, -may do their best to correct the inequalities of their time. But the -very terms in which Bacon scornfully depreciated one great concept of -philosophy are to be accepted in their literal truth. Like a virgin -consecrated to God, she bears no fruit[2]. She represents the spirit -of the world, resting, as it were, when one step in the progress has -been accomplished, and surveying the advance which has been made. -Philosophy is not,' says Fichte, 'even a means to _shape_ life: for -it lies in a totally different world, and what is to have an influence -upon life must itself have sprung from life. Philosophy is only a means -to the _knowledge_ of life.' Nor has it the vocation to edify men, and -take the place of religion on the higher levels of intellect. 'The -philosopher,' Fichte boldly continues, 'has no God at all and can have -no God: he has only a concept of the concept or of the Idea of God. It -is only in life that there is God and religion: but the philosopher as -such is not the whole complete man, and it is impossible for any one -to be _only_ a philosopher[3].' Philosophy does not profess to bring -into being what ought to be, but is not yet. It sets up no mere ideals, -which must wait for some future day in order to be realised. Enough -for it if it show what the world _is,_ if it were what it professes -to be, and what in a way it must be, otherwise it could not be even -what it is. The subject-matter of philosophy is that which is always -realising and always realised--the world in its wholeness as it is and -has been. It seeks to put before us, and embody in permanent outlines, -the universal law of spiritual life and growth, and not the local, -temporary, and individual acts of human will. - -Those who ask philosophy to construe, or to deduce _a priori_ a -single blade of grass, or a single act of a man, must not be grieved -if their request sounds absurd and meets with no answer. The sphere -of philosophy is the Universal. We may say, if we like, that it is -retrospective. It is the spectator of all time and all existence: it -is its duty to view things _sub specie aeternitatis_. To comprehend -the universe of thought in all its formations and all its features, to -reduce the solid structures, which mind has created, to fluidity and -transparency in the pure medium of thought, to set free the fossilised -intelligence which the great magician who wields the destinies of the -world has hidden under the mask of Nature, of the Mind of man, of -the works of Art, of the institutions of the State and the orders of -Society, and of religious forms and creeds:--such is the complicated -problem of philosophy. Its special work is to comprehend the world, -not try to make it better. If it were the purpose of philosophy to -reform and improve the existing state of things, it comes a little -too late for such a task. 'As the thought of the world,' says Hegel, -'it makes its first appearance at a time, when the actual fact has -consummated its process of formation, and is now fully matured. This is -the doctrine set forth by the notion of philosophy; but it is also the -teaching of history. It is only when the actual world has reached its -full fruition that the ideal rises to confront the reality, and builds -up, in the shape of an intellectual realm, that same world grasped in -its substantial being. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, some -one shape of life has meanwhile grown old: and grey in grey, though -it brings it into knowledge, cannot make it young again. The owl of -Minerva does not start upon its flight, until the evening twilight has -begun to fall[4].' - - -[Footnote 1: _Vermischte Schriften_, vol. ii. p. 87.] - -[Footnote 2: _De Augm. Scient._ iii. 5.] - -[Footnote 3: The passages occur in some notes (written down by F. in -reference to the charge of Atheism) published in his _Werke,_ v. pp. -342, 348.] - -[Footnote 4: _Philosophie des Rechts_, p. 20 (_Werke,_ viii).] - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -HEGEL AND THEOLOGY. - - -Even an incidental glance into Hegel's Logic cannot fail to discover -the frequent recurrence of the name of God, and the discussion of -matters not generally touched upon, unless in works bearing upon -religion. There were two questions which seem to have had a certain -fascination for Hegel. One of them, a rather unpromising problem, -referred to the distances between the several planets in the solar -system, and the law regulating these intervals[1]. The other and more -intimate problem turned upon the value of the proofs usually offered -in support of the being of God. That God is the supreme certitude of -the mind, the basis of all reality and knowledge, is what Hegel no more -put in question, than did Descartes, Spinoza, or Locke. What he often -repeated was that the _matter_ in these proofs must be distinguished -from the imperfect _manner_ in which the arguers presented it. -Again and again in his Logic, as well as in other discussions more -especially devoted to it, he examines this problem. His persistence -in this direction might earn for him that title of 'Knight of the -Holy Ghost,' by which Heine, in one of the delightful poems of his -'Reisebilder,' describes himself to the maid of Klausthal in the Harz. -The poet of Love and of Freedom had undoubted rights to rank among the -sacred band: but so also had the philosopher. Like the Socrates whom -Plato describes to us, he seems to feel that he has been commissioned -to reveal the truth of God, and quicken men by an insight into the -right wisdom. Nowhere in the modern period of philosophy has higher -spirit breathed in the utterances of a thinker. The same theme is -claimed as the common heritage of philosophy and religion. A letter -to Duboc[2], the father of a modern German novelist, lets us see how -important this aspect of his system was to Hegel himself. He had been -asked to give a succinct explanation of his standing-ground: and his -answer begins by pointing out that philosophy seeks to apprehend in -reasoned knowledge the same truth which the religious mind has in its -faith. - -Words like these may at first sight suggest the bold soaring of ancient -speculation in the times of Plato and Aristotle, or even the theories -of the medieval Schoolmen. They sound as if he proposed to do for the -modern world, and in the full light of modern knowledge, what the -Schoolmen tried to accomplish within the somewhat narrow conceptions -of medieval Christianity and Greek logic. Still there is a difference -between the two cases. While the Doctors of the Church, in appearance -at least, derived the form of exposition, and the matter of their -systems, from two independent and apparently heterogeneous sources, -the modern Scholastic of Hegel claims to be a harmonious unity, body -finding soul, and soul giving itself body. And while the Hegelian -system has the all-embracing and encyclopaedic character by which -Scholastic science threw its arms around heaven and earth, it has also -the untrammeled liberty of the Greek thinkers. Hegel, in short, shows -the union of these two modes of speculation: free as the ancient, and -comprehensive as the modern. His theory is the explication of God; -but of God in the actuality and plenitude of the world, and not as a -transcendent Being, such as an over-reverent philosophy has sometimes -supposed him, in the solitude of a world beyond. - -The greatness of a philosophy is its power of comprehending facts. -The most characteristic fact of modern times is Christianity. The -general thought and action of the civilised world has been alternately -fascinated and repelled, but always influenced, and to a high degree -permeated, by the Christian theory of life, and still more by the -faithful vision of that life displayed in the Son of Man. To pass that -great cloud of witness and leave it on the other side, is to admit that -your system is no key to the secret of the world,--even if we add, as -some will prefer, of the world as it is and has been. And therefore -the Hegelian system, if it is to be a philosophy at all, must be in -this sense Christian. But it is neither a critic, nor an apologist of -historical Christianity. The voice of philosophy is as that of the -Jewish doctor of the Law: 'If this council or this work be of men, -it will come to nought: but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, -Philosophy examines what is, and not what, according to some opinions, -ought to be. Such a point of view requires no discussion of the 'How' -or the 'Why' of Christianity. It involves no inquiry into historical -documents, or into the belief in miracles: for to it Christianity -rests only incidentally on the evidence of history; and miracles, as -vulgarly explained, can find no reception in a philosophical system. -For it Christianity is 'absolute religion': religion i. e. which has -fully become and realised all that religion meant to be. That religion -has, of course, its historical side: it appeared at a definite epoch -in the annals of our race: it revealed itself in a unique personality -in a remarkable nation. And at an early period of his life Hegel had -tried to gather up in one conception the traits of that august figure, -in his life and speech and death. But, in the light of philosophy, -this historical side shrivels up as comparatively unimportant. Not the -personality, but the 'revelation of reason' through man's spirit: not -the annals of a life once spent in serving God and men, but the words -of the 'Eternal Gospel are henceforth the essence of Christianity. - -Thus the controlling and central conception of life and actuality, -which is the final explanation of all that man thinks and does, has -a twofold aspect. There is, as it were, a double Absolute--for under -this name philosophy has what in religion corresponds to God. It is -true that in the final form of his system the Absolute Spirit has three -phases--each as it were passing on into and incorporated with the -next--Art working out its implications till it appears as Religion, -and Religion calling for its perfection in Philosophy. But in the -_Phenomenology_, his first work, the religion of Art only intervenes -as a grade from 'natural' religion to religion manifest or revealed; -and in the first edition of the _Encyclopaedia_ what is subsequently -called Art is entitled the Religion of Art. It is in entire accordance -with these indications when in the Lectures on Aesthetics[3] it is -said 'the true and original position of Art is to be the first-come -immediate self-satisfaction of Absolute Spirit'; though in our days (it -is added) 'its form has ceased to be the highest need of the spirit.' -It is hardly too much then to say that, for Hegel, the Absolute has two -phases, Religion and Philosophy. - -The Hegelian view presents itself most decisively, though perhaps -with a little lecture-like over-insistance, in the Philosophy of -Religion[4]. 'The object of religion as of philosophy is the eternal -truth in its very objectivity,--God and nothing but God,--and the -"explication" of God. Philosophy is not a wisdom of the world, but -cognition of the non-worldly: not a cognition of the external mass of -empirical existence and life, but cognition of what is eternal, what -is God, and what flows from His nature. For this nature must reveal -and develop itself. Hence philosophy "explicates" itself only when -it "explicates" religion; and in explicating itself it explicates -religion.... Thus religion and philosophy coincide: in fact, philosophy -is itself a divine service, is a religion: for it is the same -renunciation of subjective fancies and opinions, and is engaged with -God alone.' - -Again, it may be asked in what sense philosophy has to deal with God -and with Truth. These two terms are often synonyms in Hegel. All the -objects of science, all the terms of thought, all the forms of reality, -lead out of themselves, and seek for a centre and resting-point. They -are severally inadequate and partial, and they crave adequacy and -completeness. They tend to organise themselves; to call out more and -more distinctly the fuller reality which they presuppose,--which must -have been, otherwise they could not have been: they reduce their first -appearance of completeness to its due grade of inadequacy and bring out -their complementary side, so as to constitute a system or universe; and -in this tendency to a self-correcting unity consists their progress -to truth. Their untruth lies in isolation and pretended independence -or finality. This completed unity, in which all things receive their -entireness and become adequate, is their Truth: and that Truth, as -known in religious language, is God. Rightly or wrongly, God is thus -interpreted in the Logic of Hegel. - -Such a position must seem very strange to one who is familiar only -with the sober studies of English philosophy. In whatever else the -leaders of the several schools in this country disagree, they are -nearly all at one in banishing God and religion to a world beyond -the present sublunary sphere, to an inscrutable region beyond the -scope of scientific inquiry, where statements may be made at will, -but where we have no power of verifying any statement whatever. -This is the common doctrine of Spencer and Mansel, of Hamilton and -Mill. Even those English thinkers, who show some anxiety to support -what is at present called Theism, generally rest content with -vindicating for the mind the vague perception of a Being beyond us, -and differing from us incommensurably. God is to them a residual -phenomenon, a marginal existence. Outside the realm of experience -and knowledge there is not-nothing--a something--beyond definite -circumscription: incalculable, and therefore an object, possibly of -fear, possibly of hope: the reflection in the utter darkness of a great -What-may-it-not-be? He is the Unknown Power, felt by what some of -these writers call intuition, and others call experience. They do not -however allow to knowledge any capacity of apprehending in detail the -truths which belong to the kingdom of God. Now the whole teaching of -Hegel is the overthrow of the limits thus set to religious thought. To -him all thought, and all actuality when it is grasped by knowledge, is -from man's side, an exaltation of the mind towards God: while, when -regarded from the divine standing-point, it is the manifestation by God -of His own nature in its infinite variety. - -It is only when we fix our eyes clearly on these general features in -his speculation, that we can understand why _he_ places the maturity -of ancient philosophy in the time of Plotinus and Proclus. Not that -these Neo-Platonists are, as thinkers, of power equal to their master -of Athens. But, in the realm of the blind the one-eyed may be king. The -later thinkers set their vision more distinctly and persistently on the -land that is eternal--'on the further side of being,' to quote Plato's -phrase. It is for the same reason Hegel gives so much attention to the -religious or semi-religious theories of Jacob Böhme and of Jacobi, -though these men were in many ways so unlike himself. - - -[Footnote 1: Hegel's _Leben_, p. 155. It was in his dissertation -_de Orbitis Planetarum,_ that the notorious contretemps occurred, -whereby, whilst the philosopher, leaning to a Pythagorean proportion, -hinted--in a line--that it was unnecessary to expect a planet between -Mars and Jupiter, astronomers in the same year discovered Ceres, the -first-detected of the Planetoids. A good deal has been made out of -this trifle; but it has not yet been shown that the corroboration was -anything but the _luck_ of the other hypothesis.] - -[Footnote 2: _Vermischte Schriften_, vol. ii. p. 520. Duboc was a -retired hatter, of French origin, who had settled at Hamburg (Hegel's -_Briefe_, ii. 76 seqq.).] - -[Footnote 3: _Werke_, x. I, p. 131.] - -[Footnote 4: _Werke,_ xi. p. 21.] - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -PSEUDO-IDEALISM: JACOBI. - - -It is hazardous to try to sum up the net result of a philosophy in -a few paragraphs. Since Aristotle separated the pure 'energy' of -philosophy from the activities which leave works made and deeds -done behind them, it need scarcely be repeated that the result of a -philosophical system is nothing palpable or tangible,--nothing on which -you can put your finger, and say definitely: Here it is. The spirit of -a philosophy always refuses to be incarcerated in a formula, however -deftly you may try to charm it there. The statement of the principle -or tendency of a philosophical system tells not what that system is, -but what it is not. It marks off the position from contiguous points -of view; and on that account never gets beyond the borderland, which -separates that system from something else. The method and process of -reasoning is as essential in knowledge, as the result to which it -leads: and the method in this case is thoroughly bound up with the -subject-matter. A mere analysis of the method, therefore, or a mere -record of the purpose and outcome of the system, would be, the one as -well as the other, a fruitless labour, and come to nothing but words. -Thus any attempt to convey a glimpse of the truth in a few sentences -and in large outlines seems foreclosed. The theory of Hegel has an -abhorrence of mere generalities, of abstractions with no life in them, -and no growth out of them. His principle has to prove and verify itself -to be true and adequate: and that verification fills up the whole -circle of circles, of which philosophy is said to consist. - -It seems as if there were in Hegel two distinct habits of mind which -the world--the outside observer--rarely sees except in separation. -On one hand there is a sympathy with mystical and intuitional minds, -with the upholders of immediate knowledge and of innate ideas, with -those who find that science and demonstration rather tend to distract -from the one thing needful--who would 'lie in Abraham's bosom all the -year,'--those who would fain lay their grasp upon the whole before they -have gone through the drudgery of details. On the other hand, there -is within him a strongly 'rationalising' and non-visionary intellect, -with a practical and realistic bent, and the full scientific spirit. -Schelling, in an angry mood, could describe him as 'the quintessence -of all that is prosaic, both outside and in[1].' Yet, seen from other -points of view, Hegel has been accused of dreaminess, pietism, and -mystical theology. His merging of the ordinary contrasts of thought -in a completer truth, and what would popularly be described as his -mixing up of religious with logical questions, and the general -unfathomableness of his doctrine,--all seem to support such a charge. -Yet all this is not inconsistent with a rough and incisive vigour -of understanding, a plainness of reason, and a certain hardness of -temperament. This philosopher is in many ways not distinguishable from -the ordinary citizen, and there are not unfrequent moments when his -wife hears him groan over the providence that condemned him to be a -philosopher[2]. He is contemptuous towards all weakly sentimentalism, -and almost brutal in his emphasis on the reasonableness of the actual -and on the folly of dreaming the might-have-been; and keeps his -household accounts as carefully as the average head of a family. And, -perhaps, this convergence of two tendencies of thought may be noticed -in the gradual maturing of his ideas. In the period of his 'Lehrjahre,' -or apprenticeship, from 1793 to 1800, we can see the study of religion -in the earlier part of that time at Bern succeeded by the study of -politics and philosophy at Frankfort-on-the-Main. - -His purpose on the whole may be termed an attempt to combine breadth -with depth, the intensity of the mystic who craves for union with -Truth, with the extended range and explicitness of those who multiply -knowledge. 'The depth of the mind is only so deep as its courage -to expand and lose itself in its explication[3]. It must prove its -profundity by the ordered fullness of the knowledge which it has -realised. The position and the work of Hegel will not be intelligible -unless we keep in view both of these antagonistic points. - -The purpose of philosophy--as has been pointed out--is, for Hegel--to -know God, which is to know things in their Truth--to see all things in -God--to comprehend the world in its eternal significance. Supposing -the purpose capable of being achieved, what method is open to its -attainment? There is on one hand the method of ordinary science -in dealing with its objects. These are _things,_ found as it were -projected into space before the observer, lying outside one another in -_prima facie_ independence, though connected (by a further finding) -with each other by certain 'accidents' called qualities and relations. -Among the objects of knowledge, there are included, by the somewhat -naïve intellect that accepts tradition like a physical fact, certain -'things' of a rather peculiar character. One of these is God: the -others, which a historical criticism has subjoined, are the Soul and -the World. And whatever may be said of the thinghood, reality, or -existence of the World, there is no doubt that God and the Soul figure, -and figure largely, in the consciousness of the human race as entities, -differing probably in many respects from other things, but still -possessed of certain fundamental features in common, and thus playing a -part as distinct realities amongst other realities. - -Given such objects, it is natural for a reflecting mind to attempt -to make out a science of God and a science of the Soul, just as of -other 'things.' And to these, a system-loving philosopher might add a -science of the world (Cosmology)[4]. It was felt, indeed, that these -objects were peculiar and unique. Thus, for example, as regards God, -it was held necessary by the logician who saw tradition in its true -light to prove His existence': and various arguments to that end were -at different times devised. With regard to the human Soul, similarly, -it was considered essential to establish its independent reality as a -thing really separate from the bodily organism with which its phenomena -were obviously connected,--to prove, in short, its substantial -existence, and its emancipation from the bodily fate of dissolution and -decay. With reference to the World, the problem was rather different: -it was felt that the name suggested problems for thought rather than -denoted reality. How can we predicate of the whole what is predicable -of its parts? This or that may have a beginning and a cause, may have -a limit and an end: but can the totality be presented under these -aspects, without leading to self-contradiction? And the result of -these questions in the case of 'Cosmology' was to shed in the long run -similar doubts on 'Rational' Theology and 'Rational' Psychology. - -Practically this metaphysical science--which is so called as dealing -with a province or provinces of being _beyond_ the ordinary or natural -_(physical)_ realities--treated God and the Soul by the same terms -(or _categories_) as it used in dealing with 'material' objects. God -e. g. was a force, a cause, a being; so, too, was the Soul. The main -butt of Kant's destructive _Criticism of pare Reason_ is to challenge -the justice of including God and the Soul among the objects of -science,--among the things we can know as we may know plants or stars. -To make an object of knowledge (in the strict sense), to make a thing, -the prerequisite, Kant urges, is perception in space and time. Without -a sensation--and that sensation, as it were, laid out in place and -duration--an object of science is impossible. No mere demonstration -will conjure it into existence. And with that requirement the old -theology and psychology, which professed to expound the object-God and -the object-soul, were ruled out-of-order in the list of sciences, and -reduced to mere dialectical exercises. The circle of the sciences, -therefore, does not lead beyond the conditioned,' beyond the regions -of space and time. It has nothing to say of a 'first cause' or of an -ultimate end. - -Such was the result that might fairly be read from Kant's _Criticism of -pare Reason_,--especially if read without its supplementary sequels, -and, above all, if read by those in whom feeling was stronger than -thought, or who were by nature more endowed with the craving for faith -than with the mind of philosophy. Such a personality appeared in J. -H. Jacobi, the younger brother of a poet not undistinguished in his -day. Amid the duties of public office and the cares of business, he -found time to study Spinoza, the English and Scotch moralists, and -above all to follow with interest the development of Kant from the year -1763 onwards. His house at Düsseldorf was the scene of many literary -reunions, and Jacobi himself maintained familiar intercourse with -the leaders of the literary and intellectual world, such as Lessing, -Hamann, Goethe. His first considerable works were two novels, in -letters,--Allwill, begun in a serial magazine in 1775, and Woldemar, -begun in another magazine in 1777; both being issued as complete works -in 1781. Both turn on a moral antithesis, and both leave the antithesis -as they found it. _Here_ pleads the advocate of the heart: 'it is the -heart which alone and directly tells man what is good': 'virtue is a -fundamental instinct of human nature': the true basis of morals is an -immediate certainty; and the supreme standard is an 'ethical genius' -which as it were discovered virtue and which still is a paramount -authority in those exceptional situations in life when the 'grammar -of virtue' fails to supply adequate rules, and where, therefore, the -immediate voice of conscience must in a 'licence of sublime poesy[5]' -dare, as Burke says, to 'suspend its own rules in favour of its own -principles.' _There_, on the other hand, is the champion of reason, -who declares all this sentimentalism 'a veritable mysticism of -antinomianism and a quietism of immorality[6]': 'To humanity,' he says, -'and to every man (every complete man) principles, and some system -of principles, are indispensable.' Woldemar concludes with the pair -of mottoes: 'Whosoever trusts to his own heart is a fool,' and 'Trust -love: it takes everything, but it gives everything.' - -In 1780 Jacobi had his historic conversation with Lessing at -Wolfenbüttel[7]. The talk turned on Spinoza. For many years the -philosophy of Spinoza had seemed to vanish from the world. His name -was only heard in a reference of obloquy, as if it were dangerous to -be even suspected of infection with the taint of Atheism. But both -Lessing and Jacobi had found him out. The former saw in him an ally in -that struggle for higher light and wider views which he undertook in -a spirit and with a scope hardly surmised by those he usually wrought -with. Jacobi, on the contrary, saw in him personified the conjunction -of all those irreligious tendencies which all philosophy in some degree -exhibited: the tendency to veil or set aside God and personality. 'I -believe,' says Jacobi, as he began the conversation 'in an intelligent -personal cause of the world.' 'Then I am going,' replied Lessing, 'to -hear something quite new': and he dryly put aside the other's rhapsody -on the 'personal extra-mundane deity with the remark 'Words, my dear -Jacobi, words.' Jacobi's work _Letters on the doctrine of Spinoza_ -(it appeared in 1785) was the beginning of a controversy in which -Mendelssohn and Herder took part, and in which Goethe took an interest -under Herders tutorship. To the exact philological study of Spinoza -it did not contribute much: for the Spinoza whom Herder and Goethe -saw as their spiritual forefather was transfigured in their thought -to a figure to which Leibniz had almost an equal right to give his -name. He upheld to them the symbol of the immanence of the divine in -nature: he was the leader in the battle against 'philistine' deism and -utilitarianism. - -With the Kantian criticism of the pseudo-science of theology Jacobi had -in one way no fault to find. That reasoning by its demonstration cannot -find out God, was to him an axiomatic belief. But the 'man of feeling' -felt uneasy at the trenchant methods of the Königsberg man of logic. -He seemed to see the world of men and things passing under Kant's -manipulation into a mere collection of phenomena and ideas of the mind. -Still more was he sensible to the loss of his God. That surrogate of an -argument for theism which Kant seemed to offer in the implications of -the Moral Law did not give what Jacobi wanted. Mere morality is a cold -and mechanical principle--he thinks--compared with that infinite life -and love which we deem we have in God. The son of man, he felt, was, in -virtue of an indwelling genius of conscience, supreme over the moral -law: how much more, then, the Absolute and Eternal on a higher grade of -being than its mechanical regularities! - -If the way of reasoning will not carry us to the Absolute, still -less (and that is whither Jacobi wishes to reach) to God, there must -be another way: for something in him, which may be called Faith -or Feeling, Spiritual Sense or Reason, proclaims itself certain -of the reality both of God and Nature. There _is_ an objective -reality--outside and beyond him--yet somehow to be reached by a daring -leap,--whereby, out of sheer force of will, he, shutting his eyes -to the temporal and the mechanical, finds himself carried over the -dividing gulf into the land of eternal life and love. - -'I appeal' he says in his latest utterances[8] 'to an imperative, an -invincible feeling as the first and underived ground of all philosophy -and all religion,--to a feeling which lets man become aware of and -alive to the fact that he has a sense for the supersensuous.' 'As it -is religion which makes man man,' he continues, 'and which alone lifts -him above the animals, so it also makes him a philosopher.' Such an -organ for the supersensuous is what in his later writings he calls -_Vernunft_ (Reason) and distinguishes from _Verstand_ (Understanding). -'This reason,' says Coleridge (to whom we owe this use of the terms in -English) in the _Friend,_ 'is an organ bearing the same relation to -spiritual objects as the eye bears to material phenomena,' It is 'that -intuition of things which arises when we possess ourselves as one with -the whole and is opposed to that 'science of the mere understanding' -in which 'transferring reality to the negations of reality (to the -ever-varying framework of the uniform life) we think of ourselves -as separated beings, and place nature in antithesis to the mind, as -object to subject, thing to thought, death to life.' But this Reason -is even more than this. It is the direct contact with reality, which -it affirms and even _is._ It apprehends the _me_ and the _thee,_ it -apprehends above all the great _Thee,_ God: apprehends, and we may even -say appropriates[9]. And it apprehends them at one bound--in one _salto -mortale_--because it is really in implicit possession of them. Call the -step a miracle, if you will: you must admit, he adds, that 'some time -or other every philosophy must have recourse to a miracle[10].' - -And yet the asseveration rings false--it shows a womanish wilfulness -and weakness in its reiteration. He has the reality; yet he has it -not. 'Were a God known,' he says in one place, 'He would not be God.' -He yearns with passionate longing to find the living and true: he -feels himself and the Eternal clasped in one: his faith effects the -reality of things hoped for. But, he adds, 'We never see the Absolute': -the primal light of reason is but faint. It is but a presage--a -pre-supposition--of the Everlasting. This reason, in short, needs -discipline and development, it needs the ethical life to raise it: -'without morality no religiosity,' he says. 'Light,' he complains, -'is in my heart,' but at the moment I want to bring it into the -understanding, the light goes out.' And yet he knows--and Coleridge -repeats--'the consciousness of reason and of its revelations is only -possible in an understanding.' - -'There seem to be one or two motives acting upon Jacobi. The 'plain -man,' especially if he be of high character and of 'noble' religiosity, -has a feeling that the lust of philosophising disturbs the security of -life, and endangers things which are deservedly dear to him. In such -an one the 'enthusiasm of logic'--the calm pursuit of truth at all -costs, so characteristic of Lessing--is inferior to the 'enthusiasm -of life,'--a passion in which the terrestrial and the celestial are -inextricably blended, where one clings to God as the stronghold of -self, and sets personality--our human personality--in the throne of -the Eternal. He will be all that is noble and good, if only he be not -asked utterly to surrender self. So, too, Jacobi's God--or Absolute -(for he leaves his 'non-philosophy' so far as to use both names), is -rather the final aim of a grand, overpowering yearning, than a calm, -self-centred, self-expanding life which carries man along with it. -It would be, he feels, so very terrible, if at the last there were -no God to meet us--to find the throne of the universe vacant. Avaunt -philosophy, therefore! Let us cling to the faith of our nature and our -childhood, and refuse her treacherous consolations! With the central -proposition of Jacobi, Hegel, for one, is not inclined to quarrel. He -too, as he asks and answers the question as to the issues of this and -of the better life, might say - - 'Question, answer presuppose - Two points: that the thing itself which questions, answers,--_is,_ it - knows; - As it also knows the thing perceived outside itself--a force - Actual ere its own beginning, operative through its course, - Unaffected by its end,--that this thing likewise needs must be; - Call this--God, then, call that--Soul, and both the only facts for me. - Prove them facts? that they o'erpass my power of proving proves - them such: - Fact it is, I know, I know not something which is fact as much.' - -But when Jacobi goes on to say that it is the supreme and final duty -of the true sage 'to unveil reality,'--meaning thereby that, given the -feeling, he has only to - - 'Define it well - For fear divine Philosophy - Should push beyond her mark and be - Procuress to the Lords of Hell,' - -Hegel withdraws. It is the duty of philosophy to labour to make the -perception--the fleeting, uncertain, trembling perception--of faith, -a clear, sure, inwardly consistent knowledge: to show, and not merely -to assert, that 'the path of (this world's) duty is the way to (that -world's) glory.' There is, Hegel himself has said more than once, -something opposed to ordinary ways of thinking in the procedure of the -philosopher. To the outsider, it seems like standing on your head. -It involves something like what, in religious language, is termed -conversion--a new birth--becoming a new man. But though such a change -always seems to culminate in a moment of sudden transformation,--as if -the continuity of old and new were disrupted, the process has a history -and a preparation. Of that pilgrim's progress of the world-distracted -soul to its discovery of its true being in God, philosophy is the -record: a record which Hegel has written both in the _Phenomenology of -Mind_, and, more methodically, in his _Encyclopaedia._ The passage from -nature to God--or from man's limitations to the divine fullness--must -be made, he urged, in the open day and not in the secret vision when -sleep falls upon men. When the aged Jacobi read these requirements of -Hegel, he wrote to a friend: 'He may be right, and I should like once -again to experiment with him all that the power of thinking can do -alone, were not the old man's head too weak for it[11].' - -'For a philosophy like this,' says Hegel[12], 'individual man -and humanity are the ultimate standpoint:--as a fixed invincible -finitude of reason, not as a reflection of the eternal beauty, or as -a spiritual focus of the universe, but as an ultimate sense-nature, -which however with the power of faith can daub itself over here and -there with an alien supersensible. Let us suppose an artist restricted -to portrait-painting; he might so far idealise as to introduce in the -eye of a commonplace countenance a yearning look, and on its lips a -melancholy smile, but he would be utterly debarred from depicting the -Gods, sublime over yearning and melancholy--as if the delineation of -eternal pictures were only possible at the cost of humanity. So too -Philosophy--on this view--must not portray the Idea of man, but the -abstraction of a humanity empirical and mingled with short-comings, and -must bear a body impaled on the stake of the absolute antithesis; and -when it clearly feels its limitation to the sensible, it must at the -same time bedeck itself with the surface colour of a supersensible, -and point the finger of faith to a something Higher. - -'But the truth cannot be defrauded by such a consecration if finitude -be still left subsisting; the true consecration must annihilate it. -The artist, who fails to give actuality the true truth by letting -fall upon it the ethereal illumination and taking it completely in -that light, and who can only depict actuality in its bare ordinary -reality and truth (a reality however which is neither true nor real) -may apply the pathetic remedy to actuality, the remedy of tenderness -and sentimentality, everywhere putting tears on the cheeks of the -commonplace, and an O God! in their mouth. No doubt his figures in -this way direct their look over the actual heavenwards, but like -bats they belong neither to the race of birds nor beasts, neither to -earth nor heaven. Their beauty is not free from ugliness, nor their -morals without weakness and meanness: the intelligence they haply may -show is not without banality: the success which enters into it is -not without vulgarity, and the misfortune not without cowardice and -terror; and both success and misfortune have something contemptible. -So too philosophy, if it takes the finite and subjectivity as absolute -truth in the logical form habitual to her, cannot purify them by -bringing them into relation with an infinite: for that infinite is not -itself the true, because it is unable to consume finitude. But where -a philosophy consumes the temporal as such and burns up reality, its -action is pronounced a cruel dissection, which does not leave man -complete, and a forcible abstraction which has no truth, above all -no truth for life. And such an abstraction is treated as a painful -amputation of an essential piece from the completeness of the whole: -that essential piece, and absolute substantiality being believed to -consist in the temporal and empirical, and in privation. It is as if -a person, who sees only the feet of a work of art, were to complain, -should the whole work be unveiled to his eyes, that he was deprived of -the privation, that the incomplete was decompleted.' - -Jacobi has been spoken of as the leader of this 'Un-philosophy' of -faith. As such his allies lie on one side among philosophers who hold -by the deliverances of 'common sense,' by the consciousness of the -unsophisticated man shrinking from the waywardness of an idealism that -deprives him of his solidest realities. The type of such a philosopher -has been drawn by Hegel[13] in Krug. But, on the other side, Jacobi -touched hands--though not in a sympathetic spirit--with a somewhat -motley band which also had set its face to go to the everlasting gates, -but had turned aside to aimless wandering on the Hill Difficulty, or -sought too soon the repose of the Delectable Mountains, without due -sojourn in the valley of Humiliation or descent under the Shadow of -Death. Like Wordsworth, they felt that the world is too much with -us: that our true self is frittered away into fragments and passing -stages, in which we are not ourselves,--whereby we also lose the true -perception of the essential life of nature. Gradually we have sunk -into the deadening arms of habit, reduced ourselves to professional -and conventional types, and lost the freer and larger mobility of -spiritual being. We have grown into _verständige Leute_--people of -practical sense and worldly wisdom. To such, philosophy would come--if -it could come--as the great breath of life--of 'reason' (_Vernunft_) -which transcends the separations inevitable in practical will and -knowledge. But to this band--which has been styled the Romantic School -of Germany--the liberation came in ways more analogous to that craved -for by Jacobi. Their way was the way of Romance and Imagination. The -principle of Romance is the protest against confining man and nature -to the dull round of uniformities which custom and experience have -imprisoned them in. Boundless life, infinite spontaneity is surging -within us and the world, ready to break down the dams convention -and inertia have established. That inner power is an ever-fresh, -ever-restless Irony, which sets up and overthrows, which refuses to be -bound or stereotyped, which is never weary, never exhausted,--free in -the absolute sense. It is the mystic force of Nature, which they seemed -to see ever on the spring to work its magic transformations, and burst -the bulwarks of empirical law. It is the princely _jus aggratiandi,_ -the sportive sovereignty of the true artist, who is able at any moment -to enter into direct communion with the heart of things. - -The beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany, as well as in -England, was a period of effervescence:--there was a good deal of fire, -and naturally there was also a good deal of smoke. Genius was exultant -in its aspirations after Freedom, Truth, and Wisdom. The Romantic -School, which had grown up under the stimulus of Fichte's resolve to -enact thought, and had for a time been closely allied with Schelling, -counted amongst its literary chiefs the names of the Schlegels, of -Tieck, Novalis, and perhaps Richter. The world, as that generation -dreamed, was to be made young again,--first by drinking, where -Wordsworth led, from the fresh springs of nature,--afterwards when, as -often has happened, doubts arose as to where Nature was really to be -found, by an elixir distilled from the withered flowers of medieval -Catholicism and chivalry, - - 'Since the Mid-Age was the Heroic Time' - -and even from the old roots of primeval wisdom. The good old times of -faith and harmonious beauty were to be brought back again by the joint -labours of ideas and poetry.-- - - 'So, all that the old Dukes had been, without knowing it, - This Duke would fain know he was without being it.' - -To that period of incipient and darkling energy Hegel stands in -very much the same position as Luther did to the pre-Reformation -mystics, to Meister Eckhart, and the unknown author of the 'German -Theology.' It was from this side, from the school of Genius and Romance -in philosophy, that Hegel was proximately driven, not into sheer -re-action, but into system, development, and science. - -To elevate philosophy from a love of wisdom into the possession of real -wisdom, into a system and a science, is the aim which he distinctly -set before himself from the beginning. In almost every work, and every -course of lectures, whatever be their subject, he cannot let slip the -chance of an attack upon the mode of philosophising which substituted -the strength of belief or conviction for the intervention of reasoning -and argument. There may have been a strong sympathy in him with the -end which these German contemporaries and, in some ways, analogues -to Coleridge, Shelley, Wordsworth, and Byron had in view. No one who -reads his criticism of Kant can miss perceiving his bent towards the -Infinite. But he utterly rejects the vision of feeling, whether as -longing faith or devout enjoyment, as an adequate exposition of the -means to this end. Whereas these fantastic seers and sentimentalists -either disparage science as a limitation to the spirit, in the calm -trust of their life in God, or yearn throughout life for a peace -which they never quite reach, Hegel is bent upon showing men that the -Infinite is not unknowable, as Kant would have it, and yet that man can -not, as Jacobi would have it, naturally and without an effort enjoy -the things of God[14]. He will prove that the way of Truth is open, and -prove it by describing in detail every step of the road. Philosophy for -him must be reasoned truth. She does not visit favoured ones in visions -of the night, but comes to all who win her by patient study. - -'For those,' he says, 'who ask for a royal road to science, no more -convenient directions can be given than to trust to their own sound -common sense, and, if they wish to keep up with the age and with -philosophy, to read the reviews criticising philosophical works, and -perhaps even the prefaces and the first paragraphs in these works -themselves. The introductory remarks state the general and fundamental -principles; and the reviews, besides their historical information, -contain a critical estimate, which, from the very fact that it is -such, is beyond and above what it criticises. This is the road of -ordinary men: and it may be traversed in a dressing-gown. The other -way is the way of intuition. It requires you to don the vestments of -the high-priest. Along that road stalks the ennobling sentiment of the -Eternal, the True, the Infinite. But it is wrong to call "this a road. -These grand sentiments find themselves, naturally and without taking -a single step, centred in the very sanctuary of truth. So mighty is -genius, with its deep original ideas and its high flashes of wit. But -a depth like this is not enough to lay bare the sources of true being, -and these rockets are not the empyrean. True thoughts and scientific -insights are only to be gained by the labour which comprehends and -grasps its object. And that thorough grasp alone can produce the -universality of science. Contrasted with the vulgar vagueness and -scantiness of common sense, that universality is a fully-formed and -rounded intellect; and, contrasted with the un-vulgar generality of -the natural gift of reason when it has been spoilt by the laziness and -self-conceit of genius, it is truth put in possession of its native -form, and thus rendered the possible property of every self-conscious -reason[15].' - -These words which were taken to heart (unnecessarily, perhaps) by the -patron of the _Intellectual Intuition_ rung the knell to the friendship -of Hegel with his great contemporary Schelling. Yet this hard saying -is also the keynote to the subsequent work of the philosopher. In -Hegel we need expect no brilliant _apergus_ of genius, no intellectual -legerdemain, but only the patient unraveling of the clue of thought -through all knots and intricacies: a deliberate tracing and working-out -of the contradictions and mysteries in thought, until the contradiction -and the mystery disappear. Perseverance is the secret of Hegel. - -This characteristic of patient work is seen, for example, in the -incessant prosecution of hints and glimpses, until they grew into -systematic and rounded outline. Instead of vague anticipations and -guesses at truth, fragments of insight, his years of philosophic study -are occupied with writing and re-writing, in the _V_ endeavour to clear -up and arrange the masses of his ideas. Essay after essay, and sketch -after sketch of a system, succeed each other amongst his papers. His -first great work was not published before his 37th year, after six -years spent in university work at Jena, following as many spent in -preliminary lucubration. The notes which he used to dictate some years -afterwards to the boys in the Gymnasium at Nürnberg bear evidence -of constant remodelling, and the same is true of his professorial -lectures. - -Such insistance in tracing every suggestion of truth to its place -in the universe of thought is the peculiar character and difficulty -of Hegelian argument. Other observers have now and again noticed, -accentuated, and, it may be, popularised some one point or some one -law in the evolution of reason. Here and there, as we reflect, we -are forced to recognise what Hegel termed the dialectical nature in -thought,--the tendency, by which a principle, when made to be all that -it implied, when, as the phrase is, it is carried to extremes, recoils -and leaves us confronted by its antithesis. We cannot, for example, -study the history of ancient thought without noting this phenomenon. -Thus, the persistence with which Plato and Aristotle taught and -enforced the doctrine that the community was the guide and safeguard -of the several citizens, very soon issued in the schools of Zeno and -Epicurus, teaching the rights of self-seeking and of the independent -self-realisation of the individual. But the passing glimpse of an -indwelling discord in the terms, by which we argue, is soon forgotten, -and is set aside under the head of accidents, instead of being referred -to a general law. Most of us take only a single step to avoid what has -turned out wrong, and when we have overcome the seeming absoluteness of -one idea, we are content and even eager to throw ourselves under the -yoke of another, not less one-sided than its predecessor. Sometimes -one feels tempted to say that the course of human thought as a whole, -as well as that branch of it termed science, exhibits nothing but a -succession of illusions, which enclose us in the belief that some idea -is all-embracing as the universe,--illusions, from which the mind is -time after time liberated, only in a little while to sink under the -sway of some partial correction, as if it and it only were the complete -truth. - -Or, again, the Positive Philosophy exhibits as one of its features an -emphatic and popular statement of a fallacy much discussed in Hegel. -One of the best deeds of that school has been to protest against a -delusive belief in certain words and notions; particularly by pointing -out the insufficiency of what it calls metaphysical terms, i. e. those -abstract entities formed by reflective thought, which are little else -than a double of the phenomenon they are intended to explain. To -account for the existence of insanity by an assumed basis for it in -the 'insane neurosis,' or to attribute the sleep which follows a dose -of opium to the soporific virtues of the drug, are some exaggerated -examples of the metaphysical intellect which is so rampant in much -of our popular, and even of our esoteric science. Positivism by its -logical precepts ought at least to have instilled general distrust of -abstract talk about essences, laws, forces and causes, whenever they -claim an inherent and independent value, or profess to be more than -a reflex of sensation. But all this is only a desultory perception, -the reflection of an intelligent observer. When we come to Hegel, the -Comtian perception of the danger lying in the terms of metaphysics is -replaced by the Second Part of Logic, the Theory of Essential Being, -where substances, causes, forces, essences, matters, are confronted -with what Mr. Bain has called their 'suppressed correlative[16].' - - -[Footnote 1: Aus Schellings Leben (Plitt.), ii. 161.] - -[Footnote 2: Hegel's _Briefe_, ii. 377.] - -[Footnote 3: _Phenomenologie des Geistes,_ p. 9.] - -[Footnote 4: Cf. Notes and Illustrations in vol. ii. 396, and chapter -iii. of the _Logic._] - -[Footnote 5: Jacobi's _Werke_, v. 79, III, 115, 417.] - -[Footnote 6: Ibid., i. 178.] - -[Footnote 7: Jacobi's _Werke,_ iv. i. Abth. p. 55 seqq.] - -[Footnote 8: Jacobi's _Werke_, iv. i, p. xxi.] - -[Footnote 9: Jacobi's _Briefwechsel,_ i. 330.] - -[Footnote 10: Jacobi's _Werke_, iii. 53.] - -[Footnote 11: Jacobi's _Briefwechsel_, ii. 468.] - -[Footnote 12: Hegel's _Werke,_ i. 15.] - -[Footnote 13: Hegel's _Vermischte Schriften,_ i. 50.] - -[Footnote 14: Compare pages 121-142 of the _Logic._] - -[Footnote 15: _Phenomenologie des Geistes_, p. 54 (_Werke_, ii).] - -[Footnote 16: _Practical Essays,_ p. 43.] - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -THE SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY. - - -By asserting the rights of philosophy against the dogmatism of -self-inspired 'unphilosophy,' and by maintaining that we must not feel -the truth, with our eyes as it were closed, but must open them full -upon it, Hegel does not reduce philosophy to the level of one of the -finite sciences. The name 'finite,' like the name 'empirical,' is not -a title of which the sciences have any cause to be ashamed. They are -called empirical, because it is their glory and their strength to found -upon experience. They are called finite, because they have a fixed -object, which they must expect and cannot alter; because they have an -end and a beginning,--presupposing something where they begin, and -leaving something for the sciences which come after. Botany rests upon -the researches of chemistry: and astronomy hands over the record of -cosmical movements to geology. Science is interlinked with science; and -each of them is a fragment. Nor can these fragments ever, in the strict -sense of the word, make up a whole or total. They have broken off, -sometimes by accident, and sometimes for convenience, from one another. -The sciences have budded forth here and there upon the tree of popular -knowledge and ordinary consciousness, as the interest and needs of the -time drew attention closer to various points and objects in the world -surrounding us. - -Prosecute the popular knowledge about any point far enough, -substituting completeness and accuracy for vagueness, and especially -giving numerical definiteness in weight, size, and figure, until -the little drop of fact has grown into an ocean, and the mere germ -has expanded into a structure with complex interconnexion,--and -you will have a science. By its point of origin this luminous body -of facts is united to the great circle of human knowledge and -ignorance. Each special science is a part, which presupposes a total -of much lower organisation, but much wider range than itself: each -branch of scientific knowledge grows out of the already existent -tree of acquaintance with things. But the part very soon assumes an -independence of its own, and adopts a hostile or negative attitude -towards the general level of unscientific opinion. This process of what -we may, from the vulgar point of view, call abnormal development, is -repeated irregularly at various points along the surface of ordinary -consciousness. At one time it is the celestial movements calling for -the science of astronomy: at another the problem of dividing the soil -calling for the geometrician. Each of these outgrowths naturally -re-acts and modifies the whole range of human knowledge, or what we -may call popular science; and thus, while keeping up its own life, it -quickens the parent stock with an infusion of new vigour, and raises -the general intelligence to a higher level and into a higher element. - -The order of the outcome of the sciences in time, therefore, and their -connexions with one another, cannot be explained or understood, if we -look only to the sciences themselves. We must first of all descend -into the depths of natural thought, or of general culture, and trace -the lines which unite science with science in that general medium. The -systematic interdependence of the sciences must be chiefly sought for -in the workings of thought as a whole in its popular phases, and in the -action and reaction of that _general_ human thought with the sciences, -those definite organisations of knowledge which form sporadically round -the _nuclei_ here and there presented in what would superficially be -described as the inorganic mass and medium of popular knowledge. Thus, -by means of the sciences in their aggregate action, the material of -common consciousness is expanded and developed, at least in certain -parts, though the expansion may be neither consistent nor systematic. -But so long as this work is incomplete, so long, that is to say, as -every point in the line of popular knowledge has not received its due -elaboration and equal study, the sciences merely succeed each other in -a certain imperfect sequence, or exist in juxtaposition: they do not -form a total. The whole of scientific knowledge will only be formed, -when science shall be as completely rounded and unified, as in its -lower sphere and more inadequate element the ordinary consciousness of -the world is now. - -Up to a certain point the method of science is but the method of -ordinary consciousness pursued knowingly and steadily. But ere long -the method acquires a distinctive character of its own. It shakes -off the pressure of that immediate subservience in which ordinary -knowledge stands to man's needs, wishes and interests. Knowledge -is pursued--within a wide range--for its own sake, and by a class -more or less definitely set apart by humanity for its scientific -service,--which is thus performed more systematically and continuously. -But the great step which carries ordinary knowledge into its higher -region is the discovery, due to reflection and comparison, that -there is a double grade of reality-a permanent, essential, uniform, -substantial being, which is contrasted with an evanescent, apparent, -varying and accidental. To know a thing is in all cases to _relate it_ -to something else: to know it in the higher sense_--vere scire_--is -to relate it to its essence, its substantial or universal form, its -permanent self. Ordinary knowledge, e. g., fixes a thing by referring -to its antecedents: scientific knowledge refers it to its 'invariable, -'unconditional' or 'essential' antecedent,--to something which -contains it implicitly, and necessarily, and is not merely by accident -or juxtaposition associated with it. To discover this permanent, -underlying substance or reality comes to be the problem of science--a -problem which may be taken in the widest generality, or restricted -to some one group of existences. What is asked for, e.g., may be -the uniformity and essence in the appearance of the diurnal journey -of the sun, or it may be the underlying, invisible, nature which -displays itself in all the variety of minerals, and in animal and plant -life. The one-and-the-same in a diversity of many; the type-form in -individuals: the cause which is the key to understanding an effect that -always and unconditionally follows it; the force which finds different -expression in actions--are what Science seeks. - -In that search two points emerge as regards the method. The first is -the importance of quantitative statements or numerical appreciations, -and the general law that variations in the qualitative are in some -ratio concomitant with variations in the quantitative. Mathematics, -in a word, is found to be an invaluable instrument for recording -with accuracy the minutest as well as the most immense differences -of quality. First, it is seen that qualitative differences within a -given range, e.g. various colours or various musical notes, can be -accurately expressed by a numerical ratio. But, secondly, it soon -appears that even greater divergences of quality, e.g. those of colour -and of chemical quality, may possibly be reduced to stages on one -quantitative scale. It is not unnatural that such experiences should -give rise to a hope--and in sanguine minds, an assurance--that all the -phenomena of nature are ultimately phases of some common nature--some -elementary being--which runs through an infinite gamut of numerically -defined adjustments. - -But the numerical prepossession--as we may call it--creates another -assumption. Every number consists of units: every cube can be regarded -as an aggregation of smaller cubes, and in measurement is (implicitly -at least) so regarded. Transferring this to the physical world, every -object is regarded as a composite--a Large, made up by the addition -and juxtaposition of many (relatively) Littles. The essentials of the -composite are here the elements that compose it: these, by a natural -tendency, we proceed to conceive as remaining always unchanged, and -giving rise by their peculiar juxtaposition to certain perceptions in -the human being. You whirl rapidly a blazing piece of wood, and instead -of a discontinuous series of flashes you see one orbit of luminous -matter: or, let falling rain-drops take up a particular position in -reference to your eyes and the sun, and a rainbow is visible. In both -cases there is what may be called an illusion--the illusion, above -all, of unity and continuity. Now what is in these cases obviously -and demonstrably seen, is, as Leibniz in particular has reminded us, -the general law of all matter as such. In the extended and material -world there is nowhere a real unity discoverable. The small is made -up of the smaller _ad infinitum_[1]. But the conclusion (which -Leibniz drew)--that unity belongs only to v,' Monads and never by any -possibility to a material substance, was not that commonly reached -or accepted. There are--or there must be,--said the prevalent creed, -ultimates, indivisibles, indecomposables, simples, atoms. These are the -final bricks of reality, out of which the apparent universe is built: -each with a maximum,--a _ne plus ultra_--of resistibility, hardness, -fullness, and unsqueezable bulk. - -Into further details of these ultimate irreducibles we need not enter. -It is sufficient to denote the general purport of the conception, and -the tendency it implies. - -In these ultimates supreme reality is understood to lie; and on them -at last, and indeed always, rests whatever reality truly exists in -any object. All else is secondary--and, comparatively speaking, -illusory,--unreal. Any phenomena that may be noted only affect the -surface or show of these reals: the inner reality continues one -and unchanged. Outside them, around them, is the void--emptiness, -non-entity. Yet null and void as it may be, we may, in passing, -reply,--this circumambient is the source of all that gives these -masses of atoms any distinctive reality--any character of true being. -Space may be empty enough,--a mere spectre-shell; and yet it is their -differences in spatial circumstance that bring out and actualise what -they implicitly are. These '_individua_' these units of reality, these -atoms, are real and knowable only in their relations. So too Time may -be contemptuously treated as a passive receptacle: yet it is only by -its connexions in the past and the future that the present moment has -any actuality it may claim. And time and space are potent agencies--in -popular mode of utterance--whatever the mechanical philosophy may say. - -But all of these relations are in the realm of unreality. The atoms -alone _are_: and yet the void, which ought _not_ to _be,_ in an -unmistakable way _is_ also. To this mysterious vacuum which lies -outside (and yet not outside) reality, to this not-being which _is,_ -there can only be given a half-negative and baffling name. Let it -be called Chance--or let it be called Necessity; let it be called -inexplicable Law of co-existence and sequence,--the Force which is the -beginning of motion. It is the ultimate key to the mystery--but it is -at least a key which no human hand can use, or even lay hold of. It is -enough for science if, leaving this ultimate inexplicability untouched, -it trace in each separate instance the exact equation between the sum -of the constituents and the total which they compose,--if it prove that -the several items when put together exactly give the sum proposed. -Identification--the establishment of quantitative equations--is the -work of science. Identity is its canon, working on the presumption -or axiom that there can be nothing in the result which was not in -the antecedents or conditions. _Ex nihilo nihil fit._ The quantity -of energy must always be the same, though its phases may vary, or -temporarily avoid detection. Matter, i.e. the ultimate reality, is -indestructible. In short, the method of analysis and synthesis, as that -of addition and subtraction, is a calculus which takes the form of an -equation. - -So far the inorganic, inanimate world has been mainly in view. If we -now turn to the organisms, we find the popular creed expressed in the -adage _Omne vivum e vivo._ No eye has ever seen--though fanatical -observers have sometimes so deluded themselves as to think they saw--a -living being directly emerge from inorganic stuff. The saner student -of physiology contents himself with leaving for the while the crux of -the genesis of Life, and examining only the building up of the living -creature out of its constituents. Here the atom is called the cell: -every organism is a synthesis of cells, and in the cell we have the -primary element of organic reality: _Omnis cellula e cellula,_ In the -atom we have the ultimate element; in the cell a relative element,--the -absolute beginning of a new order of things,--which we may, if we -like, choose to treat (though only for logical simplicity's sake) as a -gradual development from the other and more primitive, but which, so -far as experience and history teach, is equally ultimate in its kind. -But be the final constituent (physical) atom, or (physiological) cell, -the relation of these constituents is at first conceived by science -only as composition, or mechanical synthesis. It is only gradually -that science begins to have doubts as to the inviolability and -unalterableness of the elements. When the idea--not altogether new--of -a 'latent meta-schematism' and latent process within the constituents -is entertained and carried out in earnest, science has passed on to a -new stage: from mechanical atomism to a dynamic and organic theory of -existence. And the governing ideas of scientific logic have then ceased -to be co-existence, and sequence, correlation and composition: the new -category is intus-susception, development, adaptation not only external -but internal. - -_Divide et impera_ is the motto of Science. To isolate one thing -or one group of facts from its context,--to penetrate beneath the -apparent simplicity, which time and custom have taught ordinary eyes -to see in the concrete object, to the multitude of underlying simple -elements,--to leave everything extraneous out of sight,--to abolish the -teleology which imposes upon Nature a permanent tribute (direct or -indirect) towards the supply of human wants,--and to take, as it were, -one thing at a time and study it for itself disinterestedly; that is -the problem of the sciences. And to accomplish that end they do not -hesitate to break the charmed links which in common vision hold the -world together,--to disregard the spiritual harmony which the sense of -beauty finds in the scene,--to strip off the relations of means and -end, which reflection has thrown from thing to thing, and the sensuous -atmosphere of so-called 'secondary' qualities in which human sense has -enveloped each; and finally to sever its connexion by which - - 'the whole round world is every way - Bound by gold chains about the feet of God.' - -In those days when reflection had not set in,--when humanity had not -yet found itself a stranger in the house of Nature, and had not yet -dared to regard her as a mere automatic slave, men had no doubts as to -the meaning of things. They lived sympathetically her life. - - 'Man, once descried, imprints for ever - His presence on all lifeless things: the winds - Are henceforth voices, wailing or a shout, - A querulous mutter, or a quick gay laugh.' - -To the extent of his abilities and his culture, indeed man has in all -ages read himself into the phenomena external to him. Such readings, in -times when he feared and loved his kinsfolk of Nature, were fetichism -and anthropomorphism. Gradually, however, forgetting his community, he -claimed to be the measure and master of all things: to decree their use -and function. But in course of time, when the sciences had emancipated -themselves from the yoke of philosophy, they refused to borrow any such -help in reading the riddle of the universe, and resolved to begin, -_ab ovo_, from the atom or cell, and leave the elements to work out -their own explanation. Modern science in so doing practises the lessons -learned from Spinoza and Hume. The former teaches that all conception -of order, i. e. of adaptation and harmony in nature, and indeed all -the methods by which nature is popularly explained, are only modes of -our emotional imagination, betraying how imperfect has been in most -of us the emancipation of human intellect from the servitude to the -affections[2]. The latter points out that all connexions between things -are solely mental associations, ingrained habits of expectation, the -work of time and custom, accredited only by experience[3]. There must -be no pre-suppositions allowed in the studies of science, no help -derived prematurely from the later terms in the process to elucidate -the earlier. Let man, it is said, be explained by those laws, and by -the action of those primary elements which build up every other part -of nature: let molecules by mechanical union construct the thinking -organism, and then construct society. The elements which we find by -analysis must be all that is required to make the synthesis. Thus in -modern times science carries out, fully and with the details of actual -knowledge in several branches, the principles of the atom and the void, -which Democritus suggested. - -The scientific spirit, however, the spirit of analysis and abstraction -(or of 'Mediation' and 'Reflection'), is not confined in its -operations to the physical world. The criticism of ordinary beliefs -and conventions has been applied--and applied at an earlier period--to -what has been called the Spiritual world, to Art, Religion, Morality, -and the institutions of human Society. Under these names the agency of -ages, acting by their individual minds, has created organic systems, -unities which have claimed to be permanent, inviolable, and divine. -Such unities or organic structures are the Family, the State, the works -of Art, the forms, doctrines, and systems of Religion, existing and -recognised in ordinary consciousness. But in these cases, as in Nature, -the reflective principle may come forward and ask what right these -unities have to exist. This is the question which the 'Encyclopaedic,' -the 'Aufklärung,' the 'Rationalist' and 'Freethinking' theories, -raise and have raised in the last century and the present. What is -the Family, it is said, but a fiction or convention, which is used to -give a decent, but somewhat transparent covering to a certain animal -appetite, and its probable consequences? What is the State, and what -is Society, but a fiction or compact, by which the weak try to make -themselves seem strong, and the unjust seek to shelter themselves from -the consequences of their own injustice? What is Religion, it is said, -but a delusion springing from the fears and weakness of the crowd, and -the cunning of the few, which men have fostered until it has wrapped -humanity in its snaky coils? And Poetry, we are assured, like its -sister Arts, will perish and its illusions fade away, when Science, -now in the cradle, has become the full-grown Hercules. As for Morality -and Law, and the like, the same condemnation has been prepared from -of old. All of them, it is said, are but the inventions of power and -craft, or the phantoms of human imagination, which the strength of -positive science and bare facts is destined in no long time to dispel. - -When they insisted upon a severance of the elements in the -vulgarly-accepted unities of the world, Science and Freethinking, like -Epicurus in an older day, have believed that they were liberating the -world from its various superstitions, from the bonds which instinct -and custom had fastened upon things so as to combine them into systems -more or less arbitrary. They denied the supremacy and reality of those -ideas which insist on the essential unity and self-sameness in things -that visibly and tangibly have a separate existence of their own, and -branded these ideas comprehensively as mysticism and metaphysics. -They sought to disabuse us of spirits, vital forces, divine right of -governments, final causes, _et hoc genus omne._ They were exceedingly -jealous for the independence of the individual, and for his right to -demand satisfaction for the questioning, ground-seeking faculty of -his nature. But while they did so they hardly realised how entirely -the spectator is the part, the product of what he surveys, and while -surveying treats as if it were but a spot or mark on the circumference -of the circle that lies--some way off--around him. 'Phenomenalism,' as -this mode of looking at things has been called, is false to life, and -would cut away the ground from philosophy.[4] - -To some extent philosophy returns to the position of the wider -consciousness, to the general belief in harmony and symmetry. It -reverts to the unity or connexion, which the natural presumptions of -mankind find in the picture of the world. The _nolo philosophari_ -of the intuitivist, in reaction from the supposed excesses of the -sciences, simply reverted to the bare re-statement of the popular -creed. If science, e. g., had shown that the perception of an -external world pre-supposed for its accomplishment an unsuspected -series of intermediate steps, the mere intuitivist simply denied -the intermediation by appealing to Common Sense, or to the natural -instincts and primary beliefs of mankind. Conviction and natural -instinct were declared to counterbalance the abstractions of science. -But philosophy which seeks to comprehend existence cannot take the -same ground as the intuitional school, or neglect the testimony of -science. If the spiritual unity of the world has been denied and lost -to sight, mere assertion that we feel and own its pervading power will -not do much good. It is necessary to reconcile the contrast between -the wholeness of the natural vision, and the fragmentary, but in its -fragments elaborated, result of science. - -The sciences break up the rough generalisations or vulgar concepts of -everyday use, and make their fixed distinctions yield to analysis. -They thus render continuous things which were looked at as only -separate. But they tend again to substitute the results of their -analysis as a new and permanent distinction and principle of things. -They are like revolutionists who upset and perturb an old order, and -set up a new and minuter tyranny in its place. Gradually, the general -culture, the average educated intelligence gathers up the fruit of -scientific research into the total development of humanity: and uses -the work of science to fill up the _lacunae,_ the gaps, which make -popular consciousness so irregular and disconnected. A sort of popular -philosophy comes to sum up and estimate what science has accomplished: -and therein is as it were the spirit of the world taking into his own -hand the acquisitions won by the more audacious and self-willed of -his sons, and investing them in the common store. They are set aside -and preserved there, at first in an abstract and technical form, but -destined soon to pass into the possession of all, and form that mass of -belief and instinctive or implanted knowledge whence a new generation -will draw its mental supplies. Each great scientific discovery is in -its turn reduced to a part of the common stock. It leaves the technical -field, and spreads into the common life of men, becoming embodied in -their daily beliefs,--a seed of thought, from which, by the agency of -intelligent experience, new increments of science will one day spring. - -Philosophy properly so called is also the unification of science, -but in a new sphere, a higher medium not recognised by the sciences -themselves. The reconciliation which the philosopher believes himself -to accomplish between ordinary consciousness and science is identified -by either side with a phase of its antagonist error. Science will -term philosophy a modified form of the old religious superstition. -The popular consciousness of truth, and especially religion, will -see in philosophy only a repetition or an aggravation of the evils -of science. The attempt at unity will not approve itself to either, -until they enter upon the ground which philosophy occupies, and move -in that element. And that elevation into the philosophic ether calls -for a tension of thought which is the sternest labour imposed upon -man: so that the continuous action of philosophising has been often -styled superhuman. If anywhere, it is in pure philosophy that proof -becomes impossible, unless for those who are willing to think for -themselves[5]. The philosophic lesson cannot be handed on to a mere -recipient: the result, when cut off from the process which produced -it, vanishes like the palace in the fairy tale. - -'The whole of philosophy is nothing but the study of the specific -forms or types of unity.[6] There are many species and grades of this -unity. They are not merely to be enumerated and asserted in a vague -way, as they here and there force themselves upon the notice of the -popular mind. Philosophy sees in that unity neither an ultimate and -unanalysable fact, nor a deception, but a growth (which is also a -struggle), a revealing or unfolding, which issues in an organism or -system, constructing itself more and more completely by a force of its -own. This system formed by these types of the fundamental unity is -called the 'Idea,' of which the highest law is development. Philosophy -essays to do for this connective and unifying nature, i. e. for the -thought in things, something like what the sciences have done or -would like to do for the facts of sense and matter,--to do for the -spiritual binding-element in its integrity, what is being done for -the several facts which are more or less combined. It retraces the -universe of thought from its germinal form, where it seems, as it were, -an indecomposable point, to the fully matured system or organism, and -shows not merely that one phase of pure thought passes into another, -but how it does so, and yet is not lost, but subsists suspended and -deprived of its narrowness in the maturer phase. - - -[Footnote 1: Leibniz, ed. Gerhardt, iii. 507: 'Les atomes sont l'effet -de la foiblesse de nostre imagination, qui aime à se reposer et à se -hater à venir à une fin dans les sous-divisions et analyses: il n'en -est pas ainsi dans la nature qui vient de l'infini et va à l'infini.'] - -[Footnote 2: Spinoza, _Ethica,_ i. 36, App. '_Quoniam ea nobis prae -ceteris grata sunt quae facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem -confusioni praeferunt; quasi ordo aliquid in natura praeter respectum -ad nostram imaginationem esset... Videmus itaque omnes rationes quibus -vulgus solet naturam explicare modos esse tantummodo imaginandi._' Cf. -_Eth._ iv. praef.: Epist. xxxii.] - -[Footnote 3: 'This transition of thought from the Cause to the Effect -proceeds not from Reason. It derives its origin altogether from -Custom and Experience.' Hume, Essay V. (Enquiry concerning Human -Understanding.) 'All inferences from Experience therefore are effects -of Custom.' (Ibid.)] - -[Footnote 4: J. Grote, _Exploratio Philosophica._] - -[Footnote 5: Cf. vol. ii. p. 4.] - -[Footnote 6: _Philosophie der Religion,_ i. p. 97: 'Die ganze -Philosophie ist nichts Anderes als das Studium der Bestimmungen der -Einheit.' See especially _Encycl._ § 573 (Philosophy of Mind, pp. 192 -seqq.).] - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -ANTICIPATORY SKETCH OF THE SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY. - - -The psychology of the Greeks has to all appearance given the mere -intellect an undue pre-eminence, if it has not even treated it as man's -essential self. Whether the appearance is altogether sound might be -a profitable inquiry for those who most criticise it. At any rate, a -later psychology has taught us to regard man as at once a cognitive, an -emotional, and a volitional being. It has arrived at this conclusion as -it looked at the division that parted off the systems of science from -the sphere of conduct and social life, and both from the inner life of -sentiment, of love, admiration and reverence. And the inference was -justifiable, in the same way as Plato's when, as he surveyed the triple -sphere into which the outward world of his contemporary society was -divided, he concluded a triplicity of the soul. If it was justifiable, -it was also, as in his case, somewhat misleading. In the outward -manifestation, where the letters are posted up on a gigantic scale, -one tends to forget that they only spell one word. Their difference -and distance seem increased, and we fail to note that, though there -are three aspects, yet there is only one power or soul, which exhibits -itself under one or other of the three tones or modes. In the actual -human being, cognition is always of some emotional interest and always -leads up to some practical result. From different points of view one or -other is occasionally declared to be primary and original; the others -derivative and secondary. At any rate we may say that in the ordinary -human being who is still in the garden of preparation and has not yet -stepped forth on one of the separate routes of life, his knowledge, his -emotional and his active life are in a tolerable harmony, and that each -in its little development is constantly followed by the other. - -But with the outward differentiation an inward went hand in hand. In -some cases the intellectual or scientific, in others the emotional, in -others the active faculties became predominant. Human nature in order -to attain all its completeness had first of all, as it were, to lose -its life in order to gain it. The individual had to sacrifice part of -his all-sided development in order that he might gain it again, and -in a larger measure, through the medium of society. This process is -the process of civilisation: the long and, as it often seems, weary -road by which man can only realise himself by self-sacrifice: can only -reach unity through the way of diversity, and must die to live. It is a -process in which it is but too easy to notice only one stage and speak -of it as if it were the whole. It is possible sometimes to identify -civilisation with the material increase in the means of producing -enjoyment, or with the progress of scientific teaching as to the laws -of those material phenomena on which material civilisation is largely -dependent. It is possible sometimes to take as its test the stores of -artistic works, and the extension of a lively and delicate love of all -that is beautiful and tasteful. One may identify it with a high-toned -moral life, and with an orderly social system. Or one may maintain that -the real civilisation of a country presupposes a lofty conception and -reverent attitude to the supreme source of all that is good, and true, -and beautiful. - -The question is important as bearing on the relation of philosophy to -the special sciences. Philosophy is sometimes identified with the sum -of sciences: sometimes with their complete unification. Philosophy, -says a modern, is knowledge completely unified. It is of course to some -extent a question of words in what sense a term is to be defined. And -no one will dispute that the scientific element is in point of form the -most conspicuous aspect of philosophy. Yet if we look at the historical -use of the term, one or two considerations suggest themselves. -Philosophy, said an ancient, is the knowledge of things human and -divine. Again and again, it has claimed for its task to be a guide and -chart of human life--to reveal the form of good and of beauty. But to -do this, it must be more than a mere science, or than a mere system -of the sciences. Again, it has been urged by modern critics that Kant -at last discovered for philosophy her true province--the study of the -conditions and principles of human knowledge. But though epistemology -is all-important, the science of knowledge is not identical with -philosophy: nor did Kant himself think it was. Rather his view is on -the whole in accord with what he has called the 'world's (as opposed -to the scholar's) conception of philosophy[1],' as the science of the -bearing of all ascertainable truths on the essential aims of human -reason--_teleologia humanae rationis_,--in accord, too, with the -world's conception of the philosopher as no mere logician, but the -legislator of human reason. - -This, it need hardly be added, is the conception of philosophy which -is implicitly the basis of Hegel's use. Let us hear Schelling. 'A -philosophy which in its principle is not already religion is no true -philosophy[2].' - -Or again, as to the place of Ethics: 'Morality is Godlike disposition, -an uplifting above the influence of the concrete into the realm of the -utterly universal. Philosophy is a like elevation, and for that reason -intimately one with morality, not through subordination, but through -essential and inner likeness[3].' But, again, it has more than once -been felt that philosophy is kindred with Art. It has been said--not -as a compliment--that philosophy is only a form of gratifying the -aesthetic instincts. Schopenhauer has suggested--as a novelty--that -the true way to philosophy was not by science, but through Art. And -Schelling before him had--while asserting the inner identity of the -two--even gone so far as to assert[4] that 'Art is the sole, true and -eternal organon as well as the ostensible evidence of philosophy.' - -Philosophy, therefore, is one of a triad in which the human spirit has -tried to raise itself above its limitations and to become god-like. And -philosophy is the climax; Art the lowest; Religion in the mean. But -this does not mean that Religion supersedes Art, and that Philosophy -supersedes religion; or, if we retain the term 'supersede,' we must add -that the superseded is not left behind and passed aside: it is rather -an integral constituent of what takes its place. Philosophy is true and -adequate only as it has given expression to all that religion had or -aimed at. So, too, Religion is not the destruction of Art: though here -the attitude may often seem to be more obviously negative. A religion -which has no place for art is, again, no true religion. And thus again, -Philosophy becomes a reconciler of Art and Religion: of the visible -ideal and the invisible God. Art, on the other hand, is a foretaste -and a prophecy of religion and philosophy. - -But Art, Religion, and Philosophy, again, rest upon, grow out of, and -are the fulfilment of an ethical society-a state of human life where an -ordered commonwealth in outward visibility is animated and sustained by -the spirit of freedom and self-realisation. And that public objective -existence of social humanity in its turn reposes on the will and -intelligence of human beings, of souls which in various relations -of discipline and interaction with their environment have become -free-agents, and have risen to be more than portions of the physical -world, sympathetic with its changes, and become awake to themselves and -their surroundings. Such is the mental or spiritual life as it rises to -full sense of its power, recognises its kindred with the general life, -carries out that kindred in its social organisation, and at length -through the strength social union gives floats boldly in the empyrean -of spiritual life, in art, religion, and philosophy. - -But, what about the special relationship of philosophy to the sciences? -Undoubtedly the philosophers of the early years of the century -have used lordly language in reference to the sciences. They have -asserted--from Fichte downwards--that the philosophical construction, -of the universe must justify itself to itself--must be consistent, -continuous, and coherent--and that it had not to wait for experience -to give it confirmation. Even the cautious Kant[5] had gone so far -as to assert that the 'understanding gives us nature'--i. e. as he -explains, _natura formaliter spectata_, viz., the order and regularity -in the phenomena--that it is the source of the laws of nature and -of its formal unity. The so-called proofs of natural laws are only -instances and exemplifications, which no more _prove_ them, than we -prove that 6 x 4 = 24, because 6 yards of cloth at 4s. must be paid -for by 24 shillings. To assert that this instance is no proof, is -not to reject experience--still less to refuse respect to the new -discoveries of science. But it is unquestionably to assert that there -is something prior to the sciences--prior, i. e. in the sense that Kant -speaks of the _a priori,_ something which is fundamental to them, and -constitutes them what they are--something which is assumed as real if -their syntheses (and every scientific truth is a synthesis) are to be -possible. The analysis and exhibition in its organic completeness of -this Kantian _a priori_ is the theme of the Hegelian Logic. - -The Philosophy of Nature stands in the Hegelian system between Logic -and Mental or Spiritual Philosophy. Man--intelligent, moral, religious -and artistic man--rests upon the basis of natural existence: he -is the child of the earth, the offspring of natural organisation. -But Nature itself--such is the hypothesis of the system--is only -intelligible as the reflex of that _a priori_ which has been -exhibited in Logic. The whole scheme by which the natural world is -scientifically held together, apprehended by ordinary consciousness -and elaborated by mathematical analysis, presupposes the organism -of the categories--these fundamental habits of thought or form of -conception which are the framework of the existence we know. Yet -Nature never shows this intelligible world--the Idea--in its purity -and entirety. In the half-literal, half-figurative phrases of Hegel, -Nature shows the Idea beside itself, out of its mind, alienated, _non -compos mentis._ 'It is a mad world, my masters,' 'The impotence of -nature_--Ohnmacht der Natur_[6]--is a frequent phrase, by which he -indicates the a-logical, if not illogical, character of the physical -world. Here we come across the negation of mind: chance plays its part: -contingency is everywhere. If you expect that the physical universe -will _display_ unquestioning obedience to the laws of reason and of the -higher logic, you will be disappointed. What you _see_ is fragmentary, -chaotic, irregular. To the bodily sense--even when that sense has been -rendered more penetrating by all the many material and methodical -aids of advanced civilisation--the Idea is in the natural world -presented only in traces, indications, portions, which it requires a -well-prepared mind to descry, still more to unite. Yet at the same -time the indications of that unity are everywhere, and the hypothesis -of the logical scheme or organisation of the Idea is the only theory -which seems fully to correspond with the data. Nature[7], says Hegel, -is the Idea as it shows itself in sense-perception, not as it shows -itself in thought. In thought a clear all-comprehending total; in sense -a baffling fragment. The Idea--the unity of life and knowledge--is -everywhere in nature, but nowhere clearly, or whole, or otherwise -than a glimpse; not a logical scheme or compact theory. Nature is the -sensible in which the intelligible is bound--the reality which is the -vehicle of the ideal. But the ideal treasure is held in rough and -fragile receptacles which half disclose and half conceal the light -within. Nature in short contains, but disguised, the idea, in fainter -and clearer evidences: it is the function of man, by his scientific -intelligence and ethical work, building up a social organisation, -to provide the ground on which the ultimate significance and true -foundation of the world may be deciphered, guessed, or believed, or -imaginatively presented. The verification of the guess or deciphering, -of course, lies in its adequacy to explain and colligate the facts. -The true method and true conception is that which needs no subsequent -adjustments--no epicycles to make it work--which is no mere hypothesis -useful for subjective arrangement, but issues with uncontrollable force -and self-evidence from the facts. - -What Hegel has called the 'impotence of nature,' Schopenhauer has -styled the irrational Will, and it is from that end, so to speak, that -Schopenhauer's philosophy begins. Nature--the basis of all things--the -fundamental prius--is an irresistible and irregular appetite or craving -to be, to do, to live,--but an _appetitus_ or _nisus_ which ascends -from grade to grade--from mere mechanical forces acting in movement up -to the highest form of animal activity. But as this 'Will' or blind -lust of being and instinct of life gets above the inorganic world, and -manifests itself in the animal organism, there emerges a new order of -existence--the intellect, or the ideal world. Seen from the underside, -indeed, all that has appeared now in the animal is a brain and a -nerve-system--a new species of matter. But there is another side to the -Mind which has thus awakened out of the sleep of natural forces. This -intellect is unaware and can never be made aware that it is a child of -nature: it acknowledges no superior, and no beginning or end in time. -Its natal day is infinitely beyond the age when the cosmic process -began its race; before stars gathered their masses of luminosity, and -the earth received the first germs of life. As the genius of Art, it -arrests the toiling struggle of existence to produce new forms and -destroy old ones; it sets free in typical forms of eternal beauty -the great ideas that nature vainly seeks to embody, and as moral and -religious life its aim is to annihilate the craving and the lust for -more and ever more being and to enter in passionless and calm union -with the One-and-All. - -Thus it is, if not absurd, at least misleading, to speak of Hegel's -system as Panlogism. Strictly speaking, it is only of the Logic -that this is the proper name: there, unquestionably, reason is all -and in all. Yet to hold that reason is the very life and centre of -things is for philosophy the cardinal article--the postulate which -must inspire her first and last steps and guide her throughout. But -the Logical Idea, if put at the beginning, is at first only put as a -presupposition, which it is the task of human intelligence to work -out and organise. If it be the key which is to explain nature and -render it intelligible, it is a key which has only been gained in the -process--the long process--by which man has risen from his natural -origin--never however parting company with it--to survey and comprehend -himself and his setting. The faculty of 'pure thinking,' which is the -pre-condition of Logical study, is the result of a gradual development -in which animal sense has grown, and metamorphosed, and worked itself -up to be a free intelligence and a good will capable of discerning -and fulfilling the universal and the eternal. Thus in the Logic the -system constructs the pure Idea--the ideal timeless organisation of -thoughts or λόγοι on which all knowledge of reality rests--the diamond -net which suffers nothing to escape its meshes: in the Philosophy of -Nature it tries to put together in unity and continuity the phases -and partial aspects which the physical universe presents in graduated -exemplification of the central truth: and in the Philosophy of Mind it -traces the steps by which a merely natural being becomes the moral and -aesthetic idealist in whom man approaches deity. - -It is indeed Hegel's fundamental axiom that actuality is reasonable. -But the actuality is not the appearance--the temporary phases--the -succession of event: it is the appearance rooted in its essence--the -succession concentrated (yet not lost) in its unity. There is room -for much so-called irrationality within these ranges. For, when -human beings pronounce something irrational, they only mean that -their practical intelligence would have adopted other methods to -arrive at certain conclusions. They judge, in fact, by their limited -understandings and not _ex ordine universi._ Hegel's doctrine is after -all only another way of stating the maintenance of the fittest; and -it is liable to the v same misconception by those who employ their -personal aims as the standards of judgment. - -So too there is reason--there is the Idea--in Nature. But it is -there only for the artist, the religious man, and the philosopher; -and they see it respectively by the eye of genius, by the power of -faith, by the thought of reason. They see it from the standpoint -of the absolute_--sub specie quadam aeternitatis._ It is therefore -a recalcitrant matter in which Nature presents the Idea: or, if -recalcitrant suggests a positive opposition, let us say rather a realm -in which the Idea fails to come out whole and clear, where unity has to -be forced upon and read into the facts. Science, says one writer, is -an ideal construction: it implies an abstraction from irregularities -and inequalities: it smoothes and sublimates the rough and imperfect -material into a more rounded and perfect whole. Its object, which it -terms a reality, is a non-sensible, imperceptible reality: what one -might as well call an ideality, were it not that here again the popular -imagination twists the word into a subjective sense to mean the private -and personal ideas of the student. - -But the obvious individual reality never quite in its obviousness -equals the 'golden mediocrity' of the ideal. Its myriad grapes must be -crushed to yield the wine of the spirit. - - 'It's a lifelong toil till our lump be leavened' - ---till the ore be transformed into the fine gold. But the gold is -there, and in the great laboratory of _natura_ _naturans_ is the -principle and agent of its own purification. 'Nature is made better by -no mean, but nature makes that mean'--for nature is spirit in disguise. - -It is on this side that a certain analogy of Hegel's and Schelling's -philosophy of nature with the Romantic school comes out. Nature -is felt, as it were, to be spirit-haunted, to give glimpses of a -solidarity, a design, a providentiality, which runs counter to that -general outward indifference in which part seems to have settled beside -part, each utterly indifferent to the other. Romance is the unexpected -coincidence, the sudden jumping together of what seemed set worlds -apart and utterly alien. It was the sense of this Romance which wove -its wild legends of nymph and cobold, of faun and river-god, of imp and -fairy, wielding the powers of the elements and guiding the life of even -the so-called inanimate world. But it is no less the theme of the fairy -tale of science. Even in the austere demonstrations of geometry, and -the constructions of mechanics, the un-looked-for slips upon us with -gipsy tread. Who has not--in his early studies of mathematics--been -fain to marvel at the almost unexpected consilience of property with -property in a figure, suddenly placing in almost 'eery' relief the -conjunction of what was apparently poles asunder? It is not a mere -form of words to speak of beautiful properties of a conic section or -a curve. Custom perhaps has blunted our sense for the symmetries of -celestial dynamics, but they are none the less admirable, because we -are otherwise engrossed. To the first generation of our century the -phenomena of chemistry, magnetism and electricity appealed--as they -have never since done--with a tangible demonstration of that _appetitus -ad invicem,_ that instinct of union Bacon speaks of; and this time in -a higher form than in mere mechanism. Polarity--the bifurcation of -reality into a pair of opposites which yet sought their complement -in each other--eternally dividing only eternally to unite, and thus -only to exist--became a process pressed into general service. Lastly, -what more admirable than that adaptation of the individual to the -environment--and of the environment to the individual--of the organs in -him to his total, and of his total to his organs. One in all and All in -one: one life in perpetual transformation, animals, plants, and earth -and air; one organism, developing in absolute coherence. This was the -vision which the genius of Schelling and his contemporaries saw--the -same vision which, by accumulation of facts and pictorial history, -Darwin and his disciples have impressed in some measure even on the -dullest. - -But there is a profound difference between the spirit of a Philosophy -of Nature and the aggregate of the physical sciences. Each science -takes the particular quarry which accident or providence has assigned -to it, and does its best to 'put out' every piece of rock it contains. -But it seldom goes, unless by constraint, and in these days of -specialisation it does so less and less, to examine the neighbouring -excavation, and see if there be any connexion between the strata. Even -within its own domain it is ashamed to put forward too much parade of -system. Its method is often like that of the showman in the travelling -menagerie: 'And now, please pass to the next carriage.' It respects -the compartmental arrangement into which it finds the world broken up, -and often thinks it has deserved well if it has filled the compartment -fuller than before, or succeeded in creating a few sub-compartments -within the old bounds. Even the so-called mental and moral sciences -when they lose their philosophical character tend to imitate these -features. Yet in every science there is an outlook and an outlet, -for whosoever has the will and the power, to emerge from his narrow -domain on the open fields and free prospect into the first fountains -and last great ocean of being. Always, and not least in our own day, -the physicist, the chemist, the physiologist, the psychologist, the -sociologist, and the economist, have made their special field a -platform where they might discourse _de omnibus rebus,_ and become -for the nonce philosophers and metaphysicians. It would be a silly -intolerance and a misconception of the situation to exclaim _Ne sutor -ultra crepidam_. In the organic system of things 'each "moment" even -independent of the whole is the whole; and to see this is to penetrate -to the heart of the thing.' We need hardly go to Hegel to be told that -to know one thing thoroughly well is to know all things. The finite, -which we inertly rest content with, would, if we were in full sympathy -with it, open up its heart and show us the infinite. And yet if the -specialist when he rises from his shoe-making, with a heart full of -the faith that 'there is nothing like leather,' should proclaim his -discovery of it in regions where it was hitherto unsurmised, one may -smile incredulous and be no cynic. - -Philosophy then keeps open eye and ear--as far as may be no doubt for -the finer shades and delicate details--but essentially for the music -of humanity and the music of the spheres--for the general purpose and -drift of all sciences--from mathematics to sociology--as they help to -make clear the life of nature and further the emancipation of man. It -will seem occasionally to over-emphasise the continuity of science -and to make light of its distinctions: it will seem occasionally more -anxious as to the order than as to the contents of the sciences: it -will remind the sciences of the hypothetical and formal character of -much of their method and some of their principles: and sometimes will -treat as unimportant, results on which the mere scholar or dogmatist -of science lays great weight. From his habit of dealing with the -limitations and mutual implication of principles and conceptions, -the philosopher will often be able--and perhaps only too willing--to -point out cases where the mere specialist has allowed himself to -attribute reality to his abstraction. He will tell the analyst of -the astronomical motions that he must not take the distinction of -centrifugal and centripetal force, into which mechanics disintegrate -the planetary orbit, as if it really meant that the planet was pulled -inward by one force and sent on spinning forward by another[8]. And -the scientist, proud of his mathematics, will resent and laugh at -the philosopher who lets fall a word about the planets moving in -grand independence like 'blessed gods.' The philosopher will hint to -the chemist that his formulae of composition and decomposition of -bodies are, as he uses them, somewhat mythological, picturing water -as atom of oxygen locked up with atom of hydrogen; and the chemist -will go away muttering something about a fool who does not believe -in the well-ascertained chemical truth that water is composed of -these two gases. If the philosopher further hints that it is not the -highest ideal of a chemical science to be content with enumerating -fifty or sixty elements, and detecting their several properties -and affinities[9]; that it would be well to find some principle of -gradation, some unity or law which brought meaning into meaningless -juxtaposition, the mere dogmatist, whose chemistry is his living and -who shrinks from disendowment, will scent a propensity towards the -heresy which sinks all elements in one. And yet, even among chemists, -the instinct for law and unity begins to demand satisfaction. - -A still richer store of amazing paradox and perplexing analogies awaits -anyone who will turn over the volume in Hegel's _Werke_ (vii. i) and -select the plums which lie thick in the lecture-notes. He will find -a great deal--and probably more, the less he really knows of any of -the subjects under discussion--that he cannot make head or tail of: -language where he cannot guess whether it should be taken literally or -figuratively. For Hegel seriously insists on the essential unity and -identity of all the compartments of the physical universe; he will not -keep time and space on one level, matter and motion on another, and -senses, suns, plants, passions, all in their proper province. Going -far beyond the theory which supposes that all the complex difference -of organisation has grown up in endless, endless ages from a primitive -indistinctness, so that the gap of time acts as a wall to keep early -and late apart, Hegel insists upon their essential unity to-day. And -that sounds hard--the herald of anarchy, of the collapse of the ordered -polity of the scientific state. It is no doubt probable that Hegel, -like other men, made mistakes; that he over-estimated the supposed -discoveries of the day: that he indulged in false analogies, and that -he was attracted by a daring paradox. All this has nothing to do with -his main thesis: which is, that the natural realm is as it stands an -a-logical realm where reason has gone beside itself, and yet containing -an instrument--man, and that is mind--by which its rationality may be -realised and restored. In that point at least he and Schopenhauer are -at one. - - -[Footnote 1: Kant's _Kritik d. r. Vernunft_: Methodenl. Architektonik -d. r. Vern.] - -[Footnote 2: Schelling's Werke, v. 116.] - -[Footnote 3: Ibid. v. 276.] - -[Footnote 4: Ibid. iii. 267.] - -[Footnote 5: Kant, _Kritik d. r. Vern.,_ Deduction of the Categories, -Sect. III.] - -[Footnote 6: _Encyclopaedie_, § 250.] - -[Footnote 7: _Encycl._ Sect. 244 (_Logic,_ p. 379).] - -[Footnote 8: _Encyclop._ §§ 266, 269; cf. the lecture-note as given -in _Werke_ vii i. p. 97. A large number of paradoxical analogies -from Hegel's _Naturphilosophie_ has been collected by Riehl in his -_Philosophisher Criticismus_, ii. 2, 120.] - -[Footnote 9: See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. 419.] - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - -THE SCEPTICAL DOUBT: HUME. - - -We have seen that an innate tendency leads the human mind to connect -and set in relation,--to connect, it may be erroneously, or without -proper scrutiny, or under the influence of passions or prejudices,--but -at any rate to connect. Criticism occasionally has impatiently banned -this tendency as a mere fountain of errors. The human mind, says -Francis Bacon, always assumes a greater uniformity in things than it -finds; it expects symmetry, is bold in neglecting exceptional cases, -and would fain go beyond all limits in its everlasting cry, Why and To -what end. It varies in individuals between a passion for discovering -similarities and an intent acuteness to every shade of unlikeness. But -notwithstanding these warnings of the hen, the ugly duckling Reason -_will_ go beyond what is given: it knows no insuperable limitation. -It may be guilty of what Bacon calls 'anticipation'--an induction -on evidence insufficient--or it may subdue itself to the duty of -'interpretation' of nature by proper methods: in either case, it is -an act of association, synthesis, unification. For Nous _is_ archè, -and knows that it is: it will not yield to clamour or mere rebuke: it, -too, cannot be commanded, unless by first obeying it: and Bacon, having -duly objurgated the 'mind left to itself,' is obliged to let it go to -gather the grapes before they are quite ripe, and to indulge it with -a 'prerogative' of instances. As Mr. Herbert Spencer and many others -are never weary of telling us: 'We think in relations. This is truly -the form of all thought: and if there are any other forms they must be -derived from this[1].' Man used to be defined as a thinking or rational -animal: which means that man is a connecting and relation-giving -animal; and from this, Aristotle's definition, making him out to be -a 'political' animal, is only a corollary, most applicable in the -region of Ethics. Here is the ultimate point, from which the natural -consciousness, and the energies of science, art, and religion equally -start upon their special missions. - -In ordinary life we attach but little importance to this machinery of -cognition. We incline to let the fact of synthesis drop out of sight, -as if it required no further study or notice, and we regard the things -connected as exclusively worth attending to. The interest centres -on the object--on the matter: the formal element--the connective -tissue--is _only_ an instrument of no importance, except in view of -the end it helps us to. We use general and half-explained terms, such -as development, evolution, continuity, as bridges from one thing to -another, without giving any regard to the means of locomotion on their -own account. Some one thing is the product of something else: we let -the term 'product' slip out of the proposition as unimportant: and -then read the statement so as to explain the one thing by turning it -into the other. Things, according to this opinion, are all-important: -the rest is mere words. These relations between things are not open -to further investigation or definition: they are each _sui generis,_ -or peculiar: and even if the logician in his analysis of inference -finds it advisable to deal with them, he will be content, if he can -classify them in some approximate way, as a basis for his subdivision -of propositions. This is certainly one way of getting rid of -Metaphysics--for the time. - -But there are epochs in life, and epochs in universal history, when the -mind withdraws from its immersion in active life, and reflects upon its -own behaviour as on the proceedings of some strange creature, of which -it is a mere spectator. At such seasons when we stop to reflect upon -the partial scene, and close our eyes to the totality, doubts begin to -arise, whether our procedure is justified when we unify and combine the -isolated phenomena. Have we any right to throw our own subjectivity, -the laws of our imagination and thought, into the natural world? Would -it not be more proper to refrain altogether from the use of such -conceptions? - -Philosophy, said one of the ancients[2], begins in wonder, and ends in -wonder. It begins from the surprise that something could _be_ what it -purports to be: it ends in the marvel of our having _thought_ anything -else possible. Such a phrase well becomes the naive age in which the -soul goes freely forth, wandering from one novelty to another, curious -to find out all that can be known,--like the young wanderer on the -sea-shore whom fresh pebbles and new shells tempt endlessly to fill his -basket. But as the ages roll on, and the accumulations of the past grow -heavier in the receptacle, the need of a re-examination of the stores -becomes imperative. The bright colours have faded--and generally -they fade soon: there has been much picked up in the inexperience of -youthful enthusiasm which maturer reflection hardly can think worth -carrying further. - -The duty of doubt and of re-examination of what tradition has -bequeathed has been enforced by philosophy in all ages. For it is the -cardinal principle of philosophy to be free--to possess its soul--never -to be a mere machine or mere channel of tradition. But, in some ages, -this assertion of its freedom has had for the soul a pre-eminently -negative aspect. It has meant only freedom _from_--and not also freedom -_in_ and _through_--its environing, or rather constituting, substance. -Such an epoch was seen in the ancient world when the _New Academy_, -with its sceptical abstention from all objective assertions, had to -protest against the dogmatism of the Stoic and Epicurean schoolmen. -In modern times the initial shudder before plunging in has been a -recurrent crisis. Each thinker--as he personally resolved to thread his -way through the wilderness of current opinion to the realm of certified -truth--has had to remind himself (and his contemporaries) that in -knowledge at least no possessions are secured property unless they have -been earned by the sweat of their owner's brow. This is the common -theme of Bacon's aphorisms in the beginning of the _Novum Organum_, of -Descartes' _Discourse of Method_, and of Spinoza's unfinished essay -on the _Emendation of the Intellect._ There is indeed a discrepancy -in these utterances as to the measure in which they severally think -it needful to insist as preliminary on a kind of moral and religious -consecration of life to the service of truth. But a more compelling -division arises. The maxim may be understood to say, 'Divest thy mind -of its ill-gotten gains, its evil habits, prejudices, and system, -and in childlike simplicity prepare thine eye and ear to receive in -pure vessels the stores of truth which are ready to stream in from -the world.' Or it may rather be held to say, 'Remember that thou art -a conscious, waking mind, and that every idea thou hast is thine by -thine own assent: insist upon thy right of free intelligence, and give -no place to any belief which thou hast not raised into full light of -consciousness, and found to be completely consistent with the whole -power and content of thy clearest thought.' And, we may add, if the -maxim be obeyed too exclusively in either way, it will be obeyed amiss. - -With Locke the question comes into even greater prominence. On -what conditions can I have knowledge? How can I be certified that -my ideas--the subjective images in _my_ mind--have a reference to -something objective and real? Locke's answer is, not unnaturally -perhaps, somewhat prolix, and wanting in fundamental precision of -principles. After dismissing the view that, even before experience, -there are certain common ideas spontaneously and by original endowment -present in all human beings, he goes on to show how we can sufficiently -account for the ideas we actually find by supposing in us an almost -unlimited power of joining and disjoining, of comparing, relating, -and unifying the various elementary 'ideas' which make their way into -the empty chambers of our mind by the senses. As to the source, the -channel, and the nature of these sense-ideas, Locke is obscure and -apparently inconsistent: though clearly it should be all important -to know how an idea can be caused by, or spring from, a material -thing. When in his fourth book he comes to the question of what is the -reality, or the _meaning_ of our ideas, he does not really get beyond a -few--rather dubiously reasoned-out--conclusions that, although strictly -we cannot go beyond 'the present testimony of our senses employed -about the particular objects that do affect them,' we may for practical -purposes allow a good deal to the presumptions of general probability. - -But Locke had also begun to criticise our ideas, in his account of -their formation out of the 'simple ideas'-- (which neither Locke -nor any other atomist of mind has succeeded in making clear)--which -the several senses give, and by observing or reflecting on what -goes on or is present in _our_ minds, _we_ 'form,' he says, various -ideas. In a style of discussion which is on the borderland between -vulgar and philosophical analysis-- (never quite false, but nearly -always inadequate, because it almost invariably assumes what it -ostensibly proposes to explain,) Locke tells us how we get one idea by -'enlarging,' another by 'repeating,' as we please, the bounteous data -of the touch and sight. But amongst the compounds there are some of -more disputable origin. There are some--e.g. ideas of punishable acts -or legalised states--which are 'voluntary collections of ideas put -together in the mind independent from any original patterns in nature,' -These, though entirely subjective, are entirely real, because they only -serve as patterns by which we may judge or designate things so and so. -It is worse with the idea of power, which we only 'collect' or 'infer,' -and that not from matter, where it is invisible, but only in a clear -light when we consider God and spirits. Still worse, perhaps, is it -with the idea of substance, which is a 'collection' of simple ideas -with the 'supposition' of an 'incomprehensible' something in which the -collection 'subsists.' - -Hump put all this rather more pointedly. We have 'impressions,' i. -e. lively perceptions by sense. We have also 'ideas,' i. e. fainter -images of these, but otherwise identical. An idea _should_ be a copy -of an impression. If you cannot point out any such impression, you -may be certain you are mistaken when you imagine you have any such -idea. There is prevalent in the mental world a kind of association; a -'gentle force' connects ideas in our imagination according to certain -relations they possess. This 'mind' or this 'imagination' is only a -bundle or collection of impressions and ideas; but a collection which -is continually and rapidly changing in its constituents, and in the -scale of liveliness possessed by each constituent. When an idea is -particularly fresh and forcible, it is a _belief_ or it is believed in: -when faint, not so. Or, otherwise put, the object of an idea is _said_ -to _exist_, when the idea itself is vividly _felt_[3]. Really there is -no such thing as 'external existence' taken literally. 'Our universe is -the universe of the imagination': all existence is for a consciousness. - -Impressions arise in certain orders of sequence or co-existence. When -two impressions frequently recur and always in the same order, the -custom binds them so closely together, that, should one of them only be -given as impression, we cannot help having an idea of the other, which, -growing more vivid by the contagion of the contiguous impression, -creates, or is, a belief in its reality. Between the perceptions -as such, there is no connexion; they are distinct and independent -existences. They only get a connexion through _our feeling; we feel_ -a 'determination' of our thought to pass from one to another. The -one impression has no power to produce the other; the one thing does -not cause the other. 'We never have any impression that contains any -power or efficacy[4],' Hence the power and necessity we attribute to -the so-called causal agent and to the connexion are an illegitimate -transference from our feeling, and a mistranslation of _our_ -incapacity to resist the force of habitual association into a real -bond between the two impressions _themselves,_ The necessity is in the -mind--as a habit-caused compulsion--not in the objects. - -As with the relation of cause and effect, so it is with others. The -identity of continued existence is only another name--an objective -transcript--of the feeling of smooth uninterrupted succession of -impressions in which our thought glides along from one in easy -transition to another. And here the coherence and continuity of -perceptions need not be absolute. A vivid impression of unbroken -connexion in a part will, if predominant, by association fill up the -gaps and weak points, and behind the admitted breaks in the line of -our ideas will suppose--invent--or create an imperceptible but _real_ -continuity in the supposed things. And by this fiction of a continuous -existence of our perceptions, we easily lapse into the doctrine that -our perceptions have an independent existence as objects or things in -themselves:--a doctrine which according to Hume is contrary to the -plainest experience. - -But if the world is always the world of imagination--of -_Vorstellung_--of mental representation, Hume is aware that we must -admit two orders or grades of such representation. We must distinguish, -he remarks[5], 'in the imagination betwixt the principles which -are permanent, irresistible and universal (such as the customary -transition from causes to effects and from effects to causes), and the -principles which are changeable, weak and irregular. The former are -the foundation of all our thoughts and actions,' There are, in other -words, normal and general laws of association--such as the relation -of cause and effect--which persuade us of real existence. By its own -laws, therefore, within the realm of _Vorstellung_ or Mental idea, -there grows up a permanent, objective world for all, contrasted with -the temporary, accidental perception of the individual and of the -moment; and this serves as the standard or the one common measure by -which occasional perturbations are to be measured. Within the limits of -the subjective in general there arises a subjective of higher order, -which is truly objective. This same change of front--as it may be -called--Hume makes in morals. There the mind can modify and control -its passions according as it can feel the objects of them near or far; -and though each of us has his 'peculiar position,' we can--so creating -the ethical basis--'fix on some steady and general points of view, and -always in our thoughts place ourselves in them, whatever may be our -present situation[6]': we can 'choose some common point of view,' and -from the vantage-ground of a permanent principle, however distant, we -have a chance of gaining the victory over our passion, however near. - -Thus far Hume had gone in the development of idealism,' Whether his -theory is consistent from end to end, need not be here discussed. But -it is evident that Hume was not lost in the quagmire of subjective -idealism. The objective and the subjective are with him akin: the -objective is the subjective, which is universal, permanent, and normal. -The causal relation has, in the first instance, only a subjective -necessity; but through that subjective necessity or its irresistible -belief, it generates an objective world. But it has been and is the -fortune of philosophers to be known in the philosophical world by some -conspicuous red rag of their system which first caught the eye of the -bull-like leaders of the human herd. It was so notably with Hobbes -and Spinoza; and most of the thinkers whose names appear in the pages -of Kant suffer from this curtailment. Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, -Berkeley, Hume, are _there_ not the real philosophers, discoverable in -their works, but the creatures of historic reputation and of popular -simplification who do duty for them. - -Kant's Hume is therefore a somewhat imaginary being: the product, -partly of imperfect knowledge of Hume's writings, partly of -prepossessions derived from a long previous training in German -rationalism. Such a Hume was--or would have been, had he existed--a -philosopher who 'took the objects of experience for things in -themselves,' who 'treated the conception of cause as a false and -deceptive illusion,' who did not indeed venture to assail the certainty -of mathematics, but held--as regards all knowledge about the existence -of things-- 'empiricism to be the sole source of principles,' founding -his conclusion mainly on an examination of the causal nexus[7]. This -'note of warning' sounded against the claims of pure reason--as he -calls Hume's _Enquiry_ was what about 1762 broke Kant's dogmatic -slumber and forced him to give his researches in speculative philosophy -a new direction. His first step was to generalise Hume's problem from -an inquiry into the origin of the causal idea into a general study -of the synthetic principles in knowledge. His next was to attempt to -fix the number of these concepts and synthetic principles. And his -third was to 'deduce' them: i. e., to prove the reciprocal implication -between experience or knowledge and the concepts or categories of -intelligence. - - -[Footnote 1: _First Principles_, p. 162. It may be as well to remark -that Relation is scarcely an adequate description of the nature of -thought as a whole. We shall see when we come to the theory of logic, -that the term is applicable--and then somewhat imperfectly--only to the -second phase of thought, the categories of reflection, which are the -favourite categories of science and popular metaphysics.] - -[Footnote 2: Arist. _Metaph._ i. 2. 26.] - -[Footnote 3: _Treatise of Human Nature_ (Understanding), iii. 7 and ii. -6.] - -[Footnote 4: Ibid. iii. 14.] - -[Footnote 5: _Treatise of Human Nature_ (Understanding iv. 4.)] - -[Footnote 6: _Treatise of Human Nature_ (Morals), iii. i.] - -[Footnote 7: Kant, _Prolegomena_ to Metaph. Introduction and _Crit. of -Practical Reason_ (on the Claim of Pure Reason, _Werke,_ viii. 167).] - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - - -THE ATTEMPT AT A CRITICAL SOLUTION: KANT. - - -The _Criticism of Pure Reason_ has been described by its author as a -generalisation of Hume's problem. Hume, he thought, had treated his -question on the 'relations of ideas' in their bearing upon 'matters of -fact' mainly with reference to the isolated case of cause and effect. -Kant extended the inquiry so as to comprise all those connective and -unifying ideas which form the subject-matter of metaphysics. In his own -technical language--which has lost its meaning for the present day--he -asked, 'Are Synthetic judgments _a priori_ possible?'--a question which -in another place he has translated into the form, 'Is the metaphysical -faith of men sound, and is a metaphysical science possible?' By a -metaphysics he meant in the first instance the belief in a more than -empirical reality, and secondly the science which should give real -knowledge of God, Freedom and Immortality,--a science whose objects -would be God, the World, and the Soul. From a comparatively early date -(1762-4) Kant had been inclined to suspect and distrust the claims -of metaphysics to replace faith, and to give knowledge of spiritual -reality; and he had tried to vindicate for the moral and religious life -an independence of the conclusions and methods of the metaphysical -theology and psychology of the day. But it was not till some years -later--in 1770--that he formulated any very definite views as to the -essential conditions of scientific knowledge: and it was not till 1781 -that his theory on the subject was put together in a provisionally -complete shape. - -What then are the criteria of a science? When is our thought knowledge, -and of objective reality? In the first place, there must be a given -something--a sens_-datum_--an 'impression' as Hume might have said. If -there be no impression, therefore, there can be no scientific idea, -no real knowledge. There must be the primary touch--the feeling--the -affection--the _je ne sais quoi_ of contact with reality. Secondly, -what is given can only be received if taken up by the recipient, and -in such measure as he is able to appropriate it. The given is received -in a certain mode. In the present case, the sensation is apprehended -and perceived under the forms of space and time. Perception, in other -words, whatever may be its special quality or its sensuous material, -is always an act of dating and localisation. The distinction between -the mere lump of feeling or sensibility and the perception is that -the latter implies a field of extended and mutually excluding parts -of space, and a series of points of time, both field and series being -continuous, and, so far as inexhaustibility goes, infinite. Thirdly, -even in the reception of the given there is a piece of action and -spontaneity. If the more passive recipiency be called Sense, this -active element in the adaptation may be termed Intellect. Intellect is -a power or process of choice, selection, comparison, distinguishing and -dividing, analysis and synthesis, affirmation and negation, numeration, -of judgment and doubt, of connexion and disjunction, differentiation -and integration. Its general aspect is by Kant sometimes described -as Judgment--the act of thought which correlates by distinguishing; -sometimes as Apperception, and the unity of apperception. It is, i. -e., an active unity and a synthetic energy; it unifies, and always -unifies. It links perception to perception, correlating one with -another--interpreting one by another; estimating the knowledge-value of -one by the rest. It thus 'apperceives.' It is a faculty of association -and consociation of ideas. But the association is inward and 'ideal' -union: the one idea interpenetrates and fuses with the other, even -while it remains distinct. - -Kant's work may be described--in its first stage--as an analysis and a -criticism of experience. The term Experience is an ambiguous one. It -sometimes means what has been called the 'raw material' of experience: -the crude, indigested mass of poured-in _matter_-of-knowledge. If -there be such a shapeless lump anywhere,--which has to be considered -presently--it, at any rate, is not on Kant's view properly entitled to -the name of Experience. The Given must be felt and apprehended: and--to -put the point paradoxically--to be felt it must be more than felt,--it -must be perceived. It must, in other words, be projected--set in space -and time: let out of the mere dull inner subjectivity of feeling into -the clear and distinct outer subjectivity of perception. But, again, -to be perceived, it must be apperceived: to be set in time and space, -it must first of all be in the hands of the unifying consciousness, -which is the lord of time and space. For in so far as space and time -mean a place and an order--in so far as they mean more than an empty -inconceivable receptacle for bulks of sensation, in the same degree -do they presuppose an intellectual, synthetic genius, which is in all -its perceptions one and the same,--the fundamental, original unity of -consciousness. And this analysis of experience is transcendental.' -Beginning with the assumed datum--the object of or in experience--it -shows that this object which is supposed to be _there_--to exist by -itself and wait for perception--is created by and in the very act which -apprehends it. Climbing up and rising above its habitual absorption -_in_ the _thing_, consciousness (that of the philosophic observer and -analyst) sees the thing in the act of making, and watches its growth. - -We have seen that Kant made free use of the metaphor of giving and -receiving. But it is hardly possible to use such metaphors and retain -independence of judgment. The associations customarily attached to the -figurative language carry one away easily, and often for a long way, on -the familiar paths of imagination. The analogy is used even where--if -all were looked into--its terms become meaningless. No reader of Locke -can have failed, e. g., to notice how he is misled by his own images of -the dark room and the empty cabinet:--images, useful and perhaps even -necessary, but requiring constant restraint in him who would ply them -wisely and to his reader's good. From what has been said above it will -be clear that the acquisition of experience, the growth of knowledge, -is a unique species of gift and acceptance. The consciousness which -Kant describes may be the consciousness of John Doe or Richard Roe: -but as Kant describes it, the limitations of their personality, -i.e. of their individual body and soul, have been neglected. It is -consciousness in general which is Kant's theme, just as it is granite -in general--and not the block in yonder field,--which is the theme -of the geologist. Once get that clear, and you will also see clearly -that consciousness is at once giver and recipient--neither or both: -at once receptivity and spontaneity. But--you may reply--does not the -material object _act_ (chemically, optically, mechanically, &c.) on -the sense-organ on the periphery of my body, does not the nerve-string -_convey_ the impression to the brain; and is not perception the -_effect_ of that process, in which the material object is the initial -_cause_? - -In this exposition--which is not unknown in vulgar philosophy--there -is a monstrous, almost inextricable, complication of fact with -inference, of truth with error. So long as there is an uncertainty--and -metaphysicians themselves, we may be reminded, are not agreed upon the -matter--as to what we are to understand by cause, effect, and act, -what an impression is, and how brain and intelligence mutually stand -to each other, it is hardly possible to pronounce judgment upon this -mode of statement. Yet perhaps we may go so far as to say that while -the terms quoted bear an intelligible meaning when applied within the -physiological process they are vain when used of relations of mind to -body. There is a sense in which we may speak of the action of mind -on body, and of body on mind: but what we mean would perhaps be more -unmistakably expressed by saying that the higher intellectual and -volitional energies are never in our experience entirely independent -of the influences of the lower sensitive and emotional nature. In -the metaphysical sense which the terms are here made to bear, they -mislead. Action and re-action can only take place in the separateness -of space, where one is here and another there: (though, be it added, -they cannot take place even on these terms, unless the here and the -there be somehow unified in a medium which embraces both). _Mens_, said -Spinoza, is the _idea corporis_[1]: he would hardly have said _Corpus -habet ideam_. What he meant would scarcely have been well described by -calling it a _parallelism_ or mutual independence, yet with harmony or -identity, of body and mind. Apart from body, no doubt, mind is for him -a nullity: for body is what gives it reality. But, on the other hand, -Mind is the enveloping and including 'Attribute' of the two: idealism -overlaps realism. - -This was the fundamental proposition which Kant contended for; what he -spoke of as his own Copernican discovery: though, in reality, for the -_student_ of the history of philosophy it was only the re-statement, -in some respects the clearer statement, of the idealism which even -Hume, not to mention Spinoza and Leibniz, had maintained. The world -of experience--the empirical, objective, and real world--is a world -of ideas, of representations which have place only in mind, of -appearances. Space and time are subjective: the forms of thought are -subjective: and yet they constitute phenomenal or empirical or real -objectivity. Such language is--it would seem inevitably--misunderstood: -and in his second edition, Kant--besides many other minor modifications -of statement,--had to defend himself by inserting a 'confutation of -idealism,' i.e. of the theory which holds that the existence of objects -outside us in space is doubtful, if not even impossible. But no end -of argument will ever confute the view that Kant's doctrine is such -idealism: until people can be got to rise to a new view of what is -subjectivity--what is an idea--and what is existence outside us. - -By 'subjective' the world is in the way of understanding what is due -to personal prepossession, void of general acceptability, a product of -individual feeling, peculiar and inexplicable tastes. By subjective -Kant means what belongs to _the_ subject or knowing mind as such and -in its generality: what is constitutive of intelligence in general, -what sense and intellect are _semper et ubique_. Into the question -how the human being came to have such an intellectual endowment--the -question which Nativist psychology is supposed to settle in one way; -and Evolutionism in another--Kant does not enter; he merely says -where there is knowledge, there is a knower,--a knowing subject _so_ -constituted. It comes after all to the tautology that the reality we -know is a known reality: that knowledge is a growth in the knower, -and not an accidental product due to things otherwise unknown. The -predicate (or category) _'is'_ is contained, implicit, in the predicate -'_is known,_' or what '_is_' puts implicitly, '_is known_' puts -explicitly and truly. - -By 'appearance' the world understands a sham, or at least somewhat -short of reality. By appearance Kant understands a reality which has -appeared: or, as that is going too far, a something which is real -so far as it goes (a _prima facie_ fact), but only a candidate for -admission into the circle of reals. And such reality depends on nothing -more than its thorough-going coherence with other appearances, its -explaining the rest, and being in turn explained by them,--its absolute -adaptation to its environment. And this environment all lies in the -common field of consciousness, and in the one correlating and unifying -apperceptivity of the ego,--that Ego which is the inseparable comrade, -vehicle, and judge, of all our perceptions. It is the appearance--but -as yet not the appearance _of_ something,--but rather an appearance -_to_ or _for_ something. - -By an 'idea' the world in general understands what it is sometimes -ready to call a _mere_ idea. And by a mere idea is meant something -which is _not_ reality, but a peculiarity of an individual mind, or -group of minds-a fancy, without objective truth:--something, we may -even add, which for many people is located in their own head or brain, -cut off by blank bone-walls from the open air of real being. By idea -(representation, _Vorstellung_) Kant meant that an object is always -and essentially the object of a mind: always relative to a subject -consciousness, and implying it, just as a subject consciousness always -implies an object. - -And by 'existence outside us' the world probably means--for it is -imprudent to define and refine too much in this hazy medium of words -where we all drowse--existence of things on an independent footing -beyond the limits of our personal, i. e. bodily and sentient, self. -As regards _our own_ trunk and limbs, most of us, except in some most -strange insanity, are not likely ever to be in doubt, and are indeed -more likely, after Schopenhauer's model, to take the knowledge of these -_personalia_ as the one thing immediately and intuitively certain. We -talk freely enough, it is true, about existence outside our own minds; -but it is only a drastic method of stating the difference between a -fancy and a fact. And probably we labour under a half-unconscious -hallucination that our minds are localised in some material 'seat,' -somewhere in our bodily limits, and more especially in the central -nerve-organs. - -But, as has been said elsewhere[2], the point of view under which Mind -is regarded by Kant is that of Consciousness, and especially perceptive -consciousness. He describes, as we have put it above, the steps or -conditions under which the single sense-observation is elevated into -the rank of an experience claiming universality and necessity. But -the whole machinery of consciousness--the form of sensibility and the -category of intellect--is originally set in motion by an impetus -from without: or at least the manipulating machinery requires a raw -material on which to operate. Consciousness, or the observer who -takes this point of view, feels that it is being played upon by an -unknown performer--or that it is attempting to apprehend something, -which, because the act of apprehension is also to some extent (and to -what extent, who can say?) a transmutation, it must for ever fail to -apprehend truly. It is haunted by the phantom of a real,--a thing in -its own right, which can only appear in forms of sense and intellect, -never in its own essential being. It is only a short step further--and -Kant, if one may judge him by several isolated passages, has more than -once crossed the interval,--to treat, after the manner of uneducated -consciousness and of popular science, the thing in its independent -being as the cause which produces the sensation, or as the original -which the mental idea reproduces under the distortions or modifications -rendered necessary by the sensuous-intellectual medium. For, if under -the terms of one analogy the perception is an _effect_ of the thing, -under those of another it is an _image_ or copy of external reality. - -If this be Kantian philosophy--and it can quote chapter and verse in -its favour--Kantian philosophy is one version of the great dogma of -the relativity of knowledge. That unhappy phrase seems to have many -meanings, but none of absolutely catholic acceptation. It may mean that -knowledge of things states their relations--the way they behave in -reference to this or that, in these or those circumstances; and that -of an utterly unrelated and _absolutely_ isolated thing, our knowledge -is and must be _nil._ Of a thing-in-itself we can know nothing; for -there is nothing to know. It may mean that knowledge is relative to the -recipient or the knower,--that it is not a product which can stand -by itself, but needs a vehicle and an object in close relation. In -this way, too, knowledge is relative to age and circumstances: grows -from period to period, and may even decay. And thirdly, the relativity -of knowledge may be taken to mean that we (and all human beings) can -never know the reality; because we can only know the phenomenon, i. -e. the modified, transmuted, reflected thing which has reconstituted -an image of itself after passing the interfering medium. For, first -of all, we must strip it--this 'image' so-called (the vulgar call -it the 'thing')--of the secondary qualities (sound, colour, taste, -resistance) which it has in the consciousness of a being dependent on -his sense-organs: and then, we must get rid also of those quantitative -attributes (figure, number, size) which it has in the consciousness -of a spatially and temporally perceptive being;--and then;--but the -prospect is too horrible to continue further and face the Gorgon's head -in the outer darkness, where man denudes appearance in the hope to meet -reality. - -The fact is, there are too many strands in the web which Kant is -weaving, for him or perhaps for any man to keep them all well in hand -and lose none of the symmetry of the pattern he designs. To be just, we -must, in dealing with him as with any other philosopher, try to keep -in view the unity of that design instead of insisting too minutely and -too definitely upon its occasional defects. It is easy to work the pun -that a 'critical' philosophy must itself expect to be criticised; it is -more important to remember that by a criticism Kant meant an attempt to -steer a course between the always enticing extremes of dogmatism and -scepticism,--an attempt to be fair, i. e. just to both sides, and yet -neither to sink into the systematised placidity of the former, nor to -rove in a mere guerilla warfare with the latter. And it is the mere -privateer who in the popular sense of the word is the mere critic. - -Of Kant we must remember that he has the defects of his qualities. -He prides himself on his distinctions of sense and intellect, of -imagination and understanding, of understanding and reason; and with -justice: but his distinctions are sometimes so decisive that it is -hard work both for him and for his reader to reconstitute their -unity. He is fond of utilising old classifications to embody his new -doctrine: and occasionally the result is like what we have been taught -to expect from pouring new wine into old bottles. He draws hard and -fast lines, and then has to create, as it seems, supplementary links -of connexion, which, if they operate, can only do so because they are -the very unity he began by ignoring. One gets perfectly lost in the -multitude of syntheses, in the labyrinth of categories, schemata, and -principles, of paralogisms, antinomies, and ideals of pure reason. One -part of this formalism _may_ be set down to the pedantry and pipeclay -of the age of the Great Frederick--pedantry, from which, as we console -ourselves, our modern souls are freed. But it arises rather from the -necessity of pursuing the battle between truth and error through every -complicated passage in that great fortress which ages of scholasticism -had--on various plans--gradually constructed. Kant is always a little -of the martinet and the schoolmaster; but it is because he knows that -true liberty cannot be secured without forms and must capture the old -before it can plant the new. The forms as they stand in his grouping -may often appear stiff and lifeless: but a more careful study, more -sympathetically intent, will find that there is latent life and -undisplayed connexion in the terms. Unfortunately the classified -cut-and-dried specimens are more welcome to the collector, and can -more easily be put in evidence in the examination-room. - -Thus the original question, Are synthetic judgments _a priori_ -possible? is answered--somewhat piecemeal--in a way that leads the -reader to suppose it is a question of psychology. He hears so much of -sense, imagination, intellect, in the discussion, that he fancies it is -an account of a process carried on by the faculties of an individual -mind. And of course nobody need suppose these processes are ever -carried on otherwise than by individual thinkers, human beings with -proper names. But scientific investigation is concerned only with -the essential and universal. For it, really, sense, imagination, &c. -are not so many faculties in a thinking agent: they are grades and -aspects of consciousness,-- 'powers' in a process of gradual mental -complication (involution). Kant is really dealing with a 'normal' -thought with its distinguishable constituent aspects. Only--he fails -to 'make this explicit and clear. The individualism--the un-historical -prepossession--of his age is upon his phraseology, if not upon his -thought: and one hardly realises that he is really engaged on human -thought and knowledge as a substantial subject of itself apart from its -individual vehicles,--on that thought, which lives and grows in social -institutions and products,--in language, science, literature, and moral -usage,--the common stock which one age bequeathes to the next, but -which the later-comer can only inherit if he works for and creates it -afresh. If it be a psychology, therefore, it is a psychology which does -not assume a soul with qualities, but which expounds the steps in the -constitution of a normal intelligence. - -One may note, without insisting on them too much, the defects of his -treatment of the forms of thought. It may be said that, in the _first_ -place, the table of the categories was incomplete. It had been -borrowed, as Kant himself tells us, from the old logical subdivision -of judgments, derived more or less directly from Aristotle and the -Schoolmen. Now many of the relations occurring in ordinary thought -could not be reduced to any of the twelve forms, without doing violence -to them. But Kant expressly disclaims exhaustiveness in detail. He -could, if he would: but that is for another season. In the _second_ -place, the classification did not expressly put forward any principle -or reason, and gave ground for no development. That there should be -four fundamental categories, each with three divisions, making twelve -in all, seems as inexplicable as that there should be four Athenian -tribes in early times and twelve Phratriai. The twelve patriarchs of -thought stand as if in equal authority, with little or no bearing upon -one another. We have here, in short, what seems an artificial and not -a natural classification of the types of thought. But Kant himself has -given some explanation of the triad, and a sympathetic interpretation -has shown how the four main groups are steps in the solution of one -problem[3] In the _third_ place, the question as taken up seems largely -psychological, or subjective, concerning the constitution of the human -mind as a percipient and cognitive faculty. But this is necessary, -perhaps, to the restricted nature of Kant's problem. He is dealing with -the elements that form our objective or scientific consciousness of -the physical world. The deeper question of the place and work of mind -in life in general, in law and morality and religion, does not at this -stage come before him. That problem in fact only gradually emerges -with the Criticism of the Moral Faculty and the Aesthetic Judgment. -Logic--as the doctrine of the _Logos_ which is the principle of all -things, even of its own Other--had to wait for its preparation till it -could be matured. - -In Hegel, the question assumes a wider scope, and receives a more -thorough-going answer. In the _first_ place the question about the -Categories is transferred from what we have called the epistemological -or psychological, to what Hegel terms the logical, sphere. It is -transferred from the Reason subjectively considered as a mere -receptive and synthetic human consciousness to the Reason which is in -the world and in history,--a Reason, which our Reason, as it were, -touches, and so becomes possessed of knowledge. In the _second_ place, -the Categories become a vast multitude. The intellectual telescope -discovers new stars behind the constellations named in ancient lore. -There is no longer, if there ever was, any mystic virtue supposed to -inhere in the number twelve: while the triadic arrangement is made -radical and everywhere recurs. The modern chemist of thought vastly -amplifies the number of its elementary types and factors, and proves -that many of the old Categories are neither simple nor indecomposable. -_Thirdly_, there is a systematic development or process which links -the Categories together, and shows how the most simple, abstract, and -inadequate, inevitably lead up to the most complex and adequate. Each -term or member in the organism of thought has its place conditioned by -all the others: each of them is the germ, or the ripe fruit of another. - - -[Footnote 1: Spinoza, _Eth._ ii. 7-13.] - -[Footnote 2: _Encyclopaedia_, §§ 415, 420. Consciousness is only as it -were the surface of the ocean of mind; and reflects only the lights and -shadows in the sky above it.] - -[Footnote 3: It is not the least of the merits of the exposition in -Caird's _Critical Philosophy_ of Immanuel Kant, vol. i. to have brought -out this.] - - - - -CHAPTER X. - - -THE CRITICAL SOLUTION, CONTINUED: KANT. - - -Kant's answer to his question was briefly this. Intelligence is -essentially synthetic, always supplementing the given by something -beyond, instituting relationships, unifying the many, and thus -building up concrete totalities. In pure mathematics this is obvious: -the process of numeration shows it creating number out of units, and -geometry shows elementary propositions leading on to complicated -theorems. In abstract physics it is hardly less obvious: there, e.g., -the principle of reason and consequent or the persistence of substance -are rational and legitimate steps beyond the mere datum. The more -important question follows. How are these 'pure' syntheses applicable -to real fact? To that Kant replies: They apply, because in all that -we call real or objective fact there is a subjective element or -constituent. What appears to be purely given, and independent of our -perceptions, is a product of perceptual and conceptual conditions,--is -constituted by a synthesis in perception, imagination, conception. Our -world is a mental growth--not our individual product, but the work of -that common mind in which we live and think, and which lives and thinks -in us. Anyhow it is not an isolated self-existing un-intelligent world -for ever materially outside us--an other world, eternally separate -from us; but bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh, the work realised -by our great 'elder brother,'--the Idea of human collectivity--the -Reason or Spirit in which we are all one soul. It is therefore no -unwarranted step on to a foreign property when we apply the categories -of thought and forms of sense to determine objective reality: for -objective reality has been for ever made, and is now making, objective -and reality by the conscious or unconscious syntheses of perception and -imagination. - -There remains the answer to the same question as regards the objects -of Metaphysics. These objects are according to Kant inferences, and -illegitimate inferences. They are not necessary elements or factors -in the constitution of experience. In order that there should be -experience, knowledge, science, there must be an endless hold of -space and time in which to stow it clearly and distinctly away: and -there must also be ties and relations binding it part to part, links -of reference and correlation, a sort of logical elastic band that -will stretch to include infinitely copious materials. But each real -knowledge attaches to a definite assignable perception, in a single -place and time. From this point we can travel--by means of like -points--practically without limit in any direction. But though the old -margin fades forever and forever as we move, a new margin takes its -place: the limitation and finitude remain: and new acquisitions are -always balanced in part by the loss of the old. Yet the heart and the -imagination are clamorous, and the intellect is ready to serve them. -Such an intellect Kant has called Reason, and its products (Platonic) -'Ideas.' The (Platonic) Idea expresses not so much an object of -knowledge as a postulate, a problem, an act of faith. The 'Vaulting -ambition' Intelligence 'o'erleaps itself and falls on t'other,' -Unsatisfied with a bundle of sensations and ideas, it demands their -abiding unity in a substantial Soul. To simplify the endlessness of -physical phenomena, it sums them up in a Universe. To gather all mental -and physical diversities and divisions into one life, it creates the -ideal of God. - -Each single experience, and the collected aggregate of these -experiences, is felt to fall short of a complete total: and yet this -complete total, the ultimate unity, is itself not an experience at -all. But, if it be no object of experience, it is still an idea on -which reason is inevitably driven: and the attempt to apprehend it, in -the absence of experience, gives rise to the theories of Metaphysics. -Everything, however, which can be in the strict sense of the word -known, must be perceived in space and time, or, in other words, must -lie open to experience. Where experience ends, human reason meets a -barrier which checks any efficient progress, but refuses to recognise -the check as due to a natural limit which it is really impossible to -pass. The idea of completeness, of a rounded system, or unconditional -unity, is still left, after the categories of the understanding have -done their best: and is not destroyed although its realisation or -explication is declared to be impossible. - -There is thus left unexplained a totality which encompasses all the -single members of experience--a unity compared to which the several -categories are only a collection of fragments--an infinite which -commands and regulates the finite concepts of the experiential -intellect. But in the region of rational thought there is no objective -and independent standard by which we can verify the conclusions of -Reason. There are no definite objects, lying beyond the borders of -experience, towards which it might unerringly turn; and its sole -authentic use, accordingly, is to see that the understanding is -thorough and exact, when it deals in the co-ordination of experiences. -In this want of definite objects, Reason, whenever it acts for itself, -can only fall into perpetual contradictions and sophistries. Pure -Reason, therefore, the faculty of ideas, the organ of Metaphysics, does -not of itself 'constitute' knowledge, but merely 'regulates' the action -of the understanding. - -By this rigour of demonstration Kant dealt a deadly blow, as it seemed, -to the dogmatic Metaphysics, and the Deism of his time. Hume had -shaken the certainty of Metaphysics and thrown doubt upon Theology: -but Kant apparently made an end of Metaphysics, and annihilated -Deistic theology. The German philosopher, as Hegel has said and Heine -has repeated, did thoroughly and with systematic demonstration what -Voltaire did with literary graces and not without the witticisms with -which the French executioner gives the _coup de grâce._ When a great -idea had been degraded into a vulgar doctrine and travestied in common -reality, the Frenchman met its inadequacies with graceful satire, and -showed that these half-truths were not eternal verities. The German -made a theory and a system of what was only a sally of criticism; and -rendered the criticism wrong, by making it too consistent and too -logical[1]. - -Science--such is Kant's conclusion--is of the definite and detailed, -of the conditioned. It goes from point to point, within the -enveloping unity of what we call experience, and which rests upon the -transcendental and original unity of consciousness. But a knowledge -of the whole--of the enveloping unity--is a contradiction in terms. -To know is to synthetise: you cannot synthetise synthesis. Knowledge -is of the relative: but an absolute and unconditional totality has no -relations. We may therefore, possibly, feel, believe in, presuppose -the absolute: but know it in the stricter sense, we cannot. It may be -the object of a rational faith. But as for knowledge, we can get on -in psychology without the invisible and immortal soul: we can carry -out sciences of the physical universe, without troubling ourselves -about the 'cosmological' questions of ultimate atoms or ultimate -void, of first beginning and final end: and no proofs will ever prove -the _existence_ of that 'ideal' of reason--briefly termed God--which -transcends and completes and creates all existence. Not that such Ideas -are useless even in science. They represent--if not without risks--the -faith and the presupposition which underlie the spirit of scientific -progress, and set before it an ideal perfection which it will do well -to strive after, though it can never get beyond approximations. What -is perhaps more important: this faith of reason science is as little -competent to disprove, as it is incompetent to prove it. Science is not -all in all: we are more than mere theoretical and cognitive beings. -The logic of science is not the sole code of our spiritual or higher -intellectual life; - - 'We live by admiration, hope, and love.' - -The sequel and development of the first Criticism are found in Kant's -works on ethics, aesthetics, teleology and religion. Only in one -supplementary chapter, and in casual indications as need arises, has -Kant made any pronouncement on his view of Philosophy as a whole and as -a system. That it is and can only be a system, when it really engages -on reconstruction in theory, was of course his fundamental insight. -But in his stage of _Zetesis_[2], of testing and sifting the sound -from the professed, he has confined himself to breaking up the mass -piecemeal, and leaving each result in its turn to corroborate and -correct the other. Sense and intellect may spring from a common stem; -but let us, he says, deal with them in their apparent separateness. -Reason practical must no doubt be identical at bottom with reason -theoretical: all the more convincing will be the undesigned coincidence -between the results of an inquiry into the principles of science, and -one into the principles of morals. We have seen that science ultimately -rests--though it does not discuss it and would indeed be incompetent -to do so--on a faith, a hope, a postulate of the ultimate supremacy of -intelligence,--the faith of reason in its own power (not verifiable -indeed by an exhaustive list of actual results)--or in the rationality -of the world. For science--though a kind of action and a part of -conduct--is a sort of inactive action: an _enclave_ in the busy world, -a period of preparation for the battle of life. In the field of conduct -the ultimate presupposition, which was for the luxury of science called -a reasonable faith or faith of reason, makes itself felt in the more -forcible form of a categorical imperative. - -Or, at least, so it seems on first acquaintance. The command of duty, -addressed to the sensuously-conditioned nature, brooks no opposition -and condescends to no reasons in explanation or promises by way of -attraction. The moral law claims unconditional authority: towards its -sublime aspect reverence and sheer obeisance is due, utter loyalty to -duty for duty's sake. Nothing short of this absolute identification -with the Ought and a willingly willed self-surrender of the whole self -to it can entitle an agent to the full rank of moral goodness. Such is -the form--the synthetic link which joins the sensuous will indissolubly -with the will reasonable of moral law. Now for its explanation. -Humanity, though in the world of appearance and experience always -subject to sensuous conditions, is also a power of transcending these -conditions. Man is more than he can ever show in visibly single act. -He has in him the hope, the faith, the vision of absolute perfection -and completeness: but has it not as positive attained vision, but as -the perpetual unrest of unsatisfied endeavour, as the feeling and -the anticipation of an unachieved idea. And that perfection, that -completeness he believes himself to be; he even in some sense is. -Lapses and ill-success cannot quench the faith: for so long as there is -life, there is hope. - -As he pictures out this invisible self, it may assume various forms -more or less imaginative. At times it may seem a far away, and yet -intimately near, being of beings,--the common father of all souls, the -eternal self-existent centre of life and love, the omnipresent bond -of nature, the omniscient heart of hearts,--on whom he can lean in -closest communion; though he is only too well aware how often he lives -as if God were not, and human beings were roaming specks in chaos. At -other times, he looks up to it as to an inner and better self, his -conscience, the true and permanent being, which controls his choices -and avoidances, which approves and disapproves, commands and condemns: -his soul of soul, genius, and guardian spirit. In such a mood to be -true to his own self--to follow the very voice of his nature--is to -realise his law of life. His Ego is the absolute ego--the reason which -is all things. And lastly, there are times when he conceives this -better self and true essence as the community of the faithful, as the -congregation of reasonable beings, of all perfected humanity. - -In Kantian phraseology, man under one visible form is the union of -an intelligence and a sensibility, of a noümenal with a phenomenal -being. He is, indeed, says Kant, the former only in idea: it is only -a standpoint which he assumes. But it is a standpoint he always does -assume, if he is to be practical, i. e. if he is to move and modify -the world he finds around him. And what standpoint is that? What is -the law that has to govern his action, the law of the spiritual world? -Its supreme law is the law of liberty; and that law is autonomy. -Action--always under law--but that law a self-imposed one. So act -that thy will may be thy law, and with thy will the law of all others -whatsoever; so act that no other human being may by thy act be deprived -of full freedom and treated merely as a thing: so act as to respect the -dignity of every human being as implicitly a sovereign legislative. -In other words, Morality is a stage of struggle and of progress -which bears witness to something beyond. The 'I ought' represents a -transition stage towards the 'I will,' or rather it is the translation -of it into the language of the phenomenal world.[3] Morality, in a -sense-being, always presents itself as a contest between the good -and the evil principle: but in the transcendent and noümenal being -which such a being essentially is,--in the reasonable or good will, -the victory is already won by the good. Good is the law which governs -the world, and which is the strength of the individual life. To the -sensuous imagination, indeed, which here is apt to usurp the place of -reason, things appear under a somewhat different aspect. There the -certainty of self-conquest is forced by the difficulties of apparent -failure to veil itself under the picture of a perpetual approximation -through endless ages towards the standard of perfect goodness: -the confidence that the world is reasonable is presented under the -conception of a God who makes all things work together for good to the -righteous: and the autonomy of reason presents itself as the postulate -of freedom to begin afresh, absolutely untrammeled by all that has -gone before. Thus the kingdom of reason is represented as having its -times and seasons; as making determinate starts, and working up to a -consummation in the end of ages. But implicitly Kant's idea of reason's -autonomy,--of the 'I ought' as in its supreme truth an 'I will,'--is -an eternal truth. The 'standpoint,' so to call it after Kant, is the -standpoint which explains life and conduct and which makes conduct -possible. It is the assertion that the completeness _is,_ and is my -inmost being, the source of my action, my chief good, and that chief -good not a gratification or satisfaction to be looked forward to as -reward, but essential life and self-realisation. And this joy is what -is hidden under the austere gravity of the categorical imperative. - -The Criticism of the Judgment-faculty is Kant's next step towards -providing a completer philosophy. Ostensibly it owes its origin to -the need of supplementing the treatment of Understanding and Reason -by a discussion of Judgment, and of considering our emotional as well -as our cognitive and volitional appreciations. What it really does -is to minimise still further the gulf left between the intellect -and nature--between the natural and the spiritual world. The -intellect, said the first criticism, makes nature: it makes possible -the general outlines of our conception of the world around us as -a causally-connected system, in which a permanent being undergoes -perpetual alteration, and manifests phenomena subject to mathematical -conditions. Intellect, in short, has staked out the world which is -the object of the practical man, and of his adviser the scientist. -But there is another world--the world of beauty and sublimity--the -world which art imitates and realises. The interpretation Kant gives -to the aesthetic world is as follows. The fact of beauty is a witness -to the presence in the mere copiousness of sensible existence of a -sub-conscious symmetry or spirit of harmony which realises without -compulsion and as if by free grace all the proportion and coherence -which intellect requires. Nature itself has something which does the -work that intellect was charged with, and does it with a subtle secret -hand which does not suggest the artificer. The fact of sublimity, on -the other hand, indicates the presence of an even greater spirit. -For beauty may seem--from what has been said--to be only an unbought -accrement to the commodities of life--facilitating the task of the -practical intellect. But the sublime in nature speaks of something -which is greater than human utilities and practical conveniences. It -reveals a something which is in sympathy with our essential and higher -self, and therefore stirs within us the keen rapture of the traveller -who sees from afar his home in 'rocky Ithaca,' but a something which -is cold to daily wants and vulgar satisfactions, and therefore strikes -upon us a gelid awe. - -Another world yet remains, which appeals neither to our utilitarian -science, nor to our higher sentiments of artistic perfection. This is -the world as the home of organic life, and perhaps itself an organism. -The organism is apt to be a poser for the ordinary categories of -mechanical science. Here the part contains the whole, not less than the -whole contains the part: the cause is an effect, as well as cause, of -its effect. One thing is in another, and the other in it: 'the present -is charged with the past, and pregnant of the future,'--as the great -founder of modern teleology often said. In the plant and the animal -the natural world has to a certain degree reached an ideal unity which -is also real. Reason--the syllogism--is here not merely introduced -from without, as when man manipulates, but is the immanent law of a -natural life,--the end working out itself by its own means and act. -The fact admitted in these creatures suggests extending the conception -of organism (or teleology) to nature as a whole. From this point of -view Nature may almost be said to have a history--because it is almost -conceived as having one abiding self which in apparent unconsciousness -wonderfully simulates the purposive adaptation of conscious life. -The older vulgar teleology was somewhat mechanical: it regarded the -natural world outside of--or as it said, below--man as having no end -of its own, but in its series subserving man's commodities. In the -teleology of Kant the supreme end is still in a way man, and still -there is a little of the mechanical about it: but it is not to promote -man's happiness, understood as that probably _must_ be in a selfish -sense, but to produce in him the worthiest agent to carry on to its -highest the rational process of development. The struggles and pains -of natural existence, the laws of life, the competition of rivals, are -all means in the hands of nature to produce an autonomous being. Kant -says, a moral agent. But a moral agent has been already explained as -an intelligence certified unto truth and a self-centred will whose law -is the law of the cosmos,--whose plan of life, if we so put of it, is -essentially a concentration in miniature and in individuality of the -system ordained by the all-present God. - -It is true that Kant, after all these soarings, checks enthusiasm by -the words 'not that we can know this, or that it is so: but our nature -with unmistakable tendency bids us act _as if_ it were so. Logic will -hardly justify it--but life seems to demand it.' And some have replied: -'let us trust the larger hope.' - - -[Footnote 1: Hegel's _Werke_, vol. i. p. 140.] - -[Footnote 2: Kant from 1762 onwards continues to insist on the -necessity for philosophy taking up an analytic and critical attitude to -current conceptions: see especially _Werke,_ i. 95 and 292.] - -[Footnote 3: Foundation of Metaph. of Eth. (_Werke_, viii. 82, 89): -'Dieses Sollen ist eigentlich ein Wollen.'] - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - - -SYNTHESIS AND RECONSTRUCTION: FICHTE. - - -To get the full effect of a new doctrine it must be brought into -contact with a mind unshackled by those traditional prepossessions -which clung to its original author. Kant, essentially by training a -man of the school, was by heart and character essentially a seeker -after the wider ends of the larger world. His lesson is on one hand -the scholar's disproof of pretended science, and on another an appeal -and an example to the mere scholar to make his philosophy ample for -the whole life, and co-extensive with the whole field of reality. His -first disciples who stand forward as teachers caught only the first -part of his message, and sought to set theoretical philosophy on a -sounder basis. Johann Gottlieb Fichte--perhaps the least professional -of great philosophical professors--with a resolute will, a passion for -logical thoroughness, and great impulse to force mankind to be free -and to realise liberty in an institution--was the first who really -grappled with the searching questions that arose out of Kant's message -to his age. His was a Kantism, not certainly always of the letter, nor -indeed always of the spirit: yet for all that, there was substantial -justice in his claim that his system supplied the presupposition which -gives meaning and interconnexion to Kant's utterances[1]. It is, says -the proverb, the first step that costs. And Fichte took that step. -Before his impetuosity the cautelous clauses which besmirched the great -purpose of Criticism shrunk away, the central truth was disengaged from -its old-fashioned swaddling clothes, and openly announced itself as a -renovating, almost a revolutionary principle. - -But, as was to be expected, the unity and force are paid for by a -considerable surrender of catholicity. If Kant's utterances are -fused into comparative simplicity, the unification does not embrace -the whole of the Kantian gospels. What Fichte did in his earlier -stage--the stage by which he counts in the history of philosophy--was -to emphasise and exhibit in his systematic statement that priority or -supremacy of the 'practical' over the 'theoretical' reason which Kant -had enunciated, and to put in the very foreground that self or Ego -which Kant had indicated, under the title of 'transcendental unity -of apperception,' as the focus which gives coherence and objectivity -to experience. But to put the final presupposition at the head and -front of all, as a principle originating and governing the whole line -of procedure, is really to modify in a thorough-going way the whole -aspect of a doctrine and its inner constitution. Kant's way is quiet -analysis: from the given, or what is supposed given, up regressively -to its final presuppositions, its latent _prius._ He shows you the -thing is so, apparently without effort, by judicious application of -the proper re-agent, as it were. Fichte, on the contrary, pours forth -a strong current of deduction: Let it be assumed that so and so is, -then _must,_ or then shall, something else be; and so onwards. Instead -of a glance at the secret substructure of the world, you see it, at a -magician's mandate, building itself up; stone calling to stone, and -beam to beam, to fill up the gaps and bind the walls together. And you -must not merely read or listen. You are summoned as a partner in the -work; a work the author feels, only half-consciously, he has not yet -quite accomplished, and where therefore he complains of the bystander's -dullness. - -This, one may say, was a new conception, certainly a new practice, -of philosophy. Kant had indeed hinted that the pupil in philosophy -must 'symphilosophise'; but practically, even his aim had been to -describe or narrate a process of thought with such quasi-historical -vividness and detail that the listener was sympathetically carried -through the succession of ideas which were called up before him. What -had been generally given in philosophical literature was a sort of -historical account of how thoughts happened: a succession of pictures -presented with the interposition here and there of a little reasoning, -expository of connexions. You enlisted your reader's sympathy: you -set his imagination to work by translating the logical process into a -historical event--the _Logos_ into a _Mythos_--and blending with your -narrative a little explanation as to general drift and relations, you -left him to himself to enjoy the _Theoria._ The nearest approach Fichte -makes to this polite and easy method is in the 'Sun-clear Statement,' -where he, as he says, attempts to '_force_ the reader to understand' -him. But probably these things cannot be forced. And for the rest -Fichte's characteristic attitude is to request, or command, his reader -(or pupil) to think with him, to put himself in the posture required, -to perform the act of thought described. He has not merely to be -present at the lecture, but personally to perform the experiment. It -is not a mere story to be heard and admired and forgotten. _De te_ O -pupil! _fabula narratur._ If it be a play, you are the actor as well as -the onlooker: and the play is not a play, but the drama--the nameless -drama--of the soul transacted in the unseen sub-conscious depths which -bear up its visible life. - -You do not therefore begin by getting a fact put before you. Your -_fact,_ in philosophy, must be your own _act_: not something done -and dead, passive, a thing, but something doing, alive, active: your -introspection must be, let us say, an experiment in the growing, -responsive, quick life, not anatomy of the mere _cadaver._ Think, -therefore, and catch yourself in the act of thinking. Get something -before your mind's eye, and see what it involves. It matters not what -you perceive or feel: only realise it fully and penetrate its meaning -and implications. It is of course the perception of something here and -now. And you would be, in ordinary life, eager to get on to something -else--to associate the present fact to something perceived elsewhere, -to draw conclusions about things yet to come. But if you philosophise, -you must check this practical-minded impatience and concede yourself -leisure to ponder deeply all that the single perception involves. Be -content to sit awhile with Mary, by the side of Rachel of old. Let -Martha bustle about. Fichte tells you that your perception rests,--and -you, you _see_ that it rests, on the 'I am that I am,'--on the I = I, -i. e. on the continuity, identity, and unity of the percipient self. -Make the statement of what you perceive, believe it, that is, assert -it: and you have--done what? You have pledged your whole self_--falsus -in uno, falsus in omnibus_--to its truth: its background is your whole -and one mental life. And is that all? You have also called the world to -witness: your statement--if, as it professes, it form an item however -slight in the realm of knowledge--requests and expects every other 'I' -to acknowledge your perception. Your certainty of the fact rests on -the certainty of your self: and your self is a self certified by its -ever-postulated identity with other selves, so on _ad infinitum_. In -affirming this (whatever be your statement) you affirm the Absolute -Infinite Ego. Heaven and earth are at stake in every jot and tittle[2]. - -At which plain frankness there was much cachinnation and even -muttering among the baser sort. Even wiser heads forgot--if they -ever knew--that Leibniz a century before had startled the world of -his day by a view that 'the Ego or something like it[3] was, under -the name of _monad_, the presupposition of each and every detail of -existence in any organic total. It was useless for Fichte to repeat[4] -that his philosophical Ego was not the empirical or individual ego -which he in this every-day world had to provide clothes and company -for. It is hard to persuade the world that it does not know that 'I -am I,' and what that means. Later, therefore, Fichte, going along -with the movement of contemporary speculation, and willing to avoid -one source of confusion, tended to keep off the name of Ego from -the absolute basis of all knowledge and experienced reality. But -unquestionably the absolutising of the Ego is the characteristic note -of his first period in philosophy: and it rings with the spirit of -the heaven-storming Titan. It means that the cardinal principle and -foundation of man's conscious moral and intellectual life is identical -with the principle of the Universe, even if the Universe seem not to -know it. It means that self-consciousness--the certainty that I am I -and one in all my manifestations--is the highest word yet uttered. In, -or under, the surface of human knowledge and belief in reality, there -is a transcendental Ego--a self identical with all other selves,-- -infinite, unlimited, unconditional, absolute. The certainty of human -knowledge--and therefore of all reality in consciousness--is the -Absolute,--an absolute certainty and knowledge--but an absolute with -which I identify myself,--which I am, and which is me. This is the -absolute _thesis_--the nerve and utter basis-laying--at the ground, or -rather under the ground, of all I know, feel, and will. - -This, then, is the thesis at the very foundation of all _Wissenschaft_: -and therefore figures at the head of the _Wissenschaftslehre_,--the -name Fichte gives his fundamental philosophy. But alone it is -powerless. A foundation is only a foundation, by being built upon. The -position must be defined by counterposition: thesis by antithesis: ego -by non-ego. Ego, in fact, is first made _such_, as set against _you._ -In other words, the perception we assumed to start with does not merely -_suppose_ and indeed pre-suppose the absolute Ego; but it sets in -the absolute Ego an ego and a non-ego,--sets against the lesser ego, -something limiting and limited, something defining it in one particular -direction; or, if the original consciousness we started to examine was -an act of will, then, it may be said, the non-ego appears as about to -be limited and defined by the Ego. Be our consciousness, therefore, -practical or theoretical, of action or of knowledge, its fundamental -characteristic is the conjunction (correlation with subjugation) -of an ego and a non-ego. It is always a synthesis of an original -antithesis[5]; of self and not-self. But every such synthesis which -brings together into one a self and a not-self, is possible only in the -original thesis of a greater self--an absolute Ego--which includes the -not-self and the self it contrasts within its larger self. The unity -of the first principle[6] (A = A, or I = I) parting or distinguishing -itself into the opposition of A versus not-A, Ego set against non-ego, -re-asserts itself again in consciousness (perception of objects, and -action upon them by will) as synthesis, i. e. a conjunction (not a real -union). And this synthesis is either the limitation of the Ego by the -non-ego or the limitation of the non-ego by the Ego. The former gives -the formula of theoretical, the latter that of practical consciousness. - -We begin with the absolute Ego. It is absolute activity, utter -freedom. It is the source of all action, all life. Yet if thus -implicitly everything, it is actually nothing. To be something, it -must restrict itself, set up in itself an antithesis:--by the setting -up of a not-self, at once limit and realise itself: translate itself -from ideal absoluteness and unconditionality into a reality which -is also limited and partial. All consciousness and action exhibit -this antithesis of a limited self and an outside and adversative -other-being; but the antithesis rests upon the medium of a larger life, -a thesis which transcends and includes the antithesis, and which leads -to that alternating adaptation of the two sides to one another (their -synthesis) which actual experience presents as its recurring phase[7]. -The _Wissenschaftslehre_ leaving the absolute Ego in the background -deals with the play that goes on in human experience between the -correlatives to which it has reduced itself;--the antagonism, but the -moderated and overruled antagonism, of Ego and non-ego. - -Observe the contrast to the ordinary methods of expression. Popular -language--if the popular philosophers are to be trusted as its -exponents--says 'an impression is produced by an external object on -the senses, and causes an idea in the mind.' The 'object' works a -series of marvellous effects on a mind, which--to begin with--is hardly -describable as anything more than an imagined point of resistance, -getting reality by being repeatedly impinged upon.[8] Fichte's -statements are rather interpreters of the vulgar phrases, which say -'I hear, I see';--as if, forsooth, the 'I' did it all. According to -Fichte, the 'I,'--the absolute 'I,' is the real (but secret) source -of the position in which consciousness finds itself limited by a -non-ego. But within the finite ego and its consciousness there is -no reminiscence or awareness of this its great co-partner's--the -absolute ego's--act. For the finite consciousness, the beginning of its -activity--i. e. of all empirical consciousness, lies in an impulse or -stimulus from without--a mere somewhat of which we can predicate the -very minimum of attributes. It is only _felt_ as opposing: and this -is the first stage or grade of theoretical consciousness: Sensation. -But in the perpetual antithesis--in the self-opposition which is the -radical act of consciousness--the mere limitation of Ego by non-Ego is -confronted by the underlying activity of the Ego which re-asserts the -limitation as its own act. Thus while we are, as it were, impressed, we -re-act against that impression--we set it forth before us, as ours, and -free ourselves from its immediate incumbency and oppression. Instead -of mere sentiency or feeling, we have a perception (or intuition) of it. - -It would be out of place, here, to try to write the interpretation -of that marvellous and difficult piece of dialectic--the -_Wissenschaftslehre_;--a theme to which Fichte returned again and -again up to his death, ever modifying details, selecting new modes of -exposition, and gradually, perhaps, changing the centre of gravity -of his system. It will be sufficient to note the two purposes which -it keeps in view. On the one hand it is a systematic theory of the -categories. It begins, as we have seen, with the three co-ordinates of -all reflection,--identity, difference, and reason why; it proceeds to -the co-relative principles of activity and passivity; to condition, -quantity, &c. And its work is to show how these forms naturally emerge -in the recurrent antithesis which arises in consciousness, and how -again they are brought together by the overmastering Absolute thesis -into a synthesis, from which the same process re-appears. How much this -corresponds in general conception to the Hegelian Logic is obvious, and -Fichte has the merit of the original suggestion. With this however he -conjoins--what Hegel has relegated to his Psychology--an evolutional -or developmental theory of the mental powers. We have already seen how -sensation is forced by the latent intelligence to rise into perception -(_Anschauung_): the line of psychological development is carried on by -Fichte through imagination to understanding and reason. Hegel's work is -far more complete, definite, and detailed: but that need not keep us -from giving due homage to the suggestive sketch of the originator of -the conception[9]. - -But the theoretical consciousness is not all; and as we already know, -the practical Ego is supreme over it. In it lies the key to the mystery -of the stimulus--the shock from the unknown--which awakened the -activity of the Ego. The non-ego is only a mass of resistance created -by the Ego so that it may be active; only a stepping-stone on which -it may walk; a spring-board from which it may bound. Only so much -reality has the non-ego; the reality of something which may be shaped, -made, made use of. Call the something which the stimulus (_Anstoss_) -pre-supposes, the thing-in-itself (after Kant): and if you ask How are -things-in-themselves constituted, you get from the _Wissenschaftslehre_ -the answer: 'They are as we should make them[10],' Or, as it is said -in another place: 'My world is--object and sphere of my duties and -absolutely nothing else[11]:' if you ask whether there is really -such a world, the only sound reply I can give is: 'I have certainly -and truthfully these definite duties, which take the form of duties -_towards_ such, and _in_ such, objects; and it is only in a world such -as I there represent and not elsewhere that I can perform these duties -which I cannot conceive otherwise,' - -This is a grand word: and yet we feel that, in the intensity of -intellectual consecutiveness and moral inflexibleness, we have lost -some elements to which Kant had given their place in the philosophy -of life. The third of Kant's three Criticisms is conspicuous by its -absence from the Fichtean field of view, and has no recognition in -this scheme of the universe: and the great conception of the natural -world as an organism, in which natural man is only a part, and all -is controlled by an autonomous principle of life, has been for the -while allowed to drop. Even more than in Kant religion tends to be an -epilogue or appendix to morality: and God is identified with the moral -order of the world. It is customary to speak of Fichte's idealism as -ethical, or as subjective: and so long as these words are understood, -no harm is done. But to call it subjective does not mean that Fichte -was so far beside himself as to believe the world was only a picture -or a function of his individual brain. It means that he throws the -weight too much on the side of subjectivity. The Absolute is, for him -in his first stage, described as an Absolute Ego--and thereby the -natural world seems to be left without God: and subjective duty has too -exclusively thrown on it the weight of certifying objective existence. -The world, as we shall see, and have indeed indirectly gathered from -Kant, is too good and worthy to be the mere block of stone out of -which our duties are to be hewn. And similarly, to call Fichte an -ethical idealist is only to name him right, when we add that his were -idealist ethics. The world is not here merely that social decorum may -be maintained, and that puritanical virtue may pronounce that all is so -well, that thenceforth there shall be no cakes and ale, nor ginger be -hot in the mouth. The friend of the two brothers Schlegel, and their -remarkable wives, Dorothea and Caroline, touched hands with a social -group[12] which, for good and for ill, had emancipated itself from all -codes except that which bids - - 'To thine own self be true: - Thou canst not then be false to any man.' - -To him, as to Kant, morality presented itself as autonomy, as the -dignity and grace of human nature in freest development; but to him, -more than to Kant, there commended itself the ideal of a city of -reason, a thoroughly socialised community[13], in which the welfare of -each would be an obligation on all, and the machinery of government -would be so marvellously self-corrective that all would do right and -all fare well. - -Fichte's place in the annals of philosophy depends on his academic -treatises of 1794-98, and on his more popular works from the first -date down to 1808. In a study of the philosopher as a whole it would -be necessary to go beyond these dates, and take account of the -displacement which a development of thought, which there is no good -reason to suppose other than gradual, made in the scale of his earlier -views. But for our purposes that is out of the question. In justice, -however, it must be added that some things that seem inadequately -treated, some shortcomings in catholicity of mind, would appear in -another light if the later writings--not published till after Hegel's -death--were duly taken into account. But even at the close of the -century the advancing thought of Germany was seeking other leaders. - - -[Footnote 1: Cf. notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 399.] - -[Footnote 2: Cf. notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 387.] - -[Footnote 3: Leibniz, _Werke,_ ed. Gerhardt, iv. p. 392.] - -[Footnote 4: Cf. notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 393.] - -[Footnote 5: The _antithesis_ has two members: the partial ego, and the -non-ego, which confronts. The _synthesis_ is a putting together two -separate things, so as to correlate them; but it falls short of what -would be understood in some present usage by 'synthetic unity' which -has a certain mystical ring. It is important for a student of Schelling -or Hegel to remember this distinction of synthesis from 'absolute unity -e.g. Schelling, _Werke_, v. 43.] - -[Footnote 6: _A = A_ is the more purely logical formula: _I=I_ presents -it as a personal and metaphysical identity. The _A_, which is _-A,_ is -to be distinguished from the _A_ which is opposed to _not-A._ But it is -Fichte's standpoint to insist on their being one Ego.] - -[Footnote 7: To give this interpretation of the larger Ego as Life and -Blessedness is to assume that the teaching, e. g. of the _Anweisung zum -Seligen Leben,_ is the logical deepening of the earlier language about -the Ego.] - -[Footnote 8: Cf. the description of mind as 4 a bundle of impressions.'] - -[Footnote 9: Especially given in the Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der -Wiss. (_Werke,_ i. 331). Of course Fichte goes through a corresponding -'deduction' of the emotional or moral nature. Schelling (_System des -transcend. Idealismus_) works out the 'deduction' still more at length.] - -[Footnote 10: Fichte, _Werke_, i. 286.] - -[Footnote 11: Ibid. ii. 261.] - -[Footnote 12: It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that the state of -affairs alluded to, which has its literary memorials in F. Schlegel's -_Lucinde_, and in the warm defense of that book by Scheiermacher, was -only a passing experiment in which a high-strung idealism amid a lax -society sought for truth at all costs and dared a noble lie.] - -[Footnote 13: In the _Geschlossener Handelstaat_ (of 1800), the -'classical' document of characteristic German Socialism in its earlier -and idealist phase.] - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - - -THE BEGINNINGS OF SCHELLING. - - -Schelling and Hegel had been fellow-students at Tübingen, where, -besides the ostensible lessons of the class-room, they had drunk gladly -of the springs of thought Lessing had set running, had felt the hopes -and the fears of the struggle republican France waged against the -German powers, and had seen that Kantian criticism contained within -it a fire which would burn up the hay and stubble of old theology. -Hegel, five years the elder of the two, had passed through his college -career in a very creditable but by no means brilliant way. Among his -fellows he had gained the reputation of a quiet, and rather reflective -mind, which, however, under an old-fashioned exterior, breathed a deep -impassioned zeal for that higher life of which the nobler spirits among -the young then, as now, longed to accelerate the advent. Schelling, -singularly gifted with speculative ability, literary art, and the -receptivity of genius to catch and string together the theories -that rose to the top in science and letters, had already made his -mark as a philosophic writer, while his senior compatriot, leading -the inconspicuous life of a private tutor, was only working up and -widening his ideas. Schelling's first essays in metaphysics trod the -same lines as Fichte; but in 1797 (when he was aged 22) appeared his -_Ideas towards a Philosophy of Nature._ A year later he was lecturing -at Jena, in friendly association with the Schlegels, and with Fichte, -who, however, soon quitted the place. In 1800 appeared the _System of -Transcendental Idealism_, and in 1801 the _Exposition of my System_; -followed in 1802 by _Bruno_, and in 1803 by the _Lectures on University -Studies._ Brief periods of academic teaching at Würzburg, Erlangen, and -Munich, and after 1841 at Berlin, broke the silence which set in after -his _Inquiries into the nature of human liberty_ in 1809; but little -certain was known to the outside public of the final standpoint till -the publication of his collected works (1856-61). - -An involuntary touch of sadness falls upon they historian as he surveys -Schelling's career. Seldom had a thinker's life begun with better -promise, and more distinguished performance; seldom had a nobler -inspiration, a more liberal catholicity of mood, guided and propelled -the intellectual interest; seldom had expectation of greater things -yet to come followed a writer's traces than was the lot of Schelling. -On one hand, a lively and active appropriation of the results of -scientific discovery, at least in its more suggestive advances: on the -other, a mastery of words and style which fitted him to hold his own -amongst the literary leaders; and, again, a sympathy, that seemed to -be religious, with the movement which sought _lucem ex Oriente_, and -wisdom from the treasures of the world's purer youth. And yet--in the -main--the net result, oblivion more complete than has ever befallen a -great thinker. At first, one is inclined to pass on with the remark -that even books and thinkers have their fates, and that some momentary -forgetfulness let the tide slip unused. But it is possible to be less -oracularly-obscure: and without detracting from the splendid faculty -and great achievement of Schelling to note some of the causes of his -lapse into a mere episode. - -In the first place, though his conception is of a system, his -performance is only a succession of fragments. The nearest approach -to an encyclopaedic exposition of his ideas is found in his popular -_Lectures on the Studies of University._ More than once he starts -on the task of exposition, but lets it break off about the middle. -Again, at each new occasion, the features of his scheme of thought -have slightly altered, and not merely does his philosophy profess -at first to present two distinct sides, but these two sides of the -shield vary. Thirdly, the interest in scientific novelties, always -disposed to seek the curious, the far-reaching and suggestive, more -than the sounder generalisations, tends as time goes on to fasten too -greedily on the miraculous and mysterious night-side of nature, on -magic powers and mystic discernments--a path which descends to the -abyss of a 'positive,' i.e. a quasi-materialistic, theosophy. The -matter-of-fact rationalists (both the Catholics in Bavaria, and the -Protestant theologian Paulus, once a friend, but latterly his bitterest -foe) regard him as a crypto-catholic, the advocate of medieval -obscurantism so hateful to true enlightenment. Even his literary art -renders him suspected: for there is an old quarrel between philosophy -and fiction; and grave-eyed wisdom is jealous of her gipsy rival. -Ill-advised indications of a sense of lofty superiority to the average -teacher increased the numbers and the venom of his opponents. Nor is -it perhaps beneath the dignity of history to suggest that his first -wife, Caroline, with all her wonderful attractions of intellect and -character, and notwithstanding all that she had been to Schelling in -encouragement and counsel, was too clever and too critical not to sow -many jealousies, and to add through the female line to the ranks of -those with whom he stood suspect. - -But perhaps the real reason of Schelling's failure was a certain -excess of objectivity. Fichte had drawn attacks down by an abnormal -subjectivity which would fain reform the surroundings wherever he -went. Schelling stood more apart--animated by an immense curiosity, -a boundless interest in all the expanse of objective existence; but -withal he seemed not to have his heart, deeply set and pledged to -a distinctively human interest. His first love is the Romance in -nature; and when he turns to history it is by preference to ages far -remote. His ideal of philosophy is to see it achieve its work by -the instrumentality of Art. Religion seems to culminate for him in -a mythology. Reflection and speculation are to him always somewhat -of a disease--whence philosophy is to carry us--almost magically if -possible--to rest again in the primeval unity of life. It is only an -instrument towards a great end--and that end a godlike, even if you -like a religious, Epicurean life. From such a standpoint it would be -easy, in youth, to relapse into naturalism; it would be equally easy, -in later life, to fall into supernaturalism. Philosophy--at least as -Hegel understood it--is merely neither: but the life, which never -can quite cease to be an effort, of idealism. And so Schelling could -not earn the confidence which only goes to those who are felt to be -fellow-fighters with those they lead. - -With Schelling occurs the confluence, into the main current of -philosophy, of streams of idea and research which had already -exercised a stimulative effect on the tone and products of the higher -literature of Germany. As early as 1763 (at the very date Kant let the -English and Scotch 'empiricists' shake him out of his 'rationalist' -dogmatism) Lessing--in a couple of pages _On the reality of things -outside God_--threw doubts on the tenability of the ordinary deistic -arrangement of his day, which set God _there_ and man and his -surroundings _here,_ each side, for the time at least, undisturbedly -enjoying his own. Lessing read Leibniz by the light of Spinoza, and -Spinoza by the light of Leibniz: and, if he emphasised the absolute -right to the completest individual self-development on one hand, he no -less declared on the other that 'nothing in the world is insulated, -nothing without consequences, nothing without eternal consequences.' -'I thank the Creator that I must,--must the best,' he adds (1774). Of -his conversations on these high topics with Jacobi, we have already -spoken. While Spinoza and Leibniz were either decried, or--what is -worse--misunderstood, by the established masters of instruction, they -were welcomed by a more sympathetic and, with all its drawbacks, more -appreciative study from the non-academic leaders of thought. - -Amongst these one of the most interesting and influential was Herder. -Herder, who had been amongst Kant's students in 1763, and who has -expressed his admiration of his then teacher, came as years passed-by -to consider himself the appointed antagonist of the Kantian system. -The two men were mentally and morally of different types: and in -Herder's case, a sense of injury, in the end, positively blinded -him to the meaning no less than to the merits of a doctrine he had -decreed to be pernicious. In Herder's opinion, the Kantian system -laboured throughout from the fault of a dead logical formalism and -abstractness: it inhabited a sort of limbo, cut off alike from the -fresh breath of nature and the growing life of history, and from the -eternal spirit of divine truth: it undermined (so his experience at -Weimar[1] indicated) the traditional faith, and inspired its 'adepts' -with a revolutionary superciliousness to all dogma. Its cut-and-dried -logicality, its trenchant divisions and analyses were obnoxious to his -poetically-fervid, largely-enthusiastic, and essentially-historical -soul. Man--in his concrete completeness, in his physical surroundings -and his corporeal structure, in his social organisation, in his -literary and artistic life, above all in his poetry and traditions of -religion--was the theme of his studies; and he looked with distrust on -every attempt to analyse and disintegrate the total unity of humanity -by a criticism first of this, and then a criticism of that side of -it, carried on separately. Ossian had been an early favourite of his; -and the twilight that hovers with the haze of pensive myth around the -figures of that visionary world hangs with a charm and a confusion -around the ultimate horizon of Herder's ideas. - -In 1774 and 1775 Herder wrote and wrote again an essay (published 1778) -for a prize offered by the Berlin Academy on the subject of 'Sensation -and Cognition in the human Soul.' Its fundamental points are that -'no psychology is possible, which is not at every step a distinct -physiology': that 'cognition and volition are only _one_ energy of the -soul': that 'all our thought has arisen out of and through sensation, -and in spite of all distillation still contains copious traces of -it': that there are not separate faculties of thought, but one divine -power, which unifies all the broad stream of inflowing sensation,--'one -energy, and elasticity of the soul, which reaches its height through -the medium of language.' 'What is material, what non-material in -man, I know not,' he says; 'but I am in the faith that nature has not -fastened iron plates between them,' 'Man is a slave of mechanism (but -a mechanism disguised in the garb of a lucid celestial reason) and -fancies himself free,' 'Self-feeling and fellow-feeling (a new phase of -expansion and contraction) are the two expressions of the elasticity of -our will': they vary directly with each other: and 'love therefore is -the highest reason'--a proposition, adds Herder, for which 'if we will -not trust St. John, we may trust the undoubtedly more divine Spinoza, -whose philosophy and ethics turn wholly upon this axis.' - -Herder's great work, however,--which, side by side with Lessing's -_Education of the Human Race,_ and with Kant's _Idea for a Universal -History_, helped to constitute that conception of history, as -philosophy in concrete form, which appears in Schelling, Schlegel, and -Hegel,--was the _Ideas for a Philosophy of History._ It is the pendant -and contrast to Kant's three Criticisms, with which it is nearly -contemporaneous (1784-91). Even in history Kant emphasises the work of -intelligence, of reason: and puts the intelligently-organised state--if -possible, the world-commonwealth, when war shall be transformed into -merely stimulating competition,--as the final triumph of the reason. -To Herder, while on the one hand the nature-basis is all-essential, -and must form the foundation of any genetic explanation of spiritual -phenomena, the ideal of humanity presents itself rather as a free -development of the many-sided individual--a development tempered by -the association of the family and the claims of friendship. In Kant's -view of civilisation, natural reason by its indwelling presuppositions -works out the end of culture: Herder, on the contrary, allows himself -to introduce--but only in and from the dim background--a supernatural -aid to actualise the germs of rationality latent in man's nature. -Yet, though at the first step into history the Godhead appears, and -a deified humanity looms ahead as the consummation of the process -of evolution, the development between these two extreme poles is -homogeneous and indeed one. The same law governs it throughout: - -'Ethics is only a higher physics of the mind.' Man is from the -first endowed with tendencies which, through the medium of society -and tradition, carry him on to the double end, so hard to combine, -of 'humanity and happiness,' 'humanity and religion.' But, for -this training of the spirit he is prepared by a special natural -endowment of the body: and Herder can go so far as to say that 'in -order to delineate the duties of man, we need only delineate his -form.' Developing under the influence of cosmic and geographical -conditions, and formed of the same protoplasm and on the same type -as other animals, man possesses an unique organisation, a definitely -proportioned mechanism, which is his distinctive and permanent specific -character. General identity of plan and condition prevails for man -and animals; but Herder keeps back from the Darwinian inference which -interprets the graduated diversity of type as indicating that man is -the phase reached _pro tempore_ in the gradual slide along which the -continuous change of environment carries the unstable types which -earlier environments have helped to form. For Herder's conception of -nature there are fixed differences beyond which research cannot go; and -we shall see that both Schelling and Hegel accept this reservation. - -Herder, finally, struck a blow in the war that was waged after -Lessing's death between the friends and foes of Spinozism. His little -book _God_ (1787) is a vindication v of Spinoza against Jacobi's -attack. Antiquarian accuracy it can lay no claim to: the picture -of Spinozism, one-sided at the best, is further vitiated by an -interpretation of the doctrine which leavens it to indistinctness with -the ideas of Leibniz and Shaftesbury. It was a grand--but it was also -an audacious--vision of Spinozism which found it not inconsistent with -a fundamental theism on one side and with the poetry of nature on the -other. Yet Herder had the merit of being perhaps the first to pierce -the hard logical shell of rationalism under which Spinoza had lain -hidden, and to reveal the mystic passion for God which so quaintly -called itself _amor erga rem infinitam et aeternam._ 'Spinoza,' says -Herder, 'was an enthusiast for the being of God,' Even where he -translates Spinoza's terms into ample equivalents, he does service by -teaching men that the vapid inanities they associate with terms like -_substance_, _mode, cause_, are inadequate to interpret the intensity -of meaning they had for the philosopher. To remove the seals which -rendered both Leibniz and Spinoza a mystery for the world was to -prepare the way for Schelling and Hegel[2]. - -It is under the aegis of Spinoza and Leibniz that Schelling begins -his first characteristic work,--the _Ideas towards a philosophy of -Nature._ In these thinkers he found first proclaimed as the fundamental -standpoint of philosophy the unity of the finite and the infinite, of -the real and the ideal, of the absolutely active and the absolutely -passive. They differed indeed in this, that whereas this unity is -pre-supposed by Spinoza as infinite and absolute substance, of which -all separate existence, body or mind, is only a _modus_, it is taken -by Leibniz as the universal characteristic of every individual being. -Every monad--and the human soul is the typical monad--is at once finite -and infinite, real and ideal, active and passive. But--whether as -underlying substance, or as unity of reality--both hold the cardinal -doctrine that the absolute (the 'Object' of philosophy) is the unity -and unification--the identity--of what outside it appears as two -sides or orders of being, the real and the ideal. To philosophise, -therefore--or to see things in the absolute--is (not as Hegel's -malicious joke puts it[3], to look at them 'in the night when all cows -are dark,'--but) to see them in the intense light that proceeds from -the identity of the _Spirit_ within us with the _Nature_ without us. - -Fichte had caught hold of this standpoint. He had seen that the -original antithesis which confronts us, and the conjunction (synthesis) -of its members, presupposed a still more fundamental and indeed -absolute thesis,--an aboriginal and active unity. That antithesis is -the opposition of ego and not-ego; that synthesis is every act of -knowledge and will, by which each of these powers is in turn limited -by the other. Such a synthesis (volition or cognition) would be -impossible unless on the fundamental thesis (or hypothesis) of a unity, -or identity, which gives rise to the antithesis and has the power of -overcoming it. Such an original unity is what he calls the absolute -Ego. I am what I know and will, and what I know and will is Me. Such -is the equation (briefly written, I = I) which identifies subject -and object (of knowledge and will). But the associations clinging to -the terms Fichte used gave this thought a one-sided direction. The -'_I_' is opposed to the _'Thee,'_ and the '_Them,_' and the 'It.' The -'thing'--or non-ego--is depreciated as compared with the thinker and -willer. It is postulated _ad majorem gloriam_ of the Ego: in order that -I may work out the full fruition of my being. It is what I ought to -make out of it. It _is_ nothing but what it _will be_--or will be if -I do what I ought to do. The identity of the two sides therefore is -left as 'the object of an endless task, an absolute imperative.' The -Absolute is not yet:--it is only the forecast of a postulated result. - -'If this be what Fichte teaches, and be called subjective idealism, -then for Schelling the first thing is to quit the house of bondage. Let -us leave out of view the Ego, with its misleading associations, and -begin with the two fields which are known to us, the fields of Nature -and Spirit. Nature--not Matter--is the one side: Mind or Spirit the -other. Each of them furnishes the object of one branch of philosophy--a -philosophy of Nature, on one hand, and a transcendental idealism on the -other. The former is new, and more especially Schelling's own proper -continuation of Kant: the other partly a continuation of Fichte's work. -But as they are both philosophy, they must coincide or meet. The whole -philosophy may therefore call itself a philosophy of Identity; but, for -the while, it will present itself under the two aspects of a philosophy -of Nature, conceived as the blind and unconscious, a philosophy of Mind -and history, as the free and conscious product of intelligence.[4] - - -[Footnote 1: He held posts of large general superintendence over church -and school affairs at Weimar.] - -[Footnote 2: See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 420.] - -[Footnote 3: Hegel, _Werke_, ii. 13.] - -[Footnote 4: See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 392.] - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - - -THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND IDEALISM. - - -What is meant by a 'philosophy of Nature'? 'To philosophise on Nature,' -says Schelling, 'means to lift it up out of the dead mechanism in -which it appears immersed,--to inspire it, so to speak, with liberty, -and to set it in free process of evolution: it means, in other words, -to tear ourselves away from the vulgar view which sees in Nature only -occurrences, or at the best sees the action _as a fact, not the action -itself_ in the action[1].' There is in short a process in nature -parallel in character to what Fichte had exhibited for consciousness. -The natural world is no longer subordinated, but to appearance -co-ordinate: and evolution or development, exhibited under the logical -title of a 'deduction,' is the common law of both. The real order and -the ideal order of the world are equally the work of an infinite and -unconditioned activity, 'which never quite exhausts itself in any -finite product, and of which everything individual is only as it were a -particular expression.' The nature which we see broken up in groups and -masses, and individual objects, is to be explained as a series of steps -in a process of development: the steps in a single continuous product -which has been arrested at several stages,--which presents distinct -epochs, but nevertheless all approximations, with divergences, to a -single original ideal. - -In Nature, as in Mind, the most typical phenomenon is an original -heterogeneity, duplicity, or difference, which, however, points -back to a still more fundamental homogeneity, unity, or identity. -This primary unity or ground of unification does not indeed appear -to sight; the 'soul of Nature,' the _anima mundi,_ nowhere presents -itself as such in its undivided simplicity; but only as the perpetually -recurring re-union of what has been divided. But though unapparent, -the absolute identity is the necessary presupposition of all life -and existence, as of all knowledge and action. It is the link or -'copula' which perpetually reduces the antithesis to unity, and the -heterogeneity to homogeneity, and the different to redintegration. To -this fact of antithesis, presupposing and continually reverting to an -original unity, Schelling gives the name 'Polarity,' 'It is impossible -to construe the main physical phenomena without such a conflict of -opposite principles. But this conflict only exists at the instant -of the phenomenon itself. Each natural force _awakes_ its opposite. -But that force has no independent existence: it only exists in this -contest, and it is only this contest which gives it for the moment a -separate existence. As soon as this contest ceases, the force vanishes, -by retreating into the sphere of homogeneous forces[2].' Polarity, -therefore, is a general law of the cosmos. - -A ceaseless, limitless activity, therefore, as the basis or groundwork -of all, for ever crossing, arresting, and limiting itself: an eternal -war, which, however, is always being led back to peace,--a process -of differentiation which rests upon, is the product of, and is for -ever forced back to integration, is the perpetual rhythm of the -natural universe. It is a process in which can be traced three grades, -stages, or 'powers' (first, second, and third, &c.). By its more -generally descriptive name it is called Organisation. 'Organism,' -says Schelling, 'is the principle of things. It is not a property -of single natural objects; but, on the contrary, single natural -objects are so many limitations, or single modes of apprehending the -universal organism[3].' 'The world is an organisation; and a universal -organism itself is the condition (and to that extent the positive) -of mechanism[4].' 'Mechanism is to be explained from organism: not -organism from mechanism.' 'The _essential_ of all things is _life_: the -_accidental_ is only the _kind_ of their life: and even the dead in -Nature is not utterly dead,--it is only extinct life.' - -But if the conception of an organism be thus the adequate or -complete idea of Nature as a whole, that idea is only realised as -a third 'power' supervening on, and by means of two subordinate or -inferior ranges or 'powers.' The first stage is that occupied by the -mathematical and mechanical conception of the world,--the bare skeleton -or framework which has to be clothed upon and informed with life and -growth. This first 'power' in the world-process of antithetical forces, -under the control of, and on the basis supplied by, the original -thetic unity which synthetises them, is Matter. In Matter we have the -equilibrium and statical indifference of two opposing forces--one -centrifugal, accelerating, repulsive, the other contripetal, retarding, -attractive--which, working under the synthetising unity supplied by the -force of universal gravitation, build up in their momentary arrests -or epochs the various material forms. In this first 'power' we have -as it were the scheme or machinery through which organisation will -work: the outward and 'abstract, organism. And the essential feature -of this 'construction' or 'deduction' of matter is that it does not -take material atoms and build them into a world, but 'deduces' the -properties of matter as issuing from the play of opposing forces, and -as due to the temporary syntheses resulting from the presence of unity -making itself felt in the opposites. - -A second and higher 'power' is seen in the physical universe as it -presents, itself to the sciences of electricity, magnetism, and -chemistry. If the former briefly be denominated the mechanical, -this is the chemical world. The law of polarity is here especially -prominent: the neutrality or indifference of parts is replaced by an -intenser antithesis and affinity: and the return from heterogeneity -to homogeneity takes place with more striking and even sudden effect. -Here, matter, even as inorganised, has a certain _simulacrum_ of life -and sensibility: there is in it the trace of a spirit which emerges -above the mere contiguity and juxtaposition of mechanical atoms. The -atomic theory shows itself less and less adequate as an attempt to -represent the whole phenomena of inanimate matter, and the material -universe is already charged with sympathies and antipathies which are -full of the promise and the potency of the organic world. - -The mechanical theory of the universe, in the ordinary sense, which -deals with the mathematical formulation of the laws of planetary -movement, had been the work of the seventeenth century. The eighteenth -century had seen attempts to explain the _status quo_ of the -planetary system as a resultant from the evolution of an elementary -molecular state of the cosmic mass. With the close of the eighteenth -century there appeared a group of new sciences dealing with subtler -energies of matter,--with electricity, galvanism, and above all with -the connexions of chemical, electric, and magnetic science. The -ideas thus suggested--embraced with some generality under the title -Polarity--threw light backward upon the old mechanical conceptions, -and gave them a decidedly dynamic character. Even the tranquil rest -of geometrical figures came to be explained as a meeting point and -transition moment of opposite forces. But these ideas produced an even -greater effect on biology. Here, too, the need of a special 'vital -force' to explain life and organisation disappeared: organism was -but a higher stage, a completer truth of mechanism: and both found -their explanation in the antithesis and synthesis of forces, or in -differentiation and integration of what has recently been termed an -'idée-force.' In this direction, so far as Schelling was concerned, -the obvious stimulus came from the programme sketched by Kielmeyer at -Stuttgart in 1793, in a lecture 'on the proportions of organic forces,' -According to Kielmeyer there are three types of force in the animal -organisation, sensibility, irritability and reproduction[5]. The last -of these is the basic force which builds up and propagates the animal -system. With irritability, or contraction in response to external -stimuli--material adaptation to environment--a higher level of animal -life is reached. But the highest of all forces in the living being is -sensibility. In this same order may we reasonably conceive that the -'plan of nature' proceeds. Her first products show little beyond that -reproductive power which makes broad and high the pyramid of life. But -as the creature acquires increasing heterogeneity and a comparatively -independent position, it plays the part of a re-agent against stimuli, -and a source of movements. Lastly, it not merely responds to, but -assimilates and appropriates the impression into a sensation: it -internalises the external, and carries within itself by means of the -sensibility an ever-increasing picture of the world around it. - -The idea of Evolution or Development, thus introduced by Schelling into -philosophy as a governing principle in the study of matter and of mind, -is not to be confused either with the older use of these terms or with -their current applications to-day[6]. By evolution (or development) -and involution (or envelopment) the earlier speculation on biology had -denoted the view that the organic germ contained _in parvo_ all that -the matured organism showed in large. As the mature bulb of the healthy -hyacinth shows, when cut open, to the naked eye, the stem and flowers -that will issue from it next spring; so in general the seed can be -treated as a miniature organism needing only an increase of bulk to -make it fully visible in details. Growth is thus not accretion, but -explication and enlargement of a microscopic organism subsisting in the -germ. - -Evolution, in the present time, and especially since Darwin, means -something more than this. It implies a theory of descent of the variety -of existing organisms from other organisms of a previous age, less -individualised in forms and functions. From comparatively simple and -homogeneous creatures there have issued in the course of ages creatures -of more complex, more highly differentiated structure; and this process -of gradual differentiation may be conceived as going on through an all -but infinite period. At one end we may conceive matter, just endowed -with the faculties of life and organisation, but in a minimal degree; -at the other end of the developmental process, creatures which have -organised within themselves powers, maximal both in range and variety. -The result (so far as we at present go) is a genealogy of organism -which, to quote Darwin, pictures before us a 'great tree of life which -fills with its dead and broken branches the crust of the earth and -covers the surface with its ever branching and beautiful ramifications.' - -Even Bugon, seeing how naturally he could regard 'the wolf, the fox, -and the jackal' as 'degenerate species of a single family,' concluded -we could not go wrong in supposing that 'nature could have with -time drawn from a single being all other organised beings.' Erasmus -Darwin (1794) had insisted on the power of 'appetency' in the organs -of a living creature to create and acquire new structures which it -handed down to its posterity. G. R. Treviranus[7] in his _Biology_ -(1802-5) had noted the influence of environment, and Jean Lamarck in -his _Philosophie Zoologique_ (1809) had--after assuming that 'nature -created none but the lowest organisms'--maintained that need and use -(or disuse) can so effectively modify a creature that it may even -produce new organs, and give rise by imperceptible degrees to a variety -of creatures as widely divergent as they now appear. E. g. 'The giraffe -owes its long neck to its continued habit of browsing upon trees.' And -gradually it had become recognised by speculators on this subject that, -as Mr. H. Spencer wrote in 1852, 'by small increments of modification -any amount of modification may in time be generated.' Finally, in 1859, -Darwin, with an ample resource of illustrative examples, enforced the -doctrine that the existing fauna and flora of the earth represent the -result of a struggle for existence, protracted during vast ages, in -which those creature's have been preserved (selected to live) which, -among all the variously-endowed offspring of any kind, were best fitted -to appropriate the means of subsistence in the circumstances in which -they for the time found themselves placed. The circumstances of life -on the globe are perpetually varying from place to place and time to -time: progeny never exactly reproduce their parents, and diverge widely -from each other: hence each form of life is perpetually sliding on from -phase to phase, and only those survive which are best adapted to the -new conditions of life. - -So far as Darwinism is an attempt to show that the classes of plants -and animals are not a mere juxtaposition and aggregation, but are to be -explained by reference to a single genetic principle, it is in harmony -with the Evolution taught by Schelling and Hegel. Both alike overthrow -the hard and fast lines of division which semi-popular science insists -upon, and restore the continuity of existence. Both regard Nature as -an organic realm, developing by action and re-action within itself, -living a common life in thorough sympathy and solidarity, and not a -mere machine in which the several parts retain without change the -features and functions impressed upon them at creation by some supernal -architect. But they differ in other points. Ordinary Darwinism, -at least, talks as if circumstances and organism were independent -originally, and only brought as it were, incidentally, in contact -and correlation. It fails to keep hold of the fact--of which it is -abstractly aware--that the two act upon and modify each other because -they are members of a larger organism. It forgets, in short, what -Schelling so thoroughly realised, that the organic and inorganic, -ordinarily so called, are both in a wider sense organic. It wants the -courage of recognising its own tacit presuppositions. - -But the characteristic difference between the evolution theory of -to-day and that meant by the philosophers is different from this, -though connected with it. 'The assertion,' says Schelling, 'that -the various organisms have formed themselves by gradual development -from one another, is a misconception of an Idea which really lies in -reason[8].' And Hegel no less decidedly asserts that 'Metamorphosis' -(as the term was then applied, e. g. by Goethe, to what we now call -Evolution) really _exists_ as a fact only in the case of the living -individual,--not in the supposed or theoretical continuity of the -species. 'It is an awkward way both ancient and modern speculative -biology have had of presenting the development and transition of one -physical form and sphere into a higher one as an outwardly-actual -production,--which, however, in order to make it clearer, has been -thrown back into the darkness of the past.'[9] Yet notwithstanding -these and even later protests, there is a great charm for many minds in -the evolutionist picture, e. g., of the horse of to-day as the literal -descendant through nearly fifty great stages (called species) from -some creature of the eocene age, which gradually transformed itself in -consequence of innate instability or variability of construction and in -obedience to changes in its environment. But whatever value there may -be in these as yet hypothetical aids to the imagination in grasping and -unifying the variety of organic life, they run on another line from the -philosophical evolution. That evolution is in the _Idea_, the _Notion._ -It is the 'fluidity' of terms of thought that is here sought, not -of the kinds of things,--except in a secondary way. And above all, -philosophy does not deal with a problem in time, with a mere sequence; -if it deals with a history of nature, the agents of that history are -powers and forces--and powers which are ideal no less than real. - -A nearer approach to the philosophic conception is to be found in the -views which modern physiology takes of the nature of organic structure -and function[10]. In the simplest phases of protoplasm, the apparently -homogeneous mass is really undergoing a series of changes, and indeed -only exists as such, because it is the ever-renewed resultant of -two correlated processes,--a movement up (anabolic change) by which -dead matter is assimilated and built into it, and a movement down -(katabolic changes) by which its composing elements are disintegrated -and left behind, with accompanying liberation of energy. Protoplasm or -'living matter' is the incessantly formed and re-formed thin line on -which these two currents for the moment converge,-a temporary crest -of white foam, as it were, raising itself on the Heraclitean wave of -vicissitude, where all things flow on and nothing abides. But wherever -protoplasm arises and maintains itself on this borderline of ascending -and descending states, it exhibits the three well-known properties of -assimilation, contractility, and sensitiveness. Protoplasm, placed -as it were in the mean between these two processes, is or has the -synthetic power which governs them and keeps them in one. It is no -mere chemical substance, undergoing composition and decomposition, -but rather, if looked at from the somewhat speculative standpoint of -molecular physics, a kind of intricate movement or dance of particles, -a shape or 'form' instinct with the power of producing and reproducing -itself, and, ultimately, in some highly differentiated phases -(nerve-system), with a power of producing and reproducing a world of -imagination. - -A philosophy of Nature is only half a philosophy. Its purport is -to set free the spirit in nature, to release intelligence from its -imprisonment in material encasements which hide it from the ordinary -view, and to gather together the _disjecta membra_ of the divine into -the outlines of one continuous organisation. It seeks to spiritualise -nature, i. e. to present the inner idea, unity, and genetic -interdependence of all its phenomena: to delineate _natura formaliter -spectata_ not as a logical skeleton of abstract categories, but in its -organisation and continuous life. There remains the problem of what -Schelling calls 'Transcendental Idealism':--called 'transcendental' -to avoid confusion with the vulgar idealism which supposes the world -to be what it calls a mere 'idea' or phantom of the mind. Schelling's -is on the contrary an 'Ideal-Realism': it 'materialises the laws of -intelligence to laws of nature[11].' - -We need not in details consider the genesis of Reality from the action -of the Ego. Substantially it is the same as that given by Fichte. -An activity, which is at once self-limiting and superior to all -limit, rises through stage to stage, from sensation and intuition, -to reflection and intelligence, till it becomes the consciousness of -a world of ob; ective reality. 'Give me,' says the transcendental -philosopher, 'a nature with opposing activities, of which the one -goes to infinity, and the other endeavours to behold itself in this -infinity,--and from that I will show you intelligence arising with the -whole system of its ideas[12].' In the first phase the 'ideal-real' -world arises by the synthetic action of the 'productive intuition,' -Ideas, as it were, live and move: they grow and build up: causality -is neither a category nor a schema, but an intelligent 'form' which -is also a force--an 'idée-force,' They are (in the Hegelian sense) -'Ideas,' i.e. neither merely objective nor merely subjective, but both -at once. But such an ideal world is outside and beyond consciousness: -it belongs to the same region as that higher Ego where there is no -distinction between the Ego I am and the Ego I know. To follow the -movement in this region needs a combination of mental vision and visual -intellect, which Schelling has called the 'Intellectual Intuition.' -It is a power which rising above the materialism of sense yet retains -its realism; which, while intellectual, is free from abstractness. -It is synthetic, and widely different from mere logical analysis. -It is, in short, analogous to the artistic genius: it creates a -quasi-objectivity, an ideal-reality, without which the mere words of -the speculator are meaningless. By means of this 'organ,' philosophy -can 'freely imitate and repeat the original series of actions in which -the one "act" of self-consciousness is evolved[13]. - -But the 'productive intuition' is, as Kant would say, blind: it is -unconscious in its operation: and it is only after an arrest, a Sabbath -when it surveys and judges its work, that it begins to realise itself -through a process of analysis and reflection which elicits and fixes -the categories that have been operative in it. By this abstraction -intelligence rises out of mere production to intelligent and conscious -production, i.e. to volition, where it has an ideal and realises it. -With volition and voluntary action, objectivity is to appearance -further certified and fortified. It is as active, i. e. as free, and -even moral, agents, that we set forward categorically the reality of -the world. So, too, Fichte had declared. But, as Schelling reminds -us, with this intensified assertion of a law and an ideal to which -the real must and shall correspond,--with the declaration that the -realm of absolute consistency and ideal truth of reason is the true -and real for ever and ever--we come across the fundamental antithesis -of the 'Is' and the 'Ought,5 of the objective and subjective, of -unconscious necessity and self-conscious freedom. With an attempt to -get a philosophy of history,--i. e. of man and mind as the culminating -truth of things, we see ourselves confronted with the opposition of -fatalism and chance. On one hand history is only possible for beings -who have an ideal in view,--one persistent aim and principle which -their work and will is the means of realising. And yet it is an ideal -which only the series of generations, only the whole race, can realise. -Man's license to do or to refrain rests upon a larger, latent, divine -necessity which constrains it. What human agents by their free choice -determine and carry out, is carried out, in the long run, by the force -of an everlasting and unchanging order, to which their wills seem but -a mere plaything. But that man's free agency should thus harmonise -with the constrained uniformities of nature is only possible on the -assumption that both are phenomena of a common ground, or basis of -identity, of an 'absolute identity, in which there is no duplication, -and which for that reason, because the condition of all consciousness -is duplication, can never reach consciousness. This ever-Unconscious, -which, as it were the everlasting Sun in the spirit-kingdom, is hidden -in its own undimmed light, and which, though it is never an object, -still impresses its identity on all free objects, is simultaneously -the same for all intelligences, the invisible "root" of which all -intelligences are only the "powers," and the everlasting mediator -between the self-determining subjective in us and the objective or -percipient,--simultaneously the ground of the uniformity in freedom, -and of the freedom in uniformity of the objective[14].' To rise to the -sense of this Absolute Identity, as common basis of harmony between the -'Ought' and the 'Is,' is to recognise Providence: it is Religion. - -But this 'Absolute' is never in history completely revealed--we cannot -_see_ free action coincide with predetermination. Thus if History as -a whole be> conceived as a 'continuous and gradual self-revelation; -of the Absolute,' 'God never _is,_ if _is_ means exhibition; in the -objective world: _if God were, we_ should not be[15].' Nor is the -Absolute so revealed in Nature. Yet, even as the apparent contingency -of human action throws us back on an everlasting necessity which is -yet freedom, so the apparent uniformity of natural order shows us in -organic life the traces of a free self-regulating development. To -apprehend the truth at which both seem to point we want an organ of -intelligence which shall unite in itself the conscious activity of -free production with the unconscious instinct of natural creation. -Such an organ is found in they aesthetic power of genius, in the -Artist. The artistic product is the work of two intimately-conjoined -principles:--of the art (in the narrower sense) which can be taught -and learned, and is exercised consciously and with reflection, and of -that 'poesy in Art,' the unconscious grace of genius which can neither -be handed down nor acquired, but can only be inborn by free gift of -nature. In the work thus brought to birth there is something definite, -precise, and capable of exposition in finite formulae: there is also -something which no 'prose' can ever explicate, something which tells us -of the infinite and eternal, which ever reveals and yet conceals the -Absolute and Perfect. Art, thus springing from 'imagination, the one -sole power by which we can think and conjoin even the contradictory,' -gives objectivity and outward shape to that 'intellectual intuition' by -which the philosopher subjectively (in his own consciousness) sought to -realise to himself the unity of thought and existence. - -'To the philosopher,' Schelling concludes, 'Art is supreme, because it -as it were opens to him the Holy of Holies, where in everlasting and -original unity there burns, as it were in one flame, what is parted -asunder in nature and history, and what in life and conduct, no less -than in thinking, must for ever flee apart. The view the philosopher -artificially makes for himself of nature is for Art the original and -natural. What we call nature is a poem which is locked up in strange -and secret characters. Yet could the riddle be disclosed, we should -recognise in it the Odyssey of the mind, which, strangely deceived, in -seeking itself, flees from itself: for through the sense-world there -is a glimpse, only as through words of the meaning, only as through -half-transparent mist of the land %of imagination, after which we -yearn. That splendid picture emerges, as it were, by the removal of the -invisible partition-wall which sunders the actual and the ideal world, -and is only the opening by which those figures and regions of the world -of imagination, that but imperfectly glimmer through the actual, come -forward in all their fulness. Nature is to the artist no more than -it is to the philosopher, viz. the ideal world as it appears under -constant limitations, or only the imperfect reflex of a world which -does not exist outside him, but within him.' - -'If it is Art alone, then, which can succeed in making objective -and universally accepted what the philosopher can only exhibit -subjectively, it may also be expected that philosophy, as it was in -the infancy of science born and nourished by poetry, and with it -all those sciences which were by it carried on towards perfection, -will after their completion flow back as so many single streams into -the universal ocean of poetry from which they issued. Nor is it in -general hard to say what will be the means for the return of science -to poetry: for such a means has existed in mythology before this, as -it now seems, irrevocable separation took place. But as to how a new -mythology,--which cannot be the invention of the single poet, but of -a new generation, as it were representing only a single poet,--can -itself arise, is a problem, the solution of which is to be expected -only from the future destinies of the world and the further course of -history[16].' - - -[Footnote 1: Schelling, _Werke_, iii. 13. (References always to the -first series.)] - -[Footnote 2: Schelling, _Werke,_ ii. 409.] - -[Footnote 3: Schelling, _Werke_, ii. 500.] - -[Footnote 4: Ibid. ii. 350.] - -[Footnote 5: Compare vol. ii. 360 and 429.] - -[Footnote 6: See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 424.] - -[Footnote 7: 'Every inquiry into the influence of general nature on -living beings,' says Treviranus, 'must start from the principle that -all living forms are products of physical influences which still go on -at the present time and are altered only in degree and direction.'] - -[Footnote 8: Schelling, _Werke_, iii. 63.] - -[Footnote 9: Hegel, _Encyclopaedie,_ § 249.] - -[Footnote 10: See e. g. Professor Michael Fosters article on Physiology -in the _Encyclopaedia Britannica._] - -[Footnote 11: Schelling, iii. 352, 386.] - -[Footnote 12: Ibid. iii. 427.] - -[Footnote 13: Schelling, iii. 397.] - -[Footnote 14: Schelling, iii. 600.] - -[Footnote 15: Ibid. iii. 603.] - -[Footnote 16: Schelling, iii. 628.] - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - - -TRANSITION TO HEGEL. - - -Thus far Schelling (aetat. 25) had gone in 1800. Two sides of -philosophy had been alternately presented as complementary to each -other; and now the task lay before him to publish the System itself -which formed the basis of those complementary views. To that task -Schelling set himself in 1801 (in his Journal for Speculative Physics): -but the _Darstellung meines Systems_ remained a torso. The Absolute -was abruptly 'shot from the pistol': but little followed save a -restatement in new terms of the Philosophy of Nature. Meanwhile Hegel, -who had inherited some little means by his father's death, began to -think that the hour had struck for his entrance into the literary and -philosophical arena, and wrote in the end of 1800 to Schelling asking -his aid in finding a suitable place and desirable surroundings from -which to launch himself into action. What answer or advice he received -is unknown: at any rate in the early days of 1801 he took up his -quarters at Jena, and in the autumn he gave his first lectures at the -University. Gossip suggested that Schelling, left alone (since Fichte's -departure) to sustain the onset of respectability and orthodoxy upon -the extravagances of the new Transcendentalism, had summoned his -countryman and old friend to bear a part in the fray. And the rumour -seemed to receive corroboration. The two friends issued conjointly -a _Critical Journal of Philosophy,_ which ran through two years. So -closely were the two editors associated that in one article it seems as -if the younger had supplied his more fluent pen to expound the ideas of -his senior. - -The influence of Hegel is to be seen in the _Bruno_, _or on the Divine -and Natural Principle of Things_, published in 1802. It is a dialogue, -in form closely modelled after the _Timaeus_ of Plato, dealing with the -old theme of the relation of art (poesy) and philosophy, and with the -eternal creation of the universe. It presents philosophy as a higher -than Art; for while Art achieves only an individual truth and beauty, -philosophy cognises truth and beauty in its essence and actuality -(_an und für sich_). Philosophy itself Bruno (the chief speaker of -the dialogue) does not profess to set forth, but 'only the ground and -soil on which it must be built up and carried out': and that soil -is 'the Idea of something in which all antitheses are not so much -combined, as rather one, and not so much superseded, as rather not at -all parted,'--'a unity, in which unity and antithesis, the self-similar -with the dissimilar, are one[1].' From such a standpoint it is not -wonderful that 'in the finite understanding (_Verstand,_) compared with -the supreme Idea and the way in which all things are in it, everything -seems reversed, and as if standing on its head, exactly like the things -we see mirrored on the surface of water[2].' - -This supreme Unity is essentially a trinity: an Eternal, embracing -infinite and finite; an eternal and invisible father of all things, -who, never issuing forth from his eternity, comprehends infinite and -finite in one and the same act of divine knowledge. The infinite, -again, is the Spirit, who is the unity of all things; while the finite, -though potentially equal to the infinite[3], is by its own will a God -suffering and made subject to the conditions of time[4]. This trinity -in unity (which is the Absolute) is by logic--a mere science of -understanding--rent asunder: and the one Subject-object of philosophy -becomes for reflection and understanding the three independent objects -which such a 'logical' philosophy calls respectively the Soul (erewhile -the infinite), the world (once the finite), and God (the eternal -unity). 'Opposing and separating the world of intelligence from the -world of nature, men have learned to see nature outside God, and God -outside nature, and withdrawing nature from the holy necessity, have -subordinated it to the unholy which they name mechanical, while by the -same act they have made the ideal world the scene of a lawless liberty. -At the same time as they defined nature as a merely passive entity, -they supposed they had gained the right of defining God, whom they -elevated above nature, as pure activity, utter "actuosity," as if the -one of these concepts did not stand and fall with the other, and none -had truth by itself[5].' - -The problem therefore of philosophy is on one hand to 'find the -expression for an activity which is as reposeful as the deepest repose, -for a rest which is as active as the highest activity[6].' On the -other hand; 'to find the point of unity is not the greatest thing, but -from it also to develop its opposite, this is the proper and deepest -secret of art[7].' The world as it first presents itself labours under -a radical antithesis: it offers a double face, body and soul, finite -and infinite. But to an absolute philosophy, or that high idealism -which sees all things in the light of the Eternal, the two sides are -not so separate as they first appeared. Each is also the whole and -one, but under a phase, a '_Differenz_' a preponderating aspect which -disguises the essential identity of both. Behind mind, as it were, -looms body: through body shines mind. The ideal is but a co-aspect with -the real. The difference of nature and spirit presupposes and leads -back to the indifference of the Absolute One. 'Wherever in a thing soul -and body are equated, in that thing is an imprint of the Idea, and as -the Idea in the Absolute is also itself being and essence, so in that -thing, its copy, the form is also the substance and the substance the -form[8].' - -'Thus,' so Bruno concludes, 'we shall, first in the absolute equality -of essence and form, know how both finite and infinite stream forth -from its heart, and how the one is necessarily and for ever with the -other, and comprehend how that simple ray, which issues from the -Absolute and is the very Absolute, appears parted into difference and -indifference, finite and infinite. We shall precisely define the mode -of parting and of unity for each point of the universe, and prosecute -the universe to that place where that absolute point of unity appears -parted into two relative unities. We shall recognise in the one the -source whence springs the real and naturals world; in the other, of -the ideal and divine world. With the former we shall celebrate the -incarnation of God from all eternity; with the latter the necessary -deification of man. And while we move freely and without resistance up -and down on this spiritual ladder, we shall, now, as we descend, see -the unity of the divine and natural principle parted, now, as we ascend -and again dissolve everything into one, see nature in God and God in -nature[9].' Such was the programme which Schelling offered. Hegel -accepting it,--or perhaps helping to frame it--made two not unimportant -changes. He attempted in his _Phenomenology_ to lead up step by step -to, and so warrant, that strange position of idealism u which claims to -be the image of the Absolute. He tried in his _Logic_ to give for this -point of view a systematic basis and a filling out of the bare Idea of -a Unity, neither objective nor subjective, neither form nor substance, -neither real nor ideal, but including and absorbing these. He tried, in -short, to trace in the Absolute itself the inherent difference which -issued in two different worlds, and to show its unity and identity -there. - -A _System_ of philosophy, and a philosophy of the _Absolute!_ The -project to the sober judgment of common sense stands self-condemned, -palpably beyond the tether of humanity. For if there be anything agreed -upon, it is that the knowledge of finite beings like us can never be -more than a--comparatively poor--collection of fragments, and can -never reach to that which--and such is the supposed character of the -Absolute--is utterly un-related, rank non-relativity. But in the first -place, let us not be the slaves of words, and let us not be terrified -by unfamiliar terms. After all, a System is only our old friend the -unity of knowledge, and the Absolute is not something let quite loose, -but the consummation and inter-connexion of all ties. It is no doubt -an audacious enterprise to set forth on the quest of the unity of -knowledge, and the completion of all definition and characterisation. -But, on the other hand, it may perhaps claim to be more truly modest -than the self-complacent modesty of its critics. For ordinary belief -and knowledge rest upon presuppositions which they dare not or will -not subject to revision. They too are sure that things on the whole, -or that the system of things, or that nature and history, are a realm -of uniformity, subject to unvarying law, in thorough interdependence. -They are good enough, occasionally, to urge that they hold these -beliefs on the warranty of experience, and not as, what they are -pleased to call, intuitions, _a priori_ ideas, and what not. But to -base a truth on experience is a loose manner of talking: not one whit -better than the alleged Indian foundation of the earth on the elephant, -and the elephant erected on the tortoise. For by Experience it means -experiences; and these rest one upon another, one upon another, till -at length, if this be all that holds them together, the last hangs -unsupported, (and with its superincumbent load), ready to drop in the -abyss of Nought. - -This 'transcendental,' 'absolutist,' '_a priori_' philosophy, which -stands so strange and menacing on the threshold of the nineteenth -century, is after all only, as Kant sometimes called it, an essay -to comprehend and see the true measures and dimensions of this -much-quoted Experience. All knowledge rests _in_ (not _on_) the unity -of Experience. All the several experiences rest in the totality -of one experience,--ultimate, all-embracing, absolute, infinite, -unconditioned; universal and yet individual, necessary and yet -free,--eternal, and yet filling all the nooks of time,--ideal, and yet -the mother of all reality,--unextended, and yet spread through the -spaces of the universe. Call it, if you like, the experience of the -race, but remember that that apparently more realistic and scientific -phrase connotes neither more nor less (if rightly understood) than -normal, ideal, universal, infinite, absolute experience. This is the -Unconditioned, which is the basis and the builder of all conditions: -the Absolute, which is the home and the parent of all relations. -Experience is no doubt yours and mine, but it is also much more than -either yours or mine. He who builds on and in Experience, builds on -and in the Absolute, in _the_ System--a system which is not merely -_his._ In his every utterance he claims to speak as the mouth-piece of -the Absolute, the Unconditioned; his words expect and require assent, -belief, acceptance;--they are candidates (not necessarily, or always -successful) for the rank of universal and necessary truth: they are -dogmatic assertions, and even in their humblest tones, none the less -infected with the fervour of certainty. For, indeed, otherwise, it -would be a shame and an insult to let them cross the lips. - -It is the aim of the Absolute _a priori_ philosophy to raise this -certainty to truth: or, as one may rather say, to reduce this certainty -to its kernel of truth. It seeks to determine the limits--not _of_ this -absolute and basic experience (for it has no external limits)--but -_in_ this experience: the anatomy and physiology of the Absolute,--the -correlations and inclusions, the distinctions and syntheses in the -unconditioned field. It examines the _foundation_ of all knowledge. -But--if this be the phrase--we must be on our guard against a -misapprehension of its terms. The foundations are also knowledge: -they are _in_ all knowledge and experience, its synthetic link and -its analytic distinctions. We must not shrink from paradoxes in -expression. The house of knowledge, the world of experience, is as -self-centred and self-sustaining, and even more so, than the planetary -system. It is a totality in which each part hangs upon and helps to -hold up the others, but which needs no external help, resting and yet -moving, self-poised and free. - -We may be spared, therefore, verbal criticism on the Absolute and -Unconditioned. The Absolute, and Infinite, and Eternal is no mere -negation:--the only pure negation is NOT, and even that has a flaw in -its claim. It is perfectly true--and it can only be babes and sucklings -that need to be reminded of the fact--that none of us realises and -attains the _ne plus ultra_ of knowledge and that all our systems -have their day,--have their day and cease to be. 'The coasts of the -Happy Isles of philosophy where we would fain arrive are covered only -with fragments of shattered ships, and we behold no intact vessel in -their bays[10].' So too the whole earth is full of graves; and yet -humanity lives on, charged with the attainments of the past and full -of the promise of the future. Let us by all means be critical and -not dogmatic: let us never entirely forget that each utterance, each -science, each system of ours falls short of what it wanted to be, -and for a moment at least thought it was. But let us not carry our -critical abstinence into dogmatic non-intervention: or, if so, let us -silently accept the great renunciation of all utterance henceforth. -System we all presuppose in our words and deeds, and should be much -hurt if our defect in it were seriously alleged: the Absolute we all -rest in, though amid so many self-imposed and other distractions we -feel and see it not. The philosopher proposes for his task--or rather -the philosopher is one on whom this task forces itself as for him the -one thing inevitable--to determine what is that system and what that -Absolute, or, if the phrase be preferred, the philosopher traces to its -unity, and retraces into its differences that Experience--that felt, -known, and willed synthesis of Reality,--that realised ideal world--on -which and in which we live and move. He does not make the system, nor -does he set up the Absolute. He only tries to discover the system, and -to construe the Absolute. - -It may be said that the best of philosophers can do no more than -give us _a_ System and _an_ Absolute. Undoubtedly that is so. Each -philosophy is from one point of view a strictly individualist -performance. It is not, in one way, _the_ Absolute truth, which it -promises or hopes to disclose. The truth is seen through one being's -eyes; and his 'measure,' as Protagoras might have said, is upon it. Yet -it is still _the_ Absolute, as seen through those eyes; it is still -in a marvellous measure that truth, that absolute truth, 'which the -actual generations garble.' For both the artist and the philosopher, -if they create, only re-create or imitate; if they are makers, they -are still more seers: and their power of 'imitation' and of 'vision' -rests on their capacity to de-individualise themselves of their -eccentricities and idiosyncrasies, and to bring out only that in them -which is the common truth of all essential thought and vision. In -proportion as they purge themselves of this _evil_ subjectivity are -they true artists and philosophers. They are both--and so, too, is -the religious genius--idealists: but the test of the value of their -idealism is its power of including and synthetising reality. That is -their verification: that, and not their concord with this or that -opinion, this or that theory of individuals or of groups. Not that the -views either of groups or individuals are unimportant. But often they -are but frozen lumps in the stream, temporary islands which have lost -their fluidity, and which imagine themselves continental and permanent. - -Truth, then, reasoned truth, harmonious experience, absolute system, -is the theme of philosophy. Or, in Hegelian language, its theme is -the Truth, and that Truth, God. Not alum, an aggregate, or even what -is ordinarily styled a system, of truths: but the one and yet diverse -pulse of truth, which beats through all: the supreme point of view in -which all the parts and differences, occasionally standing out as if -independent, sink into their due relation and are seen in their right -proportion. - - -[Footnote 1: Schelling, iv. 231, 235, 236.] - -[Footnote 2: Ibid. 244.] - -[Footnote 3: 'In things thou seest nought but the misplaced images of -that absolute unity; and even in knowledge, so far as it is a relative -unity, thou seest nought but an image--only drawn amiss in another -direction--of that absolute cognition, in which being is as little -determined by thought as thought by being.'] - -[Footnote 4: Schelling, iv. 252. See further, iv. 327: 'The pure -subject, that absolute knowledge, the absolute Ego, the form of all -forms, is the only-begotten Son of the Absolute, equally eternal with -him, not diverse from his Essence, but one with it.'] - -[Footnote 5: Schelling, iv. 306. Cp. for actuosity, notes in vol. ii. -396. Spinoza, Cogit. Met. ii. 11, speaks of the actuosa essentia of -God.] - -[Footnote 6: Schelling, iv. 305.] - -[Footnote 7: Ibid. iv. 328.] - -[Footnote 8: Ibid. iv. 306.] - -[Footnote 9: Schelling, iv. 328.] - -[Footnote 10: Hegel, Werke, i. 166.] - - - - -PROLEGOMENA - -BOOK II - -_IN THE PORCHES OF PHILOSOPHY_ - - - - -CHAPTER XV. - - -THE TWO AGES OF REASON. - - -The eighteenth century--it has been often said--was a rationalising, -unhistorical, age: and, in contrast, the nineteenth has been declared -to be _par excellence_ the founder and the patron of the historical -method. In the one, the tendency governing the main movement of -European civilisation was towards cosmopolitan and universal -enlightenment. A common ideal, and, because common, necessarily rather -general and abstract, perhaps even somewhat vulgarly utilitarian, -pervaded Western Europe, and threw its influence for good and evil -on literature and art, on religion and polity. It grew out of a -revulsion, in many ways natural, from the religious extravagances -of the century-and-a-half preceding, which had led prudent thinkers -to reduce religion to a 'reasonable' minimum, and to reject all -things that savoured of or suggested enthusiasm, fanaticism, and -superstition. In politics the same one type or system of government -and laws was aimed at, more or less, in all advancing states. National -peculiarities and patriotism were looked at askance, as unworthy of -the free 'humanity' which was set forward as the end of all training. -To simplify, to level, to render intelligible, and self-consistent was -the task of enlightenment in dealing with all institutions. To remove -all anomalies and inequalities, to give security for liberty and to -facilitate the right to pursue happiness[1], was the chief watchword -of this movement. Its questions were--Is religion, Is art and science, -Is political organisation, a source of happiness? Are poetry, and a -belief in divine things, and abstruse knowledge, upon the whole for -human advantage and benefit? Only such civilisation can be justified -as, taken all in all, is a blessing; if not (cried some) we may as well -cling to the happiness of the barbarian. - -That these are important questions, and that the purposes -above-mentioned are in many ways good, is clear. But before we can -answer the questions, or decide as to the feasibility of the aims, -there are some things to be brought and to be kept in view. And these -things were not as a rule brought and kept in view. It was assumed that -the standard of adjudication was found in the averagely educated and -generally cultured individual among the class of more or less 'advanced -thinkers' who asked the questions and set up the aims. That class, -already denationalised by function, forming a commonwealth or rather a -friendly fraternity throughout the capitals of Europe, had cut itself -off from the narrower and the deeper sympathies of the national life. -Forming a sort of mean or middle stratum in the social organisation, -they tended to ignore or despise equally the depths below them and -the heights above. They took themselves as the types of humanity, and -what _their_ understandings found acceptable they dubbed rational: all -else was a survival from the ages of darkness. They forgot utterly -that they were only a part, a class, a member in the social body: -and that they could only be and do what they were and did, because -what they were not and did not do was otherwise supplied. It takes -all sorts of people to make a world: but each class--and the order of -literature and intelligence is no exception--tends to set itself up as -the corner-stone (if not something more) of the social edifice. What is -more: in such a loose aggregate as the intelligent upper-middle class, -the individual tends more and more to count as something, detached and -by himself, to be an equal and free unit of judgment and choice, to be -emancipated from all the bonds which hold in close affinity members -of a group whose functions are unlike each other's, and yet decidedly -complementary. Such a class, again--though there are of course -conspicuous exceptions--is, by the stress of special interests, removed -from direct contact with nature and reality, and lives what in the main -may be styled an artificial life. - -When such a class asked what were the benefits of art or religion, -it thought first of itself; and it looked upon art and religion--and -the same would be true of philosophy and science, or of political -sanctions--as _merely_ objective and outward entities, foreign to the -individual, yet by some mechanical influences brought into connexion -with him,--as one might apply to him a drug or a viand. But clearly -to a person of practical aims, bent on conveying information and -enlightenment, bent on making all men as like each other as possible -in the medium range of cultivation which he thinks desirable, the -utility of some of these things is questionable and limited. It is -only a little modicum of religion, of art and of science, which can be -justified by its obvious pleasure-giving power; and it is easy to point -the thesis against enthusiasm in these regions, by reference to the -disastrous wars fanned by religion, to the license that has followed -the steps of art, and to the lives wasted in the zeal for increasing -knowledge. In his ideal of human life such a practical reformer -will tend to suppress all that bears too clear a trace of natural, -infra-rational, non-intelligent kindred,--all that ties us too closely -to mother earth and universal nature. - -But if this was the dominant tone of the literary teachers who had -chief audience from the public ear, there was no lack of dissentient -voices who appealed to nature, who loved the past, who set sentiment -and imagination above intellect, and who never bowed the knee to -the great idols of enlightened middle-class utilitarianism. Even -in the leaders of the enlightening host--amongst the chiefs of the -_Aufklärung_--there is a breadth and a depth of human interest which -sets them far above their average followers, and which should prevent -us from joining without discrimination in the depreciatory judgments -so often passed on the eighteenth century. The pioneers in the great -emancipatory movement of modern times should not be allowed to suffer -from the exaggerations and haste of their more vulgar imitators--still -less refused the meed of gratitude we owe them. But when their ideas -were violently translated into reality, when the levelling, unshackling -process was set at work by vulgar hands, the shortcomings of their -theories were made to show even greater than they were: and inevitable -reaction set in. Even the revolutionist himself has come to admit that -fraternity at that time came badly off in comparison with liberty and -equality[2]. But these drawbacks were accentuated when the cosmopolitan -reform-movement, by its haste and intolerance, awakened the spirit -of national jealousy. The deeper instincts of life rose in protest -against the supposed superiority of intellect: the heart claimed its -rights against the head: the man of nature and feeling was roused up to -meet the man of reasoning and criticism. The spirit of war evoked those -energies of human nature--some of them not its least valuable--which -had slumbered in times of easy-going peace. The days of adversity and -humiliation taught men that the march of literary culture is not the -all-in-all of life and history. - -It was made apparent, practically at least, that intelligence, with -its hard and fast formulae, its logical principles, its keen analysis, -was not deep enough or wide enough to justify its claim to the august -title of reason. To be reasonable implies a more comprehensive, -patient, many-sided observation than is necessary to prove the claim -to mere intelligence. To be intelligent is to seize the right means -to execute a given or accepted end--it is to be quick and correct in -the practice of life, to carry out in detail what has been determined -on in general. Understanding plays upon the surface of life and deals -with the momentary case: and its greatest praise is to be fleet in -the application of principles, apt to detect the point on which to -direct action, correct in its estimate of means to ends. Clearsighted, -prudent, and direct, it is the supreme virtue in a given sphere: but -the sphere must be given, and its end constituted in the measured round -of practical life, its system complete: or, understanding is bewildered -before a hopeless puzzle. Understanding is--the improvident cynic might -say--a certain animal-like sagacity--(such cynical philosophers were -perhaps Hobbes and Schopenhauer[3])--a mere power of carrying out a -given rule in a new but similar case, and of doing so, perhaps, through -a long chain of intermediate links and means. - -But there are more things in heaven and earth than are heard of in -the philosophy of the logical intellect. The _subtilitas naturae_[4] -far surpasses the refinements of the practical intellect: and if the -latter is ever to overcome or be equal to the former, it must, so to -speak, wait patiently upon it, as a handmaiden upon the hands of her -mistress. Such a trained and disciplined intellect which has conquered -nature by obedience is what the philosophers at the beginning of this -century called _reason_[5]. It is in life as much as in our mind. It -comes not by self-assertion, by the attempt to force our ends and -views on nature, but by feeling and thinking ourselves in and along -with nature. Or, briefly, it breaks down the middle wall of partition -by which man had treated nature as a mere world of _objects_--things -to be used and to minister to his pleasure--but always alien to him, -always mere matter to be manipulated _ab extra._ Yet even to get full -use and enjoyment out of a thing it is well to be in closer community -with it, and on terms of friendly acquaintance. The function of this -fuller reason cannot be performed without something analogous to -sympathy and imagination. Sympathy, which realises the inner unity -of the so-called 'thing' with ourselves: imagination, which sets it -in the full circumstances of those relationships which the practical -intelligence is inclined to abstract from and to neglect. Yet only -something _analogous_ to sympathy and imagination: if, as may well be -the case, we attach to these terms any association of irregular or mere -emotional operation. The imagination in question is the 'scientific' -imagination--the power of wide large vision which sets the object fully -in reality, and is not content with a mere name or abstract face of a -fact--a name which represents a fact no doubt, but represents it, as -many such 'agents' or deputies do, in a hard and wooden spirit. The -sympathy in question is the transcending of the antithesis between -subjective and objective; not a fantastic or fortuitous choice of one -or a few out of many on whom to lavish locked-up stores of affection, -but the full recognition of unity as pervading differences, and -reducing them to no more than aspects in correlation. - -What has been said of sympathy and imagination, as the allies and -ministers of reason, might be extended and applied to humour, -to wit, to irony. These also it may be said--and with the same -qualifications--are essential to a philosopher in the highest -sense. The humour, viz., which strides over the barriers set up by -institution and convention between the high and the humble, and -sees man's superficial distinctions overpowered by a half-grim, -half-jubilant _Ananke_,--which notes how human proposal is overcome, -not without grace, by divine and natural disposal, how the deep inner -identity in all estates breaks triumphantly through the fences of -custom and deliberate intention. The wit, which upsets the hardened -fixity of classes and groups, flits from one to another, shows -glimpses of affinity between remote provinces of idea, and all this, -without laboured and artificial search for analogies, though to the -slower-following practical mind, hampered by its solid limits, these -leaps from province to province seem paradoxical and whimsical. -The irony, which notes the tragicomedy of life under its apparent -regularity of prose,--which detects the vanity of all efforts to check -the flux of vitality and make the volatile permanent; which contrasts -the apparent with the real, the obviously and officiously meant with -the truly desired and willed, and shows how diplomatically-close design -is dissipated in a jest, or the soul bent on many years of enjoyment -is plunged into torment. Thus, in a way, imagination, sympathy, wit, -humour, irony and paradox are elements that go to the making of a -philosopher: but in the serenity of reasoned wisdom they lose their -frolicsome and fantastic mood, and fill their minor place with sober -cheer. Wedded to the lord of wisdom, the Muse of poesy and wit loses -her sprightly laugh and her dancing step, becoming a subdued, yet -gracious matron, who, with her offspring, sheds gleams of brightness -and warmth and colour in the somewhat austere household. Yet still the -free maiden of poesy, in the open fields where the shadow of reflective -thought has not yet fallen, has the greater charm; and a certain -jealousy not unfrequently reigns between the married sister and the -virgin yet untamed. - -But though poetry and the allied arts of words were very helpful to -philosophy--witness the services which, though in widely different -ways, Goethe and Schiller rendered to the higher thinking of -Germany--even more stimulative and fruitful was the research into -nature and history. Nature _and_ history: but they lie closer together -than the conjunction suggests. It is true that in recent times we have -been forcibly taught to separate civil from natural history, if we have -not even been further taught that the latter is an improper application -of the term. But when Aristotle said that 'Poetry is more philosophical -than History' he was probably not restricting his remark to the story -of nations and states; even as when Bacon set history as the field -of memory beside the fields of imagination and reasoning, he was not -solely referring to the records of the human past. The distinction -between natural and civil history is no doubt for practical education -a distinction of supreme importance. But it is so, because in this -scholastic phase the conception of both, under these comprehensive -names, was superficial and abstract. Natural history meant only the -classificatory description of animals, plants, and minerals: civil -history the tale composed to string together the succession of human -actions on the public and national field of life. - -We have seen in an earlier chapter the advances which Lessing, Kant, -and above all Herder, made in this direction[6]. Emphasising in their -several ways the great dictum of Spinoza that human passions, and the -whole scheme of human life, are _res naturales, quae communes naturae -leges sequuntur_, they gave to history a higher, more philosophical, -more scientific scope than what the name used to connote. Neither in -Spinoza himself, nor in these his followers, did this insistence on -the unity of nature at all lead them to neglect the difference--almost -equivalent, it may be said, in the end to an _Imperium in imperio_--by -which rational man marks himself off to a special kindred with the -divine[7]. We have seen too what Schelling did to show that history, if -in one aspect it be the product of free human volitions, is, in another -and as he thought a superior aspect, the realm subject to a divine or -natural necessity. The whole tendency of this epoch of thought--the -tendency which entitles it above all to the name of speculative--is its -impulse to over-ride this distinction between Nature and History; to -over-ride it, however, not in the sense of simply ignoring or denying -it, but of carrying it up into a unity which would do justice to both, -without exclusively favouring either, and hardly without clipping -both of any extravagant claims. The distinction remains,--no longer -an abrupt division, but now tempered and mellowed by the presence of -a paramount unity. Nature now has a real history: no longer a mere -factitious aggregate of classified facts, it is the phenomenon of -a 'latent process,' due to a 'latent schematism,' and a 'form' or -principle of organisation. Classification does not cease: but it ceases -to be an end in itself, and becomes only subordinate or auxiliary to a -higher scientific end. The main theme is to construe the complete cycle -of life-change and the complete organisation of life-state from the -evidence pieced out and put together from the various orders, classes, -and species of living creatures. And on the other side the mere tale -or narrative of history, with its gossip of personalities, and its -accidents of war and intrigue, tends to become insignificant in the -presence of the great popular life, in its deep and subtle connexion -with agencies of nature hitherto unsurmised, in its dependence upon -necessities and uniformities which envelope or rather permeate and -constitute the human will. It is not indeed that the force of great -personalities has come to be treated as a quantity we may neglect. The -force of the great leader, of the genius, of the hero, is not less -admirable to the wise philosophical historian to-day than it ever was -to his story-telling predecessor. But he flatters himself that he -understands better, and can better take account of, the conditions -which make the genius and the hero possible. Achilles still counts for -more than a thousand common soldiers, and Homer himself is not merely -the composite image by which a long tradition has fused into a dim -pictorial unity the countless bards who sang for ages on the isles of -Greece and the coasts of Ionia. Yet we feel sure that Achilles did -what he did, because of the race he sprang from, the inspiration he -felt around him, the companionship in body and spirit of his peers. We -feel that the hero derives his strength from earth and air, from the -spiritual and material substance in which he draws his breath. True, -we cannot explain him, as if he and his heroisms were a mere product -of mathematical and mechanical forces. But where we once recognise -that behind the single visible deed and agent there is a spiritual -nature--an underlying agency--which, unperceived, keeps the hearth-fire -of public life burning in the celestial temple of Vesta, we can at -least see that though genius is a marvel and a mystery, yet it is -according to law, and no mere will-o'-the-wisp. - -But when we say that the actions and sayings even of the foremost -individuals are to be comprehended only in the light of universal -forces and laws, there is an error which is only too ready to -substitute itself for the truth. It soon appears for example that, -among the general causes which control the development of civilisation -and the acts of individuals, the economical condition is of great and -prominent effect. And, above all, it is easily measurable, and subject -to palpable standards (such as statistics of exports and imports, -&c.). It was natural therefore that a school of historico-social -philosophers should arise who maintained that the economical state of -a given society was the fundamental principle or form of its life, -of which all other phases of its civilisation, religious, aesthetic, -&c., were only variable dependent functions. This view, which comes -out in the socialist theory of Marx, is clearly the exaggeration or -abstract statement of a partial truth into a pseudo-complete theory. -The truth is one which found expression as early as Plato. It is this: -that in the economical system of a society we find the first and -somewhat external or mechanical suggestion of the organism to which -the state is yet to grow. In the economic law of reciprocity there is -a 'certain faint image' of the principle of social organisation or -political life. But when we go beyond, and interpret this first phase -to mean the original foundation, we are stating a figment which has a -plausibility only when by the economic state we mean a great deal more -than abstractly economic facts include. And this again arises because -it is really impossible to carry out thoroughly the abstraction of one -aspect of social life from the others. There are no purely economic -facts which are independent of other social influences,--of ideals, e. -g. moral or aesthetic,--ideals which nobody would call economic, though -they never quite part company from economical conditions. - -So again there is occasionally a tendency to magnify the influence of -what in the narrowest sense may be termed political systems. Forms -of government, and titles of sovereignty are regarded as forces to -which individuals--even the highest--must bow. But here again the -exaggeration of a principle need not tempt us to rush with Tom Paine -into the opposite extravagance that government and state-power are -superfluities, or quasi-ornamental additions to a social fabric, which -can do without them and, like other beasts of low organisation, can, -when shorn of them, reproduce them with ease. And thus though we may -dissent from the view that laws and constitutions are omnipotent, we -may admit that in them the central unity and controlling principle of -social life finds its dominant expression in great outlines. We shall -not agree with him who said 'Let who will make the laws of a nation -if I may make its ballads': because we know that the nation will in -the end have the chief voice in determining what are to be its ballads -no less than its laws. We shall not quite accept the dictum that the -intellectual class which formulates ideas and sets up programmes of -ideals gives the real lead to the process of civilisation; for we shall -remember that real ideas are not formed by individuals, but are the -slow work of concrete experience in the so-called inorganic masses, -finding at length utterance through the lips of those appointed to that -end by the natural and divine order. Yet we shall, on the other hand, -see that the high things of the world are dependent on the lowly: that -a song-maker is sometimes not less potent than a legislature: that -pecuniary conditions are effective in the sanctuaries of religion and -the high places of art: and that the noblest ideas of great thinkers -draw their strength and life through roots that run unseen through very -humble ground. - -_La Raison_, says Leibniz, _est l'enchainement des vérités._[8] Truth -linked into truth, and so made truer: truth, with which all things -harmonise and nothing cries dissent: truth, which is neither the -prerogative of the mere _demos_, nor of the intellectual aristocracy, -but of that rarer unity which, when they can exercise several and -mutually-tendered self-abnegation, is the real spirit of both: truth, -thus conceived, is that king of life, that sun of Reason which lighteth -every man. Truth--to use again the language of Leibniz,--which is not -merely the aggregate of monads,--but the monad of monads, their mutual -penetration and corrective completion, in that Idea-reality where they -retain their individuality, but retain it in the fullness and fruition -of the absolute which each essentially or implicitly is. This kingdom -of suffering and yet triumphant truth is the true age of Reason--not -outwardly-critical, individualistically-reforming, mere intellectual -and abstract intelligence,--but intelligence, charged with emotion, -full of reverence, reverent above all to the majesty of that divinity -which, much disguised, and weather-beaten, like Glaucus of the sea, -resides in common and natural humanity. This is the Reason of German -idealism at the commencement of the century. To the clear-cut dogmas of -the abstract intellect it savours of mysticism. If it is friendly to -distinctions and constantly makes them, it is the pronounced enemy of -hard and fast separations. Begin where you like, the reason of things, -if you allow it to work, carries you round till you also see identity -where you only saw difference, or effects where you only looked for -causes. You begin, as the inductive logician, with the belief that -the process is from the known to the unknown. You start with your -basis of fact, as you called it. The nemesis of things forces you -to admit that your facts were partly fictions which waited for the -unknown to give them a truer and fuller reality. You talk at first of -induction, as if it were a single and simple process, which out of -facts builds up generalities and uniformities. You learn as you go on -that the only induction that operates, except in cases which have been -artificially simplified by supposing half the task done before you -apply your experimental methods, is an induction of which the major -part is deductive, and where your conclusion will be recurrently made -your premiss. Your induction only works on the basis of a hypothesis, -and must itself be linked in the 'concatenation of truths,'--a -concatenation which is also a criticism and a correction. - - -[Footnote 1: 'We hold,' says the American Declaration of Independence -(1776), 'these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created -equal: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable -rights: that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of -happiness,' &c.] - -[Footnote 2: Louis Blanc, _History of the Revolution_, vol. i.] - -[Footnote 3: Hobbes, _Leviathan_, Part I. chaps. 2 and 3; and -elsewhere. Schopenhauer, _Welt als Wille_, Book I. § 6.] - -[Footnote 4: Bacon, _Novum Organum_, i. 10.] - -[Footnote 5: See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 400.] - -[Footnote 6: See Chapter XII.] - -[Footnote 7: Cf. _Ethica,_ iv. 37, Schol. I. contrasting _rerum -externarum communis constitutio_ with _ipsa hominis natura, in se sola -considerata._] - -[Footnote 8: See the _Discours préliminaire_ to the _Theodicee_.] - - - - -CHAPTER XVI. - - -THE NEW IDEALISM. - - -This new idealism which conjures by the name of Reason is a different -thing from the pseudo-idealism of Jacobi, as it is from the -'rationalism,' so-called, of the mere intellectualist. Its ideal is not -a desperate refuge from the hard and bitter reality, only to be reached -by the plunge of faith,--which seems rather the leap of despair: not -a _mere_ other-world,--always _other_, longed for, presaged, beheld -in dreamy vision, but unperceived by the clear light of intelligence: -clutched at, but elusive of every effort. It is not won by turning -the back on reality and flying on the wings of morning faith to the -better land and the presence of the divine: but by persistence in -unfolding, expanding, adjusting, re-combining, and fortifying those -partial glimpses of the unseen which occur in every vision of the seen. -It is true the ideal is, in a way, always an other world: but not a -_mere_ other world; it is another, and yet not another, but the same, -seen, if you like to say, transfigured, idealised. But idealisation, -if so applied, means not an addition here and a subtraction there -made in reality, from some source outside--from some indeterminable -Whence (Whence indeed should such additions come?). It does not mean -a correction of faults and failures in the real, at the will of an -artist who is dissatisfied with his subject-model and would mend it -out of other faces and forms stored up in memory or sketch-book. -This idealism does not in that sense idealise (so as to falsify). It -means complete reality; absolute, systematic, unconditioned reality: -nowhere fragmentary, nowhere referring outside, but completing itself -in all its members. It means--to quote the Hegelian term--seeing all -things in the Idea--their notion (or ideality), i. e. their unifying -'grip,' reflecting itself in their objectivity, and their reality -completing itself in art, religion, and philosophy to that ideal which -to the non-artistic, non-religious, non-philosophic mood is only dimly -suggested and partially supposed. Still less is it an idealism which, -as popularly understood, turns reality and historic fact into _mere_ -ideas. - -But, as perhaps may have been apparent, to call this way of thought -idealism need not keep us from acknowledging that the same philosophy -is also realism. If it insists, so to say, on the idealism of--what -we sometimes call material--nature, it no less insists on the realism -of--what is supposed immaterial--mind. The mental or spiritual world -loses its unsubstantial intangibleness, its mere supposedness, its -'ideal' or _merely_-ideal character. To the older, and we may say -vulgar, view the mind or soul was a mere 'thought,' something of -which all that could be seen were certain acts or phenomena. It was -a _mere idea_, which one could pretty well get on without--so long -as he kept, as the phrase was, to the phenomena--phenomena without -reality. How vague and aery again was the subject-matter of morals! A -few virtues and vices, confessedly general descriptive titles, a talk -about will and conscience,--all of them merely several predicates of an -unknown, spoken of, postulated, but unproducible. Compared with this -mere supposedness the spiritual world in Schelling and Hegel acquires -the reality of a quasi-organism (really supra-organic), growing -and constituting itself, and making room in it for a host of human -relationships. The abstract faculties of mind get reality (not indeed -sensible): the intangible notions of morals become almost palpable: the -kingdom of mind becomes a real pendant to the kingdom of nature. And, -on the other hand, the kingdom of nature gets its ideality recognised: -its unity and continuity made effective in an Idea which embraces, -co-ordinated and systematised, its disparate and unconnected portions. - -This new Idealism, if it led men back from the historical world to -nature, was yet hardly in all respects a pupil of Rousseau. Not 'Back -from civilisation and artificiality to nature and the freedom of the -woodland,' was its cry: but rather 'Remember that man always rests -on and grows out of nature, always has his ideals made directly or -indirectly visible in physical (sensible) structures; and that, when -culture turns away from sense and nature to some supposed higher, it is -really entering on a path which leads to abysses,' Its voice, in fact, -was much like the longing expressed in Schiller's _Gods of Greece;_ -it wished man more godlike and the divine more human. But instead of -backward,--its motto was forward: or back to nature, only to resume the -true starting-point, and retreat from a path of civilisation whose end -is perdition. Man also was nature[1]--if he is never _mere_ nature, i. -e. the nature unexalted to its truth--but he brought to expression, -and might bring to ever clearer and fuller expression, a something -which was in infra-human nature, but which nature elsewhere had -failed adequately to present. Thus the relation of Man to Nature was -apparently twofold. On one hand, the physical world was essentially a -world of reason and intelligence--though of intelligence petrified[2]. -So far Hegel agreed with Schelling. But, on the other hand (and here -Hegel took up the great paradox of Fichte), man's place in the universe -is to fulfil the promise and implication of Nature to the full reality -of Spirit, to fulfil it by law and morality; but (here he completes -Fichte by the help of Schelling) also in higher measure, by art, -religion, and science. The world of intelligence and reason which man -constructs as an ethical, artistic, and religious being, is the full -truth of the natural world,--the higher meaning, and fuller, more -consistent, and complete reality of the sensible: and it is so, because -the lord of Nature is one with the lord of the human soul. The new way -of philosophy therefore, if it could be ever charged with saying that -the so-called real things of ordinary life were only ideas, or mental -images, meant that, as taken by the unthinking or imperfectly thinking -perception, they were something of which all that could be said was to -describe their relations to something else, of which in turn the same -remark might be made; so that--as far as they went--reality was never -with us, but only an assurance (soon to be proved vain) that it was -next door[3]. On the contrary--in _its_ use of the term Idea--what this -idealism asserted rather was that the objects of Nature in their _prima -facie_ apprehension were not yet an Idea: if, i.e., an Idea is a mental -or spiritual reality which explains and completes itself, instead of -sending us on endless fool's errands elsewhere--, is a concept which -is exactly adequate to reality, and has gathered in it the power of -reality. - -The new idealism is not subversive of realism, but includes it and -makes it the reality it professed to be. It may therefore, as Schelling -proposed[4], be called an ideal-realism, or a real-idealism. If any -body likes, he may even, if he is no Greek scholar, call it Monism; -but in that case he had better begin by admitting to himself that any -Monism, which can stand its ground and serve for an explanation of the -universe, will not exclude Dualism. All is indeed one life, one being, -one thought; but a life, a being, a thought, which only exists as it -opposes itself within itself, sets itself apart from itself, projects -its meaning and relations outwards and upwards, and yet retains and -carries out the power of reuniting itself. The Absolute may be called -One: but it is also the All; it is a One which makes and overcomes -difference: it is, and it essentially is, in the antithesis of Nature -and Spirit, Object and Subject, Matter and Mind; but under and over the -antithesis it is fundamental and completed unity. Monism, literally -understood, is absurd--for it ignores, what cannot be ignored, the -many: and Dualism, which is offered sometimes as a competitive scheme, -is not much better; unless we understand the Dualism to be no fixed -bisection, but an ever-appearing and ever-superseded antithesis which -is the witness to the power and the freedom of the One,--which is not -alone, but One and All, One in All, and All in One. - -The central or cardinal point of Idealism is its refusal to be kept -standing at a fixed disruption between Subject and Object, between -Spirit and Nature. Its _Idea_ is the identity or unity (not without the -difference) of both. In its purely logical or epistemological aspect -one can easily see that, as Schopenhauer was so fond of repeating, -There is no Object without a Subject and no Subject without an -Object[5]. The difficulty arises in remembering these excellent truisms -when one of the correlatives is out of sight, and the other seems -to be independent and to come before us with a title to recognition -apparently all its own. When the Subject figures as the individual -consciousness, encased, it may perhaps be added, in an individual body, -and the Object as a thing apparently out there in a world beyond all -by itself, then the lapse from this rudimentary idealism becomes easy. -In the practice of life and business, each of us, self-conscious and -autonomous _subject_ as he may be, comes to rank in the estimate of -others, and ere long to some extent in his own, as also a part of the -aggregate of objects. All reality and substance seem as it were to -slide over into the object-side. The conscious subject counts as a mere -onlooker or the passive spectator of a performance that goes on in an -outside field of event,--yet that outside is his own object-mind; his -mind counts as a mere idea, or rather as a succession of ideas, i. e. -of mental pictures with a certain meaning in them. A little step more -and the very subject-mind itself is turned into an object. There stands -indeed--according to the ordinary introspective psychology--as it -were in one corner, or at one loop-hole of vision, a mind looking on, -observing and criticising another thing which is also called a mind; -but the mind observing can only reflect or register, and the mind which -is observed is very much thing-like, apparently acted upon by other -things, and acting upon them in turn. This object-mind, a real among -other reals, in relations of cause and effect with them, does not, -if we can trust the _words_ of those who tell about it, see itself, -but lies open to the inspection of this other mind, represented by the -psychological observer, who is good enough to report to us something -of its blind and dark estate. Its re-actions, he informs us, exhibit a -remarkable peculiarity. They are equivalent to states of consciousness: -and even to acts of will and knowledge. As when a violin is touched in -certain ways by the bow, you get a musical note, so when certain agents -come in contact with this peculiar real, they elicit a re-action, -termed sense or idea. - -To distinguish in this manner between mental passivity and activity is -natural and right. The basis of all consciousness and mental activity -is an original division, a 'judgment' or dijudication of self from -self. But, once the dijudication made for such ends, it is a mistake -to forget its initiation and lose sight entirely of the fact that -the observing mind is also the active, and that the object-self is -not merely in relation to the subject-self, but in a higher unity is -identifiable therewith. Still the thing is done, habitually done. We -all profess this faith of ordinary realism in our first reflections -upon ourselves. And the effect of the oblivion is that we seek -elsewhere for the initial activity, which we have abstracted from and -lost sight of. The receptive passive mind,--called subject still, but -now become a subject in the sense of the anatomist,--has to be set in -motion, to be impinged upon or impressed. The psychical event which you -_call_ knowledge, and which no doubt _means_ knowledge,--the mental -'state' which you observe--or, it may even, if your authority is a -particularly obstinate and _intransigcant_ realist, be the molecular -change in brain cells,--requires an antecedent event to account for -it. The origin of the movement which issued in the given psychical -or molecular change is sought in a self-subsistent thing which _out -there_ gives rise to a series of movements which _in here_ result -in a sensation. Or, a thing somehow produces an attenuated image of -itself in the brain, or in the mind; for, in this mythological tale -of psychical occurrence, accuracy is unattainable, and one must not -seek to be too precise. In any case the relationship between thing -and idea is conceived after the analogy of the nexus of cause and -effect, or original and copy; and the verbal imagination of the -analogical reasoner is satisfied. What Hegel, after Schelling, teaches, -on the other side, is that the process of sense-impression and the -manipulations to which it is subjected by intellect presuppose, for -their existence and their objective truth, a Reason which is the unity -of subject and object, an original identity uniting knowledge to being. - -But the same defect of unphilosophic consciousness has another -phase which philosophy has to remember. Popular language speaks of -_things_,--of things here and things there, which act upon each other -and upon the so-called mind: i. e. on this imagined and supposed -passive mind. For things, a more 'scientific' conception has been -substituted--that of _forces_; which, whether attached to atoms or not, -are asserted to be the real sources of the change and event which fill -the world of our experience. And as, according to some psychologists, -the mind is only a vacant ground or space with more or less narrow -limits of room, on which the entities called ideas are for that reason -forced into more or less close relationships, without any nearer or -more essential tie; so, too, the mind is apt to be treated by others -only as a battle-field or wrestling-ground of opposing forces. Here -the atom-forces, as in the other case the atom-ideas, are, it is -assumed, merely and purely independent: and yet such is the force of -a limited environment--shall we say, in more popular language, the -force of space and time?--that they must meet with one another, must, -as it were, form associations, connexions, relationships. Great, -verily, is the force of juxtaposition. Space and time, because they are -essentially limiting, correlating, defining, weld links which the great -prophet of this empirical school has not scrupled to call insoluble, -ineradicable, inseparable. Space and time, says his great successor, -are infinite. But they are infinite only in the sense that they can -never be exhausted: they are everywhere, and for ever: but as real they -are only here and now. Time can precede time, and space fade away into -remoter space: but every space and every time is finite, defining, -limiting, relative, and synthetic. And, if we look closer, space and -time may come to seem the visible, ghostly, abstract outline--on one -hand stiffening and bodying-out the ideal synthesis of thought and -intelligence, on the other, faintly reproducing or fore-casting the -real synthesis of organisation and living nature. - -In saying this we give the reasonable interpretation of -'association':--so far at least as association is supposed to be -brought about by juxtaposition in time and space. Time and space, as -Kant might say, give the schema--the sensible and visible reflex of the -eternal and universal thought-relation: they are _a priori_ because -they are in the physical world the _primitive_, the first phase and the -lowest manifestation of that unity which as we know it in nature and -mind always blends with sense, or displays itself in sensible forms. -They are the first stamp of reality, of real Nature: with them we are -in Nature, but it is an abstract shadowy nature. They mark the ascent -(which only from the mere logician's standpoint shall we call the -descent) of the abstract (pure) idea into the element of multiplicity, -of opposition, of life and consciousness. In the psychical and -intellectual world, again, as it rises to more perfect ideality (as it -elicits more _meaning_ from crude _fact_) they lose their prominence; -they sink into the powers of memory and imagination, which build up -past and future into the unity of the ever present, until in their -consummation they leave as their residual product the abstract element -of pure thought: a thought which claims the attributes of universality -and eternity, which claims, i. e., to merge or submerge in it all space -and all time[6]. - -It is evident therefore that if an associationist theory, like that of -Hume, proposes to explain the actual field of mental life by elements -given in it, and by no other, it can only do so on certain assumptions, -which may be summed up in the proposition that the mind--the real -mental space and time even (and not its supposed 'image')--is at once -subjective and objective, at once real and ideal, at once the field -of operation, the force which directs operations, and the mind which -is aware of itself and its acts. To say, as Hume appears to do, that -an unintermittent long-established custom breeds _in us_ certain -irresistible and essential habits of thought, can only refer to an -unexplained and unnoticed duplication of the self. There is here, one -self, which is only a bundle of fragments, of ideas intrinsically -separate and only incidentally connected by outside pressure, which -enter into ties, peradventure necessary or indissoluble, though not -due to inner affinity. And there is another self which is a self-same -unity, dividing and growing, or assimilating, acted upon but only -because it solicits action, and in a way controlling the process going -on within it. The difficulty for the investigator is to realise that -these two selves are one. No amount of ingenuity will ever succeed in -honestly showing unity to be the mere resultant--even should it be -a fictitious or phenomenal unity--of the collisions and fortuitous -attachments or detachments of different and independent reals. The -reals which behave in such a way as to engender unities, to cause -syntheses, are reals in a mind; and the mind must not merely, as it -were, flow around them, but have them fluid members of itself. If they -are reals, they are ideal-reals. You must begin with an ideal-unity -which is also a real-unity, in which variety can play and by which it -is controlled. - -'Forces,' no less than 'things,' are terms of thought, names of reality -indeed, but inadequate because due to an abstraction and leaving -their correlatives out of sight--names of momentary elements seized -in the flux, and made with more or less success to indicate 'moments' -and 'factors' or 'aspects' in the total sum and power of reality. -Explanation by permanent and separate forces labours under the same -disadvantages as that by things. Science, grown more self-critical, -begins to see that in forces, &c., it has names and formulae which -are not the full reality, but only useful (_if_ useful) abstractions. -Neither things nor forces, though called real, are so in the full -sense. Hume said,--and said not untruly, though with some relish of -paradox,--that we never had any real impression or idea of power -and force. The statement should be taken along with another that -what we mistake for power in things is only our own want of power to -overcome a suggested association, or to break a customary train of -ideas. Lotze, again, has remarked that the supposed consciousness of -power exerted in voluntary movement is confused with a feeling of -work done, or inertia overcome. Whatever may be the truth about the -psychological experience, there can be no doubt for the epistemologist -that the so-called perception of force is an interpretation of one -aspect of experience which, with a certain amount of arbitrary arrest -and simplification, renders it intelligible and real by means of an -antithesis and correlation. Force in fact only exists, or arises, in -relation or opposition to a counter-force: action and re-action are -always equal and opposite, says the mathematical formula. Two forces -are as little independent as an up and a down, or as a west and a -north; force solicits force, and force only _is_ in so far as it is -solicited. The soliciting can only solicit because it is solicited. -In other words, it is not enough to say that the forces which thus -confront each other are correlatives. The relationship must be carried -up a stage higher: the forces themselves get their pseudo-real -character, only so long as they are kept apart forcibly or by inertia. -Carry out their implications: and they re-unite (not however to the -loss of all distinction) in a higher idea, an intelligible unity which, -by its division and return to unity, makes possible and real their -contention. It is this carrying-out of implications to their explicit -truth which is at the root of Schopenhauer's playing fast and loose -with the distinction between force and will. But with him the two terms -are taken up vague and indefinite, in the haze of popular conception or -want of conception, and are without effort or justification identified: -whereas in Hegel, there is, on the lowest estimate, an _attempt_ made -to trace the somewhat intricate steps which mediate the metamorphosis. - -The new idealism thus maintains the organic and even supra-organic -nature of thought and being. The world of experience, when taken in its -reality and fullness, is an organism which lives and knows and wills, -and which is life, action, knowledge; its own means and its own end. -The subject acting, living, knowing is action, knowledge, life. In the -ordinary organism there is a subject of functions, a being in relation -to an inorganic world. In the world-organism (if the inadequate name -is still to be retained) there is no outside world, no inorganic -or extra-organic thing. In the world-organism the organ and its -environment is combined in one, re-united: the plant or animal is not -without its place, and its place is not without plant or animal. They -are not merely in correlation, but essentially and actually one. _Quid -prosunt leges sine moribus?_ asks the moralist: but in the Absolute or -the supra-organic Idea, law and morality are not apart: the necessity -is also freedom: the law is not severed from its phenomenon. Such an -organism which is life, thinking, will, is what Hegel calls the Idea: -an organism which is completely organic, with no mere matter: and that -Idea is the foundation of his Idealism. Conceived under its conditions, -the forces which are sometimes represented as struggling with each -other on the field of man's life, are no longer independent; still less -completely separable forces. They are the inner division by which the -spirit re-establishes and makes secure its unity: their antagonisms -are the breath of life. And they have their relations in their common -service, building up one life. They form a certain hierarchy of -organisation; in which however the higher or more developed does not -merely supervene upon the cruder, but in a way supersedes it, and yet -contrives to retain its worth and its real truth. - - -[Footnote 1: Cf. Spinoza's remark on Body, _Eth._ III. pr. 2 Schol.: -'Etenim quod corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit; hoc est neminem -hucusque experientia docuit quid corpus ex solis legibus naturae -quatenus corporea tantum consideratur possit agere,' &c.] - -[Footnote 2: See vol. ii, notes and illustrations, p. 392.] - -[Footnote 3: Schopenhauers well-known description of this recurrent -throwing back of the responsibility of reality on something else is -here suggested ('World as Will and Idea,' § 17).] - -[Footnote 4: See p. 157 (chap. xiii).] - -[Footnote 5: _Satz vom Grunde,_ § 16: _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung: -Ergänzungen._ Cap. i.] - -[Footnote 6: See later, chapter xxvi.] - - - - -CHAPTER XVII. - - -METHODS, ARTIFICIAL AND NATURAL. - - -When modern philosophy took its first steps, it was disdainful and -depreciatory to the past, both Medieval and Old-Greek. Bacon and -Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza,--be their other differences what they -may--all echo the same disparagement. Like Wordsworth's _Rob Roy_, they -cry-- - - 'What need of books? - Burn all the statutes and their shelves. - - We'll show that we can help to frame - A world of other stuff.' - -On this iconoclastic age supervenes the attempt of Leibniz to combine -in one all that was good in the new corpuscular philosophy with -all that was precious in the old Platonic idealism as expanded by -Aristotle. So, at the later philosophic crisis towards the close of -the eighteenth century, the somewhat destructive and revolutionary -tendencies of Kant and Fichte lead up by a natural revulsion and -complement to the reconstructive systems of Schelling and Hegel. In -them the conservative instinct comes to supplement the defects of -the radical go-ahead. Instead of tossing the past away to the winds, -and crying out _Écrasez l'infâme_,--instead of throwing medievalism -behind, breaking all the restrictions on individual liberty which -feudal Europe had created to secure and safeguard the communities that -housed its early freedom, the new spirit of the time saw that the -problems of modern life were not solved by merely throwing overboard -as encumbrances and refuse all checks and forms. On the contrary, the -reflective mind saw that forms and checks so-called there must be, and -that the art of statesmanship, though it could not entirely consist in -copying the old, had still to work in some way after the analogy of the -old methods: i. e. to do under new circumstances what would solve the -same requisites, as the old constitution had done for its time. The -change is well illustrated by the attitude towards state organisation -shown by William von Humboldt at different epochs of his life. - -People talk glibly of the Historical Method, and what it has done for -us. To hear what is sometimes said it might be supposed that this was -the method that had been always habitual in history, but which in -these latter days had been applied to other topics, and had proved its -value on the new ground by achieving results that had hitherto been -mere desiderata. This however is pretty nearly to reverse the true -state of the case. It was long till history came to have any method -worthy of the name. In most of those who figure as great historians -the object had been to tell a good tale, to keep the thread of events -distinct, to subordinate incidents to the main issue, to portray -personal and public character and its influence on events. History was -practised--we may even say--more as an art than as a science. If it -dealt with causes, it dealt with individual, concrete, living causes, -not with cold, dead abstractions of forces, laws, or tendencies. If it -did not altogether ignore the suggestions of a quest for principles to -be found in Thucydides and Polybius, it was much more enamoured of the -art of Livy and Tacitus, or even of the naïveté of Herodotus. Of such -history who has not felt the power; who has not admired the genius that -reconstructs the men and circumstances of the past, and makes them -live over again their deeds, and again in the end yield the palm to -inevitable fate! But it was not from such history that the historical -method arose. - -The historical method was the product of the new conception of nature -and mind in their mutual relations which has been already noted. To -estimate the labours of thinkers towards this view of history would -be an interesting but complex inquiry. Leibniz in particular by -his principles of development, of continuity, of general analogy, -should have made two things for ever clear. And these two results -that might have been supposed secure were, first, that the present -existence (which at first seems to be alone real) is only a narrow -transition line between a past and a future,--a line of points -intersecting a complex movement or development; and secondly, that -all development is of something which is essentially infinite, which -requires nothing external, no fillip from circumstances or from an -external providence, to set it going, but is in itself a synthesis of -active and passive force in a something at least analogous to an Ego. -The first principle is embalmed in Leibniz's maxim: 'The present is -laden with the past, and full of the future': and the second, in the -maxim 'the Monads have no doors or windows.' In virtue of the first, -the existent (of this instant) is only a stage or grade, rooted in -what has been, and insignificant unless in reference to what is to -come. In virtue of the second, all development is from within, and -presupposes therefore that the developing individual includes within -it a great deal which a cursory view would at first sight assume to -be without it, and only accidentally in contact with it. It might -indeed be well to add a third principle--what Leibniz has sometimes -called the Law of Continuity--the law that, as he says, distinct and -noticeable perceptions are the resultants of an infinite number of -insensible or little perceptions. But continuity proper is not this: -continuity proper or identity is a pure idea. The visible or sensible -discontinuity reposes on, and is to be explained by, an invisible or -ideal continuity. Each body, for instance, in nature, appearing to have -a separate existence of its own, is only a stage isolated or insulated -in a continuing process: and that process, binding, as it does, past -to future, is the process of a Mind. _Omne Corpus_, wrote Leibniz in -1671, _est mens momentanea seu carens recordatione._ Every physical -and material object is an intelligence, but an intelligence which -neither looks before nor after, but is limited _for itself_ to the mere -instant: an intelligence which has no history. Yet to the intelligent -observer it has a past,--it has a memory, it bears in it the traces -of its antecedent. Yet to read that book of memory, to decipher the -'insensible perceptions' which are buried beneath the momentary -present, beneath its unspiritual reality, and to knit present with past -and future, is the work of an intelligence, in and to whom the material -discloses its store of meaning, or in whom it is re-spiritualised. In -other words, the presupposition of this historical method is the ideal -continuity of being, transcending and absorbing the differences of time. - -But the teaching of Leibniz--even more perhaps than that of -Spinoza--fell on an evil age: if it was not actually choked with -thorns, it found a soil with little depth, and its brief verdure was -soon followed by a fearful withering. Anxious as Leibniz was to commend -his theories to all men,--and not least perhaps to win the suffrages -of some illustrious and intelligent women--he was led to present them -under forms and phrases which were to each correspondent specially -familiar. And the natural consequence was not absent. The forms of -accommodation were what told: they stuck, and the truth they were -meant to convey slipped away: the Leibnitian theory was re-interpreted -into the doctrines it had been meant to supersede. As with Spinoza, -so with Leibniz, a keen apprehension of his meaning came first to the -thinkers on the borderland of literature and philosophy, to Lessing and -Herder, and found an appreciative welcome in the more academic systems -first from Schelling and Hegel. Above all, this theory of 'petites -perceptions' so closely bound up (as was to be expected) with his -mathematical discoveries in the Calculus, is what marks him as having a -finer ear for the secret harmonies and principles of existence than the -coarser organs of popular philosophy could catch up or appreciate. - -'In order,' says Leibniz, 'to get a clearer idea of the little -perceptions which we cannot distinguish in the crowd, I am accustomed -to employ the example of the roar or noise of the sea which strikes -us upon the shore. To hear this sound, as we do hear it, we must hear -the parts which compose this total, i. e. the sounds of each wave, -though each of these little sounds only makes itself perceptible in the -confused assemblage of all the others together, (that is to say, in -that same roar,) and would not be noticed if this wave which causes it -were alone. For we must be a little affected by the movement of that -wave, and we must have some perception of each of these sounds, however -small they may be; otherwise we should never have the perception of -a hundred thousand waves, since a hundred thousand zeros would never -make anything.... These little perceptions are of greater efficiency by -their consequences than we suppose. It is they which form that _Je ne -sais quoi_, those tastes, those images of sensible qualities, clear in -the assemblage, but confused in the parts; those impressions made upon -us by surrounding bodies which envelop the infinite, that _nexus_ which -each being has with all the rest of the universe. It may even be said -that in virtue of these little perceptions the present is big with the -future and laden with the past, that everything conspires together: and -that in the least of substances, eyes as piercing as those of God could -read the whole sequel of the things of the universe. - -'These insensible perceptions, further, mark and constitute the -same individual, who is characterised by the traces or expressions -which they preserve of the preceding states of that individual, thus -forming the connexion with his present state. These may be known by -a superior spirit, though that individual himself should not feel -them, i. e. though express memory should no longer be there. But these -perceptions also supply the means of rediscovering that memory, at -need, by periodic developments, which may one day happen.... It is -also by these insensible perceptions that I explain that admirable -pre-established harmony of mind and body, and even of all monads or -simple substances,--which takes the place of the impossible influence -of one upon another.... After this, I should add but little if I -said that it is these small perceptions which _determine_ us in many -conjunctures without our thinking of it, and which deceive the vulgar -by the appearance of an _indifference of equilibrium_, as if we were -entirely indifferent whether we turned, e. g., to right or to left. - -'I have remarked also that in virtue of insensible variations two -individual things could never be perfectly alike, and that they ought -always to differ more than _numero._ And with this we have done once -for all with the empty tablets of the mind, a soul without thought, -a substance without action, the void of space, the atoms, and even -parcels not actually divided in matter; we have done with pure repose, -entire uniformity in a portion of time, of place or of matter,... -and a thousand other fictions of philosophers which come from their -incomplete notions, fictions which the nature of things does not -suffer, and which our ignorance and the little attention we have for -the insensible lets pass, but which could never be rendered tolerable, -unless we confine them to abstractions of the mind which protests that -it does not deny what it puts aside and considers out of place in any -present consideration. Otherwise, if we took it quite in earnest, to -mean that things which we do not perceive do not exist in the soul or -body, we should fail in philosophy as in politics by neglecting τὀ -μικρόν, insensible steps of progress:--whereas an abstraction is not an -error provided we know that what we put out of sight is still there.' - -This was the conception which Bacon had shadowed out, which Leibniz -had presented under many names and with many applications, as the -olive-branch between Plato and Democritus; it now became through -philosophical and extra-philosophic acceptance a current maxim in the -general field of knowledge. Nature assimilated to history, and history -assimilated to nature: freedom built upon necessity, and efficient -causes rounded off, though not entirely merged, in final. It is the -recognition of law, order, causality in the psychical world, yet not -of _mere_ so-called natural law; and therefore without reducing it to -a merely physical and material world. It is in fact the new method -which is inevitable and necessary, as soon as it is manifest that -life, organisation, development is the underlying truth and central -notion of things. You look at the world at first, let us say, as a mere -collection of separate things in varying degrees of juxtaposition: -and all that you think of doing to them, either by way of theory or -practice, is to put them together, to link them closer, or separate -them more widely. You do so from outside by an arranging force; for -they are assumed to be purely passive, waiting to be touched, each set -in its place--from which it can only be moved by a push or a pull. -This is the method of mathematics or mechanics. It shows the dexterity -of the agent or of the expositor: but you feel that it is artificial, -and arbitrary. It is analytic or synthetic--but not auto-analysis -or auto-synthesis. The director of the movement (we may call it -'construction') may no doubt have the real secret: he may work the -things well and fairly, and unite or divide them according to inner -affinities; but we cannot, as matters stand, be sure of this. The -things, in fact, he deals with have been already emptied of all life -and peculiarity of their own: they are alike in quality, only differing -by a more or less,--a difference which at any moment may be altered by -an act of subtraction or addition. No doubt you can build up what are -_called_ systems--compounds of a kind--in this way: but they do not -really hang and grow together; they are only prevented from breaking -up by the absence of any empty place to which the parts may withdraw. -Bit holds up bit; but how all the bits have found themselves so caged -up without exit is a mystery. Absolute neutrality or indifference of -each part to others, and yet absolute equilibrium[1] in the total -composite,--such is the situation. - -The chemical method (taking chemistry as a type of the sciences -like optics, electricity, &c.) is a revelation of a different state -of affairs. The elements of things are here seen to be unique and -incomparable; yet in each there is a latent sympathy ready to break out -when the proper occasion arrives. Bring two things together, and their -affinity suddenly, in the proper circumstances, leads to their complete -fusion: a product arises which, when formed, hardly betrays its origin -and composition. In a way this is the converse of the mechanical or -mathematical method. In it was no fusion, no inner mixture: each part -after composition lay beside the other, and their union was only in the -ideas of the onlooker. It was mere juxtaposition still,--though now -closer: an abnormally keen eye would still have been able to descry the -dividing lines and measure the gaps. At least mere mechanical physics -tends so to conceive it. Here, on the contrary, there is union--but -only at the moment of fusion: once that is accomplished, the result is -apparently simple, and bears no suggestion of being a compound. In the -mechanical union the result is exactly equal to the sum of the elements -which go to make it: in the chemical there is something positively new, -something, i. e., of which the premises gave no indication and made no -promise. - -Either of these methods,--of these conceptions of existence--works -well in a certain region. But both of them only do their work on a -certain hypothesis, or with a certain abstraction. The mechanical -method supposes that objects are all qualitatively alike, differing -only in quantity or weight: all therefore entirely comparable with -each other, and capable of being substituted for each other in an -equation. Where this assumption holds good, the method of addition and -division, the method of the calculus does its work[2]. The chemical -method works on another assumption,--the assumption of a number of -qualitatively-differenced elements, of elements which also are, so to -speak, set on edge against some, and ready to leap into the arms of -others. If the observer in the first case had the game entirely in his -own hand,--could build up and separate at his pleasure, could determine -results _a priori_: he is here baffled by the unexpected, and can only -wait and watch to learn _a posteriori_ the behaviour of the bodies -possessed of this occult and non-predictable affinity. At the best he -can only formulate what he observes, try to classify it, ascertain -any common principles running through it, any serial recurrences, -or the like: and that is all that chemical philosophy can achieve. -Chemical affinity--the fact that certain elements combine in certain -ways, and refuse to enter into certain alliances--is a great fact: -but to _a priori_ reasoning or abstract syllogising it is an entire -inexplicability, one of the accidents in the universe which must be -reckoned with, but cannot be understood. - -It is probably evident that, if we want to get a comprehension of -the life and concrete reality of things, neither of these methods -will quite answer the purpose. With the first alone, if it could be -universally carried out, the universe would be thoroughly explained: -everything would be exactly equivalent to some sum or multiple of -every other: there would be no mystery, nothing unique, and strictly -individual. Given time, we could find a formula for every reality, -and a predicate exactly fitted to any subject. Yet even mathematics -has to confess the existence of irrationals, surds, infinite series, -and the like. For our unities and standards are always arbitrary, -artificial, and one-sided, and fall short of the subtlety of nature. -Even our simpler types of surfaces--the circle and the square--remain -irreducible to each other: and we only avoid the collision by the -remark that practically and with any required amount of exactness -the discrepancy between the two can be adjusted. If we turn to the -chemical method, again, there is a nearer approach to actuality in the -recognition of the presence of something more than mere composition -and juxtaposition. It is not that there is something which is _not_ -juxtaposition: but rather it is much _more than mere_ juxtaposition. -There may be degrees of this something more: but it is only to a gross -or abstract view that it is not present at all. Mere cohesion even -shows a unity in things juxta-posed. Mere contact is contagious: it -infects. 'When a violin has been played on frequently by a tyro,' says -G. H. Lewes, 'its tone deteriorates, its molecules become re-arranged, -so that one mode of vibration is more ready than another[3].' 'Toute -impression,' he quotes from Delboeuf, 'laisse une certaine trace -ineffaçable.' So-called chemical composition is only a conspicuous -instance, with peculiarities, of this alteration in state produced -by what, from the mechanical standpoint, are called inner molecular -displacements. But to recognise a fact is one thing: to give its -explanation is another. Yet, on the other hand, to recognise the fact -is to note an important point which had been omitted by the mechanical -construction of things. There the result could hardly be called new: -it was exactly equal to its constituent elements: and the equation was -transparent. And it was transparent because the whole process, analysis -and synthesis, was not a work or process of the observed thing, but -the work of the observing mind: it makes the (artificial) unities, -numbers them, and adds them or subtracts. But with the chemical result, -though it also is equal to its elements, there is something new. -Water, no doubt, is oxygen and hydrogen, but here, at least, there -is no doubt that the _plus_ sign unduly simplifies the relationship, -and rather indicates or represents a nexus than accurately defines -it. And yet, there is nothing in water which was not, in some--shall -we say mysterious?--way, in the oxygen and the hydrogen. Chemical -physics, therefore, brings out clearly, or comparatively clearly, -something which the ordinary and coarser simplicity-loving theory is -obliged and is able to neglect: it realises the virtue that lies in -juxtaposition, and shows that the mere outer change of quantity goes -with a deeper inward and qualitative one. The result does more than -sum up and condense what was spread out in extension and dispersed -in parts before: it brings out or reveals something which previously -was unsurmised. Always, in a liberal interpretation of the maxim, it -is true that _Ex nihilo nihil fit:_ but here, especially, the effect -actually discloses what was--but was latent or unperceived--in the -premises. The maxim, to be fairly treated, must be read backwards as -well as forwards. - -But we must go a step further if we wish the full explanation. If the -premises are to be adequate to support the conclusion, they must be -restated in terms which hint at the conclusion--which in a way contain -it, but contain it in potentiality and promise, not in act. This is -the method of development, which is the method that is applicable to -full concrete reality, not like the others to parts abstracted from -or insulated in reality. So long as you deal with these selected -bits of fact--abstracted from their surroundings, subject to strict -observation or strict experiment, you can apply a comparatively simple -and straightforward method. You are dealing with abstracted, mutilated, -prepared fact. You are guided in these cases by the canons of identity -and difference: you add and subtract, or subtract and add; and that -is all. You use what are called the rules of experimental method. But -these canons do not directly apply--except by happy accident--to the -real world, where antecedent and consequents are not separate and -tabulated, as the logical canons, the rules of formal logic, require. -In dealing with this concrete reality, a much more complex method is -needed, a method which has to blend induction with deduction, and -to start from both ends in the series of causation at once. You can -apply observation or experiment, only when the issues have already -been extremely simplified and narrowed down: when the question has -been rendered so definite that it is next-door to the answer, and the -removal of a slight partition-wall will as it were make the two one -clear space. Where observation and experiment are available, indeed, is -where the general outlines and principles of the subject are settled, -where the scheme of reality is defined in large, but a variety of minor -issues still remains to be settled. Unless this general framework is -fixed, neither observation nor experiment, with their canon of identity -and difference, are of any avail. These methods, therefore, only apply -in sciences which are in principle or substantially complete, though -admitting of possibly infinite extension in details and particulars. -Where the science is yet to constitute, i. e. in dealing with the -kinds of real things in their completeness, and not as viewed in -some definite aspect, induction and deduction must go hand in hand -and help each other at every step: and if they, as they must, have -recourse to experiment and observation, it will be at first in a very -unsatisfactory and tentative way. - -Such is the way the contrast between the simplicity belonging to an -artificial method dealing with picked instances, and the complexity -that real concrete organic nature demands, presented itself to J. S. -Mill as he advanced in his inquiry. The only complete method for the -investigation of unsophisticated nature, not yet mapped out and defined -in general departments, is the deductive-inductive method in which -induction and deduction separately have a subordinate place,--using -induction in the narrow sense the term has been hitherto allowed to -bear. And that sense, it may be added, is, as in some passages of -Aristotle, little else than a reverse of syllogism, or to speak more -accurately, it is a syllogism which goes up to generals instead of -descending from them. It is like the syllogistic deduction formal and -abstract in character. The (deductive) syllogism assumes the existence -of major premises--of general propositions which in the last resort, -if they are real bases, must be primary and true, or self-evident -facts. But a critic, like Mill, had little difficulty in showing -that a general truth rests upon and presupposes the very particular -conclusions which it is used to establish. Unless every singular is -true, the universal which embraces or unifies them cannot really be -true. Therefore the conclusion is really implied and presupposed in -the principles of its premises. But, unfortunately for the application -and supposed sequel of this not unjust remark, a similar remark may -be made on the ordinary exposition of the inductive method. Induction, -it is said, infers from or on a basis of single facts. But if a single -truth is really, i. e. unconditionally true, it is indistinguishable -from the universal. If it is really true once, it is true for ever. -The assertion of the individual proposition as true, if it can be -supported--(and unless it be true, what basis can it afford for -the general conclusion?)--implies the truth of the universal it is -sometimes used to establish. The inductive logician tells us to build -on singular and definite facts, on truths of definite and individual -experience: but a definite or determinate truth rests upon universality -(indeed is a universal), and cannot be found unless we have already -found the special total or organism of truth in which it forms a part. -Individuals and universals presuppose each other, and do not, as the -first impression leads us to think, stand apart as two unconnected -termini, from either of which, if we happen to be so located, we can -without road or railway make a legitimate passage to the other. - -If it be urged, as it may naturally be, that on this showing there is -no solid or 'absolute' starting-point at all, the contention may be -conceded. The only fixed and steady points in knowledge are points -hypothetically fixed,--certified, that is, for the time and in the -circumstances we employ them. But in the open field--or rather in -the wilderness--of knowledge, where the ground of fact is not staked -off, and the unexpected may always turn up, the only test of truth is -the corroboration given by the consilience of paths initiated from -different points: it is only by an undesigned coincidence in the -results of independent operations that you can succeed in orienting -yourself. You begin your road at two ends, and you meet: you locate -or fix your point by drawing its co-ordinates to two direction-lines -taken anyhow at first, and only in formed science diverging at a fixed -angle. And in the absolute your direction-lines cannot be supposed -fixed: you can only gradually adjust them to each other as you -proceed. Intelligence, says Aristotle, is a principle, a beginning; -and intelligence, he says again, supplies beginnings[4]. Science, in -the technical sense, only comes into operation,--or, in other words, -deduction and (in the narrower sense used by Mill, and proceeding by -_pure_ observation and experiment) induction only find a way,--where -beginnings and principles have been set up, where an approximate order -or provisional system has been established. And if logic, in its -stricter sense, is the method of sciences already made and in their -essentials constituted, then logic can be asked to do no more than -to provide a theory of such formal processes. If it traces the path -which leads 'from the known to the unknown,' if it always proceeds on -the hypothesis of a given knowledge, then such induction or deduction -(from certain and approved singular facts, or from certain and approved -general truths) fully satisfies the practical need of the scientific -reasoner. But if Logic be, as it sometimes is, and may very reasonably -be, taken in the wider sense of an epistemology,--a theory of the -nature and origin of knowledge as a whole, and not of mere inference -or syllogism;--if it does not merely ask how we can satisfactorily -get from one piece of knowledge (we are supposed to have) to another -(not yet supposed to be), but how we come to have knowledge at all; -then its problem must go behind the rudiments of vulgar induction and -deduction. It must ask--what, so far as one can see, Mill and his -mere followers have never seriously asked at all--what induction -is, what are its relations with deduction, and what is the place of -either in the process of knowledge. And as the process of knowledge -is the path to reality, it must also ask about the nature of this -goal,--reality and truth. It is all very well for the narrower Logic -to formulate in terms the methods actually employed in sciences: to -state in abstract canons what is there seen in life and action. But -a _Science of Logic_--an epistemology--(and a genuine epistemology -cannot claim to be anything short of an ontology) must face the fact of -science itself--must ask how the ideas of the knower must--or otherwise -they are not knowledge--embrace and contain the reality of the known. -The other and narrower Logic is and will remain a theory of forms of -reasoning-a transcript in fainter terms of the procedure of science in -any given step it takes upward to generals or downward to particulars: -but the logic which deals with knowledge as such, in its systematic -entirety,--the transcendental Logic, in short, must have a real value, -an invincible relation to reality. The formal Logic--the logic of Mill -and Hamilton--must be carried back to its principles, to its first -step: and that first step which will also be the last step, and the -inspiring principle of every intermediate step, is that of Intelligence -(Aristotle's Νοῡς), of which the products or manifestations are λόγοι, -i. e. definite conceptions, categories, formulations of rules and -principles of definite range,--determinations or special types of unity. - -Mill really faced the problem of method to better effect when he came -to deal with a class of questions in which he was really interested, -and which moreover have for epistemological purposes the advantage of -being as yet unreduced into the rank and file of disciplined science. -These questions are those dealing with man, his mental and moral -nature, and history. Even its advocates or patrons occasionally admit -that there is no accepted idea of what Sociology is or does. Its name -at least expresses a longing towards a unity, or a presentiment that -there is some underlying unity and common method in the group of what -are loosely called the moral, or the historical, or the social and -political sciences. But sociology is, as most people will allow, the -name of a science unrealised--the felt and consciously-apprehended -need of a science, and the dissatisfaction with the existing state of -knowledge in certain departments. And undoubtedly it was with problems -of social science,--problems of politico-economic and socio-ethical or -socio-religious matters, that Mill's interests were mainly engaged. -Like his master in this department, Auguste Comte, he wanted to carry -into the topics which he was chiefly bent upon that 'scientific' -precision which they by pretty general admission lacked, and which -revolutionary movements had shown they greatly needed. But he could -not help seeing that the 'induction' of dynamics and physics was not -exactly the instrument he was in search of. Theory and hypothesis -here demanded a much larger share in the process than in the more -mathematical sciences. Causes and effects in reality here rolled round -into each other, instead of remaining calmly fixed, one set here, and -the other there. Of course even here--i. e. in organic and concrete -sciences--it is possible to introduce observation and experiment,--no -doubt, with greater effort and constraint, but still not altogether -impracticable. But the artificial and mutilative character of such -experimentation is felt here in a way different from its pressure in -other cases. And what is more important, to institute an experiment or -set on foot a scientific observation (and to observe means to _watch_ -a definitely restricted natural process with a view to answer some -question about it), presupposes--as we have already seen--a tolerably -definite provisional theory as to the general lie of the country to be -investigated. Only when the country has been reasonably well mapped out -in provinces and provided with some system of roads, can these problems -of detail--questions to be answered Yes or No--be profitably put. And -it is--in some parts of the historical sciences at least--somewhat -premature to put questions requiring a categorical reply. There is -only the vague _malaise_ of felt difficulty to guide us. We do not, -in many cases, know what it is that we want to know; for, it demands -a good deal of wisdom and trained art to put the proper or reasonable -question,--so much so, indeed, that to succeed in formulating your -question fully is equivalent or nearly equivalent to being able to -answer it. The value of observations and experiments--which are ways of -putting nature to the question and it may be to the torture--depends -entirely upon the knowledge and the command of general ideas possessed -by the observer and experimenter. And the same may be said of the -reduced and tabulated conspectuses of the results of many observations -and experiments which are called Statistics. Their value depends on -the truth and breadth of view which presided at their collection and -arrangement[5]. - -The historical or genetic method is the method of Science in general, -but considered and employed under a limited aspect. And under its -more comprehensive aspect it may be called--though no name is -unimpeachable--the method of development. Now the essence of the idea -of development--as was clearly shown by Leibniz--is the refusal to -admit external interference, and the resolve to let a thing explain -itself by itself. It does not, like the mechanical method, manipulate -the thing from outside--try to add it up out of factors or items -fashioned and fabricated after some external standard. Nor does it, -like the chemical, look at the result as an inexplicable alteration, -due apparently to a mere stroke of combination or disintegration--yet -not obviously reducible to a mere equivalent of its elements. On -the contrary, it recognises in the object a certain independence or -originality, yet also the presence of an immanent law which does not -wait for the outsider to put it together, but constructs itself, as it -were, after a plan of its own. There is in the so-called object, though -we do not at first sight recognise it, the same originative principle -both analytic and synthetic, as we own in thought. The object is--in -a true logic--a process, a self-completing process, and not merely an -object, mechanical, or other object. It changes, grows or decays, while -we observe, unless for brief instants we cut it off from its connexions -and arrest its development. And our observation, if truly scientific, -must be sympathetic with its process of change. It is neither a mere -thing to be explained and construed _ab extra_: nor a mystery of sudden -transformation to be passively accepted; but a growth, a history, to be -sympathetically watched and understood,--understood, because it follows -the same order as the movement of our own thought in the process of -knowledge. _Similia similibus cognoscuntur_[6]. - -One sometimes hears it asked by paradoxical critics at which end -a history should begin. And to ordinary dogmatic recklessness, -paradoxical the question may well seem. Begin at the beginning, no -doubt, is the vulgar reply; which in this case is understood to -mean from the earliest point in date (that, of course, being easily -ascertained, and a thing known to all men). But,--so Plato long ago -well raised the difficulty which will always confront us,--are we to go -from the beginnings, or towards the beginnings? And it does not quite -solve the question to say that we are to begin with what is known: -for under that word the same difficulty re-appears. Can you really -know one end without the other? To the vulgar partisan of historical -method, its precept means Go to the earlier, if you wish to understand -the meaning, the value, and the elements constitutive of the later and -subsequent. Begin with origins, with the earliest elements, the phases -that first appear; and thus you will get light to see the later as they -really stand. That this is a common interpretation of the historical -method is notorious. To explain _Homo sapiens_, one is told to study -the ape,--the nearest analogue of his lost or missing progenitor: to -understand the contemporary horse, go to eohippus, or hipparion, or -however his early prototype may be at present named and recognised. -And in all this there is a truth--or least a half-truth. But let us -equally recognise the other half of the truth. If past throws light on -present, present throws not less light on past. You propose, let us -say, to write a history of Greece. A wordy philosophy, wise in its own -conceit and in fine phrases, will advise you to approach the subject -without prepossession or prejudice. So far, good. But what is meant -by the absence of prepossession or prejudice? Not a blank openness -to impression, not a mere passivity; but if passivity at all, a wise -passivity: if openness, the openness of the trained judge. - -The advice, so often associated with Francis Bacon, to get rid of all -false pre-conceptions, of all _idola,_ is one which it is easy to -mistake in an over-zeal to follow it. That mere negation of prejudices -which we call childish innocence is no match for the craft by which -Nature seeks to keep or disguise her secrets. The free consciousness, -the unbiassed mind, is not the easy result of one great act of -renunciation, but the work of continued self-discipline, self-conquest, -self-realisation. If you are not to impose upon the thing a -pre-conception alien to it, neither must you rashly give yourself away -to the thing, or to the first whims which accident puts upon you as the -thing. What seems a fact or thing is only a candidate for the post of -thing or fact: and its credentials need to be examined, and compared -with other evidences. To detect a fact, therefore, is only possible for -a tried and tested consciousness which by patience and self-mastery has -won the key of interpretation. What Bacon apparently meant--though, -as often happens, in his eagerness to combat a prevailing folly, he -sometimes overshot himself in statement--was to insist on the eternal -wedlock of the mind and things, of things and the mind, as the sole -and sufficient condition for the reality of knowledge and truth. The -mind may not presume to do without things, or things to domineer the -mind;--or the result is a windy and frothy vanity. And the wedlock -is eternal: in his own eloquent words, 'the mind itself is but an -accident to knowledge[7],' and he might have added, so also are things: -for, as he says, 'the truth of being and the truth of knowing is all -one': only in the bond of knowledge are things true and real,--being -otherwise only 'permanent possibilities,' or possibilities barely even -permanent--or not even possibilities. Yet he scarcely realised that -his 'due rejections and exclusions' and negations were a fundamental -_constitutive_ element in those facts of which he habitually emphasises -only the positive side. - -He therefore who would understand--or would write--the history of -Greece must really in his studies begin at both ends--both at the -Greece of to-day, and at the Greece of Solon, or what earlier period -may be taken as the start of Greek history. With perhaps the least -qualified dogmatism, one may assert that he will begin with the -Greece of to-day; or if he deals solely with Ancient Greece he will -begin with the full blaze of Hellenic civilisation which still has a -pale reflection in the modern world, and gradually work back to the -beginnings. It is no doubt customary to begin Greek history, say, with -the Homeric Age, and work downwards, as it is customary to begin a -formal treatise on geography with the general features of the earth's -shape and surface. But that beginning represents really the temporarily -accredited and accepted result of a process which, starting from the -other end, has worked backwards to commencements or origins. And the -teacher, in particular, will do well not to imitate too slavishly the -method of the formal treatise. A day may come--or may have come--for -example, for Greek history to start from periods long anterior to the -supposed or traditional date of the wars around the wall of Troy. But -when it does so, it will have done so by more thoroughly ransacking -the Greece of to-day: and so disclosing the secrets of what is termed -pre-historic Greece. Then, conversely, when modern diggings on Greek -soil reveal the features of an earlier than what was erewhile to older -historians its earliest past, the reconstruction of that early people's -life reflects a new light on the directions and the limitations of -its subsequent civilisation. We see better into the reality of Homer, -and even of Demosthenes--into their ideal glory and their historical -limitations, when we explore the cradle in which their race's life was -erst fostered, and the rock out of which they and nature hewed them. -And this is no peculiarity of Greece. The deepest research into the -social institutions which control the England of to-day is the best -propaedeutic for the study of Anglo-Saxon times; and the same is true -_vice versa_. - -Nor, again, is the truth of the proposition confined to what we -ordinarily mean by history. The Greek poet has said 'Art had to wait on -and welcome chance, and chance to wait on Art': or as we may paraphrase -it, if every invention and discovery is in a measure a lucky chance, -it is a luck that only falls to the wisely prepared head and hand. The -casual event falls as a germ of new construction or theory only on an -intelligence ready to welcome it,--prepared with its complement in the -spirit of an idea, eager to take shape. The means again, in the arts -and crafts, is not only a means to something else; it is also a means -to its own end, to realise or perfect itself. The rude tool of the -savage, for instance, is not merely a means to supply his wants: it -is also a means towards completing and improving itself, and towards -perfecting itself by constructing an ampler tool, which supersedes it, -because it can do all and more than all the work of the earlier, or -can do it more economically. All progress that deserves the name is -an incessant and continuous revision of a first step: a re-adaptation -of an old instrument: a repeated and unending self-correction. It -is only a partially-true symbol of human advance to speak of it as -a line: unless we add, by another piece of symbolism, that the line -is only the protracted or extended phase in which the form of time -drags out for us the magnified and organised point-nucleus. It is a -truth--which we are only too ready to forget or discount--that the -savage (and he bears with justice both epithets, 'the noble savage,' -and 'the brute barbarian') is not something left happily behind us, in -the onward march of civilisation; but that he is, however much we may -fancy him suppressed and superseded, still present, at least 'ideally' -in the finest products of humanity, and may hap only too likely--as -the Russian is said, when scratched, to betray his original Tartar -breed--to burst put on provocation into a grim reality. The Pullman -car of to-day retains within it for the archaeologically-trained eye -the rudiments of the primitive wain of the primitive nomade: and -the careful study of either end of the scale will not merely throw -a marvellous light on the excellencies or the defects of the other, -but will probably also tend in the impartial observer to moderate the -self-gratulations of modern advance. For it is only those whose view -ranges within narrow limits that are over-impressed by the magnitude of -the advance made in the 'last new thing.' - -If progress were but the addition of bit to bit, of new bits to what -is already there, or if we could change _this,_ and leave _that_ -unchanged,--as the word perhaps verbally means, and as many people at -any rate seem to understand it, progress might indeed seem an easy -thing, and to be undertaken with a light heart. For, it would appear -as if we could lose nothing, and might probably (indeed, as enthusiasm -and forgetfulness of the merits of the past are in certain periods -ready to urge, must certainly) gain. But it is a more serious matter -when we realise that we must move altogether, if we really are to move -at all; i. e. really are to make progress, and not merely change, so -to speak, from one foot to rest on another. For progress,--if it be -what it is expected to be, and what it must be if it does what it is -expected to do--is an organic, and not merely a mechanical or chemical -change. A mechanical change is only a nominal or formal change: a -chemical is more than change; but in organic change, that which changes -also abides, and the new is not merely other than the old, and not -merely a re-arrangement of the old, but the old transmuted,--the same -yet not the _mere_ same[8]. Progress in short is always the unity of -differentiation and integration. It must not be an externality, nor a -mere dead product of a transformation scene, but a continuous growth, -inwardly digested, made part and parcel of the collective life, which -it has thereby rendered more full, real, and not merely made less -intense at the cost of some extension. In true progress, which is only -another name for true growth, nothing is quite lost, but only changed, -retained in a richer shape and a fuller reality. How far such progress -is possible, except in limited and finite spheres: how far progress in -one involves necessarily deterioration in another and how, therefore, -progress is not attributable to the Absolute, are questions we need not -here discuss. But so far at least we may go as to say that a progress -which does not follow the natural law of development and carry on into -the future the worth and substance of the past, is not a progress which -any general enthusiasm ought to be spent upon. - -Development then has two faces, one to the future and another -to the past. And what is called the historical method is apt to -emphasise only one of the two aspects, just as, it may be added, -practical considerations are often likely to produce an opposite but -equally partial bias in favour of the future. The historical method -in incapable hands is liable to lead to unprofitable sighs,--not -unaccompanied by a certain luxury of tears--over the lowly hole of -the pit--it may even be the filth and brutishness, out of which so -much of noble humanity (for thither the interest of development -always reverts) has been dug; and in empty heads the practical, -the vulgarly-utilitarian satisfaction is liable to equally vain -fits of self-applause on our magnificent progress. But both the -self-depreciation of him who loiters regretfully round the beggarly -rudiments, and the self-laudation of glorious 'improvements' looking -derisively on less glorious days, are unworthy of the reasonable and -scientific spirit. The philosophical method does not allow itself to -be imposed upon by the lapse of time, and insists that in a sense -the past contained the present--that, as the poet says, the child -is father of the man. Not indeed contained in any grosser or more -delicate mechanical way. The coming development does not necessarily -lie prefigured--if we had the proper microscope to see it--as a germ -in the first and original state. That may be, or may not be. Yet -prefigured it is by the law of its structure, or in the intelligible -unity by which only can its existence be understood and construed. - -But if this be the method of real development, in the growth of nature, -and the progress of history, it is also the method of that supreme -product of historical progress, the spirit and system of philosophy. -Thought, also, the culminating stage in which the spirit of man becomes -conscious of itself and of its universe, will move or grow on the same -lines as that of which it is the comprehension and theory. It will -begin at the two ends, and each beginning will complete and presuppose -the other. Nature will suppose and yet lead up to Spirit or Mind: -Spirit or Mind will throw light on the mystery of Nature: Being will -point to knowledge or Idea; and Idea show itself the basis of Being. -Or, if we consider the triple division of the philosophic system, as it -runs in Hegel's _Encyclopaedia_, we can see how misleading it may be to -take that one order as absolute. To understand it thoroughly we must -begin with each of the three in turn: so as thus to realise that each -does not except figuratively succeed the other, but that in each an -aspect of the whole truth is presented which had been put by the other -parts somewhat in the background. In each part there is a definition -and a revelation of the Absolute. But each is also, as it were, a -projection, a perspective view, a condensed or expanded image of the -other. In each the Absolute is one and whole, in some more veiled, -more restricted, and more meagre than in others; but the veil, and the -restriction, and the emptying, are self-imposed: and for that reason -the veil is really transparent, the restriction is negatived, and the -emptying is not only a self-humiliating but a self-ennobling irony--the -irony of the Absolute. - - -[Footnote 1: Of course the term 'equilibrium' may be used loosely to -mean a great deal more than this,--how much will depend on the context. -These quasi-mathematical analyses have great fascination: their -apparent simplicity imposes upon us.] - -[Footnote 2: The distinction, it will be observed, lies between the -method of mathematical physics and that of physics which has learned -something from the researches of electricity or chemistry. If the -method or principles of chemistry are thus said to be reduced to those -of physics, this is because the conceptions of physics have been -revolutionised from the side of chemistry, &c., and even of biology. -This tendency of modern science is precisely in the line indicated by -Schelling and Hegel.] - -[Footnote 3: _Problems of Life and Mind_, iii. p. 58.] - -[Footnote 4: _Eth._ vii. 7 ὁ νοῡς ἀρχή: 6. 6 νοῡς ἐστι τῶν ἀρχῶν.] - -[Footnote 5: Statistics only define--and primarily for the -imagination--the general laws and principles on which they rest. The -clear-cut mathematical form strikes and 'catches on,' where a more -universal statement sounds vague and glides off. Hence, as one says, -they may prove _anything._ The fact is, they prove _nothing._ They only -illustrate in diagrammatic form the theory which presided at their -collection. To emphasise the fundamental nature of ethics for human -development you need only say that conduct is three-fourths or (as to -some minds the precision rises with the denominator of the fraction -17/20) of human life.] - -[Footnote 6: The resolute misinterpretation--as it often seems--of -the maxim that like is known by like,--is a curious chapter in the -history of Logic. All knowledge is based upon,--or, to speak more -simply, _is_--the identity of differents: of differents, which in -knowledge are identified,--of identity which in knowledge is put under -difference. And yet the ordinary meaningless talk on this matter seems -to assimilate knower and known to two separate things (or persons), -who casually and, we may add, inexplicably know each other: which is -mythology, perhaps, but not epistemology.] - -[Footnote 7: Bacon: 'In Praise of Knowledge' (a mere leaflet of much -significance towards estimating his true grandeur). On the _Conjugium_ -of _Mens_ and _Universus_ see _Novum Organum_, distrib. op.] - -[Footnote 8: The said _mere_ same is not really the same at all. -Nobody in his senses predicates sameness except where he also sees -differences: or, the term always implies relation.] - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII. - - -THE RANGE OF PERSONALITY. - - -The difference between the conceptions of reality held by Aristotle and -Plato respectively is that where Plato said Being, Essence or Substance -(οὐσία), Aristotle said Activity (ἐνέργεια). To be is to act, to be -active. To the outsider--the plain man of philosophic legend, it seems -at first that a thing must _be_ before it can _do_: that you must have -an agent before you get an action. And, in a way, Aristotle admits -this not quite satisfactory criticism. Every activity presupposes, he -allows, a power to act, a potentiality: every actual presupposes an -implicit or a mere possibility. Existence seems, as it were, to be -doubled; or the mere surface-being is turned into a subject which has -a predicate. But if the existence is to be real, it has to include -both elements, and with the latter or the actuality, as its crown. -Nor is this all. The possibility which issues forth in action may be -fairly called self-realisation. That is to say: A--the hypothetical -agent--acts, does something: and in so doing, seems to go forth and -beyond itself, to externalise itself. Or, A is acted upon, and thus -seems to be diminished. But what it externalises, or puts forth, is -after all what it _is_: it puts forth itself: and, on the other hand, -if it be a patient, it is no less an agent and self-limitative. What a -thing really is, is what it _makes_ itself be: what it allows itself to -be made, that it really is. Yet further, if the word self-realisation -be taken in its fullness of meaning,--if there be really a _self,_ -and it be realised, then this self-realisation, which is the truth -or more developed conception of being, seems to imply or postulate -in it a self-consciousness, an awareness of the process of completed -being,--completed in its return from utterance of possibility to -self-fruition or in its re-assumption of itself. - -To us, of course, as beings aware of what we do and achieve, this -is simple enough: but it is also true of _things,_ that we only -understand them, in so far as we put them in, or invest them with, the -same activity and apperception of activity as we are familiar with -in our own experience. The veriest materialist cannot help speaking -of things as agents, as behaving, as having a function. He would, no -doubt, if he were to be cross-examined, refuse to identify himself -with the primitive anthropomorphism, or at least zoömorphism of the -natural man who sees the river run and the clouds sweep the sky; and -he would probably mutter something referring to people who cannot see -when they ride a metaphor to death. Still less, perhaps, would he -be inclined to adopt the spiritualistic or animistic hypothesis of -philosophising physicists, like Fechner, who would accredit even the -plants at our feet, and the stars in the sky, with souls, or soul-like -centres of their life. But, however he may shrink from what we may call -the ontological consequences of his language, there is no doubt that -for him the meaning of the world, its reality and truth, is obtained -by an interpretation in terms which, rigidly employed, imply their -environment by a self-consciousness to which they are relative. Take -from him the tacit assumption (which he often finds it difficult to -realise just because it is the foundation of all his language) that -reality is in the last resort a self-conscious reality, and his words -become meaningless, or what he might think worse, metaphorical. - -To Bacon, who, though not without a strong speculative impulse, -approached philosophic dicta from the standpoint of an average -intelligent Englishman (and it is on that account that his remarks are -often so instructive), it seemed a grave fault of the Stagirite to -define the soul, that 'most noble substance,' by words of the second -intention. Without substance--a solid something as basis of act and -event--the reality of the soul seemed likely to fare badly. Behind -consciousness he, like many others, felt there must be a something of -which consciousness is the state, act, or predicate and attribute. The -thinking must come from a thinker. There must be a permanent subject of -thought--a persistent substance which does not disappear when thinking -for the nonce stops. And thinking is according to common experience -very liable to stops and interruptions. Both Bacon and Locke felt that -without this refuge to fall back upon, personal identity was in a bad -way, or personality itself little better than a delusion. And therefore -when Aristotle, and his modern followers, treated soul and mind as -essentially definable by the terms activity, self-realisation, it has -been freely urged against them that they are tampering with the pearl -of great price which all our hopes and aspirations fondly guard. - -And this is a subject on which there is inevitably a good deal of -misunderstanding. And the misunderstanding will probably last so long -as one set of writers flaunts over it that blessed word Personality -as a holy, a sacrosanct thing, like the visionary cross with its -inscription _In hoc signo vinces_: and as another set treats it as a -mere fetish, under which is hidden nothing better than stock or stone, -or a heap of old bones. Perhaps some concessions might well be made -on both sides. And the first of them would be to try to come to some -clearer understanding what the term in question means. And, on that -point, if we follow the example of Aristotle and examine popular usage, -to see if it can help us to any consistent use of the term, we shall -find that by personal as opposed to real we mean something peculiarly -attached to the individual, of which he cannot divest himself as -of other outward things, though it also is an outward thing[1] The -person in this narrowest sense means the body; and if the epithet -is further extended it still expresses what is directly manipulated -through the members of the living agent, and is more or less closely -attached to it. Yet if it means the body, we must be careful to add -that it is the body, regarded not as such but as the representative, -the outward manifestation, the inseparable sign or symbol of a spirit, -an intelligence and a will. The person is the visible or tangible -phenomenon of something inward,--the phase or function by which -an individual agent takes his place in the common world of human -intercourse and interaction--his peculiar and definite part in the -general or universal world and field. - -Personality thus mingles or unifies in it an universal and an -individual aspect or element: it hints that the universal work always -has in reality an individually-determinate tone,--that nothing in -the world, even if it be called the same, is really and actively -the same. _Si duo idem faciunt, non est idem quod faciunt._ Thus, -what separates personality from individuality is simply that in the -narrower or abstracter use of the latter term there is an absence -of the due subordination of all individuality to universality, and -of all universality to individuality. Personality, in short, is an -individuality which is not a mere freak, not merely different from -other things, but also in itself charged with a universal meaning -or function. Yet even this is not enough to describe it. It is the -individuality of an intelligence: the flesh and blood, and, in a -secondary degree, the outward things, stamped with intelligence. -Every member of a kind, every natural existence, has this double -character; this convergence or union of universal and individual. In -being this individual object, it is at the same time a universal, and -_vice versa._ But in the attribution of personality there is involved -something beyond what is common to all creatures. And that something, -we may first of all say, is this. Whereas in the case of other _things_ -the individuality is distinctly subordinate, and each is reckoned -primarily by its kind, in the case of _persons_ we can almost declare -that the universality is subordinate to the individuality. This -union of individuality and universality in a single manifestation, -with the implication that the individuality is the essential and -permanent element to which the universality is almost in the nature -of an accident, is what forms the cardinal point in Personality. And -one can understand, when the distinction is thus put, the obvious and -palpable antagonism in which the view stands to the central principles -of Spinoza[2] We speak of a man as a Personality when we wish to note -the fact that he is no mere manufactured article, the representative -of a common type, with nothing to choose between him and a thousand -others, but that he is, as it were, one of a thousand, one 'Whom -nature printed and then broke the type,' that he has in the highest -sense 'distinction,' the nobility of nature's own patent. Other things -exist, so to speak, for the sake of their kind, and for the sake of -other things; a person, in the strictest sense, is never a mere means -to something beyond, but always at the same time an end in itself -or himself. Other things are mere examples in illustration of a law -that rides superior to them and overrules them: the person is a law -unto himself. He has the royal and divine right of creating law--of -starting by his exception a new law which shall henceforth be a canon -and a standard. For in such a personality when he claims his full -rights there is the visible immanence of the divine and universal--or -there is the visible unity of the eternal and the temporal. He rules -as the natural king, the great ruler whose judgment and authority are -better than the complex code of common laws: he guides as the artistic -genius who sees truth steadily in a single intuition and in that single -picture sees it whole[3]. - -But when we ask if such a personality is found in the field of -actual experience and history, there arises a divergence of -opinions. It is at any rate matter of common experience that there -is a good deal of unjustified identification of the self with the -universal--identification in which the universal suffers violence and -is taken by force. There are only too often cases where the personal -interest is allowed to disguise itself under a semblance of zeal for -the common good, and that even without conscious intent or act of -deception. No good and noble deed, Hegel has said, can ever be done -without faith in its goodness, and zeal for its attainment: without a -holy passion and fervour of devotion, which exceeds the cold service of -duty rendered for duty's sake[4]. But it is equally true and equally -to be remembered that this interference of personal passion and -disinterested interest has defaced the noblest causes and made flow -endless torrents of fanaticism and persecution. A personality in which -the universal was perfectly incarnated in the individual would be in -truth a God amongst men. And it is probably a more likely occurrence -that where the individual as such arrogates to himself the privilege of -the universal, there should be seen not the deeds of the god, but the -ebullitions of the beast that is in man. - -A personality, then, in popular language, and perhaps also in popular -philosophy, is the living and conscious individual in whom general -forces, truths, or ideas become real, active, efficient forces, -truths, and ideas. And the importance of the conception resides in the -safeguard thus supposed to arise, which will prevent the realities of -the world from being dissipated away into the endless and restless -flux of the terms of thought, - - 'La bufera infernal che mai non resta.' - -To such a common frame of mind ideas, truths, forces are vacant, -ghostly forms, devoid of true life and reality: to get such they need -blood and flesh to clothe them, to give them substance and power. Now -Hegel, no less than those who offer this criticism, regards ideas -(in the ordinary sense of that term), truths and forces, also as -abstractions which need something to make them powers in the real -world of nature and the ideal world of mind. Hegel, like Schelling, -has a sublime contempt for mere universals. But as to the something -else, there is a divergence of view. Two well-known answers are given -by the popular philosophy known as materialism or spiritualism: two -systems which are probably not so wide apart as the contrast of -their names might imply. According to the former, thinking, ideas, -truths, goodness and beauty are special functions (the grosser -materialists say secretions) of a special kind of matter--of something -which is accessible to ordinary mechanical and chemical tests, but -which exhibits also, in certain cases, the exceptional phenomena of -consciousness. Here the essential reality is a something, permanent -and essentially indestructible,--something which no man has seen, -nor indeed can see,--but which is called Matter. The spiritualistic -philosopher (as distinguished from the _idealist_) regards as the -essential realities in the universe what he calls spirits. What these -are, also, nobody has as yet (any more than in Kant's time[5]) given -any very authoritative account, but so far as the quasi-scientific -expositions in regard to them throw any general light on the subject, -we may say that they suggest only a differently-constituted matter, a -matter e. g. of less or more dimensions than that we are most familiar -with. - -Now the advocate of spiritual reality, who protests most strongly -against the injury done to personality by reducing it to something -fluid and not fixed, something in process and not in persistent -substance, seems mostly to lean to a quasi-spiritualistic hypothesis, -or to the--so-called--higher materialism. He is an advocate of what we -may describe as the soul-thing, of a permanent, (he would even hold, -an absolutely permanent) substance or substratum of psychical reality -which, no doubt, exhibits certain properties, but is always more than -any one, or any mere series of its phenomena. It has been said, indeed, -by one who spoke with authority that he that will save his soul shall -lose it, and he that will lose it shall find it. But this has always -been a hard saying, which has been as far as possible explained away -by exegesis. Yet its moral import is not so very far removed from its -philosophical equivalent. The true life is not that of self-seeking -pleasure, but the life spent in the service of truth and love, the -life dedicated to impersonal interests, and ideal good. So also the -reality of the human soul as we first know it lies not in itself, but -in its transfiguration, its purification, and liberation to higher -forms of being. The Soul, in its first avatar in each of us, is after -all of the earth, earthy, unless it continue on that path of growth -and development on which it has entered. It is as Aristotle said, and -said well, the first actualisation[6]--the proximate ideality of an -organic body. In soul organic body carries out its promise: in soul we, -the observers, or untrained psychologists, note our first awareness of -mental life in its organic environment. But there are other grades, -other heights of achievement, yet set before the principle of life, -which is more than mere life and mere soul: or soul contains a germ -which must bear higher fruit. To be itself, or to become all that it in -promise and potency contains, it must dispossess itself of what clings -to it and possess itself of what is its own; and so transmute its first -phase into one more adequate. The soul is, as Hegel has said, the -awakening of mind from the sleep of nature[7]: it is nature gathering -itself out of its absorption in its dispersion, the breath of life and -feeling striving through the scattered members of the material world, -and finding itself at first half-asleep, a pervading, unifying current -that flows through and makes continuous the various portions of the -universe. It is the earliest real, felt unity in which the logical or -synthetic pulse--as yet purely potential in Nature, and only surmised -by science--re-appears in the actual concrete world. And as the -earliest, it is, like first loves, what one clings to hardest as our -prime and fundamental _differentia._ Here at least we are something--a -centre of being, and not a mere centreless expanse of extension: -something emerging from the world of silence and of night--something in -which each feels - - 'I am not what I see, - And other than the things I touch.' - -And that something we would not lose, at any cost.--But the only way -not to lose it, is to use it as a stepping-stone to higher things. The -metaphor, indeed, like metaphors in general, must not be pressed too -far. For it is more than a stepping-stone and it is never left behind -as a mere dead self: there is - - 'Nothing of it that doth fade - But doth suffer a sea-change - Into something rich and strange.' - -And that richer result into which it is transformed is the -consciousness of a self, and the intelligence which wills and knows. - -If it be asked in what respects the result is richer, the answer is -as follows. The soul,--this 'first entelechy--is exclusive, and it -is immersed in its natural limits of organic life. It has yet to go -through the school of self-detachment, the process of 'erecting itself -above itself'; and of thus extending its view and its range of control -over a wider field of objects. Gradually it attains to the rank of a -consciousness before which is unrolled the spectacle of a world of -objects set over against it, and even of a world within it; itself as -an object deposed to the rank of something to be surveyed. As such, -it seems almost to have left all immersion in corporeity completely -behind, and to have completely divested itself of any limitation. It -floats freely above the real psychical life out of which it emerged--a -detached but somewhat shadowy self, not burdened by any restrictions -of nature or circumstance. As such a mere Ego, or logical self--as the -mere theatre on which the play of ideas takes place, it surveys its -real psychical self far below; it finds itself as a strange sort of -thing, and says _This was me_ (which however is not exactly the same -as _I am I_, I = I). Yet it was a great step to have thus ceased to be -absorbed in its qualities, to be the mere breath of life and feeling, -stirring in its several affections and modifications. In order to -get forward, it was necessary to recoil a little: to save itself--and -that must mean to get itself in fuller and richer being--the mind had, -as it were, to measure and realise the full depth of its nonentity, -and to surrender all that it had hitherto clung to as its own. In an -attitude of reflection upon itself it fancies that it is the empty -room, the _tabula rasa_, on which experience is to write itself: but -in its secret heart it retains the faith and acts upon it, that it is -the power of intelligent and intelligible unity which makes the writing -intelligible, if it does not even itself play the writer. What it now -seems to find--what fills up its consciousness, presumed empty and -merely receptive,--it gradually recognises to be its very and original -own. Through labour and experiment it fills up the vacant form (the -passive half of itself to which it deposed itself) of consciousness; -and thus, as an intelligent self, a true mind, it has for itself and -realises as in itself all the life and reality which in its earlier -stage of soul it only was and felt itself naturally to be. But on this -stage of free intelligence it is no longer bound up with its natural -being in such a way as to feel itself a fixed and restricted centre, -sunk in the living environment so as to see no further, and to deem -itself in its seclusion the permanent reality, the exclusive fact. -It is no longer exclusive and self-concentrated, but inclusive and -all-embracing. It is no longer a mere consciousness--a mere receptive -and synthetic unity of apperception--but a reason and a mind. And a -reason and a mind already refuse to be narrowed and confined by the -same limits as seem appropriate to the soul. In the province of free -self-realised intelligence we at least seem to occupy a ground on -which others can equally come,--to have nothing peculiar or merely -individual. In Knowledge, which is reasoned perception, and in Will, -which is reasoned impulse, there is a king's highway, a public forum, -where souls meet and converse and perform a collective work;--and -in both _mere_, i. e. essentially restricted, individuality is at a -discount[8]. - -Such would be the course of development if we looked at it only in the -inwardness or subjectivity of psychical, conscious, and intelligent -life. But an analogous or parallel development may be observed if we -look at man as an active, i. e. a practical and moral being, a being -who makes Nature his own, stamps it with his title of possession, and -who gives to his fellowship with other souls an objective, outward -existence in the forms and institutions of social life. Here too -his first achievement is the affirmation of his individuality, the -distinction in outward and tangible shape of the Mine from the Thine: -the creation of property, and the projection of himself in a world of -mutually-recognised personalities. As the individual soul in the inner -life, so the personal being with its property is the solid, insoluble -basis of the life in public--the field of social ethics. The same -instinct, which in its dread of dissolution clings to the perpetuity -of the inner nucleus of soul, upholds the other as containing the -stable and eternal security of all social well-being. The immortality -of soul in the inner world: the sacro-sanctity of property in the -outer. But if these postulates are to be permitted, if individuality -and personality are to abide, they must, in the one case as in the -other, bow to the law of development, the law of history and of life. -They must correct themselves, re-adjust themselves,--include what they -excluded, and re-combine their elements, transmute themselves into -what we have, after Hegel, called their _truth_: must redintegrate -themselves with suppressed correlatives, and carry out their -implications of larger unity. The soul, exclusive and fast-clad in -its mere organic vestment, in which it is as yet only the name and -form of intellectual life, has first of all to retract itself into -the bare abstract consciousness, or mere self, on which the masses -of reality stream, to fill its vacant rooms and empty forms up with -ideas. So too the person--that close concretion or coalescence of mind -with material--that identification of self with its 'clothes,' its -property and all it can vulgarly be said to _own,_ is only an aspect -of truth which tends to be over-estimated when it is reflected upon, -and must notwithstanding be over-ridden and merged. Withdrawing itself -from its clothing of earth and water, and even perhaps from its inner -mansion of flesh and bone, personality floats in the free air as the -impersonal personality of conscience,--the ethereal realm where pure -practical reason rules. In that ether where morals reign absolutely is -the home of the categorical imperative, of the Stoical law of duty, -of the conscience which, here at least, has might as it has right. It -too, like its parallel, consciousness, in the inner mental life, has, -or seems to have, all its fulfilment from without. As even Kant admits, -it is itself a vacant form; yet a form of such influence as to impress -on whatever comes within its range an obligation to be universal and to -be uniform. Here too, as in the parallel stage, it was of inestimable -importance that mind should, in the socio-ethical sphere, see itself -supreme in its innermost dignity and personality,--the personality -which lies within,--even though that supremacy were at first no better -than as a law, a form, a category, recognised as authoritative and -imperative. For conscience, like the field of consciousness, is after -all only a quasi-passive self--a remarkable property or endowment, -a sort of innate principle or idea by which the mind was seen to be -distinguished in a unique way from all things else. To realise once -for all the fact that consciousness and conscience form an absolute -tribunal from which there can be no appeal: that the 'synthetic unity -of apperception' in the theoretical, and the 'autonomy of the rational -will' in the practical sphere, are the ultimate and final _a priori_: -this is a great thing to do,--even though it only expands and defines -the Cartesian principle of clear and distinct ideas, and will remain as -Kant's title of honour in the history of philosophy. He thus fenced off -or consecrated the sanctuary of the mental and moral life. - -But it was not enough to set apart the sacred principle, the central -hearth-fire of truth and goodness. If at an earlier stage,--earlier, -i.e. in this logical analysis,--the formal was wholly sunk in the -material, if i. e. the mere series of legal formulae in their hard -and brittle outlines were absolutely identified--without doubt or -hesitation--with the morally and socially good; the formal side, or -mere spirit and will of good, the abstract principle of morality, -is now invested with an equally undue prominence. The actual or -concrete ethical community--be it family or state, or other social -organisation--is animated and maintained by a spirit which transcends -and includes alike the outward shell of civil law and the inward law -of conscience. For, curiously enough, as it may seem at first, both -conscience and civil legislation assume the form of imperative and -definite commands--laws political or civil, and laws moral. Both fall -therefore into an inflexibility, a rigorous and mechanical hardness in -their enouncements. Both worship the lord of what men call logic, i. -e. of formal consistency and formal uniformity, to an excess which -sometimes issues in fantastic irregularities. Their several maxims of -legal conformity and of duty for duty's sake are in first appearance -excellent: but a further reflection shows that the Law covers a good -many inconsistent or at least unrelated laws within its code, and Duty -is often sadly to seek in presence of the collisions between what offer -themselves as _prima facie_ duties in any given case. The amplest code -of laws that ever existed will always leave lots of loop-holes for -negligence and villainy, and would never work for an instant, were it -not for ever supplemented by the spirit of faith and love, by social -piety and political loyalty, by the thousand ties of sentiment and -feeling which really vivify its dry bones. So too the abstractions -of the conscientious imperative, of the law of duty, of the moral -tribunal, of the man within the breast, and of the dignity and beauty -of human nature, would effect nothing unless they could always tacitly -count on the support of recognised and authoritative social law and -usage. Outward rests upon inward; and rules direct feelings. - -Here, again, as in the purely intellectual or cognitive sphere, it -is evident that the spirit of man has its source of life neither in -its abstract self-hood (in consciousness and conscience) nor in its -mere natural environment and organic endowment (in sense-affections, -and social law and usage), but in the unity of both,--a unity which -transcends either. Both individual and society live and grow, because -they are continuous and one: because they presuppose an ideal unity -or a living Idea at the root of their being, as their inner and -essential guiding-principle, at once constitutive and regulative of -their action. The machinery of language supplies to the intellectual -sphere a sort of sensible meeting-ground and common field in which -the development of knowledge becomes possible: and the same purpose -is subserved in the social sphere by the machinery of ethical and -political forms and institutions. These are the field, the home of -freedom, as the other are of knowledge. It is in these collective and -objective structures that we get the expression of the law of human -development: the visible sign, viz. of the essentially universal nature -of the individual. The individual in these attains his relative truth: -for they show the weakness of the individuality of the mere individual. -They show that his exclusiveness, his quasi-originality, is only an -appearance:--confronted, no doubt, by an appearance of an opposite -character, as if the originality and the reality lay in the environment -and the collective body. They point therefore beyond and behind both -foci to a common centre or inclusive unity of life. - -But they do not destroy personality and individuality: they only -transform it and made it a more adequate and consistent representation -of reality, by giving in it a place to factors or 'moments' which, -though always effective, were not recognised as constitutive elements, -and treated only as externally interfering agencies. It may be a -question, of course, how far it is wise to retain the term after -its meaning has thus been altered by expansion and redistribution -of elements. On the whole it seems impracticable--and it would be -undesirable, perhaps, even if it were more feasible--to be too hard -and fast in our use of denotations. It is hardly the province of -philosophy to coin new terms in which to deposit the results of her -researches. A term no doubt--particularly if, as the phrase runs, it be -luckily discovered, or judiciously selected--may save the expenditure -of thought. But it is hardly the business of philosophy to encourage -economy in this direction. Much more is it the perpetual task of -philosophy to counteract the ossification that sets in in terms,--to -reinterpret the meaning which is absorbed in these 'counters of -thought,' and make them once more sterling money for the market of -life. What, for instance, is the work of Aristotle's Ethics, but to -set free the genii which the black magic of every-day intercourse has -incarcerated in the non-significant Greek term Εὐδαιμονία? Like our own -Happiness, it flits from lip to lip, little better than a mere name, -which is still prized, but--except for a few synonyms that are equally -vague with itself--is attached to things which a little reflection -shows it cannot truly denote. Aristotle seeks--we may say--to define -it. But the phrase 'definition' seems barely applicable to the complex -process thus implied,--a process of which definition, as ordinarily -understood, is only one small portion. For to define happiness, is to -reconstruct the conception. Or, to be more accurate, it is really to -construct it or reproduce in consciousness its construction. As it -stands, the thing to be defined is a name and a thing, of which certain -relations to other things soon begin to show themselves, which is more -or less similar to one thing, and more or less to be distinguished from -another. To mark it off from these co-terminous things, and to show how -they are related to it on different sides,--this would be what we may -perhaps call strict, or formal, or nominal, or _mere_ definition. - -Now whatever be the other uses of such definitions--and they are -serviceable at the outgoing in any branch of enquiry,--they are -not precisely the work we expect a philosopher to do for us. And -assuredly it is not Aristotle who would stop short at that sort of -definitions. We find accordingly that for the purpose of realising -what happiness--the common name for human good--means, he is obliged -to bring into the field the whole system of his thought in its -cardinal notions of Energy, Soul, &c. Aristotle here as elsewhere -retraces the path of thought which carries us from mere, vulgar, -inadequately-apprehended happiness (he follows the same process in his -treatment of pleasure, friendship &c.--to take only ethical examples) -to true, essential and completely-apprehended happiness,--or, to use -Hegel's technical phrases, from happiness as it is _an-sich_ (in or -at itself) or as it is _für-sich_ (for or to itself), to happiness as -it is _an-und-für-sich._ In so 'defining' happiness Aristotle is thus -obliged to bring in his conceptions of man and of society, of human -life and its powers, of natural and acquired faculty, of mind in its -relations to nature; and if not to expound, at least to employ, his -fundamental categories of philosophical thought. Such a machinery can -hardly be called less than a construction, i. e. a re-construction by -conscious effort of the latent but actual concatenation of the elements -in the fact. - -In this case we traverse the distance which separates mere happiness -from true happiness, from happiness imperfectly or abstractly conceived -to happiness adequately and concretely conceived. Of course when we say -real or true happiness, we use these terms as they are used within the -ordinary range of human speech. An ultimate and absolute in truth and -reality is for us at any given time only a comparatively or relatively -ultimate and absolute. It is that which, so far as we can see and -think (all philosophising presumably goes on under this stipulation, -tacit or express), gives an expression, an interpretation, a meaning -and a construction to reality which leaves no feature unrecognised, no -contradiction unsolved, no discord unreconciled, which leaves nothing -outside and alien to it, and suppresses without acknowledgment nothing -that has ever been recognised within it. It is, if you like so to -call it, the completest, or (if you are really in earnest with your -philosophising and have carried it on to what for you is the end) the -complete formula of the Absolute--of that which in a transcendent sense -_is,_ is _all,_ is the infinite and eternal _one._ Yet, after all, it -is a formula. But here that undying adversary of all thought steps -in and says A _mere_ formula. And to that we must here as elsewhere -rejoin: No, not a mere formula. A mere formula would be not even a -formula,--a formula only in name--and with no reality which it served -to formulate. It is a real and true formula, if it be a formula at all, -and not something which merely swaggers about under that title. Nay -more, if it be a true and real formula, it is the truth and the reality -in its day and generation, until at least a truer truth and a more real -reality shall have been discovered. Let us by all means be modest: but -there is a false humility which becomes no man and is the guise of -hypocrisy or insincere sincerity. Let us--in other words--never assume -that 'we are the men, and that wisdom will die with us': but equally -let us hold fast the faith of reason that what we know as true and -real can never be false, i. e. utterly false, however much it may turn -out one day to be surmounted. And, on the other hand, let us equally -remember that in the mere and abstract commencement--the unreal and -the untrue, as we must perforce style it by contrast with the (_pro -tempore_) truth and reality--there is no utter and sheer error or -unreality. It has always been felt to be one of the most loveable sides -of Aristotelianism--this recognition of the reasonableness of all -actual fact, or of the truth latent in the honest, though narrow and -ill-defined judgments of the mass. - -Thus, coming back to personality, let us admit that the _mere_ -personality which at first sight seemed only worth rejecting, is -an element, at least, in true personality,--or is a part which, -because an organic member and no mere mechanical part, is full of -traces and indications which involve and postulate the whole. The -true personality and the true individuality of being is something -which presupposes for its completeness the social state--the organic -community. It is no doubt familiar to us that, according to an old -but never quite dormant view, the collective community is but the -aggregate or congeries of individuals. But the individuals whose -aggregation makes the community are themselves products of the social -union. Complete, all-round, harmonious personality, it is sometimes -said, is the highest fruit to be yielded by social development. Or, -as the last century would have preferred to put it, the main or sole -aim of the State is furtherance towards Humanity--to the stature of -the perfect man. And these are true sayings,--but perhaps only half -true. If all must grow so that one and each may grow, so and not less -must each one grow so that the all--the commonwealth of reason and -the kingdom of God--may be more and more present, 'may come.' And -that kingdom only comes when All is in Each, and Each is in All: and -when, without loss or diminution, each is each and all is all. Then -and not till then does personality become true and infinite, free and -harmonious individuality, which is in the same instant universality. -The monad--to use the language of the great Idealist who did not find -individuality at all incompatible with universality--never ceases to -be a monad: it is eternal and indestructible, an absolute centre of -being. The monad in its individual measure 'expresses' or 'envelops' -the Infinite or Absolute: it is, i. e. under a subjective limitation, -identical with the absolute, a concentration or condensation of it -into an impenetrable, i. e. literally an individual, point,--but a -point which is in the psychical or intellectual world never entirely -_carens recordatione,_ or oblivious of its essential totality. But if -the monad 'expresses' the Absolute, it no less concords or sympathises -in harmonious development with all its congeners, the other monads: so -that while it neither interferes with them, nor suffers violence from -them, it yet exists and acts in an ideal identity, that is, in a real -fellowship, with them. Again, the monad has what may be called its -side of passivity, but passivity here does not mean _mere_ passivity, -but rather the essential limitation due to its special and peculiar -stand-point--a limitation which in the higher orders of being becomes -transparent or is transcended. How far Leibniz succeeds in reconciling -this apparent contradiction--how far even any one can reveal the mystic -indwelling of universal and individual in each other, this is a serious -question in its place: but it is only bare justice to Leibniz to say -that he at least never failed to emphasise both aspects of reality, -and that if one 'moment' is predominant and fundamental in his work it -is not the monad, but the Monad of Monads. If necessity be the right -word to express the relation of the Universal Law to the individual -being and to affirm that the individual is not a loose self-supporting -unit (and Leibniz, far from thinking so, always uses in its stead the -phrase _inclinat, non necessitat_[9], to emphasise the immanence of -law, or the autonomy of every completed being), then Leibniz is not -less, but more necessitarian than Spinoza. His difference from Spinoza, -in fact, lies mainly, if not solely, in his clearer recognition of -the transcendence, no less than the immanence, of the Absolute, which -Spinoza has somewhat veiled under the apparent insignificance of the -difference between _natura naturans_ and _natura naturata._ Yet the -Monad of Monads is no supra-mundane, or _merely_ transcendent God. - -But if we further ask whether such personality is attainable in the -world of experience and describable in terms of thought--whether there -be any actual and visible agent possessed of this true personality, -as we have agreed to call it, we are in face with a higher stage of -the problem of personality. And that question in other words brings -us back to where we began. A true and real personality, a complete -individuality is something which so transmutes all that we are most -accustomed to call by that name that it is hardly any use clinging to -it, unless to protest against the danger of mistaking such expansion -and transmutation to be only a blank negation. Yet to cling to it too -much involves a danger for the true recognition of that transcendent's -universality. All human personality, all natural individuality is, as -Lotze has eloquently pointed out[10], something which falls far short -of what it professes to be. But in the general failure to unite the -universal with the particular, or the fact with the idea, there are -degrees; and we can at least affirm so much as this that the truest -individuality and the most real personality is not that which is least -permeated by thought, but that in which thought has had the largest -share. Individuality is something more than a mere sum of general -qualities;--that is certainly the fact; but it is not less the fact, -that for us an individuality and personality is more perfect and true -in proportion as more general function and universal character coalesce -into harmony and power in it. Assert then the initial presence and -virtue of individuality and personality in the human soul: but remember -that it has this virtue, not for what it is, but for what it promises -and may reasonably be expected to be, and that, to realise the promise, -it has to behave inclusively, rather than exclusively, gather up into -itself and make its own all content, rather than set itself up in -reserve and isolation. - -We have seen that the social organisation, animated as it is by the -moral idea, is rather the arena on which the true union of mind and -matter, of idea and nature, of thought and fact may be worked for, than -itself the fruition of such an effort. All-important is the State; -all-important the ethical idea which pervades it. But the world of -freedom--the ideal world so far made actual--is not what it promised -to be. 'Is it not,' said Plato, 'the nature of things that the actual -should always lack the perfection of theory?' In the visible world the -State, indeed, rules supreme: 'it is,' as Hegel might say in the words -of his great predecessor in political theory, 'that Leviathan or mortal -God to whom under the immortal God we owe our welfare and safety.' But -there is something in the State which the State in its palpable reality -cannot adequately express. If it is highest in the hierarchy of this -world, the lowest in the ideal kingdom of the Absolute is higher than -it. Above the State as the embodiment and the guarantee of the moral -life, there is the realm of Art, Religion, and Philosophy. In them -man's craving for individuality and personality finds a satisfaction it -could never hope for below them: they at least restore the truth and -reality of man's life and of the universe in a measure far exceeding -what even morality could do. If we ask then what Art, Religion, and -Science have to show of Personality or true realised individuality, -the answer is briefly as follows. Had it not been that august names -have spoken of imitation as the essence of Art-work, we should hardly -have deemed it possible that men should speak of Realistic Art. Yet -here, as in Religion and in Science, the epithet is introduced to guard -against a misconception of the province of Idealism. All Art, all -Religion, all Science, are and must be idealistic: but they can never -be--as the familiar phrase puts it--merely idealistic, i. e. visionary, -fantastic, unreal. All of them, in other words, may be said to show -us 'the light that never was on sea or land'--the heavenly city--the -eternal truth of things. But they must, on their peril, show it here -and now, and not in a pretended or other world. They must--no less than -law and morality--work in terrestrial materials, and not with superfine -celestialities. _Mentem mortalia tangunt._ It is out of the oldest and -commonest realities of life and death that the poet and the painter -make the melodies of heaven sound in our ears, and gladden us with -the rays of the empyrean. It is out of the hard rock of the real that -the artist's rod must strike the well-spring of the ideal. So too, in -like manner, a religion must show the Divine, but show Him immanent: -an immanence which, on one hand, shall not drag Godhead down to the -level of casual reality, nor on the other set Him far off in lonely -transcendence. - -The aesthetic faculty, awakened as it is by the natural response of -man's perceptions to the harmonies of existence, to the spontaneous -coherency of its many parts in a united whole, and stimulated by the -creative work of human art, which moulds even the naturally discordant -or unconnected into a concordant expression (sometimes it may be, -as in handicraft, only to satisfy human needs), lifts us above the -imperfections and fragmentariness of things, above our selfish interest -in them, into a frame of mind where they are seen whole and perfect, -and yet one and veritably individual. In its supreme or comprehensive -phase it does not deal merely with the beautiful, nor merely with -the beautiful and sublime. All true art, whether it awakes awe or -admiration, laughter or tears, whether it melts the soul, or steels it -to endurance, has a common characteristic; and that is to raise the -single instance, the prosaic or commonplace fact, into its universal, -eternal, infinite significance. It frees the fact from the limitations -which our distractions, our practicality, our temporary hopes and -fears, have deeply stamped upon it. It is still, after art has dealt -with it, to all appearance a single fact: but it now has the universe -behind it and within it. It carries us away from the incompleteness, -the pressure of externals, the solicitude for the future and the -regrets for the past, into a self-contained, self-satisfying totality, -into freedom and leisure, rest which is not stolid, and action which -involves no toil. Such a result is partly, as was said, the gift -of common nature, which speaks peace, comfort, joy, self-possessed -fruition for all her children when their sense is open and free: partly -it comes through those select ones among these children who have a -larger perception of the meaning and inner truth of her works, and who -can by a sensible reconstruction, which if it is fair and successful -will only bring out more clearly the unity and harmony which deeper -insight detects, help others to see and enjoy what they have felt and -rejoiced over. Such are the poets--in the widest sense--the makers, the -seers, who in verse, in music, in picture and sculpture--who, in human -lives, it may be even in the conduct of their own, show us how divine a -thing is nature and humanity: show us the secret and unheard harmonies -that to the full-opened ear absorb and transmute the lower discords of -life and vulgar reality. It is they who give immortality and divinity, -who make heroes and demigods[11]. Or, if they may not be said to make -them, they half-reveal and half-construct the ideal figures which stand -high and beneficent in the history of the world. And by those who -thus half-construct, and half-reveal, are meant not merely the single -artists in whom the process culminates to final outline and publicity, -but the many-voiced poesy of the collective human heart which out of -its myriad elemental springs constitutes the total figure, the august -image of the hero, and the saint, lending him from its plenitude all -that his abstract self seemed to want. It is on the tide of national -and human enthusiasm that the individual artist is lifted up to realise -the full significance of his ideal figure, and his imaginative craft -can only be inspired by the vigour and warmth of the collective passion -for noble ends and high action. - -Nowhere it would seem is the ideal of personality and many-sided -individuality more adequately realised. Here, at last, the whole truth -of life, the indwelling of individual and universal in one body, seems -to be realised. But it is realised in an ideal. It is--if we analyse -it--a synthesis of three elements; partly in the material reality which -serves as bodily vehicle; partly in the conception and technique of the -artist; partly in the general mind which inspires both the material -and the form with its own larger life. It is--as its name implies--an -artificial product--a synthesis of elements which tend to fall apart. -Technique varies, conceptions lose their interest, the tone of general -culture alters, and materials are dependent on locality. When that -happens, the work of art is left high and dry: no longer a living -God, but a dead idol, still wondrous, but speaking no more its human -language. - -So it is with the heroic figures who rise into the purer air of -universal history. They also--so far as they live with a personal -power--are works of art: works of real-idealism. For all history which -deserves the name, and is not mere abstract dry-as-dust chronicle (as -to the possibility of which utter aridity there may be legitimate -doubts), is a work of fiction or invention, of reconstruction. It -seeks to understand its characters. But to understand them it is not -(and as historical art cannot be) content with a mere reference to -motives acting on them from outside. It seeks to understand them with -and in their times--to see in them the full measure of contemporary -life and thought which elsewhere has found so meagre expression. Such -is the artistic completion of personality in the ideal,--whether in -what is called history, or what is called art. It exaggerates a truth, -because it loses sight of the background. And that background, which -helps to constitute such ideal personality, is no constant element. -The centuries and generations as they roll contribute their varying -quota to set, as they say, the historical character in its true light, -in its fulness and truth of reality. And thus this personality of -the great leaders of human life is only an image and a sign--a fruit -of development, no bare fact which remains unchanged and always the -same. It is rather a personification than a personality. It incarnates -the living spirit who is universal and eternal in the limits of a -sensuously-defined individual, and indeed incarnates there only so much -as the generation it speaks to can see of complete truth. It is only -after all a vehicle of truth; though a nobler vehicle than social and -personal ethics can afford. - -As it is felt that the treasure of the idea--that the full power of -spiritual life--cannot be adequately stored in the earthen vessels -of mortality, the consummation of personality is forced to recede -into the invisible if it would be still conceived as attainable. -'True personality,' says Lotze, 'is with the Infinite,' What here is -fragmentary, is there a rounded total, a perfect unity: He alone is -absolutely self-determining, self-explaining: is all that He means to -be, and means all that He is. In a sense, philosophy does not hesitate -to countersign all this. But, in adopting it, philosophy must reserve -the right of noting the danger and the ambiguity of such language. -Religion does well, philosophy may say, in thus insisting upon the -dependence of all appearance on one Absolute reality; but it is well -also not to forget that all appearance is also the appearance of that -reality or Absolute. And in so saying, be it added, philosophy assumes -no essential superiority to religion. Religion in its fulness, and -apart from any theories that may grow up under its wing, is more than -theory, more than mere philosophy: it is the consummating unity of -life--the enthusiasm and supreme power of life, its consecration and -divinisation by its assured immanence in the eternal and universal. -It is, in short, as was long ago said of it, the true life, the light -which is the light and life of men; and its inspiring principles are -faith, hope, and love. But when unassisted religion proceeds to set -before itself the meaning and lesson of its life, when it proceeds to -formulate a theory of the world and set out a scheme of world-history, -it trespasses on the field of knowledge, and is amenable to the -criticisms of the reflective spirit--the spirit of philosophy. And -that criticism briefly is to the effect that the religious theory -in its ordinary form is an imperfect interpretation of the religious -experience. Nor is this to derogate from the prerogative of the friends -of God. It is only to criticise the formulae and phrases of dogmatic -theology--a theology, however, which is as old as religion itself, -and which takes different forms from age to age, and from one level -of thought to another, always in its measure translating religious -reality, truth, or experience into the categories, naive or artificial, -simple or complex, of the science (it may be the pseudo-science) of -the time. Philosophy, therefore, is the criticism of the science of -God--that is of theology--as it is the criticism of other sciences. -For criticism philosophy always is: always the reflection upon fixed -dogma, and the discussion of it till it becomes sensible of its -defects, and stands upon another and higher plane. And to some it may -seem that this is the sole function which philosophy can legitimately -undertake. 'Yet,' as Aristotle remarked, 'the good critic must know -what he criticises.' He must not merely reflect upon it from outside, -but deal with it from the plenitude of experience, from the abundance -of the heart. If he be a critic then, he cannot be a mere critic, but -also an agent in the work of reconstruction. Or, if we put the thing -otherwise; though, as Fichte said (p. 28), philosophy is a different -thing from life, the true philosopher can never be a mere philosopher, -but must, if he is to reach the height of his vocation, have also -entered into the full experience of reality, into the whole truth of -life. His philosophy will then not be outside of religion and aesthetic -perception. In its comprehension of all grades and forms of reality and -truth, goodness, holiness, beauty, will have their place. He also will -be among the theologians. - -And when the philosopher deals with personality in this high, this -supreme sphere, he will submit that the truth of personality is -subordinate to the truth of spirituality. He will argue that by -sticking too closely and fixedly to personality we are running a risk -of bringing down the divine to the level of the human. If, with Dante, -he can say that in its very heart the Light Eternal - - 'Mi parve pinta della nostra effige;' - -he will undoubtedly add with Dante - - 'Oh quanto è corto 'l dire e come fioco - Al mio concetto;' - -or, with the first philosophical theologian who interpreted the -experience of Christian life, he will rise from the historical Jesus to -the inward witness of the Spirit. - - -[Footnote 1: The legal use of the distinction between 'real' and -'personal' is only partly 'logical,' and largely retains traces of -the larger logic of life and history. Yet, roughly speaking, personal -property is what we can, so to speak, carry on our backs or in our -pockets.] - - -[Footnote 2: See Spinoza, _Cogitata Metaph_., Pars II. cap. 8: 'Nec -fugit nos vocabulum (_Personalitatis_ scilicet) quod theologi passim -usurpant ad rem explicandam: verum quamvis vocabulum non ignoremus -eius tamen significationem ignoramus: quamvis constanter credamus, in -visione Dei beatissima Deum hoc suis revelaturum.' For Hegel, it may be -noted, Person, so far as he uses the term at all, bears its restricted -legal and juridical sense. A person is a free intelligence, which -realises that independence by appropriating an external thing as its -sign and property. It probably belongs therefore to a world in which -people count rather by what they _have_ than by what they _are_; the -world of law where rights and duties tend to oppose each other. This is -not the highest kind of world for human beings.] - -[Footnote 3: This one may call the Platonic ideal of the State, where -Equity rules supreme in the incarnate spirit of wisdom,--a guide -adapting its measures to circumstances, not tied down to the inflexible -letter of one law in an incoherent and imperfect code. See the -_Politicus_, p. 294; _Phaedrus,_ p. 275; and compare Aristotle's Wise -man whose conduct is not κατὰ λόγον but μετὰ λόγου.] - -[Footnote 4: See e. g. _Encyclopaedia_, § 475.] - -[Footnote 5: See his 'Dreams of a Spirit-seer, illustrated by Dreams of -Metaphysics.' (_Werke,_ ed. Ros. und Schub. Bd. VII. p. 38 sqq.)] - -[Footnote 6: It is perilous and misleading (said the ancient Graiae, -who dwell on the way to the Hesperides of philosophy) to interpret an -old system by the language of modern (and especially German) idealism. -It is much worse, replied Perseus, not to interpret it at all, but to -repeat its magic _ipsissima verba_,--carefully Latinised, as if they -belonged to a cabinet of fossils.] - -[Footnote 7: _Encyclopaedia_, §§ 387, 389.] - -[Footnote 8: The above is an attempt to give a very condensed synopsis -of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (_Encyclopaedia_).] - -[Footnote 9: See especially in the _Theodicee,_ part I. § 43 seqq. Cf. -Nouv. Ess. II. § 9, _incline sans necessiter:_ I. § 13, _La nécessité -ne doit pas être confondue avec la détermination._] - -[Footnote 10: _Microcosmus_, Book IX. chap. 4.] - -[Footnote 11: See the well-known passage in _Wilhelm Meisters -Lehrjahre__,_ Book II. chap. a.] - - - - -CHAPTER XIX. - - -GENESIS IN MENTAL LIFE. - - -Aristotle, who saw into the nature of abstract entities, remarked that -the mind was nothing before it exercised itself[1]. The mind,--and -the same will turn out true of many things else where it is at first -unsurmised,--is not a fixed thing, a sort of exceedingly refined -substance, which we can lay hold of without further trouble. It is what -it has become, or what it makes itself to be. This point, that 'To be' -= 'To have become,' or rather to have made itself, is an axiom never -to be lost sight of in dealing with the mind. It is easy to talk of -and about conscience and freewill, as if these were existing things -in a sort of mental space, as hard to miss or mistake as a stone and -an orange, or as if they were palpable organs of mind, as separately -observable as the eye or ear. One asks if the will is free or not, as -glibly as one might ask whether an orange is sweet; and the answer can -be given with equal ease, affirmatively or negatively, in both cases. -Everything in these cases depends on whether the will has made itself -free or not, whether indeed we are speaking of the will at all, and -on what we mean by freedom. To ask the question in an abstract way, -taking no account of circumstances, is one of those temptations which -lead the intellect astray and produce only confusion and wordy war--as -a good deal of so-called popular metaphysics has done. The mind and -its phenomena, as they are called, cannot be dissected with the same -calmness of analysis as other substances which adapt themselves to the -scalpel: nor is dissection after all more than a part of the scientific -process, subject to the control of the synthesis in physiology. - -The ordinary metaphysician makes his own task easy and his thoughtful -reader's a burden, by plunging too lightly _in medias res._ He wants -patience--often, perhaps, because he thinks too much of his reader's -impatience at analysis--to unravel the tangled mass which human -experience, when first looked at, presents. He is apt to catch at any -end which promises to effect a temporary clearance. True philosophy, -on the contrary, must show that it has got hold of what it means to -discuss: it has to construct its subject-matter: and it constructs it -by tracing every step and movement in its construction shown in actual -history. The mind is what it has been made and has made itself; and -to see what it is we must consider it not as an Alpha and Omega of -research, as popular conception and language tend to represent it, -but in the stages constituting its process, in the fluidity of its -development, in the elements out of which it results. We must penetrate -the apparent fixity and simplicity under which it comes forward, -and see through it into the process which bears it into being. For, -otherwise, the object of our investigation is taken, as if it were -the most unmistakable thing of sense and fancy,--as if everybody were -agreed that this and no other were the point in question. - -But in this matter of stability and the reverse, there is a broad -distinction between the natural and the spiritual world. In Nature -every step in the organisation, by which the Cosmos is developed, -has an independent existence of its own: and the lowest formation -confronts the highest, each standing by itself beside the other. -Matter and motion, for example, are not merely found as subordinate -elements entering into the making of a plant or an animal. They have -a free existence of their own: and the free existence of matter in -motion is seen in the shape of the planetary system. So, too, chemical -or electrical phenomena can be observed by themselves, operating in -spheres where they are untrammeled by the influence of biological -conditions. It seems, at least at first sight, to be different in -the case of mind. There the specific types or several stages in the -integrating process of mental development seem to have no substantive -existence in the earlier part of the range, and to appear only as -states or factors entering into, and merged in, the higher grades -of development. This causes a peculiar difficulty in the study of -mind. We cannot seize a formation in an independent shape of its -own: we must trace it in the growth of the whole. Mental fusion and -coalescence of elements is peculiarly close, and hardly leaves any -traces of its constituent factors[2]. Sensation, for instance, in its -purity, as mere sensation, is apparently something which we can never -study in isolation. All the sensation which we can, in the strictly -psychological (as opposed to the physiological) mode of study, examine, -i. e. which we can reproduce in ourselves, is more than mere sensation: -it includes elements of thought, and probably of desire and will. -This, of course, makes the difficulties of so-called introspection: -difficulties so great and real that they have provoked in natural -reaction a set against introspection altogether, and the adoption of -the external observation (physiological or so-called psycho-physical) -employed in the 'objective' sciences. And hence when we accept the -name, such as intellect, conscience, will, &c., as if it expressed -something specially existent in a detached shape of its own, we make -an assumption which it is impossible to justify. We are reckoning -with paper-money which belongs to no recognised currency, and may be -stamped as the dealer wills. The consequence is that the thing with -which we begin our examination is an opaque point,--a mere _terminus a -quo_, from which we start on our journey of explication, leaving the -_terminus_ itself behind us unexplained. - -The constituents of mind do not lie side by side tranquilly -co-existent, like the sheep beside the herbage on which it browses. -Their existence is maintained in an inward movement, by which, while -they differentiate themselves, they still keep up an identity. In -our investigations we cannot begin with what is to be defined. The -botanist, if he is to give us a science of the plant, must begin with -something whose indwelling aim it is to be itself and to realise its -own possibility. He must begin with what is not the plant, and end -with what is; begin, let us say, with the germ which has the tendency -to pass into the plant. The speculative science of biology begins with -a cell, and builds these cells up into the tissues and structures out -of which vegetables and animals are constituted. The object of the -science appears as the result of the scientific process: or, _a science -is the ideal construction of its object_. As in these cases, so in the -case of thought. We must see it grow up from its simplest element, from -the bare point of being, the mere speck of being which, if actually no -better than nothing, is yet a germ which in the air of thought will -grow and spread; and see it appear as a result due to the ingrowing and -outgrowing union of many elements, none of which satisfies by itself, -but leads onward from abstractions to the meeting of abstractions in -what is more and more concrete. The will and conscience, understanding -and reason, of man are not matter-of-fact units to be picked up and -examined. You must, first of all, make sure what you have in hand: and -to be sure of that is to see that the mind is the necessary outcome -of a course of development. The mind is not an immediate _datum,_ -with nothing behind it, coming upon the field of mental vision with -a divinely-bestowed array of faculties; but a mediated unity, i. e. -a unity which has grown up through a complex interaction of forces, -and which lives in differences through comprehending and reconciling -antagonisms. - -If the mind be not thus exhibited in its process, in the sum and -context of its relations, we may mean what we like with each mental -object that comes under our observation: but with as much right another -observer may mean something else. We may, of course, define as we -please: we may build up successive definitions into a consistent total: -but such a successful arrangement is not a real science. Unless we -show how this special form of mind is constituted, we are dealing with -abstractions, with names which we may analyse, but which remain as they -were when _our_ analysis is over, and which seem like unsubstantial -ghosts defying our coarse engines of dissection. They are not -destroyed: like immaterial and aery beings they elude the sword which -smites them, and part but to re-unite. The name, and the conception -bodied forth in it, is indeed stagnant, and will to all appearance -become the ready prey of analysis: but there is something behind -this materialised and solidified conception, this worn-out counter -or sign, which mere analysis cannot even reach. And that underlying -nature is a process or movement, a meeting of elements, which it is -the business of philosophy to unfold. The analyst in this case has -dealt with ideas as if they were a finer sort of material product, a -fixed and assailable point: and this is perhaps the character of the -generalised images, which take the place of thoughts in our customary -habits of mind. But ideas, when they have real force and life, are -not hard and solid, but, as it were, fluid and transparent, and can -easily escape the divisions and lines which the analytical intellect -would impose. Perhaps some may think that it is unwise to fight with -ghosts like these, and that the best plan would be to disregard this -war of words altogether. But, on the other hand, it may be urged that -such unsubstantial forms have a decided reality in life: that men will -talk of them and conjure by their means, with or without intelligence; -and that the best course is to understand them. It will then be seen -that it is our proper work as philosophers to watch the process, by -which the spiritual unity divides and yet retains its divided members -in unity. Even in the first steps we take to get a real hold of an -object we see this. To understand it, we must deprive it of its seeming -independence. Every individual object is declared by the logician to -be the meeting of two currents, the coincidence of two movements. It -concentrates into an undecompounded unit,--at least such it appears to -representative or material thought,--two elements, each of which it is -in turn identifiable with. The one of these elements has been called -the self-same (or identity), the universal, the genus, the whole: while -the second is called the difference, the particular, the part. And by -these two points of reference it is fixed,--by two points which are -for the moment accepted as stationary. What has thus been stated in -the technical language of Logic is often repeated in the scientific -parlance of the day, but with more materialised conceptions and in -more concrete cases. The dynamic theory of matter represents it as a -unity of attraction and repulsion. A distinguished Darwinian remarks -that 'all the various forms of organisms are the necessary products -of the unconscious action and reaction between the two properties of -adaptability and heredity, reducible as these are to the functions of -nutrition and reproduction[3]. The terms 'action and reaction' are -hardly sufficient, it may be, to express the sort of unity which is -called for: but the statement at least shows the reduction of an actual -fact to the interaction of two forces, the meeting of two currents. -The one of these is the power of the kind, or universal, which tends -to keep things always the same: the other the power of localised -circumstances and particular conditions, which tends to render things -more and more diversified. The one may be called a centripetal, the -other a centrifugal force. If the one be synthetic, the other is -analytic. But such names are of little value, save for temporary -distinction, and must never be treated as permanent differences which -explain themselves. The centre is relative, and so is the totality. - -Thus it is that the so-called Evolutionist explains the origin of -natural kinds. They are what they severally are by reason of a process, -a struggle, by alliances and divisions, by re-unions and selections. -They are not independent of the inorganic world around them: it has -entered into their blood and structure, and made them what they are. -To understand them we must learn all we can of the simpler and earlier -forms, which have left traces in their structure: traces which, -without the existence of such more primitive forms, we might have -misunderstood, or have passed by unperceived. And, again, we learn -that our hard and fast distinctions are barely justified by Nature. -There, kind in its extreme examples seems to run into kind, and we do -not find the logically-exact type accurately embodied anywhere. Our -classifications into genera and species turn out to be in the first -instance prompted by a practical need to embrace the variety in a -simple shape. But though perfectly valid, so far as we use them for -such ends, they tend to lead us false, if we press them too far. - -And when we have seen so much, we may learn the further lesson that -the variety of organisation, animal and vegetable, is only the -exhibition in an endless detail by single pictures, more or less -complementary, more or less inclusive of each other, of that one -vital organisation in principle and construction which we could not -otherwise have had presented to us. In a million lessons from the vast -ranges of contemporary and of extinct life there is impressed upon -the biological observer the idea of that system of life-function and -life-structure which is the goal of biological science. The interest -in the mere variety whether of modern or of primeval forms of life is -as such merely historical; its truer use is to enable the scientific -imagination to rise above local or temporary limitations. And thus in -the end the records and guesses of evolution in time and place serve -to build up a theory of the timeless universal nature of life and -organisation. - -And what is true of Nature is equally true of the Mind. For these -two, as we have already seen, are not isolable from each other. -Neither the mind nor the so-called external world are either of them -self-subsistent existences, issuing at once and ready-made out of -nothing. The mind does not come forth, either equipped or un-equipped, -to conquer the world: the world is not a prey prepared for the spider, -waiting for the mind to comprehend and appropriate it. The mind and -the world, the so-called 'subject' and so-called 'object,' are equally -the results of a process: and it is only when we isolate the terminal -aspects of that process, and in the practical business of life forget -the higher theoretical point of view, that we lose sight of their -origin, and have two worlds facing each other. As the one side or -aspect of the process gathers feature and form, so does the other. As -the depth and intensity of the intellect increases, the limits of the -external world extend also. For the psychical life is just the power -which maintains a continuing correlation between the body and its -environment, and between the various elements in that environment. It -is the unity in which that correlation lives and is aware of itself. -It is the subject-object, which sets one element against another, and -gives it quasi-independence. The mind of the savage is exactly measured -by the world he has around him. The dull, almost animal, sensation -and feeling, which is what we may call his mental action, is just the -obverse of the narrow circumference that girdles his external world. -The beauty and interest of the grander phenomena of terrestrial nature, -and of the celestial movements, are ideally non-existent for a being, -whose whole soul is swallowed up in the craving for food, the fear of -attack, and the lower enjoyments of sense. In the course of history we -can see the intellect growing deeper and broader, and the limits of the -world recede simultaneously with the advance of the mind. This process -or movement of culture takes place in the sequence of generations, and -in the variety of races and civilisations spread over the face of the -world. But here too, the higher science, not resting in the merely -historical inquiry, takes no interest in the medium of time, and merely -uses it to supply material for the rational sequence of ideas[4]. - -The objective world of knowledge is really at one with the subjective -world: they spring from a common source, what Kant called the 'original -synthetic unity of apperception.' The distinction between them flows -from abstraction, from failure to keep in view the whole round of -life and experience. The subjective world--the mind of man--is really -constituted by the same force as the objective world of nature: the -latter has been translated from the world of extension, with its -externality of parts in time and space, into an inner world of thought -where unity, the fusion or coalescence of all types and forms, is the -leading feature. The difficulty of passing from the world of being to -the world of thoughts, from notion to thing, from subject to object, -from Ego to Non-ego, is a difficulty which men have unduly allowed to -grow upon them. It grows by talking of and analysing _mere_ being, -_mere_ thought, _mere_ notion, or _mere_ thing. And it will be -dispelled when it is seen that there is no _mere_ being, and no _mere_ -thought: that these two halves of the unity of experience--the unity -we divide and the division we unify in every judgment we make--are -continually leaning out of themselves, each towards the other. But -men, beginning as they must from themselves, and failing to revise and -correct their stand-point till it became an _ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος,_ argued -from a belief that the individual mind was a fixed and absolute centre, -from which the universe had to be evaluated. In Hegel's words, they -made man and not God the object of their philosophy[5]. So that Kant -really showed the outcome of a system which acted on the hypothesis -that man in his individual capacity was all in all. Hegel, on his own -showing, came to prove that the real scope of philosophy was God;--that -the Absolute is the 'original synthetic unity' from which the external -world and the Ego have issued by differentiation, and in which they -return to unity. - -If this be so, then there is behind the external world and behind the -mind an organism of pure types or forms of thought,--an organism which -presents itself, in a long array of fragments, to the senses in the -world of nature, where all things lie outside of one another, and which -then is, as it were, reflected back into itself so as to constitute the -mind, or spiritual world, where all parts tend to coalesce in a more -than organic unity. The deepest craving of thought, and the fundamental -problem of philosophy, will accordingly be to discover the nature and -law of that totality or primeval unity,--the totality which we see -appearing in the double aspect of nature and mind, and which we first -become acquainted with as it is manifested in this state of dis-union. -To satisfy this want is what the Logic of Hegel seeks. It lays bare -the kingdom of those potent shades,--the phases of the Idea--which -embodies itself more concretely in the external world of body, and the -inward world of mind. The psychological or individualist conditions, -which even in the Kantian criticism sometimes seem to set up mind as an -entity parallel to the objects of nature, and antithetic to nature as -a whole, have fallen away. Reason has to be taken in the whole of its -actualisation as a world of reason, not in its bare possibility, not in -the narrow ground of an individual's level of development, but in the -realised formations of reasonable knowledge and action, as shown in Art -and Life, Science and Religion. In this way we come to a reason which -might be in us or in the world, but which, being to a certain extent -different from either, was the focus of two orders of manifestations. - -To ascertain that ultimate basis of the world and mind was the chief -thing philosophy had to see to. But in order to do this, a good deal -of preliminary work was necessary. The work of Logic, as understood -by Hegel, involves a stand-point which is not that of every-day life -or reflection on experience. It presupposes the whole process from -the provisional starting-point which seems at first sight simplest -and universally acceptable, upwards to the unhypothetical principle -which--though at a long distance--it involves and leads up to, or -presupposes. We all know Aristotle's dictum ᾽Εν τοῐς αὶσθητοῐς τὰ -νοητά ἐστιν: _Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu._ The fact -of sense and feeling _is_ the fact of experience: or rather the fact -and reality of experience is the underlying truth which the expression -of it in terms of sense and perception inadequately interprets. Even -in the principles of sensation there is judgment, thought, reasoning: -but it needs eliciting, re-statement, opening up, and explanation. -The Phenomenology of Mind is, as Hegel himself has said, his voyage of -discovery. It traces the path, and justifies the work of traversing -it, from the ill-founded and imperfect certainties of sense and -common-sense, up through various scientific, moral, and religious modes -of interpreting experience and expressing its net sum of reality, -till it culminates in the stand-point of 'pure thought,' of supreme -or 'absolute' consciousness. It is certainly not a history of the -individual mind: and equally little is it a history of the process of -the intellectual development of the race. In a way it mixes up both. -For its main interest is not on the purely historical side. It indulges -in bold transitions, in sudden changes of scene from ancient Greece -and Rome to modern Germany, from public facts and phases of national -life to works of fiction (compare its use of Goethe's _Faust_ and his -version of _Rameau's Nephew)._ It lingers--for historical accuracy and -proportion unduly--over the period of Kant and Fichte, and reads Seneca -by the light of the _Sorrows of Werther._ For its aim is to gather from -the inspection of all ways in which men have attempted to reach reality -the indication of their several content of truth, and of the several -defects from it, so as to show the one necessary path on which even all -their errors converge and which they serve to set out in clearer light. - -Hegel's philosophy is undoubtedly the outcome of a vast amount of -historical experience, particularly in the ancient world, and implies -a somewhat exhaustive study of the products of art, science, politics, -and religion. By experience he was led to his philosophy, not by -what is called _a priori_ reasoning. It is curious indeed to observe -the prevalent delusion that German philosophy is the 'high _priori_ -road,'--to hear its profundity admired, but its audacity and neglect of -obvious facts deplored. The fact is that without experience neither -Hegel nor anybody else will come to anything. But, on the other hand, -experience is in one sense only the yet undeciphered mass of feeling -and reality, the yet unexpounded psychical content of his life; or, -taken in another acceptation, it is only a form which in one man's case -means a certain power of vision, and in another a different degree. One -man sees the idea which explains and unifies experience as actuality: -to the other man it is only a subjective notion. And even when it is -seen, there are differences in the subsequent development. One man -sees it, asserts it on all hands, and then closes. Another sees it, -and asks if this is all, or if it is only part of a system. An appeal -to 'my experience' is very much like an appeal to 'my sentiments' or -'my feelings': it may prove as much or as little as can be imagined: -in other words, it can prove nothing. The same is true of the appeal -to consciousness, that oracle on whose dicta it has sometimes been -proposed to found a system of philosophy. By that name seems meant the -deliverances of some primal and unerring nucleus of mind, some real -and central self, whose voice can be clearly distinguished from the -mere divergent cries of self-interest and casual opinion. That such -discernment is possible no philosophy will seek to deny: but it is a -discernment which involves comparison, examination, and reasoning. -And in that case the appeal to consciousness is the exhortation to -clear and deliberate thinking. While, on another side, it hints that -philosophy does not--in the end--deal with mere abstractions, but with -the real concrete life of mind. And if an appeal to other people's -experience is meant, that is only an argument from authority. What -other people experience is their business, not mine. Experience -_means_ a great deal for which it is not the right name: and to give -an explanation of what it is, and what it does, would render a great -service to English methodologists. - -There are, however, two modes in which these studies to discover the -truth may appear. In the one case they are reproduced in all their -fragmentary and patch-work character. They are supposed to possess a -value of their own, and are enunciated with all the detail of historic -incident. The common-place books of a man are, as it were, published -to instruct the world and give some hint of the extent of his reading. -But, in the other case, the scaffolding of incident and externality -may be removed. The single facts, which gave the persuasion of the -idea, are dismissed, as interesting only for the individual student on -his way to truth: or, if the historical vehicle of truth be retained -at all, it is translated into another and intellectual medium. Such a -history, the quintessence of extensive and deep research, is presented -in the Phenomenology. The names of persons and places have faded from -the record, as if they had been written in evanescent inks,--dates -are wanting,--individualities and their biographies yield up their -place to universal and timeless principles. Such typical forms are -the concentrated essence of endless histories. They remind one of the -descriptions which Plato in his Republic gives of the several forms -of temporal government. Or, to take a modern instance, the Hegelian -panorama of thought which presents only the universal evolution of -thought,--that evolution in which the whole mind of the world takes the -place of all his children, whether they belong to the common level, -or stand amongst representative heroes,--may be paralleled to English -readers by Browning's poem of _Sordello._ There can be no question -that such a method is exposed to criticism, and likely to excite -misconception. If it tend to give artistic completeness to the work, -it also tantalises the outsider who has a desire to reach his familiar -standing-ground. He wishes a background of time and space, where the -forms of the abstract ideas may be embodied to his mind's eye. In most -ages, and with good ground, the world has been sceptical, when it -perceived no reference to authorities, no foot-notes, no details of -experiments made: nor is it better disposed to accept provisorily, and -find, as the process goes on, that it verifies itself to intelligence. - - - -[Footnote 1: _De Anima,_ iii. 4.] - -[Footnote 2: A philological parallel may make this clearer. 'The -Indo-German,' says Misteli _(__Typen des Sprachbaues,_ p. 363), -'embraces or condenses several categories in a single idea in a -way which though less logical is more fruitful; for in this way he -procures graspable totals with which he can work further, and not -patch-work which would crumble away in his hands. Our _He_ includes -four grammatical categories, which work not separately, but as a -whole:--third person, masculine gender, singular, nominative; whereas -the Magyar _ö_ is the vehicle only of one category, the third person, -which is either determined as singular by the context, or as plural -by the addition of _k_: gender in these languages does not exist: and -as subject again _ö_ is specially interpreted from the context. The -unification of the four categories makes _He_ an individual and a word; -the generality and isolation of one category makes _ö_ an abstract and -a stem.'] - -[Footnote 3: Häckel, _Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte_, p. 157.] - -[Footnote 4: See above, pp. 155, 198.] - -[Footnote 5: Hegel's _Werke,_ vol. i. p. 15.] - - - - -CHAPTER XX. - - -GENERAL LAW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. - - -'The order and concatenation of ideas,' says Spinoza, 'is the same as -the order and concatenation of things[1].' The objective world at least -of acts and institutions develops parallel with the growth and system -of men's ideas. In the tangled skein which human life and reality -present to the observer, the only promising clue is to be found in the -process by which in history the past throws light on the present and -gets light in return. There in the stream of time and in the expanses -of space the condensed results, the hard knots, which present life -offers for explanation, are broken up into a vast number of problems, -each presenting a different aspect, and one helping towards a fairer -and clearer appreciation of another. - -The present medium of general intelligence and theory in which we live -embraces in a way the results of all that has preceded it, of all the -steps of culture through which the world has risen. But in this body of -intellectual beliefs and ideas with which our single soul is clad,--in -this common soil of thought,--the several contributions of the past -have been half or even wholly obliterated, and are only the shadows of -their old selves. What in a former day was a question of all-engrossing -interest has left but a trace: the complete and detailed formations -of ancient thought have lost their distinctness of outline, and have -shrunk into mere shadings in the contour of our intellectual world. -Questions, from which the ancient philosophers could never shake -themselves loose, are now only a barely perceptible _nuance_ in the -complex questions of the present day. Discussions about the bearings of -the 'one' and the 'many,' puzzles like those of Zeno, and the casuistry -of statesmanship such as is found in the Politics of Aristotle, have -for most people little else than an antiquarian interest. We scarcely -detect the faint traces they have left in the 'burning questions' -of our own age. We are too ready to forget that the past is never -altogether annihilated, and that every step, however slight it may -seem, which has once been taken in the movement of intellect, must be -traversed again in order to understand the constitution of our present -intellectual world. To outward appearance the life and work of past -generations have so completely lost their organic nature, with its -unified and vital variety, that in their present phase they have turned -into hard and opaque atoms of thought. The living forces of growth, -as geologists tell us, which pulsed through the vegetables of one -period are suspended and put in abeyance: and these vegetables turn -into what we call the inorganic and inanimate strata of the earth. -Similarly, when all vitality has been quenched or rendered torpid in -the structures of thought, they sink into the material from which -individuals draw their means of intellectual support. This inorganic -material of thought stands to the mind, almost in the same way as the -earth and its products stand to the body of a man. If the one is our -material, the other is our spiritual _substance_. In the one our mind, -as in the other our body, lives, moves, and has its being. - -But in each case besides the practical need, which bids us consume the -substance as dead matter, and apply it to use, there is the theoretical -bent which seeks to reproduce ideally the past as a living and fully -developed organism. 'This past,' says Hegel, 'is traversed by the -individual, in the same way as one who begins to study a more advanced -science repeats the preliminary lessons with which he had long been -acquainted, in order to bring their information once more before his -mind. He recalls them: but his interest and study are devoted to other -things. In the same way the individual must go through all that is -contained in the several stages in the growth of the universal mind: -but all the while he feels that they are forms of which the mind has -divested itself,--that they are steps on a road which has been long -ago completed and levelled. Thus, points of learning, which in former -times tasked the mature intellects of men, are now reduced to the level -of exercises, lessons, and even games of boyhood: and in the progress -of the schoolroom we may recognise the course of the education of the -world, drawn, as it were, in shadowy outline[2].' - -The scope of historical investigation therefore is this. It shows -how every shading in the present world of thought, which makes our -spiritual environment, has been once living and actual with an -independent being of its own. But it also reveals the presence of -shades and elements in the present which if our eyes had looked on the -present alone we should scarcely have suspected: and it thus enables us -to interpolate stages in development of which the result preserves only -rudimentary traces. And, when carried out in a philosophical spirit, -it shows further, that in those formations, which are produced in -each period of the structural development of reason, the universe of -thought, or the Idea, is always whole and complete, but characterised -in some special mode which for that period seems absolute and final. -Each form or 'dimension' of thought, in which the totality is grasped -and unified, is therefore not so simple or elementary as it may seem -to casual observers regarding only the simplicity of language: it is -a total, embracing more or less of simpler elements, each of which -was once an inferior total, though in this larger sphere they are -reduced to unity. Thus each term or period in the process is really -an individualised whole, with a complex interconnexion and contrast -included in it: it is _concrete._ No single word or phrase explains it: -yet it is one totality,--a rounded life, from which its several spheres -of life must be explained. But when that period is passing away, the -form of its idea is separated, and retained, apart from the life and -mass of the elements which constituted it a real totality; and then the -mere shading or shell, with only part of its context of thought, is -left _abstract._ When that time has come, a special form, a whole act -in the drama, of humanity has been transformed into an empty husk, and -is only a name. - -The sensuous reality of life, as it is limited in space and time, and -made palpable in matter and motion, is however the earliest cradle -of humanity. The environment of sense is prior in the order of time -to the environment of thought. Who, it may be asked, first wrought -their way out of that atmosphere of sense into an ether of pure -thought? Who first saw that in sense there was yet present something -more than sensation,--that the deliverances of sense-perception rest -upon and involve relations, ties, distinctions, which contradict its -self-confidence and carry us beyond its simple indications?. Who laid -the first foundations of that world of reason in which the civilised -nations of the modern period live and move? The answer is, the Greek -philosophers: and in the first place the philosophers of Elea. For -Hegel the history of thought begins with Greece. All that preceded the -beginnings of Greek speculation, and most that lies outside it, has -only a secondary interest for the culture of the West. - -But 'many heroes lived before the days of Agamemnon,' The records of -culture no longer begin with Greece. Even in Hegel's own day, voices, -like those of the poet Rückert (in his 'habilitation'-exercise), were -heard declaring that the true fountain of European thought, the real -philosophy, was to be sought in the remoter East. Since the time of -Hegel, the study of primitive life, and of the rise of primitive ideas -in morals and religion, has enabled us to some extent to trace the -early gropings of barbarian fancy and reason. The comparative study -of languages has, on the other hand, partly revealed the contrivances -by which human reason has risen from one grade of consciousness to -another. The sciences of language and of primitive culture have -revealed new depths in the development of thought, where thought is -still enveloped in nature and sense and symbols,--depths which were -scarcely dreamed of in the earlier part of the present century. Here -and there, investigators have even supposed that they had found the -cradle of some elements in art, religion, and society, or, it may be, -of humanity itself. - -These researches have accomplished much, and they promise to accomplish -more. They help us perhaps to take a juster view of the early Greek -thinkers, and show how much they still laboured under conditions -of thought and speech from which their struggles have partly freed -us. But for the present, and with certain explanations to be given -later, it may still be said that the birthday of our modern world -is the moment when the Greek sages began to construe the facts of -the universe. Before their time the world lay, as it were, in a -dream-life. Unconsciously in the womb of time the spirit of the world -was growing,--its faculties forming in secresy and silence,--until -the day of birth when the preparations were completed, and the young -spirit drew its first breath in the air of thought. A new and to us -all-important epoch in the history of thought begins with the Greeks: -and the utterances of Parmenides mark the first hard, and still -somewhat material, outlines of the spiritual world in which we live. -Other nations of an older day had gathered the materials: in their -languages, customs, religions, &c., there was an unconscious deposit of -reason. It was reserved for the Greeks to recognise that reason: and -thus in them reason became conscious. - -For us, then, it was the Greek philosophers who distinctly drew the -distinction between sense and thought, and who first translated the -actual forms of our natural life into their abbreviated equivalents in -terms of logic. The struggle to carry through this transition, this -elevation into pure thought, is what gives the dramatic interest to -the Dialogues of Plato and keeps the sympathy of his readers always -fresh. Socrates, we are told, first taught men to seek a general -definition: not to be content with having--like Pythagoreans--their -meaning wrapped up inseparably in psychical images and quasi-material -symbols. He taught them to refer word to fellow word, to elicit the -underlying idea by the collision and comparison of instances, to get -at the 'content' which was identical in all the multiplicity of forms. -He taught them, in--brief, to think: and Plato carried out widely and -deeply the lesson. The endeavour to create an ideal world, which, at -its very creation, seems often to be transformed into a refined and -attenuated copy of the sense-world, meets us in almost every page of -his Dialogues. In Aristotle this effort, with its concomitant tendency -to give 'sensible' form to the ideal, is so far over and past; and -some sort of intellectual world, perhaps narrow and inadequate, -is reached,--the logical scheme in which immediate experience was -expressed and codified. What these thinkers began, succeeding ages have -inherited and promoted. - -In the environment of reason, therefore, which encompasses the -consciousness of our age, are contained under a generalised form and -with elimination of all the particular circumstances, the results won -in the development of mind and morals. These results now constitute -the familiar joints and supports in the framework of ordinary thought: -around and upon them cluster our beliefs and imaginations. During each -epoch of history, the consciousness of the world, at first by the mouth -of its great men, its illustrious statesmen, artists, and philosophers, -has explicitly recognised, and translated into terms of thought,--into -logical language,--that synthesis of the world which the period had -practically secured by the action of its children. That activity went -on, as is the way of natural activities, spontaneously, through the -pressure of need, by an immanent adaptation of means to ends, not in -conscious straining after a result. For the conscious or reflective -effort of large bodies of men is often in a direction contrary to -the Spirit of the Time. This Spirit of the Time, the absolute mind, -which is neither religious nor irreligious, but infinite and absolute -in its season, is the real motive principle of the world. But that -Spirit of the Time is not always the voice that is most effective at -the poll, or rings loudest in public rhetoric. It is often a still -small voice, which only the wise, the self-restrained, the unselfish -hear. And he who hears it and obeys it, not he who follows the blatant -crowd, is the hero. It is only to a mistaken or an exaggerated -hero-worship, therefore, that Hegel can be said to be a foe. Great -men are great: but the Spirit of the Time is greater: their greatness -lies in understanding it and bringing it to consciousness. The man, -who would act independently of his time and in antagonism to it, is -only the exponent of its latent tendencies. Nor need the synthesis -be always formulated by a philosopher in order to leaven the minds -of the next generation. The whole system of thought,--the theory of -the time,--its world, in short, influences minds, although it is not -explicitly formulated and stated: it becomes the nursery of future -thought and speculation. Philosophy in its articulate utterances only -gives expression to the silent and half-conscious grasp of reason over -its objects. But when the adaptation is not merely reached but seen and -felt, when the synthesis or world of that time is made an object of -self-consciousness, the exposition has made an advance upon the period -which preceded. For that period started in its growth from the last -exposition, the preceding system of philosophy, after it had become -the common property of the age, and taken its place in their mental -equipment. - -Each exposition or perception of the synthesis by the philosopher -restores or re-affirms the unity which in the divided energies of -the period, in its progressive, reforming, and reactionary aspects, -in its differentiating time, had to a great extent been lost. By the -reforming, progressive, and scientific movement of which each period -is full, the unity or totality with which it began is shown to be -defective. The value of the initial synthesis is impaired; its formula -is found inadequate to comprehend the totality: and the differences -which that unity involved, or which were implicitly in it, are now -explicitly affirmed. But the bent towards unity is a natural law -making itself felt even in the period of differentiation. And it -makes itself felt in the pain of contradiction, of discord, of broken -harmony. And that pain--which is the sign of an ever-present life that -refuses to succumb to the encroaching elements--is the stimulus to -re-construction. Only so far as pain ceases to be pain, as it benumbs, -and deadens, does it involve stagnation: as pain proper, felt as -resistance to an inner implicitly victorious principle, it stimulates -and quickens to efforts to make life whole again. The integrating -principle is present and active. There is then an effort, a re-action; -the feeling has to do something to make itself outwardly felt: the -implicit has to be actually put in its place, forced as it were into -action and set forth[3]: and the existing contrasts and differences -which the re-forming agency has called into vigorous life are lifted -from their isolation, and show of independence, and kept, as it were, -suspended in the unity[4]. The differences are not lost or annihilated: -but they come back to a centre, they find themselves, as it were, -at home: they lose their unfair prominence and self-assertion, and -sink into their places as constituents in the embracing organism[5]. -The unity which comes is not however the same as the unity which -disappeared, however much it may seem so. The mere _notion_--the -inner sense and inner unity--has put itself forward into the real -world: it is no longer a mere subjective principle, but as moulded -into actuality, into the objective world, it has become an Idea. -(_Begriff_ is now _Idee._) For the Idea is always more than a notion: -it is a notion translated into objectivity, and yet in objectivity -not sinking into a mere congeries of independent parts, but retaining -them 'ideally'--united by links of thought and service--in its larger -ideal-reality. It is all that the object ought to be (and which in a -sense it must be, if it is at all), and all that the subject sought to -be and looked forward to. - -The mind of the world moves, as it were, in cycles, but with each new -cycle a difference supervenes, a new tone is perceptible. History, -which reflects the changing aspects of reality, does and does not -repeat itself. The distinctions and the unity are neither of them the -same after each step as they were before it: they have both suffered a -change: it is a new scene that comes above the horizon, however like -the last it may seem to the casual observer. Thus when the process -of differentiation is repeated anew, it is repeated in higher terms, -multiplied, and with a higher power or wider range of meaning[6]. Each -unification however is a perfect world, a complete whole: it is the -same sum of being; but in each successive level of advance it receives -a fuller expression, and a more complexly-grouped type of features[7]. -Such is the rhythmic movement,--the ebb and flow of the world, always -recurring with the same burden but, as we cannot but hope, with richer -variety of tones, and fuller sense of itself. The sum of actuality, the -Absolute, is neither increased nor diminished. The world, the ultimate -reality of experience and life, was as much a rounded total to the -Hebrew Patriarchs as it is to us: without advancing, it has been, we -may say, in its expression deepened, developed, and organised. In one -part of the sway of thought, however, there is a harder, narrower, -insistance (by practical and business minds) on the sufficiency of -a definite principle to satisfy all wants and to make all mysteries -plain, and a disposition to ignore all other elements of life: at -another, there is a fuller recognition of the differences, gaps, and -contradictions, involved in the last synthesis,--which recognition -it is the tendency of scientific inquiry, of reforming efforts, of -innovation, to produce: and in the last period of the sway, there is -a stronger and more extended grasp taken by the unity pervading these -differences,--which is the work appointed to philosophy gathering up -the results of science and practical amendments. - -To this rhythmical movement Hegel has appropriated the name of -Dialectic. The name came in the first instance from Kant, but -ultimately from Plato, where it denotes the process which brings the -'many' under the 'one,' and divides the 'one' into the 'many.' But how, -it may be asked, does difference spring up, if we begin with unity, and -how do the differences return into the unity? In other words, given a -universal, how are we ever to get at particulars, and how will these -particulars ever give rise to a real individual? Such is the problem, -in the technical language of the Logic of the 'Notion.' And we may -answer, that the unity or universal in question is either a true and -adequate or an imperfect unity. In the latter case it is a mere unit, -amid other units, bound to them and serving to recall them by relations -of contrast, complement, similarity. It is one of many,--a subordinate -member in a congeries, and not _the One_. If, on the contrary, it be -a true Unity, it is a concrete universal,--the parent of perpetual -variety. The unity, if it be its genuine shape which is formulated by -philosophers, is not mere monotony without differences. If it is a -living and real Idea, containing a complex inter-action of principles: -it is not a single line of action, but the organic confluence of -several. No one single principle by itself is enough to state a life, -a character, or a period. But as the unity comes before the eye of the -single thinker, it is seldom or never grasped with all its fulness of -life and difference. The whole synthesis, although it is implicitly -present and underlies experience and life as its essential basis, -is not consciously apprehended, but for the most part taken on one -side only, one emphatic aspect into which it has concentrated itself. -And even if the master could grasp the whole, could see the unity of -actuality in all its differences, (and we may doubt whether any man -or any philosopher can thus incarnate the prerogative of reason,) his -followers and the popular mind would not imitate him. While his grasp -of comprehension may possibly have been thorough, though he may have -seen life whole through all its differences, inequalities, and schisms, -and with all these reduced or idealised to their due proportions, -into the unity beyond, the crowd who follow him are soon compelled -to lay exclusive stress on some one side of his theory. Some of them -see the totality from one aspect, some from another. It is indeed the -whole which in a certain sense they see: but it is the whole narrowed -down to a point. While _his_ theory was a comprehensive and concrete -grasp, including and harmonising many things which seem otherwise wide -apart, theirs is abstract and inadequate: it fixes on a single point, -which is thus withdrawn from its living and meaning-giving context, -and left as an empty name. Now it is the very nature of popular -reasoning to tend to abstractions, in this sense of the word. Popular -thought wants the time and perseverance necessary to retain a whole -truth, and so is contented with a partial image. It seeks for simple -and sharp precision: it likes to have something distinctly before -it, visible to the eye of imagination, and capable of being stated -in a clear and unambiguous formula for the intellect. And popular -thought--the dogmatic insistence on one-sided truth--is not confined -to the so-called non-philosophic world: just as, on the other hand, -the inclusive and comprehensive unity of life and reality is seen and -felt and recognised by many--and felt by them first--who have no claim -to the technical rank of philosophers. Popular thought is the thought -which skims the surface of reality, which addresses itself to the level -of opinion prevalent in all members of the mass as such, and does not -go beyond that into the ultimate and complex depths of experience. - -Thus it comes about that the concrete or adequate synthesis which -should have appeared in the self-conscious thought of the period, -when it reflected upon what it was, has been replaced by a narrow -and one-sided formula, an abstract and formal universal, a universal -which does not express all the particulars. One predominant side of -the synthesis steals the place of the total: what should have been -a comprehensive universal has lowered itself into a particular. Not -indeed the same particular as existed before the union: because it has -been influenced by the synthesis, so as to issue with a new colouring, -as if it had been steeped in a fresh liquid. But still it is really -a particular: and as such, it evokes a new particular in antagonism -to it and exhibiting an element latent in the synthesis. If the -first side of the antithesis which claims unduly to be the total, or -universal, be called Conservative, the second must be called Reforming -or Progressive. If the first step is Dogmatic, the second is Sceptical. -If the one side assumes to be the whole, the other practically refutes -the assumption. If the one agency clings blindly to the unity,--as -when pious men rally round the central idea of religion, the other as -tenaciously and narrowly holds to the difference,--as when science -displays the struggle for existence and the empire of chance among -the myriads of aimless organisms. They are two warring abstractions, -each in a different direction. But as they are the offspring of one -parent,--as they have each in their own way narrowed the whole down to -a point, it cannot but be that when they evolve or develop all that -is in them, they will ultimately coincide, and complete each other. -The contradiction will not disappear until it has been persistently -worked out,--when each opposing member which was potentially a total -has become what it was by its own nature destined to be. And this -disappearance of the antithesis is the reappearance of the unity in all -its strength, reinforced with all the wealth of new distinctions. - -Thus on a large scale we have seen the law of growth, of development, -of life. It may be called growth by antagonism. But the antagonism -here is over-ruled, and subject to the guidance of an indwelling -unity. _Mere_ antagonism--if there be such a thing--would lead to -nothing. A mere positive or affirmative point of being would lead -to no antithesis, were it not, so to speak, a point floating in an -ether of larger life and being, whence it draws an outside element -which it overcomes, assimilates and absorbs. A bare national mind -only grows to richer culture, because it lives in a universal human -life, and can say _Nihil humani a me alienum puto._ So too the mere -unit is always tainted with a dependence on outside: or it is always -implicitly more than a mere unit: and what seems to come upon it from -outside, is really an enemy from within, and it falls because there is -treason within its walls. The revolution succeeds because the party -of conservative order is not so hard and homogeneous as it appears. -So, too, it is the immanent presence of the complete thought, of the -Idea, which is the heart and moving spring that sets going the pulse -of the universal movement of thought, and which reappears in every one -of these categories to which the actualised thought of an age has been -reduced. In every term of thought there are three stages or elements: -the original narrow definiteness, claiming to be self-sufficient,--the -antagonism and criticism to which this gives rise,--and the union which -results when the two supplement and modify each other. In the full life -and organic unity of every notion there is a definite kernel, with -rigid outlines as if it were immovable: there is a revulsion against -such exclusiveness, a questioning and critical attitude: and there is -the complete notion, where the two first stages interpenetrate. - - - -[Footnote 1: _Eth._ ii 7.] - -[Footnote 2: _Phenomenologie__des Geistes_, p. 22.] - -[Footnote 3: Gesetzt.] - -[Footnote 4: Aufgehoben.] - -[Footnote 5: Idee: Ideeller Weise.] - -[Footnote 6: Potenz.] - -[Footnote 7: 'Nicht nur die Einsicht in die Abhängigkeit des Einzelnen -vom Ganzen ist allein das Wesentliche; ebenso dass jedes Moment selbst -unabhängig vom Ganzen das Ganze ist, und dies ist das Vertiefen in die -Sache.' (Hegels _Leben_, p. 548.)] - - - - -CHAPTER XXI. - - -ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE I AND THE ORDINARY LOGIC. - - -The ordinary logic-books have made us all familiar with the popular -distinction between Abstract and Concrete. By a concrete term they mean -the name of an existence or reality which is obvious to the senses, and -is found in time and place;--or they mean the name of an attribute when -we expressly or tacitly recognise its dependence upon such a thing of -the senses. When, on the contrary, the attribute is forcibly withdrawn -from its context and made an independent entity in the mind, the term -expressing it becomes in the usual phraseology abstract. Any term -therefore which denotes a non-sensible or intelligible object would -probably be called abstract. And there is something to be said for the -distinction, which, though unsuccessful in its expression, has some -feeling of the radical antithesis between mere being and mere thought. -It is true, that in the totality of sense and feeling, in the full -sense-experience, there is a concrete fulness, as it were, an infinite -store of features and phases waiting for subsequent analysis to detect. -In the real kind of actual nature there is an inexhaustible mine of -properties, which no artificial classification and description can -ever come to the end of. Every quality which we state, every relation -which we predicate, is a partial and incomplete element in this -presupposed reality, this implicit concrete; and as such is abstract, -and comparatively unreal. It is something forcibly torn out of and held -apart from its context. But on the other hand the concrete reality is -not at first real, but implicit: it becomes really concrete only as it -re-embraces, and re-constitutes in its totality the elements detected -by analysis. But the popular distinction forgets this, and gives the -title and rank of concrete to what very poorly deserves the name, viz. -to the yet undiscerned reality denoted by a substantive name. Yet -there can be little doubt that the popular use of these terms, or the -popular apprehension of what constitutes reality,--for that is what it -comes to,--is sufficiently represented by the ordinary logic-books. -So that, if the whole business of the logician lies in formulating -the distinctions prevalent in popular thought, the ordinary logic is -correct. - -Now the popular logic of the day,--the logic which has long been -taught in our schools and universities--has three sources.--In the -first place, but in a slight degree, it trenches upon the province -of psychology, and gives some account of the operation by which -concepts or general ideas are supposed to be formed, and of the errors -or fallacies which naturally creep into the process of reasoning. -This is the more strictly modern, the descriptive part of our -logic-books.--But, secondly, the logic of our youth rests in a much -higher degree upon the venerable authority of Aristotle. That logic, -within its own compass, was a masterpiece of analysis, and for many -centuries maintained an ascendency over the minds of men, which it -well deserved. But it was not an analysis of thought or knowledge as a -whole, and it treated its subject in fragments. It gave in one place -an analysis of science and in another an analysis of certain methods, -which could be observed in popular discussions and practical oratory. -As Lord Bacon remarked, it did little else than state and, it may be, -exaggerate the _rationale_ of argumentation. A high level of popular -thought it unquestionably was, which Aristotle had to investigate,--a -level which many generations of less favoured races were unable to -reach. But there were defects in this Logic which fatally marred its -general usefulness, when the limited scope of its original intention -had been lost sight of. The thoughts of Greece, it has been said, were -greatest and most active in the line of popular action for the city and -the public interest, in the discussions, the quibbles, the fallacies, -and rhetorical arts of the barber's shop and the 'agora.' The aim -of such exercises was to convince, to demonstrate, to persuade, to -overcome;--it might be for good and truth, but also it might not. And -accordingly the Logic of Aristotle has been said to have for its end -and canon the power to convince and to give demonstrative certainty. -There is some ground, it may be, for this charge. The ancient logician -seems to luxuriate in a rank growth of forms of sophism, and in an -almost childlike fondness for variety of argumentative method. He -seems resolved to trace the wayward tricks of thought and its phases -through every nook and cranny, to exhaust all the permutations and -complications of its elements. But let us be just, and remember that -all this was in the main a speculative inquiry--for the sake of theory. -It developed the powers of judgment and inference, just as the modern -research for new metals, new plants, or new planets, develops the -powers of observation. Both have some value in the material results -they discover: but, after all, the mental culture they give is the main -thing. And the talents quickened by deductive research are no whit -less valuable than those owed to the other. Forms are essential, even -if it be possible to make the terrible mistake of regarding them as -all-important to the exclusion of matter. - -And then, this is not the whole truth. There is a perfectly serious -Greek science--Mathematics--a science of many branches: a science -which, from Plato downwards, always stood in alliance with the studies -of philosophy. Now, it might be said, perhaps with ground, that the -conception of mathematical method too much dominated all attempts to -get at the rationale of science, and led to the supremacy of syllogism. -It would be fairer perhaps to put this objection in another shape. -We should then say that the logic of Aristotle,--the _Analytics_--is -too much restricted to dealing with the most general and elementary -principles of reasoning. But this is not in itself a fault. It -becomes a fault only where there is no growth in philosophy--when -it is merely handed on from master to pupil; and where there is a -tendency to put philosophic doctrine to immediate use. To expend the -whole energy of intellect in laying bare the general principles, the -fundamental method, of knowledge and inference, is precisely what the -founder of a science has a duty to do. But the beginning thus made -requires development--and development which is fruitful must proceed -by correction and antithesis, no less than by positive additions. It -was not given to Aristotle's logic to be so carried on. His logic, -like his system in general, had no real successor to carry it on in -the following generation: and when in the less original ages of early -Byzantine rule it again found students, it had become a quasi-sacred -text which could only be commented on, not modified and developed. From -the great _Exegetai_ of Greece it passed westward to Boethius and -eastward to the Syrian and Persian commentators in the early centuries -of the Caliphate. From these, and from other intermediaries, it may be, -it finally culminated in the work of the Latin Schoolmen of the later -Middle Ages. But the very reverence which all these expositors felt for -the text of _the_ Philosopher rendered true development impossible. - -Then, on the other hand, the lust of practical utility caused a -grave misconception of what logic can do. For Aristotle, logic -is a scientific analysis of the modes of inference; its uses are -those which follow intrinsically from all noble activity freely and -zealously prosecuted. But with the death of Aristotle the great days -of knowledge for the sake of knowledge and divine wisdom were over. -The Stoics into whose hands the chief sceptre of philosophy, directly -or indirectly, passed never rose above the conception of life as a -task and a duty, and of all other things, literature, science, and -art, as subservient to the performance of that task. The conception is -an ennobling one: but only with a relative or comparative nobility. -It ennobles, if it is set beside and against the view that life is a -frivolous play, a sport of caprice and selfishness. But it darkens and -narrows the outlook of humanity, when it loses sight of life as a joy, -a self-enlarging and self-realising freedom, of life as in its supreme -phase _θεωρία_--or the enjoyment of God. To the Stoic, therefore,--and -to the dominant Christian theory which entered to some extent on the -Stoic inheritance--logic, like the rest of philosophy, was something -only valuable because ultimately it helped to save the soul. - -It thus sunk into the position of an Organon or instrument. To the -Stoic,--for instance to Epictetus--its value was its use to establish -the doctrines of the Stoic faith, by confuting the ill-arranged and -futile inferences on which were founded the aims and approvals of -ordinary worldly life. To the Christian, again, it served as a method -for putting into systematic shape (under the guidance of certain -supreme categories or principles also borrowed from Greek thought) the -variety of fundamental and derivative aspects which successive minds, -pondering on the power and mystery of the Christian faith, had set -forward as its essential dogmas. It thus helped to build up (out of -the leading ideas of Greek metaphysics, and the principles emerging in -the earliest attempts to formulate the law of Christ) that amalgam of -the power of a divine life with the reflective thought of the teachers -of successive generations, which constitutes the dogmatic creed of -Christendom. Such a reconstruction in thought of the reality which -underlies experience--(in this case the experience of the Christian -life), is inevitable if man is to be man, a free intelligence, and -not a mere animal-like feeling. But its success is largely, if not -entirely, dependent on the value of the logic and metaphysics which it -employs: and it would be a bold thing to say that the subtle, abstract, -and unreal system of Neo-Platonist and Neo-Aristotelian thought was an -organon adequate to cope with the breadth and depth, latent if not very -explicit, in the fulness and reality of the religious life. - -Yet even as an Organon, Logic had to sink to a lower rank. As -traditionalism grew supreme, and religion ossified into a stereotyped -form of belief and practice, logic had less to do as an organiser -of dogma. It sank, or seemed to sink (for it would be rash to speak -too categorically of an epoch of thought so far removed from modern -sympathy and understanding as the age of the Schoolmen), into a futile -(and as it seems occasionally almost a viciously-despairing) play with -_pro_ and _contra_,--into a lust of argumentation which in masters -like Ockam comes perilously close to scepticism or agnosticism. More -and more, Scholastic thought, which, at one time, had been in the -centre of such intellectual life as there was, came to be stranded on -the shore, while the onward-flowing tide spread in other directions. -These were the great days of logical sway, when it seemed as if logic -could create new truth: as if forms could beget matter. So at least -ran an outside rumour, which was probably based on some amount of real -folly. But the more important point was that the old logic had lost -touch with reality. New problems were arising, which it was--without -a profound reconstruction--quite incapable of solving. Of these there -were obviously two--not unconnected perhaps, but arising in different -spheres of life. There was the revival of religious experience, growing -especially since the thirteenth century with an ever-swelling stream -in the souls of men and women, till it burst through all bounds of -outward organisation in the catastrophe of the Reformation. Luther may -have been historically unjust (as Bacon afterwards was) to the 'blind -heathen master,' as he called Aristotle: but he was governed by a true -instinct when (unlike the compromise-loving Melanchthon) he found the -traditional system of logic and metaphysics no proper organon for -the new phase of faith and theory. So, too, the new attempts at an -inception and instauration of the sciences grew up outside the walls -of old tradition, and were at first perhaps discouraged and persecuted -as infidel and heretical, and were, even without that burden, pursued -at much hap-hazard and with much ignorance both in aims and methods. -Intelligent onlookers,--especially if inspired by an enthusiasm for -the signs of an age happier for human welfare--could not but sec how -needful it was to come to some understanding on the aims and methods of -the rising sciences. - -This want, which he keenly felt, Francis Bacon tried to satisfy. He -pointed out, vaguely, but zealously and in a noble spirit, the end -which that new logic had to accomplish. Bacon, however, could not do -more than state these bold suggestions: he had not the power to execute -them. He imagined indeed that he could display a method, by which -science would make incredible advances, and the kingdom of truth in a -few years come into the world. But this is a sort of thing which no -man can do. Plato, if we take his _Republic_ for a political pamphlet, -had tried to do it for the social life of Athens. What Plato could -not do for the political world of Greece, Bacon could not do for the -intellectual world in his time: for as the Athenian worked under the -shadow of his own state, over-mastered even without his knowledge by -the ordinances of Athens, so the Englishman was evidently enthralled -by the medieval conceptions and by the logic which he condemned. What -Aristotle had for ages been supposed to do, no philosopher could do for -the new spirit of inquiry which had risen in and before the days of -Bacon. That spirit, as exhibited in his great contemporaries, Bacon, -as he has himself shown, could not rightly understand or appreciate. -He failed, above all, to recognise the self-corrective, tentative, -and hypothetical nature, of all open inquiry. But one need not for -this disparage his work. It showed a new sense of the magnitude of the -modern problem: it set prominently forward the comprehensive aim of -human welfare: and by its conception of the 'forma' it kept science -pledged to a high ideal. But Bacon could only play the part of the -guide-post: he could not himself lay down the road. And negatively he -could warn against the belief that mathematics could _generate_ or do -more indeed than _define_ the sciences. The spirit of free science, of -critical investigation, of inductive inquiry, must and did constitute -its forms, legislation, and methods for itself. For no philosopher can -lay down laws or methods beforehand which the sciences must follow. -The logician only comes after, and, appreciating and discovering the -not always conspicuous methods of knowledge, endeavours to gather -them up and give them their proper place in the grand total of human -thought, correcting its inadequacies by their aid, and completing their -divisions by its larger unities. Or rather this is a picture of what -English logic might have done. But it does not do so in the ordinary -and accepted text-books on the subject. What it does do, is rather as -follows. To the second and fundamental part which it subjects to a few -unimportant alterations,--i. e. to the doctrine of terms, propositions, -and reasonings,--it subjoins an enumeration of the methods used in the -sciences. - -To the rude minds of the Teutonic peoples the logical system of -Aristotle had seemed almost a divine revelation. From the brilliant -intellect of Greece a hand was stretched to help them in the -arrangement of their religious beliefs. The Church accepted the aid of -logic, foreign though logic was to its natural bent, as eagerly as the -young society tried for a while to draw support from the ancient forms -of the Roman Empire. So with the advance of the Sciences in modern -times some hopeful spirits looked upon the Inductive Logic of Mill in -the light of a new revelation. The vigorous action of the sciences -hailed a systematic account of its methods almost as eagerly as the -strong, but untaught intellect of the barbarian world welcomed the -lessons of ancient philosophy. For the first time the sciences, which -had been working blindly or instinctively, but with excellent success, -found their procedure stated clearly and definitely, yet without -any attempt to reduce their varied life to the Procrustean bed of -mathematics, which had once been held to possess a monopoly of method. -The enormous influence of the physical sciences saw itself reflected -in a distinct logical outline: and the new logic became the dominant -philosophy. Such for a while was the proud position of the Inductive -Logic. Enthusiastic students of science in all countries, who were not -inaccessible to wider culture, used quotations from Mill to adorn and -authorise their attempts at generalisation and theory. A period of -speculation in the scientific world succeeded the period of experiment, -in which facts had been collected and registered. A chapter on Method -became a necessary introduction to all higher scientific treatises. In -our universities methodology was prodigally applied to the study of -ancient philosophy. And so long as the scientific epoch lasts in its -one-sided prominence, so long the theory of inductive and experimental -methods may dominate the intellectual world. - -But the Inductive Logic hardly rose to the due sense of its situation. -It has not held to the same high ideal as Bacon set before it. It has -planted itself beside what it was good enough to call the Deductive -Logic, and given the latter a certain toleration as a harmless lunatic, -or an old pauper who had seen better days. Retaining the latter with -certain modifications, although it has now lost its meaning in the -changed outlines of the intellectual world, Inductive Logic adds a -methodology of the sciences, without however founding this methodology -upon a comprehensive analysis of knowledge as a whole, when -enlarged and enlightened by the work of the sciences. Hence the two -portions,--the old logic, mutilated and severed from the Greek world it -grew out of, and the new Inductive or specially-scientific logic, not -going beyond a mere classification of methods,--can never combine, any -more than oil and water. And the little psychology, which is sometimes -added, does not facilitate the harmony. - -But Inductive Logic should have adopted a more thorough policy. There -can only be one Logic, which must be both inductive and deductive, but -exclusively, and in parts, neither. To achieve that task however Logic -must not turn its back indifferently on what it calls metaphysics, and -it must rise to a higher conception of the problems of what it calls -psychology. - -In these circumstances the ordinary logic, in its fundamental terms, -is more on the level of popular thought, than in a strictly scientific -region, and does not attempt to unite the two regions, and examine the -fundamental basis of thought on which scientific methods rest. The case -of Concrete and Abstract will illustrate what has been said. To popular -thought the sense-world is concrete: the intellectual world abstract. -And so it is in the ordinary logic. To Hegel, on the contrary, the -intellectual interpretation of the world of reality and experience -is a truer and thus a more concrete description of it than that -contained in a series of sense-terms. Now the difference between the -two uses of the term is not a mere arbitrary change of names. When the -philosopher denies the concreteness of the sense-world, and declares -that it, as merely sensible, is only a mass of excluding elements, a -'manifold,' and in the second instance a series of abstractions, drawn -out of this _congeries_ by perception, the change of language marks -the total change of position between the philosophic and the popular -consciousness. Reality and concreteness as estimated by the one line of -thought are the very reverse of those of the other. A mere sense-world -to the philosopher is a world which wants unity, which is made up of -bits imperfectly adjusted to each other, and always leading us to look -for an explanation of them in sources outside them. The single things -we say we perceive,--the here and the now we perceive them in--are -found, upon reflection and analysis, to depend upon general laws, on -relations that go beyond the single,--on what is neither here nor -now, but everywhere and timeless. The reality of the thing is found -to imply a general system of relations which make it what it is. -Sense-perception in short is the beginning of knowledge: and it begins -by taking up its task piecemeal. It rests upon a felt totality: and to -raise this to an intelligible totality, it must at first only isolate -one attribute at a time. - -The apprehension of a thing from one side or aspect,--the apprehension -of one thing apart from its connexions,--the retention of a term or -formula apart from its context,--is what Hegel terms 'abstract.' -Ordinary terms are essentially abstract. They spring from the -analysis of something which would, in the first stage of the process, -in strictness be described not as concrete, but as chaos:--as the -indefinite or 'manifold' of sensation. But the first conceptions, which -spring from this group when it is analysed, are abstract: they are -each severed from the continuity of their reality. To interpret our -feeling, our experience as felt, we must break it up. But the first -face that presents itself is apt to impress us unduly, and seems more -real, because nearer feeling: on the other it is more unreal, because -less adequate as a total expression of the felt unity. In the same -sense we call Political Economy an abstract science, because it looks -upon man as a money-making and money-distributing creature, and keeps -out of sight his other qualities. Our notions in this way are more -abstract or more concrete, according as our grasp of thought extends -to less or more of the relations which are necessarily pre-supposed by -them. On the other hand, when a term of thought owns and emphasises -its solidarity with others, when it is not circumscribed to a single -relation, but becomes a focus in which a variety of relations converge, -when it is placed in its right post in the organism of thought, -its limits and qualifications as it were recognised and its degree -ascertained,--then that thought is rendered 'concrete.' A concrete -notion is a notion in its totality, looking before and after, connected -indissolubly with others: a unity of elements, a meeting-point of -opposites. An abstract notion is one withdrawn from everything that -naturally goes along with it, and enters into its constitution. All -this is no disparagement of abstraction. To abstract is a necessary -stage in the process of knowledge. But it is equally necessary to -insist on the danger of clinging, as to an ultimate truth, to the -pseudo-simplicity of abstraction, which forgets altogether what it is -in certain situations desirable for a time to overlook. - -In a short essay, with much grim humour and quaint illustrations, -Hegel tried to show what was meant by the name 'abstract,' which in -his use of it denotes the cardinal vice of the 'practical' habit of -mind. From this essay, entitled 'Who is the Abstract Thinker[1]?' -it may be interesting to quote a few lines. A murderer is, we may -suppose, led to the scaffold. In the eyes of the multitude he is a -murderer and nothing more. The ladies perhaps may make the remark that -he is a strong, handsome, and interesting man. At such a remark the -populace is horrified. "What! a murderer handsome? Can anybody's mind -be so low as to call a murderer handsome? You must be little better -yourselves." And perhaps a priest who sees into the heart, and knows -the reasons of things, will point to this remark, as evidence of the -corruption of morals prevailing among the upper classes. A student -of character, again, inquires into the antecedents of the criminal's -up-bringing: he finds that he owes his existence to ill-assorted -parents; or he discovers that this man has suffered severely for some -trifling offence, and that under the bitter feelings thus produced -he has spurned the rules of society, and cannot support himself -otherwise than by crime. No doubt there will be people who when they -hear this explanation will say "Does this person then mean to excuse -the murderer?" In my youth I remember hearing a city magistrate -complain that book-writers were going too far, and trying to root out -Christianity and good morals altogether. Some one, it appeared, had -written a defence of suicide. It was horrible! too horrible! On further -inquiry it turned out that the book in question was the _Sorrows of -Werther._ - -'By abstract thinking, then, is meant that in the murderer we see -nothing but the simple fact that he is a murderer, and by this single -quality annihilate all the human nature which is in him. The polished -and sentimental world of Leipsic thought otherwise. They threw their -bouquets, and twined their flowers round the wheel and the criminal -who was fastened to it.--But this also is the opposite pole of -abstraction.--It was in a different strain that I once heard a poor -old woman, an inmate of the workhouse, rise above the abstraction -of the murderer. The sun shone, as the severed head was laid upon -the scaffold. "How finely," said the woman, "does God's gracious sun -lighten up Binder's head!" We often say of a poor creature who excites -our anger that he is not worth the sun shining on him. That woman saw -that the murderer's head was in the sunlight, and that it had not -become quite worthless. She raised him from the punishment of the -scaffold into the sunlit grace of God. It was not by wreaths of violets -or by sentimental fancies that she brought about the reconciliation: -she saw him in the sun above received into grace.' - - -[Footnote 1: 'Wer denkt abstrakt!' (_Vermischte Schriften_, vol. ii. p. -402.)] - - - - -CHAPTER XXII. - - -FROM SENSE TO THOUGHT. - - -Induction and Experience are names to which is often assigned the -honour of being the source of all our knowledge. But what induction -and experience consist in, is what we are supposed to be already -aware of; and that is--it may be briefly said--the concentration -of the felt and sense-given fragments into an intimate unity. The -accidents and fortunes that have befallen us in lapses of time, the -scenes that have been set before and around us in breadths of space, -are condensed into a mood of mind, a habitual shading of judgment, -or frame of thought. The details of fact re-arrange themselves into -a general concept; their essence gets distilled into a concentrated -form. Their meaning disengages itself from its embodiment, and floats -as a self-sustaining form in an ideal world. Thus if we look at the -larger process of history, we see every period trying to translate the -sensuous fact of its life into a formula of thought, and to fix it in -definite characters. The various parts of existence, and existence as -a whole, are stripped of their sensible or factual nature, in which we -originally feel and come into contact with them, and are reduced to -their simple equivalents in terms of thought. From sense and immediate -feeling there is, in the first place, generated an image or idea which -at least represents and stands for reality; and from that, in the -second place, comes a thought or notion proper, which holds the facts -in unity. - -The phenomenon may, perhaps, be illustrated by the case of numbers. To -the adult European, numbers and numbering are an obvious and essential -part of our scheme of things that seems to need no special explanation. -But the experience of children suggests its artificiality, and the -evidence from the history of language corroborates that surmise. If -number be in a way describable as part of the sense-experience, or -total impression, it certainly does not come upon us with the same -passivity on our part as the perception of taste or colour, or even -of shape. It postulates a higher grade of activity. As Plato says, it -'awakes the intelligence': it implies a question and looks forward -to an answer: it is thus the first appearance of what in its later -fullness will be called 'Dialectic,' To put it otherwise: Numbering -can only proceed where there is a unit, and an identity: it implies a -one, and it implies an infinite repetibility of that one[1] It thus -postulates the double mental act, first of reducing the various to -its basis of identity, and, secondly, of performing a synthesis of -the identical units thus created. In the highly artificial world in -which we live all this seems simple enough. The products of machinery, -articles of furniture, dress, &c., &c., are already uniform items: and -the strokes of a clock seem almost to invite summation. But in free -nature this similarity is much less obviously stamped on things: and -the products of primitive art--of literal _manu_-facture--display an -individuality, an element of personal taste, even, which is necessarily -lacking in things turned out by machinery. Thus it was necessary, -before we could number, to reduce the qualitatively different to -a quantitative equality or comparability. There are indeed some -instances, in that nearest of things to us, the human body, which -might help. There is the obvious similarity of organs and limbs which -go in pairs, and which might easily suggest a dual, as, so to speak, -a sensuous fact amongst other facts. Again, there is the hand and its -five fingers, or the two hands and the ten fingers. The five or ten, -as a whole naturally given, suggest a grouping of numbers in natural -aggregates. The fingers, again, (and here we may keep at first to the -fingers proper, minus the thumb,) may be without much ingenuity said -to give us a set of four, naturally distinct, yet naturally alike, -and needing, so to speak, the minimum of intelligence to create the -numerical scale from one to four. It is by them, indeed, that Plato, it -may be unconsciously, illustrates the genesis of number. Here in short -you have the natural abacus of the nations, but one restricted, first, -perhaps to the group 1-4, secondly to the group 1-10. - -We have seen how the dual was, in certain instances, almost a natural -perceptive fact. But when it is so envisaged, it is hardly recognised -as number strictly so called. It is only a fresh and peculiar sensuous -attribute of things: a thing which has the quality of duplication, not -a thought which is the synthesis of two identical units. It is a sort -of accident, not part of a regular system or series. So again with -the plural, which may appear in several shapes before it is assigned -to its proper place as a systematic function of the singular. If the -Malay, in order to say 'the king of all apes' has to enumerate one -after another the several sub-species of ape, or if to express 'houses' -he has to reduplicate the singular, to insert a word meaning 'all' -or 'many,' we can see that the conception of number is for him still -in the bonds of sense. It is not a synthetic category, but only a -material multitude. But in other cases the plural proper is almost -confounded with the so-called 'collective.' It is not an unfamiliar -fact in Greek and Latin that the plural has acquired a meaning of -its own,--not the mere multiple of its singular; as also that the -collective term is occasionally used as an abstract, occasionally -as the more or less indeterminate collection of the individuals. -Such plurals and such collectives represent a stage of language and -conception when the aggregate of singulars form a uniquely-qualified -case of the object. And the peculiarity of them is seen in the way -the plurality is immersed in and restricted to the special class of -objects: as e. g. when in English the plurality of a number of ships -is verbally stereotyped as against the plurality of a number of sheep, -or of partridges (fleet, flock, covey). In such instances the category -of number is completely pervaded and modified by the quality of the -objects it is applied to. So, in the Semitic languages, the so-called -'broken plural' is a quasi-collective, which grammatically counts as -a feminine singular (like so many Latin and Greek collectives): and -whereas the more regular plural is generally shown by separable affix, -this quasi-collective plural enters the very body of the word by -vowel-change, indicating as it were by this absorption the constitution -of a specifically new view of things. On the other hand, it may be -said, there is in this collective a trace of the emergence of the -universal and identical element through the generalisation due to the -conjunction of several similars all acting as one[2] - -In a true plural, on the contrary, it is required that the sign of -number be clearly eliminated from any peculiarities of its special -object, and be distinctly separated from the collective. And similarly -the true numeral has to be realised in its abstractness, as a category -_per se._ And to do this requires some amount of abstraction. In -Greek, for example, we meet the distinction between numbers in the -abstract, pure numbers (such as four and six), and bodily or physical -numbers (such as four men, six trees)[3]. The geometrical aspect -under which numbers were regarded by the Greeks, e. g. as oblong or -square numbers, bears in the same direction. But another phenomenon -in language tells the tale more distinctly[4]. Abundantly in Sanscrit -and Greek, more rarely in Zend and Teutonic, and here and there in -the Semitic languages, we meet with what is known as the dual number, -a special grammatical form intended to express a pair of objects. -The witty remark of Du Ponceau[5] concerning the Greek dual, that it -had apparently been invented only for lovers and married people, may -illustrate its uses, but hardly suffices to explain its existence in -language. But a comparison of barbarian dialects serves to show that -the dual is, as it were, a prelude to the plural,--a first attempt to -grasp the notion of plurality in a definite way, which served its turn -in primitive society, but afterwards disappeared, when the plural had -been developed, and the numerals had attained a form of their own. If -this be so, the dual is what physiologists call a rudimentary organ, -and tells the same story as these organs do of the processes of nature. - -The language of the Melanesian island of Annatom, one of the New -Hebrides, may be taken as an instance of a state of speech in which -the dual is natural. That language possesses a fourfold distinction of -number in its personal pronouns, a different form to mark the singular, -dual, trial, and plural: and the pronoun of the first person plural -distinguishes in addition whether the person addressed is or is not -included in the 'we-two,' 'we-three,' or 'we-many' of the speaker[6]. -The same language however possesses only the first three numerals, and -in the translation of the Bible into this dialect it was necessary -to introduce the English words, four, five, &c. The two facts must -be taken together: the luxuriance of the personal pronouns and the -scanty development of numerals in such languages are two phenomena -of the same law. The numeral 'four' to these tribes is said to bear -the meaning of 'many' or 'several,' Another fact points in the same -direction. In many languages, such as those of China, Further India and -Mexico, it is customary in numbering to use what W. von Humboldt has -called class-words. Here it is felt that an artificial unity has to -be created, a common denominator found, and all reduced to it, before -any summation can be carried out. Scholars and officials, in Chinese, -can only be classed under the rubric of 'jewel' or dignity: and -animals or fish by 'tails,' as if thereby only could one get a handle -to hold them and count them. (The idiom still lingers in western -languages: as in English, heads of cabbage, or of cattle: or German, -_sechs Mann Soldaten._) So in Malay, instead of 'five boys' the phrase -used is 'boy five-man': in other words, the numerals are supposed to -inhere as yet in objects of a special kind or common occurrence[7]. -And among the South Sea Islanders the consciousness of number is -decidedly personal: that is to say, the distinction between one and -two is first conceived as a distinction between 'I' and 'we two.' Even -this amount of simplification surpasses what is found amongst some -Australian tribes. There we find four duals: one for brothers and -sisters: one for parents and children: one for husbands and wives: and -one between brothers-in-law[8]. Each pair has a different form. We -thus seem to see to what early language is applied: not to designate -the objects of nature, but the members of the primitive family and -their interests. The consciousness of numbers was first awakened by the -need of distinguishing and combining the things that belonged to and -specially interested men and women in the narrow circle of barbarian -life[9]. It is not altogether imaginative in principle, though it may -be occasionally surmise in details, to connect the rise of grammatical -forms with the temperament and character of the people, and therefore -with its social organisation. If the Bantoo or Caffir languages of -Southern Africa instead of a single third personal pronoun and third -personal termination to the verb use the separate forms corresponding -to the ten class-prefixes of the nouns, it must be in accordance with -the general spirit and system of these tribes. The various plural -forms, if they persist, will reflect contemporary modes of life. - -Numbers were at first immersed in the persons, and then, as things -came to be considered also, in the things numbered. The mind seems to -have proceeded slowly from the vague one to definite numbers. And the -first decided step was taken towards an apprehension of numbers when -two was distinguished from one, and the distinction was made part of -the personal terminations. The plural was a further step in the same -direction: the real value of which, however, did not become apparent -until the numerals had been separately established in forms of their -own. When that was accomplished, the special form of the dual became -useless: it had outlived its purpose, and henceforth it ceased to have, -any but that poetical beauty of old association which often adorns the -once natural, but now obsolete growths of the past. When the numerals -were thus emancipated from their material and sensuous environment, -quantity was translated from outward being in its embodiments into a -form of thought. At first, indeed, it was placed in an ethereal or -imaginative space, the counterpart as it were of the sensuous space -in which it had been previously immersed. It became a denizen of the -mental region, as it had been before a habitant of the sense-world. - -The mind was informed with quantity in the shape of number: but it does -not follow from this, that the new product was comprehended, or the -process of its production kept in view. Like all new inventions (and -numeration may fairly be classed under that head), it was laid hold -of, and all its consequences, results, and uses estimated and realised -by the practical and defining intellect. In one direction, it became, -like many new inventions in the early days of society, a magic charm, -and was invested with mystery, sacredness, and marvellous powers. But -the intelligent mind,--the understanding,--resolved to make better use -of the new instrument: and that in two ways, in practical work and in -theory. On the one hand it was applied practically in the dealings -of life,--in commerce, contracts, legislation, and religion. On the -other hand, the new conception of number, which common sense and the -instinctive action of men had evolved, was carried out in all its -theory: it was analysed in all directions, and its elements combined -in all possible ways. The result was the science of arithmetic, -and mathematics in general. Such consequences did the reflective -understanding derive from the analysis of its datum,--the fact of -quantity freed from its sensuous envelope. - -The general action of understanding, and of practical thought, is of -this kind. It accepts the representative images which have emerged from -sensation, as they occur: and tries to appreciate them, to give them -precision, to carry them into details, and to analyse them until their -utmost limits of meaning are explored. Where they have come from, and -where they lead to,--the process out of which they spring, and which -fixes the extent of their validity,--are questions of no interest -to the understanding[10]. It takes its objects, as given in popular -conception, as fixed and ultimate entities to be expounded in detail. - -We have taken number as one example of the transference of a sensible -or sense-immersed fact into a form of thought: but a form which is -still placed in a superior or mental space. One advantage of taking -number as illustration, is that numbered things are distinguished from -numbers in an emphatic and recognised way. Nobody will dispute that -the abstraction, as it is called, has an existence of its own, and -can be made a legitimate object of independent investigation. But if -the process be more obvious in the case of the numerals, there must -have been a similar course of development leading to the pronouns, the -prepositions, and the auxiliary verbs--to what has been called the -'formal' or 'pronominal' or 'demonstrative' element, the connective and -constructive tissue of language. Whether these pronominal 'roots' form -a special and originally-distinct class of their own, or are derived -from a transmutation of more material or substantial elements, is a -question on which linguistic research casts as yet no very certain -light. It is true that on the one hand etymology is mainly silent on -the origin of pronouns, numerals, and the more fundamental prepositions -(i. e. cannot refer them to roots significant of qualitative being): -and one need not lay much stress on remarks, like that of Gabelenz[11], -that in the Indo-Chinese languages the words for _I, five, fish_ -have a like sound, as do those for _thou, two, ear_, or that _I am,_ -originally means _I breathe_. In all languages--though with immense -diversities of degree, this formal element has attained a certain -independence. And in many instances we can more or less trace the -process by which there grew up in language an independent world of -thought: we can see the natural existence passing out of the range of -the senses into spiritual relations. Before our eyes a world of reason -is slowly constituting itself in the history of culture: and we, who -live now, enter upon the inheritance which past ages have laid up for -us. - -There is, however, a difference between the way in which these -results look to us now, and the way in which they originally -organised themselves. The child who begins to learn a language in the -lesson-books and the grammars finds the members of it all, as it were, -upon one level: adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, and verbs confront -him with the same authority and rank. This appearance is deceptive: -it may easily suggest that the words are not members in an organism, -in and out of which they have developed. And this organism of thought -has its individual types, expressed in the great families of human -speech. Its generic form (as drawn out in a logical system) appears -in different grades, with different degrees of fullness, in Altaic -and Dravidian from what it does in Malay, or in Chinese, and these -again have their own predominant categories as compared with those -used in the American or African languages, or in Indo-Germanic and -Semitic. If the Altaic languages e. g. are wanting in the verb proper, -and manage with possessive suffixes and nouns; if the Semitic tenses -display a poverty which contrasts with their wealth in Greek; and -yet each group performs its function, we may infer that each speech -has a complete organism, though it does not bring all its parts to -adequate expression. All this distinction of 'parts of speech,' of -forms, prefixes and suffixes, &c., is part of the life of language, -embodying in more or less distinct organs the organisation of thought -in the individual form it reached in that speech-type. Thus in Chinese -there are strictly speaking no isolated words, nouns, or verbs: there -are only abstract parts of a concrete sentence; and grammar in Chinese -therefore has no accidence (no declensions, conjugations, &c.) but -only syntax. Yet it is these abstract fragments which exist and seem -to have independence and inherent meaning: whereas the unity in which -they cohere to form a concrete context is the fleeting sentence of -the moment. At the opposite extreme, again, the Mexican family of -languages tend to incorporate relations to subject and object with -the verb, in such a degree that the word almost becomes a sentence. -Facts like these suggest that a science of the forms of language, in -proportion as it generalises, tends to approach logic; and that logic -will have a converse tendency to elevate to an unduly typical position -the grammatical form of the languages with which the logician is best -acquainted. - -If these points were remembered, there would be less absurd employment -of the grammatical categories of one group of languages to systematise -another. Greek and Sanscrit grammar plays sad havoc with the organism -of a Semitic tongue, and it is not less out of place as a schema -for delineating e. g. South African dialect. Isolated words even in -an Indo-Germanic language--even, we may say, in such a language as -English--are still fractional, and do not get life and individuality -except in their context. And it needs but a little experience to show -how various that individuality may be. It needs perhaps still more -meditation to realise that it is in this individuality that the real -life of language lies: in the words said and written to express the -thought of a personality. But, first, because language has its material -and mechanical side, and secondly, because in civilised countries it -further acquires a more stereotyped mechanism in written and printed -language, its parts tend to gain a pseudo-independence. It is one aim -of a philosophical dictionary to restore the organic interconnexion -which in the mere sequence of vocables in juxtaposition is apt to be -lost. What we call the meaning of a word is something which carries us -beyond that mere word,--which restores the connexions which have been -broken off and forgotten. In the form of a dictionary, of course, this -can only be done piece-meal: but if each piece is done thoroughly, it -can hardly fail to bring out certain comprehensive connexions. The mere -word seems a simple thing; and one is at first disposed to get rid of -its difficulty by substituting a so-called synonym. But a deeper study -reveals the fact that an exact synonym is a thing one can no more find -than two peas which are absolutely indistinguishable. A synonym is only -a practical _pis aller_. But every word is really as it were a point -in an infinitely complex organic life, with its essence or meaning -determined by the currents to and fro which meet in it. - -Words as we see them _prima facie_ in a printed page do look separate -entities. They stand, one here and another there, in a quasi-extension, -with marks of direction and connexion pointing from one to another, -but of connexion apparently extraneous to the more solid points which -are represented by nouns and verbs, or names of substances, actions, -and attributes. Results, as they are, of that practical analysis which -the need of writing down language has led to, they are treated as -complete wholes, which by the speaker are forced into certain temporary -connexions. But this is an illusion which, because a thing changes -its relationships, assumes that it can exist out of all relationships -whatever. Every word of Language is such an abstraction, isolated from -its context. But amid these contexts there are certain similarities: -identical elements are detected: and these identical elements are the -common names of language, the terms of general significance. In all -cases, however, what an utterance of language describes or expresses -is a definite individual event or scene, conceived as a concrete -of several parts. Each separate vocable is a contribution to the -total: a step towards the real redintegration of the whole out of its -several parts. But the total itself--the content of fact in any single -sentence--is only an abstraction,--a part of the universe which human -interest and need have isolated from the comprehensive scope of things. -Thus, in two degrees, we may say, the picture produced in the sentence -falls short of the truth of things. Each statement is an arbitrary or -accidental cutting out of the totality: each element of the cutting is -dependent on that abstraction, and relative to it. But--as in a given -group of speech, the same sets of circumstances will naturally be -selected, and tend to recur again and again,--the terms which describe -them will acquire a certain association with the objects, and will come -to be called the common names of these agents, acts, and qualities. -They denote or 'represent' the things and acts, conceived however in -certain aspects and relations, and not in their entirety and totality -of nature. - -In this product of intellectual movement above the limits of sensation -we have the 'representation'[12] as Hegel calls it, on which the -Understanding turns its forces. We have one product of the organic -whole of thought taken by itself as if it were independent, set -forth as a settled nucleus for further acquaintance: and this one -point discussed fully and with precision, elaborated in all detail -and consequence, to the neglect of its context, and the necessary -limitations involved in the notion. The process of name-giving may -illustrate this tendency in human thought to touch its objects only in -one point. The names given to objects do not embrace the whole nature -of these objects, but give expression only to one striking feature -in them. Thus the name of the horse points it out as 'the strong' or -'the swift': the moon is 'the measurer' or 'the shining one'; and so -in all cases. The object as expressed in these names is viewed from -one aspect, or in one point: and the name, which originally at least -corresponds to the conception, meets the object, properly speaking, -on that side only, or in that relation. The object is not studied in -its own nature, and in its total world, but as it specially enters the -range of human interest, and serves human utilities. One can at least -guess why it should be so: why a name should, in logical language, -express an 'accidens' and not the 'essentia' of the object. For the -investigation of primitive language seems to show that words, as we -know them in separate existence, are a secondary formation: and that -the first significant speech was an utterance intended to describe a -scene, an action, a phenomenon, or complex of event. In point of time, -the primary fact of language is an agglomeration or aggregate,--we -may call it either word or clause (λόγος in short)--which describes -in one breath a highly individualised action or phenomenon. The -spirit or unifying principle in this group might be the accent. Such -a word-group denotes a highly specialised form of being: and if we -call it a word, we may say that the earliest words, and the words of -barbarous tribes, are ingeniously special.[13] But it would be more -correct to say, that in such a group the elements of the scene enter -only from a single aspect or in a single relation. Accordingly when -disintegration begins, the result is as follows. The elements of the -group, having now become independent words held together by the syntax -of the sentence, are adopted to denote the several objects which -entered into the total phenomenon. But these words, or fragments of the -word-group, 'represent' the objects in question from a certain point -of view, and not in their integrity. The names of things therefore -touch them only in one point, and express only one aspect. And thus, -although different names will arise for the same thing, as it enters -into different groups, in each case the name will connote only a -general attribute and not the nature of the thing. These names are in -the Hegelian sense of the term 'abstract.' In popular phraseology, they -are only 'signs' of things: i. e. not 'symbols' (though they may have -been in some cases symbolic in origin), for in a symbol there is a -_natural_ correspondence or sensible analogy to the thing symbolised, -but something 'instituted,' due to an 'understanding' or convention. - - -[Footnote 1: See vol. ii. p. 190, (Logic, § 102).] - -[Footnote 2: See Max Müller in Mind, vol. i. 345.] - -[Footnote 3: Pure number is ἀριθμὸς μοναδικός: applied number is -ἀριθμὸς φυσικὸς or σωματικός. Aristotle, _Metaph_. N. 5, speaks of -αριθμὸς πύρινος ἤ γήϊνος. But this is only Greek idiom: as we say -'Greek history' instead of 'History of Greece:' or vice versa, when we -translate _Populus Romanus_ by 'people of Rome.' Aristotle is speaking -of 'proportions' or 'amounts' of fire or earth in the compounds of -these elements.] - -[Footnote 4: See L. Geiger, _Ursprung und Entwickelung der menschlichen -Sprache und Vernunft_ (vol. i. p. 380). And Gabelenz 'Die melanesischen -Sprachen' in the _Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der -Wissenschaften_ (VIII), 1861, pp. 89-91.] - -[Footnote 5: _Mémoire sur le Systeme grammatical_, &c. p. 155.] - -[Footnote 6: Cf. _nous_ and _nous autres_. The same distinction is -found in some American languages. There is a dual in the language of -the Greenlanders; but it is not, however, used when a natural duality -seems to call for it, but in cases when, though there might have been -several things, only two are actually found.] - -[Footnote 7: W. von Humboldt, _Verschiedenheit des menschlichen -Sprachbaues_, p. 423 (ed. 1841); Misteli, _Typen des Sprachbaues_ -(1893).] - -[Footnote 8: Capt. Grey, _Vocabulary of the dialects of S. W. -Australia_, pp. xxi and 104 (1840).] - -[Footnote 9: The sharp distinction between the first and second -personal pronouns and the third: the want of any apparent connexion -in the Indo-Germanic languages between the first and second persons -singular and the plural form seems to point in the same direction.] - -[Footnote 10: Cf. vol. ii. _Notes and Illustrations_, p. 400.] - -[Footnote 11: _Die Sprachwissenschaft_, p. 168.] - -[Footnote 12: 'Vorstellung,' as distinguished from 'Begriff.'] - -[Footnote 13: Thus in Malay, there are about twenty words for -strike, according as it is done with thick or thin wood, downwards, -horizontally, or upwards, with the hand, with the fist, with the -flat hand, with a club, with the sharp edge, with a hammer, &c. (See -Misteli, _Typen des Sprachbaues_, p. 265.)] - - - - -CHAPTER XXIII. - - -FIGURATE OR REPRESENTATIVE THOUGHT. - - -The compensating dialectic whereby reason, under the guise of -imagination, overthrows the narrowness of popular estimates, makes -itself observed even in the popular use of the terms abstract and -concrete. Terms like state, mind, wealth, may from one point of view -be called abstract, from another concrete. At a certain pitch these -abstractions cease to be abstract, and become even to popular sense -very concrete realities. In the tendency to personification in language -we see the same change from abstract to concrete: as when Virtue is -called a goddess, or Fashion surnamed the despot of womankind. In -such instances, imagination, more or less in the service of art and -religion, upsets the narrow vulgar estimates of reality. But it upsets -them, so to speak, by giving to the abstraction (through its creative -power) that sensuous concreteness which the mere abstract lacks and -which the ordinary mind alone recognises as real. It 'stoops to -conquer.' Such a representation is, as Hegel says[1], 'the synthetic -combination of the Universal and Individual': 'synthetic,' because not -their free, spontaneous, and essential unity, but the supreme product -of the artistic will and hand, which, rather than let the universal -perish by neglect, build for it, the eternal and omnipresent, 'a -temple made with hands.' In mythology we can see the same process: by -which, as it is phrased, an abstract term becomes concrete: by which, -as we may more correctly say, a thought is transformed into, or rather -stops short at, a representative picture. The many gods of polytheism -are the fixed and solidified shapes in which the several degrees of -religious growth have taken 'a local habitation and a name': or they -bear witness to the failure of the greater part of the world to grasp -the idea of Deity in its unity and totality apart from certain local -and temporary conditions. So, too, terms like force, law, matter,--the -abstractions of the mere popular mind--are by certain periods reduced -to the level of sensuous things, and spoken of as real entities, -somewhere and somehow existent, apart from the thinking medium to -which they belong. Such terms, again, as property, wealth, truth, are -popularly identified with the objects in which they are for the time -and place manifested or embodied. - -In these ways the abstract, in the ordinary meaning, becomes in the -ordinary meaning concrete. The distinction between abstract and -concrete is turned into a distinction between understanding and sense, -instead of, as Hegel makes it, a distinction in the adequacy and -completeness of thought itself. Thought (the Idea), as has been more -than once pointed out, is the principle of unification or unification -itself: it is organisation plus the consciousness of organisation: -it is the unifier, the unity, and the unified,--subject as well as -object, and eternal copula of both. An attempt is at first made in -two degrees to represent the thought in terms of the senses as a sort -of superior or higher-class sensible. When the impossibility of that -attempt is seen, common sense ends by denying what it has learned to -call the super-sensible altogether. These three plans may be called -respectively the mythological, the metaphysical, and the positive or -nominalist fallacies of thought. In the mythological, or strictly -anthropomorphic fallacy, thought is conceived under the bodily shape -and the physical qualities of humanity, as a separate unifying, -controlling, synthetic agent, through whose interference the several -things, otherwise dead and motionless, acquire a semblance of life -and action, though in reality but puppets or marionettes: that is to -say, it is identified with a subject of like passions with ourselves, -a repetition of the particular human personality, with its narrowness -and weakness. The action of the Idea is here replaced by the agency -of supposed living beings, invested with superhuman powers. In the -metaphysical or realist fallacy we have a feeble ghostly reproduction -of the mythological. The living personal deity is replaced by a faint -scare-crow of abstract deity. The cause of the changes that go on in -nature is now attributed to indwelling sympathies and animosities, -to the abhorrence of a vacuum, to selection, affinity, and the like: -to essences and laws conceived of as somehow existent in a mystic -space and time. In the positive or nominalist fallacy, the failure of -these two theories begins to be felt: and the mind, which had only -heard of unifying reason under these two phases and is meanwhile sure -of its sense-perceptions, treats the objective synthesis as a dream -and a delusion. Or, at best, it regards the synthesis as essentially -subjective--as a complementary idealising activity of ours which -ekes out the defects of reality, and brings continuity into the -discontinuous. Our thought--(it is only _our_ thought)--is but an -instrument, distinct from us and from the reality: yet acting as a -bridge to connect these two opposing shores--a bridge however which -does not really reach the other side, but only an artificial image, -which simulates to us, and will for ever simulate, the inaccessible -reality. This last view is the utterance of the popular matter-of-fact -reason, when in weariness and tedium it turns from the attempt to grasp -thought pure and simple, and instead of reducing the metaphysical -antitheses to the transparent unity of comprehension, relapses into -mere acceptance of a given reality. - -In some of these cases the full step into pure thought is never -made. The creations of mythology, for example, display an unfinished -and baffled attempt to rise from the separation of sense to the -unity and organisation of thought. The gods of heathenism are only -individuals--and individuals only _meant to be,_ and by the act of -faith and devotion set forth as reality before the worshipper: but they -are individuals in which imagination embodies a unified and centralised -system of forces or principles. They _mean_ the powers of nature and of -mind, but the sceptre in their hands is only a sign of power attributed -by the believer; and far away, encompassing alike them and him, is the -great relentless necessity. In other cases there is a relapse: when -the higher stage of thought has been attained, it is instantaneously -lost. Terms which are really thoughts are again reduced to the level of -the things of sense, individualised in some object, which, though it -is only a representation or sign, is allowed to usurp the place of the -thought which it but partially and by extraneous institution embodies. -The intuition of the sensuous imagination at every step throws its -spells on the products of thought, and turns them into a representative -picture, which in popular use and wont occupies the place of the -notion. Instead of being retained in their native timelessness, the -terms of the Idea are brought under the laws of Sense-perception, under -the conditions of space and time. - -The term 'representation,' which Hegel employs to name these -picture-thoughts or figurate conceptions, corresponds to the facts -of their nature. A 'representation' is one of two things: either a -particular thing sent out accredited with general functions, or a -universal narrowed down into a particular thing. Thus, as it has been -seen, a general name implies or connotes a universal relation or -attribute, but confines it to denote a particular object or class. -'Swift,' for example, was an epithet tied down to express the horse. In -the first instance we may suppose the name to be a sort of metaphor: -differing only by its simplicity and frequency of suggestion from those -endless epithets, which in Norse or Arabic poetry veil and adorn the -object which they are meant to designate. That is, we conceive the -object as an embodiment or representation of the quality, as an eagle -is the emblem of strength: only in the latter case we distinguish -between the object and its metaphorical signification. In the second -place, however, the object of experience is allowed completely to -coincide with the aspect discriminated by the selective epithet, and we -can no longer in ordinary thought separate the imaging object from the -general relation which it images forth. This is the level of thought to -which Hegel appropriates the term 'representation.' It includes under -it the three fallacies of thought already noted and saves the trouble -of comprehending the reality. In the Hegelian sense, a representation -is abstract; because it solidifies, hardens, and isolates the term of -thought, makes it a particular, and never rises above the single case -to the general notion embodied in it. - -The world of representative thought is a world of independent points -in juxtaposition, which we arrange as seems best to us. It lies in -an undefinable borderland between us and things. It is a would-be, -but not an actual, reality. It is not like a true Idea--the unity of -subjective and objective: but only a make-believe. We have put it -there, and yet we credit it with an effective existence. When our mind -moves amongst these picture-thoughts, it can only institute external -relations between the terms. A judgment, in that case, is interpreted -to mean the conjunction of two terms, which at once step into the rank -of subject and predicate by means of the copula. A sentence is an -arrangement of words _ab extra_ in conscious or unconscious conformity -with the rules of grammar. The world of knowledge, or the Idea, as -a whole is turned into a plane surface with its typical terms,--the -members of the organism of reason,--like dots put in co-ordination and -juxtaposition, not spontaneously affected towards each other. Even if -they are not embodied and reduced to a sensuous level of existence, -they are held to be originally separate and unconnected. How they -all came into being, and whether they do not all by gradations and -differentiation-proceed from one root, are questions neither asked nor -answered. - -The level of representative thinking--thinking i. e. which is not -the grasp (_Begriff_) of the reality, but only the apprehension of -something which stands for and represents it--is the level on which we -all come, more or less, to stand in our non-philosophic moments. It -is, in essentials, the realm of what Plato called _δόξα_,--the level -of consciousness which fails to rise to see the unity of essence in -the many single goods and beauties, which holds its knowledge (such -at is) at the mercy of accidents, not bound by the conclusions of -reasoning,--the realm which is not without reality, but an immature -and uncertain reality. It is, in essentials, the same as what, as -opposed to _intellectus_, Spinoza styled _imaginatio._ Imagination, -to Spinoza, is an understanding under the bondage of particular -passions and temporary interests, which loses sight of the great -bond of being or _Substantia_, and fixes its glance on the parts in -subordinate and infra-essential relationships: which is always finite, -i. e. never really comprehensive and self-sustaining in its view, but -always limited by a tacit reference to something outside itself. The -'Representation' is the idea, in the loose and inexact use of that -word, which goes with the phrase _mere idea_,--i. e. a mere mental -image, which is not the reality, though it is believed to do duty for -and to represent it[2]. Yet it is not a mere thought: rather its whole -aim and meaning is to refer to reality, to suggest it, to bring it -nearer us. Its fault is that it is an imperfect, partial, one-sided, -or even one-pointed idea. It is really an instance and phase of -the _ignava ratio_, to which a date or name serves as a ποῦ στῶ of -explanation. - - 'At Kilne there was no weathercock, - And that's the reason why.' - -Such 'representation,' according to Hegel, is, e. g., the mode of -intelligence accessible to those who cling to the mere, or abstractly, -religious mood, and who cannot or will not rise to the comprehension -of their creed. Its facts or dogmas present themselves to such a -restricted conception as the parts of a picture or the stages of a -history, in visible or imaginatively-construable space, and in a -succession of times. The essence of religion, of course, for Hegel as -for other exponents of its inmost nature, is a feeling of certitude -or faith which transcends the gulfs and separations of the secular -consciousness, which sees with the believing soul the inner peace, -the absolute harmony of the true reality. _Pectus facit theologum._ -The sense of utter dependence on God, in complete identity with the -sense of absolute independence in God--that strength of faith is the -very life of religion. But when religion seeks to give an intelligent -expression of her faith, when she tries to give a reason acceptable to -the outside world, she is apt, unless specially trained in the high -things of the spirit, to base her creed not on the rock of ages, but -on the signs and miracles of the times. She has tried to theorise the -faith: but, although her faith may be sound and true, the religious -spirit, unless it be also the spirit of wisdom and reasoned truth, runs -a risk of falling into the fallacy of _Post hoc_, _ergo propter hoc._ -She descends therefore to the region of representation: she uses the -language of sense and analogy; she presents the spiritual under the -guise of the natural. Yet in her heart of hearts these things are only -a parable,--they are but - - 'Flesh and blood - To which she links a truth divine.' - -Hegel--in the introduction to his lectures on the Philosophy of -Religion--is reported to have given the following characteristics of -'representation,' (_a_) It is still trammeled by the senses. Thought -and sensation strive for the mastery in it. Thought is bound fast to -an illustration: and of this illustration it cannot as representative -thought divest itself:--the eternally living idea is chained to the -transient and perishable form of sense. It is metaphorical and material -thinking, which is helpless without the metaphor and the matter. (_b_) -Representative thought envisages what is timeless and infinite under -the conditions of time and space. It loses sight of the moral and -spirit of historical development under the semblance of the names, -incidents, and forms in which it is displayed. The historical and -philosophical sense is lost under the antiquarian. Representative -thought keeps the shell, and throws away the kernel. (_c_) The terms -by which such a materialised thought describes its objects are not -internally connected: each is independent of the other; and we -only bring them together for the occasion by an act of subjective -arrangement[3]. - -The thing--the so-called _subject_ of the properties, of which it is -really no more than the _substratum_--affords no sufficient ground -for the unity of the properties attached to it. The substratum or -subject of the proposition is given, and we then look around to see -what other properties accompany the primary characteristic for which -the name was applied. But the term of popular language is not a real -unity capable of supporting differences; it is only one aspect of a -thing, a single point fixed and isolated in the process of language -by the action of natural selection. And so, to ask how the properties -are related to the thing, is to ask how one aspect, taken out of its -setting, is related to another isolated aspect: which is evidently an -unanswerable question. Science is right in rejecting the 'thing' of -popular conception. If _a_ is _a,_ and nothing more, as the law of -Identity informs us, then it is for ever impossible to get on to _b, -c, d_, and the rest. The union between the thing divided or defined, -and its divided or defining members, is what is termed extra-logical; -in other words, it is not evident from what is given or stated in the -popular conception. That union must be sought elsewhere, and deeper. - -And when _we_ step in to overcome the repugnance which the point of -conception, or what is supposed the subject, shows against admitting -a diversity of predicates,--when _we_ force it into union with these -properties: or when we try to remove the separation which leaves -the cause and effect as two independent things to fall apart; our -action, by which we effect a unification of differences, may, from -another and a universal point of view, be said to be the notion, or -grasp of thought, coming to the consciousness of itself. Thought, -as it were, recognises itself and its image in those objects of -representative conception, which seem to be given and imposed upon -the intellect. The two worlds, which the understanding accepts -as each solid and independent,--the world of external objects or -conceptions, and the world of self,--meet and coincide in the free -agency of thought, developing itself under a double aspect. It is -the 'original synthetical unity of apperception' (to quote Kant's -words), from which the Ego or thinking subject, and the 'manifold' -or body and world, are simultaneously differentiated. Thus, on the -one hand, we ourselves no longer remain a rigid unity, existing in -antithesis to the objects presupposed or referred to by representative -thought: and on the other hand the so-called thing loses its hardness -and fragmentary independence, as distinguished from our apprehension -of it. _Our_ action, as we incline to call it, which mends the -inadequacies of terms, is from a philosophic point of view, the notion -itself coming to the front and claiming recognition. The process of -thought is then seen to be a totality, of which our faculties, on -the one hand, and the existing thing, on the other, are isolated -abstractions, supposed habitually to exist on their own account. -To view either of these systems, the mental, on the one hand, and -the objective world, on the other, as self-subsistent, has been the -error in much of our metaphysics, and in the popular conceptions of -what constitutes reality. The idealism of metaphysicians has been -often as narrow and insufficient as the realism of common sense. An -adequate philosophy, on the contrary, recognises the presence of both -elements, in a subordinate and formative position. Representations -may be compared to the little pools left here and there by the sea -amongst the rocks and sand: the notion, or grasp of thought, is the -tidal wave, which left them there to stagnate, but comes back again to -restore their continuity with the great sea. In our thinking we are -only the ministers and interpreters of the Idea,--of the organic and -self-developing system of thought. - -The difference between a representative conception and a thought proper -may be illustrated by the case of the term 'Money.' Money may be -either a materialised thought, i. e. a Representative Conception, or -a Notion Proper. In the former case, money is identified with a piece -of money. It is probably, in the first instance, embodied in coins of -gold, silver, and bronze. In the second place, a wide gulf is placed -between it and the other articles for which it is given in exchange. -If other things are regarded as money, they are generally treated on -the assumption that they can in case of need be reduced to coinage. The -conception of money by the unscientific vulgar considers it separately -from other commodities: and the laws which forbade its exportation -gave a vigorous expression to the belief that it was something _sui -generis_, and subject to conditions of its own. The scientific notion -of money modifies this belief in the peculiarity and fixity of money. -Science does so historically, when it can point to a time and a race -where money in our sense of the word does not exist, and where barter -takes the place of buying and selling. Science does so philosophically, -when it expounds what may be called the _process_ of money,--the -inter-action or meeting of conditions to which the existence of money -is due. The notion of money, as given in the _Ethics_ of Aristotle, -says that it is the common measure of utility or demand. When we leave -out of sight the specific quality of an object, and consider only its -capacity of satisfying human wants, we have what is called its worth -or value. This value of the thing,--the psychological fact which is -left, when all the qualities marking the objective thing are reduced -to their social efficiency--is the notion, of which the currency is -the representation, reducing thought to the level of the senses, and -embodying the 'ideality' of value in a tangible and visible object. -So long as this 'idea' of value is kept in view, the currency is -comprehended: but when the perception of the notion disappears, money -is left a mere piece of currency, the general notion being narrowed -down to the coinage. Thus the notion of money, like other notions in -their ideal truth, is not in us, nor in the things merely: it is what -from a minor point of view, when we and the things are regarded under -the head of want or need, may be called the _truth_ of both, the unity -of the two sides. Thus considered, money falls into its proper place in -the order of things. - - -[Footnote 1: _Werke,_ ii. 529, 555.] - -[Footnote 2: Hegel's _Werke_, ii. 431: '_Wobei das Selbst nur -repräsentirt_ und vorgestellt ist, da ist es nicht wirklich: we es -vertreten ist, ist es nicht.' Cf. _ib._ 416.] - -[Footnote 3: _Philosophie der Religion,_ i. p. 137 seqq.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXIV. - - -FROM SUBSTANCE TO SUBJECT. - - -'It is, in my view, all important,' says Hegel[1], 'to apprehend and -express the True not as _Substance,_ but equally much as _Subject_.' -Substance, as Spinoza defines it, is that which is in itself and -which is conceived through itself, something which does not need the -conception of something else by which its concept may be formed[2]. -Substance, in other words, is something which serves to explain -itself, which is _causa sui._ The mind, looking out on the wide world -of mutable and manifold objects, finds its rest in the great calm of -a something at their base, the eternal nature which, itself unmoved, -is the one foundation, complete and sufficient, of all things,--a -_res aeterna et infinita,_ which can feed the mind with joy alone[3]. -These words suggest only an object--a transcendent object--the basis -of an objective order. They seem to leave little for the contemplating -subject to do save to discern it and, so discerning, to rest in it -and to love. They seem to leave substance a mere datum, a far-off -all-embracing end in which the variety of human effort can find a -central object and a final close. Yet, in the end it appears[4] that -this _Res aeterna_ loves himself with an intellectual love, and -this love is identified with the love of man to God, so far at least -as man's mind, considered _sub specie aeternitatis_, can be said to -'explicate' Deity. From this conclusion it might be said that Spinoza -rises above the mere category of substance: God is no longer the mere -foundation of things--the absolute object of all objects. He rises in -human spirit (regarded in its eternal significance) to the rank of -a true subject. He is not merely known as the True; but He himself, -living and moving in the essential spirit of man, knows himself and -acquiesces in his infinite beatitude. But if this be the legitimate -inference to be drawn from the closing sections of the _Ethics_, it is -not the view ordinarily suggested by the mention of Spinoza's doctrine. -That doctrine, on the contrary, seems, as it first confronts us, and -as it has taken its place in history, to omit the subjectivity which -had found so decided a recognition in the commencement of Cartesianism. -In the _cogito ergo sum_ so much at least is clearly stated: true -being--the true--is not merely known, but itself knows; not a mere -object, but a subject: a subject-object, or, an Idea. It is to be -admitted, indeed, that Descartes hardly remains at this altitude, but -he touches it for a moment. Even when he finds in the conception of God -a security for truth and reality, and thus seems to base these on a -one-sidedly objective standard, he regards God as, on the other hand, -the truth and reality postulated and presupposed by the structural -system of our ideas. God--such seems the tendency of his so-called -'proof'--is the inevitable prius and presupposition of our thought and -being: He makes us know, as much as He is ultimately the object known: -He is the unity and the creator of subject and object. - -But it is hardly possible to get in philosophy the full recognition of -the antithesis between subject and substance and the inclusion of both -in the fuller Idea, till after the time of Kant. Kant himself is, in -essentials, the antithesis of Spinoza, but it is not till Fichte that -the full force of that antithesis is expressly recognised. With Hegel, -the two opposite points of view are equally insisted on: the immanence -and the transcendence of the True, the Real, the Absolute: or, in -other words, the unity in it of subject and object, or of thought and -existence. Or, in the words of the religious spirit, though heaven and -the heaven of heavens cannot contain Him, He dwells in the spirit of -the righteous, and is not far from any one of us. The truth is not the -correspondence or agreement of an idea with a further reality which it -represents. Such an idea or 'representation' is a projection which has -escaped from our hands, which has slipped from our grip, and which, -while owning its mere vicarious character, at the same time beckons -us on to seek a reality we can never find. The 'representation' is in -a way objective--it is set over against us: but yet it is not truly -objective, not self-subsistent and self-possessed. Its objectivity is -the objectivity of a name: a quasi-objectivity, which requires to be -dipped in the living waters of intelligence before it can really exist -and act. It seems, to the untrained observer, to point only outwards to -the real object which it copies or designates: to a deeper reflection, -it is seen to point equally inward to the mind which informed it and -projected it. Thus the knowing subject, and the known object, with the -representation which acts as a perpetual mediator to connect and yet -not unify the one of these terms with the other,--all at last take -their place, reduced and transfigured, in the unity of the Idea. - -According to the Spinozist point of view, thought, it might seem by -a sort of miracle, dispels the mists that envelop and bewilder it, -sees through the multeity of modes, and the isolated pictures of -imagination, to the true reality, one, infinite and eternal. Before -that august vision of absolute wholeness the only attitude of a finite -mind would seem to be resignation, worship, reverence,--deeply shading -into the submission of absorption. For in it intellect and will are -declared to have no place[5]. With such a statement, we get that first -aspect of religion which has found its most imposing representative -in the faith of Islam. In every religion there must, however, be more -than this: or it would fail to do what all religion essentially does. -Sheer dependence_--Schlechthinnige Abhängigkeit_ (as Schleiermacher -has named it)--can never be the whole burden of a religious teacher's -message. Always--at least in the background--there is a contradictory -element--in apparent discrepancy with the first--the deification of the -worshipper. And as the Ethics of Spinoza--like every complete system -of speculative truth--deals with a problem parallel to, if not even -identical with, that of religion, its initial definitions and main -programme must never let us forget the tacit presuppositions worked out -to explicitness, as they are partly, in its conclusion. When Intellect -and Will are denied to the _Deus = Natura = Substantia,_ it is meant -that the Absolute is and has more than intellect and will can well -name, and that in Him (or Her, or It, for the pronominal distinctions -of gender matter nothing here), the separation of will from intellect -is a fallacy which can have no place. What Spinoza casts out are the -lower passions, the affections of weakness; these _as such,_ i. e. as -elements of weakness, can have no place in Him. But in God, as in the -free man who most resembles God, and in whose love He loves himself, -there is--but that also in terms we cannot fathom--abundance of -joy--the joy of infinite self-realisation. - -Partly by the complementary theory of Leibniz, partly by the antagonist -theories of Kant, the way had been prepared for setting forth, and -in fuller outline, the implications so tardily admitted by Spinoza. -It was only by a misuse or mal-extension of a word that Herder's -God--a God who is Force--and the Force of Forces--could be supposed -an advance upon Spinoza. There is in Force an analogue of Life; but -it is life in dependence, life not self-centred, always going forth, -and when it goes forth dissipated. It is as it were pushed from -behind, and is lost in what comes after it. If a Force of Forces means -anything, it means something more than Force: it means a master of -force, a force-controller and force-adjuster, a unity and principle -of forces. And Substance, as Spinoza understood it, is more than -this variability, this deification of instability. It is the unity -in which the variety and disparity of existence, the multiplicity of -vicissitude, is merged and lost, only again to issue from it, and yet -not leave it behind, in the infinitely-various modes of its two great -and conspicuous attributes of consciousness and extensionality. If -Hegel then sought to go beyond Spinoza, he sought to find a formula -which would lose nothing that Spinoza had reached, but would at the -same time bring out what Spinoza had left an implication, or noted in -a partial rectification. As in religion, besides the utter dependence -on God (so that, God failing, I perish), there must be also an absolute -union, complete reconciliation--complete as culminating in unity and -identity (so that God shall not be God, unless I am I): so it is in -philosophy. The Absolute cannot merely _be_, and be far away--the last -goal in which the variety of life is made one, and the turmoil of the -passionate existences laid to rest. The Soul which is (as some of the -medieval Christians would say) still _in itinere_, a wayfarer, is such -because its glance is turned on outward circumstances: but country is -no accident: the soul even here carries with it that _patria_, 'which -is the heavenly,' in its longings, and has it, even while yet on -pilgrimage, in that strong possession of all things by itself, which -the theologian styles Faith. This goal determines the pilgrimage, fixes -its direction, gives progress to its steps. - -In the myth-loving language of Plato (and of Wordsworth in his Platonic -ode) the Soul has in other spheres of being dwelt with the gods and -seen the secret of the world: it is itself one of the immortals, and -as it is here and now, is in a land of exile. At the morning of birth, -the living sample of humanity has left his original glory behind; and -a deep forgetfulness--only short of absolute--cuts it off from his -every-day consciousness. In his present reality he finds himself in a -land of darkness, fast bound in a hollow of the rock, looking out only -on the ghostly images that flit across his prison wall, cast there by -the objects that move between his back and the light of a mysterious -fire behind him and them. Such is his natural estate, as it meets the -bodily eye: the estate of the lowly savage, whom superstition and -ignorance seem to hold as their captive for ever. But, though his -high home and his glory of other days have left no conscious memory -in the soul, asleep and imbruted in its fleshly house, they have not -departed without leaving a trace behind. For forgetfulness is not -blank non-existence. The sample of humanity inherits the birthright -of his fathers--he has hopes and fears, duties and rights, which are -his, if he can mature himself to take possession of them. He suffers -from the pains of growth, from the sense of disparity between what -he is and what he may and should be--from the noble uneasiness and -dissatisfaction of a being who feels--if he does not know--his infinite -potentialities. For these potentialities--otherwise they have no title -even to that name--are also actualities, yet actualities which protest -their own incompleteness, and crave imperiously for what they lack. -What he has is his right, but his right only in so far as it is also -his duty. It is as such, and only as such, that he still retains the -soul in all its prerogatives: as the right, which is the duty, of -knowledge. Such a pre-figured and promised, but yet to be realised, -possession is what Plato has called _Eros_, or Love. But it is a Love -whose wings are at first invisible, and who often seems rather to crawl -among ignoble things than to soar in the free fresh air. - -The process of experience has been by Plato called Anamnesis or -Recollection. But Recollection is not always an easy, and never a -merely passive, process; and sometimes the forgetfulness seems so deep -that no extraneous stimulus can at all move it. We have seen already -one of these stimuli which rouse the sleeping sense--the mystery of -numbers: and there are many others. But, we have also learned, that -in the psychical sphere items of memory are not, as reckless fancy -puts it, stored up in compartments, sorted and arranged, ready to be -pulled out. The process of recollection is a complicated affair: an -affair of give and take, of comparison and selection and rejection, -of construction and reconstruction. You cannot haul up ready-made -memories from the mine. And this perhaps was sometimes forgotten by -Plato; it certainly has been by more than one of his commentators. -You may, no doubt, call up ideas from the vasty deep: but they come -by laws and principles of their own. Even when they come, which they -sometimes do unexpectedly, they come as an echo of the calling mind. -Recollection involves intellectual process: as Kant said, the synthesis -of imagination reposes upon the synthesis in the concept. Yet--and this -is the point which Plato's title of _Anamnesis_ accentuates--unless -'the soul had been such as to be affected in this way' (the words are -those of Aristotle), unless the soul had been implicitly intellectual -in tone and faculty, it would not have grasped the presented universe -under the categories which it uses. There is, says Aristotle, in the -barest act of sensation a congenital power of judgment; there is, says -Plato, an eye of the soul--a natural virtue of intelligence, which can -never be put into it, and must always be presupposed in any theory of -its processes. - -There are, therefore, no innate ideas, says Cudworth in explanation of -Plato, if these ideas mean formed and completed products of knowledge. -All ideas in this sense begin and grow within the range of experience, -and the history of their growth or development in literature and art -can be at least approximately traced. We can trace, that is, the -successions and connexions of the various types of beauty, or goodness: -can show how the idea at one time dwelt in one of its aspects, at -another in a different one. We can observe the variation, and it may -be the progress, in men's conception of God. But it is another matter -when we seek to explain these ideas themselves out of other elements, -heterogeneous to them. When that question is asked, then with Plato we -seem, in the absence of any theory of origins, obliged to own that it -is by the Beautiful that beautiful things come to be beautiful. The -μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένοs--the crossing of essential boundaries--which -Aristotle forbids to science, still raises its eternal barrier in -the logical, if it cease to hold good (as has been suggested) in the -physical sphere. In the totality which we call the world and experience -of reality there are, so to say, ultimate and irreducible provinces. -The utmost that philosophy, i. e. science, can do with these is to -co-ordinate them,--to show their mutual filiations, adaptations, and -harmonies,--to note their inadequacies and discrepancies. They are -not all of equal rank, perhaps; they have to yield to each other, it -may be in turn: but none of them can be arbitrarily expunged from -the totality, and none of them shown to be a mere phase of others. -To do that is to strip the universe of its variety and--it may be -added--of its beauty and its interest. If it be a false philosophy -that does it, there is a good deal of false philosophy abroad. There -is a lust of explanation which is never content till it has found an -equation for everything, till it has expressed everything in terms of -the common-place, till it has emptied everything of all that made it -individual and real, and turned it into an abstract, identical (as -only abstracts can be) with some other abstract. Such abstractions -are of course useful, and therefore need no excuse, when restricted -to a special sphere. So long, that is, as we remember that it is an -abstraction we are making, and that we are arbitrarily simplifying -the real natural problem, no harm is done by these artificial -constructions; and they are important steps in a larger process. But -what is correct and useful within a range whose limits we can define, -becomes dangerous when carried beyond all bounds. Its approximate truth -then becomes misleading error. - -It is these irreducible elements--these great provinces in human -experience, in reality, in the system of reason--that correspond to -the more important of what are known as Platonic ideas. As ultimate -constituents of the actual world they are in the narrower sense -inexplicable. One does not amount to an exact sum of some others, nor -is one got from another by the simple process of subtraction. But -if they cannot be explained, by being reduced to multiples of some -one basis, they can be comprehended in the respective implication -and explication they exhibit with their co-realities. They can be -correlated, reduced, and unified: we may even say, they can be -identified; but if we use such a term, we must mean that there is -some totality beyond and above them in which they all find a place -and all are harmonious; in which all when brought to their Truth are -really one and the same. This birthright of human nature in all ages -and countries--this central essence of man's spirit--is the realm of -Platonic ideas. They are the great elements, or constituent members, of -humanity and of reality: the framework of his mind and of the world. -How in each case they may be wrought out in detail, to what degree -they may here be evolved, and there stunted, is a matter of historical -research. And, in a sense, even it is not wrong to try to trace them -one to another: to explain them, as the phrase is, one by another. For -they are essentially connected: they are members of one system: they -are unified and harmonised in a way for which even the word 'organism' -is wholly insufficient. They are the poles and lines on which the tent -of human life, of intelligent life, is stretched: but they are also the -invisible ties which bind together the earth and heavens, and all that -is therein. - -These ideas therefore are immanent in man: for they are the basis -of human nature. But to name, to disentangle them, to measure out -their bounds and describe their connexions--that is no easy work. -And that is the work of Platonic recollection. That is the process -of historical experience. But it is a small thing for Plato to say -that these ideas are innate in man. What he is more concerned to make -clear is that in the possession or vision of these eternal forms, the -human soul is a partner of the gods, a citizen of the heavens. In -less mythical language, man, as an intelligent, artistic, moral, and -religious being, is not a mere accidental on-looker on the surface of -things, but near their central and abiding truth. The forms of his -mind, to speak after the manner of Kant, are the objective essences of -the real world of experience. Degrees there may be in the reality which -they possess--less or larger measures of truth to full experience--but -true and real they are: never mere falsity or emptiness. To estimate -the amounts of that reality is a problem Plato often tried. At one time -it seems as if the Good were in his estimate the form of forms, the -real of reals: but when we look closely, we see that it is a goodness -which is synonymous with real reality or perfect being. At another time -truth, i. e. reality, seems to be lord of all: at another, beauty: -and again he seems to confess his inability to lay down the order -of precedence in this hierarchy. Of one thing only he is perfectly -clear: and that is the unreality, the non-entity of the sense-world -as merely perceived, and the true being of the world of reason. But -he has no doubts as to the central truth that in the good, the true, -and the beautiful, there is a higher reality--a more far-reaching and -deep-piercing influence than in all the mere variety of sensation, the -mere multitude of sensible fact. - -What Plato has sometimes called the act of reminiscence, what he has -sometimes called the instinct of Love, is also known to him as the -process of Dialectic. For reminiscence has to watch and wrestle with -the inertia of oblivion, has to set the imagined beside the real, and -to correct percepts by concepts, concepts by percepts, has to brace -up its energies, and to advance not by mere pressing onward, but by -tacking and zigzagging through contrary difficulties finally realise -itself. And love too is a battle, where the craving for union has to -measure its force with the instinct of independence, where selfishness -and self-surrender seek a reconciliation, and where in the close, if -the close be love, each is self-retained only as self-abandoned, and -each rises to a higher union in which lower selfhoods are absorbed. -Even so in the course of Dialectic. It is the art which divides -and conjoins, which unifies and distinguishes: the art of asking -and answering. To Plato it appears in the main as an action of the -intelligent subject: but an action which, as he hints, is almost a -natural instinct, which through discipline has become an art. In the -hands of its typical artist, it proceeds, or seems to proceed, as if -unconscious of its principle and end. Socrates has, as he professes, -no overt conception of the result: he has no knowledge of the positive -conclusion to be reached. It is the Logos--the logic of reality--which -sustains the movement. Abandoning any subjective humour of carrying -the argument to a preconceived end, one is swept on by the current of -real logic--the reason in things. The dogma we have set up and seemed -to see before us, will, if we are dispassionate, carry us on beyond -itself, and suggest aspects calling for recognition and acceptance. If -only we refrain from arresting the movement of criticism,--a course -to which prudence, ease, custom, and every form of the _ignava ratio_ -counsel us,--truth will reveal itself in us, and by us. It is because -other aims, personal and particular, are so ever-present with us, that -speculative free inquiry seems so hard. It is we who insist on closing -up the door, not the truth that is reluctant to show itself. - -Truth, then, is self-revelation or development. Not a result which is -to be accepted, bowed to, and reverenced: but the result issuing (and -only valuable as issuing) from a process in which we and objectivity -are fellow-workers. The truth may no doubt be presented--as Spinoza -does present it--in definitions, stating the net result as fundamental -fact. Fundamental fact it is; but as so stated, as Substance, it comes -as a stranger, almost as an enemy: the great vision, suddenly offered -to untrained eyes, overwhelms and alarms the living sense of self, of -personality. Hegel wishes to show it as a friend, as our very own,--as -Subject (but not merely subject). It is for this that philosophy runs -through its cycle and returns into itself. Man points to nature and -nature to man: universal to individual: thought to things: the self to -God, and God to the human soul. - - -[Footnote 1: Hegel, _Werke_, ii. 14.] - -[Footnote 2: Spinoza, _Eth._ Def. 3.] - -[Footnote 3: Spin. _De inteil. Em._ i. 10.] - -[Footnote 4: Spin. _Eth._ v. 35.] - -[Footnote 5: _Eth._ i. 17 schol.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXV. - - -REASON AND THE DIALECTIC OF UNDERSTANDING. - - -Representative conceptions, besides being the burden of our ordinary -materialising consciousness, are also the data of science, accepted -and developed in their consequences. Because they are so accepted, -as given into our hand, scientific reasoning can only institute -relations between them. Its business as thus conceived is progressive -unification, comparing objects with one another, demonstrating the -similarities which exist between them, and combining them with each -other. The exercise of thought which deals with such objects is limited -by their existence: it is only formal. It is finite thought, because -it is only subjective: it begins at a given point and stops somewhere, -and never gets quite round its materials so as to call them truly its -own. Each of the objects on which it is turned seems to be outside -of it, and independent of it. Each point of fact, again, when it is -carried out to its utmost, meets with other thoughts which limit it, -and claim to be equally self-centred. Such knowledge creeps on from -point to point. To this thinking German philosophy from the time of -Kant and Jacobi applied a name, which since the days of Coleridge has -been translated by 'Understanding'[1]. This degree or mode of thinking ---not a faculty of thought--is the systematised and thorough exercise -of what in England is called 'Common Sense.' In the first place, it is -synonymous with practical intelligence. It takes what it calls facts, -or things, as given, and aims only at arranging and combining them and -drawing from them counsels of prudence or rules of art. Seeing things -on a superficies, as it were so many unconnected points, here itself -and there the various things of the world, it tries to bring them into -connexion. It accepts existing distinctions, and seeks to render them -more precise by pointing out and sifting the elements of sameness. -Its greatest merit is an abhorrence of vagueness, inconsistency, and -what it stigmatises as mysticism: it wishes to be clear, distinct, and -practical. In its proper sphere,--and it has an indispensable function -to perform even in philosophy: wherever, that is, it is unnecessary -to go into the essential truth of things, and one has only to do good -work in a clearly defined sphere,--the understanding has an independent -value of its own[2] Nor is this true merely of practical life, where -a man must accommodate himself to facts: it is equally applicable -in the higher theoretic life,--in art, religion, and philosophy. If -intelligent definiteness does not make itself apparent in these, there -is something wrong about them. - -It is only when this exercise of thought is regarded as a _ne plus -ultra,_ and its mandates to restrict investigation by the limits of -foregone conclusions find obedience, that understanding deserves -the reproachful language which was lavished upon it by the German -philosophers at the close of the last century. The understanding is -abstract: this sums up its offences in one word. Its objects, that -is the things it deals with and believes utterly real, are only -partly so, and when that incompleteness is unrecognised, are only -abstractions. Both in its contracted forms, such as faith and common -sense, and in its systematic form, the logical or narrowly-consistent -intellect, it is partial and liable to be tenacious of half-truths. -Only that whereas in feeling and common-sense there is often a great -deal which they cannot express,--whereas the heart is often more -liberal than its interpreting mind will allow--the reverse is true of -the logically-consistent intellect. The narrowness of the latter is, -in its own opinion, exactly equal to the truth of things: and whatever -it expresses is asserted without qualification to be the absolute -fact. Its business is, given the initial point (which is assumed to be -certain and perspicuous), to see all which that point will necessarily -involve or lead to. For example, Order may be supposed to be the chief -end of the State. Let us consider, says the intelligent arguer (without -wasting time on abstruse inquiries as to what Order is or means, and -what sort of Order we want), to what consequences and institutions -this conception will lead us. Or, again, the chief end of the State -is assumed to be Liberty. To what special forms of organisation will -this hypothesis (also assumed a self-evident conception) lead? Or we -may go a step further. It is evident, some will say, that in a State -there must be a certain admixture of Order and Liberty. How are we to -proceed--what laws and ordinances will be necessary, to secure the -proper equilibrium of these two principles? The two must be blended, -and each have its legitimate influence. - -These are examples of the operation of Understanding. It can only reach -a synthesis (or conjunction), never a real unity, because it believes -in the omnipotence of the abstractions with which it began: but must -either carry out one partial principle to its consequences, or allow -an alternate and combined force to two opposite principles. Its canon -is identity: given something, let us see what follows when we keep the -same point always in view, and compare other points with the one which -we are supposed to know. Its method is analytic: given a conception -in which popular thought supposes itself at home, and let us see all -the elements of truth which can be deduced from it. Its statements are -abstract and narrow: or, in the words of Anaxagoras, one thing is cut -off from another with a hatchet[3]. In its excess it degenerates into -dogmatism, whether that dogmatism be theological or naturalistic. - -The fact is that the Understanding, as this analytic, abstract, and -finite action of mind is called,--the thought which holds objective -ideas distinct from one another, and from the subjective faculties of -thought as a whole,--that this Understanding is, when it claims to be -heard and obeyed in science, not sufficiently thorough-going. It begins -at a point which is not so isolated as it seems, but is a member of a -body of thought: nor is it aware that the whole of this body of thought -is in organic, and even more than organic, union. It errs in taking too -much for granted: and in not seeing how this given point is the result -of a process,--that in it, in any thought or idea, several tendencies -or elements converge and are held in union, but with the possibility -of working their way into a new independence. In other words, the -Understanding requires, as the organon and method of philosophy, to -be replaced by the Reason[4],--by infinite thought, concrete, at -once analytic and synthetic. How then, it may be asked, can we make -the passage from the inadequate to the adequate? To that question the -answer may be given that it is our act of arbitrary arrest which halts -at the inadequate: that in complete Reason, which is the constituent -nature both of us and of things, the Understanding is only a grade -which points beyond itself, and therefore presupposes and struggles up -to the adequate thought. In other words, it is Reason which creates or -lays down for behoof of its own organisation the aims, conditions, and -fixed entities,--the objects, by which it is bound and limited in its -analytic exercise as understanding. Reason, therefore, is the implicit -tendency to correct its own inadequacy: and we have only to check -self-will and prejudice so far that the process may be accomplished. - -The movement is not at one step: it has a middle term or mean which -often seems as if it were a step backward. Progress in knowledge is -usually described as produced by the mode of demonstration or the -mode of experience. Formal Logic prefers the first mode of describing -it: Applied Logic prefers the second. Either mode may serve, if we -properly comprehend what demonstration and experience mean. And that -will not be done unless we keep equally before us the affirmative and -the negative element in the process. The law of rational progress in -knowledge, of the dialectical movement of consciousness, or in one -word of experience, is not simple movement in a straight line, but -movement by negation and absorption of the premisses. The conclusion -or the new object of knowledge is a product into which the preceding -object is reduced or absorbed. Thus the movement from faith (which -is concentrated and wholly personal knowledge) to open and universal -knowledge, which is capable of becoming the possession of a -community,--truth and not merely conviction, must pass through doubt. -The premisses from which we start, and the original object with which -we begin, are not left _in statu quo_: they are destroyed in their -own shape, and become only materials to build up a new object and a -conclusion. It is on the stepping-stones of discarded ideas that we -rise to higher truth: and it is on the abrogation of the old objects -of knowledge that the new objects are founded. Not merely does a new -object come in to supplement the old, and correct its inadequacies by -the new presence: not merely do _we_ add new ranges to _our_ powers of -vision, retaining the old faculties and subjoining others. The whole -world--alike inward and outward,--the consciousness and its object--is -subjected to a thorough renovation: every feature is modified, and -the system re-created. The old perishes: but in perishing contributes -to constitute the new. Thus the new is at once the affirmation and -negation of the old. And such is the invariable nature of intelligent -progress, of which the old and not a few modern logicians failed to -render a right account, because they missed the negative element, and -did not see that the immediate premisses must be abolished in order to -secure a conclusion,--even as the grapes must be crushed before the -wine can be obtained. - -This is the real meaning of Experience, when it is called the teacher -of humanity: and it was for this reason that Bacon described it as -'far the best demonstration.'[5] Experience is that absolute process, -embracing both us and things, which displays the nullity of what is -immediately given, or baldly and nakedly accepted, and completes it -by the rough remedy of contradiction. The change comes over both -us and the things: neither the one side nor the other is left as it -was before. And it is here that the advantage of Experience over -demonstration consists. Demonstration tends to be looked upon as -subjective only (_constringit assensum, non res_): whereas Experience -is also objective. But Experience is more than merely objective: it -is the absolute process of thought pure and entire; and as such it -is described by Hegel as Dialectic, or Dialectical movement. This -Dialectic covers the ground of demonstration,--a fragment of it -especially described and emphasised in the Formal Logic,--and of -Experience,--under which name it is better known in actual life, and in -the philosophy of the sciences[6]. - -Dialectic is the negative or destructive aspect of reason, as -preparatory to its affirmative or constructive aspect. It is the spirit -of dissent and criticism: the outgoing as opposed to the indwelling: -the restless as distinguished from the quiet: the reproductive as -opposed to the nutritive instinct: the centrifugal as opposed to the -centripetal force: the radical and progressive tendency as opposed -to the conservative. But no one of these examples sufficiently or -accurately describes it. For it is the utterance of an implicit -contradiction,--the recognition of an existing and felt, but hitherto -unrecognised and unformulated want. Dialectic does not supervene from -without upon the fixed ideas of understanding: it is the evidence of -the higher nature which lies behind them, of the dependence on a larger -unity which understanding implicitly or explicitly denies. That higher -nature, the notion or grasp of reasonable thought, comes forward, and -has at first, in opposition to the one-sided products of understanding, -the look of a destructive agent. If we regard the understanding and -its object, as ultimate and final,--and they are so regarded in the -ordinary estimation of the world,--then this negative action of reason -seems utterly pernicious, and tends to end in the subversion of all -fixity whatever, of everything definite. In this light Dialectic -is what is commonly known as Scepticism; just as the understanding -in its excess is known as Dogmatism. But in the total grasp of the -rational or speculative notion, Dialectic ceases to be Scepticism, and -Understanding ceases to be Dogmatism. - -Still there can be no doubt that the Dialectic of reason is dangerous, -if taken abstractly and as if it were a whole truth. For the thoughts -of ordinary men tend to be more abstract than their materials warrant. -Men seek to formulate their feelings, faith, and conduct: but the -_rationale_ of their inmost belief,--their creed,--is generally -narrower than it might be. Out of the undecomposed and massive -'substance,' on which their life and conduct is founded, they extract -one or two ingredients: they emphasise with undue stress one or two -features in their world, and attach to these partial formulae a value -which would be deserved only if they really represented the whole -facts. Hence when the narrow outlines of their creed are submitted -to dialectic,--when the inlying contradictions are exposed, men feel -as if the system of the world had sunk beneath them. But it is not -the massive structure of their world, the organic unity in which they -live, that is struck by dialectic: it is only those luminous points, -the representative terms of material thought, which float before their -consciousness, and which have been formulated in hard and fast outlines -by the understanding. These points, as so defined and exaggerated, are -what dialectic shakes. Not an alien force, but the inherent power of -thought, destroys the temporary constructions of the understanding. The -infinite comes to show the inadequacy of the finite which it has made. - -In philosophy this second stage is as essential as the first. -The one-sidedness of the first abstraction is corrected by the -one-sidedness of the other. In the Philosophy of Plato, as has been -noted, the dialectical energy of thought is sometimes spoken of -under the analogy of sexual passion--the Love which, in the words of -Sophocles, 'falls upon possessions' and makes all fixed ordinance of -no account, and finds no obstacles insuperable to its strong desire. -But Love, as the speaker explains, is a child of Wealth and Want: -he is never poor, and never rich: he is in a mean between ignorance -and knowledge[7]. Thus is described the active unrest of growth, the -'_inquietude poussante_,' as Leibniz called it,--the quickening force -of the negative and of contradiction. - -At the word 'contradiction' there is heard a murmur of objection, -partly on technical, partly on material grounds. There are, it is said, -other ways of getting from one idea to another than by contradiction: -and it is not right to give the title to mere cases of contrast and -correlation. Now it may be the case that the relations of ideas are -many and various. In particular there is to many people a decided -pleasure in the mere accumulation of bits of knowledge. In their mental -stock there are only aggregates,--conjunctions due to accidents of -time and place,--associations and fusions which do not reach organised -unity. In all of us, perhaps, there are more or less miscellaneous -collections of beliefs, perceptions, hopes, and wishes, in no very -obvious connexion with one another. An united self, one, harmonious, -and complete, is probably rather an ideal of development than a fact -realised. There are in each two or three discordant selves,--among -which it might sometimes be difficult to select the right and true -one (for that will depend on the momentary point of view). The deeper -consciousness may go on entirely independent of the train of the more -superficial ideas: the world of reality may glide past without touching -the world of dream or of fiction: our business part may live in a -region parted off from our religion by gulfs inscrutable. In all these -cases there cannot be said to be any contradiction. - -But Hegel speaks of the essential progress of knowledge, and of that -true self or real mind which has attained complete harmony--the self -and mind that is implicitly or explicitly Absolute. In such a mind -where the finite has passed or is passing into the infinite, in a mind -that is really becoming one and total, its parts must meet and modify -each other. At each phase, if that phase is earnest, self-certain, and -real, it claims to be complete, and can brook no rival. The bringer -of new things must appear as an enemy: for the old system, however -imperfect as a mere form, has behind it the strength of an infinite -and perfect content: it is more than it has explicated: but as it -(from its imperfection and honesty) identifies itself with its form, -it is resolved to resist change. Progress then must be by antagonism: -it cannot be real progress otherwise, but only the mere shifting of -dilettante doubt and dilettante toleration. Both new and old are worth -something, and they must prove their value by neither being lost, but -both recognised, in a completer scheme of things. - -Yet there is a difference in the measure of contradiction at different -stages of thought. It is always greatest when there is least to be -opposed about. The more meagre an idea, a creed, a term of thought, -the more violent the antitheses to it. The more abstractly we hold a -doctrine, the more readily are we disposed to sniff opposition. And as -in more concrete belief, so in the more abstract terms of thought. They -seem so wide apart--like 'Is' and 'Is not'--and yet, taken alone, they -are really so ready to recoil into one another. As thought deepens, -contradiction takes a more modified form. The relativity of things -becomes apparent: and what were erewhile opposed as contradictory, -turn out as pairs of correlatives, neither of which is fully what it -professed to be, unless it also is all that seemed reserved for the -other. Lastly, and in the full truth of development, progress is seen -to be not merely a sudden recoil from one abstraction to another, -nor merely a continual reference to an underlying correlative, but -the movement of one totality which advances by self-opposition, -self-reconciliation, and self-reconstruction. In this stage, the -weight and bulk of unity keeps the contradiction in its place of due -subordination. But both elements are equally essential, and if the -unity is less palpable in the abstract beginnings, and the divergence -less wide at the close, at neither beginning nor close can either be -absent. - -But if we merely look at the differentiation or negation involved -in the action of reason, we miss the half of its meaning: and the -new statement is as one-sided as the old. We have not grasped the -full meaning until we see that what, as understanding, affirmed a -finite, denies, as dialectic, the absoluteness or adequacy of that -finite. Both the partial views have a right to exist, because each -gives its contribution to the science of truth.[8] If we penetrate -behind the surface,--if we do not look at the two steps in the process -abstractly and in separation,--it will be seen that these two elements -coincide and unite. But we must be careful here. This coincidence or -identification of opposites has not annihilated their opposition or -difference. That difference subsists, but in abeyance, reduced to an -element or 'moment' in the unity. Each of the two elements has been -modified by the union: and thus when each issues from the unity it -has a richer significance than it had before. This unity, in which -difference is lost and found, is the rational notion,--the speculative -grasp of thought. It is the product of experience,--the ampler -affirmative which is founded upon an inclusion of negatives. - -We began with the bare unit, or simple and unanalysed point, -which satisfied popular language and popular imagination as its -_nucleus_:--the representation which had caught and half-idealised a -point, moment, or aspect in the range of feeling and sensation. In this -stage the notion or thought proper is yet latent. In the first place, -the _nucleus_ of imagination was analysed, defined, and, as we may -surmise, narrowed in the Intellect. And this grade of thought is known -as the Understanding. In the second place, the definite and precise -term, as understanding supposes it, was subjected to criticism: its -contradictions displayed; and the very opposite of the first definition -established in its place. This is the action of Dialectic. In the third -place, by means of this second stage, the real nature or truth was seen -to lie in a union where the opposites interpenetrate and mould each -other. Thus we have as a conscious unity,--conscious because it, as -unity, yet embraces a difference as difference--what we started with -as an unconscious unity, the truth of feeling, faith, and inspiration. -The first was an immediate unity:--that is to say, we were in the midst -of the unity, sunk in it, and making a part of it: the second is a -mediated unity, which has been reached by a process of reflection, and -which as a conscious unity involves that process. - -Reason, then, is infinite, as opposed to understanding, which is finite -thinking. The limits which are found and accepted by the analytic -intellect, are limits which reason has imposed, and which it can -take away: the limits are in it, and not over it. The larger reason -has been laying down those limits, which our little minds at first -tend to suppose absolute. Let us put the same law in more concrete -terms. It is reason,--the Idea,--or, to give it an inadequate and -abstract name, Natural Selection--which has created the several forms -of the animal and vegetable world: it is reason, again, which in -the struggle for existence contradicts the very inadequacies which -it has brought into being: and it is reason, finally, which affirms -both these actions,--the hereditary descent, and the adaptation--in -the provisionally permanent and adequate forms which result from the -struggle. - -The three stages thus enumerated are therefore not merely stages -in our human reason as subjective. They state the law of rational -development in pure thought, in Nature, and in the world of Mind,--the -world of Art, Morals, and Science. They represent the law of thought -or reason in its most general or abstract terms. They state, mainly -in reference to the method or form of thought, that Triplicity, which -will be seen in those real formations or phases to which thought -moulds itself,--the typical species of reason. They reappear hundreds -of times, in different multiples, in the system of philosophy. The -abstract point of the Notion which parts asunder in the Judgment, and -returns to a unity including difference in the Syllogism:--the mere -generality of the Universal, which, by a disruption into Particulars -and detail, gives rise to the real and actual Individual:--the Identity -which has to be combined with Difference in order to furnish a possible -Ground for Existence:--the baldness and nakedness of an Immediate -belief, which comes to the full and direct certainty of itself, to -true immediacy, only by gathering up the full sense of the antithesis -which can separate conviction from truth, or by realising the Mediation -connecting them:--all these are illustrations of the same law really -applied which has been formally stated as the necessity for a defining, -a dialectical, and a speculative element in thought. The three parts -of Logic are an instance of the same thing: and when the Idea, or -organism of thought, appears developed in the series of Natural forms, -it is only to prepare the kingdom of reason actualised in the world of -Mind. The Understanding, on the field of the world, corresponds, says -Hegel[9], to the conception of Divine Goodness. The life of nature -goes on in the independence and self-possession of all its parts, each -as fixed and proud of its own, as if its share of earth were for ever -assured. The finite being then has his season of self-satisfied ease: -while the gods live in quiet, away from the sight of man's doings. -The dialectical stage, again, corresponds to the conception of God as -an omnipotent Lord: when the Power of the universe waxes terrific, -destroying the complacency of the creatures and making them feel their -insufficiency,--when the once beneficent appears jealous and cruel, and -the joyous equanimity of human life is oppressed by the terrors of the -inscrutable hand of fate. The easy-minded Greek lived for the most part -in the former world: the uneasy Hebrew to a great extent in the latter. -But the truth lay neither in the placid wisdom of Zeus, leaving the -world to its own devices, nor in the jealous Jehovah of Mount Sinai: -the true speculative union is found in the mystical unity of Godhead -with human nature. In this comprehensive spirit did Hegel treat Logic. - -This Triplicity runs through Hegel's works. If you open one, the main -divisions are marked with the capitals A, B, C. One of these, it may -be, is broken up into chapters headed by the Roman numerals I, II, III. -Under one or more of these probably come severally the Arabic numerals -1, 2, 3. Any one of these again may be subdivided, and gives rise to -sections, headed by the small letters a, b, c. And, lastly, any one -of these may be treated to a distribution under the three titles α, -β, γ. Of course the division is not in each case carried equally far: -nor does the subject always permit it: nor is Hegel's knowledge alike -vigorous, or his interest in all directions the same. - - -[Footnote 1: 'Verstand,'] - -[Footnote 2: 'Die Vernunft ohne Verstand ist Nichts; der Verstand doch -Etwas ohne Vernunft.' Hegel's _Leben_, p. 546.] - -[Footnote 3: Ὃτι οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐv τῷ ἑvi κόσμῳ ἀὐδὲ -ἀποκέκοπται πελέκεϊ. Simplic. Phys. fol. 38 a (ed. Diels, p. 176).] - -[Footnote 4: 'Vernunft.'] - -[Footnote 5: _Novum Organum_, Book I. 70.] - -[Footnote 6: _Phenomenologie des Geistes_, p. 67.] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, _Symposion,_ 203.] - -[Footnote 8: Cf. Dante, _Parad._ iv. 130.] - -[Footnote 9: See in the _Logic_ (vol. ii. p. 145).] - - - - -PROLEGOMENA - -BOOK III - -_LOGICAL OUTLINES_ - - - - -CHAPTER XXVI. - - -THOUGHT PURE AND ENTIRE. - - -The English reader may probably be taken to be familiar with the -conception of Logic as the Science of the _Form_ of Thought. He may -also have heard this explained as equivalent to the Science of Thought -as Thought, or of Thought as Form, or of Formal Thought. But, probably, -also, he brings to the lesson no very high estimate of _form_ as -such. In the old language of Greek philosophy, transmitted through -the Schoolmen of the West, and still lingering in the phraseology of -Bacon and Shakespeare[1], Forms and substantial forms were powers in -the world of reality. But a generation arose which knew them not: to -which they were only belated survivals of the past. The forms had lost -connexion with matter and content, and had come to seem something -occult, transcendent, and therefore, to a practical and realistic age, -something fantastic and superfluous. Yet it may be well to recall -that the same author who has put on record his view that forms are -only mental figments, unless they be fully 'determinate in matter,' -has equally laid it down that the so-called 'causes' of vulgar -philosophy--the matter and the agent--are only 'vehicles of the form,' -Thus spontaneously did Bacon reconstruct the Aristotelian theory of the -interdependence of form and matter, that form is always form _of_ (or -_in_) matter, and that matter is always _for_ form. - -The relativity of form and matter, or of form and content, is indeed -almost a commonplace of popular discussion on logical subjects. -But like other uncritical applications of great truths, this is -both carried beyond its proper bounds, and is not carried out with -sufficient thoroughness. There cannot--it is said--be a formal logic, -because every exercise of thought is internally affected or modified by -the material--the subject-matter--with which it deals. It is implied -in such an argument that the 'subject-matter' finds no difficulty -in existing by itself, but that the 'thought' is a mere vacuity or -un-characterised something which owes its every character to the -said matter. But a subject-matter which has content and character -has therefore form: it is already known, already thought. And as to -this thought, which is said to approach its matter with a self so -blank, so impartial, so neutral--what is it? It is a thought or a -thinking which has never as yet thought,--which is only named 'thought' -by right of expectation, but is itself nothing actual. Of such ---fictitious--thought there can hardly be a science. - -On the other hand, that may be easily called a formal logic, which is -much more than formal: and that may be called material, which is only -a species of formal. Great indeed is the virtue of names, to suppress -and to replace thought. When forms hang on as mysterious names after -their day is passed--when they are retained in a certain honour, while -the real working methods have assumed other titles; then these forms -become purely formal and antiquated. Thus the Logic of Aristotle seemed -in its unfamiliar language to a later generation to be purely formal -and superfluous. It was only another side of the same mistake when -the new forms--the forms efficient and active in matter,--were not -recognised as formal, but were boldly styled material: and the Logic -which discussed such matter-marked forms was called a material Logic. - -The phrase Matter of Thought, like its many congeners, is a fruitful -mother of misconceptions. Caught up by the pictorial imagination, which -is always at hand to anticipate thought, it suggests a matter, which is -not thought, but is _there,_ all the same, lying in expectation of it. -It suggests two things--(for are there not two words, and a preposition -or term of relation between them?). But there are not two things. -This _matter_ is just as much a nonentity as the aforesaid _thought_: -a matter of thought is a thought matter,--matter, thought once, and -possibly to be thought again. - -All this talk about the Relativity of form and matter is insincere, -and semi-conventional. It is (like the well-known antithesis between -Matter and Mind, of which indeed it is only a variation) a halting -between two views. That which it chiefly leans to, is that there can -be no form without matter, though there may well be matter which is -not yet formed. At the best it goes no further than to admit or assert -that _besides_ the one there is _also_ the other. It establishes a -see-saw, and is proud of it. This is Dualism. Its maxim is, Don't -forget that there is an Other. You have explored the One: you have -perhaps done well. But there is also and always the Other. The second -view is not the mere negation of this dualism. That there is a -dualism is a fact which it acknowledges.[2] All life and reality is -manifested in dualism--in antithesis: but the life and the reality -is one. Mind--_Geist_--actualised and intelligent experience--is -the one ultimate and essential reality.[3] In the face of its unity, -mere matter is only a half-truth, and mere thought is only another. -The reality, the unity, and the truth, is matter as formed, nature as -reflected in mind. In the reality of experience there is always the -presence of thought: and thought is only real when it is wedded with -nature in the truth of man's mind. So far Bacon and Hegel coincide. -Man--in so far as he is Mind--and of course Mind in its fullness is not -merely subjective nor merely objective, but absolute--is the measure of -all things, the central and comprehensive reality. Such a man--and such -a mind--is, we need hardly add, not the man in the street, nor the man -in the study: but the infinite, universal, eternal mind in whom these -and all others essentially have their being. Such truth of Man--such -Mind--is the Absolute: it is sometimes named God: it is the ideal of -all aspiration, and the fountain of all truth. - -'Logic,' says Hegel[4], 'is the science of the Idea in the medium of -mere thought.' It exhibits the truth in one partial aspect, or shows -one appearance of the total unity of the world,--the aspect it would -wear if we could for a moment suppose the reality of Nature to vanish -out of sight, and the ideality of Mind reduced to a ghost. It dissects -the underlying organisation--the scheme of unification--which the world -of mental or spiritual experience presents in all its concreteness. -And it does so because it exhibits the last result of the ever clearer -and clearer experience which Mind achieves as it comes to see and -realise itself. The logical skeleton is the sublimated product of -a rich concrete experience. It has been a curious delusion of some -who were probably satisfied by a casual glance at Hegel's _Logic_, -especially in its earlier chapters, to suppose that the Logic was -meant to be the absolute beginning: and that pure or mere thought was -the congenital endowment of the heaven-born philosopher[5]. To Hegel, -on the contrary, Logic was an abstraction from a fuller, more concrete -reality. He did not indeed suppose that the symbolical conception of -Movement--in its popular pictorialness--would be an adequate substitute -or representative for thought; but he knew that the energy of mental -development was the fact, and the truth, of which 'becoming' is a -meagre, abstract phase. - -Logic, then, is not the Science of mere or pure thought, but of the -Idea (which is co-terminous with reality)--of the Mind's synthetic -unity of experience--looked at, however, abstractly, in the medium -of pure thought. Just so, Nature-philosophy is the same Idea, as it -turns up bit after bit distracted, fragmentary, and more or less -mutilated, in the multiplication, the time and space division, of -physical phenomena. But as science requires us to go from the simple -to the more complex, as the truth has to prove itself true, by serving -in its conclusion as the corroboration of all its premisses or -presuppositions; so the system of philosophy begins with the Logic. -Yet it can only begin there, because it has already apprehended itself -in its completeness: and it can only move onward because it is the -concentrated essence--the implicit being--of all that it actually and -explicitly is. It may appear to emerge from a point: but that point -has at its back the intellectual unity of a philosophy which embraces -the world. It presupposes the complete philosopher who shall be the -complete organ of absolute intelligence, of universal and eternal -Spirit. - -A satisfactory Logic then presupposes or implies a complete system of -philosophy. No doubt, for a logic which deals with the minor problems -of ratiocination or formal induction, all that is needed is a certain -general acquaintance with popular conceptions, and with the results or -methods of physical science. But if logic takes its business seriously, -it must go behind these presuppositions. It must trace back reasoning -to its roots, fibres, and first principles. And to do that it is not -enough to put at the front a psychological chapter. Far from helping, -psychology in these matters is much more in need of being helped -itself. Till it has learned a little of the puzzle of the one and the -many, the same and the diverse, being, quality, and essence, psychology -will be as little use to Logic as blind guides generally are. Nor need -this prevent us from saying that when psychology has thoroughly learned -these mysteries, it will give fresh life and reality to the logic which -it touches upon. The principles of Logic lie in another field,[6] and -are deeper in the ground, than obvious psychological gossip. - -If Logic then deals with form, it deals with a form of forms--the -form of the world, of life, and of reality. It is a form, which -is a unity in diversity, an organism,--a form which is infinitely -manifold, and yet in all its multiplicity one. Logic is the morphology -of thought,--of that thought which in Nature is concealed under -the variety and divisions of things, and which in the theory of -mental and spiritual life is resumed into a complete biology of the -world-organism. The problem of Logic then demands an abstraction--an -effort of self-concentration--an effort by which the whole machinery -of the sensible universe shall be left behind, and the accustomed -clothing of our thoughts be removed. To move in this ether of pure -thought is clearly one of the hardest of problems. - -Like Plato, we may occasionally feel that we have caught a glimpse of -the super-sensible world unveiled; but it disappears as the senses -regain their hold. We can probably fix a firm eye on one term of -reason, and criticise its value: but it is less easy to survey the -Bacchic dance from term to term[7], and allow them to criticise -themselves. The distracting influence of our associations, or of -outside things, is always leading us astray. Either we incline to treat -thoughts as psychological products or species, the outcome of a mental -process, which are (_a_) given to us from the beginning, and so _a -priori_ or innate, or which (_b_) spring up in the course of experience -by mutual friction between our mind and the outside world, and so are -_a posteriori_ or derivative. Or disregarding the subjective side of -thoughts, we act as if they were more correctly called things: we -speak of relations between phenomena: we suppose things, and causes, -and quantities to form part of the so-called external universe, which -science explores. The one estimate of thought, like the other, keeps in -view, though at some distance, and so as not to interfere with their -practical discussions, the separate and equal existence of thoughts -and things. The psychologists or subjectivists of logic scrutinise the -world within us first of all, and purpose to accomplish what can be -done for the mind as possessing a faculty of thought, before they turn -to the world of things. The realists or objectivists of logic think it -better for practical work to allow thought only the formal or outside -labour of surveying and analysing the laws of phenomena out of the -phenomena which contain them. Neither of them examines thought--'the -original synthetic unity'--in its own integrity as a movement in its -own self, an inner organisation, of which subject and object, the -mind and the things called external, are the vehicles, or, in logical -language, the accidents. - -If it is possible to treat the history of the English Constitution as -an object of inquiry in itself and for its own sake, without reference -to the individuals who in course of time marred and mended it, or -to the setting of events in which its advance is exhibited, why not -treat the thought, which is the universal element of all things, of -English Constitution, and Italian Art, and Greek Philosophy, in the -same way,--absolutely, i. e. in itself and for its own sake? When -that is done, distinctions rigidly sustained between _a priori_ and -_a posteriori_ become meaningless because now seen to belong to a -distinction of earlier and later in the history of the individual -consciousness. There is at best only a modified justification for such -mottoes and cries, as 'Art for Art's sake,' or 'Science must be left -free and unchecked,' or 'The rights of the religious conscience ought -always to be respected': but there can be no demur or limitation to the -cry that Thought must be studied in Thought by Thought and for the sake -of Thought. For Art, and Science, and Religion are specialised modes -in which the totality or truth of things presents itself to mankind, -and none of them can claim an unconditioned sway: their claims clash, -and each must be admitted to be after all a partial interpretation, a -more or less one-sided interpretation of the true reality of the world. -Thought on the other hand is unlimited: for it exists not merely in -its own abstract modes, but interpenetrates and rules all the other -concrete forms of experience, manifesting itself in Art and Religion, -not less than in Science. And thus when we study Thought, we study that -which is in itself and for itself,--we study Absolute Being. On the -other side it must be noted that in Logic it is Absolute Being, only -when and as it is _thought,_ which we study. The two sides, Being and -Thought, must both come forward: and come in unity, although in some -phases of the Idea the thought-element, in others the being-element is -more pronounced. - -Thought, too, is Being. An old distinction of the Stoics, which not -inaptly represents popular views on this matter, set on one side ὄντα, -existences (which were always corporeal, whether they were the things -we touch and feel, or the words and breathings by which we utter them), -and on the other side the meanings or thoughts proper or σημαινόμενα -(which were incorporeal). These λεκτά, as they were otherwise called, -were to the Stoics the proper sphere of Logic. In the sense therefore -which the Stoics and popular consciousness give to being, the object of -logic does not possess being. It is not corporeal. It cannot however -be said to be in the sphere of non-being. It is rather a part of -reality--of concrete being--which can be considered apart, as if it -stood alone. Alone it does not stand. And yet it holds a position so -fundamental,--is the same theme again and again repeated under endless -variations,--is so obviously the universal of things--that it may -properly form the subject of independent study. - -It is, moreover, a part of Reality, which may well claim to stand for -the whole. It is, so to say, the score of the musical composition, -rolled up in its bare, silent, unadorned lineaments; the articulated -theme, besides, and not the mere germinal concept, of all the variety -of melody. But it is only laid up there _in abstracto_, because in -the soul of the composer it had already taken concrete form, due to -his capacity and training, his mental force, his art and science. It -is there that the score has its source. But secondly, the musical work -exists in the performance of the orchestra: in the manipulations of the -several instruments, in the notes of the singers, in all the diversity -of parts which make up the mechanism for unfolding the meaning or -theme--that unreality, that mere thought, which to the stricter Stoic -might be said to have no ὔπαρξις, or bodily subsistence. And there are -still people who will be disposed to assert that it is only in the -multitude of notes of violin, trombone, flute, &c., that the music is -real:--though perhaps these hardy realists do not quite mean what they -say. For what they probably mean, and what is the fact, is that the -music exists as a complete reality in those who have ears and minds -capable of comprehending and enjoying it: in those who can reunite -meaning and theme to execution and orchestration: and we may even add -that it is more and more real, in proportion to the greater power with -which they can bring these two into one. - -We shall rather say then that thought points to reality, and that mere -nature seeks for interpretation: that mere thought and mere being both -seek for reunion. Yet if in the complete reality we thus distinguish -two elements, we may follow Hegel in setting the pure Idea first. It -is no doubt in a way true that, as has been said, Hegel may be often -read most easily if we first begin with his concluding paragraphs. In -psychology and ethics the fundamental principles have assumed a more -imposing, a larger, a more humanly-interesting shape, than they bear -in the intangible outlines of Logic. There they are written in blacker -ink and broader lines than in the grey on grey. But after all, it is -only for those who have grasped the faint--yet fixed--outlines that the -full-contoured figure speaks its amplest truth. The true sculptor must -begin with a thorough study of anatomy. For those therefore who do not -care merely for results, it is indispensable to begin--or at least to -turn back to the beginning--to the Logic. No doubt the full tones of -the heard and sounded harmony are the true and adequate presentation -of the composer's purpose: but they will be best comprehended and -appreciated by those who have thoroughly grasped the score. - -In Logic, so regarded, thought is no longer merely our thought. It is -the constructive, relational, unifying element of reality. Without it -reality would not articulately be anything for us: and such thoughts -seem to be its net extract, its quintessence, its concentrated meaning. -But really they are only the potent _form_ of reality. Or, more -exactly, in its limits, under its phases, must come all reality if it -is to be part and parcel of our intelligent possession, our certified -property. Such a thought is the frame-work, the shape-giver of our -world, of our communicable experience. It is the formative principle of -our intelligent life, as it is the principle through which things have -meaning for us, and we have meaning for and fellowship with others. -It is not so rich as religion and art, perhaps it does not have the -intensity of feeling and faith: but it is at the very basis of all of -these, or it is the concentrated essence of what in them is explicated -and developed. Humanity in these its highest energies is more than mere -thought--more than mere logic: but it is still at the root thought, and -it is still governed by the laws and movement of this higher logic. For -this is a logic which is no mere instrument of technical reasoning, -for proof or disproof: no mere code of rules for the evaluation of -testimony. It is a logic which deals with a thought--or an Idea in -thought-form--which is the principle of all life and reality: the way -of self-criticism which leads to truth: a thought which is at home in -all the phases and provinces of experience. - -Under the same name, Logic, therefore, we find something quite -different from what the example of Aristotle and his ancient and modern -followers had accustomed us to.[8] Under the auspices of Kant and his -'Transcendental logic' there has emerged the need of something more -corresponding to the title. For the word itself was not used either by -Aristotle or the Stoics. Neither the Analytics and Topics of the one, -nor the Dialectic of the other, exhaust the conception of the science, -or, to put it more accurately, they are only inceptions of a science, -the fulfilment of which was reserved for a later time. Bacon and Locke, -Descartes and Spinoza, all the thinkers of modern Europe call for a -deeper probing of the logical problem: for a grasp of it which shall -be more worthy of its conventional name, Logic, the theory of Reason. -And we may even say that what is wanted is a unification of the problem -of the Organon with that of the first philosophy, a unification of -Logic with Metaphysics: a recognition that the problem of reason is -not merely the method of reasoning, but the whole theory as to the -correlations of perception and conception, of thinking and reality. - -This conception of Logic as the self-developing system of Thought -pure and entire, is the distinctive achievement of Hegel. 'I cannot -imagine,' he says, 'that the method which I have followed in this -system of Logic, or rather the method which this system follows in -its own self, is otherwise than susceptible of much improvement, and -many completions of detail: but I know at the same time that it is the -only genuine method. This is evident from the circumstance that it is -nothing distinct from its object and subject-matter: for it is the -subject-matter within itself, or its inherent dialectic, which moves it -along.'[9] - -But how is this universe of thought to be discovered, and its law of -movement to be described? From times beyond the reach of history, -from nations and tribes of which we know only by tradition and vague -conjectures, in all levels of social life and action, the synthetic -energy of thought has been productive, and its evolution in the field -of time has been going on. For thousands of years the intellectual city -has been rearing its walls: and much of the process of its formation -lies beyond the scope of observation. But fortunately there is a help -at hand, which will enable us to discover at least the main outlines in -the system of thought. - -The key to the solution was found somewhat in the same way as led -to the Darwinian theory concerning the Origin of Species. When the -question touching the causes of variation and persistence in the -natural kinds of plants and animals seemed so complex as to baffle all -attempts at an answer, Darwin found what seemed a clue likely to lead -to a theory of descent. The methods adopted in order to keep up, or to -vary, a species under domestication were open to anybody's inspection: -and those principles, which were consciously pursued in artificial -selection by the breeder, suggested a theory of similar selection -in free nature. In studying the phenomena of thought, of which the -species or types were no less numerous and interesting than those in -organic nature, it was perhaps impossible to survey the whole history -of humanity. But it was comparatively easy to observe the process of -thought in those cases where its growth had been fostered consciously -and distinctly. The history of philosophy records the steps in the -conscious and artificial manipulation of what for the far greater part -is transacted in the silent workshops of nature. Philosophy, in short, -is to the general growth of intelligence what artificial breeding is to -the variation of species under natural conditions. In the successive -systems of philosophy, the order and concatenation of ideas was, as it -were, clarified out of the perturbed medium of real life, and expressed -in its bare equivalents in terms of thought, and thus first really -acquired. Half of his task was already performed for the logician, -and there remained the work, certainly no slight one--of showing the -unity and organic development which marked the conscious reasoning, -and of connecting it with the general movement of human thought. The -logician had to break down the rigid lines which separated one system -of philosophy from another,--to see what was really involved in the -contradiction of one system by its successor,--and to show that the -negation thus given to an antecedent principle was a definite negation, -ending not in mere zero or vacuity, but in a distinct result, and -making an advance upon the previous height of intelligence. - -To say this was to give a new value to the history of philosophy. -For it followed that each system was no _mere_ opinion or personal -view, but was in the main a genuine attempt of the thinker to give -expression to the tacit or struggling consciousness of his age. Behind -the individual--who is often unduly regardless of his contemporaries -and predecessors, and who writes or thinks with little knowledge or -sympathy for them, there is the general bearing and interest of the -age, its powerful solidarity of purpose and conception. The philosopher -is the prophet, because he is in a large part the product of his age. -He is an organ of the mind of his age and nation; and both he and it -play a part in the general work of humanity. - -On the other hand, it is dangerous to insist too forcibly on the -rationality of the history of philosophy. For it may be taken to -mean--probably only by blinded or wooden commentators--that each -step in the evolution and concatenation of the logical idea is to be -identified with some historical system, and that these systems must -have appeared in this precise order. And this would be to expect -too much from the 'impotence of nature' which plays its part in the -historical world also: as that on one side forms part of the Natural. -There is Reason in the world--and in the world of history; but not in -the pellucid brightness and distinct outlines proper to the Idea in -the abstract element of thought. It may take several philosophers to -make one step in thought; and sometimes one philosopher of genius may -take several steps at once. There may even be co-eval philosophies: -and there may be philosophies which appear to run on in independent -or parallel lines of development. It may well be that Hegel has -underestimated these divergencies, and that he has been too apt to see -in all history the co-operation to one dominant purpose. But these -errors in the execution of a philosophy of history, and especially of -the history of philosophy, should not diminish our estimate of its -principle.[10] - -At first this process was seen in the medium of time. But the -conditions of time are of practical and particular interest only. The -day when the first leaves appear, and the season when the fruit ripens -on a tree, are questions of importance to practical arboriculture. But -botany deals only with the general theory of the plant's development, -in which such considerations have to be generalised. So logic leaves -out of account those points of time and chance which the interests of -individuals and nations find all-important. And when this element of -time has been removed, there is left a system of the types of thought -pure and entire,--embalming the life of generations in mere words. The -same self-identical thought is set forth from its initial narrowness -and poverty on to its final amplitude and wealth of differences. At -each stage it is the Absolute: outside of it there is nothing. It is -the whole, pure and entire: always the whole. But in its first totality -it is all but a void: in its last a fully-formed and articulated -world,--because it holds all that it ever threw out of itself resumed -into its grasp. - -In these circumstances nothing can sound higher and nobler than the -Theory of Logic. It presents the Truth unveiled in its proper form and -absolute nature. If the philosopher may call this absolute totality -of thought ever staying the same in its eternal development,--this -adequacy of thought to its own requirements--by the name of God, then -we may say with Hegel that Logic exhibits God as He is in His eternal -Being before the creation of Nature and a finite Mind.[11] But the -logical Idea is only a phantom Deity--the bare possibility of a God -or of absolute reality in all the development of its details. - -The first acquaintance with the abstract theory is likely to dash -cold water on the enthusiasm thus awakened, and may sober our views -of the magic efficacy of Logic. 'The student on his first approach -to the Science,' says Hegel, 'sees in Logic at first only one system -of abstractions apart and limited to itself, not extending so as -to include other facts and sciences. On the contrary, when it is -contrasted with the variety abounding in our generalised picture of -the world, and with the tangible realities embraced in the other -sciences,--when it is compared with the promise of the Absolute Science -to lay bare the essence of that variety, the inner nature of the mind -and the world, or, in one word, the Truth,--this science of Logic -in its abstract outline, in the colourless cold simplicity of its -mere terms of thought, seems as if it would perform anything sooner -than this promise, and in the face of that variety seems very empty -indeed. A first introduction to the study of Logic leads us to suppose -that its significance is restricted to itself. Its doctrines are not -believed to be more than one separate branch of study engaged with the -terms or dimensions of thought, besides which the other scientific -occupations have a proper material and body of their own. Upon these -occupations, it is assumed, Logic may exert a formal influence, but -it is the influence of a natural and spontaneous logic for which the -scientific form and its study may be in case of need dispensed with. -The other sciences have upon the whole rejected the regulation-method, -which made them a series of definitions, axioms, and theorems, with the -demonstration of these theorems. What is called Natural Logic rules -in the sciences with full sway, and gets along without any special -investigation in the direction of thought itself. The entire materials -and facts of these sciences have detached themselves completely -from Logic. Besides they are more attractive for sense, feeling, or -imagination, and for practical interests of every description. - -And so it comes about that Logic has to be learned at first, as -something which is perhaps understood and seen into, but of which the -compass, the depth, and further import are in the earliest stages -unperceived. It is only after a deeper study of the other sciences that -logical theory rises before the mind of the student into a universal, -which is not merely abstract, but embraces within it the variety -of particulars.--The same moral truth on the lips of a youth, who -understands it quite correctly, does not possess the significance or -the burden of meaning which it has in the mind of the veteran, in whom -the experience of a lifetime has made it express the whole force of its -import. In the same way, Logic is not appreciated at its right value -until it has grown to be the result of scientific experience. It is -then seen to be the universal truth,--not a special study beside other -matters and other realities, but the essence of all these other facts -together.[12] - - -[Footnote 1: E. g. 'formal' in _Hamlet_, iv. 5. 215; 'informal' in -_Measure for Measure,_ v. 236.] - -[Footnote 2: _Encycl._ § 574 (_Philosophy of Mind,_ p. 196).] - -[Footnote 3: _Encycl._ § 377.] - -[Footnote 4: _Logic_, vol. ii. p. 30.] - -[Footnote 5: The criticisms of A. Trendelenburg, in his _Logische -Untersuchungen,_ rest on such assumptions. 'Trendelenburg,' says -Hartmann, 'means low-water mark in German philosophy.'] - -[Footnote 6: See above all Bradley's _Principles of Logic_, and -Bosanquet's _Logic_, &c.] - -[Footnote 7: 'Das Wahre ist der bacchantische Taumel, an dem kein Glied -nicht trunken ist; und weil jedes, indem es sich absondert, ebenso -unmittelbar sich auflöst,--ist es ebenso die durchsichtige und einfache -Ruhe.' _Phenom. des Geistes,_ p 35.] - -[Footnote 8: Prantl, _Geschichte der Logik,_ i. 87.] - -[Footnote 9: _Wissenschaft der Logik_, i. p. 39.] - -[Footnote 10: See _Encyclop._ § 549 _(Philosophy of Mind_, pp. 148 -seqq.). It is, of course, quite another question--to be answered by -intelligent research--how far in particular cases Hegel has accurately -studied a thinker, and faithfully interpreted him. Some of his critics -in this line appear to mistake philology--which is a highly important -authority in its own field--for philosophy: and will no doubt go on -doing so.] - -[Footnote 11: Hegel's _Werke_, iii., 33.] - -[Footnote 12: _Wissenschaft der Logik_, i. p. 43.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXVII. - - -ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE: OR THE CATEGORIES. - - -According to the strict reasonings of Kant in his _Criticism of Pure -Reason_, and the somewhat looser discussions of Mr. Spencer in his -_First Principles_ a science of Metaphysics or theory of the Infinite, -Absolute, or Unconditioned is impossible. As a result of the criticism -by Kant, Jacobi claimed the Absolute for Faith: and Spencer banishes -the Absolute or Unknowable to the sphere of Religion to be worshipped -or ignored, but in either case blindly. As we have already seen, Hegel -does not accept this distribution of provinces between religion and -philosophy. There is only one world, one reality: but it is known more -or less fully, more or less truly and adequately. It is presented in -one way to the sensuous imagination: in another to the scientific -analyst: in a third to the philosopher. To the first it is a mere -succession or expanse of pictures, facts, appearances: and outside -it--somewhere, but not here,--there is a land, a being of perfect -wholeness and harmony. To the second it is an unending chain of causes -and effects, of one thing simplified by being referred to another till -at last a mighty all-explaining nullity, called an 'Ultimate Cause,' -is presumed to linger, eternally unperceived at the infinitely-distant -end of the series. To the third everything is seen in connexion, but -not a mere uni-linear connexion: each, when studied, more and more -completes itself by including those relations which seemed to stand -outside: each fully realised, or completely invested with its ideal -implications, is seen no longer to be an incident or isolated fact, but -an implicit infinite, and a vice-gerent of the eternal. Philosophy thus -releases both ordinary and scientific knowledge from their limitations; -it shows the finite passing into the infinite. And Hegel, accordingly, -purposes to show that this unfathomable Absolute is very near us, and -at our very door: in our hands, as it were, and especially present -in our every-day language. If we are ever to gain the Absolute, we -must be careful not to lose one jot or tittle of the Relative[1]. The -Absolute--this term, which is to some so offensive and to others so -precious--always presents itself to us in Relatives: and when we have -persistently traced the Proteus through all its manifestations,--when -we have, so to speak, seen the Absolute Relativity of Relation, there -is very little more needed in order to apprehend the Absolute pure and -entire. One may say of the Absolute what Goethe[2] says of Nature: 'She -lives entirely in her children: and the mother, where is she?' - -It is a great step, when we have detected the Relativity of what had -hitherto seemed Absolute,--when a new aspect of the infinite fullness -of the world, the truth of things, dawns upon us. But it is even a -greater step when we see that the Relativity which we have thus -discovered is itself Relative. And this is one advantage of first -studying the value of the categories of ethics and physics on Logical -ground. On the concreter region of Nature and Mind, the several grades -and species into which reality is divided have a portentous firmness -and grandeur about them, and the intrinsic dialectic seems scarcely -adequate to shaking the foundations of their stability. They severally -stand as independent self-sustaining entities, separate from each -other, and stereotyped in their several formations. But in the ether of -abstract Idea, in the fluid and transparent form of mere thoughts, the -several stages in the development of the Absolute, the various grades -of category, clearly betray their Relativity, and by the negation of -this Relativity lead on to a higher Absolute. - -To the practical man,--so long as his reflection does not go deep,--the -concepts on which his knowledge and faith are built seem eternal, -unshifting rock, parts of the inmost fabric of things. He accepts them -as ultimate validities. To him matter and force, cause and effect, -distinctions between form and content, whole and part, quantity and -quality, belong to the final constitution of the world. (And so, in a -sense, they do.) If he ever overcome the absoluteness which popular -thought attributes to the individual things of sense and imagination, -and show their relativity, he does so only to fall under the glamour -of a new deception. Causes and matters, forces and atoms, become new -ultimates, new absolutes, of another order. Fictions or postulates of -the understanding take the place of the figments of imagination. The -ordinary scientific man labours especially under the 'metaphysical' -fallacy: he realises abstractions in their abstractness. As against -this it is the business of the logician to show how such terms are to -be interpreted as steps in a process of interpretation--containing so -much that others of simpler structure have handed on, and themselves -presupposing by implication a great deal they fail properly to -explicate. Thus, the logician evinces at one blow the relativity of -each term in its mereness, abstractness, or false absoluteness, and the -ideal absoluteness which always carries it beyond itself, and makes it -mean more than it says. - -The natural mind always hastens to substantiate the terms it employs. -It makes them a fixed, solid foundation, an hypostasis, on which -further building may be raised. If such pseudo-absolutising of concepts -is to be called metaphysics, then logic has to free us from the -illusions of metaphysics, to de-absolutise them, to disabuse us of a -false Absolute. The false Absolute is what Hegel calls the Abstract: -it is the part which, because it succeeded in losing sight of its -dependence, had believed itself to be a whole. Logic shows--in the -phrase of Hegel--that each such term or concept is only an attempt -to express, explicate, or define the Absolute[3]: a predicate of the -Absolute, but falling short of its subject, or only uttering part of -the whole truth of reality. But while Logic shows it only to be an -attempt, and therefore in an aspect relative, it equally shows its -ingrained tendency to complete itself, to carry out to realisation -its ideal implication,--shows, in short, that e. g. force is more -than _mere_ force, that thing-in-itself is not properly even a thing; -that a veritable notion (_Begriff_) or grasp of a thing is more than -a _mere_ (subjective) notion, &c. Thus the true Absolute is not the -emptiest and most meagre of abstractions,--what is left as a residual -after the relative in all its breadth and length has been cut out -of it; it is the concretest of all being, the whole which includes -without destroying all partial aspects. Yet as it includes them, it -shows itself their master and more than master: making each lose and -win in the other, till all are satisfied in unity, and no shade of -individuality is utterly lost in the totality of the Universal. - -Accordingly, Metaphysics and Logic tend to form one body. For the -distant and transcendent Absolute, which was the object of older -Metaphysics, was substituted an Absolute, self-revealing in the terms -of thought. Being is deposed from its absoluteness, and made the -first postulate of thought. Former Metaphysics had dashed itself in -vain against the reefs that girdle the island of the supersensible -and noümenal, the supposed world of true Being: and the struggle at -last grew so disastrous that Kant gave the signal to retreat, and to -leave the world of true Being, the impregnable Thing-in-itself, to its -repose. His advice to metaphysicians[4] was that, while scientific -research continued to concentrate the attack of analysis upon single -experiences conforming to certain conditions, they should investigate -these' conditions of possible experience or foundations of objectivity. -In other words, he turned observation to what he called Transcendental -Logic. It was by means of this suggestion, understood in the widest -sense, that Hegel was led to treat Logic as the science of ultimate -reality. He had to show how these conditions when carried out in -full gave the Unconditioned. He attacked the Absolute, if we may say -so, in detail. The Absolute, as the totality, universe or system of -Relativity, lays itself open to observation by deposing itself to a -Relative. It possesses the differentiating power of separating itself -as an object in passivity, from itself as a subject in action,--of -deposing itself to appearance, of being _for_ itself, and also _in_ -and _for_ itself. And thus Thought is the active universal,--which -actualises itself more and more out of abstraction into concreteness. - -Hegel, then, solved the problem of Metaphysics by turning it into -Logic. The same principle, Thought, appeared in both: in the former -as a fixed and passive result, showing no traces of spontaneity,--in -the latter as an activity, with a mere power of passing from object -to object, discovering and establishing connexions and relations. The -two sciences were fragments, unintelligible and untenable, when taken -in abstract isolation. This is the justification, if justification -be required, for Hegel's unification of Logic and Metaphysics. The -Hegelian Logic falls into three parts: the theory of Transitory Being: -the theory of Relative Being: and the theory of the Notion. The first -and second of these in his Science of Logic are called Objective Logic; -they also might be described as Metaphysics. The third part is more -strictly on Logical ground. Or perhaps it is best to describe the whole -as the Metaphysics of Logic. - -The Logic of Hegel is the Science of Thought as an organic system of -its characteristic forms, which in their entirety constitute the Idea. -These forms or types of thought, the moulds in which the Idea confines -itself in its evolution, are not unlike what have been otherwise called -the Categories. (Of course the foreign word 'Categories' does not -commend itself to Hegel).[5] They are the modifications or definite -forms, the articulated and distinct shapes, in which the process of -Thought ever and anon culminates in the course of its movement. The -Infinite and Absolute at these points conditions itself, and as so -conditioned or differentiated is apprehended and stamped with a name. -They specify the unspecified, and give utterance to the ineffable. -They are the names by which reason grasps the totality of things,--the -names by which the truth (or God) reveals itself, however inadequately. -From one point of view they constitute a series, each evolved from -the other, a more completely detailed term or utterance of thought -resulting by innate contradiction from a less detailed. From another -point of view the total remains perpetually the same; and the change -seems only on the surface. The one aspect of the movement conceals the -Absolute: the other puts the Relative into the background. - -What then are the Categories? We may answer: They are the ways in -which expression is given to the unifying influence of thought: and we -have to consider them as points or stations in the progress of this -unification, and in the light of this influence. These Categories are -the typical structures marking the definite grades in the growth of -thought,--the moulds or forms which thought assumes and places itself -in,--those instants when the process of thought takes a determinate -form, and admits of being grasped. The growth of thought, like -other growths, is often imperceptible and impalpable. And then, -unexpectedly, a condensation takes place, a form is precipitated out of -the transparent medium. A new concept, a new grasp of reality, emerges -from the solution of elements: and a name is created to realise the -new shade of the Idea. These thought-terms are the world of Platonic -forms, if we consider his 'form of Good' as corresponding to the 'Idea' -of Hegel. For if we look carefully into this mystic word 'Good' which -plays so brilliant a part in ancient philosophy, we shall see that it -only expresses in a more concrete and less analytic form, as ancient -thought often does, the same thing as so many moderns love to speak -of as Relativity, and which is also implied in Aristotle's conception -of an End. To see things _sub specie boni_--which Plato describes -as the supreme quality of the truth-seeker who is to guide men into -uprightness, or into conformity with the true nature of things,--is -to see them elevated above their partial self-subsistence into the -harmony and totality of that which is always and unvaryingly its real -self. The Good is the sun-light in which things lose their earlier -character (which they had in the days of our bondage and ignorance) of -mysterious and perplexing spectres of the night. In the light of the -Good, things are shorn of their false pretence of self-subsistence and -substantiality, deposed by comparison with the perfect and unspotted, -and as it were stung into seeking a higher form of being by struggle. -And this is the abstract moral way of looking. But to see them in the -form of Good means also that they are seen to be more and better than -we thought, that they are not condemned to inadequacy, but bear in them -the witness and revelation of infinity and absoluteness. And this is -rather the faith of religion and the vision of art. And the 'form of -Good' is only a brief and undeveloped vision of an Absolute, which is -the 'form of Relativity,'--Relativity elevated into an Absolute. - -A Category is often spoken of as if it were the highest extreme of -generalisation, the most abstract and most widely applicable term -possible. If we climb sufficiently far and high up the Porphyry's tree -of thought, we may expect, thought the old logicians, to reach the -'_summa genera_' or highest species of human thought. Nor have modern -logicians always refrained from this byway. But these quantitative -distinctions of greater and less, in which the Formal Logic revels, -are not very suitable to any of the terms or processes of thought, -and they certainly give an imperfect description of the Categories. -The essential function which the Categories perform in the fabric -of thought and language is, in the first place, to combine, affirm, -demonstrate, relate, and unify,--and _not_ to generalise.[6] Their -action may be better compared to that fulfilled by those symbols in -an algebraical expression, which like _plus_ and _minus_ denote an -operation to be performed in the way of combining or relating, than -to the office of the symbols which in these expressions denote the -magnitudes themselves. - -To the student of language the Categories sometimes present themselves -as pronominal, or formal roots,--those roots which, as it is said, do -not denote things, but relations between things. He meets them in the -inflections of nouns and verbs; in the signs of number, gender, case, -and person: but, as thus presented, their influence is subordinate to -the things of which they are, as it were, the accidents. He meets them -in a more independent and tangible shape in the articles, pronouns, -prepositions, conjunctions, and numerals, and in what are called the -auxiliary verbs. In these apparently trifling, and in some languages -almost non-existent words or parts of words, we have the symbols of -relations,--the means of connexion between single words,--the cement -which binds significant speech together. There are languages, such as -the older and classical forms of Chinese, where these categorising -terms are, as it were, in the air: where they are only felt in accent -and position, and have no separate existence of their own. But in -the languages of the Indo-European family they gradually appear, at -first in combination, perhaps, with the more material roots, and only -in the course of time asserting an independent form. Originally they -appear to denote the relations of space and time,--the generalised or -typical links between the parts of our sense-perceptions: but from -there they are afterwards, and in a little while, transferred into -the service of intellect. These little words are the very life-blood -of a language,--its spirit and force. It is in these categories, -as they show themselves in the different linguistic families, that -a nation betrays its mode and tone of thought. The language of the -Altaic races, e. g., expresses activity only as a piece of property, -an appropriation of a substance, and knows no true distinction of noun -and verb: the Semitic Tongues in their tense-system perhaps betray the -intense inwardness of the race: whereas the immense inflectionalism of -the Indo-European seems not unconnected with his greater versatility -and energy. Complete mastery in the manipulation of these particles -and forms is what makes an idiomatic knowledge of a language, as -distinct from a mere remembrance of the vocabulary. And philosophy -is the recognition of their import and significance. Thus in Greek -philosophy the central questions turn upon such words as Being and -not-Being: Becoming: that out of which: that for the sake of which: the -what-was-being: the what is: the other: the one: the great and small: -that which is upon the whole: what is according to each: this somewhat: -&c.[7] And again in Modern Philosophy, how often has the battle raged -about the meaning of such words as I: will: can: must: because: same -and different: self: &c.! - - -[Footnote 1: Cf. Herbart's maxim, 'Wie viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung -auf Sein.' (_Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik._)] - -[Footnote 2: _Die Natur_ (1780): 'Sie lebt in lauter Kindern: und die -Mutter, wo ist sie?.... Sie ist ganz und doch immer unvollendet.... Sie -verbirgt sich in tausend Namen und Termen, und ist immer dieselbe.'] - -[Footnote 3: _Logic (Encyclop.)_ §§ 85, 87, 112, 194, &c.] - -[Footnote 4: Metaphysic is, in Kant's usage, ambiguous. It means (_a_) -a supposed science of the supersensible or unconditioned reality; -(_b_) a study of the conditions or presuppositions--the Kantian _a -priori_--of some aspect of Experience, e. g. a Metaphysic of Moral -rules.] - -[Footnote 5: His usual term is _Denkbestimmungen,_ the several -expressions or specific forms of the unification which thought is. -The term Categories has been identified by Kant with his list of -_Stammbegriffe._ and by Mill with his classes of nameable things,--with -some critical remarks on Aristotle's use of the word. That use--to -denote the elements of predicable reality, what Grote called _ens_--is -probably not so 'rhapsodical' as Kant, with his new-born zeal for the -contrast of sensibility and intellect, was inclined to suppose. A real -history of the Category-theory would be almost a history of philosophy. -Perhaps the name might be more sparingly used.] - -[Footnote 6: Generalisation is only one small aspect of thought, with -specialisation as its, at least as important, pendant. To read certain -logics, one might think the all-comprehensive virtue of truths were to -be general,--not to be true.] - -[Footnote 7: ὅν and μὴ ὅν: τὸ γιγνόμενον: τὸ ἐξ οὗ: τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα: τὸ τί -ἦν εἶναι: τὸ τί ἐστι: θάτερον: ἕν: τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν: τὸ καθ' ὅλου: -τὸ καθ' ἔκαστον: τόδε τί.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXVIII. - - -THE THREE PARTS OF LOGIC. - - -Logic, as it is understood in these pages, is the critical history -of the terms of thought by which reality, the sum of experience, the -world, is described or expressed. It is the philosophical criticism -of the concepts, or elements of conception, by which we define or -develop the Totality, the Absolute. It describes the constitution -of the intellectual realm, by and in which we give body, coherence, -unity, and system to reality. It is the self-developing organisation -of the thoughts by which we think things, and by which things are -what they are. It is the ripe fruit of the experience of the ages of -humanity, and it therefore bears in itself a principle of growth. But -if it be a fruit, it is a fruit which can watch its own growth, which -reflects upon its own life. Its three parts show the main stages of its -development, beginning with the least adequate and most abstract or -general description of reality. - -The first part of Logic, the theory of Being[1], may be called the -theory of unsupported and freely-floating Being. We do not mean -something which _is,_ but the mere 'is,' the bare fact of Being, -without any substratum. The degree of condensation or development, -where substantive and attribute, or noun and verb, co-exist, has not -yet come. The terms or forms of Being float as it were freely in the -air, and we go from one to another, or--to put it more correctly--one -passes into another. The terms in question are Is and Not: Become: -There is: Some and Other: Each: One: Many: and so on through the -terms of number to degree and numerical specificality. This Being is -immediate: i.e. it contains no reference binding it with anything -beyond itself, but stands forward baldly and nakedly, as if alone; -and, if hard pressed, it turns over into something else. It includes -the three stages of Quality, Quantity, and Measure. The ether of -'Is' presumes no substratum, or further connexion with anything: and -we only meet a series of points as we travel along the surface of -thought. To _name,_ to _number_, to _measure_, are the three grades -of our ordinary and natural thought: so simple, that one is scarcely -disposed to look upon them as grades of thought at all. And yet if -thought is self-specification, what more obvious forms of specifying -it are there than to name (so pointing it out, or qualifying it), to -number (so quantifying it, or stating its dimensions), and to measure -it? These are the three primary specificates by which we think,--the -three primary dimensions of thought. Thought, in so determining, -plays upon the surface, and has no sense of the interdependence of -its terms. And if we could imagine a natural state of consciousness -in which sensations had not yet hardened into permanent things, and -into connexions between things, we should have something like the -range of Immediate Being. Colours and sounds, a series of floating -qualities, pass before the eye and the ear: these colours and sounds -are in course of time counted: and then, by applying the numbers to -these qualities, we get the proportions or limits ascertained. When -this process in actual life,--the advance from the vague feelings -which tell us of sweet, cold, &c., by means of a definite enumeration -of their phenomena, to the rules guiding their operation,--is reduced -to its most abstract terms, we have the process of Being. It would -be the period when a distinction between things and their actions -or properties has not arisen. The demonstrative pronouns and the -numerals are among the linguistic expressions of Being in its several -stages. Perhaps too we may illustrate it by the so-called 'impersonal' -verb--which has hardly reached the stage of verb proper, having no -subject: or by the name which still fluctuates between the stage of -substantive or adjective. - -The first sphere was that of Being directly confronting us, and using -the demonstrative pronouns first of all. The second is Relative or -Reflective Being: and in this we have to deal with the relative -pronouns. The surface of Being is now seen to exhibit a secondary -formation, to involve a sort of permanent standard in itself, and to -be essentially relative. The mere quality, when reduced to number, is -seen to be subjected to a certain measure, rule, sort, or standard: -and this reflex of itself always haunts it, modifying and determining -it. Thus instead of qualities, we begin to speak of the properties of -a thing: we have, as it were, two levels of Being, in intimate and -necessary connexion, where there was only one before. At first it was -but a mere surface-picture, one thing here and another there: a this -and a that; one, _now,_ and another, _then. This,_ it might be, was -round, and _that_ square: _now,_ it was bright, and _then,_ it was -dull: _here_ was a head, and _there_ was a limb. But the comparison of -quality with quantity, measuring one by the other, gave rise to the -conception of something permanent, a true nucleus amid the changes. The -fact, previously single, is now become double: the mere event is now a -phenomenon, a temporary and outward manifestation of something inner. -We now see each that _is,_ in the halo of what it _has been,_ or will -be: the passing modification in the light of the permanent type. But as -yet the permanent and the passing are separate, and only throw light -on each other: A explaining itself by B and B by A. We have apparently -two facts; neither of which can however stand by itself and therefore -refers us to the other. But to get a real rest in this incessant round -of mutual reference of one to another we must take a higher stand-point. - -In this sphere of Relativity the terms expressive of things come in -pairs: such as Same and Different, Like and Unlike: True Being and Show -or Semblance: Cause and Effect: Substance and Accident: Matter and -Form: and the like. If we compare mere Being to the cell in its simple -state, we may say that in the second sphere of Logic a nucleus has been -formed,--that a distinction has sprung up between two elements, which -are still in closest interconnexion. We have penetrated behind the -seeming simplicity of the surface: and in fact discovered it to be mere -seeming in the light of the substratum, cause, or essence, upon which -it is now reflected. In immediate Being one category, or specificate, -or dimension of thought passes over into another, and then disappears: -but in mediated Being one category has a meaning only by its relation -to another,--only by its reflection on another,--only by the light -which another casts upon it. Thus a cause has no meaning except in -connexion with its effect: a force implies or postulates an exertion -of that force: an essence is constituted by the existence which issues -from it. Instead of 'is,' therefore, which denotes resting-upon-self, -or connexion-with-self, the verb of the second sphere is 'has,' -denoting reference, or connexion-with-something-else: e.g. the cause -_has_ an effect: the thing _has_ properties. Instead of numerals, -come the prepositions and pronouns of relation, such as which, same, -like, as, by, because. The only conjunction in the first stage or -Being was 'And,'--mere juxtaposition; and even that conjunction was -perhaps premature, and due to reflective thought, going beyond what was -immediately before it, and tracing out connexions with other things. -The first stage, as we have seen, treated of the terms of natural -thought present in the action of the senses: the second stage--that of -Essential Being--deals with scientific, reflective, or mediate thought. -What, why, are the questions: comparison and connexion the methods: the -establishment of relations of similarity, causation, and co-existence, -the purpose in this range of logical method. Its categories are those -most familiar to science in its reflective and comparative stage. It -is the peculiar home of what are known as Metaphysical subtleties. The -natural but delusive tendency of reasoning is to throw the emphasis -on one side of the relation, and to regard the other as accessary and -secondary. Contrasts between _essentia_ and _existentia: substantia_ -and _modi_: cause and effect: real and apparent: constantly occur. - -If the first branch of Logic was the sphere of simple Being in a point -or series of points, the second is that of difference and discordant -Being, broken up in itself. The progress in this second sphere--of -_Essentia_ or Relative being--consists in gradually overcoming the -antithesis and discrepancy between the two sides in it--the Permanent -and the Phenomenal. At first the stress rests upon the Permanent -and true Being which lies behind the seeming--upon the essence or -substratum in the background, on which the show of immediate Being has -been proved by the process in the first sphere really to rest. Then, -secondly, Existence comes to the front, and Appearances or Phenomena -are regarded as the only realities with which science can deal. And -yet even in this case we cannot but distinguish between matter and -form, between the phenomena and their laws, between force and its -exercises: and thus repeat the relativity, though both terms in it are -now on the whole transferred into the range of the Phenomenal world. -The third range of Essential Being is known as Actuality, where the -two elements in relation rise to the level of independent existences, -essences in phenomenal guise--bound together, and deriving their very -characteristics from that close union. Relativity or correlation is -now clearly apparent in actual form, and comprises the three heads of -Substantial Relation, Causal Relation, and Reciprocal Relation. In -this case while the two members of the relation are now indissolubly -linked together, they are no more submitted to each other than they -are independent. According to Reciprocity everything actual is at once -cause and effect: it is the meeting-point of relations: a whole with -independent elements in mutual interconnexion. Such a total is the -Notion. - -This brings us to the third branch of Logic,--the theory of the -Notion, or Grasp of Thought.[2] The theory of Causality, with which -the second branch closed, continued to let the thought fall asunder -into two unequal halves--always however in relation or connexion with -each other. But in the present part of the Logic the two halves are -re-united, or in their difference their identity is also recognised. -Instead of a cause of a thing (which is separate from it in order), we -have a concept which is its principle of unity, its universal in which -it is individualised. Instead of incessant and endless Relativity, -we have Development. By development is meant self-specification, or -self-actualisation: the thing is what it becomes, or while it changes -it remains identical with itself. The Category or Development is the -category or method of philosophic or speculative science: just as -Being corresponded to natural thought, and Relativity or Reflection to -metaphysical and realistic science. According to the law of Development -diversity and unity both receive their due. Mere unity or Being -reappears now as Universality or Generality. Mere diversity, or the -relativity of essence, re-appears as Particularity, or the speciality -of details. And the union of the two is seen in the Individualised -notion or real object. In other words, the true thought which really -grasps and gets all round its object, which is a real whole, is a -Triplicity: it is first seen all as the ground or self-same, the -possibility--secondly, all as the existence in details, and difference, -the actuality or contingency--and thirdly, all as the self-same in -difference, and the possible in actuality. Every object in its full -reality is an innate movement; and to grasp it wholly we must apprehend -it as such a self-evolving and self-involving unity of elements, in -each of which however it is whole and entire. Thus the Notion embraces -the three elements or factors of universal, particular and individual. -These three elements first rise to independence and get their full -significance or explication in the syllogism, with its three terms -and judgments, exhibiting the various ways in which any two of these -elements in thought are brought into unity by means of the third. This -adequate form is a system or organic unity which contains in itself the -premisses of its conclusion or the means to its realisation,--which is -a process within itself, and when complete and self-supporting perforce -gives itself reality. - -The Notion or _Begriff_ is where Hegel makes his special mark on -Logic. Schelling, even, following on Kant, had (like Schopenhauer -after him) lauded the merit of the Intuition at the expense of the -mere notion[3] and expressed himself surprised at Hegel's use of the -word. But what Hegel wants first to insist upon is that the Intuition -or Perception (_Anschauung_) is built upon the Notion--that it is -only because there is a universal principle in its details that the -individual reality of the percept is assured. That we can elicit a -notion from a perception is only possible because it is implicitly -dominated by a universal. Secondly, Hegel wishes to note (as elsewhere) -that the full adequate notion, the notion as self-explaining and -self-constituting, is all that is meant by the object. Thus the Notion -or Subject_--Causa Sui_--when it is fully realised in the plenitude -of its elements or differences,--when each element has scope of its -own, is the Object--the actual and individualised total of thought, or -syllogism in reality. This objective world or Object appears in three -forms. An Object is either a mechanical, a chemical, or a teleological -object. The terms mechanical and chemical are not to be understood in -the narrow sense of a machine or chemical compound. They are to be -taken in an analogical sense, just as J. S. Mill speaks of a chemical -or geometrical method of treating social problems. The object or -realised notion is mechanical, when the unification of the members in -the totality comes or seems to come from without, so that the whole -or universal they form is external and almost indifferent to the -particulars, and only arranges them. An object is chemical, when the -connexion or genesis of the compound from its factors is not evident: -when the elements are as it were lost, and only give rise to a fresh -particular. An object is teleological, when the universal is, though -not distinctly conceived as realised, still always as tending to be -realised by the particulars. And in each of these grades the object -comes more and more to be seen to be a self-enacting, self-legislating -being; more and more a due pendant to the subject-notion. Modern -science is a vehement opponent of teleology: and with justice, so -far as in teleology, means and end fall apart. But it is mistaken in -supposing itself to return to the mechanical point of view. On the -contrary its success is most generally secured by rising to the point -of view given by the Idea of Life, and by looking upon the objective -world as an Organism, that is, as the notion in objectivity, soul -indissolubly united with body. But even the Idea of Life, in which we -enter the third stage of the notion, is defective as a representation -of the truth of Objectivity: for body and soul must part. The -conception of an Organism or living being is too crude. Reality is no -doubt well described as alive: the Absolute well defined as Life. But -here again Life is taken in a higher than its sense of _mere_ Life: -it is life as intelligent and volitional energy. If the universe--the -Absolute--can be said to be living, it must be said also that it is -more than Living. Such a life--such existence--is what Aristotle has -called _θεωρία_ and ἐνέργεια of the highest in man. It is mental and -spiritual life. In its consummation it is the Idea--the absolute -Idea--the totality which is and is aware of itself,--the developed -unity of the Notion with Objectivity. This unity thus presented is -what lies implicit to our perception in Nature: and thus the Idea, -as developed in Logic, forms the prologue and presupposition to the -Philosophy of Nature. - - -[Footnote 1: Being (_das Seyn_) probably conveys much more to an -English reader than is here meant or wanted. It is Being, where the -distinction between essence and appearance has not yet emerged or been -thought of. If being = τὸ ὄν, then essence (_Wesen_) = _τὸ ὄντως_ ὄν, -the being which underlies and yet includes appearance. _Wesen_ has more -right to the substantival vocable of Being: _Seyn_ is little better -than an 'Is' or 'Be.' - -In writers of Locke's time, 'Being seems to mean a reality, an actually -existing object, e.g. Clarke: 'There has existed from eternity some one -unchangeable and independent Being.' 'What the substance or _essence_ -of that Being is, we have no idea.' 'Essence,' says Locke, 'may be -taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is.' Of -course Aristotle long ago noted Being as one of the terms with variety -of implication; and his own fluctuation about _οὐσία_ is an obvious -illustration of this. - -In the translation of the _Logic_, _Wesen_ is occasionally rendered by -Being (e. g. Supreme Being); _Seyn,_ by existence. _Seyn_ here means -so little that one can hardly find any word of sufficiently minimal -content for it.] - -[Footnote 2: No doubt, as Dr. W. T. Harris remarks, _Notion_ (used -by Dr. Stirling) is a quite insignificant rendering of Hegel's -_Begriff_:--for which he proposes Self-activity. But, as he admits, -that is just Hegel's way: he coins brand-new the old terms, and forces -us, if we will follow him, to think full meaning into them.] - -[Footnote 3: See vol. ii, Notes and Illustrations, p. 408.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXIX. - - -THE SEARCH FOR A FIRST PRINCIPLE. - - -If there be one thing which, more than another, distinguishes Modern -Philosophers from the Ancient Philosophy of Athens, it is the desire -to discover a First Principle of certainty, a handle by which they -may get hold of and set in due order the perplexed mass of reality. -They find themselves born to an inheritance of tradition, a mass of -belief and lore which overwhelms where it does not support. The long -watches of the Middle Ages had been a time of preparation--even if -the 'cerebration' had been somewhat unconscious. The mind had been -by discipline trained to freedom. As it worked amid the material and -tried to order it and defend it, the intellect grew to recognise its -lordship over the load of authority. Overt revolts indeed against -coercion by decrees and by canons of dogma had never been wanting even -in the quietest of the so-called 'ages of faith.' But it is not in the -loudest outcry or the most rampant dissent that progress shows its most -effective course. The 'catholic' and 'orthodox' tradition equally bears -witness to a movement to emancipation, to self-centred intelligence. -Such an emancipation however cannot be complete and self-realised -without a sharp and painful wrench at the moment of mental birth. -The great word of disruption, of self-assertion, of defiance to the -past and to the dominant, must be said: and, as human beings are -constituted, it will be said in a tone of acerbity for which neither -the revolutionist nor the reactionary are severally alone responsible. - -Thus to hear the brave words and the bold defiance hurled out by -the thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one might -fancy they, like Archimedes, sought a supernal vantage-ground from -which they could move the world. Yet, unlike the material earth, -the intellectual globe is a burden we each carry with us,--which we -find upon us when--if ever--we begin to shake ourselves out of the -slothful unconsciousness of our merely vegetative life. For though -we all carry it, we do not all feel its weight. In some individuals -and in some ages there is so accurate a proportion between the inner -power and the outer pressure that the load of belief and custom is -but a well-fitting garb, almost a second nature. To others there -is a felt disproportion, a sense of superincumbent clothes and -uncongenial, unnatural trappings. Out of such struggles to be free, -grow, occasionally, philosophers, and reformers. To the former the -burden is the burden of the unintelligible: to the latter the burden of -the unbearable and intolerable. To the philosopher the removal of the -burden consists in such a re-adjustment of the intellectual world that -it shall be no longer a foreign thing, but bone of his bone and flesh -of his flesh. But, to re-adjust and to re-organise, one must stand -back from the objective: one must cast it forth, and look about for a -clue to an exit from the maze of confusion. The given and subsistent -is put on probation: not rejected, but for the moment declined: not -denied, but asked to present its credentials.[1] This is the ἐποχή -of the sceptical schools of later Greece; the invitation to doubt -addressed by Descartes to his own soul. It is the protest against that -vulgar precipitancy which in primitive and modern credulity is ready to -give itself away to any doctrine which has the voice and the garb of -outward authority. Or is it the assertion! of the royal and inalienable -sovereignty of the Subjectivity to be _certain_ of whatever claims to -be objective and _true_: the assertion that what is true must be seen -and experienced to be true. Or it is, in another way, the principle of -Socrates: that the beginning of knowledge, the first step in the way -of wisdom, is to know that you know nothing--to realise the absolute -supremacy of self-consciousness. - -It is in short the same demand as Augustine's. There is indeed a wide -gulf of temperament and circumstances dividing the bishop of Hippo from -the mathematician Descartes and the rationalist Spinoza. But in the cry -for the knowledge of 'God and my Soul' as the first, the indispensable, -the sole knowledge: as the _one_ knowledge which binds the finite and -the infinite together,--the knowledge on which turns the truth of -science, and the reality of experience, the great thinkers of these -diverse ages are at one.[2] They turn their backs upon the external -that they may find rest in the truly internal, on the inner certainty, -which is not a mere subjective but a very objective also: not a mere -_anima mea,_ but in close unity therewith _Deus meus._ This is perhaps -more explicit in Spinoza, in some points, than in Descartes, and in -many respects more decisively put by Augustine than by either. But this -is what is really meant by the initial concentration of suspense: this -is what is sought when a Principle is sought. Nothing short of this -unity of subjective and objective in an Absolute--we may say--Ego, is a -principle. - -But 'principles' like other terms are sometimes lightly taken; and can -be in the plural--just as in lower levels of religion and society there -can be gods many and lords many. Nor in a way wrongly. For, as has been -before pointed out, a principle is the unity of beginning and end: it -is only caught hold of by approaching from different directions: it -loses its life and power when cut off from the many organs by which it -distributes itself so as to grasp reality. If it be essentially one, -it is not a bare unit: it cannot, without injury, be reduced to utter -simplicity, and accepted in the shape of a single term. And yet this is -what almost inevitably happens to every so-called principle. - -Like a _deus ex machina_, or a trick of the trade, it is applied to -unloose every knot, and to clear any difficulties that arise. But a -principle of this stamp possesses no intimate connexion or organic -solidarity with the theory which it helps to prop. It is always at -hand as a ready-made schema or heading, and can be attached to the -most incongruous orders of fact. Thus in the works of Aristotle, the -principle of 'End' or 'Activity' has sometimes seemed to be applied -to whatever subject comes forward, and like a hereditary official -vestment to suit all its wearers equally well or equally ill. What is -true 'on the whole' is not always true 'of each': the _καθόλον_ never -quite equals the _καθ' ἔκαστον._ The modern principle of Utility is -equally flexible in its application to the problems of moral and social -life. It costs no trouble to pronounce the magic word, and even 'such -as are of weaker capacity' may make something out of such a formula. -But an abstract formula, which is equally applicable to everything, -is not particularly applicable to anything. While it seems to save -trouble, and is so plain as to be almost tautological (as when the -worth of a thing or act is explained to mean its utility), it really -suggests fresh questions in every case, and multiplies the difficulty. -Having an outward adaptability to every kind of fact, the principle -has no true sympathy with any: it becomes a mere form, which we use as -we do a measuring-rod, moving it along from one thing to another. We -are always reverting to first principles as our last principles also. -Even Aristotle, when he remarked that an object had to be criticised -from its own principles and not from general formulae, saw through the -fallacy of this style of argument. - -This is like asking for bread and getting a stone. The philosopher, -who ought to take us through the shut chambers of the world, merely -hands us a key at the gate, telling us that it will unlock every door, -and then the insides will speak for themselves. But we would have our -philosopher do a little more than this. Not being ourselves omniscient, -we should be glad of a guide-book at the least, and perhaps even of -the services of an interpreter to explain some peculiarities, some -startling phenomena, and sights even more unpleasant than those which -appalled the spouse of the notorious Bluebeard. Or, dropping metaphor, -we wish the formula to be applied systematically and thoroughly. -When that is done the formula loses its abstractness; it gains those -necessary amplifications and qualifications, as we call them, without -which no theory explains much or gives much information. And thus, -instead of fancying that our initial formula contains the truth in a -nutshell, we shall find that it is only one step to be taken on the -way to truth, and that its narrow statement sinks more and more into -insignificance, as its amplified theory gains in significance. - -But an adequate principle must have other qualities.[3] What has been -said up to this point, only amounts to a condition, that our principle -must cease to be abstract and formal, and must become concrete and -real. What we want, it may be said, is a Beginning. But a beginning is -not exactly the same thing as a principle: a beginning is to a large -extent a matter of choice and convenience,--a matter depending on the -state and prospects of the beginner; and the main point is not where we -should begin, but that we should be thorough in our treatment. It is -otherwise, however, in the present case. For the skill of the expositor -simply lies in the exactitude with which he reproduces the spontaneous -movement of growth in his object. His art is _celare artem:_ to -retire, as it were, into the background, and seem to leave the object -to expound itself. In a dramatic work it is no doubt the hand of the -dramatist that seems to set the whole of the characters in motion, that -weaves destinies and snips the thread of life. And yet in a perfect -work of dramatic art everything must seem to flow on by a necessity of -character, a consecution of inner fate. The true artist dare not act or -allow the _deus ex machina._ So every genuine work of science--which -is more than a compilation, a school-book, a bundle of notes, and -contributions toward a subject--must be a self-determined unity--a -self-justifying scheme in which the personality of the worker enters -into and is absorbed in the system of his work. - -If this is generally true, it is above all a canon to rule the -logician. He at least must follow the Logos and the Logos alone. His -theme must be a law unto itself: all its movements must be freely -and nobly objective. For his subject-matter is at least an organism, -and develops according to an inward law. But it is even more than an -organism: it must not merely develop, as organisms do,--not merely -live and grow--but _know_ that it develops and as it were _will_ its -own development--and in that harmony of being, willing, and knowing, -be essentially one. In Hegelian language it must not merely be -implicit_--an sich_ or _für uns_--the subject of a change which it -undergoes and feels, but without definitely realising,--the subject -of a change which we (the historians) perceive. It must also be _für -sich_: aware of its modifications, an agent in bringing them about: -and yet withal in so looking forth and willing, be self-possessed, and -self-enjoying. - -The principle of Hegelianism is the principle of Development, the -principle of the Notion--but a Notion which is objective as well as -subjective--the Idea. That principle then determines the beginning -of Logic. We must know the whole course of growth and history before -we can say where is the true commencement. It must be that out of -which the end can obviously and spontaneously issue. In a sense, it -must implicitly contain the end. It must show us the very beginning -of thought, before it has yet come to the full consciousness of -itself,--when the truth of what it is still lurks in the background and -has to be developed. We must see thought in its first and fundamental -calling. As the biologist, when he describes the structure of a plant, -rests upon the assumption of a previous development of parts, in an -existing plant, which has resulted in a seed,--but begins with the seed -from which the plant is derived: so the logician must begin with a -point which in a way presupposes the system to which it leads. But in -its beginning this presupposition is not apparent: and in fact, the -presupposition will only appear when the development of the system -is complete. The first step in a process, just because it is a step, -may be said to presuppose the completed process. Thus the beginning -of Logic presumes the fullest realisation of Mind, as the beginning -of botany can only be told by one who knows the whole story of the -plant. It is from this circumstance that Hegel describes philosophy as -a circle rounded in itself, where the end meets with the beginning, or -says that philosophy has to grasp its original grasp or conceive its -concept. In other words, it is not till we reach the conclusion that -we see, in the light thus shed upon the beginning, what that beginning -really was. From the general analogy of the sciences we should not -expect that the beginning of thought would be full-grown thought, or -indeed seem to the undiscerning eye to be thought at all. In many -cases, the embryonic organism shows but little similarity to the adult, -and occasionally a violent abruptness seems, on cursory glance, to -mark off one stage of a creation's growth from the next. Who that knew -not the result could in the seed prefigure to himself the tree? The -beginning is not usually identifiable with the final issue, except by -some effort to trace the process of connexion. The object of science -only appears in its truth when the science has done its work. - -The beginning of philosophy must hold a germ of development, however -dead and motionless it may seem. But it must also to some extent -be a result,--the result of the development or concentration of -consciousness;--of the other forms of which it is the hypothetical -foundation, or, of which it is (otherwise viewed) the first -appearance. The variety of imaginative conception, and the chaos -of sense, must vanish in a point, by an act of abstraction, which -leaves out all the variety and the chaos,--or rather by an act -of distillation, which draws out of them their real essence and -concentrated virtue. This variety, when thoroughly examined and tested, -shrivels up into a point:--it only _is._ Everything definite as we call -it, the endless repetitions of existence, have disappeared, and have -left only the energy of concentration, the unitary point of Being. - -We may describe the process in two ways. We may say that we have left -out of sight all existing differences,--that we have stripped off -every vestige of empirical conceptions, and left a residue of pure -thought. The thought is pure, perhaps, but it is not entire. In this -way of describing it, pure thought is the most abstract thought,--the -last outcome of those operations which have divested our conceptions -of everything real and concrete about them. But thus to speak of the -process as Abstraction would be to express half of the truth only: -and would really leave us a mere zero, or gulf of vacuity. In the -beginning there would then be nothing--the mere annihilation of all -possible and actual existence. And it is certainly true that in the -beginning there can be nothing.--On the other hand, and secondly, there -is affirmation as well as negation involved in the ultimate action -by which sense and imagination pass into thought. They are not left -behind, and the emptiness only retained: they are carried into their -primary consequence, or into their proximate truth. They are reduced -to their simplest equivalent or their lowest term in the vocabulary -of thought: which is Being. The process which creates the initial -point of pure thought is at once an abstraction from everything, and a -concentration upon itself in a point:-- which point, accordingly, is -a unity or inter-penetration of positive and negative. This absolute -self-concentration into a point is the primary step by which Mind -comes to know itself,--the first step in the Absolute's process of -self-cognition--that process which it is the purpose of Logic to trace, -so far as it is conducted in the range of mere thought. - -The bare point of Being and nothing more is the beginning in the -process of the Absolute's self-cognition: it is, in other words, our -first and rudimentary apprehension of reality,--the narrow edge by -which we come in contact with the universe of Reason. For these are two -aspects of the same. The process of the self-cognition or manifestation -of the Absolute Idea is the very process by which philosophers (not -philosophers only) have built up the edifice of thought. What the -one statement views from the universal side or the totality, the -other views in connexion with the several achievements of individual -thinkers. Of course the evolution of the system of thought, as it -is brought about by individuals, leaves plenty of room for the play -of what is known as Chance. The Natural History of Thought or the -History of Philosophers has to regard the action of national character -upon individual minds, and the reciprocal action of these minds upon -one another. The History of Organic Nature similarly presents the -dependence of the species upon their surroundings, and of one species -upon another in the medium of its conditions. Gradually Physical -Science reduces these conditions to their universal forms, and may -try to exhibit the evolution of the animal through its species in all -grades of development. So in the Science of the development of this -Idea the accidents, as we may call them, disappear: and the temporary -and local questions, which once engrossed the deepest attention, fade -away into generalised forms of universal application. Philosophy, as -it historically presents itself in the world, is not an accidental -production, or dependent on the arbitrary choice of men. The accident, -if such there be, is that these particular men should have been the -philosophers, and not that such should have been their philosophy. -They were, according to their several capacity for utterance, only -the mouth-pieces of the Spirit of the Times,--of the absolute mind -under the superficial limitations of their period. They saw the -Idea of their world more clearly and distinctly than other men; and -therein lies their title to fame: but really their words were only -a reflex,--an almost involuntary and necessary movement, due to the -pressure of the cosmical reason. The great philosophers are, like all -men in all estates, and according to their measure, the ministers of -the Truth,--apostles charged to bring about that consummation of the -times in which reality is more fully apprehended and more adequately -estimated. Necessity is laid upon them to consecrate themselves to the -service of the Idea, and to devote their lives to the noble but austere -work of speculation--the work which seeks _sine ira et studio_ to -reconstruct that city of God which is the permanent, if it often be the -hidden, foundation of human life. - - -[Footnote 1: Cf. p. 90.] - -[Footnote 2: Augustin. _Soliloq._ i. 7. 'Deum et animam scire cupio. -Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino.'] - -[Footnote 3: 'A Principle,' says Herbart (_Psychologie als -Wissenschaft,_ Einl.) 'should have the double property of having -originally a certainty of its own, and of generating other certainty. -The way and manner in which the second comes about is the Method.'] - - - - -CHAPTER XXX. - - -THE LOGIC OF DESCRIPTION: NATURAL REALISM: BEING. - - -The antithesis between thought and being, between idea and actuality, -between notion and object, is almost a commonplace of criticism. -Between the ideas of the subject and objectivity a great gulf seems -to yawn fixed and impassable. Thinkers, like Anselm and Descartes, -have (it is asserted) attempted by a trick which cheated themselves -to get from the notion to the object. But--as Kant is supposed to -have for ever shown--these _decepti deceptores_ are now universally -discredited.[1] Yet the same Kant had shown that the 'things' of -ordinary experience are only ideas or appearances in consciousness. -These latter ideas, however, were verified by the necessity of -interdependence in which they stood, as given by sense. From the -notions which Anselm and Descartes proposed to invest with objectivity, -there was absent the feature of sense-perception. They were not limited -and real ideas, but synthetic laws, general and abstract aspects of -reality, modes of conception. They were not definite and individualised -things, but terms or conditions for all concepts and realities. They -were forms,--forms essential to the explication of reality--and never -mere parts of reality. - -With such 'forms' or 'thought-terms,' such abstractions, Logic (_à -la mode de Hegel_) has to deal. And in dealing with them it has to -counteract this popular distinction (which Kant inclines toward) which -sets up an insuperable division between thought and being, between -reality and syllogism, between is and is known. Certain of these -denominators which thinking employs to describe reality the popular -mind wholly identifies with reality. That being is a thought, that -force and thing are only modes of conception, sounds to the untrained -intellect only a verbal quibble. Things, beings, are there_--out -there_, it says: force is 'ultimate reality.' It is perhaps ready -to allow that _substances_ are only mental figments: but it is more -doubtful about causes, and inclines to assume them to be in outside -nature, and to generate a real necessity in things. On the other hand, -it has little doubt that concepts and syllogism are only our ways of -looking at reality,--the reality of substances and phenomena, with -quality and quantity: that 'final cause' is a mere subjective principle -of explanation: and that ideas and knowledge are altogether additions -superinduced on a real world. - -Now what the Logic shows is that, on one hand, all these terms are -ideal and regulative; and on the other that they are real, because -constitutive of reality. Showing--or shall we say, reminding us--that -being is after all a form of thought, it shows us that knowledge, at -the other end, contains or implies reality. It is the business of logic -as a fundamental philosophy to dispel the illusion that sensations are -fixed reality: that causes and effects are an absolutely real order; -whereas concepts and sciences and still more aesthetic and moral -principles are not. Its doctrine is that all Our thought-terms, the -most vulgar and the most delicate, are, as we may put it, symbolical of -reality: explications and manifestations of it. Absolutely real--if -that means utterly unideal--none of them are. On the other hand, -absolutely ideal,--if that means utterly unreal--none of them are -either. If you call them real, their reality is that of thought. If you -call them ideal, it is an ideality of a real. Being is not a fixed and -solid substratum, a hard rock of reality, on which we may build our -relations and further determinations. It also is a thought: it also -lives in relation, and becomes more real by further determination.[2] -But the habit comes natural to the majority to attribute essential -and independent reality (total reality) to the thought-modes it is -familiar with in practice: whereas the modes familiar to more advanced -intelligence are put aside as merely ideal. - -Thus in proportion as Logic insists on the reality of idea, it insists -also on the ideality of being. Being is after all a thought: when -separate from the relations of experience, a very poor thought. A -'supreme being' even is a thought. And the question of questions for -Logic is what degree of reality, what amount of truth does each result -of unification express. Is it self-consistent and complete, or does it -imply further elements, and if so, in what direction does it suggest -and receive completion? But at the best the reality of a logical -term is an abstract or formal reality, and consists in its power to -interpret, to expound, to define the Absolute. Its more concrete and -material reality it has in Nature and in Mind. There however Philosophy -has in a further measure to repeat its earlier lesson and show that -Nature is not without its ideal aspect, and that Mind is founded on -physical reality. - -All science tends to carry us over the hard lines of separation which -practical interests treat as if ultimate disruptions. The sciences of -Nature, for instance, in their completed circle must carry us from -the inorganic to the organic: must in some way make a path from the -lifeless to the alive. The science of thought has a corresponding task. -It has to show that the incommensurability between thought and being, -or between the idea and actuality, disappears on closer examination. -When we trace the development of thought sufficiently far, we see that -Being is an imperfect or inadequate thought,--certainly not adequate -to the Idea, but not for that reason generically differing from it. -The fixity of Being as more than, and superior to, mere Thought is a -habit of mind, due to the same worldly-minded immobility as leads us -all to believe (and, within the limited practical range, to believe -rightly) that the earth is solidly at rest, notwithstanding all the -demonstrations of the Copernicans. But Thought has not deposited all -its burden, or uttered all its meaning in Being. Being is the veriest -abstraction,--the very rudiment of thought--meagre as meagre can be. -It is on one side the bare position or affirmation of thought: on the -other hand it is the very negation of thought,--if thought be only -possible under difference. For a mere 'Is' is a mere indescribable -without-difference. There is no such thing as mere Being: or mere Being -is mere nothing: _mere_ Being is not. - -The first category of Ontology is that of Being. It is the merest -simplicity and meagreness, with nothing definite in it at all: and -for that very reason constantly liable to be confused with categories -of more concrete burden. It denotes all things, and connotes next -to nothing. It does not however mean something which has being; it -does not mean definite being: still less does it mean permanent and -substantial being. Ordinary language certainly uses being in all these -senses. But if we are to be logical, we must not mix up categories with -one another: we must take terms at their precise value. Mere Being then -is the mere 'Is,' which can give no explanation or analysis of itself: -which indescribable in itself: which is an 'Is' and nothing more. The -simplest answer to those who invest Being with so much signification, -is to ask them to consider the logical _copula_. 'Every school-boy -knows' that the 'Is' of the copula disappears in several languages: -that it is far from indispensable in Latin: that in Greek e. g. the -demonstrative article serves the same purpose. In Hebrew too the -pronouns officiate for the so-called substantive verb: and the same -verb probably does not exist in the Polynesian family of languages, -where its place is supplied by what we call the demonstrative -pronoun.[3] In the copula, which according to M. Laromiguiere, as -quoted by Mr. Mill, expresses only '_un rapport spécial entre le sujet -et l'attribut_,' we encounter the mere undeveloped and unexplained -unifying of thought, the very abstraction of relativity[4]. - -In the beginning, then, there is nothing and yet that nothing is. Such -is the fundamental antithesis of thought: or the discrepancy which -makes itself felt between each several term of thought and the whole -Idea of which they are the expression. Being is the term emphasised -as absolute by understanding: then the dialectical power, or the -consciousness of the whole, steps in to counteract the one-sided -element. In other words, thought, the total thought, asks what is -Being, mere and simple; and answers mere nothing.[5] The one aspect -of the point is as justifiable as the other. In other words the two -aspects are indissoluble: they are in one. The term 'Unity,' applied to -the relation of Being and Not, may perhaps mislead: and it is therefore -better to say that the two points of view are (as Mr. Spencer puts -it) at once 'antithetical and inseparable,' An unrelated being, an -'absolute' (i. e. separate and transcendent) reality is an Unknowable, -i. e. an ineffable, an unspeakable of which we can legitimately -predicate a not- , leaving imagination to fill up the blank after the -hyphen. A mere Not, with no substratum which it negatives, is mere -Being: and a mere Being, which has no substratum, is a mere Not. The -movement upward and the movement downward are here illustrated: and -it is evident that they are the same movement[6],--the same unrest, -only differentiated as up and down by some _termini_ not yet explicitly -brought into view. Each--Is and Not--as it seeks to differentiate -itself, to make itself clear, passes into the other. In fact, the very -vocation, calling, or notion of Being and Nothing, is not Being and -Nothing, but the tendency of each to pass into the other. Their truth, -in short, is not in themselves, but in their process,--and that process -by which the one passes into the other is 'To become.' Try to get at -mere Being and you are left with Nought: of mere Nought you can only -say it is. The two abstractions have no truth except in the passage -into one another: and this passage or transition is 'To become.' Take -reality apart from what it leads on to, and from what it has come from, -apart from its end or purpose and from its cause, take it as mere -being: then this being in its supposed singleness and self-subsistence -is really annihilated: _stat magni nominis umbra_: but it is the name -of nothing. True being is always on the way to or from being: to stop -is fatal. - -This unity or inseparability of opposite elements in a truth or -real notion is the stumbling-block to the incipient Hegelian. The -respectable citizens of Germany were amazed, says Heine, at the -shamelessness of J. G. Fichte, when he proclaimed that the Ego produced -the world, as if that had cast doubts on their reality; and the ladies -were curious to know whether Madame Fichte was included in the general -denial of substantial existence[7]. If easy-going critics treated -Fichte in this way, they had even better source for amusement in Hegel. -That Being and Nothing is the same was a perpetual fund for jokes, -too tempting to be missed. Now, in the baldness, and occasionally -paradoxical style, of Hegel's statements, there is some excuse for such -exaggerations. Being and Nothing are not merely the same: they are also -different: they at least tend to pass into each other. In the technical -language of logicians, the question is not what being denotes, but what -it connotes. The word 'is' had, it may be, originally a 'demonstrative' -meaning, a 'pronominal' force, which in course of time passed from -a local or sensuous meaning to express a thought. No doubt 'is' and -'is not' are wide enough apart in our application of them as copula -of a proposition: but if we subtract the two terms and leave only -the copula standing, the difference of the two becomes inexpressible -and unanalysable. In both there is the same statement of immediacy -or face-to-faceness: that two things are brought to confront each -other,--united, as it were, without producing any real or specific sort -of union. If Thought be unifying, Being is the minimum of unification: -if Thought be relating, Being is the most abstract of relations. So -abstract, indeed, that its relativity is completely lost sight of: so -utterly one, that it vanishes in a point. And just because it _is_ -(as it seems) out of relations, it must be nothing. No doubt, between -the two terms Being and not-Being a difference is meant; when they -are employed, a difference is thrown into them; and then they are not -the same: but if we keep out of sight what is meant, and stick to the -ultimate point which is said, we shall find that mere being and mere -nothing are alike inapprehensible by themselves, and that to institute -a difference we must go out of and beyond them. Perhaps some approach -to the right point of comprehension may be made, if we note that when -two people quarrel and can give no reason or further development to -their opposite assertions, the one person's 'is' is exactly equal -(apart from subsequent explanations) to the other's 'is not.' The mere -'Is' and 'Is not' have precisely the same amount of content: a mere -affirmation or assertion, which is mere nothing,--because connecting, -where there is nothing to connect. - -The truth of 'is' then turns out 'become': nothing _is_: all things are -coming to be and passing out of being. This illustrates the meaning of -the word 'truth' in Hegel. It is partly synonymous with 'concrete,' -partly with the 'notion.' With concrete: because to get at the truth, -we must take into account a new element, kept out of sight in the mere -affirmation of being. With notion: because if we wish to comprehend -being, we must grasp it as 'becoming.' For truth lies in transcending -the first or merely given. We have to go forward, and to go backward, -as it were: forward from being, backward to being: we look before and -after. The attempt to isolate the mere point of being is impossible -in thought: it would only lead to the 'representation' of being,--i. -e. the notion of being would be arrested in its development, and -identified probably with a sensible thing, i. e. with _something_, and -some concrete thing said to be. - -If being, however, is truly apprehended as a passage from the unknown -to the known, or as emergence from bare vacuity, then it implies a -definiteness, which we missed before. Somewhat has become: or the -indeterminate being has been invested with definiteness and distinct -character. Mere being (mere _Is)_ is nothing: to be something is -must be not something else. The second step in the process to -self-realisation therefore is reached: Being has become Somewhat; which -is more, because it professes less. The fluid unity or movement from -'is' to 'is not,' and _vice versa_, has crystallised: and 'There is' -is the still imperfectly unified result precipitated. By this term we -imply the _finitude_ of being,--imply that a portion has been cut off -from the vague, and contrasted with something else. In the ordinary -application of the word, Being is especially employed to denote this -stage of definite being[8]. Thus we speak of bringing something into -being: by which we mean, not mere being, but a definite being, or, -in short, reality. Reality is determinateness, as opposite to mere -vagueness. To be real, it is necessary to be somewhat,--to limit and -define. Whatever is anything or is real, is _eo facto_ finite. Even an -infinite therefore to be real must submit to self-limitation. This is -the necessity of finitude: in order to be anything more and higher, -there must come, first of all, a determinate being and reality. But -reality, as we have seen, implies negation: it implies limiting, -distinction, and dependence. Everything finite, every 'somewhat,' has -somewhat else to counteract, narrow, and thwart it. To be somewhat -_(esse aliquid)_ is an object of ambition, as Juvenal implies: but it -is only an unsatisfactory goal after all. For somewhat always implies -something else, by which it is limited: whereas mere being, just -because it is nothing, is free from the check of an other. - -This, then, is the price to be paid for rising into reality, and coming -to be somewhat: there is always somewhat else to be minded. The very -point which makes a 'somewhat,' as above a mere 'nothing,' is its -determinateness: and determinateness, as at first determinateness from -outside, a given and passive determinateness, is also a negation and -limit. Now the limit of a thing is that point where it begins to be -somewhat else: where it passes out of itself and yields to another. -Accordingly in the very act of being determined, somewhat is passing -over into another: it is altering, and becoming somewhat else. Thus a -some-thing' implies for its being the being of somewhat else: its being -is as it were only to be beside something else,--it is finite, and -alterable, a _this_ with a _that_ always in the neighbourhood. Such is -the character of determinate being. It leads to an endless series from -some to an other, and so on _ad infinitum:_ everything as a somewhat, -as a determinate being, in reality, presupposes a something else, and -that again has some third thing; and so the chain is extended with -its everlasting _And,_ And, And, (as in the children's way of telling -a story). Somewhat-ness is always vexed by the fact that it is not -somewhat else: and for that very reason, ceasing to be the primary -object, it becomes somewhat else itself; and the other term becomes the -somewhat. And so the same story is repeated in endless progression, -till one gets wearied with the repetition of finitude which is held out -as infinite. - -Thus in determinate being as in mere being we see the apparent fixity -resolved into a double movement--the alteration from some to somewhat -else, and _vice versa._ But a movement like this implies after all -that there is a something which alters: which is alterable, but which -alters into somewhat. This somewhat which alters into somewhat, and -thus retains itself, is a being which has risen above alteration, which -is independent of it because including it: which is _for itself,_ and -not for somewhat else. Thus in order to advance a step further from -determinate and alterable being, we have only to keep a firm grasp -on both sides of the process, and not suffer the one to slip away -from the other. We must not merely _say,_ but energise the unity of -the two 'antithetical yet inseparable' elements we are naturally -disposed to take and leave only as One _and_ an Other. Something -becomes something else: in short, the one side passes on to the other -side of the antithesis, and the limitation is absorbed. The new result -is something _in_ something else: the limit is taken up within: and -this being which results is its own limit, i. e. no restrictive limit -at all, but self-imposed characteristic and definiteness. It is -Being-for-self:--the third step in the process of thought under the -general category of Being. The range of Being which began in a vague -nebula, and passed into a series of points, is now reduced to a single -point, self-complete and whole. - -This Being-for-self is a kind of true infinite, which results by -absorption of the finite. The false infinite, which has already come -before us, is the endless range of finitude, passing from one finite -to another, from somewhat to somewhat else, until _satiety_ sets in -with weariness. The true infinite is _satisfaction_,--the inclusion -of the other being into self, so that it is no longer a limit, but a -constituent part in the being. Such inclusion in the unity of an idea, -of elements which are realistically separate, is termed 'ideality.' The -antithesis is reduced to become an organic and dependent part. It still -exists, but as no longer outside and independent. Thus in determinate -being the determinateness is found in somewhat else: in being-for-self -the determinateness is self-realisation. Being-for-self may be shortly -expressed by 'one' or 'each': as determinate being a, or an, or by -'some': and Being simple has no nominal equivalent. As 'some' is always -fractional or partial, 'each' is always a whole or unit. Mere Being has -not the consistency of any noun or pronoun: it is the bare (impersonal) -verb. - -But 'each for self' expresses the sentiment of an armed neutrality -with implicit leanings to universal war,--the _bellum omnium contra -omnes._ Each is self-centred, independent, resting upon self, and not -minding anything else,--which is now thrown out as indifferent into the -background. Each is centripetal; anything else is for it a matter of no -moment. If determinate being was something to be explained by something -other, this is or professed to be self-explanatory, and rests upon -itself. It seems purely affirmative, and promises to give a definite -unity. But we cannot free thought from negation in this sphere, any -more than in the earlier. We may, if we like, assert the absolute -self-sufficingness, primariness, and unalterability of each; but a -very little reflection shows the opposite to be true. The very notion -of each is exclusiveness towards the rest: a negative and, as it were, -polemical attitude towards others is the very basis of Being-for-self. -One after one, they each rise to confront each, each excluding each, -until their self-importance is reduced to be a mere point in a -series of points, one amongst many. When that is clearly seen, their -qualitative character has disappeared: and there is left only their -quantity.[9] The negative attitude of each to each forms a sort of -bond connecting them. If to the reference which connects we give the -name of attraction, then we may say that the repulsion of each against -each is exactly equal to their mutual attraction. And thus, in the -language of Hobbes, the universal quarrel is only the other side of the -general union in the great Leviathan: repulsion, in the shape of mutual -fear, is the principle of attraction. Thus each for self is repeated -endlessly: instead of the atom or unit we have a multitude, utterly -indifferent to what each is for itself. The mere fact that it is, -entitles it to count, and so constitutes quantity. Here we may shortly -recapitulate the categories of Quality or Being Proper. It forms three -steps or grades: those of indeterminate being: determinate being: -self-determined being: or if we speak of them as processes, we have -becoming: alteration: attraction and repulsion[10]. From the extreme of -abstraction and concentration thought, under the form of Being, passes -on to greater determinateness and development. The fixity of mere -Being is seen to imply a distinction of elements, and a dependence of -one upon the other: where the 'is' and 'is not' part from each other -sufficiently to let us distinguish them. This is the stage of finitude: -when we say that there is somewhat, but there are others, and imply -that any one has an end, a limit, a negation in its nature. These -words describe the finite scene,--a fragmentary being which makes an -advance upon indeterminateness, but loses its wholeness and is always -and necessarily leading on to something else. It is the revulsion -from the vague and yet unspecified universal to definite and limited -particulars. In the third stage the limit is uplifted and included in -the particular, which now contains its negation in itself,--is (by -accepting its dependence) independent, is its own ground, and may be -called an individual. But an individual, again, implies an aggregate -of ones, or a multitude. This being-for-self is an individual or atom: -it is the basis of those higher developments known as subjectivity and -personality. These are, as it were, higher multiples of it. - -This first sphere of thought, apparently so abstruse and unreal in its -abstractions, had to be thus narrowly discussed because it presents -all the difficulties and peculiarities of Hegel in their elementary -form. They are clearly the fundamental problems of ancient Greek -philosophy--of that first or fundamental philosophy which discusses -Being and its intrinsic attributes or accidents. Modern superficiality -has sometimes reproached these old thinkers (who, forsooth, 'knew no -language but their own') for their tiresome insistence on this problem -of Is and Is not. Compared, indeed, with what are called topics of -interest, e. g. the Soul and the Hereafter, or the origins of the -Cosmic process, tiresome such inquiry is. But it is the bitter lesson -of experience that till such fundamentals are at least critically -surveyed, the interesting topics will still (and in more than one -sense) belong to the Unknowable. Herbart not less than Hegel sees it is -the prime business of philosophical criticism (i. e. of philosophy) to -examine thoroughly those primary notions on which the whole structure -of thought rests. It is on the comprehension of the radical limitations -latent in the seemingly simplest terms of thought, that the profoundest -problems of human interest ultimately turn. - -Thus, in the first place, the process of Being, as seen in the light -of the whole system of Logic, shows that reality is truly known only -as a trinity,--or perhaps rather as a duality in unity. This is the -'Notion' or 'Grasp' of Being. First, reality seems an unspecialised -and self-centred being,--and that by itself is mere nothing: a mere -_universal._ Second, it appears a specialised and differentiated being -of some and other: a mere _particular_, limited by other particulars, -and so finite. Third, as a combination of the two earlier stages: -as wholeness with determinateness, as unity; and so an _individual_ -which is the _true_ or complete and authentic character of all being. -In the _metaphysics_ of Being these three elements follow, one after -another: but in the _logic_ of the notion they interpenetrate, and -each of them is the others and the total. The truth or the notion of -being takes it in Being-for-self as a universalised particular or -as an individual.--In the second place: the sphere of mere Being is -that of _mere_ identity: that of determinate being is the sphere of -otherness, difference: that of self-determined being is the sphere of -well-grounded existence.--Thirdly: the first sphere may be illustrated -by the freedom of indeterminateness, expressed by the word 'may': the -second by necessity or determinateness, expressed by the word 'must': -and the third, by the freedom which even in its determinateness -is self-determining, expressed by the word 'will.'--Fourthly: -these steps illustrate the meaning of the Hegelian technical terms -_setzen_: _aufheben: an sich_: _für sich_: _Idealität: Realität._ -Thus Determinate Being or somewhat is _an sich_ or implicitly (by -implication) somewhat else: and the process of determinate being -is to lay it down or express (_setzen_) it as such. When this -explicitly-stated 'other' or limit is included in the Being, and -reduced into a unity with somewhat in each Being-for-self, it is said -to be '_aufgehoben_'--uplifted, as it were, so that it is no longer a -separate existent, but is still an efficient element. As being partly -_this,_ and partly _that,_ now _one,_ and now an _other,_ which limits -and is limited, determinate being is _Realität._ The characteristic -of reality is externality of its parts, which are thus left side by -side quasi-independent: that of ideality is unity and solidarity of -function. When the mutual dependence of elements is tightened till -it becomes equivalent to unity and totality, these elements are seen -in their Ideality (_Idealität_). Such a total has the others in it -as elements (_Momente_); they are there ideally (_ideëller Weise,_) -as it were (in the loose analogical use of that term) organically: -that is, they are denied the privilege, which their total has, of -being-for-themselves. They do not enjoy the benefit of their own being, -though their presence is felt.--Fifthly: Being-for-self is absolute -negativity; i.e. the negation of negation. Determinate being was a -negation of Being mere and simple: Being-for-self is the negation of -this, and so a return to true affirmation, as including the element of -negation. - -Being seemed to describe a complete reality. But its latent limitation -has become explicit. It only retains itself by a self-assertion which -leaves it a mere abstract unit, or atom,--a unit with nothing in it -to be united,-and where it matters not whether it be somewhat or -other. The quality of Being, in which all qualitative attributes are -lost and sunk, is Quantity: the characteristic of which is to be a -matter of no importance to Being, as it originally presents itself. -In other words, whilst Quality is identical with Being,--while Being -means qualitativeness, and the Being of a thing means its quality, or -constitution; Quantity is external to Being, and a thing is, while its -quantity undergoes all sorts of variation. At least this is true within -certain limits: for quantity is not an ultimate category any more than -quality. But for the present the truth of quality is quantity; or, in -other words, if a thing is to be anything definite it must ultimately -rest on a solid atom: must be a unit and amenable to measurement. First -come qualities, such as sweet, green, and the like: these seem to be -truth and reality to the senses and the natural mind: and in their -universality are represented by the abstract terms of qualitative -being. The first step in the progress of knowledge consists in seeing -that quality presupposes quantity. Number, in short, is the proximate -truth to which the vague qualitative distinction of _a, some,_ and -_each_ is to be reduced. The qualitative differences of sounds are -reduced to relations or ratios of number: and so are the other data of -sensation. We see this truth recognised in the Atomic School, which -may be taken to represent the summing-up of that period of thought -which begins with the 'Being' of Parmenides, and the 'Becoming' of -Heraclitus. When Democritus says that, although bitter and sweet are -conventional distinctions, yet in reality there is only atoms and -void[11], he is introducing a distinction between real and apparent. -But again the irregular and sporadic appearances of species of quality -are replaced by a gradual and regular series of quantities. With mere -Being you have a conception quite unfit for describing the manifold -reality. But by breaking up the whole Being into a countless number of -atoms of being, you get the means of establishing an equation between -a given sensible and some multiple of the atomic unit. Thus Atomism, -with its many bits of being and its interfluent non-being in which they -can unite, replaces the total and complete universe of being and its -attendant shadow of unreality, the world of opinion. Still the _Is not_ -clings to the _Is_: if each atom seems complete, they are subject to a -necessity which forces them by negation, i. e. by the void (as Atomism -figuratively calls the repulsion of the atoms) to meet each other and -form apparent unities. Before a step could be made to higher problems, -it was necessary to see that the proximate truth of the qualitative -world,--or world of sense proper (ἰδία αἴσθησις) is in its simplest -terms a quantitative world, or world of common sensibles (κοινὰ -αἴσθητα), universalised sensibles, number and quantity. - -The sphere of quantity need only be briefly sketched. It has its three -heads: (1) quantity in general,--the universal and vague notion of -quantitativeness, the mere conception of reality as the Great and the -Little, or the More and Less[12]: (2) Quantum, or defined quantity, -expressed in the shape of a number: and (3) the quantitative ratio -or degree, which is the individualisation or self-determination of -numbers, or their application to one another,--which gives the real -meaning and value of numbers. The fundamental antithesis, which -we found in quality, comes before us here more definitely as the -opposition of many ones in one number. In every quantity there are the -two elements: the 'one,' unity or solidarity, which renders a total -number possible, and the 'many' or multiplicity, which gives it real -body and character. By this quantitative law, reality must always be -both Continuous and Discrete. Thus when I regard a line as consisting -of a number of points I treat it as a discrete quantity: as many in -one. When, on the other hand, I regard the line as the unity of these -points, it becomes a continuous quantity. These distinctions are not -so trivial as they may appear: they lie at the bases of paradoxes like -those by which Zeno disproved the ordinary representations of motion, -and when a M.P. informs the House of Commons that it is impossible -to divide 73l. 1s. 6d. by 1l. 2s. 6d., he is, like Zeno, and perhaps -more unconsciously, forgetting that these quantities are not merely -continuous but discrete. - -The Pythagoreans, according to the tradition of antiquity, -philosophised number. In it they found the reality, or the principle -of things,--the characteristic feature which dominated existence, and -by which the world in all its multiplicity could be made coherent -and intelligible. They saw it composed of two elements: a limit or -limiting, and an unlimited: the latter as it were a dark ground, -measureless and endless, on which definiteness was gradually marked -out. Such a limiting principle would be e. g. the unit of number. But -the full definiteness of number only comes out when a numerical scale -is fixed on, in which each number bears a definite ratio to what goes -before and what comes after. Each number in such a scale is really a -multiple of its unit: a product of its unity into its multeity, of the -monad into the indefinite duad. It is this view of each number, as the -product of its prime unit with the ratio, which comes explicitly to -the fore in Degree, or quantitative ratio. Each so-called quantitative -statement is thus a ratio between a given quantity in the object and an -assumed standard or unit of number. - -These implications latent in quantitative order or determination come -out in mensuration. If quantitative or numerical precision is to have -a real basis, it presupposes the existence of a qualitative atom or -unit which shall be the Measure. Measure is therefore the truth and the -unity of quantity and quality: each refers forward and backward to the -other, and both lead up to or imply a modulus, or standard unit. Such -a standard unit may seem, at first sight, to be a matter of arbitrary -choice and imposition. There seems to be no ultimate reason for taking -the foot or the cubit as unit of measurement: and if the original foot -or cubit be the king's limb, it is easy to say that the whole thing is -conventional and artificial. But it is evident on further reflection, -first that the foot or the pace is the natural and primitive measurer -of lengths of space for the human being, and secondly that the -particular foot which is imposed as the measure is taken as being -normal and typical. So too it is partly arbitrary choice which fixes -upon the starting-point for the scale of temperatures: but here also -the range from freezing-point to boiling-point of the commonest of -liquids affords a sufficient standard from which naturally to carry on -the scale above or below it. - -What happens is therefore that what is the rule, the standard,--we -may also say, the test of being, is the natural mean or average. The -measure presents itself as the permanent and regular proportion of -quantity and quality. It is the amount or quantity at which things -settle down in equilibrium and produce the quality or characteristic -feature of the object. To say that Measure is the supreme category -or the truth of being--of that superficial being which merely is--of -the mere fact of perception--is to say that the prime or governing -feature of reality, its obviously dominant characteristic in this -sphere, is a self-imposing harmony and proportion. It naturally -arranges itself--defines and describes itself in rhythmic series, in -regular scales, in symmetrical schemes. All things are in geometrical -proportion, self-defined and uniformly graded. Such a conception and -category of reality may be said to be peculiarly Greek. The doctrine -of the Mean is well known as a principle of their popular Ethics. But -the Mean is an average which is regarded as a Normal,--a regular and -permanent mode of being which is equivalent to a standard. The rule is -given by the logic of facts and of nature. There is in it an apparent -optimism--a belief that what is predominant and fundamental is right: -a doctrine of immanent symmetry and order. The mere habitual custom -is as such held to be the right and good. It is true, no doubt, that -Protagoras came to point out that this Measure was not inherent in -things, but came from Man, the measure of all things: and that the -later philosophy had to show how the conception of reality should -be re-construed, if the objectivity of Measure and symmetry in the -universe were still to be maintained. Still even with this correction -the belief remained down to the Stoic School that being is essentially -self-ordering: that Nature is immanent proportion. - -The Measure thus emerging as the Mean, which stands out as the -permanent background or recurrent same amidst varying extremes, is -set against these divergencies and used to measure them. It has to -serve as a denominator for all of these: or each of these differences -has a definite ratio to it. For that purpose it must be so graded or -present such a scale that the smallest difference from it that exists -may be measured, estimated and defined in terms of it. It is here out -of place to consider how this can be accomplished,--how mensuration in -any case is solved as a problem of scientific determination. What is -more important is to note the fact that appearances everywhere start up -to testify to the incompatibility of the two elements in measure,--to -their tendency to fly away from each other. It is only within certain -ranges that quantity and quality change proportionately to each other. -The colour spectrum, the scale of musical notes, the series of chemical -combination, the order of the planets, all are found in experience up -to some point to follow a symmetrical order, and exhibit a measure. -But after that point is reached, a sudden change or transition occurs. -There is a break in the continuity of being: without warning, a new -series of physical manifestation, having a new rule or measure, emerges -by a sort of catastrophe. So also, it is only to a certain portion of -the process of physical order in the human body that psychical changes -are found to correspond. Everywhere the correspondence or harmony or -proportion of immediate fact has its breaks,--its sudden emergencies -into a new range of being. - -It is on the repeated evidence of this fact--the discontinuity of -immediate being, the inexplicable gulfs which separate its ordered -provinces from one another, that we rise to the distinction of two -orders or grades of being: a double aspect of reality. The primitive -consciousness is, we may suppose, confined to one level of being, one -world. And so long as the facts remain within limits there is no need -to go further. The measure is the rule. But the uniformity breaks -down abruptly[13]: the rule has its inevitable exceptions: it is no -law or principle, but only the factual majority within a fixed range. -Thus the measure, to fulfil all that is expected of it, and be a full -expression or definition of reality, must go beyond a mere measure: -must become the essence, or rather give place to the essence. In order -to explain the irregularity and want of measure which turns up if we -exceed the narrow provinces of being, we are forced on the conception -of a being, one permanent and the same, set in relation, antithetical -but inseparable, to an other being, manifold, changing, and different. -The undying rhythm, the ceaseless symmetry retreat into the further -region--the world beyond: while the older surface-being, as set against -it, comes to be a mere phenomenon or appearance, a derivative and -dependent something, which has its roots of being in the underlying -law and essential reality. But the two planes are still in intimate -connexion, in a correlation which becomes more and more palpable as its -implications are disclosed and realised. - -This change from Measure to Essential Being is one which Greek -philosophy seems to exhibit in the step from Pythagoreanism to -Platonism. Plato himself has noted the passage from what have been -called the mathematical to the metaphysical categories, and insisted -on the essential and higher truth to which mathematics only point. -Mathematical terms give the supreme definiteness to the world of being; -they show it as in its several compartments a world immanently ordered -and measured. As in Greek Art, all seems to be fully brought to the -surface: as the image suggests no further and deeper meaning, but -affords an absolute identity of aspect and purport; so the natural and -semi-popular philosophy of Greece was satisfied for its ethics with the -proportionate, the becoming, the beautiful. Plato however passes beyond -the surface, and reflects the apparent fact on a deeper permanent -reality behind. That reality is still, in name, only the 'form' or -'shape'-- only the regular and permanent type--only the measure. But -it is called the really real, the _ὄντως ὄν_,--the being of being. In -it the truth is clear, transparent, one and systematic, which in the -sensible or immediate world is obscure, confused, multiple. It is the -key to explain the difficulties and irregularities of the first and -visible scene. Yet even Plato never for a moment forgets the essential -correspondence of the two realms, however he may insist upon their -separation, and however hard he may find it to explain how being can be -duplicated, how the one can be many and yet not cease to be one, how -appearance has part in reality. - -This indeed is not a difficulty confined to Plato. It is, after all, -the same antithesis as we found in the beginning: the Is which lapses -into the Is not. It now becomes the play of positive and negative--of -perpetual relativity: of a known dependent on an unknown, and an -unknown interpreted by a known: an essence guaranteed by its show -or seeming and a _Schein_ which supposes permanent _Sein._ How can a -thing be, and yet not be true? How can pleasures seem and not be real? -Aristotle, taking up the Platonic antithesis of true and apparent -being, carries it on into greater detail. Matter and form: possibility -and actuality: are amongst his cardinal pairs of correlatives. But -he is anxious to maintain their essential relativity: to show that -reality only is and maintains itself as the unity of the two poles of -universal and particular, reason and sense, or as a syllogism and a -development. So far as he succeeds in doing this, Aristotle rises above -the correlational view of reality into the comprehension of it as a -unity, which carries itself through difference into self-realisation. - - -[Footnote 1: What he did show was that these Ideas were not objects in -the vulgar sense of reality, or things.] - -[Footnote 2: Cf. the controversy between Schiller and Goethe as to idea -and observation, quoted by Whewell, _Scientific Ideas_, i. 36.] - -[Footnote 3: The use of the substantival form _Being_ for the verbal -(participle, infinitive, or indicative) suggests an idea of permanence -and substance, or essence. So potentiality seems much more real than -_may_ or _can._ And yet the phrase He knows δυνάμει is only equivalent -to He can or may know (δύναται or ἐνδέχεται).] - -[Footnote 4: When it is said that: 'It is strange that so profound a -thinker as Hegel should not have seen that the conception of definite -objects, such as a _dog_ and _cat_, is prior no less in nature than in -knowledge to the conception of abstract relations, such as _is_ and _is -not,'_ it is difficult to say what the writer meant. Had he ever heard -of geometry? Both in nature and in knowledge (i. e. in the natural -process from sense to thought) chairs and tables are prior to lines -and surface. The mathematical point and line are abstractions, i. e. -thoughts, and no image of sensuous reality. It is also true that the -ordinary conception of the sun's movements was 'prior no less in nature -than in knowledge' to the theory of the earth's rotation. And no doubt -Hegel, sedate though his boyhood was, had made the acquaintance of dog -and cat in his pre-logical days: as of balls and windows before he was -turned upon Euclid. See Mansel's _Letters_, _Lectures_, &c., p. 209.] - -[Footnote 5: As _Being_ to ordinary unthinkingness seems to mean a -great deal it cannot expound, so the mind full of the mystic depths of -time and space is disgusted to find them turn so empty and shallow when -it would set forth its wealth. See Augustin. _Confess._ xi. 14.] - -[Footnote 6: This may be illustrated by saying that to _affirm_ is the -same energy of thought as to _deny,_ and that the difference lies in -the terms related by the judgment. _In themselves,_ the one act is as -empty or meaningless as the other.] - -[Footnote 7: Heine, _Ueber Deutschland (Werke),_ v. 213.] - -[Footnote 8: πᾱσα οὐσία δοκεῑ τόδε τι σημαίνειν (Ar. _Cat._ 5).] - -[Footnote 9: Hence the disparaging sense in which the term 'individual' -may be used.] - -[Footnote 10: These latter terms being used in a metaphorical sense.] - -[Footnote 11: νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρόν ἐτεῇ δὲ ἃτομα καὶ κενόν. -Democritus ap. Sext. _Empir. adv. Math._ vii. 135.] - -[Footnote 12: Aristotle's μᾱλλον καὶ ἦττον: see _Metaph._ i. 6 τὺ μέγα -κaὶ τὸ μικρον.] - -[Footnote 13: Thus, the sharp break at death suggests the reference of -vital phenomena to a substantial soul.] - - - - -CHAPTER XXXI. - - -THE LOGIC OF EXPLANATION AND REALISTIC METAPHYSICS: ESSENCE. - - -The coherence and consistency of being was, it appeared in the last -chapter, only to be maintained by assuming it to fall into two planes, -or orders, always however relative to each other. The need of a measure -forced itself upon even the superficial student. In the ordinary -business of economical life one commodity of common use or of general -acceptability steps into the place of a common measure. At first it is -no more than one amongst many, a more suitable and convenient means of -discharging the task of mensuration. But gradually it draws away into -a world of its own, and acquires in common estimation a unique and -peculiar dignity. It becomes a commodity of a higher order than the -common, and is even treated as if it had intrinsic and inherent worth, -apart from all relations of exchange. In a further stage it rises to -rank as an invariable and almost supersensible standard, which amid all -the fluctuations of currency tends to remain unchanged. One loses sight -of the movement out of which it grew and in which it exists--the social -give and take, the interaction of individual needs and general opinion. - -The characteristic feature of this sphere of thought is the perpetual -antithesis of terms. And its tragedy is the result of the tendency to -separate the terms, and treat them as independently real. It matters -not how often this error may be detected. Each side of the antithesis -no doubt reflects itself upon the other. But we as constantly fail to -note that reflection. Even the philosopher who most loudly preaches -relativity falls into the common trap, and speaks of relatives as -ultimate and absolute. He talks of an Unknowable, as if it could be -without a Known (or Knowable): whereas no such term fully manifests -itself. Each term owes its distinct existence to its correlative: -each gives itself over to the other, and invests it with meaning -and authority. Accordingly when even the ordinary mind, which takes -these categories as they are given, is asked what each means, it can -only reply by referring to the other. A cause is _that_ which has an -effect. The dialectic in the nature of thought,--its self-revising -self-conscious nature--which was concealed in the First Part of Logic, -where one term, when carried to its extreme, passed over into another, -is made obvious in the Second Part, where each term postulates and even -points to its correlative, and, however it may be contra-distinguished, -cannot be thought without it. Thus, force is a meaningless abstraction -without the correlative expression or utterance of force: and matter -means nothing except in its distinction from, and yet reflection on, -form. These, it may be said, are simple and tautological statements. -They are principles, however, which every day sees disregarded. Have -they, for example, been remembered by those theorists who tell us -that everything is ultimately reducible to matter, or who propose to -improve upon that theory by explaining that matter is after all only -another name for force? Forgetting how this reduction is made, they are -dealing with abstractions or mental figments, and losing their way in -an endless maze of metaphysics. Do those who speak so confidently of -laws of nature as something real and effective ever reflect that the -two terms are more or less relative to each other, and that there is -some latent metaphor in the phrase? Or if they prefer to speak of laws -of phenomena, on which word is the accent to be laid? Those who thus -speak of matter and force, really speak of a matter which is formed and -form-possessed, capable of determining its own form, and of a force -which can rule its own exertions: and for such conceptions the words in -question are scarcely adequate representatives. They use the language -of the Second, to express notions which properly belong to the Third -branch of Logic. - -The whole range of Essence or Relativity exhibits a sort of see-saw: -while one term goes up in importance, the other term goes down. The -several antitheses, too, have their day of fashion, and give place to -others. Those inquirers who speak of the phenomena of nature shrug -their shoulders at the very mention of essences: and the practical -man, whose field is actuality, acquires a very pronounced contempt -for both abstractions. One class of investigators glories in the -perpetual discovery of differences, and stigmatises the seekers after -identity and similarity as dreamers: while the latter retort, and -name the specialisers empiricists. One intellect considers an action -almost solely by its grounds or motives: another almost solely by -its consequences. Some console themselves for their degradation by -piquing themselves on what they might have been: others despise these -'would-be' minds for what they practically are. What a wealth there -lies in each of us, which our nearest friends know nothing of, and -which has never been made outward! But in this mode of thought, it is -the persistent delusion, misleading science no less than metaphysics -and the reflective thinking of ordinary life, to suppose that either of -two relative terms has an existence and value of its own. In Germany -paper-money is sometimes known as 'Schein' or Show. That term marks its -relativity to the gold or silver currency of the realm: and it would -be as absurd to pay with Austrian paper-money in Persia, as to take -one term of Essence apart from its correlative. The disputes about -essences, about matters and forces, about substance, about freedom and -necessity, or cause and effect, are generally aggravated by a forced -abstraction of one term from another on which its meaning and existence -depend. - -The essence may be roughly defined as that measure or standard which -corresponds to the variation of immediate being, and yet remains -identical in all variation. Or, if we like, we may say that this -immediate being, which, as derivative, may now be called existence[1], -has its ground in the essence. The essence is the ground of existence: -and essence which exists is a 'thing,' Such an existing essence or -thing subsists in its properties; and these properties are only found -in the thing. Thus the essence, when it comes into existence as a -thing, turns out to be a mere phenomenon or appearance.--Such briefly -stated is the development of essence proper into appearance. - -With the idea of essential being--a permanent which yet changes, there -emerge the problems connected with the double aspect of relation as -identity and difference,--the favourite categories of reflection. These -terms indeed the popular logician would fain avoid as savouring of -pedantic accuracy, and prefers the psychological titles of similarity -and contrast. These, he tends to insinuate, are unique experiences, -direct feelings, beyond which it is impossible to go in analysis. -The logician, on the other hand, must insist on dealing with the -more radical phase of the terms. And he must note their essential -interdependence and their intrinsic contradictoriness. Abstract -sameness, or sameness which does not presuppose a tinge of difference, -is a fiction of weak thought, which wishes to simplify the subtlety -of nature. Identity is a relative term, and for that very reason -presupposes difference: and for the same reason difference presupposes -identity and is meaningless without it. The whole dispute about -'Personal Identity,' as it descends from one English psychologist to -another, is enveloped in the obscurity which springs from failure to -grasp the logical antinomy on which the question turns. When I feel -that my friend whom I have not met for years is still the same, should -I take the trouble to express myself in this manner, unless with -reference to the difference betwixt Then and Now? If I remark that -two men are different, would the remark be worth making or hearing -unless there was some identity which made that difference all the -more striking? The essence is, in short, the unity of sameness and -difference: and when so apprehended, it is the ground by which we -explain existence. The essence, ground, or possibility, is at once -itself and not itself: if it is self-identical, it is for the same -reason self-distinguishing. If it is to be itself, it can only be so -by negativing what in it is other than itself. The affirmation of self -implies the negation of the other of self,--the redintegration (though -not the blank absorption) of the other in it. This is the _crux_ which -lies in _Ex nihilo nihil fit:_ what exists must not be other than -the essence (the effect not more than the cause), and yet unless it -is other and different, there has been no passage from essence to -existence. - -The tendency to identify, and the tendency to distinguish, alternate -both in scientific thought and in general culture. But whichever -prevail for the moment, it is only as a re-action and a protest against -the one-sided predominance of the other. And thus both ultimately -rest upon and presuppose a ground of existence which is neither mere -sameness nor mere difference. It is only when the two tendencies meet -and interpenetrate that science accomplishes its end, and discovers -the ground of existence. In the first instance the world presents to -incipient science the aspect of mere identity and of mere difference. -Likeness is confounded with sameness, and unlikeness with diversity. -The popular and the infant minds do not draw fine distinctions. Things -to them are either the same or different: one point of sameness may -in certain conditions obliterate whole breadths of difference; and -tiny divergence may make as nothing all the many points of agreement, -purely and simply, i. e. abstractly. But the process of comparison, -setting things beside each other, teaches us to refine a little, and -speak of things as Like or Unlike. One thing is like another when the -element of identity preponderates: it is unlike, when the difference -is uppermost. Thus while we distinguish things from one another, we -connect them. From mere variety, and mere sameness, we have risen, -secondly, to distinctions of like and unlike. But, thirdly, this -distinction of same and different is in the thing itself. Everything -includes an antithesis or contradiction in it: it is at once positive -and negative. One can only be virtuous, so long as one is not utterly -virtuous.[2] To be a philosopher, implies that you are not wholly or -merely a philosopher. The rational animal is so, because of an inherent -irrationality, and is so, only as rising upon and superseding it. Every -epithet, so to speak, by which you describe any reality, presupposes in -it the negative of the quality. Not only does every negation presuppose -an attempted or surmised affirmation, but an affirmation is always, -it may be said, a re-affirmation against an incipient doubt. Every -stage of reality involves the presence of antithetical but inseparable -elements: every light implies a shadow to set it forth. The epithet -of each real is only _a potiori._ While it retains itself, it must -lose itself. Its positivity is only secured by its self-negation and -its identity is based upon its self-distinction. Every proposition -which conveys real knowledge is a statement that self-sameness is -combined with difference. Every such proposition is synthetical: it -unites or identifies what is supposed to be implicitly different, -or differentiates what seemed only identical. Here we have that -_coincidentia oppositorum,_ which is the truth of essence. Thus, e. g. -the essence of the Self is the contradiction between its self-centred -unity and its existence by self-differentiation into elements. - -Essence, thus comprehended as the unity of identity and difference, -as that which is and is not the same, is the Ground, from which an -Existence comes as the Consequent. Or, otherwise expressed, the ground -is the source of the differences,--the point where they converge into -unity, and whence they diverge into existence. Everything in existence -has such a ground: or, as it is somewhat tautologically stated in the -common formula, a sufficient ground. On that account, it is no great -matter to give reasons or grounds for a thing, and no amount of them -can render a thing either right or wrong, unless in reference to some -given and supposedly fixed point. For the ground only states the same -thing over again in a mediate or reflected form. It carries back the -actual fact to its antecedent: and thus deprives it of its abruptness -or inexplicability, by showing you it was there implicitly; and -therefore as you accepted the ground you cannot complain of what but -serves to continue it. To refer to the ground is to say there is really -nothing new: and as you raised no objection before, you need raise none -now. - -The Existent world--a world of existents, each conditioning and -conditioned--is popularly described as a world of Things. These -Things are the solid hinges on which turns our ordinary conception of -change and action. They act, and exhibit properties. Being is partly -substantive, partly adjective. The Thing itself is the ground of -its properties: i. e. each thing is looked upon as a unity in which -different relations converge, or an identity which subsists through its -changing states. This is the side emphasised in ordinary life, when -a thing is regarded as the permanent and enduring subject, which has -certain properties. But a little science or a little reflection soon -turns the tables upon the thing, and shows that the properties are -independent matters, which, temporarily it may be, converge or combine -into a factitious unity which we term a thing. But these very matters -cannot be independent or whole, just because they interpenetrate each -other in the thing. The thing, which from one point of view seemed -permanent, and the properties, which from another point of view seemed -self-subsistent matters, are neither of them more than appearance. For -they must be at one, and at one they cannot be. And if we reduce the -various matters to one, and speak of Matter in general, we have a mere -abstraction--a something which only becomes real by being stamped with -a special form. _Mere_ Matter like _mere_ Thing (thing in itself) is a -knowable Unknowable. - -In this way we pass from the talk about essence, things, and matter -into an other range of the sphere of relativity. We no longer have -one order of being behind or in the depth, and another referring back -to it. We now speak (as Mill does) of Phenomena:--not phenomena of -an unknown, but, simply disregarding the background, we find all we -want upon the surface. For neither is thing more real than property, -nor essence than existence. Each is exactly equal in reality to the -other, and that reality is its relation to the other. The thing and -the essence with their claim to truth disappear. Nothing truly is: -but only appears to be. The semblance (_Schein_) may refer to an -essential. But the appearance (_Erscheinung_) only refers to another -appearance, and so on. The phenomenal world is all on one level:--as -was the world of immediate being. But, there, each term of being -presented itself as independent: here, nothing is independent--nothing -ever really _is,_ but only represents something else, which is in its -turn representative. Yet even here there is a pretence of hierarchy -in existence. In the phenomenon a certain superiority is attributed -to its Law. But the conception of Law is hard to keep in its proper -place. Either it assumes a permanency--even were it but a permanent -possibility--as contrasted with the coming and passing phenomenon: -and then it is apt to be confounded with a real Essence. Or, on the -other hand, it comes to be looked on as a mere way of colligating -phenomena,--as a mere appearance in the variety of appearance (as it -were an iris in the rain-drops)--a phenomenon of a phenomenon. Such a -distinction between the phenomenon and its law; therefore, is and must -be illusory, or itself only an appearance. As such it is described as -the difference of Form and Content: two terms, which are incessantly -opposed, but which more than most antitheses reveal when pressed the -hollowness of their opposition. For true or developed Form is Content, -and _vice versa._ - -Instead however of this practical identification of the law of the -phenomenon with the duly-formulated phenomenon itself, it is more -natural to emphasise the discordance of the two aspects of reality, -and yet to acknowledge their essential relativity. This essential -relativity in the phenomenon has a threefold aspect: the relation of -whole and parts; of force and the exertion of force; of inward and -outward. The relation of whole and parts tends to explain by statical -composition: the relation of force and its exertion, by dynamical -construction. According to the former the parts are constituted by -their dependence upon and in the whole, and yet the whole is composed -by the addition of the several parts together. Each extreme is what -it is only through the other. Only those parts can make up a whole, -which somehow have the whole in them: and to become the whole, they -must contrive to wholly obliterate their partitional character. A -better exhibition of the inner unity and the difference between form -and contents is seen in the relation of a force to its exertion. Here -the contents appear under a double form: first, under the form of mere -identity, as force,--secondly, under the form of mere distinction, -as the manifestation of that force. Yet a force is only such in its -utterance or manifestation, while in that utterance, if abstracted -from the force it carries forth, all energy has been superseded. -This separation of content and form, or of content as developed in -two forms, appears still more clearly in the third relation: that -of outward and inward. This is a popular distinction of very wide -application in reference to phenomena. But neither outside nor inside -is anything apart from its correlative. If the elements implied in the -conception of phenomena are to have full justice done them, it must be -expanded so as to give expression to these two phases, to include the -outward and the inward. But at first only by reverting to something -like the old distinction of essence and existence,--an essence however -which is existent or phenomenal, and an existence which stands -independent, though in correlation. Such being is Actuality--being, i. -e. which is what it must be, and must be what it is. - -Actuality, though it comes under the general head of Essence, tends -to pass away into another sphere. Here, as elsewhere, we see that -the general rubric of a sphere is only partially applicable to some -of its subordinate sections. In essence proper there were, or were -assumed to be, two grades of being--a real or essential, and an -unessential or seeming: or being was regarded (contradictorily) both -as ideal (as one thing) and real (as having several properties). In -Appearance or Manifestation the aspects of being are supposed to lie -on a level; but they are always a pair of aspects, one side of which -is entirely dependent for its explanation on a reflection from the -other, e. g. whole and parts, the favourite category for explaining -the larger unities. But in the category of actuality there is nothing -so merely potential, so unessential as mere essence recognised: and -each actual is something firm and self-supporting which does not, -like a phenomenon, merely borrow its reality from its antithesis or -correlative. Thus we have, in a way, got back to the characteristics -of immediate being: only, as we find it, we have this affirmation of -the self-subsistence of reals contradictorily accompanied with the -conviction of their necessary interdependence. It is a reflective (or -correlated), not an immediate reality. There is no other world of being -to have recourse to for explanation now: nor can we play back and -forward from aspect to aspect of a reality which never comes forward -itself, but only as a reflection on or from another. The world of -reality is a self-contained world: its parts and phases are each hard -realities: and for that reason they bear hard upon each other in the -bond of necessity. - -The total actuality falls naturally in our conception into three -elements. We separate first the central fact--the nucleus of the -business, the concentrated reality in reality: the fact in its -mere identity and inner abstractness: the ultimate drift or inner -possibility of things. Then we turn to the rest of the concrete -fact--all without which the fact would not be itself--the detail -and particularity: this we treat as a sort of materials or passive -conditions from which the real fact is to be produced, on which it -is dependent and which precede it in time. Lastly, in order to get -back the unity of the fact from these two unconnected elements, we -refer to some agency which puts them together. The End--or thing to -be realised--(so to speak) has to be brought out by a motive agency -(efficient cause) which imposes the form (or general character) on -the matter and makes these one. By this analysis, however, we have -only put asunder what is one experience and introduced a mechanical -(external) unifier needlessly. The name of _conditions_ is given to the -particulars or details, considered apart from the rest of the fact, -and hypothetically invested with an existence anterior to it, with -the implication, first, that they are self-subsistent, and secondly, -that they to some extent involve the rest of it. Again, the general -fact, the fact in its mere nominal or abstract generality or essence, -its mere possibility, does not exist separately: every fact when in -thought completed has its so-called conditions not outside it, but as -constituent elements, aspects, or factors in it. Lastly, the so-called -agency is the active element itself in the act, an aspect or factor -in the totality: the aspect which keeps actuality together as a -self-energising fact--a _Thathandlung_ and not a mere _Thatsache_ (to -quote Fichte's phrase). Our practical and technical habits, where the -agent is other than his materials and aims, lead us to draw the same -distinctions in the realm of total Nature: they are aspects useful _in -ordine ad hominem_ which we, without due modification, apply _in ordine -ad Universum._ - -It is originally in our practical operations that the distinctions -of necessary and possible emerge,--with a view to the accomplishment -of our desires and purposes. That is necessary which is required and -needed if some bare plan is projected and is to be actualised: it is -the condition or conditions without which the end cannot be attained. -It is an epithet of the means. Possible, on the contrary, is an -epithet of the end or plan, and denotes that there are means for its -attainment, without however always specifying that this is known of the -present or given instance. It is clear that everything as regards the -application of these terms will depend on the definiteness with which -the plan is conceived, both in itself so to speak and in its relations -with the rest of the circumstances. On the other hand, when a result -emerges without being included in the purpose, and without any means -having been employed for attaining it, it is said to be a chance, -accident, or contingency. - -These terms are applied by analogy to the uses of theoretical -explanation. Just as in will you have a general aim to begin with, -which becomes more and more determinate as it moves forward in the -volitional process to execution; so in the attempt to understand the -world you suppose it first of all the mere shadow or phantom of itself, -a promise and potentiality of things to come: a next-to-nothing, -which however you credit with a magic wealth of potential being. So -much indeed may this possibility be emphasised that nothing more -is needed: it is possible, and, without a thought of difficulties -and counteractives, you could swear that it is actual[3]. Being -removed above this solid land of actuality, cut off from the ties -and bonds of conditions, it fancies itself moving in its vacuum; -and being free from all bonds of actuality fancies itself actually -free, or self-disposing, whereas it can only claim this _liberum -arbitrium indifferentiae,_ so long as it remains bare and powerless -possibility--a mere may-be, which, apart from all conditions, would -exist only by a mere contingency, or freak of chance. This mere -potentiality--being only an ante-dated, presupposed, and hypothetical -actuality--being only a substance or substratum--must be raised out -of its supposititious existence into reality by means of appropriate -conditions. These conditions are necessary to its resuming its place -or reaching a place in actuality. Thus each object becomes actual or -real from a presupposed possibility by means of an external necessity. -As in the former case the possibility was identified with power, -and conditions were left out of sight as comparatively unimportant: -so here the possibility--taken to lie at the root of the thing--is -made a mere susceptibility, which would be nothing actual unless -stimulated and necessitated from outside. This necessity in the very -heart of actuality (which is its characteristic to the reflectional -mode of mind) thus arises from the separation and hypostatisation -of its elements into independent powers which are so far in stress -and opposition. This is the climax of metaphysics--if metaphysics -be the investiture of the dynamic factors of the notion with the -power and character of supposed agents or forces. It appears in -three phases, with the three categories of substance, cause, and -reciprocity. To the first, reality is regarded as dominated by its -mere underlying potentiality: the reality of the mere superficial -contingents is controlled by the necessity of its latent or substantial -being. To explain event or incident, here, is merely to bind it -to the generic nature or the intrinsic doom, which--unexplained -and inexplicable--manifests itself in an extrinsically fluctuating -appearance of facts: e. g. the single crime is explained as the product -of social conditions. Under the conception of Causality, each thing is -a mere might-be which owes all its actuality to a definite antecedent -or cause,--an antecedent termed for the moment unconditional, but anon -reduced to dependence on further conditions. The effect is as a fact: -but would not have been so unless for an earlier fact--i. e. unless the -effect in a supposed earlier stage of its growth had been helped on by -certain conditions or circumstances to acquire actual and full being in -the effect. And cause and conditions can change places, according to -what we happen to regard as the central nucleus or inner possibility -of the effect. Lastly, the conception of reciprocity recognises that -causality is rather an arbitrary simplification of reality into strands -of rectilinear event; it remembers that Substance emphasises the -dependence of each non-independent element on the supposed totality -which they grow from, and doing so, it lays down the reversibility -and essential elasticity of the causal relation. The cause in causing -re-acts upon itself, and the effect is itself a cause of the effect, -active as well as passive. The dependence in short is all-environing: -nowhere is there any loop-hole to escape from necessity. Motives act -on purpose, and purpose acts on motives: the stone hurls back the hand -that hurled it. - -Explanation is thus baffled and thus forced to recognise its own -limitations. The simplest fact is beyond all the powers of explanatory -science to do full justice to: for to know fully the 'flower in the -crannied wall' after this method of explanation would involve endless -multiples of action and re-action. The antinomy between necessity -and contingency arose by following out the antithesis, so natural to -us, between selfsame and different, essence and existence, substance -and accidents, till they were invested with a right to independent -place and function. But the separation of the abstract receptacle -of possibility, self-same and essential, from the equally abstract -conditions which fill it up and make it actual, is only the great -human instrumentality of comprehension, which however is not reached -until each thing is realised and idealised as an individual, which -has universality and has particularity, but never either alone. -Its universality is possibility--its particularity the aspect of -contingency: but these aspects are in submission to an inclusive unity. -The real when ill known seems contingent; when somewhat better known -it seems necessary by external (physical) compulsion; in its truth -to intelligence, the real is a self-active, a _causa sui,_ or it is -necessary by that self-determination which is the freedom of autonomy. - -The view of the world under the category of actuality (Reality), and -as dominated by the law of causality, is the culminating stand-point -of scientific or reflective realism. It began with a mere descriptive -science, naming and qualifying the successive aspects of being,--with -description which passed through numeration into the definiteness -of measurement. But all such determination was found to imply the -existence of a permanent reality, or at least to involve the reference -of one reality to another, outside of it, and yet not independent -of relations to it, which had to make part of its nature. To the -scientific realist the sum of fact presents itself independent of -consciousness, as a complicated mass of real elements governed by -laws and subject to necessities. Each thing or state of a thing is -explained by reference to something outside it, which is its cause, and -measured by something inside it which is its unit or atomic standard. -Alternately the reference, and the unit are designated arbitrary -(contingent) and necessary (essential): i. e. they are sometimes -considered as only a way of looking at reality[4]--and sometimes as -inevitable implications and conditions of reality. - -All this is Objective Logic: or, so far as it does not realise -its implications, it is Metaphysics. Its terms of thought[5] are -in practice treated as elements of a reality which is what it is, -apart from thought-conditions, apart from consciousness. As Hegel -exhibits them in their interdependence, they hint their underlying -thought-nature, which in their empirical applications is hardly -apparent. For to the realistic stand-point mind and subjectivity are -left out of account as only passive onlookers. The realist may no -doubt speak of a Subject: but he means a real, a corporeal self, an -actual amongst other actuals. If he speaks of mind and will, such mind -and will are parts and ingredients in a general scheme of causes and -effects; they are points of transition through which passes the moving -stream of event. They also are things and substances. They are agents -and patients, always both, no doubt but the chief circumstance to note -is that they are actuals, and that even knowledge and will are regarded -as species of action and motion. - -When Protagoras laid down his maxim that _Man is the measure of all -things_, he stated, apparently in an ambiguous manner, that the fact -of measure (and all that mensuration implies), and (we may add) -the existence of correlation in actuality, presupposed for their -explanation the assumption of Mind and subjectivity. Mind thus became -the basis of all actuality which claimed to be objective--claimed, in -short, to be actual. The truth and objectivity of the objective lies in -the subjective; Mind is its own measure, i. e. the absolute measure, -and it is self-relation. So Kant had taught and Fichte enforced. The -basis of objectivity is the subjective; but a subjective different -from that so-called by the plain man or by the naive psychologist. By -the subjective he does not, as the plain man, understand the compound -of body and soul, the living and breathing organism amid outer -objects--nor, as the psychological idealist does, a psychical process, -a series or bundle of states of consciousness, always contrasted -with a reality, _the_ reality outside consciousness. It is true that -his language resembles the language of psychology: as Herbart and -others have said, that is to be expected, for he talks of mind and -consciousness. But the consciousness he speaks of is a unity that -includes all space and all time: it is one and all-embracing, infinite, -because not as individual (psychological) consciousness set in -antithesis to reality, as the other half of the duality of existence. -It is consciousness generalised_--Bewusstsein überhaupt--_ an eternal, -i. e. a timeless consciousness, an universal i. e. not a localised, -mind:--a necessary Idea, but with an inward self-regulating necessity. -Such a consciousness Fichte called the Absolute Ego: but as we saw -before, the adjective transforms the substantive. Such a consciousness, -which is absolute self-consciousness, is the Idea:--no psychical event, -but the logical condition and explanation of reality whether physical -or psychical. The Idea is the presupposition of epistemology, but -of an epistemology which claims to occupy the place of old usurped -by metaphysics. Metaphysics has no higher category than actuality: -transcendental logic shows that actuality rests in the Idea,--reality -conceived and conception realised. - - -[Footnote 1: _Existence,_ as opposed to _Dasein_, should thus imply -the emergence into efficient being from a state of quietude or passive -latency (_Wesen_).] - -[Footnote 2: As Aristotle says, The brave man stands his ground, yet -fearing: (cf. Tolstoi: _Siege of Sevastopol_). If he does not fear, -brave is not the word for him.] - -[Footnote 3: Put into Greek, the mere ἐνδέχεται (_licet,_ or -_forsitan_) is taken as equivalent to δύναμαι (_possum_).] - -[Footnote 4: Herbart's _Zufällige Ansicht_, or contingent aspect.] - -[Footnote 5: 'Denkbestimmungen.'] - - - - -CHAPTER XXXII. - - -LOGIC OF COMPREHENSION AND IDEALISM: THE NOTION. - - -The distinction between the psychical or psychological idea and the -logical concept has been more than once alluded to. The idea or -representation is under psychical form exactly equivalent to the -undigested and passively accepted thing to which we give the title of -physical or external. It is the ideal, in the sense of the psychical, -pendant to the real: and hangs up in the mental view in the same way as -the real object to the physical perception. It is in brief the crude -object, considered not as existing, but as a state of consciousness--it -is a reduplication in inner space of the thing in outer space. If we -cannot say it is altogether mythological, we must however note that -it is simply a psychical reflex, which has an existence only through -abstraction, and is neither more or less than the object apprehended -without comprehension. - -The concept or notion is more than an image, and less than an image. An -idea-image is symbolical of the unanalysed totality of the thing. But -the notion is in the first instance due to an analysis, and secondly, -a reconstruction of the thing. It takes up the thing in its relations: -it thinks it, i. e. it abstracts and mutilates it, and artificially -recombines. It implies analysis and synthesis. It produces a sort of -manufactured thing: a mental construction. But the construction--as -contrasted with the passivity that says first A and then B and a -connexion of them--has the traces of subjective or mental violence -about it: for violence there is in the act of comprehension. We have -however got together in unity what actuality in the process of history -let fall asunder, and could only, at the best, show as independent -reals held against their will in ubiquitous relations of reciprocity. -But the unity in which the individual sets the universal and the -particular is an imported unity, which though it gives place and -explanation to the elements of reality, seems to impose its synthesis -upon reality. So far the concept is subjective only. It is an ample -explanation including the facts, but not quite self-explanatory. _We_ -conceive, and judge, and reason: but all this is alien to the object. - -But there is a counterpart almost in antagonism to this. There is -a concept, i. e. a grouping of existence into totals mediated by -necessary links, which presents itself as embodied in things: and -this embodied concept is the objective world. That world, apart from -our interpretation and conception, offers itself as a synthesis of -universal, particular and individual. It groups itself into systems, -mechanical, chemical, and teleological. But in all of these there -is lacking the evidence of the inward and subjective principle of -unification. The unity is external, the members are held in a vice: -their unity is given as a fact: it follows through certain laws and -does not reveal itself. There is a want of perspicuity of connexion: -logic--the need of inner explanation--in short, is not satisfied by -this logic of facts. It is rather a realm of necessity than of freedom. -It wants life; wants true self-activity. As in the subjective notion, -the facts resented the hand of the logician (for here is the sphere -of logic proper in the old Aristotelian sense), and refused to show -themselves in the simple and transparent transitions of his argument: -so the objective synthesis of the members of a mechanical system, or -of a kingdom of means and ends, lacks the freedom and lucidity of -inner movement which logical insight demands. Objectivity--the logic -of fact--is a syllogism of necessity, so hardened and fixed that the -necessity of the conclusion is more obvious than the self-determination -by the syllogism. - -The third stage of the Notion shows the union of the pellucidity and -ideality of the syllogistic progress with the necessity and reality -of the objective order. Here actuality and the concept are at one. At -first as a mere fact--or more fact than idea. Life, organic life, is -no doubt development: a totality which is in all its parts, and where -parts have their being in the total. But life as such, the so-called -vital principle, does not emancipate itself to a true universal: it is -immersed in its particulars. Intellectual life, on the contrary,--the -form of consciousness--rises independent and distinct from the -totality of life. Psychology follows Biology. But as such--under the -form of intellect and will--it has an antithesis no less fatal to its -absoluteness than the opposite one-sidedness of life. There is--to -put it in language more familiar to the present day--there is an -analogue of life in all nature; and all reality, even the rock and the -crystal, has its life-history. There is, properly speaking, no mere -inorganic reality: organic life is universal. And then, going a step -further, we attribute to all reality something analogous to a soul, or -a consciousness. We talk, in rash moods, of mind-stuff and feelings, -even in molecules. But as Spinoza has reminded us, terms like Will -and Intellect have about them something finite, because they imply -an antagonism to an object: they are predominantly subjective. The -reality in its final truth must be a subject-object: the adequacy of -thought and being, the equation of real and ideal, the intellection -which is life. And this is called Absolute Idea. It is natural to -translate such an equation, when made a result, into a mere blank. -And a blank it would be, if we suppose all that has gone before -obliterated, and only the result left. Then, in the coincidence of -opposites, we have only a zero of a gulf of negation. A life which _is_ -consciousness may seem to fade away like a vague ideal with no reality. -A consciousness which _is_ life can be no consciousness at all. The -_is_ and the _is known_ dare not coincide or they perish both. - -A categorical proposition, says Hegel, can never express a speculative -truth. That is to say: the subject over-rides the predicate, or the -predicate makes you ignore the subject. The affirmation keeps out -of sight the negation. To say that life _is_ consciousness makes us -forget that the very assertion would not and could not be made, unless -also life were other than consciousness. In its full proportion of -meaning, therefore, the proposition must imply a return to unity -through difference, to identity through otherness. Affirmation, -fully realised, is re-affirmation through negation. Cognition is but -recognition deepened by contrast. This law which governs--or rather -which is--logic; the principle of identity through contradiction--must -not be lost sight of in the supreme struggle of thought. The Idea is -the unity of life and consciousness: but it is a unity in which they -are (_aufgehoben_)--not a zero in which they utterly collapse. - -We may illustrate in two ways. In the first we may compare the -'Ενεργεια of Aristotle. That is his formula of reality. Nominally -it only means activity and actuality: and sums up the metaphysical -formula for what really is,--the hard fact of being. But through it -there glimmers the meaning of consciousness. It not merely is, but -it means what it is. Energy of Soul is the end of life--the supreme -fulfilling of desire, and consummation of tendency. As such it is, and -feels that it is. It is the virtuous deed, which is its own reward. But -Aristotle seems sometimes to fall from that identification of being and -consciousness. The world of _praxis_ parts from the world of _Theoria._ -In that case the activity is a mere activity--the outward shell of -action: and then, as a supplement or complement to the abstract result -of the activity the consciousness of achievement gets a distinct -position as Pleasure: and the activity, now no consummation, but only -a means to an end, get its completion from this arbitrarily abstracted -shadow of reality.[1] - -The second illustration may come from Mr. Spencer. - -'We can think of Matter only in terms of Mind. We can think of Mind -only in terms of Matter. When we have pushed our explorations of the -first to the uttermost limit we are referred to the second for a -final answer: and when we have got the final answer of the second we -are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it.' Beyond -this see-saw indeed we cannot go, so as to leave it behind: but in -reality we transcend it. The Mind that is in terms of Matter is partly -the region of psychic event, partly the world of science, art and -religion. And psychic event is always antithetical to physical reality. -But the spiritual world already includes the antithesis of psychical -and physical, and including it keeps it as a principle of life and -consciousness. The supreme or absolute mind does not indeed rise above -Physis and Psyche so as to have no antagonism: but it is the unity of -antitheses. - -What those who crave for something higher than this rest in unrest, -this life in consciousness and consciousness in life, want, would -destroy the very condition of reality. Still philosophising, they would -be above philosophy. They want an objective reality in which they may -still their beating hearts,--a 'repose which ever is the same' and -yet is not annihilation:--to sink into the great sea of being, and -leave consciousness with its radical division behind. Such a craving -philosophy, in Hegers hands, has no power of satisfying. It cannot, in -the sense in which Jacobi and Schelling used the words, reveal Being. -It cannot get at the _That_ except by means of the _What,_ and is the -eternal antithesis and correlation of these two. It will always be -rational and logical--for it is its function to think being: and it -will re-affirm that an unthought and a-logical being is a mere name, -which in the language of humanity at least has no meaning, whatever -it may stand for in the Volapük of imagined gods. To go beyond this -correlation of Being and Thought is therefore no advance, but a relapse -into the _Natura Naturans_, which, in its abstract completeness, _is,_ -but dare not be anything. Philosophy therefore in its supreme Idea is -still the 'Ενεργεια of θεωρία, and not bare Οὐσία. For it mere Being -is always Nothing. And to be actual it must live in antithesis and -live victorious over antithesis. It follows the law of humanity _(Und -das heisst ein Kämpfer sein_)--which can only exist in warfare as a -church militant, but for continuous existence must also be a church -triumphant. Like religion and art, it sometimes craves for utter union -in the fullness of Being. Such a fullness is the unspeakable and the -vain,--which we may picture as the apathy of Nirvana; but which is the -absorption of Art, Religion and Philosophy,--the cease of consciousness -and an abyss. We may call it--it matters not--Being. - -These stages of the Notion must be examined in somewhat fuller detail. -The subjective notion is the effort at the comprehension (at first -subjective) of the two correlated elements into which actuality as -such has been seen to fall--and to fall again and again without -end. It brings out, or explicates (and with some opposition to the -divisions of reality) the unity which was presupposed by the antagonist -and inseparable reals. Hitherto we have had two things or aspects -in relation and move from one to the other by an act of reflection. -But to get two points in relation, they must belong to or exist in -a unity. The divided reality of cause and effect must, if it is to -be intelligible, submit to a unification of its elements. It is -comparatively easy to get on if we are always allowed to have one foot -on solid ground, and can move the other. Give us a standing-point, and -explanation is simplified. But to get a notion of things is, it may -seem, to transcend them, or get beneath them, and take a stand-point -outside actuality which shall unify them. If we added to immediate -being a further element to explain it, it may be said we now superadd -a third to explain the two others. Over and above the different and -related elements, there is assumed to be a unity. And at first it is -certainly such a superimposed element, added to the facts, and regarded -as our way of looking at them, as a subjective notion or grasp, holding -together what is in itself reluctant to be unified. - -The three aspects or factors in a Concept are the Universal, the -Particular, and the Individual. These are what Hegel calls the -'moments' or 'vanishing factors' of the notion. They are 'vanishing,' -because in their logical mobility they form a pellucid union: if they -are distinct, yet they refuse to be independent of one another. Or, we -may say, each in its truth is the meeting-ground and unification of -the two others, thus forming a sort of cycle of perpetual movement. -And in this way we may see that the addition of the third has really -been a simplification: it has made two one. For the Unit which welds -together is not a _tertium quid_, but simply the explicit statement -and assertion of the truth implied in the antithesis, which was yet -inseparability, of the two others. And for the same reason, neither -mere universal nor mere particular nor mere individual are full -reality, when taken apart. One can understand how Hegel could speak of -the 'Bacchantelike intoxication' of the concept. It may be illustrated -by the following utterances in which a modern psychologist labours -to express the complex unity of mental fact. First we are told that -a 'nervous shock,' e. g. the awakening caused by a sudden blow, or a -simple sensation (so-called), is the ultimate unit of consciousness. -And if this were all, it would correspond to the qualities of immediate -being, which we can suppose measurable: we should get a science of -purely empirical psychology based on psychical atoms. But, immediately -after, it appears that the 'relational element' is never absent from -the lowest stage of consciousness. Accordingly, besides feelings, there -_must be_ relations between feelings. And that means a good deal: -especially if we also note the proposition that, in truth, 'neither a -feeling nor a relation is an independent element of consciousness,' -Evidently you cannot have either without both, and it seems difficult -to have both when neither is independent. Nor does it mend matters to -learn that 'a relation is a momentary feeling': for that only seems -a way of implying that it is, and yet is not, a feeling. Such are -the difficulties that beset the sincere attempt to comprehend. The -fixed points of explanation stagger under the burden of truth; and -their unsteadiness shows that they lack the full foundation. Yet that -foundation--it must be repeated--is not something extra: it is the -underlying unity which gives life to the relativity of the separates. - -For the peculiarity of the Notional stand-point is that it insists on -thorough comprehension. The usual explanation refers us from a later to -an earlier, from a strange to a familiar, from a complex to a simple, -from compound to elements. It keeps analysis and synthesis, induction -and deduction apart. To comprehend is, on the other hand, to light up -earlier by later and later by earlier, and carry both into their unity. -It does not merely refer existence to its ground, phenomenon to law, -or effect to cause; because beyond these it has still to reveal the -unity of nature which carries on one of these into the other. Thus, the -explanatory method in Social Science may either refer us to the simple -elements or parts out of which the total is composed, or to an earlier -stage in the same institution's life. The analytical sociologist -does the former: the historical the latter. Neither really faces the -problem. For if the whole is made up of parts, it is made up of parts -which have been characterised by the whole. If the later has come -from the earlier, that only shows that the nature of the earlier was -inadequately ascertained. Development--which implies a permanent which -changes, an identity which is also different,--is thus more than mere -reference to an antecedent; because the antecedent must also figure as -a simultaneous. _Cessante causa, cessat et effectus._ But here, in the -concept (or λόγος) or syllogism, the permanent exists as the--may we -call it--consciousness which binds together the elements of reality, -as the life and the history, which is ideally continuous through real -changes, and is a real unity through the distinctions of appearance. - -Such a comprehension e. g. of the State would show that though it -must have a universal aspect, a particular, and an individual, yet -these are not severally identifiable with the divisions of sovereign, -executive, and people, but that in each of the latter the three -moments of the notion must appear, and that e. g. the people is not -mere people, but also executive and sovereign, just as the sovereign -is no mere sovereign, but also executive and of the people. The same -may be illustrated in the so-called individual. A man in his special -department and sphere of action may very likely lose the sense of his -wholeness and his integrity,--perhaps in more senses than one! He -may reduce himself to the limits of his profession. But in so doing -he becomes untrue, or, in Hegelian parlance, abstract: he fails to -recognise the universality of his position. All work, however petty, -which is done in the right spirit, is holy. - - 'One place performs, like any other place, - The proper service every place on earth - Was framed to furnish man with: serves alike - To give him note, that through the place he sees - A place is signified he never saw.' - -It is a false patriotism, for example, which is inconsistent with the -spirit of universal brotherhood: and there is something radically wrong -with the religion, on the other hand, which cannot be carried into act -amid the pettiness of ordinary practical interests. The universal, -again, is not a world beyond this world of sense and individuals: if it -were so, it would itself be a mere particular. It is rather the world -of sense unified, organised, and, if we may say so, spiritualised. -And an individual which is merely and simply individual is an utter -abstraction, which is quite meaningless, and in the real world -impossible. Or, if we prefer to express the same thing in connexion -with the mind, sensation apart from thought is an inconceivable -abstraction. Sensation is always alloyed with thought, and we can at -the most _suppose_ pure sensation to exist amongst the brutes. The mere -individual opens out and expands: and in that expansion we see the -universal: (sensation is thought in embryo). But, on the other hand, -the developed universal concentrates itself into a point: (thought -returns into the centre of feeling). - -The same process of particular, individual and universal, which thus -goes on under the apparent point of the notion, is more distinctly -and explicitly seen, with due emphasis on the several members, in -the evolution of the notion into the Judgment and the Syllogism. The -judgment is the statement of what each individual notion implicitly is, -viz. a universal or inward nature in itself, or that it is a universal -which individualises itself. The judgment may, therefore, in its -simplest terms be formulated as: The Individual is the Universal. The -connective link,--the copula 'is,' expresses however at first no more -than a mere point-like contact of the two terms, not their complete -identity. By a graduated series of judgments this identity between the -two terms is drawn closer, until in the three terms and propositions of -a syllogism the unity of the three factors of the notion finds its most -adequate expression in (subjective) thought. - -It may be a question how far syllogisms as they are ordinarily found -are calculated to impress this synthesis of the three elements upon the -observer. The three elements there tend to bid each other good-bye, and -are only kept together by the awkward means of the middle term, and -the conjunction 'therefore.' In these circumstances it becomes easy -to show, that the major premiss is a superfluity, not adding anything -to the cogency of the argument. But under the prominence of this -criticism of form, we are apt to let slip the real question touching -the nature of the syllogism. And that nature is to give their due place -to the three elements in the notion: which in the syllogism have each -a quasi-independence and difference as separate terms, while they are -also reduced to unity. The syllogism expresses in definite outlines -that everything which we think, or the comprehension which constitutes -an object, is a particular which is individualised by means of its -universal nature. As always, thought refers to reality; and a notion -has to be carried out into objectivity. But as Aristotle complained, -matter is recalcitrant to form. The objective appears at first only as -an opposite, and instead of revealing, it rather obscures and condenses -the features of subjectivity. - -Objectivity, or the thought which has forgotten its origin and stands -out as a world, may be taken in three aspects: Mechanical, Chemical, -and Teleological. That is to say, the mode in which groups or systems -naturally present themselves in the objective world, is threefold. The -contradiction which stands in the way of comprehending objectivity -comes from the fact that it contains subjectivity absorbed in it. In -other words, the object is at once active and passive; as thought and -subjectivity it should be its own synthetiser, as objectivity it is -necessitated to interdependence, and the subjectivity, at this stage, -is in abeyance. Consequently, either the two attributes co-exist, or -they cancel each other, or they are in mutual connexion. - -(1) In the first case the objects are independent, and yet are -connected with one another. Such connexion is an external one, due -to force, impulse, and outward authority. The principle of union is -implied: but the objects are mutually determined from without. The -more, for example, an object acts upon the imagination, the more -vehement is the reaction of the mind towards it.--(2) But if the -object is independent, as has been allowed, then the determination -from without must really come from within. Thus desire is a turning or -bent towards the object which draws it. The desiring soul leans out of -itself. It gravitates towards a centre: and it is its own nature to be -thus centripetal. The lesser objects of themselves draw closer around -the more prominent object.--(3) But if this gravitation were absolute, -the objects would lose their independence altogether, and sink into -their centre. Accordingly if the independence of these objects is -to remain, there must be, as it were, a double centre, the relative -centre of each object, and the absolute centre of the system to which -it belongs. In each of these three forms of mechanical combination, -the objects continue external and independent. A mechanical theory of -the state regards classes as independent, seeks to produce a balance -between them, separates individuals and associations from the state, -and, in short, conceives the state as one large centralising force with -a number of minor spheres depending upon it, but with a greater or less -amount of self-centred action in each of them. - -The fact is that an object cannot really be thought as thus -independently subsistent. Its real nature is rather affinity,--a -tendency to combine with another: it requires to receive its -complement. Every object is naturally in a state of unstable -equilibrium, with a tendency to quit its isolation and form a union. -This theory, which is called the Chemical theory of an object, -regards it as the reverse of indifferent: as in a permanent state -of susceptibility. When objects thus open and eager for foreign -influences combine, there results a new product, in which both the -constituents are lost, so far as their qualities go. The qualities -of the constituents are neutralised. A man's mind, for example, -prepared by certain culture, meets a new stimulus in some strange -doctrine, and the result is a new form of intellectual life. But at -this point the process, which such a form of objectivity represents, -is closed: all that remains is for the product to break up one day -into its constituent factors. There is no provision made for carrying -it on further. Hence if we are to have a self-regulating system of -objectivity, we must rise above the Chemical theory of objects. And -to do that, the first course is to look at the objective world as -_regulated_ (though not immanently constituted) by the Notion. - -The Notion as regulative of objectivity,--as independent and -self-subsistent, but as in necessary connexion with Objectivity,--is -the End, Aim, or Final Cause. According to this, the Teleological -and practical theory of the Universe[2], the object is considered as -bound to reproduce and carry out the notion, and the notion is looked -upon as meant to execute itself in reality. The two sides, subjective -and objective, are, in other words, in necessary connexion with each -other, but not identical. This is the contrast of the End and the -Means. By the 'Means' is meant an object _which is determined by an -End_, and which operates upon other objects.--(1) The End is originally -subjective: an instinct or desire after something-- a feeling of -want and the wish to remedy it. It is confronted by an objective -mass, which is indifferent to these wishes: and manifests itself as a -tendency outwards,--an appetite towards action. It seizes and uses up -the objective world.--(2) But the End in the second place reduces this -indifferent mass to be an instrument or Means: makes it the middle term -between itself and the object.--(3) But the means is only valuable as -a preparation to the End regarded as Realised, which thus counts as -the truth of the thing. These are the three terms of the Syllogism of -Teleology: the Subjective End, the Means, and the End Realised. It is -the process of adaptation by which each thing is conceived as the means -to some end, and which actively transforms the thing into something -by which that end is realised. In the last resort it presents us with -an objective world in which utility or design is the principle of -systematisation: and in which therefore there is an endless series of -ends which become means to other and higher ends. After all is done, -the object remains foreign to the notion, and is only subsumed under -it, and adapted to it. We want a notion which shall be identifiable -with objectivity--which shall permeate it through and through, as soul -does body. Such a unity of Subjective and Objective--the Motion in (and -not merely in relation to) Objectivity--is what Hegel terms the Idea. - -The first form of the Idea is Life, taking that as a logical category, -or as equivalent to self-organisation. The living, as organisms, are -contrasted with mere mechanisms. The essential progress of modern -science lies in its emphasis on this aspect of the Idea: which includes -all that the teleological period taught about adaptation, and only sets -aside the externality of means to ends there found. The savant of the -last century and the beginning of the present dealt with the object -of his inquiries as a mechanical, chemical, or teleological object. -The modern theorist tends to see the world as one self-evolving Life. -According to the naturalist of last century, kinds of animals and -plants were viewed as convenient, and perhaps arbitrary arrangements: -according to the moderns, these kinds represent the grades or steps in -the life of the natural world. - -What, then, is the nature of the process which we call Life? Is it -adequately or definitely defined as 'a continuous adjustment of -internal to external relations'? Or is it a good deal more than -anything the word 'correspondence' implies? According to Hegel it is -nothing so simple, but a syllogism with three terms, and a syllogism -moreover which permutates its terms and premisses. There is, in the -first place, the term, which is also a process, of self-production. The -living must articulate itself, create for itself limbs and members, and -keep up a perpetual re-creation of morphological and structural system -of parts. Secondly, there is the assimilation of what is external to -the living individual. If there is to be life, spiritual or bodily, -there must be a physiological intus-susception of foreign elements. -Without this the first term or process is impossible. Thirdly, there -must be a term or process of Reproduction or generation by which -the living being passes itself on as a new unit. All life, mental -or bodily, involves Reproduction.--These are the three terms of the -process of vitality. - -But such a life, considered as merely organic, the life studied in -Biology, is only a fragment. The truer life is in the genus, not in the -individual: the consciousness, the sensation which inwardly unifies the -diversity of organic processes. The universal has become the medium -in which the Idea exists: it exists no longer in immediacy. The mere -natural life gives place to the life of the Spirit. The life of the -Spirit has the double form of Cognition and Will:--the theoretical and -the practical action of the Idea: or Truth and Goodness. In short, the -Idea divides into two halves, which yet remain the same at bottom: -Reason and the World: but yet there is reason in the world. The action -of the Idea, or its process at this stage, is to bring these two terms -into connexion, and show their ideal unity. Beginning with Reason, it -goes on to discover reason in the World. Truth consists in the adequacy -of object to notion. Such adequacy is the Idea: and an object which -thus corresponds with its notion is an ideal object. The ideal man is -the True Man. Truth is the revelation of rationality from the objective -world: and Cognition is the name for that process. On the other hand, -Goodness is the realisation of rationality in the objective world: -and the Will is the name for that process. Truth proceeds from the -Objectivity: Goodness from the Subjectivity. But truth can only proceed -(analytically) from the objective world, in so far as it is produced -(synthetically) by the subjectivity. And, on the other hand, when the -good is realised in objectivity, it is submitted to the process of -Cognition. - -With the unity of Life and Consciousness, the Absolute Idea, we reach -the supreme effort of Logic. In Bacon's words, 'the truth of being and -the truth of knowing is all one' (cf. p. 224). That is the absolute -condition of comprehending reality: the principle of Absolute Idealism, -so far apart from its psychological wraith, and yet compelled to -employ the same language. But after all it is Logic, i. e., only the -supreme logical condition of the reality of the physical and psychical -world. And it gains reality at the cost of the disruption of its -elements: it lets the Is slip from the Is known-- the _est_ from the -_cogitatur_--Being from consciousness. Or, in less mysterious language, -fundamental philosophy, or Logic, gives place to the concreter system -of Philosophy--the Philosophy of the Outward and of the Inward -actuality,--of Nature and Mind. - -The reader of the _Divina Commedia_ may hardly need to be reminded -that, at each of the grander changes of scene and grade in his -pilgrimage, Dante suddenly finds himself without obvious means -transported into a new region of experience. There are catastrophes -in the process of development: not unprepared, but summing up, as in -a flash of insight, the gradual and unperceived process of growth. -There is birth and death in the spiritual world: and such are moments -of sudden lapse, abrupt conversion, when the waters of Lethe close -around, and thereafter all things are new. There are such moments of -accumulated and abnormal intensity also in the Hegelian philosophy when -a new cycle of idea suddenly appears. Such are the epochs of change at -the great crises from Being to Essence, and from Essence to Notion. -There is a revulsion, a sharp turn of the path which dialectic can -enforce but cannot smooth away,--on that path which dialectic indeed, -as opposed to the old logic of identity, shows not to be a mere smooth -continuity. All development is by breaks, and yet makes for continuity. - -This is again exemplified in the passage from Logic to Physics. The -reality which presents itself to the philosopher as Nature is a world -of reason--but, as it stands, it only lives as some speechless work -of art. It is, so to speak, the picture on the wall--the reflection -that is cast by the fuller reality of experience. Reason here is -in the garb of sense-perception. Nature is the silent image--the -_tableau vivant_--which becomes intelligent, speaking, and real, in -the observing and comprehending mind. It is the statue of Condillac, -not yet invested with the minimum of sensibility and consciousness. -Nature is or shows all that the Idea contained, but contained only -in possibility, as a logical condition of reality. It shows it in -reality--and that is a reality spread through endless times and spaces. -Its unity, its meaning, its continuity are broken up into fragments. -Yet as Nature, i. e. in its structural unity, and not in the dispersion -of things and elements, it is all a unity of development and has a -life-history written in its organism for intelligence to read and to -reconstitute, on the assumption that all its accident and irregularity -is but the inevitable imperfection of reality as given in parts and -successions. - - - - - - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's -Philosophy, by William Wallace and G. W. F. 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W. F. Hegel - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy - and Especially of his Logic - -Author: William Wallace - G. W. F. Hegel - -Release Date: June 27, 2017 [EBook #54992] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROLEGOMENA--STUDY OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY *** - - - - -Produced by Produced and Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature -(online soon in an extended version, also linking to free -sources for education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational -materials,...) Images generously made available by the -Internet Archive. - - - - - - -</pre> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 500px;"> -<img src="images/cover.jpg" width="500" alt="" /> -</div> -<h1>PROLEGOMENA</h1> - -<h3>TO THE STUDY OF</h3> - -<h1>HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY</h1> - -<h4>AND</h4> - -<h4><i>ESPECIALLY OF HIS LOGIC</i></h4> - -<h3>BY</h3> - -<h2>WILLIAM WALLACE</h2> - -<h4>M.A., LL.D.</h4> - -<h4>FELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE</h4> - -<h4>AND WHYTE'S PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD</h4> - -<h4>SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND AUGMENTED</h4> - -<h5>OXFORD</h5> - -<h5>AT THE CLARENDON PRESS</h5> - -<h5>1894</h5> - - - -<hr class="full" /> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">IN REMEMBRANCE OF<br /> -<span style="font-size: 1.2em;">B. JOWETT</span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK</span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">AND</span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE</span><br /> -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">OXFORD</span></p> - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h4><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE">PREFACE</a></h4> - - -<p>The present volume of Prolegomena completes the second edition of my -<span style="font-size: 0.8em;">LOGIC OF HEGEL</span> which originally appeared in 1874. The translation, -which was issued as a separate volume in the autumn of 1892, had been -subjected to revision throughout: such faults as I could detect had -been amended, and many changes made in the form of expression with the -hope of rendering the interpretation clearer and more adequate. But, -with a subject so abstruse and complicated as Hegel's Logic, and a -style so abrupt and condensed as that adopted in his <i>Encyclopaedia</i>, -a satisfactory translation can hardly fall within the range of -possibilities. Only the enthusiasm of youth could have thrown itself -upon such an enterprise; and later years have but to do what they may -to fulfil the obligations of a task whose difficulties have come to -seem nearly insuperable. The translation volume was introduced by a -sketch of the growth of the <i>Encyclopaedia</i> through the three editions -published in its author's lifetime: and an appendix of notes supplied -some literary and historical elucidations of the text, with quotations -bearing on the philosophical development between Kant and Hegel.</p> - -<p>The Prolegomena, which have grown to more than twice their original -extent, are two-thirds of them new matter. The lapse of twenty years -could not but involve a change in the writer's attitude, at least in -details, towards both facts and problems. The general purpose of the -work, however, still remains the same, to supply an introduction to the -study of Hegel, especially his <i>Logic,</i> and to philosophy in general. -But, in the work of altering and inserting, I can hardly imagine that -I have succeeded in adjusting the additions to the older work with -that artful juncture which would simulate the continuity of organic -growth. To perform that feat would require a master who surveyed from -an imperial outlook the whole system of Hegelianism in its history -and meaning; and I at least do not profess such a mastery. Probably -therefore a critical review will discern inequalities in the ground, -and even discrepancies in the statement, of the several chapters. To -remove these strains of inconsistency would in any case have been a -work of time and trouble: and, after all, mere differences in depth -or breadth of view may have their uses. The writer cannot always -compel the reader to understand him, as he himself has not always -the same faculty to penetrate and comprehend the problems he deals -with. In these arduous paths of research it may well happen that the -clearest and truest perceptions are not always those which communicate -themselves with fullest persuasion and gift of insight. Schopenhauer -has somewhere compared the structure of his philosophical work to the -hundred-gated Thebes: so many, he says, are the points of access it -offers for the pilgrims after truth to reach its central dogma. So—if -one may parallel little things with his adventurous quest—even the -less speculative chapters, and the less consecutive discourse, of -these Prolegomena may prove helpful to some individual mood or phase -of mind. If—as I suspect—the Second Book should elicit the complaint -that the reader has been kept wandering too long and too deviously in -the <i>Porches of Philosophy</i>, I will hope that sometimes in the course -of these rovings he may come across a wicket-gate where he can enter, -and—which is the main thing—gather truth fresh and fruitful for -himself.</p> - -<p>Fourteen chapters, viz. II, XXIV, and the group from VII to XVIII -inclusive, are in this edition almost entirely new. Three chapters of -the first edition, numbered XIX, XXII, XXIII, have been dropped. For -the rest, Chaps. III-VI in the present correspond to Chaps. II-V in -the first edition: Chap. XIX to parts of VII, VIII: Chaps. XX-XXIII to -Chaps. IX-XII: Chaps. XXV-XXX to Chaps. XIII-XVIII: and Chaps. XXXI, -XXXII to Chaps. XX, XXI. But some of those nominally retained have been -largely rewritten.</p> - -<p>The new chapters present, amongst other things, a synopsis of the -progress of thought in Germany during the half-century which is -bisected by the year 1800, with some indication of the general -conditions of the intellectual world, and with some reference to the -interconnexion of speculation and actuality. Jacobi and Herder, Kant, -Fichte, and Schelling have been especially brought under succinct -review. In the first edition I did Kant less than justice. I have now, -so far as my limits allowed, tried to rectify the impression; and even -more perhaps, by a clear palinode, to tender my apology for the meagre -and somewhat inappreciative notice I gave to the great names of Fichte -and Schelling. For like reasons, and from a growing perception how -much post-Kantian thought owed to the pre-Kantian thinkers, Spinoza -and Leibniz have been partly brought within my range. If, furthermore, -I may seem to have transgressed the due amount of allusions and -comparisons drawn from Plato and Aristotle, Bacon and Mill, the excuse -must be sought in that fixture of philosophical horizon which can -hardly but creep on after a quarter of a century spent in teaching -philosophy under the customs and ordinances of the Oxford School of -Classical Philology.</p> - -<p>It would be to mistake the scope of this survey to seek in it a -history of the philosophers of the period I have named. They have -been presented, not in and for themselves, but as <i>momenta</i> or -constituent! factors in producing Hegel's conception of the aim and -method of philosophy. To do this it was necessary to lay stress on -their inner purport and implications: to treat the individual thinker -in subordination to the general movement of ideas: to give, as far as -was possible, a constructive conception of them rather than an analysis -and chronicle. Yet as the picture had to be done, so to say, with a few -vigorous touches, and made characteristic rather than descriptive, it -cannot have that fairness and completeness which only patient study of -every feature and untiring experiment in reconstruction can enable even -the artist to produce. I may have seemed to confine the environment -too exclusively to continental thinkers: but this is not, I think, -due to any anti-patriotic bias. English (by which term, I may explain -to my countrymen, I mean English-writing) thought, if it has its own -intrinsic value, has after all been only an occasional influence, -of suggestion and modification, in Germany. It is not therefore an -integral portion of my theme. Even in Kant's case, too much may be made -of the stimulus he received from Hume.</p> - -<p>Even twenty years ago, my translation could hardly be described -literally as a voice crying in the wilderness. But since that time -there has been a considerable out-put of history, translation, and -criticism referring to the great age of German philosophy, and a -comparatively numerous group of writers, more or less familiar with -the aims and principles of that period, have treated various parts -of philosophy with notable independence and originality. To these -writers it has sometimes been found convenient to give the title -of Neo-Kantians, or Neo-Hegelians. The prefix suggests that they -do not in all points reproduce the ideal or the caricature which -vulgar tradition fancied, and perhaps still fancies, to be implied -in German 'transcendentalism.' And that for the good reason that the -springs of the movement lie in the natural and national revulsion of -English habits of mind. Slowly, but at length, the storms of the great -European revolution found their way to our intellectual world, and -shook church and state, society and literature. The homeless spirit -of the age had to reconsider the task of rebuilding its house of -life. It may have been that some of the seekers, in the fervour of a -first impression, spoke unadvisedly, as if salvation could and would -come to English philosophy only by Kant and Hegel. Yet, there was a -real foundation for the belief that the insularity—however necessary -in its season, and however admirable in some of its results—which -had secluded and narrowed the British mind since the middle of the -eighteenth century, needed something deeper and stronger than French -'ideology' to bring it abreast of the requirements of the age. Whatever -may be the drawbacks of transcendentalism, they are virtues when set -beside the vulgar ideals of enlightenment by superficialisation. Mill -has well pointed out how the spirit of Coleridge was for the higher -intellectual life a needful complement to the spirit of Bentham. Yet -the spirit of Coleridge had but caught some of the side-lights and -romantic illuminations: it had not dared to face the central sun either -in literature or philosophy. The scholar who has given us excellent -versions of Fichte's lighter works, those who have translated and -expounded Kant, and the great author who opened German literature -to the British public, have brought us nearer the higher teaching -of Germany. In Germany itself it has always been the possession -only of the few. Even at the height of the classical period there -were litterateurs who vended thousands of their books for Goethe's -hundreds, and the great philosophers had ten opponents to one follower -even amongst the teachers of their day. Yet Goethe and not Kotzebue -gave the permanent law to literature; Hegel, and not Krug or Fries, -has influenced philosophy. To have had the resolution to learn in -this school is the merit of 'Neo-Hegelianism.' It has probably not -found Kant free from puzzles and contradictions, or Hegel always -intelligible. But the example of the Germans has served to widen and -deepen our ideas of philosophy: to make us think more highly of its -function, and to realise that it is essentially science, and the -science of supreme reality. And it has at least familiarised many with -the heresy that dilettantism and occasional fits of speculativeness are -worth as little in philosophy as elsewhere. To have striven for dignity -in its scope, and scientific security in its method, is something. If -the Neo-Hegelian has not given philosophy a settled language, it may -be urged that a philosophical language cannot be created by the easy -device of inventing a few Hellenistic-seeming vocables.</p> - -<p>I could have wished to make these volumes a worthier contribution -to the work whereby these and other writers have recently enriched -our island philosophy. Not least because of the honoured name I have -ventured to write on the dedication-page. If, as Epicurus said, we -should above all be grateful to the past, the first meed is from the -scholar due to the teachers of earlier years, and not least those who -have now entered into their rest. I do not forget what I, and others, -owed to T. H. Green, my predecessor in the Chair of Moral Philosophy; -that example of high-souled devotion to truth, and of earnest and -intrepid thinking on the deep things of eternity. But at this season -the memory of my Oxford tutor and friend is naturally most prominent. -The late Master of Balliol College was more than a mere scholar or -a mere philosopher. He seemed so idealist and yet so practical: so -realist and yet so full of high ideals: so delicately kind and yet -so severely reasonable. You felt he saw life more steadily and saw -it more whole than others: as one reality in which religion and -philosophy, art and business, the sciences and theology, were severally -but elements and aspects. To the amateurs of novelty, to the slaves -of specialisation, to the devotees of any narrow way, such largeness -might, with the impatience natural to limited minds, have seemed -indifference. So must appear those who on higher planes hear all the -parts in the harmony of humanity, and with the justice of a wise love -maintain an intellectual <i>Sôprosyné</i>. On his pupils this secret power -of an other-world serenity laid an irresistible spell, and bore in upon -them the conviction that beyond scholarship and logic there was the -fuller truth of life and the all-embracing duty of doing their best to -fulfil the amplest requirements of their place.</p> - -<p>In earlier days Jowett had been keenly interested in German philosophy, -and had made a version (most of which was still extant in 1868) of the -Logic I have translated. But Greek literature, and above all Plato, -drew him to more congenial fields. It was on his suggestion,—or shall -I say injunction—at that date, that the work I had casually begun was -some years later prosecuted to completion. It was his words, again, two -years ago, that bade me spare no labour in the work of revision.</p> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em;">OXFORD,</p> - -<p><i>December</i>, 1893.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h4><a name="FROM_THE_PREFACE_TO_THE_FIRST_EDITION" id="FROM_THE_PREFACE_TO_THE_FIRST_EDITION">FROM THE PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION</a></h4> - - -<p>The 'Logic of Hegel' is a name which may be given to two separate -books. One of these is the 'Science of Logic' (Wissenschaft der Logik), -first published in three volumes (1812-1816), while its author was -schoolmaster at Nüremberg. A second edition was on its way, when Hegel -was suddenly cut off, after revising the first volume only. In the -'Secret of Hegel,' the earlier part of this Logic has been translated -by Dr. Hutchison Stirling, with whose name German philosophy is chiefly -associated in this country.</p> - -<p>The other Logic, of which the present work is a translation, forms the -First Part in the 'Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences.' The -first edition of the Encyclopaedia appeared at Heidelberg in 1817; the -second in 1827; and the third in 1830. It is well to bear in mind that -these dates take us back forty or fifty years, to a time when modern -science and Inductive Logic had yet to win their laurels, and when the -world was in many ways different from what it is now. The earliest -edition of the Encyclopaedia contained the pith of the system. The -subsequent editions brought some new materials, mainly intended to -smooth over and explain the transitions between the various sections, -and to answer the objections of critics. The work contained a synopsis -of philosophy in the form of paragraphs, and was to be supplemented by -the <i>viva voce</i> remarks of the lecturer.</p> - -<p>The present volume is translated from the edition of 1843, forming the -Sixth Volume in Hegel's Collected Works. It consists of two nearly -equal portions. One halt here printed in more open type, contains -Hegel's Encyclopaedia, with all the author's own additions. The first -paragraph under each number marks the earliest and simplest statement -of the first edition. The other half, here printed in closer type, is -made up of the notes taken in lecture by the editor (Henning) and by -Professors Hotho and Michelet. These notes for the most part connect -the several sections, rather than explain their statements. Their -genuineness is vouched for by their being almost verbally the same with -other parts of Hegel's own writings.</p> - -<p>The translation has tried to keep as closely as possible to the -meaning, without always adhering very rigorously to the words of the -original. It is, however, much more literal in the later and systematic -part, than in the earlier chapters.</p> - -<p>The Prolegomena which precede the translation have not been given in -the hope or with the intention of expounding the Hegelian system. They -merely seek to remove certain obstacles, and to render Hegel less -tantalizingly hard to those who approach him for the first time. How -far they will accomplish this, remains to be seen.</p> - -<p style="font-size: 0.8em;">OXFORD,</p> -<p><i>September,</i> 1873.</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h4><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></h4> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">BOOK I.</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">OUTLOOKS AND APPROACHES TO HEGEL.</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER I. <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_3">3</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">WHY HEGEL IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER II. <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_14">14</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">WHY TRANSLATE HEGEL?</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER III. <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_21">21</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY AND HEGEL</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER IV. <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_30">30</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">HEGEL AND THEOLOGY</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER V. <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_37">37</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">PSEUDO-IDEALISM: JACOBI</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER VI. <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_57">57</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER VII. <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_72">72</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">ANTICIPATORY SKETCH OF THE SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER VIII. <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_88">88</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE SCEPTICAL DOUBT: HUME</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER IX. <span class="linenum"> <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE ATTEMPT AT A CRITICAL SOLUTION: KANT</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER X. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_112">112</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE CRITICAL SOLUTION (<i>continued</i>): KANT</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XI. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_124">124</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">SYNTHESIS AND RECONSTRUCTION: FICHTE</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XII. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_136">136</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE BEGINNINGS OF SCHELLING</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XIII. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_147">147</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND IDEALISM</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XIV. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_163">163</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">TRANSITION TO HEGEL</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">BOOK II. </p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">IN THE PORCHES OF PHILOSOPHY.</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XV.<span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_175">175</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE TWO AGES OF REASON</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XVI. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_189">189</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE NEW IDEALISM</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XVII. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_202">202</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">METHODS, ARTIFICIAL AND NATURAL</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XVIII. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_230">230</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE RANGE OF PERSONALITY</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XIX. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_261">261</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">GENESIS IN MENTAL LIFE</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XX. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_277">277</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">GENERAL LAW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXI. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_292">292</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE: AND THE ORDINARY LOGIC</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXII. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_307">307</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">FROM SENSE TO THOUGHT</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXIII. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_323">323</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">FIGURATE OR REPRESENTATIVE THOUGHT</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXIV. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_335">335</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">FROM SUBSTANCE TO SUBJECT</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXV. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_348">348</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">REASON AND THE DIALECTIC OF UNDERSTANDING</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">BOOK III.</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">LOGICAL OUTLINES.</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXVI. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_365">365</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THOUGHT PURE AND ENTIRE</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXVII. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_383">383</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE: OR THE CATEGORIES</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXVIII. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_394">394</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE THREE PARTS OF LOGIC</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXIX. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_404">404</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE SEARCH FOR A FIRST PRINCIPLE</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXX. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_415">415</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE LOGIC OF DESCRIPTION: NATURAL REALISM: BEING</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXXI. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_440">440</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE LOGIC OF EXPLANATION AND REALISTIC METAPHYSICS:</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">ESSENCE</p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">CHAPTER XXXII. <span class="linenum"><a href="#Page_459">459</a></span></p> - -<p class="center" style="font-size: 0.8em;">THE LOGIC OF COMPREHENSION AND IDEALISM: THE NOTION</p> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<h5>Book I</h5> - -<h4><i>OUTLOOKS AND APPROACHES TO HEGEL</i></h4> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></p> -<h5>CHAPTER I.</h5> - - -<h4>WHY HEGEL IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND.</h4> - - -<p>'The condemnation,' says Hegel, 'which a great man lays upon the -world, is to force it to explain him<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>.' The greatness of Hegel, if -it be measured by this standard, must be something far above common. -Interpreters of his system have contradicted each other, almost as -variously as the several commentators on the Bible. He is claimed -as their head by widely different schools of thought, all of which -appeal to him as the original source of their line of argument. The -Right wing, and the Left, as well as the Centre, profess to be the -genuine descendants of the prophet, and to inherit the mantle of his -inspiration. If we believe one side, Hegel is only to be rightly -appreciated when we divest his teaching of every shred of religion and -orthodoxy which it retains. If we believe another class of expositors, -he was the champion of Christianity.</p> - -<p>These contradictory views may be safely left to abolish each other. But -diversity of opinion on such topics is neither unnatural, nor unusual. -The meaning and the bearings of a great event, or a great character, -or a great work of reasoned thought, will be estimated and explained -in different ways, according to the effect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> they produce on different -minds and different levels of life and society. Those effects, perhaps, -will not present themselves in their true character, until long after -the original excitement has passed away. To some minds, the chief value -of the Hegelian system will lie in its vindication of the truths of -natural and revealed religion, and in the agreement of the elaborate -reasonings of the philosopher with the simple aspirations of mankind -towards higher things. To others that system will have most interest -as a philosophical history of thought,—an exposition of that organic -development of reason, which underlies and constitutes all the varied -and complex movement of the world. To a third class, again, it may seem -at best an instrument or method of investigation, stating the true -law by which knowledge proceeds in its endeavour to comprehend and -assimilate existing nature.</p> - -<p>While these various meanings may be given to the Hegelian scheme -of thought, the majority of the world either pronounce Hegel to be -altogether unintelligible, or banish him to the limbo of <i>a priori</i> -thinkers,—that bourne from which no philosopher returns. To argue with -those who start from the latter conviction would be an ungrateful, -and probably a superfluous task. Wisdom is justified, we may be sure, -of all her children. But it may be possible to admit the existence of -difficulties, and agree to some extent with those who complain that -Hegel is impenetrable and hard as adamant. There can be no doubt of -the forbidding aspect of the most prominent features in his system. -He is hard in himself, and his readers find him hard. His style is -not of the best, and to foreign eyes seems unequal. At times he is -eloquent, stirring, and striking: again his turns are harsh, and his -clauses tiresome to disentangle: and we are always coming upon that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> -childlikeness of literary manner, which English taste fancies it can -detect in some of the greatest works of German genius; There are faults -in Hegel, which obscure his meaning: but more obstacles are due to the -nature of the work, and the pre-occupations of our minds. There is -something in him which fascinates the thinker, and which inspires -a sympathetic student with the vigour and the hopefulness of the -spring-time.</p> - -<p>Perhaps the main hindrance in the way of a clear vision is the contrast -which Hegelian philosophy offers to our ordinary habits of mind. -Generally speaking, we rest contented if we can get tolerably near our -object, and form a general picture of it to set before ourselves. -It might almost be said that we have never thought of such a thing as -being in earnest either with our words or with our thoughts. We get -into a way of speaking with an uncertain latitude of meaning, and leave -a good deal to the fellow-feeling of our hearers, who are expected to -mend what is defective in our utterances. For most of us the place of -exact thought is supplied by metaphors and pictures, by mental images, -and figures generalised from the senses. And thus it happens that, when -we come upon a single precise and definite statement, neither exceeding -nor falling short in its meaning, we are thrown out of our reckoning. -Our fancy and memory have nothing left for them to do: and, as fancy -and memory make up the greater part of what we loosely call thinking, -our powers of thought seem to be brought to a standstill. Those who -crave for fluent reading, or prefer easy writing, something within -the pale of our usual mental lines, are more likely to find what they -seek in the ten partially correct and approximate ways commonly used -to give expression to a truth, than in the one simple and accurate -statement of the thought. We prefer a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> familiar name, and an accustomed -image, on which our faculties may work. But in the atmosphere of -Hegelian thought, we feel very much as if we had been lifted into a -vacuum, where we cannot breathe, and which is a fit habitation for -unrecognisable ghosts only.</p> - -<p>Nor is this all. The traveller, as his train climbs the heights of -Alps or Apennines, occasionally, after circling in grand curve upon -the mountain-side, and perhaps after having been dragged mysterious -distances through the gloom of a tunnel, finds himself as it would seem -back at the same place as he looked forth from some minutes before; and -it is only after a brief comparison that he realises he now commands a -wider view from a point some hundreds of feet higher. So the student -of Hegel—(and it might be the case with Fichte also) as the machinery -of the dialectical method, with its thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, -carries him round and round from term to term of thought—like the -<i>Logos</i> and the Spirit, which blow us whithersoever they list—begins -to suffer from dizziness at the apprehension that he has been the -victim of phantasmagoria and has not really moved at all. It is only -later—if ever—that he recognises that the scene, though similar, -is yet not altogether the same. It is only later—if ever—that he -understands that the path of philosophy is no wandering from land to -land more remote in search of a lost Absolute, a vanished God; no -setting forth of new and strange facts, of new Gods, but the revelation -in fuller and fuller truth of the immanent reality in whom we live, and -move, and have our being,—the manifestation in more closely-knit unity -and more amply-detailed significance of that Infinite and Eternal, -which was always present among us, though we saw but few, perhaps even -no, traces of its power and glory.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p> - -<p>To read Hegel often reminds us of the process we have to go through -in trying to answer a riddle. The terms of the problem to be solved -are all given to us: the features of the object are, it may be, fully -described: and yet somehow we cannot at once tell what it is all about, -or add up the sum of which we have the several items. We are waiting -to learn the subject of the proposition, of which all these statements -may be regarded as the predicates. Something, we feel, has undoubtedly -been said: but we are at a loss to see what it has been said about. -Our mind wanders round from one familiar object to another, and tries -them in succession to see whether any one satisfies the several points -in the statement and includes them all. We grope here and there for -something we are acquainted with, in which the bits of the description -may cohere, and get a unity which they cannot give themselves. When -once we have hit upon the right object, our troubles are at an end: and -the empty medium is now peopled with a creature of our imagination. We -have reached a fixed point in the range of our conception, around which -the given features may cluster.</p> - -<p>All this trouble caused by the Hegelian theory of what philosophy -involves—viz. really beginning at the beginning, is saved by a device -well known to the several branches of Science. It is the way with them -to assume that the student has a rough general image of the objects -which they examine; and under the guidance, or with the help of this -generalised image, they go on to explain and describe its outlines more -completely. They start with an approximate conception, such as anybody -may be supposed to have; and this they seek to render more definite. -The geologist, for example, could scarcely teach geology', unless he -could pre-suppose or produce some acquaintance on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> part of his -pupils with what Hume would have called an 'impression' or an 'idea' of -the rocks and formations of which he has to treat. The geometer gives -a short, and, as it were, popular explanation of the sense in which -angles, circles, triangles, &c. are to be understood: and then by -the aid of these provisional definitions we come to a more scientific -notion of the same terms. The third book of Euclid, for example, brings -before us a clearer notion of what a circle is, than the nominal -explanation in the list of definitions. By means of these temporary -aids, or, as we may call them, leading-strings for the intellect, the -progress of the ordinary scientific student is made tolerably easy. -But v in philosophy, as it is found in Hegel, there is quite another -way of working. The helps in question are absent: and until it be seen -that they are not even needed, the Hegelian theory will remain a sealed -mystery. For that which the first glance seemed to show as an enigma, -is only the plain and unambiguous statement of thought. Instead of -casting around for images and accustomed names, we have only to accept -the several terms and articles in the development of thought as they -present themselves. These terms merely require to be apprehended. They -stand in no immediate need of illustration from our experience. What we -have to bring to the work, is patience, self-restraint, the sacrifice -of our cherished habits of mind, the surrender of the natural wish to -see at once what it all comes to, what it is good for, how it squares -with other convictions. As Bacon reminded his age, Into the kingdom -of philosophy, as into the kingdom of heaven, none can enter, <i>nisi -sub persona infantis</i>: i. e. unless he at least steadfastly resolve to -renounce that world which lieth in the Evil.</p> - -<p>Ordinary knowledge consists in referring a new object<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> to a class of -objects, that is to say, to a generalised image with which we are -already acquainted. It is not so much cognition as re-cognition. -'"What is the truth?"' asked Lady Chettam of Mrs. Cadwallader in -<i>Middle-march</i>. "The truth? he is as bad as the wrong physic—nasty to -take, and sure to disagree." "There could not be anything worse than -that," said Lady Chettam, with so vivid a conception of the physic -that she seemed to have learned something exact about Mr. Casaubon's -'disadvantages.' Once we have referred the new individual to a familiar -category or a convenient metaphor, once we have given it a name, and -introduced it into the society of our mental drawing-room, we are -satisfied. We have put a fresh object in its appropriate drawer in -the cabinet of our ideas: and hence, with the pride of a collector, -we can calmly call it our own. But such acquaintance, proceeding from -a mingling of memory and naming, is not the same thing as knowledge -in the strict sense of the term.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> 'What is he?' 'Do you know him?' -These are our questions: and we are satisfied when we learn his name -and his calling. We may never have penetrated into the inner nature of -those objects, with whose <i>tout ensemble,</i> or rough outlines, we are -so much at home, that we fancy ourselves thoroughly cognisant of them. -Classifications are only the first steps in science: and we do not -understand a thought because we can view it under the guise of some of -its illustrations.</p> - -<p>In the case of the English reader of Hegel some peculiar hindrances -spring from the foreign language. In strong contrast to most of the -well-known German philosophers, he may be said to write in the popular -and national dialect of his country. Of course there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> are tones and -shades of meaning given to his words by the general context of his -system. But upon the whole he did what he promised to J. H. Voss—the -translator of Homer, and the poet of the <i>Luise,</i> in a letter written -from Jena in 1805. He there says of his projects: 'Luther has made the -Bible, and you have made Homer speak German. No greater gift than this -could be given to the nation. So long as a nation is not acquainted -with a noble work in its own language, it is still barbarian, and does -not regard the work as its own. Forget these two examples, and I may -describe my own efforts as an attempt to teach philosophy to speak in -German.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<p>Yet, in this matter of nationalising or Germanising philosophy, he only -carried a step further what Wolff and even Kant had begun; just as, on -the other hand, he falls a long way short of what K. C. F. Krause, his -contemporary, attempted in the same direction. Such an attempt, by its -very nature, could never command a popular success. It runs directly -counter to that tendency already noted, to escape the requirement to -think and think for ourselves, by taking refuge under the shadow of -a familiar term, which conceals in its apparent simplicity a great -complex of ill-apprehended elements. The ordinary mind—and the more -readily perhaps the more vulgar it is—flees for ease and safety to a -cosmopolitan term, to the denationalised vocable of learned origin, to -the language of general European culture. To such an ordinary mind—and -up at least to a certain extent we all at times come under that -heading—the effort to remain in the pellucid air of our unadulterated -mother-tongue is too embarrassing to be long continued. Nor, after all, -is it more than partially practicable. The well of German undefiled -is apt to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> run dry. Hegel himself never shrinks when it is needful to -appropriate non-Teutonic words, and is in the habit of employing the -synonymous terms of native and of classical origin with a systematic -difference of meaning <a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>Hegel is unquestionably <i>par excellence</i> the philosopher of -Germany,—German through and through. For philosophy, though the -common birthright of full-grown reason in all ages and countries, -must like other universal and cosmopolitan interests, such as the -State, the Arts, or the Church, submit to the limits and peculiarities -imposed upon it by the natural divisions of race and language. The -subtler <i>nuances</i>, as well as the coarser differences of national -speech, make themselves vividly felt in the systems of philosophy, -and defy translation. If Greek philosophy cannot, no more can German -philosophy be turned into a body of English thought by a stroke of the -translator's pen. There is a difference in this matter, a difference -at least in degree, between the special sciences and philosophy. The -several sciences have a de-nationalised and cosmopolitan character, -like the trades and industries of various nations; they are pretty much -the same in one country and another, especially when we consider the -details, and neglect the general subdivisions. But in the political -body, in the works of high art, and in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> systems of philosophy, the -whole of the character and temperament of the several peoples finds -its expression, and stands distinctly marked, in a shape of its own. -If the form of German polity be not transferable to this side of the -Channel, no more will German philosophy. Direct utilisation for English -purposes is out of the question: the circumstances are too different. -But the study of the great works of foreign thought is not on that -account useless, any more than the study of the great works of foreign -statesmanship.</p> - -<p>Hegel did good service, at least, by freeing philosophy from that -aspect of an imported luxury, which it usually had,—as if it were an -exotic plant removed from the bright air of Greece into the melancholy -mists of Western Europe. 'We have still,' he says, 'to break down the -partition between the language of philosophy, and that of ordinary -consciousness: we have to overcome the reluctance against thinking what -we are familiar with<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>.' Philosophy must be brought face to face with -ordinary life, so as to draw its strength from the actual and living -present, and not from the memories or traditions of the past. It has -to become the organised and completed thinking of what is contained -blindly and vaguely in the various levels of popular intelligence, as -these are more or less educated and ordered. It must grow naturally, as -in ancient Greece, from the necessities of the social situation, and -not be a product of artificial introduction and nurture: the revelation -by the mind's own energy of an implicit truth, not the communication -of a mystery sacramentally received. To suppose that a mere change of -words can give this grace, would be absurd. Yet where the national life -pulses strong, as that of Germany in those days did at first in letters -and then in social reform, the dominant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> note will make itself felt -even in the neutral regions of speculation. It was a step on the right -road to banish a pompous and aristocratic dialect from philosophy, and -to lead it back to those words and forms of speech, which are at least -in silent harmony with the national feeling.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Leben</i> (Rosenkranz), p. 555.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> 'Das Bekannte überhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist, -nicht erkannt.' <i>Phenomenologie des Geistes,</i> p. 24.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Vermischte Schriften,</i> vol. ii. p. 474.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> e. g. <i>Dasein</i> and <i>Existenz: Wirklichkeit</i> and -<i>Realität</i>: <i>Wesen</i> and <i>Substanz.</i> It is the same habit of curiously -pondering over the tones and shades of language which leads him to -something very like playing on words, and to etymologising, as one may -call it, on unetymological principles: e. g. the play on <i>Mein</i> and -<i>Meinung</i> (vol. ii. 32: cf. <i>Werke</i>, ii. 75): the literal rendering of -<i>Erinnerung</i> (<i>Encycl.</i> §§ 234 and 450); and the abrupt transitions, -as it would seem, from literal to figurative use of such a term as -<i>Grund.</i> At the same time it is well not to be prosaically certain -that a free play of thought does not follow the apparently fortuitous -assonance of words.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Leben</i> (Rosenkranz), p. 553.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span></p></div> - - -<h5>CHAPTER II.</h5> - - -<h4>WHY TRANSLATE HEGEL?</h4> - - -<p>'But,' it is urged, 'though it be well to let the stream of foreign -thought irrigate some of our philosophical pastures, though we should -not for ever entrench ourselves in our insularity—why try to introduce -Hegel, of all philosophers confessedly the most obscure? Why not be -content with the study and the "exploitation" of Kant, whom Germans -themselves still think so important as to expound him with endless -comment and criticism, and who has at length found, after some -skirmishes, a recognised place in the English philosophical curriculum? -Why seek for more Teutonic thinking that can be found in Schopenhauer, -and found there in a clear and noble style, luminous in the highest -degree, and touching with no merely academic abstruseness the problems -of life and death? Or—as that song is sweetest to men which is the -newest to ring in their ears—why not render accessible to English -readers the numerous and suggestive works of Eduard von Hartmann, -and of Friedrich Nietzsche—not to mention Robert Hamerling<a name="FNanchor_1_6" id="FNanchor_1_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_6" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>? Or, -finally, why not give us more and ever more translations of the works -in logic, ethics, psychology, or metaphysics, of those many admirable -teachers in the German universities, whom it would be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> invidious to -try to single out by name? As for Hegel, his system, in the native -land of the philosopher, is utterly discredited; its influence is -extinct; it is dead as a door-nail. It is a pity to waste labour and -distract attention, and that in English lands, where there are plenty -of problems of our own to solve, by an attempt, which must perforce be -futile, to resuscitate these defunctitudes?'</p> - -<p>That Hegelianism has been utterly discredited, in certain quarters, is -no discovery reserved for these later days. But on this matter perhaps -we may borrow an analogy. If the reader will be at the trouble to take -up two English newspapers of opposite partisanship and compare the -reports from their foreign correspondents on some question of home -politics, he may, if a novice, be surprised to learn that according -to one, the opinion e. g. of Vienna is wholly adverse to the measure, -while, according to the other, that opinion entirely approves.</p> - -<p>It is no new thing to find Hegelianism in general obloquy. Even in 1830 -the Catholic philosopher and theologian Günther<a name="FNanchor_2_7" id="FNanchor_2_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_7" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>—an admirer, but by -no means a follower of Hegel—wrote that, 'for some years it had been -the fashion in learned Germany to look upon philosophy, and above all -Hegelian philosophy, as a door-mat on which everybody cleaned his muddy -boots before entering the sanctuary of politics and religion.' What -is true as regards the alleged surcease of Hegelianism is that in the -reaction which from various causes turned itself against philosophy in -the two decennia after 1848, that system, as the most deeply committed -part of the 'metaphysical' host, suffered most severely. History and -science seemed to triumph along the whole line. But it may be perhaps -permissible to remark that Hegelianism had predicted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> for itself the -fate that it proved had fallen on all other philosophies. After the -age of Idealism comes the turn of Realism. The Idea had to die—had to -sink as a germ in the fields of nature and history before it could bear -its fruit. Above all it is not to be expected that such a system, so -ambitious in aim and concentrated in expression, could find immediate -response and at once disclose all its meaning. His first disciples -are not the—truest interpreters of any great teacher. What he saw -in the one comprehensive glance of genius, his successors must often -be content to gather by the slow accumulation of years, and perhaps -centuries, of experience. It is not to Theophrastus that we go for -the truest and fullest conception of Aristotelianism; nor is Plato to -be measured by what his immediate successors in the Academy managed -to make out of him. It is now more than a century since Kant gave his -lesson to the public, and we are still trying to get him focussed in a -single view: it may be even longer till Hegel comes fully within the -range of our historians of thought. Aristotelianism too had to wait -centuries till it fully entered the consciousness even of the thinking -world.</p> - -<p>It is to be said too that without Hegel it would be difficult to -imagine what even teachers, like Lotze, who were very unlike him, would -have had to say. It does not need a very wide soul, nor need one be a -mere dilettantist eclectic, to find much of Schopenhauer's work far -from incompatible with his great, and as some have said, complementary -opposite. It is not indeed prudent as yet for a writer in Germany who -wishes to catch the general ear to affix too openly a profession of -Hegelian principles, and he will do well to ward off suspicion by some -disparaging remarks on the fantastic methods, the overfondness for -system, the contempt for common sense and scientific results which, -as he declares, vitiate all<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> the speculations of the period from 1794 -to 1830. But under the names of Spinoza and of Leibniz the leaven of -Hegelian principles has been at work: and if the Philistines solve the -riddle of the intellectual Samson, it is because they have ploughed -with his heifer,—because his ideas are part of the modern stock of -thought,—not from what they literally read in the great thinkers at -the close of the seventeenth century. Last year saw appear in Germany -two excellent treatises describable as popular introductions to -philosophy<a name="FNanchor_3_8" id="FNanchor_3_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_8" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>, one by a thinker who has never disguised his obligations -to Hegel, the other by a teacher in the University of Berlin who may in -many ways be considered as essentially kindred with our general English -style of thought. But both treatises are more allied in character to -the spirit of the Hegelian attempts to comprehend man and God than to -the formalistic and philological disquisitions which have for some -years formed the staple of German professorial activity. And, lastly, -the vigorous thinker, who a quarter of a century ago startled the -reading public by the portent of a new metaphysic which should be the -synthesis of Schelling and Schopenhauer, has lately informed us<a name="FNanchor_4_9" id="FNanchor_4_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_9" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> that -his affinity to Hegel is, taken all in all, greater than his affinity -to any other philosopher'; and that that affinity extends to all that -in Hegel has essential and permanent value.</p> - -<p>But it is not on Eduard von Hartmann's commendation that we need rest -our estimate of Hegelianism. We shall rather say that, till more of -Hegel has been assimilated, he must still block the way. Things have -altered greatly in the last twenty years, it is true; and ideas of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> -more or less Hegelian origin have taken their place in the common -stock of philosophic commodities. But it will probably be admitted by -those best qualified to speak on the subject, that the shower has not -as yet penetrated very deeply into the case-hardened soil, still less -saturated it in the measure most likely to cause fruitful shoots to -grow forth. We have to go back to Hegel in the same spirit as we go to -Kant, and, for that matter, to Plato or Descartes: or, as the moderns -may go back—to borrow from another sphere—to Dante or Shakespeare. -We do not want the modern poet to resuscitate the style and matter of -<i>King Lear</i> or of the <i>Inferno.</i> Yet as the Greek tragedian steeped his -soul in the language and the legend of Homeric epic, as Dante nurtured -his spirit on the noble melodies of Mantua's poet; so philosophy, if it -is to go forth strong and effective, must mould into its own substance -the living thought of former times. It would be as absurd, and as -impossible to be literally and simply a Hegelian,—if that means one -for whom Hegel sums up all philosophy and all truth—as it is to be at -the present day in the literal sense a Platonist or an Aristotelian. -The world may be slow, the world of opinion and thought may linger: <i>e -pur si muove.</i> We too have our own problems—the same, no doubt, in a -sense, from age to age, and yet infinitely varying and never in two -ages alike. New stars have appeared on the spiritual sky; and whether -they have in them the eternal light or only the flash and glare of a -passing meteor, they alter the aspects of the night in which we are -still waiting for the dawn.</p> - -<p>A new language, born of new relations of ideas, or of new ideas, is -perforce for our generation the vehicle of all utterances, and we -cannot again speak the dialect, however imposing or however quaint, of -a vanished day.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span></p> - -<p>And for that reason there must always be a new philosophy, couched -in the language of the age, sympathetic with its hopes and fears, -conscious of its beliefs, more or less sensible of its problems—as -indeed we may be confident there always will be. But, perhaps, the -warrior in that battle against illusion and prejudice, against the -sloth which takes things as they are and the poorness of spirit -which is satisfied with first appearances, will not do wisely to -disdain the past. He will not indeed equip himself with rusty swords -and clumsy artillery from the old arsenals. But he will not disdain -the lessons of the past,—its methods and principles of tactics and -strategy. Recognising perhaps some defects and inequalities in the -methods and aims of thought most familiar to him and current in his -vicinity, he may go abroad for other samples, even though they be not -in all respects worth his adoption. And so without taking Hegel as -omniscient, or pledging himself to every word of the master, he may -think from his own experience that there is much in the system that -will be helpful, when duly estimated and assimilated, to others. There -is—and few can be so bigoted<i></i> or so positive-minded as to regret -it—there is unquestionably a growing interest in English-speaking -countries in what may be roughly called philosophy—the attempt, -unprejudiced by political, scientific, or ecclesiastical dogma, to -solve the questions as to what the world really is, and what man's -place and function is. 'The burthen of the mystery, the heavy and the -weary weight of all this unintelligible world' is felt—felt widely -and sometimes felt deeply. To the direct lightening of that burthen -and that mystery it is the privilege of our profoundest thinkers and -our far-seeing poets and artists to contribute. To the translator of -Hegel there falls the humbler task of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> making accessible, if it may be, -something of one of the later attempts at a solution of the enigma of -life and existence,—an attempt which for a time dazzled some of the -keenest intellects of its age, and which has at least impressed many -others with the conviction, born of momentary flashes from it of vast -illuminant power, that—<i>si sic omnia</i>—there was here concealed a key -to many puzzles, and a guard against many illusions likely to beset the -inquirer after truth.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_6" id="Footnote_1_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_6"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> A book by V. Knauer published last year (<i>Hauptprobleme -der Philosophie</i>), a series of popular lectures, gives one-sixth of its -space to the 'Atomistic of Will' by the Austrian poet Hamerling.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_7" id="Footnote_2_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_7"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Briefe</i>, ii. 349.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_8" id="Footnote_3_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_8"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> J. Volkelt, <i>Vorträge zur Einführung in die Philosophie -der Gegenwart</i> (München 1892): F. Paulsen, <i>Einleitung in die -Philosophie</i> (Berlin 1892).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_9" id="Footnote_4_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_9"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> E. v. Hartmann, <i>Kritische Wanderungen</i>, p. 74.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER III.</h5> - - -<h4>ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY AND HEGEL.</h4> - - -<p>Although we need not take too seriously Hegel's remark (vol. ii. p. -13) on the English conception of philosophy, it may be admitted that, -by the dominant school of English thought, philosophy, taken in the -wide sense it has predominantly born abroad, was, not so very long -ago, all but entirely ignored. Causes of various kinds had turned the -energy of the English mind into other directions, not less essential to -the common welfare. Practical needs and an established social system -helped—to bind down studies to definite and particular objects, and to -exclude what seemed vague and general investigations with no immediate -bearing on the business of life. Hence philosophy in England could -hardly exist except when it was reduced to the level of a special -branch of science, or when it could be used as a receptacle for the -principles and methods common to all the sciences. The general term -was often used to denote the wisdom of this world, or the practical -exhibition of self-control in life and action. For those researches, -which are directed to the objects once considered proper to philosophy, -the more definite and characteristic term came to be Mental and Moral -Science.</p> - -<p>The old name was in certain circles restricted to denote the vague and -irregular speculations of those thinkers, who either lived before the -rise of exact science, or who acted in defiance of its precepts and its -example. One large and influential class of English<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> thinkers inclined -to sweep philosophy altogether away, as equivalent to metaphysics and -obsolete forms of error; and upon the empty site thus obtained they -sought to construct a psychological theory of mind, or they tried to -arrange and codify those general remarks upon the general procedure -of the sciences which are known under the name of Inductive Logic. A -smaller, but not less vigorous, school of philosophy looked upon their -business as an extension and rounding off of science into a complete -unification of knowledge. The first is illustrated by the names of J. -S. Mill and Mr. Bain: the second is the doctrine of Mr. Herbert Spencer.</p> - -<p>The encyclopaedic aggregate of biological, psychological, ethical -and social investigation which Mr. Spencer pursues, under the -general guidance of the formula of evolution by differentiation -and integration, still proceeds on its course: but though its -popularity—as such popularity goes—is vast and more than national, -it does not and probably cannot find many imitators. Very differently -stand matters with the movement in psychology and logic. Here -the initiative has led to divergent and unexpected developments. -Psychology, which at first was partly an ampler and a more progressive -logic, a theory of the origin and nature of knowledge, partly a -propaedeutic to the more technical logic and ethics, and pursued in -a loosely introspective way, has gravitated more and more towards -its experimental and physiological side, with occasional velleities -to assume the abstractly-mathematical character of a psycho-physical -science. Logic, on the other hand, has also changed its scope. Not -content to be a mere tool of the sciences or a mere criterion for the -estimation of evidence, it has in one direction grown into a systematic -effort to become an epistemology—a system of the first principles of -knowledge and reality—a metaphysic of science; and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> in another it has -sought to realise the meaning of those old forms of inference which -the logicians of half a century ago were inclined to pooh-pooh as -obsolete. Most remarkable—and most novel of all—is the vast increase -of interest and research in the problems of ethics and v of what is -called the philosophy of religion—subjects which at that date were -literally burning questions, apt to scorch the fingers of those who -touched them. In all of this, but especially marked in some leading -thinkers, the ruling feature is the critical—the sceptical, i. e. the -eager, watchful, but self-restrained—attitude towards its themes. Ever -driving on to find a deeper unity than shows on the surface, and to get -at principles, the modern thinker—and in this we see the permanent -and almost overwhelming influence of Kant upon him—recoils from the -dogmatism of system, at the very moment it seems to be within his grasp.</p> - -<p>Thus the recent products of English thought have been, as Mr. Spencer -has taught us to say, partly in the line of differentiation, partly -of integration. At one moment it seems as if the ancient queen of the -sciences sat like Hecuba, <i>exul, inops,</i> while her younger daughters -enjoyed the freedom and progress of specialisation. The wood seems lost -behind the trees. And at another, again, the centripetal force seems to -preponderate: every department, logic, ethics, psychology, sociology, -rapidly carries its students on and up to fundamental questions, if -not to fundamental principles. Philosophy—the one and undivided -truth and quest of truths—emerges fresh, vigorous, and as yet rather -indeterminate, from the mass of detailed investigations. That the -position is now altered from what it was in times when knowledge had -fewer departments, is obvious. The task of the 'synoptic' mind—which -Plato claims for the philosopher—grows increasingly difficult: but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> -that is hardly a reason for performing it in a more perfunctory way. -It seems rather as if in such a crisis one of the great reconstructive -systems of a preceding age might be in some measure helpful.</p> - -<p>If we consult history, it is at once clear that philosophy, or the -pursuit of ultimate reality and permanent truth, went hand in hand with -scientific researches into facts and their particular explanations.</p> - -<p>In their earlier stages the two tendencies of thought were scarcely -distinguishable. The philosophers of Ionia and Magna Graecia were also -the scientific pioneers of their time. Their fragmentary remains remind -us at times of the modern theories of geology and biology,—at other -times of the teachings of idealism. The same thing is comparatively -true of the earlier philosophers of Modern Europe. The seventeenth -and eighteenth centuries, in spite of Bacon and Newton, endeavoured -to study the mental and moral life by a method which was a strange -mixture of empiricism and metaphysics. In words, indeed, the thinkers -from Descartes to Wolff duly emphasise, perhaps over-emphasise, the -antithesis between the extended and the intellectual. But in practice -their course is not so clear. Their mental philosophy is often only a -preliminary <i>medicina mentis</i> to set the individual mind in good order -for undertaking the various tasks awaiting a special research. They are -really eager to get on to business, and only, as it were, with regret -spend time in this clearance of mental faculty. And when they do deal -with objects, the material and extended tends to become the dominant -conception, the basis of reality. The human mind, that <i>nobilissima -substantia</i>, is treated only as an aggregate, or a receptacle, of -ideas, and the <i>mens</i>,—with them all nearly as with Spinoza,—is only -an <i>idea corporis,</i> and that phrase not taken so<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> highly as Spinoza's -perhaps should be taken. In the works of these thinkers, as of the -pre-Socratics, there is one element which may be styled philosophical, -and another element which maybe styled scientific,—if we use both -words vaguely. But with Socrates in the ancient, and with Kant in the -modern epoch of philosophy, an attempt was made to get the boundary -between the two regions definitively drawn. The distinction was in the -first place accompanied by something like turning the back upon science -and popular conceptions. Socrates withdrew thought from disquisitions -concerning the nature of all things, and fixed it upon man and -the state of man. Kant left the broad fields of actually-attained -knowledge, and inquired into the central principle on which the -acquisition of science, the laws of human life, and the ideals of art -and religion, were founded.</p> - -<p>The change thus begun was not unlike that which Copernicus effected in -the theory of Astronomy. Human personality, either in the actualised -forms of the State, or in the abstract shape of the Reason,—that -intellectual liberty, which is a man's true world,—was, at least by -implication, made the pivot around which the system of the sciences -might turn. In the contest, which according to Reid prevails between -Common Sense and Philosophy, the presumptions of the former have -been distinctly reversed, and Kant, like Socrates, has shown that it -is not the several items of fact, but the humanity, the moral law, -the thought, which underlies these doctrines, which give the real -resting-point and true centre of movement. But this negative attitude -of philosophy to the sciences is only the beginning, needed to secure -a standing-ground. In the ancient world Aristotle, and in the modern -Hegel (as the inheritor of the labours of Fichte and Schelling), -exhibit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> the movement outwards to reconquer the universe, proceeding -from that principle which Socrates and Kant had emphasised in its -fundamental worth.</p> - -<p>Mr. Mill, in the closing chapter of his Logic, has briefly sketched -the ideal of a science to which he gives the name of Teleology, -corresponding in the ethical and practical sphere to a <i>Philosophia -Prima</i>, or Metaphysics, in the theoretical. This ideal and ultimate -court of appeal is to be valid in Morality, and also in Prudence, -Policy and Taste. But the conception, although a desirable one, falls -short of the work which Hegel assigns to philosophy. What he intended -to accomplish with detail and regular evolution was not a system of -principles in these departments of action only, but a theory which -would give its proper place in our total Idea of reality to Art, -Science, and Religion, to all the consciousness of ordinary life, and -to the evolution of the physical universe. Philosophy ranges over -the—whole field of actuality, or existing fact. Abstract principles -are all very well in their way; but they are not philosophy. If the -world in its historical and its present life develops into endless -detail in regular lines, philosophy must equally develop the narrowness -of its first principles into the plenitude of a System,—into what -Hegel calls, the Idea. His point of view may be gathered from the -following remarks in a review of Hamann, an erratic friend and -fellow-citizen of Kant's.</p> - -<p>Hamann would not put himself to the trouble, which in an higher sense -God undertook. The ancient philosophers have described God under the -image of a round ball. But if that be His nature, God has unfolded it; -and in the actual world He has opened the closed shell of truth into a -system of Nature, into a State-system, a system of Law and Morality, -into the system of the world's History. The shut fist has become -an open<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> hand, the fingers of which reach out to lay hold of man's -mind, and draw it to Himself. Nor is the human mind a self-involved -intelligence, blindly moving within its own secret recesses. It is no -mere feeling and groping about in a vacuum, but an intelligent system -of rational organisation. Of that system Thought is the summit in point -of form: and Thought maybe described as the capability of going beyond -the mere surface of God's self-expansion,—or rather as the capability, -by means of reflection upon it, of entering into it, and then when the -entrance has been secured, of retracing in thought God's expansion of -Himself. To take this trouble is the express duty and end of ends set -before the thinking mind, ever since God laid aside His rolled-up form, -and revealed Himself<a name="FNanchor_1_10" id="FNanchor_1_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_10" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>.'</p> - -<p>Enthusiastic admirers have often spoken as if the salvation of the time -could only come from the Hegelian philosophy. 'Grasp the secret of -Hegel,' they say, 'and you will find a cure for the delusions of your -own mind, and the remedy which will set right the wrongs of the world.' -These high claims to be a panacea were never made by Hegel himself. -According to him, as according to Aristotle, philosophy <i>as such</i> can -produce nothing new. Practical statesmen, and theoretical reformers, -may do their best to correct the inequalities of their time. But the -very terms in which Bacon scornfully depreciated one great concept of -philosophy are to be accepted in their literal truth. Like a virgin -consecrated to God, she bears no fruit<a name="FNanchor_2_11" id="FNanchor_2_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_11" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>. She represents the spirit -of the world, resting, as it were, when one step in the progress has -been accomplished, and surveying the advance which has been made. -Philosophy is not,' says Fichte, 'even a means to <i>shape</i> life:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> for -it lies in a totally different world, and what is to have an influence -upon life must itself have sprung from life. Philosophy is only a means -to the <i>knowledge</i> of life.' Nor has it the vocation to edify men, and -take the place of religion on the higher levels of intellect. 'The -philosopher,' Fichte boldly continues, 'has no God at all and can have -no God: he has only a concept of the concept or of the Idea of God. It -is only in life that there is God and religion: but the philosopher as -such is not the whole complete man, and it is impossible for any one -to be <i>only</i> a philosopher<a name="FNanchor_3_12" id="FNanchor_3_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_12" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>.' Philosophy does not profess to bring -into being what ought to be, but is not yet. It sets up no mere ideals, -which must wait for some future day in order to be realised. Enough -for it if it show what the world <i>is,</i> if it were what it professes -to be, and what in a way it must be, otherwise it could not be even -what it is. The subject-matter of philosophy is that which is always -realising and always realised—the world in its wholeness as it is and -has been. It seeks to put before us, and embody in permanent outlines, -the universal law of spiritual life and growth, and not the local, -temporary, and individual acts of human will.</p> - -<p>Those who ask philosophy to construe, or to deduce <i>a priori</i> a -single blade of grass, or a single act of a man, must not be grieved -if their request sounds absurd and meets with no answer. The sphere -of philosophy is the Universal. We may say, if we like, that it is -retrospective. It is the spectator of all time and all existence: it -is its duty to view things <i>sub specie aeternitatis</i>. To comprehend -the universe of thought in all its formations and all its features, to -reduce the solid structures, which mind has created, to fluidity and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> -transparency in the pure medium of thought, to set free the fossilised -intelligence which the great magician who wields the destinies of the -world has hidden under the mask of Nature, of the Mind of man, of -the works of Art, of the institutions of the State and the orders of -Society, and of religious forms and creeds:—such is the complicated -problem of philosophy. Its special work is to comprehend the world, -not try to make it better. If it were the purpose of philosophy to -reform and improve the existing state of things, it comes a little -too late for such a task. 'As the thought of the world,' says Hegel, -'it makes its first appearance at a time, when the actual fact has -consummated its process of formation, and is now fully matured. This is -the doctrine set forth by the notion of philosophy; but it is also the -teaching of history. It is only when the actual world has reached its -full fruition that the ideal rises to confront the reality, and builds -up, in the shape of an intellectual realm, that same world grasped in -its substantial being. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, some -one shape of life has meanwhile grown old: and grey in grey, though -it brings it into knowledge, cannot make it young again. The owl of -Minerva does not start upon its flight, until the evening twilight has -begun to fall<a name="FNanchor_4_13" id="FNanchor_4_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_13" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>.'</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_10" id="Footnote_1_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_10"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Vermischte Schriften</i>, vol. ii. p. 87.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_11" id="Footnote_2_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_11"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>De Augm. Scient.</i> iii. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_12" id="Footnote_3_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_12"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The passages occur in some notes (written down by F. in -reference to the charge of Atheism) published in his <i>Werke,</i> v. pp. -342, 348.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_13" id="Footnote_4_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_13"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Philosophie des Rechts</i>, p. 20 (<i>Werke,</i> viii).</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER IV.</h5> - - -<h4>HEGEL AND THEOLOGY.</h4> - - -<p>Even an incidental glance into Hegel's Logic cannot fail to discover -the frequent recurrence of the name of God, and the discussion of -matters not generally touched upon, unless in works bearing upon -religion. There were two questions which seem to have had a certain -fascination for Hegel. One of them, a rather unpromising problem, -referred to the distances between the several planets in the solar -system, and the law regulating these intervals<a name="FNanchor_1_14" id="FNanchor_1_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_14" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>. The other and more -intimate problem turned upon the value of the proofs usually offered -in support of the being of God. That God is the supreme certitude of -the mind, the basis of all reality and knowledge, is what Hegel no more -put in question, than did Descartes, Spinoza, or Locke. What he often -repeated was that the <i>matter</i> in these proofs must be distinguished -from the imperfect <i>manner</i> in which the arguers presented it. -Again and again<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> in his Logic, as well as in other discussions more -especially devoted to it, he examines this problem. His persistence -in this direction might earn for him that title of 'Knight of the -Holy Ghost,' by which Heine, in one of the delightful poems of his -'Reisebilder,' describes himself to the maid of Klausthal in the Harz. -The poet of Love and of Freedom had undoubted rights to rank among the -sacred band: but so also had the philosopher. Like the Socrates whom -Plato describes to us, he seems to feel that he has been commissioned -to reveal the truth of God, and quicken men by an insight into the -right wisdom. Nowhere in the modern period of philosophy has higher -spirit breathed in the utterances of a thinker. The same theme is -claimed as the common heritage of philosophy and religion. A letter -to Duboc<a name="FNanchor_2_15" id="FNanchor_2_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_15" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>, the father of a modern German novelist, lets us see how -important this aspect of his system was to Hegel himself. He had been -asked to give a succinct explanation of his standing-ground: and his -answer begins by pointing out that philosophy seeks to apprehend in -reasoned knowledge the same truth which the religious mind has in its -faith.</p> - -<p>Words like these may at first sight suggest the bold soaring of ancient -speculation in the times of Plato and Aristotle, or even the theories -of the medieval Schoolmen. They sound as if he proposed to do for the -modern world, and in the full light of modern knowledge, what the -Schoolmen tried to accomplish within the somewhat narrow conceptions -of medieval Christianity and Greek logic. Still there is a difference -between the two cases. While the Doctors of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> Church, in appearance -at least, derived the form of exposition, and the matter of their -systems, from two independent and apparently heterogeneous sources, -the modern Scholastic of Hegel claims to be a harmonious unity, body -finding soul, and soul giving itself body. And while the Hegelian -system has the all-embracing and encyclopaedic character by which -Scholastic science threw its arms around heaven and earth, it has also -the untrammeled liberty of the Greek thinkers. Hegel, in short, shows -the union of these two modes of speculation: free as the ancient, and -comprehensive as the modern. His theory is the explication of God; -but of God in the actuality and plenitude of the world, and not as a -transcendent Being, such as an over-reverent philosophy has sometimes -supposed him, in the solitude of a world beyond.</p> - -<p>The greatness of a philosophy is its power of comprehending facts. -The most characteristic fact of modern times is Christianity. The -general thought and action of the civilised world has been alternately -fascinated and repelled, but always influenced, and to a high degree -permeated, by the Christian theory of life, and still more by the -faithful vision of that life displayed in the Son of Man. To pass that -great cloud of witness and leave it on the other side, is to admit that -your system is no key to the secret of the world,—even if we add, as -some will prefer, of the world as it is and has been. And therefore -the Hegelian system, if it is to be a philosophy at all, must be in -this sense Christian. But it is neither a critic, nor an apologist of -historical Christianity. The voice of philosophy is as that of the -Jewish doctor of the Law: 'If this council or this work be of men, -it will come to nought: but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, -Philosophy examines what is, and not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> what, according to some opinions, -ought to be. Such a point of view requires no discussion of the 'How' -or the 'Why' of Christianity. It involves no inquiry into historical -documents, or into the belief in miracles: for to it Christianity -rests only incidentally on the evidence of history; and miracles, as -vulgarly explained, can find no reception in a philosophical system. -For it Christianity is 'absolute religion': religion i. e. which has -fully become and realised all that religion meant to be. That religion -has, of course, its historical side: it appeared at a definite epoch -in the annals of our race: it revealed itself in a unique personality -in a remarkable nation. And at an early period of his life Hegel had -tried to gather up in one conception the traits of that august figure, -in his life and speech and death. But, in the light of philosophy, -this historical side shrivels up as comparatively unimportant. Not the -personality, but the 'revelation of reason' through man's spirit: not -the annals of a life once spent in serving God and men, but the words -of the 'Eternal Gospel are henceforth the essence of Christianity.</p> - -<p>Thus the controlling and central conception of life and actuality, -which is the final explanation of all that man thinks and does, has -a twofold aspect. There is, as it were, a double Absolute—for under -this name philosophy has what in religion corresponds to God. It is -true that in the final form of his system the Absolute Spirit has three -phases—each as it were passing on into and incorporated with the -next—Art working out its implications till it appears as Religion, -and Religion calling for its perfection in Philosophy. But in the -<i>Phenomenology</i>, his first work, the religion of Art only intervenes -as a grade from 'natural' religion to religion manifest or revealed; -and in the first edition of the <i>Encyclopaedia</i> what is subsequently -called Art is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> entitled the Religion of Art. It is in entire accordance -with these indications when in the Lectures on Aesthetics<a name="FNanchor_3_16" id="FNanchor_3_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_16" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> it is -said 'the true and original position of Art is to be the first-come -immediate self-satisfaction of Absolute Spirit'; though in our days (it -is added) 'its form has ceased to be the highest need of the spirit.' -It is hardly too much then to say that, for Hegel, the Absolute has two -phases, Religion and Philosophy.</p> - -<p>The Hegelian view presents itself most decisively, though perhaps -with a little lecture-like over-insistance, in the Philosophy of -Religion<a name="FNanchor_4_17" id="FNanchor_4_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_17" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. 'The object of religion as of philosophy is the eternal -truth in its very objectivity,—God and nothing but God,—and the -"explication" of God. Philosophy is not a wisdom of the world, but -cognition of the non-worldly: not a cognition of the external mass of -empirical existence and life, but cognition of what is eternal, what -is God, and what flows from His nature. For this nature must reveal -and develop itself. Hence philosophy "explicates" itself only when -it "explicates" religion; and in explicating itself it explicates -religion.... Thus religion and philosophy coincide: in fact, philosophy -is itself a divine service, is a religion: for it is the same -renunciation of subjective fancies and opinions, and is engaged with -God alone.'</p> - -<p>Again, it may be asked in what sense philosophy has to deal with God -and with Truth. These two terms are often synonyms in Hegel. All the -objects of science, all the terms of thought, all the forms of reality, -lead out of themselves, and seek for a centre and resting-point. They -are severally inadequate and partial, and they crave adequacy and -completeness. They tend to organise themselves; to call out more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> and -more distinctly the fuller reality which they presuppose,—which must -have been, otherwise they could not have been: they reduce their first -appearance of completeness to its due grade of inadequacy and bring out -their complementary side, so as to constitute a system or universe; and -in this tendency to a self-correcting unity consists their progress -to truth. Their untruth lies in isolation and pretended independence -or finality. This completed unity, in which all things receive their -entireness and become adequate, is their Truth: and that Truth, as -known in religious language, is God. Rightly or wrongly, God is thus -interpreted in the Logic of Hegel.</p> - -<p>Such a position must seem very strange to one who is familiar only -with the sober studies of English philosophy. In whatever else the -leaders of the several schools in this country disagree, they are -nearly all at one in banishing God and religion to a world beyond -the present sublunary sphere, to an inscrutable region beyond the -scope of scientific inquiry, where statements may be made at will, -but where we have no power of verifying any statement whatever. -This is the common doctrine of Spencer and Mansel, of Hamilton and -Mill. Even those English thinkers, who show some anxiety to support -what is at present called Theism, generally rest content with -vindicating for the mind the vague perception of a Being beyond us, -and differing from us incommensurably. God is to them a residual -phenomenon, a marginal existence. Outside the realm of experience -and knowledge there is not-nothing—a something—beyond definite -circumscription: incalculable, and therefore an object, possibly of -fear, possibly of hope: the reflection in the utter darkness of a great -What-may-it-not-be? He is the Unknown Power, felt by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> what some of -these writers call intuition, and others call experience. They do not -however allow to knowledge any capacity of apprehending in detail the -truths which belong to the kingdom of God. Now the whole teaching of -Hegel is the overthrow of the limits thus set to religious thought. To -him all thought, and all actuality when it is grasped by knowledge, is -from man's side, an exaltation of the mind towards God: while, when -regarded from the divine standing-point, it is the manifestation by God -of His own nature in its infinite variety.</p> - -<p>It is only when we fix our eyes clearly on these general features in -his speculation, that we can understand why <i>he</i> places the maturity -of ancient philosophy in the time of Plotinus and Proclus. Not that -these Neo-Platonists are, as thinkers, of power equal to their master -of Athens. But, in the realm of the blind the one-eyed may be king. The -later thinkers set their vision more distinctly and persistently on the -land that is eternal—'on the further side of being,' to quote Plato's -phrase. It is for the same reason Hegel gives so much attention to the -religious or semi-religious theories of Jacob Böhme and of Jacobi, -though these men were in many ways so unlike himself.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_14" id="Footnote_1_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_14"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Leben</i>, p. 155. It was in his dissertation -<i>de Orbitis Planetarum,</i> that the notorious contretemps occurred, -whereby, whilst the philosopher, leaning to a Pythagorean proportion, -hinted—in a line—that it was unnecessary to expect a planet between -Mars and Jupiter, astronomers in the same year discovered Ceres, the -first-detected of the Planetoids. A good deal has been made out of -this trifle; but it has not yet been shown that the corroboration was -anything but the <i>luck</i> of the other hypothesis.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_15" id="Footnote_2_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_15"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Vermischte Schriften</i>, vol. ii. p. 520. Duboc was a -retired hatter, of French origin, who had settled at Hamburg (Hegel's -<i>Briefe</i>, ii. 76 seqq.).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_16" id="Footnote_3_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_16"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Werke</i>, x. I, p. 131.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_17" id="Footnote_4_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_17"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Werke,</i> xi. p. 21.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER V.</h5> - - -<h4>PSEUDO-IDEALISM: JACOBI.</h4> - - -<p>It is hazardous to try to sum up the net result of a philosophy in -a few paragraphs. Since Aristotle separated the pure 'energy' of -philosophy from the activities which leave works made and deeds -done behind them, it need scarcely be repeated that the result of a -philosophical system is nothing palpable or tangible,—nothing on which -you can put your finger, and say definitely: Here it is. The spirit of -a philosophy always refuses to be incarcerated in a formula, however -deftly you may try to charm it there. The statement of the principle -or tendency of a philosophical system tells not what that system is, -but what it is not. It marks off the position from contiguous points -of view; and on that account never gets beyond the borderland, which -separates that system from something else. The method and process of -reasoning is as essential in knowledge, as the result to which it -leads: and the method in this case is thoroughly bound up with the -subject-matter. A mere analysis of the method, therefore, or a mere -record of the purpose and outcome of the system, would be, the one as -well as the other, a fruitless labour, and come to nothing but words. -Thus any attempt to convey a glimpse of the truth in a few sentences -and in large outlines seems foreclosed.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> The theory of Hegel has an -abhorrence of mere generalities, of abstractions with no life in them, -and no growth out of them. His principle has to prove and verify itself -to be true and adequate: and that verification fills up the whole -circle of circles, of which philosophy is said to consist.</p> - -<p>It seems as if there were in Hegel two distinct habits of mind which -the world—the outside observer—rarely sees except in separation. -On one hand there is a sympathy with mystical and intuitional minds, -with the upholders of immediate knowledge and of innate ideas, with -those who find that science and demonstration rather tend to distract -from the one thing needful—who would 'lie in Abraham's bosom all the -year,'—those who would fain lay their grasp upon the whole before they -have gone through the drudgery of details. On the other hand, there -is within him a strongly 'rationalising' and non-visionary intellect, -with a practical and realistic bent, and the full scientific spirit. -Schelling, in an angry mood, could describe him as 'the quintessence -of all that is prosaic, both outside and in<a name="FNanchor_1_18" id="FNanchor_1_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_18" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>.' Yet, seen from other -points of view, Hegel has been accused of dreaminess, pietism, and -mystical theology. His merging of the ordinary contrasts of thought -in a completer truth, and what would popularly be described as his -mixing up of religious with logical questions, and the general -unfathomableness of his doctrine,—all seem to support such a charge. -Yet all this is not inconsistent with a rough and incisive vigour -of understanding, a plainness of reason, and a certain hardness of -temperament. This philosopher is in many ways not distinguishable from -the ordinary citizen, and there are not unfrequent moments when his -wife hears him groan over the providence that condemned him to be a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> -philosopher<a name="FNanchor_2_19" id="FNanchor_2_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_19" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>. He is contemptuous towards all weakly sentimentalism, -and almost brutal in his emphasis on the reasonableness of the actual -and on the folly of dreaming the might-have-been; and keeps his -household accounts as carefully as the average head of a family. And, -perhaps, this convergence of two tendencies of thought may be noticed -in the gradual maturing of his ideas. In the period of his 'Lehrjahre,' -or apprenticeship, from 1793 to 1800, we can see the study of religion -in the earlier part of that time at Bern succeeded by the study of -politics and philosophy at Frankfort-on-the-Main.</p> - -<p>His purpose on the whole may be termed an attempt to combine breadth -with depth, the intensity of the mystic who craves for union with -Truth, with the extended range and explicitness of those who multiply -knowledge. 'The depth of the mind is only so deep as its courage -to expand and lose itself in its explication<a name="FNanchor_3_20" id="FNanchor_3_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_20" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>. It must prove its -profundity by the ordered fullness of the knowledge which it has -realised. The position and the work of Hegel will not be intelligible -unless we keep in view both of these antagonistic points.</p> - -<p>The purpose of philosophy—as has been pointed out—is, for Hegel—to -know God, which is to know things in their Truth—to see all things in -God—to comprehend the world in its eternal significance. Supposing -the purpose capable of being achieved, what method is open to its -attainment? There is on one hand the method of ordinary science -in dealing with its objects. These are <i>things,</i> found as it were -projected into space before the observer, lying outside one another in -<i>prima facie</i> independence,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> though connected (by a further finding) -with each other by certain 'accidents' called qualities and relations. -Among the objects of knowledge, there are included, by the somewhat -naïve intellect that accepts tradition like a physical fact, certain -'things' of a rather peculiar character. One of these is God: the -others, which a historical criticism has subjoined, are the Soul and -the World. And whatever may be said of the thinghood, reality, or -existence of the World, there is no doubt that God and the Soul figure, -and figure largely, in the consciousness of the human race as entities, -differing probably in many respects from other things, but still -possessed of certain fundamental features in common, and thus playing a -part as distinct realities amongst other realities.</p> - -<p>Given such objects, it is natural for a reflecting mind to attempt -to make out a science of God and a science of the Soul, just as of -other 'things.' And to these, a system-loving philosopher might add a -science of the world (Cosmology)<a name="FNanchor_4_21" id="FNanchor_4_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_21" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. It was felt, indeed, that these -objects were peculiar and unique. Thus, for example, as regards God, -it was held necessary by the logician who saw tradition in its true -light to prove His existence': and various arguments to that end were -at different times devised. With regard to the human Soul, similarly, -it was considered essential to establish its independent reality as a -thing really separate from the bodily organism with which its phenomena -were obviously connected,—to prove, in short, its substantial -existence, and its emancipation from the bodily fate of dissolution and -decay. With reference to the World, the problem was rather different: -it was felt that the name suggested problems for thought rather than -denoted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> reality. How can we predicate of the whole what is predicable -of its parts? This or that may have a beginning and a cause, may have -a limit and an end: but can the totality be presented under these -aspects, without leading to self-contradiction? And the result of -these questions in the case of 'Cosmology' was to shed in the long run -similar doubts on 'Rational' Theology and 'Rational' Psychology.</p> - -<p>Practically this metaphysical science—which is so called as dealing -with a province or provinces of being <i>beyond</i> the ordinary or natural -<i>(physical)</i> realities—treated God and the Soul by the same terms -(or <i>categories</i>) as it used in dealing with 'material' objects. God -e. g. was a force, a cause, a being; so, too, was the Soul. The main -butt of Kant's destructive <i>Criticism of pare Reason</i> is to challenge -the justice of including God and the Soul among the objects of -science,—among the things we can know as we may know plants or stars. -To make an object of knowledge (in the strict sense), to make a thing, -the prerequisite, Kant urges, is perception in space and time. Without -a sensation—and that sensation, as it were, laid out in place and -duration—an object of science is impossible. No mere demonstration -will conjure it into existence. And with that requirement the old -theology and psychology, which professed to expound the object-God and -the object-soul, were ruled out-of-order in the list of sciences, and -reduced to mere dialectical exercises. The circle of the sciences, -therefore, does not lead beyond the conditioned,' beyond the regions -of space and time. It has nothing to say of a 'first cause' or of an -ultimate end.</p> - -<p>Such was the result that might fairly be read from Kant's <i>Criticism of -pare Reason</i>,—especially if read without its supplementary sequels, -and, above all, if read by those in whom feeling was stronger than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> -thought, or who were by nature more endowed with the craving for faith -than with the mind of philosophy. Such a personality appeared in J. -H. Jacobi, the younger brother of a poet not undistinguished in his -day. Amid the duties of public office and the cares of business, he -found time to study Spinoza, the English and Scotch moralists, and -above all to follow with interest the development of Kant from the year -1763 onwards. His house at Düsseldorf was the scene of many literary -reunions, and Jacobi himself maintained familiar intercourse with -the leaders of the literary and intellectual world, such as Lessing, -Hamann, Goethe. His first considerable works were two novels, in -letters,—Allwill, begun in a serial magazine in 1775, and Woldemar, -begun in another magazine in 1777; both being issued as complete works -in 1781. Both turn on a moral antithesis, and both leave the antithesis -as they found it. <i>Here</i> pleads the advocate of the heart: 'it is the -heart which alone and directly tells man what is good': 'virtue is a -fundamental instinct of human nature': the true basis of morals is an -immediate certainty; and the supreme standard is an 'ethical genius' -which as it were discovered virtue and which still is a paramount -authority in those exceptional situations in life when the 'grammar -of virtue' fails to supply adequate rules, and where, therefore, the -immediate voice of conscience must in a 'licence of sublime poesy<a name="FNanchor_5_22" id="FNanchor_5_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_22" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>' -dare, as Burke says, to 'suspend its own rules in favour of its own -principles.' <i>There</i>, on the other hand, is the champion of reason, -who declares all this sentimentalism 'a veritable mysticism of -antinomianism and a quietism of immorality<a name="FNanchor_6_23" id="FNanchor_6_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_23" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>': 'To humanity,' he says, -'and to every man (every complete man) principles, and some system<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> -of principles, are indispensable.' Woldemar concludes with the pair -of mottoes: 'Whosoever trusts to his own heart is a fool,' and 'Trust -love: it takes everything, but it gives everything.'</p> - -<p>In 1780 Jacobi had his historic conversation with Lessing at -Wolfenbüttel<a name="FNanchor_7_24" id="FNanchor_7_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_24" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>. The talk turned on Spinoza. For many years the -philosophy of Spinoza had seemed to vanish from the world. His name -was only heard in a reference of obloquy, as if it were dangerous to -be even suspected of infection with the taint of Atheism. But both -Lessing and Jacobi had found him out. The former saw in him an ally in -that struggle for higher light and wider views which he undertook in -a spirit and with a scope hardly surmised by those he usually wrought -with. Jacobi, on the contrary, saw in him personified the conjunction -of all those irreligious tendencies which all philosophy in some degree -exhibited: the tendency to veil or set aside God and personality. 'I -believe,' says Jacobi, as he began the conversation 'in an intelligent -personal cause of the world.' 'Then I am going,' replied Lessing, 'to -hear something quite new': and he dryly put aside the other's rhapsody -on the 'personal extra-mundane deity with the remark 'Words, my dear -Jacobi, words.' Jacobi's work <i>Letters on the doctrine of Spinoza</i> -(it appeared in 1785) was the beginning of a controversy in which -Mendelssohn and Herder took part, and in which Goethe took an interest -under Herders tutorship. To the exact philological study of Spinoza -it did not contribute much: for the Spinoza whom Herder and Goethe -saw as their spiritual forefather was transfigured in their thought -to a figure to which Leibniz had almost an equal right to give his -name. He upheld to them the symbol of the immanence of the divine in -nature: he was the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> leader in the battle against 'philistine' deism and -utilitarianism.</p> - -<p>With the Kantian criticism of the pseudo-science of theology Jacobi had -in one way no fault to find. That reasoning by its demonstration cannot -find out God, was to him an axiomatic belief. But the 'man of feeling' -felt uneasy at the trenchant methods of the Königsberg man of logic. -He seemed to see the world of men and things passing under Kant's -manipulation into a mere collection of phenomena and ideas of the mind. -Still more was he sensible to the loss of his God. That surrogate of an -argument for theism which Kant seemed to offer in the implications of -the Moral Law did not give what Jacobi wanted. Mere morality is a cold -and mechanical principle—he thinks—compared with that infinite life -and love which we deem we have in God. The son of man, he felt, was, in -virtue of an indwelling genius of conscience, supreme over the moral -law: how much more, then, the Absolute and Eternal on a higher grade of -being than its mechanical regularities!</p> - -<p>If the way of reasoning will not carry us to the Absolute, still -less (and that is whither Jacobi wishes to reach) to God, there must -be another way: for something in him, which may be called Faith -or Feeling, Spiritual Sense or Reason, proclaims itself certain -of the reality both of God and Nature. There <i>is</i> an objective -reality—outside and beyond him—yet somehow to be reached by a daring -leap,—whereby, out of sheer force of will, he, shutting his eyes -to the temporal and the mechanical, finds himself carried over the -dividing gulf into the land of eternal life and love.</p> - -<p>'I appeal' he says in his latest utterances<a name="FNanchor_8_25" id="FNanchor_8_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_25" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> 'to an imperative, an -invincible feeling as the first and underived ground of all philosophy -and all religion,—to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> a feeling which lets man become aware of and -alive to the fact that he has a sense for the supersensuous.' 'As it -is religion which makes man man,' he continues, 'and which alone lifts -him above the animals, so it also makes him a philosopher.' Such an -organ for the supersensuous is what in his later writings he calls -<i>Vernunft</i> (Reason) and distinguishes from <i>Verstand</i> (Understanding). -'This reason,' says Coleridge (to whom we owe this use of the terms in -English) in the <i>Friend,</i> 'is an organ bearing the same relation to -spiritual objects as the eye bears to material phenomena,' It is 'that -intuition of things which arises when we possess ourselves as one with -the whole and is opposed to that 'science of the mere understanding' -in which 'transferring reality to the negations of reality (to the -ever-varying framework of the uniform life) we think of ourselves -as separated beings, and place nature in antithesis to the mind, as -object to subject, thing to thought, death to life.' But this Reason -is even more than this. It is the direct contact with reality, which -it affirms and even <i>is.</i> It apprehends the <i>me</i> and the <i>thee,</i> it -apprehends above all the great <i>Thee,</i> God: apprehends, and we may even -say appropriates<a name="FNanchor_9_26" id="FNanchor_9_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_26" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>. And it apprehends them at one bound—in one <i>salto -mortale</i>—because it is really in implicit possession of them. Call the -step a miracle, if you will: you must admit, he adds, that 'some time -or other every philosophy must have recourse to a miracle<a name="FNanchor_10_27" id="FNanchor_10_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_27" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>.'</p> - -<p>And yet the asseveration rings false—it shows a womanish wilfulness -and weakness in its reiteration. He has the reality; yet he has it -not. 'Were a God known,' he says in one place, 'He would not be God.' -He yearns with passionate longing to find the living<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> and true: he -feels himself and the Eternal clasped in one: his faith effects the -reality of things hoped for. But, he adds, 'We never see the Absolute': -the primal light of reason is but faint. It is but a presage—a -pre-supposition—of the Everlasting. This reason, in short, needs -discipline and development, it needs the ethical life to raise it: -'without morality no religiosity,' he says. 'Light,' he complains, -'is in my heart,' but at the moment I want to bring it into the -understanding, the light goes out.' And yet he knows—and Coleridge -repeats—'the consciousness of reason and of its revelations is only -possible in an understanding.'</p> - -<p>'There seem to be one or two motives acting upon Jacobi. The 'plain -man,' especially if he be of high character and of 'noble' religiosity, -has a feeling that the lust of philosophising disturbs the security of -life, and endangers things which are deservedly dear to him. In such -an one the 'enthusiasm of logic'—the calm pursuit of truth at all -costs, so characteristic of Lessing—is inferior to the 'enthusiasm -of life,'—a passion in which the terrestrial and the celestial are -inextricably blended, where one clings to God as the stronghold of -self, and sets personality—our human personality—in the throne of -the Eternal. He will be all that is noble and good, if only he be not -asked utterly to surrender self. So, too, Jacobi's God—or Absolute -(for he leaves his 'non-philosophy' so far as to use both names), is -rather the final aim of a grand, overpowering yearning, than a calm, -self-centred, self-expanding life which carries man along with it. -It would be, he feels, so very terrible, if at the last there were -no God to meet us—to find the throne of the universe vacant. Avaunt -philosophy, therefore! Let us cling to the faith of our nature and our -childhood, and refuse her treacherous consolations!<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> With the central -proposition of Jacobi, Hegel, for one, is not inclined to quarrel. He -too, as he asks and answers the question as to the issues of this and -of the better life, might say</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 13em;">'Question, answer presuppose</span><br /> -Two points: that the thing itself which questions, answers,—<i>is,</i> it<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">knows;</span><br /> -As it also knows the thing perceived outside itself—a force<br /> -Actual ere its own beginning, operative through its course,<br /> -Unaffected by its end,—that this thing likewise needs must be;<br /> -Call this—God, then, call that—Soul, and both the only facts for me.<br /> -Prove them facts? that they o'erpass my power of proving proves<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2em;">them such:</span><br /> -Fact it is, I know, I know not something which is fact as much.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>But when Jacobi goes on to say that it is the supreme and final duty -of the true sage 'to unveil reality,'—meaning thereby that, given the -feeling, he has only to</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 8em;">'Define it well</span><br /> -For fear divine Philosophy<br /> -Should push beyond her mark and be<br /> -Procuress to the Lords of Hell,'<br /> -</p> - -<p>Hegel withdraws. It is the duty of philosophy to labour to make the -perception—the fleeting, uncertain, trembling perception—of faith, -a clear, sure, inwardly consistent knowledge: to show, and not merely -to assert, that 'the path of (this world's) duty is the way to (that -world's) glory.' There is, Hegel himself has said more than once, -something opposed to ordinary ways of thinking in the procedure of the -philosopher. To the outsider, it seems like standing on your head. -It involves something like what, in religious language, is termed -conversion—a new birth—becoming a new man. But though such a change -always seems to culminate in a moment of sudden transformation,—as if -the continuity of old and new were disrupted, the process has a history -and a preparation. Of that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> pilgrim's progress of the world-distracted -soul to its discovery of its true being in God, philosophy is the -record: a record which Hegel has written both in the <i>Phenomenology of -Mind</i>, and, more methodically, in his <i>Encyclopaedia.</i> The passage from -nature to God—or from man's limitations to the divine fullness—must -be made, he urged, in the open day and not in the secret vision when -sleep falls upon men. When the aged Jacobi read these requirements of -Hegel, he wrote to a friend: 'He may be right, and I should like once -again to experiment with him all that the power of thinking can do -alone, were not the old man's head too weak for it<a name="FNanchor_11_28" id="FNanchor_11_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_28" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>.'</p> - -<p>'For a philosophy like this,' says Hegel<a name="FNanchor_12_29" id="FNanchor_12_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_29" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>, 'individual man -and humanity are the ultimate standpoint:—as a fixed invincible -finitude of reason, not as a reflection of the eternal beauty, or as -a spiritual focus of the universe, but as an ultimate sense-nature, -which however with the power of faith can daub itself over here and -there with an alien supersensible. Let us suppose an artist restricted -to portrait-painting; he might so far idealise as to introduce in the -eye of a commonplace countenance a yearning look, and on its lips a -melancholy smile, but he would be utterly debarred from depicting the -Gods, sublime over yearning and melancholy—as if the delineation of -eternal pictures were only possible at the cost of humanity. So too -Philosophy—on this view—must not portray the Idea of man, but the -abstraction of a humanity empirical and mingled with short-comings, and -must bear a body impaled on the stake of the absolute antithesis; and -when it clearly feels its limitation to the sensible, it must at the -same time bedeck itself with the surface colour of a super<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span>sensible, -and point the finger of faith to a something Higher.</p> - -<p>'But the truth cannot be defrauded by such a consecration if finitude -be still left subsisting; the true consecration must annihilate it. -The artist, who fails to give actuality the true truth by letting -fall upon it the ethereal illumination and taking it completely in -that light, and who can only depict actuality in its bare ordinary -reality and truth (a reality however which is neither true nor real) -may apply the pathetic remedy to actuality, the remedy of tenderness -and sentimentality, everywhere putting tears on the cheeks of the -commonplace, and an O God! in their mouth. No doubt his figures in -this way direct their look over the actual heavenwards, but like -bats they belong neither to the race of birds nor beasts, neither to -earth nor heaven. Their beauty is not free from ugliness, nor their -morals without weakness and meanness: the intelligence they haply may -show is not without banality: the success which enters into it is -not without vulgarity, and the misfortune not without cowardice and -terror; and both success and misfortune have something contemptible. -So too philosophy, if it takes the finite and subjectivity as absolute -truth in the logical form habitual to her, cannot purify them by -bringing them into relation with an infinite: for that infinite is not -itself the true, because it is unable to consume finitude. But where -a philosophy consumes the temporal as such and burns up reality, its -action is pronounced a cruel dissection, which does not leave man -complete, and a forcible abstraction which has no truth, above all -no truth for life. And such an abstraction is treated as a painful -amputation of an essential piece from the completeness of the whole: -that essential piece, and absolute substantiality being believed to -consist in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> temporal and empirical, and in privation. It is as if -a person, who sees only the feet of a work of art, were to complain, -should the whole work be unveiled to his eyes, that he was deprived of -the privation, that the incomplete was decompleted.'</p> - -<p>Jacobi has been spoken of as the leader of this 'Un-philosophy' of -faith. As such his allies lie on one side among philosophers who hold -by the deliverances of 'common sense,' by the consciousness of the -unsophisticated man shrinking from the waywardness of an idealism that -deprives him of his solidest realities. The type of such a philosopher -has been drawn by Hegel<a name="FNanchor_13_30" id="FNanchor_13_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_30" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> in Krug. But, on the other side, Jacobi -touched hands—though not in a sympathetic spirit—with a somewhat -motley band which also had set its face to go to the everlasting gates, -but had turned aside to aimless wandering on the Hill Difficulty, or -sought too soon the repose of the Delectable Mountains, without due -sojourn in the valley of Humiliation or descent under the Shadow of -Death. Like Wordsworth, they felt that the world is too much with -us: that our true self is frittered away into fragments and passing -stages, in which we are not ourselves,—whereby we also lose the true -perception of the essential life of nature. Gradually we have sunk -into the deadening arms of habit, reduced ourselves to professional -and conventional types, and lost the freer and larger mobility of -spiritual being. We have grown into <i>verständige Leute</i>—people of -practical sense and worldly wisdom. To such, philosophy would come—if -it could come—as the great breath of life—of 'reason' (<i>Vernunft</i>) -which transcends the separations inevitable in practical will and -knowledge. But to this band—which has been styled the Romantic School -of Germany—the liberation came in ways more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> analogous to that craved -for by Jacobi. Their way was the way of Romance and Imagination. The -principle of Romance is the protest against confining man and nature -to the dull round of uniformities which custom and experience have -imprisoned them in. Boundless life, infinite spontaneity is surging -within us and the world, ready to break down the dams convention -and inertia have established. That inner power is an ever-fresh, -ever-restless Irony, which sets up and overthrows, which refuses to be -bound or stereotyped, which is never weary, never exhausted,—free in -the absolute sense. It is the mystic force of Nature, which they seemed -to see ever on the spring to work its magic transformations, and burst -the bulwarks of empirical law. It is the princely <i>jus aggratiandi,</i> -the sportive sovereignty of the true artist, who is able at any moment -to enter into direct communion with the heart of things.</p> - -<p>The beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany, as well as in -England, was a period of effervescence:—there was a good deal of fire, -and naturally there was also a good deal of smoke. Genius was exultant -in its aspirations after Freedom, Truth, and Wisdom. The Romantic -School, which had grown up under the stimulus of Fichte's resolve to -enact thought, and had for a time been closely allied with Schelling, -counted amongst its literary chiefs the names of the Schlegels, of -Tieck, Novalis, and perhaps Richter. The world, as that generation -dreamed, was to be made young again,—first by drinking, where -Wordsworth led, from the fresh springs of nature,—afterwards when, as -often has happened, doubts arose as to where Nature was really to be -found, by an elixir distilled from the withered flowers of medieval -Catholicism and chivalry,</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'Since the Mid-Age was the Heroic Time'<br /> -</p> - -<p>and even from the old roots of primeval wisdom. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> good old times of -faith and harmonious beauty were to be brought back again by the joint -labours of ideas and poetry.—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'So, all that the old Dukes had been, without knowing it,<br /> -This Duke would fain know he was without being it.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>To that period of incipient and darkling energy Hegel stands in -very much the same position as Luther did to the pre-Reformation -mystics, to Meister Eckhart, and the unknown author of the 'German -Theology.' It was from this side, from the school of Genius and Romance -in philosophy, that Hegel was proximately driven, not into sheer -re-action, but into system, development, and science.</p> - -<p>To elevate philosophy from a love of wisdom into the possession of real -wisdom, into a system and a science, is the aim which he distinctly -set before himself from the beginning. In almost every work, and every -course of lectures, whatever be their subject, he cannot let slip the -chance of an attack upon the mode of philosophising which substituted -the strength of belief or conviction for the intervention of reasoning -and argument. There may have been a strong sympathy in him with the -end which these German contemporaries and, in some ways, analogues -to Coleridge, Shelley, Wordsworth, and Byron had in view. No one who -reads his criticism of Kant can miss perceiving his bent towards the -Infinite. But he utterly rejects the vision of feeling, whether as -longing faith or devout enjoyment, as an adequate exposition of the -means to this end. Whereas these fantastic seers and sentimentalists -either disparage science as a limitation to the spirit, in the calm -trust of their life in God, or yearn throughout life for a peace -which they never quite reach, Hegel is bent upon showing men that the -Infinite is not unknowable, as Kant would have it, and yet that man can -not, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> Jacobi would have it, naturally and without an effort enjoy -the things of God<a name="FNanchor_14_31" id="FNanchor_14_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_31" class="fnanchor">[14]</a>. He will prove that the way of Truth is open, and -prove it by describing in detail every step of the road. Philosophy for -him must be reasoned truth. She does not visit favoured ones in visions -of the night, but comes to all who win her by patient study.</p> - -<p>'For those,' he says, 'who ask for a royal road to science, no more -convenient directions can be given than to trust to their own sound -common sense, and, if they wish to keep up with the age and with -philosophy, to read the reviews criticising philosophical works, and -perhaps even the prefaces and the first paragraphs in these works -themselves. The introductory remarks state the general and fundamental -principles; and the reviews, besides their historical information, -contain a critical estimate, which, from the very fact that it is -such, is beyond and above what it criticises. This is the road of -ordinary men: and it may be traversed in a dressing-gown. The other -way is the way of intuition. It requires you to don the vestments of -the high-priest. Along that road stalks the ennobling sentiment of the -Eternal, the True, the Infinite. But it is wrong to call "this a road. -These grand sentiments find themselves, naturally and without taking -a single step, centred in the very sanctuary of truth. So mighty is -genius, with its deep original ideas and its high flashes of wit. But -a depth like this is not enough to lay bare the sources of true being, -and these rockets are not the empyrean. True thoughts and scientific -insights are only to be gained by the labour which comprehends and -grasps its object. And that thorough grasp alone can produce the -universality of science. Contrasted with the vulgar vagueness and -scantiness of common sense, that universality<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> is a fully-formed and -rounded intellect; and, contrasted with the un-vulgar generality of -the natural gift of reason when it has been spoilt by the laziness and -self-conceit of genius, it is truth put in possession of its native -form, and thus rendered the possible property of every self-conscious -reason<a name="FNanchor_15_32" id="FNanchor_15_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_32" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>.'</p> - -<p>These words which were taken to heart (unnecessarily, perhaps) by the -patron of the <i>Intellectual Intuition</i> rung the knell to the friendship -of Hegel with his great contemporary Schelling. Yet this hard saying -is also the keynote to the subsequent work of the philosopher. In -Hegel we need expect no brilliant <i>apergus</i> of genius, no intellectual -legerdemain, but only the patient unraveling of the clue of thought -through all knots and intricacies: a deliberate tracing and working-out -of the contradictions and mysteries in thought, until the contradiction -and the mystery disappear. Perseverance is the secret of Hegel.</p> - -<p>This characteristic of patient work is seen, for example, in the -incessant prosecution of hints and glimpses, until they grew into -systematic and rounded outline. Instead of vague anticipations and -guesses at truth, fragments of insight, his years of philosophic study -are occupied with writing and re-writing, in the <i>V</i> endeavour to clear -up and arrange the masses of his ideas. Essay after essay, and sketch -after sketch of a system, succeed each other amongst his papers. His -first great work was not published before his 37th year, after six -years spent in university work at Jena, following as many spent in -preliminary lucubration. The notes which he used to dictate some years -afterwards to the boys in the Gymnasium at Nürnberg bear evidence -of constant remodelling, and the same is true of his professorial -lectures.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span></p> - -<p>Such insistance in tracing every suggestion of truth to its place -in the universe of thought is the peculiar character and difficulty -of Hegelian argument. Other observers have now and again noticed, -accentuated, and, it may be, popularised some one point or some one -law in the evolution of reason. Here and there, as we reflect, we -are forced to recognise what Hegel termed the dialectical nature in -thought,—the tendency, by which a principle, when made to be all that -it implied, when, as the phrase is, it is carried to extremes, recoils -and leaves us confronted by its antithesis. We cannot, for example, -study the history of ancient thought without noting this phenomenon. -Thus, the persistence with which Plato and Aristotle taught and -enforced the doctrine that the community was the guide and safeguard -of the several citizens, very soon issued in the schools of Zeno and -Epicurus, teaching the rights of self-seeking and of the independent -self-realisation of the individual. But the passing glimpse of an -indwelling discord in the terms, by which we argue, is soon forgotten, -and is set aside under the head of accidents, instead of being referred -to a general law. Most of us take only a single step to avoid what has -turned out wrong, and when we have overcome the seeming absoluteness of -one idea, we are content and even eager to throw ourselves under the -yoke of another, not less one-sided than its predecessor. Sometimes -one feels tempted to say that the course of human thought as a whole, -as well as that branch of it termed science, exhibits nothing but a -succession of illusions, which enclose us in the belief that some idea -is all-embracing as the universe,—illusions, from which the mind is -time after time liberated, only in a little while to sink under the -sway of some partial correction, as if it and it only were the complete -truth.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span></p> - -<p>Or, again, the Positive Philosophy exhibits as one of its features an -emphatic and popular statement of a fallacy much discussed in Hegel. -One of the best deeds of that school has been to protest against a -delusive belief in certain words and notions; particularly by pointing -out the insufficiency of what it calls metaphysical terms, i. e. those -abstract entities formed by reflective thought, which are little else -than a double of the phenomenon they are intended to explain. To -account for the existence of insanity by an assumed basis for it in -the 'insane neurosis,' or to attribute the sleep which follows a dose -of opium to the soporific virtues of the drug, are some exaggerated -examples of the metaphysical intellect which is so rampant in much -of our popular, and even of our esoteric science. Positivism by its -logical precepts ought at least to have instilled general distrust of -abstract talk about essences, laws, forces and causes, whenever they -claim an inherent and independent value, or profess to be more than -a reflex of sensation. But all this is only a desultory perception, -the reflection of an intelligent observer. When we come to Hegel, the -Comtian perception of the danger lying in the terms of metaphysics is -replaced by the Second Part of Logic, the Theory of Essential Being, -where substances, causes, forces, essences, matters, are confronted -with what Mr. Bain has called their 'suppressed correlative<a name="FNanchor_16_33" id="FNanchor_16_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_33" class="fnanchor">[16]</a>.'</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_18" id="Footnote_1_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_18"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Aus Schellings Leben (Plitt.), ii. 161.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_19" id="Footnote_2_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_19"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Briefe</i>, ii. 377.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_20" id="Footnote_3_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_20"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Phenomenologie des Geistes,</i> p. 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_21" id="Footnote_4_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_21"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Cf. Notes and Illustrations in vol. ii. 396, and chapter -iii. of the <i>Logic.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_22" id="Footnote_5_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_22"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Jacobi's <i>Werke</i>, v. 79, III, 115, 417.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_23" id="Footnote_6_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_23"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Ibid., i. 178.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_24" id="Footnote_7_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_24"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Jacobi's <i>Werke,</i> iv. i. Abth. p. 55 seqq.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_25" id="Footnote_8_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_25"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Jacobi's <i>Werke</i>, iv. i, p. xxi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_26" id="Footnote_9_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_26"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Jacobi's <i>Briefwechsel,</i> i. 330.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_27" id="Footnote_10_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_27"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Jacobi's <i>Werke</i>, iii. 53.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_28" id="Footnote_11_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_28"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Jacobi's <i>Briefwechsel</i>, ii. 468.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_29" id="Footnote_12_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_29"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Werke,</i> i. 15.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_30" id="Footnote_13_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_30"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Vermischte Schriften,</i> i. 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_31" id="Footnote_14_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_31"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Compare pages 121-142 of the <i>Logic.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_32" id="Footnote_15_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_32"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Phenomenologie des Geistes</i>, p. 54 (<i>Werke</i>, ii).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_33" id="Footnote_16_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_33"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Practical Essays,</i> p. 43.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER VI.</h5> - - -<h4>THE SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY.</h4> - - -<p>By asserting the rights of philosophy against the dogmatism of -self-inspired 'unphilosophy,' and by maintaining that we must not feel -the truth, with our eyes as it were closed, but must open them full -upon it, Hegel does not reduce philosophy to the level of one of the -finite sciences. The name 'finite,' like the name 'empirical,' is not -a title of which the sciences have any cause to be ashamed. They are -called empirical, because it is their glory and their strength to found -upon experience. They are called finite, because they have a fixed -object, which they must expect and cannot alter; because they have an -end and a beginning,—presupposing something where they begin, and -leaving something for the sciences which come after. Botany rests upon -the researches of chemistry: and astronomy hands over the record of -cosmical movements to geology. Science is interlinked with science; and -each of them is a fragment. Nor can these fragments ever, in the strict -sense of the word, make up a whole or total. They have broken off, -sometimes by accident, and sometimes for convenience, from one another. -The sciences have budded forth here and there upon the tree of popular -knowledge and ordinary consciousness, as the interest and needs of the -time drew attention<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> closer to various points and objects in the world -surrounding us.</p> - -<p>Prosecute the popular knowledge about any point far enough, -substituting completeness and accuracy for vagueness, and especially -giving numerical definiteness in weight, size, and figure, until -the little drop of fact has grown into an ocean, and the mere germ -has expanded into a structure with complex interconnexion,—and -you will have a science. By its point of origin this luminous body -of facts is united to the great circle of human knowledge and -ignorance. Each special science is a part, which presupposes a total -of much lower organisation, but much wider range than itself: each -branch of scientific knowledge grows out of the already existent -tree of acquaintance with things. But the part very soon assumes an -independence of its own, and adopts a hostile or negative attitude -towards the general level of unscientific opinion. This process of what -we may, from the vulgar point of view, call abnormal development, is -repeated irregularly at various points along the surface of ordinary -consciousness. At one time it is the celestial movements calling for -the science of astronomy: at another the problem of dividing the soil -calling for the geometrician. Each of these outgrowths naturally -re-acts and modifies the whole range of human knowledge, or what we -may call popular science; and thus, while keeping up its own life, it -quickens the parent stock with an infusion of new vigour, and raises -the general intelligence to a higher level and into a higher element.</p> - -<p>The order of the outcome of the sciences in time, therefore, and their -connexions with one another, cannot be explained or understood, if we -look only to the sciences themselves. We must first of all descend -into the depths of natural thought, or of general culture,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> and trace -the lines which unite science with science in that general medium. The -systematic interdependence of the sciences must be chiefly sought for -in the workings of thought as a whole in its popular phases, and in the -action and reaction of that <i>general</i> human thought with the sciences, -those definite organisations of knowledge which form sporadically round -the <i>nuclei</i> here and there presented in what would superficially be -described as the inorganic mass and medium of popular knowledge. Thus, -by means of the sciences in their aggregate action, the material of -common consciousness is expanded and developed, at least in certain -parts, though the expansion may be neither consistent nor systematic. -But so long as this work is incomplete, so long, that is to say, as -every point in the line of popular knowledge has not received its due -elaboration and equal study, the sciences merely succeed each other in -a certain imperfect sequence, or exist in juxtaposition: they do not -form a total. The whole of scientific knowledge will only be formed, -when science shall be as completely rounded and unified, as in its -lower sphere and more inadequate element the ordinary consciousness of -the world is now.</p> - -<p>Up to a certain point the method of science is but the method of -ordinary consciousness pursued knowingly and steadily. But ere long -the method acquires a distinctive character of its own. It shakes -off the pressure of that immediate subservience in which ordinary -knowledge stands to man's needs, wishes and interests. Knowledge -is pursued—within a wide range—for its own sake, and by a class -more or less definitely set apart by humanity for its scientific -service,—which is thus performed more systematically and continuously. -But the great step which carries ordinary knowledge into its higher -region is the discovery, due to reflection<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> and comparison, that -there is a double grade of reality-a permanent, essential, uniform, -substantial being, which is contrasted with an evanescent, apparent, -varying and accidental. To know a thing is in all cases to <i>relate it</i> -to something else: to know it in the higher sense<i>—vere scire</i>—is -to relate it to its essence, its substantial or universal form, its -permanent self. Ordinary knowledge, e. g., fixes a thing by referring -to its antecedents: scientific knowledge refers it to its 'invariable, -'unconditional' or 'essential' antecedent,—to something which -contains it implicitly, and necessarily, and is not merely by accident -or juxtaposition associated with it. To discover this permanent, -underlying substance or reality comes to be the problem of science—a -problem which may be taken in the widest generality, or restricted -to some one group of existences. What is asked for, e.g., may be -the uniformity and essence in the appearance of the diurnal journey -of the sun, or it may be the underlying, invisible, nature which -displays itself in all the variety of minerals, and in animal and plant -life. The one-and-the-same in a diversity of many; the type-form in -individuals: the cause which is the key to understanding an effect that -always and unconditionally follows it; the force which finds different -expression in actions—are what Science seeks.</p> - -<p>In that search two points emerge as regards the method. The first is -the importance of quantitative statements or numerical appreciations, -and the general law that variations in the qualitative are in some -ratio concomitant with variations in the quantitative. Mathematics, -in a word, is found to be an invaluable instrument for recording -with accuracy the minutest as well as the most immense differences -of quality. First, it is seen that qualitative differences within a -given range, e.g. various colours or various musical notes, can be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> -accurately expressed by a numerical ratio. But, secondly, it soon -appears that even greater divergences of quality, e.g. those of colour -and of chemical quality, may possibly be reduced to stages on one -quantitative scale. It is not unnatural that such experiences should -give rise to a hope—and in sanguine minds, an assurance—that all the -phenomena of nature are ultimately phases of some common nature—some -elementary being—which runs through an infinite gamut of numerically -defined adjustments.</p> - -<p>But the numerical prepossession—as we may call it—creates another -assumption. Every number consists of units: every cube can be regarded -as an aggregation of smaller cubes, and in measurement is (implicitly -at least) so regarded. Transferring this to the physical world, every -object is regarded as a composite—a Large, made up by the addition -and juxtaposition of many (relatively) Littles. The essentials of the -composite are here the elements that compose it: these, by a natural -tendency, we proceed to conceive as remaining always unchanged, and -giving rise by their peculiar juxtaposition to certain perceptions in -the human being. You whirl rapidly a blazing piece of wood, and instead -of a discontinuous series of flashes you see one orbit of luminous -matter: or, let falling rain-drops take up a particular position in -reference to your eyes and the sun, and a rainbow is visible. In both -cases there is what may be called an illusion—the illusion, above -all, of unity and continuity. Now what is in these cases obviously -and demonstrably seen, is, as Leibniz in particular has reminded us, -the general law of all matter as such. In the extended and material -world there is nowhere a real unity discoverable. The small is made -up of the smaller <i>ad infinitum</i><a name="FNanchor_1_34" id="FNanchor_1_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_34" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>. But the conclusion<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> (which -Leibniz drew)—that unity belongs only to v,' Monads and never by any -possibility to a material substance, was not that commonly reached -or accepted. There are—or there must be,—said the prevalent creed, -ultimates, indivisibles, indecomposables, simples, atoms. These are the -final bricks of reality, out of which the apparent universe is built: -each with a maximum,—a <i>ne plus ultra</i>—of resistibility, hardness, -fullness, and unsqueezable bulk.</p> - -<p>Into further details of these ultimate irreducibles we need not enter. -It is sufficient to denote the general purport of the conception, and -the tendency it implies.</p> - -<p>In these ultimates supreme reality is understood to lie; and on them -at last, and indeed always, rests whatever reality truly exists in -any object. All else is secondary—and, comparatively speaking, -illusory,—unreal. Any phenomena that may be noted only affect the -surface or show of these reals: the inner reality continues one -and unchanged. Outside them, around them, is the void—emptiness, -non-entity. Yet null and void as it may be, we may, in passing, -reply,—this circumambient is the source of all that gives these -masses of atoms any distinctive reality—any character of true being. -Space may be empty enough,—a mere spectre-shell; and yet it is their -differences in spatial circumstance that bring out and actualise what -they implicitly are. These '<i>individua</i>' these units of reality, these -atoms, are real and knowable only in their relations. So too Time may -be contemptuously treated as a passive receptacle: yet it is only by -its connexions in the past and the future that the present moment has -any actuality it may claim. And time and space are potent agencies—in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> -popular mode of utterance—whatever the mechanical philosophy may say.</p> - -<p>But all of these relations are in the realm of unreality. The atoms -alone <i>are</i>: and yet the void, which ought <i>not</i> to <i>be,</i> in an -unmistakable way <i>is</i> also. To this mysterious vacuum which lies -outside (and yet not outside) reality, to this not-being which <i>is,</i> -there can only be given a half-negative and baffling name. Let it -be called Chance—or let it be called Necessity; let it be called -inexplicable Law of co-existence and sequence,—the Force which is the -beginning of motion. It is the ultimate key to the mystery—but it is -at least a key which no human hand can use, or even lay hold of. It is -enough for science if, leaving this ultimate inexplicability untouched, -it trace in each separate instance the exact equation between the sum -of the constituents and the total which they compose,—if it prove that -the several items when put together exactly give the sum proposed. -Identification—the establishment of quantitative equations—is the -work of science. Identity is its canon, working on the presumption -or axiom that there can be nothing in the result which was not in -the antecedents or conditions. <i>Ex nihilo nihil fit.</i> The quantity -of energy must always be the same, though its phases may vary, or -temporarily avoid detection. Matter, i.e. the ultimate reality, is -indestructible. In short, the method of analysis and synthesis, as that -of addition and subtraction, is a calculus which takes the form of an -equation.</p> - -<p>So far the inorganic, inanimate world has been mainly in view. If we -now turn to the organisms, we find the popular creed expressed in the -adage <i>Omne vivum e vivo.</i> No eye has ever seen—though fanatical -observers have sometimes so deluded themselves as to think they saw—a -living being directly emerge from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> inorganic stuff. The saner student -of physiology contents himself with leaving for the while the crux of -the genesis of Life, and examining only the building up of the living -creature out of its constituents. Here the atom is called the cell: -every organism is a synthesis of cells, and in the cell we have the -primary element of organic reality: <i>Omnis cellula e cellula,</i> In the -atom we have the ultimate element; in the cell a relative element,—the -absolute beginning of a new order of things,—which we may, if we -like, choose to treat (though only for logical simplicity's sake) as a -gradual development from the other and more primitive, but which, so -far as experience and history teach, is equally ultimate in its kind. -But be the final constituent (physical) atom, or (physiological) cell, -the relation of these constituents is at first conceived by science -only as composition, or mechanical synthesis. It is only gradually -that science begins to have doubts as to the inviolability and -unalterableness of the elements. When the idea—not altogether new—of -a 'latent meta-schematism' and latent process within the constituents -is entertained and carried out in earnest, science has passed on to a -new stage: from mechanical atomism to a dynamic and organic theory of -existence. And the governing ideas of scientific logic have then ceased -to be co-existence, and sequence, correlation and composition: the new -category is intus-susception, development, adaptation not only external -but internal.</p> - -<p><i>Divide et impera</i> is the motto of Science. To isolate one thing -or one group of facts from its context,—to penetrate beneath the -apparent simplicity, which time and custom have taught ordinary eyes -to see in the concrete object, to the multitude of underlying simple -elements,—to leave everything extraneous out of sight,—to abolish the -teleology which imposes upon Nature<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> a permanent tribute (direct or -indirect) towards the supply of human wants,—and to take, as it were, -one thing at a time and study it for itself disinterestedly; that is -the problem of the sciences. And to accomplish that end they do not -hesitate to break the charmed links which in common vision hold the -world together,—to disregard the spiritual harmony which the sense of -beauty finds in the scene,—to strip off the relations of means and -end, which reflection has thrown from thing to thing, and the sensuous -atmosphere of so-called 'secondary' qualities in which human sense has -enveloped each; and finally to sever its connexion by which</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'the whole round world is every way<br /> -Bound by gold chains about the feet of God.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>In those days when reflection had not set in,—when humanity had not -yet found itself a stranger in the house of Nature, and had not yet -dared to regard her as a mere automatic slave, men had no doubts as to -the meaning of things. They lived sympathetically her life.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 2.5em;">'Man, once descried, imprints for ever</span><br /> -His presence on all lifeless things: the winds<br /> -Are henceforth voices, wailing or a shout,<br /> -A querulous mutter, or a quick gay laugh.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>To the extent of his abilities and his culture, indeed man has in all -ages read himself into the phenomena external to him. Such readings, in -times when he feared and loved his kinsfolk of Nature, were fetichism -and anthropomorphism. Gradually, however, forgetting his community, he -claimed to be the measure and master of all things: to decree their use -and function. But in course of time, when the sciences had emancipated -themselves from the yoke of philosophy, they refused to borrow any such -help in reading the riddle of the universe, and resolved to begin, -<i>ab ovo</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> from the atom or cell, and leave the elements to work out -their own explanation. Modern science in so doing practises the lessons -learned from Spinoza and Hume. The former teaches that all conception -of order, i. e. of adaptation and harmony in nature, and indeed all -the methods by which nature is popularly explained, are only modes of -our emotional imagination, betraying how imperfect has been in most -of us the emancipation of human intellect from the servitude to the -affections<a name="FNanchor_2_35" id="FNanchor_2_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_35" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>. The latter points out that all connexions between things -are solely mental associations, ingrained habits of expectation, the -work of time and custom, accredited only by experience<a name="FNanchor_3_36" id="FNanchor_3_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_36" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>. There must -be no pre-suppositions allowed in the studies of science, no help -derived prematurely from the later terms in the process to elucidate -the earlier. Let man, it is said, be explained by those laws, and by -the action of those primary elements which build up every other part -of nature: let molecules by mechanical union construct the thinking -organism, and then construct society. The elements which we find by -analysis must be all that is required to make the synthesis. Thus in -modern times science carries out, fully and with the details of actual -knowledge in several branches, the principles of the atom and the void, -which Democritus suggested.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span></p> - -<p>The scientific spirit, however, the spirit of analysis and abstraction -(or of 'Mediation' and 'Reflection'), is not confined in its -operations to the physical world. The criticism of ordinary beliefs -and conventions has been applied—and applied at an earlier period—to -what has been called the Spiritual world, to Art, Religion, Morality, -and the institutions of human Society. Under these names the agency of -ages, acting by their individual minds, has created organic systems, -unities which have claimed to be permanent, inviolable, and divine. -Such unities or organic structures are the Family, the State, the works -of Art, the forms, doctrines, and systems of Religion, existing and -recognised in ordinary consciousness. But in these cases, as in Nature, -the reflective principle may come forward and ask what right these -unities have to exist. This is the question which the 'Encyclopaedic,' -the 'Aufklärung,' the 'Rationalist' and 'Freethinking' theories, -raise and have raised in the last century and the present. What is -the Family, it is said, but a fiction or convention, which is used to -give a decent, but somewhat transparent covering to a certain animal -appetite, and its probable consequences? What is the State, and what -is Society, but a fiction or compact, by which the weak try to make -themselves seem strong, and the unjust seek to shelter themselves from -the consequences of their own injustice? What is Religion, it is said, -but a delusion springing from the fears and weakness of the crowd, and -the cunning of the few, which men have fostered until it has wrapped -humanity in its snaky coils? And Poetry, we are assured, like its -sister Arts, will perish and its illusions fade away, when Science, -now in the cradle, has become the full-grown Hercules. As for Morality -and Law, and the like, the same condemnation has been prepared from -of old.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> All of them, it is said, are but the inventions of power and -craft, or the phantoms of human imagination, which the strength of -positive science and bare facts is destined in no long time to dispel.</p> - -<p>When they insisted upon a severance of the elements in the -vulgarly-accepted unities of the world, Science and Freethinking, like -Epicurus in an older day, have believed that they were liberating the -world from its various superstitions, from the bonds which instinct -and custom had fastened upon things so as to combine them into systems -more or less arbitrary. They denied the supremacy and reality of those -ideas which insist on the essential unity and self-sameness in things -that visibly and tangibly have a separate existence of their own, and -branded these ideas comprehensively as mysticism and metaphysics. -They sought to disabuse us of spirits, vital forces, divine right of -governments, final causes, <i>et hoc genus omne.</i> They were exceedingly -jealous for the independence of the individual, and for his right to -demand satisfaction for the questioning, ground-seeking faculty of -his nature. But while they did so they hardly realised how entirely -the spectator is the part, the product of what he surveys, and while -surveying treats as if it were but a spot or mark on the circumference -of the circle that lies—some way off—around him. 'Phenomenalism,' as -this mode of looking at things has been called, is false to life, and -would cut away the ground from philosophy.<a name="FNanchor_4_37" id="FNanchor_4_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_37" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>To some extent philosophy returns to the position of the wider -consciousness, to the general belief in harmony and symmetry. It -reverts to the unity or connexion, which the natural presumptions of -mankind find in the picture of the world. The <i>nolo philosophari</i> -of the intuitivist, in reaction from the supposed excesses<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> of the -sciences, simply reverted to the bare re-statement of the popular -creed. If science, e. g., had shown that the perception of an -external world pre-supposed for its accomplishment an unsuspected -series of intermediate steps, the mere intuitivist simply denied -the intermediation by appealing to Common Sense, or to the natural -instincts and primary beliefs of mankind. Conviction and natural -instinct were declared to counterbalance the abstractions of science. -But philosophy which seeks to comprehend existence cannot take the -same ground as the intuitional school, or neglect the testimony of -science. If the spiritual unity of the world has been denied and lost -to sight, mere assertion that we feel and own its pervading power will -not do much good. It is necessary to reconcile the contrast between -the wholeness of the natural vision, and the fragmentary, but in its -fragments elaborated, result of science.</p> - -<p>The sciences break up the rough generalisations or vulgar concepts of -everyday use, and make their fixed distinctions yield to analysis. -They thus render continuous things which were looked at as only -separate. But they tend again to substitute the results of their -analysis as a new and permanent distinction and principle of things. -They are like revolutionists who upset and perturb an old order, and -set up a new and minuter tyranny in its place. Gradually, the general -culture, the average educated intelligence gathers up the fruit of -scientific research into the total development of humanity: and uses -the work of science to fill up the <i>lacunae,</i> the gaps, which make -popular consciousness so irregular and disconnected. A sort of popular -philosophy comes to sum up and estimate what science has accomplished: -and therein is as it were the spirit of the world taking into his own -hand the acquisitions won by the more audacious and self-willed of -his sons,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> and investing them in the common store. They are set aside -and preserved there, at first in an abstract and technical form, but -destined soon to pass into the possession of all, and form that mass of -belief and instinctive or implanted knowledge whence a new generation -will draw its mental supplies. Each great scientific discovery is in -its turn reduced to a part of the common stock. It leaves the technical -field, and spreads into the common life of men, becoming embodied in -their daily beliefs,—a seed of thought, from which, by the agency of -intelligent experience, new increments of science will one day spring.</p> - -<p>Philosophy properly so called is also the unification of science, -but in a new sphere, a higher medium not recognised by the sciences -themselves. The reconciliation which the philosopher believes himself -to accomplish between ordinary consciousness and science is identified -by either side with a phase of its antagonist error. Science will -term philosophy a modified form of the old religious superstition. -The popular consciousness of truth, and especially religion, will -see in philosophy only a repetition or an aggravation of the evils -of science. The attempt at unity will not approve itself to either, -until they enter upon the ground which philosophy occupies, and move -in that element. And that elevation into the philosophic ether calls -for a tension of thought which is the sternest labour imposed upon -man: so that the continuous action of philosophising has been often -styled superhuman. If anywhere, it is in pure philosophy that proof -becomes impossible, unless for those who are willing to think for -themselves<a name="FNanchor_5_38" id="FNanchor_5_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_38" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. The philosophic lesson cannot be handed on to a mere -recipient: the result, when cut off from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> the process which produced -it, vanishes like the palace in the fairy tale.</p> - -<p>'The whole of philosophy is nothing but the study of the specific -forms or types of unity.<a name="FNanchor_6_39" id="FNanchor_6_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_39" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> There are many species and grades of this -unity. They are not merely to be enumerated and asserted in a vague -way, as they here and there force themselves upon the notice of the -popular mind. Philosophy sees in that unity neither an ultimate and -unanalysable fact, nor a deception, but a growth (which is also a -struggle), a revealing or unfolding, which issues in an organism or -system, constructing itself more and more completely by a force of its -own. This system formed by these types of the fundamental unity is -called the 'Idea,' of which the highest law is development. Philosophy -essays to do for this connective and unifying nature, i. e. for the -thought in things, something like what the sciences have done or -would like to do for the facts of sense and matter,—to do for the -spiritual binding-element in its integrity, what is being done for -the several facts which are more or less combined. It retraces the -universe of thought from its germinal form, where it seems, as it were, -an indecomposable point, to the fully matured system or organism, and -shows not merely that one phase of pure thought passes into another, -but how it does so, and yet is not lost, but subsists suspended and -deprived of its narrowness in the maturer phase.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_34" id="Footnote_1_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_34"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Leibniz, ed. Gerhardt, iii. 507: 'Les atomes sont l'effet -de la foiblesse de nostre imagination, qui aime à se reposer et à se -hater à venir à une fin dans les sous-divisions et analyses: il n'en -est pas ainsi dans la nature qui vient de l'infini et va à l'infini.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_35" id="Footnote_2_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_35"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Spinoza, <i>Ethica,</i> i. 36, App. '<i>Quoniam ea nobis prae -ceteris grata sunt quae facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem -confusioni praeferunt; quasi ordo aliquid in natura praeter respectum -ad nostram imaginationem esset... Videmus itaque omnes rationes quibus -vulgus solet naturam explicare modos esse tantummodo imaginandi.</i>' Cf. -<i>Eth.</i> iv. praef.: Epist. xxxii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_36" id="Footnote_3_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_36"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> 'This transition of thought from the Cause to the Effect -proceeds not from Reason. It derives its origin altogether from -Custom and Experience.' Hume, Essay V. (Enquiry concerning Human -Understanding.) 'All inferences from Experience therefore are effects -of Custom.' (Ibid.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_37" id="Footnote_4_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_37"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> J. Grote, <i>Exploratio Philosophica.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_38" id="Footnote_5_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_38"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Cf. vol. ii. p. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_39" id="Footnote_6_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_39"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Philosophie der Religion,</i> i. p. 97: 'Die ganze -Philosophie ist nichts Anderes als das Studium der Bestimmungen der -Einheit.' See especially <i>Encycl.</i> § 573 (Philosophy of Mind, pp. 192 -seqq.).</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER VII.</h5> - - -<h4>ANTICIPATORY SKETCH OF THE SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY.</h4> - - -<p>The psychology of the Greeks has to all appearance given the mere -intellect an undue pre-eminence, if it has not even treated it as man's -essential self. Whether the appearance is altogether sound might be -a profitable inquiry for those who most criticise it. At any rate, a -later psychology has taught us to regard man as at once a cognitive, an -emotional, and a volitional being. It has arrived at this conclusion as -it looked at the division that parted off the systems of science from -the sphere of conduct and social life, and both from the inner life of -sentiment, of love, admiration and reverence. And the inference was -justifiable, in the same way as Plato's when, as he surveyed the triple -sphere into which the outward world of his contemporary society was -divided, he concluded a triplicity of the soul. If it was justifiable, -it was also, as in his case, somewhat misleading. In the outward -manifestation, where the letters are posted up on a gigantic scale, -one tends to forget that they only spell one word. Their difference -and distance seem increased, and we fail to note that, though there -are three aspects, yet there is only one power or soul, which exhibits -itself under one or other of the three tones or modes. In the actual -human being, cognition is always of some emotional<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> interest and always -leads up to some practical result. From different points of view one or -other is occasionally declared to be primary and original; the others -derivative and secondary. At any rate we may say that in the ordinary -human being who is still in the garden of preparation and has not yet -stepped forth on one of the separate routes of life, his knowledge, his -emotional and his active life are in a tolerable harmony, and that each -in its little development is constantly followed by the other.</p> - -<p>But with the outward differentiation an inward went hand in hand. In -some cases the intellectual or scientific, in others the emotional, in -others the active faculties became predominant. Human nature in order -to attain all its completeness had first of all, as it were, to lose -its life in order to gain it. The individual had to sacrifice part of -his all-sided development in order that he might gain it again, and -in a larger measure, through the medium of society. This process is -the process of civilisation: the long and, as it often seems, weary -road by which man can only realise himself by self-sacrifice: can only -reach unity through the way of diversity, and must die to live. It is a -process in which it is but too easy to notice only one stage and speak -of it as if it were the whole. It is possible sometimes to identify -civilisation with the material increase in the means of producing -enjoyment, or with the progress of scientific teaching as to the laws -of those material phenomena on which material civilisation is largely -dependent. It is possible sometimes to take as its test the stores of -artistic works, and the extension of a lively and delicate love of all -that is beautiful and tasteful. One may identify it with a high-toned -moral life, and with an orderly social system. Or one may maintain that -the real civilisation of a country presupposes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> a lofty conception and -reverent attitude to the supreme source of all that is good, and true, -and beautiful.</p> - -<p>The question is important as bearing on the relation of philosophy to -the special sciences. Philosophy is sometimes identified with the sum -of sciences: sometimes with their complete unification. Philosophy, -says a modern, is knowledge completely unified. It is of course to some -extent a question of words in what sense a term is to be defined. And -no one will dispute that the scientific element is in point of form the -most conspicuous aspect of philosophy. Yet if we look at the historical -use of the term, one or two considerations suggest themselves. -Philosophy, said an ancient, is the knowledge of things human and -divine. Again and again, it has claimed for its task to be a guide and -chart of human life—to reveal the form of good and of beauty. But to -do this, it must be more than a mere science, or than a mere system -of the sciences. Again, it has been urged by modern critics that Kant -at last discovered for philosophy her true province—the study of the -conditions and principles of human knowledge. But though epistemology -is all-important, the science of knowledge is not identical with -philosophy: nor did Kant himself think it was. Rather his view is on -the whole in accord with what he has called the 'world's (as opposed -to the scholar's) conception of philosophy<a name="FNanchor_1_40" id="FNanchor_1_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_40" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>,' as the science of the -bearing of all ascertainable truths on the essential aims of human -reason—<i>teleologia humanae rationis</i>,—in accord, too, with the -world's conception of the philosopher as no mere logician, but the -legislator of human reason.</p> - -<p>This, it need hardly be added, is the conception of philosophy which -is implicitly the basis of Hegel's use. Let us hear Schelling. 'A -philosophy which in its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> principle is not already religion is no true -philosophy<a name="FNanchor_2_41" id="FNanchor_2_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_41" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>.'</p> - -<p>Or again, as to the place of Ethics: 'Morality is Godlike disposition, -an uplifting above the influence of the concrete into the realm of the -utterly universal. Philosophy is a like elevation, and for that reason -intimately one with morality, not through subordination, but through -essential and inner likeness<a name="FNanchor_3_42" id="FNanchor_3_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_42" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>.' But, again, it has more than once -been felt that philosophy is kindred with Art. It has been said—not -as a compliment—that philosophy is only a form of gratifying the -aesthetic instincts. Schopenhauer has suggested—as a novelty—that -the true way to philosophy was not by science, but through Art. And -Schelling before him had—while asserting the inner identity of the -two—even gone so far as to assert<a name="FNanchor_4_43" id="FNanchor_4_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_43" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> that 'Art is the sole, true and -eternal organon as well as the ostensible evidence of philosophy.'</p> - -<p>Philosophy, therefore, is one of a triad in which the human spirit has -tried to raise itself above its limitations and to become god-like. And -philosophy is the climax; Art the lowest; Religion in the mean. But -this does not mean that Religion supersedes Art, and that Philosophy -supersedes religion; or, if we retain the term 'supersede,' we must add -that the superseded is not left behind and passed aside: it is rather -an integral constituent of what takes its place. Philosophy is true and -adequate only as it has given expression to all that religion had or -aimed at. So, too, Religion is not the destruction of Art: though here -the attitude may often seem to be more obviously negative. A religion -which has no place for art is, again, no true religion. And thus again, -Philosophy becomes a reconciler of Art and Religion: of the visible -ideal and the invisible God.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> Art, on the other hand, is a foretaste -and a prophecy of religion and philosophy.</p> - -<p>But Art, Religion, and Philosophy, again, rest upon, grow out of, and -are the fulfilment of an ethical society-a state of human life where an -ordered commonwealth in outward visibility is animated and sustained by -the spirit of freedom and self-realisation. And that public objective -existence of social humanity in its turn reposes on the will and -intelligence of human beings, of souls which in various relations -of discipline and interaction with their environment have become -free-agents, and have risen to be more than portions of the physical -world, sympathetic with its changes, and become awake to themselves and -their surroundings. Such is the mental or spiritual life as it rises to -full sense of its power, recognises its kindred with the general life, -carries out that kindred in its social organisation, and at length -through the strength social union gives floats boldly in the empyrean -of spiritual life, in art, religion, and philosophy.</p> - -<p>But, what about the special relationship of philosophy to the sciences? -Undoubtedly the philosophers of the early years of the century -have used lordly language in reference to the sciences. They have -asserted—from Fichte downwards—that the philosophical construction, -of the universe must justify itself to itself—must be consistent, -continuous, and coherent—and that it had not to wait for experience -to give it confirmation. Even the cautious Kant<a name="FNanchor_5_44" id="FNanchor_5_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_44" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> had gone so far -as to assert that the 'understanding gives us nature'—i. e. as he -explains, <i>natura formaliter spectata</i>, viz., the order and regularity -in the phenomena—that it is the source of the laws of nature and -of its formal unity. The so-called proofs of natural laws are only -instances and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> exemplifications, which no more <i>prove</i> them, than we -prove that 6 x 4 = 24, because 6 yards of cloth at 4s. must be paid -for by 24 shillings. To assert that this instance is no proof, is -not to reject experience—still less to refuse respect to the new -discoveries of science. But it is unquestionably to assert that there -is something prior to the sciences—prior, i. e. in the sense that Kant -speaks of the <i>a priori,</i> something which is fundamental to them, and -constitutes them what they are—something which is assumed as real if -their syntheses (and every scientific truth is a synthesis) are to be -possible. The analysis and exhibition in its organic completeness of -this Kantian <i>a priori</i> is the theme of the Hegelian Logic.</p> - -<p>The Philosophy of Nature stands in the Hegelian system between Logic -and Mental or Spiritual Philosophy. Man—intelligent, moral, religious -and artistic man—rests upon the basis of natural existence: he -is the child of the earth, the offspring of natural organisation. -But Nature itself—such is the hypothesis of the system—is only -intelligible as the reflex of that <i>a priori</i> which has been -exhibited in Logic. The whole scheme by which the natural world is -scientifically held together, apprehended by ordinary consciousness -and elaborated by mathematical analysis, presupposes the organism -of the categories—these fundamental habits of thought or form of -conception which are the framework of the existence we know. Yet -Nature never shows this intelligible world—the Idea—in its purity -and entirety. In the half-literal, half-figurative phrases of Hegel, -Nature shows the Idea beside itself, out of its mind, alienated, <i>non -compos mentis.</i> 'It is a mad world, my masters,' 'The impotence of -nature<i>—Ohnmacht der Natur</i><a name="FNanchor_6_45" id="FNanchor_6_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_45" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>—is a frequent phrase, by which he -indicates the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> a-logical, if not illogical, character of the physical -world. Here we come across the negation of mind: chance plays its part: -contingency is everywhere. If you expect that the physical universe -will <i>display</i> unquestioning obedience to the laws of reason and of the -higher logic, you will be disappointed. What you <i>see</i> is fragmentary, -chaotic, irregular. To the bodily sense—even when that sense has been -rendered more penetrating by all the many material and methodical -aids of advanced civilisation—the Idea is in the natural world -presented only in traces, indications, portions, which it requires a -well-prepared mind to descry, still more to unite. Yet at the same -time the indications of that unity are everywhere, and the hypothesis -of the logical scheme or organisation of the Idea is the only theory -which seems fully to correspond with the data. Nature<a name="FNanchor_7_46" id="FNanchor_7_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_46" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>, says Hegel, -is the Idea as it shows itself in sense-perception, not as it shows -itself in thought. In thought a clear all-comprehending total; in sense -a baffling fragment. The Idea—the unity of life and knowledge—is -everywhere in nature, but nowhere clearly, or whole, or otherwise -than a glimpse; not a logical scheme or compact theory. Nature is the -sensible in which the intelligible is bound—the reality which is the -vehicle of the ideal. But the ideal treasure is held in rough and -fragile receptacles which half disclose and half conceal the light -within. Nature in short contains, but disguised, the idea, in fainter -and clearer evidences: it is the function of man, by his scientific -intelligence and ethical work, building up a social organisation, -to provide the ground on which the ultimate significance and true -foundation of the world may be deciphered, guessed, or believed, or -imaginatively presented. The verification of the guess or deciphering,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> -of course, lies in its adequacy to explain and colligate the facts. -The true method and true conception is that which needs no subsequent -adjustments—no epicycles to make it work—which is no mere hypothesis -useful for subjective arrangement, but issues with uncontrollable force -and self-evidence from the facts.</p> - -<p>What Hegel has called the 'impotence of nature,' Schopenhauer has -styled the irrational Will, and it is from that end, so to speak, that -Schopenhauer's philosophy begins. Nature—the basis of all things—the -fundamental prius—is an irresistible and irregular appetite or craving -to be, to do, to live,—but an <i>appetitus</i> or <i>nisus</i> which ascends -from grade to grade—from mere mechanical forces acting in movement up -to the highest form of animal activity. But as this 'Will' or blind -lust of being and instinct of life gets above the inorganic world, and -manifests itself in the animal organism, there emerges a new order of -existence—the intellect, or the ideal world. Seen from the underside, -indeed, all that has appeared now in the animal is a brain and a -nerve-system—a new species of matter. But there is another side to the -Mind which has thus awakened out of the sleep of natural forces. This -intellect is unaware and can never be made aware that it is a child of -nature: it acknowledges no superior, and no beginning or end in time. -Its natal day is infinitely beyond the age when the cosmic process -began its race; before stars gathered their masses of luminosity, and -the earth received the first germs of life. As the genius of Art, it -arrests the toiling struggle of existence to produce new forms and -destroy old ones; it sets free in typical forms of eternal beauty -the great ideas that nature vainly seeks to embody, and as moral and -religious life its aim is to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> annihilate the craving and the lust for -more and ever more being and to enter in passionless and calm union -with the One-and-All.</p> - -<p>Thus it is, if not absurd, at least misleading, to speak of Hegel's -system as Panlogism. Strictly speaking, it is only of the Logic -that this is the proper name: there, unquestionably, reason is all -and in all. Yet to hold that reason is the very life and centre of -things is for philosophy the cardinal article—the postulate which -must inspire her first and last steps and guide her throughout. But -the Logical Idea, if put at the beginning, is at first only put as a -presupposition, which it is the task of human intelligence to work -out and organise. If it be the key which is to explain nature and -render it intelligible, it is a key which has only been gained in the -process—the long process—by which man has risen from his natural -origin—never however parting company with it—to survey and comprehend -himself and his setting. The faculty of 'pure thinking,' which is the -pre-condition of Logical study, is the result of a gradual development -in which animal sense has grown, and metamorphosed, and worked itself -up to be a free intelligence and a good will capable of discerning -and fulfilling the universal and the eternal. Thus in the Logic the -system constructs the pure Idea—the ideal timeless organisation of -thoughts or λόγοι on which all knowledge of reality rests—the diamond -net which suffers nothing to escape its meshes: in the Philosophy of -Nature it tries to put together in unity and continuity the phases -and partial aspects which the physical universe presents in graduated -exemplification of the central truth: and in the Philosophy of Mind it -traces the steps by which a merely natural being becomes the moral and -aesthetic idealist in whom man approaches deity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span></p> - -<p>It is indeed Hegel's fundamental axiom that actuality is reasonable. -But the actuality is not the appearance—the temporary phases—the -succession of event: it is the appearance rooted in its essence—the -succession concentrated (yet not lost) in its unity. There is room -for much so-called irrationality within these ranges. For, when -human beings pronounce something irrational, they only mean that -their practical intelligence would have adopted other methods to -arrive at certain conclusions. They judge, in fact, by their limited -understandings and not <i>ex ordine universi.</i> Hegel's doctrine is after -all only another way of stating the maintenance of the fittest; and -it is liable to the v same misconception by those who employ their -personal aims as the standards of judgment.</p> - -<p>So too there is reason—there is the Idea—in Nature. But it is -there only for the artist, the religious man, and the philosopher; -and they see it respectively by the eye of genius, by the power of -faith, by the thought of reason. They see it from the standpoint -of the absolute<i>—sub specie quadam aeternitatis.</i> It is therefore -a recalcitrant matter in which Nature presents the Idea: or, if -recalcitrant suggests a positive opposition, let us say rather a realm -in which the Idea fails to come out whole and clear, where unity has to -be forced upon and read into the facts. Science, says one writer, is -an ideal construction: it implies an abstraction from irregularities -and inequalities: it smoothes and sublimates the rough and imperfect -material into a more rounded and perfect whole. Its object, which it -terms a reality, is a non-sensible, imperceptible reality: what one -might as well call an ideality, were it not that here again the popular -imagination twists the word into a subjective sense to mean the private -and personal ideas of the student.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span></p> - -<p>But the obvious individual reality never quite in its obviousness -equals the 'golden mediocrity' of the ideal. Its myriad grapes must be -crushed to yield the wine of the spirit.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'It's a lifelong toil till our lump be leavened'<br /> -</p> - -<p>—till the ore be transformed into the fine gold. But the gold is -there, and in the great laboratory of <i>natura</i> <i>naturans</i> is the -principle and agent of its own purification. 'Nature is made better by -no mean, but nature makes that mean'—for nature is spirit in disguise.</p> - -<p>It is on this side that a certain analogy of Hegel's and Schelling's -philosophy of nature with the Romantic school comes out. Nature -is felt, as it were, to be spirit-haunted, to give glimpses of a -solidarity, a design, a providentiality, which runs counter to that -general outward indifference in which part seems to have settled beside -part, each utterly indifferent to the other. Romance is the unexpected -coincidence, the sudden jumping together of what seemed set worlds -apart and utterly alien. It was the sense of this Romance which wove -its wild legends of nymph and cobold, of faun and river-god, of imp and -fairy, wielding the powers of the elements and guiding the life of even -the so-called inanimate world. But it is no less the theme of the fairy -tale of science. Even in the austere demonstrations of geometry, and -the constructions of mechanics, the un-looked-for slips upon us with -gipsy tread. Who has not—in his early studies of mathematics—been -fain to marvel at the almost unexpected consilience of property with -property in a figure, suddenly placing in almost 'eery' relief the -conjunction of what was apparently poles asunder? It is not a mere -form of words to speak of beautiful properties of a conic section or -a curve. Custom perhaps has blunted our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> sense for the symmetries of -celestial dynamics, but they are none the less admirable, because we -are otherwise engrossed. To the first generation of our century the -phenomena of chemistry, magnetism and electricity appealed—as they -have never since done—with a tangible demonstration of that <i>appetitus -ad invicem,</i> that instinct of union Bacon speaks of; and this time in -a higher form than in mere mechanism. Polarity—the bifurcation of -reality into a pair of opposites which yet sought their complement -in each other—eternally dividing only eternally to unite, and thus -only to exist—became a process pressed into general service. Lastly, -what more admirable than that adaptation of the individual to the -environment—and of the environment to the individual—of the organs in -him to his total, and of his total to his organs. One in all and All in -one: one life in perpetual transformation, animals, plants, and earth -and air; one organism, developing in absolute coherence. This was the -vision which the genius of Schelling and his contemporaries saw—the -same vision which, by accumulation of facts and pictorial history, -Darwin and his disciples have impressed in some measure even on the -dullest.</p> - -<p>But there is a profound difference between the spirit of a Philosophy -of Nature and the aggregate of the physical sciences. Each science -takes the particular quarry which accident or providence has assigned -to it, and does its best to 'put out' every piece of rock it contains. -But it seldom goes, unless by constraint, and in these days of -specialisation it does so less and less, to examine the neighbouring -excavation, and see if there be any connexion between the strata. Even -within its own domain it is ashamed to put forward too much parade of -system. Its method is often like that of the showman in the travelling -menagerie: 'And<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> now, please pass to the next carriage.' It respects -the compartmental arrangement into which it finds the world broken up, -and often thinks it has deserved well if it has filled the compartment -fuller than before, or succeeded in creating a few sub-compartments -within the old bounds. Even the so-called mental and moral sciences -when they lose their philosophical character tend to imitate these -features. Yet in every science there is an outlook and an outlet, -for whosoever has the will and the power, to emerge from his narrow -domain on the open fields and free prospect into the first fountains -and last great ocean of being. Always, and not least in our own day, -the physicist, the chemist, the physiologist, the psychologist, the -sociologist, and the economist, have made their special field a -platform where they might discourse <i>de omnibus rebus,</i> and become -for the nonce philosophers and metaphysicians. It would be a silly -intolerance and a misconception of the situation to exclaim <i>Ne sutor -ultra crepidam</i>. In the organic system of things 'each "moment" even -independent of the whole is the whole; and to see this is to penetrate -to the heart of the thing.' We need hardly go to Hegel to be told that -to know one thing thoroughly well is to know all things. The finite, -which we inertly rest content with, would, if we were in full sympathy -with it, open up its heart and show us the infinite. And yet if the -specialist when he rises from his shoe-making, with a heart full of -the faith that 'there is nothing like leather,' should proclaim his -discovery of it in regions where it was hitherto unsurmised, one may -smile incredulous and be no cynic.</p> - -<p>Philosophy then keeps open eye and ear—as far as may be no doubt for -the finer shades and delicate details—but essentially for the music -of humanity and the music of the spheres—for the general<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> purpose and -drift of all sciences—from mathematics to sociology—as they help to -make clear the life of nature and further the emancipation of man. It -will seem occasionally to over-emphasise the continuity of science -and to make light of its distinctions: it will seem occasionally more -anxious as to the order than as to the contents of the sciences: it -will remind the sciences of the hypothetical and formal character of -much of their method and some of their principles: and sometimes will -treat as unimportant, results on which the mere scholar or dogmatist -of science lays great weight. From his habit of dealing with the -limitations and mutual implication of principles and conceptions, -the philosopher will often be able—and perhaps only too willing—to -point out cases where the mere specialist has allowed himself to -attribute reality to his abstraction. He will tell the analyst of -the astronomical motions that he must not take the distinction of -centrifugal and centripetal force, into which mechanics disintegrate -the planetary orbit, as if it really meant that the planet was pulled -inward by one force and sent on spinning forward by another<a name="FNanchor_8_47" id="FNanchor_8_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_47" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>. And -the scientist, proud of his mathematics, will resent and laugh at -the philosopher who lets fall a word about the planets moving in -grand independence like 'blessed gods.' The philosopher will hint to -the chemist that his formulae of composition and decomposition of -bodies are, as he uses them, somewhat mythological, picturing water -as atom of oxygen locked up with atom of hydrogen; and the chemist -will go away muttering something about a fool who does not believe -in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> well-ascertained chemical truth that water is composed of -these two gases. If the philosopher further hints that it is not the -highest ideal of a chemical science to be content with enumerating -fifty or sixty elements, and detecting their several properties -and affinities<a name="FNanchor_9_48" id="FNanchor_9_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_48" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>; that it would be well to find some principle of -gradation, some unity or law which brought meaning into meaningless -juxtaposition, the mere dogmatist, whose chemistry is his living and -who shrinks from disendowment, will scent a propensity towards the -heresy which sinks all elements in one. And yet, even among chemists, -the instinct for law and unity begins to demand satisfaction.</p> - -<p>A still richer store of amazing paradox and perplexing analogies awaits -anyone who will turn over the volume in Hegel's <i>Werke</i> (vii. i) and -select the plums which lie thick in the lecture-notes. He will find -a great deal—and probably more, the less he really knows of any of -the subjects under discussion—that he cannot make head or tail of: -language where he cannot guess whether it should be taken literally or -figuratively. For Hegel seriously insists on the essential unity and -identity of all the compartments of the physical universe; he will not -keep time and space on one level, matter and motion on another, and -senses, suns, plants, passions, all in their proper province. Going -far beyond the theory which supposes that all the complex difference -of organisation has grown up in endless, endless ages from a primitive -indistinctness, so that the gap of time acts as a wall to keep early -and late apart, Hegel insists upon their essential unity to-day. And -that sounds hard—the herald of anarchy, of the collapse of the ordered -polity of the scientific state. It is no doubt probable that Hegel, -like other men, made mistakes; that he over-estimated the supposed -discoveries of the day: that he indulged in false analogies, and that -he was attracted by a daring paradox. All this has nothing to do with -his main thesis: which is, that the natural realm is as it stands an -a-logical realm where reason has gone beside itself, and yet containing -an instrument—man, and that is mind—by which its rationality may be -realised and restored. In that point at least he and Schopenhauer are -at one.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_40" id="Footnote_1_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_40"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Kant's <i>Kritik d. r. Vernunft</i>: Methodenl. Architektonik -d. r. Vern.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_41" id="Footnote_2_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_41"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Schelling's Werke, v. 116.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_42" id="Footnote_3_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_42"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Ibid. v. 276.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_43" id="Footnote_4_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_43"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Ibid. iii. 267.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_44" id="Footnote_5_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_44"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Kant, <i>Kritik d. r. Vern.,</i> Deduction of the Categories, -Sect. III.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_45" id="Footnote_6_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_45"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Encyclopaedie</i>, § 250.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_46" id="Footnote_7_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_46"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Encycl.</i> Sect. 244 (<i>Logic,</i> p. 379).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_47" id="Footnote_8_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_47"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Encyclop.</i> §§ 266, 269; cf. the lecture-note as given -in <i>Werke</i> vii i. p. 97. A large number of paradoxical analogies -from Hegel's <i>Naturphilosophie</i> has been collected by Riehl in his -<i>Philosophisher Criticismus</i>, ii. 2, 120.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_48" id="Footnote_9_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_48"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. 419.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a><br /><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER VIII.</h5> - - -<h4>THE SCEPTICAL DOUBT: HUME.</h4> - - -<p>We have seen that an innate tendency leads the human mind to connect -and set in relation,—to connect, it may be erroneously, or without -proper scrutiny, or under the influence of passions or prejudices,—but -at any rate to connect. Criticism occasionally has impatiently banned -this tendency as a mere fountain of errors. The human mind, says -Francis Bacon, always assumes a greater uniformity in things than it -finds; it expects symmetry, is bold in neglecting exceptional cases, -and would fain go beyond all limits in its everlasting cry, Why and To -what end. It varies in individuals between a passion for discovering -similarities and an intent acuteness to every shade of unlikeness. But -notwithstanding these warnings of the hen, the ugly duckling Reason -<i>will</i> go beyond what is given: it knows no insuperable limitation. -It may be guilty of what Bacon calls 'anticipation'—an induction -on evidence insufficient—or it may subdue itself to the duty of -'interpretation' of nature by proper methods: in either case, it is -an act of association, synthesis, unification. For Nous <i>is</i> archè, -and knows that it is: it will not yield to clamour or mere rebuke: it, -too, cannot be commanded, unless by first obeying it: and Bacon, having -duly objurgated the 'mind left to itself,' is obliged to let it go to -gather the grapes before they are quite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> ripe, and to indulge it with -a 'prerogative' of instances. As Mr. Herbert Spencer and many others -are never weary of telling us: 'We think in relations. This is truly -the form of all thought: and if there are any other forms they must be -derived from this<a name="FNanchor_1_49" id="FNanchor_1_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_49" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>.' Man used to be defined as a thinking or rational -animal: which means that man is a connecting and relation-giving -animal; and from this, Aristotle's definition, making him out to be -a 'political' animal, is only a corollary, most applicable in the -region of Ethics. Here is the ultimate point, from which the natural -consciousness, and the energies of science, art, and religion equally -start upon their special missions.</p> - -<p>In ordinary life we attach but little importance to this machinery of -cognition. We incline to let the fact of synthesis drop out of sight, -as if it required no further study or notice, and we regard the things -connected as exclusively worth attending to. The interest centres -on the object—on the matter: the formal element—the connective -tissue—is <i>only</i> an instrument of no importance, except in view of -the end it helps us to. We use general and half-explained terms, such -as development, evolution, continuity, as bridges from one thing to -another, without giving any regard to the means of locomotion on their -own account. Some one thing is the product of something else: we let -the term 'product' slip out of the proposition as unimportant: and -then read the statement so as to explain the one thing by turning it -into the other. Things, according to this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> opinion, are all-important: -the rest is mere words. These relations between things are not open -to further investigation or definition: they are each <i>sui generis,</i> -or peculiar: and even if the logician in his analysis of inference -finds it advisable to deal with them, he will be content, if he can -classify them in some approximate way, as a basis for his subdivision -of propositions. This is certainly one way of getting rid of -Metaphysics—for the time.</p> - -<p>But there are epochs in life, and epochs in universal history, when the -mind withdraws from its immersion in active life, and reflects upon its -own behaviour as on the proceedings of some strange creature, of which -it is a mere spectator. At such seasons when we stop to reflect upon -the partial scene, and close our eyes to the totality, doubts begin to -arise, whether our procedure is justified when we unify and combine the -isolated phenomena. Have we any right to throw our own subjectivity, -the laws of our imagination and thought, into the natural world? Would -it not be more proper to refrain altogether from the use of such -conceptions?</p> - -<p>Philosophy, said one of the ancients<a name="FNanchor_2_50" id="FNanchor_2_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_50" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>, begins in wonder, and ends in -wonder. It begins from the surprise that something could <i>be</i> what it -purports to be: it ends in the marvel of our having <i>thought</i> anything -else possible. Such a phrase well becomes the naive age in which the -soul goes freely forth, wandering from one novelty to another, curious -to find out all that can be known,—like the young wanderer on the -sea-shore whom fresh pebbles and new shells tempt endlessly to fill his -basket. But as the ages roll on, and the accumulations of the past grow -heavier in the receptacle, the need of a re-examination of the stores -becomes imperative. The bright colours have faded—and generally<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> -they fade soon: there has been much picked up in the inexperience of -youthful enthusiasm which maturer reflection hardly can think worth -carrying further.</p> - -<p>The duty of doubt and of re-examination of what tradition has -bequeathed has been enforced by philosophy in all ages. For it is the -cardinal principle of philosophy to be free—to possess its soul—never -to be a mere machine or mere channel of tradition. But, in some ages, -this assertion of its freedom has had for the soul a pre-eminently -negative aspect. It has meant only freedom <i>from</i>—and not also freedom -<i>in</i> and <i>through</i>—its environing, or rather constituting, substance. -Such an epoch was seen in the ancient world when the <i>New Academy</i>, -with its sceptical abstention from all objective assertions, had to -protest against the dogmatism of the Stoic and Epicurean schoolmen. -In modern times the initial shudder before plunging in has been a -recurrent crisis. Each thinker—as he personally resolved to thread his -way through the wilderness of current opinion to the realm of certified -truth—has had to remind himself (and his contemporaries) that in -knowledge at least no possessions are secured property unless they have -been earned by the sweat of their owner's brow. This is the common -theme of Bacon's aphorisms in the beginning of the <i>Novum Organum</i>, of -Descartes' <i>Discourse of Method</i>, and of Spinoza's unfinished essay -on the <i>Emendation of the Intellect.</i> There is indeed a discrepancy -in these utterances as to the measure in which they severally think -it needful to insist as preliminary on a kind of moral and religious -consecration of life to the service of truth. But a more compelling -division arises. The maxim may be understood to say, 'Divest thy mind -of its ill-gotten gains, its evil habits, prejudices, and system, -and in childlike simplicity prepare thine eye<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> and ear to receive in -pure vessels the stores of truth which are ready to stream in from -the world.' Or it may rather be held to say, 'Remember that thou art -a conscious, waking mind, and that every idea thou hast is thine by -thine own assent: insist upon thy right of free intelligence, and give -no place to any belief which thou hast not raised into full light of -consciousness, and found to be completely consistent with the whole -power and content of thy clearest thought.' And, we may add, if the -maxim be obeyed too exclusively in either way, it will be obeyed amiss.</p> - -<p>With Locke the question comes into even greater prominence. On -what conditions can I have knowledge? How can I be certified that -my ideas—the subjective images in <i>my</i> mind—have a reference to -something objective and real? Locke's answer is, not unnaturally -perhaps, somewhat prolix, and wanting in fundamental precision of -principles. After dismissing the view that, even before experience, -there are certain common ideas spontaneously and by original endowment -present in all human beings, he goes on to show how we can sufficiently -account for the ideas we actually find by supposing in us an almost -unlimited power of joining and disjoining, of comparing, relating, -and unifying the various elementary 'ideas' which make their way into -the empty chambers of our mind by the senses. As to the source, the -channel, and the nature of these sense-ideas, Locke is obscure and -apparently inconsistent: though clearly it should be all important -to know how an idea can be caused by, or spring from, a material -thing. When in his fourth book he comes to the question of what is the -reality, or the <i>meaning</i> of our ideas, he does not really get beyond a -few—rather dubiously reasoned-out—conclusions that, although strictly -we cannot go beyond 'the present testimony of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> our senses employed -about the particular objects that do affect them,' we may for practical -purposes allow a good deal to the presumptions of general probability.</p> - -<p>But Locke had also begun to criticise our ideas, in his account of -their formation out of the 'simple ideas'— (which neither Locke -nor any other atomist of mind has succeeded in making clear)—which -the several senses give, and by observing or reflecting on what -goes on or is present in <i>our</i> minds, <i>we</i> 'form,' he says, various -ideas. In a style of discussion which is on the borderland between -vulgar and philosophical analysis— (never quite false, but nearly -always inadequate, because it almost invariably assumes what it -ostensibly proposes to explain,) Locke tells us how we get one idea by -'enlarging,' another by 'repeating,' as we please, the bounteous data -of the touch and sight. But amongst the compounds there are some of -more disputable origin. There are some—e.g. ideas of punishable acts -or legalised states—which are 'voluntary collections of ideas put -together in the mind independent from any original patterns in nature,' -These, though entirely subjective, are entirely real, because they only -serve as patterns by which we may judge or designate things so and so. -It is worse with the idea of power, which we only 'collect' or 'infer,' -and that not from matter, where it is invisible, but only in a clear -light when we consider God and spirits. Still worse, perhaps, is it -with the idea of substance, which is a 'collection' of simple ideas -with the 'supposition' of an 'incomprehensible' something in which the -collection 'subsists.'</p> - -<p>Hump put all this rather more pointedly. We have 'impressions,' i. -e. lively perceptions by sense. We have also 'ideas,' i. e. fainter -images of these, but otherwise identical. An idea <i>should</i> be a copy -of an impression. If you cannot point out any such impression, you -may<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> be certain you are mistaken when you imagine you have any such -idea. There is prevalent in the mental world a kind of association; a -'gentle force' connects ideas in our imagination according to certain -relations they possess. This 'mind' or this 'imagination' is only a -bundle or collection of impressions and ideas; but a collection which -is continually and rapidly changing in its constituents, and in the -scale of liveliness possessed by each constituent. When an idea is -particularly fresh and forcible, it is a <i>belief</i> or it is believed in: -when faint, not so. Or, otherwise put, the object of an idea is <i>said</i> -to <i>exist</i>, when the idea itself is vividly <i>felt</i><a name="FNanchor_3_51" id="FNanchor_3_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_51" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>. Really there is -no such thing as 'external existence' taken literally. 'Our universe is -the universe of the imagination': all existence is for a consciousness.</p> - -<p>Impressions arise in certain orders of sequence or co-existence. When -two impressions frequently recur and always in the same order, the -custom binds them so closely together, that, should one of them only be -given as impression, we cannot help having an idea of the other, which, -growing more vivid by the contagion of the contiguous impression, -creates, or is, a belief in its reality. Between the perceptions -as such, there is no connexion; they are distinct and independent -existences. They only get a connexion through <i>our feeling; we feel</i> -a 'determination' of our thought to pass from one to another. The -one impression has no power to produce the other; the one thing does -not cause the other. 'We never have any impression that contains any -power or efficacy<a name="FNanchor_4_52" id="FNanchor_4_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_52" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>,' Hence the power and necessity we attribute to -the so-called causal agent and to the connexion are an illegitimate -transference from our feeling, and a mistranslation of <i>our</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> -incapacity to resist the force of habitual association into a real -bond between the two impressions <i>themselves,</i> The necessity is in the -mind—as a habit-caused compulsion—not in the objects.</p> - -<p>As with the relation of cause and effect, so it is with others. The -identity of continued existence is only another name—an objective -transcript—of the feeling of smooth uninterrupted succession of -impressions in which our thought glides along from one in easy -transition to another. And here the coherence and continuity of -perceptions need not be absolute. A vivid impression of unbroken -connexion in a part will, if predominant, by association fill up the -gaps and weak points, and behind the admitted breaks in the line of -our ideas will suppose—invent—or create an imperceptible but <i>real</i> -continuity in the supposed things. And by this fiction of a continuous -existence of our perceptions, we easily lapse into the doctrine that -our perceptions have an independent existence as objects or things in -themselves:—a doctrine which according to Hume is contrary to the -plainest experience.</p> - -<p>But if the world is always the world of imagination—of -<i>Vorstellung</i>—of mental representation, Hume is aware that we must -admit two orders or grades of such representation. We must distinguish, -he remarks<a name="FNanchor_5_53" id="FNanchor_5_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_53" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>, 'in the imagination betwixt the principles which -are permanent, irresistible and universal (such as the customary -transition from causes to effects and from effects to causes), and the -principles which are changeable, weak and irregular. The former are -the foundation of all our thoughts and actions,' There are, in other -words, normal and general laws of association—such as the relation -of cause and effect—which persuade us of real existence. By its own -laws, therefore,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> within the realm of <i>Vorstellung</i> or Mental idea, -there grows up a permanent, objective world for all, contrasted with -the temporary, accidental perception of the individual and of the -moment; and this serves as the standard or the one common measure by -which occasional perturbations are to be measured. Within the limits of -the subjective in general there arises a subjective of higher order, -which is truly objective. This same change of front—as it may be -called—Hume makes in morals. There the mind can modify and control -its passions according as it can feel the objects of them near or far; -and though each of us has his 'peculiar position,' we can—so creating -the ethical basis—'fix on some steady and general points of view, and -always in our thoughts place ourselves in them, whatever may be our -present situation<a name="FNanchor_6_54" id="FNanchor_6_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_54" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>': we can 'choose some common point of view,' and -from the vantage-ground of a permanent principle, however distant, we -have a chance of gaining the victory over our passion, however near.</p> - -<p>Thus far Hume had gone in the development of idealism,' Whether his -theory is consistent from end to end, need not be here discussed. But -it is evident that Hume was not lost in the quagmire of subjective -idealism. The objective and the subjective are with him akin: the -objective is the subjective, which is universal, permanent, and normal. -The causal relation has, in the first instance, only a subjective -necessity; but through that subjective necessity or its irresistible -belief, it generates an objective world. But it has been and is the -fortune of philosophers to be known in the philosophical world by some -conspicuous red rag of their system which first caught the eye of the -bull-like leaders of the human herd. It was so notably with Hobbes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> -and Spinoza; and most of the thinkers whose names appear in the pages -of Kant suffer from this curtailment. Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, -Berkeley, Hume, are <i>there</i> not the real philosophers, discoverable in -their works, but the creatures of historic reputation and of popular -simplification who do duty for them.</p> - -<p>Kant's Hume is therefore a somewhat imaginary being: the product, -partly of imperfect knowledge of Hume's writings, partly of -prepossessions derived from a long previous training in German -rationalism. Such a Hume was—or would have been, had he existed—a -philosopher who 'took the objects of experience for things in -themselves,' who 'treated the conception of cause as a false and -deceptive illusion,' who did not indeed venture to assail the certainty -of mathematics, but held—as regards all knowledge about the existence -of things—'empiricism to be the sole source of principles,' founding -his conclusion mainly on an examination of the causal nexus<a name="FNanchor_7_55" id="FNanchor_7_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_55" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>. This -'note of warning' sounded against the claims of pure reason—as he -calls Hume's <i>Enquiry</i> was what about 1762 broke Kant's dogmatic -slumber and forced him to give his researches in speculative philosophy -a new direction. His first step was to generalise Hume's problem from -an inquiry into the origin of the causal idea into a general study -of the synthetic principles in knowledge. His next was to attempt to -fix the number of these concepts and synthetic principles. And his -third was to 'deduce' them: i. e., to prove the reciprocal implication -between experience or knowledge and the concepts or categories of -intelligence.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_49" id="Footnote_1_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_49"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>First Principles</i>, p. 162. It may be as well to remark -that Relation is scarcely an adequate description of the nature of -thought as a whole. We shall see when we come to the theory of logic, -that the term is applicable—and then somewhat imperfectly—only to the -second phase of thought, the categories of reflection, which are the -favourite categories of science and popular metaphysics.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_50" id="Footnote_2_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_50"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Arist. <i>Metaph.</i> i. 2. 26.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_51" id="Footnote_3_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_51"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Treatise of Human Nature</i> (Understanding), iii. 7 and ii. -6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_52" id="Footnote_4_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_52"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Ibid. iii. 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_53" id="Footnote_5_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_53"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Treatise of Human Nature</i> (Understanding iv. 4.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_54" id="Footnote_6_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_54"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Treatise of Human Nature</i> (Morals), iii. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_55" id="Footnote_7_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_55"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Kant, <i>Prolegomena</i> to Metaph. Introduction and <i>Crit. of -Practical Reason</i> (on the Claim of Pure Reason, <i>Werke,</i> viii. 167).</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER IX.</h5> - - -<h4>THE ATTEMPT AT A CRITICAL SOLUTION: KANT.</h4> - - -<p>The <i>Criticism of Pure Reason</i> has been described by its author as a -generalisation of Hume's problem. Hume, he thought, had treated his -question on the 'relations of ideas' in their bearing upon 'matters of -fact' mainly with reference to the isolated case of cause and effect. -Kant extended the inquiry so as to comprise all those connective and -unifying ideas which form the subject-matter of metaphysics. In his own -technical language—which has lost its meaning for the present day—he -asked, 'Are Synthetic judgments <i>a priori</i> possible?'—a question which -in another place he has translated into the form, 'Is the metaphysical -faith of men sound, and is a metaphysical science possible?' By a -metaphysics he meant in the first instance the belief in a more than -empirical reality, and secondly the science which should give real -knowledge of God, Freedom and Immortality,—a science whose objects -would be God, the World, and the Soul. From a comparatively early date -(1762-4) Kant had been inclined to suspect and distrust the claims -of metaphysics to replace faith, and to give knowledge of spiritual -reality; and he had tried to vindicate for the moral and religious life -an independence of the conclusions and methods of the metaphysical -theology and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> psychology of the day. But it was not till some years -later—in 1770—that he formulated any very definite views as to the -essential conditions of scientific knowledge: and it was not till 1781 -that his theory on the subject was put together in a provisionally -complete shape.</p> - -<p>What then are the criteria of a science? When is our thought knowledge, -and of objective reality? In the first place, there must be a given -something—a sens<i>-datum</i>—an 'impression' as Hume might have said. If -there be no impression, therefore, there can be no scientific idea, -no real knowledge. There must be the primary touch—the feeling—the -affection—the <i>je ne sais quoi</i> of contact with reality. Secondly, -what is given can only be received if taken up by the recipient, and -in such measure as he is able to appropriate it. The given is received -in a certain mode. In the present case, the sensation is apprehended -and perceived under the forms of space and time. Perception, in other -words, whatever may be its special quality or its sensuous material, -is always an act of dating and localisation. The distinction between -the mere lump of feeling or sensibility and the perception is that -the latter implies a field of extended and mutually excluding parts -of space, and a series of points of time, both field and series being -continuous, and, so far as inexhaustibility goes, infinite. Thirdly, -even in the reception of the given there is a piece of action and -spontaneity. If the more passive recipiency be called Sense, this -active element in the adaptation may be termed Intellect. Intellect is -a power or process of choice, selection, comparison, distinguishing and -dividing, analysis and synthesis, affirmation and negation, numeration, -of judgment and doubt, of connexion and disjunction, differentiation -and integration. Its general aspect is by Kant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> sometimes described -as Judgment—the act of thought which correlates by distinguishing; -sometimes as Apperception, and the unity of apperception. It is, i. -e., an active unity and a synthetic energy; it unifies, and always -unifies. It links perception to perception, correlating one with -another—interpreting one by another; estimating the knowledge-value of -one by the rest. It thus 'apperceives.' It is a faculty of association -and consociation of ideas. But the association is inward and 'ideal' -union: the one idea interpenetrates and fuses with the other, even -while it remains distinct.</p> - -<p>Kant's work may be described—in its first stage—as an analysis and a -criticism of experience. The term Experience is an ambiguous one. It -sometimes means what has been called the 'raw material' of experience: -the crude, indigested mass of poured-in <i>matter</i>-of-knowledge. If -there be such a shapeless lump anywhere,—which has to be considered -presently—it, at any rate, is not on Kant's view properly entitled to -the name of Experience. The Given must be felt and apprehended: and—to -put the point paradoxically—to be felt it must be more than felt,—it -must be perceived. It must, in other words, be projected—set in space -and time: let out of the mere dull inner subjectivity of feeling into -the clear and distinct outer subjectivity of perception. But, again, -to be perceived, it must be apperceived: to be set in time and space, -it must first of all be in the hands of the unifying consciousness, -which is the lord of time and space. For in so far as space and time -mean a place and an order—in so far as they mean more than an empty -inconceivable receptacle for bulks of sensation, in the same degree -do they presuppose an intellectual, synthetic genius, which is in all -its perceptions one and the same,—the fundamental, original unity of -consciousness. And this analysis of experience is transcendental.'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> -Beginning with the assumed datum—the object of or in experience—it -shows that this object which is supposed to be <i>there</i>—to exist by -itself and wait for perception—is created by and in the very act which -apprehends it. Climbing up and rising above its habitual absorption -<i>in</i> the <i>thing</i>, consciousness (that of the philosophic observer and -analyst) sees the thing in the act of making, and watches its growth.</p> - -<p>We have seen that Kant made free use of the metaphor of giving and -receiving. But it is hardly possible to use such metaphors and retain -independence of judgment. The associations customarily attached to the -figurative language carry one away easily, and often for a long way, on -the familiar paths of imagination. The analogy is used even where—if -all were looked into—its terms become meaningless. No reader of Locke -can have failed, e. g., to notice how he is misled by his own images of -the dark room and the empty cabinet:—images, useful and perhaps even -necessary, but requiring constant restraint in him who would ply them -wisely and to his reader's good. From what has been said above it will -be clear that the acquisition of experience, the growth of knowledge, -is a unique species of gift and acceptance. The consciousness which -Kant describes may be the consciousness of John Doe or Richard Roe: -but as Kant describes it, the limitations of their personality, -i.e. of their individual body and soul, have been neglected. It is -consciousness in general which is Kant's theme, just as it is granite -in general—and not the block in yonder field,—which is the theme -of the geologist. Once get that clear, and you will also see clearly -that consciousness is at once giver and recipient—neither or both: -at once receptivity and spontaneity. But—you may reply—does not the -material object <i>act</i> (chemically, optically,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> mechanically, &c.) on -the sense-organ on the periphery of my body, does not the nerve-string -<i>convey</i> the impression to the brain; and is not perception the -<i>effect</i> of that process, in which the material object is the initial -<i>cause</i>?</p> - -<p>In this exposition—which is not unknown in vulgar philosophy—there -is a monstrous, almost inextricable, complication of fact with -inference, of truth with error. So long as there is an uncertainty—and -metaphysicians themselves, we may be reminded, are not agreed upon the -matter—as to what we are to understand by cause, effect, and act, -what an impression is, and how brain and intelligence mutually stand -to each other, it is hardly possible to pronounce judgment upon this -mode of statement. Yet perhaps we may go so far as to say that while -the terms quoted bear an intelligible meaning when applied within the -physiological process they are vain when used of relations of mind to -body. There is a sense in which we may speak of the action of mind -on body, and of body on mind: but what we mean would perhaps be more -unmistakably expressed by saying that the higher intellectual and -volitional energies are never in our experience entirely independent -of the influences of the lower sensitive and emotional nature. In -the metaphysical sense which the terms are here made to bear, they -mislead. Action and re-action can only take place in the separateness -of space, where one is here and another there: (though, be it added, -they cannot take place even on these terms, unless the here and the -there be somehow unified in a medium which embraces both). <i>Mens</i>, said -Spinoza, is the <i>idea corporis</i><a name="FNanchor_1_56" id="FNanchor_1_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_56" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>: he would hardly have said <i>Corpus -habet ideam</i>. What he meant would scarcely have been well described by -calling it a <i>parallelism</i> or mutual independence,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> yet with harmony or -identity, of body and mind. Apart from body, no doubt, mind is for him -a nullity: for body is what gives it reality. But, on the other hand, -Mind is the enveloping and including 'Attribute' of the two: idealism -overlaps realism.</p> - -<p>This was the fundamental proposition which Kant contended for; what he -spoke of as his own Copernican discovery: though, in reality, for the -<i>student</i> of the history of philosophy it was only the re-statement, -in some respects the clearer statement, of the idealism which even -Hume, not to mention Spinoza and Leibniz, had maintained. The world -of experience—the empirical, objective, and real world—is a world -of ideas, of representations which have place only in mind, of -appearances. Space and time are subjective: the forms of thought are -subjective: and yet they constitute phenomenal or empirical or real -objectivity. Such language is—it would seem inevitably—misunderstood: -and in his second edition, Kant—besides many other minor modifications -of statement,—had to defend himself by inserting a 'confutation of -idealism,' i.e. of the theory which holds that the existence of objects -outside us in space is doubtful, if not even impossible. But no end -of argument will ever confute the view that Kant's doctrine is such -idealism: until people can be got to rise to a new view of what is -subjectivity—what is an idea—and what is existence outside us.</p> - -<p>By 'subjective' the world is in the way of understanding what is due -to personal prepossession, void of general acceptability, a product of -individual feeling, peculiar and inexplicable tastes. By subjective -Kant means what belongs to <i>the</i> subject or knowing mind as such and -in its generality: what is constitutive of intelligence in general, -what sense and intellect are <i>semper et ubique</i>. Into the question -how the human<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> being came to have such an intellectual endowment—the -question which Nativist psychology is supposed to settle in one way; -and Evolutionism in another—Kant does not enter; he merely says -where there is knowledge, there is a knower,—a knowing subject <i>so</i> -constituted. It comes after all to the tautology that the reality we -know is a known reality: that knowledge is a growth in the knower, -and not an accidental product due to things otherwise unknown. The -predicate (or category) <i>'is'</i> is contained, implicit, in the predicate -'<i>is known,</i>' or what '<i>is</i>' puts implicitly, '<i>is known</i>' puts -explicitly and truly.</p> - -<p>By 'appearance' the world understands a sham, or at least somewhat -short of reality. By appearance Kant understands a reality which has -appeared: or, as that is going too far, a something which is real -so far as it goes (a <i>prima facie</i> fact), but only a candidate for -admission into the circle of reals. And such reality depends on nothing -more than its thorough-going coherence with other appearances, its -explaining the rest, and being in turn explained by them,—its absolute -adaptation to its environment. And this environment all lies in the -common field of consciousness, and in the one correlating and unifying -apperceptivity of the ego,—that Ego which is the inseparable comrade, -vehicle, and judge, of all our perceptions. It is the appearance—but -as yet not the appearance <i>of</i> something,—but rather an appearance -<i>to</i> or <i>for</i> something.</p> - -<p>By an 'idea' the world in general understands what it is sometimes -ready to call a <i>mere</i> idea. And by a mere idea is meant something -which is <i>not</i> reality, but a peculiarity of an individual mind, or -group of minds-a fancy, without objective truth:—something, we may -even add, which for many people is located in their own head or brain, -cut off by blank bone-walls<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> from the open air of real being. By idea -(representation, <i>Vorstellung</i>) Kant meant that an object is always -and essentially the object of a mind: always relative to a subject -consciousness, and implying it, just as a subject consciousness always -implies an object.</p> - -<p>And by 'existence outside us' the world probably means—for it is -imprudent to define and refine too much in this hazy medium of words -where we all drowse—existence of things on an independent footing -beyond the limits of our personal, i. e. bodily and sentient, self. -As regards <i>our own</i> trunk and limbs, most of us, except in some most -strange insanity, are not likely ever to be in doubt, and are indeed -more likely, after Schopenhauer's model, to take the knowledge of these -<i>personalia</i> as the one thing immediately and intuitively certain. We -talk freely enough, it is true, about existence outside our own minds; -but it is only a drastic method of stating the difference between a -fancy and a fact. And probably we labour under a half-unconscious -hallucination that our minds are localised in some material 'seat,' -somewhere in our bodily limits, and more especially in the central -nerve-organs.</p> - -<p>But, as has been said elsewhere<a name="FNanchor_2_57" id="FNanchor_2_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_57" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>, the point of view under which Mind -is regarded by Kant is that of Consciousness, and especially perceptive -consciousness. He describes, as we have put it above, the steps or -conditions under which the single sense-observation is elevated into -the rank of an experience claiming universality and necessity. But -the whole machinery of consciousness—the form of sensibility and the -category of intellect—is originally set in motion by an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> impetus -from without: or at least the manipulating machinery requires a raw -material on which to operate. Consciousness, or the observer who -takes this point of view, feels that it is being played upon by an -unknown performer—or that it is attempting to apprehend something, -which, because the act of apprehension is also to some extent (and to -what extent, who can say?) a transmutation, it must for ever fail to -apprehend truly. It is haunted by the phantom of a real,—a thing in -its own right, which can only appear in forms of sense and intellect, -never in its own essential being. It is only a short step further—and -Kant, if one may judge him by several isolated passages, has more than -once crossed the interval,—to treat, after the manner of uneducated -consciousness and of popular science, the thing in its independent -being as the cause which produces the sensation, or as the original -which the mental idea reproduces under the distortions or modifications -rendered necessary by the sensuous-intellectual medium. For, if under -the terms of one analogy the perception is an <i>effect</i> of the thing, -under those of another it is an <i>image</i> or copy of external reality.</p> - -<p>If this be Kantian philosophy—and it can quote chapter and verse in -its favour—Kantian philosophy is one version of the great dogma of -the relativity of knowledge. That unhappy phrase seems to have many -meanings, but none of absolutely catholic acceptation. It may mean that -knowledge of things states their relations—the way they behave in -reference to this or that, in these or those circumstances; and that -of an utterly unrelated and <i>absolutely</i> isolated thing, our knowledge -is and must be <i>nil.</i> Of a thing-in-itself we can know nothing; for -there is nothing to know. It may mean that knowledge is relative to the -recipient or the knower,—that it is not a product which can stand<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> -by itself, but needs a vehicle and an object in close relation. In -this way, too, knowledge is relative to age and circumstances: grows -from period to period, and may even decay. And thirdly, the relativity -of knowledge may be taken to mean that we (and all human beings) can -never know the reality; because we can only know the phenomenon, i. -e. the modified, transmuted, reflected thing which has reconstituted -an image of itself after passing the interfering medium. For, first -of all, we must strip it—this 'image' so-called (the vulgar call -it the 'thing')—of the secondary qualities (sound, colour, taste, -resistance) which it has in the consciousness of a being dependent on -his sense-organs: and then, we must get rid also of those quantitative -attributes (figure, number, size) which it has in the consciousness -of a spatially and temporally perceptive being;—and then;—but the -prospect is too horrible to continue further and face the Gorgon's head -in the outer darkness, where man denudes appearance in the hope to meet -reality.</p> - -<p>The fact is, there are too many strands in the web which Kant is -weaving, for him or perhaps for any man to keep them all well in hand -and lose none of the symmetry of the pattern he designs. To be just, we -must, in dealing with him as with any other philosopher, try to keep -in view the unity of that design instead of insisting too minutely and -too definitely upon its occasional defects. It is easy to work the pun -that a 'critical' philosophy must itself expect to be criticised; it is -more important to remember that by a criticism Kant meant an attempt to -steer a course between the always enticing extremes of dogmatism and -scepticism,—an attempt to be fair, i. e. just to both sides, and yet -neither to sink into the systematised placidity of the former, nor to -rove in a mere guerilla warfare with the latter. And it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> is the mere -privateer who in the popular sense of the word is the mere critic.</p> - -<p>Of Kant we must remember that he has the defects of his qualities. -He prides himself on his distinctions of sense and intellect, of -imagination and understanding, of understanding and reason; and with -justice: but his distinctions are sometimes so decisive that it is -hard work both for him and for his reader to reconstitute their -unity. He is fond of utilising old classifications to embody his new -doctrine: and occasionally the result is like what we have been taught -to expect from pouring new wine into old bottles. He draws hard and -fast lines, and then has to create, as it seems, supplementary links -of connexion, which, if they operate, can only do so because they are -the very unity he began by ignoring. One gets perfectly lost in the -multitude of syntheses, in the labyrinth of categories, schemata, and -principles, of paralogisms, antinomies, and ideals of pure reason. One -part of this formalism <i>may</i> be set down to the pedantry and pipeclay -of the age of the Great Frederick—pedantry, from which, as we console -ourselves, our modern souls are freed. But it arises rather from the -necessity of pursuing the battle between truth and error through every -complicated passage in that great fortress which ages of scholasticism -had—on various plans—gradually constructed. Kant is always a little -of the martinet and the schoolmaster; but it is because he knows that -true liberty cannot be secured without forms and must capture the old -before it can plant the new. The forms as they stand in his grouping -may often appear stiff and lifeless: but a more careful study, more -sympathetically intent, will find that there is latent life and -undisplayed connexion in the terms. Unfortunately the classified -cut-and-dried specimens are more welcome<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> to the collector, and can -more easily be put in evidence in the examination-room.</p> - -<p>Thus the original question, Are synthetic judgments <i>a priori</i> -possible? is answered—somewhat piecemeal—in a way that leads the -reader to suppose it is a question of psychology. He hears so much of -sense, imagination, intellect, in the discussion, that he fancies it is -an account of a process carried on by the faculties of an individual -mind. And of course nobody need suppose these processes are ever -carried on otherwise than by individual thinkers, human beings with -proper names. But scientific investigation is concerned only with -the essential and universal. For it, really, sense, imagination, &c. -are not so many faculties in a thinking agent: they are grades and -aspects of consciousness,—'powers' in a process of gradual mental -complication (involution). Kant is really dealing with a 'normal' -thought with its distinguishable constituent aspects. Only—he fails -to 'make this explicit and clear. The individualism—the un-historical -prepossession—of his age is upon his phraseology, if not upon his -thought: and one hardly realises that he is really engaged on human -thought and knowledge as a substantial subject of itself apart from its -individual vehicles,—on that thought, which lives and grows in social -institutions and products,—in language, science, literature, and moral -usage,—the common stock which one age bequeathes to the next, but -which the later-comer can only inherit if he works for and creates it -afresh. If it be a psychology, therefore, it is a psychology which does -not assume a soul with qualities, but which expounds the steps in the -constitution of a normal intelligence.</p> - -<p>One may note, without insisting on them too much, the defects of his -treatment of the forms of thought. It may be said that, in the <i>first</i> -place, the table of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> categories was incomplete. It had been -borrowed, as Kant himself tells us, from the old logical subdivision -of judgments, derived more or less directly from Aristotle and the -Schoolmen. Now many of the relations occurring in ordinary thought -could not be reduced to any of the twelve forms, without doing violence -to them. But Kant expressly disclaims exhaustiveness in detail. He -could, if he would: but that is for another season. In the <i>second</i> -place, the classification did not expressly put forward any principle -or reason, and gave ground for no development. That there should be -four fundamental categories, each with three divisions, making twelve -in all, seems as inexplicable as that there should be four Athenian -tribes in early times and twelve Phratriai. The twelve patriarchs of -thought stand as if in equal authority, with little or no bearing upon -one another. We have here, in short, what seems an artificial and not -a natural classification of the types of thought. But Kant himself has -given some explanation of the triad, and a sympathetic interpretation -has shown how the four main groups are steps in the solution of one -problem<a name="FNanchor_3_58" id="FNanchor_3_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_58" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In the <i>third</i> place, the question as taken up seems largely -psychological, or subjective, concerning the constitution of the human -mind as a percipient and cognitive faculty. But this is necessary, -perhaps, to the restricted nature of Kant's problem. He is dealing with -the elements that form our objective or scientific consciousness of -the physical world. The deeper question of the place and work of mind -in life in general, in law and morality and religion, does not at this -stage come before him. That problem in fact only gradually emerges -with the Criticism of the Moral Faculty and the Aesthetic Judgment.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> -Logic—as the doctrine of the <i>Logos</i> which is the principle of all -things, even of its own Other—had to wait for its preparation till it -could be matured.</p> - -<p>In Hegel, the question assumes a wider scope, and receives a more -thorough-going answer. In the <i>first</i> place the question about the -Categories is transferred from what we have called the epistemological -or psychological, to what Hegel terms the logical, sphere. It is -transferred from the Reason subjectively considered as a mere -receptive and synthetic human consciousness to the Reason which is in -the world and in history,—a Reason, which our Reason, as it were, -touches, and so becomes possessed of knowledge. In the <i>second</i> place, -the Categories become a vast multitude. The intellectual telescope -discovers new stars behind the constellations named in ancient lore. -There is no longer, if there ever was, any mystic virtue supposed to -inhere in the number twelve: while the triadic arrangement is made -radical and everywhere recurs. The modern chemist of thought vastly -amplifies the number of its elementary types and factors, and proves -that many of the old Categories are neither simple nor indecomposable. -<i>Thirdly</i>, there is a systematic development or process which links -the Categories together, and shows how the most simple, abstract, and -inadequate, inevitably lead up to the most complex and adequate. Each -term or member in the organism of thought has its place conditioned by -all the others: each of them is the germ, or the ripe fruit of another.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_56" id="Footnote_1_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_56"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Spinoza, <i>Eth.</i> ii. 7-13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_57" id="Footnote_2_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_57"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Encyclopaedia</i>, §§ 415, 420. Consciousness is only as it -were the surface of the ocean of mind; and reflects only the lights and -shadows in the sky above it.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_58" id="Footnote_3_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_58"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> It is not the least of the merits of the exposition in -Caird's <i>Critical Philosophy</i> of Immanuel Kant, vol. i. to have brought -out this.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER X.</h5> - - -<h4>THE CRITICAL SOLUTION, CONTINUED: KANT.</h4> - - -<p>Kant's answer to his question was briefly this. Intelligence is -essentially synthetic, always supplementing the given by something -beyond, instituting relationships, unifying the many, and thus -building up concrete totalities. In pure mathematics this is obvious: -the process of numeration shows it creating number out of units, and -geometry shows elementary propositions leading on to complicated -theorems. In abstract physics it is hardly less obvious: there, e.g., -the principle of reason and consequent or the persistence of substance -are rational and legitimate steps beyond the mere datum. The more -important question follows. How are these 'pure' syntheses applicable -to real fact? To that Kant replies: They apply, because in all that -we call real or objective fact there is a subjective element or -constituent. What appears to be purely given, and independent of our -perceptions, is a product of perceptual and conceptual conditions,—is -constituted by a synthesis in perception, imagination, conception. Our -world is a mental growth—not our individual product, but the work of -that common mind in which we live and think, and which lives and thinks -in us. Anyhow it is not an isolated self-existing un-intelligent world -for ever materially outside us—an other world,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> eternally separate -from us; but bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh, the work realised -by our great 'elder brother,'—the Idea of human collectivity—the -Reason or Spirit in which we are all one soul. It is therefore no -unwarranted step on to a foreign property when we apply the categories -of thought and forms of sense to determine objective reality: for -objective reality has been for ever made, and is now making, objective -and reality by the conscious or unconscious syntheses of perception and -imagination.</p> - -<p>There remains the answer to the same question as regards the objects -of Metaphysics. These objects are according to Kant inferences, and -illegitimate inferences. They are not necessary elements or factors -in the constitution of experience. In order that there should be -experience, knowledge, science, there must be an endless hold of -space and time in which to stow it clearly and distinctly away: and -there must also be ties and relations binding it part to part, links -of reference and correlation, a sort of logical elastic band that -will stretch to include infinitely copious materials. But each real -knowledge attaches to a definite assignable perception, in a single -place and time. From this point we can travel—by means of like -points—practically without limit in any direction. But though the old -margin fades forever and forever as we move, a new margin takes its -place: the limitation and finitude remain: and new acquisitions are -always balanced in part by the loss of the old. Yet the heart and the -imagination are clamorous, and the intellect is ready to serve them. -Such an intellect Kant has called Reason, and its products (Platonic) -'Ideas.' The (Platonic) Idea expresses not so much an object of -knowledge as a postulate, a problem, an act of faith. The 'Vaulting -ambition' Intelligence 'o'erleaps itself and falls on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> t'other,' -Unsatisfied with a bundle of sensations and ideas, it demands their -abiding unity in a substantial Soul. To simplify the endlessness of -physical phenomena, it sums them up in a Universe. To gather all mental -and physical diversities and divisions into one life, it creates the -ideal of God.</p> - -<p>Each single experience, and the collected aggregate of these -experiences, is felt to fall short of a complete total: and yet this -complete total, the ultimate unity, is itself not an experience at -all. But, if it be no object of experience, it is still an idea on -which reason is inevitably driven: and the attempt to apprehend it, in -the absence of experience, gives rise to the theories of Metaphysics. -Everything, however, which can be in the strict sense of the word -known, must be perceived in space and time, or, in other words, must -lie open to experience. Where experience ends, human reason meets a -barrier which checks any efficient progress, but refuses to recognise -the check as due to a natural limit which it is really impossible to -pass. The idea of completeness, of a rounded system, or unconditional -unity, is still left, after the categories of the understanding have -done their best: and is not destroyed although its realisation or -explication is declared to be impossible.</p> - -<p>There is thus left unexplained a totality which encompasses all the -single members of experience—a unity compared to which the several -categories are only a collection of fragments—an infinite which -commands and regulates the finite concepts of the experiential -intellect. But in the region of rational thought there is no objective -and independent standard by which we can verify the conclusions of -Reason. There are no definite objects, lying beyond the borders of -experience, towards which it might unerringly turn; and its sole -authentic use, accordingly, is to see that the understanding is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> -thorough and exact, when it deals in the co-ordination of experiences. -In this want of definite objects, Reason, whenever it acts for itself, -can only fall into perpetual contradictions and sophistries. Pure -Reason, therefore, the faculty of ideas, the organ of Metaphysics, does -not of itself 'constitute' knowledge, but merely 'regulates' the action -of the understanding.</p> - -<p>By this rigour of demonstration Kant dealt a deadly blow, as it seemed, -to the dogmatic Metaphysics, and the Deism of his time. Hume had -shaken the certainty of Metaphysics and thrown doubt upon Theology: -but Kant apparently made an end of Metaphysics, and annihilated -Deistic theology. The German philosopher, as Hegel has said and Heine -has repeated, did thoroughly and with systematic demonstration what -Voltaire did with literary graces and not without the witticisms with -which the French executioner gives the <i>coup de grâce.</i> When a great -idea had been degraded into a vulgar doctrine and travestied in common -reality, the Frenchman met its inadequacies with graceful satire, and -showed that these half-truths were not eternal verities. The German -made a theory and a system of what was only a sally of criticism; and -rendered the criticism wrong, by making it too consistent and too -logical<a name="FNanchor_1_59" id="FNanchor_1_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_59" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>.</p> - -<p>Science—such is Kant's conclusion—is of the definite and detailed, -of the conditioned. It goes from point to point, within the -enveloping unity of what we call experience, and which rests upon the -transcendental and original unity of consciousness. But a knowledge -of the whole—of the enveloping unity—is a contradiction in terms. -To know is to synthetise: you cannot synthetise synthesis. Knowledge -is of the relative: but an absolute and unconditional totality has no -relations. We may therefore, possibly, feel, believe in, presuppose<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> -the absolute: but know it in the stricter sense, we cannot. It may be -the object of a rational faith. But as for knowledge, we can get on -in psychology without the invisible and immortal soul: we can carry -out sciences of the physical universe, without troubling ourselves -about the 'cosmological' questions of ultimate atoms or ultimate -void, of first beginning and final end: and no proofs will ever prove -the <i>existence</i> of that 'ideal' of reason—briefly termed God—which -transcends and completes and creates all existence. Not that such Ideas -are useless even in science. They represent—if not without risks—the -faith and the presupposition which underlie the spirit of scientific -progress, and set before it an ideal perfection which it will do well -to strive after, though it can never get beyond approximations. What -is perhaps more important: this faith of reason science is as little -competent to disprove, as it is incompetent to prove it. Science is not -all in all: we are more than mere theoretical and cognitive beings. -The logic of science is not the sole code of our spiritual or higher -intellectual life;</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'We live by admiration, hope, and love.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>The sequel and development of the first Criticism are found in Kant's -works on ethics, aesthetics, teleology and religion. Only in one -supplementary chapter, and in casual indications as need arises, has -Kant made any pronouncement on his view of Philosophy as a whole and as -a system. That it is and can only be a system, when it really engages -on reconstruction in theory, was of course his fundamental insight. -But in his stage of <i>Zetesis</i><a name="FNanchor_2_60" id="FNanchor_2_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_60" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>, of testing and sifting the sound<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> -from the professed, he has confined himself to breaking up the mass -piecemeal, and leaving each result in its turn to corroborate and -correct the other. Sense and intellect may spring from a common stem; -but let us, he says, deal with them in their apparent separateness. -Reason practical must no doubt be identical at bottom with reason -theoretical: all the more convincing will be the undesigned coincidence -between the results of an inquiry into the principles of science, and -one into the principles of morals. We have seen that science ultimately -rests—though it does not discuss it and would indeed be incompetent -to do so—on a faith, a hope, a postulate of the ultimate supremacy of -intelligence,—the faith of reason in its own power (not verifiable -indeed by an exhaustive list of actual results)—or in the rationality -of the world. For science—though a kind of action and a part of -conduct—is a sort of inactive action: an <i>enclave</i> in the busy world, -a period of preparation for the battle of life. In the field of conduct -the ultimate presupposition, which was for the luxury of science called -a reasonable faith or faith of reason, makes itself felt in the more -forcible form of a categorical imperative.</p> - -<p>Or, at least, so it seems on first acquaintance. The command of duty, -addressed to the sensuously-conditioned nature, brooks no opposition -and condescends to no reasons in explanation or promises by way of -attraction. The moral law claims unconditional authority: towards its -sublime aspect reverence and sheer obeisance is due, utter loyalty to -duty for duty's sake. Nothing short of this absolute identification -with the Ought and a willingly willed self-surrender of the whole self -to it can entitle an agent to the full rank of moral goodness. Such is -the form—the synthetic link which joins the sensuous will indissolubly -with the will reasonable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> of moral law. Now for its explanation. -Humanity, though in the world of appearance and experience always -subject to sensuous conditions, is also a power of transcending these -conditions. Man is more than he can ever show in visibly single act. -He has in him the hope, the faith, the vision of absolute perfection -and completeness: but has it not as positive attained vision, but as -the perpetual unrest of unsatisfied endeavour, as the feeling and -the anticipation of an unachieved idea. And that perfection, that -completeness he believes himself to be; he even in some sense is. -Lapses and ill-success cannot quench the faith: for so long as there is -life, there is hope.</p> - -<p>As he pictures out this invisible self, it may assume various forms -more or less imaginative. At times it may seem a far away, and yet -intimately near, being of beings,—the common father of all souls, the -eternal self-existent centre of life and love, the omnipresent bond -of nature, the omniscient heart of hearts,—on whom he can lean in -closest communion; though he is only too well aware how often he lives -as if God were not, and human beings were roaming specks in chaos. At -other times, he looks up to it as to an inner and better self, his -conscience, the true and permanent being, which controls his choices -and avoidances, which approves and disapproves, commands and condemns: -his soul of soul, genius, and guardian spirit. In such a mood to be -true to his own self—to follow the very voice of his nature—is to -realise his law of life. His Ego is the absolute ego—the reason which -is all things. And lastly, there are times when he conceives this -better self and true essence as the community of the faithful, as the -congregation of reasonable beings, of all perfected humanity.</p> - -<p>In Kantian phraseology, man under one visible form<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> is the union of -an intelligence and a sensibility, of a noümenal with a phenomenal -being. He is, indeed, says Kant, the former only in idea: it is only -a standpoint which he assumes. But it is a standpoint he always does -assume, if he is to be practical, i. e. if he is to move and modify -the world he finds around him. And what standpoint is that? What is -the law that has to govern his action, the law of the spiritual world? -Its supreme law is the law of liberty; and that law is autonomy. -Action—always under law—but that law a self-imposed one. So act -that thy will may be thy law, and with thy will the law of all others -whatsoever; so act that no other human being may by thy act be deprived -of full freedom and treated merely as a thing: so act as to respect the -dignity of every human being as implicitly a sovereign legislative. -In other words, Morality is a stage of struggle and of progress -which bears witness to something beyond. The 'I ought' represents a -transition stage towards the 'I will,' or rather it is the translation -of it into the language of the phenomenal world.<a name="FNanchor_3_61" id="FNanchor_3_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_61" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Morality, in a -sense-being, always presents itself as a contest between the good -and the evil principle: but in the transcendent and noümenal being -which such a being essentially is,—in the reasonable or good will, -the victory is already won by the good. Good is the law which governs -the world, and which is the strength of the individual life. To the -sensuous imagination, indeed, which here is apt to usurp the place of -reason, things appear under a somewhat different aspect. There the -certainty of self-conquest is forced by the difficulties of apparent -failure to veil itself under the picture of a perpetual approximation -through endless ages towards the standard<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> of perfect goodness: -the confidence that the world is reasonable is presented under the -conception of a God who makes all things work together for good to the -righteous: and the autonomy of reason presents itself as the postulate -of freedom to begin afresh, absolutely untrammeled by all that has -gone before. Thus the kingdom of reason is represented as having its -times and seasons; as making determinate starts, and working up to a -consummation in the end of ages. But implicitly Kant's idea of reason's -autonomy,—of the 'I ought' as in its supreme truth an 'I will,'—is -an eternal truth. The 'standpoint,' so to call it after Kant, is the -standpoint which explains life and conduct and which makes conduct -possible. It is the assertion that the completeness <i>is,</i> and is my -inmost being, the source of my action, my chief good, and that chief -good not a gratification or satisfaction to be looked forward to as -reward, but essential life and self-realisation. And this joy is what -is hidden under the austere gravity of the categorical imperative.</p> - -<p>The Criticism of the Judgment-faculty is Kant's next step towards -providing a completer philosophy. Ostensibly it owes its origin to -the need of supplementing the treatment of Understanding and Reason -by a discussion of Judgment, and of considering our emotional as well -as our cognitive and volitional appreciations. What it really does -is to minimise still further the gulf left between the intellect -and nature—between the natural and the spiritual world. The -intellect, said the first criticism, makes nature: it makes possible -the general outlines of our conception of the world around us as -a causally-connected system, in which a permanent being undergoes -perpetual alteration, and manifests phenomena subject to mathematical -conditions. Intellect, in short, has staked out the world which is -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> object of the practical man, and of his adviser the scientist. -But there is another world—the world of beauty and sublimity—the -world which art imitates and realises. The interpretation Kant gives -to the aesthetic world is as follows. The fact of beauty is a witness -to the presence in the mere copiousness of sensible existence of a -sub-conscious symmetry or spirit of harmony which realises without -compulsion and as if by free grace all the proportion and coherence -which intellect requires. Nature itself has something which does the -work that intellect was charged with, and does it with a subtle secret -hand which does not suggest the artificer. The fact of sublimity, on -the other hand, indicates the presence of an even greater spirit. -For beauty may seem—from what has been said—to be only an unbought -accrement to the commodities of life—facilitating the task of the -practical intellect. But the sublime in nature speaks of something -which is greater than human utilities and practical conveniences. It -reveals a something which is in sympathy with our essential and higher -self, and therefore stirs within us the keen rapture of the traveller -who sees from afar his home in 'rocky Ithaca,' but a something which -is cold to daily wants and vulgar satisfactions, and therefore strikes -upon us a gelid awe.</p> - -<p>Another world yet remains, which appeals neither to our utilitarian -science, nor to our higher sentiments of artistic perfection. This is -the world as the home of organic life, and perhaps itself an organism. -The organism is apt to be a poser for the ordinary categories of -mechanical science. Here the part contains the whole, not less than the -whole contains the part: the cause is an effect, as well as cause, of -its effect. One thing is in another, and the other in it: 'the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> present -is charged with the past, and pregnant of the future,'—as the great -founder of modern teleology often said. In the plant and the animal -the natural world has to a certain degree reached an ideal unity which -is also real. Reason—the syllogism—is here not merely introduced -from without, as when man manipulates, but is the immanent law of a -natural life,—the end working out itself by its own means and act. -The fact admitted in these creatures suggests extending the conception -of organism (or teleology) to nature as a whole. From this point of -view Nature may almost be said to have a history—because it is almost -conceived as having one abiding self which in apparent unconsciousness -wonderfully simulates the purposive adaptation of conscious life. -The older vulgar teleology was somewhat mechanical: it regarded the -natural world outside of—or as it said, below—man as having no end -of its own, but in its series subserving man's commodities. In the -teleology of Kant the supreme end is still in a way man, and still -there is a little of the mechanical about it: but it is not to promote -man's happiness, understood as that probably <i>must</i> be in a selfish -sense, but to produce in him the worthiest agent to carry on to its -highest the rational process of development. The struggles and pains -of natural existence, the laws of life, the competition of rivals, are -all means in the hands of nature to produce an autonomous being. Kant -says, a moral agent. But a moral agent has been already explained as -an intelligence certified unto truth and a self-centred will whose law -is the law of the cosmos,—whose plan of life, if we so put of it, is -essentially a concentration in miniature and in individuality of the -system ordained by the all-present God.</p> - -<p>It is true that Kant, after all these soarings, checks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> enthusiasm by -the words 'not that we can know this, or that it is so: but our nature -with unmistakable tendency bids us act <i>as if</i> it were so. Logic will -hardly justify it—but life seems to demand it.' And some have replied: -'let us trust the larger hope.'</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_59" id="Footnote_1_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_59"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Werke</i>, vol. i. p. 140.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_60" id="Footnote_2_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_60"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Kant from 1762 onwards continues to insist on the -necessity for philosophy taking up an analytic and critical attitude to -current conceptions: see especially <i>Werke,</i> i. 95 and 292.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_61" id="Footnote_3_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_61"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Foundation of Metaph. of Eth. (<i>Werke</i>, viii. 82, 89): -'Dieses Sollen ist eigentlich ein Wollen.'</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XI.</h5> - - -<h4>SYNTHESIS AND RECONSTRUCTION: FICHTE.</h4> - - -<p>To get the full effect of a new doctrine it must be brought into -contact with a mind unshackled by those traditional prepossessions -which clung to its original author. Kant, essentially by training a -man of the school, was by heart and character essentially a seeker -after the wider ends of the larger world. His lesson is on one hand -the scholar's disproof of pretended science, and on another an appeal -and an example to the mere scholar to make his philosophy ample for -the whole life, and co-extensive with the whole field of reality. His -first disciples who stand forward as teachers caught only the first -part of his message, and sought to set theoretical philosophy on a -sounder basis. Johann Gottlieb Fichte—perhaps the least professional -of great philosophical professors—with a resolute will, a passion for -logical thoroughness, and great impulse to force mankind to be free -and to realise liberty in an institution—was the first who really -grappled with the searching questions that arose out of Kant's message -to his age. His was a Kantism, not certainly always of the letter, nor -indeed always of the spirit: yet for all that, there was substantial -justice in his claim that his system supplied the presupposition which -gives meaning and interconnexion to Kant's utterances<a name="FNanchor_1_62" id="FNanchor_1_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_62" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>. It is, says<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> -the proverb, the first step that costs. And Fichte took that step. -Before his impetuosity the cautelous clauses which besmirched the great -purpose of Criticism shrunk away, the central truth was disengaged from -its old-fashioned swaddling clothes, and openly announced itself as a -renovating, almost a revolutionary principle.</p> - -<p>But, as was to be expected, the unity and force are paid for by a -considerable surrender of catholicity. If Kant's utterances are -fused into comparative simplicity, the unification does not embrace -the whole of the Kantian gospels. What Fichte did in his earlier -stage—the stage by which he counts in the history of philosophy—was -to emphasise and exhibit in his systematic statement that priority or -supremacy of the 'practical' over the 'theoretical' reason which Kant -had enunciated, and to put in the very foreground that self or Ego -which Kant had indicated, under the title of 'transcendental unity -of apperception,' as the focus which gives coherence and objectivity -to experience. But to put the final presupposition at the head and -front of all, as a principle originating and governing the whole line -of procedure, is really to modify in a thorough-going way the whole -aspect of a doctrine and its inner constitution. Kant's way is quiet -analysis: from the given, or what is supposed given, up regressively -to its final presuppositions, its latent <i>prius.</i> He shows you the -thing is so, apparently without effort, by judicious application of -the proper re-agent, as it were. Fichte, on the contrary, pours forth -a strong current of deduction: Let it be assumed that so and so is, -then <i>must,</i> or then shall, something else be; and so onwards. Instead -of a glance at the secret substructure of the world, you see it, at a -magician's mandate, building itself up; stone calling to stone, and -beam to beam, to fill up the gaps and bind the walls together. And you<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> -must not merely read or listen. You are summoned as a partner in the -work; a work the author feels, only half-consciously, he has not yet -quite accomplished, and where therefore he complains of the bystander's -dullness.</p> - -<p>This, one may say, was a new conception, certainly a new practice, -of philosophy. Kant had indeed hinted that the pupil in philosophy -must 'symphilosophise'; but practically, even his aim had been to -describe or narrate a process of thought with such quasi-historical -vividness and detail that the listener was sympathetically carried -through the succession of ideas which were called up before him. What -had been generally given in philosophical literature was a sort of -historical account of how thoughts happened: a succession of pictures -presented with the interposition here and there of a little reasoning, -expository of connexions. You enlisted your reader's sympathy: you -set his imagination to work by translating the logical process into a -historical event—the <i>Logos</i> into a <i>Mythos</i>—and blending with your -narrative a little explanation as to general drift and relations, you -left him to himself to enjoy the <i>Theoria.</i> The nearest approach Fichte -makes to this polite and easy method is in the 'Sun-clear Statement,' -where he, as he says, attempts to '<i>force</i> the reader to understand' -him. But probably these things cannot be forced. And for the rest -Fichte's characteristic attitude is to request, or command, his reader -(or pupil) to think with him, to put himself in the posture required, -to perform the act of thought described. He has not merely to be -present at the lecture, but personally to perform the experiment. It -is not a mere story to be heard and admired and forgotten. <i>De te</i> O -pupil! <i>fabula narratur.</i> If it be a play, you are the actor as well as -the onlooker: and the play is not a play, but the drama—the nameless -drama—of the soul<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> transacted in the unseen sub-conscious depths which -bear up its visible life.</p> - -<p>You do not therefore begin by getting a fact put before you. Your -<i>fact,</i> in philosophy, must be your own <i>act</i>: not something done -and dead, passive, a thing, but something doing, alive, active: your -introspection must be, let us say, an experiment in the growing, -responsive, quick life, not anatomy of the mere <i>cadaver.</i> Think, -therefore, and catch yourself in the act of thinking. Get something -before your mind's eye, and see what it involves. It matters not what -you perceive or feel: only realise it fully and penetrate its meaning -and implications. It is of course the perception of something here and -now. And you would be, in ordinary life, eager to get on to something -else—to associate the present fact to something perceived elsewhere, -to draw conclusions about things yet to come. But if you philosophise, -you must check this practical-minded impatience and concede yourself -leisure to ponder deeply all that the single perception involves. Be -content to sit awhile with Mary, by the side of Rachel of old. Let -Martha bustle about. Fichte tells you that your perception rests,—and -you, you <i>see</i> that it rests, on the 'I am that I am,'—on the I = I, -i. e. on the continuity, identity, and unity of the percipient self. -Make the statement of what you perceive, believe it, that is, assert -it: and you have—done what? You have pledged your whole self<i>—falsus -in uno, falsus in omnibus</i>—to its truth: its background is your whole -and one mental life. And is that all? You have also called the world to -witness: your statement—if, as it professes, it form an item however -slight in the realm of knowledge—requests and expects every other 'I' -to acknowledge your perception. Your certainty of the fact rests on -the certainty of your self: and your self is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> a self certified by its -ever-postulated identity with other selves, so on <i>ad infinitum</i>. In -affirming this (whatever be your statement) you affirm the Absolute -Infinite Ego. Heaven and earth are at stake in every jot and tittle<a name="FNanchor_2_63" id="FNanchor_2_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_63" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>.</p> - -<p>At which plain frankness there was much cachinnation and even -muttering among the baser sort. Even wiser heads forgot—if they -ever knew—that Leibniz a century before had startled the world of -his day by a view that 'the Ego or something like it<a name="FNanchor_3_64" id="FNanchor_3_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_64" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> was, under -the name of <i>monad</i>, the presupposition of each and every detail of -existence in any organic total. It was useless for Fichte to repeat<a name="FNanchor_4_65" id="FNanchor_4_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_65" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -that his philosophical Ego was not the empirical or individual ego -which he in this every-day world had to provide clothes and company -for. It is hard to persuade the world that it does not know that 'I -am I,' and what that means. Later, therefore, Fichte, going along -with the movement of contemporary speculation, and willing to avoid -one source of confusion, tended to keep off the name of Ego from -the absolute basis of all knowledge and experienced reality. But -unquestionably the absolutising of the Ego is the characteristic note -of his first period in philosophy: and it rings with the spirit of -the heaven-storming Titan. It means that the cardinal principle and -foundation of man's conscious moral and intellectual life is identical -with the principle of the Universe, even if the Universe seem not to -know it. It means that self-consciousness—the certainty that I am I -and one in all my manifestations—is the highest word yet uttered. In, -or under, the surface of human knowledge and belief in reality, there -is a transcendental Ego—a self identical with all other selves,—<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> -infinite, unlimited, unconditional, absolute. The certainty of human -knowledge—and therefore of all reality in consciousness—is the -Absolute,—an absolute certainty and knowledge—but an absolute with -which I identify myself,—which I am, and which is me. This is the -absolute <i>thesis</i>—the nerve and utter basis-laying—at the ground, or -rather under the ground, of all I know, feel, and will.</p> - -<p>This, then, is the thesis at the very foundation of all <i>Wissenschaft</i>: -and therefore figures at the head of the <i>Wissenschaftslehre</i>,—the -name Fichte gives his fundamental philosophy. But alone it is -powerless. A foundation is only a foundation, by being built upon. The -position must be defined by counterposition: thesis by antithesis: ego -by non-ego. Ego, in fact, is first made <i>such</i>, as set against <i>you.</i> -In other words, the perception we assumed to start with does not merely -<i>suppose</i> and indeed pre-suppose the absolute Ego; but it sets in -the absolute Ego an ego and a non-ego,—sets against the lesser ego, -something limiting and limited, something defining it in one particular -direction; or, if the original consciousness we started to examine was -an act of will, then, it may be said, the non-ego appears as about to -be limited and defined by the Ego. Be our consciousness, therefore, -practical or theoretical, of action or of knowledge, its fundamental -characteristic is the conjunction (correlation with subjugation) -of an ego and a non-ego. It is always a synthesis of an original -antithesis<a name="FNanchor_5_66" id="FNanchor_5_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_66" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>; of self and not-self. But every<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> such synthesis which -brings together into one a self and a not-self, is possible only in the -original thesis of a greater self—an absolute Ego—which includes the -not-self and the self it contrasts within its larger self. The unity -of the first principle<a name="FNanchor_6_67" id="FNanchor_6_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_67" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> (A = A, or I = I) parting or distinguishing -itself into the opposition of A versus not-A, Ego set against non-ego, -re-asserts itself again in consciousness (perception of objects, and -action upon them by will) as synthesis, i. e. a conjunction (not a real -union). And this synthesis is either the limitation of the Ego by the -non-ego or the limitation of the non-ego by the Ego. The former gives -the formula of theoretical, the latter that of practical consciousness.</p> - -<p>We begin with the absolute Ego. It is absolute activity, utter -freedom. It is the source of all action, all life. Yet if thus -implicitly everything, it is actually nothing. To be something, it -must restrict itself, set up in itself an antithesis:—by the setting -up of a not-self, at once limit and realise itself: translate itself -from ideal absoluteness and unconditionality into a reality which -is also limited and partial. All consciousness and action exhibit -this antithesis of a limited self and an outside and adversative -other-being; but the antithesis rests upon the medium of a larger life, -a thesis which transcends and includes the antithesis, and which leads -to that alternating adaptation of the two sides to one another (their -synthesis) which actual experience presents as its recurring phase<a name="FNanchor_7_68" id="FNanchor_7_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_68" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>. -The <i>Wissenschaftslehre</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> leaving the absolute Ego in the background -deals with the play that goes on in human experience between the -correlatives to which it has reduced itself;—the antagonism, but the -moderated and overruled antagonism, of Ego and non-ego.</p> - -<p>Observe the contrast to the ordinary methods of expression. Popular -language—if the popular philosophers are to be trusted as its -exponents—says 'an impression is produced by an external object on -the senses, and causes an idea in the mind.' The 'object' works a -series of marvellous effects on a mind, which—to begin with—is hardly -describable as anything more than an imagined point of resistance, -getting reality by being repeatedly impinged upon.<a name="FNanchor_8_69" id="FNanchor_8_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_69" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Fichte's -statements are rather interpreters of the vulgar phrases, which say -'I hear, I see';—as if, forsooth, the 'I' did it all. According to -Fichte, the 'I,'—the absolute 'I,' is the real (but secret) source -of the position in which consciousness finds itself limited by a -non-ego. But within the finite ego and its consciousness there is -no reminiscence or awareness of this its great co-partner's—the -absolute ego's—act. For the finite consciousness, the beginning of its -activity—i. e. of all empirical consciousness, lies in an impulse or -stimulus from without—a mere somewhat of which we can predicate the -very minimum of attributes. It is only <i>felt</i> as opposing: and this -is the first stage or grade of theoretical consciousness: Sensation. -But in the perpetual antithesis—in the self-opposition which is the -radical act of consciousness—the mere limitation of Ego by non-Ego is -confronted by the underlying activity of the Ego which re-asserts the -limitation as its own act. Thus while we are, as it were, impressed, we -re-act against that impression—we set it forth before us, as ours, and -free ourselves<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> from its immediate incumbency and oppression. Instead -of mere sentiency or feeling, we have a perception (or intuition) of it.</p> - -<p>It would be out of place, here, to try to write the interpretation -of that marvellous and difficult piece of dialectic—the -<i>Wissenschaftslehre</i>;—a theme to which Fichte returned again and -again up to his death, ever modifying details, selecting new modes of -exposition, and gradually, perhaps, changing the centre of gravity -of his system. It will be sufficient to note the two purposes which -it keeps in view. On the one hand it is a systematic theory of the -categories. It begins, as we have seen, with the three co-ordinates of -all reflection,—identity, difference, and reason why; it proceeds to -the co-relative principles of activity and passivity; to condition, -quantity, &c. And its work is to show how these forms naturally emerge -in the recurrent antithesis which arises in consciousness, and how -again they are brought together by the overmastering Absolute thesis -into a synthesis, from which the same process re-appears. How much this -corresponds in general conception to the Hegelian Logic is obvious, and -Fichte has the merit of the original suggestion. With this however he -conjoins—what Hegel has relegated to his Psychology—an evolutional -or developmental theory of the mental powers. We have already seen how -sensation is forced by the latent intelligence to rise into perception -(<i>Anschauung</i>): the line of psychological development is carried on by -Fichte through imagination to understanding and reason. Hegel's work is -far more complete, definite, and detailed: but that need not keep us -from giving due homage to the suggestive sketch of the originator of -the conception<a name="FNanchor_9_70" id="FNanchor_9_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_70" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></p> - -<p>But the theoretical consciousness is not all; and as we already know, -the practical Ego is supreme over it. In it lies the key to the mystery -of the stimulus—the shock from the unknown—which awakened the -activity of the Ego. The non-ego is only a mass of resistance created -by the Ego so that it may be active; only a stepping-stone on which -it may walk; a spring-board from which it may bound. Only so much -reality has the non-ego; the reality of something which may be shaped, -made, made use of. Call the something which the stimulus (<i>Anstoss</i>) -pre-supposes, the thing-in-itself (after Kant): and if you ask How are -things-in-themselves constituted, you get from the <i>Wissenschaftslehre</i> -the answer: 'They are as we should make them<a name="FNanchor_10_71" id="FNanchor_10_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_71" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>,' Or, as it is said -in another place: 'My world is—object and sphere of my duties and -absolutely nothing else<a name="FNanchor_11_72" id="FNanchor_11_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_72" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>:' if you ask whether there is really -such a world, the only sound reply I can give is: 'I have certainly -and truthfully these definite duties, which take the form of duties -<i>towards</i> such, and <i>in</i> such, objects; and it is only in a world such -as I there represent and not elsewhere that I can perform these duties -which I cannot conceive otherwise,'</p> - -<p>This is a grand word: and yet we feel that, in the intensity of -intellectual consecutiveness and moral inflexibleness, we have lost -some elements to which Kant had given their place in the philosophy -of life. The third of Kant's three Criticisms is conspicuous by its -absence from the Fichtean field of view, and has no recognition in -this scheme of the universe: and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> great conception of the natural -world as an organism, in which natural man is only a part, and all -is controlled by an autonomous principle of life, has been for the -while allowed to drop. Even more than in Kant religion tends to be an -epilogue or appendix to morality: and God is identified with the moral -order of the world. It is customary to speak of Fichte's idealism as -ethical, or as subjective: and so long as these words are understood, -no harm is done. But to call it subjective does not mean that Fichte -was so far beside himself as to believe the world was only a picture -or a function of his individual brain. It means that he throws the -weight too much on the side of subjectivity. The Absolute is, for him -in his first stage, described as an Absolute Ego—and thereby the -natural world seems to be left without God: and subjective duty has too -exclusively thrown on it the weight of certifying objective existence. -The world, as we shall see, and have indeed indirectly gathered from -Kant, is too good and worthy to be the mere block of stone out of -which our duties are to be hewn. And similarly, to call Fichte an -ethical idealist is only to name him right, when we add that his were -idealist ethics. The world is not here merely that social decorum may -be maintained, and that puritanical virtue may pronounce that all is so -well, that thenceforth there shall be no cakes and ale, nor ginger be -hot in the mouth. The friend of the two brothers Schlegel, and their -remarkable wives, Dorothea and Caroline, touched hands with a social -group<a name="FNanchor_12_73" id="FNanchor_12_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_73" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> which, for good and for ill, had emancipated itself from all -codes except that which bids</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 8em;">'To thine own self be true:</span><br /> -Thou canst not then be false to any man.'<br /> -</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span></p> - -<p>To him, as to Kant, morality presented itself as autonomy, as the -dignity and grace of human nature in freest development; but to him, -more than to Kant, there commended itself the ideal of a city of -reason, a thoroughly socialised community<a name="FNanchor_13_74" id="FNanchor_13_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_74" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>, in which the welfare of -each would be an obligation on all, and the machinery of government -would be so marvellously self-corrective that all would do right and -all fare well.</p> - -<p>Fichte's place in the annals of philosophy depends on his academic -treatises of 1794-98, and on his more popular works from the first -date down to 1808. In a study of the philosopher as a whole it would -be necessary to go beyond these dates, and take account of the -displacement which a development of thought, which there is no good -reason to suppose other than gradual, made in the scale of his earlier -views. But for our purposes that is out of the question. In justice, -however, it must be added that some things that seem inadequately -treated, some shortcomings in catholicity of mind, would appear in -another light if the later writings—not published till after Hegel's -death—were duly taken into account. But even at the close of the -century the advancing thought of Germany was seeking other leaders.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_62" id="Footnote_1_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_62"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Cf. notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 399.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_63" id="Footnote_2_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_63"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Cf. notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 387.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_64" id="Footnote_3_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_64"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Leibniz, <i>Werke,</i> ed. Gerhardt, iv. p. 392.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_65" id="Footnote_4_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_65"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Cf. notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 393.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_66" id="Footnote_5_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_66"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The <i>antithesis</i> has two members: the partial ego, and the -non-ego, which confronts. The <i>synthesis</i> is a putting together two -separate things, so as to correlate them; but it falls short of what -would be understood in some present usage by 'synthetic unity' which -has a certain mystical ring. It is important for a student of Schelling -or Hegel to remember this distinction of synthesis from 'absolute unity -e.g. Schelling, <i>Werke</i>, v. 43.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_67" id="Footnote_6_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_67"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>A = A</i> is the more purely logical formula: <i>I=I</i> presents -it as a personal and metaphysical identity. The <i>A</i>, which is <i>-A,</i> is -to be distinguished from the <i>A</i> which is opposed to <i>not-A.</i> But it is -Fichte's standpoint to insist on their being one Ego.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_68" id="Footnote_7_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_68"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> To give this interpretation of the larger Ego as Life and -Blessedness is to assume that the teaching, e. g. of the <i>Anweisung zum -Seligen Leben,</i> is the logical deepening of the earlier language about -the Ego.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_69" id="Footnote_8_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_69"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Cf. the description of mind as 4 a bundle of impressions.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_70" id="Footnote_9_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_70"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Especially given in the Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der -Wiss. (<i>Werke,</i> i. 331). Of course Fichte goes through a corresponding -'deduction' of the emotional or moral nature. Schelling (<i>System des -transcend. Idealismus</i>) works out the 'deduction' still more at length.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_71" id="Footnote_10_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_71"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Fichte, <i>Werke</i>, i. 286.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_72" id="Footnote_11_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_72"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Ibid. ii. 261.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_73" id="Footnote_12_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_73"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that the state of -affairs alluded to, which has its literary memorials in F. Schlegel's -<i>Lucinde</i>, and in the warm defense of that book by Scheiermacher, was -only a passing experiment in which a high-strung idealism amid a lax -society sought for truth at all costs and dared a noble lie.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_74" id="Footnote_13_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_74"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> In the <i>Geschlossener Handelstaat</i> (of 1800), the -'classical' document of characteristic German Socialism in its earlier -and idealist phase.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XII.</h5> - - -<h4>THE BEGINNINGS OF SCHELLING.</h4> - - -<p>Schelling and Hegel had been fellow-students at Tübingen, where, -besides the ostensible lessons of the class-room, they had drunk gladly -of the springs of thought Lessing had set running, had felt the hopes -and the fears of the struggle republican France waged against the -German powers, and had seen that Kantian criticism contained within -it a fire which would burn up the hay and stubble of old theology. -Hegel, five years the elder of the two, had passed through his college -career in a very creditable but by no means brilliant way. Among his -fellows he had gained the reputation of a quiet, and rather reflective -mind, which, however, under an old-fashioned exterior, breathed a deep -impassioned zeal for that higher life of which the nobler spirits among -the young then, as now, longed to accelerate the advent. Schelling, -singularly gifted with speculative ability, literary art, and the -receptivity of genius to catch and string together the theories -that rose to the top in science and letters, had already made his -mark as a philosophic writer, while his senior compatriot, leading -the inconspicuous life of a private tutor, was only working up and -widening his ideas. Schelling's first essays in metaphysics trod the -same lines as Fichte; but in 1797<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> (when he was aged 22) appeared his -<i>Ideas towards a Philosophy of Nature.</i> A year later he was lecturing -at Jena, in friendly association with the Schlegels, and with Fichte, -who, however, soon quitted the place. In 1800 appeared the <i>System of -Transcendental Idealism</i>, and in 1801 the <i>Exposition of my System</i>; -followed in 1802 by <i>Bruno</i>, and in 1803 by the <i>Lectures on University -Studies.</i> Brief periods of academic teaching at Würzburg, Erlangen, and -Munich, and after 1841 at Berlin, broke the silence which set in after -his <i>Inquiries into the nature of human liberty</i> in 1809; but little -certain was known to the outside public of the final standpoint till -the publication of his collected works (1856-61).</p> - -<p>An involuntary touch of sadness falls upon they historian as he surveys -Schelling's career. Seldom had a thinker's life begun with better -promise, and more distinguished performance; seldom had a nobler -inspiration, a more liberal catholicity of mood, guided and propelled -the intellectual interest; seldom had expectation of greater things -yet to come followed a writer's traces than was the lot of Schelling. -On one hand, a lively and active appropriation of the results of -scientific discovery, at least in its more suggestive advances: on the -other, a mastery of words and style which fitted him to hold his own -amongst the literary leaders; and, again, a sympathy, that seemed to -be religious, with the movement which sought <i>lucem ex Oriente</i>, and -wisdom from the treasures of the world's purer youth. And yet—in the -main—the net result, oblivion more complete than has ever befallen a -great thinker. At first, one is inclined to pass on with the remark -that even books and thinkers have their fates, and that some momentary -forgetfulness let the tide slip unused. But it is possible to be less -oracularly-obscure:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> and without detracting from the splendid faculty -and great achievement of Schelling to note some of the causes of his -lapse into a mere episode.</p> - -<p>In the first place, though his conception is of a system, his -performance is only a succession of fragments. The nearest approach -to an encyclopaedic exposition of his ideas is found in his popular -<i>Lectures on the Studies of University.</i> More than once he starts -on the task of exposition, but lets it break off about the middle. -Again, at each new occasion, the features of his scheme of thought -have slightly altered, and not merely does his philosophy profess -at first to present two distinct sides, but these two sides of the -shield vary. Thirdly, the interest in scientific novelties, always -disposed to seek the curious, the far-reaching and suggestive, more -than the sounder generalisations, tends as time goes on to fasten too -greedily on the miraculous and mysterious night-side of nature, on -magic powers and mystic discernments—a path which descends to the -abyss of a 'positive,' i.e. a quasi-materialistic, theosophy. The -matter-of-fact rationalists (both the Catholics in Bavaria, and the -Protestant theologian Paulus, once a friend, but latterly his bitterest -foe) regard him as a crypto-catholic, the advocate of medieval -obscurantism so hateful to true enlightenment. Even his literary art -renders him suspected: for there is an old quarrel between philosophy -and fiction; and grave-eyed wisdom is jealous of her gipsy rival. -Ill-advised indications of a sense of lofty superiority to the average -teacher increased the numbers and the venom of his opponents. Nor is -it perhaps beneath the dignity of history to suggest that his first -wife, Caroline, with all her wonderful attractions of intellect and -character, and notwithstanding all that she had been to Schelling in -encouragement and counsel, was too clever and too<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> critical not to sow -many jealousies, and to add through the female line to the ranks of -those with whom he stood suspect.</p> - -<p>But perhaps the real reason of Schelling's failure was a certain -excess of objectivity. Fichte had drawn attacks down by an abnormal -subjectivity which would fain reform the surroundings wherever he -went. Schelling stood more apart—animated by an immense curiosity, -a boundless interest in all the expanse of objective existence; but -withal he seemed not to have his heart, deeply set and pledged to -a distinctively human interest. His first love is the Romance in -nature; and when he turns to history it is by preference to ages far -remote. His ideal of philosophy is to see it achieve its work by -the instrumentality of Art. Religion seems to culminate for him in -a mythology. Reflection and speculation are to him always somewhat -of a disease—whence philosophy is to carry us—almost magically if -possible—to rest again in the primeval unity of life. It is only an -instrument towards a great end—and that end a godlike, even if you -like a religious, Epicurean life. From such a standpoint it would be -easy, in youth, to relapse into naturalism; it would be equally easy, -in later life, to fall into supernaturalism. Philosophy—at least as -Hegel understood it—is merely neither: but the life, which never -can quite cease to be an effort, of idealism. And so Schelling could -not earn the confidence which only goes to those who are felt to be -fellow-fighters with those they lead.</p> - -<p>With Schelling occurs the confluence, into the main current of -philosophy, of streams of idea and research which had already -exercised a stimulative effect on the tone and products of the higher -literature of Germany. As early as 1763 (at the very date Kant let the -English and Scotch 'empiricists' shake him out of his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span> 'rationalist' -dogmatism) Lessing—in a couple of pages <i>On the reality of things -outside God</i>—threw doubts on the tenability of the ordinary deistic -arrangement of his day, which set God <i>there</i> and man and his -surroundings <i>here,</i> each side, for the time at least, undisturbedly -enjoying his own. Lessing read Leibniz by the light of Spinoza, and -Spinoza by the light of Leibniz: and, if he emphasised the absolute -right to the completest individual self-development on one hand, he no -less declared on the other that 'nothing in the world is insulated, -nothing without consequences, nothing without eternal consequences.' -'I thank the Creator that I must,—must the best,' he adds (1774). Of -his conversations on these high topics with Jacobi, we have already -spoken. While Spinoza and Leibniz were either decried, or—what is -worse—misunderstood, by the established masters of instruction, they -were welcomed by a more sympathetic and, with all its drawbacks, more -appreciative study from the non-academic leaders of thought.</p> - -<p>Amongst these one of the most interesting and influential was Herder. -Herder, who had been amongst Kant's students in 1763, and who has -expressed his admiration of his then teacher, came as years passed-by -to consider himself the appointed antagonist of the Kantian system. -The two men were mentally and morally of different types: and in -Herder's case, a sense of injury, in the end, positively blinded -him to the meaning no less than to the merits of a doctrine he had -decreed to be pernicious. In Herder's opinion, the Kantian system -laboured throughout from the fault of a dead logical formalism and -abstractness: it inhabited a sort of limbo, cut off alike from the -fresh breath of nature and the growing life of history, and from the -eternal spirit of divine truth: it undermined (so his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> experience at -Weimar<a name="FNanchor_1_75" id="FNanchor_1_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_75" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> indicated) the traditional faith, and inspired its 'adepts' -with a revolutionary superciliousness to all dogma. Its cut-and-dried -logicality, its trenchant divisions and analyses were obnoxious to his -poetically-fervid, largely-enthusiastic, and essentially-historical -soul. Man—in his concrete completeness, in his physical surroundings -and his corporeal structure, in his social organisation, in his -literary and artistic life, above all in his poetry and traditions of -religion—was the theme of his studies; and he looked with distrust on -every attempt to analyse and disintegrate the total unity of humanity -by a criticism first of this, and then a criticism of that side of -it, carried on separately. Ossian had been an early favourite of his; -and the twilight that hovers with the haze of pensive myth around the -figures of that visionary world hangs with a charm and a confusion -around the ultimate horizon of Herder's ideas.</p> - -<p>In 1774 and 1775 Herder wrote and wrote again an essay (published 1778) -for a prize offered by the Berlin Academy on the subject of 'Sensation -and Cognition in the human Soul.' Its fundamental points are that -'no psychology is possible, which is not at every step a distinct -physiology': that 'cognition and volition are only <i>one</i> energy of the -soul': that 'all our thought has arisen out of and through sensation, -and in spite of all distillation still contains copious traces of -it': that there are not separate faculties of thought, but one divine -power, which unifies all the broad stream of inflowing sensation,—'one -energy, and elasticity of the soul, which reaches its height through -the medium of language.' 'What is material, what non-material in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> -man, I know not,' he says; 'but I am in the faith that nature has not -fastened iron plates between them,' 'Man is a slave of mechanism (but -a mechanism disguised in the garb of a lucid celestial reason) and -fancies himself free,' 'Self-feeling and fellow-feeling (a new phase of -expansion and contraction) are the two expressions of the elasticity of -our will': they vary directly with each other: and 'love therefore is -the highest reason'—a proposition, adds Herder, for which 'if we will -not trust St. John, we may trust the undoubtedly more divine Spinoza, -whose philosophy and ethics turn wholly upon this axis.'</p> - -<p>Herder's great work, however,—which, side by side with Lessing's -<i>Education of the Human Race,</i> and with Kant's <i>Idea for a Universal -History</i>, helped to constitute that conception of history, as -philosophy in concrete form, which appears in Schelling, Schlegel, and -Hegel,—was the <i>Ideas for a Philosophy of History.</i> It is the pendant -and contrast to Kant's three Criticisms, with which it is nearly -contemporaneous (1784-91). Even in history Kant emphasises the work of -intelligence, of reason: and puts the intelligently-organised state—if -possible, the world-commonwealth, when war shall be transformed into -merely stimulating competition,—as the final triumph of the reason. -To Herder, while on the one hand the nature-basis is all-essential, -and must form the foundation of any genetic explanation of spiritual -phenomena, the ideal of humanity presents itself rather as a free -development of the many-sided individual—a development tempered by -the association of the family and the claims of friendship. In Kant's -view of civilisation, natural reason by its indwelling presuppositions -works out the end of culture: Herder, on the contrary, allows himself -to introduce—but only in and from the dim background—a supernatural -aid to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> actualise the germs of rationality latent in man's nature. -Yet, though at the first step into history the Godhead appears, and -a deified humanity looms ahead as the consummation of the process -of evolution, the development between these two extreme poles is -homogeneous and indeed one. The same law governs it throughout:</p> - -<p>'Ethics is only a higher physics of the mind.' Man is from the -first endowed with tendencies which, through the medium of society -and tradition, carry him on to the double end, so hard to combine, -of 'humanity and happiness,' 'humanity and religion.' But, for -this training of the spirit he is prepared by a special natural -endowment of the body: and Herder can go so far as to say that 'in -order to delineate the duties of man, we need only delineate his -form.' Developing under the influence of cosmic and geographical -conditions, and formed of the same protoplasm and on the same type -as other animals, man possesses an unique organisation, a definitely -proportioned mechanism, which is his distinctive and permanent specific -character. General identity of plan and condition prevails for man -and animals; but Herder keeps back from the Darwinian inference which -interprets the graduated diversity of type as indicating that man is -the phase reached <i>pro tempore</i> in the gradual slide along which the -continuous change of environment carries the unstable types which -earlier environments have helped to form. For Herder's conception of -nature there are fixed differences beyond which research cannot go; and -we shall see that both Schelling and Hegel accept this reservation.</p> - -<p>Herder, finally, struck a blow in the war that was waged after -Lessing's death between the friends and foes of Spinozism. His little -book <i>God</i> (1787) is a vindication v of Spinoza against Jacobi's -attack. Antiquarian accuracy it can lay no claim to: the picture -of Spinozism,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> one-sided at the best, is further vitiated by an -interpretation of the doctrine which leavens it to indistinctness with -the ideas of Leibniz and Shaftesbury. It was a grand—but it was also -an audacious—vision of Spinozism which found it not inconsistent with -a fundamental theism on one side and with the poetry of nature on the -other. Yet Herder had the merit of being perhaps the first to pierce -the hard logical shell of rationalism under which Spinoza had lain -hidden, and to reveal the mystic passion for God which so quaintly -called itself <i>amor erga rem infinitam et aeternam.</i> 'Spinoza,' says -Herder, 'was an enthusiast for the being of God,' Even where he -translates Spinoza's terms into ample equivalents, he does service by -teaching men that the vapid inanities they associate with terms like -<i>substance</i>, <i>mode, cause</i>, are inadequate to interpret the intensity -of meaning they had for the philosopher. To remove the seals which -rendered both Leibniz and Spinoza a mystery for the world was to -prepare the way for Schelling and Hegel<a name="FNanchor_2_76" id="FNanchor_2_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_76" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>.</p> - -<p>It is under the aegis of Spinoza and Leibniz that Schelling begins -his first characteristic work,—the <i>Ideas towards a philosophy of -Nature.</i> In these thinkers he found first proclaimed as the fundamental -standpoint of philosophy the unity of the finite and the infinite, of -the real and the ideal, of the absolutely active and the absolutely -passive. They differed indeed in this, that whereas this unity is -pre-supposed by Spinoza as infinite and absolute substance, of which -all separate existence, body or mind, is only a <i>modus</i>, it is taken -by Leibniz as the universal characteristic of every individual being. -Every monad—and the human soul is the typical monad—is at once finite -and infinite, real and ideal, active and passive. But—whether as -under<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span>lying substance, or as unity of reality—both hold the cardinal -doctrine that the absolute (the 'Object' of philosophy) is the unity -and unification—the identity—of what outside it appears as two -sides or orders of being, the real and the ideal. To philosophise, -therefore—or to see things in the absolute—is (not as Hegel's -malicious joke puts it<a name="FNanchor_3_77" id="FNanchor_3_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_77" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>, to look at them 'in the night when all cows -are dark,'—but) to see them in the intense light that proceeds from -the identity of the <i>Spirit</i> within us with the <i>Nature</i> without us.</p> - -<p>Fichte had caught hold of this standpoint. He had seen that the -original antithesis which confronts us, and the conjunction (synthesis) -of its members, presupposed a still more fundamental and indeed -absolute thesis,—an aboriginal and active unity. That antithesis is -the opposition of ego and not-ego; that synthesis is every act of -knowledge and will, by which each of these powers is in turn limited -by the other. Such a synthesis (volition or cognition) would be -impossible unless on the fundamental thesis (or hypothesis) of a unity, -or identity, which gives rise to the antithesis and has the power of -overcoming it. Such an original unity is what he calls the absolute -Ego. I am what I know and will, and what I know and will is Me. Such -is the equation (briefly written, I = I) which identifies subject -and object (of knowledge and will). But the associations clinging to -the terms Fichte used gave this thought a one-sided direction. The -'<i>I</i>' is opposed to the <i>'Thee,'</i> and the '<i>Them,</i>' and the 'It.' The -'thing'—or non-ego—is depreciated as compared with the thinker and -willer. It is postulated <i>ad majorem gloriam</i> of the Ego: in order that -I may work out the full fruition of my being. It is what I ought to -make out of it. It <i>is</i> nothing but what it <i>will be</i>—or will be if -I do what<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> I ought to do. The identity of the two sides therefore is -left as 'the object of an endless task, an absolute imperative.' The -Absolute is not yet:—it is only the forecast of a postulated result.</p> - -<p>'If this be what Fichte teaches, and be called subjective idealism, -then for Schelling the first thing is to quit the house of bondage. Let -us leave out of view the Ego, with its misleading associations, and -begin with the two fields which are known to us, the fields of Nature -and Spirit. Nature—not Matter—is the one side: Mind or Spirit the -other. Each of them furnishes the object of one branch of philosophy—a -philosophy of Nature, on one hand, and a transcendental idealism on the -other. The former is new, and more especially Schelling's own proper -continuation of Kant: the other partly a continuation of Fichte's work. -But as they are both philosophy, they must coincide or meet. The whole -philosophy may therefore call itself a philosophy of Identity; but, for -the while, it will present itself under the two aspects of a philosophy -of Nature, conceived as the blind and unconscious, a philosophy of Mind -and history, as the free and conscious product of intelligence.<a name="FNanchor_4_78" id="FNanchor_4_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_78" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_75" id="Footnote_1_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_75"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> He held posts of large general superintendence over church -and school affairs at Weimar.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_76" id="Footnote_2_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_76"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 420.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_77" id="Footnote_3_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_77"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Hegel, <i>Werke</i>, ii. 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_78" id="Footnote_4_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_78"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 392.</p> -</div> -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></p> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XIII.</h5> - - -<h4>THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND IDEALISM.</h4> - - -<p>What is meant by a 'philosophy of Nature'? 'To philosophise on Nature,' -says Schelling, 'means to lift it up out of the dead mechanism in -which it appears immersed,—to inspire it, so to speak, with liberty, -and to set it in free process of evolution: it means, in other words, -to tear ourselves away from the vulgar view which sees in Nature only -occurrences, or at the best sees the action <i>as a fact, not the action -itself</i> in the action<a name="FNanchor_1_79" id="FNanchor_1_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_79" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>.' There is in short a process in nature -parallel in character to what Fichte had exhibited for consciousness. -The natural world is no longer subordinated, but to appearance -co-ordinate: and evolution or development, exhibited under the logical -title of a 'deduction,' is the common law of both. The real order and -the ideal order of the world are equally the work of an infinite and -unconditioned activity, 'which never quite exhausts itself in any -finite product, and of which everything individual is only as it were a -particular expression.' The nature which we see broken up in groups and -masses, and individual objects, is to be explained as a series of steps -in a process of development: the steps in a single continuous product -which has been arrested<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> at several stages,—which presents distinct -epochs, but nevertheless all approximations, with divergences, to a -single original ideal.</p> - -<p>In Nature, as in Mind, the most typical phenomenon is an original -heterogeneity, duplicity, or difference, which, however, points -back to a still more fundamental homogeneity, unity, or identity. -This primary unity or ground of unification does not indeed appear -to sight; the 'soul of Nature,' the <i>anima mundi,</i> nowhere presents -itself as such in its undivided simplicity; but only as the perpetually -recurring re-union of what has been divided. But though unapparent, -the absolute identity is the necessary presupposition of all life -and existence, as of all knowledge and action. It is the link or -'copula' which perpetually reduces the antithesis to unity, and the -heterogeneity to homogeneity, and the different to redintegration. To -this fact of antithesis, presupposing and continually reverting to an -original unity, Schelling gives the name 'Polarity,' 'It is impossible -to construe the main physical phenomena without such a conflict of -opposite principles. But this conflict only exists at the instant -of the phenomenon itself. Each natural force <i>awakes</i> its opposite. -But that force has no independent existence: it only exists in this -contest, and it is only this contest which gives it for the moment a -separate existence. As soon as this contest ceases, the force vanishes, -by retreating into the sphere of homogeneous forces<a name="FNanchor_2_80" id="FNanchor_2_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_80" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>.' Polarity, -therefore, is a general law of the cosmos.</p> - -<p>A ceaseless, limitless activity, therefore, as the basis or groundwork -of all, for ever crossing, arresting, and limiting itself: an eternal -war, which, however, is always being led back to peace,—a process -of differentiation which rests upon, is the product of, and is for -ever<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> forced back to integration, is the perpetual rhythm of the -natural universe. It is a process in which can be traced three grades, -stages, or 'powers' (first, second, and third, &c.). By its more -generally descriptive name it is called Organisation. 'Organism,' -says Schelling, 'is the principle of things. It is not a property -of single natural objects; but, on the contrary, single natural -objects are so many limitations, or single modes of apprehending the -universal organism<a name="FNanchor_3_81" id="FNanchor_3_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_81" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>.' 'The world is an organisation; and a universal -organism itself is the condition (and to that extent the positive) -of mechanism<a name="FNanchor_4_82" id="FNanchor_4_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_82" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>.' 'Mechanism is to be explained from organism: not -organism from mechanism.' 'The <i>essential</i> of all things is <i>life</i>: the -<i>accidental</i> is only the <i>kind</i> of their life: and even the dead in -Nature is not utterly dead,—it is only extinct life.'</p> - -<p>But if the conception of an organism be thus the adequate or -complete idea of Nature as a whole, that idea is only realised as -a third 'power' supervening on, and by means of two subordinate or -inferior ranges or 'powers.' The first stage is that occupied by the -mathematical and mechanical conception of the world,—the bare skeleton -or framework which has to be clothed upon and informed with life and -growth. This first 'power' in the world-process of antithetical forces, -under the control of, and on the basis supplied by, the original -thetic unity which synthetises them, is Matter. In Matter we have the -equilibrium and statical indifference of two opposing forces—one -centrifugal, accelerating, repulsive, the other contripetal, retarding, -attractive—which, working under the synthetising unity supplied by the -force of universal gravitation, build up in their momentary arrests -or epochs the various material forms. In this first 'power' we have -as it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> were the scheme or machinery through which organisation will -work: the outward and 'abstract, organism. And the essential feature -of this 'construction' or 'deduction' of matter is that it does not -take material atoms and build them into a world, but 'deduces' the -properties of matter as issuing from the play of opposing forces, and -as due to the temporary syntheses resulting from the presence of unity -making itself felt in the opposites.</p> - -<p>A second and higher 'power' is seen in the physical universe as it -presents, itself to the sciences of electricity, magnetism, and -chemistry. If the former briefly be denominated the mechanical, -this is the chemical world. The law of polarity is here especially -prominent: the neutrality or indifference of parts is replaced by an -intenser antithesis and affinity: and the return from heterogeneity -to homogeneity takes place with more striking and even sudden effect. -Here, matter, even as inorganised, has a certain <i>simulacrum</i> of life -and sensibility: there is in it the trace of a spirit which emerges -above the mere contiguity and juxtaposition of mechanical atoms. The -atomic theory shows itself less and less adequate as an attempt to -represent the whole phenomena of inanimate matter, and the material -universe is already charged with sympathies and antipathies which are -full of the promise and the potency of the organic world.</p> - -<p>The mechanical theory of the universe, in the ordinary sense, which -deals with the mathematical formulation of the laws of planetary -movement, had been the work of the seventeenth century. The eighteenth -century had seen attempts to explain the <i>status quo</i> of the -planetary system as a resultant from the evolution of an elementary -molecular state of the cosmic mass. With the close of the eighteenth -century there appeared a group<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> of new sciences dealing with subtler -energies of matter,—with electricity, galvanism, and above all with -the connexions of chemical, electric, and magnetic science. The -ideas thus suggested—embraced with some generality under the title -Polarity—threw light backward upon the old mechanical conceptions, -and gave them a decidedly dynamic character. Even the tranquil rest -of geometrical figures came to be explained as a meeting point and -transition moment of opposite forces. But these ideas produced an even -greater effect on biology. Here, too, the need of a special 'vital -force' to explain life and organisation disappeared: organism was -but a higher stage, a completer truth of mechanism: and both found -their explanation in the antithesis and synthesis of forces, or in -differentiation and integration of what has recently been termed an -'idée-force.' In this direction, so far as Schelling was concerned, -the obvious stimulus came from the programme sketched by Kielmeyer at -Stuttgart in 1793, in a lecture 'on the proportions of organic forces,' -According to Kielmeyer there are three types of force in the animal -organisation, sensibility, irritability and reproduction<a name="FNanchor_5_83" id="FNanchor_5_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_83" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. The last -of these is the basic force which builds up and propagates the animal -system. With irritability, or contraction in response to external -stimuli—material adaptation to environment—a higher level of animal -life is reached. But the highest of all forces in the living being is -sensibility. In this same order may we reasonably conceive that the -'plan of nature' proceeds. Her first products show little beyond that -reproductive power which makes broad and high the pyramid of life. But -as the creature acquires increasing heterogeneity and a comparatively -independent position, it plays the part of a re-agent against stimuli, -and a source of movements.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> Lastly, it not merely responds to, but -assimilates and appropriates the impression into a sensation: it -internalises the external, and carries within itself by means of the -sensibility an ever-increasing picture of the world around it.</p> - -<p>The idea of Evolution or Development, thus introduced by Schelling into -philosophy as a governing principle in the study of matter and of mind, -is not to be confused either with the older use of these terms or with -their current applications to-day<a name="FNanchor_6_84" id="FNanchor_6_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_84" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>. By evolution (or development) -and involution (or envelopment) the earlier speculation on biology had -denoted the view that the organic germ contained <i>in parvo</i> all that -the matured organism showed in large. As the mature bulb of the healthy -hyacinth shows, when cut open, to the naked eye, the stem and flowers -that will issue from it next spring; so in general the seed can be -treated as a miniature organism needing only an increase of bulk to -make it fully visible in details. Growth is thus not accretion, but -explication and enlargement of a microscopic organism subsisting in the -germ.</p> - -<p>Evolution, in the present time, and especially since Darwin, means -something more than this. It implies a theory of descent of the variety -of existing organisms from other organisms of a previous age, less -individualised in forms and functions. From comparatively simple and -homogeneous creatures there have issued in the course of ages creatures -of more complex, more highly differentiated structure; and this process -of gradual differentiation may be conceived as going on through an all -but infinite period. At one end we may conceive matter, just endowed -with the faculties of life and organisation, but in a minimal degree; -at the other end of the developmental process, creatures which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> have -organised within themselves powers, maximal both in range and variety. -The result (so far as we at present go) is a genealogy of organism -which, to quote Darwin, pictures before us a 'great tree of life which -fills with its dead and broken branches the crust of the earth and -covers the surface with its ever branching and beautiful ramifications.'</p> - -<p>Even Bugon, seeing how naturally he could regard 'the wolf, the fox, -and the jackal' as 'degenerate species of a single family,' concluded -we could not go wrong in supposing that 'nature could have with -time drawn from a single being all other organised beings.' Erasmus -Darwin (1794) had insisted on the power of 'appetency' in the organs -of a living creature to create and acquire new structures which it -handed down to its posterity. G. R. Treviranus<a name="FNanchor_7_85" id="FNanchor_7_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_85" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> in his <i>Biology</i> -(1802-5) had noted the influence of environment, and Jean Lamarck in -his <i>Philosophie Zoologique</i> (1809) had—after assuming that 'nature -created none but the lowest organisms'—maintained that need and use -(or disuse) can so effectively modify a creature that it may even -produce new organs, and give rise by imperceptible degrees to a variety -of creatures as widely divergent as they now appear. E. g. 'The giraffe -owes its long neck to its continued habit of browsing upon trees.' And -gradually it had become recognised by speculators on this subject that, -as Mr. H. Spencer wrote in 1852, 'by small increments of modification -any amount of modification may in time be generated.' Finally, in 1859, -Darwin, with an ample resource of illustrative examples, enforced the -doctrine that the existing fauna and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> flora of the earth represent the -result of a struggle for existence, protracted during vast ages, in -which those creature's have been preserved (selected to live) which, -among all the variously-endowed offspring of any kind, were best fitted -to appropriate the means of subsistence in the circumstances in which -they for the time found themselves placed. The circumstances of life -on the globe are perpetually varying from place to place and time to -time: progeny never exactly reproduce their parents, and diverge widely -from each other: hence each form of life is perpetually sliding on from -phase to phase, and only those survive which are best adapted to the -new conditions of life.</p> - -<p>So far as Darwinism is an attempt to show that the classes of plants -and animals are not a mere juxtaposition and aggregation, but are to be -explained by reference to a single genetic principle, it is in harmony -with the Evolution taught by Schelling and Hegel. Both alike overthrow -the hard and fast lines of division which semi-popular science insists -upon, and restore the continuity of existence. Both regard Nature as -an organic realm, developing by action and re-action within itself, -living a common life in thorough sympathy and solidarity, and not a -mere machine in which the several parts retain without change the -features and functions impressed upon them at creation by some supernal -architect. But they differ in other points. Ordinary Darwinism, -at least, talks as if circumstances and organism were independent -originally, and only brought as it were, incidentally, in contact -and correlation. It fails to keep hold of the fact—of which it is -abstractly aware—that the two act upon and modify each other because -they are members of a larger organism. It forgets, in short, what -Schelling so thoroughly realised, that the organic and inorganic,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> -ordinarily so called, are both in a wider sense organic. It wants the -courage of recognising its own tacit presuppositions.</p> - -<p>But the characteristic difference between the evolution theory of -to-day and that meant by the philosophers is different from this, -though connected with it. 'The assertion,' says Schelling, 'that -the various organisms have formed themselves by gradual development -from one another, is a misconception of an Idea which really lies in -reason<a name="FNanchor_8_86" id="FNanchor_8_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_86" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>.' And Hegel no less decidedly asserts that 'Metamorphosis' -(as the term was then applied, e. g. by Goethe, to what we now call -Evolution) really <i>exists</i> as a fact only in the case of the living -individual,—not in the supposed or theoretical continuity of the -species. 'It is an awkward way both ancient and modern speculative -biology have had of presenting the development and transition of one -physical form and sphere into a higher one as an outwardly-actual -production,—which, however, in order to make it clearer, has been -thrown back into the darkness of the past.'<a name="FNanchor_9_87" id="FNanchor_9_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_87" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Yet notwithstanding -these and even later protests, there is a great charm for many minds in -the evolutionist picture, e. g., of the horse of to-day as the literal -descendant through nearly fifty great stages (called species) from -some creature of the eocene age, which gradually transformed itself in -consequence of innate instability or variability of construction and in -obedience to changes in its environment. But whatever value there may -be in these as yet hypothetical aids to the imagination in grasping and -unifying the variety of organic life, they run on another line from the -philosophical evolution. That evolution is in the <i>Idea</i>, the <i>Notion.</i> -It is the 'fluidity' of terms of thought that is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> here sought, not -of the kinds of things,—except in a secondary way. And above all, -philosophy does not deal with a problem in time, with a mere sequence; -if it deals with a history of nature, the agents of that history are -powers and forces—and powers which are ideal no less than real.</p> - -<p>A nearer approach to the philosophic conception is to be found in the -views which modern physiology takes of the nature of organic structure -and function<a name="FNanchor_10_88" id="FNanchor_10_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_88" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>. In the simplest phases of protoplasm, the apparently -homogeneous mass is really undergoing a series of changes, and indeed -only exists as such, because it is the ever-renewed resultant of -two correlated processes,—a movement up (anabolic change) by which -dead matter is assimilated and built into it, and a movement down -(katabolic changes) by which its composing elements are disintegrated -and left behind, with accompanying liberation of energy. Protoplasm or -'living matter' is the incessantly formed and re-formed thin line on -which these two currents for the moment converge,-a temporary crest -of white foam, as it were, raising itself on the Heraclitean wave of -vicissitude, where all things flow on and nothing abides. But wherever -protoplasm arises and maintains itself on this borderline of ascending -and descending states, it exhibits the three well-known properties of -assimilation, contractility, and sensitiveness. Protoplasm, placed -as it were in the mean between these two processes, is or has the -synthetic power which governs them and keeps them in one. It is no -mere chemical substance, undergoing composition and decomposition, -but rather, if looked at from the somewhat speculative standpoint of -molecular physics, a kind of intricate movement or dance of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> particles, -a shape or 'form' instinct with the power of producing and reproducing -itself, and, ultimately, in some highly differentiated phases -(nerve-system), with a power of producing and reproducing a world of -imagination.</p> - -<p>A philosophy of Nature is only half a philosophy. Its purport is -to set free the spirit in nature, to release intelligence from its -imprisonment in material encasements which hide it from the ordinary -view, and to gather together the <i>disjecta membra</i> of the divine into -the outlines of one continuous organisation. It seeks to spiritualise -nature, i. e. to present the inner idea, unity, and genetic -interdependence of all its phenomena: to delineate <i>natura formaliter -spectata</i> not as a logical skeleton of abstract categories, but in its -organisation and continuous life. There remains the problem of what -Schelling calls 'Transcendental Idealism':—called 'transcendental' -to avoid confusion with the vulgar idealism which supposes the world -to be what it calls a mere 'idea' or phantom of the mind. Schelling's -is on the contrary an 'Ideal-Realism': it 'materialises the laws of -intelligence to laws of nature<a name="FNanchor_11_89" id="FNanchor_11_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_89" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>.'</p> - -<p>We need not in details consider the genesis of Reality from the action -of the Ego. Substantially it is the same as that given by Fichte. -An activity, which is at once self-limiting and superior to all -limit, rises through stage to stage, from sensation and intuition, -to reflection and intelligence, till it becomes the consciousness of -a world of ob; ective reality. 'Give me,' says the transcendental -philosopher, 'a nature with opposing activities, of which the one -goes to infinity, and the other endeavours to behold itself in this -infinity,—and from that I will show you intelligence arising with the -whole system of its ideas<a name="FNanchor_12_90" id="FNanchor_12_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_90" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>.' In the first phase the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> 'ideal-real' -world arises by the synthetic action of the 'productive intuition,' -Ideas, as it were, live and move: they grow and build up: causality -is neither a category nor a schema, but an intelligent 'form' which -is also a force—an 'idée-force,' They are (in the Hegelian sense) -'Ideas,' i.e. neither merely objective nor merely subjective, but both -at once. But such an ideal world is outside and beyond consciousness: -it belongs to the same region as that higher Ego where there is no -distinction between the Ego I am and the Ego I know. To follow the -movement in this region needs a combination of mental vision and visual -intellect, which Schelling has called the 'Intellectual Intuition.' -It is a power which rising above the materialism of sense yet retains -its realism; which, while intellectual, is free from abstractness. -It is synthetic, and widely different from mere logical analysis. -It is, in short, analogous to the artistic genius: it creates a -quasi-objectivity, an ideal-reality, without which the mere words of -the speculator are meaningless. By means of this 'organ,' philosophy -can 'freely imitate and repeat the original series of actions in which -the one "act" of self-consciousness is evolved<a name="FNanchor_13_91" id="FNanchor_13_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_91" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>.</p> - -<p>But the 'productive intuition' is, as Kant would say, blind: it is -unconscious in its operation: and it is only after an arrest, a Sabbath -when it surveys and judges its work, that it begins to realise itself -through a process of analysis and reflection which elicits and fixes -the categories that have been operative in it. By this abstraction -intelligence rises out of mere production to intelligent and conscious -production, i.e. to volition, where it has an ideal and realises it. -With volition and voluntary action, objectivity is to appearance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> -further certified and fortified. It is as active, i. e. as free, and -even moral, agents, that we set forward categorically the reality of -the world. So, too, Fichte had declared. But, as Schelling reminds -us, with this intensified assertion of a law and an ideal to which -the real must and shall correspond,—with the declaration that the -realm of absolute consistency and ideal truth of reason is the true -and real for ever and ever—we come across the fundamental antithesis -of the 'Is' and the 'Ought,5 of the objective and subjective, of -unconscious necessity and self-conscious freedom. With an attempt to -get a philosophy of history,—i. e. of man and mind as the culminating -truth of things, we see ourselves confronted with the opposition of -fatalism and chance. On one hand history is only possible for beings -who have an ideal in view,—one persistent aim and principle which -their work and will is the means of realising. And yet it is an ideal -which only the series of generations, only the whole race, can realise. -Man's license to do or to refrain rests upon a larger, latent, divine -necessity which constrains it. What human agents by their free choice -determine and carry out, is carried out, in the long run, by the force -of an everlasting and unchanging order, to which their wills seem but -a mere plaything. But that man's free agency should thus harmonise -with the constrained uniformities of nature is only possible on the -assumption that both are phenomena of a common ground, or basis of -identity, of an 'absolute identity, in which there is no duplication, -and which for that reason, because the condition of all consciousness -is duplication, can never reach consciousness. This ever-Unconscious, -which, as it were the everlasting Sun in the spirit-kingdom, is hidden -in its own undimmed light, and which, though it is never an object, -still impresses its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> identity on all free objects, is simultaneously -the same for all intelligences, the invisible "root" of which all -intelligences are only the "powers," and the everlasting mediator -between the self-determining subjective in us and the objective or -percipient,—simultaneously the ground of the uniformity in freedom, -and of the freedom in uniformity of the objective<a name="FNanchor_14_92" id="FNanchor_14_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_92" class="fnanchor">[14]</a>.' To rise to the -sense of this Absolute Identity, as common basis of harmony between the -'Ought' and the 'Is,' is to recognise Providence: it is Religion.</p> - -<p>But this 'Absolute' is never in history completely revealed—we cannot -<i>see</i> free action coincide with predetermination. Thus if History as -a whole be> conceived as a 'continuous and gradual self-revelation; -of the Absolute,' 'God never <i>is,</i> if <i>is</i> means exhibition; in the -objective world: <i>if God were, we</i> should not be<a name="FNanchor_15_93" id="FNanchor_15_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_93" class="fnanchor">[15]</a>.' Nor is the -Absolute so revealed in Nature. Yet, even as the apparent contingency -of human action throws us back on an everlasting necessity which is -yet freedom, so the apparent uniformity of natural order shows us in -organic life the traces of a free self-regulating development. To -apprehend the truth at which both seem to point we want an organ of -intelligence which shall unite in itself the conscious activity of -free production with the unconscious instinct of natural creation. -Such an organ is found in they aesthetic power of genius, in the -Artist. The artistic product is the work of two intimately-conjoined -principles:—of the art (in the narrower sense) which can be taught -and learned, and is exercised consciously and with reflection, and of -that 'poesy in Art,' the unconscious grace of genius which can neither -be handed down nor acquired, but can only be inborn by free gift of -nature. In the work thus brought to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> birth there is something definite, -precise, and capable of exposition in finite formulae: there is also -something which no 'prose' can ever explicate, something which tells us -of the infinite and eternal, which ever reveals and yet conceals the -Absolute and Perfect. Art, thus springing from 'imagination, the one -sole power by which we can think and conjoin even the contradictory,' -gives objectivity and outward shape to that 'intellectual intuition' by -which the philosopher subjectively (in his own consciousness) sought to -realise to himself the unity of thought and existence.</p> - -<p>'To the philosopher,' Schelling concludes, 'Art is supreme, because it -as it were opens to him the Holy of Holies, where in everlasting and -original unity there burns, as it were in one flame, what is parted -asunder in nature and history, and what in life and conduct, no less -than in thinking, must for ever flee apart. The view the philosopher -artificially makes for himself of nature is for Art the original and -natural. What we call nature is a poem which is locked up in strange -and secret characters. Yet could the riddle be disclosed, we should -recognise in it the Odyssey of the mind, which, strangely deceived, in -seeking itself, flees from itself: for through the sense-world there -is a glimpse, only as through words of the meaning, only as through -half-transparent mist of the land %of imagination, after which we -yearn. That splendid picture emerges, as it were, by the removal of the -invisible partition-wall which sunders the actual and the ideal world, -and is only the opening by which those figures and regions of the world -of imagination, that but imperfectly glimmer through the actual, come -forward in all their fulness. Nature is to the artist no more than -it is to the philosopher, viz. the ideal world as it appears under -constant limitations, or only the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> imperfect reflex of a world which -does not exist outside him, but within him.'</p> - -<p>'If it is Art alone, then, which can succeed in making objective -and universally accepted what the philosopher can only exhibit -subjectively, it may also be expected that philosophy, as it was in -the infancy of science born and nourished by poetry, and with it -all those sciences which were by it carried on towards perfection, -will after their completion flow back as so many single streams into -the universal ocean of poetry from which they issued. Nor is it in -general hard to say what will be the means for the return of science -to poetry: for such a means has existed in mythology before this, as -it now seems, irrevocable separation took place. But as to how a new -mythology,—which cannot be the invention of the single poet, but of -a new generation, as it were representing only a single poet,—can -itself arise, is a problem, the solution of which is to be expected -only from the future destinies of the world and the further course of -history<a name="FNanchor_16_94" id="FNanchor_16_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_94" class="fnanchor">[16]</a>.'</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_79" id="Footnote_1_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_79"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Schelling, <i>Werke</i>, iii. 13. (References always to the -first series.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_80" id="Footnote_2_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_80"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Schelling, <i>Werke,</i> ii. 409.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_81" id="Footnote_3_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_81"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Schelling, <i>Werke</i>, ii. 500.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_82" id="Footnote_4_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_82"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Ibid. ii. 350.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_83" id="Footnote_5_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_83"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Compare vol. ii. 360 and 429.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_84" id="Footnote_6_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_84"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 424.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_85" id="Footnote_7_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_85"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> 'Every inquiry into the influence of general nature on -living beings,' says Treviranus, 'must start from the principle that -all living forms are products of physical influences which still go on -at the present time and are altered only in degree and direction.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_86" id="Footnote_8_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_86"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Schelling, <i>Werke</i>, iii. 63.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_87" id="Footnote_9_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_87"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Hegel, <i>Encyclopaedie,</i> § 249.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_88" id="Footnote_10_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_88"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See e. g. Professor Michael Fosters article on Physiology -in the <i>Encyclopaedia Britannica.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_89" id="Footnote_11_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_89"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Schelling, iii. 352, 386.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_90" id="Footnote_12_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_90"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Ibid. iii. 427.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_91" id="Footnote_13_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_91"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Schelling, iii. 397.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_92" id="Footnote_14_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_92"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Schelling, iii. 600.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_93" id="Footnote_15_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_93"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Ibid. iii. 603.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_94" id="Footnote_16_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_94"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Schelling, iii. 628.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XIV.</h5> - - -<h4>TRANSITION TO HEGEL.</h4> - - -<p>Thus far Schelling (aetat. 25) had gone in 1800. Two sides of -philosophy had been alternately presented as complementary to each -other; and now the task lay before him to publish the System itself -which formed the basis of those complementary views. To that task -Schelling set himself in 1801 (in his Journal for Speculative Physics): -but the <i>Darstellung meines Systems</i> remained a torso. The Absolute -was abruptly 'shot from the pistol': but little followed save a -restatement in new terms of the Philosophy of Nature. Meanwhile Hegel, -who had inherited some little means by his father's death, began to -think that the hour had struck for his entrance into the literary and -philosophical arena, and wrote in the end of 1800 to Schelling asking -his aid in finding a suitable place and desirable surroundings from -which to launch himself into action. What answer or advice he received -is unknown: at any rate in the early days of 1801 he took up his -quarters at Jena, and in the autumn he gave his first lectures at the -University. Gossip suggested that Schelling, left alone (since Fichte's -departure) to sustain the onset of respectability and orthodoxy upon -the extravagances of the new Transcendentalism, had summoned his -countryman and old friend to bear a part in the fray. And the rumour<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> -seemed to receive corroboration. The two friends issued conjointly -a <i>Critical Journal of Philosophy,</i> which ran through two years. So -closely were the two editors associated that in one article it seems as -if the younger had supplied his more fluent pen to expound the ideas of -his senior.</p> - -<p>The influence of Hegel is to be seen in the <i>Bruno</i>, <i>or on the Divine -and Natural Principle of Things</i>, published in 1802. It is a dialogue, -in form closely modelled after the <i>Timaeus</i> of Plato, dealing with the -old theme of the relation of art (poesy) and philosophy, and with the -eternal creation of the universe. It presents philosophy as a higher -than Art; for while Art achieves only an individual truth and beauty, -philosophy cognises truth and beauty in its essence and actuality -(<i>an und für sich</i>). Philosophy itself Bruno (the chief speaker of -the dialogue) does not profess to set forth, but 'only the ground and -soil on which it must be built up and carried out': and that soil -is 'the Idea of something in which all antitheses are not so much -combined, as rather one, and not so much superseded, as rather not at -all parted,'—'a unity, in which unity and antithesis, the self-similar -with the dissimilar, are one<a name="FNanchor_1_95" id="FNanchor_1_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_95" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>.' From such a standpoint it is not -wonderful that 'in the finite understanding (<i>Verstand,</i>) compared with -the supreme Idea and the way in which all things are in it, everything -seems reversed, and as if standing on its head, exactly like the things -we see mirrored on the surface of water<a name="FNanchor_2_96" id="FNanchor_2_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_96" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>.'</p> - -<p>This supreme Unity is essentially a trinity: an Eternal, embracing -infinite and finite; an eternal and invisible father of all things, -who, never issuing forth from his eternity, comprehends infinite and -finite in one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> and the same act of divine knowledge. The infinite, -again, is the Spirit, who is the unity of all things; while the finite, -though potentially equal to the infinite<a name="FNanchor_3_97" id="FNanchor_3_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_97" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>, is by its own will a God -suffering and made subject to the conditions of time<a name="FNanchor_4_98" id="FNanchor_4_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_98" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. This trinity -in unity (which is the Absolute) is by logic—a mere science of -understanding—rent asunder: and the one Subject-object of philosophy -becomes for reflection and understanding the three independent objects -which such a 'logical' philosophy calls respectively the Soul (erewhile -the infinite), the world (once the finite), and God (the eternal -unity). 'Opposing and separating the world of intelligence from the -world of nature, men have learned to see nature outside God, and God -outside nature, and withdrawing nature from the holy necessity, have -subordinated it to the unholy which they name mechanical, while by the -same act they have made the ideal world the scene of a lawless liberty. -At the same time as they defined nature as a merely passive entity, -they supposed they had gained the right of defining God, whom they -elevated above nature, as pure activity, utter "actuosity," as if the -one of these concepts did not stand and fall with the other, and none -had truth by itself<a name="FNanchor_5_99" id="FNanchor_5_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_99" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>.'</p> - -<p>The problem therefore of philosophy is on one hand to 'find the -expression for an activity which is as reposeful as the deepest repose, -for a rest which is as active as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> the highest activity<a name="FNanchor_6_100" id="FNanchor_6_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_100" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>.' On the -other hand; 'to find the point of unity is not the greatest thing, but -from it also to develop its opposite, this is the proper and deepest -secret of art<a name="FNanchor_7_101" id="FNanchor_7_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_101" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>.' The world as it first presents itself labours under -a radical antithesis: it offers a double face, body and soul, finite -and infinite. But to an absolute philosophy, or that high idealism -which sees all things in the light of the Eternal, the two sides are -not so separate as they first appeared. Each is also the whole and -one, but under a phase, a '<i>Differenz</i>' a preponderating aspect which -disguises the essential identity of both. Behind mind, as it were, -looms body: through body shines mind. The ideal is but a co-aspect with -the real. The difference of nature and spirit presupposes and leads -back to the indifference of the Absolute One. 'Wherever in a thing soul -and body are equated, in that thing is an imprint of the Idea, and as -the Idea in the Absolute is also itself being and essence, so in that -thing, its copy, the form is also the substance and the substance the -form<a name="FNanchor_8_102" id="FNanchor_8_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_102" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>.'</p> - -<p>'Thus,' so Bruno concludes, 'we shall, first in the absolute equality -of essence and form, know how both finite and infinite stream forth -from its heart, and how the one is necessarily and for ever with the -other, and comprehend how that simple ray, which issues from the -Absolute and is the very Absolute, appears parted into difference and -indifference, finite and infinite. We shall precisely define the mode -of parting and of unity for each point of the universe, and prosecute -the universe to that place where that absolute point of unity appears -parted into two relative unities. We shall recognise in the one the -source whence springs the real and naturals world; in the other, of -the ideal and divine world.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> With the former we shall celebrate the -incarnation of God from all eternity; with the latter the necessary -deification of man. And while we move freely and without resistance up -and down on this spiritual ladder, we shall, now, as we descend, see -the unity of the divine and natural principle parted, now, as we ascend -and again dissolve everything into one, see nature in God and God in -nature<a name="FNanchor_9_103" id="FNanchor_9_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_103" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>.' Such was the programme which Schelling offered. Hegel -accepting it,—or perhaps helping to frame it—made two not unimportant -changes. He attempted in his <i>Phenomenology</i> to lead up step by step -to, and so warrant, that strange position of idealism u which claims to -be the image of the Absolute. He tried in his <i>Logic</i> to give for this -point of view a systematic basis and a filling out of the bare Idea of -a Unity, neither objective nor subjective, neither form nor substance, -neither real nor ideal, but including and absorbing these. He tried, in -short, to trace in the Absolute itself the inherent difference which -issued in two different worlds, and to show its unity and identity -there.</p> - -<p>A <i>System</i> of philosophy, and a philosophy of the <i>Absolute!</i> The -project to the sober judgment of common sense stands self-condemned, -palpably beyond the tether of humanity. For if there be anything agreed -upon, it is that the knowledge of finite beings like us can never be -more than a—comparatively poor—collection of fragments, and can -never reach to that which—and such is the supposed character of the -Absolute—is utterly un-related, rank non-relativity. But in the first -place, let us not be the slaves of words, and let us not be terrified -by unfamiliar terms. After all, a System is only our old friend the -unity of knowledge, and the Absolute is not something let quite loose, -but the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> consummation and inter-connexion of all ties. It is no doubt -an audacious enterprise to set forth on the quest of the unity of -knowledge, and the completion of all definition and characterisation. -But, on the other hand, it may perhaps claim to be more truly modest -than the self-complacent modesty of its critics. For ordinary belief -and knowledge rest upon presuppositions which they dare not or will -not subject to revision. They too are sure that things on the whole, -or that the system of things, or that nature and history, are a realm -of uniformity, subject to unvarying law, in thorough interdependence. -They are good enough, occasionally, to urge that they hold these -beliefs on the warranty of experience, and not as, what they are -pleased to call, intuitions, <i>a priori</i> ideas, and what not. But to -base a truth on experience is a loose manner of talking: not one whit -better than the alleged Indian foundation of the earth on the elephant, -and the elephant erected on the tortoise. For by Experience it means -experiences; and these rest one upon another, one upon another, till -at length, if this be all that holds them together, the last hangs -unsupported, (and with its superincumbent load), ready to drop in the -abyss of Nought.</p> - -<p>This 'transcendental,' 'absolutist,' '<i>a priori</i>' philosophy, which -stands so strange and menacing on the threshold of the nineteenth -century, is after all only, as Kant sometimes called it, an essay -to comprehend and see the true measures and dimensions of this -much-quoted Experience. All knowledge rests <i>in</i> (not <i>on</i>) the unity -of Experience. All the several experiences rest in the totality -of one experience,—ultimate, all-embracing, absolute, infinite, -unconditioned; universal and yet individual, necessary and yet -free,—eternal, and yet filling all the nooks of time,—ideal, and yet -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> mother of all reality,—unextended, and yet spread through the -spaces of the universe. Call it, if you like, the experience of the -race, but remember that that apparently more realistic and scientific -phrase connotes neither more nor less (if rightly understood) than -normal, ideal, universal, infinite, absolute experience. This is the -Unconditioned, which is the basis and the builder of all conditions: -the Absolute, which is the home and the parent of all relations. -Experience is no doubt yours and mine, but it is also much more than -either yours or mine. He who builds on and in Experience, builds on -and in the Absolute, in <i>the</i> System—a system which is not merely -<i>his.</i> In his every utterance he claims to speak as the mouth-piece of -the Absolute, the Unconditioned; his words expect and require assent, -belief, acceptance;—they are candidates (not necessarily, or always -successful) for the rank of universal and necessary truth: they are -dogmatic assertions, and even in their humblest tones, none the less -infected with the fervour of certainty. For, indeed, otherwise, it -would be a shame and an insult to let them cross the lips.</p> - -<p>It is the aim of the Absolute <i>a priori</i> philosophy to raise this -certainty to truth: or, as one may rather say, to reduce this certainty -to its kernel of truth. It seeks to determine the limits—not <i>of</i> this -absolute and basic experience (for it has no external limits)—but -<i>in</i> this experience: the anatomy and physiology of the Absolute,—the -correlations and inclusions, the distinctions and syntheses in the -unconditioned field. It examines the <i>foundation</i> of all knowledge. -But—if this be the phrase—we must be on our guard against a -misapprehension of its terms. The foundations are also knowledge: -they are <i>in</i> all knowledge and experience, its synthetic link and -its analytic distinctions. We must<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> not shrink from paradoxes in -expression. The house of knowledge, the world of experience, is as -self-centred and self-sustaining, and even more so, than the planetary -system. It is a totality in which each part hangs upon and helps to -hold up the others, but which needs no external help, resting and yet -moving, self-poised and free.</p> - -<p>We may be spared, therefore, verbal criticism on the Absolute and -Unconditioned. The Absolute, and Infinite, and Eternal is no mere -negation:—the only pure negation is NOT, and even that has a flaw in -its claim. It is perfectly true—and it can only be babes and sucklings -that need to be reminded of the fact—that none of us realises and -attains the <i>ne plus ultra</i> of knowledge and that all our systems -have their day,—have their day and cease to be. 'The coasts of the -Happy Isles of philosophy where we would fain arrive are covered only -with fragments of shattered ships, and we behold no intact vessel in -their bays<a name="FNanchor_10_104" id="FNanchor_10_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_104" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>.' So too the whole earth is full of graves; and yet -humanity lives on, charged with the attainments of the past and full -of the promise of the future. Let us by all means be critical and -not dogmatic: let us never entirely forget that each utterance, each -science, each system of ours falls short of what it wanted to be, -and for a moment at least thought it was. But let us not carry our -critical abstinence into dogmatic non-intervention: or, if so, let us -silently accept the great renunciation of all utterance henceforth. -System we all presuppose in our words and deeds, and should be much -hurt if our defect in it were seriously alleged: the Absolute we all -rest in, though amid so many self-imposed and other distractions we -feel and see it not. The philosopher<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> proposes for his task—or rather -the philosopher is one on whom this task forces itself as for him the -one thing inevitable—to determine what is that system and what that -Absolute, or, if the phrase be preferred, the philosopher traces to its -unity, and retraces into its differences that Experience—that felt, -known, and willed synthesis of Reality,—that realised ideal world—on -which and in which we live and move. He does not make the system, nor -does he set up the Absolute. He only tries to discover the system, and -to construe the Absolute.</p> - -<p>It may be said that the best of philosophers can do no more than -give us <i>a</i> System and <i>an</i> Absolute. Undoubtedly that is so. Each -philosophy is from one point of view a strictly individualist -performance. It is not, in one way, <i>the</i> Absolute truth, which it -promises or hopes to disclose. The truth is seen through one being's -eyes; and his 'measure,' as Protagoras might have said, is upon it. Yet -it is still <i>the</i> Absolute, as seen through those eyes; it is still -in a marvellous measure that truth, that absolute truth, 'which the -actual generations garble.' For both the artist and the philosopher, -if they create, only re-create or imitate; if they are makers, they -are still more seers: and their power of 'imitation' and of 'vision' -rests on their capacity to de-individualise themselves of their -eccentricities and idiosyncrasies, and to bring out only that in them -which is the common truth of all essential thought and vision. In -proportion as they purge themselves of this <i>evil</i> subjectivity are -they true artists and philosophers. They are both—and so, too, is -the religious genius—idealists: but the test of the value of their -idealism is its power of including and synthetising reality. That is -their verification: that, and not their concord with this or that -opinion, this or that theory of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> individuals or of groups. Not that the -views either of groups or individuals are unimportant. But often they -are but frozen lumps in the stream, temporary islands which have lost -their fluidity, and which imagine themselves continental and permanent.</p> - -<p>Truth, then, reasoned truth, harmonious experience, absolute system, -is the theme of philosophy. Or, in Hegelian language, its theme is -the Truth, and that Truth, God. Not alum, an aggregate, or even what -is ordinarily styled a system, of truths: but the one and yet diverse -pulse of truth, which beats through all: the supreme point of view in -which all the parts and differences, occasionally standing out as if -independent, sink into their due relation and are seen in their right -proportion.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_95" id="Footnote_1_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_95"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Schelling, iv. 231, 235, 236.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_96" id="Footnote_2_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_96"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Ibid. 244.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_97" id="Footnote_3_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_97"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> 'In things thou seest nought but the misplaced images of -that absolute unity; and even in knowledge, so far as it is a relative -unity, thou seest nought but an image—only drawn amiss in another -direction—of that absolute cognition, in which being is as little -determined by thought as thought by being.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_98" id="Footnote_4_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_98"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Schelling, iv. 252. See further, iv. 327: 'The pure -subject, that absolute knowledge, the absolute Ego, the form of all -forms, is the only-begotten Son of the Absolute, equally eternal with -him, not diverse from his Essence, but one with it.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_99" id="Footnote_5_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_99"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Schelling, iv. 306. Cp. for actuosity, notes in vol. ii. -396. Spinoza, Cogit. Met. ii. 11, speaks of the actuosa essentia of -God.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_100" id="Footnote_6_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_100"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Schelling, iv. 305.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_101" id="Footnote_7_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_101"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Ibid. iv. 328.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_102" id="Footnote_8_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_102"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Ibid. iv. 306.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_103" id="Footnote_9_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_103"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Schelling, iv. 328.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_104" id="Footnote_10_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_104"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Hegel, Werke, i. 166.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>BOOK II</h5> - -<h4><i>IN THE PORCHES OF PHILOSOPHY</i></h4> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a><br /><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XV.</h5> - - -<h4>THE TWO AGES OF REASON.</h4> - - -<p>The eighteenth century—it has been often said—was a rationalising, -unhistorical, age: and, in contrast, the nineteenth has been declared -to be <i>par excellence</i> the founder and the patron of the historical -method. In the one, the tendency governing the main movement of -European civilisation was towards cosmopolitan and universal -enlightenment. A common ideal, and, because common, necessarily rather -general and abstract, perhaps even somewhat vulgarly utilitarian, -pervaded Western Europe, and threw its influence for good and evil -on literature and art, on religion and polity. It grew out of a -revulsion, in many ways natural, from the religious extravagances -of the century-and-a-half preceding, which had led prudent thinkers -to reduce religion to a 'reasonable' minimum, and to reject all -things that savoured of or suggested enthusiasm, fanaticism, and -superstition. In politics the same one type or system of government -and laws was aimed at, more or less, in all advancing states. National -peculiarities and patriotism were looked at askance, as unworthy of -the free 'humanity' which was set forward as the end of all training. -To simplify, to level, to render intelligible, and self-consistent was -the task of enlightenment in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> dealing with all institutions. To remove -all anomalies and inequalities, to give security for liberty and to -facilitate the right to pursue happiness<a name="FNanchor_1_105" id="FNanchor_1_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_105" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>, was the chief watchword -of this movement. Its questions were—Is religion, Is art and science, -Is political organisation, a source of happiness? Are poetry, and a -belief in divine things, and abstruse knowledge, upon the whole for -human advantage and benefit? Only such civilisation can be justified -as, taken all in all, is a blessing; if not (cried some) we may as well -cling to the happiness of the barbarian.</p> - -<p>That these are important questions, and that the purposes -above-mentioned are in many ways good, is clear. But before we can -answer the questions, or decide as to the feasibility of the aims, -there are some things to be brought and to be kept in view. And these -things were not as a rule brought and kept in view. It was assumed that -the standard of adjudication was found in the averagely educated and -generally cultured individual among the class of more or less 'advanced -thinkers' who asked the questions and set up the aims. That class, -already denationalised by function, forming a commonwealth or rather a -friendly fraternity throughout the capitals of Europe, had cut itself -off from the narrower and the deeper sympathies of the national life. -Forming a sort of mean or middle stratum in the social organisation, -they tended to ignore or despise equally the depths below them and -the heights above. They took themselves as the types of humanity, and -what <i>their</i> understandings found acceptable they dubbed rational: all -else was a survival<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> from the ages of darkness. They forgot utterly -that they were only a part, a class, a member in the social body: -and that they could only be and do what they were and did, because -what they were not and did not do was otherwise supplied. It takes -all sorts of people to make a world: but each class—and the order of -literature and intelligence is no exception—tends to set itself up as -the corner-stone (if not something more) of the social edifice. What is -more: in such a loose aggregate as the intelligent upper-middle class, -the individual tends more and more to count as something, detached and -by himself, to be an equal and free unit of judgment and choice, to be -emancipated from all the bonds which hold in close affinity members -of a group whose functions are unlike each other's, and yet decidedly -complementary. Such a class, again—though there are of course -conspicuous exceptions—is, by the stress of special interests, removed -from direct contact with nature and reality, and lives what in the main -may be styled an artificial life.</p> - -<p>When such a class asked what were the benefits of art or religion, -it thought first of itself; and it looked upon art and religion—and -the same would be true of philosophy and science, or of political -sanctions—as <i>merely</i> objective and outward entities, foreign to the -individual, yet by some mechanical influences brought into connexion -with him,—as one might apply to him a drug or a viand. But clearly -to a person of practical aims, bent on conveying information and -enlightenment, bent on making all men as like each other as possible -in the medium range of cultivation which he thinks desirable, the -utility of some of these things is questionable and limited. It is -only a little modicum of religion, of art and of science, which can be -justified by its obvious pleasure-giving power; and it is easy to point -the thesis<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> against enthusiasm in these regions, by reference to the -disastrous wars fanned by religion, to the license that has followed -the steps of art, and to the lives wasted in the zeal for increasing -knowledge. In his ideal of human life such a practical reformer -will tend to suppress all that bears too clear a trace of natural, -infra-rational, non-intelligent kindred,—all that ties us too closely -to mother earth and universal nature.</p> - -<p>But if this was the dominant tone of the literary teachers who had -chief audience from the public ear, there was no lack of dissentient -voices who appealed to nature, who loved the past, who set sentiment -and imagination above intellect, and who never bowed the knee to -the great idols of enlightened middle-class utilitarianism. Even -in the leaders of the enlightening host—amongst the chiefs of the -<i>Aufklärung</i>—there is a breadth and a depth of human interest which -sets them far above their average followers, and which should prevent -us from joining without discrimination in the depreciatory judgments -so often passed on the eighteenth century. The pioneers in the great -emancipatory movement of modern times should not be allowed to suffer -from the exaggerations and haste of their more vulgar imitators—still -less refused the meed of gratitude we owe them. But when their ideas -were violently translated into reality, when the levelling, unshackling -process was set at work by vulgar hands, the shortcomings of their -theories were made to show even greater than they were: and inevitable -reaction set in. Even the revolutionist himself has come to admit that -fraternity at that time came badly off in comparison with liberty and -equality<a name="FNanchor_2_106" id="FNanchor_2_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_106" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>. But these drawbacks were accentuated when the cosmopolitan -reform-movement, by its haste and intolerance, awakened the spirit -of national jealousy.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> The deeper instincts of life rose in protest -against the supposed superiority of intellect: the heart claimed its -rights against the head: the man of nature and feeling was roused up to -meet the man of reasoning and criticism. The spirit of war evoked those -energies of human nature—some of them not its least valuable—which -had slumbered in times of easy-going peace. The days of adversity and -humiliation taught men that the march of literary culture is not the -all-in-all of life and history.</p> - -<p>It was made apparent, practically at least, that intelligence, with -its hard and fast formulae, its logical principles, its keen analysis, -was not deep enough or wide enough to justify its claim to the august -title of reason. To be reasonable implies a more comprehensive, -patient, many-sided observation than is necessary to prove the claim -to mere intelligence. To be intelligent is to seize the right means -to execute a given or accepted end—it is to be quick and correct in -the practice of life, to carry out in detail what has been determined -on in general. Understanding plays upon the surface of life and deals -with the momentary case: and its greatest praise is to be fleet in -the application of principles, apt to detect the point on which to -direct action, correct in its estimate of means to ends. Clearsighted, -prudent, and direct, it is the supreme virtue in a given sphere: but -the sphere must be given, and its end constituted in the measured round -of practical life, its system complete: or, understanding is bewildered -before a hopeless puzzle. Understanding is—the improvident cynic might -say—a certain animal-like sagacity—(such cynical philosophers were -perhaps Hobbes and Schopenhauer<a name="FNanchor_3_107" id="FNanchor_3_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_107" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>)—a mere power of carrying out a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> -given rule in a new but similar case, and of doing so, perhaps, through -a long chain of intermediate links and means.</p> - -<p>But there are more things in heaven and earth than are heard of in -the philosophy of the logical intellect. The <i>subtilitas naturae</i><a name="FNanchor_4_108" id="FNanchor_4_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_108" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -far surpasses the refinements of the practical intellect: and if the -latter is ever to overcome or be equal to the former, it must, so to -speak, wait patiently upon it, as a handmaiden upon the hands of her -mistress. Such a trained and disciplined intellect which has conquered -nature by obedience is what the philosophers at the beginning of this -century called <i>reason</i><a name="FNanchor_5_109" id="FNanchor_5_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_109" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. It is in life as much as in our mind. It -comes not by self-assertion, by the attempt to force our ends and -views on nature, but by feeling and thinking ourselves in and along -with nature. Or, briefly, it breaks down the middle wall of partition -by which man had treated nature as a mere world of <i>objects</i>—things -to be used and to minister to his pleasure—but always alien to him, -always mere matter to be manipulated <i>ab extra.</i> Yet even to get full -use and enjoyment out of a thing it is well to be in closer community -with it, and on terms of friendly acquaintance. The function of this -fuller reason cannot be performed without something analogous to -sympathy and imagination. Sympathy, which realises the inner unity -of the so-called 'thing' with ourselves: imagination, which sets it -in the full circumstances of those relationships which the practical -intelligence is inclined to abstract from and to neglect. Yet only -something <i>analogous</i> to sympathy and imagination: if, as may well be -the case, we attach to these terms any association of irregular or mere -emotional operation. The imagination<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> in question is the 'scientific' -imagination—the power of wide large vision which sets the object fully -in reality, and is not content with a mere name or abstract face of a -fact—a name which represents a fact no doubt, but represents it, as -many such 'agents' or deputies do, in a hard and wooden spirit. The -sympathy in question is the transcending of the antithesis between -subjective and objective; not a fantastic or fortuitous choice of one -or a few out of many on whom to lavish locked-up stores of affection, -but the full recognition of unity as pervading differences, and -reducing them to no more than aspects in correlation.</p> - -<p>What has been said of sympathy and imagination, as the allies and -ministers of reason, might be extended and applied to humour, -to wit, to irony. These also it may be said—and with the same -qualifications—are essential to a philosopher in the highest -sense. The humour, viz., which strides over the barriers set up by -institution and convention between the high and the humble, and -sees man's superficial distinctions overpowered by a half-grim, -half-jubilant <i>Ananke</i>,—which notes how human proposal is overcome, -not without grace, by divine and natural disposal, how the deep inner -identity in all estates breaks triumphantly through the fences of -custom and deliberate intention. The wit, which upsets the hardened -fixity of classes and groups, flits from one to another, shows -glimpses of affinity between remote provinces of idea, and all this, -without laboured and artificial search for analogies, though to the -slower-following practical mind, hampered by its solid limits, these -leaps from province to province seem paradoxical and whimsical. -The irony, which notes the tragicomedy of life under its apparent -regularity of prose,—which detects the vanity of all efforts to check -the flux of vitality and make the volatile permanent; which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> contrasts -the apparent with the real, the obviously and officiously meant with -the truly desired and willed, and shows how diplomatically-close design -is dissipated in a jest, or the soul bent on many years of enjoyment -is plunged into torment. Thus, in a way, imagination, sympathy, wit, -humour, irony and paradox are elements that go to the making of a -philosopher: but in the serenity of reasoned wisdom they lose their -frolicsome and fantastic mood, and fill their minor place with sober -cheer. Wedded to the lord of wisdom, the Muse of poesy and wit loses -her sprightly laugh and her dancing step, becoming a subdued, yet -gracious matron, who, with her offspring, sheds gleams of brightness -and warmth and colour in the somewhat austere household. Yet still the -free maiden of poesy, in the open fields where the shadow of reflective -thought has not yet fallen, has the greater charm; and a certain -jealousy not unfrequently reigns between the married sister and the -virgin yet untamed.</p> - -<p>But though poetry and the allied arts of words were very helpful to -philosophy—witness the services which, though in widely different -ways, Goethe and Schiller rendered to the higher thinking of -Germany—even more stimulative and fruitful was the research into -nature and history. Nature <i>and</i> history: but they lie closer together -than the conjunction suggests. It is true that in recent times we have -been forcibly taught to separate civil from natural history, if we have -not even been further taught that the latter is an improper application -of the term. But when Aristotle said that 'Poetry is more philosophical -than History' he was probably not restricting his remark to the story -of nations and states; even as when Bacon set history as the field -of memory beside the fields of imagination and reasoning, he was not -solely referring to the records<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> of the human past. The distinction -between natural and civil history is no doubt for practical education -a distinction of supreme importance. But it is so, because in this -scholastic phase the conception of both, under these comprehensive -names, was superficial and abstract. Natural history meant only the -classificatory description of animals, plants, and minerals: civil -history the tale composed to string together the succession of human -actions on the public and national field of life.</p> - -<p>We have seen in an earlier chapter the advances which Lessing, Kant, -and above all Herder, made in this direction<a name="FNanchor_6_110" id="FNanchor_6_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_110" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>. Emphasising in their -several ways the great dictum of Spinoza that human passions, and the -whole scheme of human life, are <i>res naturales, quae communes naturae -leges sequuntur</i>, they gave to history a higher, more philosophical, -more scientific scope than what the name used to connote. Neither in -Spinoza himself, nor in these his followers, did this insistence on -the unity of nature at all lead them to neglect the difference—almost -equivalent, it may be said, in the end to an <i>Imperium in imperio</i>—by -which rational man marks himself off to a special kindred with the -divine<a name="FNanchor_7_111" id="FNanchor_7_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_111" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>. We have seen too what Schelling did to show that history, if -in one aspect it be the product of free human volitions, is, in another -and as he thought a superior aspect, the realm subject to a divine or -natural necessity. The whole tendency of this epoch of thought—the -tendency which entitles it above all to the name of speculative—is its -impulse to over-ride this distinction between Nature and History; to -over-ride it, however, not in the sense of simply ignoring or denying -it, but of carrying it up into a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> unity which would do justice to both, -without exclusively favouring either, and hardly without clipping -both of any extravagant claims. The distinction remains,—no longer -an abrupt division, but now tempered and mellowed by the presence of -a paramount unity. Nature now has a real history: no longer a mere -factitious aggregate of classified facts, it is the phenomenon of -a 'latent process,' due to a 'latent schematism,' and a 'form' or -principle of organisation. Classification does not cease: but it ceases -to be an end in itself, and becomes only subordinate or auxiliary to a -higher scientific end. The main theme is to construe the complete cycle -of life-change and the complete organisation of life-state from the -evidence pieced out and put together from the various orders, classes, -and species of living creatures. And on the other side the mere tale -or narrative of history, with its gossip of personalities, and its -accidents of war and intrigue, tends to become insignificant in the -presence of the great popular life, in its deep and subtle connexion -with agencies of nature hitherto unsurmised, in its dependence upon -necessities and uniformities which envelope or rather permeate and -constitute the human will. It is not indeed that the force of great -personalities has come to be treated as a quantity we may neglect. The -force of the great leader, of the genius, of the hero, is not less -admirable to the wise philosophical historian to-day than it ever was -to his story-telling predecessor. But he flatters himself that he -understands better, and can better take account of, the conditions -which make the genius and the hero possible. Achilles still counts for -more than a thousand common soldiers, and Homer himself is not merely -the composite image by which a long tradition has fused into a dim -pictorial unity the countless bards who sang for ages on the isles of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> -Greece and the coasts of Ionia. Yet we feel sure that Achilles did -what he did, because of the race he sprang from, the inspiration he -felt around him, the companionship in body and spirit of his peers. We -feel that the hero derives his strength from earth and air, from the -spiritual and material substance in which he draws his breath. True, -we cannot explain him, as if he and his heroisms were a mere product -of mathematical and mechanical forces. But where we once recognise -that behind the single visible deed and agent there is a spiritual -nature—an underlying agency—which, unperceived, keeps the hearth-fire -of public life burning in the celestial temple of Vesta, we can at -least see that though genius is a marvel and a mystery, yet it is -according to law, and no mere will-o'-the-wisp.</p> - -<p>But when we say that the actions and sayings even of the foremost -individuals are to be comprehended only in the light of universal -forces and laws, there is an error which is only too ready to -substitute itself for the truth. It soon appears for example that, -among the general causes which control the development of civilisation -and the acts of individuals, the economical condition is of great and -prominent effect. And, above all, it is easily measurable, and subject -to palpable standards (such as statistics of exports and imports, -&c.). It was natural therefore that a school of historico-social -philosophers should arise who maintained that the economical state of -a given society was the fundamental principle or form of its life, -of which all other phases of its civilisation, religious, aesthetic, -&c., were only variable dependent functions. This view, which comes -out in the socialist theory of Marx, is clearly the exaggeration or -abstract statement of a partial truth into a pseudo-complete theory. -The truth is one which found expression as early as Plato. It is this: -that in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> economical system of a society we find the first and -somewhat external or mechanical suggestion of the organism to which -the state is yet to grow. In the economic law of reciprocity there is -a 'certain faint image' of the principle of social organisation or -political life. But when we go beyond, and interpret this first phase -to mean the original foundation, we are stating a figment which has a -plausibility only when by the economic state we mean a great deal more -than abstractly economic facts include. And this again arises because -it is really impossible to carry out thoroughly the abstraction of one -aspect of social life from the others. There are no purely economic -facts which are independent of other social influences,—of ideals, e. -g. moral or aesthetic,—ideals which nobody would call economic, though -they never quite part company from economical conditions.</p> - -<p>So again there is occasionally a tendency to magnify the influence of -what in the narrowest sense may be termed political systems. Forms -of government, and titles of sovereignty are regarded as forces to -which individuals—even the highest—must bow. But here again the -exaggeration of a principle need not tempt us to rush with Tom Paine -into the opposite extravagance that government and state-power are -superfluities, or quasi-ornamental additions to a social fabric, which -can do without them and, like other beasts of low organisation, can, -when shorn of them, reproduce them with ease. And thus though we may -dissent from the view that laws and constitutions are omnipotent, we -may admit that in them the central unity and controlling principle of -social life finds its dominant expression in great outlines. We shall -not agree with him who said 'Let who will make the laws of a nation -if I may make its ballads': because we know that the nation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> will in -the end have the chief voice in determining what are to be its ballads -no less than its laws. We shall not quite accept the dictum that the -intellectual class which formulates ideas and sets up programmes of -ideals gives the real lead to the process of civilisation; for we shall -remember that real ideas are not formed by individuals, but are the -slow work of concrete experience in the so-called inorganic masses, -finding at length utterance through the lips of those appointed to that -end by the natural and divine order. Yet we shall, on the other hand, -see that the high things of the world are dependent on the lowly: that -a song-maker is sometimes not less potent than a legislature: that -pecuniary conditions are effective in the sanctuaries of religion and -the high places of art: and that the noblest ideas of great thinkers -draw their strength and life through roots that run unseen through very -humble ground.</p> - -<p><i>La Raison</i>, says Leibniz, <i>est l'enchainement des vérités.</i><a name="FNanchor_8_112" id="FNanchor_8_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_112" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Truth -linked into truth, and so made truer: truth, with which all things -harmonise and nothing cries dissent: truth, which is neither the -prerogative of the mere <i>demos</i>, nor of the intellectual aristocracy, -but of that rarer unity which, when they can exercise several and -mutually-tendered self-abnegation, is the real spirit of both: truth, -thus conceived, is that king of life, that sun of Reason which lighteth -every man. Truth—to use again the language of Leibniz,—which is not -merely the aggregate of monads,—but the monad of monads, their mutual -penetration and corrective completion, in that Idea-reality where they -retain their individuality, but retain it in the fullness and fruition -of the absolute which each essentially or implicitly is. This kingdom -of suffering and yet triumphant truth is the true age of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> Reason—not -outwardly-critical, individualistically-reforming, mere intellectual -and abstract intelligence,—but intelligence, charged with emotion, -full of reverence, reverent above all to the majesty of that divinity -which, much disguised, and weather-beaten, like Glaucus of the sea, -resides in common and natural humanity. This is the Reason of German -idealism at the commencement of the century. To the clear-cut dogmas of -the abstract intellect it savours of mysticism. If it is friendly to -distinctions and constantly makes them, it is the pronounced enemy of -hard and fast separations. Begin where you like, the reason of things, -if you allow it to work, carries you round till you also see identity -where you only saw difference, or effects where you only looked for -causes. You begin, as the inductive logician, with the belief that -the process is from the known to the unknown. You start with your -basis of fact, as you called it. The nemesis of things forces you -to admit that your facts were partly fictions which waited for the -unknown to give them a truer and fuller reality. You talk at first of -induction, as if it were a single and simple process, which out of -facts builds up generalities and uniformities. You learn as you go on -that the only induction that operates, except in cases which have been -artificially simplified by supposing half the task done before you -apply your experimental methods, is an induction of which the major -part is deductive, and where your conclusion will be recurrently made -your premiss. Your induction only works on the basis of a hypothesis, -and must itself be linked in the 'concatenation of truths,'—a -concatenation which is also a criticism and a correction.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_105" id="Footnote_1_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_105"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> 'We hold,' says the American Declaration of Independence -(1776), 'these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created -equal: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable -rights: that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of -happiness,' &c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_106" id="Footnote_2_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_106"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Louis Blanc, <i>History of the Revolution</i>, vol. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_107" id="Footnote_3_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_107"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Hobbes, <i>Leviathan</i>, Part I. chaps. 2 and 3; and -elsewhere. Schopenhauer, <i>Welt als Wille</i>, Book I. § 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_108" id="Footnote_4_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_108"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Bacon, <i>Novum Organum</i>, i. 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_109" id="Footnote_5_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_109"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> See notes and illustrations in vol. ii. p. 400.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_110" id="Footnote_6_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_110"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> See Chapter XII.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_111" id="Footnote_7_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_111"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Cf. <i>Ethica,</i> iv. 37, Schol. I. contrasting <i>rerum -externarum communis constitutio</i> with <i>ipsa hominis natura, in se sola -considerata.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_112" id="Footnote_8_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_112"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> See the <i>Discours préliminaire</i> to the <i>Theodicee</i>.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XVI.</h5> - - -<h4>THE NEW IDEALISM.</h4> - - -<p>This new idealism which conjures by the name of Reason is a different -thing from the pseudo-idealism of Jacobi, as it is from the -'rationalism,' so-called, of the mere intellectualist. Its ideal is not -a desperate refuge from the hard and bitter reality, only to be reached -by the plunge of faith,—which seems rather the leap of despair: not -a <i>mere</i> other-world,—always <i>other</i>, longed for, presaged, beheld -in dreamy vision, but unperceived by the clear light of intelligence: -clutched at, but elusive of every effort. It is not won by turning -the back on reality and flying on the wings of morning faith to the -better land and the presence of the divine: but by persistence in -unfolding, expanding, adjusting, re-combining, and fortifying those -partial glimpses of the unseen which occur in every vision of the seen. -It is true the ideal is, in a way, always an other world: but not a -<i>mere</i> other world; it is another, and yet not another, but the same, -seen, if you like to say, transfigured, idealised. But idealisation, -if so applied, means not an addition here and a subtraction there -made in reality, from some source outside—from some indeterminable -Whence (Whence indeed should such additions come?). It does not mean -a correction of faults and failures in the real, at the will of an -artist who is dissatisfied with his subject-model and would mend it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> -out of other faces and forms stored up in memory or sketch-book. -This idealism does not in that sense idealise (so as to falsify). It -means complete reality; absolute, systematic, unconditioned reality: -nowhere fragmentary, nowhere referring outside, but completing itself -in all its members. It means—to quote the Hegelian term—seeing all -things in the Idea—their notion (or ideality), i. e. their unifying -'grip,' reflecting itself in their objectivity, and their reality -completing itself in art, religion, and philosophy to that ideal which -to the non-artistic, non-religious, non-philosophic mood is only dimly -suggested and partially supposed. Still less is it an idealism which, -as popularly understood, turns reality and historic fact into <i>mere</i> -ideas.</p> - -<p>But, as perhaps may have been apparent, to call this way of thought -idealism need not keep us from acknowledging that the same philosophy -is also realism. If it insists, so to say, on the idealism of—what -we sometimes call material—nature, it no less insists on the realism -of—what is supposed immaterial—mind. The mental or spiritual world -loses its unsubstantial intangibleness, its mere supposedness, its -'ideal' or <i>merely</i>-ideal character. To the older, and we may say -vulgar, view the mind or soul was a mere 'thought,' something of -which all that could be seen were certain acts or phenomena. It was -a <i>mere idea</i>, which one could pretty well get on without—so long -as he kept, as the phrase was, to the phenomena—phenomena without -reality. How vague and aery again was the subject-matter of morals! A -few virtues and vices, confessedly general descriptive titles, a talk -about will and conscience,—all of them merely several predicates of an -unknown, spoken of, postulated, but unproducible. Compared with this -mere supposedness the spiritual world in Schelling and Hegel acquires -the reality of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> quasi-organism (really supra-organic), growing -and constituting itself, and making room in it for a host of human -relationships. The abstract faculties of mind get reality (not indeed -sensible): the intangible notions of morals become almost palpable: the -kingdom of mind becomes a real pendant to the kingdom of nature. And, -on the other hand, the kingdom of nature gets its ideality recognised: -its unity and continuity made effective in an Idea which embraces, -co-ordinated and systematised, its disparate and unconnected portions.</p> - -<p>This new Idealism, if it led men back from the historical world to -nature, was yet hardly in all respects a pupil of Rousseau. Not 'Back -from civilisation and artificiality to nature and the freedom of the -woodland,' was its cry: but rather 'Remember that man always rests -on and grows out of nature, always has his ideals made directly or -indirectly visible in physical (sensible) structures; and that, when -culture turns away from sense and nature to some supposed higher, it is -really entering on a path which leads to abysses,' Its voice, in fact, -was much like the longing expressed in Schiller's <i>Gods of Greece;</i> -it wished man more godlike and the divine more human. But instead of -backward,—its motto was forward: or back to nature, only to resume the -true starting-point, and retreat from a path of civilisation whose end -is perdition. Man also was nature<a name="FNanchor_1_113" id="FNanchor_1_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_113" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>—if he is never <i>mere</i> nature, i. -e. the nature unexalted to its truth—but he brought to expression, -and might bring to ever clearer and fuller expression, a something -which was in infra-human nature, but which nature elsewhere had -failed adequately to present.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> Thus the relation of Man to Nature was -apparently twofold. On one hand, the physical world was essentially a -world of reason and intelligence—though of intelligence petrified<a name="FNanchor_2_114" id="FNanchor_2_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_114" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>. -So far Hegel agreed with Schelling. But, on the other hand (and here -Hegel took up the great paradox of Fichte), man's place in the universe -is to fulfil the promise and implication of Nature to the full reality -of Spirit, to fulfil it by law and morality; but (here he completes -Fichte by the help of Schelling) also in higher measure, by art, -religion, and science. The world of intelligence and reason which man -constructs as an ethical, artistic, and religious being, is the full -truth of the natural world,—the higher meaning, and fuller, more -consistent, and complete reality of the sensible: and it is so, because -the lord of Nature is one with the lord of the human soul. The new way -of philosophy therefore, if it could be ever charged with saying that -the so-called real things of ordinary life were only ideas, or mental -images, meant that, as taken by the unthinking or imperfectly thinking -perception, they were something of which all that could be said was to -describe their relations to something else, of which in turn the same -remark might be made; so that—as far as they went—reality was never -with us, but only an assurance (soon to be proved vain) that it was -next door<a name="FNanchor_3_115" id="FNanchor_3_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_115" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>. On the contrary—in <i>its</i> use of the term Idea—what this -idealism asserted rather was that the objects of Nature in their <i>prima -facie</i> apprehension were not yet an Idea: if, i.e., an Idea is a mental -or spiritual reality which explains and completes itself, instead of -sending us on endless fool's errands elsewhere—,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> is a concept which -is exactly adequate to reality, and has gathered in it the power of -reality.</p> - -<p>The new idealism is not subversive of realism, but includes it and -makes it the reality it professed to be. It may therefore, as Schelling -proposed<a name="FNanchor_4_116" id="FNanchor_4_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_116" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>, be called an ideal-realism, or a real-idealism. If any -body likes, he may even, if he is no Greek scholar, call it Monism; -but in that case he had better begin by admitting to himself that any -Monism, which can stand its ground and serve for an explanation of the -universe, will not exclude Dualism. All is indeed one life, one being, -one thought; but a life, a being, a thought, which only exists as it -opposes itself within itself, sets itself apart from itself, projects -its meaning and relations outwards and upwards, and yet retains and -carries out the power of reuniting itself. The Absolute may be called -One: but it is also the All; it is a One which makes and overcomes -difference: it is, and it essentially is, in the antithesis of Nature -and Spirit, Object and Subject, Matter and Mind; but under and over the -antithesis it is fundamental and completed unity. Monism, literally -understood, is absurd—for it ignores, what cannot be ignored, the -many: and Dualism, which is offered sometimes as a competitive scheme, -is not much better; unless we understand the Dualism to be no fixed -bisection, but an ever-appearing and ever-superseded antithesis which -is the witness to the power and the freedom of the One,—which is not -alone, but One and All, One in All, and All in One.</p> - -<p>The central or cardinal point of Idealism is its refusal to be kept -standing at a fixed disruption between Subject and Object, between -Spirit and Nature. Its <i>Idea</i> is the identity or unity (not without the -difference) of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span> both. In its purely logical or epistemological aspect -one can easily see that, as Schopenhauer was so fond of repeating, -There is no Object without a Subject and no Subject without an -Object<a name="FNanchor_5_117" id="FNanchor_5_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_117" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. The difficulty arises in remembering these excellent truisms -when one of the correlatives is out of sight, and the other seems -to be independent and to come before us with a title to recognition -apparently all its own. When the Subject figures as the individual -consciousness, encased, it may perhaps be added, in an individual body, -and the Object as a thing apparently out there in a world beyond all -by itself, then the lapse from this rudimentary idealism becomes easy. -In the practice of life and business, each of us, self-conscious and -autonomous <i>subject</i> as he may be, comes to rank in the estimate of -others, and ere long to some extent in his own, as also a part of the -aggregate of objects. All reality and substance seem as it were to -slide over into the object-side. The conscious subject counts as a mere -onlooker or the passive spectator of a performance that goes on in an -outside field of event,—yet that outside is his own object-mind; his -mind counts as a mere idea, or rather as a succession of ideas, i. e. -of mental pictures with a certain meaning in them. A little step more -and the very subject-mind itself is turned into an object. There stands -indeed—according to the ordinary introspective psychology—as it -were in one corner, or at one loop-hole of vision, a mind looking on, -observing and criticising another thing which is also called a mind; -but the mind observing can only reflect or register, and the mind which -is observed is very much thing-like, apparently acted upon by other -things, and acting upon them in turn. This object-mind, a real among -other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> reals, in relations of cause and effect with them, does not, -if we can trust the <i>words</i> of those who tell about it, see itself, -but lies open to the inspection of this other mind, represented by the -psychological observer, who is good enough to report to us something -of its blind and dark estate. Its re-actions, he informs us, exhibit a -remarkable peculiarity. They are equivalent to states of consciousness: -and even to acts of will and knowledge. As when a violin is touched in -certain ways by the bow, you get a musical note, so when certain agents -come in contact with this peculiar real, they elicit a re-action, -termed sense or idea.</p> - -<p>To distinguish in this manner between mental passivity and activity is -natural and right. The basis of all consciousness and mental activity -is an original division, a 'judgment' or dijudication of self from -self. But, once the dijudication made for such ends, it is a mistake -to forget its initiation and lose sight entirely of the fact that -the observing mind is also the active, and that the object-self is -not merely in relation to the subject-self, but in a higher unity is -identifiable therewith. Still the thing is done, habitually done. We -all profess this faith of ordinary realism in our first reflections -upon ourselves. And the effect of the oblivion is that we seek -elsewhere for the initial activity, which we have abstracted from and -lost sight of. The receptive passive mind,—called subject still, but -now become a subject in the sense of the anatomist,—has to be set in -motion, to be impinged upon or impressed. The psychical event which you -<i>call</i> knowledge, and which no doubt <i>means</i> knowledge,—the mental -'state' which you observe—or, it may even, if your authority is a -particularly obstinate and <i>intransigcant</i> realist, be the molecular -change in brain cells,—requires an antecedent event to account for -it. The origin of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> movement which issued in the given psychical -or molecular change is sought in a self-subsistent thing which <i>out -there</i> gives rise to a series of movements which <i>in here</i> result -in a sensation. Or, a thing somehow produces an attenuated image of -itself in the brain, or in the mind; for, in this mythological tale -of psychical occurrence, accuracy is unattainable, and one must not -seek to be too precise. In any case the relationship between thing -and idea is conceived after the analogy of the nexus of cause and -effect, or original and copy; and the verbal imagination of the -analogical reasoner is satisfied. What Hegel, after Schelling, teaches, -on the other side, is that the process of sense-impression and the -manipulations to which it is subjected by intellect presuppose, for -their existence and their objective truth, a Reason which is the unity -of subject and object, an original identity uniting knowledge to being.</p> - -<p>But the same defect of unphilosophic consciousness has another -phase which philosophy has to remember. Popular language speaks of -<i>things</i>,—of things here and things there, which act upon each other -and upon the so-called mind: i. e. on this imagined and supposed -passive mind. For things, a more 'scientific' conception has been -substituted—that of <i>forces</i>; which, whether attached to atoms or not, -are asserted to be the real sources of the change and event which fill -the world of our experience. And as, according to some psychologists, -the mind is only a vacant ground or space with more or less narrow -limits of room, on which the entities called ideas are for that reason -forced into more or less close relationships, without any nearer or -more essential tie; so, too, the mind is apt to be treated by others -only as a battle-field or wrestling-ground of opposing forces. Here -the atom-forces,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> as in the other case the atom-ideas, are, it is -assumed, merely and purely independent: and yet such is the force of -a limited environment—shall we say, in more popular language, the -force of space and time?—that they must meet with one another, must, -as it were, form associations, connexions, relationships. Great, -verily, is the force of juxtaposition. Space and time, because they are -essentially limiting, correlating, defining, weld links which the great -prophet of this empirical school has not scrupled to call insoluble, -ineradicable, inseparable. Space and time, says his great successor, -are infinite. But they are infinite only in the sense that they can -never be exhausted: they are everywhere, and for ever: but as real they -are only here and now. Time can precede time, and space fade away into -remoter space: but every space and every time is finite, defining, -limiting, relative, and synthetic. And, if we look closer, space and -time may come to seem the visible, ghostly, abstract outline—on one -hand stiffening and bodying-out the ideal synthesis of thought and -intelligence, on the other, faintly reproducing or fore-casting the -real synthesis of organisation and living nature.</p> - -<p>In saying this we give the reasonable interpretation of -'association':—so far at least as association is supposed to be -brought about by juxtaposition in time and space. Time and space, as -Kant might say, give the schema—the sensible and visible reflex of the -eternal and universal thought-relation: they are <i>a priori</i> because -they are in the physical world the <i>primitive</i>, the first phase and the -lowest manifestation of that unity which as we know it in nature and -mind always blends with sense, or displays itself in sensible forms. -They are the first stamp of reality, of real Nature: with them we are -in Nature, but it is an abstract shadowy nature. They mark<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> the ascent -(which only from the mere logician's standpoint shall we call the -descent) of the abstract (pure) idea into the element of multiplicity, -of opposition, of life and consciousness. In the psychical and -intellectual world, again, as it rises to more perfect ideality (as it -elicits more <i>meaning</i> from crude <i>fact</i>) they lose their prominence; -they sink into the powers of memory and imagination, which build up -past and future into the unity of the ever present, until in their -consummation they leave as their residual product the abstract element -of pure thought: a thought which claims the attributes of universality -and eternity, which claims, i. e., to merge or submerge in it all space -and all time<a name="FNanchor_6_118" id="FNanchor_6_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_118" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>.</p> - -<p>It is evident therefore that if an associationist theory, like that of -Hume, proposes to explain the actual field of mental life by elements -given in it, and by no other, it can only do so on certain assumptions, -which may be summed up in the proposition that the mind—the real -mental space and time even (and not its supposed 'image')—is at once -subjective and objective, at once real and ideal, at once the field -of operation, the force which directs operations, and the mind which -is aware of itself and its acts. To say, as Hume appears to do, that -an unintermittent long-established custom breeds <i>in us</i> certain -irresistible and essential habits of thought, can only refer to an -unexplained and unnoticed duplication of the self. There is here, one -self, which is only a bundle of fragments, of ideas intrinsically -separate and only incidentally connected by outside pressure, which -enter into ties, peradventure necessary or indissoluble, though not -due to inner affinity. And there is another self which is a self-same -unity, dividing and growing, or assimilating, acted upon but only -because it solicits action, and in a way controlling the process<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> going -on within it. The difficulty for the investigator is to realise that -these two selves are one. No amount of ingenuity will ever succeed in -honestly showing unity to be the mere resultant—even should it be -a fictitious or phenomenal unity—of the collisions and fortuitous -attachments or detachments of different and independent reals. The -reals which behave in such a way as to engender unities, to cause -syntheses, are reals in a mind; and the mind must not merely, as it -were, flow around them, but have them fluid members of itself. If they -are reals, they are ideal-reals. You must begin with an ideal-unity -which is also a real-unity, in which variety can play and by which it -is controlled.</p> - -<p>'Forces,' no less than 'things,' are terms of thought, names of reality -indeed, but inadequate because due to an abstraction and leaving -their correlatives out of sight—names of momentary elements seized -in the flux, and made with more or less success to indicate 'moments' -and 'factors' or 'aspects' in the total sum and power of reality. -Explanation by permanent and separate forces labours under the same -disadvantages as that by things. Science, grown more self-critical, -begins to see that in forces, &c., it has names and formulae which -are not the full reality, but only useful (<i>if</i> useful) abstractions. -Neither things nor forces, though called real, are so in the full -sense. Hume said,—and said not untruly, though with some relish of -paradox,—that we never had any real impression or idea of power -and force. The statement should be taken along with another that -what we mistake for power in things is only our own want of power to -overcome a suggested association, or to break a customary train of -ideas. Lotze, again, has remarked that the supposed consciousness of -power exerted in voluntary movement is confused with a feeling<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> of -work done, or inertia overcome. Whatever may be the truth about the -psychological experience, there can be no doubt for the epistemologist -that the so-called perception of force is an interpretation of one -aspect of experience which, with a certain amount of arbitrary arrest -and simplification, renders it intelligible and real by means of an -antithesis and correlation. Force in fact only exists, or arises, in -relation or opposition to a counter-force: action and re-action are -always equal and opposite, says the mathematical formula. Two forces -are as little independent as an up and a down, or as a west and a -north; force solicits force, and force only <i>is</i> in so far as it is -solicited. The soliciting can only solicit because it is solicited. -In other words, it is not enough to say that the forces which thus -confront each other are correlatives. The relationship must be carried -up a stage higher: the forces themselves get their pseudo-real -character, only so long as they are kept apart forcibly or by inertia. -Carry out their implications: and they re-unite (not however to the -loss of all distinction) in a higher idea, an intelligible unity which, -by its division and return to unity, makes possible and real their -contention. It is this carrying-out of implications to their explicit -truth which is at the root of Schopenhauer's playing fast and loose -with the distinction between force and will. But with him the two terms -are taken up vague and indefinite, in the haze of popular conception or -want of conception, and are without effort or justification identified: -whereas in Hegel, there is, on the lowest estimate, an <i>attempt</i> made -to trace the somewhat intricate steps which mediate the metamorphosis.</p> - -<p>The new idealism thus maintains the organic and even supra-organic -nature of thought and being. The world of experience, when taken in its -reality and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> fullness, is an organism which lives and knows and wills, -and which is life, action, knowledge; its own means and its own end. -The subject acting, living, knowing is action, knowledge, life. In the -ordinary organism there is a subject of functions, a being in relation -to an inorganic world. In the world-organism (if the inadequate name -is still to be retained) there is no outside world, no inorganic -or extra-organic thing. In the world-organism the organ and its -environment is combined in one, re-united: the plant or animal is not -without its place, and its place is not without plant or animal. They -are not merely in correlation, but essentially and actually one. <i>Quid -prosunt leges sine moribus?</i> asks the moralist: but in the Absolute or -the supra-organic Idea, law and morality are not apart: the necessity -is also freedom: the law is not severed from its phenomenon. Such an -organism which is life, thinking, will, is what Hegel calls the Idea: -an organism which is completely organic, with no mere matter: and that -Idea is the foundation of his Idealism. Conceived under its conditions, -the forces which are sometimes represented as struggling with each -other on the field of man's life, are no longer independent; still less -completely separable forces. They are the inner division by which the -spirit re-establishes and makes secure its unity: their antagonisms -are the breath of life. And they have their relations in their common -service, building up one life. They form a certain hierarchy of -organisation; in which however the higher or more developed does not -merely supervene upon the cruder, but in a way supersedes it, and yet -contrives to retain its worth and its real truth.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_113" id="Footnote_1_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_113"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Cf. Spinoza's remark on Body, <i>Eth.</i> III. pr. 2 Schol.: -'Etenim quod corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit; hoc est neminem -hucusque experientia docuit quid corpus ex solis legibus naturae -quatenus corporea tantum consideratur possit agere,' &c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_114" id="Footnote_2_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_114"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See vol. ii, notes and illustrations, p. 392.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_115" id="Footnote_3_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_115"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Schopenhauers well-known description of this recurrent -throwing back of the responsibility of reality on something else is -here suggested ('World as Will and Idea,' § 17).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_116" id="Footnote_4_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_116"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See p. 157 (chap. xiii).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_117" id="Footnote_5_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_117"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Satz vom Grunde,</i> § 16: <i>Welt als Wille und Vorstellung: -Ergänzungen.</i> Cap. i.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_118" id="Footnote_6_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_118"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> See later, chapter xxvi.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XVII.</h5> - - -<h4>METHODS, ARTIFICIAL AND NATURAL.</h4> - - -<p>When modern philosophy took its first steps, it was disdainful and -depreciatory to the past, both Medieval and Old-Greek. Bacon and -Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza,—be their other differences what they -may—all echo the same disparagement. Like Wordsworth's <i>Rob Roy</i>, they -cry—</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 4em;">'What need of books?</span><br /> -Burn all the statutes and their shelves.<br /> -<br /> -We'll show that we can help to frame<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2.5em;">A world of other stuff.'</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>On this iconoclastic age supervenes the attempt of Leibniz to combine -in one all that was good in the new corpuscular philosophy with -all that was precious in the old Platonic idealism as expanded by -Aristotle. So, at the later philosophic crisis towards the close of -the eighteenth century, the somewhat destructive and revolutionary -tendencies of Kant and Fichte lead up by a natural revulsion and -complement to the reconstructive systems of Schelling and Hegel. In -them the conservative instinct comes to supplement the defects of -the radical go-ahead. Instead of tossing the past away to the winds, -and crying out <i>Écrasez l'infâme</i>,—instead of throwing medievalism -behind, breaking all the restrictions on individual liberty which -feudal Europe had created to secure and safeguard the communities that -housed its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> early freedom, the new spirit of the time saw that the -problems of modern life were not solved by merely throwing overboard -as encumbrances and refuse all checks and forms. On the contrary, the -reflective mind saw that forms and checks so-called there must be, and -that the art of statesmanship, though it could not entirely consist in -copying the old, had still to work in some way after the analogy of the -old methods: i. e. to do under new circumstances what would solve the -same requisites, as the old constitution had done for its time. The -change is well illustrated by the attitude towards state organisation -shown by William von Humboldt at different epochs of his life.</p> - -<p>People talk glibly of the Historical Method, and what it has done for -us. To hear what is sometimes said it might be supposed that this was -the method that had been always habitual in history, but which in -these latter days had been applied to other topics, and had proved its -value on the new ground by achieving results that had hitherto been -mere desiderata. This however is pretty nearly to reverse the true -state of the case. It was long till history came to have any method -worthy of the name. In most of those who figure as great historians -the object had been to tell a good tale, to keep the thread of events -distinct, to subordinate incidents to the main issue, to portray -personal and public character and its influence on events. History was -practised—we may even say—more as an art than as a science. If it -dealt with causes, it dealt with individual, concrete, living causes, -not with cold, dead abstractions of forces, laws, or tendencies. If it -did not altogether ignore the suggestions of a quest for principles to -be found in Thucydides and Polybius, it was much more enamoured of the -art of Livy and Tacitus, or even of the naïveté of Herodotus. Of such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> -history who has not felt the power; who has not admired the genius that -reconstructs the men and circumstances of the past, and makes them -live over again their deeds, and again in the end yield the palm to -inevitable fate! But it was not from such history that the historical -method arose.</p> - -<p>The historical method was the product of the new conception of nature -and mind in their mutual relations which has been already noted. To -estimate the labours of thinkers towards this view of history would -be an interesting but complex inquiry. Leibniz in particular by -his principles of development, of continuity, of general analogy, -should have made two things for ever clear. And these two results -that might have been supposed secure were, first, that the present -existence (which at first seems to be alone real) is only a narrow -transition line between a past and a future,—a line of points -intersecting a complex movement or development; and secondly, that -all development is of something which is essentially infinite, which -requires nothing external, no fillip from circumstances or from an -external providence, to set it going, but is in itself a synthesis of -active and passive force in a something at least analogous to an Ego. -The first principle is embalmed in Leibniz's maxim: 'The present is -laden with the past, and full of the future': and the second, in the -maxim 'the Monads have no doors or windows.' In virtue of the first, -the existent (of this instant) is only a stage or grade, rooted in -what has been, and insignificant unless in reference to what is to -come. In virtue of the second, all development is from within, and -presupposes therefore that the developing individual includes within -it a great deal which a cursory view would at first sight assume to -be without it, and only accidentally in contact with it. It might -indeed be well<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> to add a third principle—what Leibniz has sometimes -called the Law of Continuity—the law that, as he says, distinct and -noticeable perceptions are the resultants of an infinite number of -insensible or little perceptions. But continuity proper is not this: -continuity proper or identity is a pure idea. The visible or sensible -discontinuity reposes on, and is to be explained by, an invisible or -ideal continuity. Each body, for instance, in nature, appearing to have -a separate existence of its own, is only a stage isolated or insulated -in a continuing process: and that process, binding, as it does, past -to future, is the process of a Mind. <i>Omne Corpus</i>, wrote Leibniz in -1671, <i>est mens momentanea seu carens recordatione.</i> Every physical -and material object is an intelligence, but an intelligence which -neither looks before nor after, but is limited <i>for itself</i> to the mere -instant: an intelligence which has no history. Yet to the intelligent -observer it has a past,—it has a memory, it bears in it the traces -of its antecedent. Yet to read that book of memory, to decipher the -'insensible perceptions' which are buried beneath the momentary -present, beneath its unspiritual reality, and to knit present with past -and future, is the work of an intelligence, in and to whom the material -discloses its store of meaning, or in whom it is re-spiritualised. In -other words, the presupposition of this historical method is the ideal -continuity of being, transcending and absorbing the differences of time.</p> - -<p>But the teaching of Leibniz—even more perhaps than that of -Spinoza—fell on an evil age: if it was not actually choked with -thorns, it found a soil with little depth, and its brief verdure was -soon followed by a fearful withering. Anxious as Leibniz was to commend -his theories to all men,—and not least perhaps to win the suffrages -of some illustrious and intelligent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> women—he was led to present them -under forms and phrases which were to each correspondent specially -familiar. And the natural consequence was not absent. The forms of -accommodation were what told: they stuck, and the truth they were -meant to convey slipped away: the Leibnitian theory was re-interpreted -into the doctrines it had been meant to supersede. As with Spinoza, -so with Leibniz, a keen apprehension of his meaning came first to the -thinkers on the borderland of literature and philosophy, to Lessing and -Herder, and found an appreciative welcome in the more academic systems -first from Schelling and Hegel. Above all, this theory of 'petites -perceptions' so closely bound up (as was to be expected) with his -mathematical discoveries in the Calculus, is what marks him as having a -finer ear for the secret harmonies and principles of existence than the -coarser organs of popular philosophy could catch up or appreciate.</p> - -<p>'In order,' says Leibniz, 'to get a clearer idea of the little -perceptions which we cannot distinguish in the crowd, I am accustomed -to employ the example of the roar or noise of the sea which strikes -us upon the shore. To hear this sound, as we do hear it, we must hear -the parts which compose this total, i. e. the sounds of each wave, -though each of these little sounds only makes itself perceptible in the -confused assemblage of all the others together, (that is to say, in -that same roar,) and would not be noticed if this wave which causes it -were alone. For we must be a little affected by the movement of that -wave, and we must have some perception of each of these sounds, however -small they may be; otherwise we should never have the perception of -a hundred thousand waves, since a hundred thousand zeros would never -make anything.... These little perceptions are of greater efficiency by -their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> consequences than we suppose. It is they which form that <i>Je ne -sais quoi</i>, those tastes, those images of sensible qualities, clear in -the assemblage, but confused in the parts; those impressions made upon -us by surrounding bodies which envelop the infinite, that <i>nexus</i> which -each being has with all the rest of the universe. It may even be said -that in virtue of these little perceptions the present is big with the -future and laden with the past, that everything conspires together: and -that in the least of substances, eyes as piercing as those of God could -read the whole sequel of the things of the universe.</p> - -<p>'These insensible perceptions, further, mark and constitute the -same individual, who is characterised by the traces or expressions -which they preserve of the preceding states of that individual, thus -forming the connexion with his present state. These may be known by -a superior spirit, though that individual himself should not feel -them, i. e. though express memory should no longer be there. But these -perceptions also supply the means of rediscovering that memory, at -need, by periodic developments, which may one day happen.... It is -also by these insensible perceptions that I explain that admirable -pre-established harmony of mind and body, and even of all monads or -simple substances,—which takes the place of the impossible influence -of one upon another.... After this, I should add but little if I -said that it is these small perceptions which <i>determine</i> us in many -conjunctures without our thinking of it, and which deceive the vulgar -by the appearance of an <i>indifference of equilibrium</i>, as if we were -entirely indifferent whether we turned, e. g., to right or to left.</p> - -<p>'I have remarked also that in virtue of insensible variations two -individual things could never be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> perfectly alike, and that they ought -always to differ more than <i>numero.</i> And with this we have done once -for all with the empty tablets of the mind, a soul without thought, -a substance without action, the void of space, the atoms, and even -parcels not actually divided in matter; we have done with pure repose, -entire uniformity in a portion of time, of place or of matter,... -and a thousand other fictions of philosophers which come from their -incomplete notions, fictions which the nature of things does not -suffer, and which our ignorance and the little attention we have for -the insensible lets pass, but which could never be rendered tolerable, -unless we confine them to abstractions of the mind which protests that -it does not deny what it puts aside and considers out of place in any -present consideration. Otherwise, if we took it quite in earnest, to -mean that things which we do not perceive do not exist in the soul or -body, we should fail in philosophy as in politics by neglecting τὀ -μικρόν, insensible steps of progress:—whereas an abstraction is not an -error provided we know that what we put out of sight is still there.'</p> - -<p>This was the conception which Bacon had shadowed out, which Leibniz -had presented under many names and with many applications, as the -olive-branch between Plato and Democritus; it now became through -philosophical and extra-philosophic acceptance a current maxim in the -general field of knowledge. Nature assimilated to history, and history -assimilated to nature: freedom built upon necessity, and efficient -causes rounded off, though not entirely merged, in final. It is the -recognition of law, order, causality in the psychical world, yet not -of <i>mere</i> so-called natural law; and therefore without reducing it to -a merely physical and material world. It is in fact the new method -which is inevitable and necessary, as soon as it is manifest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> that -life, organisation, development is the underlying truth and central -notion of things. You look at the world at first, let us say, as a mere -collection of separate things in varying degrees of juxtaposition: -and all that you think of doing to them, either by way of theory or -practice, is to put them together, to link them closer, or separate -them more widely. You do so from outside by an arranging force; for -they are assumed to be purely passive, waiting to be touched, each set -in its place—from which it can only be moved by a push or a pull. -This is the method of mathematics or mechanics. It shows the dexterity -of the agent or of the expositor: but you feel that it is artificial, -and arbitrary. It is analytic or synthetic—but not auto-analysis -or auto-synthesis. The director of the movement (we may call it -'construction') may no doubt have the real secret: he may work the -things well and fairly, and unite or divide them according to inner -affinities; but we cannot, as matters stand, be sure of this. The -things, in fact, he deals with have been already emptied of all life -and peculiarity of their own: they are alike in quality, only differing -by a more or less,—a difference which at any moment may be altered by -an act of subtraction or addition. No doubt you can build up what are -<i>called</i> systems—compounds of a kind—in this way: but they do not -really hang and grow together; they are only prevented from breaking -up by the absence of any empty place to which the parts may withdraw. -Bit holds up bit; but how all the bits have found themselves so caged -up without exit is a mystery. Absolute neutrality or indifference of -each part to others, and yet absolute equilibrium<a name="FNanchor_1_119" id="FNanchor_1_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_119" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> in the total -composite,—such is the situation.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span></p> - -<p>The chemical method (taking chemistry as a type of the sciences -like optics, electricity, &c.) is a revelation of a different state -of affairs. The elements of things are here seen to be unique and -incomparable; yet in each there is a latent sympathy ready to break out -when the proper occasion arrives. Bring two things together, and their -affinity suddenly, in the proper circumstances, leads to their complete -fusion: a product arises which, when formed, hardly betrays its origin -and composition. In a way this is the converse of the mechanical or -mathematical method. In it was no fusion, no inner mixture: each part -after composition lay beside the other, and their union was only in the -ideas of the onlooker. It was mere juxtaposition still,—though now -closer: an abnormally keen eye would still have been able to descry the -dividing lines and measure the gaps. At least mere mechanical physics -tends so to conceive it. Here, on the contrary, there is union—but -only at the moment of fusion: once that is accomplished, the result is -apparently simple, and bears no suggestion of being a compound. In the -mechanical union the result is exactly equal to the sum of the elements -which go to make it: in the chemical there is something positively new, -something, i. e., of which the premises gave no indication and made no -promise.</p> - -<p>Either of these methods,—of these conceptions of existence—works -well in a certain region. But both of them only do their work on a -certain hypothesis, or with a certain abstraction. The mechanical -method supposes that objects are all qualitatively alike, differing -only in quantity or weight: all therefore entirely comparable with -each other, and capable of being substituted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> for each other in an -equation. Where this assumption holds good, the method of addition and -division, the method of the calculus does its work<a name="FNanchor_2_120" id="FNanchor_2_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_120" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>. The chemical -method works on another assumption,—the assumption of a number of -qualitatively-differenced elements, of elements which also are, so to -speak, set on edge against some, and ready to leap into the arms of -others. If the observer in the first case had the game entirely in his -own hand,—could build up and separate at his pleasure, could determine -results <i>a priori</i>: he is here baffled by the unexpected, and can only -wait and watch to learn <i>a posteriori</i> the behaviour of the bodies -possessed of this occult and non-predictable affinity. At the best he -can only formulate what he observes, try to classify it, ascertain -any common principles running through it, any serial recurrences, -or the like: and that is all that chemical philosophy can achieve. -Chemical affinity—the fact that certain elements combine in certain -ways, and refuse to enter into certain alliances—is a great fact: -but to <i>a priori</i> reasoning or abstract syllogising it is an entire -inexplicability, one of the accidents in the universe which must be -reckoned with, but cannot be understood.</p> - -<p>It is probably evident that, if we want to get a comprehension of -the life and concrete reality of things, neither of these methods -will quite answer the purpose. With the first alone, if it could be -universally carried out, the universe would be thoroughly explained:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span> -everything would be exactly equivalent to some sum or multiple of -every other: there would be no mystery, nothing unique, and strictly -individual. Given time, we could find a formula for every reality, -and a predicate exactly fitted to any subject. Yet even mathematics -has to confess the existence of irrationals, surds, infinite series, -and the like. For our unities and standards are always arbitrary, -artificial, and one-sided, and fall short of the subtlety of nature. -Even our simpler types of surfaces—the circle and the square—remain -irreducible to each other: and we only avoid the collision by the -remark that practically and with any required amount of exactness -the discrepancy between the two can be adjusted. If we turn to the -chemical method, again, there is a nearer approach to actuality in the -recognition of the presence of something more than mere composition -and juxtaposition. It is not that there is something which is <i>not</i> -juxtaposition: but rather it is much <i>more than mere</i> juxtaposition. -There may be degrees of this something more: but it is only to a gross -or abstract view that it is not present at all. Mere cohesion even -shows a unity in things juxta-posed. Mere contact is contagious: it -infects. 'When a violin has been played on frequently by a tyro,' says -G. H. Lewes, 'its tone deteriorates, its molecules become re-arranged, -so that one mode of vibration is more ready than another<a name="FNanchor_3_121" id="FNanchor_3_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_121" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>.' 'Toute -impression,' he quotes from Delboeuf, 'laisse une certaine trace -ineffaçable.' So-called chemical composition is only a conspicuous -instance, with peculiarities, of this alteration in state produced -by what, from the mechanical standpoint, are called inner molecular -displacements. But to recognise a fact is one thing: to give its -explanation is another. Yet, on the other hand, to recognise the fact -is to note<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> an important point which had been omitted by the mechanical -construction of things. There the result could hardly be called new: -it was exactly equal to its constituent elements: and the equation was -transparent. And it was transparent because the whole process, analysis -and synthesis, was not a work or process of the observed thing, but -the work of the observing mind: it makes the (artificial) unities, -numbers them, and adds them or subtracts. But with the chemical result, -though it also is equal to its elements, there is something new. -Water, no doubt, is oxygen and hydrogen, but here, at least, there -is no doubt that the <i>plus</i> sign unduly simplifies the relationship, -and rather indicates or represents a nexus than accurately defines -it. And yet, there is nothing in water which was not, in some—shall -we say mysterious?—way, in the oxygen and the hydrogen. Chemical -physics, therefore, brings out clearly, or comparatively clearly, -something which the ordinary and coarser simplicity-loving theory is -obliged and is able to neglect: it realises the virtue that lies in -juxtaposition, and shows that the mere outer change of quantity goes -with a deeper inward and qualitative one. The result does more than -sum up and condense what was spread out in extension and dispersed -in parts before: it brings out or reveals something which previously -was unsurmised. Always, in a liberal interpretation of the maxim, it -is true that <i>Ex nihilo nihil fit:</i> but here, especially, the effect -actually discloses what was—but was latent or unperceived—in the -premises. The maxim, to be fairly treated, must be read backwards as -well as forwards.</p> - -<p>But we must go a step further if we wish the full explanation. If the -premises are to be adequate to support the conclusion, they must be -restated in terms which hint at the conclusion—which in a way contain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span> -it, but contain it in potentiality and promise, not in act. This is -the method of development, which is the method that is applicable to -full concrete reality, not like the others to parts abstracted from -or insulated in reality. So long as you deal with these selected -bits of fact—abstracted from their surroundings, subject to strict -observation or strict experiment, you can apply a comparatively simple -and straightforward method. You are dealing with abstracted, mutilated, -prepared fact. You are guided in these cases by the canons of identity -and difference: you add and subtract, or subtract and add; and that -is all. You use what are called the rules of experimental method. But -these canons do not directly apply—except by happy accident—to the -real world, where antecedent and consequents are not separate and -tabulated, as the logical canons, the rules of formal logic, require. -In dealing with this concrete reality, a much more complex method is -needed, a method which has to blend induction with deduction, and -to start from both ends in the series of causation at once. You can -apply observation or experiment, only when the issues have already -been extremely simplified and narrowed down: when the question has -been rendered so definite that it is next-door to the answer, and the -removal of a slight partition-wall will as it were make the two one -clear space. Where observation and experiment are available, indeed, is -where the general outlines and principles of the subject are settled, -where the scheme of reality is defined in large, but a variety of minor -issues still remains to be settled. Unless this general framework is -fixed, neither observation nor experiment, with their canon of identity -and difference, are of any avail. These methods, therefore, only apply -in sciences which are in principle or substantially complete, though -admitting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> of possibly infinite extension in details and particulars. -Where the science is yet to constitute, i. e. in dealing with the -kinds of real things in their completeness, and not as viewed in -some definite aspect, induction and deduction must go hand in hand -and help each other at every step: and if they, as they must, have -recourse to experiment and observation, it will be at first in a very -unsatisfactory and tentative way.</p> - -<p>Such is the way the contrast between the simplicity belonging to an -artificial method dealing with picked instances, and the complexity -that real concrete organic nature demands, presented itself to J. S. -Mill as he advanced in his inquiry. The only complete method for the -investigation of unsophisticated nature, not yet mapped out and defined -in general departments, is the deductive-inductive method in which -induction and deduction separately have a subordinate place,—using -induction in the narrow sense the term has been hitherto allowed to -bear. And that sense, it may be added, is, as in some passages of -Aristotle, little else than a reverse of syllogism, or to speak more -accurately, it is a syllogism which goes up to generals instead of -descending from them. It is like the syllogistic deduction formal and -abstract in character. The (deductive) syllogism assumes the existence -of major premises—of general propositions which in the last resort, -if they are real bases, must be primary and true, or self-evident -facts. But a critic, like Mill, had little difficulty in showing -that a general truth rests upon and presupposes the very particular -conclusions which it is used to establish. Unless every singular is -true, the universal which embraces or unifies them cannot really be -true. Therefore the conclusion is really implied and presupposed in -the principles of its premises. But, unfortunately for the application -and supposed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> sequel of this not unjust remark, a similar remark may -be made on the ordinary exposition of the inductive method. Induction, -it is said, infers from or on a basis of single facts. But if a single -truth is really, i. e. unconditionally true, it is indistinguishable -from the universal. If it is really true once, it is true for ever. -The assertion of the individual proposition as true, if it can be -supported—(and unless it be true, what basis can it afford for -the general conclusion?)—implies the truth of the universal it is -sometimes used to establish. The inductive logician tells us to build -on singular and definite facts, on truths of definite and individual -experience: but a definite or determinate truth rests upon universality -(indeed is a universal), and cannot be found unless we have already -found the special total or organism of truth in which it forms a part. -Individuals and universals presuppose each other, and do not, as the -first impression leads us to think, stand apart as two unconnected -termini, from either of which, if we happen to be so located, we can -without road or railway make a legitimate passage to the other.</p> - -<p>If it be urged, as it may naturally be, that on this showing there is -no solid or 'absolute' starting-point at all, the contention may be -conceded. The only fixed and steady points in knowledge are points -hypothetically fixed,—certified, that is, for the time and in the -circumstances we employ them. But in the open field—or rather in -the wilderness—of knowledge, where the ground of fact is not staked -off, and the unexpected may always turn up, the only test of truth is -the corroboration given by the consilience of paths initiated from -different points: it is only by an undesigned coincidence in the -results of independent operations that you can succeed in orienting -yourself. You begin your road at two ends, and you meet: you locate -or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> fix your point by drawing its co-ordinates to two direction-lines -taken anyhow at first, and only in formed science diverging at a fixed -angle. And in the absolute your direction-lines cannot be supposed -fixed: you can only gradually adjust them to each other as you -proceed. Intelligence, says Aristotle, is a principle, a beginning; -and intelligence, he says again, supplies beginnings<a name="FNanchor_4_122" id="FNanchor_4_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_122" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. Science, in -the technical sense, only comes into operation,—or, in other words, -deduction and (in the narrower sense used by Mill, and proceeding by -<i>pure</i> observation and experiment) induction only find a way,—where -beginnings and principles have been set up, where an approximate order -or provisional system has been established. And if logic, in its -stricter sense, is the method of sciences already made and in their -essentials constituted, then logic can be asked to do no more than -to provide a theory of such formal processes. If it traces the path -which leads 'from the known to the unknown,' if it always proceeds on -the hypothesis of a given knowledge, then such induction or deduction -(from certain and approved singular facts, or from certain and approved -general truths) fully satisfies the practical need of the scientific -reasoner. But if Logic be, as it sometimes is, and may very reasonably -be, taken in the wider sense of an epistemology,—a theory of the -nature and origin of knowledge as a whole, and not of mere inference -or syllogism;—if it does not merely ask how we can satisfactorily -get from one piece of knowledge (we are supposed to have) to another -(not yet supposed to be), but how we come to have knowledge at all; -then its problem must go behind the rudiments of vulgar induction and -deduction. It must ask—what, so far as one can see, Mill and his -mere followers have never seriously<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> asked at all—what induction -is, what are its relations with deduction, and what is the place of -either in the process of knowledge. And as the process of knowledge -is the path to reality, it must also ask about the nature of this -goal,—reality and truth. It is all very well for the narrower Logic -to formulate in terms the methods actually employed in sciences: to -state in abstract canons what is there seen in life and action. But -a <i>Science of Logic</i>—an epistemology—(and a genuine epistemology -cannot claim to be anything short of an ontology) must face the fact of -science itself—must ask how the ideas of the knower must—or otherwise -they are not knowledge—embrace and contain the reality of the known. -The other and narrower Logic is and will remain a theory of forms of -reasoning-a transcript in fainter terms of the procedure of science in -any given step it takes upward to generals or downward to particulars: -but the logic which deals with knowledge as such, in its systematic -entirety,—the transcendental Logic, in short, must have a real value, -an invincible relation to reality. The formal Logic—the logic of Mill -and Hamilton—must be carried back to its principles, to its first -step: and that first step which will also be the last step, and the -inspiring principle of every intermediate step, is that of Intelligence -(Aristotle's Νοῡς), of which the products or manifestations are λόγοι, -i. e. definite conceptions, categories, formulations of rules and -principles of definite range,—determinations or special types of unity.</p> - -<p>Mill really faced the problem of method to better effect when he came -to deal with a class of questions in which he was really interested, -and which moreover have for epistemological purposes the advantage of -being as yet unreduced into the rank and file of disciplined science. -These questions are those dealing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> with man, his mental and moral -nature, and history. Even its advocates or patrons occasionally admit -that there is no accepted idea of what Sociology is or does. Its name -at least expresses a longing towards a unity, or a presentiment that -there is some underlying unity and common method in the group of what -are loosely called the moral, or the historical, or the social and -political sciences. But sociology is, as most people will allow, the -name of a science unrealised—the felt and consciously-apprehended -need of a science, and the dissatisfaction with the existing state of -knowledge in certain departments. And undoubtedly it was with problems -of social science,—problems of politico-economic and socio-ethical or -socio-religious matters, that Mill's interests were mainly engaged. -Like his master in this department, Auguste Comte, he wanted to carry -into the topics which he was chiefly bent upon that 'scientific' -precision which they by pretty general admission lacked, and which -revolutionary movements had shown they greatly needed. But he could -not help seeing that the 'induction' of dynamics and physics was not -exactly the instrument he was in search of. Theory and hypothesis -here demanded a much larger share in the process than in the more -mathematical sciences. Causes and effects in reality here rolled round -into each other, instead of remaining calmly fixed, one set here, and -the other there. Of course even here—i. e. in organic and concrete -sciences—it is possible to introduce observation and experiment,—no -doubt, with greater effort and constraint, but still not altogether -impracticable. But the artificial and mutilative character of such -experimentation is felt here in a way different from its pressure in -other cases. And what is more important, to institute an experiment or -set on foot a scientific observation (and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> to observe means to <i>watch</i> -a definitely restricted natural process with a view to answer some -question about it), presupposes—as we have already seen—a tolerably -definite provisional theory as to the general lie of the country to be -investigated. Only when the country has been reasonably well mapped out -in provinces and provided with some system of roads, can these problems -of detail—questions to be answered Yes or No—be profitably put. And -it is—in some parts of the historical sciences at least—somewhat -premature to put questions requiring a categorical reply. There is -only the vague <i>malaise</i> of felt difficulty to guide us. We do not, -in many cases, know what it is that we want to know; for, it demands -a good deal of wisdom and trained art to put the proper or reasonable -question,—so much so, indeed, that to succeed in formulating your -question fully is equivalent or nearly equivalent to being able to -answer it. The value of observations and experiments—which are ways of -putting nature to the question and it may be to the torture—depends -entirely upon the knowledge and the command of general ideas possessed -by the observer and experimenter. And the same may be said of the -reduced and tabulated conspectuses of the results of many observations -and experiments which are called Statistics. Their value depends on -the truth and breadth of view which presided at their collection and -arrangement<a name="FNanchor_5_123" id="FNanchor_5_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_123" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>.</p> - -<p>The historical or genetic method is the method of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> Science in general, -but considered and employed under a limited aspect. And under its -more comprehensive aspect it may be called—though no name is -unimpeachable—the method of development. Now the essence of the idea -of development—as was clearly shown by Leibniz—is the refusal to -admit external interference, and the resolve to let a thing explain -itself by itself. It does not, like the mechanical method, manipulate -the thing from outside—try to add it up out of factors or items -fashioned and fabricated after some external standard. Nor does it, -like the chemical, look at the result as an inexplicable alteration, -due apparently to a mere stroke of combination or disintegration—yet -not obviously reducible to a mere equivalent of its elements. On -the contrary, it recognises in the object a certain independence or -originality, yet also the presence of an immanent law which does not -wait for the outsider to put it together, but constructs itself, as it -were, after a plan of its own. There is in the so-called object, though -we do not at first sight recognise it, the same originative principle -both analytic and synthetic, as we own in thought. The object is—in -a true logic—a process, a self-completing process, and not merely an -object, mechanical, or other object. It changes, grows or decays, while -we observe, unless for brief instants we cut it off from its connexions -and arrest its development. And our observation, if truly scientific, -must be sympathetic with its process of change. It is neither a mere -thing to be explained and construed <i>ab extra</i>: nor a mystery of sudden -transformation to be passively accepted; but a growth, a history, to be -sympathetically watched and understood,—understood, because it follows -the same order<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> as the movement of our own thought in the process of -knowledge. <i>Similia similibus cognoscuntur</i><a name="FNanchor_6_124" id="FNanchor_6_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_124" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>.</p> - -<p>One sometimes hears it asked by paradoxical critics at which end -a history should begin. And to ordinary dogmatic recklessness, -paradoxical the question may well seem. Begin at the beginning, no -doubt, is the vulgar reply; which in this case is understood to -mean from the earliest point in date (that, of course, being easily -ascertained, and a thing known to all men). But,—so Plato long ago -well raised the difficulty which will always confront us,—are we to go -from the beginnings, or towards the beginnings? And it does not quite -solve the question to say that we are to begin with what is known: -for under that word the same difficulty re-appears. Can you really -know one end without the other? To the vulgar partisan of historical -method, its precept means Go to the earlier, if you wish to understand -the meaning, the value, and the elements constitutive of the later and -subsequent. Begin with origins, with the earliest elements, the phases -that first appear; and thus you will get light to see the later as they -really stand. That this is a common interpretation of the historical -method is notorious. To explain <i>Homo sapiens</i>, one is told to study -the ape,—the nearest analogue of his lost or missing progenitor: to -understand the contemporary horse, go to eohippus, or hipparion, or -however his early prototype may be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> at present named and recognised. -And in all this there is a truth—or least a half-truth. But let us -equally recognise the other half of the truth. If past throws light on -present, present throws not less light on past. You propose, let us -say, to write a history of Greece. A wordy philosophy, wise in its own -conceit and in fine phrases, will advise you to approach the subject -without prepossession or prejudice. So far, good. But what is meant -by the absence of prepossession or prejudice? Not a blank openness -to impression, not a mere passivity; but if passivity at all, a wise -passivity: if openness, the openness of the trained judge.</p> - -<p>The advice, so often associated with Francis Bacon, to get rid of all -false pre-conceptions, of all <i>idola,</i> is one which it is easy to -mistake in an over-zeal to follow it. That mere negation of prejudices -which we call childish innocence is no match for the craft by which -Nature seeks to keep or disguise her secrets. The free consciousness, -the unbiassed mind, is not the easy result of one great act of -renunciation, but the work of continued self-discipline, self-conquest, -self-realisation. If you are not to impose upon the thing a -pre-conception alien to it, neither must you rashly give yourself away -to the thing, or to the first whims which accident puts upon you as the -thing. What seems a fact or thing is only a candidate for the post of -thing or fact: and its credentials need to be examined, and compared -with other evidences. To detect a fact, therefore, is only possible for -a tried and tested consciousness which by patience and self-mastery has -won the key of interpretation. What Bacon apparently meant—though, -as often happens, in his eagerness to combat a prevailing folly, he -sometimes overshot himself in statement—was to insist on the eternal -wedlock of the mind and things, of things and the mind, as the sole -and sufficient<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> condition for the reality of knowledge and truth. The -mind may not presume to do without things, or things to domineer the -mind;—or the result is a windy and frothy vanity. And the wedlock -is eternal: in his own eloquent words, 'the mind itself is but an -accident to knowledge<a name="FNanchor_7_125" id="FNanchor_7_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_125" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>,' and he might have added, so also are things: -for, as he says, 'the truth of being and the truth of knowing is all -one': only in the bond of knowledge are things true and real,—being -otherwise only 'permanent possibilities,' or possibilities barely even -permanent—or not even possibilities. Yet he scarcely realised that -his 'due rejections and exclusions' and negations were a fundamental -<i>constitutive</i> element in those facts of which he habitually emphasises -only the positive side.</p> - -<p>He therefore who would understand—or would write—the history of -Greece must really in his studies begin at both ends—both at the -Greece of to-day, and at the Greece of Solon, or what earlier period -may be taken as the start of Greek history. With perhaps the least -qualified dogmatism, one may assert that he will begin with the -Greece of to-day; or if he deals solely with Ancient Greece he will -begin with the full blaze of Hellenic civilisation which still has a -pale reflection in the modern world, and gradually work back to the -beginnings. It is no doubt customary to begin Greek history, say, with -the Homeric Age, and work downwards, as it is customary to begin a -formal treatise on geography with the general features of the earth's -shape and surface. But that beginning represents really the temporarily -accredited and accepted result of a process which, starting from the -other end, has worked backwards to commencements or origins.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> And the -teacher, in particular, will do well not to imitate too slavishly the -method of the formal treatise. A day may come—or may have come—for -example, for Greek history to start from periods long anterior to the -supposed or traditional date of the wars around the wall of Troy. But -when it does so, it will have done so by more thoroughly ransacking -the Greece of to-day: and so disclosing the secrets of what is termed -pre-historic Greece. Then, conversely, when modern diggings on Greek -soil reveal the features of an earlier than what was erewhile to older -historians its earliest past, the reconstruction of that early people's -life reflects a new light on the directions and the limitations of -its subsequent civilisation. We see better into the reality of Homer, -and even of Demosthenes—into their ideal glory and their historical -limitations, when we explore the cradle in which their race's life was -erst fostered, and the rock out of which they and nature hewed them. -And this is no peculiarity of Greece. The deepest research into the -social institutions which control the England of to-day is the best -propaedeutic for the study of Anglo-Saxon times; and the same is true -<i>vice versa</i>.</p> - -<p>Nor, again, is the truth of the proposition confined to what we -ordinarily mean by history. The Greek poet has said 'Art had to wait on -and welcome chance, and chance to wait on Art': or as we may paraphrase -it, if every invention and discovery is in a measure a lucky chance, -it is a luck that only falls to the wisely prepared head and hand. The -casual event falls as a germ of new construction or theory only on an -intelligence ready to welcome it,—prepared with its complement in the -spirit of an idea, eager to take shape. The means again, in the arts -and crafts, is not only a means to something else; it is also a means -to its own end,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> to realise or perfect itself. The rude tool of the -savage, for instance, is not merely a means to supply his wants: it -is also a means towards completing and improving itself, and towards -perfecting itself by constructing an ampler tool, which supersedes it, -because it can do all and more than all the work of the earlier, or -can do it more economically. All progress that deserves the name is -an incessant and continuous revision of a first step: a re-adaptation -of an old instrument: a repeated and unending self-correction. It -is only a partially-true symbol of human advance to speak of it as -a line: unless we add, by another piece of symbolism, that the line -is only the protracted or extended phase in which the form of time -drags out for us the magnified and organised point-nucleus. It is a -truth—which we are only too ready to forget or discount—that the -savage (and he bears with justice both epithets, 'the noble savage,' -and 'the brute barbarian') is not something left happily behind us, in -the onward march of civilisation; but that he is, however much we may -fancy him suppressed and superseded, still present, at least 'ideally' -in the finest products of humanity, and may hap only too likely—as -the Russian is said, when scratched, to betray his original Tartar -breed—to burst put on provocation into a grim reality. The Pullman -car of to-day retains within it for the archaeologically-trained eye -the rudiments of the primitive wain of the primitive nomade: and -the careful study of either end of the scale will not merely throw -a marvellous light on the excellencies or the defects of the other, -but will probably also tend in the impartial observer to moderate the -self-gratulations of modern advance. For it is only those whose view -ranges within narrow limits that are over-impressed by the magnitude of -the advance made in the 'last new thing.'</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span></p> - -<p>If progress were but the addition of bit to bit, of new bits to what -is already there, or if we could change <i>this,</i> and leave <i>that</i> -unchanged,—as the word perhaps verbally means, and as many people at -any rate seem to understand it, progress might indeed seem an easy -thing, and to be undertaken with a light heart. For, it would appear -as if we could lose nothing, and might probably (indeed, as enthusiasm -and forgetfulness of the merits of the past are in certain periods -ready to urge, must certainly) gain. But it is a more serious matter -when we realise that we must move altogether, if we really are to move -at all; i. e. really are to make progress, and not merely change, so -to speak, from one foot to rest on another. For progress,—if it be -what it is expected to be, and what it must be if it does what it is -expected to do—is an organic, and not merely a mechanical or chemical -change. A mechanical change is only a nominal or formal change: a -chemical is more than change; but in organic change, that which changes -also abides, and the new is not merely other than the old, and not -merely a re-arrangement of the old, but the old transmuted,—the same -yet not the <i>mere</i> same<a name="FNanchor_8_126" id="FNanchor_8_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_126" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>. Progress in short is always the unity of -differentiation and integration. It must not be an externality, nor a -mere dead product of a transformation scene, but a continuous growth, -inwardly digested, made part and parcel of the collective life, which -it has thereby rendered more full, real, and not merely made less -intense at the cost of some extension. In true progress, which is only -another name for true growth, nothing is quite lost, but only changed, -retained in a richer shape and a fuller reality. How far such progress -is possible,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> except in limited and finite spheres: how far progress in -one involves necessarily deterioration in another and how, therefore, -progress is not attributable to the Absolute, are questions we need not -here discuss. But so far at least we may go as to say that a progress -which does not follow the natural law of development and carry on into -the future the worth and substance of the past, is not a progress which -any general enthusiasm ought to be spent upon.</p> - -<p>Development then has two faces, one to the future and another -to the past. And what is called the historical method is apt to -emphasise only one of the two aspects, just as, it may be added, -practical considerations are often likely to produce an opposite but -equally partial bias in favour of the future. The historical method -in incapable hands is liable to lead to unprofitable sighs,—not -unaccompanied by a certain luxury of tears—over the lowly hole of -the pit—it may even be the filth and brutishness, out of which so -much of noble humanity (for thither the interest of development -always reverts) has been dug; and in empty heads the practical, -the vulgarly-utilitarian satisfaction is liable to equally vain -fits of self-applause on our magnificent progress. But both the -self-depreciation of him who loiters regretfully round the beggarly -rudiments, and the self-laudation of glorious 'improvements' looking -derisively on less glorious days, are unworthy of the reasonable and -scientific spirit. The philosophical method does not allow itself to -be imposed upon by the lapse of time, and insists that in a sense -the past contained the present—that, as the poet says, the child -is father of the man. Not indeed contained in any grosser or more -delicate mechanical way. The coming development does not necessarily -lie prefigured—if we had the proper microscope to see it—as a germ -in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> first and original state. That may be, or may not be. Yet -prefigured it is by the law of its structure, or in the intelligible -unity by which only can its existence be understood and construed.</p> - -<p>But if this be the method of real development, in the growth of nature, -and the progress of history, it is also the method of that supreme -product of historical progress, the spirit and system of philosophy. -Thought, also, the culminating stage in which the spirit of man becomes -conscious of itself and of its universe, will move or grow on the same -lines as that of which it is the comprehension and theory. It will -begin at the two ends, and each beginning will complete and presuppose -the other. Nature will suppose and yet lead up to Spirit or Mind: -Spirit or Mind will throw light on the mystery of Nature: Being will -point to knowledge or Idea; and Idea show itself the basis of Being. -Or, if we consider the triple division of the philosophic system, as it -runs in Hegel's <i>Encyclopaedia</i>, we can see how misleading it may be to -take that one order as absolute. To understand it thoroughly we must -begin with each of the three in turn: so as thus to realise that each -does not except figuratively succeed the other, but that in each an -aspect of the whole truth is presented which had been put by the other -parts somewhat in the background. In each part there is a definition -and a revelation of the Absolute. But each is also, as it were, a -projection, a perspective view, a condensed or expanded image of the -other. In each the Absolute is one and whole, in some more veiled, -more restricted, and more meagre than in others; but the veil, and the -restriction, and the emptying, are self-imposed: and for that reason -the veil is really transparent, the restriction is negatived, and the -emptying is not only a self-humiliating but a self-ennobling irony—the -irony of the Absolute.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_119" id="Footnote_1_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_119"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Of course the term 'equilibrium' may be used loosely to -mean a great deal more than this,—how much will depend on the context. -These quasi-mathematical analyses have great fascination: their -apparent simplicity imposes upon us.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_120" id="Footnote_2_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_120"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The distinction, it will be observed, lies between the -method of mathematical physics and that of physics which has learned -something from the researches of electricity or chemistry. If the -method or principles of chemistry are thus said to be reduced to those -of physics, this is because the conceptions of physics have been -revolutionised from the side of chemistry, &c., and even of biology. -This tendency of modern science is precisely in the line indicated by -Schelling and Hegel.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_121" id="Footnote_3_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_121"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Problems of Life and Mind</i>, iii. p. 58.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_122" id="Footnote_4_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_122"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Eth.</i> vii. 7 ὁ νοῡς ἀρχὴ: 6. 6 νοῡς ἐστι τῶν ἀρχῶν.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_123" id="Footnote_5_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_123"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Statistics only define—and primarily for the -imagination—the general laws and principles on which they rest. The -clear-cut mathematical form strikes and 'catches on,' where a more -universal statement sounds vague and glides off. Hence, as one says, -they may prove <i>anything.</i> The fact is, they prove <i>nothing.</i> They only -illustrate in diagrammatic form the theory which presided at their -collection. To emphasise the fundamental nature of ethics for human -development you need only say that conduct is three-fourths or (as to -some minds the precision rises with the denominator of the fraction -17/20) of human life.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_124" id="Footnote_6_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_124"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The resolute misinterpretation—as it often seems—of -the maxim that like is known by like,—is a curious chapter in the -history of Logic. All knowledge is based upon,—or, to speak more -simply, <i>is</i>—the identity of differents: of differents, which in -knowledge are identified,—of identity which in knowledge is put under -difference. And yet the ordinary meaningless talk on this matter seems -to assimilate knower and known to two separate things (or persons), -who casually and, we may add, inexplicably know each other: which is -mythology, perhaps, but not epistemology.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_125" id="Footnote_7_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_125"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Bacon: 'In Praise of Knowledge' (a mere leaflet of much -significance towards estimating his true grandeur). On the <i>Conjugium</i> -of <i>Mens</i> and <i>Universus</i> see <i>Novum Organum</i>, distrib. op.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_126" id="Footnote_8_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_126"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> The said <i>mere</i> same is not really the same at all. -Nobody in his senses predicates sameness except where he also sees -differences: or, the term always implies relation.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XVIII.</h5> - - -<h4>THE RANGE OF PERSONALITY.</h4> - - -<p>The difference between the conceptions of reality held by Aristotle and -Plato respectively is that where Plato said Being, Essence or Substance -(οὐσία), Aristotle said Activity (ἐνέργεια). To be is to act, to be -active. To the outsider—the plain man of philosophic legend, it seems -at first that a thing must <i>be</i> before it can <i>do</i>: that you must have -an agent before you get an action. And, in a way, Aristotle admits -this not quite satisfactory criticism. Every activity presupposes, he -allows, a power to act, a potentiality: every actual presupposes an -implicit or a mere possibility. Existence seems, as it were, to be -doubled; or the mere surface-being is turned into a subject which has -a predicate. But if the existence is to be real, it has to include -both elements, and with the latter or the actuality, as its crown. -Nor is this all. The possibility which issues forth in action may be -fairly called self-realisation. That is to say: A—the hypothetical -agent—acts, does something: and in so doing, seems to go forth and -beyond itself, to externalise itself. Or, A is acted upon, and thus -seems to be diminished. But what it externalises, or puts forth, is -after all what it <i>is</i>: it puts forth itself: and, on the other hand, -if it be a patient, it is no less an agent and self-limitative. What a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> -thing really is, is what it <i>makes</i> itself be: what it allows itself to -be made, that it really is. Yet further, if the word self-realisation -be taken in its fullness of meaning,—if there be really a <i>self,</i> -and it be realised, then this self-realisation, which is the truth -or more developed conception of being, seems to imply or postulate -in it a self-consciousness, an awareness of the process of completed -being,—completed in its return from utterance of possibility to -self-fruition or in its re-assumption of itself.</p> - -<p>To us, of course, as beings aware of what we do and achieve, this -is simple enough: but it is also true of <i>things,</i> that we only -understand them, in so far as we put them in, or invest them with, the -same activity and apperception of activity as we are familiar with -in our own experience. The veriest materialist cannot help speaking -of things as agents, as behaving, as having a function. He would, no -doubt, if he were to be cross-examined, refuse to identify himself -with the primitive anthropomorphism, or at least zoömorphism of the -natural man who sees the river run and the clouds sweep the sky; and -he would probably mutter something referring to people who cannot see -when they ride a metaphor to death. Still less, perhaps, would he -be inclined to adopt the spiritualistic or animistic hypothesis of -philosophising physicists, like Fechner, who would accredit even the -plants at our feet, and the stars in the sky, with souls, or soul-like -centres of their life. But, however he may shrink from what we may call -the ontological consequences of his language, there is no doubt that -for him the meaning of the world, its reality and truth, is obtained -by an interpretation in terms which, rigidly employed, imply their -environment by a self-consciousness to which they are relative. Take -from him the tacit assumption (which he often finds it difficult to -realise just because it is the foundation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> of all his language) that -reality is in the last resort a self-conscious reality, and his words -become meaningless, or what he might think worse, metaphorical.</p> - -<p>To Bacon, who, though not without a strong speculative impulse, -approached philosophic dicta from the standpoint of an average -intelligent Englishman (and it is on that account that his remarks are -often so instructive), it seemed a grave fault of the Stagirite to -define the soul, that 'most noble substance,' by words of the second -intention. Without substance—a solid something as basis of act and -event—the reality of the soul seemed likely to fare badly. Behind -consciousness he, like many others, felt there must be a something of -which consciousness is the state, act, or predicate and attribute. The -thinking must come from a thinker. There must be a permanent subject of -thought—a persistent substance which does not disappear when thinking -for the nonce stops. And thinking is according to common experience -very liable to stops and interruptions. Both Bacon and Locke felt that -without this refuge to fall back upon, personal identity was in a bad -way, or personality itself little better than a delusion. And therefore -when Aristotle, and his modern followers, treated soul and mind as -essentially definable by the terms activity, self-realisation, it has -been freely urged against them that they are tampering with the pearl -of great price which all our hopes and aspirations fondly guard.</p> - -<p>And this is a subject on which there is inevitably a good deal of -misunderstanding. And the misunderstanding will probably last so long -as one set of writers flaunts over it that blessed word Personality -as a holy, a sacrosanct thing, like the visionary cross with its -inscription <i>In hoc signo vinces</i>: and as another set treats it as a -mere fetish, under which is hidden nothing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> better than stock or stone, -or a heap of old bones. Perhaps some concessions might well be made -on both sides. And the first of them would be to try to come to some -clearer understanding what the term in question means. And, on that -point, if we follow the example of Aristotle and examine popular usage, -to see if it can help us to any consistent use of the term, we shall -find that by personal as opposed to real we mean something peculiarly -attached to the individual, of which he cannot divest himself as -of other outward things, though it also is an outward thing<a name="FNanchor_1_127" id="FNanchor_1_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_127" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> The -person in this narrowest sense means the body; and if the epithet -is further extended it still expresses what is directly manipulated -through the members of the living agent, and is more or less closely -attached to it. Yet if it means the body, we must be careful to add -that it is the body, regarded not as such but as the representative, -the outward manifestation, the inseparable sign or symbol of a spirit, -an intelligence and a will. The person is the visible or tangible -phenomenon of something inward,—the phase or function by which -an individual agent takes his place in the common world of human -intercourse and interaction—his peculiar and definite part in the -general or universal world and field.</p> - -<p>Personality thus mingles or unifies in it an universal and an -individual aspect or element: it hints that the universal work always -has in reality an individually-determinate tone,—that nothing in -the world, even if it be called the same, is really and actively -the same. <i>Si duo idem faciunt, non est idem quod faciunt.</i> Thus,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> -what separates personality from individuality is simply that in the -narrower or abstracter use of the latter term there is an absence -of the due subordination of all individuality to universality, and -of all universality to individuality. Personality, in short, is an -individuality which is not a mere freak, not merely different from -other things, but also in itself charged with a universal meaning -or function. Yet even this is not enough to describe it. It is the -individuality of an intelligence: the flesh and blood, and, in a -secondary degree, the outward things, stamped with intelligence. -Every member of a kind, every natural existence, has this double -character; this convergence or union of universal and individual. In -being this individual object, it is at the same time a universal, and -<i>vice versa.</i> But in the attribution of personality there is involved -something beyond what is common to all creatures. And that something, -we may first of all say, is this. Whereas in the case of other <i>things</i> -the individuality is distinctly subordinate, and each is reckoned -primarily by its kind, in the case of <i>persons</i> we can almost declare -that the universality is subordinate to the individuality. This -union of individuality and universality in a single manifestation, -with the implication that the individuality is the essential and -permanent element to which the universality is almost in the nature -of an accident, is what forms the cardinal point in Personality. And -one can understand, when the distinction is thus put, the obvious and -palpable antagonism in which the view stands to the central principles -of Spinoza<a name="FNanchor_2_128" id="FNanchor_2_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_128" class="fnanchor">[2]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> We speak of a man as a Personality when we wish to note -the fact that he is no mere manufactured article, the representative -of a common type, with nothing to choose between him and a thousand -others, but that he is, as it were, one of a thousand, one 'Whom -nature printed and then broke the type,' that he has in the highest -sense 'distinction,' the nobility of nature's own patent. Other things -exist, so to speak, for the sake of their kind, and for the sake of -other things; a person, in the strictest sense, is never a mere means -to something beyond, but always at the same time an end in itself -or himself. Other things are mere examples in illustration of a law -that rides superior to them and overrules them: the person is a law -unto himself. He has the royal and divine right of creating law—of -starting by his exception a new law which shall henceforth be a canon -and a standard. For in such a personality when he claims his full -rights there is the visible immanence of the divine and universal—or -there is the visible unity of the eternal and the temporal. He rules -as the natural king, the great ruler whose judgment and authority are -better than the complex code of common laws: he guides as the artistic -genius who sees truth steadily in a single intuition and in that single -picture sees it whole<a name="FNanchor_3_129" id="FNanchor_3_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_129" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>.</p> - -<p>But when we ask if such a personality is found in the field of -actual experience and history, there arises a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> divergence of -opinions. It is at any rate matter of common experience that there -is a good deal of unjustified identification of the self with the -universal—identification in which the universal suffers violence and -is taken by force. There are only too often cases where the personal -interest is allowed to disguise itself under a semblance of zeal for -the common good, and that even without conscious intent or act of -deception. No good and noble deed, Hegel has said, can ever be done -without faith in its goodness, and zeal for its attainment: without a -holy passion and fervour of devotion, which exceeds the cold service of -duty rendered for duty's sake<a name="FNanchor_4_130" id="FNanchor_4_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_130" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. But it is equally true and equally -to be remembered that this interference of personal passion and -disinterested interest has defaced the noblest causes and made flow -endless torrents of fanaticism and persecution. A personality in which -the universal was perfectly incarnated in the individual would be in -truth a God amongst men. And it is probably a more likely occurrence -that where the individual as such arrogates to himself the privilege of -the universal, there should be seen not the deeds of the god, but the -ebullitions of the beast that is in man.</p> - -<p>A personality, then, in popular language, and perhaps also in popular -philosophy, is the living and conscious individual in whom general -forces, truths, or ideas become real, active, efficient forces, -truths, and ideas. And the importance of the conception resides in the -safeguard thus supposed to arise, which will prevent the realities of -the world from being dissipated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> away into the endless and restless -flux of the terms of thought,</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'La bufera infernal che mai non resta.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>To such a common frame of mind ideas, truths, forces are vacant, -ghostly forms, devoid of true life and reality: to get such they need -blood and flesh to clothe them, to give them substance and power. Now -Hegel, no less than those who offer this criticism, regards ideas -(in the ordinary sense of that term), truths and forces, also as -abstractions which need something to make them powers in the real -world of nature and the ideal world of mind. Hegel, like Schelling, -has a sublime contempt for mere universals. But as to the something -else, there is a divergence of view. Two well-known answers are given -by the popular philosophy known as materialism or spiritualism: two -systems which are probably not so wide apart as the contrast of -their names might imply. According to the former, thinking, ideas, -truths, goodness and beauty are special functions (the grosser -materialists say secretions) of a special kind of matter—of something -which is accessible to ordinary mechanical and chemical tests, but -which exhibits also, in certain cases, the exceptional phenomena of -consciousness. Here the essential reality is a something, permanent -and essentially indestructible,—something which no man has seen, -nor indeed can see,—but which is called Matter. The spiritualistic -philosopher (as distinguished from the <i>idealist</i>) regards as the -essential realities in the universe what he calls spirits. What these -are, also, nobody has as yet (any more than in Kant's time<a name="FNanchor_5_131" id="FNanchor_5_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_131" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>) given -any very authoritative account, but so far as the quasi-scientific -expositions in regard to them throw<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> any general light on the subject, -we may say that they suggest only a differently-constituted matter, a -matter e. g. of less or more dimensions than that we are most familiar -with.</p> - -<p>Now the advocate of spiritual reality, who protests most strongly -against the injury done to personality by reducing it to something -fluid and not fixed, something in process and not in persistent -substance, seems mostly to lean to a quasi-spiritualistic hypothesis, -or to the—so-called—higher materialism. He is an advocate of what we -may describe as the soul-thing, of a permanent, (he would even hold, -an absolutely permanent) substance or substratum of psychical reality -which, no doubt, exhibits certain properties, but is always more than -any one, or any mere series of its phenomena. It has been said, indeed, -by one who spoke with authority that he that will save his soul shall -lose it, and he that will lose it shall find it. But this has always -been a hard saying, which has been as far as possible explained away -by exegesis. Yet its moral import is not so very far removed from its -philosophical equivalent. The true life is not that of self-seeking -pleasure, but the life spent in the service of truth and love, the -life dedicated to impersonal interests, and ideal good. So also the -reality of the human soul as we first know it lies not in itself, but -in its transfiguration, its purification, and liberation to higher -forms of being. The Soul, in its first avatar in each of us, is after -all of the earth, earthy, unless it continue on that path of growth -and development on which it has entered. It is as Aristotle said, and -said well, the first actualisation<a name="FNanchor_6_132" id="FNanchor_6_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_132" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>—the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span> proximate ideality of an -organic body. In soul organic body carries out its promise: in soul we, -the observers, or untrained psychologists, note our first awareness of -mental life in its organic environment. But there are other grades, -other heights of achievement, yet set before the principle of life, -which is more than mere life and mere soul: or soul contains a germ -which must bear higher fruit. To be itself, or to become all that it in -promise and potency contains, it must dispossess itself of what clings -to it and possess itself of what is its own; and so transmute its first -phase into one more adequate. The soul is, as Hegel has said, the -awakening of mind from the sleep of nature<a name="FNanchor_7_133" id="FNanchor_7_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_133" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>: it is nature gathering -itself out of its absorption in its dispersion, the breath of life and -feeling striving through the scattered members of the material world, -and finding itself at first half-asleep, a pervading, unifying current -that flows through and makes continuous the various portions of the -universe. It is the earliest real, felt unity in which the logical or -synthetic pulse—as yet purely potential in Nature, and only surmised -by science—re-appears in the actual concrete world. And as the -earliest, it is, like first loves, what one clings to hardest as our -prime and fundamental <i>differentia.</i> Here at least we are something—a -centre of being, and not a mere centreless expanse of extension: -something emerging from the world of silence and of night—something in -which each feels</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'I am not what I see,<br /> -And other than the things I touch.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>And that something we would not lose, at any cost.—But the only way -not to lose it, is to use it as a stepping-stone<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> to higher things. The -metaphor, indeed, like metaphors in general, must not be pressed too -far. For it is more than a stepping-stone and it is never left behind -as a mere dead self: there is</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'Nothing of it that doth fade<br /> -But doth suffer a sea-change<br /> -Into something rich and strange.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>And that richer result into which it is transformed is the -consciousness of a self, and the intelligence which wills and knows.</p> - -<p>If it be asked in what respects the result is richer, the answer is -as follows. The soul,—this 'first entelechy—is exclusive, and it -is immersed in its natural limits of organic life. It has yet to go -through the school of self-detachment, the process of 'erecting itself -above itself'; and of thus extending its view and its range of control -over a wider field of objects. Gradually it attains to the rank of a -consciousness before which is unrolled the spectacle of a world of -objects set over against it, and even of a world within it; itself as -an object deposed to the rank of something to be surveyed. As such, -it seems almost to have left all immersion in corporeity completely -behind, and to have completely divested itself of any limitation. It -floats freely above the real psychical life out of which it emerged—a -detached but somewhat shadowy self, not burdened by any restrictions -of nature or circumstance. As such a mere Ego, or logical self—as the -mere theatre on which the play of ideas takes place, it surveys its -real psychical self far below; it finds itself as a strange sort of -thing, and says <i>This was me</i> (which however is not exactly the same -as <i>I am I</i>, I = I). Yet it was a great step to have thus ceased to be -absorbed in its qualities, to be the mere breath of life and feeling, -stirring in its several affections and modifications.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> In order to -get forward, it was necessary to recoil a little: to save itself—and -that must mean to get itself in fuller and richer being—the mind had, -as it were, to measure and realise the full depth of its nonentity, -and to surrender all that it had hitherto clung to as its own. In an -attitude of reflection upon itself it fancies that it is the empty -room, the <i>tabula rasa</i>, on which experience is to write itself: but -in its secret heart it retains the faith and acts upon it, that it is -the power of intelligent and intelligible unity which makes the writing -intelligible, if it does not even itself play the writer. What it now -seems to find—what fills up its consciousness, presumed empty and -merely receptive,—it gradually recognises to be its very and original -own. Through labour and experiment it fills up the vacant form (the -passive half of itself to which it deposed itself) of consciousness; -and thus, as an intelligent self, a true mind, it has for itself and -realises as in itself all the life and reality which in its earlier -stage of soul it only was and felt itself naturally to be. But on this -stage of free intelligence it is no longer bound up with its natural -being in such a way as to feel itself a fixed and restricted centre, -sunk in the living environment so as to see no further, and to deem -itself in its seclusion the permanent reality, the exclusive fact. -It is no longer exclusive and self-concentrated, but inclusive and -all-embracing. It is no longer a mere consciousness—a mere receptive -and synthetic unity of apperception—but a reason and a mind. And a -reason and a mind already refuse to be narrowed and confined by the -same limits as seem appropriate to the soul. In the province of free -self-realised intelligence we at least seem to occupy a ground on -which others can equally come,—to have nothing peculiar or merely -individual. In Knowledge, which is reasoned perception,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> and in Will, -which is reasoned impulse, there is a king's highway, a public forum, -where souls meet and converse and perform a collective work;—and -in both <i>mere</i>, i. e. essentially restricted, individuality is at a -discount<a name="FNanchor_8_134" id="FNanchor_8_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_134" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>.</p> - -<p>Such would be the course of development if we looked at it only in the -inwardness or subjectivity of psychical, conscious, and intelligent -life. But an analogous or parallel development may be observed if we -look at man as an active, i. e. a practical and moral being, a being -who makes Nature his own, stamps it with his title of possession, and -who gives to his fellowship with other souls an objective, outward -existence in the forms and institutions of social life. Here too -his first achievement is the affirmation of his individuality, the -distinction in outward and tangible shape of the Mine from the Thine: -the creation of property, and the projection of himself in a world of -mutually-recognised personalities. As the individual soul in the inner -life, so the personal being with its property is the solid, insoluble -basis of the life in public—the field of social ethics. The same -instinct, which in its dread of dissolution clings to the perpetuity -of the inner nucleus of soul, upholds the other as containing the -stable and eternal security of all social well-being. The immortality -of soul in the inner world: the sacro-sanctity of property in the -outer. But if these postulates are to be permitted, if individuality -and personality are to abide, they must, in the one case as in the -other, bow to the law of development, the law of history and of life. -They must correct themselves, re-adjust themselves,—include what they -excluded, and re-combine their elements, transmute themselves into -what we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> have, after Hegel, called their <i>truth</i>: must redintegrate -themselves with suppressed correlatives, and carry out their -implications of larger unity. The soul, exclusive and fast-clad in -its mere organic vestment, in which it is as yet only the name and -form of intellectual life, has first of all to retract itself into -the bare abstract consciousness, or mere self, on which the masses -of reality stream, to fill its vacant rooms and empty forms up with -ideas. So too the person—that close concretion or coalescence of mind -with material—that identification of self with its 'clothes,' its -property and all it can vulgarly be said to <i>own,</i> is only an aspect -of truth which tends to be over-estimated when it is reflected upon, -and must notwithstanding be over-ridden and merged. Withdrawing itself -from its clothing of earth and water, and even perhaps from its inner -mansion of flesh and bone, personality floats in the free air as the -impersonal personality of conscience,—the ethereal realm where pure -practical reason rules. In that ether where morals reign absolutely is -the home of the categorical imperative, of the Stoical law of duty, -of the conscience which, here at least, has might as it has right. It -too, like its parallel, consciousness, in the inner mental life, has, -or seems to have, all its fulfilment from without. As even Kant admits, -it is itself a vacant form; yet a form of such influence as to impress -on whatever comes within its range an obligation to be universal and to -be uniform. Here too, as in the parallel stage, it was of inestimable -importance that mind should, in the socio-ethical sphere, see itself -supreme in its innermost dignity and personality,—the personality -which lies within,—even though that supremacy were at first no better -than as a law, a form, a category, recognised as authoritative and -imperative. For conscience, like the field of consciousness, is after<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> -all only a quasi-passive self—a remarkable property or endowment, -a sort of innate principle or idea by which the mind was seen to be -distinguished in a unique way from all things else. To realise once -for all the fact that consciousness and conscience form an absolute -tribunal from which there can be no appeal: that the 'synthetic unity -of apperception' in the theoretical, and the 'autonomy of the rational -will' in the practical sphere, are the ultimate and final <i>a priori</i>: -this is a great thing to do,—even though it only expands and defines -the Cartesian principle of clear and distinct ideas, and will remain as -Kant's title of honour in the history of philosophy. He thus fenced off -or consecrated the sanctuary of the mental and moral life.</p> - -<p>But it was not enough to set apart the sacred principle, the central -hearth-fire of truth and goodness. If at an earlier stage,—earlier, -i.e. in this logical analysis,—the formal was wholly sunk in the -material, if i. e. the mere series of legal formulae in their hard -and brittle outlines were absolutely identified—without doubt or -hesitation—with the morally and socially good; the formal side, or -mere spirit and will of good, the abstract principle of morality, -is now invested with an equally undue prominence. The actual or -concrete ethical community—be it family or state, or other social -organisation—is animated and maintained by a spirit which transcends -and includes alike the outward shell of civil law and the inward law -of conscience. For, curiously enough, as it may seem at first, both -conscience and civil legislation assume the form of imperative and -definite commands—laws political or civil, and laws moral. Both fall -therefore into an inflexibility, a rigorous and mechanical hardness in -their enouncements. Both worship the lord of what men call logic, i. -e. of formal consistency and formal uniformity, to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> an excess which -sometimes issues in fantastic irregularities. Their several maxims of -legal conformity and of duty for duty's sake are in first appearance -excellent: but a further reflection shows that the Law covers a good -many inconsistent or at least unrelated laws within its code, and Duty -is often sadly to seek in presence of the collisions between what offer -themselves as <i>prima facie</i> duties in any given case. The amplest code -of laws that ever existed will always leave lots of loop-holes for -negligence and villainy, and would never work for an instant, were it -not for ever supplemented by the spirit of faith and love, by social -piety and political loyalty, by the thousand ties of sentiment and -feeling which really vivify its dry bones. So too the abstractions -of the conscientious imperative, of the law of duty, of the moral -tribunal, of the man within the breast, and of the dignity and beauty -of human nature, would effect nothing unless they could always tacitly -count on the support of recognised and authoritative social law and -usage. Outward rests upon inward; and rules direct feelings.</p> - -<p>Here, again, as in the purely intellectual or cognitive sphere, it -is evident that the spirit of man has its source of life neither in -its abstract self-hood (in consciousness and conscience) nor in its -mere natural environment and organic endowment (in sense-affections, -and social law and usage), but in the unity of both,—a unity which -transcends either. Both individual and society live and grow, because -they are continuous and one: because they presuppose an ideal unity -or a living Idea at the root of their being, as their inner and -essential guiding-principle, at once constitutive and regulative of -their action. The machinery of language supplies to the intellectual -sphere a sort of sensible meeting-ground and common field in which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> -the development of knowledge becomes possible: and the same purpose -is subserved in the social sphere by the machinery of ethical and -political forms and institutions. These are the field, the home of -freedom, as the other are of knowledge. It is in these collective and -objective structures that we get the expression of the law of human -development: the visible sign, viz. of the essentially universal nature -of the individual. The individual in these attains his relative truth: -for they show the weakness of the individuality of the mere individual. -They show that his exclusiveness, his quasi-originality, is only an -appearance:—confronted, no doubt, by an appearance of an opposite -character, as if the originality and the reality lay in the environment -and the collective body. They point therefore beyond and behind both -foci to a common centre or inclusive unity of life.</p> - -<p>But they do not destroy personality and individuality: they only -transform it and made it a more adequate and consistent representation -of reality, by giving in it a place to factors or 'moments' which, -though always effective, were not recognised as constitutive elements, -and treated only as externally interfering agencies. It may be a -question, of course, how far it is wise to retain the term after -its meaning has thus been altered by expansion and redistribution -of elements. On the whole it seems impracticable—and it would be -undesirable, perhaps, even if it were more feasible—to be too hard -and fast in our use of denotations. It is hardly the province of -philosophy to coin new terms in which to deposit the results of her -researches. A term no doubt—particularly if, as the phrase runs, it be -luckily discovered, or judiciously selected—may save the expenditure -of thought. But it is hardly the business of philosophy to encourage -economy in this direction.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span> Much more is it the perpetual task of -philosophy to counteract the ossification that sets in in terms,—to -reinterpret the meaning which is absorbed in these 'counters of -thought,' and make them once more sterling money for the market of -life. What, for instance, is the work of Aristotle's Ethics, but to -set free the genii which the black magic of every-day intercourse has -incarcerated in the non-significant Greek term Εὐδαιμονία? Like our own -Happiness, it flits from lip to lip, little better than a mere name, -which is still prized, but—except for a few synonyms that are equally -vague with itself—is attached to things which a little reflection -shows it cannot truly denote. Aristotle seeks—we may say—to define -it. But the phrase 'definition' seems barely applicable to the complex -process thus implied,—a process of which definition, as ordinarily -understood, is only one small portion. For to define happiness, is to -reconstruct the conception. Or, to be more accurate, it is really to -construct it or reproduce in consciousness its construction. As it -stands, the thing to be defined is a name and a thing, of which certain -relations to other things soon begin to show themselves, which is more -or less similar to one thing, and more or less to be distinguished from -another. To mark it off from these co-terminous things, and to show how -they are related to it on different sides,—this would be what we may -perhaps call strict, or formal, or nominal, or <i>mere</i> definition.</p> - -<p>Now whatever be the other uses of such definitions—and they are -serviceable at the outgoing in any branch of enquiry,—they are -not precisely the work we expect a philosopher to do for us. And -assuredly it is not Aristotle who would stop short at that sort of -definitions. We find accordingly that for the purpose of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> realising -what happiness—the common name for human good—means, he is obliged -to bring into the field the whole system of his thought in its -cardinal notions of Energy, Soul, &c. Aristotle here as elsewhere -retraces the path of thought which carries us from mere, vulgar, -inadequately-apprehended happiness (he follows the same process in his -treatment of pleasure, friendship &c.—to take only ethical examples) -to true, essential and completely-apprehended happiness,—or, to use -Hegel's technical phrases, from happiness as it is <i>an-sich</i> (in or -at itself) or as it is <i>für-sich</i> (for or to itself), to happiness as -it is <i>an-und-für-sich.</i> In so 'defining' happiness Aristotle is thus -obliged to bring in his conceptions of man and of society, of human -life and its powers, of natural and acquired faculty, of mind in its -relations to nature; and if not to expound, at least to employ, his -fundamental categories of philosophical thought. Such a machinery can -hardly be called less than a construction, i. e. a re-construction by -conscious effort of the latent but actual concatenation of the elements -in the fact.</p> - -<p>In this case we traverse the distance which separates mere happiness -from true happiness, from happiness imperfectly or abstractly conceived -to happiness adequately and concretely conceived. Of course when we say -real or true happiness, we use these terms as they are used within the -ordinary range of human speech. An ultimate and absolute in truth and -reality is for us at any given time only a comparatively or relatively -ultimate and absolute. It is that which, so far as we can see and -think (all philosophising presumably goes on under this stipulation, -tacit or express), gives an expression, an interpretation, a meaning -and a construction to reality which leaves no feature unrecognised, no -contradiction unsolved, no discord<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> unreconciled, which leaves nothing -outside and alien to it, and suppresses without acknowledgment nothing -that has ever been recognised within it. It is, if you like so to -call it, the completest, or (if you are really in earnest with your -philosophising and have carried it on to what for you is the end) the -complete formula of the Absolute—of that which in a transcendent sense -<i>is,</i> is <i>all,</i> is the infinite and eternal <i>one.</i> Yet, after all, it -is a formula. But here that undying adversary of all thought steps -in and says A <i>mere</i> formula. And to that we must here as elsewhere -rejoin: No, not a mere formula. A mere formula would be not even a -formula,—a formula only in name—and with no reality which it served -to formulate. It is a real and true formula, if it be a formula at all, -and not something which merely swaggers about under that title. Nay -more, if it be a true and real formula, it is the truth and the reality -in its day and generation, until at least a truer truth and a more real -reality shall have been discovered. Let us by all means be modest: but -there is a false humility which becomes no man and is the guise of -hypocrisy or insincere sincerity. Let us—in other words—never assume -that 'we are the men, and that wisdom will die with us': but equally -let us hold fast the faith of reason that what we know as true and -real can never be false, i. e. utterly false, however much it may turn -out one day to be surmounted. And, on the other hand, let us equally -remember that in the mere and abstract commencement—the unreal and -the untrue, as we must perforce style it by contrast with the (<i>pro -tempore</i>) truth and reality—there is no utter and sheer error or -unreality. It has always been felt to be one of the most loveable sides -of Aristotelianism—this recognition of the reasonableness of all -actual fact, or of the truth latent in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> the honest, though narrow and -ill-defined judgments of the mass.</p> - -<p>Thus, coming back to personality, let us admit that the <i>mere</i> -personality which at first sight seemed only worth rejecting, is -an element, at least, in true personality,—or is a part which, -because an organic member and no mere mechanical part, is full of -traces and indications which involve and postulate the whole. The -true personality and the true individuality of being is something -which presupposes for its completeness the social state—the organic -community. It is no doubt familiar to us that, according to an old -but never quite dormant view, the collective community is but the -aggregate or congeries of individuals. But the individuals whose -aggregation makes the community are themselves products of the social -union. Complete, all-round, harmonious personality, it is sometimes -said, is the highest fruit to be yielded by social development. Or, -as the last century would have preferred to put it, the main or sole -aim of the State is furtherance towards Humanity—to the stature of -the perfect man. And these are true sayings,—but perhaps only half -true. If all must grow so that one and each may grow, so and not less -must each one grow so that the all—the commonwealth of reason and -the kingdom of God—may be more and more present, 'may come.' And -that kingdom only comes when All is in Each, and Each is in All: and -when, without loss or diminution, each is each and all is all. Then -and not till then does personality become true and infinite, free and -harmonious individuality, which is in the same instant universality. -The monad—to use the language of the great Idealist who did not find -individuality at all incompatible with universality—never ceases to -be a monad: it is eternal and indestructible, an absolute centre of -being. The monad<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> in its individual measure 'expresses' or 'envelops' -the Infinite or Absolute: it is, i. e. under a subjective limitation, -identical with the absolute, a concentration or condensation of it -into an impenetrable, i. e. literally an individual, point,—but a -point which is in the psychical or intellectual world never entirely -<i>carens recordatione,</i> or oblivious of its essential totality. But if -the monad 'expresses' the Absolute, it no less concords or sympathises -in harmonious development with all its congeners, the other monads: so -that while it neither interferes with them, nor suffers violence from -them, it yet exists and acts in an ideal identity, that is, in a real -fellowship, with them. Again, the monad has what may be called its -side of passivity, but passivity here does not mean <i>mere</i> passivity, -but rather the essential limitation due to its special and peculiar -stand-point—a limitation which in the higher orders of being becomes -transparent or is transcended. How far Leibniz succeeds in reconciling -this apparent contradiction—how far even any one can reveal the mystic -indwelling of universal and individual in each other, this is a serious -question in its place: but it is only bare justice to Leibniz to say -that he at least never failed to emphasise both aspects of reality, -and that if one 'moment' is predominant and fundamental in his work it -is not the monad, but the Monad of Monads. If necessity be the right -word to express the relation of the Universal Law to the individual -being and to affirm that the individual is not a loose self-supporting -unit (and Leibniz, far from thinking so, always uses in its stead the -phrase <i>inclinat, non necessitat</i><a name="FNanchor_9_135" id="FNanchor_9_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_135" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>, to emphasise the immanence of -law, or the autonomy of every completed being), then Leibniz is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> -less, but more necessitarian than Spinoza. His difference from Spinoza, -in fact, lies mainly, if not solely, in his clearer recognition of -the transcendence, no less than the immanence, of the Absolute, which -Spinoza has somewhat veiled under the apparent insignificance of the -difference between <i>natura naturans</i> and <i>natura naturata.</i> Yet the -Monad of Monads is no supra-mundane, or <i>merely</i> transcendent God.</p> - -<p>But if we further ask whether such personality is attainable in the -world of experience and describable in terms of thought—whether there -be any actual and visible agent possessed of this true personality, -as we have agreed to call it, we are in face with a higher stage of -the problem of personality. And that question in other words brings -us back to where we began. A true and real personality, a complete -individuality is something which so transmutes all that we are most -accustomed to call by that name that it is hardly any use clinging to -it, unless to protest against the danger of mistaking such expansion -and transmutation to be only a blank negation. Yet to cling to it too -much involves a danger for the true recognition of that transcendent's -universality. All human personality, all natural individuality is, as -Lotze has eloquently pointed out<a name="FNanchor_10_136" id="FNanchor_10_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_136" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>, something which falls far short -of what it professes to be. But in the general failure to unite the -universal with the particular, or the fact with the idea, there are -degrees; and we can at least affirm so much as this that the truest -individuality and the most real personality is not that which is least -permeated by thought, but that in which thought has had the largest -share. Individuality is something more than a mere sum of general -qualities;—that is certainly the fact; but it is not less the fact, -that for us an individuality and personality is more perfect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> and true -in proportion as more general function and universal character coalesce -into harmony and power in it. Assert then the initial presence and -virtue of individuality and personality in the human soul: but remember -that it has this virtue, not for what it is, but for what it promises -and may reasonably be expected to be, and that, to realise the promise, -it has to behave inclusively, rather than exclusively, gather up into -itself and make its own all content, rather than set itself up in -reserve and isolation.</p> - -<p>We have seen that the social organisation, animated as it is by the -moral idea, is rather the arena on which the true union of mind and -matter, of idea and nature, of thought and fact may be worked for, than -itself the fruition of such an effort. All-important is the State; -all-important the ethical idea which pervades it. But the world of -freedom—the ideal world so far made actual—is not what it promised -to be. 'Is it not,' said Plato, 'the nature of things that the actual -should always lack the perfection of theory?' In the visible world the -State, indeed, rules supreme: 'it is,' as Hegel might say in the words -of his great predecessor in political theory, 'that Leviathan or mortal -God to whom under the immortal God we owe our welfare and safety.' But -there is something in the State which the State in its palpable reality -cannot adequately express. If it is highest in the hierarchy of this -world, the lowest in the ideal kingdom of the Absolute is higher than -it. Above the State as the embodiment and the guarantee of the moral -life, there is the realm of Art, Religion, and Philosophy. In them -man's craving for individuality and personality finds a satisfaction it -could never hope for below them: they at least restore the truth and -reality of man's life and of the universe in a measure far exceeding -what even morality could do.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> If we ask then what Art, Religion, and -Science have to show of Personality or true realised individuality, -the answer is briefly as follows. Had it not been that august names -have spoken of imitation as the essence of Art-work, we should hardly -have deemed it possible that men should speak of Realistic Art. Yet -here, as in Religion and in Science, the epithet is introduced to guard -against a misconception of the province of Idealism. All Art, all -Religion, all Science, are and must be idealistic: but they can never -be—as the familiar phrase puts it—merely idealistic, i. e. visionary, -fantastic, unreal. All of them, in other words, may be said to show -us 'the light that never was on sea or land'—the heavenly city—the -eternal truth of things. But they must, on their peril, show it here -and now, and not in a pretended or other world. They must—no less than -law and morality—work in terrestrial materials, and not with superfine -celestialities. <i>Mentem mortalia tangunt.</i> It is out of the oldest and -commonest realities of life and death that the poet and the painter -make the melodies of heaven sound in our ears, and gladden us with -the rays of the empyrean. It is out of the hard rock of the real that -the artist's rod must strike the well-spring of the ideal. So too, in -like manner, a religion must show the Divine, but show Him immanent: -an immanence which, on one hand, shall not drag Godhead down to the -level of casual reality, nor on the other set Him far off in lonely -transcendence.</p> - -<p>The aesthetic faculty, awakened as it is by the natural response of -man's perceptions to the harmonies of existence, to the spontaneous -coherency of its many parts in a united whole, and stimulated by the -creative work of human art, which moulds even the naturally discordant -or unconnected into a concordant expression (sometimes it may be, -as in handicraft, only to satisfy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> human needs), lifts us above the -imperfections and fragmentariness of things, above our selfish interest -in them, into a frame of mind where they are seen whole and perfect, -and yet one and veritably individual. In its supreme or comprehensive -phase it does not deal merely with the beautiful, nor merely with -the beautiful and sublime. All true art, whether it awakes awe or -admiration, laughter or tears, whether it melts the soul, or steels it -to endurance, has a common characteristic; and that is to raise the -single instance, the prosaic or commonplace fact, into its universal, -eternal, infinite significance. It frees the fact from the limitations -which our distractions, our practicality, our temporary hopes and -fears, have deeply stamped upon it. It is still, after art has dealt -with it, to all appearance a single fact: but it now has the universe -behind it and within it. It carries us away from the incompleteness, -the pressure of externals, the solicitude for the future and the -regrets for the past, into a self-contained, self-satisfying totality, -into freedom and leisure, rest which is not stolid, and action which -involves no toil. Such a result is partly, as was said, the gift -of common nature, which speaks peace, comfort, joy, self-possessed -fruition for all her children when their sense is open and free: partly -it comes through those select ones among these children who have a -larger perception of the meaning and inner truth of her works, and who -can by a sensible reconstruction, which if it is fair and successful -will only bring out more clearly the unity and harmony which deeper -insight detects, help others to see and enjoy what they have felt and -rejoiced over. Such are the poets—in the widest sense—the makers, the -seers, who in verse, in music, in picture and sculpture—who, in human -lives, it may be even in the conduct of their own, show us how divine a -thing is nature and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> humanity: show us the secret and unheard harmonies -that to the full-opened ear absorb and transmute the lower discords of -life and vulgar reality. It is they who give immortality and divinity, -who make heroes and demigods<a name="FNanchor_11_137" id="FNanchor_11_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_137" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>. Or, if they may not be said to make -them, they half-reveal and half-construct the ideal figures which stand -high and beneficent in the history of the world. And by those who -thus half-construct, and half-reveal, are meant not merely the single -artists in whom the process culminates to final outline and publicity, -but the many-voiced poesy of the collective human heart which out of -its myriad elemental springs constitutes the total figure, the august -image of the hero, and the saint, lending him from its plenitude all -that his abstract self seemed to want. It is on the tide of national -and human enthusiasm that the individual artist is lifted up to realise -the full significance of his ideal figure, and his imaginative craft -can only be inspired by the vigour and warmth of the collective passion -for noble ends and high action.</p> - -<p>Nowhere it would seem is the ideal of personality and many-sided -individuality more adequately realised. Here, at last, the whole truth -of life, the indwelling of individual and universal in one body, seems -to be realised. But it is realised in an ideal. It is—if we analyse -it—a synthesis of three elements; partly in the material reality which -serves as bodily vehicle; partly in the conception and technique of the -artist; partly in the general mind which inspires both the material -and the form with its own larger life. It is—as its name implies—an -artificial product—a synthesis of elements which tend to fall apart. -Technique varies, conceptions lose their interest, the tone of general -culture alters,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> and materials are dependent on locality. When that -happens, the work of art is left high and dry: no longer a living -God, but a dead idol, still wondrous, but speaking no more its human -language.</p> - -<p>So it is with the heroic figures who rise into the purer air of -universal history. They also—so far as they live with a personal -power—are works of art: works of real-idealism. For all history which -deserves the name, and is not mere abstract dry-as-dust chronicle (as -to the possibility of which utter aridity there may be legitimate -doubts), is a work of fiction or invention, of reconstruction. It -seeks to understand its characters. But to understand them it is not -(and as historical art cannot be) content with a mere reference to -motives acting on them from outside. It seeks to understand them with -and in their times—to see in them the full measure of contemporary -life and thought which elsewhere has found so meagre expression. Such -is the artistic completion of personality in the ideal,—whether in -what is called history, or what is called art. It exaggerates a truth, -because it loses sight of the background. And that background, which -helps to constitute such ideal personality, is no constant element. -The centuries and generations as they roll contribute their varying -quota to set, as they say, the historical character in its true light, -in its fulness and truth of reality. And thus this personality of -the great leaders of human life is only an image and a sign—a fruit -of development, no bare fact which remains unchanged and always the -same. It is rather a personification than a personality. It incarnates -the living spirit who is universal and eternal in the limits of a -sensuously-defined individual, and indeed incarnates there only so much -as the generation it speaks to can see of complete truth. It is only -after all a vehicle of truth; though<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> a nobler vehicle than social and -personal ethics can afford.</p> - -<p>As it is felt that the treasure of the idea—that the full power of -spiritual life—cannot be adequately stored in the earthen vessels -of mortality, the consummation of personality is forced to recede -into the invisible if it would be still conceived as attainable. -'True personality,' says Lotze, 'is with the Infinite,' What here is -fragmentary, is there a rounded total, a perfect unity: He alone is -absolutely self-determining, self-explaining: is all that He means to -be, and means all that He is. In a sense, philosophy does not hesitate -to countersign all this. But, in adopting it, philosophy must reserve -the right of noting the danger and the ambiguity of such language. -Religion does well, philosophy may say, in thus insisting upon the -dependence of all appearance on one Absolute reality; but it is well -also not to forget that all appearance is also the appearance of that -reality or Absolute. And in so saying, be it added, philosophy assumes -no essential superiority to religion. Religion in its fulness, and -apart from any theories that may grow up under its wing, is more than -theory, more than mere philosophy: it is the consummating unity of -life—the enthusiasm and supreme power of life, its consecration and -divinisation by its assured immanence in the eternal and universal. -It is, in short, as was long ago said of it, the true life, the light -which is the light and life of men; and its inspiring principles are -faith, hope, and love. But when unassisted religion proceeds to set -before itself the meaning and lesson of its life, when it proceeds to -formulate a theory of the world and set out a scheme of world-history, -it trespasses on the field of knowledge, and is amenable to the -criticisms of the reflective spirit—the spirit of philosophy. And -that criticism briefly is to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> effect that the religious theory -in its ordinary form is an imperfect interpretation of the religious -experience. Nor is this to derogate from the prerogative of the friends -of God. It is only to criticise the formulae and phrases of dogmatic -theology—a theology, however, which is as old as religion itself, -and which takes different forms from age to age, and from one level -of thought to another, always in its measure translating religious -reality, truth, or experience into the categories, naive or artificial, -simple or complex, of the science (it may be the pseudo-science) of -the time. Philosophy, therefore, is the criticism of the science of -God—that is of theology—as it is the criticism of other sciences. -For criticism philosophy always is: always the reflection upon fixed -dogma, and the discussion of it till it becomes sensible of its -defects, and stands upon another and higher plane. And to some it may -seem that this is the sole function which philosophy can legitimately -undertake. 'Yet,' as Aristotle remarked, 'the good critic must know -what he criticises.' He must not merely reflect upon it from outside, -but deal with it from the plenitude of experience, from the abundance -of the heart. If he be a critic then, he cannot be a mere critic, but -also an agent in the work of reconstruction. Or, if we put the thing -otherwise; though, as Fichte said (p. 28), philosophy is a different -thing from life, the true philosopher can never be a mere philosopher, -but must, if he is to reach the height of his vocation, have also -entered into the full experience of reality, into the whole truth of -life. His philosophy will then not be outside of religion and aesthetic -perception. In its comprehension of all grades and forms of reality and -truth, goodness, holiness, beauty, will have their place. He also will -be among the theologians.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span></p> - -<p>And when the philosopher deals with personality in this high, this -supreme sphere, he will submit that the truth of personality is -subordinate to the truth of spirituality. He will argue that by -sticking too closely and fixedly to personality we are running a risk -of bringing down the divine to the level of the human. If, with Dante, -he can say that in its very heart the Light Eternal</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'Mi parve pinta della nostra effige;'<br /> -</p> - -<p>he will undoubtedly add with Dante</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'Oh quanto è corto 'l dire e come fioco<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 2.5em;">Al mio concetto;'</span><br /> -</p> - -<p>or, with the first philosophical theologian who interpreted the -experience of Christian life, he will rise from the historical Jesus to -the inward witness of the Spirit.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_127" id="Footnote_1_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_127"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The legal use of the distinction between 'real' and -'personal' is only partly 'logical,' and largely retains traces of -the larger logic of life and history. Yet, roughly speaking, personal -property is what we can, so to speak, carry on our backs or in our -pockets.</p></div> - - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_128" id="Footnote_2_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_128"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See Spinoza, <i>Cogitata Metaph</i>., Pars II. cap. 8: 'Nec -fugit nos vocabulum (<i>Personalitatis</i> scilicet) quod theologi passim -usurpant ad rem explicandam: verum quamvis vocabulum non ignoremus -eius tamen significationem ignoramus: quamvis constanter credamus, in -visione Dei beatissima Deum hoc suis revelaturum.' For Hegel, it may be -noted, Person, so far as he uses the term at all, bears its restricted -legal and juridical sense. A person is a free intelligence, which -realises that independence by appropriating an external thing as its -sign and property. It probably belongs therefore to a world in which -people count rather by what they <i>have</i> than by what they <i>are</i>; the -world of law where rights and duties tend to oppose each other. This is -not the highest kind of world for human beings.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_129" id="Footnote_3_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_129"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> This one may call the Platonic ideal of the State, where -Equity rules supreme in the incarnate spirit of wisdom,—a guide -adapting its measures to circumstances, not tied down to the inflexible -letter of one law in an incoherent and imperfect code. See the -<i>Politicus</i>, p. 294; <i>Phaedrus,</i> p. 275; and compare Aristotle's Wise -man whose conduct is not κατὰ λόγον but μετὰ λόγου.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_130" id="Footnote_4_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_130"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See e. g. <i>Encyclopaedia</i>, § 475.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_131" id="Footnote_5_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_131"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> See his 'Dreams of a Spirit-seer, illustrated by Dreams of -Metaphysics.' (<i>Werke,</i> ed. Ros. und Schub. Bd. VII. p. 38 sqq.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_132" id="Footnote_6_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_132"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> It is perilous and misleading (said the ancient Graiae, -who dwell on the way to the Hesperides of philosophy) to interpret an -old system by the language of modern (and especially German) idealism. -It is much worse, replied Perseus, not to interpret it at all, but to -repeat its magic <i>ipsissima verba</i>,—carefully Latinised, as if they -belonged to a cabinet of fossils.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_133" id="Footnote_7_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_133"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Encyclopaedia</i>, §§ 387, 389.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_134" id="Footnote_8_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_134"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> The above is an attempt to give a very condensed synopsis -of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (<i>Encyclopaedia</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_135" id="Footnote_9_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_135"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See especially in the <i>Theodicee,</i> part I. § 43 seqq. Cf. -Nouv. Ess. II. § 9, <i>incline sans necessiter:</i> I. § 13, <i>La nécessité -ne doit pas être confondue avec la détermination.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_136" id="Footnote_10_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_136"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Microcosmus</i>, Book IX. chap. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_137" id="Footnote_11_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_137"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See the well-known passage in <i>Wilhelm Meisters -Lehrjahre</i><i>,</i> Book II. chap. a.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XIX.</h5> - - -<h4>GENESIS IN MENTAL LIFE.</h4> - - -<p>Aristotle, who saw into the nature of abstract entities, remarked that -the mind was nothing before it exercised itself<a name="FNanchor_1_138" id="FNanchor_1_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_138" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>. The mind,—and -the same will turn out true of many things else where it is at first -unsurmised,—is not a fixed thing, a sort of exceedingly refined -substance, which we can lay hold of without further trouble. It is what -it has become, or what it makes itself to be. This point, that 'To be' -= 'To have become,' or rather to have made itself, is an axiom never -to be lost sight of in dealing with the mind. It is easy to talk of -and about conscience and freewill, as if these were existing things -in a sort of mental space, as hard to miss or mistake as a stone and -an orange, or as if they were palpable organs of mind, as separately -observable as the eye or ear. One asks if the will is free or not, as -glibly as one might ask whether an orange is sweet; and the answer can -be given with equal ease, affirmatively or negatively, in both cases. -Everything in these cases depends on whether the will has made itself -free or not, whether indeed we are speaking of the will at all, and -on what we mean by freedom. To ask the question in an abstract way, -taking no account of circumstances, is one of those<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> temptations which -lead the intellect astray and produce only confusion and wordy war—as -a good deal of so-called popular metaphysics has done. The mind and -its phenomena, as they are called, cannot be dissected with the same -calmness of analysis as other substances which adapt themselves to the -scalpel: nor is dissection after all more than a part of the scientific -process, subject to the control of the synthesis in physiology.</p> - -<p>The ordinary metaphysician makes his own task easy and his thoughtful -reader's a burden, by plunging too lightly <i>in medias res.</i> He wants -patience—often, perhaps, because he thinks too much of his reader's -impatience at analysis—to unravel the tangled mass which human -experience, when first looked at, presents. He is apt to catch at any -end which promises to effect a temporary clearance. True philosophy, -on the contrary, must show that it has got hold of what it means to -discuss: it has to construct its subject-matter: and it constructs it -by tracing every step and movement in its construction shown in actual -history. The mind is what it has been made and has made itself; and -to see what it is we must consider it not as an Alpha and Omega of -research, as popular conception and language tend to represent it, -but in the stages constituting its process, in the fluidity of its -development, in the elements out of which it results. We must penetrate -the apparent fixity and simplicity under which it comes forward, -and see through it into the process which bears it into being. For, -otherwise, the object of our investigation is taken, as if it were -the most unmistakable thing of sense and fancy,—as if everybody were -agreed that this and no other were the point in question.</p> - -<p>But in this matter of stability and the reverse, there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> is a broad -distinction between the natural and the spiritual world. In Nature -every step in the organisation, by which the Cosmos is developed, -has an independent existence of its own: and the lowest formation -confronts the highest, each standing by itself beside the other. -Matter and motion, for example, are not merely found as subordinate -elements entering into the making of a plant or an animal. They have -a free existence of their own: and the free existence of matter in -motion is seen in the shape of the planetary system. So, too, chemical -or electrical phenomena can be observed by themselves, operating in -spheres where they are untrammeled by the influence of biological -conditions. It seems, at least at first sight, to be different in -the case of mind. There the specific types or several stages in the -integrating process of mental development seem to have no substantive -existence in the earlier part of the range, and to appear only as -states or factors entering into, and merged in, the higher grades -of development. This causes a peculiar difficulty in the study of -mind. We cannot seize a formation in an independent shape of its -own: we must trace it in the growth of the whole. Mental fusion and -coalescence of elements is peculiarly close, and hardly leaves any -traces of its constituent factors<a name="FNanchor_2_139" id="FNanchor_2_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_139" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> Sensation, for instance, in its -purity, as mere sensation, is apparently something which we can never -study in isolation. All the sensation which we can, in the strictly -psychological (as opposed to the physiological) mode of study, examine, -i. e. which we can reproduce in ourselves, is more than mere sensation: -it includes elements of thought, and probably of desire and will. -This, of course, makes the difficulties of so-called introspection: -difficulties so great and real that they have provoked in natural -reaction a set against introspection altogether, and the adoption of -the external observation (physiological or so-called psycho-physical) -employed in the 'objective' sciences. And hence when we accept the -name, such as intellect, conscience, will, &c., as if it expressed -something specially existent in a detached shape of its own, we make -an assumption which it is impossible to justify. We are reckoning -with paper-money which belongs to no recognised currency, and may be -stamped as the dealer wills. The consequence is that the thing with -which we begin our examination is an opaque point,—a mere <i>terminus a -quo</i>, from which we start on our journey of explication, leaving the -<i>terminus</i> itself behind us unexplained.</p> - -<p>The constituents of mind do not lie side by side tranquilly -co-existent, like the sheep beside the herbage on which it browses. -Their existence is maintained in an inward movement, by which, while -they differentiate themselves, they still keep up an identity. In -our investigations we cannot begin with what is to be defined. The -botanist, if he is to give us a science of the plant, must begin with -something whose indwelling aim it is to be itself and to realise its -own possibility.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> He must begin with what is not the plant, and end -with what is; begin, let us say, with the germ which has the tendency -to pass into the plant. The speculative science of biology begins with -a cell, and builds these cells up into the tissues and structures out -of which vegetables and animals are constituted. The object of the -science appears as the result of the scientific process: or, <i>a science -is the ideal construction of its object</i>. As in these cases, so in the -case of thought. We must see it grow up from its simplest element, from -the bare point of being, the mere speck of being which, if actually no -better than nothing, is yet a germ which in the air of thought will -grow and spread; and see it appear as a result due to the ingrowing and -outgrowing union of many elements, none of which satisfies by itself, -but leads onward from abstractions to the meeting of abstractions in -what is more and more concrete. The will and conscience, understanding -and reason, of man are not matter-of-fact units to be picked up and -examined. You must, first of all, make sure what you have in hand: and -to be sure of that is to see that the mind is the necessary outcome -of a course of development. The mind is not an immediate <i>datum,</i> -with nothing behind it, coming upon the field of mental vision with -a divinely-bestowed array of faculties; but a mediated unity, i. e. -a unity which has grown up through a complex interaction of forces, -and which lives in differences through comprehending and reconciling -antagonisms.</p> - -<p>If the mind be not thus exhibited in its process, in the sum and -context of its relations, we may mean what we like with each mental -object that comes under our observation: but with as much right another -observer may mean something else. We may, of course, define as we -please: we may build up successive definitions into a consistent total: -but such a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> successful arrangement is not a real science. Unless we -show how this special form of mind is constituted, we are dealing with -abstractions, with names which we may analyse, but which remain as they -were when <i>our</i> analysis is over, and which seem like unsubstantial -ghosts defying our coarse engines of dissection. They are not -destroyed: like immaterial and aery beings they elude the sword which -smites them, and part but to re-unite. The name, and the conception -bodied forth in it, is indeed stagnant, and will to all appearance -become the ready prey of analysis: but there is something behind -this materialised and solidified conception, this worn-out counter -or sign, which mere analysis cannot even reach. And that underlying -nature is a process or movement, a meeting of elements, which it is -the business of philosophy to unfold. The analyst in this case has -dealt with ideas as if they were a finer sort of material product, a -fixed and assailable point: and this is perhaps the character of the -generalised images, which take the place of thoughts in our customary -habits of mind. But ideas, when they have real force and life, are -not hard and solid, but, as it were, fluid and transparent, and can -easily escape the divisions and lines which the analytical intellect -would impose. Perhaps some may think that it is unwise to fight with -ghosts like these, and that the best plan would be to disregard this -war of words altogether. But, on the other hand, it may be urged that -such unsubstantial forms have a decided reality in life: that men will -talk of them and conjure by their means, with or without intelligence; -and that the best course is to understand them. It will then be seen -that it is our proper work as philosophers to watch the process, by -which the spiritual unity divides and yet retains its divided members -in unity.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span> Even in the first steps we take to get a real hold of an -object we see this. To understand it, we must deprive it of its seeming -independence. Every individual object is declared by the logician to -be the meeting of two currents, the coincidence of two movements. It -concentrates into an undecompounded unit,—at least such it appears to -representative or material thought,—two elements, each of which it is -in turn identifiable with. The one of these elements has been called -the self-same (or identity), the universal, the genus, the whole: while -the second is called the difference, the particular, the part. And by -these two points of reference it is fixed,—by two points which are -for the moment accepted as stationary. What has thus been stated in -the technical language of Logic is often repeated in the scientific -parlance of the day, but with more materialised conceptions and in -more concrete cases. The dynamic theory of matter represents it as a -unity of attraction and repulsion. A distinguished Darwinian remarks -that 'all the various forms of organisms are the necessary products -of the unconscious action and reaction between the two properties of -adaptability and heredity, reducible as these are to the functions of -nutrition and reproduction<a name="FNanchor_3_140" id="FNanchor_3_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_140" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>. The terms 'action and reaction' are -hardly sufficient, it may be, to express the sort of unity which is -called for: but the statement at least shows the reduction of an actual -fact to the interaction of two forces, the meeting of two currents. -The one of these is the power of the kind, or universal, which tends -to keep things always the same: the other the power of localised -circumstances and particular conditions, which tends to render things -more and more diversified. The one may be called a centripetal, the -other a centrifugal force. If the one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> be synthetic, the other is -analytic. But such names are of little value, save for temporary -distinction, and must never be treated as permanent differences which -explain themselves. The centre is relative, and so is the totality.</p> - -<p>Thus it is that the so-called Evolutionist explains the origin of -natural kinds. They are what they severally are by reason of a process, -a struggle, by alliances and divisions, by re-unions and selections. -They are not independent of the inorganic world around them: it has -entered into their blood and structure, and made them what they are. -To understand them we must learn all we can of the simpler and earlier -forms, which have left traces in their structure: traces which, -without the existence of such more primitive forms, we might have -misunderstood, or have passed by unperceived. And, again, we learn -that our hard and fast distinctions are barely justified by Nature. -There, kind in its extreme examples seems to run into kind, and we do -not find the logically-exact type accurately embodied anywhere. Our -classifications into genera and species turn out to be in the first -instance prompted by a practical need to embrace the variety in a -simple shape. But though perfectly valid, so far as we use them for -such ends, they tend to lead us false, if we press them too far.</p> - -<p>And when we have seen so much, we may learn the further lesson that -the variety of organisation, animal and vegetable, is only the -exhibition in an endless detail by single pictures, more or less -complementary, more or less inclusive of each other, of that one -vital organisation in principle and construction which we could not -otherwise have had presented to us. In a million lessons from the vast -ranges of contemporary and of extinct life there is impressed upon -the biological observer the idea of that system of life-function and -life-structure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> which is the goal of biological science. The interest -in the mere variety whether of modern or of primeval forms of life is -as such merely historical; its truer use is to enable the scientific -imagination to rise above local or temporary limitations. And thus in -the end the records and guesses of evolution in time and place serve -to build up a theory of the timeless universal nature of life and -organisation.</p> - -<p>And what is true of Nature is equally true of the Mind. For these -two, as we have already seen, are not isolable from each other. -Neither the mind nor the so-called external world are either of them -self-subsistent existences, issuing at once and ready-made out of -nothing. The mind does not come forth, either equipped or un-equipped, -to conquer the world: the world is not a prey prepared for the spider, -waiting for the mind to comprehend and appropriate it. The mind and -the world, the so-called 'subject' and so-called 'object,' are equally -the results of a process: and it is only when we isolate the terminal -aspects of that process, and in the practical business of life forget -the higher theoretical point of view, that we lose sight of their -origin, and have two worlds facing each other. As the one side or -aspect of the process gathers feature and form, so does the other. As -the depth and intensity of the intellect increases, the limits of the -external world extend also. For the psychical life is just the power -which maintains a continuing correlation between the body and its -environment, and between the various elements in that environment. It -is the unity in which that correlation lives and is aware of itself. -It is the subject-object, which sets one element against another, and -gives it quasi-independence. The mind of the savage is exactly measured -by the world he has around him. The dull, almost animal, sensation -and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> feeling, which is what we may call his mental action, is just the -obverse of the narrow circumference that girdles his external world. -The beauty and interest of the grander phenomena of terrestrial nature, -and of the celestial movements, are ideally non-existent for a being, -whose whole soul is swallowed up in the craving for food, the fear of -attack, and the lower enjoyments of sense. In the course of history we -can see the intellect growing deeper and broader, and the limits of the -world recede simultaneously with the advance of the mind. This process -or movement of culture takes place in the sequence of generations, and -in the variety of races and civilisations spread over the face of the -world. But here too, the higher science, not resting in the merely -historical inquiry, takes no interest in the medium of time, and merely -uses it to supply material for the rational sequence of ideas<a name="FNanchor_4_141" id="FNanchor_4_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_141" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>.</p> - -<p>The objective world of knowledge is really at one with the subjective -world: they spring from a common source, what Kant called the 'original -synthetic unity of apperception.' The distinction between them flows -from abstraction, from failure to keep in view the whole round of -life and experience. The subjective world—the mind of man—is really -constituted by the same force as the objective world of nature: the -latter has been translated from the world of extension, with its -externality of parts in time and space, into an inner world of thought -where unity, the fusion or coalescence of all types and forms, is the -leading feature. The difficulty of passing from the world of being to -the world of thoughts, from notion to thing, from subject to object, -from Ego to Non-ego, is a difficulty which men have unduly allowed to -grow upon them. It grows by talking of and analysing <i>mere</i> being, -<i>mere</i> thought,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> <i>mere</i> notion, or <i>mere</i> thing. And it will be -dispelled when it is seen that there is no <i>mere</i> being, and no <i>mere</i> -thought: that these two halves of the unity of experience—the unity -we divide and the division we unify in every judgment we make—are -continually leaning out of themselves, each towards the other. But -men, beginning as they must from themselves, and failing to revise and -correct their stand-point till it became an <i>ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος,</i> argued -from a belief that the individual mind was a fixed and absolute centre, -from which the universe had to be evaluated. In Hegel's words, they -made man and not God the object of their philosophy<a name="FNanchor_5_142" id="FNanchor_5_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_142" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. So that Kant -really showed the outcome of a system which acted on the hypothesis -that man in his individual capacity was all in all. Hegel, on his own -showing, came to prove that the real scope of philosophy was God;—that -the Absolute is the 'original synthetic unity' from which the external -world and the Ego have issued by differentiation, and in which they -return to unity.</p> - -<p>If this be so, then there is behind the external world and behind the -mind an organism of pure types or forms of thought,—an organism which -presents itself, in a long array of fragments, to the senses in the -world of nature, where all things lie outside of one another, and which -then is, as it were, reflected back into itself so as to constitute the -mind, or spiritual world, where all parts tend to coalesce in a more -than organic unity. The deepest craving of thought, and the fundamental -problem of philosophy, will accordingly be to discover the nature and -law of that totality or primeval unity,—the totality which we see -appearing in the double aspect of nature and mind, and which we first -become acquainted with as it is manifested in this state of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> dis-union. -To satisfy this want is what the Logic of Hegel seeks. It lays bare -the kingdom of those potent shades,—the phases of the Idea—which -embodies itself more concretely in the external world of body, and the -inward world of mind. The psychological or individualist conditions, -which even in the Kantian criticism sometimes seem to set up mind as an -entity parallel to the objects of nature, and antithetic to nature as -a whole, have fallen away. Reason has to be taken in the whole of its -actualisation as a world of reason, not in its bare possibility, not in -the narrow ground of an individual's level of development, but in the -realised formations of reasonable knowledge and action, as shown in Art -and Life, Science and Religion. In this way we come to a reason which -might be in us or in the world, but which, being to a certain extent -different from either, was the focus of two orders of manifestations.</p> - -<p>To ascertain that ultimate basis of the world and mind was the chief -thing philosophy had to see to. But in order to do this, a good deal -of preliminary work was necessary. The work of Logic, as understood -by Hegel, involves a stand-point which is not that of every-day life -or reflection on experience. It presupposes the whole process from -the provisional starting-point which seems at first sight simplest -and universally acceptable, upwards to the unhypothetical principle -which—though at a long distance—it involves and leads up to, or -presupposes. We all know Aristotle's dictum ᾽Εν τοῐς αὶσθητοῐς τὰ -νοητά ἐστιν: <i>Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu.</i> The fact -of sense and feeling <i>is</i> the fact of experience: or rather the fact -and reality of experience is the underlying truth which the expression -of it in terms of sense and perception inadequately interprets. Even -in the principles of sensation there is judgment, thought, reasoning: -but it needs eliciting, re-statement,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> opening up, and explanation. -The Phenomenology of Mind is, as Hegel himself has said, his voyage of -discovery. It traces the path, and justifies the work of traversing -it, from the ill-founded and imperfect certainties of sense and -common-sense, up through various scientific, moral, and religious modes -of interpreting experience and expressing its net sum of reality, -till it culminates in the stand-point of 'pure thought,' of supreme -or 'absolute' consciousness. It is certainly not a history of the -individual mind: and equally little is it a history of the process of -the intellectual development of the race. In a way it mixes up both. -For its main interest is not on the purely historical side. It indulges -in bold transitions, in sudden changes of scene from ancient Greece -and Rome to modern Germany, from public facts and phases of national -life to works of fiction (compare its use of Goethe's <i>Faust</i> and his -version of <i>Rameau's Nephew).</i> It lingers—for historical accuracy and -proportion unduly—over the period of Kant and Fichte, and reads Seneca -by the light of the <i>Sorrows of Werther.</i> For its aim is to gather from -the inspection of all ways in which men have attempted to reach reality -the indication of their several content of truth, and of the several -defects from it, so as to show the one necessary path on which even all -their errors converge and which they serve to set out in clearer light.</p> - -<p>Hegel's philosophy is undoubtedly the outcome of a vast amount of -historical experience, particularly in the ancient world, and implies -a somewhat exhaustive study of the products of art, science, politics, -and religion. By experience he was led to his philosophy, not by -what is called <i>a priori</i> reasoning. It is curious indeed to observe -the prevalent delusion that German philosophy is the 'high <i>priori</i> -road,'—to hear its profundity admired, but its audacity and neglect of -obvious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> facts deplored. The fact is that without experience neither -Hegel nor anybody else will come to anything. But, on the other hand, -experience is in one sense only the yet undeciphered mass of feeling -and reality, the yet unexpounded psychical content of his life; or, -taken in another acceptation, it is only a form which in one man's case -means a certain power of vision, and in another a different degree. One -man sees the idea which explains and unifies experience as actuality: -to the other man it is only a subjective notion. And even when it is -seen, there are differences in the subsequent development. One man -sees it, asserts it on all hands, and then closes. Another sees it, -and asks if this is all, or if it is only part of a system. An appeal -to 'my experience' is very much like an appeal to 'my sentiments' or -'my feelings': it may prove as much or as little as can be imagined: -in other words, it can prove nothing. The same is true of the appeal -to consciousness, that oracle on whose dicta it has sometimes been -proposed to found a system of philosophy. By that name seems meant the -deliverances of some primal and unerring nucleus of mind, some real -and central self, whose voice can be clearly distinguished from the -mere divergent cries of self-interest and casual opinion. That such -discernment is possible no philosophy will seek to deny: but it is a -discernment which involves comparison, examination, and reasoning. -And in that case the appeal to consciousness is the exhortation to -clear and deliberate thinking. While, on another side, it hints that -philosophy does not—in the end—deal with mere abstractions, but with -the real concrete life of mind. And if an appeal to other people's -experience is meant, that is only an argument from authority. What -other people experience is their business, not mine. Experience -<i>means</i> a great deal for which it is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> not the right name: and to give -an explanation of what it is, and what it does, would render a great -service to English methodologists.</p> - -<p>There are, however, two modes in which these studies to discover the -truth may appear. In the one case they are reproduced in all their -fragmentary and patch-work character. They are supposed to possess a -value of their own, and are enunciated with all the detail of historic -incident. The common-place books of a man are, as it were, published -to instruct the world and give some hint of the extent of his reading. -But, in the other case, the scaffolding of incident and externality -may be removed. The single facts, which gave the persuasion of the -idea, are dismissed, as interesting only for the individual student on -his way to truth: or, if the historical vehicle of truth be retained -at all, it is translated into another and intellectual medium. Such a -history, the quintessence of extensive and deep research, is presented -in the Phenomenology. The names of persons and places have faded from -the record, as if they had been written in evanescent inks,—dates -are wanting,—individualities and their biographies yield up their -place to universal and timeless principles. Such typical forms are -the concentrated essence of endless histories. They remind one of the -descriptions which Plato in his Republic gives of the several forms -of temporal government. Or, to take a modern instance, the Hegelian -panorama of thought which presents only the universal evolution of -thought,—that evolution in which the whole mind of the world takes the -place of all his children, whether they belong to the common level, -or stand amongst representative heroes,—may be paralleled to English -readers by Browning's poem of <i>Sordello.</i> There can be no question -that such a method is exposed to criticism, and likely to excite<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span> -misconception. If it tend to give artistic completeness to the work, -it also tantalises the outsider who has a desire to reach his familiar -standing-ground. He wishes a background of time and space, where the -forms of the abstract ideas may be embodied to his mind's eye. In most -ages, and with good ground, the world has been sceptical, when it -perceived no reference to authorities, no foot-notes, no details of -experiments made: nor is it better disposed to accept provisorily, and -find, as the process goes on, that it verifies itself to intelligence.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_138" id="Footnote_1_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_138"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>De Anima,</i> iii. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_139" id="Footnote_2_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_139"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> A philological parallel may make this clearer. 'The -Indo-German,' says Misteli <i>(</i><i>Typen des Sprachbaues,</i> p. 363), -'embraces or condenses several categories in a single idea in a -way which though less logical is more fruitful; for in this way he -procures graspable totals with which he can work further, and not -patch-work which would crumble away in his hands. Our <i>He</i> includes -four grammatical categories, which work not separately, but as a -whole:—third person, masculine gender, singular, nominative; whereas -the Magyar <i>ö</i> is the vehicle only of one category, the third person, -which is either determined as singular by the context, or as plural -by the addition of <i>k</i>: gender in these languages does not exist: and -as subject again <i>ö</i> is specially interpreted from the context. The -unification of the four categories makes <i>He</i> an individual and a word; -the generality and isolation of one category makes <i>ö</i> an abstract and -a stem.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_140" id="Footnote_3_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_140"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Häckel, <i>Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte</i>, p. 157.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_141" id="Footnote_4_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_141"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See above, pp. <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_142" id="Footnote_5_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_142"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Werke,</i> vol. i. p. 15.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XX.</h5> - - -<h4>GENERAL LAW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.</h4> - - -<p>'The order and concatenation of ideas,' says Spinoza, 'is the same as -the order and concatenation of things<a name="FNanchor_1_143" id="FNanchor_1_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_143" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>.' The objective world at least -of acts and institutions develops parallel with the growth and system -of men's ideas. In the tangled skein which human life and reality -present to the observer, the only promising clue is to be found in the -process by which in history the past throws light on the present and -gets light in return. There in the stream of time and in the expanses -of space the condensed results, the hard knots, which present life -offers for explanation, are broken up into a vast number of problems, -each presenting a different aspect, and one helping towards a fairer -and clearer appreciation of another.</p> - -<p>The present medium of general intelligence and theory in which we live -embraces in a way the results of all that has preceded it, of all the -steps of culture through which the world has risen. But in this body of -intellectual beliefs and ideas with which our single soul is clad,—in -this common soil of thought,—the several contributions of the past -have been half or even wholly obliterated, and are only the shadows of -their old selves. What in a former day was a question of all-engrossing -interest has left but a trace: the complete<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> and detailed formations -of ancient thought have lost their distinctness of outline, and have -shrunk into mere shadings in the contour of our intellectual world. -Questions, from which the ancient philosophers could never shake -themselves loose, are now only a barely perceptible <i>nuance</i> in the -complex questions of the present day. Discussions about the bearings of -the 'one' and the 'many,' puzzles like those of Zeno, and the casuistry -of statesmanship such as is found in the Politics of Aristotle, have -for most people little else than an antiquarian interest. We scarcely -detect the faint traces they have left in the 'burning questions' -of our own age. We are too ready to forget that the past is never -altogether annihilated, and that every step, however slight it may -seem, which has once been taken in the movement of intellect, must be -traversed again in order to understand the constitution of our present -intellectual world. To outward appearance the life and work of past -generations have so completely lost their organic nature, with its -unified and vital variety, that in their present phase they have turned -into hard and opaque atoms of thought. The living forces of growth, -as geologists tell us, which pulsed through the vegetables of one -period are suspended and put in abeyance: and these vegetables turn -into what we call the inorganic and inanimate strata of the earth. -Similarly, when all vitality has been quenched or rendered torpid in -the structures of thought, they sink into the material from which -individuals draw their means of intellectual support. This inorganic -material of thought stands to the mind, almost in the same way as the -earth and its products stand to the body of a man. If the one is our -material, the other is our spiritual <i>substance</i>. In the one our mind, -as in the other our body, lives, moves, and has its being.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span></p> - -<p>But in each case besides the practical need, which bids us consume the -substance as dead matter, and apply it to use, there is the theoretical -bent which seeks to reproduce ideally the past as a living and fully -developed organism. 'This past,' says Hegel, 'is traversed by the -individual, in the same way as one who begins to study a more advanced -science repeats the preliminary lessons with which he had long been -acquainted, in order to bring their information once more before his -mind. He recalls them: but his interest and study are devoted to other -things. In the same way the individual must go through all that is -contained in the several stages in the growth of the universal mind: -but all the while he feels that they are forms of which the mind has -divested itself,—that they are steps on a road which has been long -ago completed and levelled. Thus, points of learning, which in former -times tasked the mature intellects of men, are now reduced to the level -of exercises, lessons, and even games of boyhood: and in the progress -of the schoolroom we may recognise the course of the education of the -world, drawn, as it were, in shadowy outline<a name="FNanchor_2_144" id="FNanchor_2_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_144" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>.'</p> - -<p>The scope of historical investigation therefore is this. It shows -how every shading in the present world of thought, which makes our -spiritual environment, has been once living and actual with an -independent being of its own. But it also reveals the presence of -shades and elements in the present which if our eyes had looked on the -present alone we should scarcely have suspected: and it thus enables us -to interpolate stages in development of which the result preserves only -rudimentary traces. And, when carried out in a philosophical spirit, -it shows further, that in those formations, which are produced in -each period of the structural<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> development of reason, the universe of -thought, or the Idea, is always whole and complete, but characterised -in some special mode which for that period seems absolute and final. -Each form or 'dimension' of thought, in which the totality is grasped -and unified, is therefore not so simple or elementary as it may seem -to casual observers regarding only the simplicity of language: it is -a total, embracing more or less of simpler elements, each of which -was once an inferior total, though in this larger sphere they are -reduced to unity. Thus each term or period in the process is really -an individualised whole, with a complex interconnexion and contrast -included in it: it is <i>concrete.</i> No single word or phrase explains it: -yet it is one totality,—a rounded life, from which its several spheres -of life must be explained. But when that period is passing away, the -form of its idea is separated, and retained, apart from the life and -mass of the elements which constituted it a real totality; and then the -mere shading or shell, with only part of its context of thought, is -left <i>abstract.</i> When that time has come, a special form, a whole act -in the drama, of humanity has been transformed into an empty husk, and -is only a name.</p> - -<p>The sensuous reality of life, as it is limited in space and time, and -made palpable in matter and motion, is however the earliest cradle -of humanity. The environment of sense is prior in the order of time -to the environment of thought. Who, it may be asked, first wrought -their way out of that atmosphere of sense into an ether of pure -thought? Who first saw that in sense there was yet present something -more than sensation,—that the deliverances of sense-perception rest -upon and involve relations, ties, distinctions, which contradict its -self-confidence and carry us beyond its simple indications?. Who laid -the first foundations of that world<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> of reason in which the civilised -nations of the modern period live and move? The answer is, the Greek -philosophers: and in the first place the philosophers of Elea. For -Hegel the history of thought begins with Greece. All that preceded the -beginnings of Greek speculation, and most that lies outside it, has -only a secondary interest for the culture of the West.</p> - -<p>But 'many heroes lived before the days of Agamemnon,' The records of -culture no longer begin with Greece. Even in Hegel's own day, voices, -like those of the poet Rückert (in his 'habilitation'-exercise), were -heard declaring that the true fountain of European thought, the real -philosophy, was to be sought in the remoter East. Since the time of -Hegel, the study of primitive life, and of the rise of primitive ideas -in morals and religion, has enabled us to some extent to trace the -early gropings of barbarian fancy and reason. The comparative study -of languages has, on the other hand, partly revealed the contrivances -by which human reason has risen from one grade of consciousness to -another. The sciences of language and of primitive culture have -revealed new depths in the development of thought, where thought is -still enveloped in nature and sense and symbols,—depths which were -scarcely dreamed of in the earlier part of the present century. Here -and there, investigators have even supposed that they had found the -cradle of some elements in art, religion, and society, or, it may be, -of humanity itself.</p> - -<p>These researches have accomplished much, and they promise to accomplish -more. They help us perhaps to take a juster view of the early Greek -thinkers, and show how much they still laboured under conditions -of thought and speech from which their struggles have partly freed -us. But for the present, and with certain<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> explanations to be given -later, it may still be said that the birthday of our modern world -is the moment when the Greek sages began to construe the facts of -the universe. Before their time the world lay, as it were, in a -dream-life. Unconsciously in the womb of time the spirit of the world -was growing,—its faculties forming in secresy and silence,—until -the day of birth when the preparations were completed, and the young -spirit drew its first breath in the air of thought. A new and to us -all-important epoch in the history of thought begins with the Greeks: -and the utterances of Parmenides mark the first hard, and still -somewhat material, outlines of the spiritual world in which we live. -Other nations of an older day had gathered the materials: in their -languages, customs, religions, &c., there was an unconscious deposit of -reason. It was reserved for the Greeks to recognise that reason: and -thus in them reason became conscious.</p> - -<p>For us, then, it was the Greek philosophers who distinctly drew the -distinction between sense and thought, and who first translated the -actual forms of our natural life into their abbreviated equivalents in -terms of logic. The struggle to carry through this transition, this -elevation into pure thought, is what gives the dramatic interest to -the Dialogues of Plato and keeps the sympathy of his readers always -fresh. Socrates, we are told, first taught men to seek a general -definition: not to be content with having—like Pythagoreans—their -meaning wrapped up inseparably in psychical images and quasi-material -symbols. He taught them to refer word to fellow word, to elicit the -underlying idea by the collision and comparison of instances, to get -at the 'content' which was identical in all the multiplicity of forms. -He taught them, in—brief, to think: and Plato carried out widely and -deeply<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> the lesson. The endeavour to create an ideal world, which, at -its very creation, seems often to be transformed into a refined and -attenuated copy of the sense-world, meets us in almost every page of -his Dialogues. In Aristotle this effort, with its concomitant tendency -to give 'sensible' form to the ideal, is so far over and past; and -some sort of intellectual world, perhaps narrow and inadequate, -is reached,—the logical scheme in which immediate experience was -expressed and codified. What these thinkers began, succeeding ages have -inherited and promoted.</p> - -<p>In the environment of reason, therefore, which encompasses the -consciousness of our age, are contained under a generalised form and -with elimination of all the particular circumstances, the results won -in the development of mind and morals. These results now constitute -the familiar joints and supports in the framework of ordinary thought: -around and upon them cluster our beliefs and imaginations. During each -epoch of history, the consciousness of the world, at first by the mouth -of its great men, its illustrious statesmen, artists, and philosophers, -has explicitly recognised, and translated into terms of thought,—into -logical language,—that synthesis of the world which the period had -practically secured by the action of its children. That activity went -on, as is the way of natural activities, spontaneously, through the -pressure of need, by an immanent adaptation of means to ends, not in -conscious straining after a result. For the conscious or reflective -effort of large bodies of men is often in a direction contrary to -the Spirit of the Time. This Spirit of the Time, the absolute mind, -which is neither religious nor irreligious, but infinite and absolute -in its season, is the real motive principle of the world. But that -Spirit of the Time is not always<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> the voice that is most effective at -the poll, or rings loudest in public rhetoric. It is often a still -small voice, which only the wise, the self-restrained, the unselfish -hear. And he who hears it and obeys it, not he who follows the blatant -crowd, is the hero. It is only to a mistaken or an exaggerated -hero-worship, therefore, that Hegel can be said to be a foe. Great -men are great: but the Spirit of the Time is greater: their greatness -lies in understanding it and bringing it to consciousness. The man, -who would act independently of his time and in antagonism to it, is -only the exponent of its latent tendencies. Nor need the synthesis -be always formulated by a philosopher in order to leaven the minds -of the next generation. The whole system of thought,—the theory of -the time,—its world, in short, influences minds, although it is not -explicitly formulated and stated: it becomes the nursery of future -thought and speculation. Philosophy in its articulate utterances only -gives expression to the silent and half-conscious grasp of reason over -its objects. But when the adaptation is not merely reached but seen and -felt, when the synthesis or world of that time is made an object of -self-consciousness, the exposition has made an advance upon the period -which preceded. For that period started in its growth from the last -exposition, the preceding system of philosophy, after it had become -the common property of the age, and taken its place in their mental -equipment.</p> - -<p>Each exposition or perception of the synthesis by the philosopher -restores or re-affirms the unity which in the divided energies of -the period, in its progressive, reforming, and reactionary aspects, -in its differentiating time, had to a great extent been lost. By the -reforming, progressive, and scientific movement of which each period -is full, the unity or totality with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> which it began is shown to be -defective. The value of the initial synthesis is impaired; its formula -is found inadequate to comprehend the totality: and the differences -which that unity involved, or which were implicitly in it, are now -explicitly affirmed. But the bent towards unity is a natural law -making itself felt even in the period of differentiation. And it -makes itself felt in the pain of contradiction, of discord, of broken -harmony. And that pain—which is the sign of an ever-present life that -refuses to succumb to the encroaching elements—is the stimulus to -re-construction. Only so far as pain ceases to be pain, as it benumbs, -and deadens, does it involve stagnation: as pain proper, felt as -resistance to an inner implicitly victorious principle, it stimulates -and quickens to efforts to make life whole again. The integrating -principle is present and active. There is then an effort, a re-action; -the feeling has to do something to make itself outwardly felt: the -implicit has to be actually put in its place, forced as it were into -action and set forth<a name="FNanchor_3_145" id="FNanchor_3_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_145" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>: and the existing contrasts and differences -which the re-forming agency has called into vigorous life are lifted -from their isolation, and show of independence, and kept, as it were, -suspended in the unity<a name="FNanchor_4_146" id="FNanchor_4_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_146" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. The differences are not lost or annihilated: -but they come back to a centre, they find themselves, as it were, -at home: they lose their unfair prominence and self-assertion, and -sink into their places as constituents in the embracing organism<a name="FNanchor_5_147" id="FNanchor_5_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_147" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. -The unity which comes is not however the same as the unity which -disappeared, however much it may seem so. The mere <i>notion</i>—the -inner sense and inner unity—has put itself forward into the real -world: it is no longer a mere subjective principle, but as moulded -into actuality, into the objective world,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> it has become an Idea. -(<i>Begriff</i> is now <i>Idee.</i>) For the Idea is always more than a notion: -it is a notion translated into objectivity, and yet in objectivity -not sinking into a mere congeries of independent parts, but retaining -them 'ideally'—united by links of thought and service—in its larger -ideal-reality. It is all that the object ought to be (and which in a -sense it must be, if it is at all), and all that the subject sought to -be and looked forward to.</p> - -<p>The mind of the world moves, as it were, in cycles, but with each new -cycle a difference supervenes, a new tone is perceptible. History, -which reflects the changing aspects of reality, does and does not -repeat itself. The distinctions and the unity are neither of them the -same after each step as they were before it: they have both suffered a -change: it is a new scene that comes above the horizon, however like -the last it may seem to the casual observer. Thus when the process -of differentiation is repeated anew, it is repeated in higher terms, -multiplied, and with a higher power or wider range of meaning<a name="FNanchor_6_148" id="FNanchor_6_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_148" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>. Each -unification however is a perfect world, a complete whole: it is the -same sum of being; but in each successive level of advance it receives -a fuller expression, and a more complexly-grouped type of features<a name="FNanchor_7_149" id="FNanchor_7_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_149" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>. -Such is the rhythmic movement,—the ebb and flow of the world, always -recurring with the same burden but, as we cannot but hope, with richer -variety of tones, and fuller sense of itself. The sum of actuality, the -Absolute, is neither increased nor diminished. The world, the ultimate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> -reality of experience and life, was as much a rounded total to the -Hebrew Patriarchs as it is to us: without advancing, it has been, we -may say, in its expression deepened, developed, and organised. In one -part of the sway of thought, however, there is a harder, narrower, -insistance (by practical and business minds) on the sufficiency of -a definite principle to satisfy all wants and to make all mysteries -plain, and a disposition to ignore all other elements of life: at -another, there is a fuller recognition of the differences, gaps, and -contradictions, involved in the last synthesis,—which recognition -it is the tendency of scientific inquiry, of reforming efforts, of -innovation, to produce: and in the last period of the sway, there is -a stronger and more extended grasp taken by the unity pervading these -differences,—which is the work appointed to philosophy gathering up -the results of science and practical amendments.</p> - -<p>To this rhythmical movement Hegel has appropriated the name of -Dialectic. The name came in the first instance from Kant, but -ultimately from Plato, where it denotes the process which brings the -'many' under the 'one,' and divides the 'one' into the 'many.' But how, -it may be asked, does difference spring up, if we begin with unity, and -how do the differences return into the unity? In other words, given a -universal, how are we ever to get at particulars, and how will these -particulars ever give rise to a real individual? Such is the problem, -in the technical language of the Logic of the 'Notion.' And we may -answer, that the unity or universal in question is either a true and -adequate or an imperfect unity. In the latter case it is a mere unit, -amid other units, bound to them and serving to recall them by relations -of contrast, complement, similarity. It is one of many,—a subordinate -member in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span> a congeries, and not <i>the One</i>. If, on the contrary, it be -a true Unity, it is a concrete universal,—the parent of perpetual -variety. The unity, if it be its genuine shape which is formulated by -philosophers, is not mere monotony without differences. If it is a -living and real Idea, containing a complex inter-action of principles: -it is not a single line of action, but the organic confluence of -several. No one single principle by itself is enough to state a life, -a character, or a period. But as the unity comes before the eye of the -single thinker, it is seldom or never grasped with all its fulness of -life and difference. The whole synthesis, although it is implicitly -present and underlies experience and life as its essential basis, -is not consciously apprehended, but for the most part taken on one -side only, one emphatic aspect into which it has concentrated itself. -And even if the master could grasp the whole, could see the unity of -actuality in all its differences, (and we may doubt whether any man -or any philosopher can thus incarnate the prerogative of reason,) his -followers and the popular mind would not imitate him. While his grasp -of comprehension may possibly have been thorough, though he may have -seen life whole through all its differences, inequalities, and schisms, -and with all these reduced or idealised to their due proportions, -into the unity beyond, the crowd who follow him are soon compelled -to lay exclusive stress on some one side of his theory. Some of them -see the totality from one aspect, some from another. It is indeed the -whole which in a certain sense they see: but it is the whole narrowed -down to a point. While <i>his</i> theory was a comprehensive and concrete -grasp, including and harmonising many things which seem otherwise wide -apart, theirs is abstract and inadequate: it fixes on a single point, -which is thus withdrawn from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> its living and meaning-giving context, -and left as an empty name. Now it is the very nature of popular -reasoning to tend to abstractions, in this sense of the word. Popular -thought wants the time and perseverance necessary to retain a whole -truth, and so is contented with a partial image. It seeks for simple -and sharp precision: it likes to have something distinctly before -it, visible to the eye of imagination, and capable of being stated -in a clear and unambiguous formula for the intellect. And popular -thought—the dogmatic insistence on one-sided truth—is not confined -to the so-called non-philosophic world: just as, on the other hand, -the inclusive and comprehensive unity of life and reality is seen and -felt and recognised by many—and felt by them first—who have no claim -to the technical rank of philosophers. Popular thought is the thought -which skims the surface of reality, which addresses itself to the level -of opinion prevalent in all members of the mass as such, and does not -go beyond that into the ultimate and complex depths of experience.</p> - -<p>Thus it comes about that the concrete or adequate synthesis which -should have appeared in the self-conscious thought of the period, -when it reflected upon what it was, has been replaced by a narrow -and one-sided formula, an abstract and formal universal, a universal -which does not express all the particulars. One predominant side of -the synthesis steals the place of the total: what should have been -a comprehensive universal has lowered itself into a particular. Not -indeed the same particular as existed before the union: because it has -been influenced by the synthesis, so as to issue with a new colouring, -as if it had been steeped in a fresh liquid. But still it is really -a particular: and as such, it evokes a new particular in antagonism -to it and exhibiting an element latent in the synthesis. If the -first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> side of the antithesis which claims unduly to be the total, or -universal, be called Conservative, the second must be called Reforming -or Progressive. If the first step is Dogmatic, the second is Sceptical. -If the one side assumes to be the whole, the other practically refutes -the assumption. If the one agency clings blindly to the unity,—as -when pious men rally round the central idea of religion, the other as -tenaciously and narrowly holds to the difference,—as when science -displays the struggle for existence and the empire of chance among -the myriads of aimless organisms. They are two warring abstractions, -each in a different direction. But as they are the offspring of one -parent,—as they have each in their own way narrowed the whole down to -a point, it cannot but be that when they evolve or develop all that -is in them, they will ultimately coincide, and complete each other. -The contradiction will not disappear until it has been persistently -worked out,—when each opposing member which was potentially a total -has become what it was by its own nature destined to be. And this -disappearance of the antithesis is the reappearance of the unity in all -its strength, reinforced with all the wealth of new distinctions.</p> - -<p>Thus on a large scale we have seen the law of growth, of development, -of life. It may be called growth by antagonism. But the antagonism -here is over-ruled, and subject to the guidance of an indwelling -unity. <i>Mere</i> antagonism—if there be such a thing—would lead to -nothing. A mere positive or affirmative point of being would lead -to no antithesis, were it not, so to speak, a point floating in an -ether of larger life and being, whence it draws an outside element -which it overcomes, assimilates and absorbs. A bare national mind -only grows to richer culture, because it lives in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> a universal human -life, and can say <i>Nihil humani a me alienum puto.</i> So too the mere -unit is always tainted with a dependence on outside: or it is always -implicitly more than a mere unit: and what seems to come upon it from -outside, is really an enemy from within, and it falls because there is -treason within its walls. The revolution succeeds because the party -of conservative order is not so hard and homogeneous as it appears. -So, too, it is the immanent presence of the complete thought, of the -Idea, which is the heart and moving spring that sets going the pulse -of the universal movement of thought, and which reappears in every one -of these categories to which the actualised thought of an age has been -reduced. In every term of thought there are three stages or elements: -the original narrow definiteness, claiming to be self-sufficient,—the -antagonism and criticism to which this gives rise,—and the union which -results when the two supplement and modify each other. In the full life -and organic unity of every notion there is a definite kernel, with -rigid outlines as if it were immovable: there is a revulsion against -such exclusiveness, a questioning and critical attitude: and there is -the complete notion, where the two first stages interpenetrate.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_143" id="Footnote_1_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_143"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Eth.</i> ii 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_144" id="Footnote_2_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_144"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Phenomenologie</i><i>des Geistes</i>, p. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_145" id="Footnote_3_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_145"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Gesetzt.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_146" id="Footnote_4_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_146"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Aufgehoben.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_147" id="Footnote_5_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_147"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Idee: Ideeller Weise.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_148" id="Footnote_6_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_148"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Potenz.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_149" id="Footnote_7_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_149"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> 'Nicht nur die Einsicht in die Abhängigkeit des Einzelnen -vom Ganzen ist allein das Wesentliche; ebenso dass jedes Moment selbst -unabhängig vom Ganzen das Ganze ist, und dies ist das Vertiefen in die -Sache.' (Hegels <i>Leben</i>, p. 548.)</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXI.</h5> - - -<h4>ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE I AND THE ORDINARY LOGIC.</h4> - - -<p>The ordinary logic-books have made us all familiar with the popular -distinction between Abstract and Concrete. By a concrete term they mean -the name of an existence or reality which is obvious to the senses, and -is found in time and place;—or they mean the name of an attribute when -we expressly or tacitly recognise its dependence upon such a thing of -the senses. When, on the contrary, the attribute is forcibly withdrawn -from its context and made an independent entity in the mind, the term -expressing it becomes in the usual phraseology abstract. Any term -therefore which denotes a non-sensible or intelligible object would -probably be called abstract. And there is something to be said for the -distinction, which, though unsuccessful in its expression, has some -feeling of the radical antithesis between mere being and mere thought. -It is true, that in the totality of sense and feeling, in the full -sense-experience, there is a concrete fulness, as it were, an infinite -store of features and phases waiting for subsequent analysis to detect. -In the real kind of actual nature there is an inexhaustible mine of -properties, which no artificial classification and description can -ever come to the end of. Every quality<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span> which we state, every relation -which we predicate, is a partial and incomplete element in this -presupposed reality, this implicit concrete; and as such is abstract, -and comparatively unreal. It is something forcibly torn out of and held -apart from its context. But on the other hand the concrete reality is -not at first real, but implicit: it becomes really concrete only as it -re-embraces, and re-constitutes in its totality the elements detected -by analysis. But the popular distinction forgets this, and gives the -title and rank of concrete to what very poorly deserves the name, viz. -to the yet undiscerned reality denoted by a substantive name. Yet -there can be little doubt that the popular use of these terms, or the -popular apprehension of what constitutes reality,—for that is what it -comes to,—is sufficiently represented by the ordinary logic-books. -So that, if the whole business of the logician lies in formulating -the distinctions prevalent in popular thought, the ordinary logic is -correct.</p> - -<p>Now the popular logic of the day,—the logic which has long been -taught in our schools and universities—has three sources.—In the -first place, but in a slight degree, it trenches upon the province -of psychology, and gives some account of the operation by which -concepts or general ideas are supposed to be formed, and of the errors -or fallacies which naturally creep into the process of reasoning. -This is the more strictly modern, the descriptive part of our -logic-books.—But, secondly, the logic of our youth rests in a much -higher degree upon the venerable authority of Aristotle. That logic, -within its own compass, was a masterpiece of analysis, and for many -centuries maintained an ascendency over the minds of men, which it -well deserved. But it was not an analysis of thought or knowledge as a -whole, and it treated its subject in fragments. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> gave in one place -an analysis of science and in another an analysis of certain methods, -which could be observed in popular discussions and practical oratory. -As Lord Bacon remarked, it did little else than state and, it may be, -exaggerate the <i>rationale</i> of argumentation. A high level of popular -thought it unquestionably was, which Aristotle had to investigate,—a -level which many generations of less favoured races were unable to -reach. But there were defects in this Logic which fatally marred its -general usefulness, when the limited scope of its original intention -had been lost sight of. The thoughts of Greece, it has been said, were -greatest and most active in the line of popular action for the city and -the public interest, in the discussions, the quibbles, the fallacies, -and rhetorical arts of the barber's shop and the 'agora.' The aim -of such exercises was to convince, to demonstrate, to persuade, to -overcome;—it might be for good and truth, but also it might not. And -accordingly the Logic of Aristotle has been said to have for its end -and canon the power to convince and to give demonstrative certainty. -There is some ground, it may be, for this charge. The ancient logician -seems to luxuriate in a rank growth of forms of sophism, and in an -almost childlike fondness for variety of argumentative method. He -seems resolved to trace the wayward tricks of thought and its phases -through every nook and cranny, to exhaust all the permutations and -complications of its elements. But let us be just, and remember that -all this was in the main a speculative inquiry—for the sake of theory. -It developed the powers of judgment and inference, just as the modern -research for new metals, new plants, or new planets, develops the -powers of observation. Both have some value in the material results -they discover: but, after all, the mental culture they give is the main -thing. And<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> the talents quickened by deductive research are no whit -less valuable than those owed to the other. Forms are essential, even -if it be possible to make the terrible mistake of regarding them as -all-important to the exclusion of matter.</p> - -<p>And then, this is not the whole truth. There is a perfectly serious -Greek science—Mathematics—a science of many branches: a science -which, from Plato downwards, always stood in alliance with the studies -of philosophy. Now, it might be said, perhaps with ground, that the -conception of mathematical method too much dominated all attempts to -get at the rationale of science, and led to the supremacy of syllogism. -It would be fairer perhaps to put this objection in another shape. -We should then say that the logic of Aristotle,—the <i>Analytics</i>—is -too much restricted to dealing with the most general and elementary -principles of reasoning. But this is not in itself a fault. It -becomes a fault only where there is no growth in philosophy—when -it is merely handed on from master to pupil; and where there is a -tendency to put philosophic doctrine to immediate use. To expend the -whole energy of intellect in laying bare the general principles, the -fundamental method, of knowledge and inference, is precisely what the -founder of a science has a duty to do. But the beginning thus made -requires development—and development which is fruitful must proceed -by correction and antithesis, no less than by positive additions. It -was not given to Aristotle's logic to be so carried on. His logic, -like his system in general, had no real successor to carry it on in -the following generation: and when in the less original ages of early -Byzantine rule it again found students, it had become a quasi-sacred -text which could only be commented on, not modified and developed. From -the great <i>Exegetai</i> of Greece it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> passed westward to Boethius and -eastward to the Syrian and Persian commentators in the early centuries -of the Caliphate. From these, and from other intermediaries, it may be, -it finally culminated in the work of the Latin Schoolmen of the later -Middle Ages. But the very reverence which all these expositors felt for -the text of <i>the</i> Philosopher rendered true development impossible.</p> - -<p>Then, on the other hand, the lust of practical utility caused a -grave misconception of what logic can do. For Aristotle, logic -is a scientific analysis of the modes of inference; its uses are -those which follow intrinsically from all noble activity freely and -zealously prosecuted. But with the death of Aristotle the great days -of knowledge for the sake of knowledge and divine wisdom were over. -The Stoics into whose hands the chief sceptre of philosophy, directly -or indirectly, passed never rose above the conception of life as a -task and a duty, and of all other things, literature, science, and -art, as subservient to the performance of that task. The conception is -an ennobling one: but only with a relative or comparative nobility. -It ennobles, if it is set beside and against the view that life is a -frivolous play, a sport of caprice and selfishness. But it darkens and -narrows the outlook of humanity, when it loses sight of life as a joy, -a self-enlarging and self-realising freedom, of life as in its supreme -phase <i>θεωρία</i>—or the enjoyment of God. To the Stoic, therefore,—and -to the dominant Christian theory which entered to some extent on the -Stoic inheritance—logic, like the rest of philosophy, was something -only valuable because ultimately it helped to save the soul.</p> - -<p>It thus sunk into the position of an Organon or instrument. To the -Stoic,—for instance to Epictetus—its value was its use to establish -the doctrines of the Stoic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> faith, by confuting the ill-arranged and -futile inferences on which were founded the aims and approvals of -ordinary worldly life. To the Christian, again, it served as a method -for putting into systematic shape (under the guidance of certain -supreme categories or principles also borrowed from Greek thought) the -variety of fundamental and derivative aspects which successive minds, -pondering on the power and mystery of the Christian faith, had set -forward as its essential dogmas. It thus helped to build up (out of -the leading ideas of Greek metaphysics, and the principles emerging in -the earliest attempts to formulate the law of Christ) that amalgam of -the power of a divine life with the reflective thought of the teachers -of successive generations, which constitutes the dogmatic creed of -Christendom. Such a reconstruction in thought of the reality which -underlies experience—(in this case the experience of the Christian -life), is inevitable if man is to be man, a free intelligence, and -not a mere animal-like feeling. But its success is largely, if not -entirely, dependent on the value of the logic and metaphysics which it -employs: and it would be a bold thing to say that the subtle, abstract, -and unreal system of Neo-Platonist and Neo-Aristotelian thought was an -organon adequate to cope with the breadth and depth, latent if not very -explicit, in the fulness and reality of the religious life.</p> - -<p>Yet even as an Organon, Logic had to sink to a lower rank. As -traditionalism grew supreme, and religion ossified into a stereotyped -form of belief and practice, logic had less to do as an organiser -of dogma. It sank, or seemed to sink (for it would be rash to speak -too categorically of an epoch of thought so far removed from modern -sympathy and understanding as the age of the Schoolmen), into a futile -(and as it seems<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> occasionally almost a viciously-despairing) play with -<i>pro</i> and <i>contra</i>,—into a lust of argumentation which in masters -like Ockam comes perilously close to scepticism or agnosticism. More -and more, Scholastic thought, which, at one time, had been in the -centre of such intellectual life as there was, came to be stranded on -the shore, while the onward-flowing tide spread in other directions. -These were the great days of logical sway, when it seemed as if logic -could create new truth: as if forms could beget matter. So at least -ran an outside rumour, which was probably based on some amount of real -folly. But the more important point was that the old logic had lost -touch with reality. New problems were arising, which it was—without -a profound reconstruction—quite incapable of solving. Of these there -were obviously two—not unconnected perhaps, but arising in different -spheres of life. There was the revival of religious experience, growing -especially since the thirteenth century with an ever-swelling stream -in the souls of men and women, till it burst through all bounds of -outward organisation in the catastrophe of the Reformation. Luther may -have been historically unjust (as Bacon afterwards was) to the 'blind -heathen master,' as he called Aristotle: but he was governed by a true -instinct when (unlike the compromise-loving Melanchthon) he found the -traditional system of logic and metaphysics no proper organon for -the new phase of faith and theory. So, too, the new attempts at an -inception and instauration of the sciences grew up outside the walls -of old tradition, and were at first perhaps discouraged and persecuted -as infidel and heretical, and were, even without that burden, pursued -at much hap-hazard and with much ignorance both in aims and methods. -Intelligent onlookers,—especially if inspired by an enthusiasm for -the signs of an age<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> happier for human welfare—could not but sec how -needful it was to come to some understanding on the aims and methods of -the rising sciences.</p> - -<p>This want, which he keenly felt, Francis Bacon tried to satisfy. He -pointed out, vaguely, but zealously and in a noble spirit, the end -which that new logic had to accomplish. Bacon, however, could not do -more than state these bold suggestions: he had not the power to execute -them. He imagined indeed that he could display a method, by which -science would make incredible advances, and the kingdom of truth in a -few years come into the world. But this is a sort of thing which no -man can do. Plato, if we take his <i>Republic</i> for a political pamphlet, -had tried to do it for the social life of Athens. What Plato could -not do for the political world of Greece, Bacon could not do for the -intellectual world in his time: for as the Athenian worked under the -shadow of his own state, over-mastered even without his knowledge by -the ordinances of Athens, so the Englishman was evidently enthralled -by the medieval conceptions and by the logic which he condemned. What -Aristotle had for ages been supposed to do, no philosopher could do for -the new spirit of inquiry which had risen in and before the days of -Bacon. That spirit, as exhibited in his great contemporaries, Bacon, -as he has himself shown, could not rightly understand or appreciate. -He failed, above all, to recognise the self-corrective, tentative, -and hypothetical nature, of all open inquiry. But one need not for -this disparage his work. It showed a new sense of the magnitude of the -modern problem: it set prominently forward the comprehensive aim of -human welfare: and by its conception of the 'forma' it kept science -pledged to a high ideal. But Bacon could only play the part of the -guide-post: he could not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> himself lay down the road. And negatively he -could warn against the belief that mathematics could <i>generate</i> or do -more indeed than <i>define</i> the sciences. The spirit of free science, of -critical investigation, of inductive inquiry, must and did constitute -its forms, legislation, and methods for itself. For no philosopher can -lay down laws or methods beforehand which the sciences must follow. -The logician only comes after, and, appreciating and discovering the -not always conspicuous methods of knowledge, endeavours to gather -them up and give them their proper place in the grand total of human -thought, correcting its inadequacies by their aid, and completing their -divisions by its larger unities. Or rather this is a picture of what -English logic might have done. But it does not do so in the ordinary -and accepted text-books on the subject. What it does do, is rather as -follows. To the second and fundamental part which it subjects to a few -unimportant alterations,—i. e. to the doctrine of terms, propositions, -and reasonings,—it subjoins an enumeration of the methods used in the -sciences.</p> - -<p>To the rude minds of the Teutonic peoples the logical system of -Aristotle had seemed almost a divine revelation. From the brilliant -intellect of Greece a hand was stretched to help them in the -arrangement of their religious beliefs. The Church accepted the aid of -logic, foreign though logic was to its natural bent, as eagerly as the -young society tried for a while to draw support from the ancient forms -of the Roman Empire. So with the advance of the Sciences in modern -times some hopeful spirits looked upon the Inductive Logic of Mill in -the light of a new revelation. The vigorous action of the sciences -hailed a systematic account of its methods almost as eagerly as the -strong, but untaught intellect of the barbarian world welcomed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> the -lessons of ancient philosophy. For the first time the sciences, which -had been working blindly or instinctively, but with excellent success, -found their procedure stated clearly and definitely, yet without -any attempt to reduce their varied life to the Procrustean bed of -mathematics, which had once been held to possess a monopoly of method. -The enormous influence of the physical sciences saw itself reflected -in a distinct logical outline: and the new logic became the dominant -philosophy. Such for a while was the proud position of the Inductive -Logic. Enthusiastic students of science in all countries, who were not -inaccessible to wider culture, used quotations from Mill to adorn and -authorise their attempts at generalisation and theory. A period of -speculation in the scientific world succeeded the period of experiment, -in which facts had been collected and registered. A chapter on Method -became a necessary introduction to all higher scientific treatises. In -our universities methodology was prodigally applied to the study of -ancient philosophy. And so long as the scientific epoch lasts in its -one-sided prominence, so long the theory of inductive and experimental -methods may dominate the intellectual world.</p> - -<p>But the Inductive Logic hardly rose to the due sense of its situation. -It has not held to the same high ideal as Bacon set before it. It has -planted itself beside what it was good enough to call the Deductive -Logic, and given the latter a certain toleration as a harmless lunatic, -or an old pauper who had seen better days. Retaining the latter with -certain modifications, although it has now lost its meaning in the -changed outlines of the intellectual world, Inductive Logic adds a -methodology of the sciences, without however founding this methodology -upon a comprehensive analysis of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> knowledge as a whole, when -enlarged and enlightened by the work of the sciences. Hence the two -portions,—the old logic, mutilated and severed from the Greek world it -grew out of, and the new Inductive or specially-scientific logic, not -going beyond a mere classification of methods,—can never combine, any -more than oil and water. And the little psychology, which is sometimes -added, does not facilitate the harmony.</p> - -<p>But Inductive Logic should have adopted a more thorough policy. There -can only be one Logic, which must be both inductive and deductive, but -exclusively, and in parts, neither. To achieve that task however Logic -must not turn its back indifferently on what it calls metaphysics, and -it must rise to a higher conception of the problems of what it calls -psychology.</p> - -<p>In these circumstances the ordinary logic, in its fundamental terms, -is more on the level of popular thought, than in a strictly scientific -region, and does not attempt to unite the two regions, and examine the -fundamental basis of thought on which scientific methods rest. The case -of Concrete and Abstract will illustrate what has been said. To popular -thought the sense-world is concrete: the intellectual world abstract. -And so it is in the ordinary logic. To Hegel, on the contrary, the -intellectual interpretation of the world of reality and experience -is a truer and thus a more concrete description of it than that -contained in a series of sense-terms. Now the difference between the -two uses of the term is not a mere arbitrary change of names. When the -philosopher denies the concreteness of the sense-world, and declares -that it, as merely sensible, is only a mass of excluding elements, a -'manifold,' and in the second instance a series of abstractions, drawn -out of this <i>congeries</i> by perception, the change of language marks -the total change of position between<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> the philosophic and the popular -consciousness. Reality and concreteness as estimated by the one line of -thought are the very reverse of those of the other. A mere sense-world -to the philosopher is a world which wants unity, which is made up of -bits imperfectly adjusted to each other, and always leading us to look -for an explanation of them in sources outside them. The single things -we say we perceive,—the here and the now we perceive them in—are -found, upon reflection and analysis, to depend upon general laws, on -relations that go beyond the single,—on what is neither here nor -now, but everywhere and timeless. The reality of the thing is found -to imply a general system of relations which make it what it is. -Sense-perception in short is the beginning of knowledge: and it begins -by taking up its task piecemeal. It rests upon a felt totality: and to -raise this to an intelligible totality, it must at first only isolate -one attribute at a time.</p> - -<p>The apprehension of a thing from one side or aspect,—the apprehension -of one thing apart from its connexions,—the retention of a term or -formula apart from its context,—is what Hegel terms 'abstract.' -Ordinary terms are essentially abstract. They spring from the -analysis of something which would, in the first stage of the process, -in strictness be described not as concrete, but as chaos:—as the -indefinite or 'manifold' of sensation. But the first conceptions, which -spring from this group when it is analysed, are abstract: they are -each severed from the continuity of their reality. To interpret our -feeling, our experience as felt, we must break it up. But the first -face that presents itself is apt to impress us unduly, and seems more -real, because nearer feeling: on the other it is more unreal, because -less adequate as a total expression of the felt unity. In the same -sense we call Political Economy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> an abstract science, because it looks -upon man as a money-making and money-distributing creature, and keeps -out of sight his other qualities. Our notions in this way are more -abstract or more concrete, according as our grasp of thought extends -to less or more of the relations which are necessarily pre-supposed by -them. On the other hand, when a term of thought owns and emphasises -its solidarity with others, when it is not circumscribed to a single -relation, but becomes a focus in which a variety of relations converge, -when it is placed in its right post in the organism of thought, -its limits and qualifications as it were recognised and its degree -ascertained,—then that thought is rendered 'concrete.' A concrete -notion is a notion in its totality, looking before and after, connected -indissolubly with others: a unity of elements, a meeting-point of -opposites. An abstract notion is one withdrawn from everything that -naturally goes along with it, and enters into its constitution. All -this is no disparagement of abstraction. To abstract is a necessary -stage in the process of knowledge. But it is equally necessary to -insist on the danger of clinging, as to an ultimate truth, to the -pseudo-simplicity of abstraction, which forgets altogether what it is -in certain situations desirable for a time to overlook.</p> - -<p>In a short essay, with much grim humour and quaint illustrations, -Hegel tried to show what was meant by the name 'abstract,' which in -his use of it denotes the cardinal vice of the 'practical' habit of -mind. From this essay, entitled 'Who is the Abstract Thinker<a name="FNanchor_1_150" id="FNanchor_1_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_150" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>?' -it may be interesting to quote a few lines. A murderer is, we may -suppose, led to the scaffold. In the eyes of the multitude he is a -murderer and nothing more. The ladies perhaps may make the remark that -he is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span> a strong, handsome, and interesting man. At such a remark the -populace is horrified. "What! a murderer handsome? Can anybody's mind -be so low as to call a murderer handsome? You must be little better -yourselves." And perhaps a priest who sees into the heart, and knows -the reasons of things, will point to this remark, as evidence of the -corruption of morals prevailing among the upper classes. A student -of character, again, inquires into the antecedents of the criminal's -up-bringing: he finds that he owes his existence to ill-assorted -parents; or he discovers that this man has suffered severely for some -trifling offence, and that under the bitter feelings thus produced -he has spurned the rules of society, and cannot support himself -otherwise than by crime. No doubt there will be people who when they -hear this explanation will say "Does this person then mean to excuse -the murderer?" In my youth I remember hearing a city magistrate -complain that book-writers were going too far, and trying to root out -Christianity and good morals altogether. Some one, it appeared, had -written a defence of suicide. It was horrible! too horrible! On further -inquiry it turned out that the book in question was the <i>Sorrows of -Werther.</i></p> - -<p>'By abstract thinking, then, is meant that in the murderer we see -nothing but the simple fact that he is a murderer, and by this single -quality annihilate all the human nature which is in him. The polished -and sentimental world of Leipsic thought otherwise. They threw their -bouquets, and twined their flowers round the wheel and the criminal -who was fastened to it.—But this also is the opposite pole of -abstraction.—It was in a different strain that I once heard a poor -old woman, an inmate of the workhouse, rise above the abstraction -of the murderer. The sun shone, as the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> severed head was laid upon -the scaffold. "How finely," said the woman, "does God's gracious sun -lighten up Binder's head!" We often say of a poor creature who excites -our anger that he is not worth the sun shining on him. That woman saw -that the murderer's head was in the sunlight, and that it had not -become quite worthless. She raised him from the punishment of the -scaffold into the sunlit grace of God. It was not by wreaths of violets -or by sentimental fancies that she brought about the reconciliation: -she saw him in the sun above received into grace.'</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_150" id="Footnote_1_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_150"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> 'Wer denkt abstrakt!' (<i>Vermischte Schriften</i>, vol. ii. p. -402.)</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXII.</h5> - - -<h4>FROM SENSE TO THOUGHT.</h4> - - -<p>Induction and Experience are names to which is often assigned the -honour of being the source of all our knowledge. But what induction -and experience consist in, is what we are supposed to be already -aware of; and that is—it may be briefly said—the concentration -of the felt and sense-given fragments into an intimate unity. The -accidents and fortunes that have befallen us in lapses of time, the -scenes that have been set before and around us in breadths of space, -are condensed into a mood of mind, a habitual shading of judgment, -or frame of thought. The details of fact re-arrange themselves into -a general concept; their essence gets distilled into a concentrated -form. Their meaning disengages itself from its embodiment, and floats -as a self-sustaining form in an ideal world. Thus if we look at the -larger process of history, we see every period trying to translate the -sensuous fact of its life into a formula of thought, and to fix it in -definite characters. The various parts of existence, and existence as -a whole, are stripped of their sensible or factual nature, in which we -originally feel and come into contact with them, and are reduced to -their simple equivalents in terms of thought. From sense and immediate -feeling there is, in the first place, generated an image or idea which -at least represents and stands for reality; and from that, in the -second place, comes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> a thought or notion proper, which holds the facts -in unity.</p> - -<p>The phenomenon may, perhaps, be illustrated by the case of numbers. To -the adult European, numbers and numbering are an obvious and essential -part of our scheme of things that seems to need no special explanation. -But the experience of children suggests its artificiality, and the -evidence from the history of language corroborates that surmise. If -number be in a way describable as part of the sense-experience, or -total impression, it certainly does not come upon us with the same -passivity on our part as the perception of taste or colour, or even -of shape. It postulates a higher grade of activity. As Plato says, it -'awakes the intelligence': it implies a question and looks forward -to an answer: it is thus the first appearance of what in its later -fullness will be called 'Dialectic,' To put it otherwise: Numbering -can only proceed where there is a unit, and an identity: it implies a -one, and it implies an infinite repetibility of that one<a name="FNanchor_1_151" id="FNanchor_1_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_151" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> It thus -postulates the double mental act, first of reducing the various to -its basis of identity, and, secondly, of performing a synthesis of -the identical units thus created. In the highly artificial world in -which we live all this seems simple enough. The products of machinery, -articles of furniture, dress, &c., &c., are already uniform items: and -the strokes of a clock seem almost to invite summation. But in free -nature this similarity is much less obviously stamped on things: and -the products of primitive art—of literal <i>manu</i>-facture—display an -individuality, an element of personal taste, even, which is necessarily -lacking in things turned out by machinery. Thus it was necessary, -before we could number, to reduce the qualitatively different to -a quantitative equality or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> comparability. There are indeed some -instances, in that nearest of things to us, the human body, which -might help. There is the obvious similarity of organs and limbs which -go in pairs, and which might easily suggest a dual, as, so to speak, -a sensuous fact amongst other facts. Again, there is the hand and its -five fingers, or the two hands and the ten fingers. The five or ten, -as a whole naturally given, suggest a grouping of numbers in natural -aggregates. The fingers, again, (and here we may keep at first to the -fingers proper, minus the thumb,) may be without much ingenuity said -to give us a set of four, naturally distinct, yet naturally alike, -and needing, so to speak, the minimum of intelligence to create the -numerical scale from one to four. It is by them, indeed, that Plato, it -may be unconsciously, illustrates the genesis of number. Here in short -you have the natural abacus of the nations, but one restricted, first, -perhaps to the group 1-4, secondly to the group 1-10.</p> - -<p>We have seen how the dual was, in certain instances, almost a natural -perceptive fact. But when it is so envisaged, it is hardly recognised -as number strictly so called. It is only a fresh and peculiar sensuous -attribute of things: a thing which has the quality of duplication, not -a thought which is the synthesis of two identical units. It is a sort -of accident, not part of a regular system or series. So again with -the plural, which may appear in several shapes before it is assigned -to its proper place as a systematic function of the singular. If the -Malay, in order to say 'the king of all apes' has to enumerate one -after another the several sub-species of ape, or if to express 'houses' -he has to reduplicate the singular, to insert a word meaning 'all' -or 'many,' we can see that the conception of number is for him still -in the bonds of sense. It is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> a synthetic category, but only a -material multitude. But in other cases the plural proper is almost -confounded with the so-called 'collective.' It is not an unfamiliar -fact in Greek and Latin that the plural has acquired a meaning of -its own,—not the mere multiple of its singular; as also that the -collective term is occasionally used as an abstract, occasionally -as the more or less indeterminate collection of the individuals. -Such plurals and such collectives represent a stage of language and -conception when the aggregate of singulars form a uniquely-qualified -case of the object. And the peculiarity of them is seen in the way -the plurality is immersed in and restricted to the special class of -objects: as e. g. when in English the plurality of a number of ships -is verbally stereotyped as against the plurality of a number of sheep, -or of partridges (fleet, flock, covey). In such instances the category -of number is completely pervaded and modified by the quality of the -objects it is applied to. So, in the Semitic languages, the so-called -'broken plural' is a quasi-collective, which grammatically counts as -a feminine singular (like so many Latin and Greek collectives): and -whereas the more regular plural is generally shown by separable affix, -this quasi-collective plural enters the very body of the word by -vowel-change, indicating as it were by this absorption the constitution -of a specifically new view of things. On the other hand, it may be -said, there is in this collective a trace of the emergence of the -universal and identical element through the generalisation due to the -conjunction of several similars all acting as one<a name="FNanchor_2_152" id="FNanchor_2_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_152" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>In a true plural, on the contrary, it is required that the sign of -number be clearly eliminated from any peculiarities of its special -object, and be distinctly separated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> from the collective. And similarly -the true numeral has to be realised in its abstractness, as a category -<i>per se.</i> And to do this requires some amount of abstraction. In -Greek, for example, we meet the distinction between numbers in the -abstract, pure numbers (such as four and six), and bodily or physical -numbers (such as four men, six trees)<a name="FNanchor_3_153" id="FNanchor_3_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_153" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>. The geometrical aspect -under which numbers were regarded by the Greeks, e. g. as oblong or -square numbers, bears in the same direction. But another phenomenon -in language tells the tale more distinctly<a name="FNanchor_4_154" id="FNanchor_4_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_154" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>. Abundantly in Sanscrit -and Greek, more rarely in Zend and Teutonic, and here and there in -the Semitic languages, we meet with what is known as the dual number, -a special grammatical form intended to express a pair of objects. -The witty remark of Du Ponceau<a name="FNanchor_5_155" id="FNanchor_5_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_155" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> concerning the Greek dual, that it -had apparently been invented only for lovers and married people, may -illustrate its uses, but hardly suffices to explain its existence in -language. But a comparison of barbarian dialects serves to show that -the dual is, as it were, a prelude to the plural,—a first attempt to -grasp the notion of plurality in a definite way, which served its turn -in primitive society, but afterwards disappeared, when the plural had -been developed, and the numerals had attained a form of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> their own. If -this be so, the dual is what physiologists call a rudimentary organ, -and tells the same story as these organs do of the processes of nature.</p> - -<p>The language of the Melanesian island of Annatom, one of the New -Hebrides, may be taken as an instance of a state of speech in which -the dual is natural. That language possesses a fourfold distinction of -number in its personal pronouns, a different form to mark the singular, -dual, trial, and plural: and the pronoun of the first person plural -distinguishes in addition whether the person addressed is or is not -included in the 'we-two,' 'we-three,' or 'we-many' of the speaker<a name="FNanchor_6_156" id="FNanchor_6_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_156" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>. -The same language however possesses only the first three numerals, and -in the translation of the Bible into this dialect it was necessary -to introduce the English words, four, five, &c. The two facts must -be taken together: the luxuriance of the personal pronouns and the -scanty development of numerals in such languages are two phenomena -of the same law. The numeral 'four' to these tribes is said to bear -the meaning of 'many' or 'several,' Another fact points in the same -direction. In many languages, such as those of China, Further India and -Mexico, it is customary in numbering to use what W. von Humboldt has -called class-words. Here it is felt that an artificial unity has to -be created, a common denominator found, and all reduced to it, before -any summation can be carried out. Scholars and officials, in Chinese, -can only be classed under the rubric of 'jewel' or dignity: and -animals or fish by 'tails,' as if thereby only could one get a handle -to hold<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> them and count them. (The idiom still lingers in western -languages: as in English, heads of cabbage, or of cattle: or German, -<i>sechs Mann Soldaten.</i>) So in Malay, instead of 'five boys' the phrase -used is 'boy five-man': in other words, the numerals are supposed to -inhere as yet in objects of a special kind or common occurrence<a name="FNanchor_7_157" id="FNanchor_7_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_157" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>. -And among the South Sea Islanders the consciousness of number is -decidedly personal: that is to say, the distinction between one and -two is first conceived as a distinction between 'I' and 'we two.' Even -this amount of simplification surpasses what is found amongst some -Australian tribes. There we find four duals: one for brothers and -sisters: one for parents and children: one for husbands and wives: and -one between brothers-in-law<a name="FNanchor_8_158" id="FNanchor_8_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_158" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>. Each pair has a different form. We -thus seem to see to what early language is applied: not to designate -the objects of nature, but the members of the primitive family and -their interests. The consciousness of numbers was first awakened by the -need of distinguishing and combining the things that belonged to and -specially interested men and women in the narrow circle of barbarian -life<a name="FNanchor_9_159" id="FNanchor_9_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_159" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>. It is not altogether imaginative in principle, though it may -be occasionally surmise in details, to connect the rise of grammatical -forms with the temperament and character of the people, and therefore -with its social organisation. If the Bantoo or Caffir languages of -Southern Africa instead of a single third personal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> pronoun and third -personal termination to the verb use the separate forms corresponding -to the ten class-prefixes of the nouns, it must be in accordance with -the general spirit and system of these tribes. The various plural -forms, if they persist, will reflect contemporary modes of life.</p> - -<p>Numbers were at first immersed in the persons, and then, as things -came to be considered also, in the things numbered. The mind seems to -have proceeded slowly from the vague one to definite numbers. And the -first decided step was taken towards an apprehension of numbers when -two was distinguished from one, and the distinction was made part of -the personal terminations. The plural was a further step in the same -direction: the real value of which, however, did not become apparent -until the numerals had been separately established in forms of their -own. When that was accomplished, the special form of the dual became -useless: it had outlived its purpose, and henceforth it ceased to have, -any but that poetical beauty of old association which often adorns the -once natural, but now obsolete growths of the past. When the numerals -were thus emancipated from their material and sensuous environment, -quantity was translated from outward being in its embodiments into a -form of thought. At first, indeed, it was placed in an ethereal or -imaginative space, the counterpart as it were of the sensuous space -in which it had been previously immersed. It became a denizen of the -mental region, as it had been before a habitant of the sense-world.</p> - -<p>The mind was informed with quantity in the shape of number: but it does -not follow from this, that the new product was comprehended, or the -process of its production kept in view. Like all new inventions (and -numeration may fairly be classed under that head), it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> was laid hold -of, and all its consequences, results, and uses estimated and realised -by the practical and defining intellect. In one direction, it became, -like many new inventions in the early days of society, a magic charm, -and was invested with mystery, sacredness, and marvellous powers. But -the intelligent mind,—the understanding,—resolved to make better use -of the new instrument: and that in two ways, in practical work and in -theory. On the one hand it was applied practically in the dealings -of life,—in commerce, contracts, legislation, and religion. On the -other hand, the new conception of number, which common sense and the -instinctive action of men had evolved, was carried out in all its -theory: it was analysed in all directions, and its elements combined -in all possible ways. The result was the science of arithmetic, -and mathematics in general. Such consequences did the reflective -understanding derive from the analysis of its datum,—the fact of -quantity freed from its sensuous envelope.</p> - -<p>The general action of understanding, and of practical thought, is of -this kind. It accepts the representative images which have emerged from -sensation, as they occur: and tries to appreciate them, to give them -precision, to carry them into details, and to analyse them until their -utmost limits of meaning are explored. Where they have come from, and -where they lead to,—the process out of which they spring, and which -fixes the extent of their validity,—are questions of no interest -to the understanding<a name="FNanchor_10_160" id="FNanchor_10_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_160" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>. It takes its objects, as given in popular -conception, as fixed and ultimate entities to be expounded in detail.</p> - -<p>We have taken number as one example of the transference of a sensible -or sense-immersed fact into a form of thought: but a form which is -still placed in a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> superior or mental space. One advantage of taking -number as illustration, is that numbered things are distinguished from -numbers in an emphatic and recognised way. Nobody will dispute that -the abstraction, as it is called, has an existence of its own, and -can be made a legitimate object of independent investigation. But if -the process be more obvious in the case of the numerals, there must -have been a similar course of development leading to the pronouns, the -prepositions, and the auxiliary verbs—to what has been called the -'formal' or 'pronominal' or 'demonstrative' element, the connective and -constructive tissue of language. Whether these pronominal 'roots' form -a special and originally-distinct class of their own, or are derived -from a transmutation of more material or substantial elements, is a -question on which linguistic research casts as yet no very certain -light. It is true that on the one hand etymology is mainly silent on -the origin of pronouns, numerals, and the more fundamental prepositions -(i. e. cannot refer them to roots significant of qualitative being): -and one need not lay much stress on remarks, like that of Gabelenz<a name="FNanchor_11_161" id="FNanchor_11_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_161" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>, -that in the Indo-Chinese languages the words for <i>I, five, fish</i> -have a like sound, as do those for <i>thou, two, ear</i>, or that <i>I am,</i> -originally means <i>I breathe</i>. In all languages—though with immense -diversities of degree, this formal element has attained a certain -independence. And in many instances we can more or less trace the -process by which there grew up in language an independent world of -thought: we can see the natural existence passing out of the range of -the senses into spiritual relations. Before our eyes a world of reason -is slowly constituting itself in the history of culture: and we, who -live now, enter upon the inheritance which past ages have laid up for -us.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span></p> - -<p>There is, however, a difference between the way in which these -results look to us now, and the way in which they originally -organised themselves. The child who begins to learn a language in the -lesson-books and the grammars finds the members of it all, as it were, -upon one level: adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, and verbs confront -him with the same authority and rank. This appearance is deceptive: -it may easily suggest that the words are not members in an organism, -in and out of which they have developed. And this organism of thought -has its individual types, expressed in the great families of human -speech. Its generic form (as drawn out in a logical system) appears -in different grades, with different degrees of fullness, in Altaic -and Dravidian from what it does in Malay, or in Chinese, and these -again have their own predominant categories as compared with those -used in the American or African languages, or in Indo-Germanic and -Semitic. If the Altaic languages e. g. are wanting in the verb proper, -and manage with possessive suffixes and nouns; if the Semitic tenses -display a poverty which contrasts with their wealth in Greek; and -yet each group performs its function, we may infer that each speech -has a complete organism, though it does not bring all its parts to -adequate expression. All this distinction of 'parts of speech,' of -forms, prefixes and suffixes, &c., is part of the life of language, -embodying in more or less distinct organs the organisation of thought -in the individual form it reached in that speech-type. Thus in Chinese -there are strictly speaking no isolated words, nouns, or verbs: there -are only abstract parts of a concrete sentence; and grammar in Chinese -therefore has no accidence (no declensions, conjugations, &c.) but -only syntax. Yet it is these abstract fragments which exist and seem -to have independence and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> inherent meaning: whereas the unity in which -they cohere to form a concrete context is the fleeting sentence of -the moment. At the opposite extreme, again, the Mexican family of -languages tend to incorporate relations to subject and object with -the verb, in such a degree that the word almost becomes a sentence. -Facts like these suggest that a science of the forms of language, in -proportion as it generalises, tends to approach logic; and that logic -will have a converse tendency to elevate to an unduly typical position -the grammatical form of the languages with which the logician is best -acquainted.</p> - -<p>If these points were remembered, there would be less absurd employment -of the grammatical categories of one group of languages to systematise -another. Greek and Sanscrit grammar plays sad havoc with the organism -of a Semitic tongue, and it is not less out of place as a schema -for delineating e. g. South African dialect. Isolated words even in -an Indo-Germanic language—even, we may say, in such a language as -English—are still fractional, and do not get life and individuality -except in their context. And it needs but a little experience to show -how various that individuality may be. It needs perhaps still more -meditation to realise that it is in this individuality that the real -life of language lies: in the words said and written to express the -thought of a personality. But, first, because language has its material -and mechanical side, and secondly, because in civilised countries it -further acquires a more stereotyped mechanism in written and printed -language, its parts tend to gain a pseudo-independence. It is one aim -of a philosophical dictionary to restore the organic interconnexion -which in the mere sequence of vocables in juxtaposition is apt to be -lost. What we call the meaning of a word is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> something which carries us -beyond that mere word,—which restores the connexions which have been -broken off and forgotten. In the form of a dictionary, of course, this -can only be done piece-meal: but if each piece is done thoroughly, it -can hardly fail to bring out certain comprehensive connexions. The mere -word seems a simple thing; and one is at first disposed to get rid of -its difficulty by substituting a so-called synonym. But a deeper study -reveals the fact that an exact synonym is a thing one can no more find -than two peas which are absolutely indistinguishable. A synonym is only -a practical <i>pis aller</i>. But every word is really as it were a point -in an infinitely complex organic life, with its essence or meaning -determined by the currents to and fro which meet in it.</p> - -<p>Words as we see them <i>prima facie</i> in a printed page do look separate -entities. They stand, one here and another there, in a quasi-extension, -with marks of direction and connexion pointing from one to another, -but of connexion apparently extraneous to the more solid points which -are represented by nouns and verbs, or names of substances, actions, -and attributes. Results, as they are, of that practical analysis which -the need of writing down language has led to, they are treated as -complete wholes, which by the speaker are forced into certain temporary -connexions. But this is an illusion which, because a thing changes -its relationships, assumes that it can exist out of all relationships -whatever. Every word of Language is such an abstraction, isolated from -its context. But amid these contexts there are certain similarities: -identical elements are detected: and these identical elements are the -common names of language, the terms of general significance. In all -cases, however, what an utterance of language<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span> describes or expresses -is a definite individual event or scene, conceived as a concrete -of several parts. Each separate vocable is a contribution to the -total: a step towards the real redintegration of the whole out of its -several parts. But the total itself—the content of fact in any single -sentence—is only an abstraction,—a part of the universe which human -interest and need have isolated from the comprehensive scope of things. -Thus, in two degrees, we may say, the picture produced in the sentence -falls short of the truth of things. Each statement is an arbitrary or -accidental cutting out of the totality: each element of the cutting is -dependent on that abstraction, and relative to it. But—as in a given -group of speech, the same sets of circumstances will naturally be -selected, and tend to recur again and again,—the terms which describe -them will acquire a certain association with the objects, and will come -to be called the common names of these agents, acts, and qualities. -They denote or 'represent' the things and acts, conceived however in -certain aspects and relations, and not in their entirety and totality -of nature.</p> - -<p>In this product of intellectual movement above the limits of sensation -we have the 'representation'<a name="FNanchor_12_162" id="FNanchor_12_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_162" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> as Hegel calls it, on which the -Understanding turns its forces. We have one product of the organic -whole of thought taken by itself as if it were independent, set -forth as a settled nucleus for further acquaintance: and this one -point discussed fully and with precision, elaborated in all detail -and consequence, to the neglect of its context, and the necessary -limitations involved in the notion. The process of name-giving may -illustrate this tendency in human thought to touch its objects only in -one point. The names given to objects do not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> embrace the whole nature -of these objects, but give expression only to one striking feature -in them. Thus the name of the horse points it out as 'the strong' or -'the swift': the moon is 'the measurer' or 'the shining one'; and so -in all cases. The object as expressed in these names is viewed from -one aspect, or in one point: and the name, which originally at least -corresponds to the conception, meets the object, properly speaking, -on that side only, or in that relation. The object is not studied in -its own nature, and in its total world, but as it specially enters the -range of human interest, and serves human utilities. One can at least -guess why it should be so: why a name should, in logical language, -express an 'accidens' and not the 'essentia' of the object. For the -investigation of primitive language seems to show that words, as we -know them in separate existence, are a secondary formation: and that -the first significant speech was an utterance intended to describe a -scene, an action, a phenomenon, or complex of event. In point of time, -the primary fact of language is an agglomeration or aggregate,—we -may call it either word or clause (λόγος in short)—which describes -in one breath a highly individualised action or phenomenon. The -spirit or unifying principle in this group might be the accent. Such -a word-group denotes a highly specialised form of being: and if we -call it a word, we may say that the earliest words, and the words of -barbarous tribes, are ingeniously special.<a name="FNanchor_13_163" id="FNanchor_13_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_163" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> But it would be more -correct to say, that in such a group the elements of the scene enter -only from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> a single aspect or in a single relation. Accordingly when -disintegration begins, the result is as follows. The elements of the -group, having now become independent words held together by the syntax -of the sentence, are adopted to denote the several objects which -entered into the total phenomenon. But these words, or fragments of the -word-group, 'represent' the objects in question from a certain point -of view, and not in their integrity. The names of things therefore -touch them only in one point, and express only one aspect. And thus, -although different names will arise for the same thing, as it enters -into different groups, in each case the name will connote only a -general attribute and not the nature of the thing. These names are in -the Hegelian sense of the term 'abstract.' In popular phraseology, they -are only 'signs' of things: i. e. not 'symbols' (though they may have -been in some cases symbolic in origin), for in a symbol there is a -<i>natural</i> correspondence or sensible analogy to the thing symbolised, -but something 'instituted,' due to an 'understanding' or convention.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_151" id="Footnote_1_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_151"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See vol. ii. p. 190, (Logic, § 102).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_152" id="Footnote_2_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_152"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See Max Müller in Mind, vol. i. 345.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_153" id="Footnote_3_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_153"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Pure number is ἀριθμὸς μοναδικός: applied number is -αριθμὸς φυσικὸς or σωματικός. Aristotle, <i>Metaph</i>. N. 5, speaks of -αριθμὸς πύρινος ἤ γήϊνος. But this is only Greek idiom: as we say -'Greek history' instead of 'History of Greece:' or vice versa, when we -translate <i>Populus Romanus</i> by 'people of Rome.' Aristotle is speaking -of 'proportions' or 'amounts' of fire or earth in the compounds of -these elements.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_154" id="Footnote_4_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_154"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> See L. Geiger, <i>Ursprung und Entwickelung der menschlichen -Sprache und Vernunft</i> (vol. i. p. 380). And Gabelenz 'Die melanesischen -Sprachen' in the <i>Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der -Wissenschaften</i> (VIII), 1861, pp. 89-91.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_155" id="Footnote_5_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_155"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Mémoire sur le Systeme grammatical</i>, &c. p. 155.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_156" id="Footnote_6_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_156"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Cf. <i>nous</i> and <i>nous autres</i>. The same distinction is -found in some American languages. There is a dual in the language of -the Greenlanders; but it is not, however, used when a natural duality -seems to call for it, but in cases when, though there might have been -several things, only two are actually found.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_157" id="Footnote_7_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_157"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> W. von Humboldt, <i>Verschiedenheit des menschlichen -Sprachbaues</i>, p. 423 (ed. 1841); Misteli, <i>Typen des Sprachbaues</i> -(1893).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_158" id="Footnote_8_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_158"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Capt. Grey, <i>Vocabulary of the dialects of S. W. -Australia</i>, pp. xxi and 104 (1840).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_159" id="Footnote_9_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_159"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> The sharp distinction between the first and second -personal pronouns and the third: the want of any apparent connexion -in the Indo-Germanic languages between the first and second persons -singular and the plural form seems to point in the same direction.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_160" id="Footnote_10_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_160"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Cf. vol. ii. <i>Notes and Illustrations</i>, p. 400.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_161" id="Footnote_11_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_161"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Die Sprachwissenschaft</i>, p. 168.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_162" id="Footnote_12_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_162"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> 'Vorstellung,' as distinguished from 'Begriff.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_163" id="Footnote_13_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_163"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Thus in Malay, there are about twenty words for -strike, according as it is done with thick or thin wood, downwards, -horizontally, or upwards, with the hand, with the fist, with the -flat hand, with a club, with the sharp edge, with a hammer, &c. (See -Misteli, <i>Typen des Sprachbaues</i>, p. 265.)</p></div> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span></p> - -<h5>CHAPTER XXIII.</h5> - - -<h4>FIGURATE OR REPRESENTATIVE THOUGHT.</h4> - - -<p>The compensating dialectic whereby reason, under the guise of -imagination, overthrows the narrowness of popular estimates, makes -itself observed even in the popular use of the terms abstract and -concrete. Terms like state, mind, wealth, may from one point of view -be called abstract, from another concrete. At a certain pitch these -abstractions cease to be abstract, and become even to popular sense -very concrete realities. In the tendency to personification in language -we see the same change from abstract to concrete: as when Virtue is -called a goddess, or Fashion surnamed the despot of womankind. In -such instances, imagination, more or less in the service of art and -religion, upsets the narrow vulgar estimates of reality. But it upsets -them, so to speak, by giving to the abstraction (through its creative -power) that sensuous concreteness which the mere abstract lacks and -which the ordinary mind alone recognises as real. It 'stoops to -conquer.' Such a representation is, as Hegel says<a name="FNanchor_1_164" id="FNanchor_1_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_164" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>, 'the synthetic -combination of the Universal and Individual': 'synthetic,' because not -their free, spontaneous, and essential unity, but the supreme product -of the artistic will and hand, which, rather than let the universal -perish by neglect,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span> build for it, the eternal and omnipresent, 'a -temple made with hands.' In mythology we can see the same process: by -which, as it is phrased, an abstract term becomes concrete: by which, -as we may more correctly say, a thought is transformed into, or rather -stops short at, a representative picture. The many gods of polytheism -are the fixed and solidified shapes in which the several degrees of -religious growth have taken 'a local habitation and a name': or they -bear witness to the failure of the greater part of the world to grasp -the idea of Deity in its unity and totality apart from certain local -and temporary conditions. So, too, terms like force, law, matter,—the -abstractions of the mere popular mind—are by certain periods reduced -to the level of sensuous things, and spoken of as real entities, -somewhere and somehow existent, apart from the thinking medium to -which they belong. Such terms, again, as property, wealth, truth, are -popularly identified with the objects in which they are for the time -and place manifested or embodied.</p> - -<p>In these ways the abstract, in the ordinary meaning, becomes in the -ordinary meaning concrete. The distinction between abstract and -concrete is turned into a distinction between understanding and sense, -instead of, as Hegel makes it, a distinction in the adequacy and -completeness of thought itself. Thought (the Idea), as has been more -than once pointed out, is the principle of unification or unification -itself: it is organisation plus the consciousness of organisation: -it is the unifier, the unity, and the unified,—subject as well as -object, and eternal copula of both. An attempt is at first made in -two degrees to represent the thought in terms of the senses as a sort -of superior or higher-class sensible. When the impossibility of that -attempt is seen, common sense ends by denying what it has learned to -call the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span> super-sensible altogether. These three plans may be called -respectively the mythological, the metaphysical, and the positive or -nominalist fallacies of thought. In the mythological, or strictly -anthropomorphic fallacy, thought is conceived under the bodily shape -and the physical qualities of humanity, as a separate unifying, -controlling, synthetic agent, through whose interference the several -things, otherwise dead and motionless, acquire a semblance of life -and action, though in reality but puppets or marionettes: that is to -say, it is identified with a subject of like passions with ourselves, -a repetition of the particular human personality, with its narrowness -and weakness. The action of the Idea is here replaced by the agency -of supposed living beings, invested with superhuman powers. In the -metaphysical or realist fallacy we have a feeble ghostly reproduction -of the mythological. The living personal deity is replaced by a faint -scare-crow of abstract deity. The cause of the changes that go on in -nature is now attributed to indwelling sympathies and animosities, -to the abhorrence of a vacuum, to selection, affinity, and the like: -to essences and laws conceived of as somehow existent in a mystic -space and time. In the positive or nominalist fallacy, the failure of -these two theories begins to be felt: and the mind, which had only -heard of unifying reason under these two phases and is meanwhile sure -of its sense-perceptions, treats the objective synthesis as a dream -and a delusion. Or, at best, it regards the synthesis as essentially -subjective—as a complementary idealising activity of ours which -ekes out the defects of reality, and brings continuity into the -discontinuous. Our thought—(it is only <i>our</i> thought)—is but an -instrument, distinct from us and from the reality: yet acting as a -bridge to connect these two opposing shores—a bridge however which -does not really reach<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span> the other side, but only an artificial image, -which simulates to us, and will for ever simulate, the inaccessible -reality. This last view is the utterance of the popular matter-of-fact -reason, when in weariness and tedium it turns from the attempt to grasp -thought pure and simple, and instead of reducing the metaphysical -antitheses to the transparent unity of comprehension, relapses into -mere acceptance of a given reality.</p> - -<p>In some of these cases the full step into pure thought is never -made. The creations of mythology, for example, display an unfinished -and baffled attempt to rise from the separation of sense to the -unity and organisation of thought. The gods of heathenism are only -individuals—and individuals only <i>meant to be,</i> and by the act of -faith and devotion set forth as reality before the worshipper: but they -are individuals in which imagination embodies a unified and centralised -system of forces or principles. They <i>mean</i> the powers of nature and of -mind, but the sceptre in their hands is only a sign of power attributed -by the believer; and far away, encompassing alike them and him, is the -great relentless necessity. In other cases there is a relapse: when -the higher stage of thought has been attained, it is instantaneously -lost. Terms which are really thoughts are again reduced to the level of -the things of sense, individualised in some object, which, though it -is only a representation or sign, is allowed to usurp the place of the -thought which it but partially and by extraneous institution embodies. -The intuition of the sensuous imagination at every step throws its -spells on the products of thought, and turns them into a representative -picture, which in popular use and wont occupies the place of the -notion. Instead of being retained in their native timelessness, the -terms of the Idea are brought under the laws of Sense-perception, under -the conditions of space and time.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span></p> - -<p>The term 'representation,' which Hegel employs to name these -picture-thoughts or figurate conceptions, corresponds to the facts -of their nature. A 'representation' is one of two things: either a -particular thing sent out accredited with general functions, or a -universal narrowed down into a particular thing. Thus, as it has been -seen, a general name implies or connotes a universal relation or -attribute, but confines it to denote a particular object or class. -'Swift,' for example, was an epithet tied down to express the horse. In -the first instance we may suppose the name to be a sort of metaphor: -differing only by its simplicity and frequency of suggestion from those -endless epithets, which in Norse or Arabic poetry veil and adorn the -object which they are meant to designate. That is, we conceive the -object as an embodiment or representation of the quality, as an eagle -is the emblem of strength: only in the latter case we distinguish -between the object and its metaphorical signification. In the second -place, however, the object of experience is allowed completely to -coincide with the aspect discriminated by the selective epithet, and we -can no longer in ordinary thought separate the imaging object from the -general relation which it images forth. This is the level of thought to -which Hegel appropriates the term 'representation.' It includes under -it the three fallacies of thought already noted and saves the trouble -of comprehending the reality. In the Hegelian sense, a representation -is abstract; because it solidifies, hardens, and isolates the term of -thought, makes it a particular, and never rises above the single case -to the general notion embodied in it.</p> - -<p>The world of representative thought is a world of independent points -in juxtaposition, which we arrange as seems best to us. It lies in -an undefinable borderland<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> between us and things. It is a would-be, -but not an actual, reality. It is not like a true Idea—the unity of -subjective and objective: but only a make-believe. We have put it -there, and yet we credit it with an effective existence. When our mind -moves amongst these picture-thoughts, it can only institute external -relations between the terms. A judgment, in that case, is interpreted -to mean the conjunction of two terms, which at once step into the rank -of subject and predicate by means of the copula. A sentence is an -arrangement of words <i>ab extra</i> in conscious or unconscious conformity -with the rules of grammar. The world of knowledge, or the Idea, as -a whole is turned into a plane surface with its typical terms,—the -members of the organism of reason,—like dots put in co-ordination and -juxtaposition, not spontaneously affected towards each other. Even if -they are not embodied and reduced to a sensuous level of existence, -they are held to be originally separate and unconnected. How they -all came into being, and whether they do not all by gradations and -differentiation-proceed from one root, are questions neither asked nor -answered.</p> - -<p>The level of representative thinking—thinking i. e. which is not -the grasp (<i>Begriff</i>) of the reality, but only the apprehension of -something which stands for and represents it—is the level on which we -all come, more or less, to stand in our non-philosophic moments. It -is, in essentials, the realm of what Plato called <i>δόξα</i>,—the level -of consciousness which fails to rise to see the unity of essence in -the many single goods and beauties, which holds its knowledge (such -at is) at the mercy of accidents, not bound by the conclusions of -reasoning,—the realm which is not without reality, but an immature -and uncertain reality. It is, in essentials, the same as what, as -opposed to <i>intellectus</i>, Spinoza styled <i>imaginatio.</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> Imagination, -to Spinoza, is an understanding under the bondage of particular -passions and temporary interests, which loses sight of the great -bond of being or <i>Substantia</i>, and fixes its glance on the parts in -subordinate and infra-essential relationships: which is always finite, -i. e. never really comprehensive and self-sustaining in its view, but -always limited by a tacit reference to something outside itself. The -'Representation' is the idea, in the loose and inexact use of that -word, which goes with the phrase <i>mere idea</i>,—i. e. a mere mental -image, which is not the reality, though it is believed to do duty for -and to represent it<a name="FNanchor_2_165" id="FNanchor_2_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_165" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>. Yet it is not a mere thought: rather its whole -aim and meaning is to refer to reality, to suggest it, to bring it -nearer us. Its fault is that it is an imperfect, partial, one-sided, -or even one-pointed idea. It is really an instance and phase of -the <i>ignava ratio</i>, to which a date or name serves as a ποῦ στῶ of -explanation.</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -'At Kilne there was no weathercock,<br /> -And that's the reason why.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>Such 'representation,' according to Hegel, is, e. g., the mode of -intelligence accessible to those who cling to the mere, or abstractly, -religious mood, and who cannot or will not rise to the comprehension -of their creed. Its facts or dogmas present themselves to such a -restricted conception as the parts of a picture or the stages of a -history, in visible or imaginatively-construable space, and in a -succession of times. The essence of religion, of course, for Hegel as -for other exponents of its inmost nature, is a feeling of certitude -or faith which transcends the gulfs and separations of the secular -consciousness, which sees with the believing soul the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> inner peace, -the absolute harmony of the true reality. <i>Pectus facit theologum.</i> -The sense of utter dependence on God, in complete identity with the -sense of absolute independence in God—that strength of faith is the -very life of religion. But when religion seeks to give an intelligent -expression of her faith, when she tries to give a reason acceptable to -the outside world, she is apt, unless specially trained in the high -things of the spirit, to base her creed not on the rock of ages, but -on the signs and miracles of the times. She has tried to theorise the -faith: but, although her faith may be sound and true, the religious -spirit, unless it be also the spirit of wisdom and reasoned truth, runs -a risk of falling into the fallacy of <i>Post hoc</i>, <i>ergo propter hoc.</i> -She descends therefore to the region of representation: she uses the -language of sense and analogy; she presents the spiritual under the -guise of the natural. Yet in her heart of hearts these things are only -a parable,—they are but</p> - -<p style="margin-left: 10%;"> -<span style="margin-left: 8em;">'Flesh and blood</span><br /> -To which she links a truth divine.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>Hegel—in the introduction to his lectures on the Philosophy of -Religion—is reported to have given the following characteristics of -'representation,' (<i>a</i>) It is still trammeled by the senses. Thought -and sensation strive for the mastery in it. Thought is bound fast to -an illustration: and of this illustration it cannot as representative -thought divest itself:—the eternally living idea is chained to the -transient and perishable form of sense. It is metaphorical and material -thinking, which is helpless without the metaphor and the matter. (<i>b</i>) -Representative thought envisages what is timeless and infinite under -the conditions of time and space. It loses sight of the moral and -spirit of historical development under the semblance of the names, -incidents, and forms in which it is displayed. The historical and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> -philosophical sense is lost under the antiquarian. Representative -thought keeps the shell, and throws away the kernel. (<i>c</i>) The terms -by which such a materialised thought describes its objects are not -internally connected: each is independent of the other; and we -only bring them together for the occasion by an act of subjective -arrangement<a name="FNanchor_3_166" id="FNanchor_3_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_166" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>.</p> - -<p>The thing—the so-called <i>subject</i> of the properties, of which it is -really no more than the <i>substratum</i>—affords no sufficient ground -for the unity of the properties attached to it. The substratum or -subject of the proposition is given, and we then look around to see -what other properties accompany the primary characteristic for which -the name was applied. But the term of popular language is not a real -unity capable of supporting differences; it is only one aspect of a -thing, a single point fixed and isolated in the process of language -by the action of natural selection. And so, to ask how the properties -are related to the thing, is to ask how one aspect, taken out of its -setting, is related to another isolated aspect: which is evidently an -unanswerable question. Science is right in rejecting the 'thing' of -popular conception. If <i>a</i> is <i>a,</i> and nothing more, as the law of -Identity informs us, then it is for ever impossible to get on to <i>b, -c, d</i>, and the rest. The union between the thing divided or defined, -and its divided or defining members, is what is termed extra-logical; -in other words, it is not evident from what is given or stated in the -popular conception. That union must be sought elsewhere, and deeper.</p> - -<p>And when <i>we</i> step in to overcome the repugnance which the point of -conception, or what is supposed the subject, shows against admitting -a diversity of predicates,—when <i>we</i> force it into union with these -properties: or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span> when we try to remove the separation which leaves -the cause and effect as two independent things to fall apart; our -action, by which we effect a unification of differences, may, from -another and a universal point of view, be said to be the notion, or -grasp of thought, coming to the consciousness of itself. Thought, -as it were, recognises itself and its image in those objects of -representative conception, which seem to be given and imposed upon -the intellect. The two worlds, which the understanding accepts -as each solid and independent,—the world of external objects or -conceptions, and the world of self,—meet and coincide in the free -agency of thought, developing itself under a double aspect. It is -the 'original synthetical unity of apperception' (to quote Kant's -words), from which the Ego or thinking subject, and the 'manifold' -or body and world, are simultaneously differentiated. Thus, on the -one hand, we ourselves no longer remain a rigid unity, existing in -antithesis to the objects presupposed or referred to by representative -thought: and on the other hand the so-called thing loses its hardness -and fragmentary independence, as distinguished from our apprehension -of it. <i>Our</i> action, as we incline to call it, which mends the -inadequacies of terms, is from a philosophic point of view, the notion -itself coming to the front and claiming recognition. The process of -thought is then seen to be a totality, of which our faculties, on -the one hand, and the existing thing, on the other, are isolated -abstractions, supposed habitually to exist on their own account. -To view either of these systems, the mental, on the one hand, and -the objective world, on the other, as self-subsistent, has been the -error in much of our metaphysics, and in the popular conceptions of -what constitutes reality. The idealism of metaphysicians has been -often as narrow and insufficient as the realism of common sense. An<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span> -adequate philosophy, on the contrary, recognises the presence of both -elements, in a subordinate and formative position. Representations -may be compared to the little pools left here and there by the sea -amongst the rocks and sand: the notion, or grasp of thought, is the -tidal wave, which left them there to stagnate, but comes back again to -restore their continuity with the great sea. In our thinking we are -only the ministers and interpreters of the Idea,—of the organic and -self-developing system of thought.</p> - -<p>The difference between a representative conception and a thought proper -may be illustrated by the case of the term 'Money.' Money may be -either a materialised thought, i. e. a Representative Conception, or -a Notion Proper. In the former case, money is identified with a piece -of money. It is probably, in the first instance, embodied in coins of -gold, silver, and bronze. In the second place, a wide gulf is placed -between it and the other articles for which it is given in exchange. -If other things are regarded as money, they are generally treated on -the assumption that they can in case of need be reduced to coinage. The -conception of money by the unscientific vulgar considers it separately -from other commodities: and the laws which forbade its exportation -gave a vigorous expression to the belief that it was something <i>sui -generis</i>, and subject to conditions of its own. The scientific notion -of money modifies this belief in the peculiarity and fixity of money. -Science does so historically, when it can point to a time and a race -where money in our sense of the word does not exist, and where barter -takes the place of buying and selling. Science does so philosophically, -when it expounds what may be called the <i>process</i> of money,—the -inter-action or meeting of conditions to which the existence of money -is due. The notion of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> money, as given in the <i>Ethics</i> of Aristotle, -says that it is the common measure of utility or demand. When we leave -out of sight the specific quality of an object, and consider only its -capacity of satisfying human wants, we have what is called its worth -or value. This value of the thing,—the psychological fact which is -left, when all the qualities marking the objective thing are reduced -to their social efficiency—is the notion, of which the currency is -the representation, reducing thought to the level of the senses, and -embodying the 'ideality' of value in a tangible and visible object. -So long as this 'idea' of value is kept in view, the currency is -comprehended: but when the perception of the notion disappears, money -is left a mere piece of currency, the general notion being narrowed -down to the coinage. Thus the notion of money, like other notions in -their ideal truth, is not in us, nor in the things merely: it is what -from a minor point of view, when we and the things are regarded under -the head of want or need, may be called the <i>truth</i> of both, the unity -of the two sides. Thus considered, money falls into its proper place in -the order of things.</p> -<hr class="r5" /> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_164" id="Footnote_1_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_164"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Werke,</i> ii. 529, 555.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_165" id="Footnote_2_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_165"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Werke</i>, ii. 431: '<i>Wobei das Selbst nur -repräsentirt</i> und vorgestellt ist, da ist es nicht wirklich: we es -vertreten ist, ist es nicht.' Cf. <i>ib.</i> 416.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_166" id="Footnote_3_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_166"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Philosophie der Religion,</i> i. p. 137 seqq.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXIV.</h5> - - -<h4>FROM SUBSTANCE TO SUBJECT.</h4> - - -<p>'It is, in my view, all important,' says Hegel<a name="FNanchor_1_167" id="FNanchor_1_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_167" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>, 'to apprehend and -express the True not as <i>Substance,</i> but equally much as <i>Subject</i>.' -Substance, as Spinoza defines it, is that which is in itself and -which is conceived through itself, something which does not need the -conception of something else by which its concept may be formed<a name="FNanchor_2_168" id="FNanchor_2_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_168" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>. -Substance, in other words, is something which serves to explain -itself, which is <i>causa sui.</i> The mind, looking out on the wide world -of mutable and manifold objects, finds its rest in the great calm of -a something at their base, the eternal nature which, itself unmoved, -is the one foundation, complete and sufficient, of all things,—a -<i>res aeterna et infinita,</i> which can feed the mind with joy alone<a name="FNanchor_3_169" id="FNanchor_3_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_169" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>. -These words suggest only an object—a transcendent object—the basis -of an objective order. They seem to leave little for the contemplating -subject to do save to discern it and, so discerning, to rest in it -and to love. They seem to leave substance a mere datum, a far-off -all-embracing end in which the variety of human effort can find a -central object and a final close. Yet, in the end it appears<a name="FNanchor_4_170" id="FNanchor_4_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_170" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> that -this <i>Res aeterna</i> loves himself with an intellectual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span> love, and -this love is identified with the love of man to God, so far at least -as man's mind, considered <i>sub specie aeternitatis</i>, can be said to -'explicate' Deity. From this conclusion it might be said that Spinoza -rises above the mere category of substance: God is no longer the mere -foundation of things—the absolute object of all objects. He rises in -human spirit (regarded in its eternal significance) to the rank of -a true subject. He is not merely known as the True; but He himself, -living and moving in the essential spirit of man, knows himself and -acquiesces in his infinite beatitude. But if this be the legitimate -inference to be drawn from the closing sections of the <i>Ethics</i>, it is -not the view ordinarily suggested by the mention of Spinoza's doctrine. -That doctrine, on the contrary, seems, as it first confronts us, and -as it has taken its place in history, to omit the subjectivity which -had found so decided a recognition in the commencement of Cartesianism. -In the <i>cogito ergo sum</i> so much at least is clearly stated: true -being—the true—is not merely known, but itself knows; not a mere -object, but a subject: a subject-object, or, an Idea. It is to be -admitted, indeed, that Descartes hardly remains at this altitude, but -he touches it for a moment. Even when he finds in the conception of God -a security for truth and reality, and thus seems to base these on a -one-sidedly objective standard, he regards God as, on the other hand, -the truth and reality postulated and presupposed by the structural -system of our ideas. God—such seems the tendency of his so-called -'proof'—is the inevitable prius and presupposition of our thought and -being: He makes us know, as much as He is ultimately the object known: -He is the unity and the creator of subject and object.</p> - -<p>But it is hardly possible to get in philosophy the full recognition of -the antithesis between subject and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> substance and the inclusion of both -in the fuller Idea, till after the time of Kant. Kant himself is, in -essentials, the antithesis of Spinoza, but it is not till Fichte that -the full force of that antithesis is expressly recognised. With Hegel, -the two opposite points of view are equally insisted on: the immanence -and the transcendence of the True, the Real, the Absolute: or, in -other words, the unity in it of subject and object, or of thought and -existence. Or, in the words of the religious spirit, though heaven and -the heaven of heavens cannot contain Him, He dwells in the spirit of -the righteous, and is not far from any one of us. The truth is not the -correspondence or agreement of an idea with a further reality which it -represents. Such an idea or 'representation' is a projection which has -escaped from our hands, which has slipped from our grip, and which, -while owning its mere vicarious character, at the same time beckons -us on to seek a reality we can never find. The 'representation' is in -a way objective—it is set over against us: but yet it is not truly -objective, not self-subsistent and self-possessed. Its objectivity is -the objectivity of a name: a quasi-objectivity, which requires to be -dipped in the living waters of intelligence before it can really exist -and act. It seems, to the untrained observer, to point only outwards to -the real object which it copies or designates: to a deeper reflection, -it is seen to point equally inward to the mind which informed it and -projected it. Thus the knowing subject, and the known object, with the -representation which acts as a perpetual mediator to connect and yet -not unify the one of these terms with the other,—all at last take -their place, reduced and transfigured, in the unity of the Idea.</p> - -<p>According to the Spinozist point of view, thought, it might seem by -a sort of miracle, dispels the mists that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span> envelop and bewilder it, -sees through the multeity of modes, and the isolated pictures of -imagination, to the true reality, one, infinite and eternal. Before -that august vision of absolute wholeness the only attitude of a finite -mind would seem to be resignation, worship, reverence,—deeply shading -into the submission of absorption. For in it intellect and will are -declared to have no place<a name="FNanchor_5_171" id="FNanchor_5_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_171" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. With such a statement, we get that first -aspect of religion which has found its most imposing representative -in the faith of Islam. In every religion there must, however, be more -than this: or it would fail to do what all religion essentially does. -Sheer dependence<i>—Schlechthinnige Abhängigkeit</i> (as Schleiermacher -has named it)—can never be the whole burden of a religious teacher's -message. Always—at least in the background—there is a contradictory -element—in apparent discrepancy with the first—the deification of the -worshipper. And as the Ethics of Spinoza—like every complete system -of speculative truth—deals with a problem parallel to, if not even -identical with, that of religion, its initial definitions and main -programme must never let us forget the tacit presuppositions worked out -to explicitness, as they are partly, in its conclusion. When Intellect -and Will are denied to the <i>Deus = Natura = Substantia,</i> it is meant -that the Absolute is and has more than intellect and will can well -name, and that in Him (or Her, or It, for the pronominal distinctions -of gender matter nothing here), the separation of will from intellect -is a fallacy which can have no place. What Spinoza casts out are the -lower passions, the affections of weakness; these <i>as such,</i> i. e. as -elements of weakness, can have no place in Him. But in God, as in the -free man who most resembles God, and in whose love He loves himself,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> -there is—but that also in terms we cannot fathom—abundance of -joy—the joy of infinite self-realisation.</p> - -<p>Partly by the complementary theory of Leibniz, partly by the antagonist -theories of Kant, the way had been prepared for setting forth, and -in fuller outline, the implications so tardily admitted by Spinoza. -It was only by a misuse or mal-extension of a word that Herder's -God—a God who is Force—and the Force of Forces—could be supposed -an advance upon Spinoza. There is in Force an analogue of Life; but -it is life in dependence, life not self-centred, always going forth, -and when it goes forth dissipated. It is as it were pushed from -behind, and is lost in what comes after it. If a Force of Forces means -anything, it means something more than Force: it means a master of -force, a force-controller and force-adjuster, a unity and principle -of forces. And Substance, as Spinoza understood it, is more than -this variability, this deification of instability. It is the unity -in which the variety and disparity of existence, the multiplicity of -vicissitude, is merged and lost, only again to issue from it, and yet -not leave it behind, in the infinitely-various modes of its two great -and conspicuous attributes of consciousness and extensionality. If -Hegel then sought to go beyond Spinoza, he sought to find a formula -which would lose nothing that Spinoza had reached, but would at the -same time bring out what Spinoza had left an implication, or noted in -a partial rectification. As in religion, besides the utter dependence -on God (so that, God failing, I perish), there must be also an absolute -union, complete reconciliation—complete as culminating in unity and -identity (so that God shall not be God, unless I am I): so it is in -philosophy. The Absolute cannot merely <i>be</i>, and be far away—the last -goal in which the variety of life is made one, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> the turmoil of the -passionate existences laid to rest. The Soul which is (as some of the -medieval Christians would say) still <i>in itinere</i>, a wayfarer, is such -because its glance is turned on outward circumstances: but country is -no accident: the soul even here carries with it that <i>patria</i>, 'which -is the heavenly,' in its longings, and has it, even while yet on -pilgrimage, in that strong possession of all things by itself, which -the theologian styles Faith. This goal determines the pilgrimage, fixes -its direction, gives progress to its steps.</p> - -<p>In the myth-loving language of Plato (and of Wordsworth in his Platonic -ode) the Soul has in other spheres of being dwelt with the gods and -seen the secret of the world: it is itself one of the immortals, and -as it is here and now, is in a land of exile. At the morning of birth, -the living sample of humanity has left his original glory behind; and -a deep forgetfulness—only short of absolute—cuts it off from his -every-day consciousness. In his present reality he finds himself in a -land of darkness, fast bound in a hollow of the rock, looking out only -on the ghostly images that flit across his prison wall, cast there by -the objects that move between his back and the light of a mysterious -fire behind him and them. Such is his natural estate, as it meets the -bodily eye: the estate of the lowly savage, whom superstition and -ignorance seem to hold as their captive for ever. But, though his -high home and his glory of other days have left no conscious memory -in the soul, asleep and imbruted in its fleshly house, they have not -departed without leaving a trace behind. For forgetfulness is not -blank non-existence. The sample of humanity inherits the birthright -of his fathers—he has hopes and fears, duties and rights, which are -his, if he can mature himself to take possession of them. He<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> suffers -from the pains of growth, from the sense of disparity between what -he is and what he may and should be—from the noble uneasiness and -dissatisfaction of a being who feels—if he does not know—his infinite -potentialities. For these potentialities—otherwise they have no title -even to that name—are also actualities, yet actualities which protest -their own incompleteness, and crave imperiously for what they lack. -What he has is his right, but his right only in so far as it is also -his duty. It is as such, and only as such, that he still retains the -soul in all its prerogatives: as the right, which is the duty, of -knowledge. Such a pre-figured and promised, but yet to be realised, -possession is what Plato has called <i>Eros</i>, or Love. But it is a Love -whose wings are at first invisible, and who often seems rather to crawl -among ignoble things than to soar in the free fresh air.</p> - -<p>The process of experience has been by Plato called Anamnesis or -Recollection. But Recollection is not always an easy, and never a -merely passive, process; and sometimes the forgetfulness seems so deep -that no extraneous stimulus can at all move it. We have seen already -one of these stimuli which rouse the sleeping sense—the mystery of -numbers: and there are many others. But, we have also learned, that -in the psychical sphere items of memory are not, as reckless fancy -puts it, stored up in compartments, sorted and arranged, ready to be -pulled out. The process of recollection is a complicated affair: an -affair of give and take, of comparison and selection and rejection, -of construction and reconstruction. You cannot haul up ready-made -memories from the mine. And this perhaps was sometimes forgotten by -Plato; it certainly has been by more than one of his commentators. -You may, no doubt, call up ideas from the vasty deep: but they come -by laws<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> and principles of their own. Even when they come, which they -sometimes do unexpectedly, they come as an echo of the calling mind. -Recollection involves intellectual process: as Kant said, the synthesis -of imagination reposes upon the synthesis in the concept. Yet—and this -is the point which Plato's title of <i>Anamnesis</i> accentuates—unless -'the soul had been such as to be affected in this way' (the words are -those of Aristotle), unless the soul had been implicitly intellectual -in tone and faculty, it would not have grasped the presented universe -under the categories which it uses. There is, says Aristotle, in the -barest act of sensation a congenital power of judgment; there is, says -Plato, an eye of the soul—a natural virtue of intelligence, which can -never be put into it, and must always be presupposed in any theory of -its processes.</p> - -<p>There are, therefore, no innate ideas, says Cudworth in explanation of -Plato, if these ideas mean formed and completed products of knowledge. -All ideas in this sense begin and grow within the range of experience, -and the history of their growth or development in literature and art -can be at least approximately traced. We can trace, that is, the -successions and connexions of the various types of beauty, or goodness: -can show how the idea at one time dwelt in one of its aspects, at -another in a different one. We can observe the variation, and it may -be the progress, in men's conception of God. But it is another matter -when we seek to explain these ideas themselves out of other elements, -heterogeneous to them. When that question is asked, then with Plato we -seem, in the absence of any theory of origins, obliged to own that it -is by the Beautiful that beautiful things come to be beautiful. The -μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένοs—the crossing of essential boundaries—which -Aristotle forbids to science, still<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> raises its eternal barrier in -the logical, if it cease to hold good (as has been suggested) in the -physical sphere. In the totality which we call the world and experience -of reality there are, so to say, ultimate and irreducible provinces. -The utmost that philosophy, i. e. science, can do with these is to -co-ordinate them,—to show their mutual filiations, adaptations, and -harmonies,—to note their inadequacies and discrepancies. They are -not all of equal rank, perhaps; they have to yield to each other, it -may be in turn: but none of them can be arbitrarily expunged from -the totality, and none of them shown to be a mere phase of others. -To do that is to strip the universe of its variety and—it may be -added—of its beauty and its interest. If it be a false philosophy -that does it, there is a good deal of false philosophy abroad. There -is a lust of explanation which is never content till it has found an -equation for everything, till it has expressed everything in terms of -the common-place, till it has emptied everything of all that made it -individual and real, and turned it into an abstract, identical (as -only abstracts can be) with some other abstract. Such abstractions -are of course useful, and therefore need no excuse, when restricted -to a special sphere. So long, that is, as we remember that it is an -abstraction we are making, and that we are arbitrarily simplifying -the real natural problem, no harm is done by these artificial -constructions; and they are important steps in a larger process. But -what is correct and useful within a range whose limits we can define, -becomes dangerous when carried beyond all bounds. Its approximate truth -then becomes misleading error.</p> - -<p>It is these irreducible elements—these great provinces in human -experience, in reality, in the system of reason—that correspond to -the more important of what<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> are known as Platonic ideas. As ultimate -constituents of the actual world they are in the narrower sense -inexplicable. One does not amount to an exact sum of some others, nor -is one got from another by the simple process of subtraction. But -if they cannot be explained, by being reduced to multiples of some -one basis, they can be comprehended in the respective implication -and explication they exhibit with their co-realities. They can be -correlated, reduced, and unified: we may even say, they can be -identified; but if we use such a term, we must mean that there is -some totality beyond and above them in which they all find a place -and all are harmonious; in which all when brought to their Truth are -really one and the same. This birthright of human nature in all ages -and countries—this central essence of man's spirit—is the realm of -Platonic ideas. They are the great elements, or constituent members, of -humanity and of reality: the framework of his mind and of the world. -How in each case they may be wrought out in detail, to what degree -they may here be evolved, and there stunted, is a matter of historical -research. And, in a sense, even it is not wrong to try to trace them -one to another: to explain them, as the phrase is, one by another. For -they are essentially connected: they are members of one system: they -are unified and harmonised in a way for which even the word 'organism' -is wholly insufficient. They are the poles and lines on which the tent -of human life, of intelligent life, is stretched: but they are also the -invisible ties which bind together the earth and heavens, and all that -is therein.</p> - -<p>These ideas therefore are immanent in man: for they are the basis -of human nature. But to name, to disentangle them, to measure out -their bounds and describe their connexions—that is no easy work. -And that is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> the work of Platonic recollection. That is the process -of historical experience. But it is a small thing for Plato to say -that these ideas are innate in man. What he is more concerned to make -clear is that in the possession or vision of these eternal forms, the -human soul is a partner of the gods, a citizen of the heavens. In -less mythical language, man, as an intelligent, artistic, moral, and -religious being, is not a mere accidental on-looker on the surface of -things, but near their central and abiding truth. The forms of his -mind, to speak after the manner of Kant, are the objective essences of -the real world of experience. Degrees there may be in the reality which -they possess—less or larger measures of truth to full experience—but -true and real they are: never mere falsity or emptiness. To estimate -the amounts of that reality is a problem Plato often tried. At one time -it seems as if the Good were in his estimate the form of forms, the -real of reals: but when we look closely, we see that it is a goodness -which is synonymous with real reality or perfect being. At another time -truth, i. e. reality, seems to be lord of all: at another, beauty: -and again he seems to confess his inability to lay down the order -of precedence in this hierarchy. Of one thing only he is perfectly -clear: and that is the unreality, the non-entity of the sense-world -as merely perceived, and the true being of the world of reason. But -he has no doubts as to the central truth that in the good, the true, -and the beautiful, there is a higher reality—a more far-reaching and -deep-piercing influence than in all the mere variety of sensation, the -mere multitude of sensible fact.</p> - -<p>What Plato has sometimes called the act of reminiscence, what he has -sometimes called the instinct of Love, is also known to him as the -process of Dialectic. For reminiscence has to watch and wrestle with -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> inertia of oblivion, has to set the imagined beside the real, and -to correct percepts by concepts, concepts by percepts, has to brace -up its energies, and to advance not by mere pressing onward, but by -tacking and zigzagging through contrary difficulties finally realise -itself. And love too is a battle, where the craving for union has to -measure its force with the instinct of independence, where selfishness -and self-surrender seek a reconciliation, and where in the close, if -the close be love, each is self-retained only as self-abandoned, and -each rises to a higher union in which lower selfhoods are absorbed. -Even so in the course of Dialectic. It is the art which divides -and conjoins, which unifies and distinguishes: the art of asking -and answering. To Plato it appears in the main as an action of the -intelligent subject: but an action which, as he hints, is almost a -natural instinct, which through discipline has become an art. In the -hands of its typical artist, it proceeds, or seems to proceed, as if -unconscious of its principle and end. Socrates has, as he professes, -no overt conception of the result: he has no knowledge of the positive -conclusion to be reached. It is the Logos—the logic of reality—which -sustains the movement. Abandoning any subjective humour of carrying -the argument to a preconceived end, one is swept on by the current of -real logic—the reason in things. The dogma we have set up and seemed -to see before us, will, if we are dispassionate, carry us on beyond -itself, and suggest aspects calling for recognition and acceptance. If -only we refrain from arresting the movement of criticism,—a course -to which prudence, ease, custom, and every form of the <i>ignava ratio</i> -counsel us,—truth will reveal itself in us, and by us. It is because -other aims, personal and particular, are so ever-present with us, that -speculative free inquiry seems so hard. It is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> we who insist on closing -up the door, not the truth that is reluctant to show itself.</p> - -<p>Truth, then, is self-revelation or development. Not a result which is -to be accepted, bowed to, and reverenced: but the result issuing (and -only valuable as issuing) from a process in which we and objectivity -are fellow-workers. The truth may no doubt be presented—as Spinoza -does present it—in definitions, stating the net result as fundamental -fact. Fundamental fact it is; but as so stated, as Substance, it comes -as a stranger, almost as an enemy: the great vision, suddenly offered -to untrained eyes, overwhelms and alarms the living sense of self, of -personality. Hegel wishes to show it as a friend, as our very own,—as -Subject (but not merely subject). It is for this that philosophy runs -through its cycle and returns into itself. Man points to nature and -nature to man: universal to individual: thought to things: the self to -God, and God to the human soul.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_167" id="Footnote_1_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_167"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Hegel, <i>Werke</i>, ii. 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_168" id="Footnote_2_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_168"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Spinoza, <i>Eth.</i> Def. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_169" id="Footnote_3_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_169"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Spin. <i>De inteil. Em.</i> i. 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_170" id="Footnote_4_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_170"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Spin. <i>Eth.</i> v. 35.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_171" id="Footnote_5_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_171"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Eth.</i> i. 17 schol.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXV.</h5> - - -<h4>REASON AND THE DIALECTIC OF UNDERSTANDING.</h4> - - -<p>Representative conceptions, besides being the burden of our ordinary -materialising consciousness, are also the data of science, accepted -and developed in their consequences. Because they are so accepted, -as given into our hand, scientific reasoning can only institute -relations between them. Its business as thus conceived is progressive -unification, comparing objects with one another, demonstrating the -similarities which exist between them, and combining them with each -other. The exercise of thought which deals with such objects is limited -by their existence: it is only formal. It is finite thought, because -it is only subjective: it begins at a given point and stops somewhere, -and never gets quite round its materials so as to call them truly its -own. Each of the objects on which it is turned seems to be outside -of it, and independent of it. Each point of fact, again, when it is -carried out to its utmost, meets with other thoughts which limit it, -and claim to be equally self-centred. Such knowledge creeps on from -point to point. To this thinking German philosophy from the time of -Kant and Jacobi applied a name, which since the days of Coleridge has -been translated by 'Understanding'<a name="FNanchor_1_172" id="FNanchor_1_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_172" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>. This degree or mode of thinking<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> -—not a faculty of thought—is the systematised and thorough exercise -of what in England is called 'Common Sense.' In the first place, it is -synonymous with practical intelligence. It takes what it calls facts, -or things, as given, and aims only at arranging and combining them and -drawing from them counsels of prudence or rules of art. Seeing things -on a superficies, as it were so many unconnected points, here itself -and there the various things of the world, it tries to bring them into -connexion. It accepts existing distinctions, and seeks to render them -more precise by pointing out and sifting the elements of sameness. -Its greatest merit is an abhorrence of vagueness, inconsistency, and -what it stigmatises as mysticism: it wishes to be clear, distinct, and -practical. In its proper sphere,—and it has an indispensable function -to perform even in philosophy: wherever, that is, it is unnecessary -to go into the essential truth of things, and one has only to do good -work in a clearly defined sphere,—the understanding has an independent -value of its own<a name="FNanchor_2_173" id="FNanchor_2_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_173" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> Nor is this true merely of practical life, where -a man must accommodate himself to facts: it is equally applicable -in the higher theoretic life,—in art, religion, and philosophy. If -intelligent definiteness does not make itself apparent in these, there -is something wrong about them.</p> - -<p>It is only when this exercise of thought is regarded as a <i>ne plus -ultra,</i> and its mandates to restrict investigation by the limits of -foregone conclusions find obedience, that understanding deserves -the reproachful language which was lavished upon it by the German -philosophers at the close of the last century. The understanding is -abstract: this sums up its offences in one word. Its objects, that -is the things it deals with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> and believes utterly real, are only -partly so, and when that incompleteness is unrecognised, are only -abstractions. Both in its contracted forms, such as faith and common -sense, and in its systematic form, the logical or narrowly-consistent -intellect, it is partial and liable to be tenacious of half-truths. -Only that whereas in feeling and common-sense there is often a great -deal which they cannot express,—whereas the heart is often more -liberal than its interpreting mind will allow—the reverse is true of -the logically-consistent intellect. The narrowness of the latter is, -in its own opinion, exactly equal to the truth of things: and whatever -it expresses is asserted without qualification to be the absolute -fact. Its business is, given the initial point (which is assumed to be -certain and perspicuous), to see all which that point will necessarily -involve or lead to. For example, Order may be supposed to be the chief -end of the State. Let us consider, says the intelligent arguer (without -wasting time on abstruse inquiries as to what Order is or means, and -what sort of Order we want), to what consequences and institutions -this conception will lead us. Or, again, the chief end of the State -is assumed to be Liberty. To what special forms of organisation will -this hypothesis (also assumed a self-evident conception) lead? Or we -may go a step further. It is evident, some will say, that in a State -there must be a certain admixture of Order and Liberty. How are we to -proceed—what laws and ordinances will be necessary, to secure the -proper equilibrium of these two principles? The two must be blended, -and each have its legitimate influence.</p> - -<p>These are examples of the operation of Understanding. It can only reach -a synthesis (or conjunction), never a real unity, because it believes -in the omnipotence of the abstractions with which it began: but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> must -either carry out one partial principle to its consequences, or allow -an alternate and combined force to two opposite principles. Its canon -is identity: given something, let us see what follows when we keep the -same point always in view, and compare other points with the one which -we are supposed to know. Its method is analytic: given a conception -in which popular thought supposes itself at home, and let us see all -the elements of truth which can be deduced from it. Its statements are -abstract and narrow: or, in the words of Anaxagoras, one thing is cut -off from another with a hatchet<a name="FNanchor_3_174" id="FNanchor_3_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_174" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>. In its excess it degenerates into -dogmatism, whether that dogmatism be theological or naturalistic.</p> - -<p>The fact is that the Understanding, as this analytic, abstract, and -finite action of mind is called,—the thought which holds objective -ideas distinct from one another, and from the subjective faculties of -thought as a whole,—that this Understanding is, when it claims to be -heard and obeyed in science, not sufficiently thorough-going. It begins -at a point which is not so isolated as it seems, but is a member of a -body of thought: nor is it aware that the whole of this body of thought -is in organic, and even more than organic, union. It errs in taking too -much for granted: and in not seeing how this given point is the result -of a process,—that in it, in any thought or idea, several tendencies -or elements converge and are held in union, but with the possibility -of working their way into a new independence. In other words, the -Understanding requires, as the organon and method of philosophy, to -be replaced by the Reason<a name="FNanchor_4_175" id="FNanchor_4_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_175" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>,—by infinite thought,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> concrete, at -once analytic and synthetic. How then, it may be asked, can we make -the passage from the inadequate to the adequate? To that question the -answer may be given that it is our act of arbitrary arrest which halts -at the inadequate: that in complete Reason, which is the constituent -nature both of us and of things, the Understanding is only a grade -which points beyond itself, and therefore presupposes and struggles up -to the adequate thought. In other words, it is Reason which creates or -lays down for behoof of its own organisation the aims, conditions, and -fixed entities,—the objects, by which it is bound and limited in its -analytic exercise as understanding. Reason, therefore, is the implicit -tendency to correct its own inadequacy: and we have only to check -self-will and prejudice so far that the process may be accomplished.</p> - -<p>The movement is not at one step: it has a middle term or mean which -often seems as if it were a step backward. Progress in knowledge is -usually described as produced by the mode of demonstration or the -mode of experience. Formal Logic prefers the first mode of describing -it: Applied Logic prefers the second. Either mode may serve, if we -properly comprehend what demonstration and experience mean. And that -will not be done unless we keep equally before us the affirmative and -the negative element in the process. The law of rational progress in -knowledge, of the dialectical movement of consciousness, or in one -word of experience, is not simple movement in a straight line, but -movement by negation and absorption of the premisses. The conclusion -or the new object of knowledge is a product into which the preceding -object is reduced or absorbed. Thus the movement from faith (which -is concentrated and wholly personal knowledge) to open and universal -knowledge, which is capable of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> becoming the possession of a -community,—truth and not merely conviction, must pass through doubt. -The premisses from which we start, and the original object with which -we begin, are not left <i>in statu quo</i>: they are destroyed in their -own shape, and become only materials to build up a new object and a -conclusion. It is on the stepping-stones of discarded ideas that we -rise to higher truth: and it is on the abrogation of the old objects -of knowledge that the new objects are founded. Not merely does a new -object come in to supplement the old, and correct its inadequacies by -the new presence: not merely do <i>we</i> add new ranges to <i>our</i> powers of -vision, retaining the old faculties and subjoining others. The whole -world—alike inward and outward,—the consciousness and its object—is -subjected to a thorough renovation: every feature is modified, and -the system re-created. The old perishes: but in perishing contributes -to constitute the new. Thus the new is at once the affirmation and -negation of the old. And such is the invariable nature of intelligent -progress, of which the old and not a few modern logicians failed to -render a right account, because they missed the negative element, and -did not see that the immediate premisses must be abolished in order to -secure a conclusion,—even as the grapes must be crushed before the -wine can be obtained.</p> - -<p>This is the real meaning of Experience, when it is called the teacher -of humanity: and it was for this reason that Bacon described it as -'far the best demonstration.'<a name="FNanchor_5_176" id="FNanchor_5_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_176" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Experience is that absolute process, -embracing both us and things, which displays the nullity of what is -immediately given, or baldly and nakedly accepted, and completes it -by the rough remedy of contradiction. The change comes over both<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span> -us and the things: neither the one side nor the other is left as it -was before. And it is here that the advantage of Experience over -demonstration consists. Demonstration tends to be looked upon as -subjective only (<i>constringit assensum, non res</i>): whereas Experience -is also objective. But Experience is more than merely objective: it -is the absolute process of thought pure and entire; and as such it -is described by Hegel as Dialectic, or Dialectical movement. This -Dialectic covers the ground of demonstration,—a fragment of it -especially described and emphasised in the Formal Logic,—and of -Experience,—under which name it is better known in actual life, and in -the philosophy of the sciences<a name="FNanchor_6_177" id="FNanchor_6_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_177" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>.</p> - -<p>Dialectic is the negative or destructive aspect of reason, as -preparatory to its affirmative or constructive aspect. It is the spirit -of dissent and criticism: the outgoing as opposed to the indwelling: -the restless as distinguished from the quiet: the reproductive as -opposed to the nutritive instinct: the centrifugal as opposed to the -centripetal force: the radical and progressive tendency as opposed -to the conservative. But no one of these examples sufficiently or -accurately describes it. For it is the utterance of an implicit -contradiction,—the recognition of an existing and felt, but hitherto -unrecognised and unformulated want. Dialectic does not supervene from -without upon the fixed ideas of understanding: it is the evidence of -the higher nature which lies behind them, of the dependence on a larger -unity which understanding implicitly or explicitly denies. That higher -nature, the notion or grasp of reasonable thought, comes forward, and -has at first, in opposition to the one-sided products of understanding, -the look of a destructive agent. If<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> we regard the understanding and -its object, as ultimate and final,—and they are so regarded in the -ordinary estimation of the world,—then this negative action of reason -seems utterly pernicious, and tends to end in the subversion of all -fixity whatever, of everything definite. In this light Dialectic -is what is commonly known as Scepticism; just as the understanding -in its excess is known as Dogmatism. But in the total grasp of the -rational or speculative notion, Dialectic ceases to be Scepticism, and -Understanding ceases to be Dogmatism.</p> - -<p>Still there can be no doubt that the Dialectic of reason is dangerous, -if taken abstractly and as if it were a whole truth. For the thoughts -of ordinary men tend to be more abstract than their materials warrant. -Men seek to formulate their feelings, faith, and conduct: but the -<i>rationale</i> of their inmost belief,—their creed,—is generally -narrower than it might be. Out of the undecomposed and massive -'substance,' on which their life and conduct is founded, they extract -one or two ingredients: they emphasise with undue stress one or two -features in their world, and attach to these partial formulae a value -which would be deserved only if they really represented the whole -facts. Hence when the narrow outlines of their creed are submitted -to dialectic,—when the inlying contradictions are exposed, men feel -as if the system of the world had sunk beneath them. But it is not -the massive structure of their world, the organic unity in which they -live, that is struck by dialectic: it is only those luminous points, -the representative terms of material thought, which float before their -consciousness, and which have been formulated in hard and fast outlines -by the understanding. These points, as so defined and exaggerated, are -what dialectic shakes. Not an alien force, but the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> inherent power of -thought, destroys the temporary constructions of the understanding. The -infinite comes to show the inadequacy of the finite which it has made.</p> - -<p>In philosophy this second stage is as essential as the first. -The one-sidedness of the first abstraction is corrected by the -one-sidedness of the other. In the Philosophy of Plato, as has been -noted, the dialectical energy of thought is sometimes spoken of -under the analogy of sexual passion—the Love which, in the words of -Sophocles, 'falls upon possessions' and makes all fixed ordinance of -no account, and finds no obstacles insuperable to its strong desire. -But Love, as the speaker explains, is a child of Wealth and Want: -he is never poor, and never rich: he is in a mean between ignorance -and knowledge<a name="FNanchor_7_178" id="FNanchor_7_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_178" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>. Thus is described the active unrest of growth, the -'<i>inquietude poussante</i>,' as Leibniz called it,—the quickening force -of the negative and of contradiction.</p> - -<p>At the word 'contradiction' there is heard a murmur of objection, -partly on technical, partly on material grounds. There are, it is said, -other ways of getting from one idea to another than by contradiction: -and it is not right to give the title to mere cases of contrast and -correlation. Now it may be the case that the relations of ideas are -many and various. In particular there is to many people a decided -pleasure in the mere accumulation of bits of knowledge. In their mental -stock there are only aggregates,—conjunctions due to accidents of -time and place,—associations and fusions which do not reach organised -unity. In all of us, perhaps, there are more or less miscellaneous -collections of beliefs, perceptions, hopes, and wishes, in no very -obvious connexion with one another. An united self, one, harmonious, -and complete, is probably rather<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span> an ideal of development than a fact -realised. There are in each two or three discordant selves,—among -which it might sometimes be difficult to select the right and true -one (for that will depend on the momentary point of view). The deeper -consciousness may go on entirely independent of the train of the more -superficial ideas: the world of reality may glide past without touching -the world of dream or of fiction: our business part may live in a -region parted off from our religion by gulfs inscrutable. In all these -cases there cannot be said to be any contradiction.</p> - -<p>But Hegel speaks of the essential progress of knowledge, and of that -true self or real mind which has attained complete harmony—the self -and mind that is implicitly or explicitly Absolute. In such a mind -where the finite has passed or is passing into the infinite, in a mind -that is really becoming one and total, its parts must meet and modify -each other. At each phase, if that phase is earnest, self-certain, and -real, it claims to be complete, and can brook no rival. The bringer -of new things must appear as an enemy: for the old system, however -imperfect as a mere form, has behind it the strength of an infinite -and perfect content: it is more than it has explicated: but as it -(from its imperfection and honesty) identifies itself with its form, -it is resolved to resist change. Progress then must be by antagonism: -it cannot be real progress otherwise, but only the mere shifting of -dilettante doubt and dilettante toleration. Both new and old are worth -something, and they must prove their value by neither being lost, but -both recognised, in a completer scheme of things.</p> - -<p>Yet there is a difference in the measure of contradiction at different -stages of thought. It is always greatest when there is least to be -opposed about. The more meagre an idea, a creed, a term of thought,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> -the more violent the antitheses to it. The more abstractly we hold a -doctrine, the more readily are we disposed to sniff opposition. And as -in more concrete belief, so in the more abstract terms of thought. They -seem so wide apart—like 'Is' and 'Is not'—and yet, taken alone, they -are really so ready to recoil into one another. As thought deepens, -contradiction takes a more modified form. The relativity of things -becomes apparent: and what were erewhile opposed as contradictory, -turn out as pairs of correlatives, neither of which is fully what it -professed to be, unless it also is all that seemed reserved for the -other. Lastly, and in the full truth of development, progress is seen -to be not merely a sudden recoil from one abstraction to another, -nor merely a continual reference to an underlying correlative, but -the movement of one totality which advances by self-opposition, -self-reconciliation, and self-reconstruction. In this stage, the -weight and bulk of unity keeps the contradiction in its place of due -subordination. But both elements are equally essential, and if the -unity is less palpable in the abstract beginnings, and the divergence -less wide at the close, at neither beginning nor close can either be -absent.</p> - -<p>But if we merely look at the differentiation or negation involved -in the action of reason, we miss the half of its meaning: and the -new statement is as one-sided as the old. We have not grasped the -full meaning until we see that what, as understanding, affirmed a -finite, denies, as dialectic, the absoluteness or adequacy of that -finite. Both the partial views have a right to exist, because each -gives its contribution to the science of truth.<a name="FNanchor_8_179" id="FNanchor_8_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_179" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> If we penetrate -behind the surface,—if we do not look at the two steps in the process -abstractly and in separation,—it will be seen that these<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> two elements -coincide and unite. But we must be careful here. This coincidence or -identification of opposites has not annihilated their opposition or -difference. That difference subsists, but in abeyance, reduced to an -element or 'moment' in the unity. Each of the two elements has been -modified by the union: and thus when each issues from the unity it -has a richer significance than it had before. This unity, in which -difference is lost and found, is the rational notion,—the speculative -grasp of thought. It is the product of experience,—the ampler -affirmative which is founded upon an inclusion of negatives.</p> - -<p>We began with the bare unit, or simple and unanalysed point, -which satisfied popular language and popular imagination as its -<i>nucleus</i>:—the representation which had caught and half-idealised a -point, moment, or aspect in the range of feeling and sensation. In this -stage the notion or thought proper is yet latent. In the first place, -the <i>nucleus</i> of imagination was analysed, defined, and, as we may -surmise, narrowed in the Intellect. And this grade of thought is known -as the Understanding. In the second place, the definite and precise -term, as understanding supposes it, was subjected to criticism: its -contradictions displayed; and the very opposite of the first definition -established in its place. This is the action of Dialectic. In the third -place, by means of this second stage, the real nature or truth was seen -to lie in a union where the opposites interpenetrate and mould each -other. Thus we have as a conscious unity,—conscious because it, as -unity, yet embraces a difference as difference—what we started with -as an unconscious unity, the truth of feeling, faith, and inspiration. -The first was an immediate unity:—that is to say, we were in the midst -of the unity, sunk in it, and making a part of it: the second is a -mediated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span> unity, which has been reached by a process of reflection, and -which as a conscious unity involves that process.</p> - -<p>Reason, then, is infinite, as opposed to understanding, which is finite -thinking. The limits which are found and accepted by the analytic -intellect, are limits which reason has imposed, and which it can -take away: the limits are in it, and not over it. The larger reason -has been laying down those limits, which our little minds at first -tend to suppose absolute. Let us put the same law in more concrete -terms. It is reason,—the Idea,—or, to give it an inadequate and -abstract name, Natural Selection—which has created the several forms -of the animal and vegetable world: it is reason, again, which in -the struggle for existence contradicts the very inadequacies which -it has brought into being: and it is reason, finally, which affirms -both these actions,—the hereditary descent, and the adaptation—in -the provisionally permanent and adequate forms which result from the -struggle.</p> - -<p>The three stages thus enumerated are therefore not merely stages -in our human reason as subjective. They state the law of rational -development in pure thought, in Nature, and in the world of Mind,—the -world of Art, Morals, and Science. They represent the law of thought -or reason in its most general or abstract terms. They state, mainly -in reference to the method or form of thought, that Triplicity, which -will be seen in those real formations or phases to which thought -moulds itself,—the typical species of reason. They reappear hundreds -of times, in different multiples, in the system of philosophy. The -abstract point of the Notion which parts asunder in the Judgment, and -returns to a unity including difference in the Syllogism:—the mere -generality of the Universal, which,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> by a disruption into Particulars -and detail, gives rise to the real and actual Individual:—the Identity -which has to be combined with Difference in order to furnish a possible -Ground for Existence:—the baldness and nakedness of an Immediate -belief, which comes to the full and direct certainty of itself, to -true immediacy, only by gathering up the full sense of the antithesis -which can separate conviction from truth, or by realising the Mediation -connecting them:—all these are illustrations of the same law really -applied which has been formally stated as the necessity for a defining, -a dialectical, and a speculative element in thought. The three parts -of Logic are an instance of the same thing: and when the Idea, or -organism of thought, appears developed in the series of Natural forms, -it is only to prepare the kingdom of reason actualised in the world of -Mind. The Understanding, on the field of the world, corresponds, says -Hegel<a name="FNanchor_9_180" id="FNanchor_9_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_180" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>, to the conception of Divine Goodness. The life of nature -goes on in the independence and self-possession of all its parts, each -as fixed and proud of its own, as if its share of earth were for ever -assured. The finite being then has his season of self-satisfied ease: -while the gods live in quiet, away from the sight of man's doings. -The dialectical stage, again, corresponds to the conception of God as -an omnipotent Lord: when the Power of the universe waxes terrific, -destroying the complacency of the creatures and making them feel their -insufficiency,—when the once beneficent appears jealous and cruel, and -the joyous equanimity of human life is oppressed by the terrors of the -inscrutable hand of fate. The easy-minded Greek lived for the most part -in the former world: the uneasy Hebrew to a great extent in the latter. -But the truth lay neither in the placid<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> wisdom of Zeus, leaving the -world to its own devices, nor in the jealous Jehovah of Mount Sinai: -the true speculative union is found in the mystical unity of Godhead -with human nature. In this comprehensive spirit did Hegel treat Logic.</p> - -<p>This Triplicity runs through Hegel's works. If you open one, the main -divisions are marked with the capitals A, B, C. One of these, it may -be, is broken up into chapters headed by the Roman numerals I, II, III. -Under one or more of these probably come severally the Arabic numerals -1, 2, 3. Any one of these again may be subdivided, and gives rise to -sections, headed by the small letters a, b, c. And, lastly, any one -of these may be treated to a distribution under the three titles α, -β, γ. Of course the division is not in each case carried equally far: -nor does the subject always permit it: nor is Hegel's knowledge alike -vigorous, or his interest in all directions the same.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_172" id="Footnote_1_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_172"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> 'Verstand,'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_173" id="Footnote_2_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_173"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> 'Die Vernunft ohne Verstand ist Nichts; der Verstand doch -Etwas ohne Vernunft.' Hegel's <i>Leben</i>, p. 546.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_174" id="Footnote_3_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_174"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Ὃτι οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐv τῷ ἑvi κόσμῳ ἀὐδὲ -ἀποκέκοπται πελέκεϊ. Simplic. Phys. fol. 38 a (ed. Diels, p. 176).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_175" id="Footnote_4_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_175"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> 'Vernunft.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_176" id="Footnote_5_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_176"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Novum Organum</i>, Book I. 70.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_177" id="Footnote_6_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_177"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Phenomenologie des Geistes</i>, p. 67.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_178" id="Footnote_7_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_178"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Plato, <i>Symposion,</i> 203.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_179" id="Footnote_8_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_179"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Cf. Dante, <i>Parad.</i> iv. 130.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_180" id="Footnote_9_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_180"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See in the <i>Logic</i> (vol. ii. p. 145).</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span></p></div> - - - - - -<h5>BOOK III</h5> - -<h4><i>LOGICAL OUTLINES</i></h4> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a><br /><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span></p> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXVI.</h5> - - -<h4>THOUGHT PURE AND ENTIRE.</h4> - - -<p>The English reader may probably be taken to be familiar with the -conception of Logic as the Science of the <i>Form</i> of Thought. He may -also have heard this explained as equivalent to the Science of Thought -as Thought, or of Thought as Form, or of Formal Thought. But, probably, -also, he brings to the lesson no very high estimate of <i>form</i> as -such. In the old language of Greek philosophy, transmitted through -the Schoolmen of the West, and still lingering in the phraseology of -Bacon and Shakespeare<a name="FNanchor_1_181" id="FNanchor_1_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_181" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>, Forms and substantial forms were powers in -the world of reality. But a generation arose which knew them not: to -which they were only belated survivals of the past. The forms had lost -connexion with matter and content, and had come to seem something -occult, transcendent, and therefore, to a practical and realistic age, -something fantastic and superfluous. Yet it may be well to recall -that the same author who has put on record his view that forms are -only mental figments, unless they be fully 'determinate in matter,' -has equally laid it down that the so-called 'causes' of vulgar -philosophy—the matter and the agent—are only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> 'vehicles of the form,' -Thus spontaneously did Bacon reconstruct the Aristotelian theory of the -interdependence of form and matter, that form is always form <i>of</i> (or -<i>in</i>) matter, and that matter is always <i>for</i> form.</p> - -<p>The relativity of form and matter, or of form and content, is indeed -almost a commonplace of popular discussion on logical subjects. -But like other uncritical applications of great truths, this is -both carried beyond its proper bounds, and is not carried out with -sufficient thoroughness. There cannot—it is said—be a formal logic, -because every exercise of thought is internally affected or modified by -the material—the subject-matter—with which it deals. It is implied -in such an argument that the 'subject-matter' finds no difficulty -in existing by itself, but that the 'thought' is a mere vacuity or -un-characterised something which owes its every character to the -said matter. But a subject-matter which has content and character -has therefore form: it is already known, already thought. And as to -this thought, which is said to approach its matter with a self so -blank, so impartial, so neutral—what is it? It is a thought or a -thinking which has never as yet thought,—which is only named 'thought' -by right of expectation, but is itself nothing actual. Of such -—fictitious—thought there can hardly be a science.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, that may be easily called a formal logic, which is -much more than formal: and that may be called material, which is only -a species of formal. Great indeed is the virtue of names, to suppress -and to replace thought. When forms hang on as mysterious names after -their day is passed—when they are retained in a certain honour, while -the real working methods have assumed other titles; then these forms -become purely formal and antiquated. Thus the Logic of Aristotle seemed -in its unfamiliar language to a later<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> generation to be purely formal -and superfluous. It was only another side of the same mistake when -the new forms—the forms efficient and active in matter,—were not -recognised as formal, but were boldly styled material: and the Logic -which discussed such matter-marked forms was called a material Logic.</p> - -<p>The phrase Matter of Thought, like its many congeners, is a fruitful -mother of misconceptions. Caught up by the pictorial imagination, which -is always at hand to anticipate thought, it suggests a matter, which is -not thought, but is <i>there,</i> all the same, lying in expectation of it. -It suggests two things—(for are there not two words, and a preposition -or term of relation between them?). But there are not two things. -This <i>matter</i> is just as much a nonentity as the aforesaid <i>thought</i>: -a matter of thought is a thought matter,—matter, thought once, and -possibly to be thought again.</p> - -<p>All this talk about the Relativity of form and matter is insincere, -and semi-conventional. It is (like the well-known antithesis between -Matter and Mind, of which indeed it is only a variation) a halting -between two views. That which it chiefly leans to, is that there can -be no form without matter, though there may well be matter which is -not yet formed. At the best it goes no further than to admit or assert -that <i>besides</i> the one there is <i>also</i> the other. It establishes a -see-saw, and is proud of it. This is Dualism. Its maxim is, Don't -forget that there is an Other. You have explored the One: you have -perhaps done well. But there is also and always the Other. The second -view is not the mere negation of this dualism. That there is a -dualism is a fact which it acknowledges.<a name="FNanchor_2_182" id="FNanchor_2_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_182" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> All life and reality is -manifested in dualism—in antithesis: but the life and the reality -is one. Mind—<i>Geist</i>—actualised and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> intelligent experience—is -the one ultimate and essential reality.<a name="FNanchor_3_183" id="FNanchor_3_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_183" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In the face of its unity, -mere matter is only a half-truth, and mere thought is only another. -The reality, the unity, and the truth, is matter as formed, nature as -reflected in mind. In the reality of experience there is always the -presence of thought: and thought is only real when it is wedded with -nature in the truth of man's mind. So far Bacon and Hegel coincide. -Man—in so far as he is Mind—and of course Mind in its fullness is not -merely subjective nor merely objective, but absolute—is the measure of -all things, the central and comprehensive reality. Such a man—and such -a mind—is, we need hardly add, not the man in the street, nor the man -in the study: but the infinite, universal, eternal mind in whom these -and all others essentially have their being. Such truth of Man—such -Mind—is the Absolute: it is sometimes named God: it is the ideal of -all aspiration, and the fountain of all truth.</p> - -<p>'Logic,' says Hegel<a name="FNanchor_4_184" id="FNanchor_4_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_184" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>, 'is the science of the Idea in the medium of -mere thought.' It exhibits the truth in one partial aspect, or shows -one appearance of the total unity of the world,—the aspect it would -wear if we could for a moment suppose the reality of Nature to vanish -out of sight, and the ideality of Mind reduced to a ghost. It dissects -the underlying organisation—the scheme of unification—which the world -of mental or spiritual experience presents in all its concreteness. -And it does so because it exhibits the last result of the ever clearer -and clearer experience which Mind achieves as it comes to see and -realise itself. The logical skeleton is the sublimated product of -a rich concrete experience. It has been a curious delusion of some -who were probably satisfied by a casual glance at Hegel's <i>Logic</i>, -especially in its earlier chapters, to suppose that the Logic was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> -meant to be the absolute beginning: and that pure or mere thought was -the congenital endowment of the heaven-born philosopher<a name="FNanchor_5_185" id="FNanchor_5_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_185" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>. To Hegel, -on the contrary, Logic was an abstraction from a fuller, more concrete -reality. He did not indeed suppose that the symbolical conception of -Movement—in its popular pictorialness—would be an adequate substitute -or representative for thought; but he knew that the energy of mental -development was the fact, and the truth, of which 'becoming' is a -meagre, abstract phase.</p> - -<p>Logic, then, is not the Science of mere or pure thought, but of the -Idea (which is co-terminous with reality)—of the Mind's synthetic -unity of experience—looked at, however, abstractly, in the medium -of pure thought. Just so, Nature-philosophy is the same Idea, as it -turns up bit after bit distracted, fragmentary, and more or less -mutilated, in the multiplication, the time and space division, of -physical phenomena. But as science requires us to go from the simple -to the more complex, as the truth has to prove itself true, by serving -in its conclusion as the corroboration of all its premisses or -presuppositions; so the system of philosophy begins with the Logic. -Yet it can only begin there, because it has already apprehended itself -in its completeness: and it can only move onward because it is the -concentrated essence—the implicit being—of all that it actually and -explicitly is. It may appear to emerge from a point: but that point -has at its back the intellectual unity of a philosophy which embraces -the world. It presupposes the complete philosopher who shall be the -complete organ of absolute intelligence, of universal and eternal -Spirit.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span></p> - -<p>A satisfactory Logic then presupposes or implies a complete system of -philosophy. No doubt, for a logic which deals with the minor problems -of ratiocination or formal induction, all that is needed is a certain -general acquaintance with popular conceptions, and with the results or -methods of physical science. But if logic takes its business seriously, -it must go behind these presuppositions. It must trace back reasoning -to its roots, fibres, and first principles. And to do that it is not -enough to put at the front a psychological chapter. Far from helping, -psychology in these matters is much more in need of being helped -itself. Till it has learned a little of the puzzle of the one and the -many, the same and the diverse, being, quality, and essence, psychology -will be as little use to Logic as blind guides generally are. Nor need -this prevent us from saying that when psychology has thoroughly learned -these mysteries, it will give fresh life and reality to the logic which -it touches upon. The principles of Logic lie in another field,<a name="FNanchor_6_186" id="FNanchor_6_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_186" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> and -are deeper in the ground, than obvious psychological gossip.</p> - -<p>If Logic then deals with form, it deals with a form of forms—the -form of the world, of life, and of reality. It is a form, which -is a unity in diversity, an organism,—a form which is infinitely -manifold, and yet in all its multiplicity one. Logic is the morphology -of thought,—of that thought which in Nature is concealed under -the variety and divisions of things, and which in the theory of -mental and spiritual life is resumed into a complete biology of the -world-organism. The problem of Logic then demands an abstraction—an -effort of self-concentration—an effort by which the whole machinery -of the sensible universe shall be left behind, and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> accustomed -clothing of our thoughts be removed. To move in this ether of pure -thought is clearly one of the hardest of problems.</p> - -<p>Like Plato, we may occasionally feel that we have caught a glimpse of -the super-sensible world unveiled; but it disappears as the senses -regain their hold. We can probably fix a firm eye on one term of -reason, and criticise its value: but it is less easy to survey the -Bacchic dance from term to term<a name="FNanchor_7_187" id="FNanchor_7_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_187" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>, and allow them to criticise -themselves. The distracting influence of our associations, or of -outside things, is always leading us astray. Either we incline to treat -thoughts as psychological products or species, the outcome of a mental -process, which are (<i>a</i>) given to us from the beginning, and so <i>a -priori</i> or innate, or which (<i>b</i>) spring up in the course of experience -by mutual friction between our mind and the outside world, and so are -<i>a posteriori</i> or derivative. Or disregarding the subjective side of -thoughts, we act as if they were more correctly called things: we -speak of relations between phenomena: we suppose things, and causes, -and quantities to form part of the so-called external universe, which -science explores. The one estimate of thought, like the other, keeps in -view, though at some distance, and so as not to interfere with their -practical discussions, the separate and equal existence of thoughts -and things. The psychologists or subjectivists of logic scrutinise the -world within us first of all, and purpose to accomplish what can be -done for the mind as possessing a faculty of thought, before they turn -to the world of things. The realists or objectivists of logic think it -better for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span> practical work to allow thought only the formal or outside -labour of surveying and analysing the laws of phenomena out of the -phenomena which contain them. Neither of them examines thought—'the -original synthetic unity'—in its own integrity as a movement in its -own self, an inner organisation, of which subject and object, the -mind and the things called external, are the vehicles, or, in logical -language, the accidents.</p> - -<p>If it is possible to treat the history of the English Constitution as -an object of inquiry in itself and for its own sake, without reference -to the individuals who in course of time marred and mended it, or -to the setting of events in which its advance is exhibited, why not -treat the thought, which is the universal element of all things, of -English Constitution, and Italian Art, and Greek Philosophy, in the -same way,—absolutely, i. e. in itself and for its own sake? When -that is done, distinctions rigidly sustained between <i>a priori</i> and -<i>a posteriori</i> become meaningless because now seen to belong to a -distinction of earlier and later in the history of the individual -consciousness. There is at best only a modified justification for such -mottoes and cries, as 'Art for Art's sake,' or 'Science must be left -free and unchecked,' or 'The rights of the religious conscience ought -always to be respected': but there can be no demur or limitation to the -cry that Thought must be studied in Thought by Thought and for the sake -of Thought. For Art, and Science, and Religion are specialised modes -in which the totality or truth of things presents itself to mankind, -and none of them can claim an unconditioned sway: their claims clash, -and each must be admitted to be after all a partial interpretation, a -more or less one-sided interpretation of the true reality of the world. -Thought on the other hand is unlimited: for it exists not merely in -its own abstract<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span> modes, but interpenetrates and rules all the other -concrete forms of experience, manifesting itself in Art and Religion, -not less than in Science. And thus when we study Thought, we study that -which is in itself and for itself,—we study Absolute Being. On the -other side it must be noted that in Logic it is Absolute Being, only -when and as it is <i>thought,</i> which we study. The two sides, Being and -Thought, must both come forward: and come in unity, although in some -phases of the Idea the thought-element, in others the being-element is -more pronounced.</p> - -<p>Thought, too, is Being. An old distinction of the Stoics, which not -inaptly represents popular views on this matter, set on one side ὄντα, -existences (which were always corporeal, whether they were the things -we touch and feel, or the words and breathings by which we utter them), -and on the other side the meanings or thoughts proper or σημαινόμενα -(which were incorporeal). These λεκτά, as they were otherwise called, -were to the Stoics the proper sphere of Logic. In the sense therefore -which the Stoics and popular consciousness give to being, the object of -logic does not possess being. It is not corporeal. It cannot however -be said to be in the sphere of non-being. It is rather a part of -reality—of concrete being—which can be considered apart, as if it -stood alone. Alone it does not stand. And yet it holds a position so -fundamental,—is the same theme again and again repeated under endless -variations,—is so obviously the universal of things—that it may -properly form the subject of independent study.</p> - -<p>It is, moreover, a part of Reality, which may well claim to stand for -the whole. It is, so to say, the score of the musical composition, -rolled up in its bare, silent, unadorned lineaments; the articulated -theme, besides, and not the mere germinal concept, of all the variety -of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> melody. But it is only laid up there <i>in abstracto</i>, because in -the soul of the composer it had already taken concrete form, due to -his capacity and training, his mental force, his art and science. It -is there that the score has its source. But secondly, the musical work -exists in the performance of the orchestra: in the manipulations of the -several instruments, in the notes of the singers, in all the diversity -of parts which make up the mechanism for unfolding the meaning or -theme—that unreality, that mere thought, which to the stricter Stoic -might be said to have no ὔπαρξις, or bodily subsistence. And there are -still people who will be disposed to assert that it is only in the -multitude of notes of violin, trombone, flute, &c., that the music is -real:—though perhaps these hardy realists do not quite mean what they -say. For what they probably mean, and what is the fact, is that the -music exists as a complete reality in those who have ears and minds -capable of comprehending and enjoying it: in those who can reunite -meaning and theme to execution and orchestration: and we may even add -that it is more and more real, in proportion to the greater power with -which they can bring these two into one.</p> - -<p>We shall rather say then that thought points to reality, and that mere -nature seeks for interpretation: that mere thought and mere being both -seek for reunion. Yet if in the complete reality we thus distinguish -two elements, we may follow Hegel in setting the pure Idea first. It -is no doubt in a way true that, as has been said, Hegel may be often -read most easily if we first begin with his concluding paragraphs. In -psychology and ethics the fundamental principles have assumed a more -imposing, a larger, a more humanly-interesting shape, than they bear -in the intangible outlines of Logic. There they are written in blacker -ink<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span> and broader lines than in the grey on grey. But after all, it is -only for those who have grasped the faint—yet fixed—outlines that the -full-contoured figure speaks its amplest truth. The true sculptor must -begin with a thorough study of anatomy. For those therefore who do not -care merely for results, it is indispensable to begin—or at least to -turn back to the beginning—to the Logic. No doubt the full tones of -the heard and sounded harmony are the true and adequate presentation -of the composer's purpose: but they will be best comprehended and -appreciated by those who have thoroughly grasped the score.</p> - -<p>In Logic, so regarded, thought is no longer merely our thought. It is -the constructive, relational, unifying element of reality. Without it -reality would not articulately be anything for us: and such thoughts -seem to be its net extract, its quintessence, its concentrated meaning. -But really they are only the potent <i>form</i> of reality. Or, more -exactly, in its limits, under its phases, must come all reality if it -is to be part and parcel of our intelligent possession, our certified -property. Such a thought is the frame-work, the shape-giver of our -world, of our communicable experience. It is the formative principle of -our intelligent life, as it is the principle through which things have -meaning for us, and we have meaning for and fellowship with others. -It is not so rich as religion and art, perhaps it does not have the -intensity of feeling and faith: but it is at the very basis of all of -these, or it is the concentrated essence of what in them is explicated -and developed. Humanity in these its highest energies is more than mere -thought—more than mere logic: but it is still at the root thought, and -it is still governed by the laws and movement of this higher logic. For -this is a logic which is no mere instrument of technical reasoning, -for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> proof or disproof: no mere code of rules for the evaluation of -testimony. It is a logic which deals with a thought—or an Idea in -thought-form—which is the principle of all life and reality: the way -of self-criticism which leads to truth: a thought which is at home in -all the phases and provinces of experience.</p> - -<p>Under the same name, Logic, therefore, we find something quite -different from what the example of Aristotle and his ancient and modern -followers had accustomed us to.<a name="FNanchor_8_188" id="FNanchor_8_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_188" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Under the auspices of Kant and his -'Transcendental logic' there has emerged the need of something more -corresponding to the title. For the word itself was not used either by -Aristotle or the Stoics. Neither the Analytics and Topics of the one, -nor the Dialectic of the other, exhaust the conception of the science, -or, to put it more accurately, they are only inceptions of a science, -the fulfilment of which was reserved for a later time. Bacon and Locke, -Descartes and Spinoza, all the thinkers of modern Europe call for a -deeper probing of the logical problem: for a grasp of it which shall -be more worthy of its conventional name, Logic, the theory of Reason. -And we may even say that what is wanted is a unification of the problem -of the Organon with that of the first philosophy, a unification of -Logic with Metaphysics: a recognition that the problem of reason is -not merely the method of reasoning, but the whole theory as to the -correlations of perception and conception, of thinking and reality.</p> - -<p>This conception of Logic as the self-developing system of Thought -pure and entire, is the distinctive achievement of Hegel. 'I cannot -imagine,' he says, 'that the method which I have followed in this -system of Logic, or rather the method which this system follows<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span> in -its own self, is otherwise than susceptible of much improvement, and -many completions of detail: but I know at the same time that it is the -only genuine method. This is evident from the circumstance that it is -nothing distinct from its object and subject-matter: for it is the -subject-matter within itself, or its inherent dialectic, which moves it -along.'<a name="FNanchor_9_189" id="FNanchor_9_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_189" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -<p>But how is this universe of thought to be discovered, and its law of -movement to be described? From times beyond the reach of history, -from nations and tribes of which we know only by tradition and vague -conjectures, in all levels of social life and action, the synthetic -energy of thought has been productive, and its evolution in the field -of time has been going on. For thousands of years the intellectual city -has been rearing its walls: and much of the process of its formation -lies beyond the scope of observation. But fortunately there is a help -at hand, which will enable us to discover at least the main outlines in -the system of thought.</p> - -<p>The key to the solution was found somewhat in the same way as led -to the Darwinian theory concerning the Origin of Species. When the -question touching the causes of variation and persistence in the -natural kinds of plants and animals seemed so complex as to baffle all -attempts at an answer, Darwin found what seemed a clue likely to lead -to a theory of descent. The methods adopted in order to keep up, or to -vary, a species under domestication were open to anybody's inspection: -and those principles, which were consciously pursued in artificial -selection by the breeder, suggested a theory of similar selection -in free nature. In studying the phenomena of thought, of which the -species or types were no less numerous and interesting than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span> those in -organic nature, it was perhaps impossible to survey the whole history -of humanity. But it was comparatively easy to observe the process of -thought in those cases where its growth had been fostered consciously -and distinctly. The history of philosophy records the steps in the -conscious and artificial manipulation of what for the far greater part -is transacted in the silent workshops of nature. Philosophy, in short, -is to the general growth of intelligence what artificial breeding is to -the variation of species under natural conditions. In the successive -systems of philosophy, the order and concatenation of ideas was, as it -were, clarified out of the perturbed medium of real life, and expressed -in its bare equivalents in terms of thought, and thus first really -acquired. Half of his task was already performed for the logician, -and there remained the work, certainly no slight one—of showing the -unity and organic development which marked the conscious reasoning, -and of connecting it with the general movement of human thought. The -logician had to break down the rigid lines which separated one system -of philosophy from another,—to see what was really involved in the -contradiction of one system by its successor,—and to show that the -negation thus given to an antecedent principle was a definite negation, -ending not in mere zero or vacuity, but in a distinct result, and -making an advance upon the previous height of intelligence.</p> - -<p>To say this was to give a new value to the history of philosophy. -For it followed that each system was no <i>mere</i> opinion or personal -view, but was in the main a genuine attempt of the thinker to give -expression to the tacit or struggling consciousness of his age. Behind -the individual—who is often unduly regardless of his contemporaries -and predecessors, and who writes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> or thinks with little knowledge or -sympathy for them, there is the general bearing and interest of the -age, its powerful solidarity of purpose and conception. The philosopher -is the prophet, because he is in a large part the product of his age. -He is an organ of the mind of his age and nation; and both he and it -play a part in the general work of humanity.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, it is dangerous to insist too forcibly on the -rationality of the history of philosophy. For it may be taken to -mean—probably only by blinded or wooden commentators—that each -step in the evolution and concatenation of the logical idea is to be -identified with some historical system, and that these systems must -have appeared in this precise order. And this would be to expect -too much from the 'impotence of nature' which plays its part in the -historical world also: as that on one side forms part of the Natural. -There is Reason in the world—and in the world of history; but not in -the pellucid brightness and distinct outlines proper to the Idea in -the abstract element of thought. It may take several philosophers to -make one step in thought; and sometimes one philosopher of genius may -take several steps at once. There may even be co-eval philosophies: -and there may be philosophies which appear to run on in independent -or parallel lines of development. It may well be that Hegel has -underestimated these divergencies, and that he has been too apt to see -in all history the co-operation to one dominant purpose. But these -errors in the execution of a philosophy of history, and especially of -the history of philosophy, should not diminish our estimate of its -principle.<a name="FNanchor_10_190" id="FNanchor_10_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_190" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span></p> - -<p>At first this process was seen in the medium of time. But the -conditions of time are of practical and particular interest only. The -day when the first leaves appear, and the season when the fruit ripens -on a tree, are questions of importance to practical arboriculture. But -botany deals only with the general theory of the plant's development, -in which such considerations have to be generalised. So logic leaves -out of account those points of time and chance which the interests of -individuals and nations find all-important. And when this element of -time has been removed, there is left a system of the types of thought -pure and entire,—embalming the life of generations in mere words. The -same self-identical thought is set forth from its initial narrowness -and poverty on to its final amplitude and wealth of differences. At -each stage it is the Absolute: outside of it there is nothing. It is -the whole, pure and entire: always the whole. But in its first totality -it is all but a void: in its last a fully-formed and articulated -world,—because it holds all that it ever threw out of itself resumed -into its grasp.</p> - -<p>In these circumstances nothing can sound higher and nobler than the -Theory of Logic. It presents the Truth unveiled in its proper form and -absolute nature. If the philosopher may call this absolute totality -of thought ever staying the same in its eternal development,—this -adequacy of thought to its own requirements—by the name of God, then -we may say with Hegel that Logic exhibits God as He is in His eternal -Being before the creation of Nature and a finite Mind.<a name="FNanchor_11_191" id="FNanchor_11_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_191" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> But the -logical Idea is only a phantom Deity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span>—the bare possibility of a God -or of absolute reality in all the development of its details.</p> - -<p>The first acquaintance with the abstract theory is likely to dash -cold water on the enthusiasm thus awakened, and may sober our views -of the magic efficacy of Logic. 'The student on his first approach -to the Science,' says Hegel, 'sees in Logic at first only one system -of abstractions apart and limited to itself, not extending so as -to include other facts and sciences. On the contrary, when it is -contrasted with the variety abounding in our generalised picture of -the world, and with the tangible realities embraced in the other -sciences,—when it is compared with the promise of the Absolute Science -to lay bare the essence of that variety, the inner nature of the mind -and the world, or, in one word, the Truth,—this science of Logic -in its abstract outline, in the colourless cold simplicity of its -mere terms of thought, seems as if it would perform anything sooner -than this promise, and in the face of that variety seems very empty -indeed. A first introduction to the study of Logic leads us to suppose -that its significance is restricted to itself. Its doctrines are not -believed to be more than one separate branch of study engaged with the -terms or dimensions of thought, besides which the other scientific -occupations have a proper material and body of their own. Upon these -occupations, it is assumed, Logic may exert a formal influence, but -it is the influence of a natural and spontaneous logic for which the -scientific form and its study may be in case of need dispensed with. -The other sciences have upon the whole rejected the regulation-method, -which made them a series of definitions, axioms, and theorems, with the -demonstration of these theorems. What is called Natural Logic rules -in the sciences with full sway, and gets along without any special -investigation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span> in the direction of thought itself. The entire materials -and facts of these sciences have detached themselves completely -from Logic. Besides they are more attractive for sense, feeling, or -imagination, and for practical interests of every description.</p> - -<p>And so it comes about that Logic has to be learned at first, as -something which is perhaps understood and seen into, but of which the -compass, the depth, and further import are in the earliest stages -unperceived. It is only after a deeper study of the other sciences that -logical theory rises before the mind of the student into a universal, -which is not merely abstract, but embraces within it the variety -of particulars.—The same moral truth on the lips of a youth, who -understands it quite correctly, does not possess the significance or -the burden of meaning which it has in the mind of the veteran, in whom -the experience of a lifetime has made it express the whole force of its -import. In the same way, Logic is not appreciated at its right value -until it has grown to be the result of scientific experience. It is -then seen to be the universal truth,—not a special study beside other -matters and other realities, but the essence of all these other facts -together.<a name="FNanchor_12_192" id="FNanchor_12_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_192" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_181" id="Footnote_1_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_181"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> E. g. 'formal' in <i>Hamlet</i>, iv. 5. 215; 'informal' in -<i>Measure for Measure,</i> v. 236.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_182" id="Footnote_2_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_182"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Encycl.</i> § 574 (<i>Philosophy of Mind,</i> p. 196).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_183" id="Footnote_3_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_183"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Encycl.</i> § 377.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_184" id="Footnote_4_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_184"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Logic</i>, vol. ii. p. 30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_185" id="Footnote_5_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_185"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The criticisms of A. Trendelenburg, in his <i>Logische -Untersuchungen,</i> rest on such assumptions. 'Trendelenburg,' says -Hartmann, 'means low-water mark in German philosophy.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_186" id="Footnote_6_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_186"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> See above all Bradley's <i>Principles of Logic</i>, and -Bosanquet's <i>Logic</i>, &c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_187" id="Footnote_7_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_187"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> 'Das Wahre ist der bacchantische Taumel, an dem kein Glied -nicht trunken ist; und weil jedes, indem es sich absondert, ebenso -unmittelbar sich auflöst,—ist es ebenso die durchsichtige und einfache -Ruhe.' <i>Phenom. des Geistes,</i> p 35.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_188" id="Footnote_8_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_188"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Prantl, <i>Geschichte der Logik,</i> i. 87.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_189" id="Footnote_9_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_189"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>Wissenschaft der Logik</i>, i. p. 39.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_190" id="Footnote_10_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_190"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See <i>Encyclop.</i> § 549 <i>(Philosophy of Mind</i>, pp. 148 -seqq.). It is, of course, quite another question—to be answered by -intelligent research—how far in particular cases Hegel has accurately -studied a thinker, and faithfully interpreted him. Some of his critics -in this line appear to mistake philology—which is a highly important -authority in its own field—for philosophy: and will no doubt go on -doing so.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_191" id="Footnote_11_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_191"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Hegel's <i>Werke</i>, iii., 33.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_192" id="Footnote_12_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_192"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>Wissenschaft der Logik</i>, i. p. 43.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXVII.</h5> - - -<h4>ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE: OR THE CATEGORIES.</h4> - - -<p>According to the strict reasonings of Kant in his <i>Criticism of Pure -Reason</i>, and the somewhat looser discussions of Mr. Spencer in his -<i>First Principles</i> a science of Metaphysics or theory of the Infinite, -Absolute, or Unconditioned is impossible. As a result of the criticism -by Kant, Jacobi claimed the Absolute for Faith: and Spencer banishes -the Absolute or Unknowable to the sphere of Religion to be worshipped -or ignored, but in either case blindly. As we have already seen, Hegel -does not accept this distribution of provinces between religion and -philosophy. There is only one world, one reality: but it is known more -or less fully, more or less truly and adequately. It is presented in -one way to the sensuous imagination: in another to the scientific -analyst: in a third to the philosopher. To the first it is a mere -succession or expanse of pictures, facts, appearances: and outside -it—somewhere, but not here,—there is a land, a being of perfect -wholeness and harmony. To the second it is an unending chain of causes -and effects, of one thing simplified by being referred to another till -at last a mighty all-explaining nullity, called an 'Ultimate Cause,' -is presumed to linger, eternally unperceived at the infinitely-distant -end of the series. To the third<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> everything is seen in connexion, but -not a mere uni-linear connexion: each, when studied, more and more -completes itself by including those relations which seemed to stand -outside: each fully realised, or completely invested with its ideal -implications, is seen no longer to be an incident or isolated fact, but -an implicit infinite, and a vice-gerent of the eternal. Philosophy thus -releases both ordinary and scientific knowledge from their limitations; -it shows the finite passing into the infinite. And Hegel, accordingly, -purposes to show that this unfathomable Absolute is very near us, and -at our very door: in our hands, as it were, and especially present -in our every-day language. If we are ever to gain the Absolute, we -must be careful not to lose one jot or tittle of the Relative<a name="FNanchor_1_193" id="FNanchor_1_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_193" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>. The -Absolute—this term, which is to some so offensive and to others so -precious—always presents itself to us in Relatives: and when we have -persistently traced the Proteus through all its manifestations,—when -we have, so to speak, seen the Absolute Relativity of Relation, there -is very little more needed in order to apprehend the Absolute pure and -entire. One may say of the Absolute what Goethe<a name="FNanchor_2_194" id="FNanchor_2_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_194" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> says of Nature: 'She -lives entirely in her children: and the mother, where is she?'</p> - -<p>It is a great step, when we have detected the Relativity of what had -hitherto seemed Absolute,—when a new aspect of the infinite fullness -of the world, the truth of things, dawns upon us. But it is even a -greater step when we see that the Relativity which we have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> thus -discovered is itself Relative. And this is one advantage of first -studying the value of the categories of ethics and physics on Logical -ground. On the concreter region of Nature and Mind, the several grades -and species into which reality is divided have a portentous firmness -and grandeur about them, and the intrinsic dialectic seems scarcely -adequate to shaking the foundations of their stability. They severally -stand as independent self-sustaining entities, separate from each -other, and stereotyped in their several formations. But in the ether of -abstract Idea, in the fluid and transparent form of mere thoughts, the -several stages in the development of the Absolute, the various grades -of category, clearly betray their Relativity, and by the negation of -this Relativity lead on to a higher Absolute.</p> - -<p>To the practical man,—so long as his reflection does not go deep,—the -concepts on which his knowledge and faith are built seem eternal, -unshifting rock, parts of the inmost fabric of things. He accepts them -as ultimate validities. To him matter and force, cause and effect, -distinctions between form and content, whole and part, quantity and -quality, belong to the final constitution of the world. (And so, in a -sense, they do.) If he ever overcome the absoluteness which popular -thought attributes to the individual things of sense and imagination, -and show their relativity, he does so only to fall under the glamour -of a new deception. Causes and matters, forces and atoms, become new -ultimates, new absolutes, of another order. Fictions or postulates of -the understanding take the place of the figments of imagination. The -ordinary scientific man labours especially under the 'metaphysical' -fallacy: he realises abstractions in their abstractness. As against -this it is the business of the logician to show how such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> terms are to -be interpreted as steps in a process of interpretation—containing so -much that others of simpler structure have handed on, and themselves -presupposing by implication a great deal they fail properly to -explicate. Thus, the logician evinces at one blow the relativity of -each term in its mereness, abstractness, or false absoluteness, and the -ideal absoluteness which always carries it beyond itself, and makes it -mean more than it says.</p> - -<p>The natural mind always hastens to substantiate the terms it employs. -It makes them a fixed, solid foundation, an hypostasis, on which -further building may be raised. If such pseudo-absolutising of concepts -is to be called metaphysics, then logic has to free us from the -illusions of metaphysics, to de-absolutise them, to disabuse us of a -false Absolute. The false Absolute is what Hegel calls the Abstract: -it is the part which, because it succeeded in losing sight of its -dependence, had believed itself to be a whole. Logic shows—in the -phrase of Hegel—that each such term or concept is only an attempt -to express, explicate, or define the Absolute<a name="FNanchor_3_195" id="FNanchor_3_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_195" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>: a predicate of the -Absolute, but falling short of its subject, or only uttering part of -the whole truth of reality. But while Logic shows it only to be an -attempt, and therefore in an aspect relative, it equally shows its -ingrained tendency to complete itself, to carry out to realisation -its ideal implication,—shows, in short, that e. g. force is more -than <i>mere</i> force, that thing-in-itself is not properly even a thing; -that a veritable notion (<i>Begriff</i>) or grasp of a thing is more than -a <i>mere</i> (subjective) notion, &c. Thus the true Absolute is not the -emptiest and most meagre of abstractions,—what is left as a residual -after the relative in all its breadth and length has been cut out -of it;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> it is the concretest of all being, the whole which includes -without destroying all partial aspects. Yet as it includes them, it -shows itself their master and more than master: making each lose and -win in the other, till all are satisfied in unity, and no shade of -individuality is utterly lost in the totality of the Universal.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, Metaphysics and Logic tend to form one body. For the -distant and transcendent Absolute, which was the object of older -Metaphysics, was substituted an Absolute, self-revealing in the terms -of thought. Being is deposed from its absoluteness, and made the -first postulate of thought. Former Metaphysics had dashed itself in -vain against the reefs that girdle the island of the supersensible -and noümenal, the supposed world of true Being: and the struggle at -last grew so disastrous that Kant gave the signal to retreat, and to -leave the world of true Being, the impregnable Thing-in-itself, to its -repose. His advice to metaphysicians<a name="FNanchor_4_196" id="FNanchor_4_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_196" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> was that, while scientific -research continued to concentrate the attack of analysis upon single -experiences conforming to certain conditions, they should investigate -these' conditions of possible experience or foundations of objectivity. -In other words, he turned observation to what he called Transcendental -Logic. It was by means of this suggestion, understood in the widest -sense, that Hegel was led to treat Logic as the science of ultimate -reality. He had to show how these conditions when carried out in -full gave the Unconditioned. He attacked the Absolute, if we may say -so, in detail. The Absolute, as the totality, universe or system of -Relativity,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> lays itself open to observation by deposing itself to a -Relative. It possesses the differentiating power of separating itself -as an object in passivity, from itself as a subject in action,—of -deposing itself to appearance, of being <i>for</i> itself, and also <i>in</i> -and <i>for</i> itself. And thus Thought is the active universal,—which -actualises itself more and more out of abstraction into concreteness.</p> - -<p>Hegel, then, solved the problem of Metaphysics by turning it into -Logic. The same principle, Thought, appeared in both: in the former -as a fixed and passive result, showing no traces of spontaneity,—in -the latter as an activity, with a mere power of passing from object -to object, discovering and establishing connexions and relations. The -two sciences were fragments, unintelligible and untenable, when taken -in abstract isolation. This is the justification, if justification -be required, for Hegel's unification of Logic and Metaphysics. The -Hegelian Logic falls into three parts: the theory of Transitory Being: -the theory of Relative Being: and the theory of the Notion. The first -and second of these in his Science of Logic are called Objective Logic; -they also might be described as Metaphysics. The third part is more -strictly on Logical ground. Or perhaps it is best to describe the whole -as the Metaphysics of Logic.</p> - -<p>The Logic of Hegel is the Science of Thought as an organic system of -its characteristic forms, which in their entirety constitute the Idea. -These forms or types of thought, the moulds in which the Idea confines -itself in its evolution, are not unlike what have been otherwise called -the Categories. (Of course the foreign word 'Categories' does not -commend itself to Hegel).<a name="FNanchor_5_197" id="FNanchor_5_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_197" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> They<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> are the modifications or definite -forms, the articulated and distinct shapes, in which the process of -Thought ever and anon culminates in the course of its movement. The -Infinite and Absolute at these points conditions itself, and as so -conditioned or differentiated is apprehended and stamped with a name. -They specify the unspecified, and give utterance to the ineffable. -They are the names by which reason grasps the totality of things,—the -names by which the truth (or God) reveals itself, however inadequately. -From one point of view they constitute a series, each evolved from -the other, a more completely detailed term or utterance of thought -resulting by innate contradiction from a less detailed. From another -point of view the total remains perpetually the same; and the change -seems only on the surface. The one aspect of the movement conceals the -Absolute: the other puts the Relative into the background.</p> - -<p>What then are the Categories? We may answer: They are the ways in -which expression is given to the unifying influence of thought: and we -have to consider them as points or stations in the progress of this -unification, and in the light of this influence. These Categories are -the typical structures marking the definite grades in the growth of -thought,—the moulds or forms which thought assumes and places itself -in,—those instants when the process of thought takes a determinate -form, and admits of being grasped. The growth of thought, like -other growths, is often imperceptible and impalpable.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span> And then, -unexpectedly, a condensation takes place, a form is precipitated out of -the transparent medium. A new concept, a new grasp of reality, emerges -from the solution of elements: and a name is created to realise the -new shade of the Idea. These thought-terms are the world of Platonic -forms, if we consider his 'form of Good' as corresponding to the 'Idea' -of Hegel. For if we look carefully into this mystic word 'Good' which -plays so brilliant a part in ancient philosophy, we shall see that it -only expresses in a more concrete and less analytic form, as ancient -thought often does, the same thing as so many moderns love to speak -of as Relativity, and which is also implied in Aristotle's conception -of an End. To see things <i>sub specie boni</i>—which Plato describes -as the supreme quality of the truth-seeker who is to guide men into -uprightness, or into conformity with the true nature of things,—is -to see them elevated above their partial self-subsistence into the -harmony and totality of that which is always and unvaryingly its real -self. The Good is the sun-light in which things lose their earlier -character (which they had in the days of our bondage and ignorance) of -mysterious and perplexing spectres of the night. In the light of the -Good, things are shorn of their false pretence of self-subsistence and -substantiality, deposed by comparison with the perfect and unspotted, -and as it were stung into seeking a higher form of being by struggle. -And this is the abstract moral way of looking. But to see them in the -form of Good means also that they are seen to be more and better than -we thought, that they are not condemned to inadequacy, but bear in them -the witness and revelation of infinity and absoluteness. And this is -rather the faith of religion and the vision of art. And the 'form of -Good' is only a brief and undeveloped<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span> vision of an Absolute, which is -the 'form of Relativity,'—Relativity elevated into an Absolute.</p> - -<p>A Category is often spoken of as if it were the highest extreme of -generalisation, the most abstract and most widely applicable term -possible. If we climb sufficiently far and high up the Porphyry's tree -of thought, we may expect, thought the old logicians, to reach the -'<i>summa genera</i>' or highest species of human thought. Nor have modern -logicians always refrained from this byway. But these quantitative -distinctions of greater and less, in which the Formal Logic revels, -are not very suitable to any of the terms or processes of thought, -and they certainly give an imperfect description of the Categories. -The essential function which the Categories perform in the fabric -of thought and language is, in the first place, to combine, affirm, -demonstrate, relate, and unify,—and <i>not</i> to generalise.<a name="FNanchor_6_198" id="FNanchor_6_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_198" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Their -action may be better compared to that fulfilled by those symbols in -an algebraical expression, which like <i>plus</i> and <i>minus</i> denote an -operation to be performed in the way of combining or relating, than -to the office of the symbols which in these expressions denote the -magnitudes themselves.</p> - -<p>To the student of language the Categories sometimes present themselves -as pronominal, or formal roots,—those roots which, as it is said, do -not denote things, but relations between things. He meets them in the -inflections of nouns and verbs; in the signs of number, gender, case, -and person: but, as thus presented, their influence is subordinate to -the things of which they are, as it were, the accidents. He meets them -in a more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> independent and tangible shape in the articles, pronouns, -prepositions, conjunctions, and numerals, and in what are called the -auxiliary verbs. In these apparently trifling, and in some languages -almost non-existent words or parts of words, we have the symbols of -relations,—the means of connexion between single words,—the cement -which binds significant speech together. There are languages, such as -the older and classical forms of Chinese, where these categorising -terms are, as it were, in the air: where they are only felt in accent -and position, and have no separate existence of their own. But in -the languages of the Indo-European family they gradually appear, at -first in combination, perhaps, with the more material roots, and only -in the course of time asserting an independent form. Originally they -appear to denote the relations of space and time,—the generalised or -typical links between the parts of our sense-perceptions: but from -there they are afterwards, and in a little while, transferred into -the service of intellect. These little words are the very life-blood -of a language,—its spirit and force. It is in these categories, -as they show themselves in the different linguistic families, that -a nation betrays its mode and tone of thought. The language of the -Altaic races, e. g., expresses activity only as a piece of property, -an appropriation of a substance, and knows no true distinction of noun -and verb: the Semitic Tongues in their tense-system perhaps betray the -intense inwardness of the race: whereas the immense inflectionalism of -the Indo-European seems not unconnected with his greater versatility -and energy. Complete mastery in the manipulation of these particles -and forms is what makes an idiomatic knowledge of a language, as -distinct from a mere remembrance of the vocabulary. And philosophy -is the recognition of their import and significance.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span> Thus in Greek -philosophy the central questions turn upon such words as Being and -not-Being: Becoming: that out of which: that for the sake of which: the -what-was-being: the what is: the other: the one: the great and small: -that which is upon the whole: what is according to each: this somewhat: -&c.<a name="FNanchor_7_199" id="FNanchor_7_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_199" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> And again in Modern Philosophy, how often has the battle raged -about the meaning of such words as I: will: can: must: because: same -and different: self: &c.!</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_193" id="Footnote_1_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_193"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Cf. Herbart's maxim, 'Wie viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung -auf Sein.' (<i>Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik.</i>)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_194" id="Footnote_2_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_194"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Die Natur</i> (1780): 'Sie lebt in lauter Kindern: und die -Mutter, wo ist sie?.... Sie ist ganz und doch immer unvollendet.... Sie -verbirgt sich in tausend Namen und Termen, und ist immer dieselbe.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_195" id="Footnote_3_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_195"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Logic (Encyclop.)</i> §§ 85, 87, 112, 194, &c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_196" id="Footnote_4_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_196"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Metaphysic is, in Kant's usage, ambiguous. It means (<i>a</i>) -a supposed science of the supersensible or unconditioned reality; -(<i>b</i>) a study of the conditions or presuppositions—the Kantian <i>a -priori</i>—of some aspect of Experience, e. g. a Metaphysic of Moral -rules.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_197" id="Footnote_5_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_197"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> His usual term is <i>Denkbestimmungen,</i> the several -expressions or specific forms of the unification which thought is. -The term Categories has been identified by Kant with his list of -<i>Stammbegriffe.</i> and by Mill with his classes of nameable things,—with -some critical remarks on Aristotle's use of the word. That use—to -denote the elements of predicable reality, what Grote called <i>ens</i>—is -probably not so 'rhapsodical' as Kant, with his new-born zeal for the -contrast of sensibility and intellect, was inclined to suppose. A real -history of the Category-theory would be almost a history of philosophy. -Perhaps the name might be more sparingly used.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_198" id="Footnote_6_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_198"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Generalisation is only one small aspect of thought, with -specialisation as its, at least as important, pendant. To read certain -logics, one might think the all-comprehensive virtue of truths were to -be general,—not to be true.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_199" id="Footnote_7_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_199"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> ὅν and μὴ ὅν: τὸ γιγνόμενον: τὸ ἐξ οὗ: τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα: τὸ τί -ἦν εἶναι: τὸ τί ἐστι: θάτερον: ἕν: τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν: τὸ καθ' ὅλου: -τὸ καθ' ἔκαστον: τόδε τί.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXVIII.</h5> - - -<h4>THE THREE PARTS OF LOGIC.</h4> - - -<p>Logic, as it is understood in these pages, is the critical history -of the terms of thought by which reality, the sum of experience, the -world, is described or expressed. It is the philosophical criticism -of the concepts, or elements of conception, by which we define or -develop the Totality, the Absolute. It describes the constitution -of the intellectual realm, by and in which we give body, coherence, -unity, and system to reality. It is the self-developing organisation -of the thoughts by which we think things, and by which things are -what they are. It is the ripe fruit of the experience of the ages of -humanity, and it therefore bears in itself a principle of growth. But -if it be a fruit, it is a fruit which can watch its own growth, which -reflects upon its own life. Its three parts show the main stages of its -development, beginning with the least adequate and most abstract or -general description of reality.</p> - -<p>The first part of Logic, the theory of Being<a name="FNanchor_1_200" id="FNanchor_1_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_200" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>, may be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> called the -theory of unsupported and freely-floating Being. We do not mean -something which <i>is,</i> but the mere 'is,' the bare fact of Being, -without any substratum. The degree of condensation or development, -where substantive and attribute, or noun and verb, co-exist, has not -yet come. The terms or forms of Being float as it were freely in the -air, and we go from one to another, or—to put it more correctly—one -passes into another. The terms in question are Is and Not: Become: -There is: Some and Other: Each: One: Many: and so on through the -terms of number to degree and numerical specificality. This Being is -immediate: i.e. it contains no reference binding it with anything -beyond itself, but stands forward baldly and nakedly, as if alone; -and, if hard pressed, it turns over into something else. It includes -the three stages of Quality, Quantity, and Measure. The ether of -'Is' presumes no substratum, or further connexion with anything: and -we only meet a series of points as we travel along the surface of -thought. To <i>name,</i> to <i>number</i>, to <i>measure</i>, are the three grades -of our ordinary and natural thought: so simple, that one is scarcely -disposed to look upon them as grades of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> thought at all. And yet if -thought is self-specification, what more obvious forms of specifying -it are there than to name (so pointing it out, or qualifying it), to -number (so quantifying it, or stating its dimensions), and to measure -it? These are the three primary specificates by which we think,—the -three primary dimensions of thought. Thought, in so determining, -plays upon the surface, and has no sense of the interdependence of -its terms. And if we could imagine a natural state of consciousness -in which sensations had not yet hardened into permanent things, and -into connexions between things, we should have something like the -range of Immediate Being. Colours and sounds, a series of floating -qualities, pass before the eye and the ear: these colours and sounds -are in course of time counted: and then, by applying the numbers to -these qualities, we get the proportions or limits ascertained. When -this process in actual life,—the advance from the vague feelings -which tell us of sweet, cold, &c., by means of a definite enumeration -of their phenomena, to the rules guiding their operation,—is reduced -to its most abstract terms, we have the process of Being. It would -be the period when a distinction between things and their actions -or properties has not arisen. The demonstrative pronouns and the -numerals are among the linguistic expressions of Being in its several -stages. Perhaps too we may illustrate it by the so-called 'impersonal' -verb—which has hardly reached the stage of verb proper, having no -subject: or by the name which still fluctuates between the stage of -substantive or adjective.</p> - -<p>The first sphere was that of Being directly confronting us, and using -the demonstrative pronouns first of all. The second is Relative or -Reflective Being: and in this we have to deal with the relative -pronouns. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span> surface of Being is now seen to exhibit a secondary -formation, to involve a sort of permanent standard in itself, and to -be essentially relative. The mere quality, when reduced to number, is -seen to be subjected to a certain measure, rule, sort, or standard: -and this reflex of itself always haunts it, modifying and determining -it. Thus instead of qualities, we begin to speak of the properties of -a thing: we have, as it were, two levels of Being, in intimate and -necessary connexion, where there was only one before. At first it was -but a mere surface-picture, one thing here and another there: a this -and a that; one, <i>now,</i> and another, <i>then. This,</i> it might be, was -round, and <i>that</i> square: <i>now,</i> it was bright, and <i>then,</i> it was -dull: <i>here</i> was a head, and <i>there</i> was a limb. But the comparison of -quality with quantity, measuring one by the other, gave rise to the -conception of something permanent, a true nucleus amid the changes. The -fact, previously single, is now become double: the mere event is now a -phenomenon, a temporary and outward manifestation of something inner. -We now see each that <i>is,</i> in the halo of what it <i>has been,</i> or will -be: the passing modification in the light of the permanent type. But as -yet the permanent and the passing are separate, and only throw light -on each other: A explaining itself by B and B by A. We have apparently -two facts; neither of which can however stand by itself and therefore -refers us to the other. But to get a real rest in this incessant round -of mutual reference of one to another we must take a higher stand-point.</p> - -<p>In this sphere of Relativity the terms expressive of things come in -pairs: such as Same and Different, Like and Unlike: True Being and Show -or Semblance: Cause and Effect: Substance and Accident: Matter and -Form: and the like. If we compare mere Being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> to the cell in its simple -state, we may say that in the second sphere of Logic a nucleus has been -formed,—that a distinction has sprung up between two elements, which -are still in closest interconnexion. We have penetrated behind the -seeming simplicity of the surface: and in fact discovered it to be mere -seeming in the light of the substratum, cause, or essence, upon which -it is now reflected. In immediate Being one category, or specificate, -or dimension of thought passes over into another, and then disappears: -but in mediated Being one category has a meaning only by its relation -to another,—only by its reflection on another,—only by the light -which another casts upon it. Thus a cause has no meaning except in -connexion with its effect: a force implies or postulates an exertion -of that force: an essence is constituted by the existence which issues -from it. Instead of 'is,' therefore, which denotes resting-upon-self, -or connexion-with-self, the verb of the second sphere is 'has,' -denoting reference, or connexion-with-something-else: e.g. the cause -<i>has</i> an effect: the thing <i>has</i> properties. Instead of numerals, -come the prepositions and pronouns of relation, such as which, same, -like, as, by, because. The only conjunction in the first stage or -Being was 'And,'—mere juxtaposition; and even that conjunction was -perhaps premature, and due to reflective thought, going beyond what was -immediately before it, and tracing out connexions with other things. -The first stage, as we have seen, treated of the terms of natural -thought present in the action of the senses: the second stage—that of -Essential Being—deals with scientific, reflective, or mediate thought. -What, why, are the questions: comparison and connexion the methods: the -establishment of relations of similarity, causation, and co-existence, -the purpose in this range of logical method. Its categories are those -most familiar<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> to science in its reflective and comparative stage. It -is the peculiar home of what are known as Metaphysical subtleties. The -natural but delusive tendency of reasoning is to throw the emphasis -on one side of the relation, and to regard the other as accessary and -secondary. Contrasts between <i>essentia</i> and <i>existentia: substantia</i> -and <i>modi</i>: cause and effect: real and apparent: constantly occur.</p> - -<p>If the first branch of Logic was the sphere of simple Being in a point -or series of points, the second is that of difference and discordant -Being, broken up in itself. The progress in this second sphere—of -<i>Essentia</i> or Relative being—consists in gradually overcoming the -antithesis and discrepancy between the two sides in it—the Permanent -and the Phenomenal. At first the stress rests upon the Permanent -and true Being which lies behind the seeming—upon the essence or -substratum in the background, on which the show of immediate Being has -been proved by the process in the first sphere really to rest. Then, -secondly, Existence comes to the front, and Appearances or Phenomena -are regarded as the only realities with which science can deal. And -yet even in this case we cannot but distinguish between matter and -form, between the phenomena and their laws, between force and its -exercises: and thus repeat the relativity, though both terms in it are -now on the whole transferred into the range of the Phenomenal world. -The third range of Essential Being is known as Actuality, where the -two elements in relation rise to the level of independent existences, -essences in phenomenal guise—bound together, and deriving their very -characteristics from that close union. Relativity or correlation is -now clearly apparent in actual form, and comprises the three heads of -Substantial Relation, Causal Relation,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> and Reciprocal Relation. In -this case while the two members of the relation are now indissolubly -linked together, they are no more submitted to each other than they -are independent. According to Reciprocity everything actual is at once -cause and effect: it is the meeting-point of relations: a whole with -independent elements in mutual interconnexion. Such a total is the -Notion.</p> - -<p>This brings us to the third branch of Logic,—the theory of the -Notion, or Grasp of Thought.<a name="FNanchor_2_201" id="FNanchor_2_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_201" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> The theory of Causality, with which -the second branch closed, continued to let the thought fall asunder -into two unequal halves—always however in relation or connexion with -each other. But in the present part of the Logic the two halves are -re-united, or in their difference their identity is also recognised. -Instead of a cause of a thing (which is separate from it in order), we -have a concept which is its principle of unity, its universal in which -it is individualised. Instead of incessant and endless Relativity, -we have Development. By development is meant self-specification, or -self-actualisation: the thing is what it becomes, or while it changes -it remains identical with itself. The Category or Development is the -category or method of philosophic or speculative science: just as -Being corresponded to natural thought, and Relativity or Reflection to -metaphysical and realistic science. According to the law of Development -diversity and unity both receive their due. Mere unity or Being -reappears now as Universality or Generality. Mere<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> diversity, or the -relativity of essence, re-appears as Particularity, or the speciality -of details. And the union of the two is seen in the Individualised -notion or real object. In other words, the true thought which really -grasps and gets all round its object, which is a real whole, is a -Triplicity: it is first seen all as the ground or self-same, the -possibility—secondly, all as the existence in details, and difference, -the actuality or contingency—and thirdly, all as the self-same in -difference, and the possible in actuality. Every object in its full -reality is an innate movement; and to grasp it wholly we must apprehend -it as such a self-evolving and self-involving unity of elements, in -each of which however it is whole and entire. Thus the Notion embraces -the three elements or factors of universal, particular and individual. -These three elements first rise to independence and get their full -significance or explication in the syllogism, with its three terms -and judgments, exhibiting the various ways in which any two of these -elements in thought are brought into unity by means of the third. This -adequate form is a system or organic unity which contains in itself the -premisses of its conclusion or the means to its realisation,—which is -a process within itself, and when complete and self-supporting perforce -gives itself reality.</p> - -<p>The Notion or <i>Begriff</i> is where Hegel makes his special mark on -Logic. Schelling, even, following on Kant, had (like Schopenhauer -after him) lauded the merit of the Intuition at the expense of the -mere notion<a name="FNanchor_3_202" id="FNanchor_3_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_202" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> and expressed himself surprised at Hegel's use of the -word. But what Hegel wants first to insist upon is that the Intuition -or Perception (<i>Anschauung</i>) is built upon the Notion—that it is -only because there is a universal principle in its details that the -individual reality<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> of the percept is assured. That we can elicit a -notion from a perception is only possible because it is implicitly -dominated by a universal. Secondly, Hegel wishes to note (as elsewhere) -that the full adequate notion, the notion as self-explaining and -self-constituting, is all that is meant by the object. Thus the Notion -or Subject<i>—Causa Sui</i>—when it is fully realised in the plenitude -of its elements or differences,—when each element has scope of its -own, is the Object—the actual and individualised total of thought, or -syllogism in reality. This objective world or Object appears in three -forms. An Object is either a mechanical, a chemical, or a teleological -object. The terms mechanical and chemical are not to be understood in -the narrow sense of a machine or chemical compound. They are to be -taken in an analogical sense, just as J. S. Mill speaks of a chemical -or geometrical method of treating social problems. The object or -realised notion is mechanical, when the unification of the members in -the totality comes or seems to come from without, so that the whole -or universal they form is external and almost indifferent to the -particulars, and only arranges them. An object is chemical, when the -connexion or genesis of the compound from its factors is not evident: -when the elements are as it were lost, and only give rise to a fresh -particular. An object is teleological, when the universal is, though -not distinctly conceived as realised, still always as tending to be -realised by the particulars. And in each of these grades the object -comes more and more to be seen to be a self-enacting, self-legislating -being; more and more a due pendant to the subject-notion. Modern -science is a vehement opponent of teleology: and with justice, so -far as in teleology, means and end fall apart. But it is mistaken in -supposing itself to return to the mechanical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span> point of view. On the -contrary its success is most generally secured by rising to the point -of view given by the Idea of Life, and by looking upon the objective -world as an Organism, that is, as the notion in objectivity, soul -indissolubly united with body. But even the Idea of Life, in which we -enter the third stage of the notion, is defective as a representation -of the truth of Objectivity: for body and soul must part. The -conception of an Organism or living being is too crude. Reality is no -doubt well described as alive: the Absolute well defined as Life. But -here again Life is taken in a higher than its sense of <i>mere</i> Life: -it is life as intelligent and volitional energy. If the universe—the -Absolute—can be said to be living, it must be said also that it is -more than Living. Such a life—such existence—is what Aristotle has -called <i>θεωρία</i> and ἐνέργεια of the highest in man. It is mental and -spiritual life. In its consummation it is the Idea—the absolute -Idea—the totality which is and is aware of itself,—the developed -unity of the Notion with Objectivity. This unity thus presented is -what lies implicit to our perception in Nature: and thus the Idea, -as developed in Logic, forms the prologue and presupposition to the -Philosophy of Nature.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_200" id="Footnote_1_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_200"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Being (<i>das Seyn</i>) probably conveys much more to an -English reader than is here meant or wanted. It is Being, where the -distinction between essence and appearance has not yet emerged or been -thought of. If being = τὸ ὄν, then essence (<i>Wesen</i>) = <i>τὸ ὄντως</i> ὄν, -the being which underlies and yet includes appearance. <i>Wesen</i> has more -right to the substantival vocable of Being: <i>Seyn</i> is little better -than an 'Is' or 'Be.' -</p> -<p> -In writers of Locke's time, 'Being seems to mean a reality, an actually -existing object, e.g. Clarke: 'There has existed from eternity some one -unchangeable and independent Being.' 'What the substance or <i>essence</i> -of that Being is, we have no idea.' 'Essence,' says Locke, 'may be -taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is.' Of -course Aristotle long ago noted Being as one of the terms with variety -of implication; and his own fluctuation about <i>οὐσία</i> is an obvious -illustration of this. -</p> -<p> -In the translation of the <i>Logic</i>, <i>Wesen</i> is occasionally rendered by -Being (e. g. Supreme Being); <i>Seyn,</i> by existence. <i>Seyn</i> here means -so little that one can hardly find any word of sufficiently minimal -content for it.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_201" id="Footnote_2_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_201"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> No doubt, as Dr. W. T. Harris remarks, <i>Notion</i> (used -by Dr. Stirling) is a quite insignificant rendering of Hegel's -<i>Begriff</i>:—for which he proposes Self-activity. But, as he admits, -that is just Hegel's way: he coins brand-new the old terms, and forces -us, if we will follow him, to think full meaning into them.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_202" id="Footnote_3_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_202"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See vol. ii, Notes and Illustrations, p. 408.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXIX.</h5> - - -<h4>THE SEARCH FOR A FIRST PRINCIPLE.</h4> - - -<p>If there be one thing which, more than another, distinguishes Modern -Philosophers from the Ancient Philosophy of Athens, it is the desire -to discover a First Principle of certainty, a handle by which they -may get hold of and set in due order the perplexed mass of reality. -They find themselves born to an inheritance of tradition, a mass of -belief and lore which overwhelms where it does not support. The long -watches of the Middle Ages had been a time of preparation—even if -the 'cerebration' had been somewhat unconscious. The mind had been -by discipline trained to freedom. As it worked amid the material and -tried to order it and defend it, the intellect grew to recognise its -lordship over the load of authority. Overt revolts indeed against -coercion by decrees and by canons of dogma had never been wanting even -in the quietest of the so-called 'ages of faith.' But it is not in the -loudest outcry or the most rampant dissent that progress shows its most -effective course. The 'catholic' and 'orthodox' tradition equally bears -witness to a movement to emancipation, to self-centred intelligence. -Such an emancipation however cannot be complete and self-realised -without a sharp and painful wrench at the moment of mental birth. -The great<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> word of disruption, of self-assertion, of defiance to the -past and to the dominant, must be said: and, as human beings are -constituted, it will be said in a tone of acerbity for which neither -the revolutionist nor the reactionary are severally alone responsible.</p> - -<p>Thus to hear the brave words and the bold defiance hurled out by -the thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one might -fancy they, like Archimedes, sought a supernal vantage-ground from -which they could move the world. Yet, unlike the material earth, -the intellectual globe is a burden we each carry with us,—which we -find upon us when—if ever—we begin to shake ourselves out of the -slothful unconsciousness of our merely vegetative life. For though -we all carry it, we do not all feel its weight. In some individuals -and in some ages there is so accurate a proportion between the inner -power and the outer pressure that the load of belief and custom is -but a well-fitting garb, almost a second nature. To others there -is a felt disproportion, a sense of superincumbent clothes and -uncongenial, unnatural trappings. Out of such struggles to be free, -grow, occasionally, philosophers, and reformers. To the former the -burden is the burden of the unintelligible: to the latter the burden of -the unbearable and intolerable. To the philosopher the removal of the -burden consists in such a re-adjustment of the intellectual world that -it shall be no longer a foreign thing, but bone of his bone and flesh -of his flesh. But, to re-adjust and to re-organise, one must stand -back from the objective: one must cast it forth, and look about for a -clue to an exit from the maze of confusion. The given and subsistent -is put on probation: not rejected, but for the moment declined: not -denied, but asked to present its credentials.<a name="FNanchor_1_203" id="FNanchor_1_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_203" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> is the ἐποχή -of the sceptical schools of later Greece; the invitation to doubt -addressed by Descartes to his own soul. It is the protest against that -vulgar precipitancy which in primitive and modern credulity is ready to -give itself away to any doctrine which has the voice and the garb of -outward authority. Or is it the assertion! of the royal and inalienable -sovereignty of the Subjectivity to be <i>certain</i> of whatever claims to -be objective and <i>true</i>: the assertion that what is true must be seen -and experienced to be true. Or it is, in another way, the principle of -Socrates: that the beginning of knowledge, the first step in the way -of wisdom, is to know that you know nothing—to realise the absolute -supremacy of self-consciousness.</p> - -<p>It is in short the same demand as Augustine's. There is indeed a wide -gulf of temperament and circumstances dividing the bishop of Hippo from -the mathematician Descartes and the rationalist Spinoza. But in the cry -for the knowledge of 'God and my Soul' as the first, the indispensable, -the sole knowledge: as the <i>one</i> knowledge which binds the finite and -the infinite together,—the knowledge on which turns the truth of -science, and the reality of experience, the great thinkers of these -diverse ages are at one.<a name="FNanchor_2_204" id="FNanchor_2_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_204" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> They turn their backs upon the external -that they may find rest in the truly internal, on the inner certainty, -which is not a mere subjective but a very objective also: not a mere -<i>anima mea,</i> but in close unity therewith <i>Deus meus.</i> This is perhaps -more explicit in Spinoza, in some points, than in Descartes, and in -many respects more decisively put by Augustine than by either. But this -is what is really meant by the initial concentration of suspense: this -is what is sought when a Principle is sought.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span> Nothing short of this -unity of subjective and objective in an Absolute—we may say—Ego, is a -principle.</p> - -<p>But 'principles' like other terms are sometimes lightly taken; and can -be in the plural—just as in lower levels of religion and society there -can be gods many and lords many. Nor in a way wrongly. For, as has been -before pointed out, a principle is the unity of beginning and end: it -is only caught hold of by approaching from different directions: it -loses its life and power when cut off from the many organs by which it -distributes itself so as to grasp reality. If it be essentially one, -it is not a bare unit: it cannot, without injury, be reduced to utter -simplicity, and accepted in the shape of a single term. And yet this is -what almost inevitably happens to every so-called principle.</p> - -<p>Like a <i>deus ex machina</i>, or a trick of the trade, it is applied to -unloose every knot, and to clear any difficulties that arise. But a -principle of this stamp possesses no intimate connexion or organic -solidarity with the theory which it helps to prop. It is always at -hand as a ready-made schema or heading, and can be attached to the -most incongruous orders of fact. Thus in the works of Aristotle, the -principle of 'End' or 'Activity' has sometimes seemed to be applied -to whatever subject comes forward, and like a hereditary official -vestment to suit all its wearers equally well or equally ill. What is -true 'on the whole' is not always true 'of each': the <i>καθόλον</i> never -quite equals the <i>καθ' ἔκαστον.</i> The modern principle of Utility is -equally flexible in its application to the problems of moral and social -life. It costs no trouble to pronounce the magic word, and even 'such -as are of weaker capacity' may make something out of such a formula. -But an abstract formula, which is equally applicable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span> to everything, -is not particularly applicable to anything. While it seems to save -trouble, and is so plain as to be almost tautological (as when the -worth of a thing or act is explained to mean its utility), it really -suggests fresh questions in every case, and multiplies the difficulty. -Having an outward adaptability to every kind of fact, the principle -has no true sympathy with any: it becomes a mere form, which we use as -we do a measuring-rod, moving it along from one thing to another. We -are always reverting to first principles as our last principles also. -Even Aristotle, when he remarked that an object had to be criticised -from its own principles and not from general formulae, saw through the -fallacy of this style of argument.</p> - -<p>This is like asking for bread and getting a stone. The philosopher, -who ought to take us through the shut chambers of the world, merely -hands us a key at the gate, telling us that it will unlock every door, -and then the insides will speak for themselves. But we would have our -philosopher do a little more than this. Not being ourselves omniscient, -we should be glad of a guide-book at the least, and perhaps even of -the services of an interpreter to explain some peculiarities, some -startling phenomena, and sights even more unpleasant than those which -appalled the spouse of the notorious Bluebeard. Or, dropping metaphor, -we wish the formula to be applied systematically and thoroughly. -When that is done the formula loses its abstractness; it gains those -necessary amplifications and qualifications, as we call them, without -which no theory explains much or gives much information. And thus, -instead of fancying that our initial formula contains the truth in a -nutshell, we shall find that it is only one step to be taken on the -way to truth, and that its narrow statement sinks more and more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span> into -insignificance, as its amplified theory gains in significance.</p> - -<p>But an adequate principle must have other qualities.<a name="FNanchor_3_205" id="FNanchor_3_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_205" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> What has been -said up to this point, only amounts to a condition, that our principle -must cease to be abstract and formal, and must become concrete and -real. What we want, it may be said, is a Beginning. But a beginning is -not exactly the same thing as a principle: a beginning is to a large -extent a matter of choice and convenience,—a matter depending on the -state and prospects of the beginner; and the main point is not where we -should begin, but that we should be thorough in our treatment. It is -otherwise, however, in the present case. For the skill of the expositor -simply lies in the exactitude with which he reproduces the spontaneous -movement of growth in his object. His art is <i>celare artem:</i> to -retire, as it were, into the background, and seem to leave the object -to expound itself. In a dramatic work it is no doubt the hand of the -dramatist that seems to set the whole of the characters in motion, that -weaves destinies and snips the thread of life. And yet in a perfect -work of dramatic art everything must seem to flow on by a necessity of -character, a consecution of inner fate. The true artist dare not act or -allow the <i>deus ex machina.</i> So every genuine work of science—which -is more than a compilation, a school-book, a bundle of notes, and -contributions toward a subject—must be a self-determined unity—a -self-justifying scheme in which the personality of the worker enters -into and is absorbed in the system of his work.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span></p> - -<p>If this is generally true, it is above all a canon to rule the -logician. He at least must follow the Logos and the Logos alone. His -theme must be a law unto itself: all its movements must be freely -and nobly objective. For his subject-matter is at least an organism, -and develops according to an inward law. But it is even more than an -organism: it must not merely develop, as organisms do,—not merely -live and grow—but <i>know</i> that it develops and as it were <i>will</i> its -own development—and in that harmony of being, willing, and knowing, -be essentially one. In Hegelian language it must not merely be -implicit<i>—an sich</i> or <i>für uns</i>—the subject of a change which it -undergoes and feels, but without definitely realising,—the subject -of a change which we (the historians) perceive. It must also be <i>für -sich</i>: aware of its modifications, an agent in bringing them about: -and yet withal in so looking forth and willing, be self-possessed, and -self-enjoying.</p> - -<p>The principle of Hegelianism is the principle of Development, the -principle of the Notion—but a Notion which is objective as well as -subjective—the Idea. That principle then determines the beginning -of Logic. We must know the whole course of growth and history before -we can say where is the true commencement. It must be that out of -which the end can obviously and spontaneously issue. In a sense, it -must implicitly contain the end. It must show us the very beginning -of thought, before it has yet come to the full consciousness of -itself,—when the truth of what it is still lurks in the background and -has to be developed. We must see thought in its first and fundamental -calling. As the biologist, when he describes the structure of a plant, -rests upon the assumption of a previous development of parts, in an -existing plant, which has resulted in a seed,—but begins with the seed -from which the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> plant is derived: so the logician must begin with a -point which in a way presupposes the system to which it leads. But in -its beginning this presupposition is not apparent: and in fact, the -presupposition will only appear when the development of the system -is complete. The first step in a process, just because it is a step, -may be said to presuppose the completed process. Thus the beginning -of Logic presumes the fullest realisation of Mind, as the beginning -of botany can only be told by one who knows the whole story of the -plant. It is from this circumstance that Hegel describes philosophy as -a circle rounded in itself, where the end meets with the beginning, or -says that philosophy has to grasp its original grasp or conceive its -concept. In other words, it is not till we reach the conclusion that -we see, in the light thus shed upon the beginning, what that beginning -really was. From the general analogy of the sciences we should not -expect that the beginning of thought would be full-grown thought, or -indeed seem to the undiscerning eye to be thought at all. In many -cases, the embryonic organism shows but little similarity to the adult, -and occasionally a violent abruptness seems, on cursory glance, to -mark off one stage of a creation's growth from the next. Who that knew -not the result could in the seed prefigure to himself the tree? The -beginning is not usually identifiable with the final issue, except by -some effort to trace the process of connexion. The object of science -only appears in its truth when the science has done its work.</p> - -<p>The beginning of philosophy must hold a germ of development, however -dead and motionless it may seem. But it must also to some extent -be a result,—the result of the development or concentration of -consciousness;—of the other forms of which it is the hypothetical -foundation, or, of which it is (otherwise viewed) the first<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> -appearance. The variety of imaginative conception, and the chaos -of sense, must vanish in a point, by an act of abstraction, which -leaves out all the variety and the chaos,—or rather by an act -of distillation, which draws out of them their real essence and -concentrated virtue. This variety, when thoroughly examined and tested, -shrivels up into a point:—it only <i>is.</i> Everything definite as we call -it, the endless repetitions of existence, have disappeared, and have -left only the energy of concentration, the unitary point of Being.</p> - -<p>We may describe the process in two ways. We may say that we have left -out of sight all existing differences,—that we have stripped off -every vestige of empirical conceptions, and left a residue of pure -thought. The thought is pure, perhaps, but it is not entire. In this -way of describing it, pure thought is the most abstract thought,—the -last outcome of those operations which have divested our conceptions -of everything real and concrete about them. But thus to speak of the -process as Abstraction would be to express half of the truth only: -and would really leave us a mere zero, or gulf of vacuity. In the -beginning there would then be nothing—the mere annihilation of all -possible and actual existence. And it is certainly true that in the -beginning there can be nothing.—On the other hand, and secondly, there -is affirmation as well as negation involved in the ultimate action -by which sense and imagination pass into thought. They are not left -behind, and the emptiness only retained: they are carried into their -primary consequence, or into their proximate truth. They are reduced -to their simplest equivalent or their lowest term in the vocabulary -of thought: which is Being. The process which creates the initial -point of pure thought is at once an abstraction from everything, and a -concentration upon itself in a point:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span>—which point, accordingly, is -a unity or inter-penetration of positive and negative. This absolute -self-concentration into a point is the primary step by which Mind -comes to know itself,—the first step in the Absolute's process of -self-cognition—that process which it is the purpose of Logic to trace, -so far as it is conducted in the range of mere thought.</p> - -<p>The bare point of Being and nothing more is the beginning in the -process of the Absolute's self-cognition: it is, in other words, our -first and rudimentary apprehension of reality,—the narrow edge by -which we come in contact with the universe of Reason. For these are two -aspects of the same. The process of the self-cognition or manifestation -of the Absolute Idea is the very process by which philosophers (not -philosophers only) have built up the edifice of thought. What the -one statement views from the universal side or the totality, the -other views in connexion with the several achievements of individual -thinkers. Of course the evolution of the system of thought, as it -is brought about by individuals, leaves plenty of room for the play -of what is known as Chance. The Natural History of Thought or the -History of Philosophers has to regard the action of national character -upon individual minds, and the reciprocal action of these minds upon -one another. The History of Organic Nature similarly presents the -dependence of the species upon their surroundings, and of one species -upon another in the medium of its conditions. Gradually Physical -Science reduces these conditions to their universal forms, and may -try to exhibit the evolution of the animal through its species in all -grades of development. So in the Science of the development of this -Idea the accidents, as we may call them, disappear: and the temporary -and local questions, which once engrossed the deepest attention,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span> fade -away into generalised forms of universal application. Philosophy, as -it historically presents itself in the world, is not an accidental -production, or dependent on the arbitrary choice of men. The accident, -if such there be, is that these particular men should have been the -philosophers, and not that such should have been their philosophy. -They were, according to their several capacity for utterance, only -the mouth-pieces of the Spirit of the Times,—of the absolute mind -under the superficial limitations of their period. They saw the -Idea of their world more clearly and distinctly than other men; and -therein lies their title to fame: but really their words were only -a reflex,—an almost involuntary and necessary movement, due to the -pressure of the cosmical reason. The great philosophers are, like all -men in all estates, and according to their measure, the ministers of -the Truth,—apostles charged to bring about that consummation of the -times in which reality is more fully apprehended and more adequately -estimated. Necessity is laid upon them to consecrate themselves to the -service of the Idea, and to devote their lives to the noble but austere -work of speculation—the work which seeks <i>sine ira et studio</i> to -reconstruct that city of God which is the permanent, if it often be the -hidden, foundation of human life.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_203" id="Footnote_1_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_203"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Cf. p. 90.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_204" id="Footnote_2_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_204"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Augustin. <i>Soliloq.</i> i. 7. 'Deum et animam scire cupio. -Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino.'</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_205" id="Footnote_3_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_205"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> 'A Principle,' says Herbart (<i>Psychologie als -Wissenschaft,</i> Einl.) 'should have the double property of having -originally a certainty of its own, and of generating other certainty. -The way and manner in which the second comes about is the Method.'</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5><a name="CHAPTER_XXX" id="CHAPTER_XXX">CHAPTER XXX.</a></h5> - - -<h4>THE LOGIC OF DESCRIPTION: NATURAL REALISM: BEING.</h4> - - -<p>The antithesis between thought and being, between idea and actuality, -between notion and object, is almost a commonplace of criticism. -Between the ideas of the subject and objectivity a great gulf seems -to yawn fixed and impassable. Thinkers, like Anselm and Descartes, -have (it is asserted) attempted by a trick which cheated themselves -to get from the notion to the object. But—as Kant is supposed to -have for ever shown—these <i>decepti deceptores</i> are now universally -discredited.<a name="FNanchor_1_206" id="FNanchor_1_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_206" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Yet the same Kant had shown that the 'things' of -ordinary experience are only ideas or appearances in consciousness. -These latter ideas, however, were verified by the necessity of -interdependence in which they stood, as given by sense. From the -notions which Anselm and Descartes proposed to invest with objectivity, -there was absent the feature of sense-perception. They were not limited -and real ideas, but synthetic laws, general and abstract aspects of -reality, modes of conception. They were not definite and individualised -things, but terms or conditions for all concepts and realities. They -were forms,—forms essential to the explication of reality—and never -mere parts of reality.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span></p> - -<p>With such 'forms' or 'thought-terms,' such abstractions, Logic (<i>à -la mode de Hegel</i>) has to deal. And in dealing with them it has to -counteract this popular distinction (which Kant inclines toward) which -sets up an insuperable division between thought and being, between -reality and syllogism, between is and is known. Certain of these -denominators which thinking employs to describe reality the popular -mind wholly identifies with reality. That being is a thought, that -force and thing are only modes of conception, sounds to the untrained -intellect only a verbal quibble. Things, beings, are there<i>—out -there</i>, it says: force is 'ultimate reality.' It is perhaps ready -to allow that <i>substances</i> are only mental figments: but it is more -doubtful about causes, and inclines to assume them to be in outside -nature, and to generate a real necessity in things. On the other hand, -it has little doubt that concepts and syllogism are only our ways of -looking at reality,—the reality of substances and phenomena, with -quality and quantity: that 'final cause' is a mere subjective principle -of explanation: and that ideas and knowledge are altogether additions -superinduced on a real world.</p> - -<p>Now what the Logic shows is that, on one hand, all these terms are -ideal and regulative; and on the other that they are real, because -constitutive of reality. Showing—or shall we say, reminding us—that -being is after all a form of thought, it shows us that knowledge, at -the other end, contains or implies reality. It is the business of logic -as a fundamental philosophy to dispel the illusion that sensations are -fixed reality: that causes and effects are an absolutely real order; -whereas concepts and sciences and still more aesthetic and moral -principles are not. Its doctrine is that all Our thought-terms, the -most vulgar and the most delicate, are, as we may put it, symbolical of -reality:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span> explications and manifestations of it. Absolutely real—if -that means utterly unideal—none of them are. On the other hand, -absolutely ideal,—if that means utterly unreal—none of them are -either. If you call them real, their reality is that of thought. If you -call them ideal, it is an ideality of a real. Being is not a fixed and -solid substratum, a hard rock of reality, on which we may build our -relations and further determinations. It also is a thought: it also -lives in relation, and becomes more real by further determination.<a name="FNanchor_2_207" id="FNanchor_2_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_207" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -But the habit comes natural to the majority to attribute essential -and independent reality (total reality) to the thought-modes it is -familiar with in practice: whereas the modes familiar to more advanced -intelligence are put aside as merely ideal.</p> - -<p>Thus in proportion as Logic insists on the reality of idea, it insists -also on the ideality of being. Being is after all a thought: when -separate from the relations of experience, a very poor thought. A -'supreme being' even is a thought. And the question of questions for -Logic is what degree of reality, what amount of truth does each result -of unification express. Is it self-consistent and complete, or does it -imply further elements, and if so, in what direction does it suggest -and receive completion? But at the best the reality of a logical -term is an abstract or formal reality, and consists in its power to -interpret, to expound, to define the Absolute. Its more concrete and -material reality it has in Nature and in Mind. There however Philosophy -has in a further measure to repeat its earlier lesson and show that -Nature is not without its ideal aspect, and that Mind is founded on -physical reality.</p> - -<p>All science tends to carry us over the hard lines of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span> separation which -practical interests treat as if ultimate disruptions. The sciences of -Nature, for instance, in their completed circle must carry us from -the inorganic to the organic: must in some way make a path from the -lifeless to the alive. The science of thought has a corresponding task. -It has to show that the incommensurability between thought and being, -or between the idea and actuality, disappears on closer examination. -When we trace the development of thought sufficiently far, we see that -Being is an imperfect or inadequate thought,—certainly not adequate -to the Idea, but not for that reason generically differing from it. -The fixity of Being as more than, and superior to, mere Thought is a -habit of mind, due to the same worldly-minded immobility as leads us -all to believe (and, within the limited practical range, to believe -rightly) that the earth is solidly at rest, notwithstanding all the -demonstrations of the Copernicans. But Thought has not deposited all -its burden, or uttered all its meaning in Being. Being is the veriest -abstraction,—the very rudiment of thought—meagre as meagre can be. -It is on one side the bare position or affirmation of thought: on the -other hand it is the very negation of thought,—if thought be only -possible under difference. For a mere 'Is' is a mere indescribable -without-difference. There is no such thing as mere Being: or mere Being -is mere nothing: <i>mere</i> Being is not.</p> - -<p>The first category of Ontology is that of Being. It is the merest -simplicity and meagreness, with nothing definite in it at all: and -for that very reason constantly liable to be confused with categories -of more concrete burden. It denotes all things, and connotes next -to nothing. It does not however mean something which has being; it -does not mean definite being: still less<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> does it mean permanent and -substantial being. Ordinary language certainly uses being in all these -senses. But if we are to be logical, we must not mix up categories with -one another: we must take terms at their precise value. Mere Being then -is the mere 'Is,' which can give no explanation or analysis of itself: -which indescribable in itself: which is an 'Is' and nothing more. The -simplest answer to those who invest Being with so much signification, -is to ask them to consider the logical <i>copula</i>. 'Every school-boy -knows' that the 'Is' of the copula disappears in several languages: -that it is far from indispensable in Latin: that in Greek e. g. the -demonstrative article serves the same purpose. In Hebrew too the -pronouns officiate for the so-called substantive verb: and the same -verb probably does not exist in the Polynesian family of languages, -where its place is supplied by what we call the demonstrative -pronoun.<a name="FNanchor_3_208" id="FNanchor_3_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_208" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In the copula, which according to M. Laromiguiere, as -quoted by Mr. Mill, expresses only '<i>un rapport spécial entre le sujet -et l'attribut</i>,' we encounter the mere undeveloped and unexplained -unifying of thought, the very abstraction of relativity<a name="FNanchor_4_209" id="FNanchor_4_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_209" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span></p> - -<p>In the beginning, then, there is nothing and yet that nothing is. Such -is the fundamental antithesis of thought: or the discrepancy which -makes itself felt between each several term of thought and the whole -Idea of which they are the expression. Being is the term emphasised -as absolute by understanding: then the dialectical power, or the -consciousness of the whole, steps in to counteract the one-sided -element. In other words, thought, the total thought, asks what is -Being, mere and simple; and answers mere nothing.<a name="FNanchor_5_210" id="FNanchor_5_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_210" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> The one aspect -of the point is as justifiable as the other. In other words the two -aspects are indissoluble: they are in one. The term 'Unity,' applied to -the relation of Being and Not, may perhaps mislead: and it is therefore -better to say that the two points of view are (as Mr. Spencer puts -it) at once 'antithetical and inseparable,' An unrelated being, an -'absolute' (i. e. separate and transcendent) reality is an Unknowable, -i. e. an ineffable, an unspeakable of which we can legitimately -predicate a not- , leaving imagination to fill up the blank after the -hyphen. A mere Not, with no substratum which it negatives, is mere -Being: and a mere Being, which has no substratum, is a mere Not. The -movement upward and the movement downward are here illustrated: and -it is evident that they are the same movement<a name="FNanchor_6_211" id="FNanchor_6_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_211" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>,—the same<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span> unrest, -only differentiated as up and down by some <i>termini</i> not yet explicitly -brought into view. Each—Is and Not—as it seeks to differentiate -itself, to make itself clear, passes into the other. In fact, the very -vocation, calling, or notion of Being and Nothing, is not Being and -Nothing, but the tendency of each to pass into the other. Their truth, -in short, is not in themselves, but in their process,—and that process -by which the one passes into the other is 'To become.' Try to get at -mere Being and you are left with Nought: of mere Nought you can only -say it is. The two abstractions have no truth except in the passage -into one another: and this passage or transition is 'To become.' Take -reality apart from what it leads on to, and from what it has come from, -apart from its end or purpose and from its cause, take it as mere -being: then this being in its supposed singleness and self-subsistence -is really annihilated: <i>stat magni nominis umbra</i>: but it is the name -of nothing. True being is always on the way to or from being: to stop -is fatal.</p> - -<p>This unity or inseparability of opposite elements in a truth or -real notion is the stumbling-block to the incipient Hegelian. The -respectable citizens of Germany were amazed, says Heine, at the -shamelessness of J. G. Fichte, when he proclaimed that the Ego produced -the world, as if that had cast doubts on their reality; and the ladies -were curious to know whether Madame Fichte was included in the general -denial of substantial existence<a name="FNanchor_7_212" id="FNanchor_7_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_212" class="fnanchor">[7]</a>. If easy-going critics treated -Fichte in this way, they had even better source for amusement in Hegel. -That Being and Nothing is the same was a perpetual fund for jokes, -too tempting to be missed.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span> Now, in the baldness, and occasionally -paradoxical style, of Hegel's statements, there is some excuse for such -exaggerations. Being and Nothing are not merely the same: they are also -different: they at least tend to pass into each other. In the technical -language of logicians, the question is not what being denotes, but what -it connotes. The word 'is' had, it may be, originally a 'demonstrative' -meaning, a 'pronominal' force, which in course of time passed from -a local or sensuous meaning to express a thought. No doubt 'is' and -'is not' are wide enough apart in our application of them as copula -of a proposition: but if we subtract the two terms and leave only -the copula standing, the difference of the two becomes inexpressible -and unanalysable. In both there is the same statement of immediacy -or face-to-faceness: that two things are brought to confront each -other,—united, as it were, without producing any real or specific sort -of union. If Thought be unifying, Being is the minimum of unification: -if Thought be relating, Being is the most abstract of relations. So -abstract, indeed, that its relativity is completely lost sight of: so -utterly one, that it vanishes in a point. And just because it <i>is</i> -(as it seems) out of relations, it must be nothing. No doubt, between -the two terms Being and not-Being a difference is meant; when they -are employed, a difference is thrown into them; and then they are not -the same: but if we keep out of sight what is meant, and stick to the -ultimate point which is said, we shall find that mere being and mere -nothing are alike inapprehensible by themselves, and that to institute -a difference we must go out of and beyond them. Perhaps some approach -to the right point of comprehension may be made, if we note that when -two people quarrel and can give no reason or further development to -their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span> opposite assertions, the one person's 'is' is exactly equal -(apart from subsequent explanations) to the other's 'is not.' The mere -'Is' and 'Is not' have precisely the same amount of content: a mere -affirmation or assertion, which is mere nothing,—because connecting, -where there is nothing to connect.</p> - -<p>The truth of 'is' then turns out 'become': nothing <i>is</i>: all things are -coming to be and passing out of being. This illustrates the meaning of -the word 'truth' in Hegel. It is partly synonymous with 'concrete,' -partly with the 'notion.' With concrete: because to get at the truth, -we must take into account a new element, kept out of sight in the mere -affirmation of being. With notion: because if we wish to comprehend -being, we must grasp it as 'becoming.' For truth lies in transcending -the first or merely given. We have to go forward, and to go backward, -as it were: forward from being, backward to being: we look before and -after. The attempt to isolate the mere point of being is impossible -in thought: it would only lead to the 'representation' of being,—i. -e. the notion of being would be arrested in its development, and -identified probably with a sensible thing, i. e. with <i>something</i>, and -some concrete thing said to be.</p> - -<p>If being, however, is truly apprehended as a passage from the unknown -to the known, or as emergence from bare vacuity, then it implies a -definiteness, which we missed before. Somewhat has become: or the -indeterminate being has been invested with definiteness and distinct -character. Mere being (mere <i>Is)</i> is nothing: to be something is -must be not something else. The second step in the process to -self-realisation therefore is reached: Being has become Somewhat; which -is more, because it professes less. The fluid unity or movement from -'is' to 'is not,' and <i>vice versa</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> has crystallised: and 'There is' -is the still imperfectly unified result precipitated. By this term we -imply the <i>finitude</i> of being,—imply that a portion has been cut off -from the vague, and contrasted with something else. In the ordinary -application of the word, Being is especially employed to denote this -stage of definite being<a name="FNanchor_8_213" id="FNanchor_8_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_213" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>. Thus we speak of bringing something into -being: by which we mean, not mere being, but a definite being, or, -in short, reality. Reality is determinateness, as opposite to mere -vagueness. To be real, it is necessary to be somewhat,—to limit and -define. Whatever is anything or is real, is <i>eo facto</i> finite. Even an -infinite therefore to be real must submit to self-limitation. This is -the necessity of finitude: in order to be anything more and higher, -there must come, first of all, a determinate being and reality. But -reality, as we have seen, implies negation: it implies limiting, -distinction, and dependence. Everything finite, every 'somewhat,' has -somewhat else to counteract, narrow, and thwart it. To be somewhat -<i>(esse aliquid)</i> is an object of ambition, as Juvenal implies: but it -is only an unsatisfactory goal after all. For somewhat always implies -something else, by which it is limited: whereas mere being, just -because it is nothing, is free from the check of an other.</p> - -<p>This, then, is the price to be paid for rising into reality, and coming -to be somewhat: there is always somewhat else to be minded. The very -point which makes a 'somewhat,' as above a mere 'nothing,' is its -determinateness: and determinateness, as at first determinateness from -outside, a given and passive determinateness, is also a negation and -limit. Now the limit of a thing is that point where it begins to be -somewhat else: where it passes out of itself and yields<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span> to another. -Accordingly in the very act of being determined, somewhat is passing -over into another: it is altering, and becoming somewhat else. Thus a -some-thing' implies for its being the being of somewhat else: its being -is as it were only to be beside something else,—it is finite, and -alterable, a <i>this</i> with a <i>that</i> always in the neighbourhood. Such is -the character of determinate being. It leads to an endless series from -some to an other, and so on <i>ad infinitum:</i> everything as a somewhat, -as a determinate being, in reality, presupposes a something else, and -that again has some third thing; and so the chain is extended with -its everlasting <i>And,</i> And, And, (as in the children's way of telling -a story). Somewhat-ness is always vexed by the fact that it is not -somewhat else: and for that very reason, ceasing to be the primary -object, it becomes somewhat else itself; and the other term becomes the -somewhat. And so the same story is repeated in endless progression, -till one gets wearied with the repetition of finitude which is held out -as infinite.</p> - -<p>Thus in determinate being as in mere being we see the apparent fixity -resolved into a double movement—the alteration from some to somewhat -else, and <i>vice versa.</i> But a movement like this implies after all -that there is a something which alters: which is alterable, but which -alters into somewhat. This somewhat which alters into somewhat, and -thus retains itself, is a being which has risen above alteration, which -is independent of it because including it: which is <i>for itself,</i> and -not for somewhat else. Thus in order to advance a step further from -determinate and alterable being, we have only to keep a firm grasp -on both sides of the process, and not suffer the one to slip away -from the other. We must not merely <i>say,</i> but energise the unity of -the two 'antithetical yet inseparable' elements we are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span> naturally -disposed to take and leave only as One <i>and</i> an Other. Something -becomes something else: in short, the one side passes on to the other -side of the antithesis, and the limitation is absorbed. The new result -is something <i>in</i> something else: the limit is taken up within: and -this being which results is its own limit, i. e. no restrictive limit -at all, but self-imposed characteristic and definiteness. It is -Being-for-self:—the third step in the process of thought under the -general category of Being. The range of Being which began in a vague -nebula, and passed into a series of points, is now reduced to a single -point, self-complete and whole.</p> - -<p>This Being-for-self is a kind of true infinite, which results by -absorption of the finite. The false infinite, which has already come -before us, is the endless range of finitude, passing from one finite -to another, from somewhat to somewhat else, until <i>satiety</i> sets in -with weariness. The true infinite is <i>satisfaction</i>,—the inclusion -of the other being into self, so that it is no longer a limit, but a -constituent part in the being. Such inclusion in the unity of an idea, -of elements which are realistically separate, is termed 'ideality.' The -antithesis is reduced to become an organic and dependent part. It still -exists, but as no longer outside and independent. Thus in determinate -being the determinateness is found in somewhat else: in being-for-self -the determinateness is self-realisation. Being-for-self may be shortly -expressed by 'one' or 'each': as determinate being a, or an, or by -'some': and Being simple has no nominal equivalent. As 'some' is always -fractional or partial, 'each' is always a whole or unit. Mere Being has -not the consistency of any noun or pronoun: it is the bare (impersonal) -verb.</p> - -<p>But 'each for self' expresses the sentiment of an armed neutrality -with implicit leanings to universal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span> war,—the <i>bellum omnium contra -omnes.</i> Each is self-centred, independent, resting upon self, and not -minding anything else,—which is now thrown out as indifferent into the -background. Each is centripetal; anything else is for it a matter of no -moment. If determinate being was something to be explained by something -other, this is or professed to be self-explanatory, and rests upon -itself. It seems purely affirmative, and promises to give a definite -unity. But we cannot free thought from negation in this sphere, any -more than in the earlier. We may, if we like, assert the absolute -self-sufficingness, primariness, and unalterability of each; but a -very little reflection shows the opposite to be true. The very notion -of each is exclusiveness towards the rest: a negative and, as it were, -polemical attitude towards others is the very basis of Being-for-self. -One after one, they each rise to confront each, each excluding each, -until their self-importance is reduced to be a mere point in a -series of points, one amongst many. When that is clearly seen, their -qualitative character has disappeared: and there is left only their -quantity.<a name="FNanchor_9_214" id="FNanchor_9_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_214" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> The negative attitude of each to each forms a sort of -bond connecting them. If to the reference which connects we give the -name of attraction, then we may say that the repulsion of each against -each is exactly equal to their mutual attraction. And thus, in the -language of Hobbes, the universal quarrel is only the other side of the -general union in the great Leviathan: repulsion, in the shape of mutual -fear, is the principle of attraction. Thus each for self is repeated -endlessly: instead of the atom or unit we have a multitude, utterly -indifferent to what each is for itself. The mere fact that it is, -entitles it to count, and so constitutes quantity.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span> Here we may shortly -recapitulate the categories of Quality or Being Proper. It forms three -steps or grades: those of indeterminate being: determinate being: -self-determined being: or if we speak of them as processes, we have -becoming: alteration: attraction and repulsion<a name="FNanchor_10_215" id="FNanchor_10_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_215" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>. From the extreme of -abstraction and concentration thought, under the form of Being, passes -on to greater determinateness and development. The fixity of mere -Being is seen to imply a distinction of elements, and a dependence of -one upon the other: where the 'is' and 'is not' part from each other -sufficiently to let us distinguish them. This is the stage of finitude: -when we say that there is somewhat, but there are others, and imply -that any one has an end, a limit, a negation in its nature. These -words describe the finite scene,—a fragmentary being which makes an -advance upon indeterminateness, but loses its wholeness and is always -and necessarily leading on to something else. It is the revulsion -from the vague and yet unspecified universal to definite and limited -particulars. In the third stage the limit is uplifted and included in -the particular, which now contains its negation in itself,—is (by -accepting its dependence) independent, is its own ground, and may be -called an individual. But an individual, again, implies an aggregate -of ones, or a multitude. This being-for-self is an individual or atom: -it is the basis of those higher developments known as subjectivity and -personality. These are, as it were, higher multiples of it.</p> - -<p>This first sphere of thought, apparently so abstruse and unreal in its -abstractions, had to be thus narrowly discussed because it presents -all the difficulties and peculiarities of Hegel in their elementary -form. They<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> are clearly the fundamental problems of ancient Greek -philosophy—of that first or fundamental philosophy which discusses -Being and its intrinsic attributes or accidents. Modern superficiality -has sometimes reproached these old thinkers (who, forsooth, 'knew no -language but their own') for their tiresome insistence on this problem -of Is and Is not. Compared, indeed, with what are called topics of -interest, e. g. the Soul and the Hereafter, or the origins of the -Cosmic process, tiresome such inquiry is. But it is the bitter lesson -of experience that till such fundamentals are at least critically -surveyed, the interesting topics will still (and in more than one -sense) belong to the Unknowable. Herbart not less than Hegel sees it is -the prime business of philosophical criticism (i. e. of philosophy) to -examine thoroughly those primary notions on which the whole structure -of thought rests. It is on the comprehension of the radical limitations -latent in the seemingly simplest terms of thought, that the profoundest -problems of human interest ultimately turn.</p> - -<p>Thus, in the first place, the process of Being, as seen in the light -of the whole system of Logic, shows that reality is truly known only -as a trinity,—or perhaps rather as a duality in unity. This is the -'Notion' or 'Grasp' of Being. First, reality seems an unspecialised -and self-centred being,—and that by itself is mere nothing: a mere -<i>universal.</i> Second, it appears a specialised and differentiated being -of some and other: a mere <i>particular</i>, limited by other particulars, -and so finite. Third, as a combination of the two earlier stages: -as wholeness with determinateness, as unity; and so an <i>individual</i> -which is the <i>true</i> or complete and authentic character of all being. -In the <i>metaphysics</i> of Being these three elements follow, one after -another: but in the <i>logic</i> of the notion they interpenetrate,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span> and -each of them is the others and the total. The truth or the notion of -being takes it in Being-for-self as a universalised particular or -as an individual.—In the second place: the sphere of mere Being is -that of <i>mere</i> identity: that of determinate being is the sphere of -otherness, difference: that of self-determined being is the sphere of -well-grounded existence.—Thirdly: the first sphere may be illustrated -by the freedom of indeterminateness, expressed by the word 'may': the -second by necessity or determinateness, expressed by the word 'must': -and the third, by the freedom which even in its determinateness -is self-determining, expressed by the word 'will.'—Fourthly: -these steps illustrate the meaning of the Hegelian technical terms -<i>setzen</i>: <i>aufheben: an sich</i>: <i>für sich</i>: <i>Idealität: Realität.</i> -Thus Determinate Being or somewhat is <i>an sich</i> or implicitly (by -implication) somewhat else: and the process of determinate being -is to lay it down or express (<i>setzen</i>) it as such. When this -explicitly-stated 'other' or limit is included in the Being, and -reduced into a unity with somewhat in each Being-for-self, it is said -to be '<i>aufgehoben</i>'—uplifted, as it were, so that it is no longer a -separate existent, but is still an efficient element. As being partly -<i>this,</i> and partly <i>that,</i> now <i>one,</i> and now an <i>other,</i> which limits -and is limited, determinate being is <i>Realität.</i> The characteristic -of reality is externality of its parts, which are thus left side by -side quasi-independent: that of ideality is unity and solidarity of -function. When the mutual dependence of elements is tightened till -it becomes equivalent to unity and totality, these elements are seen -in their Ideality (<i>Idealität</i>). Such a total has the others in it -as elements (<i>Momente</i>); they are there ideally (<i>ideëller Weise,</i>) -as it were (in the loose analogical use of that term) organically: -that is, they are denied the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> privilege, which their total has, of -being-for-themselves. They do not enjoy the benefit of their own being, -though their presence is felt.—Fifthly: Being-for-self is absolute -negativity; i.e. the negation of negation. Determinate being was a -negation of Being mere and simple: Being-for-self is the negation of -this, and so a return to true affirmation, as including the element of -negation.</p> - -<p>Being seemed to describe a complete reality. But its latent limitation -has become explicit. It only retains itself by a self-assertion which -leaves it a mere abstract unit, or atom,—a unit with nothing in it -to be united,-and where it matters not whether it be somewhat or -other. The quality of Being, in which all qualitative attributes are -lost and sunk, is Quantity: the characteristic of which is to be a -matter of no importance to Being, as it originally presents itself. -In other words, whilst Quality is identical with Being,—while Being -means qualitativeness, and the Being of a thing means its quality, or -constitution; Quantity is external to Being, and a thing is, while its -quantity undergoes all sorts of variation. At least this is true within -certain limits: for quantity is not an ultimate category any more than -quality. But for the present the truth of quality is quantity; or, in -other words, if a thing is to be anything definite it must ultimately -rest on a solid atom: must be a unit and amenable to measurement. First -come qualities, such as sweet, green, and the like: these seem to be -truth and reality to the senses and the natural mind: and in their -universality are represented by the abstract terms of qualitative -being. The first step in the progress of knowledge consists in seeing -that quality presupposes quantity. Number, in short, is the proximate -truth to which the vague qualitative distinction of <i>a, some,</i> and -<i>each</i> is to be reduced. The qualitative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span> differences of sounds are -reduced to relations or ratios of number: and so are the other data of -sensation. We see this truth recognised in the Atomic School, which -may be taken to represent the summing-up of that period of thought -which begins with the 'Being' of Parmenides, and the 'Becoming' of -Heraclitus. When Democritus says that, although bitter and sweet are -conventional distinctions, yet in reality there is only atoms and -void<a name="FNanchor_11_216" id="FNanchor_11_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_216" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>, he is introducing a distinction between real and apparent. -But again the irregular and sporadic appearances of species of quality -are replaced by a gradual and regular series of quantities. With mere -Being you have a conception quite unfit for describing the manifold -reality. But by breaking up the whole Being into a countless number of -atoms of being, you get the means of establishing an equation between -a given sensible and some multiple of the atomic unit. Thus Atomism, -with its many bits of being and its interfluent non-being in which they -can unite, replaces the total and complete universe of being and its -attendant shadow of unreality, the world of opinion. Still the <i>Is not</i> -clings to the <i>Is</i>: if each atom seems complete, they are subject to a -necessity which forces them by negation, i. e. by the void (as Atomism -figuratively calls the repulsion of the atoms) to meet each other and -form apparent unities. Before a step could be made to higher problems, -it was necessary to see that the proximate truth of the qualitative -world,—or world of sense proper (ἰδία αἴσθησις) is in its simplest -terms a quantitative world, or world of common sensibles (κοινὰ -αἴσθητα), universalised sensibles, number and quantity.</p> - -<p>The sphere of quantity need only be briefly sketched.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span> It has its three -heads: (1) quantity in general,—the universal and vague notion of -quantitativeness, the mere conception of reality as the Great and the -Little, or the More and Less<a name="FNanchor_12_217" id="FNanchor_12_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_217" class="fnanchor">[12]</a>: (2) Quantum, or defined quantity, -expressed in the shape of a number: and (3) the quantitative ratio -or degree, which is the individualisation or self-determination of -numbers, or their application to one another,—which gives the real -meaning and value of numbers. The fundamental antithesis, which -we found in quality, comes before us here more definitely as the -opposition of many ones in one number. In every quantity there are the -two elements: the 'one,' unity or solidarity, which renders a total -number possible, and the 'many' or multiplicity, which gives it real -body and character. By this quantitative law, reality must always be -both Continuous and Discrete. Thus when I regard a line as consisting -of a number of points I treat it as a discrete quantity: as many in -one. When, on the other hand, I regard the line as the unity of these -points, it becomes a continuous quantity. These distinctions are not -so trivial as they may appear: they lie at the bases of paradoxes like -those by which Zeno disproved the ordinary representations of motion, -and when a M.P. informs the House of Commons that it is impossible -to divide 73l. 1s. 6d. by 1l. 2s. 6d., he is, like Zeno, and perhaps -more unconsciously, forgetting that these quantities are not merely -continuous but discrete.</p> - -<p>The Pythagoreans, according to the tradition of antiquity, -philosophised number. In it they found the reality, or the principle -of things,—the characteristic feature which dominated existence, and -by which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">[Pg 434]</a></span> the world in all its multiplicity could be made coherent -and intelligible. They saw it composed of two elements: a limit or -limiting, and an unlimited: the latter as it were a dark ground, -measureless and endless, on which definiteness was gradually marked -out. Such a limiting principle would be e. g. the unit of number. But -the full definiteness of number only comes out when a numerical scale -is fixed on, in which each number bears a definite ratio to what goes -before and what comes after. Each number in such a scale is really a -multiple of its unit: a product of its unity into its multeity, of the -monad into the indefinite duad. It is this view of each number, as the -product of its prime unit with the ratio, which comes explicitly to -the fore in Degree, or quantitative ratio. Each so-called quantitative -statement is thus a ratio between a given quantity in the object and an -assumed standard or unit of number.</p> - -<p>These implications latent in quantitative order or determination come -out in mensuration. If quantitative or numerical precision is to have -a real basis, it presupposes the existence of a qualitative atom or -unit which shall be the Measure. Measure is therefore the truth and the -unity of quantity and quality: each refers forward and backward to the -other, and both lead up to or imply a modulus, or standard unit. Such -a standard unit may seem, at first sight, to be a matter of arbitrary -choice and imposition. There seems to be no ultimate reason for taking -the foot or the cubit as unit of measurement: and if the original foot -or cubit be the king's limb, it is easy to say that the whole thing is -conventional and artificial. But it is evident on further reflection, -first that the foot or the pace is the natural and primitive measurer -of lengths of space for the human being, and secondly that the -particular foot which is imposed as the measure is taken as being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span> -normal and typical. So too it is partly arbitrary choice which fixes -upon the starting-point for the scale of temperatures: but here also -the range from freezing-point to boiling-point of the commonest of -liquids affords a sufficient standard from which naturally to carry on -the scale above or below it.</p> - -<p>What happens is therefore that what is the rule, the standard,—we -may also say, the test of being, is the natural mean or average. The -measure presents itself as the permanent and regular proportion of -quantity and quality. It is the amount or quantity at which things -settle down in equilibrium and produce the quality or characteristic -feature of the object. To say that Measure is the supreme category -or the truth of being—of that superficial being which merely is—of -the mere fact of perception—is to say that the prime or governing -feature of reality, its obviously dominant characteristic in this -sphere, is a self-imposing harmony and proportion. It naturally -arranges itself—defines and describes itself in rhythmic series, in -regular scales, in symmetrical schemes. All things are in geometrical -proportion, self-defined and uniformly graded. Such a conception and -category of reality may be said to be peculiarly Greek. The doctrine -of the Mean is well known as a principle of their popular Ethics. But -the Mean is an average which is regarded as a Normal,—a regular and -permanent mode of being which is equivalent to a standard. The rule is -given by the logic of facts and of nature. There is in it an apparent -optimism—a belief that what is predominant and fundamental is right: -a doctrine of immanent symmetry and order. The mere habitual custom -is as such held to be the right and good. It is true, no doubt, that -Protagoras came to point out that this Measure was not inherent in -things, but came from Man, the measure of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span> all things: and that the -later philosophy had to show how the conception of reality should -be re-construed, if the objectivity of Measure and symmetry in the -universe were still to be maintained. Still even with this correction -the belief remained down to the Stoic School that being is essentially -self-ordering: that Nature is immanent proportion.</p> - -<p>The Measure thus emerging as the Mean, which stands out as the -permanent background or recurrent same amidst varying extremes, is -set against these divergencies and used to measure them. It has to -serve as a denominator for all of these: or each of these differences -has a definite ratio to it. For that purpose it must be so graded or -present such a scale that the smallest difference from it that exists -may be measured, estimated and defined in terms of it. It is here out -of place to consider how this can be accomplished,—how mensuration in -any case is solved as a problem of scientific determination. What is -more important is to note the fact that appearances everywhere start up -to testify to the incompatibility of the two elements in measure,—to -their tendency to fly away from each other. It is only within certain -ranges that quantity and quality change proportionately to each other. -The colour spectrum, the scale of musical notes, the series of chemical -combination, the order of the planets, all are found in experience up -to some point to follow a symmetrical order, and exhibit a measure. -But after that point is reached, a sudden change or transition occurs. -There is a break in the continuity of being: without warning, a new -series of physical manifestation, having a new rule or measure, emerges -by a sort of catastrophe. So also, it is only to a certain portion of -the process of physical order in the human body that psychical changes -are found to correspond.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span> Everywhere the correspondence or harmony or -proportion of immediate fact has its breaks,—its sudden emergencies -into a new range of being.</p> - -<p>It is on the repeated evidence of this fact—the discontinuity of -immediate being, the inexplicable gulfs which separate its ordered -provinces from one another, that we rise to the distinction of two -orders or grades of being: a double aspect of reality. The primitive -consciousness is, we may suppose, confined to one level of being, one -world. And so long as the facts remain within limits there is no need -to go further. The measure is the rule. But the uniformity breaks -down abruptly<a name="FNanchor_13_218" id="FNanchor_13_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_218" class="fnanchor">[13]</a>: the rule has its inevitable exceptions: it is no -law or principle, but only the factual majority within a fixed range. -Thus the measure, to fulfil all that is expected of it, and be a full -expression or definition of reality, must go beyond a mere measure: -must become the essence, or rather give place to the essence. In order -to explain the irregularity and want of measure which turns up if we -exceed the narrow provinces of being, we are forced on the conception -of a being, one permanent and the same, set in relation, antithetical -but inseparable, to an other being, manifold, changing, and different. -The undying rhythm, the ceaseless symmetry retreat into the further -region—the world beyond: while the older surface-being, as set against -it, comes to be a mere phenomenon or appearance, a derivative and -dependent something, which has its roots of being in the underlying -law and essential reality. But the two planes are still in intimate -connexion, in a correlation which becomes more and more palpable as its -implications are disclosed and realised.</p> - -<p>This change from Measure to Essential Being is one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span> which Greek -philosophy seems to exhibit in the step from Pythagoreanism to -Platonism. Plato himself has noted the passage from what have been -called the mathematical to the metaphysical categories, and insisted -on the essential and higher truth to which mathematics only point. -Mathematical terms give the supreme definiteness to the world of being; -they show it as in its several compartments a world immanently ordered -and measured. As in Greek Art, all seems to be fully brought to the -surface: as the image suggests no further and deeper meaning, but -affords an absolute identity of aspect and purport; so the natural and -semi-popular philosophy of Greece was satisfied for its ethics with the -proportionate, the becoming, the beautiful. Plato however passes beyond -the surface, and reflects the apparent fact on a deeper permanent -reality behind. That reality is still, in name, only the 'form' or -'shape'— only the regular and permanent type—only the measure. But -it is called the really real, the <i>ὄντως ὄν</i>,—the being of being. In -it the truth is clear, transparent, one and systematic, which in the -sensible or immediate world is obscure, confused, multiple. It is the -key to explain the difficulties and irregularities of the first and -visible scene. Yet even Plato never for a moment forgets the essential -correspondence of the two realms, however he may insist upon their -separation, and however hard he may find it to explain how being can be -duplicated, how the one can be many and yet not cease to be one, how -appearance has part in reality.</p> - -<p>This indeed is not a difficulty confined to Plato. It is, after all, -the same antithesis as we found in the beginning: the Is which lapses -into the Is not. It now becomes the play of positive and negative—of -perpetual relativity: of a known dependent on an unknown, and an -unknown interpreted by a known: an essence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span> guaranteed by its show -or seeming and a <i>Schein</i> which supposes permanent <i>Sein.</i> How can a -thing be, and yet not be true? How can pleasures seem and not be real? -Aristotle, taking up the Platonic antithesis of true and apparent -being, carries it on into greater detail. Matter and form: possibility -and actuality: are amongst his cardinal pairs of correlatives. But -he is anxious to maintain their essential relativity: to show that -reality only is and maintains itself as the unity of the two poles of -universal and particular, reason and sense, or as a syllogism and a -development. So far as he succeeds in doing this, Aristotle rises above -the correlational view of reality into the comprehension of it as a -unity, which carries itself through difference into self-realisation.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_206" id="Footnote_1_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_206"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> What he did show was that these Ideas were not objects in -the vulgar sense of reality, or things.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_207" id="Footnote_2_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_207"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Cf. the controversy between Schiller and Goethe as to idea -and observation, quoted by Whewell, <i>Scientific Ideas</i>, i. 36.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_208" id="Footnote_3_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_208"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The use of the substantival form <i>Being</i> for the verbal -(participle, infinitive, or indicative) suggests an idea of permanence -and substance, or essence. So potentiality seems much more real than -<i>may</i> or <i>can.</i> And yet the phrase He knows δυνάμει is only equivalent -to He can or may know (δύναται or ἐνδέχεται).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_209" id="Footnote_4_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_209"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> When it is said that: 'It is strange that so profound a -thinker as Hegel should not have seen that the conception of definite -objects, such as a <i>dog</i> and <i>cat</i>, is prior no less in nature than in -knowledge to the conception of abstract relations, such as <i>is</i> and <i>is -not,'</i> it is difficult to say what the writer meant. Had he ever heard -of geometry? Both in nature and in knowledge (i. e. in the natural -process from sense to thought) chairs and tables are prior to lines -and surface. The mathematical point and line are abstractions, i. e. -thoughts, and no image of sensuous reality. It is also true that the -ordinary conception of the sun's movements was 'prior no less in nature -than in knowledge' to the theory of the earth's rotation. And no doubt -Hegel, sedate though his boyhood was, had made the acquaintance of dog -and cat in his pre-logical days: as of balls and windows before he was -turned upon Euclid. See Mansel's <i>Letters</i>, <i>Lectures</i>, &c., p. 209.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_210" id="Footnote_5_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_210"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> As <i>Being</i> to ordinary unthinkingness seems to mean a -great deal it cannot expound, so the mind full of the mystic depths of -time and space is disgusted to find them turn so empty and shallow when -it would set forth its wealth. See Augustin. <i>Confess.</i> xi. 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_211" id="Footnote_6_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_211"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> This may be illustrated by saying that to <i>affirm</i> is the -same energy of thought as to <i>deny,</i> and that the difference lies in -the terms related by the judgment. <i>In themselves,</i> the one act is as -empty or meaningless as the other.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_212" id="Footnote_7_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_212"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Heine, <i>Ueber Deutschland (Werke),</i> v. 213.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_213" id="Footnote_8_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_213"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> πᾱσα οὐσία δοκεῑ τόδε τι σημαίνειν (Ar. <i>Cat.</i> 5).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_214" id="Footnote_9_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_214"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Hence the disparaging sense in which the term 'individual' -may be used.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_215" id="Footnote_10_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_215"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> These latter terms being used in a metaphorical sense.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_216" id="Footnote_11_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_216"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρόν ἐτεῇ δὲ ἃτομα καὶ κενόν. -Democritus ap. Sext. <i>Empir. adv. Math.</i> vii. 135.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_217" id="Footnote_12_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_217"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Aristotle's μᾱλλον καὶ ἦττον: see <i>Metaph.</i> i. 6 τὺ μέγα -κaὶ τὸ μικρον.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_218" id="Footnote_13_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_218"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Thus, the sharp break at death suggests the reference of -vital phenomena to a substantial soul.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXXI.</h5> - - -<h4>THE LOGIC OF EXPLANATION AND REALISTIC METAPHYSICS: ESSENCE.</h4> - - -<p>The coherence and consistency of being was, it appeared in the last -chapter, only to be maintained by assuming it to fall into two planes, -or orders, always however relative to each other. The need of a measure -forced itself upon even the superficial student. In the ordinary -business of economical life one commodity of common use or of general -acceptability steps into the place of a common measure. At first it is -no more than one amongst many, a more suitable and convenient means of -discharging the task of mensuration. But gradually it draws away into -a world of its own, and acquires in common estimation a unique and -peculiar dignity. It becomes a commodity of a higher order than the -common, and is even treated as if it had intrinsic and inherent worth, -apart from all relations of exchange. In a further stage it rises to -rank as an invariable and almost supersensible standard, which amid all -the fluctuations of currency tends to remain unchanged. One loses sight -of the movement out of which it grew and in which it exists—the social -give and take, the interaction of individual needs and general opinion.</p> - -<p>The characteristic feature of this sphere of thought is the perpetual -antithesis of terms. And its tragedy is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span> the result of the tendency to -separate the terms, and treat them as independently real. It matters -not how often this error may be detected. Each side of the antithesis -no doubt reflects itself upon the other. But we as constantly fail to -note that reflection. Even the philosopher who most loudly preaches -relativity falls into the common trap, and speaks of relatives as -ultimate and absolute. He talks of an Unknowable, as if it could be -without a Known (or Knowable): whereas no such term fully manifests -itself. Each term owes its distinct existence to its correlative: -each gives itself over to the other, and invests it with meaning -and authority. Accordingly when even the ordinary mind, which takes -these categories as they are given, is asked what each means, it can -only reply by referring to the other. A cause is <i>that</i> which has an -effect. The dialectic in the nature of thought,—its self-revising -self-conscious nature—which was concealed in the First Part of Logic, -where one term, when carried to its extreme, passed over into another, -is made obvious in the Second Part, where each term postulates and even -points to its correlative, and, however it may be contra-distinguished, -cannot be thought without it. Thus, force is a meaningless abstraction -without the correlative expression or utterance of force: and matter -means nothing except in its distinction from, and yet reflection on, -form. These, it may be said, are simple and tautological statements. -They are principles, however, which every day sees disregarded. Have -they, for example, been remembered by those theorists who tell us -that everything is ultimately reducible to matter, or who propose to -improve upon that theory by explaining that matter is after all only -another name for force? Forgetting how this reduction is made, they are -dealing with abstractions or mental figments, and losing their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span> way in -an endless maze of metaphysics. Do those who speak so confidently of -laws of nature as something real and effective ever reflect that the -two terms are more or less relative to each other, and that there is -some latent metaphor in the phrase? Or if they prefer to speak of laws -of phenomena, on which word is the accent to be laid? Those who thus -speak of matter and force, really speak of a matter which is formed and -form-possessed, capable of determining its own form, and of a force -which can rule its own exertions: and for such conceptions the words in -question are scarcely adequate representatives. They use the language -of the Second, to express notions which properly belong to the Third -branch of Logic.</p> - -<p>The whole range of Essence or Relativity exhibits a sort of see-saw: -while one term goes up in importance, the other term goes down. The -several antitheses, too, have their day of fashion, and give place to -others. Those inquirers who speak of the phenomena of nature shrug -their shoulders at the very mention of essences: and the practical -man, whose field is actuality, acquires a very pronounced contempt -for both abstractions. One class of investigators glories in the -perpetual discovery of differences, and stigmatises the seekers after -identity and similarity as dreamers: while the latter retort, and -name the specialisers empiricists. One intellect considers an action -almost solely by its grounds or motives: another almost solely by -its consequences. Some console themselves for their degradation by -piquing themselves on what they might have been: others despise these -'would-be' minds for what they practically are. What a wealth there -lies in each of us, which our nearest friends know nothing of, and -which has never been made outward! But in this mode of thought, it is -the persistent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span> delusion, misleading science no less than metaphysics -and the reflective thinking of ordinary life, to suppose that either of -two relative terms has an existence and value of its own. In Germany -paper-money is sometimes known as 'Schein' or Show. That term marks its -relativity to the gold or silver currency of the realm: and it would -be as absurd to pay with Austrian paper-money in Persia, as to take -one term of Essence apart from its correlative. The disputes about -essences, about matters and forces, about substance, about freedom and -necessity, or cause and effect, are generally aggravated by a forced -abstraction of one term from another on which its meaning and existence -depend.</p> - -<p>The essence may be roughly defined as that measure or standard which -corresponds to the variation of immediate being, and yet remains -identical in all variation. Or, if we like, we may say that this -immediate being, which, as derivative, may now be called existence<a name="FNanchor_1_219" id="FNanchor_1_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_219" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>, -has its ground in the essence. The essence is the ground of existence: -and essence which exists is a 'thing,' Such an existing essence or -thing subsists in its properties; and these properties are only found -in the thing. Thus the essence, when it comes into existence as a -thing, turns out to be a mere phenomenon or appearance.—Such briefly -stated is the development of essence proper into appearance.</p> - -<p>With the idea of essential being—a permanent which yet changes, there -emerge the problems connected with the double aspect of relation as -identity and difference,—the favourite categories of reflection. These -terms indeed the popular logician would fain avoid as savouring of -pedantic accuracy, and prefers the psychological titles of similarity -and contrast.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span> These, he tends to insinuate, are unique experiences, -direct feelings, beyond which it is impossible to go in analysis. -The logician, on the other hand, must insist on dealing with the -more radical phase of the terms. And he must note their essential -interdependence and their intrinsic contradictoriness. Abstract -sameness, or sameness which does not presuppose a tinge of difference, -is a fiction of weak thought, which wishes to simplify the subtlety -of nature. Identity is a relative term, and for that very reason -presupposes difference: and for the same reason difference presupposes -identity and is meaningless without it. The whole dispute about -'Personal Identity,' as it descends from one English psychologist to -another, is enveloped in the obscurity which springs from failure to -grasp the logical antinomy on which the question turns. When I feel -that my friend whom I have not met for years is still the same, should -I take the trouble to express myself in this manner, unless with -reference to the difference betwixt Then and Now? If I remark that -two men are different, would the remark be worth making or hearing -unless there was some identity which made that difference all the -more striking? The essence is, in short, the unity of sameness and -difference: and when so apprehended, it is the ground by which we -explain existence. The essence, ground, or possibility, is at once -itself and not itself: if it is self-identical, it is for the same -reason self-distinguishing. If it is to be itself, it can only be so -by negativing what in it is other than itself. The affirmation of self -implies the negation of the other of self,—the redintegration (though -not the blank absorption) of the other in it. This is the <i>crux</i> which -lies in <i>Ex nihilo nihil fit:</i> what exists must not be other than -the essence (the effect not more than the cause),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span> and yet unless it -is other and different, there has been no passage from essence to -existence.</p> - -<p>The tendency to identify, and the tendency to distinguish, alternate -both in scientific thought and in general culture. But whichever -prevail for the moment, it is only as a re-action and a protest against -the one-sided predominance of the other. And thus both ultimately -rest upon and presuppose a ground of existence which is neither mere -sameness nor mere difference. It is only when the two tendencies meet -and interpenetrate that science accomplishes its end, and discovers -the ground of existence. In the first instance the world presents to -incipient science the aspect of mere identity and of mere difference. -Likeness is confounded with sameness, and unlikeness with diversity. -The popular and the infant minds do not draw fine distinctions. Things -to them are either the same or different: one point of sameness may -in certain conditions obliterate whole breadths of difference; and -tiny divergence may make as nothing all the many points of agreement, -purely and simply, i. e. abstractly. But the process of comparison, -setting things beside each other, teaches us to refine a little, and -speak of things as Like or Unlike. One thing is like another when the -element of identity preponderates: it is unlike, when the difference -is uppermost. Thus while we distinguish things from one another, we -connect them. From mere variety, and mere sameness, we have risen, -secondly, to distinctions of like and unlike. But, thirdly, this -distinction of same and different is in the thing itself. Everything -includes an antithesis or contradiction in it: it is at once positive -and negative. One can only be virtuous, so long as one is not utterly -virtuous.<a name="FNanchor_2_220" id="FNanchor_2_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_220" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> To be a philosopher, implies that you are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span> not wholly or -merely a philosopher. The rational animal is so, because of an inherent -irrationality, and is so, only as rising upon and superseding it. Every -epithet, so to speak, by which you describe any reality, presupposes in -it the negative of the quality. Not only does every negation presuppose -an attempted or surmised affirmation, but an affirmation is always, -it may be said, a re-affirmation against an incipient doubt. Every -stage of reality involves the presence of antithetical but inseparable -elements: every light implies a shadow to set it forth. The epithet -of each real is only <i>a potiori.</i> While it retains itself, it must -lose itself. Its positivity is only secured by its self-negation and -its identity is based upon its self-distinction. Every proposition -which conveys real knowledge is a statement that self-sameness is -combined with difference. Every such proposition is synthetical: it -unites or identifies what is supposed to be implicitly different, -or differentiates what seemed only identical. Here we have that -<i>coincidentia oppositorum,</i> which is the truth of essence. Thus, e. g. -the essence of the Self is the contradiction between its self-centred -unity and its existence by self-differentiation into elements.</p> - -<p>Essence, thus comprehended as the unity of identity and difference, -as that which is and is not the same, is the Ground, from which an -Existence comes as the Consequent. Or, otherwise expressed, the ground -is the source of the differences,—the point where they converge into -unity, and whence they diverge into existence. Everything in existence -has such a ground: or, as it is somewhat tautologically stated in the -common formula, a sufficient ground. On that account, it is no great -matter to give reasons or grounds for a thing, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span> no amount of them -can render a thing either right or wrong, unless in reference to some -given and supposedly fixed point. For the ground only states the same -thing over again in a mediate or reflected form. It carries back the -actual fact to its antecedent: and thus deprives it of its abruptness -or inexplicability, by showing you it was there implicitly; and -therefore as you accepted the ground you cannot complain of what but -serves to continue it. To refer to the ground is to say there is really -nothing new: and as you raised no objection before, you need raise none -now.</p> - -<p>The Existent world—a world of existents, each conditioning and -conditioned—is popularly described as a world of Things. These -Things are the solid hinges on which turns our ordinary conception of -change and action. They act, and exhibit properties. Being is partly -substantive, partly adjective. The Thing itself is the ground of -its properties: i. e. each thing is looked upon as a unity in which -different relations converge, or an identity which subsists through its -changing states. This is the side emphasised in ordinary life, when -a thing is regarded as the permanent and enduring subject, which has -certain properties. But a little science or a little reflection soon -turns the tables upon the thing, and shows that the properties are -independent matters, which, temporarily it may be, converge or combine -into a factitious unity which we term a thing. But these very matters -cannot be independent or whole, just because they interpenetrate each -other in the thing. The thing, which from one point of view seemed -permanent, and the properties, which from another point of view seemed -self-subsistent matters, are neither of them more than appearance. For -they must be at one, and at one they cannot be. And if we reduce the -various matters to one, and speak<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span> of Matter in general, we have a mere -abstraction—a something which only becomes real by being stamped with -a special form. <i>Mere</i> Matter like <i>mere</i> Thing (thing in itself) is a -knowable Unknowable.</p> - -<p>In this way we pass from the talk about essence, things, and matter -into an other range of the sphere of relativity. We no longer have -one order of being behind or in the depth, and another referring back -to it. We now speak (as Mill does) of Phenomena:—not phenomena of -an unknown, but, simply disregarding the background, we find all we -want upon the surface. For neither is thing more real than property, -nor essence than existence. Each is exactly equal in reality to the -other, and that reality is its relation to the other. The thing and -the essence with their claim to truth disappear. Nothing truly is: -but only appears to be. The semblance (<i>Schein</i>) may refer to an -essential. But the appearance (<i>Erscheinung</i>) only refers to another -appearance, and so on. The phenomenal world is all on one level:—as -was the world of immediate being. But, there, each term of being -presented itself as independent: here, nothing is independent—nothing -ever really <i>is,</i> but only represents something else, which is in its -turn representative. Yet even here there is a pretence of hierarchy -in existence. In the phenomenon a certain superiority is attributed -to its Law. But the conception of Law is hard to keep in its proper -place. Either it assumes a permanency—even were it but a permanent -possibility—as contrasted with the coming and passing phenomenon: -and then it is apt to be confounded with a real Essence. Or, on the -other hand, it comes to be looked on as a mere way of colligating -phenomena,—as a mere appearance in the variety of appearance (as it -were an iris in the rain-drops)—a phenomenon of a phenomenon. Such<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span> a -distinction between the phenomenon and its law; therefore, is and must -be illusory, or itself only an appearance. As such it is described as -the difference of Form and Content: two terms, which are incessantly -opposed, but which more than most antitheses reveal when pressed the -hollowness of their opposition. For true or developed Form is Content, -and <i>vice versa.</i></p> - -<p>Instead however of this practical identification of the law of the -phenomenon with the duly-formulated phenomenon itself, it is more -natural to emphasise the discordance of the two aspects of reality, -and yet to acknowledge their essential relativity. This essential -relativity in the phenomenon has a threefold aspect: the relation of -whole and parts; of force and the exertion of force; of inward and -outward. The relation of whole and parts tends to explain by statical -composition: the relation of force and its exertion, by dynamical -construction. According to the former the parts are constituted by -their dependence upon and in the whole, and yet the whole is composed -by the addition of the several parts together. Each extreme is what -it is only through the other. Only those parts can make up a whole, -which somehow have the whole in them: and to become the whole, they -must contrive to wholly obliterate their partitional character. A -better exhibition of the inner unity and the difference between form -and contents is seen in the relation of a force to its exertion. Here -the contents appear under a double form: first, under the form of mere -identity, as force,—secondly, under the form of mere distinction, -as the manifestation of that force. Yet a force is only such in its -utterance or manifestation, while in that utterance, if abstracted -from the force it carries forth, all energy has been superseded. -This separation of content and form, or of content as developed in -two forms, appears<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_450" id="Page_450">[Pg 450]</a></span> still more clearly in the third relation: that -of outward and inward. This is a popular distinction of very wide -application in reference to phenomena. But neither outside nor inside -is anything apart from its correlative. If the elements implied in the -conception of phenomena are to have full justice done them, it must be -expanded so as to give expression to these two phases, to include the -outward and the inward. But at first only by reverting to something -like the old distinction of essence and existence,—an essence however -which is existent or phenomenal, and an existence which stands -independent, though in correlation. Such being is Actuality—being, i. -e. which is what it must be, and must be what it is.</p> - -<p>Actuality, though it comes under the general head of Essence, tends -to pass away into another sphere. Here, as elsewhere, we see that -the general rubric of a sphere is only partially applicable to some -of its subordinate sections. In essence proper there were, or were -assumed to be, two grades of being—a real or essential, and an -unessential or seeming: or being was regarded (contradictorily) both -as ideal (as one thing) and real (as having several properties). In -Appearance or Manifestation the aspects of being are supposed to lie -on a level; but they are always a pair of aspects, one side of which -is entirely dependent for its explanation on a reflection from the -other, e. g. whole and parts, the favourite category for explaining -the larger unities. But in the category of actuality there is nothing -so merely potential, so unessential as mere essence recognised: and -each actual is something firm and self-supporting which does not, -like a phenomenon, merely borrow its reality from its antithesis or -correlative. Thus we have, in a way, got back to the characteristics -of immediate being: only, as we find it,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_451" id="Page_451">[Pg 451]</a></span> we have this affirmation of -the self-subsistence of reals contradictorily accompanied with the -conviction of their necessary interdependence. It is a reflective (or -correlated), not an immediate reality. There is no other world of being -to have recourse to for explanation now: nor can we play back and -forward from aspect to aspect of a reality which never comes forward -itself, but only as a reflection on or from another. The world of -reality is a self-contained world: its parts and phases are each hard -realities: and for that reason they bear hard upon each other in the -bond of necessity.</p> - -<p>The total actuality falls naturally in our conception into three -elements. We separate first the central fact—the nucleus of the -business, the concentrated reality in reality: the fact in its -mere identity and inner abstractness: the ultimate drift or inner -possibility of things. Then we turn to the rest of the concrete -fact—all without which the fact would not be itself—the detail -and particularity: this we treat as a sort of materials or passive -conditions from which the real fact is to be produced, on which it -is dependent and which precede it in time. Lastly, in order to get -back the unity of the fact from these two unconnected elements, we -refer to some agency which puts them together. The End—or thing to -be realised—(so to speak) has to be brought out by a motive agency -(efficient cause) which imposes the form (or general character) on -the matter and makes these one. By this analysis, however, we have -only put asunder what is one experience and introduced a mechanical -(external) unifier needlessly. The name of <i>conditions</i> is given to the -particulars or details, considered apart from the rest of the fact, -and hypothetically invested with an existence anterior to it, with -the implication, first, that they are self-subsistent, and secondly, -that they to some extent involve the rest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_452" id="Page_452">[Pg 452]</a></span> of it. Again, the general -fact, the fact in its mere nominal or abstract generality or essence, -its mere possibility, does not exist separately: every fact when in -thought completed has its so-called conditions not outside it, but as -constituent elements, aspects, or factors in it. Lastly, the so-called -agency is the active element itself in the act, an aspect or factor -in the totality: the aspect which keeps actuality together as a -self-energising fact—a <i>Thathandlung</i> and not a mere <i>Thatsache</i> (to -quote Fichte's phrase). Our practical and technical habits, where the -agent is other than his materials and aims, lead us to draw the same -distinctions in the realm of total Nature: they are aspects useful <i>in -ordine ad hominem</i> which we, without due modification, apply <i>in ordine -ad Universum.</i></p> - -<p>It is originally in our practical operations that the distinctions -of necessary and possible emerge,—with a view to the accomplishment -of our desires and purposes. That is necessary which is required and -needed if some bare plan is projected and is to be actualised: it is -the condition or conditions without which the end cannot be attained. -It is an epithet of the means. Possible, on the contrary, is an -epithet of the end or plan, and denotes that there are means for its -attainment, without however always specifying that this is known of the -present or given instance. It is clear that everything as regards the -application of these terms will depend on the definiteness with which -the plan is conceived, both in itself so to speak and in its relations -with the rest of the circumstances. On the other hand, when a result -emerges without being included in the purpose, and without any means -having been employed for attaining it, it is said to be a chance, -accident, or contingency.</p> - -<p>These terms are applied by analogy to the uses of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_453" id="Page_453">[Pg 453]</a></span> theoretical -explanation. Just as in will you have a general aim to begin with, -which becomes more and more determinate as it moves forward in the -volitional process to execution; so in the attempt to understand the -world you suppose it first of all the mere shadow or phantom of itself, -a promise and potentiality of things to come: a next-to-nothing, -which however you credit with a magic wealth of potential being. So -much indeed may this possibility be emphasised that nothing more -is needed: it is possible, and, without a thought of difficulties -and counteractives, you could swear that it is actual<a name="FNanchor_3_221" id="FNanchor_3_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_221" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>. Being -removed above this solid land of actuality, cut off from the ties -and bonds of conditions, it fancies itself moving in its vacuum; -and being free from all bonds of actuality fancies itself actually -free, or self-disposing, whereas it can only claim this <i>liberum -arbitrium indifferentiae,</i> so long as it remains bare and powerless -possibility—a mere may-be, which, apart from all conditions, would -exist only by a mere contingency, or freak of chance. This mere -potentiality—being only an ante-dated, presupposed, and hypothetical -actuality—being only a substance or substratum—must be raised out -of its supposititious existence into reality by means of appropriate -conditions. These conditions are necessary to its resuming its place -or reaching a place in actuality. Thus each object becomes actual or -real from a presupposed possibility by means of an external necessity. -As in the former case the possibility was identified with power, -and conditions were left out of sight as comparatively unimportant: -so here the possibility—taken to lie at the root of the thing—is -made a mere susceptibility, which would be nothing actual unless -stimulated and necessitated from outside.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_454" id="Page_454">[Pg 454]</a></span> This necessity in the very -heart of actuality (which is its characteristic to the reflectional -mode of mind) thus arises from the separation and hypostatisation -of its elements into independent powers which are so far in stress -and opposition. This is the climax of metaphysics—if metaphysics -be the investiture of the dynamic factors of the notion with the -power and character of supposed agents or forces. It appears in -three phases, with the three categories of substance, cause, and -reciprocity. To the first, reality is regarded as dominated by its -mere underlying potentiality: the reality of the mere superficial -contingents is controlled by the necessity of its latent or substantial -being. To explain event or incident, here, is merely to bind it -to the generic nature or the intrinsic doom, which—unexplained -and inexplicable—manifests itself in an extrinsically fluctuating -appearance of facts: e. g. the single crime is explained as the product -of social conditions. Under the conception of Causality, each thing is -a mere might-be which owes all its actuality to a definite antecedent -or cause,—an antecedent termed for the moment unconditional, but anon -reduced to dependence on further conditions. The effect is as a fact: -but would not have been so unless for an earlier fact—i. e. unless the -effect in a supposed earlier stage of its growth had been helped on by -certain conditions or circumstances to acquire actual and full being in -the effect. And cause and conditions can change places, according to -what we happen to regard as the central nucleus or inner possibility -of the effect. Lastly, the conception of reciprocity recognises that -causality is rather an arbitrary simplification of reality into strands -of rectilinear event; it remembers that Substance emphasises the -dependence of each non-independent element on the supposed totality -which they grow from,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_455" id="Page_455">[Pg 455]</a></span> and doing so, it lays down the reversibility -and essential elasticity of the causal relation. The cause in causing -re-acts upon itself, and the effect is itself a cause of the effect, -active as well as passive. The dependence in short is all-environing: -nowhere is there any loop-hole to escape from necessity. Motives act -on purpose, and purpose acts on motives: the stone hurls back the hand -that hurled it.</p> - -<p>Explanation is thus baffled and thus forced to recognise its own -limitations. The simplest fact is beyond all the powers of explanatory -science to do full justice to: for to know fully the 'flower in the -crannied wall' after this method of explanation would involve endless -multiples of action and re-action. The antinomy between necessity -and contingency arose by following out the antithesis, so natural to -us, between selfsame and different, essence and existence, substance -and accidents, till they were invested with a right to independent -place and function. But the separation of the abstract receptacle -of possibility, self-same and essential, from the equally abstract -conditions which fill it up and make it actual, is only the great -human instrumentality of comprehension, which however is not reached -until each thing is realised and idealised as an individual, which -has universality and has particularity, but never either alone. -Its universality is possibility—its particularity the aspect of -contingency: but these aspects are in submission to an inclusive unity. -The real when ill known seems contingent; when somewhat better known -it seems necessary by external (physical) compulsion; in its truth -to intelligence, the real is a self-active, a <i>causa sui,</i> or it is -necessary by that self-determination which is the freedom of autonomy.</p> - -<p>The view of the world under the category of actuality<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_456" id="Page_456">[Pg 456]</a></span> (Reality), and -as dominated by the law of causality, is the culminating stand-point -of scientific or reflective realism. It began with a mere descriptive -science, naming and qualifying the successive aspects of being,—with -description which passed through numeration into the definiteness -of measurement. But all such determination was found to imply the -existence of a permanent reality, or at least to involve the reference -of one reality to another, outside of it, and yet not independent -of relations to it, which had to make part of its nature. To the -scientific realist the sum of fact presents itself independent of -consciousness, as a complicated mass of real elements governed by -laws and subject to necessities. Each thing or state of a thing is -explained by reference to something outside it, which is its cause, and -measured by something inside it which is its unit or atomic standard. -Alternately the reference, and the unit are designated arbitrary -(contingent) and necessary (essential): i. e. they are sometimes -considered as only a way of looking at reality<a name="FNanchor_4_222" id="FNanchor_4_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_222" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>—and sometimes as -inevitable implications and conditions of reality.</p> - -<p>All this is Objective Logic: or, so far as it does not realise -its implications, it is Metaphysics. Its terms of thought<a name="FNanchor_5_223" id="FNanchor_5_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_223" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> are -in practice treated as elements of a reality which is what it is, -apart from thought-conditions, apart from consciousness. As Hegel -exhibits them in their interdependence, they hint their underlying -thought-nature, which in their empirical applications is hardly -apparent. For to the realistic stand-point mind and subjectivity are -left out of account as only passive onlookers. The realist may no -doubt speak of a Subject: but he means a real, a corporeal self,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_457" id="Page_457">[Pg 457]</a></span> an -actual amongst other actuals. If he speaks of mind and will, such mind -and will are parts and ingredients in a general scheme of causes and -effects; they are points of transition through which passes the moving -stream of event. They also are things and substances. They are agents -and patients, always both, no doubt but the chief circumstance to note -is that they are actuals, and that even knowledge and will are regarded -as species of action and motion.</p> - -<p>When Protagoras laid down his maxim that <i>Man is the measure of all -things</i>, he stated, apparently in an ambiguous manner, that the fact -of measure (and all that mensuration implies), and (we may add) -the existence of correlation in actuality, presupposed for their -explanation the assumption of Mind and subjectivity. Mind thus became -the basis of all actuality which claimed to be objective—claimed, in -short, to be actual. The truth and objectivity of the objective lies in -the subjective; Mind is its own measure, i. e. the absolute measure, -and it is self-relation. So Kant had taught and Fichte enforced. The -basis of objectivity is the subjective; but a subjective different -from that so-called by the plain man or by the naive psychologist. By -the subjective he does not, as the plain man, understand the compound -of body and soul, the living and breathing organism amid outer -objects—nor, as the psychological idealist does, a psychical process, -a series or bundle of states of consciousness, always contrasted -with a reality, <i>the</i> reality outside consciousness. It is true that -his language resembles the language of psychology: as Herbart and -others have said, that is to be expected, for he talks of mind and -consciousness. But the consciousness he speaks of is a unity that -includes all space and all time: it is one and all-embracing, infinite, -because not as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_458" id="Page_458">[Pg 458]</a></span> individual (psychological) consciousness set in -antithesis to reality, as the other half of the duality of existence. -It is consciousness generalised<i>—Bewusstsein überhaupt—</i>an eternal, -i. e. a timeless consciousness, an universal i. e. not a localised, -mind:—a necessary Idea, but with an inward self-regulating necessity. -Such a consciousness Fichte called the Absolute Ego: but as we saw -before, the adjective transforms the substantive. Such a consciousness, -which is absolute self-consciousness, is the Idea:—no psychical event, -but the logical condition and explanation of reality whether physical -or psychical. The Idea is the presupposition of epistemology, but -of an epistemology which claims to occupy the place of old usurped -by metaphysics. Metaphysics has no higher category than actuality: -transcendental logic shows that actuality rests in the Idea,—reality -conceived and conception realised.</p> - -<hr class="r5" /> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_219" id="Footnote_1_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_219"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Existence,</i> as opposed to <i>Dasein</i>, should thus imply -the emergence into efficient being from a state of quietude or passive -latency (<i>Wesen</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_220" id="Footnote_2_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_220"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> As Aristotle says, The brave man stands his ground, yet -fearing: (cf. Tolstoi: <i>Siege of Sevastopol</i>). If he does not fear, -brave is not the word for him.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_221" id="Footnote_3_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_221"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Put into Greek, the mere ἐνδέχεται (<i>licet,</i> or -<i>forsitan</i>) is taken as equivalent to δύναμαι (<i>possum</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_222" id="Footnote_4_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_222"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Herbart's <i>Zufällige Ansicht</i>, or contingent aspect.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_223" id="Footnote_5_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_223"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> 'Denkbestimmungen.'</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_459" id="Page_459">[Pg 459]</a></span></p></div> - - - - -<h5>CHAPTER XXXII.</h5> - - -<h4>LOGIC OF COMPREHENSION AND IDEALISM: THE NOTION.</h4> - - -<p>The distinction between the psychical or psychological idea and the -logical concept has been more than once alluded to. The idea or -representation is under psychical form exactly equivalent to the -undigested and passively accepted thing to which we give the title of -physical or external. It is the ideal, in the sense of the psychical, -pendant to the real: and hangs up in the mental view in the same way as -the real object to the physical perception. It is in brief the crude -object, considered not as existing, but as a state of consciousness—it -is a reduplication in inner space of the thing in outer space. If we -cannot say it is altogether mythological, we must however note that -it is simply a psychical reflex, which has an existence only through -abstraction, and is neither more or less than the object apprehended -without comprehension.</p> - -<p>The concept or notion is more than an image, and less than an image. An -idea-image is symbolical of the unanalysed totality of the thing. But -the notion is in the first instance due to an analysis, and secondly, -a reconstruction of the thing. It takes up the thing in its relations: -it thinks it, i. e. it abstracts and mutilates it, and artificially -recombines. It implies analysis and synthesis. It produces a sort of -manufactured thing: a mental construction. But<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_460" id="Page_460">[Pg 460]</a></span> the construction—as -contrasted with the passivity that says first A and then B and a -connexion of them—has the traces of subjective or mental violence -about it: for violence there is in the act of comprehension. We have -however got together in unity what actuality in the process of history -let fall asunder, and could only, at the best, show as independent -reals held against their will in ubiquitous relations of reciprocity. -But the unity in which the individual sets the universal and the -particular is an imported unity, which though it gives place and -explanation to the elements of reality, seems to impose its synthesis -upon reality. So far the concept is subjective only. It is an ample -explanation including the facts, but not quite self-explanatory. <i>We</i> -conceive, and judge, and reason: but all this is alien to the object.</p> - -<p>But there is a counterpart almost in antagonism to this. There is -a concept, i. e. a grouping of existence into totals mediated by -necessary links, which presents itself as embodied in things: and -this embodied concept is the objective world. That world, apart from -our interpretation and conception, offers itself as a synthesis of -universal, particular and individual. It groups itself into systems, -mechanical, chemical, and teleological. But in all of these there -is lacking the evidence of the inward and subjective principle of -unification. The unity is external, the members are held in a vice: -their unity is given as a fact: it follows through certain laws and -does not reveal itself. There is a want of perspicuity of connexion: -logic—the need of inner explanation—in short, is not satisfied by -this logic of facts. It is rather a realm of necessity than of freedom. -It wants life; wants true self-activity. As in the subjective notion, -the facts resented the hand of the logician (for here is the sphere -of logic proper in the old<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_461" id="Page_461">[Pg 461]</a></span> Aristotelian sense), and refused to show -themselves in the simple and transparent transitions of his argument: -so the objective synthesis of the members of a mechanical system, or -of a kingdom of means and ends, lacks the freedom and lucidity of -inner movement which logical insight demands. Objectivity—the logic -of fact—is a syllogism of necessity, so hardened and fixed that the -necessity of the conclusion is more obvious than the self-determination -by the syllogism.</p> - -<p>The third stage of the Notion shows the union of the pellucidity and -ideality of the syllogistic progress with the necessity and reality -of the objective order. Here actuality and the concept are at one. At -first as a mere fact—or more fact than idea. Life, organic life, is -no doubt development: a totality which is in all its parts, and where -parts have their being in the total. But life as such, the so-called -vital principle, does not emancipate itself to a true universal: it is -immersed in its particulars. Intellectual life, on the contrary,—the -form of consciousness—rises independent and distinct from the -totality of life. Psychology follows Biology. But as such—under the -form of intellect and will—it has an antithesis no less fatal to its -absoluteness than the opposite one-sidedness of life. There is—to -put it in language more familiar to the present day—there is an -analogue of life in all nature; and all reality, even the rock and the -crystal, has its life-history. There is, properly speaking, no mere -inorganic reality: organic life is universal. And then, going a step -further, we attribute to all reality something analogous to a soul, or -a consciousness. We talk, in rash moods, of mind-stuff and feelings, -even in molecules. But as Spinoza has reminded us, terms like Will -and Intellect have about them something finite, because they imply -an antagonism to an object: they are predominantly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_462" id="Page_462">[Pg 462]</a></span> subjective. The -reality in its final truth must be a subject-object: the adequacy of -thought and being, the equation of real and ideal, the intellection -which is life. And this is called Absolute Idea. It is natural to -translate such an equation, when made a result, into a mere blank. -And a blank it would be, if we suppose all that has gone before -obliterated, and only the result left. Then, in the coincidence of -opposites, we have only a zero of a gulf of negation. A life which <i>is</i> -consciousness may seem to fade away like a vague ideal with no reality. -A consciousness which <i>is</i> life can be no consciousness at all. The -<i>is</i> and the <i>is known</i> dare not coincide or they perish both.</p> - -<p>A categorical proposition, says Hegel, can never express a speculative -truth. That is to say: the subject over-rides the predicate, or the -predicate makes you ignore the subject. The affirmation keeps out -of sight the negation. To say that life <i>is</i> consciousness makes us -forget that the very assertion would not and could not be made, unless -also life were other than consciousness. In its full proportion of -meaning, therefore, the proposition must imply a return to unity -through difference, to identity through otherness. Affirmation, -fully realised, is re-affirmation through negation. Cognition is but -recognition deepened by contrast. This law which governs—or rather -which is—logic; the principle of identity through contradiction—must -not be lost sight of in the supreme struggle of thought. The Idea is -the unity of life and consciousness: but it is a unity in which they -are (<i>aufgehoben</i>)—not a zero in which they utterly collapse.</p> - -<p>We may illustrate in two ways. In the first we may compare the -'Ενεργεια of Aristotle. That is his formula of reality. Nominally -it only means activity and actuality: and sums up the metaphysical -formula for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_463" id="Page_463">[Pg 463]</a></span> what really is,—the hard fact of being. But through it -there glimmers the meaning of consciousness. It not merely is, but -it means what it is. Energy of Soul is the end of life—the supreme -fulfilling of desire, and consummation of tendency. As such it is, and -feels that it is. It is the virtuous deed, which is its own reward. But -Aristotle seems sometimes to fall from that identification of being and -consciousness. The world of <i>praxis</i> parts from the world of <i>Theoria.</i> -In that case the activity is a mere activity—the outward shell of -action: and then, as a supplement or complement to the abstract result -of the activity the consciousness of achievement gets a distinct -position as Pleasure: and the activity, now no consummation, but only -a means to an end, get its completion from this arbitrarily abstracted -shadow of reality.[1]</p> - -<p>The second illustration may come from Mr. Spencer.</p> - -<p>'We can think of Matter only in terms of Mind. We can think of Mind -only in terms of Matter. When we have pushed our explorations of the -first to the uttermost limit we are referred to the second for a -final answer: and when we have got the final answer of the second we -are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it.' Beyond -this see-saw indeed we cannot go, so as to leave it behind: but in -reality we transcend it. The Mind that is in terms of Matter is partly -the region of psychic event, partly the world of science, art and -religion. And psychic event is always antithetical to physical reality. -But the spiritual world already includes the antithesis of psychical -and physical, and including it keeps it as a principle of life and -consciousness. The supreme or absolute mind does not indeed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_464" id="Page_464">[Pg 464]</a></span> rise above -Physis and Psyche so as to have no antagonism: but it is the unity of -antitheses.</p> - -<p>What those who crave for something higher than this rest in unrest, -this life in consciousness and consciousness in life, want, would -destroy the very condition of reality. Still philosophising, they would -be above philosophy. They want an objective reality in which they may -still their beating hearts,—a 'repose which ever is the same' and -yet is not annihilation:—to sink into the great sea of being, and -leave consciousness with its radical division behind. Such a craving -philosophy, in Hegers hands, has no power of satisfying. It cannot, in -the sense in which Jacobi and Schelling used the words, reveal Being. -It cannot get at the <i>That</i> except by means of the <i>What,</i> and is the -eternal antithesis and correlation of these two. It will always be -rational and logical—for it is its function to think being: and it -will re-affirm that an unthought and a-logical being is a mere name, -which in the language of humanity at least has no meaning, whatever -it may stand for in the Volapük of imagined gods. To go beyond this -correlation of Being and Thought is therefore no advance, but a relapse -into the <i>Natura Naturans</i>, which, in its abstract completeness, <i>is,</i> -but dare not be anything. Philosophy therefore in its supreme Idea is -still the 'Ενεργεια of θεωρία, and not bare Οὐσία. For it mere Being -is always Nothing. And to be actual it must live in antithesis and -live victorious over antithesis. It follows the law of humanity <i>(Und -das heisst ein Kämpfer sein</i>)—which can only exist in warfare as a -church militant, but for continuous existence must also be a church -triumphant. Like religion and art, it sometimes craves for utter union -in the fullness of Being. Such a fullness is the unspeakable and the -vain,—which we may picture as the apathy of Nirvana;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_465" id="Page_465">[Pg 465]</a></span> but which is the -absorption of Art, Religion and Philosophy,—the cease of consciousness -and an abyss. We may call it—it matters not—Being.</p> - -<p>These stages of the Notion must be examined in somewhat fuller detail. -The subjective notion is the effort at the comprehension (at first -subjective) of the two correlated elements into which actuality as -such has been seen to fall—and to fall again and again without -end. It brings out, or explicates (and with some opposition to the -divisions of reality) the unity which was presupposed by the antagonist -and inseparable reals. Hitherto we have had two things or aspects -in relation and move from one to the other by an act of reflection. -But to get two points in relation, they must belong to or exist in -a unity. The divided reality of cause and effect must, if it is to -be intelligible, submit to a unification of its elements. It is -comparatively easy to get on if we are always allowed to have one foot -on solid ground, and can move the other. Give us a standing-point, and -explanation is simplified. But to get a notion of things is, it may -seem, to transcend them, or get beneath them, and take a stand-point -outside actuality which shall unify them. If we added to immediate -being a further element to explain it, it may be said we now superadd -a third to explain the two others. Over and above the different and -related elements, there is assumed to be a unity. And at first it is -certainly such a superimposed element, added to the facts, and regarded -as our way of looking at them, as a subjective notion or grasp, holding -together what is in itself reluctant to be unified.</p> - -<p>The three aspects or factors in a Concept are the Universal, the -Particular, and the Individual. These are what Hegel calls the -'moments' or 'vanishing factors' of the notion. They are 'vanishing,' -because<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_466" id="Page_466">[Pg 466]</a></span> in their logical mobility they form a pellucid union: if they -are distinct, yet they refuse to be independent of one another. Or, we -may say, each in its truth is the meeting-ground and unification of -the two others, thus forming a sort of cycle of perpetual movement. -And in this way we may see that the addition of the third has really -been a simplification: it has made two one. For the Unit which welds -together is not a <i>tertium quid</i>, but simply the explicit statement -and assertion of the truth implied in the antithesis, which was yet -inseparability, of the two others. And for the same reason, neither -mere universal nor mere particular nor mere individual are full -reality, when taken apart. One can understand how Hegel could speak of -the 'Bacchantelike intoxication' of the concept. It may be illustrated -by the following utterances in which a modern psychologist labours -to express the complex unity of mental fact. First we are told that -a 'nervous shock,' e. g. the awakening caused by a sudden blow, or a -simple sensation (so-called), is the ultimate unit of consciousness. -And if this were all, it would correspond to the qualities of immediate -being, which we can suppose measurable: we should get a science of -purely empirical psychology based on psychical atoms. But, immediately -after, it appears that the 'relational element' is never absent from -the lowest stage of consciousness. Accordingly, besides feelings, there -<i>must be</i> relations between feelings. And that means a good deal: -especially if we also note the proposition that, in truth, 'neither a -feeling nor a relation is an independent element of consciousness,' -Evidently you cannot have either without both, and it seems difficult -to have both when neither is independent. Nor does it mend matters to -learn that 'a relation is a momentary feeling': for that only seems -a way of implying that it is, and yet is not,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_467" id="Page_467">[Pg 467]</a></span> a feeling. Such are -the difficulties that beset the sincere attempt to comprehend. The -fixed points of explanation stagger under the burden of truth; and -their unsteadiness shows that they lack the full foundation. Yet that -foundation—it must be repeated—is not something extra: it is the -underlying unity which gives life to the relativity of the separates.</p> - -<p>For the peculiarity of the Notional stand-point is that it insists on -thorough comprehension. The usual explanation refers us from a later to -an earlier, from a strange to a familiar, from a complex to a simple, -from compound to elements. It keeps analysis and synthesis, induction -and deduction apart. To comprehend is, on the other hand, to light up -earlier by later and later by earlier, and carry both into their unity. -It does not merely refer existence to its ground, phenomenon to law, -or effect to cause; because beyond these it has still to reveal the -unity of nature which carries on one of these into the other. Thus, the -explanatory method in Social Science may either refer us to the simple -elements or parts out of which the total is composed, or to an earlier -stage in the same institution's life. The analytical sociologist -does the former: the historical the latter. Neither really faces the -problem. For if the whole is made up of parts, it is made up of parts -which have been characterised by the whole. If the later has come -from the earlier, that only shows that the nature of the earlier was -inadequately ascertained. Development—which implies a permanent which -changes, an identity which is also different,—is thus more than mere -reference to an antecedent; because the antecedent must also figure as -a simultaneous. <i>Cessante causa, cessat et effectus.</i> But here, in the -concept (or λόγος) or syllogism, the permanent exists as the—may we -call it—consciousness<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_468" id="Page_468">[Pg 468]</a></span> which binds together the elements of reality, -as the life and the history, which is ideally continuous through real -changes, and is a real unity through the distinctions of appearance.</p> - -<p>Such a comprehension e. g. of the State would show that though it -must have a universal aspect, a particular, and an individual, yet -these are not severally identifiable with the divisions of sovereign, -executive, and people, but that in each of the latter the three -moments of the notion must appear, and that e. g. the people is not -mere people, but also executive and sovereign, just as the sovereign -is no mere sovereign, but also executive and of the people. The same -may be illustrated in the so-called individual. A man in his special -department and sphere of action may very likely lose the sense of his -wholeness and his integrity,—perhaps in more senses than one! He -may reduce himself to the limits of his profession. But in so doing -he becomes untrue, or, in Hegelian parlance, abstract: he fails to -recognise the universality of his position. All work, however petty, -which is done in the right spirit, is holy.</p> - -<p> -'One place performs, like any other place,<br /> -The proper service every place on earth<br /> -Was framed to furnish man with: serves alike<br /> -To give him note, that through the place he sees<br /> -A place is signified he never saw.'<br /> -</p> - -<p>It is a false patriotism, for example, which is inconsistent with the -spirit of universal brotherhood: and there is something radically wrong -with the religion, on the other hand, which cannot be carried into act -amid the pettiness of ordinary practical interests. The universal, -again, is not a world beyond this world of sense and individuals: if it -were so, it would itself be a mere particular. It is rather the world -of sense<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_469" id="Page_469">[Pg 469]</a></span> unified, organised, and, if we may say so, spiritualised. -And an individual which is merely and simply individual is an utter -abstraction, which is quite meaningless, and in the real world -impossible. Or, if we prefer to express the same thing in connexion -with the mind, sensation apart from thought is an inconceivable -abstraction. Sensation is always alloyed with thought, and we can at -the most <i>suppose</i> pure sensation to exist amongst the brutes. The mere -individual opens out and expands: and in that expansion we see the -universal: (sensation is thought in embryo). But, on the other hand, -the developed universal concentrates itself into a point: (thought -returns into the centre of feeling).</p> - -<p>The same process of particular, individual and universal, which thus -goes on under the apparent point of the notion, is more distinctly -and explicitly seen, with due emphasis on the several members, in -the evolution of the notion into the Judgment and the Syllogism. The -judgment is the statement of what each individual notion implicitly is, -viz. a universal or inward nature in itself, or that it is a universal -which individualises itself. The judgment may, therefore, in its -simplest terms be formulated as: The Individual is the Universal. The -connective link,—the copula 'is,' expresses however at first no more -than a mere point-like contact of the two terms, not their complete -identity. By a graduated series of judgments this identity between the -two terms is drawn closer, until in the three terms and propositions of -a syllogism the unity of the three factors of the notion finds its most -adequate expression in (subjective) thought.</p> - -<p>It may be a question how far syllogisms as they are ordinarily found -are calculated to impress this synthesis of the three elements upon the -observer. The three elements there tend to bid each other good-bye, and -are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_470" id="Page_470">[Pg 470]</a></span> only kept together by the awkward means of the middle term, and -the conjunction 'therefore.' In these circumstances it becomes easy -to show, that the major premiss is a superfluity, not adding anything -to the cogency of the argument. But under the prominence of this -criticism of form, we are apt to let slip the real question touching -the nature of the syllogism. And that nature is to give their due place -to the three elements in the notion: which in the syllogism have each -a quasi-independence and difference as separate terms, while they are -also reduced to unity. The syllogism expresses in definite outlines -that everything which we think, or the comprehension which constitutes -an object, is a particular which is individualised by means of its -universal nature. As always, thought refers to reality; and a notion -has to be carried out into objectivity. But as Aristotle complained, -matter is recalcitrant to form. The objective appears at first only as -an opposite, and instead of revealing, it rather obscures and condenses -the features of subjectivity.</p> - -<p>Objectivity, or the thought which has forgotten its origin and stands -out as a world, may be taken in three aspects: Mechanical, Chemical, -and Teleological. That is to say, the mode in which groups or systems -naturally present themselves in the objective world, is threefold. The -contradiction which stands in the way of comprehending objectivity -comes from the fact that it contains subjectivity absorbed in it. In -other words, the object is at once active and passive; as thought and -subjectivity it should be its own synthetiser, as objectivity it is -necessitated to interdependence, and the subjectivity, at this stage, -is in abeyance. Consequently, either the two attributes co-exist, or -they cancel each other, or they are in mutual connexion.</p> - -<p>(1) In the first case the objects are independent, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_471" id="Page_471">[Pg 471]</a></span> yet are -connected with one another. Such connexion is an external one, due -to force, impulse, and outward authority. The principle of union is -implied: but the objects are mutually determined from without. The -more, for example, an object acts upon the imagination, the more -vehement is the reaction of the mind towards it.—(2) But if the -object is independent, as has been allowed, then the determination -from without must really come from within. Thus desire is a turning or -bent towards the object which draws it. The desiring soul leans out of -itself. It gravitates towards a centre: and it is its own nature to be -thus centripetal. The lesser objects of themselves draw closer around -the more prominent object.—(3) But if this gravitation were absolute, -the objects would lose their independence altogether, and sink into -their centre. Accordingly if the independence of these objects is -to remain, there must be, as it were, a double centre, the relative -centre of each object, and the absolute centre of the system to which -it belongs. In each of these three forms of mechanical combination, -the objects continue external and independent. A mechanical theory of -the state regards classes as independent, seeks to produce a balance -between them, separates individuals and associations from the state, -and, in short, conceives the state as one large centralising force with -a number of minor spheres depending upon it, but with a greater or less -amount of self-centred action in each of them.</p> - -<p>The fact is that an object cannot really be thought as thus -independently subsistent. Its real nature is rather affinity,—a -tendency to combine with another: it requires to receive its -complement. Every object is naturally in a state of unstable -equilibrium, with a tendency to quit its isolation and form a union. -This<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_472" id="Page_472">[Pg 472]</a></span> theory, which is called the Chemical theory of an object, -regards it as the reverse of indifferent: as in a permanent state -of susceptibility. When objects thus open and eager for foreign -influences combine, there results a new product, in which both the -constituents are lost, so far as their qualities go. The qualities -of the constituents are neutralised. A man's mind, for example, -prepared by certain culture, meets a new stimulus in some strange -doctrine, and the result is a new form of intellectual life. But at -this point the process, which such a form of objectivity represents, -is closed: all that remains is for the product to break up one day -into its constituent factors. There is no provision made for carrying -it on further. Hence if we are to have a self-regulating system of -objectivity, we must rise above the Chemical theory of objects. And -to do that, the first course is to look at the objective world as -<i>regulated</i> (though not immanently constituted) by the Notion.</p> - -<p>The Notion as regulative of objectivity,—as independent and -self-subsistent, but as in necessary connexion with Objectivity,—is -the End, Aim, or Final Cause. According to this, the Teleological -and practical theory of the Universe[2], the object is considered as -bound to reproduce and carry out the notion, and the notion is looked -upon as meant to execute itself in reality. The two sides, subjective -and objective, are, in other words, in necessary connexion with each -other, but not identical. This is the contrast of the End and the -Means. By the 'Means' is meant an object <i>which is determined by an -End</i>, and which operates upon other objects.—(1) The End is originally -subjective: an instinct or desire after something<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_473" id="Page_473">[Pg 473]</a></span>—a feeling of -want and the wish to remedy it. It is confronted by an objective -mass, which is indifferent to these wishes: and manifests itself as a -tendency outwards,—an appetite towards action. It seizes and uses up -the objective world.—(2) But the End in the second place reduces this -indifferent mass to be an instrument or Means: makes it the middle term -between itself and the object.—(3) But the means is only valuable as -a preparation to the End regarded as Realised, which thus counts as -the truth of the thing. These are the three terms of the Syllogism of -Teleology: the Subjective End, the Means, and the End Realised. It is -the process of adaptation by which each thing is conceived as the means -to some end, and which actively transforms the thing into something -by which that end is realised. In the last resort it presents us with -an objective world in which utility or design is the principle of -systematisation: and in which therefore there is an endless series of -ends which become means to other and higher ends. After all is done, -the object remains foreign to the notion, and is only subsumed under -it, and adapted to it. We want a notion which shall be identifiable -with objectivity—which shall permeate it through and through, as soul -does body. Such a unity of Subjective and Objective—the Motion in (and -not merely in relation to) Objectivity—is what Hegel terms the Idea.</p> - -<p>The first form of the Idea is Life, taking that as a logical category, -or as equivalent to self-organisation. The living, as organisms, are -contrasted with mere mechanisms. The essential progress of modern -science lies in its emphasis on this aspect of the Idea: which includes -all that the teleological period taught about adaptation, and only sets -aside the externality of means to ends there found. The savant of the -last century<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_474" id="Page_474">[Pg 474]</a></span> and the beginning of the present dealt with the object -of his inquiries as a mechanical, chemical, or teleological object. -The modern theorist tends to see the world as one self-evolving Life. -According to the naturalist of last century, kinds of animals and -plants were viewed as convenient, and perhaps arbitrary arrangements: -according to the moderns, these kinds represent the grades or steps in -the life of the natural world.</p> - -<p>What, then, is the nature of the process which we call Life? Is it -adequately or definitely defined as 'a continuous adjustment of -internal to external relations'? Or is it a good deal more than -anything the word 'correspondence' implies? According to Hegel it is -nothing so simple, but a syllogism with three terms, and a syllogism -moreover which permutates its terms and premisses. There is, in the -first place, the term, which is also a process, of self-production. The -living must articulate itself, create for itself limbs and members, and -keep up a perpetual re-creation of morphological and structural system -of parts. Secondly, there is the assimilation of what is external to -the living individual. If there is to be life, spiritual or bodily, -there must be a physiological intus-susception of foreign elements. -Without this the first term or process is impossible. Thirdly, there -must be a term or process of Reproduction or generation by which -the living being passes itself on as a new unit. All life, mental -or bodily, involves Reproduction.—These are the three terms of the -process of vitality.</p> - -<p>But such a life, considered as merely organic, the life studied in -Biology, is only a fragment. The truer life is in the genus, not in the -individual: the consciousness, the sensation which inwardly unifies the -diversity of organic processes. The universal has become the medium -in which the Idea exists: it exists no longer in immediacy.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_475" id="Page_475">[Pg 475]</a></span> The mere -natural life gives place to the life of the Spirit. The life of the -Spirit has the double form of Cognition and Will:—the theoretical and -the practical action of the Idea: or Truth and Goodness. In short, the -Idea divides into two halves, which yet remain the same at bottom: -Reason and the World: but yet there is reason in the world. The action -of the Idea, or its process at this stage, is to bring these two terms -into connexion, and show their ideal unity. Beginning with Reason, it -goes on to discover reason in the World. Truth consists in the adequacy -of object to notion. Such adequacy is the Idea: and an object which -thus corresponds with its notion is an ideal object. The ideal man is -the True Man. Truth is the revelation of rationality from the objective -world: and Cognition is the name for that process. On the other hand, -Goodness is the realisation of rationality in the objective world: -and the Will is the name for that process. Truth proceeds from the -Objectivity: Goodness from the Subjectivity. But truth can only proceed -(analytically) from the objective world, in so far as it is produced -(synthetically) by the subjectivity. And, on the other hand, when the -good is realised in objectivity, it is submitted to the process of -Cognition.</p> - -<p>With the unity of Life and Consciousness, the Absolute Idea, we reach -the supreme effort of Logic. In Bacon's words, 'the truth of being and -the truth of knowing is all one' (cf. p. 224). That is the absolute -condition of comprehending reality: the principle of Absolute Idealism, -so far apart from its psychological wraith, and yet compelled to -employ the same language. But after all it is Logic, i. e., only the -supreme logical condition of the reality of the physical and psychical -world. And it gains reality at the cost of the disruption of its -elements: it lets the Is slip from the Is known<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_476" id="Page_476">[Pg 476]</a></span>—the <i>est</i> from the -<i>cogitatur</i>—Being from consciousness. Or, in less mysterious language, -fundamental philosophy, or Logic, gives place to the concreter system -of Philosophy—the Philosophy of the Outward and of the Inward -actuality,—of Nature and Mind.</p> - -<p>The reader of the <i>Divina Commedia</i> may hardly need to be reminded -that, at each of the grander changes of scene and grade in his -pilgrimage, Dante suddenly finds himself without obvious means -transported into a new region of experience. There are catastrophes -in the process of development: not unprepared, but summing up, as in -a flash of insight, the gradual and unperceived process of growth. -There is birth and death in the spiritual world: and such are moments -of sudden lapse, abrupt conversion, when the waters of Lethe close -around, and thereafter all things are new. There are such moments of -accumulated and abnormal intensity also in the Hegelian philosophy when -a new cycle of idea suddenly appears. Such are the epochs of change at -the great crises from Being to Essence, and from Essence to Notion. -There is a revulsion, a sharp turn of the path which dialectic can -enforce but cannot smooth away,—on that path which dialectic indeed, -as opposed to the old logic of identity, shows not to be a mere smooth -continuity. All development is by breaks, and yet makes for continuity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_478" id="Page_478">[Pg 478]</a></span></p> - -<p>This is again exemplified in the passage from Logic to Physics. The -reality which presents itself to the philosopher as Nature is a world -of reason—but, as it stands, it only lives as some speechless work -of art. It is, so to speak, the picture on the wall—the reflection -that is cast by the fuller reality of experience. Reason here is -in the garb of sense-perception. Nature is the silent image—the -<i>tableau vivant</i>—which becomes intelligent, speaking, and real, in -the observing and compre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_477" id="Page_477">[Pg 477]</a></span>hending mind. It is the statue of Condillac, -not yet invested with the minimum of sensibility and consciousness. -Nature is or shows all that the Idea contained, but contained only -in possibility, as a logical condition of reality. It shows it in -reality—and that is a reality spread through endless times and spaces. -Its unity, its meaning, its continuity are broken up into fragments. -Yet as Nature, i. e. in its structural unity, and not in the dispersion -of things and elements, it is all a unity of development and has a -life-history written in its organism for intelligence to read and to -reconstitute, on the assumption that all its accident and irregularity -is but the inevitable imperfection of reality as given in parts and -successions.</p> - - - - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's -Philosophy, by William Wallace and G. W. F. 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