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If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic - -Author: Benedetto Croce - -Translator: Douglas Ainslie - -Release Date: June 19, 2017 [EBook #54938] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL *** - - - - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... MOOC's, educational materials,...) -Images generously made available by the Internet Archive. - - - - - -PHILOSOPHY OF THE - -PRACTICAL - -ECONOMIC AND ETHIC - -TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN OF - - -BENEDETTO CROCE - - -BY - -DOUGLAS AINSLIE - -B.A. (OXON.), M.R.A.S. - - -MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED - -ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON - -1913 - - - - -Benedetto Croce's Philosophy of the Spirit, in the English translation -by Douglas Ainslie, consists of 4 volumes (which can be read separately): -1. Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic. (Second augmented - edition. A first ed. is also available at Project Gutenberg.) -2. Philosophy of the practical: economic and ethic. -3. Logic as the science of the pure concept. -4. Theory and history of historiography. ---Transcriber's note. - - - - -NOTE - - -Certain chapters only of the third part of this book were anticipated -in the study entitled _Reduction of the Philosophy of Law to the -Philosophy of Economy,_ read before the Accademia Pontaniana of Naples -at the sessions of April 21 and May 5, 1907 (_Acts,_ vol. xxxvii.); -but I have remodelled them, amplifying certain pages and summarizing -others. The concept of economic activity as an autonomous form of the -spirit, which receives systematic treatment in the second part of the -book, was first maintained in certain essays, composed from 1897 to -1900, and afterwards collected in the volume _Historical Materialism -and Marxist Economy_ (2nd edition, Palermo, Sandron, 1907). - -B. C. - -NAPLES, - -19_th April_ 1908. - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE - - -"A noi sembra che l' opera del Croce sia lo sforzo più potente che il -pensiero italiano abbia compiuto negli ultimi anni."--G. DE RUGGIERO in -_La Filosofia contemporanea,_ 1912. - -"Il sistema di Benedetto Croce rimane la più alta conquista del -pensiero contemporaneo."--G. NATOLI in _La Voce,_ 19th December 1912. - - -Those acquainted with my translation of Benedetto Croce's _Æsthetic -as Science of Expression and General Linguistic_ will not need to be -informed of the importance of this philosopher's thought, potent in its -influence upon criticism, upon philosophy and upon life, and famous -throughout Europe. - -In the Italian, this volume is the third and last of the _Philosophy -of the Spirit, Logic as Science of the Pure Concept_ coming second in -date of publication. But apart from the fact that philosophy is like -a moving circle, which can be entered equally well at any point, I -have preferred to place this volume before the _Logic_ in the hands of -British readers. Great Britain has long been a country where moral -values are highly esteemed; we are indeed experts in the practice, -though perhaps not in the theory of morality, a lacuna which I believe -this book will fill. - -In saying that we are experts in moral practice I do not, of course, -refer to the narrow conventional morality, also common with us, which -so often degenerates into hypocrisy, a legacy of Puritan origin; but -apart from this, there has long existed in many millions of Britons a -strong desire to live well, or, as they put it, cleanly and rightly, -and achieved by many, independent of any close or profound examination -of the logical foundation of this desire. Theology has for some -taken the place of pure thought, while for others, early training -on religious lines has been sufficiently strong to dominate other -tendencies in practical life. Yet, as a speculative Scotsman, I am -proud to think that we can claim divided honours with Germany in the -production of Emmanuel Kant (or Cant). - -The latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed with us a great -development of materialism in its various forms. The psychological, -anti-historical speculation contained in the so-called Synthetic -Philosophy (really psychology) of Herbert Spencer was but one of the -many powerful influences abroad, tending to divert youthful minds -from the true path of knowledge. This writer, indeed, made himself -notorious by his attitude of contemptuous intolerance and ignorance -of the work previously done in connection with subjects which he was -investigating. He accepted little but the evidence of his own senses -and judgment, as though he were the first philosopher. But time has -now taken its revenge, and modern criticism has exposed the Synthetic -Philosophy in all its barren and rigid inadequacy and ineffectuality. -Spencer tries to force Life into a brass bottle of his own making, but -the genius will not go into his bottle. The names and writings of J. S. -Mill, of Huxley, and of Bain are, with many others of lesser calibre, -a potent aid to the dissolving influence of Spencer. Thanks to their -efforts, the spirit of man was lost sight of so completely that I -can well remember hearing Kant's great discovery of the synthesis _a -priori_ described as moonshine, and Kant himself, with his categoric -imperative, as little better than a Prussian policeman. As for Hegel, -the great completer and developer of Kantian thought, his philosophy -was generally in even less esteem among the youth; and we find even the -contemplative Walter Pater passing him by with a polite apology for -shrinking from his chilly heights. I do not, of course, mean to suggest -that estimable Kantians and Hegelians did not exist here and there -throughout the kingdom in late Victorian days (the names of Stirling, -of Caird, and of Green at once occur to the mind); but they had not -sufficient genius to make their voices heard above the hubbub of the -laboratory. We all believed that the natural scientists had taken the -measure of the universe, could tot it up to a T--and consequently -turned a deaf ear to other appeals. - -Elsewhere in Europe Hartmann, Haeckel, and others were busy measuring -the imagination and putting fancy into the melting-pot--they offered -us the chemical equivalent of the wings of Aurora. We believed them, -believed those materialists, those treacherous neo-Kantians, perverters -of their master's doctrine, who waited for guileless youth with mask -and rapier at the corner of every thicket. Such as escaped this ambush -were indeed fortunate if they shook themselves free of Schopenhauer, -the (personally) comfortable philosopher of suicide and despair, and -fell into the arms of the last and least of the Teutonic giants, -Friedrich Nietzsche, whose spasmodic paragraphs, full of genius but -often empty of philosophy, show him to have been far more of a poet -than a philosopher. It was indeed a doleful period of transition for -those unfortunate enough to have been born into it: we really did -believe that life had little or nothing to offer, or that we were all -Overmen (a mutually exclusive proposition!), and had only to assert -ourselves in order to prove it. - -To the writings of Pater I have already referred, and of them it may -justly be said that they are often supremely beautiful, with the -quality and cadence of great verse, but mostly (save perhaps the volume -on _Plato and Platonism,_ by which he told the present writer that he -hoped to live) instinct with a profound scepticism, that revelled in -the externals of Roman Catholicism, but refrained from crossing the -threshold which leads to the penetralia of the creed. - -Ruskin also we knew, and he too has a beautiful and fresh vein of -poetry, particularly where free from irrational dogmatism upon Ethic -and Æsthetic. But we found him far inferior to Pater in depth and -suggestiveness, and almost devoid of theoretical capacity. Sesame for -all its Lilies is no Open Sesame to the secrets of the world. Thus, -wandering in the obscure forest, it is little to be wondered that we -did not anticipate the flood of light to be shed upon us as we crossed -the threshold of the twentieth century. - -It was an accident that took me to Naples in 1909, and the accident -of reading a number of _La Critica,_ as I have described in the -introduction to the _Æsthetic,_ that brought me in contact with the -thought of Benedetto Croce. But it was not only the _Æsthetic,_ it was -also the purely critical work of the philosopher that appeared to me at -once of so great importance. To read Hegel, for instance, after reading -Croce's study of him, is a very different experience (at least so I -found it) to reading him before so doing. - -Hegel is an author most deeply stimulative and suggestive, but any -beginner is well to take advantage of all possible aid in the difficult -study. - -To bring this thought of Hegel within the focus of the ordinary -mind has never been an easy task (I know of no one else who has -successfully accomplished it); and Croce's work, _What is living -and what is dead of the Philosophy of Hegel,_ as one may render the -Italian title of the book which I hope to translate, has enormously -aided a just comprehension, both of the qualities and the defects of -that philosopher. This work appeared in the Italian not long after the -_Æsthetic,_ and has had an influence upon the minds of contemporary -Italians, second only to the _Philosophy of the Spirit._ To clear away -the débris of Hegel, his false conception of art and of religion, to -demonstrate his erroneous application of his own great discovery of -the dialectic to pseudo-concepts, and thus to reveal it in its full -splendour, has been one of the most valuable of Croce's inestimable -contributions to critical thought. - -I shall not pause here to dilate upon the immense achievement of Croce, -the youngest of Italian senators, a recognition of his achievement -by his King and country, but merely mention his numerous historical -works, his illuminative study of Vico, which has at last revealed that -philosopher as of like intellectual stature to Kant; the immense tonic -and cultural influence of his review, _La Critica,_ and his general -editorship of the great collection of _Scrittori d' Italia._ Freed -at last from that hubbub of the laboratory, from the measures and -microscopes of the natural scientists, excellent in their place, it is -interesting to ask if any other contemporary philosopher has made a -contribution to ethical theory in any way comparable to the _Philosophy -of the Practical._ The names of Bergson and of Blondel at once occur to -the mind, but the former admits that his complete ideas on ethics are -not yet made known, and implies that he may never make them entirely -known. The reader of the _Philosophy of the Practical_ will, I think, -find that none of Bergson's explanations, "burdened," as he says, with -"geometry," and as we may say with matter, from the obsession of which -he never seems to shake himself altogether free, are comparable in -depth or lucidity with the present treatise. The spirit is described by -Bergson as memory, and matter as a succession of images. How does the -one communicate with the other? The formula of the self-creative life -process seems hardly sufficient to explain this, for if with Bergson we -conceive of life as a torrent, there must be some reason why it should -flow rather in one channel than in another. But life is supposed to -create and to absorb matter in its progress; and here we seem to have -entered a vicious circle, for the intuition presupposes, it does not -create its object. As regards the will, too, the Bergsonian theory of -the Ego as rarely (sometimes never once in life) fully manifesting -itself, and our minor actions as under the control of matter, seems -to lead to a deterministic conception and to be at variance with the -thesis of the self-creation of life. - -As regards Blondel, the identification of thought and will in the -philosophy of action leads him to the position that the infinite is not -in the universal abstract, but in the single concrete. It is through -matter that the divine truth reaches us, and God must pass through -nature or matter, in order to reach us, and we must effect the contrary -process to reach God. It is a beautiful conception; but, as de Ruggiero -suggests, do we not thus return, by a devious and difficult path, to -the pre-Hegelian, pre-Kantian, position of religious platonicism?[1] - -This, however, is not the place to discourse at length of other -philosophies. What most impresses in the Crocean thought is its -profundity, its clarity, and its _completeness,--totus teres atque -rotundus._ Croce, indeed, alone of the brilliant army of philosophers -and critics arisen in the new century, has found a complete formula for -his thought, complete, that is, at a certain stage; for, as he says, -the relative nature of all systems is apparent to all who have studied -philosophy. He alone has defined and allocated the activities of the -human spirit; he alone has plumbed and charted its ocean in all its -depth and breadth. - -A system! The word will sound a mere tinkling of cymbals to many -still aground in the abstract superficialities of nineteenth-century -scepticism; but they are altogether mistaken. To construct a system -is like building a house: it requires a good architect to build -a good house, and where it is required to build a great palace it -requires a great genius to build it successfully. Michael Angelo -built the Vatican, welding together and condensing the works of many -predecessors, ruthlessly eliminating what they contained of bad or of -erroneous: Benedetto Croce has built the Philosophy of the Spirit. -To say of either achievement that it will not last for ever, or that -it will need repair from time to time, is perfectly true; but this -criticism applies to all things human; and yet men continue to build -houses--for God and for themselves. Croce is the first to admit the -incompleteness, the lack of finality of all philosophical systems, for -each one of them deals, as he says, with a certain group of problems -only, which present themselves at a definite period of time. The -solution of these leads to the posing of new problems, first caught -sight of by the philosopher as he terminates his labours, to be solved -by the same or by other thinkers. - -And here it may be well to state very briefly the basis on which rests -the _Philosophy of the Spirit,_ without attempting to do anything more -than to give its general outline. The reader should imagine himself -standing, like bold Pizarro, on his "peak of Darien," surveying at a -great distance the vast outline of a New World, which yet is as old as -Asia. - -The Spirit is Reality, it is the whole of Reality, and it has two -forms: the theoretic and the practical activities. Beyond or outside -these _there are no other forms of any kind._ The theoretic activity -has two forms, the intuitive and individual, and the intellectual or -knowledge of the universal: the first of these produces images and is -known as _Æsthetic,_ the second concepts and is known as _Logic._ The -first of these activities is altogether independent, self-sufficient, -autonomous: the second, on the other hand, has need of the first, ere -it can exist. Their relation is therefore that of double degree. The -practical activity is the _will,_ which is thought in activity, and -this also has two forms, the economic or utilitarian, and the ethical -or moral, the first autonomous and individual, the second universal, -and this latter depends upon the first for its existence, in a manner -analogous to _Logic_ and to _Æsthetic._ - -With the theoretic activity, man understands the universe, with the -practical, he changes it. There are no grades or degrees of the Spirit -beyond these. All other forms are either without activity, or they are -verbal variants of the above, or they are a mixture of these four in -different proportions. - -Thus the Philosophy of the Spirit is divided into _Æsthetic, Logic, -and Philosophy of the Practical_ (Economic and Ethic). In these it is -complete, and embraces the whole of human activity. - -The discussion of determinism or free will is of course much more -elaborated here than in the Æsthetic, where exigencies of space -compelled the philosopher to offer it in a condensed form. His solution -that the will is and must be free, but that it contains two moments, -the first conditioned, and that the problem should be first stated in -terms of the Hegelian dialectic, seems to be the only one consonant -with facts. The conclusion that the will is autonomous and that -therefore we can _never_ be obliged to do anything against our will may -seem to be paradoxical, until the overwhelming argument in proof of -this has been here carefully studied. - -Croce's division of the practical activity into the two grades of -Economic and Ethic, to which Kant did not attain and Fichte failed -fully to perceive, has for the first time rendered comprehensible much -that was hitherto obscure in ancient history and contemporary history. -The "merely economic man" will be recognised by all students of the -_Philosophy of the Practical,_ where his characteristics are pointed -out by the philosopher; and a few years hence, when Croce's philosophy -will have filtered through fiction and journalism to the level of -the general public, the phrase will be as common as is the "merely -economic" person to-day. - -For indeed, all really new and great discoveries come from the -philosophers, gradually filtering down through technical treatises and -reviews, until they reach the level of prose fiction and of poetry, -which, since the _Æsthetic,_ we know to be one and the same thing with -different empirical manifestations. In truth, the philosophers alone -go deeply enough into the essence of things to reach their roots. Thus -some philosophy, generally in an extremely diluted form, becomes part -of every one's mental furniture and thus the world makes progress and -the general level of culture is raised. Thought is democratic in being -open to all, aristocratic in being attained only by the few--and that -is the only true aristocracy: to be on the same level as the best. - -Another discovery of Croce's, set forth in this volume for the first -time in all the plenitude of its richness, is the theory of Error. -The proof of the practical nature of error, of its necessity, and of -the fact that we only err because we will to do so, is a marvel of -acute and profound analysis. Readers unaccustomed to the dialectic may -not at first be prepared to admit the necessary forms of error, that -error is not distinct, but opposed to truth and as such its simple -dialectic negation, and that truth is thought of truth, which develops -by conquering error, which must always exist in every problem. The full -understanding of the Crocean theory of error throws a flood of light -on all philosophical problems, and has already formed the basis of at -least one brilliant study of contemporary philosophy. - -To the reduction of the concept of law to an economic factor, which -depends upon the priority and autonomy of Economic in relation to -Ethic, is devoted a considerable portion of the latter part of the -_Philosophy of the Practical,_ and it is easy to see that an elaborate -treatment of this problem was necessary, owing to the confusion as -to its true nature that has for so long existed in the minds of -thinkers, owing to their failure to grasp the above distinction. In -Great Britain indeed, where precedent counts for so much in law, -the ethical element is very often so closely attached as to be -practically indistinguishable from it, save by the light of the -Crocean analysis. In the _Logic as Science of the Pure Concept_ will -be found much to throw light upon the _Philosophy of the Practical,_ -where the foreshortening of certain proofs (due to concentration upon -other problems) may appear to leave loopholes to objection. Thought -will there be found to make use of language for expression, though -not itself language; and it will be found useless to seek logic in -words, which in themselves are always æsthetic. For there is a duality -between intuition and concept, which form the two grades or degrees of -theoretic knowledge, as described also in the _Æsthetic._ There are -two types of concept, the _pure_ and the _false_ or _pseudo-concept,_ -as Croce calls it. This latter is also divided into two types of -representation--those that are concrete without being universal (such -as the cat, the rose), and those that are without a content that can -be represented, or universal without being concrete, since they never -exist in reality (such are the triangle, free motion). The first -of these are called empirical pseudo-concepts, the second abstract -pseudo-concepts: the first are represented by the natural, the second -by the mathematical sciences. - -Of the _pure concept_ it is predicated that it is ineliminable, for -while the pseudo-concepts in their multiplicity are abolished by -thought as it proceeds, there will always remain one thought namely, -that which thinks their abolition. This concept is opposed to the -pseudo-concepts: it is ultra or omni-representative. I shall content -myself with this brief mention of the contents of the _Philosophy of -the Practical_ and of the _Logic_ upon which I am now working. - -Since the publication of _Æsthetic as Science of Expression and General -Linguistic,_ there has been some movement in the direction of the study -of Italian thought and culture, which I advocated in the Introduction -to that work. But the Alps continue to be a barrier, and the thought of -France and of Germany reaches us, as a rule, far more rapidly than that -of the home of all the arts and of civilization, as we may call that -Italy which contains within it the classical Greater Greece. A striking -instance of this relatively more rapid distribution of French thought -is afforded by the celebrated _Lundis_ of Sainte-Beuve, so familiar to -many readers; yet a critic, greater in depth than Sainte-Beuve, was -writing at the same period--greater in philosophical vision of the -relations of things, for the vision of Sainte-Beuve rarely rose above -the psychological plane. For one reader acquainted with the _History -of Italian Literature_ of De Sanctis, a hundred are familiar with the -_Lundis_ of Sainte-Beuve. - -At the present moment the hegemony of philosophical thought may be -said to be divided between Italy and France, for neither Great Britain -nor Germany has produced a philosophical mind of the first order. -The interest in Continental idealism is becoming yearly more keen, -since the publication of Bergson's and of Blondel's treatises, and of -Croce's _Philosophy of the Spirit._ Mr. Arthur Balfour, being himself -a philosopher, was one of the first to recognise the importance of -the latter work, referring to its author in terms of high praise in -his oration on Art delivered at Oxford in the Sheldonian Theatre. Mr. -Saintsbury also has expressed his belief that with the _Æsthetic_ Croce -has provided the first instrument for scientific (_i.e._ philosophical, -not "natural" scientific) criticism of literature. This surely is well, -and should lead to an era of more careful and less impartial, of more -accurate because more scientific criticism of our art and poetry. - -I trust that a similar service may be rendered to Ethical theory and -practice by the publication of the present translation, which I believe -to be rich with great truths of the first importance to humanity, -here clearly and explicitly stated for the first time and therefore -(in Vico's sense of the word) "created," by his equal and compatriot, -Benedetto Croce. - - Then leaning upon the arm of time came Truth, whose radiant face, - - Though never so late to the feast she go, hath aye the foremost place. - -DOUGLAS AINSLIE. - -ATHENAEUM CLUB, PALL MALL, _January_ 1913. - - -[1] G. de Ruggiero, _La Filosofia contemporanea,_ Laterza, Bari, 1912. - - - - -CONTENTS - - -FIRST PART - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN GENERAL - - -FIRST SECTION - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS RELATIONS - - -I - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY AS A FORM OF THE SPIRIT 3 - -Practical and theoretic life--Insufficiency of descriptive distinctions ---Insufficiency of the psychological method in philosophy--Necessity of -the philosophical method--Constatation and deduction--Theories which -deny the practical form of the spirit--The practical as an unconscious -fact: critique--Nature and practical activity--Reduction of the -practical form to the theoretical: critique--The practical as thought -in action--Recognition of its autonomy. - -II - -NEGATION OF THE SPIRITUAL FORM OF FEELING 21 - -The practical and the so-called third spiritual form: feeling--Various -meanings of the word: feeling, a psychological class--Feeling as a -state of the spirit--Function of the concept of feeling in the History -of philosophy: the indeterminate--Feeling as forerunner of the æsthetic -form--In Historic: preannouncement of the intuitive element--In -philosophical Logic: pre-announcement of the pure concept--Analogous -function in the Philosophy of the practical--Negation of -feeling--Deductive exclusion of it. - -III - -RELATION OF THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY WITH THE THEORETICAL 33 - -Precedence of the theoretical over the practical--The unity of -the spirit and the co-presence of the practical--Critique of -pragmatism--Critique of psychological objections--Nature of theoretic -precedence over the practical: historical knowledge--Its continual -mutability--No other theoretic precedent--Critique of practical -concepts and judgments--Posteriority of judgments to the practical -act--Posteriority of practical concepts--Origin of intellectualistic -and sentimentalistic doctrines--The concepts of end and means--Critique -of the end as plan or fixed design--Volition and the unknown--Critique -of the concept of practical sciences and of a practical Philosophy. - -IV - -INSEPARABILITY OF ACTION FROM ITS REAL BASE AND PRACTICAL NATURE OF THE -THEORETIC ERROR 53 - -Coincidence of intention and volition--Volition in the abstract -and in the concrete: critique--Volition thought and real volition: -critique--Critique of volition with unknown or ill-known base ---Illusions in the instances adduced--Impossibility of volition with -erroneous theoretical base--Forms of the theoretic error and problem -as to its nature--Distinction between ignorance and error: practical -origin of latter--Confirmations and proofs--Justification of the -practical repression of error--Empirical distinctions of errors and the -philosophic distinction. - -V - -IDENTITY OF VOLITION AND ACTION AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLITION AND -EVENT 73 - -Volition and action: intuition and expression--Spirit -and nature--Inexistence of volitions without action and -inversely--Illusions as to the distinctions between these -terms--Distinction between action and succession or event--Volition -and event--Successful and unsuccessful actions: critique--Acting -and foreseeing: critique--Confirmation of the inderivability of the -value of action from success--Explanation of facts that seem to be at -variance. - -VI - -THE PRACTICAL JUDGMENT, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL 86 - -Practical taste and judgment--Practical judgment as historical -judgment--Its Logic--Importance of the practical judgment--Difference -between practical judgment and judgment of event--Progress in action -and progress in Reality--Precedence of the Philosophy of the practical -over the practical judgment--Confirmation of the philosophic incapacity -of the psychological method. - -VII - -PRACTICAL DESCRIPTION, RULES AND CASUISTIC 103 - -Justification of the psychological method and of empirical and -descriptive disciplines--Practical Description and its literature ---Extension of practical description--Normative knowledge or -rules: their nature--Utility of rules--The literature of rules and -its apparent decadence--Relation between the arts (collections -of rules) and philosophic doctrines--Casuistic: its nature and -utility--Jurisprudence as casuistic. - -VIII - -CRITIQUE OF THE INVASIONS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO PRACTICAL DESCRIPTION AND -INTO ITS DERIVATIVES 121 - -First form: tendency to generalize--Historical elements that -persist in the generalizations--Second form: literary union of -philosophy and empiria--Third form: attempt to put them in close -connection--Science of the practical, and Metaphysic: various -meanings--Injurious consequences of the invasions--1st, Dissolution of -empirical concepts--Examples: war and peace, property and communism, -and the like--Other examples--Misunderstandings on the part of the -philosophers--Historical significance of such questions--2nd, False -deduction of the empirical from the philosophic--Affirmations as to -the contingent changed into philosophemes--Reasons for the rebellion -against rules--Limits between philosophy and empiria. - -IX - -HISTORICAL NOTES 144 - -I. Distinction between history of the practical principle and history -of liberation from the transcendental--II. Distinction of the practical -from the theoretical--III. Minglings of the Philosophy of the -practical with Description--Vain attempts at a definition of empirical -concepts--Attempts at deduction--IV. Various questions--Practical -nature of error--Practical taste--V. Doctrines of feeling--The -Wolfians--Jacobi and Schleiermacher--Kant--Hegel--Opponents of the -doctrine of the three faculties. Krug--Brentano. - - -SECOND SECTION - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS DIALECTIC - - -I - -NECESSITY AND FREEDOM IN THE VOLITIONAL ACT 173 - -The problem of freedom--Freedom of willing and freedom of action: -critique of such distinction--The volitional act, both necessary and -free--Comparison with the æsthetic activity--Critique of determinism -and arbitrarism--General form of this antithesis: materialism and -mysticism--Materialistic sophisms of determinism--Mysticism of doctrine -of free will--Doctrine of necessity-liberty and idealism--Doctrine -of double causality; of dualism and agnosticism--Its character of -transaction and transition. - -II - -FREEDOM AND ITS OPPOSITE. GOOD AND EVIL 192 - -Freedom of action as reality of action--Inconceivability of -the absolute absence of action--Non-freedom as antithesis and -contrariety--Nothingness and arbitrariness of non-liberty--Good as -freedom and reality, and evil as its opposite--Critique of abstract -monism and of dualism of values--Objections to the irreality of -evil--Evil in synthesis and out of synthesis--Affirmative judgments -of evil as negative judgments--Confirmations of the doctrine--The -poles of feeling (pleasure and pain); and their identity with the -practical opposites--Doctrine relating to pleasure and happiness: -critique--Empirical concepts relating to good and evil--To have to -be, ideal, inhibitive, imperative power--Evil, remorse, etc.; good, -satisfaction, etc.--Their incapacity for serving as practical -principles--Their character. - -III - -THE VOLITIONAL ACT AND THE PASSIONS 215 - -The multiplicity of volitions and the struggle for unity--Multiplicity -and unity as good and evil--Excluded volitions and passions or -desires--Passions and desires as possible volitions--Volition as -struggle with the passions--Critique of the freedom of choice--Meaning -of the so-called precedence of feeling over the volitional -act--Polipathicism and apathicism--Erroneity of both the opposed -theses--Historical and contingent meaning of these--The domination of -the passions, and the will. - -IV - -VOLITIONAL HABITS AND INDIVIDUALITY 229 - -Passions and states of the soul--Passions understood as volitional -habits--Importance and nature of these--Domination of the passions -in so far as they are volitional habits--Difficulty and reality of -dominating them--Volitional habits and individuality--Negations of -individuality for uniformity and criticism of them--Temperament -and character--Indifference of temperament--Discovery of one's -own being--The idea of "vocation"--Misunderstanding of the right -of individuality--Wicked individuality--False doctrines as to the -connection between virtues and vices--The universal in the individual, -and education. - -V - -DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS 246 - -Multiplicity and unity: development--Becoming as synthesis of -being and not-being--Nature as becoming. Its resolution in the -Spirit--Optimism and pessimism: critique--Dialectic optimism--Concept -of cosmic progress--Objections and critique--Individuals and -History--Fate, Fortune, and Providence--The infinity of progress -and mystery--Confirmation of the impossibility of a Philosophy of -history--Illegitimate transference of the concept of mystery from -History to Philosophy. - -VI - -TWO EXPLANATIONS RELATING TO HISTORIC AND ÆSTHETIC 262 - -Relation between desires and actions; and two problems of Historic -and Æsthetic--History and art--The concept of existentiality in -history--Its origin in the Philosophy of the practical: action and -the existing, desires and the non-existent--History as distinction -between actions and desires, and art as indistinction--Pure fancy and -imagination--Art as lyrical or representation of feelings--Identity -of ingenuous reality and feeling--Artists and the will--Actions and -myths--Art as pure representation of becoming, and the artistic form of -thought. - -VII - -HISTORICAL NOTES 273 - -I. The problem of freedom--II. The doctrine of evil--III. Will -and freedom--Conscience and responsibility--IV. The concept of -duty--Repentance and remorse--The doctrine of the passions--Virtues -and vices--V. The doctrine of individuality: Schleiermacher--Romantic -theories and most modern theories--VI. The concept of development and -progress. - - -THIRD SECTION - -UNITY OF THE THEORETICAL AND THE PRACTICAL - -Double result: precedence of the theoretical over the practical, and -of the practical over the theoretical--Errors of those who maintain -the exclusive precedence of the one or the other--Problem of the -unity of this duality--Not a duality of opposites--Not a duality of -finite and infinite--Perfect analogy of the two forms: theoretic and -practical--Not a parallelism, but a circle--The circle of Reality: -thought and being, subject and object--Critique of the theories as -to the primacy of the theoretical or of the practical reason--New -pragmatism: Life conditioning Philosophy--Deductive confirmation of the -two forms, and deductive exclusion of the third (feeling). - - -SECOND PART - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS SPECIAL FORMS - - -FIRST SECTION - -THE TWO PRACTICAL FORMS: ECONOMIC AND ETHIC - - -I - -DISTINCTION OF THE TWO FORMS IN THE PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 309 - -The utilitarian or economic form, and the moral or ethical -form--Insufficiency of the descriptive and psychological -distinction--Deduction and necessity of integrating it with -induction--The two forms as a fact of consciousness--The -economic form--The ethical form--Impossibility of eliminating -them--Confirmations in fact. - -II - -CRITIQUE OF THE NEGATIONS OF THE ETHICAL FORM 323 - -Exclusion of materialistic and intellectualistic criticisms--The -two possible negations--The thesis of utilitarianism against the -existence of moral acts--Difficulty arising from the presence of -these--Attempt to explain them as quantitative distinctions--Criticism -of it--Attempt to explain them as facts, either extraneous to the -practical or irrational, and stupid--Associationism and evolutionism. -Critique--Desperate attempt: theological utilitarianism and mystery. - -III - -CRITIQUE OF THE NEGATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC FORM 337 - -The thesis of moral abstractionism against the concept of the -useful--The useful as means, or as theoretic fact--Technical and -hypothetical imperatives--Critique: the useful is a practical fact ---The useful as the egoistic or the immoral--Critique: the useful -is amoral--The useful as ethical minimum--Critique: the useful -is premoral--Desperate attempt: the useful as inferior practical -conscience--Confirmation of the autonomy of the useful. - -IV - -RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL FORMS 348 - -Economic and ethic as double degree of the practical--Errors -arising from conceiving them as co-ordinated--Disinterested -actions: critique--Vain polemic conducted with such Supposition -against utilitarianism--Actions morally indifferent, obligatory, -supererogatory, etc. Critique--Comparison with the relation between -art and philosophy--Other erroneous conceptions of modes of -action--Pleasure and economic activity, happiness and virtue--Pleasure -and pain and feeling--Coincidence of duty with pleasure--Critique of -rigorism or asceticism--Relation of happiness and virtue--Critique of -the subordination of pleasure to morality--No empire of morality over -the forms of the spirit--Non-existence of other practical forms; and -impossibility of subdivision of the two established. - -V - -THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMY AND THE SO-CALLED SCIENCE OF ECONOMY 364 - -Problem of the relations between Philosophy and Science of economy ---Unreality of the laws and concepts of economic Science--Economic -Science founded on empirical concepts but not empirical or -descriptive--Absoluteness of its laws--Their mathematical -nature--Its principles and their character of arbitrary postulates -and definitions--Its utility--Comparison of Economy with Mechanic, -and reason for its exclusion from ethical, æsthetic, and logical -facts--Errors of philosophism and historicism in Economy--The -two degenerations: extreme abstractism and empiristical -disaggregation--Glance at the history of the various directions of -Economy--Meaning of the judgment of Hegel as to economic Science. - -VI - -CRITIQUE OF THE CONFUSIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF -ECONOMY 382 - -Adoption of the economic method and formulæ on the part of -Philosophy--Errors that derive from it--1st, Negation of philosophy -for economy--2nd, Universal value attributed to empirical concepts. -Example: free trade and protectionism--3rd, Transformation of the -functions of calculation into reality--The pretended calculus of -pleasures and pains; and doctrines of optimism and pessimism. - -VII - -HISTORICAL NOTES 391 - -I. Greek Ethic and its ingenuousness--II. Importance of Christianity -for Ethic--The three tendencies that result from it: utilitarianism, -rigorism, and psychologism--Hobbes, Spinoza--English Ethic--Idealistic -Philosophy--III. E. Kant and his affirmation of the ethical -principle--Contradictions of Kant as to the concept of the useful, -of prudence, of happiness, etc.--Errors that derive from it in -his Ethic--IV. Points for a Philosophy of Economy--The inferior -appetitive faculty--Problem of politics and Machiavellism--Doctrine -of the passions--Hegel and the concept of the useful--Fichte and the -elaboration of the Kantian Ethic--V. The problem of the useful and of -morality in the thinkers of the nineteenth century--Extrinsic union -of Ethic and of economic Science, from antiquity to the nineteenth -century--Philosophic questions arising from a more intimate contact -between the two--VII. Theories of the hedonistic calculus: from -Maupertuis to Hartmann. - - -SECOND SECTION - -THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE - - -I - -CRITIQUE OF MATERIALISTIC AND OF FORMALISTIC ETHIC 425 - -Various meanings of "formal" and "material"--The ethical principle -as formal (universal) and not material (contingent)--Reduction -of material Ethic to utilitarian Ethic--Expulsion of material -principles--Benevolence, love, altruism, etc.; and critique of -them--Social organism, State, interest of the species, etc. Critique -of them--Material religious principles. Critique of them--"Formal" as -statement of a merely logical demand--Critique of a formal Ethic with -this meaning: tautologism--Tautological principles: ideal, chief good, -duty, etc. Critique of them--Tautological significance of certain -formulæ, material in appearance--Conversion of tautological Ethic into -material and utilitarian Ethic--In what sense Ethic should be formal; -and in what other sense material. - - -II - -THE ETHICAL FORM AS ACTUALIZATION OF THE SPIRIT IN UNIVERSAL 440 - -Tautological Ethic, and its partial or discontinuous connection with -Philosophy--Rejection of both these conceptions--The ethical form -as volition of the universal--The universal as the Spirit (Reality, -Liberty, etc.)--Moral actions as volitions of the Spirit--Critique of -antimoralism--Confused tendency of tautological, material, religious -formulæ in relation to the Ethic of the Spirit--The Ethic of the Spirit -and religious Ethic. - -III - -HISTORICAL NOTES 452 - -I. Merit of the Kantian Ethic--The predecessors of Kant--Defect of -that Ethic: agnosticism--Critique of Hegel and of others--Kant and the -concept of freedom--Fichte and Hegel--Ethic in the nineteenth century. - - -THIRD PART - -LAWS - - -I - -LAWS AS PRODUCTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 465 - -Definition of law--Philosophical and empirical concept of society--Laws -as individual product: programmes of individual life--Exclusion of -the character of constriction: critique of this concept--Identical -characters of individual and social laws--Individual laws as the sole -real in ultimate analysis--Critique of the division of laws into -judicial and social, and into the sub-classes of these. Empiricity of -every division of laws--Extension of the concept of laws. - -II - -THE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF LAWS. CRITIQUE OF PERMISSIVE LAWS AND OF -NATURAL LAW 481 - -The volitional character and the character of class--Distinction of -laws from the so-called laws of nature--Implication of the second -in the first--Distinction of laws from practical principles--Laws -and single acts--Identity of imperative, prohibitive, and permissive -laws--Permissive character of every law and impermissive character -of every principle--Changeability of laws--Empirical considerations -as to modes of change--Critique of the eternal Code or natural -right--Natural right as the new right--Natural right as Philosophy -of the practical--Critique of natural right--Theory of natural right -persisting in judicial judgments and problems. - -III - -UNREALITY OF LAW AND REALITY OF EXECUTION. FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE -PRACTICAL SPIRIT 497 - -Law as abstract and unreal volition--Ineffectually of laws -and effectuality of practical principles--Exemplificatory -explanation--Doctrines against the utility of laws--Their -unmaintainability--Unmaintainability of confutations of them--Empirical -meaning of these controversies--Necessity of laws--Laws as preparation -for action--Analogy between practical and theoretical Spirit: practical -laws and empirical concepts--The promotion of order in reality and in -representation--Origin of the concept of plan or design. - -IV - -CONFUSION BETWEEN LAWS AND PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES. CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL -LEGALISM AND OF JESUITIC MORALITY 511 - -Transformation of principles into practical laws: legalism--Genesis -of the concept of the practically licit and indifferent--Its -consequence: the arbitrary--Ethical legalism as a simple special case -of the practical--Critique of the practically indifferent--Contests -of rigorists and of latitudinarians and their common error--Jesuitic -morality as doctrine of fraud on moral law--Concept of legal -fraud--Absurdity of fraud against oneself and against the -moral conscience--Jesuitic morality not explainable by mere -legalism--Jesuitic morality as alliance of legalism with theological -utilitarianism--Distinction between Jesuitic practice and doctrine. - -V - -JUDICIAL ACTIVITY AS GENERICALLY PRACTICAL ACTIVITY (ECONOMIC) 526 - -Legislative activity as generically practical--Vanity of disputes as to -the character of institutions, whether economic or ethical: punishment, -marriage, State, etc.--Legislative activity as economic--Judicial -activity: its economic character: its consequent identity with economic -activity--Non-recognition of economic form, and meaning of the problem -as to distinction between morality and rights--Theories of co-action -and of exteriority, as distinctive characteristics: critique of -them--Moralistic theories of rights: critique--Duality of positive and -ideal rights, historical and natural rights, etc.; absurd attempts at -unification and co-ordination--Value of all these attempts as confused -glimpse of amoral character of rights--Confirmations of this character -in ingenuous conscience--Comparison between rights and language. -Grammar and codes--Logic and language; morality and rights--History -of language as literary and artistic history--History of rights as -political and social history. - -VI - -HISTORICAL NOTES 543 - -I. Distinction between morality and rights, and its importance -for the history of the economic principle--Indistinction -lasting till Tomasio--II. Tomasio and followers--Kant and -Fichte--Hegel--Herbart and Schopenhauer--Rosmini and others--III. -Stahl, Ahrens, Trendelenburg--Utilitarians--IV. Recent writers -of treatises--Strident contradictions. Stammler--V. Value of -law--In antiquity--Diderot--Romanticism--Jacobi--Hegel--Recent -doctrines--VI. Natural rights and their dissolution--Historical -school of rights--Comparison between rights and language--VII. -Concept of law, and studies of comparative rights and of the general -Doctrine of law--VIII. Legalism and moral casuistic--Probabilitism -and Jesuitic morality--Critique of the concept of the -licit--Fichte--Schleiermacher--Rosmini. - - -CONCLUSION 586 - -The Philosophy of the Spirit as the whole of Philosophy--Correspondence -between Logic and System--Dissatisfaction at the end of every system -and its irrational motive--Rational motive: inexhaustibility of Life -and of Philosophy. - - - - -TRANSLATOR'S NOTE - -This translation of Benedetto Croce's _Philosophy of the Practical_ -(Economic and Ethic) is complete. - - - - -FIRST PART - - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN GENERAL - - - - -FIRST SECTION - - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS RELATIONS - - - - -I - - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY AS A FORM OF THE SPIRIT - - -[Sidenote: _Practical and theoretic life._] - -A glance at the life that surrounds us would seem more than sufficient -to establish, without the necessity of special demonstration, the -existence of a circle of practical activity side by side with the -theoretical. We see in life men of thought and men of action, men of -contemplation and of action, materially distinct, as it were, from one -another: here, lofty brows and slow dreamy eyes; there, narrow brows, -eyes vigilant and mobile; poets and philosophers on the one side; on -the other, captains and soldiers of industry, commerce, politics, the -army, and the church. Their work seems to differ as do the men. While -we are intent upon some discovery just announced, in chemistry or -in physic, or upon some philosophy that comes to shake old beliefs, -upon a drama or a romance that revives an artist's dream, we are -suddenly interrupted and our attention is called to spectacles of an -altogether different nature, such as a war between two states, fought -with cannon or with custom-house tariffs; or to a colossal strike, in -which thousands upon thousands of workmen make the rest of society feel -the power of their numbers and of their strength, and the importance -of their work in the general total; or a potent organization which -collects and binds together the forces of conservative resistance, -employing interests and passions, hopes and fears, vices and virtues, -as the painter his colours, or the poet his words, sometimes making -like them a masterpiece, but of a practical nature. The man of action -is from time to time assailed as it were with nausea at his orgies of -volitional effort and eyes with envy the artist or the man of science -in the same way as polite society used to look upon the monks who had -known how to select the best and most tranquil lot in life. But as a -general rule they do not go beyond this fleeting feeling, or if they -do resolve to cease their business on the Ides, they return to it on -the Kalends. But the contemplative man in his turn also sometimes -experiences this same nausea and this same aspiration; he seems to -himself to be idle where so many are working and bleeding, and he cries -to the combatants: "Arms, give me arms,"[1] for he too would be a miner -with the miners, would navigate with the navigators, be an emperor -among the kings of coal. However, as a general rule, he does not make -more out of this than a song or a book. Nobody, whatever his efforts, -can issue from his own circle. It would seem that nature supplies men -made precisely for the one or for the other form of activity, in the -same way as she makes males and females for the preservation of the -species. - -[Sidenote: _Insufficiency of descriptive distinctions._] - -But this mode of existence with which the practical activity manifests -itself in life, as though physically limited, has no certainty, when -separated from the theoretical life, nor is it, as might be believed, -a fact that imposes itself. Facts never impose themselves, save -metaphorically: it is only our thought which _imposes_ them upon -_itself,_ when it has criticized them and has recognized their reality. -That existence and that distinction, which seem so obvious that one -can touch them with one's hand, are at bottom nothing but the result -of primary and superficial philosophic reflection, which posits as -essentially distinct that which is so only at a first glance and in -the mass. Indeed, if we continue to meditate with the same method and -assumptions as in the first instance, we shall find that those very -distinctions, which reflection had established, are by reflection -annulled. It is not true that men are practical or theoretical. - -The theoretical man is also practical; he lives, he wills, he acts -like all the others. The so-called practical man is also theoretical; -he contemplates, believes, thinks, reads, writes, loves music and the -other arts. Those works that had been looked upon as inspired entirely -by the practical spirit, when examined more closely, are found to -be exceedingly complex and rich in theoretic elements--meditations, -reasonings, historical research, ideal contemplations. Those works -on the other hand that had been assumed to be manifestations of the -purely artistic or philosophic spirit, are also products of the will, -for without the will nothing can be done; the artist cannot prepare -himself for his masterpiece for years and years, nor the thinker bring -to completion his system. Was not the battle of Austerlitz also a -work of thought and the _Divine Comedy_ also a work of will? From -such reflections as these, which might be easily multiplied, arises -a mistrust, not only of the statement first made, but also of the -inquiry that has been undertaken. It is as though one had filled a -vessel with much difficulty and were then obliged to empty it anew -with a like effort, to find oneself again facing the vessel, empty as -before. Or one adheres to the conclusion that neither the theoretic -nor the practical exists as distinct, but that they are one single -fact, which is one or other of the two, or a third to be determined, -manifesting itself concretely in infinite shades and gradations, which -we arbitrarily attempt to reduce to one or more classes, separating and -denominating them as distinct in a not less arbitrary manner. - -[Sidenote: _Insufficiency of the psychological method in philosophy._] - -By describing this process of ordinary reflection, in relation to -reality and by demonstrating its philosophic impotence, has at the -same time been demonstrated the nature and the _impotence_ of the -_psychological method,_ applied to philosophical problems. For -psychological philosophy, though contained in ponderous treatises -and in solemn academical lectures, does not really achieve more than -ordinary reflection, or rather, is nothing but ordinary reflection. -Having classified the images of the infinite manifestations of human -activity, placing, for instance, will and action side, by side with -thought and imagination, it looks upon this classification as reality. -But classes are classes and not philosophical distinctions: whoever -takes them too seriously, and understands them in this second sense, -finds himself eventually obliged to admit that they possess no reality. -Thereupon he declares with shouts and protestations the non-existence -of the _faculties of the soul,_ or rather their existence as a mere -mental artifice, without relation to reality. He may do more than this -and throw overboard the criterion or distinction itself, together with -those false distinctions, proclaiming that all spiritual manifestations -are reducible to a single element. This element turns out in the end -to be precisely one of the rejected classes; hence the attempt to show -that facts of volition are nothing but facts of _representation,_ or -that those of representation are nothing but facts of _volition,_ or -that both are nothing but facts of _feeling,_ and so on. - -[Sidenote: _Necessity of the philosophical method._] - -We must then remain perfectly indifferent to the affirmations or -negations of this psychological philosophy. If it affirm the existence -of the practical activity, we must not put faith in it until we have -recognized its existence by the philosophical method, and equally -so in case it should deny it. The philosophical method demands -complete abstraction from empirical data and from their classes, and -a withdrawal into the recesses of the consciousness, in order to fix -upon it alone the eye of the mind. It has been affirmed that by this -method the individual consciousness is made the type and measure of -universal reality, and it has been suggested, with a view to obviate -this restriction and danger, that we should extend observations, so -as to include the soul of other individuals, of the present and of -the past, of our own and of other civilizations, thus completing (in -the accustomed phrase) the psychological with the historical and the -ethnographical methods. But there is no need to fear, because the -consciousness which is the object of the philosophical inquiry is not -that of the individual as individual, but the universal consciousness, -which is in every individual the basis of his individual consciousness -and of that of other individuals. The philosopher who withdraws into -himself is not seeking his own empirical self: Plato did not seek the -son of Aristo and of Perictione, nor Baruch Spinoza the poor sickly -Jew; they sought that Plato and that Spinoza, who are not Plato or -Spinoza, but man, the spirit, universal being. The remedy proposed -will therefore seem not only useless, but actually harmful; for in -an inquiry whose very object is to surpass the empirical itself, is -offered the aid of a multiplicity of selves, thus increasing the tumult -and the confusion, where there should be peace and silence; offering, -in exchange for the universal that was sought, something worse than the -individual, namely, the _general,_ which is an arbitrary complex of -mutilated individualities. - -[Sidenote: _Constatation and deduction._] - -It may seem, however, that the result of such an inquiry as to the form -and the universality of consciousness would merely possess the value of -a statement of fact, not different from any other statement, as when -we say, for instance, that the weather is rainy, or that Tizio has -married. If these two last facts be indubitable, because well observed, -in like manner indubitable, because likewise well observed, will be -an affirmation concerning the universal consciousness. And since both -affirmations are true, there is certainly no difference between them, -or between truth and truth, considered as such. But since single and -contingent facts, like the two adduced in the example, are single -and contingent, precisely because they have not their own reason in -themselves, and because the universal is the universal, precisely -because it is a sufficient reason to itself, it clearly results that -we cannot assume that truth has been definitely established from the -universal standpoint of consciousness, save when the reason for this -also has been seen, that is to say until that aspect has been simply -enunciated and asserted, as in the case of a single fact. To affirm -the existence of the practical form of activity, side by side with the -theoretical, means to deduce the one from the other, and both from -the unity of the spirit and of the real. We do not intend to withdraw -ourselves from this duty and exigency; and if we limit ourselves -here at the beginning to the assertion of its existence and to the -demonstration that the arguments brought against it are unfounded, we -do so for didascalic reasons, certain that in due course we shall be -able to free this assertion from what it may contain of provisional, -that is to say, from the character itself of assertion. - -[Sidenote: _Theories which deny the practical form of the spirit._] - -The doctrines which deny the practical form of the spirit are and -cannot but be of two fundamental kinds, according to the double -possibility offered by the proposition itself which they propose to -refute. The first doctrine affirms that _the practical form is not -spiritual activity,_ the second that although it be spiritual activity, -_yet it is not in any way distinguishable from the already recognized -theoretic form of the spirit._ The second, so to speak, denies to it -specific, the first generic character. - -[Sidenote: _The practical as a fact of unconsciousness._] - -Those who maintain the first of these theses say:--We are unconscious -of the will at the moment of willing and during its real development. -This consciousness is only attained after one has willed, that is to -say, after the volitional act has been developed. Even then, we are not -conscious of the will itself, but of our representation of the will. -Therefore the will, that is to say the practical activity, is not an -activity of the spirit. Since it is unconscious, it is nature and not -spirit. The theoretic activity which follows it is alone spiritual. - -[Sidenote: _Critique._] - -Were we, however, to allow this argument to pass, the result would be -that none of the activities of the spirit would belong to the spirit, -that they would all be unconscious and all, therefore, nature. Indeed, -the activity of the artist, at the moment when he is really so, that -is to say in what is called the moment of artistic creation, is not -conscious of itself: it becomes conscious only afterwards, either in -the mind of the critic or of the artist who becomes critic of himself. -And it has also often been said of the activity of the artist, that it -is unconscious; that it is a natural force, or madness, fury, divine -inspiration. _Est Deus in nobis_; and we only become conscious of the -divinity that burns and agitates us when the agitation is ceasing and -cooling begun. But what of the activity of the philosopher? It may -seem strange, but it is precisely the same with the philosopher. At -the moment in which he is philosophizing, he is unconscious of his -work; in him is God, or nature; he does not reflect upon his thought, -but thinks; or rather the thing thinks itself in him, as a microbe -living in us nourishes itself, reproduces itself and dies: so that -sometimes the philosopher has also seemed to be seized with madness. -The consciousness of his philosophy is not in him at that moment; but -it is in the critic and in the historian, or indeed in himself a moment -after, in so far as he is critic and historian of himself. And will the -critic or the historian at least be conscious? No, he will not be so -either, because he who will afterwards criticize the historico-critical -work is conscious of it, or he himself, in so far as he criticizes -himself, and by objectifying himself occupies a place in the history of -criticism and of historiography. In short, we should never be conscious -in any form of the spiritual activity. - -But this negation is founded on a false idea of consciousness: -spontaneous is confused with reflex consciousness, or that which is -intrinsic to one activity with that which is intrinsic to another, -which surpasses the first and makes of it its object. In such a -sense we can certainly not be conscious of the will, save in the -representation which follows it, as we are not conscious of a poem, -save at the moment of criticizing it. But there is also consciousness -in the act itself of him who reads or composes a poem, and he "is -conscious" (there is no other expression) of its beauty and of its -ugliness, of how the poem should and of how it should not be. This -consciousness is not critical, but is not therefore less real and -efficacious, and without it internal control would be wanting to the -formative act of the poet. Thus also there is consciousness in the -volitional and practical act as such: we are not aware of this act -in a reflex manner, but we feel, or, if you will, we possess it. -Without it there would be no result. It is therefore developed in -moments or alternatives of happiness and of unhappiness, of well-being -and of malaise, of satisfaction and of remorse, of pleasure and of -pain. If this be unconsciousness, we must say that unconsciousness is -consciousness itself. - -[Sidenote: _Nature and practical activity._] - -The practical activity may appear to be nature in respect of the -theoretical, but not as something without the spirit and opposed to -it, but as a form of the spirit opposed to another form, esthetic -contemplation has in like manner, as has already been mentioned, -appeared to be a natural force creating the world of intuition, which -the philosophical activity of man afterwards understands and recreates -logically. Hence art can be called nature (and has indeed been so -called), and conversely philosophy has been called spirituality. This -gives rise to the further problem: whether it be correct to consider -nature (it is convenient so to call it) that which has afterwards -been recognized in substance as spiritual activity; or whether the -concept and the name of spirit should not be reserved for that which -is truly altogether outside the spirit, and whether this something -placed altogether outside the spirit truly exists. This point does -not concern us here, although we are much disposed to admit that -one of the mainstays of that absurd conception of nature as of the -extra-spiritual is precisely the practical or volitional form of the -spirit, so conspicuously different from the theoretical form and from -the sub-forms of the same. We do not therefore hold those philosophers -to have been so completely in the wrong, who have identified nature and -will, for they have thus at any rate discovered one aspect of the truth. - -[Sidenote: _Reduction of the practical form to the theoretical._] - -Passing to the second thesis, which does not place the will outside -the spirit, but denies to it the distinction between practical and -the theoretical forms and affirms that the will is thought, there is -nothing to be objected to it, provided that, as is often the case, -"thought" be taken as synonymous with "spirit." In this case, as in -that where it is affirmed that art is thought, we need only inquire, -what form of thought is the will, as in the other what form of thought -is art. It is not, for instance, logical or historical thought, and -the will is neither imaginative, logical nor historical thought: if -anything, it must be _volitional thought._ - -But we have the genuine form of this thesis in the affirmation that -the will is the intelligence itself, that to will is to know, and that -action practically well conducted is truth. This thesis would not have -arisen, had it not found support in the real situation of things (and -what this support is will be seen when studying the relation of the -practical with the theoretic activity, and the complicated process of -deliberation). But, when tested here independently, it proves to be -unsustainable. - -[Sidenote: _Critique._] - -We must not oppose to it the usual observations as to the lack of -connection between great intellectual and great volitional development, -or the cases of those theoreticians who are practically quite -ineffectual, of philosophers who are bad governors of States, of the -"very learned" who are not "men" and the like; for the reason already -given, that an observation is not a philosophical argument, but a -fact which itself has need of an explanation, and when this has been -done, it may serve as proof of the philosophical theory, but can never -be substituted for it. But it is well to recall to memory the quite -peculiar character of the will and the practical activity in respect -of knowledge, intellectual light is cold, the will is hot. When we -pass from theoretic contemplation to action and to the practical, we -have almost the feeling of generating, and sons are not made with -thoughts and words. With the greatest intellectual clearness, we yet -remain inert, if something does not intervene that rouses to action, -something analogous to the inspiration that makes run a shiver of joy -and of voluptuousness through the veins of the artist. If the will -be not engaged, every argument, however plausible it may seem, every -situation, however clear, remains mere theory. - -The education of the will is not effected with theories or definitions, -æsthetic or historical culture, but with the exercise of the will -itself. We teach how to will as we teach how to think, by fortifying -and intensifying natural dispositions, by example, which suggests -imitation, by difficulties to be solved (practical problems), by -rousing energetic initiative and by disciplining it to persist. When -an act of will has taken place, no argument will extinguish it. As an -illness is not to be cured with reasons, so an affective and volitional -state cannot be altered by these means. Reasoning and knowledge may -and certainly do assist, but they do not constitute the ultimate and -determining moment. The will alone acts upon the will, not in the sense -that the will of one individual can act upon that of another (which -is merely a fact among the facts perceived by him), but in the sense -that the will of the individual himself, causing the previous volition -to enter upon a crisis, dissolves it and substitutes for it a new -practical synthesis, with a new volition. - -[Sidenote: _The practical as thought which realizes itself. Recognition -of its autonomy._] - -The evident paradox of the thesis which identifies without any -distinction thought and will, theory and practice, has caused it to -be modified and to be produced in another form, expressed in the -definition; that the will is thought in so far as it _is translated -into act,_ thought in so far as it is _imprinted_ upon nature, thought -when _held_ so _firmly_ before the mind as to _become action,_ and -so on. Now it remains to determine what may be the relation between -thought and will, and when this has been done, we shall see what -is exact and what inexact in the above formulæ, of translating, -imprinting, and holding fast. These formulæ are all logically vague, -however imaginative they may be. But what is important to note here is -that with the new turn given to the thesis that denies the peculiarity -of the practical activity, this same peculiarity is unconsciously -affirmed, because that transforming, that imprinting, that holding -fast, which did not exist in the simple theory, conceal precisely the -will. Thus the ultimate form of the negation comes to join hands with -that of the affirmation, and we can consider undisputed the existence -of a particular form of the spirit, which is the practical activity. We -must now examine the relation of this form with the other from which it -has been distinguished. - - -[1] Allusion to a verse of Leopardi in _Canzone all' Italia._ - - - - -II - - -NEGATION OF THE SPIRITUAL FORM OF FEELING - -[_Sidenote: The practical activity and the so-called third spiritual -form: feeling._] - -In affirming the existence of the practical form of activity, we have -had in view only the theoretical form and have demonstrated that -the one cannot be absorbed and confused in the other, and we have -referred only to the theoretic form, when announcing our intention of -determining the relations of the practical with the other forms of the -spirit. This seems but little correct, and in any case not exhaustive, -because there are or may be other non-theoretical forms of the spirit, -into which the practical form could be resolved. Of these it would be -necessary to take account. And not to beat too long about the bush, -that of which in this case it is question, is the form of _feeling,_ -the last or intermediary of the three forms into which it is customary -to divide the spiritual activity: representation, feeling, tendency; -thought, feeling, will. Attempts have not been wanting to reduce -tendency or will to feeling, or, as is said, to a sentimental reaction -from perceptions and thoughts. In fact there is hardly a treatise -of philosophy of the practical without a preliminary study of the -relations between the will and feeling. We cannot, then, escape from -the dilemma; either we must recognize the omission into which we have -fallen and hasten to correct it, or else make explicit the supposition -that may be contained in that omission (which would thus be intentional -and conscious), that _a third general form of the spirit, or a form of -feeling, does not exist._ We have adopted precisely this last position, -and it therefore becomes incumbent upon us briefly to expose the -reasons for which we hold that the concept of feeling must disappear -from the system of the spiritual forms or activities. - -[Sidenote: _Various meanings of the word feeling, as a psychological -class._] - -Feeling may and has been understood in various ways, some of which do -not at all concern our thesis. In the first place, the word "feeling" -has been used to designate a class of psychical facts constructed -according to the psychological and naturalistic method. Thus it -has happened that, with various times and authors, all the most -rudimentary, tenuous, and evanescent manifestations of the spirit have -been called "feelings," slight intuitions (or sensations as they are -called), not yet transformed into perceptions, slight perceptions, -slight tendencies and appetites, in fact all that forms, as it were, -the base of the life of the spirit. The name has thus, on the other -hand, also been given to psychical processes and conditions, in which -various forms follow one another or alternate in relation to a material -empirically limited. Such are what are called feelings of "fatherland," -"love," "nature," "the divine." Nothing forbids the formation of such -classes and the use of that denomination, but as has already been -declared in relation to the psychological method, they are of no use -to philosophy, which not only does not receive them within its limits, -but does not occupy itself with them at all, save to reject them when -they present themselves, as philosophical psychology or psychological -philosophy. To classify is not to think philosophically, and philosophy -on the one hand does not recognize criteria of small and great, of -weak and strong, of more and of less, and a small or smallest thought, -a small or smallest tendency, is for it thought and tendency and not -feeling at all; on the other, it does not admit complicated processes -without resolving these into their simple components. Thus the feeling -of love or of patriotism, and the others made use of in the example, -are revealed to philosophy as series of acts of thought and of will, -variously interlaced. Let the psychologists, then, keep their classes -and sub-classes of feeling. We, for our part, not only do not dream of -di-possessing them of such a treasure, but shall continue to draw from -it, when necessary, the small change of ordinary conversation. - -[Sidenote: _Feeling as a state of the spirit._] - -There also exists another meaning of the word "feeling," of which, -at present at any rate, we do not take account. This appears when -the word is used to designate _the state_ of the spirit or of one of -the special forms of the spirit; we should indeed term these more -correctly the _states,_ since the spirit in this case, as is known, -is polarized in two opposite terms, usually denominated _pleasure and -pain._ Indubitably these two terms can also be taken as psychological -(and are thus included in the preceding case). Hence it results that -pleasure and pain are represented by psychologists as the two extremes -of a continuous series, in which there is a passage from the one to -the other term by insensible increases and gradations. But we must -also recognize that this psychological representation is not the only -one possible, and indeed is not truly the real one, and that the two -terms have their place and their proper meaning in the philosophy -of the spirit. They are, as has been said, _opposites;_ and are -differentiated, not only by a more and a less, by a greatest and a -least, but also by the special character of distinction that opposites -possess. The doctrine of opposites and of opposites in the practical -activity of the spirit does not, however, appertain to this part of our -exposition. In denying feeling, we do not here deny the doctrine of -opposites, and that psychology of the _states_ of the spirit which is -founded upon it, but the doctrine of feeling considered as a particular -_form_ of _activity._ - -[Sidenote: _Function of the concept of feeling in the History of -philosophy; the indeterminate._] - -The conception of feeling as a spiritual activity has answered to a -want of research, which may be described as _provisional excogitation._ -Whenever thought has found itself face to face with a form or subform -of spiritual activity, which it was not possible either to eliminate -or to absorb in forms already recognized, the problem to be solved -has been endorsed with that word "feeling." With many this has passed -for a solution. Feeling, in fact, has been the indeterminate in the -history of philosophy, or rather the not yet fully determined, the -_half-determined._ - -Hence its great importance as an expedient for the indication of -new territories to conquer, and as a stimulus against remaining -obstinately shut up in old and insufficient formulæ. But hence also -its fate: the problem must not be exchanged for its solution, the -indeterminate or semi-determinate must be determined. Whenever the -determination of the forms and sub-forms of the spirit has not been -given in a complete manner, the category of feeling will reappear (and -it will be beneficial); but at the same time will reappear the duty of -exploring it and of understanding what is concealed beneath it, or at -least what unsolved difficulty has caused it to reappear afresh. - -Now we have already met with the concept of feeling on more than one -occasion, when investigating the philosophy of the theoretic spirit, -as something supplying a theoretical need outside the theoretic forms -generally admitted, or as a special form of theoretic activity. Every -time that we have done this, an attentive examination has caused it -to disappear before our eyes, and has generally helped us, either to -discover something previously unknown, or to confirm the necessity of -contested categories. - -[Sidenote: _Feeling as herald of the æsthetic form;_] - -Thus it happened that when a special _æsthetic_ function was -not recognized and it was attempted to explain it, either -intellectualistically, as nothing but an inferior form of philosophy, -or historically, as a reproduction of the historical and natural datum, -or almost as the satisfaction of certain volitional wants (hedonistic -theory), the view of art as neither a form of the intellect nor of -perception nor of will, but of _feeling,_ was an advance, as also -was the appeal to men of _feeling_ to recognize and to judge it. -As a result of this insistence, it was eventually discovered that -art possessed an absolutely simple and ingenuous theoretic form, -without either intellectual or historical contents, the form of the -pure intuition which is that of the æsthetic and artistic activity. -Whoever returns to treat of art as a product of feeling, after this -discovery of the pure intuition, falls back from the determinate to the -semi-determinate, and is at the mercy of all the dangers which arise -from it. - -[Sidenote: _As herald of the intuitive element in Historiography._] - -The theory of historiography owes its progress in like manner to the -demonstration that it is impossible to deduce the historical statement -from concepts, but that we must deduce it in final analysis from an -immediate _feeling_ of the real, that is to say, from the _intuitive_ -element, which inevitably exists in every historical reconstruction, -as in every perception. On the other hand, and in altogether another -sense, reacting against the false idea of an extra--subjective -historical objectivity, to be found in the mere reproduction of the -datum, it was made evident that no historical narration is possible -without the _reaction of feeling_ in respect to the datum. Thus was -discovered the indispensability of the _intellective_ element in the -historical affirmation. Whoever has recourse to feeling as a factor -in historiography, after this complete constitution of the historical -judgment, returns from the clear to the confused, from light, if not to -darkness, then to twilight. - -[Sidenote: _Feeling as herald of the pure concept in philosophical -Logic._] - -The concept of feeling has also been of capital importance in the -progress of the Logic of philosophy. For how could we begin to explain -that philosophy is constructed with a method altogether different from -that of the exact disciplines (natural sciences and mathematics), -without denying to those sciences the capacity of conquering the -supreme truth, the true truth, full reality, and recognizing such -capacity on the other hand to a special function called _feeling_ -or _immediate_ knowledge? That function was void, that is to say, -undetermined, because defined in a negative and not in a positive -manner: feeling was something different from the abstract and arbitrary -procedure of the exact sciences, from the abstract intellect, but its -true nature was unknown. When this was at last known it was discovered -that it was not a question of "feeling" or of "immediate knowledge," -but of the intellect itself, in its genuine and uncontaminated nature, -its pure and free activity, of intellect as _reason,_ of thought as -_speculative_ thought, of that "immediate knowledge," which is true, -intrinsic, perpetual _mediation._ Whoever henceforth returns to -feeling, after the discovery of the pure or speculative concept, and -believes it to be the creator of philosophy and of religion, fighting -with it against the natural and mathematical sciences, behaves as he -who should wish to return to-day to the flint-lock, for the excellent -reason that it was an advance upon the bow and the catapult. Thus those -who invoke feeling in philosophy are henceforth a little ridiculous. -This does not imply that they were not at one time to be taken -seriously, for this concept has been of great provisional assistance -and has been as it were the compass of the new idea of philosophy. - -[Sidenote: _Analogous function in the Philosophy of the practical._] - -The same will be the case in the investigation that we have begun of -the practical form of the spirit and of the problems to which it gives -rise. This concept of feeling has been mingled with them all, and -propositions have been formed, of which we shall indicate the true -significance in the proper places. Beginning at once and limiting -ourselves solely to the question of the existence of a peculiar -practical form, it is easy to understand why it has so often been -maintained against the intellectual and theoretical exclusivists, that -the will consists, not of knowledge, but of feeling; that the principle -of action, far from being an intellectual principle, is sentimental -emotion; that in order to produce a volition, reason, ideas, and facts -perceived do not suffice, but that it is necessary that all these -things be transformed into feelings, which must take possession of the -soul; that the base of life lived, that is, of practical life, is not -thought, but feeling, and so on. With these formulæ was recognized -the peculiarity of the practical activity. The theory of feeling in -respect of the practical represents progress as compared with the -intellectualistic theory, because the appearance of indeterminateness -is progress as compared with bad determinateness, and contains in -itself the new and more complete determinateness. - -[Sidenote: _Negation of feeling._] - -But in this very way of ours of understanding the value of these -formulæ, is implied their resolute negation, when they tend to -persist, after having accomplished their function, and to maintain -side by side with the theory of the practical a third general form -of the spirit, namely feeling. No spiritual fact or manifestation of -activity can be adduced, which, examined without superficiality, is -not reducible to an act of fancy, intellect and perception, that is, -of theory (when it is not at once revealed as an abstraction or as a -merely psychological class of these acts); or to an act of utilitarian -or ethical volition (when it is not here too a psychological class, -variously designated as aspirations, passions, affections, and the -like). Let him who will search his spirit and attempt to indicate one -single act, differing from the above, as something new and original and -deserving of the special denomination of feeling. - -[Sidenote: _Its deductive exclusion._] - -This constatation of fact (we repeat the warning) is but the first -step in the complete philosophical demonstration, which demands that -we show not only that a third form does not exist, but that _it cannot -exist._ This demonstration will be given further on, and will coincide -with that of the demonstration of the necessity of the two forms, -theoretical and practical; a duality that is unity and a unity that is -duality. Recognizing the legitimacy of the demand for a philosophical -deduction of the forms of the spirit, and therefore of a deductive -exclusion of those that are spurious and wrongly adopted, it seems that -if it be somewhat delayed, such a mode of exclusion will also yield -clearer results. - - - - -III - - -RELATION OF THE PRACTICAL TO THE THEORETIC ACTIVITY - - -[Sidenote: _Precedence of the theoretical activity._] - -Freed from the equivocal third term, which is feeling, and now passing -to the problem of the relation between the theoretical and the -practical activity enunciated, we must in the first place declare the -thesis that _the practical activity presupposes the theoretical._ Will -is impossible without knowledge; as is knowledge, so is will. - -[Sidenote: _The unity of the spirit and the co-presence of the -practical._] - -In recognizing this precedence of knowledge to will, we do not wish to -posit as thinkable a theoretical man or a theoretical moment altogether -deprived of will. This would be an unreal abstraction, inadmissible -in philosophy, which operates solely with real abstractions, that is, -with universal concretes. The forms of the spirit are distinct and -not separate, rand when the spirit is found in one of its forms, or -is _explicit_ in it, the other forms are also in it, but _implicit,_ -or, as is also said, _concomitant._ If theoretical and cognoscitive -man were not at the same time volitional, he would not even be able to -stand on his feet and look at the sky, and, literally speaking, if he -were not alive, he would not be able to think (and thinking is both -an act of life and an act of will, which is called _attention)._ Were -he not to will, he would be unable to pass from waking to sleep and -from sleep to waking. Thus in order to be purely theoretical, it is -necessary to be at the same time in some degree practical; the energy -of pure fancy and of pure thought springs from the trunk of volition. -Hence the importance of the will for the æsthetic and intellectual -life; the will is not theory, nor is it the force that makes grain to -grow or guides the course of rivers, but as it assists the culture of -grain or restrains the destructive impetus of rivers, so it assists and -restrains the force of fancy and of thought, causing them to act in -the best way, that is, to be as they really ought to be, namely, fancy -and thought in their purest manifestation. The practical activity, -therefore, acts in this way, and as it drags the man of science from -his study and the artist from his studio, if it be necessary to defend -his country or to watch at the bedside of his sick father, so it -commands the artist and the man of science to fulfil their special -mission and to be themselves in an eminent degree. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of pragmatism._] - -All the arguments that have been used in the past and that are used in -the present, to maintain the dependence of the theoretical upon the -practical activity, are of value for what of truth they contain, that -is, only to demonstrate this unity of the spiritual functions that -we have recognized, and the indispensability of the volitional force -for the health of the cognoscitive spirit. But the passage from this -thesis to the other, that the true is the production of the will, is -nothing but a sophism, founded on the double signification of the word -"production." It should be clear that to _assist_ the work of thought -with the will is one thing and that to _substitute_ the will for the -work of thought is another. To claim to substitute the will for the -work of thought, is equivalent to the negation of that force that -should be assisted; it is the most open proclamation of scepticism, -the most complete distrust of the true and of the possibility of -attaining to it. This attempt is now called _pragmatism,_ or is at -any rate one of the meanings of the word, with which the school of -the greatest confusion that has ever appeared in philosophy adorns -itself in our day. This school mixes together the most divergent -theses--that of the stimulating effect that the will has upon thought, -that other of the volitional or arbitrary moment, by means of which -perceptions and historical data are reduced to abstract types in the -natural disciplines, or postulates laid down for the construction -of mathematical classes. The third form, which might be called the -Baconian prejudice, maintains the exclusive utility of the natural -sciences and mathematics for the well-being of life. The fourth -thesis is positivistic: here it is maintained that we cannot know -anything save what we ourselves arbitrarily compress into the formula -and classes of mathematics and of naturalism. The fifth thesis is -a romantic exaggeration of the principle of creative power in man, -substituting the caprice of the individual for the universal spirit. -The sixth, something between silliness and Jesuistry, recommends -the utility of making one's illusions and believing them to be -true. The seventh is superstitious, occultist and spiritistic--and -there are others that we omit. If pragmatism has had and preserves -any attraction, it owes this to the truth of its first and second -theses and to the half truth of the fifth. All the three are however -heterogeneous in themselves and unreconcilable with the others, which -are most fallacious. But we repeat with the old philosophers that -whoever in thinking says, "Thus I will it," is lost for truth. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of psychological objections._] - -Certain reservations that are made to the above truth from the point -of view of that philosophy, which we have called psychological, are -scarcely deserving of brief mention. We find in treatises of Psychology -that knowledge does precede the practical act, but only in the higher -forms of volition, whereas in its lower forms are found only impulses, -tendencies, appetites, altogether blind of any knowledge. Thus they -are able to talk of involuntary forms of the practical activity, of -a will that is not a will, when once the true will has been defined, -as precisely appetition illumined by previous knowledge. The _blind -will_ of certain metaphysicians is derived from such excogitations of -psychologists, who make of it a practical act without intelligence. -They have here attributed the value of reality to a crude concept of -class, a thing that happens not infrequently. A blind will is however -unthinkable. Every form of the practical activity, be it as poor and -rudimentary as you like (and let as many classes and gradations as you -will be formed), presupposes knowledge of some sort. In animals too? -will be asked. In animals too, provided they be, and in so far as they -are centres of life, and so of perceptions and of will. This is also -true of vegetables and of minerals, always with the above hypothesis. -We must banish every form of _aristocracy_ from the Philosophy of the -practical, as we have banished it from Æsthetic, from Logic, from -Historic, esteeming it most harmful to the proper understanding of -those activities. The aristocratic illusion is closely allied to that -one which makes us believe that we, shut up in the egotism of our -empirical individuality, are alone aware of the truth, that we alone -feel the beautiful, that we alone know how to love, and so on. But -reality is democratic. - -From the psychological point of view yet another objection has been -raised. Knowledge (it is affirmed) cannot be the indispensable base of -the will, if, as is the case, the ignorant are often far more effective -than many learned men and philosophers. These latter, they say, -although possessing very great knowledge, and no less a stock of good -intentions, yet do not know how to direct their lives successfully. -But it is evident that in these cases the so-called ignorant possess -just that knowledge which is necessary for the purpose and is lacking -to the learned and to the philosopher, who would themselves be the -ignorant in such a case. Nicholas Macchiavelli was ignorant as compared -with Giovanni dalle Bande Nere, when he kept the spectators waiting two -hours in the sun, while he was attempting to dispose three thousand -infantry according to the directions that he had written. This he would -never have succeeded in doing, had not Signor Giovanni, with the help -of drummers and in the twinkling of an eye caused them to execute the -various manœuvres and afterwards carried Master Nicholas to dine, who, -save for him, would not have dined at all that day.[1] - -[Sidenote: _Nature of the theoretical precedence of the practical: -historical knowledge._] - -The knowledge required for the practical act is not that of the artist, -nor of the philosopher, or rather, it is these two also, but only in so -far as both are to be found as elements co-operating in that ultimate -and complete knowledge which is _historical._ If the first be called -intuition, the second concept, and the third perception, and the third -be looked upon as the result of the two preceding, it will be said -that the knowledge required for the practical act is _perceptive._ -Hence the common saying that praises the sure eye of the practical man; -hence, too, the close bond between historical sense and practical and -political sense; hence, too, the justifiable diffidence of those who, -unable to grasp effectual reality, hope to attain to it by force of -mere syllogisms and abstractions, or believe that they have attained to -it, when they have erected an imaginary edifice. They prove by so doing -that they can never be practical men, at least in the sphere of action -at which they are then aiming. - -Such knowledge is not of itself the practical act. The historian as -such is a contemplative, not a practical man or politician. If that -spark which is volition, do not spring forth, the material of knowledge -does not catch fire and is not transformed into the material of the -practical. But that knowledge is the condition, and if the condition -be not the conditioned, yet one cannot have the conditioned without -the condition. In this last signification, it is true that action -is knowledge, will, and wisdom, that is to say, in the sense that -willing and acting presuppose knowledge and wisdom. In this sense, and -considered solely in the stage of the cognoscitive investigation which -will form the base of action, the deliberation is a theoretical fact. -The customary expressions of logical, rational, judicious actions, -are metaphors, because action may be weak or energetic, coherent or -incoherent; but it will not have those predicates which are proper to -theoretical acts that precede actions, on which the metaphors aforesaid -are founded. As are these acts, so originate the practical act, will, -and action. We can act in so far as we have knowledge. Volition is not -the surrounding world which the spirit perceives; it is a beginning, -a new fact. But this fact has its roots in the surrounding world, -this beginning is irradiated with the colours of things that man has -perceived as a theoretical spirit, before he took action as a practical -spirit. - -[Sidenote: _Its continual changeability._] - -It is important to observe, as much to prevent an equivoke into which -many fall, as because of the consequences that will follow from holding -it, that we must not look upon the perceptive knowledge of reality -that surrounds us as a firm basis, upon which we act, by translating -the formed volition into act. For were this so, we should have to -assume that the surrounding world, perceived by the spirit, stops after -the perceptive act, which is not the case. That world changes every -second, the perceptive act perceives the new and the different, and the -volitional act changes according to that real and perceived change. -Perception and volition alternate every instant; in order to will, we -must touch the earth at every instant, in order to resume force and -direction. - -[Sidenote: _No other theoretic precedent._] - -Continuous perception and continuous change, that is the necessary -theoretic condition of volition. It is necessary and unique. No other -theoretical element is needed, because every other is contained in it, -and beyond it no other is thinkable. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of concepts and practical judgments._] - -But if this be true and no other theoretic element save that precede -the volition, then we find in the aforesaid theory the criticism of a -series of other theories, generally admitted in the Philosophy of the -practical, not less than in ordinary thought, none of which can be -retained without alterations and corrections. - -Or better, there are not so many various theories to criticize; there -is rather one theory, which presents itself under different aspects and -assumes various names. This theory consists substantially in affirming -that with the complex of cognitions, of which we have hitherto treated -(all of which are summed up in the historical judgment), we do not -yet possess that one which is necessary, before we can proceed to -volition and action. A special form of concepts and judgments which -can be called _practical,_ must, it is said, appear; these render -the will possible, by interposing themselves between the previous -merely historical judgment and the will. Is it not indubitable that we -possess practical concepts, that is, concepts of classes of action or -of supreme guides to action, concepts of things _good, of ideals, of -ends,_ and that we effect _judgments_ of value by the application of -those concepts to the image of given actions? Is it not indubitable -that those judgments and those concepts refer, not to the simple -present fact, but to the future? How could we will, if we did not know -what is good to will, and that a given possible action corresponds to -that concept of good? - -[Sidenote: _Posteriority of judgments to the practical act._] - -Now it is undeniable that we in fact possess the above-mentioned -concepts and judgments. But what we must absolutely deny is that they -differ in any respect from other concepts and theoretical judgments, -and that they deserve to be distinguished from these as practical and -that they have the future for their object. The future, that which -is not, is not an object of knowledge; the material of the judgment, -whether it concern actions or thoughts, does not alter its logical and -theoretical character; the concepts of modes of action are concepts -neither more nor less than those of modes of thought. With this -negation we at the same time deny the possibility of their interposing -themselves between knowledge and will. Those judgments, far from being -anterior to the will, are posterior to it. - -Let us state a simple case and observe the course of analysis on -the lines of the theory here criticized. It is winter-time; I am -cold; there is a wood close by, and I know that by cutting wood one -can light a fire and that fire gives heat: I therefore resolve to -cut wood. According to that theory, the spiritual process would be -expressed in the following chain of propositions: I know the actual -situation, that is to say, that I am cold, that wood gives fire and -fire heat, and that there exists wood that can be cut; I possess the -concept that it is a good thing to provide for the health of the body; -I judge that with heat I shall procure health during the winter, and -that in consequence heat is a good thing and the cutting of wood, -without which I cannot procure heat, is also good. Having made all -these constatations, I set in motion the spring of my will, and I -_will_ to cut the wood.--The process as above described seems real -and controllable by every one; but it is, on the contrary, illusory. -The practical judgment: "I shall act well in cutting the wood" really -means, "I will to cut the wood;" "this is a good thing" really means, -"I will this." I may change my will a moment after, substituting for -this volition one that is different or contrary, that does not matter. -At the moment that I formed that judgment, I must have seen myself -in the volitional attitude of a man cutting wood; the will must have -come first. Otherwise the judgment would never have existed. Given the -first actual situation and its complete expression in the judgment, no -other judgment can arise, if the actual situation do not change and -nothing new supervene. This new thing is always my will, which, when -the situation changes (as in the example, if I walk from the house to -the tree, or if I simply move my body in an imperceptible, manner in -the direction of the action willed), by adding to the actual reality -something that was not there before, provides material for a new -judgment. This judgment is called practical, but it is theoretical, -like the others that precede it; a judgment believed to precede the -volition, whereas in reality it follows it; a judgment believed to -condition a future act of will, whereas it is in reality the past act -of will looking at itself in the glass; a judgment that is not really -practical but _historical._ - -The illusion that things happen differently is caused by the fact -that we possess judgments concerning our past volitions, which are -afterwards collected into abstract formulæ, such as that "it is well -to cut wood." But, on the one hand, those formulæ and judgments are -in their turn formed from previous volitions, and on the other, those -formulæ do not possess any absolute value in the single and concrete -situation, so that they can be modified and substituted for others that -affirm the opposite. The question is not whether cutting wood has been -as a rule a good thing for me in the past, nor whether I have generally -willed it in the past: the question is to will it at this moment, that -is, to posit the cutting of wood at this moment as a good thing. - -[Sidenote: _Posteriority of the practical concepts._] - -As is the case with the pretended practical judgments and concepts of -classes formed upon them, so the concepts that they imply, of _things -good, of ideals, of ends, of actions worthy of being willed,_ and so -on, do not precede, but follow the volition that has taken place. These -concepts are the incipient reflection, scientific and philosophical, -upon the spontaneous acts of the will, and we cannot practise science -nor philosophize save about facts that have already taken place: if -the fact do not precede, there can be no theory. Certainly theory -does not do other than seek out the already created and give the -real principles of actions in the form of thought principles, in -the same manner as Logic discovers those principles that live and -operate in logical thought. But since the formula of the principle of -contradiction is not necessary for thinking without contradiction, but -presupposes it, so the concepts of ends, of things good, and of ideals -are not necessary for volitions, but presuppose them. - -[Sidenote: _Origin of intellectualist and sentimentalist doctrines._] - -The thesis of the will as knowledge draws support from the mistaken -belief in the practical principles and judgments that precede volition, -as also does the proposition that he who knows what is good for him -also wishes it, and that he who does not wish it does not know it. -This thesis is to be inverted, because to know what is good for one -means that one has willed it. From the opposite point of view, the -other thesis, of the impossibility of volition unless _feeling_ be -interposed between what is known and the will, is to be attributed to a -like mistaken belief. Feeling is held to give, as it were, a particular -value to facts, and to cause them to be felt as they should be felt, or -to be changed. The customary merit possessed by theories of feeling is -to be recognized in this thesis: that is to say, it has awakened or -reawakened consciousness of the peculiarity of the practical act in -respect to intellectualistic reductions and identifications. This merit -is not altogether lacking to the general theory of practical judgments -itself. These, although called judgments, were classified differently -to all the others, precisely because they were _practical._ - -[Sidenote: _The concepts of end and means._] - -Having thus shown that it is not true that man first knows the end -and then wills it, it is possible to establish with greater precision -what is to be understood by _end._ The end, then, in universal, is the -concept itself of will. Considered in the single act, as this or that -end, it is nothing but this or that determinate volition. Hence is -also to be derived a better definition of its relation to the _means,_ -which it is usual to conceive empirically and erroneously as a part of -volition and action at the service of another part. An act of will is -an infrangible unity and can be taken as divided only for practical -convenience. In the volitional act, all is volition; nothing is means, -and all is end. The means is nothing but the actual situation, from -which the volitional act takes its start, and is in that way really -distinguished from the end. Distinction and unification take place -together, because, as has been remarked, the volition is not the -situation, yet, on the other hand, as the volition, so the situation: -the one varies as a function of the other. Hence the absurdity of -the maxim, that _the end justifies the means._ This maxim is of an -empirical character and has sometimes been employed to justify actions -erroneously held to be unjustifiable, and more often to make pass as -just actions that were unjustifiable. As the end, so the means, but the -means is what is given and has no need of justification. The end is -what has been willed and must be justified in itself. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the end as flan or as fixed design._] - -The idea that we generally have of finality is to be eliminated, owing -to the continual changeability of the means, that is, of the actual -situation, which would posit the end as something fixed, as a _plan_ -to be carried out. The difference between the finality of man and that -of nature has recently been made to reside in nature: which has seemed -to act upon a plan which she changes, remakes, and accommodates at -every moment, according to contingencies, so that the point of arrival -is not for her predetermined or predeterminable. But the same can be -said of the human will and of its finality. The will too changes at -every moment, as the movement of a swimmer or of an athlete changes -at every moment, according to the motion of the sea or of the rival -athlete, and according to the varying measure or quality of his own -strength in the course of the volitional process. Man acts, case for -case and from instant to instant, realizing his will of every instant, -not that abstract conception which is called a plan. Hence also arises -the confirmation of the belief that there do not exist fixed types and -models of actions. He who seeks and awaits such models and types does -not know how to will. He is without that initiative, that creativeness, -that genius, which is not less indispensable to the practical activity -than to art and philosophy. - -[Sidenote: _The will and the unknown._] - -It will seem that the will thus becomes will of the unknown and is -at variance in too paradoxical a manner with the sayings, so clearly -evident, that _voluntas quae non fertur in incognitum_ and _ignoti -nulla cupido._ But those sayings are true only so far as they confirm -the fact that without the precedence of the theoretical act, the -practical act does not take place. Apart from this signification, it -should rather be maintained that _noti nulla cupido_ and that _voluntas -non fertur in cognitum._ What is known exists, and it is not possible -to _will the existence_ of what _exists_: the past is not a content -of volition. The will is the will of the unknown, that is to say, -is itself, which, in so far as it wills, does not know itself, and -knows itself only when it has ceased to will. Our surprise when we -come to understand the actions that we have accomplished, is often -not small; we realize that we have not done what we thought we had -done, and have on the contrary done what we had not foreseen. Hence -also the fallacy of the explanations that present volitional man as -surrounded with things that he does or does not will; whereas things, -or rather facts are the mere object of knowledge and cannot be willed -or not willed, as it is unthinkable to will that Alexander the Great -had not existed, or that Babylon had not been conquered. That which is -willed is not _things_ but _changes_ in things, that is to say, the -volitions themselves. This fallacious conception also arises from the -substitution of abstractions and classes of volitions for the real will. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the concept of practical sciences and of a -practical philosophy._] - -It is to be observed, finally, that the erroneous concept of a form -of science called the _practical_ or _normative_ has its roots in the -concept of _the end, of the good, of concepts and judgments of value_ -as original facts. When practical concepts and judgments, as a special -category of concepts and judgments, have been destroyed, the idea -of a practical and normative science has also been destroyed. For -this reason, the _Philosophy of the practical_ cannot be _practical -philosophy,_ and if it has appeared to constitute an exception -among all philosophies and that above all others it should preserve -a practical and normative function, this has arisen from a verbal -misunderstanding that is most ingenuous and most destructive. For -our part we have striven to dissipate it, even in the title of our -treatise, which, contrary to the usual custom, we have-entitled not -_practical,_ but _of the practical._ - - -[1] Bandello, _Novelle,_ i. 40, intro. - - - - -IV - - -INSEPARABILITY OF ACTION FROM ITS REAL BASE AND PRACTICAL NATURE OF THE -THEORETICAL ERROR - - -[Sidenote: _Coincidence of intention and volition._] - - -The connection between the actual situation and will, means and -end having been made clear, no distinction that it may be desired -to establish between general and concrete volition, ideal and real -volition, that is to say between _intention and volition,_ is -acceptable. Intention and volition coincide completely, and that -distinction, generally suggested with the object of justifying the -unjustifiable, is altogether arbitrary in both the forms that it -assumes. - -[Sidenote: _Volition in the abstract and in the concrete: critique._] - -The first form is that of the distinction between abstract and -concrete, or better, between general and particular. It is maintained, -that we can will the good in the abstract and yet be unable to will -it in the concrete, that we may have good intentions and yet behave -badly. But by our reduction of the thing willed to the volition, -to will the abstract is tantamount to _willing abstractly._ And to -will abstractly is tantamount to _not willing,_ if volition imply a -situation historically determined, from which it arises as an act -equally determined and concrete. Hence, of the two terms of the -pretended distinction, the first, volition of the abstract, disappears, -and the second, concrete volition, which is the true and real volition -and intention, alone remains. - -[Sidenote: _Thought volition and real volition: critique._] - -The second form abandons, it is true, the abstract for the concrete, -but assumes two different volitional acts in the same concrete: the -one real, arising from the actual situation, the other, thought or -imagined, side by side with the former: this would be the volition, -that the intention. According to such a theory, it is always possible -to _direct the intention,_ that is, the real volition can always join -with the volitional act imagined and produce a nexus, in which the -volition exists in one way, the intention in another; the first bad -and the second good, or the first good and the second bad. Thus the -honourable man approved by the Jesuit, of whom Pascal speaks, although -he desire the death of him from whom he expects an inheritance and -rejoice when it takes place, yet endows his desire with a special -character, believing that what he wishes to attain is the prosperity -of his affairs, not the death of his fellow-creature. Or the same man -may kill the man who has given him a blow; but in so doing he will fix -his thought upon the defence of his honour, not upon the homicide. -Since he is not able to abstain from the action, he at least (they say) -purines the intention. The worst of this is that the real situation, -the only one of which we can take account, is the historical, not the -imaginary situation. In the reality of the consequent volition, it is -not a question of his own prosperity and nothing more, but of his own -prosperity coupled with the death of another, or of false prosperity. -It is not a question of his own honour and nothing more, but of his own -honour in conjunction with the violation of the life of another, that -is, of false honour. Thus the asserted fact of prosperity and honour -is changed into two qualified bad actions, and what was honourable -in the imaginary case, becomes dishonourable in the real case, which -is indeed the only one of which it is question. It is of no use to -imagine a situation that differs from reality, because it is to the -real situation that the intention is directed, not to the other, and -therefore it is not possible to direct, that is to say, to change the -intention, if the actual situation do not change. - -The antipathy that has been shown for good-hearted and well-intentioned -men in recent centuries, and for practical doctrines with intention -as their principle (the morality of intention, etc.), arises from the -sophisms that we have here criticized. But since it is henceforward -clear to us that those so-called well-intentioned and good-hearted -people have neither good hearts nor good intentions and are nothing -but hypocrites, and because we do not admit any distinction between -intention and will, we are without fear or antipathy in respect to -the use of the word "intention," understanding it as a synonym for -"volition." - -[Sidenote: _Critique of volition with base either unknown or -imperfectly known._] - -But it will be said that we have here considered the case, in which, -while the real situation is known, there is a hypocritical pretence -of not knowing it, in order to deceive others and maybe oneself, and -that we have justly here declared that in such a case the will and -the intention were inseparable. But there is another case, in which, -though the situation of affairs be not known, yet it is necessary both -to will and to act at once. Here the concrete will is separated at -the beginning from the intention: the will is what it _can_ be, the -intention is as the action _would wish_ to be. - -But this instance is equally or even more inconceivable than the -preceding. It has been clearly established that if we do not know, we -cannot will. Before arriving at a resolution, man tries to see clearly -in and about him, and so long as the search continues, so long as the -doubt is not dissipated, the will remains in suspense. Nothing can -make him resolve, where the elements for coming to a resolution are -wanting; nothing can make him say to himself "I know," when he does not -know; nothing can make him say "it will be as if I knew," because that -"as if I knew" would introduce the arbitrary method into the whole of -knowledge, and would cause universal doubt to take the place of doubt -circumscribed. This would disturb the function of knowledge itself, -against which an act of real felony would be committed. From nothing -nothing is born. - -[Sidenote: _Illusions among the cases that are cited._] - -There are no exceptions to this law, and those that are adduced can be -only apparent. A man is cautiously descending the dangerous side of -a mountain, covered with ice: will he or will he not place his foot -on that surface, of which he does not and cannot know the resistance? -However, there is no time to be lost: he must go on and take the risk. -It seems evident that in a case like this he wills and operates without -complete knowledge. But the case is not indeed unique or of a special -order: every act of life implies risk of the unknown, and if there were -not in us (as they say) _potestas voluntatem nostram extra limites -intellectus nostri extendendi,_ it would be impossible to move a step, -to lift an arm, or to put into one's mouth a morsel of bread, since -_omnia incerta ac periculis sunt plena._ What must be known in order -to form the volition is not that which we should know if we were in a -situation different from that in which we are (in which case, also, -the volition would be different), but that which we can know in the -situation in which we really find ourselves. The man on the glacier has -neither time nor means to verify the resistance of the surface of the -ice; but since he is obliged to proceed further, he does not act in a -rash, but in a very prudent manner, in putting his foot trustfully on -the ice that may be unfaithful to him. He would be acting rashly if, -having the means and the time, he failed to investigate its resistance, -that is to say, if he were in _another and imaginary situation,_ not -in that real and present situation, in which he finds himself. If I -knew the cards of my adversary, as the cheat knows them, I should -play differently, but it cannot be argued that because, as an honest -player, I know only my own, I am therefore playing inconsiderately: I -am playing as I ought, with the knowledge that I possess, that is, with -full knowledge of the real situation in which I find myself. - -With this very simple observation is also solved an old puzzle of -the theory of volition. How does it happen that a man can choose -between two dishes of food at an equal distance and moving in the -same manner,[1] or between two objects altogether identical, offered -for sale to him at the same time, at the same price, by the same -individual? First, we must correct the hypothesis, for as two identical -things do not exist in nature, so the two objects in question and the -two possible actions of the example are not identical. - -[1] This was an example used by the Schoolmen and by Dante. - -Indeed the refined connoisseur always discovers some difference between -two objects, which to the ignorant, the absent-minded, and the hasty -seem to be the same. The question, then, is not of identical objects -and actions, but of those as in which there is neither time nor mode -(_majora premunt_) of recognizing the difference. For this reason, -therefore, we take no account of this difference, or, as is said, -they are looked upon as equal in this respect. But the _adiophora,_ -the indifferent, do not exist, and owing to that abstraction, we do -not take account of other differences that always exist in the real -situation, owing to which my volition becomes concrete in a movement -that causes me to take the object on my right, because (let us suppose) -I am wont to turn to the right, or because, owing to a superstition -that is not less a matter of habit, I prefer the right to the left, -or because, through sympathy due to dignity, I prefer the object that -is offered to me with the right hand to a similar object offered with -the left, which, if only for this reason, is, strictly speaking, not -the same, but different, and so on. These minute circumstances are -absent from consciousness and are not felt by the will, not because -they escape as a rule reflection. If we neglect them in analysis as -non-existent, this always occurs, because we substitute for the real -situation another unreal situation imagined by ourselves. Thus it has -also been remarked, as a proof of the irrationality believed to exist -in our volitions and to be the cause of our acting without precise -knowledge, that no reason nor any theoretic precedent can be adduced -as to why, when fixing legal punishments, or in the application of -sentences, we give forty and not forty-one days' imprisonment, a -hundred lire fine instead of a hundred and one. But here, too, it is -clear that the detailed facts are not wanting, the knowledge of which -causes us to will the punishment to be so and so. This knowledge is -to be found in traditions, in the sympathy that we have for certain -numbers, in the ease with which they can be remembered or calculated, -and so on.--To sum up, man forms the volitional act, not because he -possesses some portentous faculty of extending his will outside the -limits of the intellect, but, on the contrary, because he possesses the -faculty of circumscribing himself within the limits of his intellect -on each occasion and of willing on that basis and within those limits. -That he wills, knowing some things and ignorant of infinite other -things, is indubitable. But this means that he is man and not God, -that he is a finite and not an infinite being, and that the sum of his -historical knowledge is on each occasion human and finite, as is on -each occasion the act of will which he forms upon it. Psychologists -would say that this arises from _narrowness_ of consciousness, but -Goethe, on the contrary, remarked with metaphor more apt and thought -more profound, that the true artist is revealed in _knowing how to -limit himself._ God himself, as it seems, cannot act, save by limiting -himself in finite beings. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of volition with a false theoretic base._] - -If the intention cannot be separated from the volition, because this -belongs to the real and not to the imaginary, and proceeds from -the known and never from the unknown, there yet remains a third -possibility, which is, that the will results differently from the -intention, owing to a _theoretical error_; as when we are said to -err _in good faith_ as to the actual situation, that is, we do not -indeed substitute the unknown for the known, nor do we substitute the -imaginary for the known, but we simply make a mistake in enunciating -the historical judgment to ourselves: intending to perform one action, -we perform on the contrary another. - -This third possibility is also an impossibility, because it contradicts -the nature of the theoretical error, which, precisely because it is a -question of error and not of truth, cannot be in its turn theoretical -and must be and is practical, conformably to a theory of error of which -many great thinkers have seen or caught sight and which it is now -fitting to restore and to make clear. - -[Sidenote: _Forms of the theoretical error and problem concerning its -nature._] - -We have elsewhere amply demonstrated how theoretical errors arise -from the undue transference of one theoretical form to another, or -of one theoretical product into another distinct from it. Thus, the -artist who substitutes for the representation of the affections, -reasoning on the affections, mingling art and philosophy, or he who -in the composition of a work, fills the voids that his fancy has left -in the composition, with unsuitable elements taken from other works, -commits the artistic error, ugliness. Thus too, the philosopher, who -solves a philosophical problem in a fantastic way, as would an artist, -or, instead of a philosopheme, employs the historical, naturalistic -or mathematical method, and so produces a myth, or a contingent fact -universalized, or an abstraction in place of concreteness, that is -to say, a philosophical error. It is also a philosophical error to -transport philosophical concepts from one order to another and to -treat art as though it were philosophy or morality as though it were -economy. This also happens in an analogous manner with the historian, -the natural scientist, and the mathematician, all of whom are wrong, if -they interweave extraneous methods with those that are their own, and -with the views, conceptions, and classification of one order, those of -another.--But if this be the way in which particular errors and general -forms of theoretical error arise, what is the origin of the theoretical -error in universal? We have not asked this question explicitly -elsewhere, because only now can it receive the most effective reply. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between ignorance and error: practical genesis -of the latter._] - -Error is not ignorance, lack of knowledge, obscurity or doubt. An error -of which we are altogether without consciousness is not error at all, -but that inexhaustible field which the spiritual activity continues to -fill to infinity. True and proper error is the affirmation of knowing -what we do not know, the substitution of a representation for that -which we do not possess, an extraneous conception for the one that -is wanting. Now affirmation is thought itself, it is truth itself. -When an inquiry has been completed, a process of cogitation closed, -the result is the affirmation that a man makes to himself, not with -a new act added to the foregoing, but with the act itself of thought -that has thought. It is therefore impossible that in the circle of the -pure theoretical spirit error should ever arise. Man has in himself -the fountain of truth. If it be true that on the death-bed there is -no lying, because man transcends the finite and communicates with -the infinite, then man who thinks is always on his bed of death, the -death-bed of the finite, in contact with the infinite. We may know that -we are ignorant, but this consciousness of ignorance is the cogitative -process in its _fieri,_ not yet having attained to its end, certainly -not (as has been said) error. Before this last can appear, before -we can affirm that we have reached a result, which the testimony of -the conscience says has not been reached, something extraneous to -the theoretical spirit must intervene, that is to say, a practical -act which simulates the theoretical. And it simulates it, not indeed -intrinsically (one does not lie with the depth of oneself or on one's -death-bed), but in taking hold of the external means of communication, -of the word or expression as sound and physical fact, and diverting -it to mean what, in the given circumstances, it could not mean. The -erroneous affirmation has been rendered possible, because something -else has followed the true affirmation, which is purely theoretical, -something that is improperly called affirmation in the practical sense, -whereas it is only _communication,_ which can be substituted in a -greater or less degree for the truth and falsely represent it. Thus the -theoretical error _in general_ arises, as do its particular forms and -manifestations, from the substitution for, or the illegitimate mating -of two forms of the spirit. These cannot be both theoretical here, but -must be the theoretical and the practical forms, precisely because we -are here in the field of the spirit in general and of the fundamental -forms of its activity. We are ignorant, then, because it is necessary -to be ignorant and to feel oneself ignorant, in order to attain to -truth; but we err only because _we wish to err._ - -[Sidenote: _Proofs and confirmation._] - -Like all true doctrines, this of the practical nature of the -theoretical error, which at first sight seems most strange (especially -to professed philosophers), is yet found to be constantly confirmed -in ordinary thought. For all know and all continually repeat that -(immoderate) passions and (illegitimate) interests lead insidiously -into error, that we err, to be quick and finish or to obtain for -ourselves undeserved repose, that we err by acquiescence in old ideas, -that is to say, in order not to allow ourselves to be disturbed in our -repose that has been unduly prolonged, and so on. We do not mention -those cases in which it is a question of solemn and evident lies, -the brazen-faced manifestation of interests openly illegitimate. Let -us limit ourselves to the modest forms of error, to the venial sins, -because if these be proved to be the result of will, by so much the -more will this be proved of the shameless forms, the deadly sins. It is -also said that we err in _deafening_ ourselves and others with words, -with the verse that sounds and does not create, with the brush that -charms but does not express, with the formulæ that seem to contain a -thought but contain the void. In this way we come to recognize that -will has been rendered possible, owing to the communication being a -practical fact, of which a bad use can be made by means of a volitional -act. For the rest, if this were not so, what guarantee would truth -ever possess? If it were possible to err even once in perfect good -faith and that the mind should confuse true and false, embracing the -false as true, how could we any longer distinguish the one from the -other? Thought would be radically corrupt, whereas it is incorrupt and -incorruptible. - -It is vain, therefore, to except the existence or the possibility of -errors of good faith, because truth alone is of good faith, and error -is always in a greater or less or least degree, of bad faith. Were -this not so, it would be incorrigible, whereas it is by definition -corrigible. Consequently, the last attempt to differentiate intention -from volition fails, since it posits an intention that is frustrated in -the volition, as the effect of a theoretical error, a good intention -that becomes, through no fault of its own, a bad volition. The -intention, being volition, takes possession of the whole volitional -man, causing the intellect to be attentive and indefatigable in the -search for truth, the soul ready to accept it, whatever it be, pure of -every passion that is not the passion for truth itself, and eliminates -the possibility, or assumes the responsibility of error. - -A proof of this is afforded by the fact that to exquisite and delicate -souls, to consciences pure and dignified, even what are called their -theoretical errors are a biting bitterness, and they blame themselves -with them. On the other hand, in the presence of the foolish and the -wicked, one is often in doubt as to whether their folly and wickedness -come from the head or from the heart, whether it be madness rather -than set purpose. The truth is that all this evil, which seems to -arise from defective vision, comes really from the heart, for they -have themselves forged those false views with their sophisms, their -illegitimate internal affirmations and suggestions, that they may be -more free in their evil inclinations, thus obtaining for themselves -and for others a false moral _alibi._ We must applaud the former and -exhort them to continue to persevere in their scruple, the condition -of theoretical and practical health: we must inculcate to the second -a return to themselves and the removal of the mask that they have -assumed' as a disguise from themselves, before assuming it towards -others. - -[Sidenote: _Justification of the practical repression of error._] - -A consequence of the principle established is the justification of the -use of practical measures to induce those who err theoretically to -correct themselves, castigating them, when this is of assistance, for -admonition and example. It will be replied that these are measures of -other times, and that we are now in an epoch of liberty, when their -use is no longer permissible, and that we should now employ only the -persuasive power of truth. But those who say this are without eyes to -look within upon themselves. The Holy Inquisition is truly _holy_ and -lives for that reason in its _eternal_ idea. The Inquisition that is -dead was nothing but one of its contingent historical incarnations. -And the Inquisition must have been justified and beneficial, if whole -peoples invoked and defended it, if men of the loftiest souls founded -and created it severely and impartially, and its very adversaries -applied it on their own account, pyre answering to pyre. Thus Christian -Rome persecuted heretics as Imperial Rome had persecuted Christians, -and Protestants burned Catholics as Catholics had burned Protestants. -If certain ferocious practices are now abandoned (are they definitely -abandoned, or do they not persist in a different form?), we do not for -that reason cease from practically oppressing those who promulgate -errors. No society can dispense with this discipline, although the -mode of its application is subject to practical, utilitarian and moral -deliberation. We begin with man as a child, whose mental education is -at once and above all practical and moral education, education for -work and for sincerity (and no one has ever been seriously educated -who has not received at the least a provident slap or two or had his -ears pulled). This education is continued with the punishments for -culpable negligence and ignorance threatened in the laws, and so on -until we reach the spontaneous discipline of society, by means of which -the artist who produces the ugly and the man of science who teaches -the false are rebuked by the intelligent, or fall into discredit with -them. Such illegitimate and transitory applause as they may sometimes -obtain at the hands of the unintelligent and of the multitude is but -a poor and precarious recompense for them. Literary and artistic -criticism always has of necessity, and the more so the better it -understands its office, a practical and moral aspect reconcilable with -the purest æstheticity and theoreticity in the intrinsic examination of -works. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical distinctions of errors and philosophical -distinctions._] - -We certainly have good empirical reasons for distinguishing between -errors of bad faith and errors of good faith, errors that are avoidable -and errors that are unavoidable, pardonable and unpardonable, -mortal and venial. No one would wish to deny that there is a wide -difference between a slight distraction that leads to a wide erroneous -affirmation, and such malice as gives rise to a small and almost -imperceptible error, to a lie, which, externally considered, is almost -harmless. We should be as indulgent in respect to the former as we are -severe in respect to the latter. And from the empirical standpoint -we should recommend in certain cases tolerance and indulgence in -respect to the theoretical error, which should be looked upon rather -as ignorance than as sin. We cannot but take count of all those -affirmations, which, while they do not represent the firm security -of the true, are yet offered as points of support, or as provisional -affirmations, like those _tibicines,_ props or stakes, those bad verses -that Virgil allowed to remain in the _Aeneid,_ with the intention of -returning to them again. But it was needful to record the true bases -of the theory of error against the illusions arising from empiricism, -the more so since the general tendency of our times (for reasons that -we need not here inquire into) has led to their not being recognized. -Those bases are in the practical spirit, and the practical theory of -error is one of the justified forms of pragmatism, although perhaps it -be that very truth against which the pragmatists sin. - - - - -V - -IDENTITY OF VOLITION AND ACTION AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLITION AND -EVENT - - -[Sidenote: _Volition and action: intuition and expression._] - -Such are the relations between the practical activity and the -theoretical, which precedes and conditions it. - -Asking ourselves now, what are the relations of this same activity with -that which seems to follow it and to be outside the spirit, in company -with corporeality, naturality, physic and matter (or however else it -may be called)? we find ourselves face to face with a problem which -we have already treated and solved in another part of the system of -the spirit, and which we shall solve here in an analogous manner. What -we may now designate as the problem of the relation between _volition -and action,_ formerly appeared in the theoretical philosophy as the -problem of the relation between _intuition_ and _expression._--Are then -volitions and actions two distinct terms that may appear now together, -now separate? Can volition remain for its part isolated from action, -whereas action is not able to separate itself from volition, or is the -opposite true?--We reply, as we did on the former occasion, by denying -the problem itself and by identifying intuition with expression, -in such a manner that effective intuition became at the same time -expression, and it was declared that a so-called expression, which was -not at the same time intuition, was declared to be non-existent.--We -reply in like manner on this occasion, that _volition and action_ are -_one,_ and that volition without action or action without volition is -inconceivable. - -[Sidenote: _Spirit and nature._] - -Indeed, the relation between spirit and nature (which is a general -relation, including the other particulars between intuition and -expression, or between volition and action), understood in the way -that it is here, is a relation, not between two entities, but only -between two different methods of elaborating one unique reality, -which is spiritual reality: thus it is not truly a relation. Nor are -the two modes of elaboration two co-ordinated modes of knowledge, -for that would lead back to a duplicity of objects, but the first is -cognoscitive elaboration and true science, or philosophy, in which -reality is revealed as activity and spirituality, while the other is an -abstract elaboration for practical convenience, without cognoscitive -character. When this has been posited, the spiritual act of volition -has not another reality face to face with it, with which it must join -or combine, in order to become concrete, but is itself full reality. -That which is called matter, movement, and material modification from -the naturalistic point of view, is already included in the volitional -spiritual act, of which it might be said without difficulty (as was -once said amid much scandal of the Ego) that it is heavy, round, -square, white, red, sonorous, and, therefore, physically determinable. -The volition is not followed by a movement of the legs or arms; it -is those movements themselves that are material for the physical, -spiritual for the philosopher, extrinsic for the former, at once -intrinsic and extrinsic for the latter, or better, neither extrinsic -nor intrinsic (an arbitrary division). As poetry lives in speech and -painting in colours, so the will lives in actions, not because the one -is in the other as in an envelope, but because the one is the other and -without the other would be mutilated and indeed inconceivable. - -[Sidenote: _Inexistence of volitions without actions and vice versa._] - -We cannot affirm the distinction between volition and action, save in -force and as a proof of a dualistic metaphysical view, of an abstract -spiritualism, with matter as being and substance for correlative -term. But this point of view is eliminated by the idealist view, -which recognizes only one unique substance, and that as spirituality -and subjectivity. Without, however, now basing ourselves upon such -considerations, and according to the order that we follow, applying -ourselves to the examination of the facts of consciousness, we affirm -that it would be impossible to adduce one volitional fact that should -not be also a movement called physical. Those volitional acts, which -according to some philosophers are consumed within the will and are -in that way distinguished from external facts, are a phantasm. Every -volition, be it never so small, sets the organism in motion and -produces what are called external facts. The purpose is already an -effectuation, a beginning of combat; indeed, simple desire is not -without effects, if it be possible to destroy oneself with desires, -as is in effect maintained On the other hand, it is not possible to -indicate actions without volitions. Instinctive or habitual acts that -have become instinctive are adduced; but these too are not set in -motion, save by the will, not one by one, in their particulars, but -as a whole, in the same way as a single hand sets in motion a most -complicated machine which a thousand hands have previously constructed. -There cannot then be volition without action, nor action without -volition, as there cannot be intuition without expression or expression -without intuition. - -[Sidenote: _Illusions as to the distinction between these terms._] - -It is well, however, to indicate one among the many sources from which -is derived the illusion of this distinction and separation, effectively -inexistent. A volitional act, which is a process of some duration, -may be interrupted and substituted for other volitional acts; it may -declare itself again and again begin its work (although this will -always be more or less modified), and this may give occasion to new -interruptions and new beginnings. It seems that in this way the will -stands on one side, as something formed and definite, and that on the -other execution pursues its way and is subject to the most varied -accidents. But volition and execution proceed with equal and indeed -with one single step. What we will we execute; the volition changes as -the execution changes. In the same way, when we are engaged upon a work -of art, on a long poem for instance, the illusion arises of an abstract -conception or plan, which the poet carries out as he versifies. But -every poet knows that a poem is not created from an abstract plan, that -the initial poetical image is not without rhythm and verse, and that -it does not need rhythm and verse applied to it afterwards. He knows -that it is in reality a primitive intuition-expression, in which all -is determined and nothing is determined, and what has been already -intuified is already expressed, and what will afterwards be expressed -will only afterwards be intuified. The initial intuition is certainly -not an abstract plan, but a living and vital germ; and so is the -volitional act. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between action and succession or event._] - -When, therefore, it is affirmed that a volition is truly such, only -when it produces effects, or that a volition is to be judged by -its results, it is impossible not to assent, as we assent that an -unexpressed expression or an unversified verse is neither an expression -nor a verse. But in this signification only, because those propositions -have sometimes assumed another, which on the contrary it is needful -resolutely to reject. This is that in them action (will-action) has -been confused with _succession or event._ Now, if volition coincide -with action, it does not and cannot coincide with _event._ - -[Sidenote: _Volition and event._] - -It cannot coincide, because what is action and what is event? Action -is the act of the one; event, is the act of the whole: will is of man, -event of God. Or, to put this proposition in a less imaginary form, -the volition of the individual is as it were the contribution that he -brings to the volitions of all the other beings in the universe, event -the aggregate of all the wills and the answer to all the questions. In -this answer is included and absorbed the will itself of the individual, -which we have taken and contemplated alone. If, then, we wished to make -the volition depend upon event, action upon succession, we should be -undertaking to make one fact depend upon another fact, of which the -first is a constituent part, placing among the antecedents of action -what is its consequence, among things given those to be created, the -unknown with the known, the future in the past. - -[Sidenote: _Successful and unsuccessful actions: criticism._] - -The concepts of actions that are successful and of those that are -unsuccessful, of actions that become fully concrete in the fact, and of -those that become concrete only in part or not at all, are therefore -inexact. No action (not even those that are empirically said to be most -successful, not even the most obvious and ordinary) succeeds fully, in -the sense that it alone constitutes the fact: every action diverges by -necessity and by definition from succession or happening. If I return -home every day by the usual road, my return home is every day new and -different from that which might have been, imagined. This often amounts -to a diversity of particulars which we may call of least importance, -but which yet are not for that reason the less real. On the other hand, -no action, however vain it be held (if it be action and not velleity of -action and intrinsic contradiction, or by as much as it is action and -not imagination and contradiction), passes without trace and without -result. - -If any action could be rendered altogether vain, this same rendering -vain would invade all other actions and no fact would happen. - -[Sidenote: _Action and foresight: critique._] - -The current proposition that we cannot act without _foreseeing_ is -also incorrect. Since the conception of foreseeing is contradictory, -and since we cannot know a fact if it be not first a fact, that is, if -it have not happened; if the contradictory hypothesis held, it would -be impossible to act. But the truth is that what is called foreseeing -is nothing but seeing; it is to know the given facts and to reason -upon them with the universals. That is to say, it is the invariable -theoretical base of action, already illustrated. When we will and act, -what we will and do is _our own action_ itself, not that of others or -of all the others, and so is the resulting event. _Voluntas fertur in -incognitum,_ but the all intent upon itself does not take count of the -unknown, which is in this case relatively unknowable and, therefore, -relatively non-existent. The individual is aware that when he acts, he -does not aim at anything but the placing of new elements in universal -reality. He takes care that they shall be energetic and vital, without -nourishing the foolish illusion that they must be the only ones, or -that they alone produce reality. A popular little tale tells how -God, who had at first granted to men to know their future lives and -the day of their death, afterwards withdrew this knowledge from them -altogether, because He perceived from experience that such knowledge -made them lazy and inert. The new ignorance, on the other hand, revived -and impelled them to vie with one another in activity, as though it -had been granted them to obtain and to enjoy everything.[1] How can we -doubt that our good and energetic work can ever be rendered nugatory -in the event? That is unthinkable, and the saying _fiat justitia et -pereat mundus_ is rectified by that other saying: _fiat justitia ne -pereat mundus._ Bad is not born from good, nor inaction from action. -Every volitional man, every man active in goodness, is a contradiction -to that one-sided attitude in which the will is suppressed to give -place to happening, a world unmade is believed to be already made, -arms are crossed or the field deserted. But it also contradicts the -fatuous security that the future world will conform to the ends of our -individual actions taken in isolation; saying with the good sense of -the Florentine statesman, that we ourselves control one half of our -actions, or little less, Fortune the other half. Hence our trust in our -own strength; hence, too, our apprehension of the pitfalls of Fortune, -continually arising and continually to be conquered. This constitutes -the interior drama of true men of action, of the political geniuses -who have guided the destinies of man. While the unfit is all anxiety, -or bewilderment and depression, the fatuous is all over-confidence or -expectation of the impossible, also losing himself in bewilderment when -he finally discovers that the reality is not what he imagined. Hence -also the serenity of the sage, who knows that whatever happen there -will always be opportunity for good conduct. _Si fractus illabatur -orbis,_ there will always be a better world to construct. Hope and fear -are related to action itself in its becoming, not to its result and -succession. - -[Sidenote: _Confirmation of the inderivability of the value of action -from its success._] - -We can illustrate the fact that no one seriously thinks of valuing -an action according to its success, but that all value it at its -intrinsic value as action, from the circumstance that no one recognizes -any merit to the action of a marks-man who hits the bull's-eye, when -shooting at the target with closed eyes; whereas no little merit is -recognized to him who, after having taken careful aim, does not hit -the mark but goes very near it. We are certainly often deceived in our -practical judgments, and fortunate men are continually praised to the -skies as men of great practical capacity, while the unfortunate are -hurled into the mire as incompetent; for we do not distinguish exactly -between action and success. This is not only so as to judgments of the -present life: it is also true of the life of the past, of the pages of -history, where imbeciles are made heroes and heroes calumniated; to -the worst of leaders is attributed the honour of victories, ridiculous -statesmen credited with ability. On the other hand, the sins of madmen -are attributed to the wise, or they are accused of faults that are -nobody's fault, but the result of circumstances. In vain will the -Pericleses of all time ask, as did the ancient Pericles of the people -of Athens, that the unforeseen misfortunes of the Peloponnesian war -should be attributed to him, provided that by way of compensation he -might have praise for all the fortunate things that should also happen -παρὰ λόγον.[2] All this depends upon an imperfect knowledge of facts -more than upon anything else: hence the necessity of criticism. Just as -the work of the poet and of the painter is not materially to be laid -hold of in the poem or in the picture, but requires a re-evocation that -is often very difficult, so the work of the man of action, which is in -part fused in events and partly contained in them, as a bud that will -open in the future, asks a keen eye and the greatest care in valuation. -The history of men of action and of their deeds is easily changed -into _legend,_ and legends are never altogether eliminable, because -misunderstanding or error is never altogether eliminable. - -[Sidenote: _Explanation of apparently conflicting facts._] - -On the other hand, certain commonplaces seem to be in opposition to -the criterion itself: for example, that men are judged by success and -that it matters little what we have willed and done, when the result -is not satisfactory. There are also certain popular customs that make -individuals responsible for what happens outside their own spheres -of action, not to mention the well-known historical examples of -unfortunate leaders crucified at Carthage and guillotined at Paris, for -no other cause in reality than that of not having won the victory. And -there is also the insistence of certain thinkers upon the necessity of -never distinguishing the judgment of the act from that of the fact. But -such insistence is nothing but a new aspect of the implacable struggle -that it has been necessary to conduct against the morality of the mere -intention and against the sophisms and the subterfuges that arise from -it; an insistence that has expressed itself in paradoxical formulæ, -as are also paradoxical the trivial remarks of ordinary life that -have been mentioned. As to the customs and condemnations narrated by -history, these were without doubt extraordinary expedients in desperate -cases, in which people had placed themselves in such a position that it -was impossible or most difficult to verify intentions and actions, and -to distinguish misfortunes from betrayals; and as all expedients born -of like situations sometimes hit the mark, that is to say, punish bad -faith, so will others increase with irrationality the evil that they -would have wished to diminish, since in those cases there has not been -any bad faith to punish and to correct. - - -[1] _Arch. p. lo st. d. trad, pop.,_ of Pitré (1882), pp. 70-72. - -[2] Thuc. ii. 64. - - - - -VI - - -THE PRACTICAL JUDGMENT, THE HISTORY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL - - -With these last considerations, we are conducted to the theory of -practical judgments, that is, to those judgments of which we have -demonstrated the impossibility, when their precedence to the volitional -act was asserted; but their conceivability as following it, indeed -their necessity, is clear, by the intrinsic law of the Spirit; which -consists in always preserving or in continually attaining to full -possession of itself. - -[Sidenote: _Practical taste and judgment._] - -But we must not confound the practical judgment with what has been -called _practical taste, or the immediate consciousness of value, or -the feeling_ of the value of the volitional act. None can doubt that -such a taste, consciousness, or feeling is a real fact. The practical -act brings with it approbation and disapprobation, joy and sorrow, -and like facts of consciousness that are altogether unreflective. By -these we explain the immediate sympathy that certain actions afford -us, and the enthusiasms that are often spread through wide circles of -society, and the force of example, which is most successful in arousing -imitative efforts. Thus at certain moments the soul of all seems to -vibrate in unison with the soul of one, and the actions of many to be -prepared and carried out, as though with one accord, without its being -possible to say at those moments what is willed, what abhorred and what -admired. That taste, or consciousness, or feeling is not, however, -distinct from the volitional act, and is, indeed, the volitional act -itself. It is that internal control of which we have already spoken, -that immediate feeling of oneself, that immediate consciousness, which -makes of it a spiritual act. Abstract it from the volitional act and -the volitional act itself disappears from before you. - -If it can take place, not only in the individual who is acting, but -also in him who contemplates the action, that is because the individual -who contemplates becomes unified in that moment with the individual -who acts, he wills imitatively with him, with him suffers and enjoys, -as the disc-thrower watches with his eye and with his whole person -the disc that has been thrown, follows its rapid and direct course -and the dangers in the form of obstacles that it seems to be about to -strike, its turns and deviations, and seems to become himself a running -turning disc. The denomination "practical taste" is very well chosen, -because the analogy with the theoretic activity and with æsthetic taste -is here most full. But since æsthetic taste is not æsthetic judgment, -as the mere reproduction of the æsthetic act is not the criticism of -it, as the listener to a poem who sings within himself with the poet, -must not be confused with the critic, who analyses and understands -it, any more than the contemplator of a picture, of a statue, or of a -piece of architecture, who paints with the painter, sculptures with -the sculptor, or ideally raises airy masses with the architect; so we -must distinguish practical taste and sympathy (or antipathy) from the -practical judgment. Without taste (æsthetic or practical), judgment -(æsthetic or practical) is not possible; but taste is not judgment, -which demands a further act of the spirit. - -[Sidenote: _The practical judgment as historical judgment._] - -The practical judgment is, as has already been observed, a _historical_ -judgment; so that to judge practical acts and to give their history -is really the same thing. What occurs here is analogous to what was -demonstrated of the theoretic and æsthetic act, when we illustrated -the coincidence of literary and artistic criticism with literary and -artistic history. Criticism, be it practical or theoretic, cannot -consist of anything but determining whether a spiritual act has taken -place and what it has been. The differences between the one and the -other criticism arise only from the diversity of content present -in each case, asking different categories of judgment, but not of -logical procedure, which is in both cases the same. Every other -conception of the judgment, which should make it consist, not of a -historical judgment, but of heaven knows what sort of measurement upon -transcendental models, separated from the real world by a measurement -of which the measure is extraneous to the measured, indeed (as though -it were something of the other world) extraneous to the real itself, -runs against insuperable contradictions, and makes judgment arbitrary -and history grotesque; history would thus have value, not in itself, -but outside itself, enjoying it as a loan from others, a gracious -concession. But even these contradictions cannot appear in all their -crudity, nor the opposite theory in all its unshakable truth, save from -what will be seen further on, and we must here be satisfied with the -enunciation. - -[Sidenote: _Its logic._] - -In order to avoid repetition, we must refer to the analysis of the -single or historical judgment already given and assume its result, -namely, that it is the only judgment in which there is a true and -proper distinction between subject and predicate, and that it is -composed of an intuitive element (subject) and of an intellectual -element (predicate). In like manner the practical judgment is not -possible without a clear representation of the act to be judged and -a conception not less clear of what the practical act is in its -universality and in its particular forms, and so on, specifying in its -various sub-forms and possibilities of individuation. The judgment is -the compenetration of the two elements, the historical synthesis which -establishes: Peter has accomplished a useful act in tilling a piece -of land of such and such dimensions; Paul has accomplished an action -that is not useful in opening a new manufactory of boots, more costly -and not better than those already on the market; -Pope Leo III. acted -wisely, as custodian of the universal character of the Church of Rome, -in consecrating Charles the Frank emperor, thus restoring the empire of -the West;--Louis XVI. acted foolishly in not deciding upon a prompt and -profound change of the French political constitution, and in allowing -himself to be afterwards dragged unwilling whither he had not known -how to go of his own will. And so on. There are therefore two ways of -sinning against the exactitude of the practical judgment: either by not -having exact information as to the content of the volitional act to be -judged and understood, or by not having an exact criterion of judgment. -The first of these errors can be exemplified by those judgments that -are so frequently pronounced, without knowledge as to the true sequence -of events or without placing oneself in the precise conditions in -which the person to be judged found himself. Hence it happens not less -often, that when the facts are really known, the precise conditions -understood, and the defence of the accused has been heard, the judgment -must be altered. A cause of the second error is the substitution -(likewise a very common occurrence) of one category of judgment for the -other, as when a moral act is praised and admired for its cleverness, -or the gestures and the felicitous utterance of a practical man are -praised, as though it were a question of judging an actor or reciter. -As in art, so in life, differences of judgment arise, not so much from -difference of understanding, as from these oscillations and undue -transpositions of judgments and concepts. - -It is likewise superfluous to enter into disputes as to the -absoluteness or relativity of the practical judgment, because these -have been superseded by the concept of the historical judgment, which -is _both absolute and relative:_ absolute for the categories that it -applies, relative for the matter, always new, to which it applies them. - -[Sidenote: _Importance of the practical judgment._] - -The importance of the practical judgment for practical life is of the -greatest, and when we are warned: _nolite judicare_ or _noli nimium -judicare,_ what are meant are not true acts of judgment, but certain -psychical conditions, which reveal slight spiritual seriousness. -And the importance is of the greatest, precisely because the nature -of the judgment is historical, and as we know already, historical -knowledge, knowledge, that is, of actual situations, is the basis of -future actions. For this reason every man who is strongly volitional is -continually submitting himself and others to judgment; for this reason -we feel the need of talking to others about our own actions, in order -to be upheld by the spirit of others in forming a just judgment. This -is the origin of such social institutions as the confessional, or of -poems such as the _Divina Commedia._ The only judgment without meaning -is that _final judgment_ made in the valley Jehoshaphat, because what -object can there be in giving oneself the trouble of judging a world -looked upon as ended? We judge in order to continue to act, that is, -to live, and when universal life is at an end, judgment is vain (vain -praise or paradise, vain cruelty or hell). - -[Sidenote: _Difference between the practical judgment and the judgment -of the event._] - -The value of the volitional act is therefore, as has been demonstrated, -in the act itself, and we must not expect and derive it from succession -or event. The practical judgment always concerns the volitional act, -the intention, the action (which are all one), and never the result or -happening. With this distinction we annul one of the most disputed, -intricate, and difficult questions: if it be possible to judge, or -as they say, to try history. Since we know well that judgment and -historical narrative coincide, we must reply in general, as we have -replied, in the affirmative. We must in consequence deny all the absurd -claims of an objectivity, which is the irrealizable aspiration to the -abstention from thought and from history itself. We must also deny to -the historian that frivolous privilege by which he is allowed to judge, -almost tolerating in him an original sin or an incorrigible vice, -provided he clearly distinguish between the serious and the facetious, -between the narrative and the judgment, as though the distinction were -ever possible. But the prejudice against those who make out a case -against history on the ground that it should have happened in a manner -different from what actually took place, and describe how this should -have been, is well justified. Whoever possesses historical sense, -or even simple good sense, cannot but agree to this. The question -should in reality be asked differently, and in this manner: Is it -correct to apply to history the categories of judgment that we apply -to volitions and single acts? Is it correct to judge in a utilitarian -or moral manner historical events and the whole course of history? -Rectified in these terms, the question becomes clear, and requires a -negative answer. When we narrate artistic or philosophical, economic -or ethical history, we place ourselves at the point of view of the -individual activity. As we expose æsthetic or philosophical products, -useful or moral actions, we judge them at the same time æsthetically, -philosophically, economically, morally, and we know in every case if -the action has been such as it ought. Who would hesitate to affirm that -(at least, as an affirmative method) the _Africa_ of Petrarch was not -what he wished it to be, a poetic work; or that Emmanuel Kant did not -succeed in establishing from his practical postulates, according to his -intention, the existence of a personal God and the immortality of the -soul; or that Themistocles behaved in an undecided manner as regards -Xerxes, not knowing how to resolve to sacrifice his ambitions to the -safety of Greece, nor to inflict a grave loss upon his country, in -order to satisfy his desire for vengeance; or that Napoleon ignored the -rights of man, and behaved as one without scruples, when he ordered the -arrest and shooting of the Duc d'Enghien? But what can be the advantage -of asking if the arrest of the Persian expansion in Europe were a bad -thing or a good? if the creation of the Roman Empire deserve blame? -if the Catholic Church were wrong in concentrating Western religion -in herself? if the English revolution of the seventeenth century, the -French of the eighteenth, or the Italian of the nineteenth, could have -been avoided? if Dante could have been born in our day and have sung -the Kantian rather than the Thomist philosophy? if Michael Angelo -might have painted the victories of the modern industrial world, which -Manzotti has made into a ballet in his _Excelsior,_ instead of the -visions of the Last Judgment? Here we have before us, not individual -spirits, whose work we examine in given circumstances, but facts that -have happened, and these are the work, not of the individual, but of -the Whole. They are (as has already been said) the work of God, and God -is not to be judged, or rather He is to be judged, but not from the -visual angle at which individual works and actions are to be judged. He -is not to be judged as a poet or as a philosopher, as a statesman or -a hero, as a finite being working in the infinite. The contemplation -of His work is at the same time judgment. _Die Weltgeschichte das -Weltgericht_: the history itself of the world is the judgment of the -world, and in recounting the course of history, while not applying the -judgment of the categories above indicated, which are inapplicable, we -do, however, apply a judgment, which is that of necessity and reality. -That which has been had to be; and that which is truly real is truly -rational. - -But we cannot give the justification of this supreme judgment, of this -world-embracing judgment (we repeat the refrain), until further on. Let -it suffice for the present that in discussing the practical judgment -we have limited it to all that part of history which contemplates -actions, that is, to individual activity, to biography and to the -biographical element, which is the material of all history. In it, -the practical judgment is active and energetic, but is silent before -the event, and every history is like an impetuous river of individual -works, which flows into a sea, where it is immediately restored to calm -serene. The rush of actions and of their vicissitudes, of victory and -of defeat, of wisdom and of folly, of life and of death, are set at -rest in the solemn peace of the "historical event." - -[Sidenote: _Progress of action and progress of Reality._] - -As we have distinguished the practical judgment from the judgment of -the event, the historical-individual from the historical-cosmic, so we -must distinguish the concept of progress, as the progress which belongs -to the volitional act and that which belongs to the event. The concept -of progress (according to the explanations given elsewhere) coincides -with the concept of activity. There is progress whenever an activity -declares itself, whenever (not to leave the circle of the practical) we -pass from irresolution to resolution, from conflict to the volitional -synthesis, from suspense to action. But the event, which is no longer -action but result, that is to say, is action, not of the individual -but of the Whole, is not to be judged with that concept of progress, -and in it progress coincides with the fact. That which follows -chronologically, if it be truly real, represents a progress upon what -precedes. Even illness is progress, if there were a latent crisis of -health, and getting over it gives rise to more vigorous health. Even -apparent regression (invasion of barbarians) is progress, if it lead to -the ripening of a wider civilization. What is death for the individual -is life for the Whole.--Hence the insipidity of the question, often -proposed and still discussed by writers of treatises, whether there be -practical progress, or as is said when limiting the question, moral -progress. - -From the individual point of view, at every new volitional act, -practicality and the relative impulse of progress are once more born, -and they are extinguished with that act, to be born again in a new -one, and so on in a circle of infinite changes. As to cosmic reality, -we must declare, as in the previous example of the course of history, -that it is itself progress (which is also confirmed by the positivist -philosophy, when it declares that reality is evolved), but this is -progress of reality and therefore progress without adjective, or at -least without practical or moral adjective. - -[Sidenote: _Precedence of the philosophy of the practical over the -practical judgment._] - -The intellectual element, which is constitutive in the practical -judgment as in every other historical judgment, can also be called -the philosophical element. Hence the consequence that a philosophy of -the practical activity is a necessary condition of every practical -judgment. This is another thesis of paradoxical appearance, which, -however, it is not difficult to make plausible with suitable -reflections, plausible at least to those who do not refuse to reflect. -For what is philosophy but the thinking of the concept, and in this -case the concept of the practical? The conclusion, then, that a -philosophy is necessary for a judgment is irrefutable. The difficulty -in admitting it comes from the false association of ideas, for which -the sound of the word "philosophy" suggests the disputes of the -schools, the treatise, the manual, or the academic lecture whereas -we should think of philosophy in all its extension and profundity, -inborn in the human spirit (we have elsewhere called this _ingenuous -philosophy_) before its more complicated forms Every man has his -own philosophy, more or less developed or rudimentary, more or less -defective no one is without any philosophy. The first judgment on the -practical activity is already guided by the light of a philosophical -concept which, if it does not give a light, gives at least a glimmer, -if not straight and certain, at the least undulating and tremulous, -producing therefore tremulous and undulating judgments. Ingenuous -philosophy and philosophy in the specific sense are not, therefore, -separable from one another, with a clear-cut distinction, and if there -exist a disability in pronouncing a judgment as to many people and -to many actions, that arises from difficulties consequent upon the -philosophy of the time, which must first of all be solved, before -passing to the effective judgment. Hence long researches into doctrine -are sometimes necessary. Thus it is difficult to do justice to the -work of a rebel or of a revolutionary, without first clearing away -prejudices and understanding what a revolution is, and the relative -value of what is called obedience to the existing order of things. -Thus it would be naive to condemn as faithless the Saxon regiments -which deserted Napoleon on the field of Leipzig, or Marshal Ney, who -returned to the service of Napoleon from that of Louis XVIII., unless -we previously make clear the meaning and the limits of the political -treaty and of the military oath, which cannot be the only unconditioned -things in a world where nothing is unconditioned save the world itself. - -[Sidenote: _Confirmation of the philosophical incapacity of the -psychological method._] - -From the recognized precedence of philosophy over the practical -judgment arises the confirmation of the impossibility of the -psychological method as the foundation of a Philosophy of the -practical. Descriptive psychology is based upon practical facts -historically ascertained, or upon practical judgments. Hence, by -proceeding from particular to particular, it is not only incapable of -exhausting the infinite and of attaining to the real universal, but by -the very choice of particular examples, which should be the foundation -of philosophical research relating to the practical, it is under the -necessity of first possessing a concept of the practical. Hence it -stands between Scylla and Charybdis, between a vicious _progressus ad -infinitum_ and a not less vicious circle. - -In this way is eliminated the problem, monstrous from whatever point -of view it may arise, as to the historical origin of the practical -activity (economy or morality). If these activities be categories, -which constitute fact and judge it reflected in the spirit, they -cannot have arisen historically, as contingent facts. When we prove -the historical origin of anything, with that very proof we destroy -its universal value. The fears of certain moralists lest, with the -indication of the historical origin of morality, its value should -come to be denied, have therefore been wrongly mocked. Certainly, if -morality had a historical origin, it would also have an end, like all -historical formations, even the most grandiose, the Empire of the -East or the Empire of the West, the Hunnish Empire of Attila or the -Mongolian Empire of Gengiskhan. The fear manifested by the moralists -in question was then an instinctive horror of the incorrect method -of philosophical psychology, which now presupposes, now destroys the -categories that it would wish to establish. - - - - -VII - - -THE PRACTICAL METHOD, RULES AND CASUISTRY - - -[Sidenote: _Justification of the psychological method and of empirical -and descriptive disciplines._] - - -In repeatedly rejecting the psychological method, as at the end -of the last chapter, we have been very careful to make use of a -cautious phraseology. Thus we have employed such expressions as -"psycho-philosophical method," "speculative-descriptive method," -and the like, in order to make it quite clear that our hostility is -directed against that mixture, or rather against its introduction into -Philosophy, but is not directed against Psychology itself, that is, -descriptive psychology. This psychology has always been practised, -since the world was world, and we all practise it at every instant, and -could not propose to banish it from the spirit, save at the risk of -going mad. - -If indeed we know that the true and proper knowledge of theoretical -philosophy is resolved into the cycle of art, philosophy, and history, -and that we possess no other means of knowing the individual, both -ingenuous and reflective, outside the knowledge of the universal given -by philosophy, then we also know that the spirit needs to arrange and -to classify the infinite intuitions and perceptions given to it by art -and history, and to reduce them to classes, the better to possess and -to manipulate them. We also know that the method called _naturalistic -or positive_ performs this function, and that hence arise natural -disciplines or sciences. These do not, as is the popular belief, -deal only with so-called inferior reality (minerals, vegetables, and -animals), but with all manifestations of reality, including those most -strictly termed spiritual. - -Thus we can at this point reduce to a more correct meaning a claim -that has been usually maintained by those who have treated of the -Practical and of the Ethical in our day. They demand that a science of -the practical and of morality should be preceded by a wide historical -inquiry and have a great mass of facts as its foundation. If such -science be understood as a Philosophy of the practical and as an Ethic, -such a demand is an irrational pretension, because the true relation is -exactly the opposite: from philosophy to history, not from history to -philosophy. But if, on the other hand, this science be understood as a -naturalistic and empirical discipline, the claim is rational, because -it is not possible to construct a discipline of that sort, save with -material that has been historically-verified. - -Sidenote: _Practical description and its literature._ - -The practical discipline that arranges in groups and classifies the -spiritual facts concerning man, is _Psychology._ But the writer or the -professor is not the only psychologist. Man himself is a psychologist; -even the savage constructs in some sort of way his psychology of types -and classes. And to remain within the circle of volitional acts, their -psychology or description by types has always existed. A conspicuous -example of this was the Comedy of Menander or the New Comedy in Greece. -This partly received and gave artistic form to the results of the -observations of the moralists and partly served as material for the -elaboration of treatises, to such an extent that the _Characters_ -of Theophrastus have been looked upon as a repertory or summary of -theatrical types. In the _Rhetoric_ of Aristotle, a whole book is -devoted to a description of affections, passions, and habits. In modern -times, Descartes lamented the insufficiency of ancient treatises on the -subject, and presented as quite a new thing his _Traité des passions._ -In this treatise, six _primitive_ passions being distinguished -(admiration, love, hate, desire, joy, and sadness), he maintained that -all the others were derived from them: esteem, contempt, generosity, -pride, humility, baseness, veneration, disdain, hope, fear, jealousy, -certainty, desperation, irresolution, courage, hardihood, emulation, -cowardice, terror, remorse, mockery, piety, satisfaction, repentance, -favour, gratitude, indignation, anger, glory, shame, and so on. -Spinoza, following the example of Descartes and correcting his -theories, devoted the third part of his _Ethic_ to the affections or -passions, considering them _perinde ac si quaestio de lineis planis aut -de corporibus esset._ Let it suffice to mention the _Anthropologia_ of -Kant among the other most celebrated treatises upon the argument. - -[Sidenote: _Extension of practical description._] - -But although we have recorded as examples these general treatises on -the passions, it would be impossible to continue the enumeration, -because descriptive psychology is carried out, so to speak, with -the widest divergences and is infinitely subdivided. An ample -bibliography would not suffice to catalogue all the books dealing -with this discipline. These are sometimes arranged in chronological -divisions (Psychology of the Renaissance, of the eighteenth century, -of the Middle Ages, even including prehistoric man!). Sometimes -they contain geographical divisions (Psychology of the Englishman, -of the Frenchman, of the Russian, of the Japanese, and so on), -with subdivisions according to regions. Sometimes they combine the -two methods (Psychology of the ancient Greek, of the Roman of the -Decadence), and sometimes according to their psychical content -(Psychology of the priest, of the soldier, of the politician, of the -poet, of the man of science), and so on. And when the treatises that -bear a title of the kind above mentioned had been catalogued, it would -be also necessary to trace a great mass of descriptive psychology -(and of the best sort) in the books of historians, novelists, -dramatists, in memoirs and confessions, in maxims and advice for the -conduct of life in the sketches of satirists and caricaturists. And -when all these had been catalogued (a very difficult task), it would -be necessary to take account of all the other psychology, which, -formed in the spirit of individuals who are not writers, is poured -forth in speech. This is found, but in small part, in collections of -proverbs. It would also be necessary not to neglect (an altogether -desperate enterprize) everything that each one of us does and forgets -and substitutes continually in life, according to his own needs and -experiences. _Tantae molis_ would be a complete account, precisely -because psychological construction, having for its object actions and -individuals in action, is of such common use. - -[Sidenote: _Normative knowledge or rules: their nature._] - -There is another class of mental forms intimately connected with -Psychology, and of this also we have denied the justification in the -foregoing chapters, but only in the philosophical field, and not at -all outside it. These are the _norms,_ or _normative_ knowledge and -science, _maxims, rules, and precepts._ In truth, if philosophy, -which commands and wills and judges, when its task is on the contrary -to understand willing and commanding, and to make possible correct -judgment--if such a philosophy be a contradiction in terms, there -is yet nothing to prevent our taking the psychological classes, of -which we have indicated the formation, and separating them from one -another, according as they do or do not lead to certain other classes, -which are called _ends_ and are _abstract ends._ This is done when -those classes are selected which are more efficacious for practical -action. Psychological classes and rules are therefore the same, save -that in the second the character possessed by knowledge as prior to -action is placed in relief, that is to say, its _technical_ character. -This is proved by the easy convertibility of rules into psychological -observations, and of the latter into the former. It suffices to add -the imperative to the first and to remove it from the second. "Do -everything so as to seem good, for that helps in many things; but since -false opinions do not last, you will have difficulty in seeming good -for a long period, if you are not so in reality." That is a rule of -Francesco Guicciardini[1] (or rather of the father of Guicciardini, -quoted by him). Now if we transfer this proposition from the imperative -to the indicative mood and remove the predicate of exhortation, we -have a mere psychological observation: "To seem good helps in an -infinite number of things; but since false opinions do not last, it is -difficult to seem good for long, unless one really be so." Here is a -psychological observation of Vico upon seeming and being: "It happens -naturally that man speaks of nothing but what he affects to be and is -not."[2] This can be turned into a maxim: "Watch yourselves, in order -that by talking too much of a given advantage, you may not let it be -seen clearly that you do hot possess it." Or in relation to moral -classes it can be turned thus: "Try to be that which you would like to -appear to others," and so on. - -[Sidenote: _Usefulness of rules._] - -Of rules it can be said that they do not possess absolute value. This -is to be found written at the beginning of one of the best books of -rules: _Peu de maximes sont vraies à tous égards_ (Vauvenargues), -and he might have said, "no maxim"; for if it were ever possible -to produce one that was absolutely true, by that alone would it be -demonstrated not to be a true maxim. But criticism prevails against -the distortion of empirical rules into philosophical principles, or -against the confusion between, the psychological and the speculative -methods, to which attention has already been drawn. If this distortion -be not committed, then rules are altogether innocuous. Not only are -they innocuous, they are indispensable. Each of us is constantly -making them for use in his own life. To live without rules would be -impossible. Certainly, the man of action makes no practical rule, nor -does he indicate how we should will and act in definite circumstances, -nor does the poet make any rule of Poetic. Guicciardini himself, -whom we have just quoted, and who formulated stupendous maxims, warns -us: "These memories are rules that can be written down in books; -but special cases, which, since they have a different cause, ask a -different treatment, can ill be written down _elsewhere than in the -book of discretion._" Action depends upon the quickness of the eye, -upon the perception of the situation historically given, which has -never occurred before, and never will occur again, precisely identical. -But it is useful to possess these types of actions to encourage and -of actions to avoid, in order to sharpen the attention and to find -one's way in the world of action, to facilitate and to discipline the -examination of the concrete fact. If, therefore, individual rules are -more or less transitory, the formation of rules is immortal. - -[Sidenote: _The literature of rules and its apparent decadence._] - -The condition of literature in recent times would seem to be in -disagreement with this affirmation, since as a fact there is a great -falling off in the appearance of books of rules, compared with the -enormous mass that remains in our libraries as an inheritance of the -past. At one time rules of conduct were compiled for everything, not -only for the moral life, in the multiplication of treatises relating -to vice and virtue, to merits and to sins, to things good and evil, -to duties and to rights, dividing these and entering into minutiae, -and again, summaries, catechisms, and various "decalogues," relating -to every part of life. The literature of the Cinquecento gives rules -even for the procuress and the courtesan, in most elegant little -books, which bear the names of Piccolomini and of Aretino. In this -same century, too, Ignatius of Loyola formulated rules for "tying up" -the will, and for the reduction of the docile individual _perinde ac -cadaver,_ for the ends of "sanctity." We must further remark that -all rules, including those on poetry and the arts, have at bottom a -practical--character. That is to say, they are directed to the will, if -only as intermediary. Thus it is necessary to add to the great mass of -practical rules the unnumbered and innumerable treatises of Grammar, -Rhetoric, Poetry of the figurative arts, of music, of dancing, and so -on. But it is a fact that there are now hardly any treatises containing -rules, either for morality, politics, or for the arts. Has the world by -chance become learned on the subject, through inherited aptitude, or -rather has the inutility of rules been discovered? - -Neither the one nor the other. The rules still live in books and -treatises; they have only changed their literary form. In literature -they have reabsorbed that imperative which they used at first to -display and to boast of, not only mentally but literally. That has -been made possible by the already established convertibility of rules -into psychological classes. Hence in modern times the literary form -of the psychological observation is preferred to that of rules. This -was indeed redundant, pedantic, and at the same time ingenuous, as -for instance in the Italian Seicento. It is difficult to restrain -a smile when reading the many books on what was called the _reason -of State,_ elaborated by the Italians of that day and imitated by -foreigners, especially Spaniards and Germans. Those _arcana imperii,_ -those "secret strokes," those impostures, mysteriously inculcated on -the printed page, are a true and real æsthetic contradiction. The -eighteenth century therefore began to give up this form of treatise, -and as it happens that men are accustomed to attribute to moral virtue -that which is necessity or virtue of another kind, the writers of that -century boasted of the moral progress which had set them free from the -pernicious and immodest maxims of the "reason of State." - -It is very amusing to assist at the acts of repulsion and of exorcism, -which a man like the Abbé Galiani believes himself obliged to make in -his treatise _Dei doveri dei principi neutrali_ (1782). When, having -amply discussed this matter from the point of view of morality, he goes -on to discuss it from the point of view of politics and of the reason -of State, he despatches it in a few pages, abhorring, as he says, -that "insidious and wicked science" which formed "the delight, first -of Italian and then of almost all European minds of the fifteenth and -seventeenth centuries." He protests at every step that he is "tired -of repeating and of developing teachings of cunning and wickedness." -But what the Abbot Galiani really abhorred was the robed scholastic -treatment of a matter that he who was termed _Machiavellino_ by his -French friends, and declared that he did not admit in politics anything -but _le machiavélisme pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute son -âpreté,_[3] handled with very different ability and elegance in his -conversations in Parisian _salons_ and in his witty letters to Madame -d'Épinay. The rules of the eighteenth century are to be sought in -the speeches, essays, political opuscules, tragedies, plays dealing -with the life of citizens, fiction, history, and books of memoirs. If -Aretino and Piccolomini provided for the necessities of the respectable -courtesans and procuresses of the Cinquecento, in the Settecento, -Giacomo Casanova constructed the type of the perfect adventurer. He -began with the rules to be followed as a system of life, the _se -laisser aller au gré du vent qui pousse,_ and passed to those that -were more special and yet fundamental, such as that one should have no -scruples _de tromper des étourdis, des fripons et des sots,_ because -they _défient l'esprit_ and _on venge l'esprit quand on trompe un -sot._ There should be still less scruple in deception in affairs of -love, for, _pour ce qui regarde les femmes, ce sont des tromperies -réciproques, qu'on ne met pas en ligne de compte; car, quand l'amour -s'en mêle, on est ordinairement dupe de part et d'autre_.[4] Let us -leave to the reader to investigate, if he please, the rules of life -that are concealed beneath the most modern forms of literature; these -are a continuous, if not always beneficent, guide for daily life. - -[Sidenote: _Relation between the arts (collections of rules) and -philosophical doctrines._] - -Another circumstance that has led to the belief in the disappearance -of books of rules is the observation that from those books dealing -with the so-called _arts,_ there has come to be a treatment of the -philosophy of their subject-matter, in which those treatises have been -dissolved. Thus from Poetics and Rhetorics has come Æsthetic, from -Grammatic the Philosophy of language, from the Art of teaching and of -reasoning Logic and Gnoseology, from the historical Art, Historic, -from the Arts of economic government, the Science of Economy, from the -treatises on Natural Law, the Philosophy of Law. - -When such philosophies, then, had appeared, treatises upon the Arts -seemed to have become superfluous, and to this is attributed the cause -of their diminution or disappearance. But although it be impossible not -to recognize the historical process above described from books on the -arts to books of systems, it is necessary to be careful to interpret -it exactly and not to confuse it with a passing from empiria to -philosophy. Thus it will be seen that the part absorbed and dissolved -in philosophy has been precisely those philosophical attempts that -were mingled with such collections of rules and precepts. For it was -very natural that the writers who put them together and had ideas as -to what should be done and what avoided, were often led to investigate -the principles from which sprung the particular rules. Believing -that they were strengthening, they really came to surpass them, that -is, they passed unwittingly from one form of treatment to another, -from Psychology to Philosophy. But not even here has empiricism been -refined into philosophy (a refinement which, strictly speaking, is -impossible), but a more perfect philosophy has been substituted for one -less perfect. The dissolution, then, has not been of the rules, but of -that imperfect philosophy, a chemical process which has left the rules -in what they possess of original as residuum. Hence their persistence, -and indeed the impossibility that they should not persist, side by side -with the most pure and perfect of philosophies. - -[Sidenote: _Casuistic: its nature and utility._] - -_Casuistic_ has had the same fate as the rules, and was also at one -time responsible for a very copious literary production. Now it is -cultivated as literature only by a few Jesuits, who carry on the -glories of Escobar and of Sanchez, read only by priests preparing -themselves for the post of confessor, whose studies are based for -the most part upon old books (such as the _Theologia moralis_ of the -Neapolitan Sant' Alfonso de' Liguori). At one time Casuistic was -not confined only to profane or theological morality, to the _casus -conscientiae. _ There were also books of casuistry composed for all -aspects of life, for politics, for the life of the courtier ("the -Wise Man at Court"), for the art of love. When the literary form of -rules fell into discredit, that of Casuistic fell with it. But this -does not mean that it is dead; it lives and will live as long as rules -live. For Casuistic is nothing but the process of reasoning by which -rules are made always more precise, passing from more general cases to -those more particular, so that no one will ever be able to do without -them.--If we take for rule of life this maxim: to avoid scientific -polemics, because they constitute a waste of time, adding little to the -progress of knowledge; in what way must we behave if a polemic be such -that it enables us to gain on the one hand the time it makes us lose -on the other? Shall we maintain the general rule, or shall we waive -it on this occasion, if for no other reason than to give variety to -our occupations? And how shall we behave if not only we retrieve the -time lost but avoid losing more time in the future? Shall we wish to -enter upon the polemic at once? But if our future be looked upon as -uncertain, if we be far advanced in years or in bad health, will it not -be better to renounce the uncertain gain of the future for the certain -gain of the present?--This is a very simple example of Casuistic, -which a critic and writer (let us suppose that he is the writer of -these pages) is obliged to propose to himself and to solve. Naturally, -no Casuistic will ever furnish the concrete solution (which is the only -one that counts), since, as has been said, no rule can ever furnish -it. Rules and casuistry do not reach the individuality _omnimodo -determinata,_ which is the historical situation; yet if Casuistic -aid my action, this will always differ from that, as concrete from -abstract; or better, my action will always truly possess the form, the -definiteness that abstract casuistry cannot possess. Woe to practical -men who rely upon collections of maxims and casuistical reasonings, -and woe to those who rely upon them. Those who argue at length upon -practical matters and draw subtle distinctions, are to be avoided in -the world of affairs and in the world of action. If they have not yet -provoked some disaster, they are on the road to doing so now. This, at -least, is a good rule; like the supreme rule (which is not a rule but -philosophical truth), namely, that we must abandon rules, that is, face -the individual case, which, as such, is always irregular. - -[Sidenote: _Jurisprudence as casuistry._] - -But if a further proof be wanted of the necessity and perpetuity of -maxims and of casuistry, observe how these also persist in literary -form, as laws, where this form is not eliminable. _Laws,_ as we have -seen, are not simple rules, but are based upon _formulæ of rules,_ -and must of necessity make explicit in them decisions as to doing and -not doing. Jurisprudence is the Casuistic of law, or all the labour -of so-called interpretation, which is at bottom the excogitation of -new rules. All know that not only is Jurisprudence not of itself -legislative, but that it cannot even determine the volitional act of -the Statesman, nor the sentence, or decision upon the particular case, -a decision which the judge creates upon each occasion. But no one would -seriously think of suppressing the work and the function of those -_casuists,_ or judicial experts, a function which, since it has always -existed and continues to exist, cannot but answer to a social need. -It is possible to predict a form of social life, less complicated and -weighty, in which that function would have less scope, but whatever be -the case as regards this prediction, the casuistry of judicial experts -will continue so long as there are laws and rules, that is to say, -always. - - -[1] _Ricordi politici e civili,_ n. xliv. (in _Opere inedite_(2), -Firenze, 1857; p. 97). - -[2] _Scritti inediti,_ ed. Del Giudice, Napoli, 1862, p. 12. - -[3] Letter to the d'Épinay, 5th September 1772. - -[4] _Mémoires,_ ed. Paris, Gamier, s.a., i pp. 3-4. - - - - -VIII - - -CRITIQUE OF THE INVASIONS BY PHILOSOPHY OF THE DOMAIN OF PRACTICAL -DESCRIPTION AND OF ITS DERIVATIVES - - -In demonstrating the legitimacy and necessity of practical description -and of its derivatives, Regolistic and Casuistic, we have not -fulfilled, as it were, our whole knightly duty, which binds us to that -discipline, which we have been obliged to maltreat so exceedingly, -and shall further maltreat, when it has been or shall be presented as -a philosophical method. It is now necessary to defend its existence -against the invasion of philosophy, or rather of philosophers. We must -make it obvious that if the empiricists and psychologists, who swell -themselves out to philosophers, are bunglers, those too are bunglers -who claim to solve empirical questions philosophically. Perhaps they -are bunglers less worthy of pardon, because it is part of philosophy to -know itself clearly, and consequently its own limits. - -[Sidenote: _First form: tendency to generalize._] - -The first bad effect that philosophy has upon practical description -is the tendency to change it from description and collection of -particular descriptions into something that has the air of generality -and comprehensiveness. Because, if practical description be closely -connected with the historical conditions of definite individuals and -societies and with their wants, the more specific and near to the -concrete it is, the better it will be, and the more useless by as much -as it goes wandering toward the general. We owe to the evil influence -of philosophy those verbose treatises upon psychological classes, such -as virtue, duties, things good, affections, passions, and human types, -to read which nourishes less than fresh water, which at least refreshes. - -Let him who wishes to be convinced compare the books of rules and -observations that we owe to men of experience and to men of the -world, such as the _Ricordi_ of Guicciardini, the _Maximes_ of -Larochefoucauld, and the _Oraculo Manual_ of Balthazar Gracian, -with the _Traité des passions_ of Descartes, with that section -of the _Ethica_ of Spinoza that relates to this matter, with the -_Anthropologia_ and the _Doctrine of Virtue_ of Kant (we prefer to -record great names). He will then see on whose side is the advantage, -an advantage of originality, of importance, and even of style, which -is in this case a revelation. Those books by philosophers contain for -the most part definitions of vocabulary and of words which there is no -need to define, because everybody knows them to such an extent that the -definitions, rather than make them more clear, make them obscure. Who, -for example, can resist the philosophical triviality of the _Aphorisms -for the Wisdom of Life_ of Arthur Schopenhauer? Take the trouble to -open a book to learn that good things are to be divided into personal, -wealth and imagination, or reputation, and that the first (such as -good health and a gay temperament) are pre-eminent over the others. -Do we not learn more and with greater rapidity and efficacy from such -proverbs as "God helps the merry man"? It is superfluous to observe -that those books, in so far as they generalize, can never attain to -philosophy. They remain at bottom more or less historical. - -[Sidenote: _Historical elements persisting in generalizations._] - -The good and generous wine of the born psychologists and precept-makers -is diluted in a great deal of water, but that water, however much -there be of it, never becomes pure and is always discoloured and of an -unpleasant taste. Thus in classifications of ancient Ethic the idea of -"virtue" or of "good" was announced as the most important, in Christian -Ethic that of "duty," in the same way as in ancient Ethic the political -character was dominant, in the modern the individualistic, according to -the different character of the corresponding civilizations. Historical -elements differentiate the Ethic of Aristotle, impregnated with sane -Greek life, from that of the Stoics, in which is foretold the decadence -of the antique world and the germs of the future discovered (for -instance, cosmopolitanism, which precedes the Christian idea of the -unity of the human race). The four Platonic virtues retain the name, -but are filled with a new content, in the four cardinal virtues of the -Christian Ethic; the seven deadly sins are not to be explained in all -their settemplicity without the ascetic ideal of the Middle Ages. - -Among the various writers of treatises, the foreground is filled, now -with the idea of effort or of duty, now with that of enjoyment and -satisfaction; ideas are now despotic masters, now smiling friends; -the dominant idea is in turn that of justice, of benevolence, of -enthusiasm, and so on. In the systems of Catholic Ethic are reflected -political absolutism and semi-feudal economy; in those of Protestant -Ethic, constitutionalism, liberalism, the industrial and capitalistic -world; a strict probity, not indeed without utilitarianism, and -a hardness of heart, not indeed without austerity. Modern Ethic -is concerned with property, with the struggle of classes, with -proletarianism and communism. These are all historical facts and as -such most worthy of attention, but for that very reason they should -be examined in all their force and value and not through the medium -of the pale categories of a universal doctrine, which they disturb -and falsify and by which they are very often disturbed and falsified. -Whoever undertakes to write general treatises upon the passions, upon -the virtues, and upon the other practical classes, will always show the -signs of his time in the categories that he establishes, and the result -will be at once banal and empirical, that is to say, badly empirical. - -[Sidenote: _Second form: literary union of philosophy and empiria._] - -But hitherto the chief ill has been that useless and tiresome books are -written. Matters begin to look graver when an approach is attempted -between philosophical theories and empirical classifications and they -are united in one treatise, as the _general_ part and the _particular_ -part, the _abstract_ and the _concrete_ part, the _theoretical_ and -the _historical_ part. We do not wish to refuse recognition to an -occasionally just sense of the intimate relations between philosophy -and history as among the motives that lead to such unions, the first of -which flows into the second, revives it and is by it in turn revived. -But the history, to which philosophy applies the torch, is all history -in its palpitating reality; it is history represented by all histories -that historians have written and will write, and also by those that -they have not written and will not write. The history offered by these -empirical descriptions is only a very small part of history and (what -is worse) abstract and mutilated. This would, however, be an injury of -not too grave a nature, even at this point, provided the incongruity -were limited to literary unfitness; in which case, it is true, would be -added to inutility the ugliness of a union capricious and artificial, -but fortunately extrinsic. But by means of that extrinsic approach, -the way is opened to the attempt at an intrinsic approach, and thus -to the third form of the undue invasion of practical description by -philosophy, which constitutes the _morbus philosophico-empiricus_ in -all its harm fulness. - -[Sidenote: _Third form: attempt to place them in intimate connexion._] - -The attempt at intrinsic approach takes place when empirical -classes are placed in connection with the philosophical concepts or -categories, with pure thought. Nearly all philosophers have fallen -into this error, since it is very natural that they should not have -wished to leave a _hiatus_ between the first and second parts of -their books of Philosophy of the practical, between the general and -particular parts, and that they should have striven to connect the -one with the other by passing logically from the concepts of the -first to those of the second. The mistake was indubitably increased -owing to their small degree of clearness as to the logical nature of -the two orders of concepts (concepts and pseudo-concepts), which is -fundamentally diverse, and we shall not further insist upon this matter. - -[Sidenote: _Science of the practical and Metaphysic: various -significations._] - -Rather let us note that sometimes there has been something rational -in the minds of those who have required the Science of the practical -or Ethic to be constructed independently of all Metaphysic. In truth, -that programme of the independence of the Science of the practical -or Ethic of Metaphysic has had various meanings that it will be well -to enumerate briefly. The first meaning was that the Science of the -practical, in so far as it was philosophy, should be independent of -the _aggregate_ of the philosophical system (Metaphysic). In this -case the claim was not acceptable, as we shall see, because it was -at variance with the nature itself of philosophy, which is unity. The -second meaning was that the Practical, as science, should be kept -remote from every form of faith, or feeling or fancifulness (which has -sometimes been called "Metaphysic"); and in this case the proposition -was inexpugnable, however contestable may have seemed the opportuneity -of the meaning given to that word. The third meaning was that the -Science of the practical, in so far as it was descriptive, should stand -by itself, in order to afford a base for philosophical induction. Use -was here made of the erroneous idea, already rejected several times, -of philosophy as an intensification of the psychological method, or -as a carrying of it on. But in a fourth sense, it was desired finally -to withdraw practical description from the perilous care of the -philosophers, and it seems to us that with this fourth meaning was -expressed a very just demand. - -[Sidenote: _Damaging consequences of the invasions._] - -What are, in fact, the consequences of the care that philosophers -have bestowed upon practical description? We would not wish to use an -over-coloured simile, but what happens is very much what would happen -if a man were given a baby to suckle. He would press it violently -against his dry and arid breast, incapable of nourishing, but well -capable of tormenting it. Philosophy, when it approaches the empirical -classes, will either begin to criticize their distinctions and abolish -them, reducing several classes to one, and then reducing the reduced -classes in their turn to a less number, until none are left at all and -it finds itself in company with the universal philosophical principle -alone, or alone with itself;--or it will contrive to preserve them -as classes, deducing them philosophically, and will thus make them -rigid and absolute, removing from them that elasticity and fluidity -which they derive from their historical character, and converting them -from useful classes that they were, into bad philosophemes, concepts -contradictory in themselves. - -[Sidenote: _1a. Dissolution of the empirical concepts._] - -Both these consequences have occurred, for the books of philosophers -are full of examples, now of destruction, now of corruption of the -empirical classes of the Practical. The treatment of the doctrine -of the virtues or of so-called natural rights affords examples of -destruction. Striving to distinguish courage from prudence, or justice -from benevolence, or on the other hand, egotism from wickedness, they -ended by recognizing that true courage is prudence, true prudence -courage; that benevolence is justice, justice benevolence; that egotism -is wickedness, wickedness egotism, and so on. In this way, all the -virtues became one, the virtue of being virtuous, the will for the -good, duty. In like manner, by giving philosophical form to the natural -rights of life, of liberty, of culture, of property, and so on, they -ended by recognizing that all rights merge in one single right, which -is that of existence; which latter, indeed, is not a right, but a fact. -The passions were reduced from seventy or eighty classes to six or -seven fundamental, but these six or seven were in their turn reduced -to two only, pleasure and pain, and of these two; it was finally -discovered that they constituted one only--life, which is pleasure -and pain together. But virtues, rights, passions, possess value in -practical description only in so far as they are multiplicity--their -value is always plural, never singular. To reduce them to a single -class signifies to annul them, as to blow upon a candle signifies to -extinguish it and to remain in darkness; darkness is to be understood -as without empirical light. Now the philosopher should certainly -destroy empirical ideas, but only in so far as they present themselves -as philosophical distinctions, that is, in so far as they are empirico -philosophical: and in that case it suffices him to show that they are -empirical, without pretending to annul them in their own domain also: -_debellare superbos,_ but _parcere subjectis;_ that is, he should spare -strangers who remain quietly in their own house. - -[Sidenote: _Examples: war and peace, property and communism, and the -like._] - -It might seem desirable to pass in review all these empirical -distinctions and questions which the philosophers have thought that -they had satisfactorily solved, when they had, on the contrary, passed -beyond them. But the theme is inexhaustible, and we cannot here give -even a rich selection, comprising the most frequent and important -cases. We must limit ourselves to brief mention.--People discuss every -day: whether war be an evil, and if it be possible to abolish it; -if community of goods should take the place of private property; if -rational government be that of liberty or of authority, of democracy -or aristocracy, of anarchism or state organization; whether the State -should be in the Church or the Church in the State, or side by side and -independent; if freedom of thought should be admitted or restrained; -if instruction should be free or undertaken by the State; and other -similar problems. Now behold the philosopher applying himself to the -study of these ideas. Having tested them, he is astonished that people -can find in them opposing terms, and make them argument for dispute. -In truth (he says), war is intrinsic to reality, and peace is peace in -so far as by making an end of one war it prepares another; as Socrates -demonstrated in the _Phaedo,_ when, scratching his leg in the place -where it had been pressed by the chain, he realized that he could not -have experienced that pleasure had he not previously experienced the -pain. Nor is property different from communism: the individual declares -himself by an individual taking possession of things and becoming their -owner; but by so doing he enters into relations and into communion with -other individuals, and does business with them. And liberty excludes -subjection the less, since _sub lege libertas;_ nor does aristocracy -exclude democracy, since the true aristocrat is the bearer of those -universal values that are the substance of democracy; hence the more we -are aristocratic the more we are democratic, and inversely. Nor does -anarchism exclude State organization, because a collection of men, -however free we suppose it to be, must nevertheless govern itself -according to some laws, and these laws are the State. Then, the ideal -State, being the best government of men for their perfectionment, both -material and spiritual, accomplishes the work of the Church itself, -which is neither above, nor below, nor beside the State, because it is -the State. Thus in like manner, no one can grant or abolish freedom of -thought, since thought is by definition freedom, and the restraint is -thought itself, because liberty coincides with necessity. And finally -State instruction cannot but correspond with rational demands, and the -free instruction of citizens, if it be really so and not arbitrary and -capricious, will be the same as that of the State, or will be changed -into the instruction of the State. - -[Sidenote: _Other examples._] - -Passing to other orders of fact that are less political, but are also -argument for practical discussions, we shall refer to the so-called -conflicts between duty or interest, as symbolized in the legendary -Titus Manlius, when offered the alternative _aut reipublicae aut sui -suorumque obliviscendi_;--or to the so-called question of the two -moralities, private and public, in support of which the not legendary -Camillo Cavour said in 1860, that if he had done in his private -interest what he had done for Italy, he would have deserved the -galleys;--or we can refer to questions of classification, and ask -whether the kind of man who is socially harmless should be placed side -by side with the criminal;--or to those others, famous in Casuistic, -relating to capital punishment, homicide, suicide, lies, whether and -when they should be permitted, and other similar questions. Here, too, -the philosopher will smilingly observe that duties and interests can -never be in conflict, because in every given case duty is always one -only, and interest is always one only, that of the given case;--he -will deny that there is one public and one private morality, because -in man, the private person and the citizen, family relations, or -those of friendship, and those of political life, are inseparable and -indistinguishable;--that every man is bad and good, inoffensive and -criminal, and that in the so-called criminal there must also be the -non-criminal, if he be given the name of man;--that every punishment is -a punishment of death, that is, it causes something to die, and that it -is impossible to find a clear distinction between shutting a man up in -prison and thus taking from him a more or less large slice of physical -life, and taking it from him altogether by hanging or shooting -him;--that homicide, as such, is so little a crime that in war it is a -duty to commit it;--that a lie, which is silence as to what one knows, -is in itself so innocent that no one in the world, save a foolish -prater, tells all he knows, and that if it be admitted that one can -and should be silent, that is to say, let others be deceived by our -silence (though this is eloquent), there is no reason for not admitting -that we can also betray them with speech (often less eloquent), as is -done with children in order to send them to bed, and with sick persons -in order to comfort them;--that, finally, culpable suicide is not -the material act of depriving oneself of physical life (a thing done -without incurring blame, and indeed with praise and glory, by those who -sacrifice themselves for others in war, in epidemics, in dangers of all -sorts, and by every one who consumes his own vital strength in a worthy -cause), but the killing of the moral life in oneself. - -[Sidenote: _Misunderstanding on the part of philosophers._] - -In all these answers to questions, we have not made our imaginary -philosopher commit any blunder; we have indeed put into his mouth -things that we believe to be all of them most true and irrefutable, -because we believe them ourselves. And we hold that it is necessary to -profess them against those who arbitrarily make questions philosophical -whose terms are not philosophical. But when the philosopher offers -those solutions to the empirical disputants, he behaves like him who, -hearing a speech in a language of which he knows little, makes a reply -that is in itself most reasonable, but without relation to the previous -speech. The empiricist, if he have studied philosophy, will be able -to reply, as did King Theodore, worn with misery, in the old _opéra -bouffe_ of the Abbé Casti, to him who recalls to him the miseries -suffered by Marius, Themistocles, and Darius:-- - - Good my son, I know them well, - For I have heard these tales before; - But just at present, truth to tell, - 'Tis money interests me more. - -[Sidenote: _Historical significance of the aforesaid questions._] - -Money, that is, ready money to spend in definite situations -historically given, in order to find one's way in them; for all those -questions are without universal signification, but have arisen from -political and individual problems, to which they do and must belong. -Certainly they are insoluble in the abstract, and this is the defect, -or rather the nature of empirical questions, which, if they admitted -of rigorous solution, would not be any longer empirical. Therefore it -is a foolish thing to discuss them philosophically, as is seen in the -conspicuous example of certain casuistical enquiries (the homicide of -the unjust aggressor, the lie, incest, etc.) which have been treated by -nearly all philosophers and have been dragged about for centuries in -discussions on Ethic, although every century has left them at the same -point as they were in the one preceding. - -But if it be not possible to solve, we can at least _state_ them -in abstract terms, in the same way as drill and the sham-fight are -abstract, though certainly of use when the battle is really fought. We -can and we should bear in mind these abstract solutions, in order that -we may be the better able to solve a series of concrete cases, which -are not identical, certainly, because identical cases do not exist, but -more or less similar, and therefore require solutions that are more or -less similar.--Can war be done away with? This question refers not to -the elimination' of the category "war," but to the possibility or the -reverse of avoiding in the twentieth century and in European countries -that empirical war which is waged with cannons and cruisers, that -costs milliards when it is not waged, and tens of milliards when it -is waged, and out of which the conqueror comes conquered. It is well -understood that some form of war will always continue, because war is -inherent to life.--Can private property be done away with? This does -not mean to ask if it be possible to prevent man from taking possession -of things, of his food, or of the material that he requires for dress, -or from inhabiting a house; but whether it be possible to alter, to -the advantage of mankind, the proportion that now obtains between -production with private capital and production with collective capital, -giving the preference to the latter. - -And so on, for it would be tiresome to continue to state the historical -problems that are grouped beneath each of the recorded formulæ, which -indeed are easily to be found. Thus when we absolutely forbid the -telling of lies, as indecorous and degrading, as that which severs the -ties of human community and of reciprocal faith, as the vice (said -Herbart) that has the special faculty of stirring up against it all -the five moral ideas--justice, benevolence, equity, perfection, and -internal liberty--the intention is to forbid what is usually called -lying; but it is certainly not intended to institute a speculative -enquiry as to the relation between knowing and making known, between -the theoretic act of thought and the practical act of its communication -to other individuals. Thus again, the prohibition of suicide has in -view suicide through egoism, which is the most frequent form, and it is -therefore useless to identify this with the universal relation between -death and life, and with the proposition that life is preserved by -means of death. Thus too, finally, the conception of the delinquent -has been a beneficent rectification of common prejudices relating to -the efficacy of certain laws and penalties applied to certain classes -of individuals who are led to crime as though through unrestrainable -natural tendency. For the rest, the wisdom of life teaches us usually -to take individuals as we find them, with their virtues and vices, and -without claiming to set them violently right, and to remake them from -top to bottom. We should rather adapt them in the best way possible -for our own ends, or for those of society. This does not, however, -imply that they are fixed beings, and that each of those classes is -heterogeneous in respect of the others. If, with the help of a foolish -positivist philosophy, we make of the idea of the delinquent something -necessary, a natural being, as it is called, confounding naturalistic -with natural and incorrectly hypostasizing gnoseological procedure, -then, and then alone, are we right in reacting and in denying. - -[Sidenote: _2a. False deduction of the empirical from the -philosophical._] - -And yet those solutions of philosophers, who think that they are -solving empirical questions by annulling or ignoring them, do not yet -represent the worst that happens when philosophy usurps the function -of empiria. Such misunderstanding, such hardness of hearing, may be -proof of a spirit so energetically directed to universale that it is -unable to see anything else, and may even for that reason possess -some sympathetic quality. The worst of the worst is the entering upon -empirical questions, not in order to annul, but to take sides in them -and to solve them philosophically. - -[Sidenote: _Affirmations relating to the contingent changed into -philosophemes._] - -This cannot be done, save by supporting empirical concepts with -rigorous and philosophical concepts, confounding the one with the other -by a trick of thought, and sometimes of words, making use of synonyms -and homonyms, and pronouncing in the name of philosophy arbitrary -solutions suggested only by caprice or self-interest. This is the -complete corruption, alike of philosophy and of empiria. Not satisfied -with making practical classes follow philosophical concepts of the -practical, it is then sought to deduce the former from the latter, -and behold them now deriving virtues and duties from the universal -concept of practical moral activity, by means of the divisions of -internal and external, of part and whole, of individual and society. -These are concepts of relations, not susceptible of division, and -therefore incapable of serving as base for empirical divisions. Or -they have recourse to the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, -which is the universal concrete itself, constituting unity, and -therefore incapable of serving as basis for division. Or they will -deduce the moral virtues according to the three faculties, as virtues -of representation, feeling and thought, or according to the two of the -will and the intellect, as dianoetic and ethical virtues; as though the -base of the division of the _practical_ could be that of _theoretical_ -and _practical._ Empirical concepts become in this way all false, -whereas, in their real nature, they are neither false nor true. - -There is no thesis, however absurd, which cannot be defended with -such a method. All know that there are aristocratic and democratic -philosophers, libertarian and authoritarian, anarchical and -organicist, socialistic and anti-socialistic, bellicose and pacific, -feminist and antifeminist; and there are others who maintain the -right to lie, the right to suicide, the right to prostitution, the -right to incest, to making of themselves caterers for the scaffold, -the right to the penalty of death. These solutions can be morally and -politically justified in certain definite and particular cases. There -are other solutions rationally unjustifiable in the individual case -and put forward only through passion, wickedness, or prejudice, but in -both hypotheses, they are outside philosophy and within it so false as -to be odious, as that is odious which is maintained, not by means of -intrinsic reason, but by imposition altogether extrinsic and external. - -[Sidenote: _Reason of the rebellion against rules._] - -Such hatefulness explains the rebellion against moral rules and -concepts that has often taken place. This, together with that against -literary classes and rules and others of the same sort, forms part -of the vast movement of rebellion against empirical or empiricized -philosophy. In truth, when those rules and ideas are taken by -themselves, no rebellion is possible, because they do not exert any -pressure and obey the orders of the man who has made them. But it -happens otherwise, when they become rigid and philosophical, and -as is said, absolute, claiming to substitute themselves as such for -philosophy and to provide a base for judgments. In addition to this, -from the enforced union of philosophemes with rules, has arisen the -false idea of philosophizing about the practical (about an Ethic, -for example), which showed itself to be _practical,_ or, as is said, -_normative._ - -[Sidenote: _Limits between philosophy and empiria._] - -Philosophy, by taking part in empirical questions, ruins both itself -and them, because it loses the serenity, the dignity, and the utility -that are intrinsic to it. In like manner, the empirical disciplines -ruin themselves and philosophy when they claim to philosophize with -their classes, which are not categories, with their pseudo-concepts, -which are not concepts, with their _generalia,_ which are not -_universalia._ Here too, safety lies in distinction: the observation of -distinction alone makes possible beneficent co-operation. - - - - -IX - - -HISTORICAL ANNOTATIONS - - -A history of the general theories relating to the practical activity -is still to write, although we have several relating to particular -theories of Ethic. The mode in which such a historical narration should -be conducted results from the historical explanations themselves, -which we have exposed and shall continue to expose. Here we cannot -even offer a rapid summary. We shall limit ourselves to making a--few -remarks on the subject, and we shall give some historical account of -certain problems of the philosophy of the practical, that have had, to -some extent, profound treatment, or have at least been sufficiently -discussed (for not a few others are virgin, or almost so), with the -sole object of serving as a guide. - -[Sidenote: _I. Distinction between history of the practiced principle -and history of the liberation from the transcendental._] - -I. A first warning to bear in mind concerns the historical inquiry as -to the varying _recognition of, or failure to recognize_ the _practical -reason_ in respect to the other forms of the spirit. This series of -thoughts is not to be confounded with that _other historical process,_ -so long and so intricate, which had its origin in the debate between -St. Augustine and Pelagius (or perhaps rather in the opposition between -Platonic mysticism and Aristotelian humanism), and through analogous -debates, arising afresh during the Middle Ages and onward to modern -times, culminating in the strife for the independence of morality and -the practical reason in general from religion, which took place in -the seventeenth century. The account of the various incidents of that -debate perhaps occupies a larger space and a different place in the -special histories of Ethic than it deserves. For it is not concerned -with an entirely ethical or practical problem, but with that general -philosophical movement which produced the progressive elimination of -the transcendental and founded the immanentistic consideration of -the real: a necessary condition for the conceivability of philosophy -itself. In this lay the great importance of the affirmation that the -practical and the moral spirit of man reveals itself as constant in the -midst of the most various and opposed religious beliefs. This amounts -to saying that it is independent of religion and knowable naturally and -humanly, without the necessity of having recourse to the authority of -revelation and of making shipwreck in mystery. It is customary to say -that in the seventeenth century free-thought definitely won the victory -upon the point most ardently contested, and in this connection are -recorded the names of Charron, Grotius, Spinoza, and Pierre Bayle. To -these could be added that of G. B. Vico, who conceived of Providence -as immanent and considered that morality arose from "a sense common to -all men," from a judgment "without any sort of reflection," foundation -of the natural rights of man. But should the word "definite" be really -used here? Whenever the idea of the transcendental reappears, even in -the timid form of agnosticism, the autonomy of the practical reason is -denied, or at least again put in doubt (and with it that of the whole -human spirit). - -Two examples only of this must suffice, but they are conspicuous. -Emmanuel Kant, not having been able to surpass the mystery that he -had formulated--the principle of the practical reason--the categoric -imperative remained suspended in the void, and in that void it invokes -in relation to itself faith in a personal God and in a transcendental -future life, which shall conciliate virtue and happiness, at variance -in the life lived upon earth. This scrap of mystery which Kant -allowed to remain in his system, suffices to obscure that autonomy -of the practical reason and that concept of spiritual productivity -which he had affirmed with so much energy. Another example, perhaps -even more characteristic, is furnished by the Ethic that was prevalent -for three centuries in the English School. It was a utilitarian Ethic -and therefore incapable of truly founding moral reason. What was the -consequence of that incapacity when recognized as such? Nothing but -the renewed introduction of mystery, the explanation obtained by means -of the idea of a personal God, assuming that most extravagant form -known as "theological utilitarianism." By this theory, moral actions -that in this life do not receive adequate recompense and seem to be -unjustified from the utilitarian point of view, are rewarded by God -in another life, thus finding their economic motive for being carried -out in the present life. In our theoretic treatment of the subject, we -do not concern ourselves with the controversy, already mooted in the -_Eutyphron,_ as to whether sanctity be loved by the gods as sanctity, -or whether it be sanctity because it is beloved by the gods[1]--a -question that in the Middle Ages was transformed into that other one, -differently solved by Abélard, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus: whether the -moral law be given by divine decree, or whether the idea of God does -not of necessity coincide with the idea of moral law. We do not treat -of this, since we are occupied with the practical, not with theology -or antitheology, and consider that the contest between philosophy -and theology has been already solved and surpassed in the theory of -knowledge. For the same reason, it seems to us that we should not trace -its history in the History of the Philosophy of the Practical.[2] - -[Sidenote: _II. The distinction of the practical from the theoretical._] - -II. The true and proper history of the practical principle, conceived -as autonomous, and of the problem concerning the identity or the -distinction of the practical from theory, has a different line of -development. As a rule this problem is referred back to the celebrated -sayings of Socrates, that virtue is knowledge and vice ignorance, and -to the corrections that Aristotle, while accepting, proposes in them, -when he takes note of the part that belongs to the non-cognoscitive -element. But, as often happens, those sayings and those corrections -have been taken as being more profound than they genuinely were and -could be. This, if it have not aided the exactness of historical -interpretation, has nevertheless stimulated and fecundated thought. -On reading without prejudice the parts of the _Memorabilia,_ of the -Platonic dialogues, of the _Nicomachean Ethics,_ and of the _Magna -Moralia_ that relate to it, it appears evident that what is treated -of in them is the altogether empirical question of the importance -that mental development has for practical life, and whether knowledge -suffices for this, or natural dispositions and discipline of the -passions be not also necessary. Aristotle replied to Socrates, who had -insisted upon the element of knowing, conceiving virtue as knowledge -(λόγος), by modifying the statement with the assertion that virtue is -not indeed simply knowledge, but is _with_ knowledge (μετὰ λόγου). -In these very ingenuous considerations is to be found at the most -implicitly, but certainly not explicitly, the problem that was only -stated later on; and it would be rash to classify Socrates as an -intellectualist and Aristotle as a voluntarist. It is certain that the -Aristotelian philosophy, in accordance with good sense, preserved the -distinction between the two forms of the spirit, the theoretical and -the practical, the reason and the will, a distinction that has also -passed into the scholastic philosophy (_ratio cognoscibilis, ratio -appetibilis_) and into that of the Renaissance. But it remained always -vague, sometimes brought into prominence, sometimes, on the other hand, -attenuated. Almost dissipated in those who conceive the principles of -the practical as something similar or analogous to mathematical truths -(Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, etc.), it always reaffirms itself when -importance is given to the affections and passions, as is the case with -many thinkers of the seventeenth century (Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, -Vico); and the doctrines of the Scottish school of sensationalists -contributed not a little to keep it alive. - -It seems indubitable that Emmanuel Kant is to be connected to -some extent rather with this last tradition than with that of the -intellectualists: with Kant the practical reason possessed a domain of -its own altogether distinct from and almost antithetical to the domain -of the theoretical. But it is erroneous to present the successors -of Kant as forgetful of the practical reason and as resolving every -spiritual manifestation in the theoretical form of the spirit. -For instance, Fichte, who had a very strong consciousness of the -peculiarity of the practical activity, did not do this, nor did Hegel, -though as commonly as unjustly accused of being a cold intellectualist. -It should suffice to recall how Hegel always opposed that view of -Plato and of other thinkers (for example Campanella) who assigned the -government of the State to philosophers, a view in which the resolution -of the practical into the theoretical spirit and of the will into -knowledge seemed to become concrete. For Hegel, on the contrary, the -domain of _history_ is different from that of _philosophy;_ history -is indeed the idea, but the idea that shows itself in a _natural and -unconscious_ manner, and _philosophical_ genius is not _political_ -genius. Nor must we forget the importance that he accorded to passion, -to custom, to what is called the heart and is wont to be opposed to -the brain and to argument. For Hegel, the will is not thought, but -a special kind of thought, that is to say, thought which translates -itself into existence, the impulse to give oneself existence. Whereas -in the theoretical process, the spirit takes possession of the object -and makes it its own by thinking, that is by universalizing it, in -the practical process a difference is also stated and determined, -which on the other hand consists of its own determinations and ends. -The theoretical is contained in the practical, since there cannot be -will without intelligence; but, on the other hand, the theoretical -contains the practical, since to think is also to act. Hegel, in short, -distinguishes the practical from the theoretical and unifies them, -while retaining the distinction.[3] What is not perhaps altogether -clear to him, notwithstanding his view that history is the idea in a -natural and unconscious mode, is the unreflective character of willing. -To have given relief to this character, although in the exaggerated and -inacceptable form of the will as blind and unconscious, is the merit of -Arthur Schopenhauer, who is indeed far from standing alone in assigning -an eminent place to the will, but connects himself with all the Kantian -and post-Kantian philosophy, and in the first place with Fichte and -Schelling. - -[Sidenote: _III. The mixtures of philosophy of the practical and -description._] - -III. The mixture of philosophical concepts with empirical concepts and -with rules is a vice common to nearly all treatises of the Philosophy -of the practical, beginning with the _Nicomachean Ethic,_ which, -although in certain places loftily philosophical, should be placed in -greater part rather at the head of the history of the works of the -moralists and of writers on the practical, than of Ethic. The author -himself recognized this practical character when he wrote, _πάς ὁ περὶ -τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι.[4]_ And in -this appears the prejudice that practical philosophy should be occupied -with the practical: ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά -ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἅλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί εστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα -άλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ ηινώμεθα, ἐπεὶ ούδὲν ἃν ἧν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), κτλ.[5] -Even the greatest thinkers of modern times are not exempt from that -characteristic. Emmanuel Kant, while recognizing that the division and -treatment of duties do not belong to the Critique of the Sciences (he -should therefore have excluded them from philosophy, which is always -_criticism),_ finally relegates them to what he calls the "system" -(and is in truth the anti-systematic)[6] and writes the _Metaphysic of -Customs,_ divided into the doctrines of law and of the virtues. Fichte, -in his _System of Ethic,_ makes the applied follow the theoretical -part. Hegel gives the doctrine of duties in the third part of his -_Philosophy of Law,_ which is entitled Of Ethicity (_Sittlichkeit_.) -The Ethic of Herbart is intrinsically descriptive, for the author -himself professed to wish simply "to describe the ideal of virtue,"[7] -and the five practical ideas that he takes as principles were at bottom -nothing but classes of virtue refined into ideas. Treatises of to-day -are overflowing with empirical elements, as can be seen from those in -English by Ladd and Seth, and by those in German of Paulsen, Wundt, and -Cathrein. Sometimes a more concrete historical element is coupled in -those treatises with the empirical classification of practical examples -and institutions: as, for instance, in Cathrein, a modernized Jesuit, -who exposes at length the moral views, not only of civilized people, -ancient and modern, but also of the savages of Oceania, of Asia, of -Cochin China, of the Hottentots and Boschimans, of the Botocudis, and -so on. Questions of casuistry also survive in these treatises, such as -whether and on what occasions it is permissible to tell a lie; this -question is notably represented in the history of ideas, from the -Socrates of the _Memorabilia_ to Kant and Schopenhauer.[8] Kant added -questions of casuistry to the various sections of the _Metaphysic of -Customs,_ as scholia to the system and examples of the way in which the -truth of particular questions should be sought.[9] - -[Sidenote: _Vain attempts at definitions of empirical concepts._] - -But the efforts of ancient and modern philosophers rigorously to -define empirical concepts afford more interest than the external form -of treatment, as do their efforts to modify or to simplify, or indeed -finally to deduce them rationally. The Platonic dialogues, such as the -_Charmides,_ the _Lachetes,_ the _Protagoras,_ are most instructive -in this respect. Here it is sought to define sophrosune, andreia and -the other virtues, without arriving at any precise result, or rather -arriving at the contradictory one, that each of these virtues is _the -whole of virtue,_ whereas it should only be a _part_ of it. In the -_Republic_ is sought the relation of the four virtues, or rather of -three of them, prudence, temperance, and fortitude, with justice, which -forms as it were the foundation and unity of the whole. From such -discussions arose the affirmation, to be found also in Cicero, that -the virtues are inseparable from one another: _virtutes ita copulatae -connexaeque sunt, ut omnes participes sint, nec alia ab alia possit -separari._[10] The difficulty of the Platonic inquiry is renewed with -all those who have given definitions of the virtues and of the other -empirical concepts, because, when they have achieved with much labour -a definition which appears satisfactory, it is afterwards always found -to be too narrow or too wide. Thus the definition given by Kant and by -others (Fichte, Schopenhauer) of egoism, consisting in their view, of -considering other individuals as means and not ends, is the definition, -not of egoism, but of any form of immorality which debases the Spirit -that should be the end, by means of its own caprices. The same is to -be said of the definitions given by Fichte as to the duties inherent -to this or that condition and state: the duties, for instance, of the -learned, who should love truth, communicate it to others, rectify -errors, promote culture,[11] and so on. These are all things that -form part of the duty, not only of the learned, but of every man. The -simplifiers are not more fortunate in their attempts to reduce the -number of empirical concepts, for the concepts excluded by them have -neither more nor less right to recognition than the others that they -have accepted. Schopenhauer, for instance, when he rejects the class -of duties toward oneself,[12] should also reject that of duties toward -others. For others and ourselves are correlative terms, and we cannot -be benevolent to others and malevolent to ourselves, just to others -and unjust to ourselves. If this be met with the objection that the -empirical self is not the object of duties, we must reply that neither -are the empirical "others," but only that Spirit which is in all and -constitutes all. In reacting against these unifiers and simplifiers, -other philosophers (as for example Herbart) have maintained the -indeducibility of the virtues or duties from a single principle, which -means that they have received those concepts into their philosophy -atomistically, and left them there as something not digested and not -digestible, an extraneous element. If they had openly admitted this and -drawn from it the legitimate consequence, and for that reason excluded -those concepts from philosophy, they would really have contributed -toward simplifying and unifying, by making it homogeneous. But Herbart, -if he have no other merit, has at any rate declared that the Philosophy -of the practical is not capable of solving all the problems that occur -in life, and that we must always rely upon the answer of the heart, -upon the delicacy of individual tact. And, therefore, while Kant still -preserved casuistic questions in Ethic and professed to solve them -rationally, Herbart showed that they lack the determinations that are -of true importance in real cases, and that such questions are therefore -as a rule either without meaning or insoluble (_entweder gar keiner -Fragen, oder im Allgemein unauflöslich_).[13] - -[Sidenote: _Attempts at eduction._] - -As concerns the attempt to connect and to deduct the empirical part of -treatises from the philosophical, the first example is the Aristotelian -division of the virtues into the dianoetic and ethic, with their -consequent determination by means of the concept of mediacy (μεσότης) -between two extremes. But this Aristotelian method, which was continued -by the Scholastics, seemed to others (as for example Schleiermacher) -nothing but "a heap of virtues," without any rule and without any -certainty; hence he made constant attempts at new classifications and -new deductions. Kant recognized that the ethical obligation, that is, -respect for the law, is something unique and indivisible, and that to -attain from that to duties or _ethica officia,_ which are many, it -is necessary to introduce the consideration of objects.[14] Here he -should have stopped, because objects have infinite determinations, are -infinite. Hence the enumeration, division and deduction of duties, -should be simply pronounced impossible. Instead of doing this, he -passed at a bound, how far logical we know not, from the general -ethical obligation, to the division of duties into two great classes: -of man toward man, and of man toward beings that are not human. He -divided the first into duties toward oneself and duties toward other -men, the second into that of the duties toward beings beneath man -(animals) and those toward beings above him (God).[15] The strangeness -of these divisions, which sometimes verge on the comic, can already -be seen, though abridged, in the first class of the duties toward -oneself, subdivided in its turn into duties toward oneself as an animal -or physical being, and duties toward oneself as a moral being; as -though human duties are not always to be referred to spirituality and -can ever concern physicality or animality. In their first aspect they -receive a tripartite division, into the duty of self-preservation, -which is violated by suicide, by allowing oneself to be castrated (in -order to sing soprano, as used to be done at that time at the San Carlo -of Naples and at the Opera of Berlin), by allowing a healthy tooth -to be pulled out in order to sell it (as does poor Fantine in the -story of the _Misérables_); into the duty of preserving the species -(violation: unnatural use of the sexual impulse);--into the duty of -preserving the use of one's own strength (violation: gluttony). The -duty of preserving the dignity of man is contained beneath the second -heading (violation, lying, covetousness, abjection, etc.[16]). The -fact is that the duty of preserving the dignity of man comprises -in itself, not only the class that stands first, of duties toward -oneself, but also all the other duties toward men, animals, or gods. -Fichte feels the difficulty, because he sees that conscience is that -which determines our duty on each occasion; but he adds: "This is not -enough for science: either we must be able to determine _a priori_ -that which our conscience will affirm in universal, or we must admit -that an Ethic, as a pure applied science, is impossible."[17] The -second horn of the dilemma was precisely that of the truth, but -Fichte, like Kant, bowed to the supreme power of tradition and clung -to the first. He divides duties into mediate and conditioned (toward -oneself) and immediate and unconditioned (toward others), and into -general and special (those of various states and conditions), deducing -from this the fourfold division, resulting from the meeting of general -conditioned duties, particular conditioned, general unconditioned, -and particular unconditioned. Hegel, who in his youthful writings had -denied absolute value to the virtues, and consequently the possibility -of collisions between the virtues (for example, in the _Life of Jesus,_ -recently published), well defines the altogether empirical character -of that treatise, calling it, by reason of its natural element and of -the quantitive considerations upon which it is founded, "a natural -history of the spiritual world" (_eine geistige Naturgeschichte_); but -since he did not perceive the identity of the concept of duty with that -of virtue, he believes in the possibility of a philosophical theory -of duties.[18] This is developed by him, as has been said, in the -section of Ethicity, applying to it the dialectical rhythm proper to -the philosophical universal, and distinguishing in it three moments: of -the immediate natural spirit, which is the family, of the dissension -from which arises civil society, and of conciliation, whence arises -the State. But notwithstanding the external dialectical form, there -is to be found in all this section of the Ethicity at every point, -not so much the philosopher properly so-called, as the historian who -describes and narrates, the acute and well-balanced politician and -moralist. The merit of such a treatise resides precisely, therefore, -in the abhorrence of a sham philosophy; with but slight modifications -of literary form, it could be developed into a series of excellent -historico-political essays. Certain of the propositions of the writing -on _Natural Law_ (1802-3)[19] would tend to show that Hegel inclined -to look upon the treatment of duties and institutions as nothing -more than a provisional classification of historical and changeable -material, a thought that is in any case suggested by his whole system. -Schleiermacher was among the philosophers of that time who laboured, -perhaps, with the greatest tenacity upon the empirical classes, with -a view to reducing them to philosophical form; but the results were -unhappy, only revealing, by their contradictions persisting after -such efforts, the impossibility of the task. In fact, Schleiermacher -sees and does not see the unity of the three spheres of things good, -of duties, and of virtues; hence they appeared to him to be three -aspects of the same object, and he strangely placed them in analogical -connection with three spheres of the natural world, the mechanical, the -chemical, and the organic. He, too, starting from a double division and -a double antithesis, ideal and temporal, of knowledge and exposition -(_Darstellen,_) arrived at a quadruple division of the virtues, into -wisdom and love, discretion and perseverance, which seemed to him to -coincide with the four Platonic virtues, of φρόνησις, δικαιοσύνη, -σωφροσύνη, and ἀνδρeίa, or with the four cardinal virtues derived from -them, to which would correspond the four duties: of right, of vocation, -of love, and of conscience.[20] After this, it would be superfluous to -proceed to enumerate the ethical systems of contemporary philosophy, -noteworthy neither for the ingenuity of their artificial deductions nor -for the grandeur of their paradoxes.[21] - -[Sidenote: _IV. Various questions._] - -IV. The very copious empirical element that fills the books on -the Philosophy of the practical and the attempt to treat it -philosophically have also had the injurious effect of distracting -their authors from entering deeply into the problems of true and -proper philosophy, to which the practical activity gives rise. Thus -a history of the aforesaid aberrations would be as rich as a history -of the speculation as to the will would be poor. The problem of the -theoretic element in the volitional act, or of the theoretic phase -of deliberation, has not been developed as it deserved, and as -the important pages of the third and seventh books of the _Ethica -Nicomachea_ seemed to augur. The question, too, of the priority of -the will over the concepts of the useful and of the good and of the -practical judgments, is hardly touched by a philosopher here and there, -and the Herbartian theory of practical judgments failed to excite -any fervour of examination, criticism, or opposition. The concept -of good will and of good intention, to which Kant gave a prominent -place, is not discussed profoundly, save by Hegel, who goes deeply -into the difficult problems of abstract and concrete intention in the -introduction and in the second section of the _Philosophy of Law._ -The other problem, as to the possibility or impossibility of willing -without full knowledge, was not adequately treated after Descartes and -Spinoza. - -[Sidenote: _The practical nature of error._] - -In Descartes are also to be found the most acute observations as to the -practical nature of error. After having stated that it is impossible -that God should have given to man any faculty that was not perfect of -its kind, he asks himself: "_D'où est-ce donc que naissent mes erreurs? -C'est à savoir, de cela seul que la volonté, étant beaucoup plus ample -et plus étendue que l'entendement, je ne la contiens pas dans les mêmes -limites, mais que je l'étends aussi aux choses que je n'entends pas; -auxquelles étant de soi indifférente, elle s'égare fort aisément, et -choisit le faux pour le vrai et le mal pour le bien: ce qui fait que -je me trompe et je pèche._" Errors arise from the concourse of two -causes, the faculty of knowing and the faculty of choice: "_car pour -l'entendement seul je n'assure ni ne nie aucune chose, mais je conçois -seulement les idées des choses que je puis assurer ou nier._"[22] For -Descartes the affirmation was an act of the will, and here perhaps lies -his mistake and the mistake of those who have followed him in this -theory (Rosmini for example); that is to say, they have _mistaken_ -the _affirmation,_ which is theoretical, for the _communication,_ -which is practical, or they have taken as being of the same degree the -general will that is in affirmation through the unity of the spirit, -and the particular will that is in error. Spinoza opposes Descartes' -theory of error, but in conformity with the deterministic nature of -his philosophy, his criticism relates only to the point as to whether -the will can be the cause of error when it is not more than a mere -abstraction or _ens rationis;_ hence errors or the _particulares -volitiones_ can be determined, not indeed by the will and by liberty, -but _a causis externis_[23] The consciousness of the introduction of -the will into the theoretical spirit as production of error has been -affirmed by Schleiermacher as well as by Rosmini:[24] "It is the will -(he writes) that conceals men from themselves: the judgment cannot err -if it turn its gaze really upon itself."[25] Baader frankly reduced -incredulity to ill-will and moral corruption.[26] - -[Sidenote: _Practical taste._] - -As to the concept of an immediate form of practical discrimination, -independent of the intellectual judgment, it is to be remarked -that the faculty of _taste_ in Gracian and in other thinkers of the -seventeenth century[27] has a practical rather than a theoretical -origin, and that the sentimentalists of Ethic (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson -and others) were led to posit a moral tact sense. Before Herbart talked -of a _moral taste (sittlicher Geschmack[28])_ Jacobi, who saw better -than others the analogy between practical and æsthetic facts, had -written: "The science of the good, like the science of the beautiful, -is subject to the condition of _taste,_ without which nothing can be -decided, and beyond which nothing can be carried. The taste for the -good, like that for the beautiful, is formed by means of models of -excellence, and original acts are always the work of genius. By means -of genius, nature gives laws to art, both as regards the good and the -beautiful. Both are _liberal_ arts; they do not allow themselves to be -lowered to the level of mechanical arts and placed at the service of -industry."[29] - -[Sidenote: _V. The doctrines of feeling._] - -V. With the mention of a few facts and names, it can be proved that -the function of the term "feeling" in the history of philosophy has -been as shown above. We have already said that the peculiarity of the -practical form has been asserted by the use of the word "feeling" or -similar denominations ("moral sense," "conscience," and the like), -especially by the Scottish School, in opposition to intellectualist -reductions. Jacobi appealed to the feeling of duty (_Gefühl der -Pflicht_) or conscience in his ethical discussions. In our day, too, it -has been affirmed (by Simmel[30] and others), in opposition to abstract -and imperative Ethics, that the practical decision is the product of -feeling and is not definable by theoreticians. But the principal cause -of the importance attached to feeling in the eighteenth century was -the æsthetic problem. This is seen in Dubos's book, in the English -sentimentalists (who approach the ideas of virtue and of beauty, -treating of the moral sense and of the beautiful), and, finally, in -the doctrines of Leibnitz himself and of his school, as to _confused -cognition,_ which led to the _Aesthetica_ of Baumgarten. - -[Sidenote: _The Wolfians._] - -We owe the word and the concept of _feeling_ (_Gefühl_ and sometimes -also _Empfindung_) principally to the Leibnitzian-Wolfians and to -the German thinkers under the influence of Wolff (Mendelssohn, -Tetens, Sulzer, Riedel). - -[Sidenote: _Jacobi and Schleiermacher._] - -By means of the speculation of Jacobi, on the other hand, feeling -was called upon to fulfil the functions of a true and proper -metaphysical organ. He had demonstrated in a rigorous and irrefutable -manner that the form of the empirical sciences and of the abstract -intellect, since it proceeds by nexus of cause and effect, is incapable -of attaining to the infinite, and had assigned the affirmation of -God to the "sense of the supersensible," to "immediate knowledge," -and to "feeling." After Jacobi, the same position was assumed by -Schleiermacher, who maintained that it was impossible to know God by -means of the intellect and to treat Him as an object, since He is -indifference of thought and being. He can be known only by feeling, -which is indifference of all determinate functions of ideal and real, -of thought and being. The neocriticists and agnostics of to-day, with -their appeal to feeling in all truly philosophical questions, are -followers, often unconscious and certainly less coherent, of Jacobi and -Schleiermacher. - -The concept of feeling in the Kantian philosophy can be said to derive -its importance from the meeting of two unsatisfied wants, namely, -that which sought a concept for the æsthetic activity and that which -sought a _forma mentis_ proper to philosophy. Indeed, the _Critique -of Judgment_ corresponds to feeling, the first part of which consists -of an inquiry into the nature of the beautiful and of art. The second -part (critique of the theological judgment) is an anticipation of the -_concrete concept,_ or of that organ of speculative thought which the -_Critique of Pure Reason_ had not discovered. - -[Sidenote: _Hegel._] - -Feeling, therefore, cannot but lose importance in the Hegelian -philosophy, which makes of art a form of knowledge, and of the -teleological judgment the logic of the idea or philosophical logic, -resolving also in it the demand of Jacobi, whose feeling or immediate -knowledge is shown to be logical knowledge and supreme mediation. In -Hegel feeling is nothing but a class of spiritual facts, the lowest -of all, that in which theory and practice are still indistinct. -But this class has a merely psychological value in his system, not -philosophical and real (which is not clearly recognised by him). -Indeed, feeling, which was absolute knowledge for Jacobi and for -Schleiermacher, is placed, not in the sphere of the absolute spirit, -nor in that of the objective or practical spirit, but in the subjective -spirit, or Psychology. The "doctrine of the three faculties" -(_Dreivermögenslehre_), as was called that elaborated from Mendelssohn -to Kant and promulgated in the Kantian philosophy, did not, however, -remain without opponents in the nineteenth century; from Krug (1823) to -the youthful Fichte, and in more recent times Brentano (1874). - -[Sidenote: _Opponents of the doctrine of the three faculties. Krug._] - -Krugs confutation is wrongly combated by Hamilton and discredited by -Brentano, for it proceeds with perfect correctness, and is founded on -the correct philosophical principle that' there are no other activities -of the spirit conceivable, save those directed either inwardly or -outwardly (immanent or theoretical and transcendent or practical), -and that therefore there is no place for feeling, which would be a -mixture of the two activities, and consequently a failure of direction -or inactivity, nothing, therefore, but a poor, rudimentary knowing or -willing, that is, a psychological class, not a philosophical category. - -[Sidenote: _Brentano._] - -Brentano, returning in a measure to Descartes, constructs the -doctrine of the three faculties in a different way, determining them -as representation (to which he makes art and the æsthetic activity -correspond), judgment (to which corresponds science), and love and -hate (to which corresponds the practical). Feeling, therefore, does -not find a place of its own in the psyche, and that which is wont to -be called feeling is either representation, or love and hate. Brentano -shows himself inferior to Krug in the philosophical demonstration of -the inconceivability of this form of the spirit, but he has the merit -of having substituted certain positive elements for the indeterminate -word "feeling," although the function exercised by feeling in the -development of philosophical thought is more important than Brentano -succeeds in perceiving, for among other things he ignores and fails -to recognize the relation of the concept of feeling to the demands of -speculative thought.[31] - - - -[1] _Eutyphron,_ 10. - -[2] The history of the enfranchising of Ethic from Religion has -been done with especial care by Jodl, _Gesch. d. Ethik als philos. -Wissensch._ vol. I². (Stuttgart--Berlin, 1906). For Vico, cf. my book, -_The Philosophy of G. B. Vico_ (Bari, 1911). - -[3] _Phil. d. Rechts,_ § 4, Zus.; _Gesch. d. Philos._ ii. pp. 66, 169. - -[4] _Eth. Nicom._ 1103. - -[5] See above. - -[6] _Kritik d. prakt. Vern.,_ ed. Kirchmann, pp. 7-8. - -[7] _Allg. prakt. Phil.,_ ed. Hartenstein, p. 107. - -[8] _Memor._ iv., c. 2, §§ 14-16. Schopenhauer also exhaustively, -_Gründl. d. Moral,_ in _Werke,_ ed. Grisebach, iii. pp. 603-607. - -[9] _Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ ed. Kirchmann, p. 248. - -[10] _De Finibus,_ v, c. 23. - -[11] _System der Sittenlehre,_ § 29, in _Werke,_ iv. 346-347. - -[12] _Gründl. d. Moral,_ ed., cit., iii. pp. 506-508. - -[13] _Allg. prakt. Philos.,_ ed. Hartenstein, pp. 29-30. - -[14] _Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ pp. 247-248. - -[15] _Op. cit._ p. 251. - -[16] _Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ p. 255 _sqq._ - -[17] _System d. Sittenlehre,_ pp. 208. - -[18] _Philos. d. Rechts,_ §§ 148, 150. - -[19] _Werke,_ i. 323-423. - -[20] In the _Entwurf e. Systems d. Sittenlehre_ (in _Werke,_ sec. iii. -vol. v.), and cf. the collected writings in _Werke,_ iii. I. - -[21] For example, F. Paulsen, _System der Ethik,_ Leipzig, 1906. - -[22] _Médit._ iv.; and _Réponses aux 3mes et aux 3mes object_. - -[23] Epist. in _Opera,_ ed. Gfrörer, p. 523. - -[24] Cf., among other places, _Logica,_ §§ p. 278 _sq.; Fil. d. -diritto_ (Napoli, 1844), I. p. 50. - -[25] _Monologen,_ in _Werke,_ i. 363. - -[26] Cf. Jodl, _Gesch. d. Eth._ ii. pp. 131-132. - -[27] _Estetica_ 4, p. 222. - -[28] _Allg. pract. Phil._ pp. 9-22. - -[29] _Woldemar_(1779, 1794-95), in _Werke,_ v. p. 78. - -[30] _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft,_ Berlin, 1892-93. - - -[31] For the doctrine of feeling see, chiefly, Volkmann, _Lehrb. d. -Psychol._ (Cothen, 1885), ii. pp. 301-311; F. Brentano, _Psychol._ -(Leipzig, 1874), 1., ii. c. 5; cf. _Ursprung sitt. Erkennt._ (Leipzig, -1889) pp. 51-55; A. Palme, _Sulzer's Psychol, u. d. Anfänge d. -Dreivermögenslehre_ (Berlin, 1905). Cf. also Croce, _Estetica,_ pp. -226-228, 4th ed. - - - - -SECOND SECTION - - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS DIALECTIC - - - - -I - - -NECESSITY AND LIBERTY OF THE VOLITIONAL ACT - - -The relations of the practical form with the other forms of the spirit -having been examined, it is now necessary to re-enter, so to speak, the -interior of the volitional activity, and enclose ourselves within it, -that we may study its mode of development, its rhythm, its dialectic. -We shall no longer ask, therefore, whether the practical activity -precede or follow knowledge, or exactly what knowledge it follows and -what it precedes, what the volition is in relation to events, what the -practical concept or judgment, and the like. But we shall ask what are -good and evil, the passions and the forces that dominate them, desires -and aspirations; and in the first place (this being the problem that -opens the series and gives the key for the solution of the others) what -are the _freedom and necessity_ of the volitional act. - - -[Sidenote: _The problem of freedom._] - -This problem of freedom and necessity (that is to say, whether the will -be free or determined) has seemed to be and is, from a certain point of -view, most weighty and complicated, and we shall soon see why this is -so. But at this point, owing to the premises that we have already laid -down in our preceding treatises, and also in the part of the present -treatise that has already been developed, it will be convenient to -solve it with relative expedition. - -[Sidenote: _Freedom of willing and freedom of action: criticism of such -distinction._] - -First of all, we have been able to eliminate the distinction that is -wont to be made between freedom of willing and freedom of action, -with the duplicity of the problem thus entailed. Indeed we know that -volition and action coincide, and that it is impossible to conceive -either a volition which is not at the same time action, or an action -which is not at the same time volition, and that in consequence there -cannot be freedom of willing on the one hand and freedom of action -on the other. All the instances of the one that are brought forward -can be reduced to the other, provided that the word "freedom" be not -used in an improper and metaphorical manner. For example, a paralytic -(they say) wills to get up and run; his spirit is free, but his -action is restrained; he has freedom of willing, but not of action. -But in reality the paralytic does not seriously will to get up and -run; that is, he does not really will anything at all. Were he really -and seriously to will, that might happen to him which happened to a -paralytic gentleman in the Neapolitan revolt of 1547. This gentleman -had himself carried into the square on the arms of his servants, but he -was found, after the tumult, to the great astonishment of all, on the -top of the campanile of San Lorenzo, whither he had climbed with his -own legs; such had been his terror and such his will to be saved.[1] -As a rule, on the other hand, the paralytic does not will, because he -knows that he cannot; at the most, he _would wish_ or desire to find -himself in different conditions to those in which he finds himself, in -order that he may be able to will otherwise than he does now, which is -to remain quiet. This confirms the identity of volition and action, -and proves that the two supposed freedoms are one only. Thus, he who -is threatened and yields to the threat declares that he is deprived of -freedom of action, but that this is not exact is already affirmed in -the formula: _coacti tamen volunt._ Enforced actions not only do not -exist, but are not even conceivable. The demand for greater freedom of -action, such as new political liberties, is nothing but the demand for -certain _new conditions of fact_ for future volitions and actions. But -it is a question of more or less, since, as we know, no countenance of -imminent tyrant can extinguish the freedom of the soul; no ruler, be he -ever so strong and violent, can prevent a rebellion, or, when all else -fails, a fine death that affirms externally the freedom within. "The -will that wills not cannot be subdued."[2] - -[Sidenote: _The volitional act: both free and necessary._] - -The question that we have here to treat is, then, single, and concerns -only the will, which, as such, includes in itself action. In replying, -however, we cannot accept the dilemma, that the volitional act must -be free or determined, and cling to one of the two horns: we must on -the contrary deny the form of the question itself and say that the -volitional act is _at once free and determined._ - -Volition, in fact, as has been seen, does not arise in the void, but -in a definite situation, in unchangeable historical conditions, in -relation to an event, which, if it be, is necessary. The volition -corresponds to that situation and it is impossible to separate it: when -the situation changes, the volition changes; as the situation, so the -volition. This amounts to saying, that it is _necessitated_ or always -conditioned by a situation, and precisely by that situation in which it -arises. - -But this also means that the volition is free. Because if the actual -situation be its condition, the volition is not the condition, but the -conditioned, for it does not remain fixed in the actual situation, -nor repeats and makes a duplicate of it, which would be superfluous -and therefore impossible in the effective development of the real, -which does not allow of superfluity. The volition produces something -different, that is, something new, something that did not exist -previously and that now comes into existence: it is initiative, -creation, and therefore act of _freedom._ Were this not so, volition -would not be volition, and reality would not change, would not become, -would not grow upon itself. - -And since without necessity there cannot be liberty, because without -an actual situation there cannot be volition, so without liberty there -cannot be necessity, the actual situations are not formed, which are -always new and always necessary in respect to the new volitions. Actual -situations are events, and events are the result of the concourse of -individual volitions. The two terms cannot be separated, for if one -be removed, so is the other; but neither can they be looked upon as -identical or synonymous. They are the two moments of the volitional -act, distinct and united, which act is the _unity_ of both, and -therefore, as was said, is at once free and determined. - -This consciousness of necessity and liberty inseparably united is found -in all men of action, in all political geniuses, who are never inert or -reckless: they feel themselves at once bound and unbound; they always -conform to facts, but always to surpass them. The fatuous, on the other -hand, oscillate between the passivity of the given situation and the -sterile attempt to overleap it, that is, to leap over their own shadow. -They are consequently now inert, now forward. They do not therefore fix -or conclude anything, they do not act; or, if they do, it is always -according to what of the actual situation they have understood, and -what of initiative they have displayed. - -[Sidenote: _Comparison with the æsthetic activity._] - -The best comparison is afforded on this occasion also by the æsthetic -activity. No poet creates his poem outside definite conditions of -space and time, and even when he appears to be and is proclaimed "a -soul of other times," he belongs to his own time. The historical -situation is given to him. The world of his perceptions is such, with -those men, those customs, those thoughts, those works of art. But -when the new poem has appeared, there is in the world of reality (in -the contemplation of reality) something that was not there before, -which, although connected with the previous situation, yet is not -identical with it, is indeed a new form, and therefore a new content, -and so the revelation of a truth previously unknown. So true is this, -that in its turn the new poem conditions a spiritual and practical -movement, becomes part of the situation given for future actions and -for future poems. He is a true poet who feels himself at once bound -to his predecessors and free, conservative and revolutionary, like -Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare, who receive into themselves centuries of -history, of thought and of poetry, and add to those centuries something -that is the present and will be the future: _chargés du passé, gros de -l'avenir._ The false poet, on the other hand, is now a blind follower -of tradition and imitator, now a charlatanesque innovator, and if in -the vacuity in which he labours he sometimes does produce a fragment of -poetry, this happens only when he is made to look into himself and to -have a vision, be it great or small, of a world that arises.--But the -comparison instituted is rather an analogy than a comparison, for that -which happens in the practical sphere happens in that of poetry and in -all the other spheres of the spiritual activity. The Spirit is freedom, -and in order to be so, not in the abstract, but in the concrete, it -must also be necessity. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of determinism and of arbitrarism._] - -This indissoluble connection of necessity and liberty confutes both the -partial theories which dispute the field in the problem of freedom: -the _deterministic_ theory and that of _free will._ The determinists -do not see in the volitional act anything but the actual situation; -the followers of the theory of free will see nothing but the moment of -freedom. These conceive a volition that is as it were a duplication, -triplication, quadruplication of the given fact, and so on to the -infinite; those a volition that bursts forth from nothing, or rains -down from above and then inserts itself, no one knows how, into the -course of the real. Both exaggerate, and since exaggerations are called -in science errors in sense, both err, and being one-sided are proved -false. But since, on the other hand, it is a quality of errors opposed -to one another, to become identified and to pass, the one into the -other, it is given to us to assist at a like spectacle in this case -also, and to see the determinists change into arbitrarists and the -believers in free will into determinists. The first, in fact, passing -from cause to cause, abandon the concept of cause at the end of the -chain, as though (to use the expression of Schopenhauer), they were -dismissing the hired carriage, made use of during the day for their own -affairs, and return to free will. The others, being unable to justify -freedom in the world of reality and of experience, justify it in a -transcendental way, as the effect of a divine cause, which excludes -free will, and excludes it also when it concedes it; for by the very -fact of conceding, it determines, limits, and produces it. - -[Sidenote: _General form of this antithesis: materialism and -mysticism._] - -But with this explanation of our thesis, and of the two theses opposing -it, we are transported into the heart of one of the greatest problems -of Gnoseology, so great in fact as to appear to contain in it the whole -problem of philosophy. In fact, that which is called determinism and -free will in the Philosophy of the practical is the same antithesis -that in Gnoseology is called _materialism and mysticism._ And that -which we here oppose to the two one-sided theses, as theory of that -liberty which is also necessity, is called in Gnoseology, _idealism._ -The thesis and antithesis are therefore to be found in all the -particular problems of philosophy, since they concern the logical form -in universal. This, then, is the reason why the question of freedom of -willing has become so grave and complicated as to appear insoluble. To -obtain a solution, it was necessary to construct a Logic of philosophy, -and intrinsically necessary to renew the whole system of philosophy. -Herbart wisely counselled never to discuss the freedom of the will with -the laity, in order not to be misunderstood.[3] - -Had this advice been followed, we should not have seen both determinism -and free will torn asunder by advocates in the law courts, dragging -in the one or the other to suit their purposes, and thus insulting -good sense, which should alone rule in those places. The freedom of -the will is doubted and discussed among philosophers, as the reality -of the external world is doubted and discussed, but this is not done -because it is wished to set in doubt the existence of the boots of -this gentleman or of that gentleman's overcoat. If a confirmation be -sought that the question of the freedom of willing is, as was said, the -universal gnoseological or metaphysical question, let it be observed -how the determinists and the advocates of free will affirm or deny the -freedom of willing, not only in that field, but in all fields. Indeed, -whoever, for instance, should admit spiritual activity to knowledge and -deny it to the will, would not, properly speaking, be a determinist, -but an intellectualist or an æsthetician. That is to say, he would be -a theoretician, who, in denying the freedom of the will, would simply -mean to deny the existence of a practical activity side by side with -the theoretic; for freedom is the very essence of every spiritual form, -and with the denial of the freedom of that form is denied the form -itself. Determinism, arbitrarism, libertarianism reflect, then, the -universal gnoseological thesis of naturalism and mechanicism in the -special practical field. - -[Sidenote: _The materialistic sophisms of determinism._] - -Determinism of the will, like materialism and mechanicism in general, -consists in nothing but the transference to philosophical speculation -of the form proper to the physical disciplines. By dint of classifying -practical facts and presenting them as empirical concepts, and thus -as merely related by cause and effect, they end by forgetting that -those formulæ are not thoughts and that their content is not real -reality; and causes or motives (abstractive transformation of the -actual situation) are given as agents of the will, and thus the agent -is destroyed for the cause, the form for the abstract material. Hence -these timid phrases that on close inspection turn out to be tautologies -or mistakes: "Freedom is an illusion; what prevails is always the -strongest motive." But if we ask what is the strongest motive, we are -told (and no other reply is possible) it is _that which prevails._ -This, translated into our language, amounts to saying that the actual -situation is the actual situation, and conditions the will, which is -what it is and can be no other than it is.--Virtue is a mere product, -like vitriol. Certainly, vitriol is also in its way a creation, a -manifestation of the spirit, as is virtue, and if it be permitted to -falsify vitriol by changing it into something material and mechanical, -nothing forbids doing the same for virtue. Virtue, too, can be produced -just like vitriol, that is to say, by setting in motion the spontaneous -forces of the spirit and of so-called nature, which itself is also -spirit, and nothing forbids endowing educators with the title of -chemists and apothecaries of virtue. - -But metaphors are not arguments--Statistics prove the determinism of -human actions, which always reappear in the same way and in the same -quantity whenever certain actual circumstances appear.--But Statistics, -if they collect and simplify facts and construct views and tables -that are more or less useful, do not thus prove anything; for neither -are the instances that they give as equivalent, really so, nor the -relation that they declare between certain facts a real relation. -If we turn from artificial formulæ to the immediate observation of -the real, we find ourselves confronted with nothing but individuated -volitional acts, resulting from necessity and liberty.--The individual -has a constant character, of which action is the consequence: _operari -sequitur esse._--But the constant character is nothing but the -abstraction of the single acts done by the individual. It is therefore -natural that the actions should appear to be referable to the character -which is derived from them; but it is not correct to say that there -is equivalence, for abstraction is not equivalent to concretion.--The -individual, even if he can be conceived as free in respect to his -external environment, would be always subject to the law of his own -nature.--But the law of his own nature is not a contingent thing, but -the law itself of the Spirit, or, precisely, freedom, and it is quite -clear that freedom is not free not to be free.--The social organism -has its natural laws, which govern the action of the individual.--The -social organism is also an abstraction, which is turned into a being -only by the false interpretation of a metaphor. In all these examples, -and in the many others that could be brought forward, the error is -always the same as has been said: the substitution of the naturalistic -for the speculative construction, Physic for Metaphysic. And since -physical or naturalistic construction has no material other than given -historical facts, the doctrines above mentioned, when they are not -false, are always tautological and lead to the affirmation that the -volitional fact is a fact, or that in it is the moment of necessity. - -[Sidenote: _The mysticism of arbitrarism._] - -Arbitrarism, on the other hand, arises in the same way as mysticism, -from distrust of thought; being unable to dominate the fact that should -be explained, recourse is had to the inconceivable, to the absurd, to -miracle; subjective and individual ignorance is hypostasized and of -it is made a metaphysical reality. Arbitrarism, like mysticism, has -its element of truth, in the negation of determinism, that is, in the -recognition of the impotence of the naturalistic method and in the -affirmation that the truth lies beyond that method, in the concept of -creation and of freedom. But freedom separated from its logical and -necessary moment becomes transformed into will, just as in mysticism -in general God is transformed into the mystery, ready to receive all -individual caprices into himself, and to confer upon them an appearance -of truth. - -[Sidenote: _The doctrine of necessity-liberty, and idealism._] - -The concept of freedom (necessity-liberty), which is at once scientific -and not mechanical, and if it surpass the categories of Physic, does -not surpass those of Metaphysic, is opposed to both these views. As -idealist philosophy, it tends in general to conciliate the ideal with -the actual, thought with complete reality, philosophy with the whole of -experience. With the concept of freedom is eliminated the inertia of -determinism, and the unstable springing about of arbitrarism. The gross -material conception of the real disappears, because that which seems to -be matter is revealed as spirit, the fact as creation, necessity as the -product of liberty. But miracle disappears with them. For if the spirit -be the eternal, omnipresent, continuous miracle, unattainable by the -physical method,-a continual miracle, omnipresent and eternal, is no -longer a miracle, but the same simple and ordinary reality, which each -one of us contributes to create and each one of us can and does think. - -[Sidenote: _The doctrine of double causality; dualism and agnosticism._] - -Strict determinism and strict arbitrarism are not, however, the -sole adversaries of the concept of liberty-necessity, as rigorous -materialism and mysticism are not the only adversaries of idealism. -There exists another which must be called more dangerous (if -misunderstanding be more dangerous than error). This doctrine, since -it goes by the name of dualism, spiritualism, and neocriticism in -general philosophy, could be called the doctrine _of double practical -causality,_ in the field of the practical problem. The supporters -of this line of thought, despite many individual differences, are -all agreed in positing two distinct series of facts: one which obeys -mechanical causality, another which is initiative and creation, or (as -they say) obeys causality through freedom. There are thus two series -that interpenetrate one another or alternate at every instant and -are mutually blended, the one in the other. Hence there is something -of each in the volitional act, something of the strongest motive and -something of free choice. Such a solution has some external resemblance -with that which we maintain, but is intrinsically most different. -Our solution is _fusion_ of liberty and necessity, while this is -_juxtaposition;_ our solution is _conciliation,_ this _transaction._ -Like every juxtaposition and transaction it displeases both the -contending parties, and falls into the power, now of the one, now of -the other. Thus, if, according to the theories of that tendency, it -be maintained that freedom exists, but that there are also causes -tending to diminish it, or that there exist volitional acts, but that -involuntary acts also exist, one does not understand how a series of -facts that has its own law in itself (freedom, the will) can ever be -subordinated to facts that obey a different law (diminution of freedom, -involuntariness of acts). If this happen sometimes or many times, we -must suspect that it happens always, and that the surviving freedom is -a mask of freedom, illusion. Thus, if it be affirmed that side by side -with causality, with equivalence of causes and effects, or with the -possibility of foreseeing the effect by means of the cause, there is -another causality, in which the effect is not equivalent to the cause, -and that not only is it not to be foreseen, but is such that only after -it has happened does it allow its cause to be discovered; then the -doubt arises that one of the two causalities does not exist, because -either the effect is equivalent to the cause, and so it must always be, -or it is not equivalent to it, and so it will never be; or it can be -foreseen by means of the cause, and so it will always be, or it cannot -be foreseen, and never will be foreseen. The strict determinists and -arbitrarists have the loyalty of error, and they are rare, because -energetic spirits are rare, but the doctrine of double causality is -tinged with some of the rouge of truth, and thus seduces the many, -and is proper to weak and irresolute spirits, as indeed are dualism, -spiritualism, agnosticism, neocriticism, of which this doctrine forms a -particular case. When the absurdity of determinism and of arbitrarism -has been recognized (and their very presence is an autocriticism), it -is necessary to satisfy with a new and single concept the claim that -they represent, certainly not with _the sum of two errors,_ and the new -single concept is that of true freedom. - -[Sidenote: _Its character of transaction and transition._] - -The doctrine of double causality has had its historical importance, not -because it is a _transaction,_ but rather because it is a _transition;_ -that is, a gradual approximation to the true concept, with the -introduction into the naturalistic concept of an element of ferment and -dissolution: the concept of a causality by means of freedom, that is, -of a causality that is so only in name. The concept of freedom cannot -tolerate that of causality at its side, and of the two series posited, -one of the two is not real in itself, but simply a particular product -of the other: mechanical causality is not a fact, nor a conception, but -an instrument created for its own ends by spiritual freedom itself. -And only in this sense can it be admitted that freedom avails itself -of causality for its effectuation, and the truth of the observation be -realized, that the classifying of the perceptions in series of cause -and effect becomes itself also a presupposition of will and action. -The historical knowledge as to the actual situation that precedes the -volition, since it includes of necessity philosophical universal in -itself, so it can also include empirical universals, concepts, and -pseudo--concepts: the consciousness of the productivity of the spirit -and the mnemonic formulæ in which this productivity is fixed, and -for which it certainly appears to be mechanical, but only to him who -forgets that the formulæ themselves are mechanical. - - - -[1] Summonte, _Historia di Napoli,_ ed. 1675, iv. 205, "Miracle caused -by fear." - -[2] Dante, _Parad._ iv. 76. - -[3] _Einleit. in die Phil._ § 128, trad. Vidossich, p. 169. - - - - -II - - -FREEDOM AND ITS OPPOSITE. GOOD AND EVIL - - -[Sidenote: _Freedom of action as reality of action._] - - -Since, then, the volitional act is freedom, the question as to whether -in a given case an individual has or has not been free, is equivalent -to this other question: _Has there really been volition_ (action) in -that case? This question can have and has (as any one who lends an -ear to such discussions as are frequently heard can verify) but two -meanings. The first is, whether the case under discussion be _action_ -or _event,_ and, therefore, if it be or be not accurate to present it -as an individual act. For example:--Was Jacobinism the crime or the -glory of Voltaire and Rousseau? Was the defeat of Waterloo the fault of -Marshal Grouchy? The second is, if it be really a question of _action,_ -what, _precisely,_ has that action been? For example:--What were the -respective parts of Voltaire and of Rousseau in the propaganda of the -revolutionary spirit and of the Jacobin mode of thought? What did -Marshal Grouchy really know and will when, instead of listening to -Exelmans and to others of his generals and marching whither the cannon -was thundering, he obeyed to the letter the order he had received and -attacked the Prussian army corps of Thielman? - -[Sidenote: _Inconceivability of the absolute absence of action._] - -There is a third meaning that is to be excluded: namely, as to whether -at a given moment of time there has been any sort of action or, on -the contrary, a void and total absence of action. For the only case -in which the individual does not act is that in which he is dead or -partially dead, be the death physiological or spiritual, that of a -corpse or of a madman. The glory of putting poor madmen on a level -with the guilty and the delinquent is to be left to the thinkers of -the "new school of penal law." In every other case, man always acts, -always wills, and is always responsible and free, because life, so long -as it lasts, is nothing but a web of volitions and therefore of free -acts. He is also responsible for the acts that contribute to put man -in such conditions as amount to madness more or less transitory, and -so of irresponsibility: such is the case of drunkenness and of moral -dangers imprudently sought, and so on. At no point of life does the -_practically indifferent_ exist. - -Those actions, too, that appear to be neither willed nor free, -because they have become habitual, mechanicized, instinctive, are -willed and free, not indeed because (though this be true enough in -itself) habitual acts were once acts of will, but because (as we have -already had occasion to remark), although they have become facts -almost external to the individual willing, yet it is always the will -that permits them to act and can always arrest their action: they -are therefore to be looked upon as conditions of fact that every new -volition modifies, even when it accepts them. A machine is not the -work of the arm that moves it, but of hundreds and thousands of other -arms that were previously moved in order to construct it. But once -constructed, that which sets in motion the machinery is always the -work of one arm, an act of will, just as an act of will can stop its -movement and finally cause its disaggregation and destruction. - -[Sidenote: _Non-freedom as antithesis and contrariety._] - -But excluding the absolute absence of freedom of action (and of -existence in so far as it is action), and on the other hand the -presence of something different from it called causality having been -previously excluded from the idea of freedom, it remains nevertheless -indubitable that in the very bosom of freedom, there is _non-freedom. -_ Every volition is at the same time nolition, as every affirmation -is negation. Volition is love, nolition hate; and, as we know, every -love is hate, and the more we love, the more we hate. Antigone was -born to love intensely, and for that very reason, to hate profoundly. -What can be that which we hate in love and abhor in volition? What can -this internal enemy be, which does not consist either in the absence -of volition or in the presence of an extraneous and indifferent -element?--Since it is neither absent nor indifferent, it cannot be -anything but the _opposite or contrary_ of freedom, anti-freedom, which -constitutes the contradiction in its effective concretion. - -[Sidenote: _Nullity and arbitrariness of non-freedom._] - -Freedom is an indissoluble nexus of necessity and freedom: the force -that tends to annul it is anti-freedom, the scission of that nexus, the -analysis of that synthesis. On the one hand it aims at making liberty -fall into nothingness, by compelling it to the inertia of the fact, -and on the other, to make a leap into the void, by impelling it to -will, a sterile endeavour--two movements that are one-sided and absurd, -and become identified through the considerations already established -in relation to determinism and arbitrarism. Therefore the opposite -of freedom is qualified indifferently, either as the _passive,_ -taken by itself, opposed to the active, the fact that resists the new -creation, or as the _active,_ taken by itself and abstract, opposed -to the passive: will opposed to liberty. Anti-freedom is either the -material fact or arbitrary choice, but the first is resolved into will, -the second into material fact. Only by an act of will can the fact -that should continue to develop be fixed as a fact and so appear as a -material fact, and only by a persistence in that fact, which should -be surpassed, can will give itself the appearance of a content. The -undertaking is contradictory, and the solution, the absence of freedom, -is a contradiction. - -[Sidenote: _Good as freedom and reality, and evil as its opposite._] - -Freedom and its opposite, freedom and its internal contradiction, -freedom and will, are what is designated by the terms _good and evil._ -With us these terms are given an altogether generic meaning, as they -are taken as the representatives of all the other couples of opposites -that are wont to be enunciated in the field of practical activity, -as helpful and harmful, useful and useless, honest and dishonest, -meritorious and blameworthy, pious and impious, lawful and sinful, and -so on. All these formulæ either answer to the sub-distinctions of the -practical activity (which we shall study further on), or are the same -distinction, variously formulated, with reference to psychological -classes. But all are to be reduced to those of good and evil for -the purposes of the philosophical study of the practical activity -in general, without ulterior determinations of them as moral or -utilitarian good, moral or utilitarian evil, or any other form there -may be, and without regard to the various empirical material, with -which they may be filled. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of abstract monism and of the dualism of values._] - -That practical good and evil are to be conceived as will and anti-will, -and the good, therefore, as the reality and the bad as the irreality -of the will, the good as something positive and the bad as something -negative,--is the solution imposed by the impossibility of thinking -the two others that differ from it: namely, that which considers the -distinction between good and bad as inexistent (abstract monism of -values), and that which considers the good as transcendent in respect -of reality, which is always evil, unless the good deign to descend -and modify it (abstract dualism of values). For the criticism of -the abstract monistic view, it is necessary to distinguish between -those doctrines that deny, not only the distinction between good -and evil, but also all the analogous distinctions in every field of -activity, including that of thought, and the doctrines that allow -the distinction to subsist in other fields, but deny it in that of -the practical. The first, which deny the distinction between true -and false, are the suicide of Philosophy, the second, which deny it -only between good and evil, are the suicide of the Philosophy of the -practical: that is to say, both are founded upon errors that we have -already criticized and surpassed, and upon which it would therefore -be otiose to insist. As to the dualistic view (still common among -right-thinking professors of philosophy, that is, among the lazy and -the most lazy) it will be requisite to discuss this point seriously, -when it has been demonstrated in what way Reality can place itself -beneath the yoke of Value and of Goodness, which would be inferior -to it by hypothesis, through the very fact that they were _unreal._ -Reality living, these others dead; Reality like "the four bedevilled" -of Giusti bent upon _doing so,_ they, like the "two hundred simpletons" -of the same poet, bent upon _saying_ no. For if Value and Goodness be -real, they will be the true Reality; and that which was first called -by the name will be feigned reality, altogether identical with what we -have indicated as the moment of contradiction and of will, arising in -the very bosom of the practical activity. - -[Sidenote: _Objections to the reality of evil._] - -An instance that is always formidable has certainly been cited against -the thesis of evil as something negative and unreal, and of good as -itself the only positive and real: it has actually been affirmed that -this thesis offends against good sense. What? Is evil unreal? Is it -nothing? Unreality and nothingness are then the knavish trick of some -wicked person who starts a calumny, which, being received and believed, -injures an honest man? Unreality and nothing, the passion that drags -the gambler into economic ruin and moral abjection? So the world is all -good, all rose-coloured, all sweet; and crimes, cowardice, foolishness, -and baseness are illusions, and there is no reason to lament; so the -feeling of life should be expressed with a perpetual smile, like that -upon the lips of the wounded warriors in the marbles of Aegina? -But -let good sense and its advocates remain tranquil. If evil be a nothing, -that does not mean that it is nothing; if the vanity that seems to be -a person, be vanity and not a person, that does not mean that it has -not really the appearance of a person and should not be really combated -and dissipated. The wise, who having defined evil, deny toothache, -or like the stoical Posidonio forget the gout that transfixes them, -need Giambattista Vico to remind them how no philosophy is able to -save them from anxiety on behalf of "their wives in childbirth" and -of "their sons who languish in disease"! The world is precisely that -mixture of good and evil, which good sense says it is, and the sweet -is always tempered with the _amari aliquid._ It cannot be adequately -expressed either with lamentations only, or only with laughter. The -thesis that we have enunciated wishes to abolish, not the consciousness -of evil, but the false belief that this is something substantial, and -thus prevent one evil from being increased by another, evil by error, -_moral_ trouble by _mental_ confusion. - -[Sidenote: _Evil within and without synthesis._] - -Evil is either felt as evil, and in this case it means that it is not -realized, but that in its place is realized the good. The gambler of -the example, at the moment he knows he is doing himself economic harm, -does not play; his hand is held; and it is held, because to _know,_ -in the practical sense, equals to _will_; and to know the harm of -gambling means to know it as harm, and so to dislike gambling. If he -take to dice or cards again, this arises because that knowledge is -obliterated in him, that is, because he changes his mind; and in this -case play is not looked upon any longer as harmful; it is willed, -and so at that instant again becomes the good for him, because it -satisfies one of his wants. The calumniator, if he understand the -idea that is passing through his mind, or rather the impulse that has -seized him, as calumny, is for that very reason repugnant to it and -does not pronounce those evil words: in that case indeed he is not -a calumniator, but an honest man who resists a temptation (and no -other definition of an honest man can be given). But if he pronounce -them, this means that the opposing repugnance was not present or is -no longer present: and therefore those words are no longer for him a -wicked act of calumny, but a simple satisfaction of a desire to amuse -himself, or to reject the evil that has been done to him, and therefore -a good. In the same way, he who asserts what is false, he who renders -himself guilty of error, if he be aware of himself as frivolous or a -charlatan or disloyal, would be silent: if he talk and write and print -false insinuations, this happens either because the will for truth -does not exist in him, or is for the time being suppressed, and with -it the desire to seek it out and to diffuse it; that is to say, for -that will has been substituted the other of withdrawing from a painful -labour, or of obtaining easy praise and gain; so, for one good has been -substituted another. As a rule, it is admitted that we will the good -and do evil. "I do not do the good that I will, and I do the evil -that I do not will" (οὐ γὰρ ὂ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ὂ οὐ θέλω κακὸν -τοῦτο πράσσω), said St. Paul.[1] But it is a question of psychological -confusion, owing to which a series of moments and alternatives is -simplified into one single act, inexistent because contradictory. - -[Sidenote: _Affirmative judgments of evil as negative judgments._] - -Thus evil, when real, does not exist save in the good, which opposes -and conquers it, and therefore does not exist as a positive fact. When -on the contrary it exists as a positive fact, it is not evil, but -good (and in its turn has for shadow an evil, with which it strives -and conquers). The judgments that we give when we judge an action to -be foolish or wicked, a statement false, a work of art ugly, are all -metaphorical. In delivering them we do not mean to say that there is an -_existence_ called error, ugliness, foolishness, but only that there is -a given existence and that another is wanting. He who has launched a -calumny, dissipated his property, soiled a canvas, printed a worthless -book, does not, strictly speaking, deserve negative denominations, -because to judge means to place oneself in the conditions of the person -judged, and in those conditions there was neither evil nor ugliness -nor error nor folly; otherwise the acts that are the objects of the -judgment would not have been accomplished, and in so far as they are -accomplished they deserve positive judgment. But what is meant by the -negative form of those judgments is that such an act is this and not -another, that it is utilitarian and not moral, a commercial and not a -literary or scientific fact, and so on. - -[Sidenote: _Confirmations of the doctrine._] - -There is a very ancient saying to the effect that every one seeks -his own good and that no one deliberately wills his own evil, and, -therefore, that if the practically good man be the wise, then the -bad man can but be the ignorant. Now if we remove from the thesis -its intellectualist veneer, and translate wisdom and ignorance into -practical terms, we see that wickedness is here looked upon as a limit, -as a tendency toward the good, that has failed, not as the will for an -evil. The dispute as to who sins the more, he who is conscious of the -evil, or he who has no consciousness of it, is also illumined by the -theory that we have here exposed, which declares that both parties to -the dispute are right and wrong. For instance, he who is completely -without moral consciousness, is morally innocent, whereas he who is -more or less possessed of one, is also more or less of a sinner, for -the law itself makes him so (τὴν ἀμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔγνων εἰ μὴ διὰ νόμου, -also said St. Paul[2]). But with this saying it is not desired to put -the innocent above the sinner, but the contrary. That declaration of -ignorance is the gravest condemnation, for it is thus recognized that -the individual in question is unable to sin, and therefore unable to do -right, since the possibility of sinning is all one with that of doing -right. The poet inspires admiration, but he who does not know how to -be anything but a poet, and is therefore unable to reason and to act, -is deficient. The shrewd man is praised, but he who is _only_ shrewd -cannot be praised. The animal is a being, worthy of all esteem, but to -call a man an animal, that is, to tell him that he is nothing but an -animal, is to do him a great injury. In other words, while we recognize -as good all that a man effectively does, we do not intend to cancel -the distinction between one form and another of human activity, and -between one act and another, between the utilitarian and the moral man, -between fanciful and logical production, between animal and man. Nor -do we mean that those emphatic expressions of negative character that -we continually utter to one another and to ourselves, and by means of -which we urge ourselves and others to more lofty modes of existence, -are to be abandoned. - -[Sidenote: _The poles of feeling (pleasure and pain) and their identity -with their practical opposites._] - -Here occurs an opportunity of tying a thread that we had left loose -when discussing the theory of feeling, or rather the distinction of -feeling into the two poles of _pleasure and pain,_ understood, not as -a psychological distinction of greater or less, or of _mixed states,_ -but as a philosophical distinction of _pure states,_ or of terms that -are truly opposed. When the vague and indeterminate term of "feeling" -is directed toward theoretical facts and is determined by theoretical -philosophy as æsthetic activity or speculative thought, or in some -other way, the terms of pleasure and pain are, strictly speaking, not -applicable to it. The pure theoretic activity considered in itself, -cannot be polarized, as has been seen; it will always attain to the -beautiful, always to the true. Only in so far as the theoretic activity -is also practical activity, by the law of the unity of the spirit, -will the polarization of good and evil, which in that case are called -beautiful and ugly, true and false, take place through it if not in it. -If the term "feeling" be on the contrary directed to practical facts, -and its synonymity with the practical activity (of which feeling would -be a distinguishing characteristic) made clear by the Philosophy of -the practical, it is clear that to it belongs immediately and no longer -mediately that polarity of good and evil. Good and evil then become -what theoreticians of feeling _call pleasure and pain._ These terms are -identical with the preceding, as feeling is a fact identical with the -practical activity, generically considered. - -[Sidenote: _Doctrines concerning pleasure and happiness: critique._] - -This theory of pain and pleasure, as the synonyms of the practical -positive and negative, helps to put an end to a long series of -questions arising in connection with such concepts. Above all, the -dispute as to whether pleasure be positive or negative will appear -to be unfounded, and, therefore, whether pain have a positive or a -negative value, or, finally, whether both be negative: unfounded, -since "pleasure" means "positive" and "pain" "negative." At the most, -it may be admitted that pain has also a positivity, which is however -nothing but the positivity of the negative, that is the real existence -of the negative pole.--The theory that man always proposes to himself -pleasure as an end is, on the contrary, not only not unfounded, but of -such evident truth as not to require enunciation, much less efforts -to prove it. If pleasure be nothing but activity, it is natural that -man should have no other end save pleasure, that is, activity, life -itself. The correction that has been suggested by others, to the -effect that man wills, not indeed pleasure, but activity, of which -the outcome is pleasure, has but slight exactitude, for the two terms -are not distinguishable, and the result is not separable from the -activity; the pleasure of travelling is not separable from travelling. -That polemic has value at the most against empiricism, which limits -pleasure to an arbitrarily determined group of pleasurable facts, that -is to say, circumscribes activity to certain particular manifestations -of activity, collected in groups or classes, and substituted for -the universal concept. Finally, by means of the identification -of pleasure and pain with good and evil in general which we have -given, all disputes as to the concept of _happiness_ disappear, as -to whether it be or be not distinct from that of the good action, -practically coherent, and if man propose to himself _happiness_ as an -end. "Happiness" is equal to "pleasure," and "pleasure" is equal to -"activity." To will the good (that is, to will well and energetically), -and to be happy, are the same. The objection raised by some, that man -does not will happiness, but a certain happiness, that he does not -will pleasure, but a certain pleasure, not the good, but a certain -good, is valid; but this only amounts to distinguishing volitional -man in the act, from the theory of the will, constructed by the -philosopher. If Tizio wishes at this moment to go to bed and Caio -to take a moonlight walk, bed and walk are the affairs of Tizio and -of Caio; for the philosopher there is no Tizio, no Caio, but man in -universal; there is neither bed nor moon, but pleasure and the good. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical concepts relating to good and evil._] - -The practical activity, the will, which is also strife between good -and evil, can be illuminated now from this side and now from that by -that indivisible unity, according to the accidents of discourse and the -varying situations of life. In this way arises a series of concepts -which, in so far as they are unilateral, are empirical, and only -become again philosophical in the thought of the unity of which they -form part. Thus, to make use of a comparison, space in geometry can be -analyzed and split up into a first, second, and third dimension; but -as spatiality, it is a _unicum,_ which does not possess either one or -two or three dimensions; and when in measuring or constructing plans -of measurement, we proceed to think one of these dimensions, we become -aware that we cannot think them, save all three together, or not as -three, but as one. The empirical, practical concepts that arise upon -the antithetical and dialectical nature of the will, have had much -importance, and it is fitting, therefore, that we should mention and -explain at least the principal among them. - -[Sidenote: _Duty of being, ideal, inhibitive, and imperative power._] - -If the situations of life lead to the directing of the attention -chiefly to the aspect of the will striving against inaction and -arbitrary choice, it is posited in this strife, in this becoming, as -something that _is not_ but _must be,_ not as _real,_ but as _ideal._ -If the greatness of the ideal that is to be and to fill the soul with -joy, be set in relief in this struggle, then the ideal appears sweet -and smiling, as a _joy-bringing and beatific vision._ If, on the -other hand, the effort of its becoming be set in relief, the ideal -can be made into a metaphor, as will opposed to will, as legitimate -against rebellious will; and then it assumes a sour, rough, and hard -appearance, and the names of _inhibitive or imperative power,_ in so -far as it impedes the will, or promotes liberty. - -There is no less opportunity and interest in making clear that -relation, from the point of view of the negative term, or of evil. -A series of descriptive concepts then appears, which present the -consciousness of evil, now as obstinate _blindness (cor induratum),_ -now as _disquiet_ and _scruple,_ which induce vigilance and -circumspection, now as _humility,_ which does not permit forgetting -how easy it is to slip into evil. But it is worthy of note that the -series of words and empirical concepts that serve to illuminate -the _satisfaction_ of the good, the _victory_ won over oneself, -_tranquillity_ of conscience, is far less rich. Perhaps this arises -precisely because there is less practical interest in celebrating -the pleasure of victory than in the inculcation of the necessity for -strife and the abhorrence of evil. Why draw attention to joy and to -repose when man is already too much inclined to allow himself joy and -repose; does not Life allow them to itself and cause other problems -to follow on each solution, new perils to follow perils overpast, and -the necessity for new struggles? It is therefore of importance to -direct the greater sum of attention to those aspects from which the eye -is most frequently turned aside. Finally, these various aspects can -be placed in relation with the greater or less frequency with which -each appears in individuals, thus arriving at the construction of the -concepts of _virtue and vice,_ and of the models of _the virtuous -man, the honest man, the deliberate man, the clever man,_ and their -opposites, _the vicious, the dishonest, the unreflective, the incapable -man,_ and so on. - -[Sidenote: _Their incapacity for setting as practical principles._] - -The same thing happens with these empirical practical concepts as -with all the other empirical concepts, of which we have spoken in -general. They have been stiffened into philosophical concepts, for -the hasty satisfaction of the philosophical need of man. Hence, among -others, many of the disputes as to the principle of the Philosophy of -the practical. Some indeed maintain that such a principle is to be -found in _duty or the imperative; others in the idea or the ideal, -others in the joy of good, others in the abhorrence of pain, others in -virtue, others in enthusiasm,_ and so on. Each of the above-mentioned -theoreticians has the sharpest eyes for the discovery of the defects in -the theories of others, but is short-sighted as regards his own. Those -who maintain the ideal satirize the form of the categoric imperative -as suggestive of police or _gendarmerie;_ those of the imperative and -of duty deride the quietist form and the insipid ecstasy proper to the -contemplation of ideals; those of the avoidance of pain do not spare -their sarcasms for the hunters of joy; those of joy call these plunged -in sorrow hypocrites, who also obtain enjoyments for themselves, if in -no other way, then secretly: _si non caste, caute._ The truth is that -all are wrong as philosophers, because they all find the principle of -the will, not in itself but in an empirical concept, which gives to it -an abstract and mutilated appearance. And, on the other hand, all are -right, because those aspects are all real, and in each one of them the -others can be implicitly shown. The categoric imperative, for instance, -contains in itself both the will, which, in so far as it commands -itself, is the true will, the joy of being and the sorrow of not being -what we wish to be, the ideal, and the necessity of self-realization, -and so of entering into strife against irreality, thus becoming -imperative, and so on. - -[Sidenote: _Its characteristics._] - -If none of the formulæ given above, owing to their empirical character, -be able to indicate with precision the principle of the Philosophy -of the practical, and all are more or less convenient _synecdoches,_ -for this reason none of those concepts are to be treated as rigorous -concepts. If they be so treated, there is not one of them, however -justified it may seem to be, that is not able to cause rebellions and -has not done so. The type of the dutiful man has been reproached with -being so much preoccupied with duty that he does not really perform -it, because he forgets the impulse of the heart; of the type of the -virtuous man it is said that he, as it were, ceases from being so by -the very fact that virtue becomes in him a profession; of the type of -the honest man, that there is nothing more base than the race of honest -men; of the type of the _pious Aeneas,_ that his piety is egoism; and -in general of all these cases it has been recalled that a little vice -is necessary for virtue, as alloy for metals. Repentance and remorse, -too, although they be highly recommended as means of purification, -have had their detractors; does it not suffice (they say) that an evil -deed has been committed? Must the offence be aggravated by losing -time over it, as though anything could be remedied with sorrowing and -lamentation? But others have replied that, given human iniquity, it is -better to exceed in the matter of remorse than to pass rapidly over -it. Humility has been opposed with the _sume superbiam_ as being more -virile, and with the _laudum immensa cupido_ as being more noble; the -habit of self-tormenting with the _servite domino in laetitia,_ as, on -the other hand, the over-confident has been admonished with that other -not less biblical dictum: _beatus homo qui semper est pavidus._ These -are objections and replies that may all of them have value for the -empirical situations to which they refer; but they have neither truth -nor value in philosophy, for which they are all of them false, because -the distinctions from which they derive are not philosophical. Remorse, -for instance, has a value, not in itself, but as a passage to activity, -without which such passage would not take place; the virtuous habit has -a value, not in itself, but in so far as it is practised and constantly -preserved; duty cannot differ from the aspiration of the soul, and -both cannot differ from the volitional act; confidence is at the same -time trepidation, and humility must be one with the pride of merit. To -sum up, for, the philosopher, the dialectic of the will is all in the -concept of will, with its polarization of good and evil, which is the -actuality and concreteness of that concept. - - - -[1] Rom. vii 19. - -[2] Rom. vii. - - - - -III - - -THE VOLITIONAL ACT AND THE PASSIONS - - -[Sidenote: _The multiplicity of volitions and the struggle for unity._] - -If the volitions followed one another, so to speak monadistically, -each one shut up in itself, simple, impenetrable, indecomposible, it -would be impossible to understand the moment that there is in them -of arbitrary choice, of evil, of contradiction. But it is not so. -The individual is solicited simultaneously by many or, more exactly, -by infinite volitions, because the individual is at every moment a -microcosm and in him is reflected the whole cosmos, and he reacts -against the whole cosmos by willing in all directions. This infinity of -volitions that is in every individual, can be proved by a very obvious -fact: by what occurs in the contemplation of works of art, in which -the same individual is able to reconstruct in himself the most various -actions and psychological situations, and to feel himself in turn -mild and sanguinary, austere and voluptuous, Achilles and Thersites. -This would not happen, had he not to some extent in himself the -experience of all these various volitional attitudes. But even if we -wish to restrict ourselves to those volitions that are the most closely -connected with the historical situation, thus limited as well as may -be (every historical situation is in reality a cosmic situation), -restricting ourselves to what are called volitions of the moment, we -have always, if not a chaos, certainly a multiplicity, or at the least -a duality, of volitions. Were the individual to abandon himself to that -chaos, to that multiplicity, to that duality, he would instantly be -lacerated, broken in pieces, destroyed. But he does not abandon himself -to it, for he is an individual, volitional and operating just because -he renounces that feigned richness of the infinite and that pernicious -richness of multiplicity or duality, limiting himself on each occasion -to one single volition, which is the volition corresponding to the -given situation. - -[Sidenote: _Multiplicity and unity as bad and good._] - -This volition is consequently the result of a struggle in which the -individual drives back all the other infinite volitions, to attach -himself to that one alone which the given situation must and does -arouse in him. And when the given volition does not affirm itself fully -in this struggle, he falls a victim to multiplicity, in which is found -that arbitrary choice attached to a volition which is not the one -that should be willed, which he feels he wills and that he does will -in a way. Hence the will becomes split up in different directions and -contradictory, action not positive but negative, not truly action, but -rather passivity. - -The multiplicity of volitions explains then the moment of arbitrary -choice, of evil, in the practical activity. This could be defined as -the _volition that conquers the volitions,_ as its contrary arbitrary -choice is _the contest of volitions with volition._ - -[Sidenote: _Excluded volitions and the passions or desires._] - -The volitions that are driven back on every occasion and excluded, to -make way for the volitional act, are variously denominated in ordinary -speech and by psychologists as _appetites, tendencies, impulses, -affections, wishes, velleities, desires, aspirations, passions._ But, -as is usual with us, we do not intend to compose and defend such -classes in a naturalistic and psychological sense, nor consequently -to distinguish appetite from desire, or affection from passion, with -boundaries that must of necessity be arbitrary and undulating. What is -of real importance is only the distinction and the precise boundary, -not arbitrary but real, between the volition and volitions, or, as we -can now say, the relation between true and proper _volition_ and _the -passions or desires._ - -[Sidenote: _Passions and desires as possible volitions._] - -Passions or desires are and are not volitions: they are not volitions -in respect to the volitional synthesis, which, by excluding, annuls -them as such; they are on the other hand volitions, if considered in -themselves, for they are capable of constituting the centre of new -syntheses in changed conditions. It has been said that we cannot _will -the impossible,_ but that we can perfectly well _desire it._ That is -not exact, because the impossible, the contradictory, cannot even be -the object of desire. No one wishes to find himself at the same moment -in two different places, or to construct a triangle that should be at -the same time a square: and even if such absurd wishes be manifested -in words, the words will be absurd, but the desires will either be -different from what is stated, or they will not exist even as desires. -In a certain aspect all desires are desires of the impossible (and not -only some of them), if, that is to say, we consider them as volitions -that have not been realized and which cannot be realized at that -moment: but from another point of view, they are all possible, and can -indeed be precisely defined as _possible volitions._ This is proved by -their becoming gradually actual as the actual situation changes. If (to -choose a very simple illustration) an individual engaged in a certain -work repel the desire for food and sleep with his volition and action, -that desire is nothing at that point, as actual volition; but it does -not for that reason lose its intrinsic volitional character, for -when the hour for the repast or for sleep has struck, it passes from -possibility to actuality and becomes the will for food and sleep. The -sophism previously criticized, by means of which a bad and unsuccessful -act, that is to say one that is dominated by passion and caprice, is -justified by proving that it has had a legitimate motive and answers to -a good intention, appeals to this character of possibility, possessed -by all desires, and artfully changes it into a character of actuality, -thus substituting for the given the imagined situation. - -[Sidenote: _Volition as conflict with the passions._] - -The relation that we have defined between volition and passions or -desires explains why the will has often seemed to be nothing but -a conflict with the passions, and life itself a battle (_vivere -militare est,_) and at other times itself nothing but passions. The -will is indeed homogeneous with the passions, and is opposed, not -to the nature of the passions, which is its own nature, but to their -multiplicity. For this reason, it has been said that only passion acts -upon the passions: for the will is a passion among passions. Even -the poet or the philosopher, who frees himself from the passions by -objectifying them and making them material for æsthetic contemplation -or for speculative research, succeeds in so doing, only because he is -able to affirm the passion over the passions: the passion for poetry or -for philosophy. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the freedom of choice._] - -We must however beware of enunciating this relation in a false form, -as happens with the theory called _freedom of choice,_ where the will -is conceived as the faculty that chooses one volition from among -others and makes it its own. The will does not choose a volition -(save metaphorically), but so to speak chooses the choice itself, or -makes itself will among the desires which are not will. Nor should -the possible actions that are excluded be looked upon as constituting -a graduation in respect to the spirit, which should will _a_ and not -_b, c, d, e,_ and so on, attributing to them, nevertheless, different -values, which can be symbolized by the declining series of numbers, -passing downward from the will which is 10, to 9, 8, 7, 6, and so on. -In reality, the volitions that are excluded (_b, c, d, e_) have no -actual value, for the very reason that they are excluded. They may -acquire it in other situations different from the one analyzed, but it -is not possible to present the various situations together in one, and -far less to determine them quantitatively and numerically, otherwise -than in a symbolical manner. The propositions that present the will -sometimes as the _strongest_ volition in respect to the passions or -desires, and sometimes as the _weakest_ in respect to the passions, -which seem to be the strongest, that is, according as we consider the -active or the passive moment of the will, its victory or defeat, are -also metaphorical and symbolical. - -[Sidenote: _Significance of the so-called precedence of feeling over -the volitional act._] - -The relation established receives further light from the generally -admitted theory of the necessary precedence of the _feelings_ as -condition for the volitional act. The volitional act is preceded by a -jostling multiplicity of volitions, by a swarm of passions and desires, -which it dominates; and therefore it may seem that it follows, not -the volition, but something different from the volition, to be called -_feeling._ It is certainly different, but only because it is the -_plural_ of that _singular._ The nature of the passions and desires in -respect to the volitional act has not been clearly elucidated, and -this is another of the reasons that have caused the customary category -of "feeling" to appear and to be retained. - -[Sidenote: _Polipathicism and apathicism._] - -Finally and always through the established relation, the two opposed -theories concerning the passions are excluded: that which makes the -efficacious explanation of practical life to consist in giving free -course to the passions, holding them all to be sacred as such: this -theory could be called _polipathicism_; the other, which makes it -consist of the eradication and destruction of all the passions, in -order to give place to the exclusive domination of reason, of rational -will, or of the will that really is will, and could therefore be called -_apathicism._ - -Polipathicism has the defect of not taking account among the passions -of that which is passion _par excellence,_ and which alone becomes -actual, driving away the others: the will. Apathicism naturally -possesses the opposite defect and takes account only of the will, -and therefore not of that either, for the will becomes impotent when -alone, just as in the other case it becomes a chaotic jumble of all the -passions. - -[Sidenote: _Erroneousness of both opposed theses._] - -Such views as these are so openly unsustainable that they hardly appear -at all in their strictness and purity, in the course of the history of -philosophy, and then fugitively. But it is desirable to be attentive -not to identify the theoretic formulæ given above with the programmes -of certain groups, sects, associations, or individuals who have -verbally proclaimed polipathicism and apathicism, whereas they have -implied something very different, and could not have done otherwise. -Complete polipathicism and complete apathicism could only be attained -by the individual at the cost of disaggregation and annihilation. At -the most, sects, groups, societies, and individuals have been able to -conform to those formulæ as the simple expression of _tendencies;_ -or those formulæ are applicable to them by _hyperbole,_ in the -condemnation that it has been held desirable to inflict upon certain -unhealthy tendencies. Certainly there are individuals whose passions -are in such slight control as to suggest the absence of will; they -run after every one of their desires, or leave their soul open to the -onset of the passions that devastate it as the wind and the hail do the -fields. Lorenzo the Magnificent (symbolizing with his wonted finesse -a profoundly philosophical conflict) said to his son Piero, who was -addicted to every pleasure and caprice: "And I never have any wish but -you realize it for yourself."[1] The young rake whose adventures were -sung by De Musset may afford an example of the same disaggregation, -composed of the most violent kind of passions: - - Ce n'était pas Rolla qui gouvernait sa vie: - C'étaient ses passions; il les laissait aller, - Comme un pâtre assoupi regarde l'eau couler.... - -But even in these extreme and typical cases the will and the dominion -of the passions are never altogether absent: otherwise it would be -impossible to live, not only a lifetime, but a day, an hour, a minute. -Thus too on the other hand, no individual, be he ever so apathetic -and ascetic, ever frees himself altogether from the dominion of -the passions and the desires. We read in the life of some saint or -beatified personage, whose name escapes me, how he had attained to so -great a degree of perfection that whatever food he put into his mouth, -he tasted nothing but dry straw. Leaving to specialists the inquiry -as to how a stomach of so slight a capacity for distinguishing one -aliment from another could perform its function, and also as to the -consequences for social productiveness of so strangely perfected an -individual, it is certain that in order to nourish himself and live, -the saint in question must have had the periodical appetite or desire -of straw for his food, if for nothing else. Apathy too is often nothing -but a most violent and tenacious, though disordered, passion for ease. -Activity in any case reasserts itself with the dissolving of apathy, -a state nigh to inertia and to death, when it dissolves _grata vice -veris et Favoni,_ that is, with the appearance of the desires, of those -"suave impulses," those "heart-beats," that pain, and that pleasure, -which Giacomo Leopardi depicted in his _Risorgimento,_ overcome with -astonishment, as though face to face with the mystery of life. - -[Sidenote: _Their historical and contingent meanings._] - -The formulæ of polipathicism and of apathicism have had other -contingent and historical meanings, but of a positive nature, which -it is fitting to examine, in order to prevent the usual passage, so -fruitful of errors, from philosophical to empirical theses. The return -to the world and to nature, which is one of the characteristics of the -Renaissance and of the Reformation itself; the rights of the passions, -which is one of the traits of Romanticism in its initial period; -neo-paganism, which has given to the Italy of our day its most lofty -poetry in the work of Giosuè Carducci, were each in their turn nothing -but beneficial reactions against the lazy monastic life of the Middle -Ages, against Protestant pedantry, against degenerate Romanticism, -which despised the real world and dreamed of contradictory ideals. -On the other hand, in different times and circumstances, Christian -ascesis, Franciscan poverty, and Puritan strictness were beneficial -reactions. So true is this, that we are wont to unite in our admiration -heroes of abstinence and heroes of the passions, assertors of the -spirit and assertors of the flesh, for all, in different ways, because -in different historical situations, willed always the elevation of -humanity. Every one of those historical manifestations can be and has -been blamed and satirized, but only in its decadence, where it has -exhausted its proper function, and is no longer truly itself, but its -own mask.--The friars of the stories of the sixteenth century are not -the companions of St. Francis, as the indecent Italians of the late -Renaissance are not the active merchants, philologists, and artists who -promoted it, nor is there a greater lack of historical sense than the -transference of the characteristics of the one to the other, as is the -way of vulgar detractors and apologists. One and the same historical -fact (as has been brilliantly said) always shows itself twice: the -first time as _tragedy,_ the second as _comedy._ - -[Sidenote: _The domination of the passions and the will._] - -The cases that we have recorded, which have seemed to represent -unbridled or exhausted passion, possess not a pathological but a -physiological character, in so far as they really consist of a -domination, a volitional synthesis, which conquers and contains -divergent and ruinous passions. And with this we have answered the -question as to whether or no the passions can be dominated, and whether -man be slave or free. We can dominate them, and in that domination is -life; if we do not dominate them, we advance to meet death; to dominate -or not to dominate them are the very poles of the will, positive and -negative, and we cannot think of the one as being abolished without -thinking of the other as also abolished. - -But the labour of dominating them is hard, as all life, "sweet life," -is hard. The passions, driven back and restrained again and again by -the will, yet rage within us, tumultuous, though conquered. We tear -out the cumbersome plants, but not their roots and seeds. The man who -considers himself hardened to the trials of life, still feels and -suffers: the man who seems calm is yet always agitated within. As the -labour that is called physical deposits poison at the base of the -organism; so does the labour called spiritual in the depths of the -soul. Hence the bitterness in those men who have willed and laboured -much; hence their _cupio dissolvi,_ their aspiration for that bourne -where all is peace. The poet sublimely imagines old Luther, after his -victories, in the midst of the people awakened by him to a new life: - - Yet with a backward look, he sighed: - Call me, O God, to thee, for I am tired, - Nor without malediction can I pray! - - -[1] L. Domenichi, _Della scelta de motti, burle et facetie_ (Firenze, -1566), p. 14. - - - - -IV - - -VOLITIONAL HABITS AND THE INDIVIDUALITY - - -[Sidenote: _Passions and states of the soul._] - -Just because the passions are possible volitions and therefore -always have a definite content, it is no slight error on the part -of writers of treatises, to consider joy and sorrow, enthusiasm and -depression, content and discontent, tranquillity and remorse, and -other antithetical couples, as passions. These couples are empirical -concepts constructed upon the dialectical distinction of freedom and -anti-freedom, of good and evil; but the groups of the passions must on -the contrary be empirical concepts formed upon the basis of the varying -determination of the volitional activity, according to _objects,_ that -is to say, in its _particular_ determinations. Thus we can talk of the -passion for celebrity, for science, for art, for politics, for riches, -for luxury, for women, for the country, for the city, for sport, for -fishing, and so on, with infinite subdivisions and complications. - -[Sidenote: _Passions understood as volitional habits._] - -The distinction usually drawn between the affections, the impulses, -the desires on the one hand and the passions on the other, is on the -contrary justified, though it always has an empirical character; these -being considered, not as the single and instantaneous desire or impulse -that prompts to a single action, but as an inclination or habit of -wishing and of willing in a certain direction. In this sense, passion -would be a generic concept (always empirical), which could be divided -(empirically) into the classes of the virtues and vices; for virtue -is nothing but the passion or habit of rational actions, and vice the -contrary. - -[Sidenote: _Their importance._] - -These passions and volitional habits are not rigidly fixed, for nothing -in the field of facts is rigidly fixed. As the bed of the river -regulates the course of the river and is at the same time continuously -modified by it, so is it with the passions and volitional acts, which -reality keeps forming and modifying, and in modifying, forms anew -and in forming modifies. For this reason there is always something -arbitrary in defining habits as though they corresponded to a distinct -and limited reality; and for this reason the concepts of them are -arbitrary and empirical. Habits are not categories, nor do they give -rise to distinct concepts; but they are the like in the unlike, -unlike, itself also, in itself, although discernible in a certain way -from other groups of dissimilar facts. Their importance is great, -because they constitute, as it were, the bony structure of the body of -reality. In them _individuality_ understood as an empirical concept, -has its foundation, for which, if it be not substance, neither is it a -complex of casually divergent states. - -[Sidenote: _The control of the passions in so far as they are -volitional habits._] - -The nature of the passions as volitional habits to be both fixed and -mobile, that is to say, only relatively fixed and relatively mobile, -is the principle that aids the solution of several much-debated and -certainly important questions of the Philosophy of the practical. And -in the first place, the passions being understood as habits, the answer -to the question as to whether or no they can be controlled, and if the -answer be in the affirmative, then in what limits, receives a somewhat -different meaning, which explains the interest which that question -has always aroused. Nothing, in fact, removes our consciousness of -freedom and personality in so brutal a manner and makes us feel our -impotence and misery in so depressing a way, as to find ourselves with -our good intention and action hardly begun, face to face with the -unchained forces of our passions and of the habits that oppose it, -which drown with their deafening clamour the weak and timid voice of -the incipient action, vex it with their arrogance, and drag it along -paths well known and abhorred. We fall then into mistrust and baseness, -believe ourselves lost for ever; freedom and will seem to be fables -for the adornment of sermons and the books of moralists. The sage who -recalls to man the absolute empire that he possesses over his passions -and exhorts him never to be troubled and to repeat the twenty or -four-and-twenty letters of the alphabet, so that the spirit may have -time to recuperate its strength, to resist and to conquer, seems to -utter the insipid babble of one who has never truly loved and hated, -and to measure the full and overflowing souls of others on the model of -his own empty or almost empty soul. We laugh freely at the "short legs" -of ideals and good intentions, and read again with satisfaction not -undiluted with bitterness, some little story like Voltaire's _Memnon ou -la sagesse humaine,_ which bears as motto the very appropriate epigraph: - - Nous tromper dans nos entreprises, - C'est à quoi nous sommes sujets: - Le matin je fais des projets, - Et le long du jour des sottises; - -or at the most they conclude that there is no way to free oneself from -a bad passion save with another one equally bad, from a vice with a -vice, "as from a plank we pluck with nail a nail." - -[Sidenote: _Difficulty and reality of dominating them._] - -Nevertheless, he who torments himself and gets angry, or laughs and -draws such conclusions as these, is not in the right. That is to say, -he is right to laugh at ingenuous sages and at odious preachers and -moralists, for their theories are certainly simplicist and false. But -he is wrong in not understanding that his own theory is also simplicist -and false, for it runs into the opposite extreme.--Habits and passions -are habits and passions, because slowly formed: it is therefore a vain -illusion to attempt to destroy them at a blow. Perhaps it is believed -that the passions are tender flowerets or grasses that a child has -attached to the surface of the soil? They are a rank growth, strong -oaks whose roots dive deep into the earth!--That is most true, but it -is not for this reason impossible to modify and destroy them. They are -indeed actually modified, for that very pain, that very disappointment, -are a beginning of modification; since we do not persist in what we -abhor and follow, dragged along by force; and little by little we -end by freeing ourselves. The process of freeing ourselves from -the passions, or from vicious habits, then, is effective, but slow, -as the formation of those habits has been slow. We do not cure an -illness with a sudden act of will, but nevertheless the will guides -and directs the process of healing, and can open or close the entrance -to the medicinal forces of nature. Now the passions or vicious habits -are maladies that must follow their course, which, in order to be -beneficial, must coincide with the cure. The sages who give receipts -for freeing ourselves from them immediately are the Dulcamaras of moral -maladies; but the existence of the Dulcamaras should not impel us to -deny the existence of doctors, and above all of ourselves as doctors -of ourselves. And we should certainly adopt a very bad and illusory -method of cure, were we to accept the method so often recommended, of -destroying passion with passion, or vice with vice, thus adding vice to -vice, as those who treat the illnesses of the body with narcotics or -with stimulants often add malady to malady. - -[Sidenote: _Volitional habits and individuality._] - -Habits, then, not less than single volitional acts, of which they were -and are composed, can be and are continually conquered and modified, -in so far as they are opposed to the new volitional syntheses. This -confirms what has already been said in criticizing the polipathetic -view, which ignores the volition for the volitions, as the virtuous -habit is ignored in favour of vicious habits. But the theory of -apathicism is also to be found in this field, and it is needful -to assert in opposition to it, the great importance proper to the -volitional habits in giving concrete form to virtue. This second -critical thesis is that which affirms the value of _individuality or -peculiarity_ in the practical field. - -[Sidenote: _Negations of individuality for uniformity and their -critique._] - -Every individual is furnished by mother nature with certain definite -habits, according to the contingencies of reality among which he enters -the world; and he acquires yet others in the course of life, owing -to the actual conditions through which he passes and to the works -that he accomplishes. Those habits which he has from birth are called -aptitudes, dispositions, natural tendencies: the others acquired. The -individual in his reality is, as has been said, nothing but these -groups of habits and changes as they change. Now is it rational and -possible (the two questions here form one) that the individual in his -willing and acting should rid himself of such habits? Is it possible -to consider them as things without value? Is it possible to establish -an antithesis between individuality and rational action, as between -good and evil?--The levellers who claim to impose the same task upon -all and wish to make of the female a male, of the poet a reasoner, -of the man of science a warrior, of the saint a man of business, and -thus to give to every one a part of the task of others;--the dreamers -of a future society, in which all this shall have been done, and the -poet should attend to his poem, after having played the philosopher -for a couple of hours, for another couple of hours the tailor, and for -yet another two the waiter at an inn;--all the pedants of abstract -regularity, whom we meet to our great annoyance in life;--behold the -apathicists appear anew, for, as in the theory of the volitional act, -they advocated an abstract action, conducted by the rational will -alone in the void of the passions; so here, they advocate an abstract -rational habit, in the theory of volitional habits, a model of human -activity, to which all individuals would be obliged to conform. Perhaps -some such sensible observation as this of Vauvenargues should suffice -to confute them: _Il ne faut pas beaucoup de réflexion pour faire cuire -un poulet; et, cependant, nous voyons des hommes qui sont toute leur -vie mauvais rôtisseurs: tant il est nécessaire dans tous les métiers, -d'y être appelé par un instinct particulier et comme indépendant de -la raison._ But since it might be said that we wish to solve a grave -question with a joke, we will recall that the volitional acts and the -passions, volition and the volitions, are of the same nature (though -the one is actual and the others only possible), and that the nature of -willing implies actual definite situations, and that for this reason -we never will in universal but always in particular. In the same way -virtue, the virtuous habit of the will, is not of a different nature to -the volitional habits in general, to the passions, but is particular -and individual as they are. Those who make war upon individual habits -never succeed in substituting for them a universal habit, which is -inconceivable, but at the most other habits, equally particular and -individual. The poet who will play the farmer, the tailor, and the -waiter, in the imagined society of the future, will do all these things -as a poet. This may perhaps be an advantage, but may also perhaps be -the contrary, as future consumers of grain, of garments, and of repasts -will become aware. For the rest, do we not even now see women devoting -themselves to the severe studies of philology, of philosophy, and -of mathematics? But with the rarest exceptions, they remain always -women: their production, which is without originality, is not like -that of man, done with the complete dedication of the whole being to -the search for truth and of artistic perfection; and if in the midst -of the most abstruse inquiry, the image of themselves as wife or -mother pass through their minds, they desert, at the critical moment, -the philosophical categories, the formulæ of flexions, the ruled or -tangential spaces, and sigh for their unborn sons and for the husband -that they have not found. Is this distortion of natural habits useful? -Generally speaking, it is not. It is a doing and an undoing, a despisal -of the riches wisely accumulated and capitalized by Reality in the -course of its evolution. - -[Sidenote: _Temperament and character. Indifference of temperament._] - -Certainly the disposition natural or acquired is not virtue, and -the _temperament_ (since temperament is nothing but the sum of -habits and aptitudes) is not _character._ But virtue and character -presuppose habits and passions, of which they give the rational and -volitional synthesis: they are the form of that matter. And as matter -considered in the abstract is neither good nor bad, so the habits and -the passions (as has been very well observed) are not in themselves -either virtues or vices: they are facts. And it is necessary to take -account of facts; otherwise, they revenge themselves. On the other -hand, habits and passions certainly change; but not all of a sudden -and capriciously, rather, little by little, and always on the basis of -existing habits and passions. - -[Sidenote: _The discovery of the proper self._] - -The first duty of every individual who wishes to act effectively, -consists, therefore, in seeking for himself, in exploring his own -dispositions, in establishing what aptitudes have been deposited in -him by the course of reality, both at the moment of his birth, and -during the development of his own individual life: in knowing, that -is to say, his own habits and passions, not in order to make of them -a _tabula rasa,_ but to use them. The search is not easy and the -preparatory part of life, namely youth, is spent upon it. Few are the -fortunate individuals who have at once a clear and certain knowledge -of their own being and of their duty; the majority seek and find -it after many wanderings; and if such wanderings sometimes (as is -written in the dedication of the _Scienza nuova_) "seem misfortunes -and are opportunities," at others they are but a fruitless moving to -and fro; hence those that are undecided during the whole of their -lives, the eternal youths, those who aspire to all or to many of the -directions of human activity and are incapable in all. But when our own -being unveils itself and we see our path clearly, then to disordered -agitation succeeds the calm of sure and regular work, with its defeats -and victories, its joys and sorrows, but with the constant vision of -the Aim, that is, of the general direction to be followed. Vainly will -he who is endowed and prepared for guiding mankind in political strife -and has a clear and lively perception of human strength and weakness, -of what can and of what cannot be done, and is furnished, so to speak, -with practical sense (with the sense of complications and slight -differences), will try (save in the rarest and most exceptional cases, -and this reserve is to be understood in all that we are saying here) to -acquire a place among those who cultivate the abstract and universal, -operations demanding almost opposite aptitudes; vainly will he who was -born to sing attempt to calculate; vainly will he whose mind and soul -were made to accentuate dissensions in their bitter strife bend himself -to be a conciliator and a peacemaker. It is worse than superfluous, it -is stupid to weep over one's choleric or phlegmatic temperament. There -have been choleric saints that have even used the stick, and phlegmatic -saints who have succeeded admirably in patient persuasion: the mild -Francis, "all seraphic in his ardour," and the impetuous Dominic "whose -blows fell on the boughs of heresy." Reality is diversity and has need -of both, and each is praiseworthy if he do that well to which he has -been _called._ - -[Sidenote: _The idea of "vocation."_] - -This concept of the _vocation_ has a mystical and religious origin and -preserves that form; but it is clear that by means of the previous -considerations we have divested it of that form and reduced it to a -scientific concept. The individual is not a "monad" or a "real," he -is not a "soul" created by a God all in a moment and all of a piece; -the individual is the historical situation of the universal spirit at -every instant of time, and, therefore, the sum of the habits due to -the historical situations. Those modes of conceiving and talking of -one _and the same_ individual in two _different_ situations, or of two -_different_ individuals in the _same_ situation, are to be avoided, -because individual and situation are all one. But when the individual -has been thus defined, it remains none the less true that each -individual must direct his life according to pre-existing habits and -personal dispositions, and thus we discover the true meaning of the -mythologies and religions that have been mentioned, and the struggles -to find the suitable employment can be expressed with the words that -religion has taught us when we were children: the "vocation" and the -special "mission" that is allotted to us in life, until the last giving -of accounts and the words of dismissal and repose: _Nunc dimitte servum -tuum, Domine!_ We are the children of that Reality which generates us -and knows more than we, the Reality of which religions have caught a -glimpse and called it God, father, and eternal wisdom. - -[Sidenote: _Misunderstandings as to the rights of individuality. Evil -individuality._] - -The affirmation of the rights that belong to individuality in the -practical field has several times assumed and still assumes (in our -time, more than in the past, owing to materialism and naturalism) a -form, no longer symbolical and mystical, but wrong and irrational, that -it is desirable to remark upon here, always in order to avoid possible -equivoques. Indeed many look upon the respect due to their own beings -as due to their caprice, that is to say, to what is on the contrary -the negation of being: the right of the individual as the right to -commit follies, or to a disaggregate individuality. The declared -necessity of temperament for character is exchanged for admiration of -temperament considered in itself, which, as such, is neither admirable -nor blameworthy; but when separated from character becomes vice and -folly. Hence the admiration that has even become a literary fashion, -for the dissolute, for the violent, for homicides, for the criminals of -the public prisons, illustrated by a few courageous and energetic souls -among them, whereas they are as a rule weak, vile, and turbid. - -[Sidenote: _False doctrines as to the connection of virtues and vices._] - -Various theories are also erroneous, in which it has been sought to -establish the relation between the passions and the will, temperament -and character, passions and temperament being understood as vicious -passions and evil temperament; that is, not in themselves, but in -their antithesis to the rational will: hence the vain and paradoxical -attempts to join together and harmonize virtue and vice. Thus it has -been maintained that in certain vices are foreshadowed the virtues -which will or can be developed from them; for instance, military -valour in ferocity, industrial capacity in greed; whereas ferocity -and greed are wilful acts and contradictions incapable of generating -any virtue, as is seen in the customary cowardice of the ferocious -and the ineptitude of the greedy and covetous. Such a connection of -virtues and vices has on other occasions been presented as a mixture -or co-temperament, and it has been affirmed that the vices enter into -the composition of the virtues, as do poisons into the composition -of medicines. Finally, virtue and vice have been placed in causal -relation, and the causes of civil progress have been found in human -vices. But the vices, as they are not the antecedents, so are they -neither the ingredients nor the causes of the virtues. These are -strength, those the lack of strength. It is generally affirmed that -in every individual the virtues are accompanied by their correlative -vices, but if this possess some approximate value as an empirical -observation, strictly speaking it has none, because men can be -conceived and are actually found, whose virtue, far from yielding to -excesses and to vices, is eurythmic and temperate. But perhaps that -common saying aims at something else that it fails of explaining -well; namely, that every power has its impotence and every individual -his limit; but this does not mean vice or defect; it is nothing but -the tautological affirmation that the part is not the whole and the -individual not the universal. - -[Sidenote: _The universal in the individual and education._] - -But if the individual do not exhaust the universal, the universal -lives in individuals; Reality in each of its particular manifestations. -Therefore the affirmation of the right of individuality does not deny -the right of universality; or it denies it only in that abstract form -in which, to tell the truth, it is by itself denied. The individual -is under the obligation to seek himself, but in order to do this he -has also the obligation of cultivating himself as man in universal. A -school that represented simply a cultivation of individual aptitudes, -would be a training, not an education, a manufactory of utensils, not -a nursery of spiritual and creative activities. The true specialism -is universalism, and inversely, which means that if the universal do -not act without specializing itself, yet specialization is not really -specialization if it do not contain universality. If the two terms that -are by nature indissoluble be divided, there remains only fruitless -generalization or stupid particularization, and if our times have -sinned in this latter respect, other times have sinned in the opposite. -He is well-balanced who between these two forms of degeneration both -knows and fills his own proper and individual mission so perfectly -that he fulfils at the same time with it and through it the universal -mission of man. - - - - -V. - - -DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS - - -[Sidenote: _Multiplicity and unity: development._] - -The demonstration hitherto developed, that evil is negativity or -contradiction, and that this contradiction takes place owing to the -multiplicity of the desires in respect to the singleness of character -of the volitional act, gives rise to the further question: Why should -there be such a multiplicity, concurrent with the demand for unity, and -thus be generated strife and contradiction? Here it would be fitting -to observe that we must have filled our mouths very uselessly for a -century with the word evolution, if such a question as this be renewed, -or we remain bewildered and embarrassed before it. For the reason of -that fact, which seems without a reason, is to be found precisely in -the concept of _"evolution."_ This concept resumes most ancient views, -and has been substituted in modern times for that of an immovable -Reality, of a God who exists perfect and satisfied in himself, and -creates a world for his own transitory pleasure; or for a complex of -beings, eternally the same, with variations that are only apparent. -The concept of evolution has entered so profoundly into the blood and -bones of modern man that even those repeat it who would be incapable -of analyzing and understanding it; even the least acute of all, the -positivist philosophers who like to call themselves "philosophers of -evolution." - -[Sidenote: _Becoming as synthesis of being and not-being._] - -But before it acquired, as a vague and confused formula, so great a -publicity as quite to amount to popularity, a philosopher of genius had -analyzed and synthetized it, induced and deduced it in an unsurpassable -manner, with the speculative formula of reality as _becoming_; that -is, as synthesis of being and not-being, being and not-being being -thus unthinkable separately, and only thinkable in their living -connection, which is becoming and _development_ (evolution). Reality is -development, that is, infinite possibility that passes into infinite -actuality and from the multiplicity of every instant takes refuge in -the one, to break forth anew in the multiple and produce the new unity. -The inquiry into the dialectic of the volitional act enters in this -way into the very heart of reality. In order to deny multiplicity, -contradiction, evil and not-being, it would be necessary to deny at -the same time unity, coherence, good and being. - -[Sidenote: _Nature as becoming. Its resolution in the spirit._] - -But if by the theory that has been recorded we have explained the -necessity of evil for good, or the necessity of the not necessary for -the necessary in the volitional act of man, the identification of the -volitional act, which is man's, with reality which is of the universal -whole, might seem to be too audacious. For (it will be said) the -complex of other beings, that we are wont to separate from the complex -of human beings and to oppose to it as nature, either is motionless -and does not develop, or develops without any consciousness of good -and evil, of pleasure and pain, of value and disvalue. Both theses -have been maintained and nature has been represented, now as _without -history, now as developing itself in an unconscious or mechanical -manner._ But the contradictions and absurdities of both theses have -been together perceived. "Motionless beings" is a phrase without -meaning, to such a degree that even empirical science has everywhere -pushed its way into history, and has talked of the evolution of animals -and vegetables, of the chemical elements, and even of a history of -light and heat. The other expression, "unconscious beings," is not -less empty, because being and activity are not otherwise conceivable -save in the way that we know our being, which is consciousness; -and although empirical science certainly points to more and more -rudimentary and tenuous forms of consciousness in beings, always -differently individualized, yet it has never been able to demonstrate -the absolutely unconscious. If so-called nature be, it develops, and if -it develop, cannot do so without some consciousness. This deduction is -not a matter of conjecture, but a logical and irrefutable consequence. -What is there, then, that persists in men's souls, as an obstacle to -the acceptance of this consequence, in accordance with the profound -belief of humanity in a community of all beings with one another and -with the Whole, as manifested in philosophies and in religions, in -the speculations of the learned and in ingenuous popular beliefs? A -scholastic prejudice, an idol of the intellect, the hypostasis of -that concept of "nature" that Logic has taught us is nothing but the -abstract, mechanicizing, classifying function of the human spirit; a -prejudice arising from the substitution of the naturalistic method for -reality, by which a function is changed and materialized into a group -of beings. Those idealists were also slaves of the error of a like -hypostasis, who, though they thought everything as an activity of the -spirit, yet stopped when face to face with _Nature,_ making of it an -inferior grade of the Spirit, or, metaphorically, a spirit alienated -from itself, an unconscious; consciousness, a petrified thought, and -creating for it a special philosophy (as though all the other did -not suffice), entitled precisely, _Philosophy of nature._ But modern -thought knows henceforth how man creates for his use that skeleton or -_mannequin_ of an immobile, external mechanical nature, and he is no -longer permitted to fall back into equivoque and substitute this for -entity or for a complex of entities. Nor should he find any difficulty -in discovering everywhere activity, development, consciousness, with -its antitheses of good and evil, of joy and sorrow. Certainly the stars -do not smile, nor is the moon pale for sorrow: these are images of -the poets. Certainly animals and trees do not reason like men; this, -when it is not poetry, is gross anthropomorphism. But nature, in her -intimate self, longs for the good and abhors the evil, she is all wet -with tears and all a-shiver for joy; strife and victory is everywhere -and in every moment of universal life. - -[Sidenote: _Optimism and pessimism; critique._] - -This conception of reality, which recognizes the indissoluble link -between good and evil, is itself beyond good and evil, and consequently -surpasses the visual angles of optimism and pessimism--of optimism -that does not discover the evil in life and posits it as illusion, or -only as a very small and contingent element, or hopes for a future -life (on earth or in heaven) in which evil will be suppressed; and -of pessimism, that sees nothing but evil and makes of the world an -infinite and eternal spasm of pain, that rends itself internally and -generates nothing. It confronts the first with the fact that evil is -truly the original sin of reality, ineliminable so long as reality -exists, and therefore absolutely ineliminable as a category: the -second, with the other category the good, equally ineliminable, for -without it evil could not be. And it is easy to show how the optimist -declares himself a pessimist, the pessimist an optimist, out of -their own mouths. The setting free from individuality and from will, -which the pessimist proposes as a radical remedy, is the remedy that -reality itself applies at every moment, for we free ourselves from the -contradiction of individuality and of wilfulness by the affirmation -of the rational will, with which the same pessimist cannot dispense, -for the effectuation of his programme of ascesis or of suicide, which, -according as it is understood, is either not a programme, or a -programme altogether capricious and without universal value. In truth, -there is no need to oppose a eulogy of Life with a eulogy of Death, -since the eulogy of Life is also a eulogy of Death; for how could we -live, if we did not die at every instant? - -[Sidenote: _Dialectic optimism._] - -The dialectic conception of reality as development, that is, as a -synthesis of being and not-being, can certainly be termed optimistic, -but in a very different signification to that of abstract optimism. The -synthesis is the thesis enriched with its antithesis, and the thesis is -the good, being, not the bad or not-being. But who will wish seriously -to oppose this logical consequence? Is it not a fact that men hope and -live, although in the midst of their sorrows? Is it not a fact that the -world is not ended and does not appear to have any intention of ending? -And how would that be possible, if the moment of the good did not -prevail, just because the positive prevails upon the negative and Life -constantly triumphs over Death? - -[Sidenote: _Concept of cosmic progress._] - -This continuous triumph of Life over Death constitutes _cosmic -progress._ Progress, from the point of view whence we have hitherto -regarded it, that of individualized activity, is identical with -activity; it is the unfolding of this upon passivity. Every volitional -act, like every theoretical act, is therefore to be considered in -itself, that is, only in relation to the given situation from which it -breaks forth. In every new situation the individual begins his life -all over again. But from the cosmic point of view, at which we now -place ourselves, reality shows itself as a continuous growing upon -itself; nor is a real regress ever conceivable, because evil being -that which is not, is irreal, and that which is is always and only the -good. The real is always rational, and the rational is always real. -Cosmic progress, then, is itself also the object of affirmation, not -problematic, but apodictic. - -[Sidenote: _Objections and critique of them._] - -The difficulties that can be and are opposed to this thesis all arise -from the confusion of the truly rational with that which is falsely so -called, between the true real and that which improperly assumes this -name, that is, between the real and the unreal. Thus will be remembered -the instance of the end of the great Græco-Roman civilization, without -adequate parallel in universal history, followed by the return of -barbarism in the Middle Ages; or the common example of the shipwreck -of noblest enterprises; or (to remain in the field that more nearly -interests us) the philosophic decadence, owing to which, a mean -positivism was able to follow the idealism of the beginning of the -nineteenth century, which stands to the former as the eloquence of -an Attic orator to the stuttering of an ignorant school-boy. Did the -Middle Age, then, represent an advance upon that Rome, whose memory -lingered in the fancy as an image of lost dignity during that same -Middle Age? Was the victory of European reaction over the citizen -civilization of the Revolution and of the Empire progress? and in -Lombardy, the new Austrian domination following upon the Kingdom of -Italy? or in the Neapolitan provinces the Bourbon restoration after the -Republic of 1799 and the French Decanate? Was Comte an advance upon -Kant, Herbert Spencer upon Hegel? But different points of view are -confused under the same name in these questions, and, therefore, we do -not succeed in immediately arranging those facts beneath the principle -that has been established. It is therefore necessary to analyze. It -will then be immediately seen that ancient civilization, in what it -possessed of truly real, did not die, but was transmitted as thought, -institutions, and even as acquired aptitudes; hence it kept reappearing -in the course of the centuries and still keeps reappearing: it -certainly died in what it had of unreal, that is to say, in its -contradictions, for instance, in its incapacity to find political and -economic forms answering to the changed conditions of spirits. In like -manner, the Middle Age, which was evidently in part progress, because -it solved problems left unsolved by the preceding civilization, posed -others that it did not solve and that were solved in the succeeding -centuries; but if the posing of these new problems, which, while -destroying the old, failed to substitute provisionally anything, was -apparently not progress, neither was it regress, but the beginning of -new progress. The same is to be said of precursors, conquered in their -time, but conquerors in history, of the restorations and reactions -that are so only in name, because they contain in themselves that with -which they contend, if for no other reason, then for the very reason -that they contend: of heroes and initiators, who were conquered and -martyrized, yet knew that they were triumphing and did triumph in -dying; the cross and the pyre will become symbols of victory: _in hoc -signo vinces._ And finally, if the positivism of the second half of the -nineteenth century seem as a whole so greatly inferior to idealism, -that comes from its not being philosophy at all, but a hybrid jumble -of natural sciences and metaphysic, thus intensifying an error that -already existed in germ in idealism, and fecundating the problem -for a better solution. Many philosophers living to-day are inferior -to Socrates, because they have not even risen to the knowledge of -the concept; but those who in our day have attained to the level of -Socrates, are superior to him, because besides his thought they contain -in themselves something that Socrates had not; and those philosophers -who are logically on a level with Protagoras, surpass him, just because -they are the Protagorases of the twentieth century. There is therefore -never real regression in history; but only contradictions that follow -upon solutions given, and prepare new ones. - -[Sidenote: _Individuals and History._] - -The solutions, once attained, are acquired for ever; the problems that -have once been solved, do not again occur, or, which is the same thing, -they recur in a different way to those of the past. The web of History -is composed of such labours, to which all individuals collaborate; -but it is not the work and cannot be the purpose of any of them in -particular, because each one is exclusively intent on his particular -work, and only in _rem suam agere,_ does he also do the business of -the world. History is happening, which, as has been seen, is not to -be judged practically, because it always transcends individuals, and -to these and not to history is the practical judgment applicable. -The judgment of History is in the very fact of its existence: its -rationality is in its reality. - -[Sidenote: _Fate, Fortune, and Providence._] - -This historical web, which is and is not the work of individuals, -constitutes, as has been said, the work of the universal Spirit, of -which individuals are manifestations and instruments. In this way are -implicitly excluded those views which attribute the course of things -to Fate, to Fortune, or to Chance, that is, to mechanism or caprice, -both of them insufficient and one-sided, like determinism and free -will, each one invoking the other when it becomes aware of its own -impotence. The idea of mechanical origin, of an evolution that takes -place by the addition of very minute elements, is now being abandoned, -even for that fragment of history called _History of Nature_ (the -only true and possible Philosophy of Nature), in which is beginning -to reappear the theory of successive crises and revolution, and the -idea of freedom, whose creations are not to be measured or limited -mathematically. But the supreme rationality that guides the course of -history, should not, on the other hand, be conceived as the work of a -transcendent Intelligence or Providence, as is the case in religious -and semi-fanciful thought, which does not possess other value than that -of a confused presentiment of the truth. If History be rationality, -then a Providence certainly directs it; but of such a kind as becomes -actual in individuals, and acts, not on, but in them. This affirmation -of Providence is not conjecture or faith, but evidence of reason. -Who would feel in him the strength of life without such intimate -persuasion? Whence could he draw resignation in sorrow, encouragement -to endure? Surely what the religious man says, with the words "Let us -leave it in God's hands," is said also by the man of reason with those -other words: "Courage, and forward"? - -[Sidenote: _The infinity of progress and mystery._] - -The Spirit, which is infinite possibility passing into infinite -actuality, has drawn and draws at every moment the cosmos from chaos, -has collected diffused life into the concentrated life of the organ, -has achieved the passage from animal to human life, has created and -creates modes of life ever more lofty. The work of the Spirit is not -finished and never will be finished. Our yearning for something higher -is not vain. The very yearning, the infinity of our desire, is proof -of the infinity of that progress. The plant dreams of the animal, the -animal of man, man of superman; for this, too, is a reality, if it be -reality that with every historical movement man surpasses himself. The -time will come when the great deeds and the great works now our memory -and our boast will be forgotten, as we have forgotten the works and the -deeds, no less great, of those beings of supreme genius who created -what we call human life and seem to us now to have been savages of -the lowest grade, almost men-monkeys. They will be forgotten, for the -documents of progress is in _forgetting_; that is, in the fact being -entirely absorbed into the new fact, in which, and not in itself, -it has value. But we cannot know what the future states of Reality -will be, in their determined physiognomy and succession, owing to the -"dignity" established in the Philosophy of the practical, by which the -knowledge of the action and of the deed follows and does not precede -the action and the deed. _Mystery_ is just _the infinity of evolution_: -were this not so, that concept would not arise in the mind of man, -nor would it be possible to abuse it, as it has been abused by being -transported out of its place, that is to say, into the consciousness -of itself, which the spiritual activity should have and has to the -fullest degree, that is, the consciousness of its eternal categories. - -[Sidenote: _Illegitimate transportation of the concept of mystery from -history to philosophy._] - -The neglect of the moment of mystery is the true reason of the error -known as the _Philosophy of history,_ which undertakes to portray the -plan of Providence and to determine the formula of progress. In this -attempt (when it does not affirm mere philosophemes, as has very often -happened), it makes the vain effort to enclose the infinite in the -finite and capriciously to decree concluded that evolution which the -universal Spirit itself cannot conclude, for it would thus come to deny -itself. In Logic that error has been gnoseologically defined as the -pretension of treating the individual as though it were the universal, -making the universal individual; here it is to be defined in other -words as the pretension of treating the finite as though it were the -infinite, of making the infinite finite. - -[Sidenote: _Confirmation of the impossibility of a Philosophy of -history._] - -But the unjustified transportation of the concept of mystery from -history, where it indicates the future that the past prepares and does -not know, into philosophy, causes to be posited as mysteries which -give rise to probabilities and conjectures, problems that consist of -philosophical terms, and should therefore be philosophically solved. -But if the infinite progress and the infinite perfectibility of man -is to be affirmed, although we do not know the concrete forms that -progress and perfectibility will assume (not knowing them, because now -it imports not to _know,_ but to _do_ them), then there is no meaning -in positing as a mystery the immortality of the individual soul, or the -existence of God; for these are not _facts_ that may or may not happen -sooner or later, but _concepts_ that must be proved to be in themselves -thinkable and not contradictory, or to determine in what form they are -thinkable and not contradictory. Their thinkability will indeed be -a mystery, but of the kind that it is a duty to make clear, because -synonymous with obscurity or mental confusion. What has so far been -demonstrated has been their unthinkability in the traditional form. -Nor is it true that they correspond to profound demands of the human -soul. Man does not seek a God external to himself and almost a despot, -who commands and benefits him capriciously; nor does he aspire to an -immortality of insipid ease: but he seeks for that God which he has in -himself, and aspires to that activity, which is both Life and Death. - - - - -VI - - -TWO ELUCIDATIONS RELATING TO HISTORIC AND ÆSTHETIC - - -[Sidenote: _The relation of desires and actions; and two problems of -Historic and of Æsthetic._] - -From the consideration of the practical activity in its dialectic, and -in particular from the theory relating to desire and to action, shines -forth, if we mistake not, the full light that has hitherto perhaps been -invoked in vain upon certain capital points of Historic and Æsthetic, -which, when treating of those disciplines, we were obliged either -hardly to touch upon, or to develop in a manner altogether inadequate. -The reason of this was that an adequate development, to be convincing, -demanded as presupposition, a minute exposition as to the nature, the -relations and the constitution of the practical activity, all of them -things that could not be treated incidentally. - -[Sidenote: _History and art._] - -History or historical narrative is, as we know, very closely related -to art, in contradistinction to the abstract sciences, since both -art and history do not construct concepts of class, but represent -concrete and individuated facts. History, however, is not art pure and -simple, but is distinguished from it, because artistic representation -is in it continually illuminated with the critical distinction -between the real and the possible, what has happened and what has -been imagined, the existing and the inexisting, with the consequent -determinations connected with them, as to this or that particular mode -of reality, event, and existence, that have taken place. In every -historical narrative are always to be found, understood or implied, the -affirmations that the narrative is real, that a different narrative -would be imaginary, that the reality of the event in question properly -belongs to this or that concept of politics, rights, war, diplomacy, -economy, and so on. All this is quite absent from art, which is by -nature ingenuous and free of critical discernment; so much so, that -hardly have its representations become objects of reflection, than they -are dissolved as art, to reappear with a changed appearance (no longer -youthful, but virile or senile), as history. - -[Sidenote: _The concept of existentiality in history._] - -But if this distinction between art and history be precisely determined -gnoseologically, when it has been said that in history the predicate -of existentiality is added to mere representation (and, therefore, -all the other predicates connected with the case, referring to the -various forms of existence), and that therefore, the representative -and artistic form of history contains in itself rational and -philosophical method as precedent, yet there always remains the -ulterior philosophical problem: What is the origin of that predicate -of reality or existentiality on which all the others lean? We have -already demonstrated that it was altogether inadmissible to derive it -from a mysterious faculty called _Faith,_ or to consider it as the -apprehension of something extraneous to the spirit in universal, as _a -datum or position._ And we also stated that if the spirit recognize -its existence, yet it cannot attain to the criterion elsewhere than -from itself; which criterion was nothing but the first reflection of -the spirit upon the practical activity itself, giving rise to the -duplication of reality that has happened and reality only desired, or -of reality and irreality, of existing and inexisting. - -[Sidenote: _Its origin in the Philosophy of the practical: action and -the existing, desires and the unexisting._] - -All this now becomes a simple consequence of the connection that -has been made clear between desire and action. The cognoscitive -spirit, when it apprehends and ideally remakes this connection, has, -in enunciating it, also enunciated for the first time the couples -of terms that we have already mentioned and that variously express -the criterion of existence. To distinguish desires from actions is -tantamount to distinguishing the unreal from the real, the existing -from the unexisting, and to think the practical act is tantamount -to thinking the concept of existence and of effectual reality. For -the determination of the relation between desire and action, and -only for that, the criterion of existence is not necessary, because -that relation is itself that criterion. To say "this is a desire" -means, "this does not exist"; to say "this is an action" means, "this -exists." The desires are possibility; the resolutive and volitional -act or action, is actuality. And it is also evident that existent -and inexistent are not separable, as though the inexistent were -heterogeneous to the existent; the inexistent exists in its way, as -possibility is possible reality; the phantasm exists in the fancy and -desire in the spirit that desires. Thus the posing of the one term is -also the posing of the other, as correlative. What is repugnant and -contradictory is the introduction of the one term into the other. This -takes place, for instance, when in narrating the history, reality that -has happened is mingled as one single thing with reality dreamed of or -desired, and history is turned into _legend._ - -[Sidenote: _History as distinction between actions and desires, and art -as indistinction._] - -It can be said that history always represents actions, and in this is -implicit that it represents at the same time also desires, but only in -so far as it distinguishes them from actions: history, therefore, is -perception and memory of perception, and in it fancies and imaginations -are also perceived as such and arranged in their place. And it would -also be possible to say that art represents only desires, and is -therefore all fancy and never perception, all possible reality and -never effectual reality. But since to art is wanting the distinctive -criterion between desires and actions, it in truth represents actions -as desires and desires as actions, the real as possible, and the -possible as real; hence it would be more correct to say that art is -on the near side of the possible and the real, it is pure of these -distinctions, and is therefore pure imagination or _pure intuition._ -Desires and actions are, we know, of the same stuff, and art assumes -that stuff just as it is, careless of the new elaboration that it will -receive in an ulterior grade of the spirit, which is indeed impossible -without that first and merely fantastic elaboration. Likewise when art -takes possession of historical material, it removes from it just the -historical character, the critical elements, and by this very fact -reduces it once more to mere intuition. - -[Sidenote: _The purely fantastic and the imaginary._] - -It must further be noted that the purely fantastic, which is the -representation of a desire, must not be confounded with the mechanical -combination of images, that can be made idly, for amusement, or for -practical ends. This operation (analogous to that of the intellect upon -the pure concepts and representations, when it arbitrarily combines -them in the pseudo-concepts), is secondary and derivative; and it -presupposes the first, which provides it with the material that it cuts -up and combines. Nothing is more extraneous and repugnant to poetry -than this artificial _imagining,_ precisely because it is external and -repugnant to reality. Hence his would be a vain objection who should -coldly and capriciously combine the most different images and ask for -an explanation of the whole, with desire as the fundamental principle. -Such combinations as these, since they do not belong to poetry, are -void of real psychical content. - -[Sidenote: _Art as lyrical or representation of feelings._] - -But if the relation between desire and action be the ultimate reason -for the distinction between art and history, and this distinction be -the theoretical reflection of that real relation, the conception of -art as representation of volitional facts, taken in their quite general -and indeterminate nature, in which desire is as action and action as -desire, reveals why art affirms itself as _representation of feeling,_ -and why a work of art does not seem to possess and does not possess -value, save from its _lyrical_ character and from the imprint of the -artist's personality. The work of art that reasons or instructs as -to things that have happened, and finds a substitute for intimate -and lyrical connections in historical reasonings and connections, is -justly and universally condemned as cold and ineffectual. We do not -ask the artist for a philosophical system nor for a relation of facts -(if all this is to be found in his work it is _per accidens),_ but -for a dream of his own, for nothing but the expression of a world -desired or abhorred, or partly desired and partly abhorred. If he -make us live again in this dream the rapture of joy or the incubus of -terror, in solemnity or in humility, in tragedy or in laughter, that -suffices. Facts and concepts, and the question as to the metaphysical -constitution of reality and how it has been developed in time, are all -things that we shall ask of others. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of ingenuous reality and feeling._] - -It may seem that in this way the field of art has been much restricted -and the ingenuous representation of the real excluded from it. But -this ingenuous representation is just the representation of reality as -dream. For reality is nothing (as we henceforth know) than becoming, -possibility that passes into actuality, desire that becomes action, -from which desire springs forth again unsatiated. The artist who -represents it ingenuously, produces the lyric for this very reason. For -him there is no necessity to reach it from without, as a new element: -if he do this, he is a bad artist, and will be blamed as a hunter of -emotions, emphatic, convulsive, wearisomely sentimental, forcedly -jocose, an introducer of his own caprice into the coherence of the -work, a confounder of his empirical with his artistic personality, -which exists in the empirical individual, but is not equivalent to it. -The feeling that the true artist portrays is that of things, _lacrymae -rerum_; and by the identity of feeling and volition, of volition and -reality already demonstrated in the Philosophy of the practical, things -are themselves that feeling. The characteristic that Schelling and -Schopenhauer noted in music, of reproducing, not indeed the ideas, but -the ideal rhythm of the universe, and of objectifying the will itself, -belongs equally to all the other forms of art, because it is the -essence itself of Art, or of pure intuition. - -[Sidenote: _Artists and the will._] - -An obvious confirmation of this theory is also the empirical -observation often made, that the men who lose themselves in desires -are rather poets than men of action, dreamers rather than actors; and -in respect to this, that poets who seem to have the soul overflowing -with energetic plans, magnanimous loves, and fierce hatreds are the -most incapable in the field of action, and the worst of captains in -practical struggles; because those plans, those loves and hates, are -not will, but desires, and desires already weakened as such, because -they are no longer in process of volitional synthetization, but have -become the objects of contemplation and of dream. He who reads the -biographies of artists, or has dealings with artists in daily life, -almost always has the impression that their gusts of passion are -nothing but poetry _about to break forth,_ as a green bud that opens -and breaks the brown sheath. And if this process be painful, that -is because every travail of birth is painful. One sees, indeed, how -everything generally ends _par des chansons._ A fine poem and the -sufferer is calm again. - -[Sidenote: _Actions and myths._] - -This also explains why individual actions and practical collective -movements are accompanied with hopes, beliefs, and _myths._ These have -no logical or historical truth, but it is on the other hand impossible -to criticize them, because they are not error, but fantastic projection -of the state of soul of individuals and groups of individuals in -action, and testify to the existence of desires ready to transform -themselves into will and action. Utopias are poetry, they are not -practical acts; but beneath that poetry there is always the reality -of a desire that is a factor of future history. Hence it also happens -that poets are thought of as _seers,_ when the utopia of to-day becomes -the reality of the morrow. The Utopian and semi-poetic Address of the -Italian patriots to the Directory of June 18, 1799,[1] the not less -Utopian Proclamation of Rimini of 1815, the song of Manzoni, in which -rang out the fateful verse, - - We shall not be free if we are not one, - -will become, for the Italians of 1860, effective action and _historical -event._ - -[Sidenote: _Art as the pure representation of becoming and the artistic -form of thought._] - -Pure intuition, ingenuous representation of reality, representation -of feeling, lyricism and personal intonation, are then all equivalent -formulæ, all of them definitions of the æsthetic activity and of art. -And it would be superfluous to repeat that art thus characterized -remains the concrete form of the superior theoretical grades of the -spirit. In fact, logical thought or concept is also volition, owing to -the unity of the spirit, and the representation of such volition is the -logos made flesh, the concept that incorporates itself in language, -palpitating with the drama of its becoming. What word of man is there -that is not personally and lyrically coloured, whether he communicate -the truth of science or narrate the incidents of life? And how could we -deny a place among the dramas that agitate human life and art portrays, -to that drama of dramas, which is the drama of thought and of the -historical comprehension of the real? - - -[1] B. Croce, _Relazioni dei patrioti napoletani col Direttorio e col -Consolato e l' idea dell' unità italiana,_ Napoli, 1902, pp. 69-73. - - - - -VII - - -HISTORICAL ANNOTATIONS - - -[Sidenote: _The problem of freedom._] - -I. For the reasons stated in their place, a history of the concept of -freedom would end by becoming almost a general history of philosophy. -Denied in different ways in the mechanistic and deterministic -conceptions (from the Stoics to Spinoza), and in the theological and -arbitraristic (from Epicurus to St. Augustine and the mystics), that -concept afterwards continually assumed a more and more conciliatory -form; an indication that the question must be put in an altogether -different way. This movement culminated in the Kantian theory, in -which freedom, defended against the psychologists, is withdrawn from -natural causality and affirmed _a priori,_ as causality by means -of freedom; but, at the same time, Kant did not succeed in fully -justifying it, owing to his failure in the solution of the antitheses, -the defect of the Kantian philosophy, which never really became a -system. The embarrassments and absurdities to which the unsolved -antithesis between liberty and causality gives rise, are sufficiently -exemplified in a proposition to be found in the _Critique of Practical -Reason_: "It would be possible to foresee what man will do in the -future, if we possessed all the facts; yet he would be perfectly -free."[1] But notwithstanding these contradictions and embarrassments, -the energetic affirmation of the principle of freedom by Kant (which -had an altogether special certitude in Kant, in respect to the other -two postulates of the practical reason, God and immortality, from -which in this respect it was distinguished) helped to make prevalent -the conviction of the impossibility of eliminating that concept or -of escaping from it, and made of it the field of battle, where the -fortunes of philosophy were decided. The problem of the freedom of -willing is really solved or near to a solution, in those philosophies -which do not fatigue themselves with it as a particular problem, but -treat of it as something to be understood of itself, provided there -be a non-mechanistic conception of reality, such as would not need -special defence. This happens, not only with sentimentalists and -mystics such as Jacobi and Schleiermacher, but also and above all in -the Hegelian philosophy. Perhaps no philosopher has been less occupied -with the problem of liberty than Hegel, just because he was always -occupied with it. The will is free (he contents himself with saying); -freedom is the fundamental determination of the will, as gravity is -of matter; thus as gravity is matter itself, so is freedom the will. -Hegel consequently saw true in the contest between arbitrarism and -determinism, recognizing in determinism the merit of having given -its value to the content, the datum, in opposition to the certainty -of abstract auto-determination, so that freedom understood as free -will is considered to be illusion. Free will is both determined and -indetermined.[2] But how Hegel could conciliate this theory of freedom -with the mechanistic concept of nature that persists in him is another -question. His failure to attain to this conciliation was perhaps among -the reasons that made his profound solution of the antithesis between -determinism and indeterminism seem a vain playing with words. - -After Hegel, a return was made to the Kantian doctrine, variously -modified, in which is posited, now a double causality, now a -composition of diverging forces, now a double point of view, now two -worlds, the one included in the other and dominated, the one by the -principle of the conservation of energy, the other by that of increase. -Such contradictory doctrines are to be found for example in Lotze -and Wundt, to the latter of whom belongs the formula that the causal -explanation is certainly to be applied to spiritual facts, but _a parte -post,_ not _a parte ante_[3] The philosophy of Bergson represents in a -certain way a return to the sound idealistic view, which declares that -the dilemma of determinism and indeterminism is surpassed.[4] - -[Sidenote: _The doctrine of evil._] - -II. The conception of the relation between bad and good, as reality -opposed to reality, is mythological and religious (Parseeism, -Manichæism, Jewish-Christian doctrine of the devil, etc.). But evil had -already begun to reveal itself to the philosophical reflection of the -ancients as the unreal, the not being; and this is explicitly affirmed -in Neoplatonism. It was not, however, possible to understand this -function of unreality, real in its way, without a general dialectical -conception, which became very slowly mature. Without a dialectic -conception, evil, conceived as unreality, becomes mere illusion, not -so much a moment of the real as an equivocation of man philosophizing. -This is clearly to be seen in Spinoza, who opposes the full laws of -reality to the narrow laws of human nature, saying: _Quidquid nobis -in natura ridiculum, absurdum aut malum videtur, id inde venit quod -res tantum ex parte novimus, totiusque naturae ordinem et cohaerentium -maxima ex parte ignoramus, et quod omnia ex usu nostrae rationis -dirigi volumus, cum tamen id, quod malum esse dictat, non malum sit -respectu ordinis et legum universae naturae; sed tantum solius nostrae -naturae legum respectu._ For indeed, if evil, error and wickedness -were something that had essence, God, who is the cause of all that -has essence (continues Spinoza), would also be the cause of evil, of -error, and of wickedness. But this is not so, because evil is nothing -real. _Neronis matricidium_ (he observes) _quatenus aliquid positivum -comprehendebat, scelus non erat: nam facinus externum fecit, simulque -intentionem ad trucidendam matrem Orestes habuit, et tamen, saltem ita -uti Nero, non accusatur. Quodnam ergo Neronis scelus? Non aliud quam -quod hoc facinore ostendit se ingratum, immisericordem ac inobedientem -esse. Certum autem est, nihil horum aliquid essentiae exprimere, et -idcirco Deum eorum non fuisse catisam, licet causa actus et intentionis -Neronis fuerit_[5] But Spinoza was not able to determine in what sense -Nero was really ungrateful, implacable, and disobedient, nor in what -way such a judgment could be justified, owing to his idea of Substance, -not as subject, spirit, activity, but as cause. - -Kant did not succeed in understanding the nature of evil; for him good -and evil were "the categories of freedom,"[6] and the view of Fichte -who makes the radical evil to be _vis inertiae,_ laziness (_Trägheit,_) -which is in nature and in man as nature,[7] represents progress in -respect to the Kantian position. But only with the Hegelian dialectical -view of evil, understood as negation, is evil at the same time given -its right place; and its unreality, contradiction, which is no longer -the product of illusion of thought, but of things themselves, in -intimate contradiction with one another, if it be a blemish, is shown -to be the blemish, not of human thought, but of reality.[8] - -[Sidenote: _Decision and freedom._] - -III. Free will, too, is not considered as a quality and character of -complete liberty, but as its negation, will as contradiction, in the -Hegelian philosophy. It was preceded in this respect, not only by Kant, -but also by Descartes. Descartes wrote of the decision of indifference: -_Cette indifférence que je sens lorsque je ne suis point porté vers -un côté plutôt que vers un autre par le poids d'aucune raison est -le plus bas degré de ma liberté, et fait plutôt paraître un défaut -dans la connaissance qu'une perfection dans la volonté: car si je -connaissais toujours clairement ce qui est vrai et ce qui est bon, je -ne serais jamais en peine de délibérer quel jugement et quel choix je -devrais faire; et ainsi je serais entièrement libre, sans jamais être -indifférent._[9] - -Among the false formulæ of the _freedom of choice_ can be mentioned -that of Rosmini, who calls it _bilateral_ freedom, or that of -performing or not performing a given action.[10] But since the spirit -cannot be reduced to complete passivity, not to perform a given action -is equivalent to performing a different one; and if this other action -that presents itself before us be also not willed by us, then it will -be another, and so on. Thus it is not a question of bilaterality, but -of multiplicity of tendencies: not of the choice between two volitions, -but of the synthesis of many appetites in one, which is the will or -freedom. - -[Sidenote: _Conscience and responsibility_] - -We may mention the disputes that have been preserved in the -_Memorabilia_ as to the greater responsibility of him who knows more -(or wills more), as compared with him who knows less (or wills less), -as to whether he that acts voluntarily be more unjust than he who -acts involuntarily (ὁ ἑκὼν ἤ ὁ ἄκων). In this connection it is to -be observed that he who voluntarily does not write or read well is -certainly more grammatical than he who reads and writes ill through -ignorance; and therefore that he who commits injustice while knowing -what is just, is more just than he who commits it because he does not -know what is just; and that he is better, who says what is false when -he knows what is true, than he who says what is false, not knowing what -is true. The dispute leads to the celebration of knowledge of self, or, -as we should say, of knowing and possessing oneself.[11] - -These thoughts are discussed anew in the _Hippias minor,_ where -the multiple difficulties are placed in relief and a conclusion -reached that does not even satisfy those who propose it.[12] It is -henceforward clear that the question must be solved in the sense that -he who is conscious of sinning is certainly a sinner, whereas he who -is not conscious of so doing, does not sin at all; but this being even -incapable of sinning is in itself a sin, and places the man who is in -such a condition yet a degree lower. In the polemic of Pascal with the -Jesuits--who maintained that in order to sin it was necessary to be -conscious of one's own infirmity and of the suitable remedy, the wish -to be healed and to ask it of God--the Jesuits were theoretically on -the side of reason. _Croira-t-on, sur votre parole_ (wrote Pascal), -_que ceux qui sont plongés dans l'avarice, dans l'impudicité, dans -les blasphèmes, dans le duel, dans la vengeance, dans les vols, dans -les sacrilèges, aient véritablement le désir d'embrasser la chasteté, -l'humilité et les autres vertus chrétiennes?_ Nevertheless, it is -inevitably so, if those acts of theirs are to be judged to be vices -(and if they really are so). Hegel places himself on the side of -Pascal, who accepts and refers to the following argument and reduction -to the absurd: _Ils seront tous damnés ces demi-pécheurs qui ont -quelque amour pour la vertu. Mais pour ces francs-pécheurs, sans -mélange, pleins et achevés, l'enfer ne les tient pas: ils ont trompé le -diable à force de s'y abandonner._[13] - -A reduction to the absurd which is not such: because the formula given -as absurd expresses at bottom a very simple truth, which Hegel too -stated in his own way, when he said that it was necessary to prefer -self-will, evil, the erring Spirit, to the innocence of plants and -animals, or of Nature.[14] - -[Sidenote: _The concept of duty._] - -IV. A classical example of the disputes as to the principle of the -Philosophy of the practical, arising from the consideration of this -principle in its empirical formulations, can be furnished from the -polemic of Herbart against Kant on the subject of _duty._ Herbart -demonstrated that duty is not an original but a derived concept, -and that it appears only when there is disagreement between the -practical _ideas_ and the _will_.[15] But it would be possible to -demonstrate with the same method that the practical ideas are derived -concepts, because they do indeed presuppose the moral will, from the -manifestations of which they are constituted by means of abstraction. -Herbart was in the right against Kant, but he afterwards let the axe -fall on his own feet. The hard formula of the imperative preferred by -Kant had already been combated by Frederick Schiller, who accentuated -the moment of pleasure, sympathy and enthusiasm in the good action. - -[Sidenote: _Repentance and remorse._] - -As to the other concepts and to the disputes to which they gave rise, -it will be opportune to mention repentance and remorse. Spinoza does -not see that it has value as a necessary negative moment, for he -declared: _Poenitentia virtus non est, sive ex ratione non oritur; sed -is qui facti poenitet bis miser, seu impotens est. Nam primo prava -cupiditate, dein tristitia vinci se patitur;_ and he concludes by -assigning to it value for altogether empirical motives. Men rarely -live (he says) _ex dictamine rationis_; and yet repentance and other -similar affections do more good than harm, and if it be necessary to -sin _in istam partem potius peccandum. Terret vulgus, nisi metuat._[16] -But it was Hegel who instituted a regular persecution of the concept -of repentance and remorse. There are certain passages in his works -that should be read in connection with this question, in order that -we may clearly see how he had an eye to contingent and historical -events in his criticism. "In the Christian world in general (he writes) -there is in force an ideal of the perfect man, who cannot exist as -multitude in a people; and if this ideal is found realized in monks, -quakers, and such-like pious folk, it must be remarked that a mass of -these sad creatures does not constitute a people, just as lice and -parasitic plants cannot exist by themselves, but only on an organic -body. In order to constitute a people, it would be above all desirable -to destroy that lamblike gentleness of theirs, that vanity which is -occupied solely with their own persons, the caring for them and holding -them dear, and has always before it the image and consciousness of -its own excellence. For life in the universal and for the universal -demands, not such vile and listless gentleness, but an energetic -gentleness, not a thinking of oneself and one's own sins, but of the -universal and of what should be done for it. To him who nourishes so -false an ideal, men must always appear to be affected with weakness -and corruption, and that ideal to be so constituted that it can never -be translated into reality. They attribute importance to trifles, to -which no reasonable person pays special attention, and believe that -such weaknesses and defects exist, even when they are not remarked. -Nor should we admire their greatness of soul, but note rather that -their corruption lies precisely in standing still and looking at that -which they call weaknesses and errors, and in making out of nothing -something that exists. A man with such weaknesses and defects is -immediately quit of them, if he do not attach to them importance." The -observations that Hegel makes in his _Æsthetic,_ regarding the type of -the Magdalen in Italian art, are in this respect especially curious. -"In Italian painting the Magdalen appears, both within and without, -as the _beautiful sinner;_ sin in her is as seductive as conversion. -But here neither sin nor sanctity are to be taken too seriously. She -was pardoned, because she had loved much; she sinned through love and -beauty; and the affecting element lies in this, that she has scruples -about her love, and beautiful and sensible as she is, sheds torrents of -tears. But her error is not that she has loved so much; her beautiful -and moving error is precisely that she believes herself to be a sinner, -whereas her sensitive beauty gives the impression that she could not -have been otherwise than noble and of lofty senses in her love."[17] - -[Sidenote: _The doctrine of the passions._] - -V. The relation between the passions or desires and the will has rather -been studied at the moment of strife between the will and the passions, -than for itself and within its two terms, although Aristotle had -already begun an analysis as to the diversity of appetites or βούλησις -in respect to the intention or προαίρεσις, observing that the intention -relates only to what can be done, whereas the appetition relates also -to things that are impossible.[18] The opposed schools of the Cynics -and Cyrenaïcs, Stoics and Epicureans, and others such, were chiefly -concerned with the antithesis of the passions and the rational will; -but the formulæ of all these schools, if they have some empirical value -as precepts of life more or less suitable for definite individuals, -classes and times, possess none or very little for philosophy. Cynics -and Cyrenaïcs, Stoics and Epicureans, they seem rather to be monks -following this or that rule than philosophers. The question as to the -mode of freeing oneself from the passions and of dominating them, -which lingered till the treatises of Descartes and Spinoza, has -also a chiefly empirical character. G. B. Vico took up a position -opposed to the two opposed degenerations arising from those practical -tendencies, that of "quenching the senses," and of "making a rule of -them." He despised both Stoics and Epicureans as "monastic or solitary -philosophers," and maintained as "a philosopher politician," that it is -needful "not to tear away his own nature from man, nor to abandon him -in his corruption," but "to moderate the human passions and to make of -them human virtues."[19] Rarely has the defence of the passions enjoyed -an equally limpid philosophical enunciation; as a rule, and even in -Hegel, it has been directed chiefly against certain social tendencies, -rather than against philosophical doctrines.[20] The absolute -abandonment to the passions or their absolute destruction, are theories -that have not had true and proper representatives.--The confusion -between the various meanings of the word "passion," understood now -as appetition, or concrete and actual passion, now as a state of the -soul (joy and sorrow), now as volitional habit, is to be found in the -various treatises that we have already had occasion to record. It is -natural that their character of indifference when understood as habits -should have often been observed. Thus for Descartes, _elles sont toutes -bonnes de leur nature et nous n'avons rien à éviter que leurs mauvais -usages ou leur excès._[21] - -[Sidenote: _Virtues and Vices._] - -On the other hand, the erroneous form of the defence of the passions, -consisting of making them the preparation or cause of the virtues, is -already to be found in the English philosophers of the seventeenth -and eighteenth centuries (More, Shaftesbury, etc.); and in the -celebrated _Fable of the Bees_ of Mandeville, it assumes the aspect of -a paradoxical theory, in which the vices are looked upon as promoters -and factors of progress, morality as inefficacious and harmful for this -purpose. And La Rochefoucauld had written: "_Les vices entrent dans -la composition des vertus comme les poisons dans la composition des -remèdes._"[22] - -[Sidenote: _The doctrine of individuality: Schleiermacher._] - -All these are false or crude forms, in which is involved the doctrine -of the right to individuality, and they have always constituted and -still constitute its danger. This doctrine received its most energetic -expression in the romantic and preromantic period, thanks above all to -Schleiermacher, after it had been referred to in a rather vague way by -Jacobi.[23] - -"For some time" (writes Schleiermacher in the _Monologues_) "I too was -satisfied that I had discovered Reason; and venerating equality with -the _Unique Being_ as that which is most lofty, I believed that there -was one single measure for every case, that action should be in all of -them the same, and that each one is distinguished from the other only -in so far as it occupies a place of its own in space. I believed that -humanity manifested itself differently only in the variety of external -facts; but that the internal man, the individual, was not a being -peculiarly (_eigenthümlich_) constructed, and that each was everywhere -equal to the other." "But afterwards was revealed to me that which -instantly raised me to a high state of exaltation: it became clear that -every man must represent humanity in his own way, in an altogether -individual combination of its elements, in order that it may manifest -itself in every mode, and that everything most different may issue from -its bosom and become effectual in the fulness of time and space.... -Owing to this thought, I felt myself to be a work individually willed -and therefore elected by the Divinity and such that it must enjoy a -particular form and culture; and the free act to which this thought -belongs has collected and intimately joined together the elements of -human nature in a peculiar existence." - -"While I now do whatever I do according to my spirit and sense, -my fancy places before me as very clear proof of the internal -determination, a thousand other modes, in which it would be possible to -act otherwise without offending the laws of humanity: I rethink myself -in a thousand different forms, in order to discover with the greater -certainty that which is especially mine."[24] - -[Sidenote: _Romantic and very modern theories._] - -But this peculiarity (_Eigenthümlichkeit,_) opportunely placed in -relief by Schleiermacher, and a thought much loved by the Romantics -(Herder, Jacobi, G. Humboldt, the Schlegels, etc.), is often seen to -degenerate into individual caprice, even in those times, as may be -observed in the sort of caricature which Frederick Schlegel made of the -Fichtian I, become the individual I, and in the notorious _Lucinde,_ -to which the same Schleiermacher inconsiderately devoted a series of -letters of comment and defence. The last offshoots of the Romantics -were Max Stirner and Frederick Nietzsche: in the former the value -of individuality becomes changed into an affirmation of spasmodic -egotism; in the second there is a continuous mixture of true and false, -of good and of bad individuality, as is natural in a writer whose -_Eigenthümlichkeit_ was rather that of a poet than of a thinker. - -[Sidenote: _The concept of development and progress._] - -VI. We have discussed elsewhere Hegel's concept of development, and -his thought as synthesis of opposites, which essentially belongs to -the Hegelian philosophy and has been superficially treated and adopted -by other philosophical schools, and this is not the place either to -retrace their history or to demonstrate into what errors Hegel fell -through abusing the truth that he had discovered. Among the errors of -that philosophy (as for that matter of all contemporary philosophies -and of those that have followed one another down to our own day), is -to be noted the persistence of the concept of Nature as a mode of -reality opposed to the mode of the Spirit, whence came a dualism that -was not effectually surpassed, save in appearance. The doctrine of -development by opposites is to be understood as accepted and maintained -here, with the correction of the concept of nature, and also the -doctrine of the synthesis of opposites, free from the use or abuse -of it by Hegel for distinct concepts (and worse still, for empirical -concepts). As for the concept of Providence, which is neither Fate -nor Fortune, nor the work of a transcendent God, this, in its modern -form, goes back to the _Scienza nuova_ of Vico and is not to be -confounded with the personal religious beliefs that Vico held and kept -distinct from his philosophical concept as to immanent Providence. -The same concept reappears in the Hegelian philosophy under the form -of the Idea, or of the _astuteness of Reason,_ which avails itself -of men as its instruments and managers of business.[25] Finally, the -conception of cosmic progress was extraneous to the oriental world, -to the Græco-Roman, and to the Christian worlds, prevailing in turn -in the latter that of decadence from an original state of perfection -and of circles or returns. In its modern form it takes its origin from -thinkers free of these religious views, who merge in the philosophies -of becoming and of evolution. But the concept of progress destroyed -itself in many of these rationalistic philosophies, the "disappearance -of evil" being posited as possible (Spencer), and a definite state -of perfection conceived (though transferred from the past into the -future), that is to say a Reality that should be Reality, indeed, -perfect Reality having ceased to be development, that is to say, itself. - - - -[1] _Kr. d. prakt. Vern._ p. 119. - -[2] _Phil. d. Rechtes,_ §§ 4, 15. - -[3] Lotze, _Grundzüge der Ethik_ (Leipzig, 1884), pp. 26, 30-31; Wundt, -_Ethik_² (Stuttgart, 1892), pp. 463-464. - -[4] _Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience_ (Paris, 1898). - -[5] _Tract, theol.-pol._ vi. c. 6; _Ethica,_ p. iv. intr.; _Epist._36 -(_Opera,_ pp. 208, 378, 597). - -[6] _Kr. d. pr. Vernf._ p. 79. - -[7] _System der Sittenlehre,_ in _Werke,_ iv. pp. 198-205. - -[8] See my study: _Ciò che è vivo e ciò che è morto della filosofia di -Hegel_ (Bari, 1907). - -[9] _Médit._ iv. - -[10] For example, _Compendio di Etica_ (Roma, 1907), p. 56. - -[11] _Mentor,_ iv. c. 2, § 19 _sqq._ - -[12] _Hippias minor,_ 375. - -[13] Pascal, _Provine,_ i, iv.; Hegel, _Phil. d. Rechtes,_ § 40. - -[14] _Enc._§ 248. - -[15] _Allg. prakt. Phil._ pp. 121-122; _Einl. i. d. Phil._ (trad, -ital.), pp. 118, 171, 224. - -[16] _Ethic,_ iv. prop. 54, p. 480. - -[17] _Gesch. d. Phil._ ii. 240-241; _Vorles. üb. Aesth._ ii. 162-163. - -[18] _Eth. Nicom._ Bk. iii. cc. 2-3, 1111-1113. - -[19] _Scienza nuova seconda,_ degn. 5. - -[20] _Phän. d. Geistes,_ pp. 484-486; _Encycl._ § 474; _Phil. d. -Rechtes,_ § 124; _Phil. d. Gesch._ pp. 39-41. - -[21] _Traité des passions,_ iii. § 211. - -[22] _Maximes,_ n. 182 (Ed. Garnier, p. 43). - -[23] _Woldemar,_ pp. 112-113. - -[24] _Monologen,_ in _Werke,_ i. 366-368, 372. - -[25] See the study of Hegel mentioned. - - - - -THIRD SECTION - - -UNITY OF THE THEORETICAL AND THE PRACTICAL - - -[Sidenote: _Double result; precedence of the theoretical over the -practical and of the practical over the theoretical._] - - -The study of the practical activity in its relations that we made in -the first section has removed all doubt as to the thesis that the -practical activity presupposes the theoretical, or that _knowledge is -the necessary precedent of volition and action._[1] But the succeeding -study of the practical activity in its dialectic having led to the -result that the practical activity is reality itself in its immediacy, -and that no other reality (or we may say _other nature_) is conceivable -outside will-action, compels us also to affirm the opposite thesis, -that the theoretic activity presupposes the practical, and that -_the will is the necessary precedent of knowledge_.[2] And it is a -precedent, not indeed in the sense admitted from the beginning, of -the necessary implication of the will in every theoretical act, as -will to know, by means of the unity of the Spirit[3] (for this will -is subsidiary and not constitutive; but if it become constitutive it -produces, as has been seen, wilfulness and the theoretical error[4]), -but precisely in the sense of a constitutive will, without which no -knowledge would be thinkable. - -Knowledge, indeed, is knowledge of something: it is the remaking of -a fact, an ideal recreation of a real creation. If there have not -previously been a desire, an aspiration, a nostalgia, there cannot be -poetry; if there have not been an impulse or a heroic deed, the epic -cannot arise; if the sun do not illumine a landscape, or a soul invoke -a ray of sunlight upon the countryside, the picture of a luminous -landscape cannot exist. And if there be not a world of reality that -generates a world of representations, Philosophy, which is the search -for the universal, is not conceivable, nor History, the understanding -of the individual. - -[Sidenote: _Error of those who maintain the exclusive precedence of -either._] - -The indubitability of this affirmation, which no force of sophistry -can destroy, renders fallacious both the opposite theses, which have -several times been variously proposed and maintained: the exclusive -priority of the theoretic, and the exclusive priority of the practical. - -Those who maintain them enter into so desperate a contest with -reality, that in order to issue from it without too much dishonour, -they are finally compelled to call in the aid of a third term, which is -in turn either thought that is not thought, or will that is not will, -or something grey that contains in itself thought and will, without -being either the one or the other, nor the unity of that duality. On -the one hand is postulated a Logos, a thought _in se_ (one does not -understand how this can ever think and be thought), and it is made to -adopt the resolution (which one does not understand how it can ever -adopt) of coming forth _from itself_ and creating a nature, in order -to be able to return finally to itself, by means of this alienation, -and to be henceforth _per se,_ that is to say, able to think and to -will. The defect of this artificial construction, its mythological and -religious origin, can be said to have been already revealed, in the -comparison employed with reference to it by the author who maintained -it (Hegel), to the effect that the Logos is God _before_ the creation -of the world: a God, that is to say, altogether unreal and absurd. -On the other hand, the excogitation of a _blind Will_ (Schelling, -Schopenhauer) completely tallies with this Thought that does not think -because it has not previously willed, and that does not truly will -because it has not previously thought, and all of a sudden fashions -for itself the instrument of knowledge, to succeed in surpassing -itself in this alienation from itself, by means of liberation from -willing obtained in the contemplation of the ideas and in asceticism. -Here, too, we must repeat that the one error passes over and converts -itself into the other, and this inevitable conversion causes the other -secondary and hybrid forms of theory to have but slight interest, those -in which the priority has been conceived as that of fancy, or feeling, -or the unconscious, or the indifferentiated, and the like, all of which -represent vain efforts to suppress one of the two fundamental forms of -the spirit, or to derive them from a third, which consciousness does -not reveal. - -[Sidenote: _Problem of the unity of this duality._] - -This however does not mean that the demand to conceive the link of that -duality, or the unity of the theoretical and the practical, manifested -in all these erroneous attempts, is not legitimate. But in order to -conceive this, it is necessary to insist above all upon the reality of -this duality, of which is sought the connection and the unity. - -[Sidenote: _Not the duality of opposites._] - -This connection cannot be the relation or synthesis of opposites. The -theoretical is not the opposite of the practical, nor the practical -the opposite of the theoretical: the opposite of the theoretical is -error or the false, as the opposite of the practical is the volitional -contradiction or evil. The theoretical, far from being negative, is -positive, not less than the practical, and inversely. Neither form can -therefore be in any way debased to a simple opposite. Opposition is -intrinsic to the spirit and is to be found in each one of its forms: -hence the general value of the spirit (activity against passivity, -rationality and reality against irrationality and unreality, being -against not-being) and that of its special forms (beautiful against -ugly, true against false, useful against useless, good against evil). -But precisely for this reason, it cannot constitute the character of -one form in respect to the other: neither that of the true against the -good, nor that of the beautiful against the useful, and so on. - -[Sidenote: _Not duality of finite and infinite._] - -Nor can the connection be thought as are thought the subdivisions of -the theoretic and the practical forms, or according to the relations -of individual to universal, of finite to infinite, the first of -which terms conditions the second, but is conditioned by it only in -an implicit manner. Of the two theoretical forms (and we shall see -further on that the forms of the practical are also two), the æsthetic -precedes the logical and is autonomous: a song, a story, a statue, do -not express any concept; but the philosophy that gives the concept, is -at the same time fancy, expression, word: the prose of the philosopher -is his song. The æsthetic form is the knowledge of the individual; -the logical that of the universal, which is also individual. But this -relation that arises within the theoretic, as within the practical -form, cannot be transported to the relation of the two forms without -logical incoherence: the subdivision, so to speak, is not the -division. Thought is not the finite in respect of willing, which is -the infinite; nor is the will the finite in respect of thought, which -is the infinite. Thought and will are both of them at once finite -and infinite, individual and universal. He who passes from action to -thought, does not limit his own being by becoming finite; nor does he -limit it by passing from thought to action; or better, in both cases he -makes himself finite to attain to the infinite; poet to open to himself -the way to the thought of the eternally true; man of action, that he -may dedicate his work to the eternal good. - -[Sidenote: _Perfect analogy of the two forms, theoretic and practical._] - -The two forms, theoretical and practical, both positive, both a -connection of finite and infinite, correspond in everything, as has -already appeared from our exposition, in which the appeal to the one -from the problems of the other has always aided a better penetration -of the nature of such problems and the finding of their solution. -Thus in both there is genius and creation (geniuses of art and of -thought, and geniuses of action); in both, reproduction and judgment -take place in the same way (æsthetic taste, practical taste; history -of art and history of philosophy, history of actions); in both arise -representative concepts and empirical rules. The analogy will be -better illustrated by what is to follow, when will be demonstrated the -correspondence between art and economic, logical thought and ethicity, -historical discrimination and ethical discrimination, empirical -concepts and laws of action, and so on. - - -[Sidenote: _Not a parallelism, but a circle._] - -If this analogy exclude the possibility of the two forms being -_unequal,_ it must not, on the other hand, be perverted with the -object of conceiving them _parallel,_ as would perhaps be pleasing -to the parallelists of spirit and nature, soul and body; this is an -expedient that is certainly easy, but certainly not satisfying. They -are not parallel, but are on the contrary bound, the one to the -other, in such a way that the one proceeds from the other. From the -æsthetic apprehension of reality, from philosophical reflection upon -it, from historical reconstruction, which is its result, is obtained -that knowledge of the actual situation, on which alone is formed and -can be formed the volitional and practical synthesis, the new action. -And this new action is in its turn the material of the new æsthetic -figuration, of the new philosophical reflection, of the new historical -reconstruction. In short, knowledge and will, theory and practice, -are not two parallels, but two lines, such that the head of the one -is joined to the tail of the other; or, if a geometric symbol also be -desired, such that they constitute, not a parallelism, but a _circle._ - -[Sidenote: _The circle of Reality: thought and being, subject and -object._] - -They constitute therefore the circle of reality and of life, which is -duality-unity of thought and being, of subject and object, in such -a way that to think the subject is the same as to think the subject -of an object, and to think an object is the same as to think the -object of a subject. In truth, it sometimes seems strange and almost -impossible that such hard and difficult questions should have arisen -as to the objectivity of knowledge, and as to whether thought attains -to being, or whether there be a being beyond thought. Thought is such, -precisely because it affirms being, and being is such, precisely -because it is generated by a thought. It is only when we remember -that in those questions were included others of a very difficult and -intricate nature, concerning divine transcendency and the content of -the concept of nature (gnoseological questions, which it is the glory -of modern philosophy to have asked and solved);--it is only then that -we understand how the relation of thought and being, of knowing and of -willing, has also become obscure. Kant was forced to come to a stop -before the mystery of reality, because he had not altogether conquered -transcendency, nor altogether surpassed the false conception of nature -as _ens,_ given by the naturalists. It revealed itself to him, not -as a circle, but as an assemblage of lines diverging or joining to -infinity. Hegel made two of will and nature, owing to the insufficiency -of his gnoseological theory relating to the natural sciences, and was -led to posit a Philosophy of nature in opposition to a Philosophy of -the spirit, thus permitting to exist a form of non-mediate dualism, -after he had destroyed so many, or making it mediate in the artificial -manner to which we have referred. The shadows of that gnoseology having -been dispersed, the relation between theory and practice, subject and -object, appears in full light; and the answer becomes very simple to -the question as to how, when everything is unconvertible relation of -condition and conditioned, thought and being are reciprocally condition -and conditioned, and as to how the vicious circle is avoided. The -criticism of vicious circles includes in itself and affirms the idea -of a circularity that is not vicious; thought and being are not a -succession of two finites, but an absolute relation, that is, the -Absolute itself. To express ourselves mythologically, if the creation -of the world be the passage from chaos to cosmos, from not-being to -being, this passage does not begin either with the theoretic or with -the practical, with the subject, or with the object, but with the -Absolute, which is the absolute relation of the two terms. _In the -beginning was neither the Word nor the Act; but the Word of the Act and -the Act of the Word._ - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the theories as to the primacy of theoretical -or of practical reason._] - -It is well to state again that in consequence of the relation and -correlation established, all the questions as to the primacy of -thought or will, of the contemplative or active life, and speaking -more empirically, of the thinker or the man of action, disappear. -To pose such problems is as though one were to ask which of the two -semicircles of a circle has precedence. Similar questions, always -insoluble or badly solved, have their origin in internal obscurity as -to the fundamental correlation. When man has attained to the summit of -knowledge (a summit that is certainly not Art; nor, strictly speaking, -Philosophy, but History, the knowledge of the concrete real, that -is, the actuality of philosophy), when he has completely penetrated -the actual situation, can he perhaps stop at this point and say _hic -manebimus optime?_ Can he arrest life which is raging and demanding -to be continued? And if he succeed in suspending it for an instant in -thought, why has he suspended, if not to continue it? Knowledge is -not an end, but an instrument of life: knowledge that did not serve -life would be superfluous and harmful.--On the other hand, when a man -has willed and has thrown himself into action, when he has produced -another piece of life, can he blindly continue to produce life for -ever? Would not blindness impede the production itself? Therefore he -must rise from life to knowing, if he wish to look in the face the -product that he has lived, and surpass it with thought, for which life -is now means and instrument. Knowledge serves life and life serves -knowledge; the contemplative life, if it do not wish to become insipid -ease, must lead to activity, and that activity, if it do not wish to -become an irrational and sterile tumult, must lead to contemplation. -Reality, in specifying aptitudes, has formed men of thought and men -of action, or of prevailing thought or prevailing action, these not -superior to those, for they are collaborators.--Thus the discussions -as to whether human progress be moral or intellectual, or whether the -propelling force be the practical and economic activity, or philosophy, -or religion (Buckle, Kidd, etc.), are shown to be vain. - -[Sidenote: _New pragmatism: life conditioning Philosophy._] - -It is rather to be considered that from this bond between theory -and practice is obtained a pragmatism of a new sort, of which the -pragmatists have never thought, or at least have not been able to -distinguish from the others and to give it value. If Life condition -Thought, we have in this the apodictic demonstration of the always -historically conditioned form of every thought; not only of Art, which -is always the art of a time, of a soul, of a moment; but also of -Philosophy which can solve only those problems presented by Life. Every -philosophy reflects and cannot but reflect the preoccupations, as -they are called, of a definite historical moment; and this, not in the -quality of its _solutions_ (in which case it would be and is indeed bad -philosophy), but in the quality of its _problems._ Thus it is at once -contingent and eternal, mortal and immortal, extratemporal and living -only in time and history. - -[Sidenote: _Deductive confirmation of the two forms and deductive -exclusion of the third feeling._] - -Finally, with the establishment of the duality-unity of the theoretical -and the practical, we have demonstrated that which at the beginning -of the exposition had only been asserted and presupposed: namely, -why a _practical_ form of the spirit must be placed beside the -theoretical,[5] and why there is no _third_ form beyond these, whether -it be called _feeling_ or by any other name.[6] The theoretical form -postulates the practical, because the subject postulates the object; -but the spirit does not postulate a third form intermediate between the -two, or unity of the two, because it is itself precisely mediator and -unity of itself, _subject-object._ - - - -[1] Section I. - -[2] Section II. - -[3] Section I. c. 3. - -[4] Section I. c. 4. - -[5] Section I. c. 1. - -[6] Section I. c. 2. - - - - -SECOND PART - -THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS SPECIAL FORMS - - - - -FIRST SECTION - - -THE TWO PRACTICAL FORMS: ECONOMIC AND ETHIC - - - - -I - - -DISTINCTION OF THE TWO FORMS IN THE PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS - - -[Sidenote: _The utilitarian or economic form, and the moral or ethical -form._] - -All that has been developed in the preceding book concerns the -practical activity _in general:_ therefore no account has been taken of -the special distinctions of the practical forms, as though there were -none, or they have only been alluded to as something problematical; -and when exemplifications have been given, recourse has been had -indifferently to one or to the other of the forms commonly admitted, -whether or no they are to be held philosophically distinguishable. -Now, on the contrary, we affirm in an explicit manner that the spirit, -which we have seen distinguished as theoretical and practical, is -sub-distinguished as practical spirit, into two forms, of which the -first may be called utilitarian or _economic,_ the second moral or -_ethical._ - -[Sidenote: _Insufficiency of the descriptive and psychological -distinction._] - -In affirming this sub-distinction, we are obliged to renounce (as we -have already done for the practical in respect to the theoretical) a -demonstration by the psychological method, which has already shown -itself to be vicious. If indeed it were applicable in this field, we -should doubtless be able to strike the intellect and persuade the soul -for a moment, by pointing to the spectacle of life as a demonstration -of the two forms, economic and ethic, showing on the one hand, farmers, -commercial men, speculators, conquerors of men and of territories, -wielders of the word or of the sword as instrument of dominion; -and, on the other hand, educators, benefactors, disinterested and -self-sacrificing men, martyrs and heroes; on the one hand, economic -institutions (manufactories, mines, exchanges, exploration companies), -and on the other moral institutions (educators and schools, charitable -societies, orders of Sisters of Charity, or red, white, or blue Cross -Companies, and so on). What can be better proof of the reality of the -bipartition enunciated? Cannot we touch it, as with the hand? However -(as already in the case of the distinction between the theoretical -and the practical), what is touched with the hand is not on that -account seized by the intellect, and indeed in a little while it also -escapes the hand which had thought to be its master. For when we better -observe the individuals who seemed to be merely economic, they seem to -be also moral, and inversely;--moral institutions are also economic, -and economic moral The benefactor calculates and wishes to attain his -object with the same _cupiditas_ as the peasant, all intent upon gain; -and the peasant in his turn is ennobled in his chase after lucre by -the dignity of labour and by the moral impulses that sustain it;--all -charitable institutions are economic undertakings, and economic -undertakings are subject to moral laws, so that in drawing up accounts -there is no knowing where is that material distinction between the -economic and the ethical activities. The truth is that here too it is -not possible to start from contingent facts and from their classes -with empirical limitations, to attain to philosophical distinctions, -but that it is necessary to start from these, in order to interpret -contingent facts, and finally to understand also the mode of formation -of empirical classes. For this reason the psychological method revolves -in a circle that is effectively vicious. - -[Sidenote: _Deduction and the necessity of integrating it with -induction._] - -Neither is it possible to proceed with the method that we shall call -deductive solely; that is, we see the necessity of the two sub-forms -of the practical activity, which, being the object of the subject and -therefore in every way analogous to the activity of the subject, that -is, to the theoretical, must have a duplication of forms answering -to the duplication of the theoretical activity into æsthetic and -logical, and cannot posit the universal practical without positing the -individual that shall be its vehicle. This deduction, although in every -way correct and rigorous, cannot be convincing, save when it is also -demonstrated that it responds to fact as revealed by observation, that -is, when deduction is also induction, as the speculative method demands. - -[Sidenote: _The two forms as a fact of consciousness._] - -Leaving, therefore, on this occasion also, the deductive proof to the -complete development of the theory, we shall begin by appealing to -observation of self, in order that every one may verify in himself -the existence of the two different forms of volitional acts, termed -by us economic and ethic. The economic activity is that which wills -and effects only what corresponds to the conditions of fact in which -a man finds himself; the ethical activity is that which, although -it correspond to these conditions, also refers to something that -transcends them. To the first correspond what are called individual -ends, to the second universal ends; the one gives rise to the judgment -concerning the greater or less coherence of the action taken in itself, -the other to that concerning its greater or less coherence in respect -to the universal end, which transcends the individual. - -[Sidenote: _The economic form._] - -If we wish to recognize only the moral form of activity, we soon -perceive that it draws with it the other, from which it is distinct; -for our action, although universal in its meaning, cannot but be -something concrete and individually determined. What is put in practice -is not morality in universal, but always a determinate moral volition: -as Hegel remarked in a different connection, we do not eat fruit in -general, but cherries, pears, plums, or, these cherries, these pears, -these plums; we hasten to comfort in this or that way an individual, -made in this or that way, who finds himself in this or that state of -misfortune; we do justice at this or that point of time and space to -individual beings on a definite matter. If a good action be not solely -our individual pleasure, it must become so: otherwise, how could we -carry it out? Thus, by closer examination, we realize that our action -always obeys a rational law, even when its moral law is suppressed, so -that, when every inclination that transcends the individual has been -set aside, we do not on that account remain the prey of caprice. We -shall desire only our own will, we shall follow only our own individual -inclination; but, even so, it is necessary to will this will and this -inclination coherently, not to undulate between two or more volitions -at the same time. And if we succeed in really obtaining our desire, -if, while the moral conscience is for a moment suspended within us, -we abandon ourselves to the execution of a project of vengeance and -attain to it in spite of many obstacles, thus executing a masterpiece -of ability, a practical masterpiece; even when, in this case, _populus -non plaudit,_ we for our part certainly _nos nobis plaudimus,_ and feel -most satisfied, at least so long as lasts the suspension of the moral -consciousness; for we have done what we willed to do, we have tasted, -though but for a little while, the pleasure of the gods. Whereas if, -although we follow our desire, we do something different from it, or -mingle several mutually exclusive desires with one, and having decided -not to drink wine, for example, in order to obey the advice of the -doctor and to remain in good health, we yet yield to the wish to drink -it, that pleasure is, so to say, poisoned by preoccupation, the taste -is at the same time distaste, unless we succeed in forgetting for some -moments the advice of the doctor, or think that very possibly he does -not know what he is saying. We continually apply the same criterion -to the incidents of life; actions and individuals, of whom we cannot -morally approve, drag from us sometimes cries of admiration for the -ability with which they have conducted themselves, for the firmness -that they display, worthy (as is said) of a better cause. The Epicurean -Farinata, who raised himself erect on his red-hot bed, or the impious -Capaneus who cursed Jove beneath the rain of punishing fire, obtain -from us that esteem which we refuse to those sad souls who lived -without infamy and without praise. Art has celebrated in tragedies and -poems the strong characters of great criminals, but it has turned to -ridicule in comedies little criminals, the violent who show themselves -timid, the astute who let themselves be cheated. - -[Sidenote: _The ethical form._] - -As we cannot fail to recognize this form of the practical activity, -quite individual, hedonistic, utilitarian, and economic, and the -importance that it possesses, joined to or separated from morality, -as the case may be, and the special practical judgments that have -their origin in it (the judgment of convenience, whether it be called -utilitarian or economic), so it would be impossible not to recognize -the moral form. Yes, the volitional act satisfies us as individuals -occupying a definite point of time and space, but if it fail to -satisfy us at the same time as beings transcending time and space, -our satisfaction will be ephemeral and will rapidly be changed into -dissatisfaction. To one desire succeeds another, and to this another, -and so on to infinity; but the one is different from the other, and -the new either condemns the old or is by it condemned. If we succeed -in arranging our pleasures in series and classes, and in subordinating -and connecting them, certainly there will be some gain; but the gain -will not have been a true one on this occasion either. We shall at -the most be able to guide our life according to some plan, and for a -certain time that has not the exactitude of the moment; instead of the -instantaneous will to which succeeds a different will, we shall have -general ends for which we shall work. We shall propose, for instance, -to do certain work and to abstain from doing certain other work, in -order to marry a loved one, to win a seat in Parliament, or to obtain -literary fame. But those ends are also merely contingent (they are -general, not universal), and consequently cannot assuage our thirst. -When we all have attained to them, we shall experience _le déboire_ -that _la cueillaison d'un rêve au cœur qui l'a cueilli_ always leaves -behind. The company of the fair beloved will weary, the political -ambition realized will leave the soul empty, literary fame will seem -the shadow of vanity. Perhaps too, we shall change our side, like -the sick man who cannot rest on his bed of feathers, and begin to -follow other ends; the lover deluded with matrimony will turn to other -loves; the ambitious man, weary of political life, will think of new -ambitions, or of that of not having any, and of retiring to so-called -domestic peace; the seeker for literary fame will long for ease, -silence, and forgetting. But in vain: dissatisfaction persists. And it -will always persist, and pallid Care will always sit behind us, on the -croup of our horse, if we are not able to tear from the contingent its -character of contingent, breaking its spell, and bringing ourselves to -a full stop in that _progressus ad infinitum_ from thing to thing, from -pleasure to pleasure, to which it impels us, if we be not able to place -the eternal in the contingent, the universal in the individual, duty -in desire. Then only do we acquire that internal peace, which is not -in the future, but in the present, because eternity is in the moment, -for him who knows how to place it there. Our actions will always be -new, because reality always places new problems before us, but if we -accomplish them with lofty souls, and with purity of heart, seeking in -them that which surpasses them, we shall on every occasion possess the -Whole. Such is the character of the moral action, which satisfies us, -not as individuals, but as men, and as individuals only in so far as -we are men; and in so far as we are men, only by means of individual -satisfaction. - -[Sidenote: _Impossibility of eliminating it._] - -Those men in whom the moral consciousness is wanting, or is confused -and intermittent, make us fearful--fearful for ourselves, obliged to be -on our guard against them and to ward off their snares and injuries, -and fearful for them, for if they have not already fallen the prey to -the most terrible torments, they certainly will do so. They are like -people dancing unconsciously upon ground that has been mined; the -conscious spectator trembles for them, they do not; but if by chance -they escape the danger, they will be retrospectively horrified when -they look back. The inebriation evaporates and the clear outlines of -reality reappear, but that which restores form to those outlines is -the eternal, not the contingent, morality, not desire. We see this take -place in an intense form in what are called _conversions,_ followed by -the intention of leaving the world and its false joys and retiring to a -cloister; or, without metaphor, of becoming regenerated, of beginning -a new life with new ideal presuppositions. But intensive conversions -are catastrophes which occur, like popular revolutions, when continuous -evolution is impeded. The wise man is converted and renewed at every -moment, without the solemnity of a conversion, and with the _memorare -novissima_ he retains in the contingent, his contact with the eternal. -He knows that he must love things and creatures one by one, each in -its individuality, for he who does not love thus is neither good nor -bad, not even being a man. He will wish for literary fame, political -power, matrimony, according to his aptitudes and to the conditions in -which he finds himself; but he will wish for all these things without -wishing for them; he will wish for them, not for themselves, but for -that which they contain of universal and constant; he will love them -in God, ready to abandon them immediately their ideal content shall -have left them; he will seriously desire them with all ardour for -themselves, but only when their self is also "his other self." No -thing, no creature possesses unconditioned value, which belongs only to -that which is neither thing nor creature. The value of our individual -life is conditioned for each of us, and we must guarantee and defend -it as vehicle of the universal, and we must be ready to throw it -away, as a useless and pernicious thing, when it does not serve this -end, or rebels. But the value of every being dear to us is not less -conditioned, and Jesus said with reason, when preparing himself for -his divine mission, that he had come to separate men from their wives, -their sons, their friends, and from their native land. That separation -in union, that union in separation, is the moral activity, individual -and universal. - -[Sidenote: _Confirmed by facts._] - -Thus it happens that art, which has celebrated strong characters, able -men and affairs well conducted, has also celebrated, and with greater -liveliness, those strong men who have placed their strength at the -service of that other strength which surpasses them and makes them -eternal. For this reason, no embittered soul, no sceptic and pessimist -remains long firm in his negation of all moral light; such negations -are indeed as a rule true _amantium irae. _ The singer of the lesser -Brutus who had thus ferociously imprecated: - - Foolish Virtue, hollow mists and fields - Of restless ghosts - Are thy schools, and Repentance turns her back upon - thee,... - -is the same who, on witnessing a slight act of generosity, exclaims -with emotion: - - Fair Virtue, when my spirit becomes aware of thee, - It exults, as at a joyous event.... - -The coldest and most self-contained philosophers, when they speak of -it, find themselves sometimes impelled to adopt a poetic tone, and -Aristotle will say of Justice that it is "a more wonderful thing than -Hesperus or the Morning Star,"[1] and Emmanuel Kant will compose an -apostrophe to Duty, and will write at the end of the _Critique of -Practical Reason_: "Two things fill the soul with ever new and ever -increasing veneration and admiration the more often and the longer -reflection is occupied with them: _the starry heaven_ above me, and -_the moral law_ within me." And even the great mass of rhetoric that -has for its object virtue or the moral law is a homage rendered to this -supreme force of life, reality of reality. - -The impossibility of suppressing the economic or the moral form of the -activity in our practical consciousness, the continual appeal that the -one makes to the other, the revolving of our practical judgment about -the two aspects, both of them necessary, of the useful and the honest, -energy and goodness, pleasure and duty, explain why the Psychology -and the Description of practical life have constituted the two kinds -of types and classes, of economic and of moral men, of economic and -of moral institutions. Such rough and approximate distinctions have -however at bottom, in this as in other cases, an intimate and rigorous -distinction, which every one will find evident in himself, if he look -inward upon himself and fix his gaze persistently on the universal -forms of the spirit that acts within him. - - - -[1] _Eth. Nicom._1. v. c. i, 1129 b. - - - - -II - - -CRITIQUE OF THE NEGATIONS OF THE ETHICAL FORM - - -[Sidenote: _Exclusion of materialistic and of intellectualistic -criticisms._] - -The distinction of the two forms, well known to the inner -consciousness, will appear more clearly when we examine the reasons -for which the one or the other of them has been denied. We say the one -or the other, because we have now freed ourselves from the obligation -of refuting the theses that have their origin in presuppositions, -both materialistic and intellectualiste, and therefore deny the moral -and economic activities, either because they do not admit the concept -of spiritual activity itself, or because they do not admit the more -special conception of practical activity. The greater number of -those who deny morality are nothing but mechanicists, empiricists, -materialists, and positivists, to whose brains not only do economy and -morality appear inconceivable, but also art and science and, in short, -every spiritual value. They ask: Where is this moral principle of which -you discourse? Point it out to us with your finger. But they also ask: -Where are the categories or the pure concept? Where is the æsthetic -synthesis and the pure intuition? Where is the _a priori_ of perception -and of history? Where are all these fine things you talk of as though -they existed, and that we neither see nor touch?--And for our part, we -can henceforth let them say what they will, only praying in our hearts -that God may illuminate them and make them discover (at least when they -are near to death and the dense veil of their bodies has become more -thin) that if the universals were _things_ that it was possible to -perceive as we do individual things, they would not be universals. - -[Sidenote: _The two possible negations._] - -When the double assumption of a spiritual activity and of a practical -form of it has been admitted, it is not possible to do otherwise -than either to deny the economic for the moral form, or the moral -for the economic. What might seem to be a third possibility, that of -denying the two forms, is reducible to the first, because, when the -distinction of the terms has been suppressed, there remains nothing -but the practical activity considered in general, which coincides with -the individual and economic activity. We shall begin then with the -examination of the negation of morality for economy, which is the -thesis of _utilitarianism._ Those same materialists have recourse to -utilitarianism when they wish to present some sort of a Philosophy -of the practical, but with what little right they avail themselves -of such aid, is clear from what has already been said: the useful is -always value and teleology, and materialism, in all its sub-forms and -varieties, is incapable of positing the smallest concept of value and -finality. - -[Sidenote: _The thesis of utilitarianism against the existence of moral -acts._] - -Utilitarianism affirms that no other volition exists save that -which answers to the merely individual determination, or, as it is -also expressed, to the pleasure of the individual, understanding -by pleasure, not the generic pleasure that also accompanies moral -satisfaction in the individual, but that which is exclusively -individual. Actions, therefore, as it says, are what concern it, not -their motives, that is, the motive of the individuality of the act -abstractly conceived, not that of the spirit become concrete in it; -thus, not killing for fear of punishment and not killing because -repugnant to one's own conscience, become the same thing. They are the -consequences of different conditions, but in both cases of the same -motive, which is personal convenience. And as there does not exist -a pleasure that cannot be and is not substituted for a different -pleasure, so there is not an action, however moral it be called, that -cannot be interrupted and changed, when different conditions present -themselves. Every action, every man has his price: it is all a matter -of discovering what that price is. He who seems to place the glory -of his country above all other aspirations, although he cannot, for -example, be corrupted by money, by vanity, or by pleasure, will yet -always have in him some weak point that a more expert corrupter will -discover or be able to discover; and when the discovery has been made -and the suitable transaction proposed, the glory of his country will be -abandoned, because it has been well compensated for by something else. -This way of looking upon human actions has appeared to be concrete, -exact, rational; and the utilitarian theory, if it have often been -called _hedonistic,_ and sometimes even _æsthetic_ (understanding by -æsthetic, individual pleasure), is also wont to be decorated with the -name of ethical or practical _rationalism, rational morality._ - -[Sidenote: _Difficulties arising from the presence of these._] - -All would go very well, and the practical activity would in this way be -entirely explained and unified, if we did not at every moment of life -run against the distinction between mere pleasure and duty, between -the useful and the honest action, and if there did not arise in our -conscience an invincible distinction between the things that have a -price and those that have none, and if an abyss did not differentiate -among apparently similar actions that which has a merely utilitarian -from that which has a moral motive. The utilitarians even (who, -although bad philosophers, are men, and as such carry at the bottom of -their souls a far better philosophy than they profess in books and in -the schools) are not able to suppress that distinction in themselves -and to deny all recognition to the power of morality, to which, as men, -they submit at every moment. How then are they to behave? How are they -to explain the genesis of that distinction which, by the premises that -they have posited, cannot be other than illusion? What is there that -gives effective existence to the fallacious category of morality, side -by side with the veracious one of utility? - -[Sidenote: _Attempt to explain them as quantitative distinctions._] - -There have been several attempts to solve that hard resisting term -of morality. The first, which was logically bound to present itself, -was that of considering facts called moral as nothing but empirical -groups of utilitarian facts, and of explaining the false category as -an hypostasis of those empirical groups, arbitrarily reduced to a -rigorous and philosophical concept. Banking, usury, commerce, industry, -agriculture, and labour are empirically distinguished, yet are all -economic facts. Courage, prudence, temperance, chastity, justice, -modesty are empirically distinguished, yet are all moral facts. Why -not unite the two series, and recognize the unity and continuity of -nature by the insertion among them of other types and terms? Morality -is also utility, but the utility of the _greater number_; interest is -interest, but _well understood_; pleasure is pleasure, but pleasure of -_greater duration and quantity,_ preferred to another less intense, or -more fugitive; egoism, egoism of family, of race, of human race, egoism -of _species,_ altruism; eudemonism, but _social_ eudemonism, enjoyment, -but enjoyment of _sympathy,_ utility, but utility of conforming, not -to one's own individual judgment, but to that of _public opinion._ -Thus are moral facts included in utilitarian, in the same way as the -number a hundred thousand is not less a number than two or three and -the others inferior to it, because it is composed of three and of two -and of other numbers less than itself. Cæsar Borgia murders his brother -and thus gets rid of a rival both in love and in politics, that is, he -seeks his advantage; but Giordano Bruno also seeks his own advantage, -and nothing else, when he allows himself to be burned in order to -assert his philosophy, because, for one constituted as he, with that -demoniacal fury of his for philosophical truth, the pyre must have -seemed a very miserable and negligible thing, just as his brother's -blood seemed to Cæsar Borgia. Call the one of these actions utility -of a complexity of ten and the other utility of a complexity of a -hundred, or give to the complexity a hundred the name of morality, of -well-understood self-interest, of sympathy, of altruism, and so on, and -to the complexity of ten that of utility, of individual interest, of -egoism: the two actions will not thus have been declared of a different -nature. - -[Sidenote: _Critique._] - -But the fact is that they have already been declared of a _different -nature_ by the utilitarians themselves. No one, indeed, will have been -deceived with the ingenious phraseology excogitated: _well-understood_ -interest is no longer mere self-interest; the egoism of _species_ is -not egoism, _durable_ pleasure is not mere pleasure. The difference -between the one term and the other is not quantitative, and even where -a _greater_ quantity is talked of, a _greater_ duration, a _greater_ -number, arithmetical definitions are not posited, but symbols pointing -to qualitative differences. There is a difference, not of complexity -but of nature, between the action of Cæsar Borgia and that of Giordano -Bruno; there is no common measure between baseness and moral elevation -as there is between undulating plains and mountains. The two series, of -empirical utilitarian concepts and of empirical moral concepts, are not -only irreducible to a single series, but remain obstinately distinct -and irreducible. All that can be done, and has been done, is to unify -them verbally; and in this the utilitarians have shown themselves as -bold as it was possible to be in so miserable an enterprise. But the -identity or similarity of words does not suffice to cancel the profound -distinctions of things. - -[Sidenote: _Attempt to explain them as facts either extraneous to the -practical or irrational and stupid._] - -There would have been an immediate passage from the consciousness -of the puerility of such identifications to the recognition of -a distinct ethical form, if purpose and prejudice had not made -resistance, prompting, on the contrary, the search for new expedients -for setting themselves free in theory from the tedious and recurring -phantom of morality. On this occasion also these expedients must have -been just two: that is, to declare morality or concept _extraneous_ -to the practical, or intrinsic to it indeed, but _contrary._ The -first was attempted, but feebly, when morality was spoken of as the -fantasticality of poets, as the dream or rosy illusion caressed in -life. No attention was paid to the fact that what the poet imagines -cannot be contradictory and absurd, but must indeed be founded in the -reality of life and in the nature of things; and that morality is -not the æsthetic form in which it is reproduced and represented, but -practical form or action. But the unmaintainability of this attempt -was too evident for its success. The other expedient, on the contrary, -has always had and still has great success. This turns morality into -a practical contradictory concept, that is, into something certainly -practical, but without motive, incoherent, and in contradiction to the -healthy development of the practical. It is true that it is usually -enunciated in very different words from those used by us. They speak -as follows: What is called a good and virtuous action is nothing but -the product of the association between certain acts that are for us -the means to a pleasure, and that pleasure itself; so that gradually, -even where the primitive pleasure is absent, those acts are sought -and repeated for themselves, as though in themselves pleasurable. -The savage fought against the enemies who assailed his tribe, that -he might not be made a slave or sacrificed to the idol of another -tribe, that is to say, in order to defend his personal liberty or his -life; but later on, man, forgetting that the tribe or the city or the -State were simple means for protecting life and goods, defends them -for themselves and allows himself to be despoiled and slain for his -country. In the same way (to employ the classical example), money -is first sought as a means to enjoyment, and to form a supply for -procuring a life more comfortable and secure; but by degrees he who -amasses money turns in his soul the means into the end, and becomes -avaricious, that is, he finds delight in the mere possession of money, -and sacrifices for that all his other joys, even an easy life, food, -house and sleep, which he originally intended that money should obtain -for him. Morality arises entirely from a similar process of association -between means and end, and the case of the miser explains by analogy -every act of virtue that cannot be directly reduced to simple pleasure -and individual utility. - -[Sidenote: _Associationism and evolutionism. Critique._] - -Now the association here discussed is neither that of logic nor -of æsthetic, nor valid association, synthesis, but irrational and -fallacious association. It is only possible to exchange means for end -as the result of a bad association of ideas: therefore that association -is folly and stupidity, as the miser adduced as an example is stupid -and foolish, being called "miser" precisely for this reason, with the -intention of blaming him (for this word does not mean "economic" or -"provident"). And behold! morality should be defined as that which -is practically irrational, foolish, stupid, the product of illusion -and confusion, or the _contrary_ of the practical activity, which is -clear-sightedness, rationality, wisdom. Thus defined, it is at the -same time annulled. Indeed, irrationality is that which is condemned -to be perpetually subjected to the rational; and what is called the -moral man, if he were nothing but a false associator of ideas, would be -constantly confuted by the man of good sense, by the utilitarian, who -would prevent him from committing the stupidity of sacrificing himself -for his children, for his country, or for knowledge; or, were he to -persist, would cover him with contempt and ridicule. The fear that to -discover its origin would be tantamount to abolishing morality would -therefore be perfectly justified in this new sense also; or better, -it would not be a question of a fear, but of a fact: morality would -be in a state of progressive annulment, as the effect of increasing -instruction, both in the individual and in society. It has been replied -that neither this fear nor this fact arises, because that false -association is _indissoluble,_ being a product of _heredity,_ or, to -speak of it in proper terms, it is hereditary stupidity (evolutionistic -utilitarianism). But whether inherited or acquired, it is so dissoluble -as to be dissolved in the theory proposed: _lux facta est,_ and no -one succeeds in obscuring it any longer. If, notwithstanding that -pretended light, morality be not dissipated, if recourse be had to the -miserable subterfuge of insuperable heredity (which is surpassed at -the very moment in which its origin is made clear), this means to say -that, for the moralist himself, morality is not the irrational, but -something very rational. He does not succeed in identifying it with the -merely individually useful, but neither can he reject it as the pure -and simple negative of this. And since he does not wish to abandon the -utilitaristic hypothesis, there is no other path open to him but that -of recourse to _mystery._ - -[Sidenote: _A desperate attempt: theological utilitarianism and -mystery._] - -This is precisely what happens in the last form of utilitarianism, -which has seemed to be capricious and extravagant, but is on the -contrary profoundly auto-critical, since it reveals the ultimate -essence and defect of the doctrine: what is known as _theological -utilitarianism._ Human actions are always inspired by what is merely -useful to the individual, and if a number of these seems to diverge -from this criterion, this happens because account is not taken of -an actual fact, by means of which even the actions which seem to be -divergent are reduced to the common measure. This given fact is the -life beyond this world, in which God rewards or punishes him who has -obeyed or disobeyed his will, in the life of this world. He who in this -life seems to resist the impulse of his personal advantage and performs -sacrifices of every sort, even to that of his own life, follows equally -with the others his personal advantage; and believing in God, in the -immortality of the soul, and in the reward and the punishment that -await him, he regulates his action according to these actual facts. -_Intuitionistic_ Ethic, which places a moral duty at the side of -individual pleasure, but indeducible from it, is in reality deduced -from individual pleasure, and is likewise turned into _rational_ or -utilitarian Ethic by means of the transcendental datum. In this way the -solution makes shipwreck in mystery; since God, immortality, the other -life, the divine command, punishments and rewards, cannot be defined -and justified by means of thought and concept. When utilitarianism -becomes theological, it abandons the philosophical field, confessing by -so doing its philosophical defeat. And to philosophical consideration -the distinction between the individually useful and that which is -also superindividual shines out ever more clearly after the many vain -attacks of utilitarianism, the affirmation of the moral form, as united -and distinct from the utilitarian; the _autonomy_ of Ethic against -every form of _utilitarianism_ and every _heteronomous Ethic._ - - - - -III - - -CRITIQUE OF THE NEGATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC FORM - - -[Sidenote: _The thesis of moral abstracticism against the concept of -the useful._] - -If in the course of philosophical history, the theory of utility has -sought to cause the disappearance of the other practical term, which -is morality, by swallowing it up, we are not to believe that morality -has been for its part more modest and discreet and has not in its -turn attempted to devour its companion. One exaggeration has been met -with another; to utilitarianism has been opposed that error which may -be called _moral abstracticism,_ by means of which is refused to the -concept of utility the place that belongs to it in the organism of the -spirit. - -Such a refusal (analogous to our analysis of the utilitarian theory) -cannot take place, save in three ways: that is, in so far as value is -denied to the useful, either as _practical_ concept, or as _positive_ -concept, or as _philosophical_ concept. Here too we naturally -do not take count of the theses of the materialists or of the -intellectualists, which (especially those of the former) have raged in -the field of Economy not less than in that of Ethic, giving rise to -insane attempts to explain the useful on mechanical principles, or with -the contingencies of historical evolution. - -[Sidenote: _The useful as the means or as theoretical fact._] - -The useful (it has been said) is nothing but the _means_ to obtain a -certain end. For example, if I take a walk every day with a view to -keeping myself in good health, the daily walk is the suitable means and -is therefore useful; if, on the contrary, I find that it makes me ill, -this means that it is not the suitable means and it would be, and I -should declare it to be, useless or harmful. Now by the demonstration -given above, it is known that means and end are indistinguishable in -the _practical,_ for what is called means is nothing but the actual -situation (and the knowledge of it), from which arises the practical -act, and to which that act corresponds. Thus it is most possible to -separate the means from the end; but in so doing, the consideration of -the practical act is abandoned, and we pass to that of its theoretical -antecedent; and if the mere theoretical antecedent be called "useful" -or "practical" in ordinary speech (remembering the practical act, -to which it has been or it is presumed that it may be united) then a -metaphor is employed, against which there is nothing to be said. Those, -then, who define the useful as the means should once for all realize -that with such a definition they remove that concept from the circle -of the Philosophy of the practical and transport it into Logic, where -the relation of means and end is the very same as that of cause and -effect, and it again becomes part of the theory of empirical concepts, -in which cause and effect are wont to be posited as terms separately -conceivable. This has been more or less consciously recognized, when -the useful has been defined as the _technical,_ for we know that the -technical is nothing but knowledge thus made into a metaphor, owing to -the relation that it has or is presumed to be capable of having, with -an action that has been done or is about to be done. - -[Sidenote: _Technical and hypothetical imperatives._] - -The theoretical character of the technical has, on the contrary, -been obscured, when technical knowledge has received the name -of _hypothetical imperatives,_ distinct and ranged beside the -_categorical._ The imperative is will, and is therefore always both -categoric and imperative: _a_ is willed (categorically), but _a_ would -not be willed if the condition of fact and situation _b_ did not exist -(hypothetically). The merely hypothetical imperative is the knowledge, -that remains when abstraction is made of the practical act or of the -will; and is no longer an imperative, but a theoretic affirmation. -Where effective will is not, imperatives cannot be talked of. - -[Sidenote: _Critique: the useful is a practical fact._] - -Having made clear that the definition of the useful as _means_ implies -the negation of the useful as a practical fact and its reduction to a -theoretical category already known, we must exclude the possibility -of such a reduction, for in the useful, the practical character, the -effectivity of the will, is ineliminable. "It is useful for me to take -a walk" means, "It pleases me to take a walk," "I will to do it." It -is a question, not of contemplation or of reasoning, but of volitional -movement. The knowledge that precedes the utilitarian act is one thing, -the act itself is another. The old man has the same knowledge as the -young man, he has indeed much more (_si jeunesse savait, si vieillesse -pouvait!_), but he does not will what the young man wills: he knows -that by traversing so many kilometers he will arrive at a certain -definite point; but it is not useful for him to go there, because it is -not useful for him to traverse those kilometers, or to submit to that -exertion at the risk of an illness. The utilitarian will is expressed, -not in merely hypothetical imperatives, but in those categoric -imperatives that are at the same time hypothetical. The general formula -is "will!" or "will that you will!" or "be coherent in your willing!" -as the individuated forms are those that we are continually repeating -to ourselves, "now, to bed!" "now, up you get!" and the like; which, -when developed, mean: "go to bed" (if you wish to rest yourself), "get -up" (if you wish to work), and so on. The distinction between the -cognoscitive and the volitional theses is here evident. - -[Sidenote: _The useful as the egoistic or immoral._] - -Since then, owing to the unalterably practical character of the -utilitarian fact, it was not possible to insist upon its reduction to -the technical, and since, on the other hand, it was not desired to -recognize it as a practical category side by side with the practical -category of morality, they have tried to think of it as something -certainly practical, but at the same time of little value, to beware -of it, to combat it, to free ourselves from it. "Useful" has in this -way become synonymous with wilfulness, with individual caprice, with -will more or less perverted, and (looking upon immorality as the -individual I, shut up in itself and rebelling against the universal) -with _egoism._ This theory is supported by certain common modes of -speech, in which the moral man is opposed to the man intent upon what -is useful to him as an individual, the ethical to the economic life. -But it is a question of phrases, true,' perhaps, in a certain sense, -but inexact when understood or interpreted as affirmations of a contest -between morality and utility. - -[Sidenote: _Critique: the useful is amoral._] - -We discover at once that the contest is inexistent, by merely thinking -of the case already mentioned, of the man in whom the moral conscience -is not developed or has been suppressed, or of the case--limit -called _innocence._ What is done in innocence responds, no doubt, to -individual pleasure, and so to what is useful for the individual, as -he feels it in the given circumstances: were this not so, what is done -would not be done. But innocence is not immoral on this account. It -will be _amoral,_ because it is merely individual volition deprived -of the light of the eternal; it will never be _immoral._ Thus (to -make use of the comparison and analogy of the theoretic activity) the -images that the poet creates will be without philosophy, but will not -for this reason be anti-philosophical. Because, were that so, they -would have to be partially philosophical, that is to say, to enter into -strife with philosophy; but there is no such strife, and, therefore, -those images, although philosophically not true, are none the less not -philosophically false. Yet they are theoretical acts, in the same way -that philosophy is a theoretical act. The philosophical innocence of -the poet does not change his intuitive knowledge into bad philosophical -knowledge, into a negative of philosophy.--Further, the useful not -only is not the negative of morality, but, as we know, is also a fact -that unites itself very well with morality, as the word is joined to -the thought, making it concrete and palpable, so much so that thought -without words is impossible. What honourable man would tolerate being -judged disuseful? What moral action would be truly moral, were it not -at the same time useful? The good action is good, because it is not -bad, that is, it absolutely excludes the bad at the point in which -it becomes effective; but certainly it is not so, because disuseful; -indeed, in being good, it is also useful, because it absolutely -comprehends the useful in itself at the point in which it becomes -effective. The union of morality with utility suffices to eliminate the -concept of the useful as a negative. Certainly negative and positive -do unite to give rise to becoming and to development; but their union -is that of strife, not of concord. - -[Sidenote: _The useful as ethical minimum._] - -The third way of eliminating the concept of the useful from Philosophy, -or from the Philosophy of the practical, is that which makes of it -a concept of ethical description, or an empirical and psychological -concept designating certain groups of very minute ethical facts, the -rudimentary ethical consciousness. Hence the illusion of the existence -of volitional acts indifferent in respect to morality. These acts are -really indifferentiated for the mind that is examining them, which -sometimes does not take the trouble to do so minutely, save when such -an examination is seriously undertaken, and then they are always -differentiated into good or bad. Thus it generally said that eating and -sleeping, playing at cards or at billiards, are things that appertain, -not to morality, but to individual utility, and that each one may -conduct himself as he wills in respect to them, whereas individual -choice is excluded when it is necessary to fulfil one's own obligations -of social work or of respecting the life of one's neighbour. But if -we observe attentively, we see that also in eating or in sleeping, in -playing cards or billiards, one acts morally or immorally, since, for -example, it is immoral to ruin one's health with eating too much, -or with sleeping too little, or to corrupt soul and intellect with -card-playing and dawdling in billiard-rooms, when one can do something -better. - -[Sidenote: _Critique: the useful is premoral._] - -But the useful is none of all these things; it is not the complex of -ethical micro-organisms, in which we discover with the microscope the -same facts of life and of death that we observe with the naked eye in -macro-organisms. No microscope will ever discern in it the oppositions -of moral good and evil, because these oppositions are not really there; -there are only those of utilitarian or economic good and evil. For the -useful is not the moral minimum, but the _premoral._ In this case it -is a question, not of approximative, but of rigorous difference; not -psychological, but philosophical. - -[Sidenote: _A desperate attempt: the useful as inferior practical -conscience. Confirmation of the autonomy of the useful._] - -Finally, it is necessary to consider the attempt to present the -utilitarian conscience as a moral conscience, _different and inferior_ -to another moral conscience placed over it, not as a new mode of -eliminating the concept of the useful, by absorbing it in that of -morality, but as a confession of the autonomy of that moment of the -spirit. It would be moral, because there is no contradiction to be -found in it that can cause it to be judged immoral, and if it be so -judged, this happens because it is looked at from the point of view -of the superior conscience, or because the superior conscience is -erroneously transported into the inferior. But this has importance -precisely because it is not moral, and because the value that it is -admitted to possess, far from being morality, is spirituality; that -is to say, it constitutes a peculiar spiritual value, different from -morality. "Better a will of some sort than no will at all" is a common -saying which means that prior to morality, there is another and more -elementary spiritual demand. The distinction of the two consciences, -then, is philosophical, not one of more or less, a distinction of -degrees, but not of empirical degrees, which coincides with our -conclusion. Thus, to return to the usual comparison, the poetical -figuration is true, and can only be judged false by him who looks upon -it from a philosophical point of view, or himself falsifies it by -turning it into a bad philosopheme. But the truth of that figuration -is not philosophical, and remains purely and simply poetical truth. -It will be said that morality is implied in utilitarian volition, -because, when the individually useful is posited, the universal, which -will dominate and correct it, is promoted, in the same way as it has -been said that philosophy is implied in the æsthetic intuition, -since by positing the individual imagination is posited the claim of -the universal, which surpasses and renders it untrue. But since the -æsthetic conscience is distinguished from the philosophical, precisely -because that which in the latter is _explicit_ is only _implicit_ -in the former, so, in like manner, the utilitarian conscience is -distinguished from the moral conscience, because that morality which -becomes explicit and effective in the second, is only implicit or -actually inexistent in the first. The difference between _implicit_ and -_explicit_ is another way of enunciating the distinction between the -two consciousnesses or practical forms, the autonomy of both being thus -recognized. - - - - -IV - - -RELATION BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL FORMS - - -[Sidenote: _Economic and ethic as the double degree of the practical._] - - -The respective distinction and autonomy of the two forms, economic and -ethic, as we have hitherto been expounding it, and as results from the -words "inferior" and "superior" just now used, is that of two degrees, -at once distinct and united, such that the first can stand without -the second, but the second cannot stand without the first. The moment -of distinction lies in that possibility of existence independent of -the first; the moment of unity is in the impossibility of independent -existence of the second. If the first were wanting, there would be -identity; if the second, there would be abstract distinction or -separation. For this reason we have insisted upon showing that there -are actions without morality, yet which are perfectly economical, -whereas moral actions that are not also perfectly useful or economical -do not exist. Morality lives in concrete, in utility, the universal -in the individual, the eternal in the contingent. Hence our reason -for reducing the theses that denied the distinction between the two -practical forms to an exclusive affirmation of the economic form, this -latter being as it were the general form, which of itself involves both -itself and the other. - -[Sidenote: _Errors arising from conceiving them as coordinated._] - -Even when both the practical forms, economic and ethic, utility and -morality, are admitted, the gravest errors arise from failing to -understand the connection of unity-distinction that exists between -them, conceiving them as juxtaposed or parallel, and the respective -concepts as coordinated. - -[Sidenote: _Disinterested actions. Critique._] - -In truth, if utility and morality were coordinate concepts, each -included as species beneath the general concept of practical activity, -the first consequence that could be drawn from this (and it has been -drawn) is that morality is conceivable without utility. This has given -rise to the absurd concept of _disinterested_ actions, that is, of -those moral actions that should hold themselves aloof from any sort -of impure contact with utility. But disinterested actions would be -foolish actions, that is to say, wilful acts, caprices, non-actions. -Every action is and must be interested; indeed, the more profoundly it -is interested, so much the better. What interest is stronger and more -personal than that which impels the man of science to the search for -truth, which is his life? Morality requires that the individual should, -in every case, make his individual interest that of the universal; and -it reproves those who engage themselves in an insoluble contradiction -between the individual interest of the universal and that which is -merely individual. But it cannot claim to suppress the interest, that -is, itself, in the same way that the volitional act dominates the -passions, but cannot eradicate them without eradicating itself. Hence, -as the volitional act triumphs over the passions as the _supreme -passion,_ so morality triumphs over interests as the _supreme interest._ - -[Sidenote: _Vain polemic conducted with such an assumption against -utilitarianism._] - -The polemic of autonomous Ethic against the heteronomous Ethic of -utilitarianism has had a false and fruitless beginning, owing to this -fiction of disinterested actions. In the belief of conquering and more -than conquering, it has been attempted to show that man accomplishes -some actions without any personal interest, whereas on the contrary -an easy victory has in this way been prepared for the adversary. -Utilitarianism, in fact, has always been able triumphantly to make -the counter-demonstration that there is no action, be it as lofty as -you will, that does not answer to a personal end. It is evident that -the hero has his personal interest in the _pro patria mori,_ just as -the saint, who wishes to direct his soul toward humility, finds his -own account in allowing himself to be abused, beaten and splashed -with mud ("in this is perfect joy," said Francesco of Assisi to Frate -Leone). Correct polemic should not enter upon the useless task of -denying this evidence; it should on the contrary admit, as was admitted -above, that there is no action which does not answer to an individual -desire, since it is the individual that performs it, and the universal -is always obliged to avail itself of individuals. But when this point -has been conceded and admitted, it will prove, as was proved above, -that the useful action can either remain merely personal or progress -to the action that is universal-personal, ethical-useful. And the -ethical-useful action itself is precisely the new spiritual category -that the utilitarian does not see. - -[Sidenote: _Actions morally indifferent, obligatory, supererogatory, -etc. Critique._] - -A second erroneous but unavoidable consequence of the conception of -useful and moral as coordinated concepts is that while, according to -that theory, there can be ethical actions economically disinterested -or indifferent, so there can be actions that are useful and _morally -indifferent._ The indifferent would not be those that are merely -economic, and, therefore, neither moral nor immoral, which we have -recognized as the necessary precedent of moral actions, reappearing -always when a return is made to the state of innocence, or as soon -as the moral conscience is abolished or suspended. They would on the -contrary be economic actions that should persist as such, that is, as -ingenuous and amoral, when the moral consciousness is already kindled, -and consequently in the very circle of such a conscientiousness. -They are altogether inadmissible when thus conceived, and to have -admitted them is equivalent to annulling morality, as the recognition -of the right of subjects to rebel at their pleasure would be to annul -sovereignty, or a burlesque contract containing the clause that each -party should be free not to observe the other clauses agreed upon, at -his pleasure. Indifferent actions do not exist, either for economy -or for morality, and those to which such a character is generally -attributed are, as we know, indifferentiated, not indifferent, and -always differentiable when more closely examined. Only he who places -the useful and the moral, side by side with one another, separate -and impenetrable, is of necessity led to conceive of useful actions -morally indifferent, and as such _licit or permissible._ Hence it -also happens that moral actions also seem to be _obligatory_ compared -with the first; and that, in order to obtain equilibrium at the other -extremity, ultramoral or more than moral actions, called _meritorious -or supererogatory,_ are placed side by side with obligatory actions -that hold the mean. But morality does not grant leave _not to do,_ nor -prizes for _doing more than was required_; it simply imposes _doing,_ -doing always what is morally good, always realizing the universal, in -ordinary as in extraordinary life, on the occasions that occur every -day, every hour, every minute, as in those that occur every year, every -ten years, every century. Nothing is indifferent to economy in its -sphere and nothing to morality in its sphere: in it, economic actions -with their premoral character do not persist, but only moral actions -subsist. Economicity is certainly the concrete form of morality; but it -is never an element that possesses a value of its own in the moral life. - -[Sidenote: _Comparison with the relation of art and philosophy._] - -A comparison with the theoretic activity will serve to make clearer -this criticism of the _licit_ or morally indifferent. Artistic -intuitions or expressions are neither true nor false philosophically, -so much so that Philosophy, if it wish to exist, must also become -concrete itself, as living speech, æsthetic form, intuition-expression, -and place itself as an intuition among intuitions, though it be -an intuition _portans mysteria,_ that is, enclosing in itself the -universal. But the appearance of philosophy reacts upon the pure -intuitions, or upon the poetic representation of the world, in which -existent and inexistent were indistinct; and the world of intuition -transforms itself into the world of perceptions, in which those that -once were poetic intuitions, are now all of them critical or reflective -images penetrated by the concepts, divided into images of existence -and images of possibility. In the world of perception or of history, -no poetical element can subsist as such; what was a bewitching truth -in the field of art, were it introduced into history, would give rise -to disharmony and become changed into a repugnant lie, as we see is -actually the case in history mingled with inventions and fables. -History too assumes artistic form; but it cannot tolerate in its bosom -art as an element standing alone. Utilitarian or economic volitions and -the moral-economic volitions (universal and historical perceptions -or representations of the practical) proceed in a manner perfectly -analogous (intuitions of the practical). Moral indifference belongs -to the first, when they are on this side of the moral conscience, -but within this conscience they lose the right to innocence, as in -history the pure intuitions, when they have become perceptions, lose -the privilege that they possessed as pure intuitions. The ethical -discrimination of the economic volitions, which takes place through the -moral conscience, is then in full correspondence with the historical -discrimination of the æsthetic intuitions, which takes place through -the logical conscience. - -[Sidenote: _Other erroneous conceptions of modes of action._] - -We owe to the false conception by coordination, not only the two -monstrous little concepts of _disinterested actions_ and of those that -are morally _indifferent, licit, or permissive,_ but others also, which -have been deduced by means of a somewhat different casuistic from the -same general hypothesis. Indeed, in the preceding case, useful and -moral, posited as apart and parallel, were maintained one extraneous -to the other and at peace between themselves. But nothing forbade that -warlike plans should be attributed to those two entities, just as when -two coordinate animal species are posited, we may suppose, either -that the individuals of each one mind their own affairs and allow -the individuals of the other species to live and to prosper in peace, -or that the one takes to persecuting the other, sometimes injuring -or destroying it and sometimes being by it injured or destroyed. -Thus were and are obtained concepts of _moral anti-economic_ actions -and of _anti-economic moral_ actions, of _immoral economic_ actions, -and of _economic immoral_ actions, four concepts which are all four -to be rejected. Moral action can never be accomplished at a loss: -morality is for the moral man the supreme advantage in the situation -in which he finds himself, and it would be erroneous to measure it -by comparison with what an individual without morality would do in -the same situation, for, as we know, individual and situation are -all one, in such a way that a like comparison is impossible. In a -similar manner, an anti-economic action can never be moral; at the -most it will not even be amoral, or will not even posit the primary -and generic condition of morality, that is, it will not be action, -but inert contemplation. An immoral action can never be economic, -because immorality implies internal disagreement and strife between -one volition directed to the universal and another directed to the -merely individual, hence the result will be practical inconclusion -and infecundity, dissatisfaction and remorse; that is to say, just -the opposite of utility and economicity. In like manner, an economic -action can never be immoral: at the most (when it is merely an economic -action), it will be amoral. - -[Sidenote: Pleasure and the economic activity, happiness and virtue.] - -The bond of unity and distinction that exists between the concepts of -the useful and the moral and the consequent negation of the formula of -coordination, help to solve in a definite way the intricate questions -relating to _pleasure and morality, happiness and virtue._ - -[Sidenote: _Pleasure, pain and feeling._] - -First of all, we can here give yet another meaning to the indeterminate -category of _feeling_ with its poles of pleasure and pain, for it is -clear that when feeling was distinguished from moral activity and set -at variance with it, we had in view nothing but the pure economic -activity. And in truth, of all the tendencies included in that concept -as sketched out, this of economicity seems on the whole to prevail -over the others, so much so that we shall henceforth be disposed to -give to the word "feeling" the name of economic activity. Thus it -was reasonably maintained, with implied reference to this meaning, -that pleasure and pain are _proper_ to feeling and _extraneous_ to -the other spiritual forms, and that they only act in the others as -_concomitants._ For if the theoretical forms give rise to the dialectic -of true and false, in so far as the practical spirit can be introduced -into them, it is clear that pleasure and pain come to those forms from -the practical spirit, with which the theoretic spirit is always in -unity. In the practical spirit too, the moral activity divides into -pleasure and pain, in so far as it has concrete or economic form; and -therefore in so far as it is economic, not in so far as it is moral. -Pleasure and pain belong to feeling alone, because they belong to the -economic activity alone, which is the practical in its general form, -involving of itself all the other forms, practical and theoretic. - -[Sidenote: _Coincidence of duty with pleasure._] - -When this has been established, pleasure or economic feeling or -economic activity as positive cannot be at strife with duty or with -the moral activity in its positivity, for the two terms coincide. -The divergence existed only when they were conceived, not in unity -and distinction, but in coordination. When we speak of a good action -accompanied with pain, we make an inexact statement, or better, we make -use of a mode of expression that must be understood, not literally, -but in its spirit. The good action, as such, always brings with it -satisfaction and pleasure, and the pain said to accompany it, either -shows that the action is not yet altogether good, because it has not -been willed with complete internal accord, or that a new practical -problem, still unsolved and therefore painful, lies beyond the -pleasurable moral action. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of rigorism or asceticism._] - -The other false idea, of _rigoristic or ascetic_ Ethic, which makes war -upon pleasure as such, derives from the plan of coordination, through -the already mentioned casuistic of the conflict between the coordinated -terms. Indeed, if it be legitimate to combat this or that pleasure, -which enters into a contest with the moral act, it is not possible to -abolish the category of pleasure, for the reason already given, that -in this way the category itself of morality, which has its reality and -concreteness in pleasure (in economicity), would be abolished: the -concrete and real moral act is also pleasurable. The attempt to abolish -pleasure is as insane as would be the wish to speak without words or -any other form of expression, preserving thought pure of such sensual -contacts, that is to say, producing an inexpressed and inexpressible -thought. This last attempt has been made by _mysticism,_ which either -does not give thoughts at all, or, contradicting itself, gives them -expressed and logical, like those of all other doctrines. Asceticism -provides a complete counterpart to this in the practical field, for it -might be called _mysticism of the practical_ in the same way as the -name of _asceticism of the theoretical_ would not be unsuitable to -mysticism. - -[Sidenote: _Relation of happiness and virtue._] - -What has been said of the relation between pleasure and morality, is -to be repeated of the other between happiness and virtue, a relation -that is identical with the preceding, from which it diners only because -expressed by means of empirical concepts of class. Happiness is not -virtue, as pleasure is not morality, because there exist the pleasure -of the innocent or of the mentally deficient, and the happiness of the -child or the brute, who are without moral conscience. But virtue is -always happiness, as morality is always pleasure. It will be said that -a virtuous man may be unhappy, because he suffers atrocious physical -pain or is in financial difficulties, and, therefore, that virtue and -happiness do not coincide. But this is a vulgar sophism, because the -virtuous man, who should be also happy, must be truly and altogether -virtuous; that is to say, he must cure and conquer the ills of the body -and of fortune with his energy, if he can, or, if it be impossible -to conquer them, he must resign himself and take them into account -and develop his own activity within the limits that they lay down. -Every individual, not only the unfortunate individual of the example, -has his limits; and everyone can transform his limits into pains by -being dissatisfied with them, just as every one can, with resignation, -transform his pains into limits and conditions of activity. It will be -said that sometimes the evils that assail the virtuous man are not only -incurable, but so intolerable as to render all resignation impossible. -But he who does not effectively and absolutely resign himself, that is, -does not accommodate himself to life, dies; and the occurrence of the -death of the individual is neither happiness nor unhappiness: it is a -fact or event. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the subordination of pleasure to morality._] - -Finally, the theory that _subordinates_ pleasure or happiness, utility -or economy, to duty, to virtue, to moral activity, is to be rejected. -The subordination of the one term to the other is not possible on this -side of morality, because only one of the two terms is present; and -in like manner it is impossible in the moral circle, because, though -the terms are certainly two, they are two in one, not one above and -the other below; that is to say, they are distinct terms that become -unified. Morality has complete empire over life, and there is not an -act of life, be it as small as you will, that morality does not or -ought not to regulate. But morality has no _absolute empire over the -forms or categories of the spirit,_ and as it cannot destroy or modify -itself, so it cannot destroy or modify the other spiritual forms, which -are its necessary support and presupposition. - -[Sidenote: _No empire of morality over the forms of the spirit._] - -Hence is apparent the remarkable fatuity of those who pretend to -regulate morally the _function_ of art, of science, or of economy and -profess _moralistic_ theories of art and philosophy and a _moralized_ -economic science. The poet, the man of science, the business man, must -be as honest as others, but it is not given to them to tear in pieces -the nature of poetry, of science and of industry, in the madness of -honesty. Indeed, were this done or attempted, and the poet were to -introduce extraneous elements into his work of art, through his failure -to understand morality, or the philosopher to veil or alter the purity -of truth, or the man of business foolishly to bring his own business -to ruin, then and only then, would they be dishonest. To substitute -the _single acts_ of life that appertain to morality, for _the -universal forms of the spirit,_ and to predicate of these what should -be predicated only of those, is so evident an absurdity that it could -not be committed by anyone accustomed to philosophical distinctions. -But what nonsense is so evident that idle babblers and elegant men of -letters do not know how to cover with their ratiocinative and æsthetic -flowers and to present to society or to the academic world as truth, or -at least as a theory worthy of reflection and discussion? - -[Sidenote: _Inexistence of other practical forms and impossibility of -subdivision of the two established._] - -Such, then, are the two forms of the practical activity, and such their -relation; and as it is not possible to reduce them to one alone, so -it is not possible to multiply them beyond the two, which altogether -exhaust the nexus of finite and infinite. Hence, too, we perceive that -the economic and also the ethic-economic activity do not each of them -give rise to new subdivisions, because other terms of subdivision are -not conceivable beyond the duality of finite and infinite. As there -are no philosophical and ethical classes, nor categories of expression -(rhetoric), nor categories of concepts (formalistic logic), so there -are no economic categories and ethical categories beyond those that -constitute utility (volition of the individual) and morality (volition -of the universal). - - - - -V - - -THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMY AND THE SO-CALLED SCIENCE OF ECONOMY - -[Sidenote: _Problem of the relations between Philosophy and Science of -Economy._] - -Internal observation, confirming at all points rational necessity, -has rendered clear the existence of a special form of practical -activity, the utilitarian or economic, and of a correlative Economic -or Philosophy of economy. But however irrefutable may seem the -demonstration that we have given, yet it will never be altogether -satisfactory, while a very important point is left obscure: the -relation between our _Philosophy of economy_ and the _Science of -economy._ - -This is a system of doctrine that takes various names and forms, and -is presented in turn as political, national, pure, or mathematical -Economy; it is a system of doctrines which, although not without -precedents in antiquity, has been gradually formed, especially in -recent centuries, and is now in fullest flower. A saying of Hegel is -often recorded, not without satisfaction, for even in his time he -praised Economy as "a science that does much honour to thought, because -it extracts the laws from a mass of accidentally."[1] - -Has it the same object as our Philosophy of economy? If the reply be -in the affirmative, how does it ever arrive at concepts altogether -different? Or is it an empirical science, and if so, from what source -does it derive the rigour and absoluteness by which it is removed -from all empiricism and formulates truths of universal character? Two -strict sciences with the same object are inconceivable; and yet as -it seems, there must here be precisely two: hence the perplexity and -disorientation that the affirmation of a Philosophy of economy must and -does produce. - -[Sidenote: _Unreality of the laws and concepts of economic science._] - -If the economic actions of man be considered, in their uncontaminated -and undiminished reality, with an eye free from all prejudice, it -is never possible to establish even a _single one_ of the concepts -and laws of economic science. Every individual is different at every -moment of his life: he wills always in a new and different way, not -comparable with the other modes of his or of others' willing. If A -spent seven soldi to buy a loaf of bread yesterday, and to-day he -spend the same amount in making the same purchase, the seven soldi of -to-day are not for this reason those of yesterday, nor is the bread -the same as that of yesterday, nor the want that A satisfies to-day -the same as that of yesterday, nor is the effort that his action -costs him identical with that of yesterday. If the individual B also -spend seven soldi for a loaf of bread, the action of B is different -from that of A, as that of the A of to-day was different from that -of yesterday. If we lead the economist on to this ground of reality -(or rather to the side of this Heraclitean river, in which it is not -possible to dip the same hands twice in the same water), he will feel -himself impotent, for he will not find any point of support for the -edification of any of his theories.--The value of a piece of goods -(says a theorem of Economy) depends upon the quantity of it and of all -the other goods that are upon the market.--But what does "goods" mean? -Bread, for example, or wine? In reality, abstract bread and wine do -not exist, but a given piece of bread, a given glass of wine, with a -given individual who will give a treasure or nothing in order to eat -the one or to drink the other, according to the conditions in which he -finds himself.--Any sort of enjoyment, when protracted, decreases and -finally becomes extinguished.--That is the law of Gossen, one of the -foundation--stones of economic theory. But what are these enjoyments -that are protracted, decrease, and end by becoming extinguished? In -reality there exist only actions, which assume different positions -at every moment, owing to the continual changing of surrounding -reality, in which the volitional individual operates. The difference -is qualitative, not quantitative: if the individual A eat the bread -that he has bought for seven soldi, when swallowing the second or the -tenth or the last mouthful, he has a pleasure, not inferior to that -which he had when swallowing the first, but different: the last was -not less necessary for him, in its way, than the first; otherwise he -would have remained unsatisfied in his normal want, in his habit, or in -his caprice.--The economic man seeks the maximum of satisfaction with -the least effort.--That is the very principle of Economy, but neither -does this principle correspond with reality, most simple and general -though it be. The individual A disputes for an-hour, in order to save -two soldi in the purchase of an object, for which he has been asked -ten lire, thus attaining the maximum satisfaction for himself with the -least means that is naturally at his disposal on that occasion. The -individual B, making boast of his magnificence, lights his cigarette -with a banknote of a hundred lire, thus likewise attaining for himself -the greatest satisfaction to which he aspired, with the least means -that he possessed, namely, by burning that paper money. But if this -be so, we have here a question, not of greatest and least, but of -individual ends and of relative means adopted, or (owing to the unity -of means and ends already noted), of actions individually different. - -[Sidenote: _Economic Science founded upon empirical concepts, but not -empirical or descriptive._] - -Certainly, it is quite possible to abstract in a greater or less -measure from the infinite variety of actions and to construct a -series of types or concepts of classes and of empirical laws, thus -rendering uniform the formless, within certain limits. Thus is -obtained the concept of bread and of the consumption of bread, and -of the various portions of bread and of other objects, for which a -portion of bread can be exchanged, and so on. In this way are full -philosophico-historical reality and the method of logical necessity -and of realistic observation of facts abandoned for a feigned reality -and for a method of arbitrary choice, which, as we know, has its good -reasons for existing in the human spirit, and does great service by -the swift recall and easy control of the requisite knowledge. And -if Economy consisted in the establishment of a series of laws and -examples in the above sense (or when understood in this way), it would -join the number of the descriptive disciplines; and in that case there -would be no necessity for us to speak of it further, for it would -suffice to refer back to what has already been said of the relations of -the Philosophy of the practical with practical Description, classes, -rules, and casuistic. But economic Science is not descriptive, and is -not developed according to the following formula: goods are divided -into the classes _a, b, c, d, e,_ etc., and the class _a_ is exchanged -with the class _b_ in the proportion of I to 3, the class _b_ with the -class _c_ in the proportion of I to 5, etc. In such a formula is always -understood the _up and down,_ the _for the most part,_ and _the very -nearly:_ the classes _with their ups and downs_ are as stated; the -exchanges take place _for the most part_ in the proportions stated; if -things are to-day _very nearly_ thus, to-morrow they will be so _very -nearly,_ in a different way. - -On the contrary, the propositions of the Science of Economy are -rigorous and necessary. "Granted that soils of different degrees of -fertility are cultivated, their possessors will all obtain, besides -the absolute rent, a differential rent, with the exception of the -possessor of the least fertile soil" (Ricardo's law). "Bad money drives -out good" (Gresham's law). Now, it is not conceivable in any case that -soils of different fertility, all of them cultivated, should not give -a differential rent. It will be said that the State can confiscate the -differential rent, or that the possessor, owing to his bad cultivation -or to his bad administration, may lose it; but the proposition does -not remain less sound on this account. Nor is it possible that, when -an unchangeable paper money is in circulation, gold coins should also -circulate indifferently and on a par with it, when the total of the -money in circulation lowers the value of the monetary unit beneath -the metallic value of the better money. A madman who might be in -possession of a hoard of gold pieces at the time of the circulation of -the declining paper money (which causes poverty) would perhaps give it -in exchange for the inferior money; but the wise man will keep it in -his safe. The economic proposition expresses the rational necessity, -not the madness, which is irrational. Those propositions, like all the -others of economic science, are therefore certainly not descriptions, -but _theorems._ - -[Sidenote: _Their mathematical nature._] - -The denomination "theorems" makes us think at once of the mathematical -disciplines, among which alone can economic Science find a place. -The propositions of that science being excluded from philosophical, -historical, or naturalistic science, there remains nothing that they -can be, save _mathematical._ Yes, they are mathematical, but not pure -mathematics, for in that case they would be nothing but arithmetic, -algebra, or the calculus, that is, they would belong to the kind of -mathematical disciplines called _applied,_ because they introduce into -the paradigms of the calculus certain data taken from reality, that is -to say, taken from without the purely numerical conception. Economic -Science, then, is a mathematic applied to the concept of human action -and to its sub-species. It does not inquire what human action is; but -having posited certain concepts of action, it creates formulæ for the -prompt recognition of the necessary connections. - -[Sidenote: _Its principles; their character of arbitrary postulates and -definitions. Their utility._] - -It is not surprising that such propositions examined in their truth -appear in one respect arbitrary and in another tautological. But it is -not thus that they are examined, and it is not thus that propositions -of mathematics are ever examined, for their value lies solely in the -service that they render. Certainly Ricardo's law relating to land of -varying fertility is nothing but the definition of lands of various -fertility, in the same way that Gresham's law relating to bad money is -nothing but the definition of bad money. The same may be said of any -other economic law, as, for example, that every protective tariff is -destruction of riches, or that a demand for commodities is not a demand -for labour, since these, like the preceding, are simply definitions -of the protective tariff, of the demand for commodities, and of the -demand for labour. And it could be proved of all of them that they are -arbitrary, because the concepts of land, tariffs, commodities, money, -and so on, are arbitrary, and because they become necessary only when -that arbitrariness has been admitted as a postulate. But the same -demonstration can be given of any theorem in Geometry; since it is not -less arbitrary and tautological, that the measure of a quadrilateral -should be equal to the base multiplied by the height, or that the -sum of the squares of a cathetic should be equal to the square of -the hypotenuse. This does not prevent Geometry from being Geometry, -or negate the fact that without it we should not have been able to -build the house in which we dwell, nor to measure this star upon which -we live, nor the others that revolve around it or around which we -revolve. Thus, it would be impossible to find one's way in empirical -reality without these economic formulæ, and that would happen which -happened when economic science was still in its infancy; namely, that -by its means measures of government were adopted, which were admirably -suited to produce in the highest degree those evils which it was -thought could be avoided by its help, a misfortune of which the Spanish -government in Lombardy or in the Province of Naples in the seventeenth -century, with its _cries_ and its _pragmatics_ in economic and -financial matters, has left most excellent examples. Or what happens -now, when ignorance, or deceitful interest, which profits by ignorance, -proposes or causes to be adopted ruinous measures under the appearance -of _publica salus,_ arguing that they are good, or that they are good -for different reasons than those for which they could be maintained. -Such, for instance, would be the proposal for fresh expenditure on -public works that are useless or of little use during a period of -economic depression in a country, and instead of relieving, increase -the general depression; or the increase of protective tariffs, when -industrial progress is slow, which ought to encourage industry, but on -the contrary produce an industry that is unstable and artificial, in -place of one that is spontaneous and durable. - -[Sidenote: _Comparison of Economic with Mechanics, and reason for its -exclusion from ethical, æsthetic and logical facts._] - -The special form of application of mathematics, which we find in -economic Science, has been compared on several occasions with that -which takes place in Mechanics. "The economic man" of the first has -seemed to be altogether like the "material point" of the second, and -Economy has been called "a sort of Mechanics," or simply "Mechanics." -All this is very natural, for Mechanics are nothing but the complex -of formulæ of calculation constructed on reality, which is Spirit and -Becoming in Metaphysic, and may be abstracted and falsified in Science, -so as to assume the aspect of Force or a system of forces, for the -convenience of calculation. Economy does the same thing, when it cuts -off from the volitional acts certain groups, which it simplifies and -makes rigid with the definition of the "economic man," the laws of -"least means," and the like. And owing precisely to this mechanicizing -process of economic Science, it is ingenuous to ask oneself why -ethical, logical, or æsthetic facts are not included in Economy, and -in what way they can be included. Economic science is the sum of -abstractive operations effected upon the concept of Will or Action, -which is thus _quantified._ Now since moral facts are also will and -action, and since economic Science is not occupied with qualitative -distinctions, not even with the quality itself of that economic fact -which it employs as its material, it is clear that Science cannot -lay any stress upon moral distinguished from economic facts, nor can -it receive them in a special class, because its assumption is the -indistinction of the two orders of facts, and they are included in that -indistinction. As to æsthetic or scientific facts, these, taken by -themselves, are not facts, but representations and thoughts of facts, -and as such escape economic calculation: considered in the unity of the -spirit, they are certainly facts, that is to say, volitional products, -but as such are already found included with these in the indistinction -of economic Science. - -[Sidenote: _Errors of philosophism and historicism in Economy._] - -As a mathematical discipline, economic Science is ultimately -_quantitative,_ and it remains so, even when it makes use of the -smallest possible number of numerical and algebraical signs (even when -it is not _mathematical Economy_ in the strict sense of the word). The -attempts, both of philosophism and historicism, which claim to deny -Economy, by criticizing its abstractness and its arbitrariness, and to -make it philosophical (or as they say _psychological_) and historical -are therefore to be reproved. If Economy do not give the universal -truth of Philosophy, nor the particular truth of History, Philosophy -and History are in their turn incapable of making the smallest -calculation: if Economy have not eyes for the true, Philosophy and -History have not arms to break and to dominate the waves of fact, which -would oppress man with their importunity and finally prevent him from -seeing. Hence the absurdity of _philosophism_ and _historicism_; hence -too, the sound tendency of Economy to constitute itself _pure_ Economy, -free of _practical_ questions, which are also, it is clear, historical, -not abstract and scientific questions. - -[Sidenote: _The two degenerations: extreme abstracticism and -empiristical disaggregation._] - -But economy has in itself other enemies besides these that are -external, in so far as it is certainly a mathematical discipline, but -an applied mathematic, that is to say, one that assumes empirical -data. These empirical data can be infinitely multiplied, and hence -result infinite economic propositions, each distinct from the other; -and on the other hand, they can be regrouped, simplified and unified, -so as finally to return to the indistinct _x._ If the first tendency -prevail, we have what is called economic empiricism, a cumbrous -mass of disaggregated propositions; if the second, a very general -formula, which sometimes does not even preserve the smallest vestige -of that concept of human action from which it started, and becomes -altogether confounded with the formulæ of arithmetic, of algebra and -of the calculus. Sound economic Science must be at once abstract and -empirical, in accordance with its nature, connecting and unifying -disaggregate propositions; but it must not allow distinction to be -lost in unity, for the one is as necessary as the other. Those who -are unacquainted with the generalities of Economic Science, and those -acquainted only with its details, are alike incapable, though for -different reasons, of calculating the economic consequences of a -fact. The first see all the facts as one single fact, the second, all -the facts as different, without any arrangement by similarities and -hierarchies. The question as to the relative proportion of generalities -and particulars to be given in treatises, is one that has been -much discussed, but since this has only a didascalic and pedagogic -importance, it is only possible to answer it, case for case, according -to the nature of the various scholastic institutions that are held in -view. To maintain that Economy must stop short at this or that degree -of abstraction, and for example be limited to what are called external -goods or riches, excluding services; or to capital, as a concept -distinct from land and human labour, without striving to unify these -three concepts, is altogether capricious. Every unification, like every -specification, can be useful, and haters of abstracticism are also -abstracticists, but only half so. - -[Sidenote: _dance at the History of the various tendencies of Economy._] - -All those acquainted with economic studies will have recognized in -the concepts that we have explained, the _logical motives_ of the -history of Economy, the divisions, the polemics, the defeats and the -victories of this or that school and the progress of that branch of -studies. The quantitative character of economic science already appears -in its classics; in the inquiries of Aristotle as to prices and value -(_Politic_ and _Nichomachean Ethic_); and this is apparent also in -the rare mentions by Mediæval and Renaissance writers. Economists -have always been mathematicians, even when they have not spoken of -mathematical Economy. Our writers of the nineteenth century, Galiani, -Genovesi and Verri, were mathematicians in their methods; Francesco -Ferrara, the greatest Italian economist of the nineteenth century, was -a mathematician. The economic principle, which is all one with the -excogitation of the economic man, was formulated by the head of the -physiocratic school, Quesnay; and if the title of _political Economy,_ -first given to the discipline by Montchrétien in 1615, prevailed, -that of _social Arithmetic_ also sometimes made its appearance. Its -progress has consisted, not only in the discovery of new economic -theorems, but also in the connection and unification of those that had -previously been posited in isolation, of material and immaterial goods, -of the cost of production and of rarity, of gross and net produce, of -agricultural rents and of all the others that are not agricultural, of -the production, distribution and circulation of riches, of economic and -financial laws, of social and isolated economy, of the value of utility -and of the value of exchange. It has even been possible to unite with -the body of admitted economic doctrines those of Marx, which seemed -revolutionary, for these are only definitions of a particular casuistry -founded upon the comparison of different types of economic constitution. - -But to conquer empiricism was not enough; economic Science was menaced -in its existence by the so-called _historical School,_ which refused -to recognize abstract definitions and set up against them the infinite -variety of historical facts; hence the strife with historicism -conducted by Menger and the Austrian school. A consequence of the -struggle against the political degeneration of economic science was -the constitution of Economy as a _pure_ science (Cairnes). This was -all the more necessary, inasmuch as by confounding the abstract with -the concrete, and in the concrete itself, Economy with Ethic, there -was a desire manifested upon several occasions among German economists -(ethical school), and among Catholics of all countries, for an economic -Science that should have as its base Ethic. The conception of Economy -as a science deduced from the _egoistic_ hypothesis, has been the -extreme form of the reaction against ethicism (for example in the -treatise of Pantaleoni). The dangers arising from philosophism have -been less, because recent times, in which that discipline has most -flourished, have not sinned through excessive philosophy. - -Of late, owing to the works of Jevons and of other Englishmen, of -Gossen, of the Italians of the school of Ferrara, and of the Austrians, -Economy has become at once more and more complicated and more simple, -owing to the applications, extensions, and reductions that it has -effected. But if with its progress it be able to become ever more exact -and perspicuous, yet it will never for that reason become _organic;_ -its character of a quantitative discipline, of an applied mathematic, -in which the atomism of the postulates and of the definitions is -insuperable, does not allow of such metamorphoses. - -[Sidenote: _Signification of the judgment of Hegel upon the Science of -Economy._] - -In this connection and as the seal upon what we have just been saying, -it is fitting to observe that the phrase of Hegel referred to above -can only have been interpreted as expressing admiration for the degree -of truth attained by Economy, owing to the ignorance of Hegelian -philosophy that has become usual; as though Hegel meant that Economic -science did much honour to the _thought,_ that is, to the speculative -reason. Hegel wished to say, on the contrary, that Economy does much -honour to the intellect, that is, to the intellect alone, to that -_abstractive_ and arbitrary _intellect_ which he hunted down in all -his philosophy: that it is not indeed true and philosophical science, -but a simple descriptive or quantitative discipline treated with much -elegance. This praise also contained the demand for a delimitation, -which, however, he did not expressly enunciate, develop and execute. - - -[1] _Philos, d. Rechtes,_ § 189. _Zus._ - - - - -VI - - -CRITIQUE OF THE CONFUSIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF -ECONOMY - - -[Sidenote: _Adoption of the method and of definition of Economy by -Philosophy._] - -There is no disagreement, then, between the Philosophy of Economy -described by us and economic Science or Calculus, of which we have just -defined the nature, since there cannot be any between two altogether -heterogeneous forms, the one moving within the categories of truth, the -other outside them, with objects of a practical order. This reciprocal -tolerance can be disturbed only by Philosophy, when it compels itself, -either to invade the field of economic Science, or to receive within -itself, to a greater or less extent, the method and the formulæ -proper to the latter. We have already referred to the first, when we -noted the inadmissibility of the economic attempts of philosophism -and historicism, and we will say no more on the subject. But it is -opportune to draw attention to the fact that we must distinguish -among these attempts those that we are accustomed to meet with in -many treatises on economy, pure or political, and in the Science of -finance (especially in the prologues), which labour to discover what -economic action may be, and in what way it differs from morality, what -are pleasure and pain, utility and value; whether the State be rational -will that levies a portion of the riches of the citizens for the ends -of civilization, or a simple fact resulting from general economic laws -and the like. In all these efforts of the writers of treatises, we have -an example of the gradual passage from empiria to philosophy, which is -to be observed in all the other fields of knowledge, and if it be only -possible to say in general that the Philosophy of Economy is derived -from economic Science, it is certain, on the other hand, that it finds -no small incentive in the philosophical doubts and discussions which -economic Science supports. On the other hand, the claim to resolve -philosophically and historically the economic Science or Calculus -is, as we have seen, altogether sterile, or contradicts itself in -development. - -[Sidenote: _Errors that derive from it._] - -From the second of the cases stated above, that is to say, from the -mixture of economic with philosophic methods, arises a series of errors -that are very common and very grave, and of which it is opportune to -take some notice here. - -These errors can be divided into three groups, according as they -consist of _(a)_ considering economic Science or Calculus as a method -exclusive of every other, and alone capable of bestowing upon man all -the truth that can ever be attained in the field of human actions; -_(b)_ in attributing the value of universal thought to the empirical -thoughts upon which economic calculation is based; _(c)_ in changing -into reality the fictions excogitated for the establishment of the -Calculus. - -[Sidenote: _1st. Negation of philosophy for economy._] - -Of the three groups, the first, which represents the most extended -and radical form of the error, is, as usual, the least harmful, for -the reason previously given, that the precise and loyal positions are -those that are the most completely surpassed. Several cultivators -of economic Science, among the most strict and mathematical, enter -upon this desperate struggle against philosophy, which they ridicule -as empty chatter and do not merely wish to subdue but altogether to -destroy, substituting for it the methods of empirical observation and -of mathematical construction, thus favouring a particular empirical and -mathematical philosophy of their own, however much they may protest -to the contrary. That the pretension is unsustainable, is to be seen, -both from the contradictions in which they become entangled and from -the very fury that animates them, which is, at bottom, vexation at not -being able to free themselves from the contradictions in which they -have become involved. For our part, we should like to say to those -excellent economists, alike pure and mathematical, did this not appear -to be pouring oil upon the flames:--Spare yourselves the trouble of -philosophizing. Calculate, and do not think! - -[Sidenote: _2nd. Universal value attributed to empirical concepts. -Example: protection and free trade._] - -The other group is represented by a particular case of the empiristical -error that we have already several times criticized, and many -propositions of the kind that one hears in ordinary conversation, -against which simple good sense has often rebelled, are to be reduced -to it. Thus the empirical consideration of certain human actions as -constituting richness and happiness, causes those individuals and -peoples who possess property of that sort to be called rich and happy; -but to this is opposed, with evident truth, that every one is happy -in his own way and that external conditions are not proof of internal -satisfaction, which is alone real and effective. The great dispute on -free trade is also to be reduced to the same misunderstanding, for when -we undertake to demonstrate that wealth is destroyed by protection, the -demonstration is efficacious only if the wealth, said to be destroyed, -is precisely that of which it was desired to assure the increase by -protection; but nothing has been proved if it be a different quality -of wealth that it may be desirable to acquire, even with the loss -and the destruction of the other. For example, a people may find it -advantageous from a political and military point of view to maintain in -its territories the cultivation of grain or the construction of ships, -even if that were to cost more than to provide itself with grain and -ships from abroad; in this case, we should, strictly speaking, talk, -not of the destruction of wealth, but rather of the acquisition of -wealth (presumed national security), paid for with dear grain and dear -naval construction. When the empirical ideas of free trade were raised -to the dignity of _laws of nature_ (reason), there was a rebellion -against the economists, by which it was made clear that those laws -of nature were laws, not absolute, but empirical, that is to say, -historical and contingent facts, and that the economists who propounded -them as absolute, were not at all men of science, but politicians, -and represented (if not seriously, at least by unconscious suggestion, -or, if it be preferred, by mere chance) the interests of certain -definite classes or of certain definite peoples. And the rebellion was -right, although it afterwards degenerated into the inconclusiveness -of historicism, and absolutely denied to those false practical -applications the formulæ and laws of Economy, which are _natural_ in -quite another sense, as nominal and therefore irrefutable definitions. -Abstract principles, which are always inadequate to grasp the richness -of reality, supply with a simple instrument him who passes from them -to historical and sociological observation, which requires altogether -different methods. Hence, for instance, the meaning of the school of -Le Play, which in studying concrete economic conditions took note of -religion, of family and political feelings, and of all the other things -connected with the first; hence the admitted necessity of completing -the analytic method (as it is called) with the synthetic, or (as it -would be preferable to say) of neglecting abstractions when dealing -with the problems of life and of directly intuiting life itself. - -[Sidenote: _3rd. Transformation of the functions of the calculus into -reality._] - -But what is particular to a philosophy that enters into hybrid wedlock -with economic Science, is the transformation of those quantitative -principles, of which we have seen the artificial origin, into effective -reality. As a result, when this origin has not been observed, or has -been forgotten, we may chance to hear the theories of Gossen on the -decline of pleasures, as though they were "fundamental laws of human -sensibility"; or that some _homo economicus_ has appeared, constructor -of diagrams and calculator of degrees of utility and of curves of -satisfaction, as though these were real things. Some false conceptions -derive from economic principles transported into the philosophy of the -practical, which we have already had occasion to refute, such as that -of a _scale of values,_ which the volitional man is supposed to have -before him whenever he deliberates, and that other of the embarrassment -he experiences in choosing between _two equal goods;_ and finally the -belief that man _wills things,_ whereas what he wills in reality is not -things but actions. - -The comparisons, metaphors and symbols, taken from Economy and used -in ordinary conversation, lead to the false belief that mathematical -constructions and those of the economic calculus are the real processes -of the psyche or of the Spirit. - -[Sidenote: _The pretended calculus of pleasures and pains, and the -doctrines of optimism and pessimism._] - -The quantification of volitional acts, taken as a real fact and -introduced into philosophy, has given origin to the idea of a _calculus -of pleasures and pains and of a balance of life,_ to be established -with the pleasures on the profit side of the account and the sorrows -on the side of loss. And there have even been ravings about a double -mensuration of pleasures, to be based upon their _intensity_ and -_duration._ But the real man, at the moment he enjoys, has before him -only his own enjoyment, and at the moment that he suffers, only his -own sorrow: the past is past and life is not to be described like the -profit and loss account of a business. The true economic man says to -himself what Fra Jacopone sang in one of his lauds: - - So much is mine - As enjoyed and bestowed for the love divine! - -The sophisms that assume consistency owing to this false conception, -are most strange. Let the little dialogue of Leopardi with the seller -of almanacs suffice for all. No one would wish to live his life again, -not because the sorrows always exceed the pleasures, as that dialogue -suggests, but rather because man is not, as he believes, a consumer -of pleasures. He is a creator of life, and for this reason the idea -of doing again what has already been done, of retreading the same -path, of reliving the already past, is repugnant to him, even were it -all made up of pleasures as suggested, because he aspires only and -always to the future. _Optimism and pessimism,_ being each of them -respectively unable altogether to deny pleasure and pain, are obliged -to have recourse to these calculations and balances, in order to defend -their preconceived conclusions: but in so doing they fall from Scylla -into Charybdis and each reveals its own sophistical nature. - -Indeed, a philosophy that calculates is a philosophy that toys -or dotes, and if we have certainly advised the economists and -mathematicians to calculate and not to think, we must, on the contrary, -cry to the philosopher:--Think, and do not calculate! _Qui incipit -numerare, incipit errare!_ - - - - -VII - - -HISTORICAL ANNOTATIONS - - -The concepts of the useful and of the moral and the various attempts -either to absorb the one in the other or to distinguish them, while -recognizing their relations, are the problem on which has laboured the -Philosophy of the practical as Ethic and Economic. Has this problem -ever been fully solved? It will be permissible to doubt it, when we -observe that a philosophical concept of the useful has been wanting -until our own days; and that in consequence one of morality must also, -strictly speaking, have been wanting, for it could not have been -understood in its fulness and purity, owing to the obscure position of -the term with which it is united. - -[Sidenote: _Greek Ethic and its ingenuousness._] - -I. The utilitarian character of Greek Ethic has been affirmed on -several occasions; but one experiences a certain repugnance in applying -so precise a term to the documents of ancient thought that remain to -us. Socrates, it is true, posited the useful as the supreme concept -of morality, and identified the good life with eudæmonia; but for him -that useful was nevertheless distinct from the merely pleasing, since -it consisted in what is useful to man as man, and his eudæmonia bore -much resemblance to the tranquil conscience of him who fulfils his -proper duties. Plato (for example, in the _Protagoras_) expounds the -doctrine that good things are nothing but pleasant things, and bad -things painful; but this doctrine is enunciated in order to place in -relief the thesis that man does not do wrong, save through ignorance, -and because the bad seems to him to be the good; without saying that -in other dialogues the distinction between pleasure and the good is -recognized. Nor can the most systematic of the ancient philosophers, -Aristotle, be called without reserve a hedonist, a eudæmonist, or a -utilitarian, on the strength of his doctrine of happiness. Happiness -is the supreme good, it is an end for itself; but virtue is already -included for Aristotle in happiness, virtue which is found there, not -as an adjunct, but intrinsic, for which exterior goods are indeed -necessary, but only as instruments. The virtuous man must be a lover -of himself (φίλαυτος), that is to say, just, temperate, liberal of his -possessions, ready to yield honours and offices to his friends; lover -of himself, then, in the lofty signification of the word (lover, not of -the empirical, but of the metempirical ego), as opposed to the wicked -man, who is his own enemy. Even Epicurus could not be included among -the hedonists, since for him pleasure is not an end, but a means for -_calm,_ which is the true good, and calm is tranquillity of the spirit, -which only the virtuous man can enjoy. - -It is therefore more exact to consider Greek Ethic in its general -character, not as eudæmonistic and utilitarian, but here also, in -relation to the new problem that we now have before us (in the same -way as was done above, in respect to practical intellectualism), as -_ingenuous_; for in truth that problem did not constitute the centre -of inquiries and discussions, as they present themselves in our times, -nor were the different schools divided upon it. They were distinguished -from one another (as has been already noted in respect to the doctrine -of the passions), rather by the different rules of life respectively -laid down by each as preferable. The antitheses of the Cynics and -Cyrenaïcs, of the Epicureans and the Stoics, have but a superficial -resemblance to those of the ethical rigorists or abstractionists, -hedonists or utilitarians, which have appeared as the result of the -antithesis between pleasure and pain explicitly stated in modern times. -It would be difficult to point out ethical rigorists and utilitarians -among thinkers truly and properly so called. In order to discover the -utilitaristic attitude at that period of history, it would be necessary -to have recourse to some rhetorician, such as Carneades, ready to -maintain indifferently the most opposed paradoxes, or to Callicles and -Thrasymachus, so magnificently portrayed in the Platonic dialogues. -These were rather men of the world than philosophers, giving the -immediate and violent impression of the struggle for life, and for this -reason they were at conflict with Socrates, the philosopher, whom they -sometimes treated as a clown and utterer of paradoxes, sometimes pitied -as a child, a "suckling" child, and objected to him that philosophers -do not understand one iota about politics (as often has been and often -will be objected by politicians, not altogether without reason). If it -be wished, all the same, to find a reference to later utilitarianism -among the sophists, the hedonists and the Epicureans, or among the -Stoics, with their conception of life as a war against the passions, -something of future rigorism and asceticism, or in certain discussions -among the Platonic dialogues as to the relation between pleasure and -pain, a first trace of the discussions upon the same argument that have -become most complicated in modern times, by all means let this be done, -provided it be never forgotten that it is an affair of glimmers, rather -than of vivid light, of antitheses hardly accentuated, not of those -that are well defined and stand out clearly. - -[Sidenote: _Importance of Christianity for Ethic._] - -II. The precise and it may be said violent affirmation of the -antithesis, was the work of Christianity, which, conceiving pleasure -and duty, nature and morality to be heterogeneous elements, did -great service, both to the progress of civilization in general and -in particular to Ethic. It is necessary to insist upon this, for the -modern world was bound afterwards to react against this antithesis, -and necessarily to assume an Antichristian, even a pagan attitude, -and modern art and poetry are often inspired with an abhorrence of -the tenebrous Middle Ages and of sad Christianity, and give a sigh of -regret for Greece as for a lost Paradise, or a shout of jubilation -as for a Paradise regained. But reactions are reactions and poetry -is poetry: humanity never retraces its footsteps, though it is often -wont to adorn the future with memories of the past. The Greece of our -hearts is a new Greece, profoundly modified by Christianity; the -Greece of Goethe and of Hegel is no longer the Greece of Sophocles and -of Aristotle, but a Greece far richer and more intense. Thought, like -life, never turns back, and if it be necessary eventually to attain to -a theoretic conciliation between pleasure and duty, between the useful -and morality, such a conciliation will be very different from that of -still ingenuous Greek Ethic. - -[Sidenote: _The three resulting directions: utilitarianism, rigorism, -and psychologism._] - -The spectacle afforded by modern Ethic, from the Renaissance to the -beginning of the nineteenth century, and also (with few exceptions) in -the later periods is still altogether dominated by that antithesis, and -therefore two currents are to be discerned in it: one that attaches -itself to the first term of the antithesis, the useful, and denies the -second, or resolves it in the first, the other, which denies the useful -and retains moral duty as the exclusive form of the practical activity. -This latter is _rigoristic_ Ethic, child of Christianity and of ascetic -oriental sources, which flowed into it together by direct filiation; -the other is _utilitarianism,_ child also, though illegitimate, of -the distinction or rending asunder of the ancient unity of duty -and pleasure, virtue and happiness, effected by Christianity. The -antithesis sometimes seems to be solved and a Philosophy of the -practical appears, which, without clinging exclusively to one term or -the other, receives both into itself. But this philosophy, when it -does not reveal itself at bottom (which generally happens), as masked -utilitarianism, or (a less frequent case) rigorism attenuated in -expression, has the defect of being, not philosophy, but an empirical -description of the so-called principles of the practical, placed one -beside the other, without a profound definition or deduction of either. -This third direction may be called _intuitionism_ or _psychologism._ - -[Sidenote: _Hobbes, Spinoza._] - -Utilitarianism is principally represented by English thought, to which -belongs Hobbes, the greatest of all utilitarians, who proclaimed, _in -statu naturae_ (that is to say, in genuine reality) _mensuram juris -esse utilitatem._[1] Similar doctrines are to be found in Spinoza, who -has also been looked upon and criticized as a pure utilitarian. But the -matter is rather more complicated as regards Spinoza. Of him it should -rather be said that he would have been the most resolute of ethical -rigorists, had he ever been able to construct an Ethic. His determinism -was an insuperable obstacle to this, for it does not admit distinctions -of values, but considers the good. like being, in its abstractness, -and therefore, the being of each one as _suum essere conservare_; hence -the appearance of utilitarianism, assumed by the Ethic of Spinoza. - -[Sidenote: _English Ethic._] - -From Hobbes descend Locke, Hartley, Hume, Adam Smith, Warburton, -Paley, and others such; they are all less courageous and less coherent -philosophers than he. Indeed, if Hobbes himself could not but be -incoherent and could not avoid causing a desire for and therefore -a state of peace to arise from a state of nature or of war, whence -is discovered to the mind a source of the practical, altogether -different from that of the useful alone, which was presupposed; with -the mean and sophistical efforts of his successors, the incoherence -becomes altogether irritating. The aid sought from associationism -is among these efforts, and the excogitation of the example of the -miser (found for the first time in 1731, in a discourse of the Rev. -John Gay),[2] and also the admission of the principle of sympathy -beside that of egoism, a principle which with a cast of the dice is -made to disappear again, and to become absorbed in egoism itself. The -inanity of utilitarianism, which has already in Hobbes a tendency to -disavow itself, by recognizing as true laws not those of nature, but -those revealed by God (_in Scripturis sacris latae_),[3] and in Locke -retained the divine side by side with the civil laws and those of -public opinion,[4] became evident in the theological utilitarianism of -Warburton and of Paley. As for intuitionists and psychologists, such as -Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, these either left an unsolved dualism -(as was above all the case with the last), or, although possessing the -most lively consciousness of moral force, they yet strove to deduce -it in some way from the egoistical and utilitarian principle. The -French materialists of the eighteenth century, such as Helvétius and -D'Holbach, though less subtle, are more consequent. - -[Sidenote: _Idealistic Philosophy._] - -Rigoristic Ethic displayed its strength against anti-ethical -utilitarianism and anti-philosophical psychologism, not only in -traditional scholastic, but also in the explicit polemic undertaken by -Cudworth, Cumberland, Clarke and Price, against Hobbes, Locke, and the -other utilitarians who followed them. The makers of great systems, too, -attached themselves to ethical rigorism, Descartes (and in a certain -sense Spinoza), Malebranche, Leibnitz, and the philosophy of the -school of Leibnitz, as the moral consciousness declared itself in its -true nature in Jean Jacques Rousseau against the French materialists. -But rigorism also ended by contradicting itself in the same way as -utilitarianism, owing to its one-sidedness, when it recognized a -principle that was not merely utilitarian or that lost itself in -mystery, either by reasoning with the utilitarian principle in the -course of its development, or by receiving utilitarianism into itself, -without any mediation, in the form of the morally indifferent. This is -an old evil, which had already appeared in the _ἀδιάφορα_ of Stoicism, -and in all those exceptions to the rigorous moral law, which ascetic -Christianity had been obliged to allow, in order to exist side by side -with the worldly life. - -[Sidenote: _Kant and his affirmation of the ethical principle._] - -III. The strength and the weakness of rigorism are to be clearly seen -in the greatest ethical system to which it led: the moral doctrine of -Emmanuel Kant. It was time that the principle of Christian Ethic should -be reaffirmed, duty as clearly distinguished from pleasure, giving to -it that relief which it had been without in the systems of Descartes -and of Leibnitz, after the materialistic and utilitarian orgy that had -lasted for more than a century, and after the equivocal attempts at an -approach and fusion of the useful and the moral. Kant did not indeed in -this respect oppose Wolffian Leibnitzianism; and although the ethical -concept of _perfectio_ seemed to him to be empty and indeterminate, yet -he was never able to prove that it was a eudæmonistic and utilitarian -concept.[5] But that concept certainly had not the energy of duty and -of the Kantian categoric imperative, which are true declarations of war -against every heteronomous morality. This is the merit of Kant, after -whom no serious philosopher can be anything but a Kantian in Ethic, as, -after Christianity, to no one, not a wind-bag or an extravagant, is it -given to be anything but a Christian. Moral action has no other motive -than morality itself: to promote one's own happiness (said Kant) can -never be _immediately_ duty, and even less the principle of all duties. - -[Sidenote: _Self-contradictions of Kant concerning the concept of the -useful, of prudence, of happiness, etc._] - -But the mistake of Kant lies in not having well analyzed the concepts -of pleasure, of happiness and of the useful, and in having thought that -he could free himself from them, by placing them among another set of -principles, which he called _hypothetical_ imperatives and opposed to -the _categoric. _ We know that the imperative of those concepts is -not less categoric than that of morality: it is a true imperative, -not to be confounded with the knowledge of experience, metaphorically -called imperative, because it assumes the appearance of a technique -dealing with the practical. Kant was to some extent aware of this, for -he sub-distinguishes the hypothetical imperatives into _problematical_ -and _assertorial._ The first of these are technical and give rise to -maxims of _cleverness_ (_Geschicklichkeit_); the second are _pragmatic_ -and consist of maxims of _prudence._ Observe the difficulties in which -he becomes involved, through not wishing to recognize the autonomous -character of these imperatives compared with the moral imperatives, -that is to say, the categoricity of both. The imperatives of prudence -and of happiness are concerned (he says) "with an end which can be -assumed as real among all rational beings (in so far as the imperatives -can be applied to them in their quality of dependent beings); and, -therefore, an intention, which not only they _may_ possess, but which -it is assumed with certainty that they _do_ possess, according to a -necessity of nature, which is the intention of happiness." We should -therefore conclude that they are concerned with an end not less -serious than that of morality. But Kant perceives the poison in the -argument and strives to turn them again into imperatives concerning -means: "ability" (he continues) "in the choice of the means of one's -own well-being, may be called _prudence;_ therefore the imperative -relating to the choice of the means for one's own happiness, namely the -precept of prudence, is always hypothetical; the action is ordered, not -absolutely, but only as means for another purpose." It is clear that to -be able to call that knowledge or ability "prudence" is not sufficient -to change the imperative of happiness into mere ability and knowledge. -Kant perceives this also: "If it were easy to give a definite concept -of happiness, the imperatives of prudence would altogether coincide -with those of ability and would also be analytic. For it would be -said in the one case as in the other, that he who wishes the end also -wishes (necessarily, in conformity with reason) the only means for the -purpose within his power. The concept of happiness is unfortunately -so indeterminate, that although every one wishes to attain to it, he -is nevertheless unable ever to say definitely and in accordance with -himself exactly what he desires and wishes. The reason is that the -elements which belong to the concept of happiness are all empirical -and must therefore all be taken from experience; quired an absolute -whole, a maximum of well-being in my present state and in every future -state." In what shall happiness be placed? In riches? In knowledge? In -long life? In good health? None of these things is without dangers. In -short, it is impossible to determine with full certainty, according -to any principle whatever, what would make man truly happy; therefore -it is not possible to act according to a definite principle, but only -according to empirical concepts; and the imperatives of prudence, -strictly speaking, command nothing.--As we see, the only effective -argument of Kant against the admission of the categoric imperatives of -well-being, of utility, of happiness, is that he does not know exactly -what they are. This did not authorize him to exclude those imperatives -and reduce them to pseudo--imperatives, to hypothetic imperatives, -or to empirical rules. In other passages of his works, Kant tends to -the other solution of excluding the maxims of prudence from the pure -practical reason, because they are maxims of self-love (_Selbstliebe,_) -or of the practical reason empirically or _pathologically_ -conditioned, since for him every pleasure that precedes the moral law -and is independent of it, is pathological, that is to say, it belongs -to the senses, to the inferior appetitive faculty, not to that which -is superior and to reason. Kant often returns to this point and always -experiences the same embarrassments and contradictions, as is proved by -the variety of the arguments to which he has recourse.[6] - -[Sidenote: _Errors derived from it in his Ethic._] - -But the unrecognized autonomy of the useful, of happiness, of -well-being, generally revenges itself; because, surreptitiously -introduced, it causes itself to be unduly recognized afterwards. Thus -it comes about that Kant creates, on the one hand, the monster of -disinterested actions, and on the other, does not altogether exclude -the concept of actions morally indifferent or permissible.[7] Thus, -too, it happens that owing to the discord that he preserves between -virtue and happiness, thinking vain the pretence of the Stoics and -Epicureans to reconcile them in this life, he is led to postulate -the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul, and to -make of virtue a means of rendering oneself worthy of happiness in -another life. "The cold duty of Kant" (wrote Hegel) "is the last -undigested morsel given by revelation to reason, and it weighs -upon its stomach."[8] Consequently, the Ethic of Kant, although -so different in tendencies and inspiration, yet joined hands with -theological utilitarianism, ending at length by also declaring that -moral obligation is inconceivable, without the idea of a God, who -rewards and punishes in another life, and by declaring that God and the -immortality of the soul cannot be otherwise affirmed than by means of -moral exigencies. Moral rigorism, like utilitarianism, makes shipwreck -in mystery. - -[Sidenote: _Occasions for a philosophy of economy._] - -IV. Occasions and opportunities for a philosophical concept of the -useful were not, to tell the truth, wanting to the thought anterior -to Kant; but Kant let them all slip. Without attributing too much -suggestive power to certain classes of virtues, such as _fortitude_ -or _prudence_ (virtues that are generically economic, not exclusively -moral), which had passed from the Greek into the Christian Ethic, -nor to certain acute aphorisms of psychologists and moralists (for -instance: _Il y a des héros en mal comme en bien;--Ce n'est pas -assez d'avoir des grandes qualités, il en faut avoir l'économie;--La -souveraine habilité consiste à bien connaître le prix des choses, -etc.[9]),_ a first opportunity was certainly afforded by that inferior -faculty of appetition, which the Wolffian philosophy had inherited -from the Platonic, Aristotelian, and scholastic tradition.[10] That -faculty was parallel with the inferior faculty of knowledge, which -that same philosophy had with Baumgarten attempted to develop into an -independent science, _Aesthetica,_ a development that should have led -to the thought of an analogous transformation of the corresponding -practical faculty, which might have become an _Oeconomica_ or _Ethica -inferior,_ as from Æsthetic had been made a _Gnoseologia inferior._ But -Kant also rejected Æsthetic, as science of a special theoretic form, -science of intuition or fancy, conceiving instead, on the one hand -a transcendental Æsthetic or doctrine of space and time, and on the -other, a Critique of judgment, or doctrine of finality and morality, -symbolized in nature;[11] thus he fell into other difficulties, when -he wished to establish an analogy between the other forms of the -practical reason and that of the theoretical.[12] Although he preserved -the division of the faculty of appetition into inferior and superior -(_untere und obere Begehrungsvermögen,_) he failed to realize, as we -have seen, the true philosophical concept of the _inferior._ - -[Sidenote: _The problem of politics and Machiavellism._] - -A second opportunity was presented by the series of treatises, which, -from Machiavelli onward, had come to conceive of politics as a fact -independent of morality, elaborating in particular those precepts and -maxims of the "reason of state," of which we have already had occasion -to expose the empirical character. But however empirical they were, -those mental products gave rise to the problem of the relations between -morals and politics, that is to say, as to whether the two terms could -be considered as immediately identifiable. The thought of Machiavelli, -in particular, constituted an enigma that all attempted to interpret -in the most different ways, most by vituperating, some by defending it -with strange reasons (Spinoza was among the defenders[13]), though they -never succeeded in freeing themselves from its difficulties, for to -that end would have been necessary the understanding of the spiritual -value of the utilitarian will, even if amoral. It was only when this -difficult concept was to some extent caught sight of (by De Sanctis) -that Machiavelli appeared at once justified and criticized; but while -that concept remained obscure, the point of view of Machiavelli was -never attained and the work was condemned for reasons of a moralistic -character (Villari).[14] Kant, too, in his work on _Perpetual Peace,_ -treated the problem of the relations between morality and politics, -affirming that no disagreement is possible between them, unless by -politics is meant a _doctrine_ of prudence, that is, "a theory of -maxims for the selection of the means best adapted for the objects of -individual advantage; that is, when the existence of morality is not -altogether denied."[15] Here too, he was right, when he claimed that -concrete political actions should be submitted to morality; but, on the -other hand, he did not perceive that submission and identity presuppose -a previous independence and distinction. - -[Sidenote: _The doctrine of the passions._] - -Finally, a third opportunity was offered, in the rehabilitation of the -passions, begun by the philosophers of the seventeenth century and -expressed, as has been said, in a notable manner by Vico. Now if the -passions in general be the volitional activity itself, considered -in its dialectic, they are also the soul turned to the particular, -the useful in respect to the universal, which is sought by morality. -This is to be seen especially in Vico and better still in Hegel, very -similar to Vico in this respect; he admirably developed this moment -of _particularity,_ which is passion, necessary for the concreteness -of the universal. As the passions for Vico are human nature itself, -which morality directs but does not destroy, and are neither good -nor bad in themselves, and _utilitates ex se neque turpes neque -honestae, sed earum inaequalitas est turpitudo, aequalitas autem -honestas_[16]--so, for Hegel, "passion is neither good nor bad in its -formal character and only expresses the fact that a subject has placed -all the living interest of his spirit, of his talent, of his character, -of his enjoyment, in a single content. Nothing great can or has been -accomplished without passion. Only a morality that is dead and too -often hypocritical can inveigh against the form of passion as such. ... -Ethicity concerns the content, which, as such, is universal, something -inactive, and has its active element in the subject: the fact that the -content is immanent in it constitutes interest, and in so far as it -dominates all the efficient subjectivity, passion."[17] - -[Sidenote: _Hegel and the concept of the useful._] - -The same Hegel once observed: "As for what concerns utility, morality -must not play the disdainful towards it, for every good action is -actually useful, that is to say, possesses reality and produces -something good. A good action that were not useful would not be an -action, would not possess reality. The inutility of the good in itself, -as its unreality, is its abstractness. Not only is it possible to be -conscious of utility, but we ought to be conscious of it, since it is -true that it is useful to know the good: utility does not mean anything -but that we are conscious of our own action. If this be blameworthy, it -will also be blameworthy to know the goodness of one's own action."[18] - -Hegel thus discovered the function of the useful when rehabilitating -the passions, though in a fugitive manner. But Kant had not attributed -importance to the problem of the passions in Ethic, and had not -therefore been in a position to avail himself of the suggestion -contained in the doctrine of the passions. - -[Sidenote: _Fichte and the elaboration of the Kantian Ethic._] - -Fichte, in re-elaborating the Kantian philosophy, showed the relation -between pleasure and duty in a manner that came very near to the -truth. He gave precedence to what he called the _empirical_ over the -moral man, the former corresponding entirely to the merely utilitarian -or economic. What, asks Fichte, will be his maxim of action at this -stage? "As there is no other impulse in his consciousness save the -natural, and as this is directed only toward enjoyment and has pleasure -for its motive, that maxim cannot but be to choose what promises the -maximum of pleasure in intensity and extension; that is, the maxim -of his own happiness. This may likewise be sought in the pleasure of -others by means of the sympathetic impulses; but the ultimate scope -of his action always remains the satisfaction of those impulses and -pleasures which arise from it, and therefore, his own happiness. Man -at this stage is an intelligent animal." "But," he continues, "it is a -fault to remain here, and man must raise himself to a stage at which -he enjoys an altogether different liberty; he must be free, not only -_formaliter,_ but also _materialiter,_ that is, he must attain to the -moral stage."[19] That first stage, then, is formal freedom, and is no -longer considered a pathological condition of the spirit, or as that -merely technical knowledge of which Kant speaks. This would constitute -no small progress, if Fichte had been conscious of all the richness of -the concept of which he had caught a glimpse, and had made it fructify. -But it seems that he was not aware of this, and certainly he took no -advantage of it whatever. - -[Sidenote: _The problem of the useful and of morality in the thinkers -of the nineteenth century._] - -V. The inventive genius of modern Ethic is exhausted with these -thinkers. Their successors have reproduced the old situations, one -after the other. Some, while accepting the Kantian morality, wished -to temper and correct its exaggerations, which was not possible, -save by a more profound speculative vision of the relation between -pleasure and good, the useful and the moral; whereas they believed that -they could attain to it by _also_ taking account of pleasure and of -happiness, and by conceiving a doctrine of happiness or eudæmonology -side by side with Ethic, but subordinate to it (in Italy: Galluppi -and Rosmini). Schiller had already recognized in Kant's time the -unilaterality of Kant, and had made it the object of criticism and of -epigram, which, however, does not mean that he had truly and properly -corrected its errors. Others occupied themselves in various ways -with the enumeration and juxtaposition of the principles: thus, for -instance, Schopenhauer makes compassion arise beside egoism, which -then divides into benevolence and justice; and Herbart, although he -excludes the useful, because, according to him, "it refers to a point -external to itself,"[20] enumerates five practical ideas that are not -all truly moral. The affinity both of Herbart and of Schopenhauer, -with Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and English and Scottish psychologism, -is clear. The study of the practical ideas of Herbart is not without -interest as an unconscious affirmation of the necessity of the -economic principle. The first of these, indeed, _internal freedom,_ -consists in being able to achieve with our own strength the model -that we propose to ourselves, and is liberty, but not yet moral -liberty. "To be able to decide _according to motives_" (says Herbart -on one occasion) "is already a sign of psychical health: to decide -_according to the best motives_ is the condition of morality."[21] -The second of the practical ideas, that of _perfection,_ is concerned -precisely with the strength of the will, taken in itself, and resembles -a combination of the Hellenic virtues of fortitude and temperance. -Here willing is considered in itself, independently of its objects, -and in this consideration there is no other difference, save their -strength, between the various Willings: the greater this is, the more -it is admired; weakness displeases and strength pleases the practical -judgment, and this even when it is unjust, iniquitous and wicked, and -notwithstanding such vices.[22] Lotze, following Herbart, determines -as requisites of actions, that they must be possible, energetic, -conscientious on the one hand, and on the other, consequent, habitual, -individual, stating that these two series of predicates apply equally -to moral and immoral actions.[23]--He does not think it worth while to -take count of the English utilitarians and post-Kantian intuitionists, -or of their French, Italian, and German imitators; because, just as the -appearance of a Hobbes, of a Hume, or of a Shaftesbury, is important -in their time, so the appearance of a Bentham or of a Spencer out of -their time is insignificant, for these latter amuse themselves with -the useful, with association and evolution (which according to them -should become the socially useful), and with the double principle of -egoism and of altruism. Stuart Mill alone can afford some interest, -when he says (with that mental inconclusiveness which has seemed to -many to be acuteness and equilibrium) that moral pleasures differ from -the sensual, not only in degree, but also in genus and in quality (_in -kind_); and that justice is a class of socially useful actions that -arouses feelings themselves also different, not only in degree, but -also in genus and in quality (_in kind_), from those caused by useful -actions. In short, the philosophy of the nineteenth century has not -only been unable to progress, but has not even been able to maintain -itself on a level with the practical doctrines of Fichte and of Hegel, -in which a glimpse was caught of the relation of first and second -practical degree, and there was a tendency to reconcile passion and -ethicity. - -[Sidenote: _Extrinsic union of Ethic and of economic Science, from -antiquity to the nineteenth century._] - -VI. Certainly economic science, owing to its empirico-quantitative -character, already noted, was not made to fill the void and to furnish -a more positive and exact concept of the useful. The contact between -Economy and Philosophy remained for a time extrinsic, since economic -Science appeared in treatises upon the Philosophy of the practical, -together with the other juridical and historical matter, which it was -customary to include with it. The precedent for such a union could be -found even in Aristotle's _Nichomachean Ethic,_ which supplies certain -notions as to the concept of price and value. Considerations on the -same argument abound in the Scholastics, especially in St. Thomas, -whose _Oeconomica_ always forms part of his Ethic, as the doctrine for -the government of the family. Finally, there is an ample discussion -of the subject in the treatises of the seventeenth and eighteenth -centuries, which took the name of _natural Rights._ It happened that -the English moralists of the eighteenth century were also led to -occupy themselves with Economy and the economists with Ethic, owing -to the juxtaposition of the two concepts for didascalic reasons and -for University convenience. Thus Hutcheson developed Economy, in his -_Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy_ (1747); and the _Essays_ of -Hume are occupied with moral and economic questions; and Adam Smith -is the author, not only of _The Wealth of Nations,_ but also of _The -Theory of the Moral Feelings,_ almost two parts of a Philosophy of the -practical. The importance of economic studies had become so palpable at -that time, that toward the end of the century, Buhle was led to include -them in the history of philosophy (and we believe that he was the -first). He exposes at length in his work the ideas of Hume, of Smith, -of Stewart, attributing it as a merit to the English writers to have -reduced that material to philosophy by a method of treatment without -example (he said) in previous centuries.[24] Finally, Hegel dedicated -certain important paragraphs of his _Philosophy of Law,_ in the section -dealing with civil society,[25] to the "system of wants," or Economy. -The cult of Economy has rather increased than diminished in the -nineteenth century and the much-discussed social problem (especially -capitalism and socialism) has not been without a certain influence -upon treatises of Ethic, where, if we rarely find statements that are -strictly economic, there is always plenty of chatter about property and -production and the relations between the working and capitalistic class. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophical questions arising from a more intimate -contact between the two._] - -But a more intimate bond could not take place, save when attempts to -understand the material of science and to place it in the system of -the spirit were united with economic Science, properly so called. For -since that science is occupied with human actions and appears to give -advice as to conduct, in what relation can it possibly stand to Ethic, -which is also occupied with actions and also gives advice?--Such a -question was in a certain way already implied in the mediæval idea of -a _justum pretium,_ to be placed beside the effective price, which is -realized according to the knowledge and convenience of each; it forms -the kernel of the debate between the _subjective and the objective_ -concept of value, that is, between the purely economic consideration -and another resulting from moral exigencies, between the value that -is, and that which in a certain way should be. It began to wax ardent, -with the accusation, of being theoreticians of egoism, hurled at the -great English economists, Smith and Ricardo; this accusation, taken -up and modified by others, became accepted as the true and proper -designation of the function of Economy, which should accordingly be -that of studying human actions in their exclusively abstract, egoistic -aspect. But, since abstraction is not full reality, the false task -assigned to Economy called for the aid of the doctors. Such were -the French economists, seized with the mania of teaching generosity -to the cold Britons (Blanqui, etc.); such too were the Germans, who -wished to induce Economy to mend its ways and to become conscious of -its lofty duties towards the human race (Knies); such, finally, were -the Christians and Catholics, who thought to purify or to exorcise -that worldly and diabolical science by mingling with it ethical and -economical considerations. It was rarely suspected that economic -facts, as such, are neither egoistic nor altruistic, neither moral nor -immoral; and when it was desired to philosophize the subject, some one -got out of the difficulty by enumerating five groups of human actions, -four egoistic and only one moral: the search for the satisfaction -of one's own conscience, with the fear of blame attached (Wagner). -The problem, especially in Austria, passed from the hands of the -mathematicians into those of the psychologists. These have undertaken -to seek out the resemblance and the difference between economic and -ethical values. But on the psychological ground (as we have already -remarked when discussing intuitionistic solutions), far from solving -the antithesis, philosophy is dissolved. The mathematicians on the -other hand, that is to say the economists, who employ the quantitative -method, fascinated with the evidence of this procedure and failing -to realize that it is empty evidence, instead of limiting themselves -to the construction of their most useful formulæ, increase the -confusion by beginning to philosophize in the strangest manner; as -is to be observed in the case of Pareto, one of the most acute and -learned of contemporary economists. In one of his recent writings he -exposes the method of economic science with a string of propositions -such as these: "_Il faut faire une opération de séparation.... Cette -première opération accomplie, ... il est nécessaire de substituer par -abstraction, des conceptions simples, au moins relativement, aux objets -réels extrêmement complexes.... Mais la science n'est réellement liée -à une abstraction plutôt qu'à une autre.... Pour peu qu'on y trouve un -avantage.... Cela ne suffit pas encore: il faut continuer à séparer et -à abstraire...._" - -And after having thus advised us to treat facts without pity, -mutilating them, grinding them down, substituting for them names or -abstractions, Pareto continues undisturbed, as though all this were -nothing: these theories, "_telles, au moins que nous les concevons, se -séparant des anciens en ce qu'elles s'attachent aux faits et non aux -mots_"![26] If such be the facts, what will be the words? - -[Sidenote: _The theories of the hedonistic calculus: from Maupertuis to -Hartmann._] - -VII. It is all the more necessary to understand the diversity -between economic Science and the Philosophy of economy, between the -quantitative and the qualitative processes, owing to the fact that -since economic studies first flourished, in the eighteenth century, -absurd ideas were introduced into the books of philosophers, as -to the calculus of pleasures and the balance of life. Maupertuis' -book, _Essai de philosophie morale_ (1749), had a great influence -in this direction. Here, a balance is presented, showing a deficit -on the side of pleasures; and, following this lead, many Italian -philosopher-economists of the same period occupied themselves with such -calculations and balances (Ortes, Verri, Briganti, etc.), arriving at -results, now optimistic, now pessimistic.[27] Galluppi, too, accepted -the method as a good one,[28] and it is no marvel that the poet -Leopardi made it his, steeped as he was in the sensualistic philosophy -of the preceding century. But not only are the trivial optimistic -sophisms of the utilitarians founded upon it, but likewise many of the -pessimistic arguments of Schopenhauer and especially of Hartmann, the -latter quite unconscious (being in other respects closely connected -with the German idealist tradition) that he was accepting an element -of an altogether anti-idealistic, that is, of a mechanistic origin. - -For all these reasons, it is important to oppose the concept of the -useful (which is not indeed a concept, but an abstraction), given by -economic Science, with its philosophic concept. This we have attempted -to do in the preceding theory of Economy, as at once distinct from -and united with Ethic. In that theory, we have especially striven to -collect stray threads of aphorisms and observations of good sense -as to the value of the will, even when amoral; as to the doctrines -of happiness and of pleasure, of the inferior appetitive faculty, -of others dealing with politics and the arts of prudence, of the -new conception of the passions, considered as the spirit in its -individuality;--we have striven to attach to these that which is as -it were the philosophical result drawn from economic Science, that -is to say, the idea of a form of value that would be neither the -intellectual, the æsthetic, nor the ethical, and cannot by any means -be resolved into an ethical anti-value or egoism;--and finally, we -have attempted to unite all these threads into one, in order to form -the bond that ethical rigorism has hitherto been unable to place -between itself and reality, between the universal and the practical -individual, at the same time justifying utilitarian, activity in its -autonomy. We believe that this historical sketch will have contributed -to make clear the necessity of our attempt. - - -[1] _De cive,_ c. i. § 10. - -[2] E. Albee, _A History of English Utilitarianism,_ London, 1902, pp. -26-27. - -[3] _De cive,_ c. iii. § 33. - -[4] _Essay on Human Understanding,_ Book II. c. 28, § 7 _sqq._ - -[5] _Gründl. d. Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ p. 70. - -[6] _Gründl,_ p. 36 _sq.; Kr. d. prakt. Vernft._ pp. 15, 21-28, 43, -145; cf. _Metaph. d. Sitt._ pp. 208-209. - -[7] _Metaph. d. Sitt._ pp. 22, 23, 246. - -[8] _Gesch. d. Phil._ iii. p. 535. - -[9] La Rochefoucauld, _Maximes_ (ed. Gamier), nn. 159, 185, 224. - -[10] Wolf, _Psych, emp.,_ Frankfort and Leipzig, 1738, §§ 584, 880. - -[11] Croce, _Estetica,_ pp. 324-328. - -[12] _Kr. d. prakt. Vern._ pp. 79, 108. - -[13] _Tract. theol._ c. iv. § 7. - -[14] Cf. Croce, in De Sanctis, _Scritti vari_ (Napoli, 1898), i. pp. -xiv-xvi, pref. - -[15] _Zum ewigen Friede,_ in _Werke_ (ed. Rosenkranz-Schubert), vol. -vii. pt. i. p. 370. - -[16] _De uno univ. juris principio,_ § 46. - -[17] _Encykl._ § 474, and cf. other passages: _Phän. d. Geistes,_ pp. -484-486; _Encykl._ § 474; _Phil. d. Rechtes,_ § 124; _Phil. d. Gesch._ -pp. 39-41. - -[18] _Gesch. d. Phil._ ii. pp. 405-6. - -[19] _System der Sittenlehre,_ p. 180 _sq._; cf. p. 15. - -[20] _Einleitung,_ § 82 (Italian transl. p. 102). - -[21] _Op. cit._ § 128 (It. tr. p. 172). - -[22] _Allg. prakt. Phil._ p. 35. - -[23] _Grundzüge der Ethik,_ §§ 12, 14. - -[24] _Gesch. d. neueren Philos._ (1796-1804), sect. iv. cap. 18 (Fr. -tr., Paris, 1816, v. 432-753) - -[25] _Phil. d. Rechts,_ § 189 _sqq._ - -[26] "L'Économie et la sociologie au point de vue scientifique" in -_Rivistetele Scienza,_ i. (1907) 293, 312. - -[27] See M. Losacco, _Le dottrine edonistiche italiane del secolo -XVIII_ (Napoli, 1902). - -[28] Galluppi, _Elementi di filosofia_ (Napoli, 1846), ii. 265-266, 406 -_sqq._ - - - - -SECOND SECTION - - -THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE - - - - -I - - -CRITIQUE OF MATERIAL AND OF FORMALISTIC ETHIC - - -[Sidenote: _Various meanings of "formal" and "material."_] - -It is a much-disputed question whether the Principle of Ethic should be -conceived as _formal_ or _material._ The question, already difficult in -itself, has become yet more difficult, so as almost to cause despair -of its solution, owing to the fact that those terms, "formal" and -"material," are understood (as often happens in philosophy) in a double -sense. Hence, those who win assent to their thesis as to the formality -of the ethical principle are afterwards wont to avail themselves of -this assent, in order stealthily to introduce another thesis, which, -although it be also beneath the banner of the "formal," yet has nothing -to do with the first and is as false as that is true. And since those -who maintain the material principle do the same thing, both alike -come to expose their flanks to one another's blows. In the process of -unravelling this tangled skein, we shall begin by giving to those two -words the meaning that they usually bear in philosophical terminology, -meaning by "formal" the universal and by "material" the contingent. And -in this signification we affirm, above all, that the principle of Ethic -is _formal_ and certainly not _material._ - -[Sidenote: _The ethical principle as formal (universal) and not -material (contingent)._] - -Were it material, it would express itself by means of propositions -indicating a single volition or a group of single volitions as the true -and proper essence of the moral volition; and the moral activity would -consist of a determinate action or of a determinate group of actions. -But the moral act is always that which surpasses the single or the -groups of singles: to will and to effect the single and the series of -singles as such, does not appertain to the ethical, but to the merely -economic form. He who loves things for things' sake (be they such, and -as many as you will, of this or that kind, one, many, infinite) does -not yet love the universal, which is everywhere, and is not exhausted -in any particular thing, nor in any number of things, however immense. - -[Sidenote: _Reduction of material to utilitarian Ethic._] - -If we posit a material principle for Ethic, we relapse as a -consequence into _utilitarianism,_ from which we thought we had -escaped; because, after having asserted the universal, it is now -determined, either as a single or (which amounts to the same thing) as -a feigned universal, a simply general concept of group or series. This -vicissitude, however, presents itself in every sphere of philosophy: -when the universal and formal principle of that sphere is materialized, -we return to the sphere immediately, below it. For example, an -esthetic that posits as its principle certain single forms of art, -thus substituting matter for form, relapses from art to life lived, -which is the condition that precedes art and upon which art raises -itself in order to intuite and to dominate life. Material Ethic has -therefore been with reason discredited as heteronomous and utilitarian. -Not indeed that it is so directly and admits itself so to be: on -the contrary, it professes to be anti-utilitarian and does nothing -directly, save to point to a given object as the true content of -morality. But that object, being single, implies a merely utilitarian -volition; and material Ethic is utilitarian, because, whatever it may -do or say, it is logically reducible to utilitarianism. - -[Sidenote: _Rejection of material principles._] - -The rejection of all material character from the ethical principle -is of the greatest importance, for it frees Ethic from a long series -of concepts, each one of which has been proposed in turn as the true -ethical principle, and several still find many supporters, both in -ordinary thought and in treatises called scientific. For us, those -concepts should not be examined comparatively, so as to arrive at -preferring the one to the other, or a new one of the same type to all -the concepts previously enunciated; but they are all false, for one and -the same reason, as any other that may in future be excogitated will be -false, if it contain in it anything material. - -[Sidenote: _Benevolence, love, altruism, etc.; and critique of them._] - -A first group of such material principles is found in relation to -the general concept of an action, directed toward the welfare of -individuals, other than the individual acting. Morality (they say) -is _sacrifice of self, benevolence, love, altruism, compassion, -humanitarianism,_ or simply _naturalism_ of the Franciscan sort, -which commands us to respect, protect, and love the animals also, -since they too are God's creatures (brother Wolf, sister Fox). Such -formulæ, especially those of _benevolence and altruism,_ have been and -continue to be successful; and hardly a doubt is harboured but that -they determine in the most complete and satisfactory manner the proper -principle of morality. But in truth _others,_ as individuals, have no -rights that I too do not possess as an individual: I am another for -the other, and he is an I for himself; and if each one provided for -the good of others, neglecting and trampling upon his own good, the -result would be perfectly identical to what would happen, were each one -to provide for himself without concern for others. Morality demands -the sacrifice of me for the universal end, but of me only in my merely -individual ends; and, therefore, in this case, of me as of others. It -has no particular animosity against me, so as to wish to sacrifice me -at all costs to others. We must be severe, not only with ourselves, but -with others also; exigent, not only with ourselves, but with others -also; and so, on the contrary, benevolent not only toward others, -but also toward ourselves; compassionate, not only toward others, -but also towards this instrument of labour that we carry about with -us and of which we sometimes demand too much; that is, our empirical -individuality. Reality is neither democratic nor aristocratic, but -both together; it abhors the privilege of some over others as much as -that equality, according to which each one must have the same value -as the other at every moment. All are in turn masters and servants; -worthy of respect as bearers and representatives of good, worthy of -punishment and reprehension as clouding and impeding the good. Morality -never considers individuals in themselves, but always in their relation -to the universal; and in this respect there is no one who does not -deserve to be saved or to be suppressed; there is no animal or other -being of any kind that should not now be favoured in its existence, -now annihilated. No individual is treated as an _end,_ but all as -_means_ for universal morality; and they only obtain the dignity of -ends, in so far as they are means for universal morality. The rights of -animals have been written for and against; but in truth, a lamb has now -the duty of being slaughtered, now the right of being left in peace, -according to circumstances; in the same way that a man has now the -right to go for a walk with his friends and to sing serenades beneath -the windows of fair ladies, now the duty of putting on a uniform and -of betaking himself beneath the walls of a citadel, where he will be -blown in pieces by the enemy's grape-shot. Altruism is as insipid as -egoism, and is reducible at bottom to egoism; in much the same way as -sensual love, which has justly been called "egoism for two." Indeed, -why should we be ready to sacrifice ourselves for others, and to -promote their desire in every case and in spite of everything? For what -reason, save for the blind and irrational attachment to them which -makes a man throw away his life or descend to abjection for a wicked -woman furiously loved, suffer every shame and torment for an unworthy -son, or yield to the impulses of sympathy inspired by an individual? -This blind and irrational attachment to others is at bottom attachment -to ourselves, to our nerves, to our fancies, to our convenience, to our -habits. It is utility, not morality; for morality wills us to be ready -to separate ourselves from others as from ourselves, when the occasion -arises, to leave wives and sons and brothers, and follow duty which -transcends them all. "Thou only, O ideal, art true,..." or rather, by -means of the ideal and of the universal, all things are true; without -the ideal, there is not one of them that does not become false, as -there is not an organism that does not become vile clay, when abandoned -by life. - -[Sidenote: _Social organism, State, interest of the race, etc. Critique -of them._] - -There is another group of material principles which seems to surpass -individuals, because it makes morality to consist of promoting either -so-called _laws of nature_ or so-called _institutions._ Of such kind -are those that place morality in the service of the _social organism -and of the State, or of the interest of the Species and of Life_ (this -being understood as animal life or very near to animality). But if it -seem that contingent facts are thus escaped, that is not really so. -For none of these concepts expresses the universality of the real, but -this or that group of its particular manifestations: the life called -social or political, this or that animal species, this or that vital -manifestation. And none of these facts can be ethically willed without -exceptions. The moral man sacrifices the State to the Church, or the -Church to the State, atrophies certain organs and suppresses certain -vital functions for universal ends, or for the ends of what is called -civilization; he defends, preserves and increases certain aptitudes -of the human race, but lets others disappear or modifies them, always -adapting the interest of the species to that of the ideal. Were he to -do otherwise, he would again be substituting utility for morality, -his immediate affection for certain things or for certain single and -individual facts, to the affection for them that should always be -_mediated,_ that is to say, mediated by the universal. - -[Sidenote: _Material religious principles. Critique of them._] - -A third group of material principles, called religious, which make -morality to consist of conforming to the will of God and of the -gods, is not intrinsically different from these. Where the idea of -the transcendental and of religious mystery is introduced, there is -darkness; and anything can be put into darkness. In the first place, -nothing but darkness itself can be put there, and in this case the -religious solution is agnosticism, confession of ignorance, such as -we have hitherto treated, in criticizing theological utilitarianism -or abstract ethical rigorism, which, by means of its insoluble -contradictions, also leads to the idea of God and of mystery. But one's -own will, caprice and individual interests can also be put there; -and then religion becomes attachment to a being or to an order of -beings, which, though they be imaginary, are not for that reason less -individual; attachment to them is love or fear, sympathy or fear of -the evil they can do, and tendency to avoid it by propitiation with -prayers, adulation, gifts, services, worship. Religious principles, -then, understood as material principles, also become converted, as all -know, and we may add, know all too well, into utilitarian principles; -because, through intently fixing the gaze upon this aspect of religion, -they have forgotten to look at others more important and certainly more -noble. - -[Sidenote: _Formal principle as affirmation of a merely logical -exigency._] - -The ethical principle is not adequately expressed, either by the -_altruistic_ concept, or by that of _natural formations_ and of -_institutions,_ or by that of the _gods;_ because all of these are -general concepts, or sometimes merely individual representations; they -are certainly not universal concepts. And by the necessity of the -universal and the insufficiency of the merely general and individual, -the ethical principle must be _formal_ and not _material._ However (and -here we enter into the new meaning of this word and into the new debate -announced), the formal ethical principle has likewise been understood -as not susceptible of extension beyond the enunciation of the character -of universality, which the principle itself should possess. Its formula -has seemed to be nothing but that of a _universal law,_ to which all -men can conform in complete harmony among themselves; of _respect -towards all beings,_ in the degree that appertains to each, of that -which satisfies _the exigencies of reason and of conscience,_ and so -on. Now the formality claimed by this and similar formulæ has nothing -to do with the formality first claimed; and since in the preceding -debate we took the side of those who maintain formal as against -material Ethic, so here we must defend material against formal Ethic; -or better, an Ethic that is not material against an Ethic that is not -formal, save in the pretentions of those who thus baptize it. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of a formal ethic in this sense: tautologism._] - -What does the formality of Ethic mean in the new sense? Nothing -but this: that it is not necessary to inquire _what is the ethical -principle,_ but that we must be satisfied with saying that _whatever -it be, it must be universal._ But that it must be universal is a -proposition which belongs, not to Ethic, but to Logic; the principles -of all philosophical sciences must possess the character of -universality, the logical as the æsthetic, the principle of Ethic as -that of Economic, the moral categoric imperative as the utilitarian -categoric. Thus the thesis of formality in the new meaning is reduced -to placing at the head of Ethic, not the ethical principle, _but the -logical exigency of the ethical principle,_ in the same way that a -similar claim in Æsthetic would result in placing at the head of -that science, not the formal æsthetic principle, as for example, -Intuition-expression, but a formal æsthetic principle, the claim for -a law, so made that no form of beauty could ever be excluded from -it. Instead of constructing the science, the affirmation of logical -necessity, which that construction must obey, is infinitely repeated; -but the thesis of formality in the new sense would be better called the -thesis of _tautologism._ - -[Sidenote: _Tautological principles: ideal, chief good, duty, etc., and -critique of them._] - -Besides the formulæ to which we have referred, namely those of the -_categoric imperative, of the universal law, of the respect for being, -of the rational and of conscience,_ the formulæ of the _chief good, -of duty (or of law), of the ideal, of true pleasure, of constant -pleasure, of spiritual pleasure, of personal dignity, of self-esteem, -of the just mean, of harmony, of proportion, of justice, of perfection, -of following nature,_ and so on, also belong to the tautological -principles of Ethic; they are all tautologies, because they do not -determine to what object those logical claims are applicable. To ask -what is the form of will that produces a _constant, spiritual and -true_ pleasure, which makes _perfect, gives self-esteem, satisfies our -conscience, strikes the just mean,_ answers to what _ought_ to be done, -attains to _the supreme good,_ and so on, is tantamount to asking, -_What is the ethical form?_ This is precisely what must be answered, -if we do not wish to fall into tautology, and the reply cannot be the -question itself. - -[Sidenote: _Tautological meaning of certain formulæ, material in -appearance._] - -And it is convenient to note here that many of the formulæ that -we have criticized as belonging to material Ethic, have also been -frequently-employed as tautological formulæ, that is to say, as symbols -and metaphors of the ethical truth to be determined. The _others,_ of -which altruism speaks, are at bottom not others as physically distinct -from us, but others in an ideal sense, that is, as duty surpassing -the empirical ego; _God,_ of which religious Ethic speaks, is that -indeterminate concept, that logical exigency, which is also called the -_categoric imperative; the State or Life_ that one pledges oneself -to serve is not this or that State, this or that particular form of -life, but the symbol of the ideal; the _nature_ to be followed is that -nature, or ethical principle within us, which the speculative reason -must determine. Thus do material principles often progress, ceasing -to be such, in order to become tautological, that is, abandoning the -possession of undue determination, owing to the consciousness of a -want, of a lacuna to be filled. - -[Sidenote: _Conversion of tautological Ethic into material and -utilitarian Ethic._] - -The evil is that tautologism inevitably returns to that undue -possession, because, imagining that it has established that ethical -principle which it has not established at all, and that it has finally -constructed Ethic, of which it has not even laid the foundations, it -sets to work to explain moral and concrete facts by means of that -empty form. The consequence of this is that utilitarian motives, as -usual, fill the empty space. Why should we not violate a deposit that -has been entrusted to us? Perhaps because (as they say) the moral law -is a universal law? That does not suffice. Respect for the deposit -cannot be deduced from this principle, for a universal law is equally -thinkable, according to which is deduced in certain cases a respect for -the deposit and in certain other cases the contrary. This then is the -fact: that to restore a deposit confided to us may sometimes happen to -be a bad action, as, for instance, to restore the weapon entrusted to -us, when he who claims it intends to commit suicide or to assassinate. -Thus it happens that not knowing how to put an end to the controversy -in virtue of the true ethical principle, and wishing nevertheless in -some way to use that empty formula, it comes to be filled with the only -principle possessed, namely the utilitarian; and the reason given for -respecting the deposit is said to be the desirability of respecting for -engagements, for the ends of the individual, failing which (it will -be said) no business would thenceforth be effected and the world of -affairs would languish. - -[Sidenote: _In what sense Ethic should be formal and in what other -sense material._] - -_Formal_ Ethic, in the new sense, or as it would be better called, -tautological Ethic, might be called _formalistic,_ owing to its thus -falling back into material, heteronomous and utilitarian Ethic, since -_formalism_ here (as in Æsthetic and Logic) is the caricature of -formality, and almost a sort of materiality. In maintaining _formal_ -Ethic we do not wish that it should be _formalistic_; that is, that it -should be again covertly material. And we wish that formal Ethic should -also be material, always understanding by this that it must give, not -the mere logical condition of the ethical principle, but _this ethical -principle itself_ in its concreteness, determining what moral volition -is in its reality. - - - - -II - - -THE ETHICAL FORM AS ACTUATION OF THE SPIRIT IN UNIVERSAL - - -[Sidenote: _Tautological Ethic and its connection with Philosophy, -either partial or discontinuous._] - -If the strange idea of an ethical principle that should be formal, -in the sense of its not being known exactly what it is and how it is -justified, has ever been able to arise, this is due to two erroneous -philosophical conceptions, of which one can be called _partial,_ the -other _discontinuous_ philosophy. According to the first conception, -man is capable of knowing something of reality, certainly, but not -all: he perceives and arranges the data of experience by means of the -categories, but he is aware of the limitation of his thought and of the -impossibility of attaining to the heart of the real, which he does, it -is true, end by attaining in a certain way, but only with the heart, -not with thought. This being stated, and coming to the case of Ethic, -man hears the voice of conscience in himself, the command of the moral -law; he cannot think of any sophism to escape it: but precisely what -that law is, he is unable to say; the idea of a divine ordinance of -the world which presents itself to his spirit, may also be affirmed by -the heart, but never by thought. The second conception is confounded -by some thinkers with the first and becomes partial philosophy or -agnosticism; but if we observe closely, it is distinct from the other. -For here it is not actually asserted that the foundation of morality -is unknowable, but it is said to be unknowable in the circle of Ethic, -or that such knowledge goes beyond that circle. Ethic establishes the -moral law, deduces or arranges beneath it ethical precepts and by means -of them judges single actions. Ethic is ignorant as to whether that -law really exists, or what may be its precise universal content. It -hands this problem over to Metaphysic, or to general Philosophy, which -solves it in its own way, or is presumed to be capable of solving it. -In this conception, then, there arises a question as to competence -and hierarchy between thought and thought, between particular and -general philosophy; whereas, in the former, is affirmed the absolute -incompetence of thought. - -[Sidenote: _Rejection of both these conceptions._] - -But we do not run the risk of colliding with the obstacle placed -before us with these philosophical views, because we have constantly -rejected them both throughout the whole of our exposition of the -Philosophy of the spirit and have demonstrated their falsity. Partial -Philosophy is a contradictory concept: thought either thinks all -or nothing; and if it had a limit it would have it as thought and -therefore as surpassed. Whoso admits something unknowable, declares -everything unknowable, and inevitably falls into total scepticism. Nor -is the idea of a discontinuous philosophy divided into a whole and -its parts, with the whole outside the parts and the parts outside the -whole less inconceivable; so that, while Ethic is being studied, the -whole (complete Philosophy) seems problematical; and a part (Ethic) -can be known to some extent without knowing the whole (the whole -of Philosophy). This is a false view, ultimately derived from the -empirical sciences, in which it is possible to apprehend one order -of phenomena independently of the others; and to apprehend phenomena -without explicitly posing or by dismissing to another occasion the -philosophical problem as to their truth. Philosophy is a circle and a -unity and every point of it is intelligible only in relation to all the -others. The didascalic convenience of exposing a group of philosophical -problems separately from others--or also (if it please others, as -it has not pleased us) of dividing the exposition into particular -philosophical sciences, and into general Philosophy (also called -Metaphysic)--should not lead to the misconception that the indivisible -is really being divided. The whole of Philosophy is at once enunciated -with the first philosophical proposition; and the others that come -after will all be nothing but explanations of the first. - -[Sidenote: _The ethical form as volition of the universal._] - -Therefore, since we have never denied faith to thought, nor broken in -pieces the unity of Philosophy, we have no secret to reveal at this -point; not even a poor secret, like the exponents of discontinuous -Philosophy, who solemnly make known at the end what they have assumed -from the beginning. Our formal ethical principle is never empty form -that must only now be filled with a content. It is full form, form -in the philosophical and universal sense, which is also content and -therefore universal content. We have not restricted ourselves to -defining the ethical form as universal form, which would have resulted -in tautologism; but we have defined it _volition of the universal,_ -thus distinguishing it from the economic form, which is simply volition -of the individual. And if we now ask ourselves what is the universal, -we must reply that the answer has already been given, and that whoever -has not yet understood, whoever indeed has not understood it for some -time, will never understand it. The universal has been the object of -all our Philosophy of the Spirit, and we have always had to keep it -before our eyes, in studying, not only the practical function, but -any other function of the spirit; just as we cannot have the idea -of the branch of a tree without the idea of the trunk from which it -springs and without which there would not be the branch of a tree. That -concept, then, is not a _deus ex machina_ to appear unexpectedly at the -end of the play and hastily bring it to a conclusion, but the force -that has animated it from the first to the last scene. - -[Sidenote: _The universal as the Spirit (Reality, Liberty, etc.)._] - -What is the universal? It is the Spirit, it is Reality, in so far as -it is truly real, that is, in so far as it is unity of thought and -willing; it is Life, in so far as realized in its profundity as this -unity itself; it is Freedom, if a reality so conceived be perpetual -development, creation, progress. Outside the Spirit nothing is -thinkable in a truly universal form. Æsthetic, Logic, Historic, this -very Philosophy of the practical, have demonstrated and confirmed -this truth in every way. Every other concept brought forward reveals -itself (and has revealed itself beneath our analysis), either as a -feigned universal, or as something contingent that has been abstracted -and generalized, or as the hypostasis of certain of our particular -spiritual products, such as mathematical formulæ, or as the negation of -the Spirit, on which is conferred positive value (first with metaphor -and then with metaphysic). - -And the moral individual who wills the universal, or that which -transcends him as an individual, turns precisely to the Spirit, to -real Reality, to true Life, to Liberty. The universal is in concrete -the universal individualized, and the individual is real in so far as -he is also universal. He is not able to assert one part of himself -without asserting the other (under the penalty of stopping half-way, -_dimidiatus vir,_ and so of again becoming nothing). But in order to -assert them both, he must first posit the one as explicit and the other -as implicit, and then make the other also explicit. Man as economic -individual, at the first moment (so to speak) of his revealing himself -to life and to existence, cannot will, save individually: will his -own individual existence. There is no man, however moral he be, who -does not begin in this way. How could he ever surpass and finally -deny his own individual life, if he had not first affirmed it and -did not reaffirm it at every instant? But he who should stop at that -affirmation of the individual, regarding the first stage of development -as the resting-place, would enter into profound contradiction with -himself. He should will, not only his own self individualized, but also -that self, which, being in all selves, is their common Father. Thus he -promotes the realization of the Real, lives a full life and makes his -heart beat in harmony with the universe: _cor cordium._ - -The moral individual has this consciousness of working for the Whole. -Every action, however diverse, which conforms to ethical duty, conforms -to Life; and if, instead of promoting Life, it should depress and -mortify it, for that very reason it would be immoral. Where facts seem -to demonstrate the contrary, the interpretation of facts is erroneous, -since it affirms as a criterion of judgment a life which is not that -true life, which, as we know, we serve even by dying--dying as an -individual, as a collectivity, as a social class, or as a people. The -most humble moral act can be resolved into this volition of the Spirit -in universal. Thus it happens that the soul of a simple and ignorant -man, altogether devoted to his rude duty, vibrates in unison with that -of the philosopher, whose mind receives into it the universal Spirit: -what the one thinks at that moment, the other does, thus attaining -by his own path to that full satisfaction, that act of life, that -fruitful conjunction with the Real, which the other has attained to by -a different path. It may be said that the moral man is a _practical -philosopher_ and the philosopher a _theoretic actor._ - -[Sidenote: _Moral acts as volitions of the Spirit._] - -This criterion of the Spirit, of Progress, of Reality, is the intimate -measure of our acts in the moral conscience, as it is the foundation, -more or less clearly expressed, of our moral judgments. Why do we exalt -Giordano Bruno, who allowed himself to be condemned to the stake for -asserting his philosophy? Perhaps for the calmness with which he faced -the torture? But many fanatics, even malefactors, are capable of this, -and it may sometimes even be a simple sensual desire, of which we -have seen examples in history and of which a modern Italian poet has -lately sung, exalting the beauty of the flame and the voluptuousness of -the pyre. By facing death and refusing to deny his philosophy, Bruno -contributed to the creation of a larger form of civilization, and -for this reason he is not only a victim, but also a _martyr,_ in the -etymological sense of the word: witness and realizer of a demand of -the Spirit in universal.--Why do we praise the charitable man? Perhaps -because he yields to the emotion caused by the spectacle of suffering. -But emotion in itself is neither moral nor immoral, and thus to yield -to it materially is weakness, that is, immorality. The charitable man, -when he removes or mitigates suffering, relights a life and reconquers -a force for the common work, which both he and the person whom he has -benefited, must serve. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of antimoralism._] - -There is indeed nothing more foolish than antimoralism, so much the -fashion in our day; it is an ugly echo of unhealthy social conditions, -of one-sided theories ill understood (Marxism, Nietzscheianism). -Antimoralism is justified, in so far as it combats moral hypocrisy -in favour of effective morality instead of that of mere words, but -it loses all meaning when it inflates empty phrases or combines -contradictory propositions and preaches against morality itself. By so -doing, it thinks to celebrate strength, health and freedom, but on the -contrary exalts servitude to unbridled passions, the apparent health of -the invalid and the apparent strength of the maniac. Morality (begging -pardon of literary immoralists), far from being a pedantic fiction or -the consolation of the impotent, is _good blood against bad blood._ - -[Sidenote: _Confused tendencies of tautological, material, religious -formulæ, etc., toward the Ethic of the Spirit._] - -We must also declare that this truth concerning the ethical principle -understood as will that has for its end the universal or the Spirit, -is to some extent confirmed by several of the formulæ that we have -criticized, which have erred only in defining it, either confusing -altogether the universal and the contingent, or have fallen into -tautologism. Those who posit Life, or the interest of the Species, -Society or the State, as the end of morality, have in view that Life, -that Species, that Society, or that ideal State, which is the Spirit -in universal, although they are not able to define it clearly. The -same may be said of other formulæ, which often have a better intention -at starting than that realized in the development of the relative -doctrines, or, on the contrary, a development superior to their bad -initial intention. - -[Sidenote: _The Ethic of the Spirit and religious Ethic._] - -This function of symbol possessed by idealist Ethic, this -affirmation that the moral act is love and volition of the Spirit -in universal, is to be found above all in religious and Christian -Ethic, in the Ethic of love and of the anxious search for the divine -presence. This is the fundamental characteristic of religious Ethic, -which remains unknown to vulgar rationalists and intellectualists, to -so-called free-thinkers, and to frequenters of masonic lodges, owing to -their narrow party passion or lack of mental subtlety. There is hardly -an ethical truth (and we have already had occasion to refer to this -matter) that cannot be expressed with the words that we have learned -as children from traditional religion, and which rise spontaneously -to the lips, as the most elevated, the most appropriate and the most -beautiful; words which are certainly impregnated with mythology, but -are also weighty with profound philosophical content. There is without -doubt an exceedingly strong antithesis between the idealist philosopher -and the religious individual, but it is not greater than that within -ourselves, when, in the imminence of a crisis, we are divided in -soul and yet very near to unity and to interior conciliation. If the -religious man cannot but see in the philosopher his adversary, his -mortal foe, the philosopher, on the other hand, sees in him his younger -brother, his very self of a moment past. Hence he will feel himself -more nearly allied to an austere, emotional, religious Ethic, troubled -with phantoms, than to an Ethic that is superficially rationalistic: -for this latter is only in appearance more philosophical than the -other, since if it possess the merit of recognizing (verbally only, or -with _psittacism,_ as Leibnitz would have said) the supreme rights of -reason, yet in plucking thought from the soil in which it has grown and -depriving it of vital sap, it exercises them very ill. - - - - -III - - -HISTORICAL NOTES - - -[Sidenote: _Merit of the Kantian Ethic._] - -I. It is the singular merit of Kant to have put an end, once for all, -to every material Ethic, by proving its utilitarian character: a -merit that is not cancelled by the lacunæ that exist in other parts -of his thought, entangling him unawares in the materialism and in the -utilitarianism that he had surpassed. It would be anti-historical to -desire to judge a thinker by the contradictions into which he falls -and so to declare his work to be a failure and of no importance, when -it is only imperfect. There are errors in all the works of man, and -error is always contradiction; but he who has the eye of the historian -discovers where lies the true strength of a thought and does not deny -the light, because of necessity accompanied with shadow. Before Kant, -ethic was either openly utilitarian or such that although presenting -itself in the deceitful form of Ethic of sympathy, or religious Ethic, -was yet reducible to utilitarianism. Kant conducted an implacable and -destructive war, not only against admitted utilitarian forms, but also -against those that were masked and spurious, called by him material -Ethic. - -[Sidenote: _The predecessors of Kant._] - -In this too, his predecessors are to be found in traditional philosophy -of Christian origin, or, if it be preferred, Platonic (opposition -of material to formal Ethic can already be observed in the attitude -of Aristotle to Plato). If the fathers and the scholastics had been -divided as to the question of the relation between moral laws and the -divine will, and many of them, especially the mystics, had made that -law to depend upon the divine will and upon nothing else, yet views -had not been wanting, according to which the power of changing at -will the moral laws, that is to say, of changing his own essence, was -denied to God, since he could not be _supra se._ Religious Ethic was -cleansed of every admixture of arbitrarism and utilitarianism by this -solution, accepted by nearly all religious thinkers of the seventeenth -and eighteenth centuries (by Cudworth, by Malebranche, and finally by -Leibnitz). On the other hand, we cannot but recognize that many other -material formulæ used to be understood in an ideal, or, as we have -said, in a symbolical manner; and certainly that very eudæmonism -of Aristotle, toward which Kant showed himself too severe, was not -the pleasure and happiness of the hedonists and utilitarians, and the -mediety (μεσότης) proposed as the distinctive character of virtue, -although without doubt empty and often incoherent, was already almost -a formal principle. The same is to be said of the Stoic principle of -_following nature_; and coming to the immediate predecessors of Kant, -of that _perfectio_ already mentioned, which Kant, after wavering a -little, reduced to happiness, not, however, without stating that it is -a more indeterminate concept than any other. With Kant, however, the -point was admitted, that the moral law is not to be expressed in any -formula, which contains representative and contingent elements. - -[Sidenote: _Defect of that Ethic: agnosticism._] - -The defect of the Kantian Ethic is the defect of his whole philosophy: -agnosticism, which prevents his truly surpassing either the phenomenon -or the thing in itself, leading him, on the one hand, toward -empiricism, on the other toward that transcendental metaphysic, which -no one had done more to discredit than himself. He combated the concept -of the good or supreme good as the principle of Ethic, and he was right -in so far as he understood it as object of any sort, of "a good," as of -a "thing." But this did not exempt him from the duty of defining the -supreme good as that which is not exhausted in any particular object, -or of determining the universal. Now his philosophy was incapable of -attaining to the universal. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of Hegel and of others._] - -Hence the involuntary return to utilitarianism, clearly stated by Hegel -in his youthful essay upon natural Right. The practical principle of -Kant (remarked Hegel) is not a true but a negative absolute; hence -with him the principle of morality becomes converted into immorality: -since every fact can be thought in the form of universality, it is -never known what fact should be received into the law. In the famous -example of the deposit, Kant had said that it is necessary to keep -faith as regards the deposit, otherwise there would no longer be -deposits.[1] But if there were no more deposits, how would this -constitute a contradiction to the form of the law? There would perhaps -be contradiction and absurdity for material reasons, but it is already -agreed that this is not to be brought up in the argument. Kant wishes -to justify property, but he does not attain to more than the tautology, -that property, if it be property, must be property, opening the way -to the free choice of conceiving at will as duties these or those -contingent definitions of property. The moral maxims of Kant, owing to -the empirical determinations that they assume, are contradictory, not -only of one another, but of themselves. This inevitable degeneration -of the Kantian Ethic was called by Hegel _tautology and formalism_.[2] -Other thinkers were also affected by the utilitarianism of the -Kantian Ethic: Schopenhauer even declared that his doctrine has no -other foundation than egoism, since it can be reduced to the concept -of reciprocity, and he protested against the Kantian theory that we -should be compassionate to animals, in order to exercize ourselves -in the virtue of compassion, judging it to be the effect of the -Judæo-Christian views of Kant.[3] Schopenhauer was in some respect -right in these observations, although as regards animals we must note -that the same attitude is found in Spinoza and in other thinkers and -that it derives from material and utilitarian Ethic; and for the rest -that it would be very unjust to see nothing but egoism in the categoric -imperative of Kant, for this, we repeat, though it constitute its -danger, does not constitute its essential character. - -[Sidenote: _Kant and the concept of freedom._] - -Nevertheless, in Kant himself, in this thinker, so rich in -contradictions and suggestions, was indicated the concept which, when -elaborated, was to constitute the principle, not merely of tautological -and formalistic, but of concrete and formal Ethic, the concept of -_freedom._ By means of this concept Kant enters into the heart of the -real and reaches that region of which mysticism and religion had from -time to time caught a glimpse and had here and there attained. As the -origin of the rigid Kantian ethical conception and of his abhorrence -for the material and mundane is to be found in Christianity (and in -Paganism), so the origin of the concrete moral idea is to be sought in -St. Augustine, and also in St. Paul, in the mystics and in the great -French Christians of the seventeenth century; in that virtue of which -Pascal wrote as _plus haute que celle des pharisiens et des plus sages -du paganisme,_ and it operates with omnipotent hand, by means of which -alone is it possible _dégager l'âme de l'amour du monde, la retirer -de ce quelle a de plus cher, la faire mourir à soi-même, la porter et -l'attacher uniquement et invariablement à Dieu._[4] The successors -of Kant, especially Fichte and Hegel, closed the circle which he had -left open, and altogether excluding transcendency, they made of God -freedom and of freedom reality. Fichte, who expelled the phantom of the -thing in itself from theoretical philosophy, removed from the categoric -imperative the appearance of _qualitas occulta,_ which it had borne in -the Philosophy of the practical, illuminating that tenebrous region, -ready to receive any sort of phantasm or superstition, such as belief -in a moral law arbitrarily imposed by the divinity.[5] Hegel does not -recognize duty and the categoric imperative, but freedom only, and as -he says, the free spirit is that in which subject and object coincide -and freedom is freely willed. - -[Sidenote: _Ethic in the nineteenth century._] - -II. After the classical epoch of modern philosophy, in the general -regression of Ethic, the concept of the concreteness and universality -of the practical principle was also lost. Omitting the utilitarians, -who no longer have a place here, it must suffice to record how there -was a return either to the formalistic principles, which Hegel -criticized in Kant (for instance the principle of the Ethic of Rosmini, -the _respect for being,_ afterwards combated by Gioberti), or directly -to those material principles which Kant had already excluded. Such -are the _compassion_ of Schopenhauer, the _five practical ideas_ of -Herbart, the love of Feuerbach, _benevolence_ as the supreme ethical -idea of Lotze, the _theological_ morality of Baader, the _life_ of -Nietzsche, and the like. - -The principles of the first were completed with a religious conception -(here too Rosmini may afford an example), and those of the second, when -they did not reveal themselves as utilitarian or tautological, showed -an obscure tendency toward the Ethic of Freedom. This must not be -overlooked in the Ethic of Nietzsche, which despite the rocks and mud -that the thought of Nietzsche drags with it, is yet anti-hedonistic and -anti-utilitarian and quite full of the sense of Life as activity and -power. Positivistic evolutionism is also often unconscious idealism; -and the moral actions, united to evolution, can be interpreted as -those which correspond to the Spirit in universal. The concepts of the -pessimists alone are altogether incapable of idealistic interpretation -(for example, Schopenhauer), and those of the semi-pessimist and -semi-idealist Hartmann are strangely contradictory. He makes morality -to consist of the promotion of civilization, whence so lofty a -condition of the spirit can be attained that it will be possible to -decree universal suicide by means of the vote of all the world. - -The question asked after Kant, whether Ethic should be formal -or material, is one that we have made more precise in the other -form, whether Ethic should be abstract or concrete, full or empty, -tautological or expressive--that is (with even greater precision), -whether Ethic can be established before and without a philosophical -system and even be reconciled with agnosticism, has no longer been -understood, even by its pretended followers, the Neocriticists or -Neokantians. These have either believed they had solved it by means of -moderate utilitarianism, or by going outside it and denying the most -secure result of the Kantian critique of Ethic; or they have discussed -it tiresomely, without making a step in advance. Progress indeed was -possible on one condition alone: that a philosophical system should -be constructed not inferior to that of the postkantian idealists. But -this would have been tantamount to demanding the death of neokantianism -or neocriticism, which has not only not attempted to surpass the -idealistic systems, but has even maintained that we should philosophize -without a system, declaring that a system is altogether inconceivable. -The Neokantians can thus be recognized as the descendants of Kant; but -in the same way as the last descendant of the Hapsburgs in Spain, -who was neither emperor, king, soldier, nor man, could be recognized -as the descendant of Charles the Fifth, who was man, soldier, king, -and emperor: because, like his great predecessor, he possessed the -deformed, hanging lip of the Hapsburgs. - - -[1] _Krit. d. prakt. Vern._ pp. 30-31. - -[2] _Ueb. d. wissensch. Behandlungsarten d. Naturrechts,_ in _Werke,_ -i. 353; cf. _Gesch. d. Phil._ iii. 533 sqq. - -[3] _Gründl, d. Moral,_ in _Werke,_ ed. cit., iii. 538, 542-543. - -[4] _Lettres prov._ 1. 5. - -[5] _System d. Sittenlehre,_ pp. 49-51. - - - - -THIRD PART - - -LAWS - - - - -I - - -LAWS AS PRODUCTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL - - -[Sidenote: _Definition of law._] - -_Law_ is a volitional act, which has for content a _series_ or _class_ -of actions. - -[Sidenote: _Philosophical and empirical concepts of society._] - -This definition excludes above all from the concept of law a -determination that is generally considered essential to it, the -determination of _society_; this amounts to saying that it also extends -the concept of law to the case of the _isolated individual._ But in -order that there may be no misunderstanding in relation to a point -like this of the highest importance, it will be well to show that the -word "society" has a double meaning, philosophical and empirical, and -if we exclude its empirical sense from the concept of law, it would -neither be possible nor our wish, to exclude its philosophical sense. -Reality is unity and multiplicity together, and an individual is -conceivable, in so far as he is compared with other individuals, and -the process of reality is effective, in so far as individuals enter -into relations with one another. Without multiplicity there would not -be knowledge, action, art or thought, utility or morality; therefore -the isolated individual, torn from the reality that constitutes him -and that he constitutes, is something abstract and absurd. But he -is no longer absurd, when understood in another way, with polemical -intention against a false concept; as an individual not absolutely, -but relatively isolated, in respect to certain contingent conditions -which had wrongly been held essential: in which case the concept of -society is conversely itself abstract and unreal. "Society," indeed, -is also used to mean a multiplicity of beings of the same species, and -it is evident that here an arbitrary element enters into the problem, -for the naturalistic concept of sameness of species is arbitrary -and approximative; hence the pretended sameness might fail and the -society yet exist all the same. A man may not be able to find those -who resemble him among a multitude of men and conduct himself as if -they did not exist; but this does not prevent his living in the society -of beings that are called natural, with his dog, his horse, with -plants, with the earth, with the dead and with God. When he is placed -in solitude or isolated from the other beings, said to belong to the -same species as himself, that other society, or the communion with -what remains to him of reality, will always continue, thus enabling -him to continue his life of contemplation, of thought, of action and -of morality. In order to understand the Spirit in its universality, -we must separate it from contingencies, and society in the empirical -sense is contingency, which the concept of the isolated individual -(isolated from it and not from reality, from the _societas hominum,_ -not from the _societas entium_), enables us to surpass. The great -services which this concept has rendered to Logic, to Æsthetic and -especially to Economy, are known, for the latter only began to develop -the philosophical spirit in itself, when it conceived economic facts -as they take place in the individual, prior to what is called society, -thus positing the concept of an isolated economy. Conversely, Economic, -Æsthetic, Ethic and all philosophical problems and sciences lost their -true nature and became bastardized, when gross _sociologism_ replaced -among social contingencies those universals, which philosophers had -with great labour removed from them and thought in their purity. -Defining laws, then, as facts that occur, not only in society, -but also in the isolated individual, our intention is simply to -concentrate attention upon the concept of _true society,_ which is _all -reality,_ and not allow it to be diverted and confused with accidental -determinations, of the kind that may and may not be. - -[Sidenote: _Laws as individual product: programmes of individual life._] - -No great art is required to find instances of individuals who make -laws for themselves, carry them out and change them, grant rewards to -themselves and inflict upon themselves punishments; nor is there any -need to incommode the worthy Robinson of the economists to this end. -Without being obliged to make the effort of imagining ourselves cast -upon a desert island and provided only with a sack of corn and the -Bible, it suffices to have eyes and to observe our daily life, for -numbers of examples of internal legislation to present themselves. -Those laws, made for our use and consumption, are called _programmes -of life._ Who can live without programmes? Who does not decide that he -will desire certain actions and avoid certain others? From youth onward -we begin to legislate in this way and this production of internal laws -is interrupted only by death. We say, for instance:--"I shall devote -my life to agriculture: I shall live in the country every year from -June to November; from December to February I shall come to town, -that I may not lose touch with political or social life; from March -to May I shall travel, for pleasure and instruction." This programme -is subdivided and completed with other programmes, according to the -various conditions and possibilities taken into consideration; and laws -are established as to the way one should conduct oneself in respect to -religion, family, friends, the State, the Church and also in respect to -this or that individual; for (as is observed by Logic) the individual -conceived as a fixed being, also becomes a concept, abstraction, group, -series, or class. He who wished it, would be able to establish a -parallel between programmes or individual laws and laws that are called -social: in the individual would be found fundamental statutes, laws, -rules, ordinances, temporary arrangements, contracts, single laws and -all the other legal forms found in societies. Now in what conceivable -way do the programmes of the individual differ from those of society? -Are not those laws _programmes,_ and are not those programmes _laws?_ - -[Sidenote: _Exclusion of the character of compulsion and critique of -this concept._] - -To this interrogation of ours, which does not express a doubt within -us, but states what seems to be an undeniable fact, defying any sort -of contradiction, may be objected (and it is a common objection) -that there is a great difference between individual laws and those of -society or of the State: these are compulsory, those are not; and for -this reason these are true laws, while the others are mere programmes. -But we cannot attach any importance to this objection, at least as thus -formulated; because, having now traversed the whole of the Philosophy -of the practical, general, and special, we have never met with what -is called compulsion in the circle of willing and doing, save in the -negative sense of deficiency of will and action. No action can ever -be compulsory; every action is free, because the Spirit is freedom; -there may not be action in a certain case, but a compulsory action -is inconceivable, since it is a question of terms that exclude one -another. Does the fact give the lie to our assertion? Let us examine -the fact for a little, face to face and without preconceptions. Let us -for this purpose take an extreme case: for instance, that of the law of -a most powerful despot, who, being in command of police, should order a -group of men to bring their first-born to sacrifice to the god in whom -he believes, but they do not. Are the men who hear this manifestation -of will constrained by it? What menace can make him who wishes to say -no, say yes? That group of men will rebel, will take up arms, will -rout the troops of the despot, will put him to death, or render him -incapable of harming; and in this hypothesis the law will not reveal -any character, of compulsion. But in the other hypothesis also, where -they do not rebel and in the meantime bow to the will of the despot, -either that they may not risk their own lives, or because they defer -their rebellion to a more propitious moment and consign their sons -to death; they will not have suffered any compulsion, but will have -freely willed: they will have willed to preserve their own lives at -the expense of their sons'; or to sacrifice some of them in order to -have the time to put themselves into such a position that they may be -able to rebel with the hope of victory. Thus we find in social laws, -now observance, now inobservance of the law; but both occur in freedom. -Inobservance may be followed by what is called punishment (that is to -say, the legislator who has imposed a given class of actions, will -adopt certain definite measures against those who do not obey them; to -wit: he will will another class of actions, destined to render possible -the first, because the punishment is a new condition of things set -before the individual, according to which he must alter his previous -mode of action); but the punishment always finds itself face to face -with the freedom of the individual. He will be able freely to observe -the law in order to avoid the punishment or its recurrence; but he will -also be able freely to rebel against it, as in the instance adduced. - -[Sidenote: _Identical characteristics of individual and social laws._] - -If compulsion be wanting to individual laws, this is because it is -also always wanting to social laws: while, on the contrary, what is -really present in social laws is equally present in the observances and -rebellions, rewards and punishments of individual laws. - -To return to the former example: the individual who has decided to -devote himself to agriculture as programme of life, may be seized -all of a sudden with a great desire to devote himself to painting or -to music; and what had previously pleased may henceforward displease -him: that intimacy with mother earth, with harvests and vintages, -which seemed to be the very life for him, his true ideal, may come to -seem to him tiresome and repugnant. But if he be a serious person, -if he do not will and not will at every moment, if he do not present -in his own individuality a complete resemblance to those peoples -who change in mid-November the laws made in October and proceed -from revolution to revolution, he will examine his situation and -will recognize, for instance, that the desire arisen in his soul is -a velleity that does not answer to his true vocation and that the -first programme must remain intact; hence will take place in him a -struggle between that programme and the new rebellious volition. It -may happen that in this case the individual will sometimes neglect -the programme traced, in order to abandon himself to the temptations -of his pictorial or musical dilettanteism; but since this will happen -against his individual law, and since force must remain on the side of -law, this breach of observance will be followed by special measures, -such as the throwing away of brushes and violin, or by his forbidding -to himself those moments of recreation in such amusements, which he -used to allow himself and which have now become dangerous. In other -words, the individual inflicts punishments on himself in case of the -non-observance of his law, and these punishments must be held to be -such in the strictest sense of the term. And if we accept the other -hypothesis, analogous to that made in the case of social laws, should -the individual find himself possessed with so vehement a desire of -becoming a painter or a musician, as to be compelled to believe that -the original programme, the original law of his individuality, did -not correspond, or no longer corresponded with his true temperament, -he will rebel against the law and destroy it in himself, in the same -manner as in the other example the people destroyed the law of the -despot, by fighting with him, imprisoning, or slaying him. - -[Sidenote: _Individual laws as in ultimate analysis alone real._] - -Individual programmes or laws then are laws, and this concept includes -the isolated individual as well as society; and therefore the character -of sociality is not essential to the concept of law. Thus, to be more -precise, the only laws that really exist are individual laws and it is -not possible to conceive of social and individual laws as two forms -of the general concept of laws; unless individual and society be both -understood in the empirical sense, thus abandoning philosophical -consideration. If the individual be understood in the philosophical -sense, in which he is the Spirit concrete and individualized, it -is clear that what are called social laws can also be reduced to -individual laws; because, in order to observe a law, we must make -it our own, that is to say, individualize it, and in order to rebel -against it, we must expel it from our own personality, in which it -wished unduly to remain or to introduce itself. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the division of laws into judicial and social -and into their sub-classes. Empiricity of every division of laws._] - -The exclusion of the character of sociality from the concept of law -frees philosophy from a series of problems, grafted upon that pretended -character. The principal of these was that of the distinction of social -laws into political and judicial, on the one hand and merely social -on the other; and the further distinction of judicial law into public -and private, civil and penal, national and international, into laws -properly so called and regulations, and so on. If the concept itself of -social law be empirical, then all the distinctions and sub-distinctions -of it proposed must also be empirical, and altogether without -philosophical value. So true is this that it is impossible to decide -for one distinction or definition against another, or to correct those -hitherto given by proposing new ones. Whoever undertakes to examine -any one of these distinctions, at once realizes the aphilosophical -character affirmed of them _a priori._ Thus judicial or political laws -have been distinguished from the merely social, with the affirmation -that those are compulsory, these conventional; whereas compulsion is -impossible in both cases, for the reasons given, and if by compulsion -be meant the threat of a penalty, this is to be found in merely social -laws, not less than in judicial. The law against the falsification -of public money is usually described as judicial: he who falsifies -it runs the risk of undergoing some years' imprisonment. It is a law -called social that we must answer a salutation with a salutation: he -who does not do this runs the risk of being held ill-bred and excluded -from the society of the well-bred. What essential difference is there -between the two laws? An attempt has been made to differentiate them by -saying that the former has emanated from and is sustained by a _supreme -power,_ vigilant as to its observance, the second from particular -circles of individuals. But where is the seat of this supreme power? -Certainly not in a superindividual, who dominates individuals, but in -individuals themselves. And in this case its power and value correspond -with the power of the individuals who compose it; that is to say, -it is the law of a circle, empirically considered to be larger and -stronger, but whose volitions are realized in so far as the individuals -composing it spontaneously conform to them, because they recognize the -convenience of doing so. Monarchs who believed themselves to be most -powerful, have realized at certain moments that the power did not at -all reside in their persons or title, but in a universal consensus -of opinion, failing which their power vanished, or was reduced to a -gesture of solitary command, not far removed from the ridiculous. Laws -that seem to be excellent remain unapplied, because they meet with -tacit general resistance, or as is said, do not accord with custom: -this should suffice to enlighten the mind as to the inseverable unity -of what is called the State and what is called society. The State -is not a being, but a mobile complex of varied relations between -individuals. It may be convenient to limit this complex as well as -possible, to make a being of it to oppose other complexes: of this -there can be no doubt; and let us leave to jurists the excogitation -of these and other similar distinctions, fictitious but opportune; -nor let us consider that their work should be declared in the least -absurd. We only say that it must not be forgotten that the fictitious -is fictitious, as is the claim made to reason about it as rational -and philosophical, and to fill volumes and volumes with tiresome -disquisitions, which are necessarily vain, though the distinctions that -form their object are not vain in their circle. We who are not jurists -but philosophers, and to whom it is therefore not permitted to produce -and adopt practical distinctions, must conceive as laws and include -equally in the same category, alike the English _Magna Charta_ and -the statute of the Sicilian _Mafia,_ or of the Neapolitan _Camorra;_ -the _Regula monachorum_ of Saint Benedict and that of the _brigata -spendereccia_ that was sung in sonnets by Folgore di San Geminiano and -Cene della Chitarra and is recorded by Dante in the _Inferno;_ the -canon law and the military code, and that _droit parisien,_ which a -certain personage of Balzac had studied for three years in the blue -boudoir of one lady and in the rosy drawing-room of another, and which, -although no one ever speaks of it, yet constitutes (says the great -novelist) _une haute jurisprudence sociale, qui, bien apprise et bien -pratiquée, mène à tout._[1] What more can be said? Even those _literary -and artistic laws are laws_ which express the will to produce works, -possessing this or that other kind of argument and arrangement, as -would be the law that drama should be divided into five or three acts -or _days,_ and that romances must not exceed four or five hundred -pages, 16mo, and that a monumental statue must be nude or heroically -clad. It is evident that if anybody violate these laws, he may be -excluded (and he was indeed excluded) from the academies of good -taste, which did not prevent his being received for that very reason -into the anti-academies of the independents: in just the same way as -to have incurred punishments announced by the penal code is a title of -admission to certain criminal societies. - -[Sidenote: _Extension of the concept of law._] - -These examples that we have selected among the most extraordinary -and the most apt to scandalize, help to make it quite clear that the -concept of law must be taken in its full logical extension, when -we wish to philosophize about it. Among the many obstacles that -philosophy meets with is a curious sort of false shame, which looks -upon contact with certain arguments as injurious to the dignity of -philosophy: a contact which is avoided by arbitrarily narrowing and -therefore falsifying philosophical concepts. That of law especially -has a tradition of _solemnity,_ and brings with it associations that -must be broken in pieces. Otherwise it is impossible even to understand -what are those _firm and unwritten laws_ of the gods, which Antigone -opposed to the decrees of men and how they exercise their efficiency; -or _the sayings of Lacedaemon,_ in obedience to which fell the three -hundred at Thermopylae; or _the laws of the fatherland,_ which, with -their irresistible authority, caused Socrates to remain at the moment -when others counselled and facilitated his flight. Life is composed of -big and little actions, of least and greatest, or better, of a very -dense web of very diverse actions; and it is not a too brilliant idea -to cut that web in pieces and to throw away some of the pieces as less -beautiful, in order afterwards to contemplate in those pieces only that -have been thus selected, cut out and disconnected, the web that no -longer exists. - - -[1] Balzac, _Le Père Goriot_ (ed. Paris, Calman Lévy, 1891), p. 85. - - - - -II - - -THE CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF LAWS. CRITIQUE OF PERMISSIVE LAWS AND OF -NATURAL LAW - - -[Sidenote: _The volitional character and the character of class._] - -The undue restrictions and empirical divisions of the concept of -laws having been destroyed, if our attention be now directed to the -character that has been determined as properly belonging to them, -we have the means of distinguishing them from the other spiritual -forms with which they are often confused, partly as the result of the -metaphors and homonyms usual in ordinary speech. Laws, as has been -said, are _volitional acts_ concerning _classes_ of actions. Therefore, -where the volitional element or the element of class is wanting, there -cannot be law, save in name and by metaphor. - - -[Sidenote: Distinction of laws from the so-called laws of nature.] - -So-called _laws of nature_ or _naturalistic laws_ are not laws, -owing to the absence of the volitional element: they consist of -simple enunciations of relations between empirical concepts, that -is, of rules. This is an instance of what is called a natural law: -platinum melts at a temperature of 1780 degrees; or this other of a -grammatical law: that in the Greek language masculine nouns of the -second declension have the genitive in _ου_(with exceptions, in this -as in the other case). But they are laws in about the same way as -the King of Cups is king; and indeed it is known historically that -this denomination was transported by the Stoics from the domain of -politics, where it had first appeared, to that of nature. Empirical -concepts and rules may, as we know, assume an imperative literary form; -hence it will be said: "If you wish to melt platinum, heat it to 1780 -degrees"; "If you wish to speak Greek, decline masculine nouns of the -second declension with an _ου_ in the genitive." But the literary form -does not change anything of their true nature: those imperatives are -hypothetical imperatives, that is, false imperatives, improper laws. -Grammatical and chemical laws will remain mere formulæ, instruments -of knowledge, and not at all of action, until some one obliges me or -I oblige myself to talk Greek, or to open a chemical laboratory where -platinum is melted. The jurist who elaborates cases and rules is not -the legislator: the latter alone (with a sword in one hand) can endow -the excogitations cf the other with the character of law. - -[Sidenote: _Implication of the second in the first._] - -Certainly an act of will is necessary in order to construct empirical -concepts, formulæ, and rules (as indeed we know), an act of will -which is not that of the will implied in every act of thought, but -is a special and explicit act which, by manipulating representations -and concepts, makes a _quid medium,_ which is neither representation -nor concept, and although altogether irrational from the theoretical -point of view, is of use in the economy of the spirit. But the law in -its true meaning is a volitional act, which _assumes_ that primary -volitional act whence are formed the pseudo-concepts or concepts of -class _as already completed;_ precisely because it is the will which -has for its _object_ a _class_ of objects. It is not possible to -impose speaking according to the rule of the Greek language, or to -melt platinum according to its chemical formula, before these rules -have been laid down. And here appears very clearly the difference -between those two kinds of spiritual products, which the imperative -literary form, given to classes and rules, darkens and confuses. This -difference can be recognized in concrete cases by means of a most -simple expedient: if the rule (as we have already had occasion to -prove) can be converted into a statement of class, then the law is -inconvertible. "If you wish to melt platinum, heat it to 1780 degrees" -is a proposition that is exactly equal to "platinum melts at 1780 -degrees." But the law, "Let there be opened in every city a chemical -laboratory where platinum is to be melted," is not to be converted from -the imperative to the indicative, whatever efforts we make. - -[Sidenote: _Distinction of laws from practical principles._] - -If the volitional element be wanting to naturalistic laws, it is -certainly present in other spiritual formations also denominated and -considered as laws: but not that of _class,_ therefore neither are -these laws. Such is the case with economic and moral law, and through -them, with logical and æsthetic laws. The moral law says, "Will the -universal"; that is to say, "Will the good, the useful, the true, the -beautiful." Therefore (considered in reality and not in scientific -theory, where it appears as the concept of itself) it is a volitional -act. But this volitional act has the spirit itself for object, which -is and exists, in so far as it wills and affirms itself; it has for -object a form or a _universal,_ whereas laws have for object something -material and at the same time not instantaneous, something more or less -fixed, something _general:_ a _class,_ not an _idea._ Universal laws -(that would better be called _principles_) are the Spirit or producer; -true and proper laws are the special product of the spirit; therefore -the first can certainly be called laws, but for an altogether different -reason to the second. - -[Sidenote: _Laws and single acts._] - -Owing to the absence of the element of generality or of class, no -one would describe a single individuated act as law. The resolution -and action by which I do not rise from my seat at this moment and go -eagerly to meet the friend whose coming at the wrong moment interrupts -me at my work, is a volitional act, not a law; such as on the other -hand would be the volitional act that I might form within myself, -consisting in the intention or the programme of receiving my friends -seated and in a lukewarm way, whenever they should come to visit me in -the hours before noon, in order to make them understand by this act of -mine that they disturb me at my work, and that they should abstain from -their inopportune visits, unless they wish to submit to the penalty of -meeting with anything but a cordial reception from their friend. - -[Sidenote: _Identity of imperative, prohibitive, and permissive laws._] - -From the general but not universal character that we must recognize -to the content of laws, we have the solution of certain controversies -of the greatest importance which have been and are much discussed, -hitherto without a satisfactory or duly demonstrated conclusion. In -the first place, we must mention the dispute as to whether or no there -exist _permissive_ laws, and whether the formula that the law _aut -jubet aut vetat aut permittit_ is to be accepted. It has generally been -admitted that the law _aut jubet aut vetat,_ and that the permission -is nothing but the removal of a previous inhibition, that is, the -partial or total abrogation of a law. But in reality, the law, since it -is a volitional act, _jubet_ only; to command is to will: to command -that a chemical laboratory be opened in every city means to will that -one should be opened. And since every willing is at the same time a -not-willing, as every affirmation is at the same time a negation, every -command is at the same time an inhibition, and every _jubeo_ is a -_veto_ (whether the will be expressed in the literary form of positive -or negative, of command or of inhibition, is here without importance). - -[Sidenote: _Permissive character of every law, and impermissive -character of every principle._] - -As to permissive laws, these are inconceivable side by side with the -imperative or prohibitive, not indeed because no law ever permits, but -because by the very fact that those are imperative or prohibitive, -they are at the same time permissive: every _jubeo_ or _veto_ is at -the same time a _permitto._ Principles, as universal volitions, never -permit, because nothing escapes their command; but a single volitional -act, affirming itself, does not exclude for that reason the possibility -that other volitional acts, indeed infinite acts, should be affirmed; -for the singular never exhausts its universal. And laws are volitions -of class, they impose groups of single acts--groups that are more or -less rich, but always contingent: hence a law always leaves all the -other actions and classes of action that can be the object of will -unwilled (that is, neither commanded nor prohibited), and, therefore, -_permitted._ And even if we take all the laws formulated up to a -given moment, all together they do not exhaust the universal; and if -new laws be accumulated, one upon the other, be divided and split up -"with panting breath," to obtain complete exhaustion, a _progressus in -infinitum_ will certainly be attained, but never exhaustion, which is -unattainable. This amounts to saying that outside law or laws, there -is always _the permitted, the lawful, the indifferent, the privilege, -the right,_ or whatever be termed the concept correlative to that -of command, veto, or duty, a duality of terms that expresses the -_finitude_ of law; hence, when a determined privilege, a determined -legal right, a determined right, has been annulled by a new law, when -something previously indifferent has been differentiated, privilege, -the permitted, the indifferent, right, always arise from the bosom of -the new law. - -[Sidenote: _Mutability of laws._] - -Another contingent character of the content of laws is their -_mutability._ Laws are changeable, whereas principles, or laws of -the universal content, are unchangeable, and ready to give form to -all the most various historical material. Since actual conditions -are constantly changing, it is necessary to add new laws to the old, -to retouch and correct these, or to abolish them altogether. This is -to be seen equally in the programmes of individual lives, as in the -programmes of social and political laws. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical concepts as to the modes of change._] - -The question as to the number of modes of changing that laws possess -does not concern us, because, philosophically speaking, there is never -but one mode: the free will that produces the new law in new conditions -of fact. Involuntary changing can only be a formula for indicating -certain changes, always voluntary, that occur in a less solemn way -than others; but from these, can never be absent the solemnity of the -human will that celebrates itself. Thus, in like manner, the question -as to whether we should recognize conservation or revolution as the -fundamental concept of practical life, does not concern us; for every -conservative is at the same time a revolutionary, since he is always -obliged to adapt the law that he wishes to preserve to the new facts; -and every revolutionary is also a conservative, since he is obliged to -start from certain laws that he preserves, at any rate provisionally, -that he may change others and substitute for them new laws, which he -in his turn intends to preserve. Revolution for revolution's sake, the -cult of the Goddess Revolution, is an insane effort, which is so none -the less because it has sometimes appeared in History and like all -insane efforts it ends with suicide. Revolution revolutionizes itself -and turns into reaction. Thus when revolutionaries and conservatives -are distinguished and opposed to one another, an empirical distinction -is made there also, the meaning of which is to be found in the -historical circumstances among which it has arisen. Count Cavour was -a conservative in respect to certain problems and revolutionary in -respect to certain others, to such a degree that he seemed to the -Mazzinians to be a conservative and to the clericals and legitimists -a revolutionary. Robespierre, if he were a revolutionary for the -Girondins and at last even for the neo-moderate Danton, yet to the eyes -of Hébert and of Chaumette seemed to be a conservative, enemy of the -free development of the rights of man. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the eternal Code or natural Right._] - -We should on the other hand be very careful as to the demand so -often made and also so far as possible put into execution, for _an -eternal code, a limit-legislation or model, a universal, rational, or -natural_ justice, as it has been variously termed. Natural justice, -universal legislation, eternal code, claim to fix the transitory -and are therefore a contradictory concept: contradictory precisely -to the principle of the mutability of laws, which is the necessary -consequence of their contingent and historical character. Were natural -Right permitted to do what it announces, were God to permit that the -affairs of Reality should be carried on according to the ill-assorted -ideas of writers and professors, we should witness with the formation -and application of the eternal Code, the cessation _ipso facto_ of -Development, the end of History, the death of Life and the dissolution -of Reality. - -[Sidenote: _Natural justice as the new justice._] - -This world-ending does not take place, because, though it be possible -to dwell in contradiction, it is impossible to make it concrete and -actual: God, that is to say Reality, does not permit this. Thus it -happens that under the name of natural justice, two sorts of products -have existed in turn, or sometimes a mixture of those two different -products, which have nothing to do with the programme announced. On the -one hand, projects of new laws that seemed better than the old or good -by comparison with these judged more or less bad, have been proposed -as natural or rational justice, and precisely for this reason the old -laws were called unnatural and irrational and the new _rational and -natural._ Just as passionate and erotic temperaments, uninstructed by -the experience of their past, swear with the utmost seriousness that -their new love will be _constant, eternal and their last,_ so man, when -he creates new laws, is often seized with the illusion that his laws -will not change as did the old ones, forgetting that the old ones were -once young and that they "satisfied divers" in their heyday, to express -oneself in the words of the old carnavalesque song. Those natural -laws are historical, those eternal laws are transitory, like all the -others. All know how in certain times and places, religious tolerance, -freedom of trade, private property, constitutional monarchy, have been -proclaimed eternal; and in others, the extirpation of unbelievers, -commercial protection, communism, the republic, and anarchy. - -[Sidenote: _Natural justice as philosophy of the practical._] - -Universal concepts, which were nothing but the Principles of the -philosophy of the practical themselves, have on the other hand had a -tendency to be classed as natural justice and to surpass the transitory -and contingent. They are certainly eternal and unchangeable, but no -longer laws, for they are formal and not material. Thus treatises of -natural justice have sometimes become simply treatises (sometimes -very valuable) of the Philosophy of the practical and especially of -Ethic.--When (as to tell the truth has generally been the case) a -practical description has accompanied a general treatment of Ethic, -leading to a series of proposals for social, judicial or political -reform, there has then occurred a _mingling_ of two different -productions, which we have mentioned, philosophy and casuistic. But a -natural justice has always remained unachieved, because unachievable -and contradictory. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of natural justice._] - -In our times, owing to the increase of the historical sense, the -constructions of natural justice and of the eternal Code have almost -altogether lost the attraction they once exercized. But absurd problems -having their origin in those contradictory concepts still persist -and absurd methods of treating problems of similar origin legitimate -when taken in their true terms. An example of the first of these two -kinds of diseased residues is the treating of the _natural rights_ of -man and the attempt to establish what rights belong to man by nature -and what by historical contingencies. Among the first are enumerated -the right to life, to liberty, to work, to the family and so on; and -among the second, those that have their origin in the Italian State -or in special contracts that have been concluded. But no right of any -sort belongs to man outside society (which in this case means outside -history), that is to say, considered as spirit in universal, save that -of existing as spirit, which indeed is not a right, but necessary -reality. Catalogues of natural rights are either tautologies, which -repeat that man as spirit has the right (and therefore at the same -time the duty) of developing himself as spirit (and he does develop -in this manner, if he be man and be alive); or they are arbitrary -rationalizations of historical contingencies, such as the right to -work, which is nothing but the formula of the workpeople of the -_ateliers nationaux_ in forty-eight, or of the insurgents of Lyons; or -the right to private property, which was the formula of the burghers -against the bonds of feudalism and is again their formula against the -modern proletariat movement. - -[Sidenote: _Jusnaturalism persisting in judgments and juridical -problems._] - -We must recognize examples of the second kind of error in the -discussions constantly held as to social or political institutions, -when instead of combating them as irrational, or of defending them as -rational in historical circumstances, they are defended and combated -because they differ from or conform to the true idea of right or to -the true idea of those particular institutions, recourse being thus -had to abstract reasons, as has very well been said. A reformer will -maintain the recognition of the right of women to the administrative -or political vote, because women also form part of the State and -have general and particular interests, which they wish to guarantee -directly, without the inter-position of men, whose interests are -sometimes at variance with theirs: an argument that a conservative -will deny altogether, making appeal to the function of woman, enclosed -by eternal law in the circle of the family. A reformer will propose -divorce as the natural complement to matrimony, because, where -spiritual agreement ends, there too should end every other tie, whereas -a conservative will oppose the argument as contradictory to the very -essence of matrimony, comparing such a proposal with concubinage, -or with what is called free love. And so on.--When such arguments -are heard, it is remarked that natural rights are not dead. But -the question as to the political vote for women may be serious or -ridiculous, according to place and time; as divorce is loftily moral or -profoundly immoral, according to time and place, and it is only mental -narrowness or ignorance that can place outside humanity, or believe to -be living or persisting in immorality, peoples that practise divorce -or indissoluble matrimony, or those of to-day, who refuse the vote to -women or those of the future who will recognize their right to it, if -they do recognize it. But even polygamy or free love is not immoral, -irrational and unnatural, once it has been an institution considered -legitimate in certain times and places; nor even, we insist upon saying -it (however repugnant to our hearts and to our stomachs of civilized -Europeans), anthropophagy, for even among the anthropophagi were men -(we hope it will be admitted), who felt themselves to be most virtuous -in their clearest consciousness of self, and who nevertheless ate their -like with the same tranquillity that we eat a roast chicken, without -hatred of the chicken, but being quite well aware, for the moment -at any rate, that we are not able to do otherwise. The unconscious -reasoners on the basis of natural law must have forgotten that -page of Cornelius Νepos, which, however, they must certainly have -translated in their first years at the gymnasium: _Expertes literarum -Graecarum nihil rectum nisi quod ipsorum moribus conveniat putabunt. -Hi, si didicerint non eadem omnibus esse honesta atque turpia, SED -OMNIA MAJORUM INSTITUTIS JUDICARI, non admirabuntur nos in Graiorum -virtutibus exponendis mores eorum secutos. Neque enim Cimoni fuit turpe -Atheniensium summo viro, sororem germanam habere in matrimonium: quippe -quum ejus cives eodem uterentur instituto; at id quidem nostris moribus -nefas habetur. Laudi in Graecia ducitur adolescentulis quam plurimos -habere amatores. Nulla Lacedaemoni tam est nobilis vidua quae non ad -scenam eat mercede conducta..._. And he continues to give further -examples.[1] So ancient are the unreasonable tendency to be scandalized -and the reasonable defence of the variety of customs made by good sense. - -[1] _Vitae excell. imper.,_ pref. - - - - -III - - -UNREALITY OF THE LAW AND REALITY OF ITS EXECUTION. FUNCTION OF LAW IN -THE PRACTICAL SPIRIT - - -[Sidenote: _Law as abstract and unreal volition._] - -Since law is the volition of a class of actions, it is the volition -of an _abstract._ But as we already know, to will an abstract is -tantamount to willing abstractly. And to will abstractly is not truly -to will, for we will only in concrete, that is, in a determined -situation and with a volitional synthesis corresponding to that -situation, such that it is immediately translated into action, or -better, is at the same time effective action. Consequently it seems -that we should declare the volition that is law to be a pretended -volition: contradictory, because lacking a single, unique and -determined situation; ineffectual, because springing from the insecure -ground of an abstract concept; a volition, in fact, that is not willed; -a volitional act, not real, but _unreal._ - -[Sidenote: _Ineffectuality of laws and effectuality of practical -principles._] - -Such indeed it is. What is really wanted is not the law, but the -single act, done _under_ the law, as it is called, that is to say, -the _execution_ of the law. The single volition is the only one that -is carried out: the execution of the law is the only thing really -and truly willed and done. When the law has been formulated, life -continues ceaselessly to propound its problems, and these either do not -enter into the provisions of the law and are solved simply and solely -with universal practical principles (economic and ethic), or they do -enter into them and then it is necessary _to apply_ the law, unless -it be held to be more convenient to change it, or (this would be a -pathological case) action be not taken against it, although there be -consciousness that this is ill done. - -But even when we are in the situations foreseen by the law and act in -accordance with it, or, as is said, _apply or carry out_ the law, we -must not allow ourselves to be misled by all these metaphors; for we -must consider that the single situations in which we will and act can -never be foreseen by the law, nor is it possible to act in accordance -with it, to follow it out and to apply it. Situations are not foreseen, -because nothing is foreseen, and the real fact is always a surprise, -something that happens once only and we can only know it as it is -after it has happened. For the new fact a new measure is necessary; -for the new body a new suit of clothes. The measure of the law, on the -other hand, since it is abstract, hesitates between the universal and -the individual and is without the strength of either. To carry out the -law? But it is only the pedant of life who proposes to do such a thing, -as it is only the pedant of art who attempts to apply the rules of art. -The true artist follows the impulse of his æsthetic conscience, the -practical man the initiative of his practical genius. What is called -the single act, observance and execution of the law, obeys, not the -law, but the ethical or practical principle, and obeys it individually. -The man who has his head full of laws that he has made for himself or -has accepted from others, makes a deep reverence to the Ladies' Law -when the time comes for action, and proceeds on his own initiative. - -[Sidenote: _Exemplificatory clarification._] - - -It is the law that at the age of twenty we must present ourselves in -our district and do military service for a certain time. Let us for -the moment set aside the case in which those called upon to serve -rebel and, having seized the power of the government, abolish the law -of conscription, and re-establish that of voluntary enlistment. And -let us likewise set aside the other case, in which the conscripts -violate the law by deserting and going abroad, or hide in a cave, like -a hero of Padre Bresciani, or (like a good Tolstoian who applies the -principle of non-resistance to evil) allow themselves to be put in -prison rather than touch arms. Let us select the case of the peaceful -burgess who becomes a warrior that he may not go to prison; or of the -good citizen who recognizes his duty of serving his country and for -that reason obeys the law. In presenting himself in his district and -in the regiment, he has obeyed, not the voice of the law (which is a -voice), but his moral conscience, or simply his economic conscience. -This has already been demonstrated and we need not insist upon it. -But how can he ever obey the law, which directs him to do military -service of precisely this or that nature? Each individual has his own -temperament, his own talent, his own particular physical strength, and -each one will lend his services entirely in his own way, different from -that of another. And (be it noted) he will not do so only more or less -well or observing the law more or less, but really in a different way, -even when all observe the law with equal diligence and scrupulosity. -It may seem as if all carry out a military exercise at the same -moment, but the fact is that each man moves in a different way to the -others; or that in a parade march all walk in the same way, but, as a -matter of fact, all (even in the Prussian army) walk in a different -way. If we look at it as a whole and from a distance, there seems to -be uniformity; if we look at it from near at hand we discover the -difference. If we could make the experiment of comparing a regiment -of fifty years before with one of fifty years after, leaving military -regulations, arms, accoutrements, and everything else unaltered in -the interval, the lack of uniformity of the apparent uniformity would -leap to the eyes, a lack of uniformity that would have been rendered -possible by the changes that had taken place in the surrounding life, -in the culture, the moral education, the political conscience, the -mode of nourishment, the dwellings, and so on. But the experiment is -possible, if not in time, then in space, that is to say, by observing -the application of the same military regulations upon two different -populations. Thus one seems to have in hand one book written in two -different languages; which is literally no longer the same book, -but two different books. Giusti translated into Milanese and Porta -translated into Florentine are no longer Porta or Giusti, but two new -poets. - -[Sidenote: _Doctrines against the utility of laws. Their -unmaintainability._] - -This indubitable truth, as to the impossibility of applying the law and -of incorporating it in facts, and as to the necessity of acting in each -case, according to historical exigencies, is the true reason for the -turning of so many people's heads at different times and in different -places, causing them to proclaim nothing less than the inutility -of laws and to ask for their abolition. If it be necessary to come -eventually to the individual action, and if deliberation and execution -must be remitted to the action of the individual, what is the object of -binding ourselves with bonds, which it is afterwards necessary to tear -off and to break, that we may act? What is the object of laboriously -constructing instruments, which we are obliged to throw away when we -come to practical action, that we may use our naked hands? Owing to -such ingenuous reasonings as these, people have come to long for a -society without laws, in which each will do his own share of work, on -account of its attractiveness alone, as we find among the Harmonicists -of Fourier and in many other anarchical Utopias. Or they have sighed -for the absolute paternal government of the good old days, for the -geniality of a good-hearted tyrant, untrammelled with laws, who will -be able to follow the best dictates of his heart. Or, to descend to -less strange and more actual examples, it has been proposed that the -judge should on each occasion create the law, according to the case -before him; that is to say, that he should cease to be a judge (not -having a law to apply, and properly speaking not being able to give -judgment) and be a free decider of litigation and corrector of customs; -or at least that he should free himself from _legal fictions_ and judge -according to the individual reality of each individual case. - -[Sidenote: _Unsustainability of such confutations._] - -These theories are without doubt unsustainable, not excluding the last, -which has the appearance of being moderate; because the so-called -judicial fiction is intrinsic to the law and exists even when we -think that it is not present, for it is always a fiction to place a -concrete case in an abstract category. But defenders of the utility of -law have met these erroneous doctrines with the bad argument that law -does not admit of individual solutions, and demands strict obedience, -because the moment of individuality, of inobservance, and of violation -that may be called legitimate, does actually exist in the law and is -intrinsic to its very nature. Both adversaries and defenders of law -are therefore philosophically wrong, those who assert its inutility and -those who claim for it an impossible utility. - -[Sidenote: _Empirical meanings of those controversies._] - -And we say "philosophically," for it is well known that in this case, -as in so many other disputes of philosophic appearance, are often -concealed disputes of a practical and political nature, in which right -and wrong are divided and connected in an altogether different manner. -The adversaries of laws are often nothing but adversaries of too many -laws, or legitimately demand a less pedantic and mechanical office -for the judge than that which he often has at present; whereas the -maintainers of laws are opposed to revolutionaries, who would wish -to abrogate the definite laws, on which civil progress rests, or to -discredit all laws, and cause society to enter upon a terrible crisis -that would not promise good results. But all this is extraneous to the -philosophic problem. - -[Sidenote: _Necessity of laws._] - -If the defenders of the utility of laws had wished to make use of an -argument of good sense against their adversaries, of the sort that -imposes, even when it does not rigorously demonstrate their contention, -they might have simply noted the demand for laws, for ordinances, -for justice, for the State, which appears at all points of human -history.--Better a bad government than no government at all; better -laws that are mediocre, but stable, than the frantic pursuit for -better and better laws, with the instability that is the inevitable -consequence! And on the other hand, may God save us from genial -despots, from inspired judges, from tribunals that dive into treasures -of equity!--These are the utterances that we hear in history. Battles -have been fought for _legality,_ and rivers of blood have been shed for -it; for legality are faced the troubles of litigation, and energetic -action is displayed, which only superficial intellects can consider -a waste of time and trouble; for no trouble is superfluous when we -are protecting our own rights, and none is more sacred, since it also -guards the offended majesty of the law, the rights of all. Those who -declaim against laws can well do so with a light heart, for the law -surrounds, protects, and preserves their life for them. No sooner had -all laws disappeared than they would lose the wish to declaim: - - In such wise as when sometimes in the wood - The shepherd spies the wolf, and straight has lost - Spirit and sense, and words die on his tongue; - -and he would be obliged to have speedy recourse to the remedy and make -laws of some sort again, whatever they be, that he may again resume -his calm, his work and his gossip. - -[Sidenote: _Laws as preparation for action._] - -Passing from consideration _ad oculos_ to the philosophical, it is to -be said, on the other hand, that the utility of law does not at all -reside in its effectuality, which is something impossible, since the -single act of the individual is alone effectual; but in this, that in -order to will and to carry out the single act, it is usually necessary -to address oneself to the general, of which that individual is a single -case; that is, to address oneself to the group, of which the individual -is a component part, just as in aiming we generally begin by aiming at -the region where is the point upon which the aim will be fixed. Law is -not a real and effectual volition; it is without doubt an imperfect and -contradictory volition, but for that very reason a preparation for the -synthetic and perfect volition. Law, in short, since it is the volition -of an abstract, is not a real volition, but an _aid_ to real volition; -as (to employ the usual comparison) wooden bridges and scaffoldings are -aids to the construction of a house and have not been useless, because -they must be pulled down when the house has been built. - -[Sidenote: _Analogy between the practical and the theoretical spirit: -practical laws and empirical concepts._] - -Here the analogy between the constitution of the practical and of the -theoretical spirit is again shown to be most exact. We meet with -theoretical forms in the latter also, which are not really so and are -contradictory in themselves, positing representations that function as -universals and universals that are representative: arbitrary forms, -in which the will undertakes to command what it is not possible to -command, that is to say, representations and concepts, things which -precede and do not follow the volitional and practical form. But we -know that those fictitious concepts, those formulæ, those laws that -are not laws, those admitted falsities, which, therefore, are not -falsities, serve as a help to memory, and assist thought in finding -its way amid the multiform spectacle of the world, which it must -penetrate for itself. We do not think them, but they help us to -think; we do not imagine them, but they help us to imagine. Thus the -philosopher generally fixes his mind upon the pseudo-concepts, that he -may afterwards rise to the universals; and the artist also turns his -attention to them that he may find beneath them the individual, the -lively and ingenuous intuition that he seeks. The same pseudo-concepts, -made the object of volition and changed from formulæ to laws, fulfil -an analogous office in the practical spirit, making it possible for -the will to will in a certain direction, where it afterwards meets the -useful action, which is always individuated. - -[Sidenote: _The promotion of order in reality and representation._] - -Another aspect of the analogy is not less important. The -pseudo-concepts would not be possible, if reality did not offer the -like side by side with the unlike; which is not the universal and -necessary, but the general, a contingent (so to speak) less contingent -than others, a relatively constant variable. Pseudo-concepts are -arbitrary, not because they posit the like where is the unlike, but -because they make that variable rigid, which is only relatively -constant, making of it something absolutely constant and changing -the like into the identical. Now the practical spirit, which creates -reality, has need to create not only the unlike, but also the like; not -only that which lasts an instant, but also that which endures almost -unchanged for a year, a century, a millennium, or a millennium of -millenniums; not only the individual, but also the species, not only -the great man, but also the people, not only the actions that do not -occur again, but also those that return periodically, similar, though -not identical. Laws fulfil this function, for they constitute what -is called the _social,_ or _cosmic order._ This order, however, is -always relative and includes instability in itself; it is a rectilinear -figure, which, on being closely examined, reveals itself as also -curvilinear. For this reason it is necessary to make laws, and it is -necessary to violate, though obeying them in their execution. - -[Sidenote: _Origin of the concept of plan or design._] - -This function of law as an unreal volition, aiding nevertheless and -preparing the real, throws light upon a concept that we have had to -reject when exposing the nature and method of functioning of the -volitional act; that is to say, on the concept of _plan or design or -model,_ as proper to the practical activity, which is said to act by -carrying out a pre-established _design._ We have already demonstrated -that design and the execution of the design are in reality all one, and -that man acts by changing his design at every instant, because reality, -which is the basis of his action, changes. And as in the Philosophy -of the practical in general, so in particular in Ethic, the concept -of pre-established design has no place; because, if it be true than -in ethicity the universal is distinguished from the merely individual -action, it is also true that the universal does not exist in concrete, -save incorporated and individualized as this or that good action. The -universal of ethicity is not a design and cannot be willed for itself -outside all individuation, in the same way as to fall in love is to -fall in love with an individual and not with love. But that concept -of design, proposed for action and carried out by its means, though -erroneously adopted in Economy and in Ethic, must nevertheless have its -legitimate meaning in some special order of facts; otherwise it would -not be possible to make even erroneous use of it. This meaning is to be -found, as has been seen, in the fact of laws. - - - - -IV - - -CONFUSION BETWEEN LAWS AND PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES. CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL -LEGALISM AND OF JESUITIC MORALITY - - -[Sidenote: _Transformation of principles into practical laws: -legalism._] - -Nothing perhaps better makes clear the true nature of laws than the -examination of the very grave errors introduced by their means into -the Philosophy of the practical: for, owing to the failure to perceive -the character of mere _aid_ proper to their function, laws have been -confused with practical principles, these being looked upon as laws and -those as principles. - -[Sidenote: _Genesis of the concept of the practically licit and -indifferent._] - -We always live surrounded by innumerable laws, although these are -always finite in number. The Decalogue also admonishes: "Take not -the name of God in vain"; "Honour thy father and thy, mother"; "Thou -shalt not steal"; "Thou shalt commit no murder"; "Thou shalt not covet -thy neighbour's house, nor his wife, nor his man-servant, nor his -maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his"; etc. -The decalogue or hectalogue of prudence admonishes us: "Raise not up -against thee too many enemies "; "Mind your own business"; "Conciliate -him who is more powerful than thou"; "Hurt him who hurts thee"; etc. -Those laws that are so many and so minute easily lead to the false -belief that they suffice together to regulate our economic action and -our moral life, and that practical principles can be substituted for -and be fully represented by a Decalogue or code, which should be the -true and proper regulator of human life. - -But the Decalogue, the code, the _Corpus juris,_ ample and minute -though they be, are not, as we know, capable of exhausting the infinity -of actions conditioned by the infinite variety of facts. Every law -brings with it, as its necessary correlative, as the shadow of its -light, actions that are indifferent and indifferentiable, the legally -indifferent, the licit, the permissible, the right, the faculty of -doing or of not doing. As an inevitable consequence of this, practical -principles having been conceived as a series or complex of laws, the -concept of the _practically indifferent_ must also be posited and the -_licit_ changed from _legal_ to _practical._ - -[Sidenote: _Consequence of this: the arbitrary._] - -And this is what happens. At every moment of life we find ourselves -face to face with actual situations, to which the laws that we possess -either do not apply at all, or apply only in the approximative way -that we have seen; at every moment of life, we find ourselves without -the guidance of the law, face to face with the indifferent and the -indifferentiated. The practical man knows well that the laws were a -mere help, merely a preparatory stage to action, and that he must in -each case face the actual situation as it arises, intuite and perceive -it in its originality, and perform his own action with originality. -But he who has accepted the _legalitarian_ conception of the practical -activity and has abandoned practical principles as useless or looked -upon them as non-existent, now that he finds himself abandoned also by -the laws, in which he had put too much trust, has no other guide on -which to fall back save his own _will._ - -And will is not a guide but _the lack of a guide_; it is not action -but inaction, that is to say, contradictory action; not activity, but -passivity, not prudence and good, but imprudence and evil. - -Thus the legalitarian conception of practical principles produces -neither more nor less than the death of the practical, installing -passivity in the place of activity, evil in the place of good. - -The legalitarian theory, which proposes to fix and to determine with -precision the true concept of freedom, arrives at just the opposite -result: the will. - -[Sidenote: _Ethical legalism as simply a particular case of practical -legalism._] - -It is opportune to remark here that moral legalism, which has hitherto -alone occupied the attention of critics, is nothing but a particular -case of general practical legalism, and if the particular and not -the general case has been observed, this has depended upon the -failure to recognize the economic form in its autonomy, so common -with philosophers. But from the examples that we have given, it has -clearly resulted that legalism is an error which embraces alike -Economy and Ethic, introducing into both the philosophic absurdity of -the _practically indifferent._ Even a man without moral conscience, -or one deprived of it for a moment, if he conceive the guidance of -his utilitarian action in the form of laws, loses the compass of his -utilitarianism and falls into the arbitrary, which is the ruin of his -own individuality. If (to resume the usual example) I impose upon -myself the not drinking of wine as a hygienic law, and it happen to me -to find myself at a certain moment in such physiological conditions -that a glass of wine can accelerate the beating of the heart and -restore to me the strength of which I am in need; and if, through faith -in the established law, I forget that the law is conditional and not -absolute and that the only absolute law is to do at a given moment -what is useful at that moment; it is evident that by so reasoning and -acting, I am substituting superstition and therefore the arbitrary for -prudence and that I am causing injury to myself. - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the practically indifferent._] - -It is necessary to maintain against the morally and practically -indifferent, that it is a concept altogether external to Ethic and -Economic and devastates it terribly whenever it penetrates into it, -or (what is worse) subtly corrupts it. In Economic as in Ethic, in -the true and proper practical field, there is no _faculty_ that is -not also _obligation_; there is no _right_ that is not at the same -time a _duty;_ there is nothing _licit_ that is not _forbidden;_ nor -_permitted_ that is not turned into a _command._ πάντα ἔξεστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ -πάντα συμφέρει, said St. Paul,[1] in obscure but suggestive language -that has been much discussed--all is allowed to us but we do not allow -anything--we should say in explanation; everything can and should be -spiritually elaborated by the will and receive the form of freedom. -But in order to destroy that paradoxical concept at the roots, it -is necessary to reach the point underground where the concept of -_practical legalism_ is to be found, and to show, as we have done, its -origin, in the confusion between _principles and laws._ - -[Sidenote: _Contests between rigorists and latitudinarians and their -common error._] - -In vain have the _rigorists,_ becoming aware of the ruin that menaced -the theory of Ethic, struggled against the theoreticians of the morally -indifferent, or _latitudinarians._ So long as neither party left the -legalitarian field, one side was right against the other and both were -equally wrong, Pharisees and Sadducees, Jansenists and Molinists. -The rigorists clung desperately to the law, refusing to admit that -it could be _doubtful_ and give rise to the morally indifferent; the -law was _certain._ But the law is never really either doubtful or -certain: revolving upon empirical concepts, it never limits anything -with precision and therefore is not certain; having for its object, -not concrete action, but only preparation for it, does not propose to -limit the illimitable and so is neither uncertain nor doubtful: it -stands on this side or the other of such categories. Thus the rigorists -also found themselves face to face with the morally indifferent, and -had no way of vanquishing it. They could advise the choice of the -most painful and repugnant action, self-denial, self-tormenting; but -this too was a kind of wilfulness and evil. The latitudinarians, on -the other hand, could enlarge the field of the morally indifferent -at their pleasure, placing in evidence the dubiety of law and its -consequent impotence as a practical principle; but since they did not -recognize any practical principle outside the form of law, they were -finally obliged to have recourse to it, that they might have some -point of orientation in the guidance of their lives. And since they -could not find it in the law itself, recognized as doubtful, they were -obliged to place it in the authority of its interpreters; and when -these authorities were at variance, in the adding up of authorities -(just as is done for the Roman jurists in the law of citation made -by Theodosius II.); and since, finally, two or three or four or a -hundred authorities, when they are uncertain, are not of greater value -than one who is equally uncertain, any sort of authority finally had -to suffice them as justification for an action. _Probabilitism,_ far -from being merely an illegitimate degeneration of legalism, is its -logical consequence. Reduced as they were to authority, why should -one be of more account than another, when all are estimable people -worthy of credence? Why should the precedence be given to Papinian -over Paul or over Ulpian? If Villalobos be of opinion that a priest -who has committed a moral sin cannot say mass the same day, Sanchez, -on the other hand, Jopines that he can: why, then, should a priest who -finds himself in that case follow Villalobos rather than Sanchez? It -is true that if he make a blind choice between Villalobos and Sanchez, -he becomes the prey of self-will; but self-will and legalism are -indissoluble, and the more carefully he tries to free himself from the -bond, the more tightly it winds itself around him. - -[Sidenote: _Jesuitic morality as doctrine of fraud against the moral -law._] - -Practical legalism can also give rise to a monstrously absurd theory, -which we shall call _Jesuitic morality,_ not because it is peculiar -to the Jesuits or to Catholicism, but as dutiful homage to the most -conspicuous and likewise the most celebrated in literature of its -historical incarnations. The theory of Jesuitic morality admits that we -can rationally _defraud_ ethical law. - -[Sidenote: _Concept of legal fraud._] - -That the law is _defrauded or eluded_ every day, taken in itself, is -neither moral nor immoral, since it is an expedient of social strife -like another, and in certain cases may be a legitimate act of war and -a fraud only in name. A law held to be iniquitous should be combated -openly; but if the imposer of the iniquitous law, or he who wishes to -profit by it, have committed a mistake in drafting it, so that it can -be interpreted in such a way as to become good, or at least better, it -is very natural that the adversary should profit by the mistake, if -for no other reason than that he may discredit the law as equivocal -and lacking in precision and compel society to discuss it again. Who -does not applaud the fraud of Portia, when it is a question of saving -the life of the noble Antonio from a Shylock? And if even the _ferox -animus_ of Shylock has found defenders, as symbol of the tenacity with -which we must make our own rights respected, yet Portia also will -always find her supporters, as symbol of ingenious rebellion against an -unjust law. - -[Sidenote: _Absurdity of the fraud against ones self and against the -moral law._] - -But what is altogether irrational and yet seems to be admitted by -Jesuitic morality, is _the fraud against oneself,_ and so against one's -own moral conscience. To defraud one's own conscience, to rebel against -it with violence or with artifice, is contradiction, wilfulness, evil. -It sometimes happens that we exert ourselves to still what is called -the internal voice of admonition, the Socratic demon, or the guardian -angel. This happens in the utilitarian, not less than in the moral -field; when, for instance, we yield to a pleasure which we know to be -harmful and had intended to avoid for that reason, and when by dint of -subtleties we try to persuade ourselves that it differs from that which -we had recognized as harmful. We attempt, but we never really succeed; -we may be able to obscure our conscience for an instant, but we can -never permanently and altogether darken it; the effort itself calls for -the light that we would avoid. - -[Sidenote: _Jesuitic morality not explainable as mere legalism._] - -But that pretension of Jesuitic morality cannot on the other hand -derive from mere ethical legalism, because legalism produces the -contradictions that we have already placed in relief; it generates the -morally indifferent and at the same time suppresses it; and when it -has suppressed again generates, in order again to suppress it; and so -on to infinity, an anxious and sterile doing and undoing. But it never -authorizes fraud. Simple legalism will never justify our pretending to -ourselves when a definite action is willed or when we have a definite -intention, that we will another action and have a different intention; -or, as they say, _direction of the intention_: the intention is that -which it is and it does not allow itself to be directed at will. To -obey the letter of the law with the clear intention of breaking it in -spirit will never be justified. - -[Sidenote: _Jesuitic morality as alliance between legalism and -theological utilitarianism._] - -The pretension of Jesuitic morality becomes illuminated and transparent -to the intellect, only when we make the hypothesis of an alliance -between _practical legalism and theological utilitarianism_; that is -to say, when not only do we conceive morality as a series or complex -of legislative decisions, but when we likewise consider these to -be nothing less than the product of the will of God. They are not -in themselves moral as such, and to observe them does not arise of -intrinsic necessity; but they are obeyed as the lesser evil, through -fear of worse or in hope of future advantage. In this case there is a -silent struggle between God the legislator and man, a struggle between -the weak and the overbearing, in which the strength of the weak lies in -ingenuity, their tactic in fraud. Hence the dominant concept of Jesuit -morality: to get the better of the divine laws as far as possible, to -do the least possible of what they command; and when called upon to -give an account of one's own actions before the tribunal of confession, -or before the universal judgment, so to subtilize upon the law, that -from the interpretation thus put upon it, what has been done seems to -belong to the licit and permissive. God forbids man to kill man; but -does he intend to forbid this, when the motive for this killing is the -glory of God himself? When the slayer acts as though he were the hand -of God himself and is all one with him? Without doubt, no: so that -it will be lawful for the Jesuit to kill or cause to be killed his -Jansenist adversary, who injures divine interests by disclosing the -defects of the holy Company, which is the image of God upon earth: that -killing, then, is not only lawful, but ordained. But if he want to kill -his adversary, not through zeal for the divine glory, but because of -the injury that he causes to the personal and immoral interests of the -Jesuit? This too is permitted, provided that when killing him, though -animated with personal hate, he withdraw his regard from the real -motive, and _directing_ his intention to the divine glory, thus justify -the _means_ by the _end._ - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between the doctrine and the practice of the -Jesuits._] - -Such is the monstrous logical product, born of the union between -_legalism_ and the theory of _theological utilitarianism_; such is -the essence of Jesuitic morality, which has justly aroused horror and -disgust. And we call it _logical_ (or illogical) product, because -we wish to make it clear that here as elsewhere we are occupied with -theories only and are criticizing them alone. In practical action -Jesuitic morality was often better than the theory would imply; even -the Padre Caramuel, who put the question as to the right possessed by -the Jesuits of slaying the Jansenists, must have been at bottom a good -man; because, having almost arrived at an affirmative conclusion to -his inquiry by dint of perverting the moral law, he was seized by pity -and defrauded his own fraud, concluding negatively that the Jansenists -_occidi non possunt quia nocere non potuerunt,_ because (said he) -they are poor devils, unable to obscure the glorious brilliance of -the Company, as the owl does not conceal the light of the sun.[2] And -Saint Alphonso dei Liguori, who is usually looked upon as an example -of that lurid morality in our day, when he set to work to stir up -afresh the ugliness of casuistic in connection with the sixth and ninth -commandments, experienced all the repugnance of the gallant gentleman -that he was, at such a task, imposed upon him by the traditional mode -of treating Ethic, as is to be seen by his declarations, exclamations, -and exhortations: _Nunc aegre materiam illam tractandam aggredimur, -cujus vel solum nomen hominum mentes infidi. Det mihi veniam, quaeso, -castus lector!... Ora studiosos ... ut ... eo tempore saepius mentem -ad Deum elevent et Virgini immaculatae se commendent, ne dum aliorum -animos Deo student acquirere, ipsi suarum detrimentum patiantur._[3] -If Jesuitism were also moral corruption, this was not due to its -abstract theories, but to the education that it practised, which was -depressing, servile, and directed to mortify the strength of the will -and of the intelligence, to reduce a man to be like _senis baculus,_ -a docile and passive instrument in the hands of others; and to the -confusion in consciences as to the real motives of actions, which it -not only preserved but increased, lulling souls to sleep with sophisms -and allurements of devotion _aisées à pratiquer,_ by means of which the -gates of Paradise could be unlocked, and with _chemins de velours_ on -which one could mount to the sky with every indulgence. The rigorists -and latitudinarians are philosophically equivalent; but it is a fact -that in practice the rigorists were generally energetic and austere -souls; which should not cause us to forget that the latitudinarians -also, amid their distorted theories, sometimes had a lucid vision of -the _complications_ of reality and felt the necessity of a morality -less abstract and less disharmonic in relation to life, however -incorrectly they may nevertheless have developed its theory. - - -[1] 1 Cor. x. 23. - -[2] Pascal, _Prov._ 1. 7. - -[3] _Theol. moralis_ 7, Bassano, 1773, i. 168. - - - - -V - - -JUDICIAL ACTIVITY AS AN ACTIVITY GENERICALLY PRACTICAL (ECONOMIC) - - -[Sidenote: _Legislative activity, as generically practical._] - -The will that wills classes of actions, or the activity that makes -laws and that we can henceforward term _legislative activity_ without -fear of misunderstanding, is either moral or merely economic; and -therefore, when dialecticized, is either moral or immoral, economic or -anti-economic. It is true that this will is abstract and indeterminate; -but that does not prevent it from being, and from being obliged to be, -either moral or merely economic; and, therefore, abstractly moral and -abstractly economic, and so also abstractly immoral and anti-economic. -A programme of action will be conceived, as they say, wisely or -foolishly, to a good or to a bad end, for mere reasons of utility, or -with a lively desire for good. The legislator is a volitional man, and -as such to be judged both utilitarianly and morally. The laws that -are his volitional product are useful or injurious, good or bad. This -judgment is also without doubt abstract, for it is necessary first to -see the legislator engaged in the practical act of the application of -his law, in order to recognize what he can do and who he is. We know -many (others or ourselves?) who make plans for the most beautiful -lives, legislating admirably for themselves and for others; yet these -show themselves mean and bad in action: and we not infrequently find -the opposite case of men who calumniate themselves and who, after they -have declared the most dishonest, or at least the most amoralistic, of -intentions, when they find themselves face to face with the bad action, -ugly with the ugliness of sin, say, as the old man in the fable said to -Death: "I have not called thee!" - -[Sidenote: _Vanity of disputes as to the character of institutions, -economic or ethic: punishment, matrimony, the State, etc._] - -From these considerations, which seem to be most obvious, a not -obvious consequence is to be drawn; namely, that it is perfectly vain -to descant upon the utilitarian or moral character of laws, or of -these or those laws; to ask oneself, for instance, whether the object -of _punishment_ be _deterritio_ or _emendatio_; if _matrimony_ be an -exchange of services or a sacrament, a union of interests or a society -with moral ends; if the _State_ be the result of a contract or of a -moral idea, and so on. These questions have an immense literature -devoted to them, which has been accumulated for centuries, and although -they be vain for us, yet they cannot be so for one who has not yet -become clear as to the special forms of the practical activity and as -to the nature of law. For him they are not vain, since they represent -as it were in a concentrated form, the complete philosophical problem -concerning the practical; although they must of necessity turn out -to be insoluble. Punishment can be conceived and willed as a mere -utilitarian menace, to prevent others from performing certain classes -of actions, even if they be ethically of the highest value; or as -moral solicitude for the amelioration of society and the individual -himself who has erred, by obliging him to re-enter himself and change -his mind. Even the pain of death can be directed to this end and death -that has given or restored to the guilty a day, an hour, an instant -of that human life, of that contact with the infinite, which he had -lost, may be held not to have been in vain. Matrimony may be instituted -for the more regular satisfaction of the sexual instinct and for -other similar interests of utilitarian life; and also to secure, that -interpénétration of souls, which is the great mover of the moral life. -The State may arise from a mere contract which draws together isolated -individuals and groups and unites them for defence and offence; and -also form the profound moral aspiration of the individuals, who -recognize the universal in themselves and are attentive to realize it -in modes ever more rich and more lofty. All institutions, all laws may -receive this double form; and although there be laws that are merely -utilitarian, those that are moral are also, as is clear, utilitarian -or economic, and therefore not useless but useful. An amoral man will -make for himself amoral laws; and between an amoral man and an amoral -woman no other marriage but that of interest is possible; and between -a hundred amoral individuals, no other State is possible but that -established by contract; and no other punishment will be applicable in -such a State save that of mere _deterritio._ It will be objected that -amoral individuals and multitudes do not exist, and it may be true that -they do not exist in a continuous manner: but they do exist at certain -moments; and this as we know, suffices to justify, indeed to prove -necessary, our theory. - -[Sidenote: _Legislative activity as economic._] - -Thus no other answer is possible to the question asked as to whether -the legislative activity be moral or merely economic, save that it may -be the one or the other, and therefore, that it is not of necessity -moral; thus, defining it in its full extension, it must be called -_generically practical,_ or taken in itself, _merely economic._ - -[Sidenote: _Juridical activity: its economic character._] - -Passing now from the legislative activity to that of him who realizes -and executes the law (an activity that we may call _juridical,_ in -order not to confound it with the other), and asking whether juridical -activity be moral or distinct from morality and if distinct, what is -its distinctive characteristic, the answer cannot but be most simple -for us who have attained to our present position. So simple indeed, -that to give it would seem to be almost superfluous. Not only must the -activity of carrying out the law not be intrinsically diverse from the -activity of legislating, but as has been seen, it obeys exclusively -practical principles, economic and ethic. Hence the 'juridical activity -can be merely economic and it can be moral; and seeing that economicity -is the general form that of itself involves the other, the juridical -activity is generically practical, or _economic. _ As such and in so -far as it is such, it is at once distinct from and united with the -moral form. - -[Sidenote: _Its consequent identity with the economic activity._] - -But juridical activity does not merely enter the economic activity; -it is exactly identical with it: juridical activity and economic -activity are _synonyms._ Legislative activity enters economy and -nevertheless distinguishes itself from it, as volition of the abstract, -indeterminate volition. The juridical activity is on the other hand -concrete and determined, like the other, nor is it distinguished from -it by any secondary character. It might be attempted to subdistinguish -the economic and juridical activity, while admitting the generic -identification, and to look upon the latter as such that although -obeying the economic principle, it is yet developed _under the laws;_ -whereas the former would exist even where _laws were wanting._ But the -distinction would be empirical, of undulating boundaries. Strictly -speaking, man is surrounded with laws in all his actions, and he always -acts under all the laws, and at the same time he effectually acts under -none of them, save that of his own practical conscience. - -If the identity and synonymity of law, understood as juridical activity -with economy, has not been discovered, that too is connected with the -lack of recognition of the practical utilitarian category on the part -of philosophers and with their considering it, as they erroneously -did, either as egotism and immorality, or as an altogether empirical -division, to which was added a concept, also empirical, of the -juridical activity itself, which should be limited to what are called -laws emanating from the State, sometimes graciously including in them -social laws, and always altogether ignoring the fundamental form, -individual laws. - -[Sidenote: _The failure to recognize the economic form and the meaning -of the problem concerning the distinction between morality and law._] - -But this failure of recognition has not prevented the appearance and -persistence of the problem of the _combined unity and distinction of -law and morality,_ which has been the most frequent though the most -complicated mode of affirming the claim of a special Philosophy of -economy. A serious beginning of meditation upon law had hardly begun, -when something was observed in it that it was impossible to resolve -into the concepts of Ethic. Hence the generally admitted recognition -of the distinction between law and morality and the many attempts -at determining of what the peculiar character of the former exactly -consisted. - -[Sidenote: _Theories of compulsion and exteriority, as distinctive -characters: critique._] - -This character was placed most frequently and with greater insistence -in the two determinations of _compulsion_ and of _exteriority._ And it -was said that law is distinguished from morality because it is possible -to exercize compulsion in the juridical, but not in the moral field; -or that law deals with the field of external relations, morality with -the internal; or that one is the _psychical,_ the other the _physical_ -side of action. But as to the first determination, we have already -shown that it has no meaning at all when applied to the forms of the -spiritual activity, where nothing is compulsory and everything is at -once free and necessary: the juridical activity, if it be activity, -must likewise always be determined by free agreement. The second, which -is the determination of exteriority, is not less inconceivable; for it -is not given to separate the external from the internal, since they are -both one, nor the word from its meaning, nor the body from its spirit. -Compulsion and exteriority, taken strictly as concepts, are therefore, -in this case, void and contradictory formulæ. To fill them somehow with -a thought, it would be necessary to understand as compulsion certain -modes of action, as opposed to certain other modes; for instance, -compulsion would be the action by which an accused person was conducted -to prison by two policemen and non-compulsion that of him who should -be induced to go and constitute himself a prisoner through the -persuasion of others; and as exteriority, certain classes of actions -opposed to certain others; so that, for example, the deportment of -an individual as communal or provincial councillor would belong to -external life, his relations with his confessor or with his Æsculapius -to internal life. But compulsion and exteriority, reduced to these -meanings, become gross and empirical concepts, of which no use can be -made in philosophy and which therefore cannot be of the least value as -qualifying and distinguishing law from morality. - -In the same way, no value is to be attached to such a distinction, -when determined from what is licit to what is commanded, from rights -to duties, from what is permitted to what is obligatory; because licit -and commanded, rights and duties, from what is permitted to what is -obligatory, are correlative concepts constituting an indissoluble nexus -and it is not possible to separate and to oppose them to one another. - -[Sidenote: _Moralistic theories of rights: critique._] - -The difficulty of conveniently fixing the distinction with the -characters indicated, leads one to think of a different sort of -tentative, according to which rights would certainly be distinguished -from ethicity, not placed above or beside it, but rather in the -very sphere of morality itself, as the species in respect to the -genus or the part in respect of the whole. Juridical action would be -moral, but it would belong to the inferior levels of morality; it -would be occupied with the execution of simple _justice,_ with the -establishment of order, proportion, equality; whereas morality would -represent _more than justice,_ and would upset the equilibrium of -rights with benevolence, generosity, sacrifice, heroism. Rights (it -is also said) are limited to the _ethical minimum,_ while morality -strives for the _maximum;_ rights are concerned with strict rights or -_perfect_ duties, morality with meritorious and supererogatory actions, -_imperfect_ duties. But these determinations also pretend to separate -the inseparable, by drawing an arbitrary line of division between small -and great actions, between least and greatest, and they employ concepts -that are altogether empirical, as, for instance, that of justice -as distinct from benevolence, of the strictly obligatory from the -meritorious and supererogatory; and worse still than this, metaphors -and symbols, such as equality, order, regularity; or they operate -directly with the arithmetical and geometrical proportion of actions. -And consciously or unconsciously a return is made to Ethic pure and -simple, with the theories that make juridical activity to consist of -the recognition of others as _persons,_ or with the search for _general -utility_ (superindividual). When we act in view of the _person_ in -other individuals (or in oneself), or of the useful, which is not the -useful for the individual, but although it comprehends, yet transcends -it:--the merely juridical conscience has already been surpassed, it has -been filled with a moral content, that is to say, an ethical form has -been given to the practical activity. The double sense of the terms -"rights" and "morality" is in this way preserved in words but denied in -fact. - -[Sidenote: _Duality of positive and ideal, historical and natural -rights, etc.; and absurd attempts at unification and co-ordination._] - -The dual sense of the terms is also affirmed by the very ancient -distinction between _positive and ideal, historical_ and _natural_ -rights, _right_ and _justice,_ or, as it has also been formulated, -between the _two different justices,_ realistic and idealistic, -fruitful in conjunction. Natural rights, with their homonyms just -stated, besides the generically practical significations that we have -already examined, have also had the narrower one of ethical ideal or -morality; and therefore it cannot cause astonishment that it should -appear now conjoined with, now detached from positive rights. But how -joined and disjoined? For us it is a question of degrees, whence the -positivity of both forms is recognized: the second of these is included -in the first: the ideal right or morality (if it be right, and not -simply abstract excogitation willed by no one, or vague desire) is -both positive and historical. But those who posited the distinction -without being able to make it definite and so to dominate it were led -to conceive one or the other term as negative; and therefore both as -negative between themselves and existing only in a third: which meant -to reannul the distinction by reducing it to abstract contradiction. -If one of the two were conceived as negative, either the ideal justice -(that is, the seriousness of moral strength) was denied and turned to -ridicule, or positive justice, that is, the seriousness of volitional -strength, was presented as something turbid and impure and at best -as a human imperfection, to which it was advisable to resign oneself -since it would disappear in a society of perfect men or in a future -life of perfection. Juridical activity became something contingent -and mortal. Matters were even worse, if it were found impossible to -eliminate it with similar religious, apocalyptic, or millenary fancies. -The negative was then conceived as positive or co-ordinated with the -positive: hence incredible logical divisions of rights into forms or -species of _moral_ and _immoral rights, of just_ and _unjust_ rights, -in which the species has the function of _negation of the genus,_ -almost as though the race of horses were to be divided into two kinds: -_dead_ and _living_ horses! Unjust or immoral rights are not rights, -but a contradiction of them, and if we sometimes describe in this way -a real and effective juridical act (an economic act), it is necessary -to observe that the denomination is given from the point of view of a -superior form of activity. Rights in themselves as rights, understood -positively, are never immoral, but only _amoral._ - -[Sidenote: _Value of all these theories as confused perception of the -amoral character of justice._] - -All these errors, all these sterile tentatives have their origin, as -has been said, in the lively consciousness of a distinction existing -between right and morality and at the same time of the impossibility -of determining this correctly, owing to lack of clarity as to the -purely economic form of the practical activity. When the juridical -activity has been identified with the economic and when juridical -(economic) activity has in consequence been conceived as at once united -with and distinct from morality, we are able to recognize that these -attempts have nevertheless fulfilled a very useful function; that is -to say, they have more or less energetically asserted and defended -the position that there existed a characteristic distinction between -right and morality and that it was necessary to seek for it. They are -therefore far superior, notwithstanding their errors, to that confused -ethical conception, which receives rights and morality indistinctly -into its bosom, or to the utilitaristic conception, which arrives by a -different route at the same indistinction. This merit belongs to the -theories of the moral minimum, of justice, of the two justices and of -the contest between positive and ideal rights; but in a much greater -degree to that of compulsion, of exteriority, of the licit. With these -last was almost unconsciously set in relief the fact that right obeys -a law different from that of Ethic, and may be called _compelled and -not free by comparison with it,_ because not founded upon the necessity -of the universal; that in respect to the supreme _interiority_ of -Ethic it can be considered as something _exterior;_ that in respect -to the ethical imperative, it appears as something indifferentiated -or _licit._ These are without doubt symbols, tautologies, vague and -imprecise phrases, but efficacious in keeping the attention alert and -in promoting doubt and research. - -[Sidenote: _Confirmations of this character in the ingenuous -consciousness._] - -But the impossibility of absorbing rights into Ethic altogether and -without leaving residues is proclaimed or confessed, not only in the -theories of philosophers, but by simple thought, and especially by the -consciousness we have of the real world being governed, not by abstract -morality, but, as is said, by _force,_ or by the will in action. -"Disarmed prophets" will be efficacious in poetry, but ridiculous in -practical reality: _la force prime le droit,_ precedes it and is always -of greater value than an unreal and contradictory ethical right and -aspiration, afterwards dissolved in the empty and arbitrary. We will -not recall proverbs, maxims, historical examples, though this would be -easy; that little story of Franco Sacchetti which preserves "a fair -speech" of Messer Ridolfo da Camerino, will suffice for all. One of his -nephews had been at Bologna studying law for a good twelve years, and -when, having become an excellent lawyer, he returned to Camerino, he -went to pay a visit to Messer Ridolfo. When he paid the visit, Messer -Ridolfo said, "And what didst thou do at Bologna?" He replied, "My -Lord, I have learned _reason._" Said Messer Ridolfo, "Thou hast spent -thy time ill." The young man replied that the saying seemed to him to -be very strange. "Why was it ill spent, my Lord?" And Messer Ridolfo -said, "_Because thou shouldst have learned force, which is worth two -of the other._" The youth began to smile, and thinking it over again -and again, both he and the others that heard, perceived that what -Messer Ridolfo had said, was true.[1] - -[Sidenote: _Comparison between right and language. Grammars and codes._] - -And here too we are at last able to establish a parallel between -the practical and theoretic activity, between the problems of the -Philosophy of right and those of Logic and Æsthetic. The comparison of -right and language has been several times attempted, with very great -correction of thought, although necessarily defective execution, since -it was customary to conceive both language and right in an abstract -and empirical manner. Whoever should wish to take up the inquiry -again would do great service, were he to insist upon the fact that -since it has been impossible to understand what language really is, -so long as grammars and vocabularies were taken as its reality, so it -is impossible to understand anything of rights, so long as the eye is -fixed upon laws and codes, or what is even worse, upon the commentaries -of jurists, or upon the abstract volitional fact, or altogether upon -what is not a true and proper volitional fact, but the elaboration of -formulæ and of general concepts. - -[Sidenote: _Logic and language; morality and rights._] - -Only when rights appear as individual and continually new work of -individuals, only when the attention is directed to the spectacle of -real life and not to the abstractions of legislators and dispenses with -the dissertations of jurists, is it possible to state the problem: -how does this juridical work coincide with, and how does it differ -from moral work? And here too the comparison with language is fitting, -although language be not logicity, yet logical thought cannot become -concrete, save in speaking; so moral activity cannot live, save by -translating itself into laws and institutes, and in the realization of -laws and institutes, that is, in the juridical and economic activity. - -Finally, just as the history of a language is always arbitrary and -abstract, so long as it is considered alone, outside the works in which -the language is incarnate and the true history of a language is its -poetry and literature, so _the true history of the rights of a people_ -(of the rights that have really been executed and not merely formulated -in laws and codes, be often proved to be a dead letter) cannot but be -altogether one with _the social and political history of that people:_ -an altogether juridical or economic history; a history of _wants_ and -of _labour._ - - -[1] Novelle, xl. - - - - -VI - - -HISTORICAL ANNOTATIONS - - -[Sidenote: _Distinction between morality and rights, and its importance -for the history of the economic principle._] - -I. The history of the distinction between morality and rights is very -important, precisely because, as has been said, it is the manifestation -of the very strongly--felt desire to posit in some way a philosophy of -the aethical or amoral practical form: a manifestation which is the -most conspicuous of all those that we have had occasion to note on the -subject (theory of politics, theory of the inferior appetitive faculty, -theory of the passions, etc.).[1] And owing to the impossibility of -satisfying that exigency with the intellectual data possessed, the -problem of the relation between rights and morality has become anything -but an amusing puzzle, a theme for true vain eloquence. - -Emmanuel Kant in the _Critique of Pure Reason,_ wishing to give a -characteristic example of the difficulty of definitions, found nothing -better to record than that jurists were always seeking a definition -of rights, but had never succeeded in finding one.[2] And a jurist -philosopher of our times (Jhering) has called the definition of rights, -in their difference from morality, the "Cape Horn," or the Cape of -tempests (or shipwrecks?) of juridical science. - -[Sidenote: _Indistinction up to the time of Thomas._] - -The problem of that distinction is on the other hand relatively recent -and therefore the history of the Philosophy of rights has rightly been -placed not further back than the end of the seventeenth century, or not -much beyond Christian Thomas.[3] Up to that time, it is not possible to -speak strictly of a Philosophy of rights. Treatises of jurisprudence, -of rights and of the State, in regard to what of philosophical they -contained, were nothing but treatises of Ethic; not indeed because -the two sciences were (as they were) materially united in the same -books, but precisely because the two concepts were indistinct. The -speculations of antiquity for this part also of the Philosophy of the -practical have the character of ingenuousness already noted. It would -be incorrect to reconstruct a moralistic philosophy from the rights -of Plato, founding it, for example, upon the theory developed in the -_Gorgias_ as to the eagerness to purge his punishment that should exist -in the criminal, similar, in this respect, to the sick man, who knows -that the medicine will free him from his disease.[4] The researches -of Aristotle also as to justice (perhaps the best the classical world -has left us on the subject), look upon justice in a narrow sense, as -a virtue among virtues,[5] which should not intrinsically possess any -greater reason for distinguishing itself from the other virtues than -they for distinguishing among themselves. The pompous definitions -of the Roman jurists, still the joy of schools of jurisprudence and -of judges' rhetoric, have no philosophical weight and would in any -case confirm the identity of rights with Ethicity, if not absolutely -with the entire knowable and practical universe. There is hardly a -ray of the distinction to be traced in the discussions as to whether -rights exist by nature or by convention and in the concept of a _ἁπλῶς -δίκαιον,_ opposed to that of _πολιτικὸν δίκαιον_ found in Plato, and -more explicitly in Aristotle,[6] and rendered popular by Cicero when -speaking of the _recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, -constans, sempiterna_; of rights not drawn from the Twelve Tables or -from the pretorian Edict, but _ex intima philosophia_; and of rights -that on the other hand are _varie et ad tempus descriptae populis,_ -whence they have the name of laws _favore magis quam re._[7] - -This rough distinction between natural and positive, absolute and -relative rights; this concept of an ideal right placed face to face -with real rights, or of which the real should be an imperfect and -partial translation, also reappears in St. Thomas Aquinas and in other -scholastics. And there is nothing more than this in those thinkers who -founded what was called natural rights in the seventeenth century, -such as Grotius and his followers. It is true that the boast of having -distinguished rights from morality and religion has usually been -attributed to that historical period. But it is hardly necessary to -repeat that what was meant by these formulæ were the great social and -political questions which took the form of wars of religion in the -Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; that so-called -distinction, therefore, the result of long strife, though it have great -practical value as a sign of social transformation, has no doctrinal -value. The idea of autonomy, proper to the juridical activity, is -absent even in the profound treatise of Vico on universal rights, for -this contains only an altogether empirical distinction between _virtus_ -and _justitia_; of these the first _cum cupiditate pugnai,_ and the -second _utilitates dirigit et exaequat;_ and both derive their origin -from the _vis veri_ or _ratio humana;_ and as all the virtues are -connected and none of them can exist alone (_nulla virtus solitaria_), -so _virtus_ and _justitia_ are at bottom one.[8] The work of Vico, -which gives a new conception of the relation between ideal and history -and most original applications of Roman history, turns out to be -nothing but Ethic, when considered beneath the aspect of Philosophy of -Rights. Nor on the other hand could the problem of the nature of rights -truly form the object of enquiry on the part of utilitarians (Hobbes -and others); with whom, if the absorption of rights in morality was not -found, this did not arise because the one was distinguished from the -other, but because morality itself was denied in what was proper to -itself: the problem of the distinction disappeared, because its terms -disappeared. - -[Sidenote: _Thomas and his followers._] - -II. Thomas provided the apple of discord, or as might also be said, -cast the leaven of progress into the treatment of rights, when -he distinguished three forms of the _rectum_: the _justum,_ the -_honestum,_ the _decorum,_ placing the first in opposition to the other -two, the _forum externum_ to the _internum,_ and attributing to rights -and justice the character of coercibility.[9] The formula had a rapid -and unsuspected fortune, and became current in the schools. Gundling, -for instance, defined right as the "ordering of external relations."[10] - -[Sidenote: _Kant and Fichte._] - -It was completely developed and reasoned out, with all the strictness -that its erroneity permitted, in the doctrines of Kant and Fichte, who -were the greatest of Thomas's scholars for this part of the study. -Kant opposed _legality_ to morality; the juridical imperative is -expressed with the formula, "act externally" (_handle äusserlich_); -right is conjoined with the faculty of compulsion (_zwingen._) Hence -his doctrines are often amoralistic or economic as regards individual -juridical institutions, and this is especially the case when he deals -with the State, with matrimony, and with punishment; these were -followed by Fichte, who made some reservations for matrimony alone, -considering it an institution not only juridical, but also natural -and moral.[11] On the other hand rights were for Kant something that -surpassed the individual will and utility; it was the sum of the -conditions by means of which the will of the one can be united with -the will of another, according to a universal law of liberty.[12] -Fichte in like manner conceived of rights as altogether free of every -admixture of morality; as an objective order, arising from the fact -of the individual who coherently affirms himself and his own liberty, -thus also affirming other individuals and their liberty.[13] Both -philosophers thus preserve the moralistic concept of the legal and -the _justum_; rights, although armed with compelling power, are never -force alone, but the external ordering of freedom, namely, justice. -For this reason, Kant explicitly excludes force, in so far as it is -constitutive of rights and speaks of a "force without law"; and both -he and Fichte make coercibility to flow, not from the nature of the -volitional force itself, but from the violation of order. It is just, -says Kant, to repel force with force, when it would interfere with -liberty. The right of coercion (repeats Fichte) is founded solely upon -the violation of the original right. But it remains obscure what this -poor legality, justice, coexistence, and harmony of wills may be; -what force may be and why and how it is connected with the preceding -definition is not investigated. The distinction of the juridical from -the moral sphere is announced and proclaimed more loudly than perhaps -was ever done before or since; but to announce and to proclaim is not -to carry out. If rights be changed into an ordinance more or less -rational, to be identified with the concept of justice, one does not -see how they can exist independently of morality. Kant and Fichte -were prevented from conceiving the juridical function free from every -element of morality or immorality, by the function which they assigned -to compulsion (symbol of law), submitting it to ethical exigencies. -In this uncertainty, there cannot be wanting and there is not wanting -the thought that rights are not indeed an eternal category, but a -historical and transitory fact; and as Spinoza had already said, _si -cum humana natura ita comparatum esset ut homines id quod maxime utile -est maxime cuperent, nulla esset opus arte ad concordiam et fidem_; -Fichte thus looked upon the juridical State simply as a _State of -necessity_ opposed to the _State of reason_: and when perfection has -been attained and there is complete accord of all in the common end, -"the State" (he said) "disappears as a legislative and compulsive -force."[14] - -In the ulterior phase of his thought, Fichte _Hegel_ afterwards took -further steps toward a closer union between morality and rights. But -the complete resolution of the first in the second is effected in the -system of Hegel, though it is customary to blame this philosopher for -the opposite fault, namely, that he resolves morality in right. Above -all, Hegel would hear nothing of the concept of force in right: facts -of force and of violence, as, for instance, the relation between a -slave and his master, appertain, according to him, to a circle, which -lies on this side of right, to the subjective spirit, to a world in -which wrong can still be right. The fact that violence and tyranny are -met with in positive rights is an accidental thing and does not affect -its real nature. For Hegel, as for his predecessors, co-operation -arises only as reaction from the violation of what is just, and is -violence preservative of liberty, suppression of the previous violence. -"To define abstract and rigorous rights as law which we can be -compelled to obey, means" (writes Hegel) "to see them as a consequence -of what takes place only by the cross road of wrong." But there is -more: abstract rights, which form the first moment of the Philosophy -of the practical in Hegel, are unreal; he opposes to them the second -moment, morality, which also is abstract and unreal, consisting of the -good intention, which has not yet been incorporated in action and life: -thus concrete reality is realized only in the third moment, in the -ethos, which synthetizes the abstract rights and the abstract morality -of the intention in social life.[15] From this it is clear that the -purely juridical moment does not possess effective spiritual autonomy -for Hegel; _so_ much so, that it is placed by him upon the same plane -as abstract and unreal morality. In consequence of his identification -of rights with ethicity, Hegel is opposed to Kant and Fichte in his -definitions of single rights; he rejects the compulsory and contractual -theory of the State and (the Kantian) theory of matrimony as a strict -contract made between individuals as to the reciprocal use of their -bodies.[16] The compulsory theory of punishment seemed to him to reduce -the latter to a mere economic fact, by means of which "the State as -judging power, opens a business with goods called crimes exchangeable -for other goods, and the code is _the list of prices._"[17] - -[Sidenote: _Herbart and Schopenhauer._] - -Herbart too denies the originality of the character of compulsion -in the idea of rights, and this is one of his five practical ideas, -or, "the agreement of many wills, thought as a rule that eliminates -strife." But even in this superficial moralistic reduction, force -reappears all of a sudden, one knows not how: society has need of an -external bond, in order to subsist; force and power (_Macht_) are -added to society and _the State_ arises.[18] The same contradictions -are to be found in Schopenhauer: after he has posited the two virtues -of justice and benevolence, he makes a chapter of morality out of the -pure doctrine of law. The science of rights in the specific sense -borrows this chapter in order to study its opposite: all the limits -that morality looks upon as not to be passed without intention of -wrong-doing, on the contrary are considered by the science of rights -as limits, of which violation by others is not to be tolerated and -from which one has the right to expel others. Thus the distinction -between internal and external is in this way reproduced in all -its unmaintainability under the denomination of _rights and their -opposite._ But the bridge of asses is always the junction of rights -with force, that is to say, with the element extraneous to Ethic; and -in this connection Schopenhauer has nothing better to offer than a -comparison. "As there are certain chemical substances never to be found -pure and isolated, but always in some sort of combination with another -element, which gives to them the necessary consistency; so rights, when -they must set foot in the real world and dominate it, have need of a -small adjunct of will and force, in order to be able (notwithstanding -its nature, which is really ideal and therefore ethereal) to operate -and persist in this real and material world, without evaporating and -flying to heaven, as was the case with Hesiod."[19] - -[Sidenote: _Rosmini and others._] - -Rosmini presents the two elements not well harmonized, as the -eudæmonological and the ethical. Rights for him are not mere -eudæmonism, but a eudæmonistic fact, produced by moral right and -receiving form from it; hence the science of rights "stands between -Eudæmonology and Ethic, so that one of its ends extends to the one -and the other to the other." It would not be easy to explain and to -justify what he calls a mediate science, composed of Eudæmonology -and Ethic; and it would be far less easy to explain how this science -comes to be "completely distinct" as regards its components. If rights -have a moral form, they are moral and not eudæmonological. Owing to -this difficulty Rosmini was led to introduce the concept of the licit -as criterion of differentiation, defining right as "a personal faculty -and power of enjoying, acting and being able to act, a lawful good -that must not be impeded by others."[20] Juridically understood this -constitutes a tautology, ethically something worse. Other Catholic -authors (Taparelli, for example) deplore the separation of _ethos_ from -_jus,_ introduced (they say) by Protestant doctrines and the limitation -of right to what a man can externally exact from others according to -law; "whence it happens that in the enumeration of laws, actions are -sometimes posited that are real moral faults in the agent"; maintaining -on the contrary the necessity of treating morality and rights together, -"for rights are part of morality in the same way that trigonometry and -conic sections are a part of geometric theories."[21] - -[Sidenote: _Stahl, Ahrens, Trendelenburg._] - -III. If Catholic doctrines deserve mention for their conservativism, it -is necessary to record the names of Stahl, Ahrens, and Trendelenburg, -for no other reason than the great popularity that they enjoyed in -the schools. Stahl divides the ethical action of man into two domains, -differing in content and character. This dualism is founded upon the -double relation of human existence, individual and social, which gives -rise to two forms of imperatives: to the imperative of the individual -will, of religion, and of morality, and to that which aims at moulding -social life and is the imperative of rights. This theory, which has -a varied terminology, can be reduced to the theory of exteriority -(sociality, rights), and interiority (individuality, morality). In -a very similar way Ahrens includes law in the science of the good -or Ethic--the fundamental science. He remarks that good intention, -virtue, are not sufficient to secure to man that complex of material -and spiritual goods of which he has need, and therefore there must be -a second mode of effecting in the good, which what is of importance -would be, not the motives of the will, but the pursuit of the good and -its real existence in life. Trendelenburg (who regrets the classical -concept of the identity of Ethic and Law and looks upon the time -when they began to be distinguished as a beginning of degeneration) -discovers three sides to rights: the _logical,_ the _ethical,_ and -the _physical_ (compulsion),[22] of which none, as we see, is truly -judicial. - -[Sidenote: _Utilitarians._] - -For the reasons already indicated, it is not necessary to pause -over the juridical ideas of the utilitarians of the eighteenth and -nineteenth centuries, whose last celebrated representatives were, -in England, Bentham, Austin and Spencer. The German Kirchmann is to -be identified with the utilitarian tendency. He reduces morality to -the _respect_ inspired, not by the law, but by the _person_ of the -legislator, a respect afterwards converted into respect for the law -"owing to a peculiarity of human nature, as the result of long custom -and exercise." According to this view, rights are defined as "a union -of pleasure and morality, whether the first calls the second to its -aid or the second the first, in cases when the isolated efficacy of -either should prove insufficient." Thus rights are declared to be, not -an original principle, but the simple union of two different elements. -Jhering failed to surpass utilitarianism, notwithstanding his profound -juridical knowledge and his lively intellect. He attempted to impart -an original character to his utilitarian theory, by declaring that it -was _objective_ in respect to the usual utilitarian theories, but -he always remained under the obligation that he had undertaken, of -showing how the purest ideality of Ethic could be fortified with such, -a conception. The distinctions drawn by Jhering between recompense, -compulsion, duty, and love, since they lack a foundation, vacillate and -prove but little convincing.[23] - -[Sidenote: _Recent writers of treatises._] - -IV. Running rapidly through other recent philosophers of Rights, we -do not meet with original thoughts that compare with those of Kant, -of Fichte, and of Hegel. Lasson conceives of the philosophy of Rights -as a part of Ethic and co-ordinates with it three other parts--the -philosophy of custom, of morality or doctrine of the virtues and the -doctrine of the ethos or of the ethical personality. Rights are the -first of these three ethical moments and is concerned with the willing -of man as a willing still essentially natural; reason joins it as a -force essentially determining and limiting, at first only external; the -object of rights is to guarantee the conditions of the common life, in -so far as it is the condition for all human ends.--Steinthal recognizes -that rights undoubtedly "possess an exteriority altogether opposed to -the interiority of Ethic; hence, if they be not apprehended in their -profound nature, they may easily be repugnant to moral feeling": they -are "the system of modes of compulsion, by means of which are secured -social ethical ends." But (we repeat) since the external cannot be -separated from the internal, we do not see in what way ethical ends can -be distinguished from their modes of realization. Steinthal also says -that "Ethic is like a river and Rights like the bed of the river": a -comparison that can be variously interpreted, like all comparisons and -which for our part we should be disposed to find excellent, were it -admitted that as the bed of the river, when it runs dry, yet remains -always the bed of a possible river, so Rights can remain without Ethic -and yet be always Rights. But the signification in which Steinthal -employs that comparison is simply the same as the diad of external and -internal; that is to say, he in his turn wishes to distinguish the -indistinguishable, so that it would on the contrary be necessary to -reply that the bed of the river and the river are not two things but -one, because a river without a bed cannot exist and a bed without a -river is not the bed of a river.--Schuppe denies that Rights and the -State can claim what is immoral, but affirms that all the same they -are inferior to the exigencies of morality, because Rights and the -State concern individuals in their spatial-temporal concretion, but -do not attain to the profundity afforded by conscience in universal. -The ethical concept of rights preponderates in Wundt, for he does not -conceive of any other object of rights, subjective and objective, save -morality. Cohen, in like manner, does not admit other independence -to the science of rights save that, of writing in concepts, and of -organizing as a system of concepts the rights that is eternally -unwritten, the moral law.[24] - -As we see, if the names of the writers and sometimes their phraseology -change, the thoughts that alternate or combine are always the same. -Rümelin, who undertook to criticize a series of definitions of rights, -from that of Kant onwards, reproved Kant for having drawn too great a -distinction between rights and morality, and others (Ahrens, Stahl, -Trendelenburg) for having drawn too little. Finally, he gives his -definition in a provisional and tentative manner: "juridical ordinance -has the task of assuring to a people that part of the good adapted -for realization by a social force, according to universal norms." -Jellinek distinguishes the norms of rights from those of religion, of -ethicity and of custom, by a triple character: _(a)_ because they are -norms for the external conduct of men among themselves; _(b)_ because -they derive from a recognized external authority; _(c)_ because their -obligatoriness is guaranteed by external powers.--Stammler attaches -secondary importance to the element of compulsion, and although he does -not explicitly identify justice and morality, assigns to them the same -territory, where they should act with different methods, since the -perfectionment of the soul, the character and the thought are distinct -from right behaviour. And adopting the turn of phrase of a famous -proposition of the _Critique of Pure Reason,_ he ends by formulating -the following statement: "Justice without love is empty; compassion -without a right rule is blind." The Frenchman Duguit transports with -greater frankness the centre of rights into morality: he conceives of -rights as altogether different from force; not as _political,_ but -as _limit_ of force; as consciousness of human solidarity, beneath -whose rule we are all placed, State and individual, strong and weak, -governors and governed. French philosophers of rights generally oppose -the German school, in which the character of force is prominent, so -that French juridical philosophy sometimes assumes (for example, in -Fouillée) an attitude analogous to that assumed, as we know, by the -"generous" French economic school toward the English economists. And -merely that some Italian name should not be absent from this review of -recent writers, we will record Miraglia, who repeats the old Kantian -division, making it yet more empirical: "Morality and rights are part -of Ethic, because the good can be chiefly developed in the intimate -relations of the conscience, or on the contrary can be developed -by preference in the external relations between man and man and -between man and thing";--and Vanni, who mixes a little positivistic -evolutionism with this empirical reduction, affirming that rights are -not originally distinct from morality, but that afterwards they were -gradually differentiated, and rights now have the special function of -guardianship and guarantee: "that is to say, the ethical minimum alone -has been guaranteed, that much of the ethical field as is most directly -necessary for the maintenance of life in common, leaving to other -forces the task of regulating what is most individual in life." And so -on, though it seems that this is enough.[25] - -[Sidenote: _Strident contradictions. Stammler._] - -Such are the contradictions in which the Philosophy of rights has -struggled for about two centuries. Rights do not seem to be identical -with Ethic, but they also do not seem to be simply different; they -seem to be at once identical and different, but yet it has been found -impossible to fix the element of difference with the concepts of -external, of compulsion and others such. The thought of a difference -between the two forms of activity has not been further eliminated; -but neither has it been transformed and absorbed. This is a morbid -condition, of which the gravest symptom is the logical absurdity of -the aforesaid two rights and two justices. Rümelin talks of the pure -ideal justice, which selects from the evidence and judges on the basis -of immediate impressions of feeling; and of a realistic, rational, -empirical, disciplined and developed justice: two justices that must -however act together.[26] Others, seeking relations between those two -concepts from a single fact and failing to conquer the difficulty, -force logic by distinguishing between _concept_ and _ideal_ of rights, -or (as Vanni said) between _logical_ concept and concept of the -_rational exigencies_ of rights: as though a concept could be truly -logical, if it do not derive from rational exigencies, and as if these -can be valid, if they be not the concept itself. Worse still, Stammler -affirms the identity of rights with moral rights, and of rights alone -with immoral rights, arriving at the already criticized division of -effective rights (_Gesetzes_) into two classes. It "is either right -rights (_richtiges Recht_) or not; and right rights are effective, -whose content of will possesses the property of being _right._ Hence, -right rights stand to effective rights as _species to genus._"[27] -To meditate upon this plan of division is more than sufficient to -produce the conviction of the failure of the Philosophy of rights, as -it has been developed and as it could be developed with the practical -presuppositions hitherto admitted. As the result of the direction of -studies, from Thomas to the most recent, there remains nothing but -the problem itself, as originated by the definitions of Thomas, and -become certainly more acute and difficult, owing to later disputes and -inquiries, but never solved. - -[Sidenote: _The value of law._] - -V. Less attention has been bestowed upon the concept of _law,_ upon -which it was impossible to obtain full light, on the one hand before -the theory of abstract concepts had been developed (representative of -class) in their difference from the universal, and on the other before -preconceptions as to the necessary social and political character of -laws had been discarded. - -[Sidenote: _In antiquity._] - -But the difficulties contained in that concept had several times been -observed in antiquity. In a dialogue between Alcibiades and Pericles, -preserved in the _Memorabilia,_ it is asked if all laws be laws, or -only those that are just; and it is shown that it does not suffice -that a law should be a law, in order to ensure its observance.[28] -No true solution, however, was reached in this, as in many questions -discussed at this period by Greek philosophy. The _Crito_ is rather a -stupendous work of art than a philosophical thesis, for it shows to -the life the state of soul of Socrates, and the importance that he -attributed to the laws and to the social order: the reason alleged for -obedience to them, being placed in the fact that we have tacitly or -explicitly agreed to remain within the boundaries of a given state, -has in it something of the sophistical. Even in antiquity was seen the -necessity of tempering the rigidity of laws by means of the equable, -το ἐπιεικέç, which Aristotle defined as the correction of the law -where it sins through its character of generality (ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου ᾗ -ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου).[29] But it was not possible to escape from -empiricism by means of the concept of equity. The law sins, not once, -but always, through abstractness, or better, it never sins at all, -because its function resides precisely in that abstractness.--In modern -times Diderot felt and expressed all the gravity of the conflicts that -arise, alike from the observance and from the inobservance of the law, -and he expresses this in his _Entretien d'un père avec ses enfants sur -le danger de se mettre au-dessus des lois. "Mon père_ (remarks one -of the sons at the end of the dialogue), _c'est qu'à la rigueur il -n'y a pas de lois pour le sage.... Parlez plus bas.... Toutes étant -sujettes à des exceptions, c'est à lui qu'il appartient de juger des -cas où il faut s'y soumettre ou s'en affranchir.--Je ne serais pas trop -fâché_ (concludes the father), _qu'il y eût dans la ville un ou deux -citoyens, comme toi; mais je n'y habiterais pas, s'ils pensaient tous -de même._"[30] - -[Sidenote: _Romanticism._] - -The attitude of rebellion to the laws showed itself in German thought -and literature in the preromanticism of the _Sturm und Drang_ (for -instance in the _Räuber_ of Schiller), and in Romanticism properly -so called, when among others appeared the theories that limited the -State, such as those of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and theories of sexual -relations, such as those of Friedrich Schlegel. In the _Lucinde_ is -displayed great horror for _bourgeois_ customs and for every sort of -constraint, sexual relations being advocated with woman, family, love -and fidelity, but without matrimony. - -[Sidenote: _Jacobi._] - -Jacobi represents this attitude in several of his writings, with great -elevation of soul, and especially in the _Woldemar_ (1779, 1794-96), -the most lively protest that has ever been made against law in the name -of the individual. Here the question treated is precisely whether we -should follow the inspirations of our own conscience or the laws of -our own people. Sides are taken against "the compulsion and violence -exercised by usages, customs, habits, and against those who do not -think, save by means of those laws, holding them sacred, with resolute -soul and mind inert"; and "that audacious heroic spirit is celebrated, -which raises itself above the laws and common morality that it may -produce a new order of things." "His heart alone tells man immediately -what is good; his heart alone, his instincts only, can tell him -immediately: to love it is his life. Reflection teaches him to know and -to practise what leads to good. Habit assures and makes his the wisdom -that he has acquired." "But this individual initiative," he observes, -"may be the cause of abuse and misunderstandings." "Without doubt," -replied Jacobi, "but what cannot be misunderstood has little meaning, -and what cannot be abused has but little force in use." Men may be -divided into two classes; the one exaggerates fear, the other hope and -courage. The former are circumspect, always in doubt, they fear the -truth because it may be misunderstood, they fear great qualities, lofty -virtue, because of the aberrations to which it may give rise; and they -have evil always before their eyes. The latter are the bold (who could -be called the irreflective in the Platonic sense) and they behave with -less exactitude; they are not so perplexed, they trust rather to the -voice of their heart than to any word from without; they build rather -upon courage than upon virtue, which generally keeps them waiting too -long. They sometimes ask themselves with Young: Is virtue then alone -baptized and are the passions pagan? "If," says Jacobi, "I must keep -to one of these classes, I choose the second." "Yes," he exclaims -elsewhere, opposing the abstractness of Kant,--"yes, I am atheist and -impious, yes, I will to lie, in opposition to the will that wills -nothing, as Desdemona lied when dying, I will to lie and to deceive -like Pylades, when he slew himself for the sake of Orestes; I will to -slay like Timoleon; to break laws and oaths like Epaminondas and John -de Witt; to commit suicide like Otho; to despoil the temple like David; -to pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath day, if only because I am hungry -and the law is made for man, not man for the law. By the sacrosanct -conscience that I have within me, I know that the _privilegium -aggratiandi_ for such crimes against the pure letter of the law, -rational, absolute and universal, is the sovran right of man himself, -the seal of his dignity, of his divine nature."[31] But it must be -remarked upon reading these effusions (most sincere, as all that came -from the pen of Jacobi), that they are rather manifestations of states -of the soul than theories, and therefore, strictly speaking, not to be -theoretically censured, as is the case with all affirmations that place -in relief one side of reality, without denying the others by doing so. - -[Sidenote: _Hegel._] - -Hegel discovered this, observing in relation to our last extract: -"Neither of the two sides can be wanting to moral beauty, neither -its liveliness as individuality, by which it does not obey the -dead concept, nor the form of concept and of law, universality and -objectivity, which is the side exclusively considered by Kant, by means -of the absolute abstraction to which he submitted liveliness, thereby -suffocating it. The passage cited as to the liveliness and freedom -of the moral life does not exclude objectivity, but does not express -it either." Hence the danger of the romantic attitude, which had no -need of exhortations such as those of Jacobi, for it already too much -preferred _magnanimous_ to _honest, noble_ to _moral_ action; and was -much inclined to free itself of the law itself under the pretext of -freeing itself from the _letter_ of the law. Meeting empirical with -empirical observations, Hegel also remarked that the examples of the -violation of laws due to the divine majesty of man, adduced by Jacobi, -were conditioned by the natural temperament, by actual situations, and -especially by circumstances of supreme misfortune, of supreme and rare -necessity, in which few individuals find themselves. "It would be very -sad for liberty if it could only prove its majesty and become actual -in extraordinary cases of cruel laceration of the moral and natural -life and in extraordinary individuals. The ancients, on the other hand, -found the highest morality in the life of a well-ordered State." Hegel -admitted that the affirmation of Jacobi, "The law is made for man, not -man for the law," contained a great truth, when it was intended to -allude in this way to the positive or statutory law. But the opposite -was also true, when the allusion was to the moral law, taken as -universal, outside of which, when the individual was separated from it, -there was nothing but appetites and sensible impulses, which can only -be means for the law.[32] - -But we must not fail to recognize that Hegel does not avail himself of -this most exact distinction in his philosophy, for there the dominating -motive is respect for the laws and the tendency to attack individual -initiative. Hegel repeats many times with complacency the saying of -the Pythagorean, that the best way of educating a young man is to -make him citizen of a State ruled by good laws; and he remarks that -Herculeses belong to primitive and barbarous times, and that individual -valour has but a small field in times of culture. He was most averse -to criticism of and rebellion against the authority of the State; for -these did not seem to him to correspond to the reality of the spirit. -That surface is not the reality; at bottom all desire order; and it is -necessary to distinguish apparent political sentiment from that which -men really will, for within them they will the thing, but hesitate as -to particulars, and enjoy the vanity of censuring.[33] Men believe -that the State exists and that in it alone are particular interests -realized; but habit makes invisible to them that upon which our entire -existence depends. There is in short in Hegel, besides the philosopher, -a politician and moralist regretful of the excesses of revolutionaries -and of unbridled romanticism; and there is also in him the desire for -an exact inquiry into the function and limits of positive law.[34] - -[Sidenote: _Recent doctrines._] - -In recent times there have been many and very various manifestations -connected with the concept of this function and of its limits, and -it would occupy much space to enumerate and to illustrate them all. -We shall mention three, very distant and different. The first, which -belongs to the political and social field, is the doctrine of anarchy -and is opposed to laws of all sorts; it is a not purely philosophical -doctrine, though it involves philosophical questions.[35] The other -two, which more properly belong to the juridical field, are, the -assertion of the importance of laws and of the duty of defending their -existence, even where their violation by others does not interfere -with our individual interests, or when their defence costs individual -sacrifices (this was the argument of a vigorous little book by -Jhering);[36]--and by way of contrast the demand for a free creation of -the law by the judge (_die freie Rechtsfindung,_) which has given rise -to discussions that are yet burning, more directly provoked by a little -book of Kantorowicz (Gnaeus Flavius).[37] - -[Sidenote: _Natural rights and their dissolution. The historical school -of rights._] - -VI. If then there has not been a great gain in clearness of -fundamental concepts, as regards this part of the subject, there has on -the contrary been an indubitable advance in consciousness acquired as -to the mutability of laws and as to the consequent contradictoriness of -the idea of natural Rights. This, with its complement, the catalogue -of innate natural and inalienable rights of man, had great success in -the seventeenth century for political and social reasons, attaining -its highest development in the century following. But it may be said -that the doctrine of innate rights was liquidated by Kant in the -_Metaphysic of Custom,_ when he wrote the proposition that liberty is -the only original and innate rights, which belong to man through his -very humanity,[38] at the very moment when it was most energetically -affirmed in a practical form in the _Declaration of the Rights of -Man._ In the system of Hegel the constructions of natural rights began -to lose their rigidity; becoming indeed historical categories of -Ethicity or _Sittlichkeit,_ determinations of the spirits of various -peoples (_Volksgeister,_) which are in their turn determinations of -the Absolute or of the Idea. Owing to this view (without taking into -account his error of wishing to philosophize and to make dialectical -what is historical and empirical), Hegel connected himself closely -with the historical school of rights (Hugo, Savigny, etc.). This, -notwithstanding the exaggeration by which he seemed to deny the value -of the ideal demands made of rights, had the merit of shaking the old -conception of natural rights. This has retained its place in treatises -from that time onward in a more or less worm-eaten and unstable -condition by the force of inertia; or it has been preserved by Catholic -writers (by Rosmini not less than by the Padre Taparelli), whose -conception is of necessity but little historical; or it has reappeared -in those curious Catholics and anti-historians, the positivists -(Spencer, Ardigò). But that natural rights are nothing but _new_ -historical rights in the struggle of their becoming, is a conviction -that has penetrated the general consciousness. - -[Sidenote: _The comparison between rights and language._] - -We also owe to the historical school the comparison between the -life of rights and the life of language; this was prepared by the -discoveries of comparative linguistic, which although substantially -correct, yet had, as we have observed, the defect of limiting itself -to the _grammatical_ form of both facts, not to their genuine and -direct reality. Jacobi, in the already quoted effusions of _Woldemar,_ -had recourse to the same comparison, for other reasons and with a -more exact understanding of its terms; speaking there of the moral -infraction of laws, he wrote: "For such exceptions, for such _licences -of lofty poetry,_ the grammar of virtue has no definite rules and -therefore does not mention them No grammar, least of all the general -and philosophical, could contain in itself all that appertains to a -living language, and teach how, in every epoch, every dialect must be -formed. But it would be unwise to affirm that every one may speak as -they feel inclined." And again, "Virtue is free art; and as artistic -genius gives laws to art by its creations, so moral genius gives laws -to human conduct: just, good, noble, excellent, is what the just, good, -noble, and excellent man practises, achieves and produces in conformity -with his character; he _invents virtue,_ procures and generates -adequate expression for human dignity."[39] - -[Sidenote: _The concept of law, and the studies of comparative Rights -and of the general Doctrine of Rights._] - -VII. The study of the concept of law is also progressing, and -henceforth is not confined to so-called juridical laws and to -legislations and codes. Researches into primitive rights and into -those of savage and barbarous peoples, known as juridical Ethnography -or comparative rights, have greatly contributed to destroy many -prejudices; as also the attention that has been directed to facts -called social, that is to say, not strictly political. A school that -has had independent yet partly similar manifestations in England -(Austin, Sumner Maine, etc.) and in Germany, where it has taken -the name of school of _the general Doctrine of Rights (allgemeine -Rechtslehre,_ according to the denomination given to it by Adolph -Merkel), studies in particular the concept of law in its various -classes and subclasses; and from it there cannot but issue a more -correct understanding of the concept of law, as from the refinement -of political Economy into pure Economy has come, first Psychology and -then the Philosophy of economy. Meanwhile (and as far as we know) -the literature of the school, dominated as it is by the needs of -jurisprudence, maintains an empirical or _intellectualistic_ character; -and jurists, rather than philosophers themselves, are those that most -cultivate it. The distinctions and sub-distinctions of the laws are -conducted with subtlety, but are without solid foundation, because the -concept posited as basis of law is uncertain and arbitrary. Limiting -ourselves to a single example, let us mention Bierling, perhaps the -most philosophical of those various writers. Bierling first of all -excludes from the concept of law the modes of man's conduct toward -God, toward himself, and toward animals; but he gives no serious -reason for this. He then arrives, by a mere arbitrary act, at the -limiting of the concept of law to the manner of men's conduct among -themselves, and defines rights in the juridical sense (as he calls it: -"in general, all that men living together in any sort of community -reciprocally recognize as a norm and rule of this living together"). He -then introduces into the concept thus defined, not by deduction, but -as the result of a second arbitrary act, the concept of exteriority, -adding that, "the object of law is a definite _external_ procedure -of man toward man."[40] In all this is evident the bad influence of -jurisprudence and of its empirical preoccupations. - -[Sidenote: _legalism and moral casuistic._] - -VIII. Ethical legalism became a bitter question for Christianity, -precisely because of the contest between lofty Christian morality and -its legalitarian form, chiefly inherited from Judaism. In the ancient -world there is almost no trace of the question, just because the -struggle was never acute.[41] Hence the difficulties debated among the -patristics and the scholastics as to derogability from divine laws -and the consequent distinctions between a perfect and an imperfect -moral life, between precepts and counsels; and as recourse is had to -precedents in judicial questions, so here with these ethical problems -concerning exceptions made by God to the moral law, to the precepts -of the Bible (where some were not beautiful).[42] The practical needs -of confession give origin to books on casuistic, of which collections -exist dating from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The -Reformation manifested aversion to these treatises: Luther said that -moral theologians had first extinguished in men the fear of God and had -then placed soft cushions beneath their hands and feet; and Melanchthon -lamented that the Christian Republic was honoured _theologastrorum -sententiis de conscientiae casiobus, inestricabilibus, ubi nunquam -non ex quaestione quaestio nascitur,_ and called them _conscientiarum -cauteria._[43] - -[Sidenote: _Probabilitism and Jesuitic morality._] - -The inconclusiveness of legalism was converted into a most powerful -poison by the Jesuits, with their _probabilitism,_ of which precursors -were not wanting in the Middle Ages, but it received definite form -from the Dominican Bartolomeo Medina in 1577. From that time onward -probabilitism began to be surrounded with a copious literature, which -continually increased in the course of the seventeenth century, to -decline in the century following. The opposition originated by the -Jansenists, whose capital literary document, the _Provinciales_ of -Pascal also dates from the seventeenth century (1656), was the period -of the greatest vigour of the doctrine. But if the most perfect -and most Christian moral conscience dwelt in the Jansenists and in -Pascal and if the absurd consequences to which probabilitism led -became clearly evident in that polemic, yet it cannot be said that -philosophically the error was finally superseded. Ere this could have -happened, it would have been necessary, on the one hand to destroy -all possibility of theological utilitarianism (which was impossible -to carry out in a religious and transcendental Ethic, owing to its -mystical and irrationalistic character) and on the other to destroy -legalism. Pascal himself (and St. Augustine, to whom he appeals) was -always confined in the legislative conception of morality; hence -he speaks of the laws of "not slaying," which it was necessary to -obey strictly, save in the cases established by God or when he gives -particular orders to put certain persons to death. The Catholic -Church, always astutely political, condemned without hesitation the -extreme _rigorists,_ who wish that the law should always be followed -and the extreme _latitudinarians,_ who think that any sort of -reasons, however slight and improbable, suffice for not observing the -law; allowing intermediate sects to discuss among themselves until -they were out of breath, that is to say, _the moderate rigorists, -the probabiliorists or tutiorists, the equiprobabilitists and the -probabilitists._ Sant Alfonso dei Liguori adhered to these last, who -were of opinion that it is always permissible to do what we wish, -provided always that there be probable reasons, though less probable -than those that militate in favour of the law. In his _Dissertatio de -usu moderato opinionis probabilis,_[44] he thus exposed the principal -argument of his thesis: _Peto ab adversariis ut indicent (si possunt) -tibinam legem hanc esse scriptam invenerint, quod teneamur inter -opiniones probabiles probabiliores sequi? Haec lex quidem, prout -universalis, deberet omnibus esse nota et certa: at quomodo ista lex -certa dici potest, cum communis sententia doctorum, saltem longe major -illorum pars, post tantum discrimen absolute asserant, hanc legem non -adesse? Usque dum igitur de tali lege dubitatum, opinio quod adsit haec -lex sequendi probabiliora, quamvis alicui videatur probabilior, nunquam -tamen lex dici potest, sed appellanda erit mera opinio, utpote ex -fallibili motivo deducta, quae vim nequaquam habet, ut lex, obligandi._ -This doctrine still retains in our day very firm supporters among the -Jesuits (Cathrein,[45] Lehmkuhl,[46] etc.). - -[Sidenote: _Critique of the concept of the licit._] - -But if the destruction of theological utilitarianism has been brought -about by the criticism of the transcendental and by idealistic Ethic, -that of legalism, with its expression as the licit, the permissible, -or morally indifferent, appears in Fichte and in Schleiermacher. Kant -did not treat the question explicitly and, as observed, we can deduce -from certain of his utterances that he did not altogether abandon the -concept of the licit.[47] - -[Sidenote: _Fichte._] - -But Fichte, in a note to his _Natural Rights,_ wrote: "A right is -evidently something of which a man can avail himself or not; and -is therefore the result of a law that is merely permissive. ... -The permission is not expressly given by the law and is deduced by -interpretation from its limitation. And the limitation of a law -is shown by the fact of its being something conditioned. It is not -absolutely apparent, therefore, that a permissive law which commands in -an unconditioned manner and therefore extends to all, can be deduced -from the moral law."[48] - -[Sidenote: _Schleiermacher._] - -What was a mere mention in Fichte became an ample demonstration in the -celebrated memoir of Schleiermacher, _On the Concept of the Licit_ -(1826), which resolutely drove the licit out of the field of Ethic, -by demonstrating its altogether juridical nature: "The original seat -of this concept cannot be the domain of Ethic, in which it is not -admissible: it appertains to the domain of law and of positive law; and -there is something originally licit in civil life, precisely in this -sense that there is something half-way between what is commanded and -what is forbidden, the proper object of law."[49] - -[Sidenote: _Rosmini._] - -Rosmini, owing to having ignored this origin of the lawful, proceeded -to divide human actions into four classes: the prohibited, the -licit, the commanded, and the superogatory; the last three were all -innocent, but the licit was simply innocent, while the commanded and -the superogatory were also furnished with moral value. Hence arose -grave errors in his Ethic and in his Philosophy of law and definitions -that it is impossible to grasp, such as the following relating to -superogatory actions: "The obligatory consists in preserving the moral -order, but the superogatory consists in preserving the said order in -a more excellent and perfect manner, with fuller, more frequent, and -more ardent acts of the will. These second not only preserve the moral -order, but augment it, almost creating a part of it themselves with -their activity; they make themselves not only followers of the good, -but authors of the good itself." Rosmini also considered that the -posing of the question of probabilitism represented progress in Ethic; -that is, upon "what man should do, if he found himself in doubt as -to performing or omitting to perform an action." But the solution of -the question that he gave on his account amounted (be it said to his -honour) to the annihilation of legalism, since for him a doubtful law -does not oblige when it is positive Rights, but it does oblige when -it is moral law, that is, when there is a fear of offending against -the supreme and necessary law, which wills absolutely to be always -fulfilled.[50] In other terms, the true practical law is never (even -when it appears to be so) positive law; and the concept of law, which -always has a positive meaning, is extraneous to Ethic and to the -Philosophy of the practical: a result to which Rosmini does not attain, -or at least is not conscious of attaining. - - - -[1] See above, pp. 286, 287. - -[2] _Krit. d. rein. Vern._ (ed. Kirchmann), p. 572. - -[3] Lasson, _System der Rechtsphilosophie_ (Berlin, 1882), p. 2. - -[4] _Gorgias,_ 476-478. - -[5] _Eth. Nicom._ 3, v. c. 1-2. - -[6] _Ibid._ v. c. 7, 9; _Magna Moralia,_ i. c. 34. - -[7] _De repudi,_ iii. c. 22; _De legibus,_ ii. c. 5. - -[8] _De imo univ. jur. princ._ §§41, 43, 86. - -[9] _Fundamenta juris nat. et gentium_ (1705). - -[10] Windelband, _Geschichte d. Phil._ p. 424. - -[11] _Gründl. d. Naturr._ (1796), append., sect. I. - -[12] _Metaphys. d. Sitten,_ 1797 (ed. Kirchmann), pp. 31-35. - -[13] _Gründl, d. Naturr._ pt. i. sect. 1. - -[14] Spinoza, _Tract, pol._ c. 6, § 3; Fichte, _System d. Sittenlehre,_ -§ 18 _in fine._ - -[15] _Phil. d. Rechts,_ passim, concerning force and violence, §§ 3, -57, 94. - -[16] _Op. cit._§ 158, _sqq._ 161, 258. - -[17] _Werke,_ I., p. 371. - -[18] _Allg. prakt. Phil._ pp. 48, 126-128. - -[19] _Werke,_ i. 441-445; cf. v. 259-260. - -[20] _Fil. d. diritto_ (Napoli, 1844), i. 20-21, 88-89, 94-97. - -[21] _Saggio teor. d. dir. nat._ (Palermo, 1857), _in princ._ - -[22] Stahl, _Rechts-u. Staatslehre_² (Heidelberg, 1845), b. ii. ch. I; -Ahrens, _Naturr._ (It. tr., Napoli, 1860), i. 219 _sq._; Trendelenburg, -_Naturrecht auf d. Grunde d. Ethik_ (Leipzig, 1860). - -[23] Kirchmann, _Begr. d. Rechtes u. d. Moral_² (Berlin, 1873), pp. -107114; see Jhering, _Der Zweck i. Reckt_ (i.2, 1883; ii.3, 1886). - -[24] Lasson, _op. cit.;_ Steinthal, _Allg. Ethik_ (Berlin, 1885), pp. -135-8; Schuppe, _Ethik u. Rechtsphil._ (Breslau, 1881), pp. 283-4; -Wundt, _Ethik_² (Stuttgart, 1892),.p. 565 _sq._; Cohen, _Ethik d. -reinen Willens_ (Berlin, 1904), p. 567. - -[25] Rümelin, _Reden u. Aufsätze,_ new series (Freiburg i. B., 1881), -p. 342; Jellinek, _Allgemeine Staatslehre_ (Berlin, 1900), p. 302 -_sq.;_ Stammler, _Lehre v. richtig. Rechte_ (Berlin, 1902); Duguit, -_L'État, le droit objectif et la loi positive_ (Paris, 1901); Fouillée, -_L'Idée moderne du droit en Allem., en Angl. et en France_ (Paris, -1876); Miraglia, _Fil. d. dir._ (Napoli, 1903), p. 80; Vanni, _Lez. d. -fil. d. dir._ (Bologna, 1904), pp. 113-114. - -[26] Rümelin, _op. cit._ pp. 176-202. Cp. Lasson, p. 215 _sq._ - -[27] _Op. cit._ p. 22. Cf. Bergbohm, _Jurisprudenz u. -Rechtsphilosophie_ (Leipzig, 1892), i. 141-147 _n._ - -[28] _Mem._ i. 2. 40 _sq._ - -[29] _Eth. Nicom._ Bk. v, c. II. - -[30] _Œuvres,_ edit. Assézat et Tourneux, v. (Paris, Gamier, 1875), pp. -307-8. - -[31] _Woldemar,_ passim. - -[32] _Werke,_ i. 52 _sq.;_ xvi. 21 _sq._ - -[33] _Phil. d. Rechts,_ sect. II. _passim;_ cf. pp. 150, 153. - -[34] _Op. cit._ § 268, _Zus._ - -[35] An ample exposition of such doctrines is to be found in E. -Zoccoli, _De Anarchia,_ Turin, 1907. - -[36] _La Lotta pel diritto,_ It. tr., Milan, 1875. - -[37] _La Lotta per la scienza del diritto_ (It. tr., Palermo, 1908); -cf. _Critica,_ vi. pp. 199-201. - -[38] _Metaphys. d. Sitt._ p. 40. - -[39] _Woldemar,_ pp. in, 416, and _passim._ - -[40] Bierling, _Juristische Prinzipienlehre_ (Freiburg i. B., 1894-98, -2 vols.). - -[41] Sidgwick, _History of Ethics,_ London, 1892, p. III _sq._ - -[42] A. Bonucci, _La derogabilità del diritto naturale nella -Scolastica,_ Perugia, 1906. - -[43] Hist. remarks in dissert., _De casuisticae theologiae originibus, -locis atque praestantia_ (together with De Ligorio, _Theol. mor.,_ ed. -cit., pp. xxiv-lxxvi). - -[44] In _Theol. mor._ i. 10-24. - -[45] Cathrein, _Moralphilosophie, 4_ i. 428-437. - -[46] _Probabilismus vindicatus_ (Freiburg, Bk. i., 1906). - -[47] See above, p. 405; cf. also _Krit. d. rein. Vern._ pp. 10-11 _n._ - -[48] _Gründl. d. Naturr._ introd. § iii. _n._ - -[49] _Werke,_ sect, iii., vol. ii., pp. 418-445; cf. G. Mayer, _Die -Lehre vom Erlaubten in der Gesch. d. Ethik seit Schleiermacher,_ -Leipzig, 1899. - - -[50] _Compendio di Etica,_ pp. 48, 96, 284-285. - - - - -CONCLUSION - - -[Sidenote: _The Philosophy of the Spirit as the whole of Philosophy._] - -With the Philosophy of the practical terminates the exposition that -we had proposed to give of the Philosophy of the Spirit; and the -exposition of the whole of Philosophy also terminates, because the -Spirit is the whole of Reality. - -Here at the end, this proposition has no need of such proof or -verification as is customary in calculation. Because the proof -of Philosophy is intrinsic to it and consists of the reciprocal -confronting of the development of thought and its demands, between -the System and Logic. And Logic, as we know, if it be in a certain -sense the whole of Philosophy (philosophy in brief or in idea or in -potentiality), is also a part among the parts of the philosophical -system; so that the confrontation of the System and of Logic, of -thought in act and thought in idea, between thought and the thought -of thought, has been continuously present and active in the course of -the exposition, and the coincidence of the two processes and their -confluence into one has been clearly demonstrated. - -[Sidenote: _Correspondence between Logic and System._] - -Logic affirms the thinkability of the real and the inconceivability -of any limit that could be put to thought, of every excogitation of -the unknowable. And Philosophy, examining every part of the real, -has not found any place in which to lodge the unknowable in thought. -Logic posits as the ideal of the concept, that it should be universal -and not general, concrete and not abstract; that it should be pure -of intuitions such as those of mathematics and differ from them in -being necessary and not conventional; fruitful in intuitions like -those of the empirical sciences, but differing from them by its -infinite fecundity which dominates every possible manifestation of -the real. And the system has effectively shown that this desideratum -of Logic is not a chimæra and that the Spirit is indeed that concept -which corresponds to the ideal of the concept: there is nothing that -is not a manifestation of the Spirit (an effectual manifestation, -not conventional or metaphorical). Logic, rejecting all dualism or -pluralism, wills that the philosophical concept shall be a unique -concept or of the One, and does not suffer heterogeneous concepts -at its side. And the system has confirmed that the concept of the -Spirit alone fulfils the logical condition of the concept; and that -the concept of Nature, far from being a concept of something real, is -the hypostasis of a manner of elaborating reality, not philosophical -but practical; thus the concept itself of Nature, in so far as it is -effectual, is nothing but the product of a function of the Spirit. - -On the other hand, the Logic of the idea of the concept deduces -that it must be a synthesis of itself and of its opposite. For its -opposite, far from being heterogeneous and different, is flesh of the -flesh and blood of the blood of the concept itself, as negation is of -affirmation. And the system has led us before the Spirit or Reality as -development, which is the true reality of the real and synthesis of -opposites. Logic deduces that the concept is synthesis of itself and -of the distinct from itself, of the universal and of the individual, -and that therefore Philosophy must flow into History, and mediate its -comprehension. And the system shows the capacity of its principles for -interpreting the complex reality of History, and above all the history -of philosophy itself, by solving its problems. Logic does not admit -other distinctions of the concept than those that are the outcome -of its own nature, such as the relations of subject-object and of -individual-universal; and the system has confirmed these distinctions, -duplicating itself as Philosophy of knowledge and Philosophy of action, -of theory and of practice; subdividing itself as to the first, into -Æsthetic and Logic; as to the second, into Economic and Ethic. And -since the demand of the concept has been entirely satisfied, when these -divisions have been exhausted, we have not found the possibility of new -subdivisions, for example into various æsthetic or into various ethical -categories among the particular sub-forms of the Spirit. - -[Sidenote: _Dissatisfaction at the end of every system, and its -irrational motive._] - -Some are seized as with a sense of dissatisfaction and delusion when -they arrive at the end of the philosophical system and at the result -that there is no reality save the Spirit and no other Philosophy save -the Philosophy of the Spirit; and they do not wish to resign themselves -to accepting that and nothing else as Reality, although obliged to do -so by logical necessity. A world beyond which there is no other seems -to them poor indeed; an immanent Spirit, trammelled and far inferior -by comparison with a transcendental Spirit, an omnipotent God outside -the world; a Reality penetrable by thought, less poetical than one -surrounded with mystery; the vague and indeterminate, more beautiful -than the precise and determined. But we know that they are involved in -a psychological illusion, similar to his who should dream of an art -so sublime that every work of art really existing would by comparison -appear contemptible; and the dreamer of this turbid dream, should not -succeed in achieving a single verse. Impotent are those poets most -refined; impotent those insatiable philosophers. - -[Sidenote: _Rational motive: the inexhaustibility of Life and of -Philosophy._] - -But precisely because we know the genesis of their psychological -illusion, we know that there is in it (and there could not fail to be) -an element of truth. The infinite, inexhaustible by the thought of -the individual, is Reality itself, which ever creates new forms; Life -is the true mystery, not because impenetrable by thought, but because -thought penetrates it to the infinite with power equal to its own. And -since every moment, however beautiful, would become ugly, were we to -dwell in it, so would life become ugly, were it ever to linger in one -of its contingent forms. And because Philosophy, not less than Art, is -conditioned by Life, so no particular philosophical system can ever -contain in itself all the philosophable; no philosophical system is -_definite,_ because Life itself is never _definite._ A philosophical -system solves a group of problems historically given and prepares the -conditions for the posing of other problems, that is, of new systems. -Thus it has always been and thus it will always be. - -In such a sense, Truth is always surrounded with mystery, an ascending -to ever higher heights, which are without a summit, as Life is without -a summit. At the end of one of his researches every philosopher just -perceives the uncertain outlines of another, which he himself, or he -who comes after him, will achieve. And with this _modesty,_ which is of -the nature of things themselves, not my personal sentiment; with this -modesty, which is also confidence that I have not thought in vain, I -bring my work to a conclusion, offering it to the well disposed as an -_instrument of labour._ - - -THE END - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Philosophy of the Practical: -Economic and Ethic, by Benedetto Croce - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL *** - -***** This file should be named 54938-0.txt or 54938-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/4/9/3/54938/ - -Produced by Marc D'Hooghe at Free Literature (online soon -in an extended version, also linking to free sources for -education worldwide ... 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